Folder 7. MR 210 Moscow Conference (1)  
Sec. 2. 29 October–7 November 1943.
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

8 November 1943

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, Moscow

For Ambassador Harriman from the President.
My 041707, your 08100.

You are hereby authorized to attach our agreement regarding
Turkey to the protocol with the following change.

Change the words "Commanders responsible" to the words "Combined
Chiefs of Staff."

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1647, EWT, 8 November 1943.

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.
SECRET

PRESIDENT TO HARRIMAN

My 041707, your 06100.

You are hereby authorized to attach our agreement regarding Turkey to the protocol with the following change.

Change the words "Commanders responsible" to the words "Combined Chiefs of Staff."

ROOSEVELT
Present to Airwrmam
from NE R & Co you
are hereby authorized to
attach an agreement regarding
Turkey to the protocol
with the following change.
"commanders responsible" to
its words "Combined chiefs
of staff."

Fred B. Formen

May 04, 1907
your 06/100
From: The President
To: Ambassador Harriman

Ref.: Opnav 041707, Alusna, Moscow 06100.

Subject to the following change you are authorized to attach to the protocol our agreement with respect to Turkey.

The words "Combined Chiefs of Staff" shall be substituted for "Commander Responsible".
**NAVAL MESSAGE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>EXTENSION NUMBER</th>
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<th>PRECEDENCE</th>
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<td>FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW</td>
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**INFORMATION FOR ACTION**

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

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<td>CORRECTED TEXT</td>
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HICOM

Ø22357 RECEIVED AFTER DEPARTURE SECRETARY HULL.

REFER AMBASS HARRIMAN MSG ZERO TWO GIVING HULLS ITINERARY. YOUR MSG BACK TO YOU FOR ACTION.

<table>
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<th>NAVIADE ACTION</th>
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<td>FILE....</td>
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SECRET
SECRET
PRIORITY

FROM: 

TO: ALBEN, MOSCOW

PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN FROM THE PRESIDENT.

SUBJECT TO THE CONDITION THAT NO BRITISH OR AMERICAN RESOURCES

WILL BE COMMITTED TO THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AREA WHICH IN THE

OPINION OF THE COMMANDERS RESPONSIBLE ARE NECESSARY FOR OVERLORD

OR FOR OPERATIONS IN ITALY, THIS GOVERNMENT AGREES TO JOIN GREAT

BRITAIN AND SOVIET IN MAKING IMMEDIATE DEMAND ON TURKEY FOR USE OF

AIR BASES AND LATER PRESSING TURKEY TO ENTER THE WAR BEFORE THE END

OF THE YEAR.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1240, EST, 4 November 1943.

[Signature]

GEORGE M. ELSEY,
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

SECRET

- 1 -
November 4, 1943.

SECRET
PRESIDENT TO HARRIMAN:

This government agrees to join Great Britain and Soviet in making immediate demand on Turkey for use of air bases and later pressing Turkey to enter the war before the end of the year. Subject to the following: No British or American resources will be committed to the Eastern Mediterranean area which in the opinion of the commanders responsible are necessary for OVERLORD or for operations in Italy.

[Signature]

See PM 407.
From the President

To Secretary

White House

Washington

Yours 02.23.26

Acknowledged
4 November 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL SEXTON

The President desires that the attached message be sent to Secretary Hull. This is the message referred to in our telephone conversation this afternoon.

BOYCE P. PRICE,
Captain, C. E.
PERSONAL FOR SECRETARY HULL FROM THE PRESIDENT.

YOUR O22226, ACKNOWLEDGED.

ROOSEVELT
SECRET

PRIORITY

FROM: WAR DEPARTMENT
TO: PERSIAN GULF SERVICE COMMAND, TEHERAN, IRAN. #1757
      UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST, CAIRO, EGYPT. # 7723

FOR THE EYES OF SECRETARY HULL ONLY FROM THE PRESIDENT.

(DECIDE BALANCE OF MESSAGE ONLY RPT ONLY IF ABLE TO DELIVER TO HULL.
ADVICE CRYPTO WAR OF ACTION TAKEN AND IF DELIVERED)

SINCE YOUR DEPARTURE IS DELAYED AGAIN, WHICH I AM SORRY TO HEAR, I
FIGURE THAT BY GOING DIRECTLY THROUGH YOU CAN ARRIVE AT AN ATLANTIC
COAST HARBOR BY THE THIRTEENTH. I SHALL WAIT FOR YOU UNTIL THE FOUR-
TEENTH, EVEN THOUGH THE CHANGES AT THIS END ARE DIFFICULT.

IN THE EVENT THAT YOU ARE HELD UP BY BAD WEATHER, I THINK YOU
HAD BETTER WAIT FOR ME IN CAIRO AND LATER JOIN ME IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD
OF ALGIERS FOR A FEW DAYS.

AS CHURCHILL IS BEING KEPT WAITING FOR FINAL PLANS, PLEASE LET
ME KNOW.

BY THE TWENTY-FIFTH WE EXPECT CHIANG KAI-SHEK TO BE IN THE
NEIGHBORHOOD OF CAIRO.

YOU MIGHT ASK STALIN, IF YOU HAVE THE TIME AND OPPORTUNITY,
WHETHER HE WOULD CONSIDER FLYING FROM TEHERAN TO BASRA FOR EVEN ONE
DAY AND WE WOULD HOPE THAT A MILITARY GROUP AND MOLOTOV COULD BE WITH
US FOR A LONGER PERIOD.

WITH THE USUAL SMALL EXCEPTIONS, THE NEWSPAPERS HERE ARE GREETING
YOUR RESULTS WITH THE UTMOST ENTHUSIASM.

BEST REGARDS.

ROOSEVELT.

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1750, EST, 2 November 1943.

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.
PERSONAL AND SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT TO SECRETARY HULL.

I am sorry that your departure is again delayed but I figure that by going straight through you can get to an Atlantic coast harbor by the 13th. Even though the changes at this end are difficult, I will wait for you until the 14th.

If, however, you get held up by unexpected weather, I think you had better wait for me in Cairo and later join me for a day or two in neighborhood of Algiers.

Please let me know as I am keeping Churchill waiting to tell him final plans.

The Generalissimo will be in neighborhood of Cairo by the 25th.

If you have time before leaving Moscow, you might ask the Marshal if he would consider flying from Teheran to Basra for even one day, and we would hope Molotov and a military group could be with us longer.

All the papers here, with the usual small exceptions, are most enthusiastic about your results.

Warmest regards.

ROOSEVELT.

Released from the White House Map Room

at 1677 EWT, 2 November 1943.

L. MATHERSON,
Colonel, General Staff.
YOUR 302236 (NCR 9158) WAS DELIVERED AT 1440/31.
SECRET
URGENT
30 October 1943

From: OPNAV
To: ALUSNA, MOSCOW

Personal and secret for the Secretary of State only from the President.

I find I can postpone departure till evening of eleventh or morning of twelfth and I think this is much better than your staying in North Africa all that time. I can probably meet you at your landing port.

I will wire Churchill to postpone everything two days.

I will want Harriman and General Deane and Bohlen to join me in North Africa or Cairo.

Your work has been grand.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1815, EST, 30 October 1943.

GEORGE M. ELSEY,
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>NAVAL MESSAGE</th>
<th>NAVY DEPARTMENT</th>
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**INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.**

**RC12/1**

**UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.**

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**TEXT**

YOUR 302234 (NCR 9157) WAS DELIVERED AT 1440/31/

*PRA....ACTION*
From: Opnav

To: Alusna, Moscow

Please report delivery of my 302232 and 302236 to ultimate addressee.

Released from the White House Map Room at 1820, EWT, 30 Oct 43.

George M. Eisey
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: RADIO CORP MOSCOW

RELEASED BY:

DATE: 1 NOV 1943

TOR CODE ROOM:

DECODED BY:

PARAPHRASED BY:

FOR ACTION:

ADDRESS:

INFORMATION:

Urgent
Routine
Deferred
Priority
Routine
Deferred

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

RC10/1

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

DATE

TIME

GCT

TEXT

YOUR 302232 (NCR 9156) WAS DELIVERED AT 1140/31.

ACTION

SEALLED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVRECS.)
FROM: Opan
To: Alusna, Moscow

Personal and secret for Secretary Hull only from the President.

Alusna Moscow 301042.

I am very much surprised about Molotov's misunderstanding of my message of October 24 relative to disposition of Italian naval ships and merchant ships. I meant to convey that I was in favor of the request of the Russian Government for the use of these ships. The only proviso I made was that the Italian ships which were turned over to our respective countries would be used to prosecute the war against our enemies and that final determination of what would become of these ships would be made at the peace conference.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1800, EWT, 30 October 1943.

GEORGE M. ELIOT
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
From: The President
To: The Secretary of State
(Moscow)
No: Opnav 302232 NCR 9156

Molotov's misunderstanding of my message of October 24 regarding disposition of Italian naval ships and merchant ships surprises me very much. What I meant to convey was that I was in favor of the request of the Russian government for the use of these ships. I made the one proviso that final determination of what would become of the ships turned over to our respective countries would be made at the peace conference and that in the meantime they would be used to prosecute the war against our enemies.

ROOSEVELT
From: Opnav
To: Alusna, Moscow

Personal and secret for Ambassador Harriman from the President.

My Alusna Moscow 302232, 310051 and 310349 to the Secretary of State.

In case the above messages failed to reach Moscow prior to Hull's departure I wish you would handle as indicated. I consider it extremely important that this matter be clarified.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1125, EWT, 31 Oct 43.

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>PRESIDENT</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN, MOSCOW</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>311545 NCR 9217</td>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>31 Oct 43</td>
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>Disposition of Italian ships.</td>
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**ACTION**

Written by Colonel Mathewson. Hopkins saw and OK's; phoned to President at Hyde Park by Hopkins. President approved.

Paraphrased copy of this message, together with the references, sent to State Department.

**COPIES TO:**

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<tr>
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<th>DATE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Department</td>
<td>31 Oct 43</td>
<td>Mr. Hopkins.</td>
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</table>

**ACTION COMPLETED:**

**FILED:** 31 Oct 43
SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MATTHEWS

The attached messages from the President to the Secretary of State, dated October 30, and from the President to Ambassador Harriman, dated October 31, are forwarded for your information.

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.

4 IncIps.

Pres-Harriman 31545 NCR 9217
Pres-Sec State 310349 " 9204
Pres-Sec State 310051 " 9193
Pres-Sec State 302232 " 9156.

SECRET
- 1 -
From: The President
To: Ambassador Harriman
No: Opnav 311545, MCR 9217

I wish you would handle as indicated the messages listed below in case they failed to reach Moscow before Hull departed. It is extremely important that this matter be clarified.

My messages to the Secretary of State Opnav No's 302232, 310051, and 310349.

ROOSEVELT
NC26 (SERVICE MESSAGE) DN WASHNDC=
DN5/31STOCT PC US ORGEN USNAVAL ATTACHE MOSCOW DO DQ DQ310349
ROWON FPNZG ETC MSGE DLED FIRST NOVEMBER 0830 MOSCOW TIME

[Signature]

= MOSCOW PER RCA C NYK.

REFERS TO NCR 9204 ROWON

NCR/RS......
SECRET

30 October 1943

SECRET
URGENT

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, Moscow

Personal and secret for the Secretary of State only from the President.

Tell Molotov I am sorry the staff telegram about the Italian ships was not clear. All I want is that the ships be used for whatever is the most useful war purpose. I hope the Soviet can use their third, and I see no reason why they should not do so. Personally, I think that after the war the Italian tonnage should be distributed equitably for the permanent use of the allies. In the meantime, it ought to be used by the three nations. This is certainly not a time to delay in the use of this tonnage by the three nations. This is what we intended to convey in the staff telegram which I regret was not more clear.

ROOSEVELT

Delivered 01/0130 EWT

Released from the White House Map Room at 2300 EWT 30 October 1943.

Owen C. Kniffin
Captain CE

SECRET
30 October 1943

From: The President
To: The Secretary of State
(Moscow)
No: Opnav 510549, NCR 9204.

Inform Molotov I am sorry the staff telegram regarding Italian ships was not clear. That the ships be used for whatever is the most useful war purpose is all I want. I hope the U.S.S.R. can use their third, and I don't see why they shouldn't do so. Personally, after the war I think the Italian shipping should be equitably distributed for the permanent use of the Allies. It should be used by the three nations in the meantime. Now is certainly no time to delay in the use of this tonnage by the three nations. I regret the staff telegram wasn't clearer as this is what we intended to convey.

ROOSEVELT
30 October 1943

SECRET
URGENT

From: Opnav

To: Alusna, Moscow

Personal and secret for the Secretary of State only from the President.

My 302232.

Final disposition of all Italian ships should apply to those used by British and Americans as well as to those used by Russians.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 2020 EWT 30 October 1943

[Signature]
ODEN KNIFFIN
Captain CE
From: The President
To: The Secretary of State,
    (Moscow).
No: Opnav 510061, NCR 9193

Reference my 302252.

Final disposition to be made of all Italian ships should apply to those used by British and Americans as well as to those used by Russians.

ROOSEVELT
**NAVAL MESSAGE**

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**ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSES**

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**FOR ACTION**

| CNO   |

**INFORMATION**

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE

| Ø10934  | NCR 4509 |

**ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME**

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ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

**HICOM 3Ø2232 RECEIVED 31Ø9Ø DELIVERED 3111ØØ.**

**HICOM 3Ø2236 RECEIVED 31233Ø DELIVERED Ø1Ø7ØØ.**

**SEALED SECRET**

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR 18
SECRET
PRIORITY

FROM: WAR DEPARTMENT

TO: PERSIAN GULF SERVICE COMMAND, TEHERAN, IRAN. #1762
U.S. ARMY FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST, CAIRO. #7099

30 OCTOBER 1943

FOR THE EYES OF SECRETARY HULL ONLY FROM THE PRESIDENT.

(DECIDE BALANCE OF MESSAGE ONLY RPT ONLY IF ABLE TO DELIVER TO
HULL. ADVISE CRYPTO WAR OF ACTION TAKEN AND IF DELIVERED)

I AM WIRING CHURCHILL TO POSTPONE EVERYTHING TWO DAYS. I HAVE
FONND THAT I CAN DELAY DEPARTURE UNTIL EVENING OF ELEVENTH OR MORNING
OF TWELFTH AND I THINK THIS IS MUCH BETTER THAN YOUR STAYING IN NORTH
AFRICA ALL THAT TIME. I CAN PROBABLY MEET YOU AT YOUR LANDING PORT.

I SHALL WANT GENERAL DRAKE AND ROHLEN AND AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
TO JOIN ME IN CAIRO OR NORTH AFRICA.

DELIGHTED WITH RESULTS OF YOUR WORK.

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1840, EST, 30 October 1943.

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.
MEMORANDUM FOR ADmiral BROWN:

I thought of sending the following right away to Mr. Hull in Moscow, if you think it O.K. If so, send off immediately. Otherwise, telephone me at Hyde Park.

"Because of your postponed departure, I am getting worried about our meeting. Please consider the possibility of waiting in North Africa until I get there. This need not be decided until Monday or Tuesday at the latest. It is really important that we meet.

"In any event, if there is any doubt about your getting here in time, I hope you will leave Mr. Charles Bohlen and Mr. Frederick Reinhardt in North Africa in order that I may take them with me on my travels.

"Aside from you and your staff, I think Harriman and General Deane should meet me. The time and place of this can be decided later."

ROOSEVELT
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

Joint Chiefs of Staff
October 29, 1943

MILATTACHÉ AMBASSADY
MOSCOW, RUSSIA

Number 798

For Deane Moscow Russia, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In further reference to that part of your message number 7 pertaining to interchange weather information the following is supplemental to instructions sent you on October 26, 1943. "Exchange of meteorological liaison officers for coordination technical details and arrangements for distribution weather codes and ciphers desirable when agreements for general exchange weather information completed."

ORIGINATOR: JCS (CAPT ROYAL USN)

INFORMATION: OGD
GEN ARNOLD
ADM KING
SGT

CM-OUT-13551 (29 OCT 43) 2322Z vo

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MSG, 1-4-74
By BRF, ELS, Date

APR 24 1974

COPY NO. 14

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

10-T-4
MILATTACHE AMBASSADE
MOSCOW, RUSSIA

Number 797

This is from Marshall to Deane reference your 24 October 28

For your information, in case the message to Mr. Eden from the Prime Minister did not cover part 4 which was Eisenhower comments on Alexander's message, a paraphrase of part 4 expressing Eisenhower's views follows. Begin paraphrase the very accurate picture of the present tactical situation as given by General Alexander in the preceding paragraphs is not wholly in line with my understanding of the availability of landing craft and estimates of our buildup therefor. So far our buildup has at least equalled our estimates and the only changes in the allocations of landing craft made at the Quebec Conference have been in our favor.

To prevent the enemy from seizing the initiative and prematurely forcing us on the defensive permitting his withdrawal of divisions from our front in time to oppose OVERLORD, it is essential that we retain the initiative until the time for mounting OVERLORD approaches. It makes little difference what happens to us if OVERLORD is a success. The more divisions used by the enemy in a counteroffensive against us, if we are able to keep him on his heels until early spring, the better it will be for OVERLORD.

The following paragraphs set forth my opinion of the line of action promising the most successful accomplishment of our objective (1) a thrust launched by the 8th Army to the Southwest up the valley of the Pescara after seizing the high ground north of Pescara and Pescara River to capture important points along the line of Roviano-Avezzano-Popolii and from the east to threaten Rome. The maneuver to capture the high ground north of Pescara must, to reasonably insure success, be assisted by a force of approximately an infantry brigade group requiring the use of landing craft in a seaborne attack around the enemy's east flank.

ON-OUT-13223 (29 Oct 43)
(2) with the thrust to the southwest from Pescara by the 8th Army there will be timed a frontal attack to the north on Rome by the 5th Army combined with an airborne and amphibious attack northwest of Rome. This maneuver to be successful will require a force of at least an infantry division with some armor in an amphibious assault which should be launched as soon as the landing craft can be brought around. Landing craft is the governing factor. It is certain that more landing craft, the exact requirements for which are now being worked out in detail, will for a limited time be required if we are to avoid a costly series of slow painful frontal attacks to capture Rome.

ORIGINATOR: OPD

INFORMATION: GENERAL ARNOLD
              ADMIRAL KING
              JCS (Capt. Royal USN)
              LOG

CM-OUT-13223 (29 Oct 43)  2043Z mje
PERSONAL AND FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN.

I DELIVERED PERSONALLY YOUR MESSAGE CONCERNING TURKEY TO
MOLOTOV IN THE FORM OF A LETTER. MOLOTOV EXPRESSED THE
HIGHEST SATISFACTION AT ITS CONTENTS AND OFFERED NO OBJEC-
TION WHATSOEVER TO THE PROVIDO WHICH IT CONTAINED.

HE PROPOSED THAT YOUR AGREEMENT AS EXPRESSED IN MY LETTER
BE ATTACHED TO THE PROTOCOL CONCERNING TURKEY WHICH HE
AND EDEN HAD SIGNED, THE TEXT OF WHICH I HAVE ALREADY
CABLED YOU, AND THAT THESE TWO DOCUMENTS BE MADE A PART
OF THE MOST SECRET SEPARATE MILITARY RECORD OF THE CON-
FERENCE. HIS ANXIETY TO HAVE THIS AGREEMENT PART OF
THE ACTION OF THE CONFERENCE IS I BELIEVE DUE TO THE FACT
THAT HE IS PERSONALLY UNDER SOME CRITICISM BY THE SOVIET
MILITARY AUTHORITIES FOR NOT OBTAINING ACTION ON THIS
MATTER AT THE CONFERENCE. I SEE NO OBJECTION TO HIS
PROPOSAL AND ASK THAT YOU AUTHORIZE ME TO PUT IT INTO
EFFECT. HE DISCUSSED THE ABOVE WITH THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR
WHO IS CABLED EDEN FOR SIMILAR AUTHORIZATION

(*) TIME/DATE/GROUP AS RECEIVED.
Your message about Turkey was handed over in the form of a letter by me personally to Molotov. He expressed great satisfaction with it and the proviso caused no objection whatsoever. Molotov proposed that your agreement be attached to the protocol already signed by him and Eden and that these two documents be made part of the Conference's most secret separate military record. I believe his interest in having the agreement a part of the action of the conference is due to criticism of him by Soviet military men for his failure to obtain Conference action on the matter. I ask that you authorize me to effect his proposal, since I see no objection to it. The British ambassador is cabling for similar authorization from Eden.
PART ONE:  Ø41410  NCR 7598
PART TWO:  Ø51413  NCR 7243
PART THREE: Ø51417  NCR 7373
PART FOUR:  Ø51425  NCR 7470
PART FIVE:  Ø51438  NCR 7489

(PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN.)

NOW THAT I HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO TAKE A LONG BREATH I THOUGHT YOU WOULD WANT FROM ME A REVIEW OF THE MORE IMPORTANT IMPRESSIONS OF THE SOVIET ATTITUDE WE GOT IN AND OUTSIDE OF THE CONFERENCE ROOM. CERTAIN OF THE DOUBTS WHICH SOME PEOPLE HAVE HAD REGARDING SOVIET INTENTIONS ARE NOW LAID TO REST. ON THE OTHER HAND THE CHARACTER OF CERTAIN REAL DIFFICULTIES THAT EXIST HAS BEEN MORE SHARPLY DEFINED.

(1) THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT BEFORE THEY AGREED TO THE CONFERENCE HAD EVIDENTLY DECIDED THAT THEY WOULD TAKE A SHOT AT WORKING TOGETHER WITH THE BRITISH AND OURSELVES IN DEALING WITH WAR AND POSTWAR PROBLEMS. ON THE WHOLE THE SOVIETS ARE DELIGHTED
WITH THE WAY THE CONFERENCE WENT AND IT HAS STRENGTHENED THEIR TENTATIVE DECISION. IT WAS INTERESTING TO WATCH HOW MOLOTOV EXPANDED AS THE DAYS PASSED. AS HE BEGAN TO REALIZE MORE AND MORE THAT WE HAD NOT COME WITH A UNITED FRONT AGAINST HIM AND WERE READY TO EXPOSE FRANKLY OUR PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS, HE SHOWED INCREASING ENJOYMENT IN BEING ADMITTED FOR THE FIRST TIME INTO THE COUNCILS AS A FULL MEMBER WITH THE BRITISH AND OURSELVES. BEFORE THE CONFERENCE I DOUBT IF THEY HAD ANY INTENTION OF ALLOWING THE INCLUSION OF CHINA AS AN ORIGINAL SIGNATORY OF THE FOUR NATION DECLARATION. THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF CHINA IS A CLEAR INDICATION THAT THEY ARE GENUINELY SATISFIED WITH THE WAY THINGS WENT AND ARE READY TO MAKE IMPORTANT CONCESSIONS TO FURTHER THE NEW INTIMACY. ON THE OTHER HAND IT CANNOT BE ASSUMED THAT THIS POLICY IS ALREADY SO SET THAT WE CAN TAKE LIBERTIES WITH THEM.

(2) THEY WERE UNQUESTIONABLY CHAGRINED BY THE BRITISH AND OUR ATTITUDE RE TURKEY AND TO A LESSER EXTENT REGARDING SWEDEN.
EDEN'S FINAL UNDERSTANDING WITH THEM ON TURKEY HELPED TO OFFSET THEIR EARLY DISAPPOINTMENT BUT THEY ARE EXPECTANTLY HOPEFUL THAT WE WILL JOIN IN THIS AGREEMENT AT AN EARLY DATE. I AM CONVINCED, HOWEVER, THAT ONLY TURKEY'S ENTRY INTO THE WAR WILL SATISFY THEM. WITHOUT COMING TO MOSCOW IT IS HARD TO APPRECIATE HOW DIFFERENTLY THEY VIEW THE WAR FROM THE BRITISH AND OURSELVES.

THE RUSSIANS HAVE THE PRIMITIVE VIEW THAT THEY HAVE SUFFERED AND BLED TO DESTROY HITLER AND SEE NO REASON WHY THE TURKS SHOULD NOT DO THE SAME IF IT CAN HELP SHORTEN THE WAR. THEY HONESTLY BELIEVE THAT THE ENTRY OF TURKEY WILL FORCE THE GERMANS TO MOVE A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF DIVISIONS FROM THE EASTERN FRONT. IN POSING THIS DEMAND THEY ARE ENTIRELY INDIFFERENT TO ANY MORAL OR ACTUAL OBLIGATION TO ASSIST THE TURKS IN FIGHTING THE GERMANS. OUR ATTITUDE IN THIS REGARD IS INEXPLICABLE TO THEM. THE RUSSIANS FEEL THAT ONLY IF THE TURKS ACTIVELY FIGHT AGAINST GERMANY NOW ARE THEY ENTITLED TO ANY CONSIDERATION IN THE POST-WAR SCHEME OF THINGS. TO A SOMEWHAT MODIFIED DEGREE THEY FEEL THE SAME WAY ABOUT THE SWEDES. IN ADDITION TO THE MILITARY VALUE OF THE ENTRY OF THESE COUNTRIES INTO THE WAR, THEY BELIEVE THAT CLOSING IN ON GERMANY FROM ALL SIDES WILL HASTEN THE DETRIMENTATION OF ENEM. SEALLED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
THE EARLY MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE SHIPS WAS A DISAPPOINTMENT, THEY FEEL ALL RIGHT ABOUT IT NOW, PROVIDED SOME DEFINITE CONCLUSION IS REACHED IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE ABOVE WERE THE ONLY MATTERS OF IMPORTANCE NOT CONCLUDED IN PRINCIPLE TO THEIR SATISFACTION. (YOUR CABLE ACCEPTING THE SOVIET PROPOSAL REGARDING TURKEY HAS ARRIVED JUST AS I WAS DISPATCHING THIS MESSAGE TO YOU, AND WILL, I KNOW, BE TREMENDOUSLY WELL RECEIVED.

(3) THE SOVIETS ACCEPTED THE EXPLANATION OF OUR MILITARY PLANS BUT OUR WHOLE PERMANENT RELATIONS DEPEND IN A LARGE MEASURE ON THEIR SATISFACTION IN THE FUTURE WITH OUR MILITARY OPERATIONS, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO OVER-EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE THEY PLACE STRATEGICALLY ON THE INITIATION OF THE SO-CALLED "SECOND FRONT" NEXT SPRING. AN INVITATION TO THE NEXT MILITARY CONFERENCE IS, I BELIEVE, ESSENTIAL IF THE SEEDS SOWN AT THIS CONFERENCE ARE TO GERMENATE. IT IS CLEAR THEY NEVER LIKE TO BE FACED WITH ANGLO-AMERICAN DECISIONS ALREADY TAKEN. IF THEY ARE ASKED TO THE CONFERENCE THEY WILL EXPECT TO PARTICIPATE DURING THE CONSULTATIVE STAGE, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THIS WILL BE TO SOME EXTENT A NUISANCE AND TIME CONSUMING, BUT FROM THE LONG VIEW IT WILL BE, IN MY JUDGEMENT, WELL WORTHWHILE. IT IS IMPORTANT TO INVITE MOLOTOV AS WELL AS THE MILITARY STAFF.
His position as second to Stalin is more apparent than on my previous visits. A subsequent brief meeting with Stalin himself is still of the highest importance, and I feel that every effort should be continued to find a way to bring this about. I expect to cable you further on this subject. It would be helpful in this connection if you could inform me of your decision regarding the invitation to the military conference.

NOTE: One of the parts of this dispatch, apparently delayed in transmission, has not been received at the time this is being written. When received, it's proper sequence will be between page 5 and page 6. It will be written up as soon as received, and the pages will be numbered 5-A, 5-B, etc.

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Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVRECS.)
(4) THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARD GERMANY AS REVEALED AT THE CONFERENCE IS FUNDAMENTALLY SATISFACTORY. THERE IS OF COURSE NO DOUBT THAT THEY ARE BENT IN THE COMPLETE DESTRUCTION OF HITLER AND NAZISM. THEY ARE READY TO DEAL WITH GERMANY ON THE BASIS OF A THREE-WAY RESPONSIBILITY. OUR DIFFICULTIES WITH THEM, IF ANY, WILL BE THAT THEIR PRESENT INTENT GERMANY IS TOUGHER THAN WE HAVE IN MIND, PARTICULARLY IN REGARD TO THE MAGNITUDE OF REPARATIONS. THEIR MEASURE OF GERMANY'S CAPACITY TO PAY REPARATIONS IN GOODS AND SERVICES APPEARS TO BE BASED ON THE CONCEPT THAT THE GERMANS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO A POSTWAR STANDARD OF LIVING HIGHER THAN THE RUSSIANS. THEY DEFINITELY DID NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ENFORCED DISMEMBERMENT OF GERMANY AND ARE CERTAINLY DETERMINED TO MAKE SURE THAT THERE WILL BE NO MILITARY THREAT FROM THAT QUARTER IN ANY FORESEEABLE FUTURE. THEY CONVINCED ME THAT ANY PUBLIC REFERENCES COMING FROM MOSCOW OR FROM THE FREE GERMANY COMMITTEE SHOWING FRIENDLINESS TO THE GERMAN PEOPLE IS JUST PROPAGANDA TO WEAKEN GERMAN RESISTANCE.
THER FLIRTATION WITH THE FRENCH COMMITTEE APPEARS TO HAVE COOLED OFF AS A RESULT OF THEIR SATISFACTION WITH THEIR NEW INTIMACY WITH THE BRITISH AND OURSELVES. IT MAY OF COURSE BE REVIVED IF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THESE NEW RELATIONSHIPS IS NOT TO THEIR SATISFACTION.

NOTE: THIS IS PART 4 OF ALUSNA MOSCOW #51436. THE BALANCE OF THIS DISPATCH WAS ORIGINALLY DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE ABOVE D/T GROUP AND NCR NUMBER. PLEASE INSERT IN PROPER POSITION.
(6) Although Soviet territorial questions were never raised at the conference, it can only be inferred that the Soviet government expects to stand firmly on the position they have already taken in regard to their 1941 frontiers. I believe they have the impression that this has been tacitly accepted by the British, and the fact that we did not bring up the issue may have given them the impression that we would not raise serious objection in the future.

(7) The problem of Poland is even tougher than we believed; they regard the present Polish government-in-exile as hostile, and therefore completely unacceptable to them. They are determined to recognize only a Polish government that will be a wholeheartedly friendly neighbor. On the other hand, Molotov told me definitely that they were willing to have a strong independent Poland, giving expression to whatever social and political system the Polish people wanted. They gave us no indication during the conference that they were interested in the extension of the Soviet system. I take this with some reservation, particularly if it proves to be the only way they can get the kind of relationships they demand from their western border states.
THEY ARE DETERMINED TO HAVE NO SEMBLANCE OF THE OLD "Cordon Sanitaire" CONCEPT IN EASTERN EUROPE. MOLOTOV TOLD ME THAT THE RELATIONS THEY EXPECT TO ESTABLISH WITH THE BORDER COUNTRIES DID NOT PRECLUDE EQUALLY FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE BRITISH AND OURSELVES. IN THE CONFERENCE HOWEVER, IT WAS INDICATED THAT ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD KEEP US INFORMED THEY WOULD TAKE UNILATERAL ACTION IN RESPECT TO THESE COUNTRIES IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS SATISFACTORY TO THEMSELVES. IT IS MY FEELING THAT THIS RIGID ATTITUDE MAY WELL BE TEMPERED IN PROPORTION TO THEIR INCREASING CONFIDENCE IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE BRITISH AND OURSELVES IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF OVERALL WORLD SECURITY. ALTHOUGH FINLAND CAME UP ONLY INDIRECTLY IN OUR DISCUSSIONS, WE SENSED A BITTER AND UNCOMPROMISING ATTITUDE TOWARD HER. AS TO THE STATES WEST OF THE AREAS BORDERING ON THE SOVIET UNION, THEY APPEAR FULLY PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH THE BRITISH AND OURSELVES IN WORKING OUT PROBLEMS INVOLVED, PROVIDED THEY ARE GIVEN FULL PARTNERSHIP IN THE DECISIONS.

(8) THE DISCUSSIONS ON IRAN WERE ONLY ON A STAFF LEVEL. ONE NEVER GETS VERY FAR ON THIS LEVEL IN DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS. ALTHOUGH THEY ACCEPTED AN UNPUBLISHED RESOLUTION REAFFIRMING THEIR...
TEXT

FIDELITY TO THEIR TREATY OBLIGATIONS TOWARD IRAN, WE GOT NO CLARIFICATION OF THEIR REAL ATTITUDE. BECAUSE THIS SUBJECT WAS LEFT TO THE END, EDEN DECIDED NOT TO INSIST THAT IT BE THRASHED OUT IN THE MAIN CONFERENCE.

(9) I WILL LEAVE A REPORT ABOUT THE FAR EAST TILL I SEE YOU. AS FAR AS IT WENT, IT WAS ENTIRELY SATISFACTORY.

(10) I CANNOT LEAVE THIS REVIEW OF THE CONFERENCE WITHOUT SPEAKING OF THE SECRETARY. HIS DIGNITY AND DETERMINATION AND SINCERITY IN PRESENTING OUR ATTITUDE TOWARD THE PRESERVATION OF WORLD PEACE AND WORLD CONDITIONS COMPATIBLE WITH IT PROFOUNDLY IMPRESSED THE SOVIET OFFICIALS. I CANNOT OVER-EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION HIS PRESENCE MADE TOWARD THE FAVORABLE OUTCOME OF THE CONFERENCE.

(11) ANTHONY DID A FIRST CLASS JOB. HE SUPPORTED THE SECRETARY FAITHFULLY WHENEVER OCCASION REQUIRED. ISMAY AND DEANE WORKED AS A TEAM AND SO DID THE REST OF OUR DELEGATIONS.

(The END)
From: Averell Harriman.
To: The President.
No.: 051438, NCR 7489

I thought that you would want from me a review of the more important impressions of the Soviet attitude which we obtained inside and outside the conference room, now that I have had a chance to take a long breath. There have now been laid to rest certain of the doubts which some people have had regarding Soviet intentions. At the same time certain real difficulties that exist have been defined more sharply in character.

1. Before they agreed to the conference the Soviet Government had evidently decided that they would have a try at working together with the British and Americans in dealing with war and postwar problems. The way the conference went has, on the whole, delighted the Soviets and their tentative decision has been strengthened. As the days passed it was interesting to watch the way Molotov expanded. As the realization came to him more and more that we were ready to expose frankly our preliminary thoughts and had not come with a united front against him, he showed increasing joy in being admitted for the first time as a full member with the British and ourselves into the councils. Their acceptance of China indicates clearly that they are ready to make important concessions to further the new intimacy and are genuinely satisfied with the way things went. I doubt if before the conference they had any intention of allowing the inclusion of China as an original signatory of the Four Nation Declaration. It cannot be assumed, on the other hand, that this policy is so set that we can take liberties with them.

2. Without a doubt they were chagrined by the British and American
attitude on Turkey and to a lesser extent on Sweden. Their early dis-
appointment on Turkey was offset somewhat by Eden's final understanding
with them but they are expectantly hopeful that at an early date we will
join in this agreement. However I am convinced that the entry of Turkey
into the war is the only thing which will satisfy them. It is hard to
appreciate without coming to Moscow how different from the British and
ourselves is the Russian view of the war. They have the primitive view
that they have bled and suffered to destroy Hitler and if it will shorten
the war can see no reason why the Turks should not do the same. They really
believe that the Germans will be forced by the entry of Turkey to move a
considerable number of divisions from the Eastern front. In making this
demand they are entirely indifferent to any obligation, either moral or
actual, to assist the Turks, and cannot understand our attitude in this
regard. They feel that the Turks are not entitled to any consideration in
the postwar scheme of things unless they fight against the Germans now.
They feel the same about the Swedes to a lesser degree. They believe that
in addition to the military value of the entry of these countries into
the war, the deterioration of enemy morale will be hastened by closing
in on Germany from all sides. To them the early misunderstanding about the
ships was disappointing. Provided some definite conclusion is reached in
the near future, they now feel all right about it. The preceding were
the only two matters of importance not concluded in principle to their
satisfaction. (Just as I was sending this message to you your cable
accepting the Soviet proposal about Turkey arrived. It will be received
tremendously well).
3. The explanation of our military plans were accepted by the Soviet but in a large measure our whole permanent relations depend on their future satisfaction with our military operations. The importance they place strategically on the initiation of the so-called "Second Front" next spring cannot be over-emphasized. If the seed sown at this conference are to germinate, I believe that an invitation to the next military conference is essential. It is plain that they do not like to be faced with Anglo-American decisions which have already been taken. They will expect to participate during the consultative stage if they are invited to attend the conference. Obviously this will be to some extent time consuming and a nuisance but well worth-while, I believe, in the long run. An invitation to Molotov is as important as the military staff. It is more apparent than on my previous visits that he is second to Stalin. I feel that every effort should be made to bring about a subsequent brief meeting with Stalin as this is still of the highest importance. I expect to send you further messages on this subject. In this connection it would be helpful if you could inform me of your decision regarding the invitation to the military conference.

(Note: A part not yr* received is missing here)

6. It can only be inferred that the Soviet Government expects to stand firmly on the position it has already taken in regard to the 1941 frontiers although Soviet territorial questions were never raised at the conference. They have the impression, I believe, that this has been tacitly accepted by the British, and they may have the impression that we will not raise serious objection in the future since we did not bring up the issue.
7. The Polish problem is even tougher than we thought. The present Polish Government-in-Exile is regarded as hostile to them and therefore completely unacceptable. They are determined to recognize only a Polish Government that will be a whole-heartedly friendly neighbor. Molotov definitely told me, on the other hand, that they were willing to have a strong independent Poland which would give expressions to the political and social system desired by the Polish people. During the conference they gave us no indication that they were interested in the extension of the Soviet system. I take this with some reservation, particularly if the kind of relationship they demand from their western border states can be obtained in no other way. In Eastern Europe they are determined to have no semblance of the old "Cordon Sanitaire". I was advised by Molotov that the relations they expect to establish with the border countries did not preclude equally friendly relations with the Americans and British. Although they would keep us informed, it was indicated in the conference that they would take unilateral action in establishing relations satisfactory to themselves with these countries. I feel that their increasing confidence in their relations with the British and ourselves in the establishment of overall world security may well temper this rigid attitude proportionately. We sensed a bitter and uncompromising attitude toward Finland even though she came up only indirectly in our discussions. Provided they are given full partnership in the decisions they appear fully prepared to cooperate with the British and us in working out problems involved in the states west of the areas bordering on the Soviet Union.

8. The Iran decisions were only on a staff level. In dealing with the Soviet one never gets far on this level. We obtained no clarification
of their real attitude, although they accepted an unpublished resolution reaffirming their fidelity to their treaty obligations toward Iran. Eden
decided not to insist that this subject be thrashed out in the main con-
ference since it had been left till the end.

9. I will leave a report about the Far East until I see you. As
far as it went, it was entirely satisfactory.

10. This review of the conference cannot be left without mentioning
Mr. Hull. The Soviet officials were profoundly impressed by his dignity,
determination and sincerity in presenting our attitude toward the preser-
vation of world peace and world conditions compatible with it. The im-
portant contribution his presence made toward the favorable outcome of the
conference cannot be over-emphasized.

11. Eden did a first-class job. Whenever the occasion required he
supported the Secretary faithfully. Ismay and Beane as well as the rest
of our delegation worked as a team.
4. As revealed at the Conference, their attitude toward Germany is fundamentally satisfactory. They are bent in the complete destruction of Nazism and Hitler; of this there is no doubt. On the basis of a three-way responsibility they are ready to deal with Germany. Their present intent toward Germany is tougher than we have in mind, and our difficulties, if any, will be along that line. This is particularly true in regard to the magnitude of reparations. It appears they base their measure of Germany's ability to pay reparations in goods and services on the concept that the Germans are not entitled to a postwar standard of living higher than the Russians. The possibility of an enforced dismemberment of Germany was definitely not excluded by them and they are certainly determined to make sure there will be no threat militarily from that direction in any future foreseeable. I was convinced by them that any public references coming from the Free Germany Committee or Moscow showing friendliness to the German people is just propaganda to weaken German resistance.

5. As a result of their satisfaction with their new intimacy with the British and ourselves their flirtation with the French Committee appears to have cooled off. If the development of these new relationships is not to their satisfaction it may of course be revived.
This was answered by message to Rheine and Harriman 4 Nov.

Adam Brown says FElE
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<td>PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN.</td>
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<td>(PART TWO AND THREE OF ALUSNA MOSCOW'S $22307)</td>
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| ABOUT MIDNIGHT LAST NIGHT I TOOK THE PROTOCOL PAPERS OF THE CONFERENCE, PREVIOUSLY SIGNED BY MR. HULL, TO MOLOTOVS OFFICE WHERE HE AND EDEN THEN SIGNED. DURING THE DISCUSSION THAT FOLLOWED MOLOTOV EXPRESSED TO ME HIS SATISFACTION WITH THE UNDERSTANDING HE HAD REACHED WITH EDEN REGARDING TURKEY AND HOPED THAT WE WOULD AGREE TO MAKE IT TRIPARTITE. I TOLD HIM THAT MR. HULL HAD INFORMED YOU FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION OF THE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN HIMSELF AND EDEN. TONIGHT AT THE BALLET MOLOTOV ASKED ME WHETHER ANY WORD HAD BEEN RECEIVED FROM WASHINGTON ON THIS SUBJECT. I EXPLAINED OF COURSE THAT THERE HAD NOT YET BEEN TIME FOR A REPLY AND, IN ORDER TO BE RELIEVED OF DAILY PRESSURE FROM MOLOTOV I STATED THAT I DID NOT KNOW WHETHER YOU WOULD WISH TO EXPRESS AN OPINION UNTIL YOU HAD HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE MATTER IN DETAIL WITH MR. HULL. MOLOTOV SEEMED DISAPPOINTED THAT THERE SHOULD BE SUCH A LONG

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**SEAL**

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DELAY AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT A REPLY COULD BE GIVEN SOONER. THERE IS NO DOUBT THEY PLACE GREAT IMPORTANCE ON TURKEYS ENTRY INTO THE WAR AND HAVE BEEN UNIMPRESSIONED BY OUR REASONS FOR NOT BEING FAVORABLE TO IT. EDEN TOLD ME THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD APPROVED THE AGREEMENT REACHED WITH MOLOTOV AND THAT HE EXPECTED TO SEE THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER WITH A SENIOR STAFF OFFICER IN CAIRO ON THURSDAY. HE WOULD INSIST ON IMMEDIATE USE OF THE AIR BASES AND IF HE FOUND THE OPPORTUNITY WAS PROPITIOUS, HE MIGHT SOUND HIM OUT ON THE SUBJECT OF FULL ENTRY IN THE WAR. EDEN STATES THEY HAVE NO INTENTION OF GIVING THE TURKS ANY ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE BEYOND THE ARMS NOW BEING SHIPPED AND THE SMALL FIGHTER FORCE THEY EXPECT TO MOVE FROM THE MIDDLE EAST.

IF YOU ARE NOT PREPARED TO TAKE A DEFINITE POSITION ON THIS MATTER AT THE PRESENT TIME, I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN OUR RELATIONS IF YOU WERE TO INSTRUCT ME TO INFORM MOLOTOV OF THIS AND AN INDICATION OF THE TIME YOU WISH TO TAKE BEFORE REACHING A DECISION.

FILE...
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN.

PART 1 OF 022307.

REFERRING TO THE SECRETARY’S CABLE TO YOU 012215/MOLTOV AND EDEN INITIALED LAST NIGHT THEIR AGREEMENT REGARDING TURKEY SUBSTANTIALLY AS FOLLOWS, QUOTE:

IT IS AGREED BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARIES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED KINGDOM AS FOLLOWS:

(FOLLOWING THREE PARAGRAPHS GIVEN IN REVERSE ORDER)

THIRD: IT IS FURTHER AGREED THAT A REQUEST SHOULD IMMEDIATELY BE MADE OF TURKEY TO GIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ALL POSSIBLE AID BY PLACING AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE ALLIED FORCES TURKISH AIR BASES AND SUCH OTHER FACILITIES AS MAY BE AGREED UPON AS DESIRABLE BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS.

SECOND: IT IS AGREED BETWEEN THE TWO FOREIGN SECRETARIES THAT ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENTS IT SHOULD BE SUGGESTED TO TURKEY AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE, TO BE AGREED UPON BETWEEN THEM, THAT BEFORE THE END OF 1943 TURKEY SHOULD ENTER THE WAR.

(PAGE ONE OF TWO)
FIRST: IN ORDER THAT TURKEY MAY TAKE HER PART WITH
THE UNITED NATIONS IN HASTENING THE DEFEAT
OF HITLERITE GERMANY IN WHICH TURKEY AND OTHER
FREEDOM LOVING STATES ARE INTERESTED, THE TWO
FOREIGN SECRETARIES THINK IT MOST DESIRABLE
THAT TURKEY SHOULD ENTER THE WAR ON THE SIDE
OF THE UNITED NATIONS BEFORE THE END OF 1943.

UNQUOTE.
MOST SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY FROM HULL

A MESSAGE HAS BEEN GIVEN ME FROM THE PERSON HIGHEST IN AUTHORITY TO BE DELIVERED TO YOU PERSONALLY IN EXTREME SECRECY. THE MESSAGE PROMISES TO GET IN AND HELP TO DEFEAT THE ENEMY.

REMAINDER FOLLOWS IN ANOTHER CODE.
I HAVE ADVISED MOLOTOV THAT SYMPATHETIC CONSIDERATION IS BEING GIVEN IN WASHINGTON TO THE REQUEST OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT FOR CERTAIN ITALIAN NAVAL AND MERCHANT VESSELS, AND THAT AS A RESULT I BELIEVED THE MATTER COULD BE WORKED OUT TO THEIR SATISFACTION. I FURTHER INDICATED THAT I WOULD RECOMMEND THE MATTER BE CONCLUDED IN ALL OF ITS ASPECTS AS EARLY AS PRACTICABLE.

MR. EDEN HAD RECEIVED A CABLE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER FAVORING ACCEPTANCE OF THE REQUEST IN PRINCIPLE BUT RAISING A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS SUCH AS RESERVATION OF THE TWO LITTORIO CLASS BATTLESHIPS, RECONDITIONING THAT WOULD BE NECESSARY, AND THE ACTUAL USE TO WHICH THE SHIPS WOULD BE PUT.

CONSIDERING THE ABOVE AND THE FACT THAT MOLOTOV SEEMS
Satisfied for the present with our general replies I have thought it unwise for me to say more than I have as it will involve me in technical matters with which I am not familiar and in my judgement would complicate rather than help the final amicable settlement of the matter. It seems to me that, since this is a matter of combined British-American interests, joint instructions should be sent to our ambassadors for transmission to Mr. Molotov.

The instructions should authorize them to inform Molotov that the Soviet request for the use of Italian merchant and naval vessels has been approved subject to such reservations as may be considered appropriate.

They should also be authorized to suggest at the same time that representatives of the naval staffs of the three countries meet at, say Algiers, to work out the arrangements necessary for completing the transaction.

I feel strongly that any question of one-third of the fleet being given to the Soviets should not repeat not be opened at this time but that the discussion be confined to the acceptance of the specific Russian request. Opening up
THE DISCUSSION TO A PROPORTIONATE DIVISION OF THE FLEET WOULD, IN MY VIEW, LEAD TO SERIOUS COMPLICATIONS. IF AT A LATER DATE WE FIND THE RUSSIANS CAN USE ADDITIONAL SHIPS, IT MIGHT THEN BE TO OUR ADVANTAGE TO OFFER THEM VOLUNTARILY THE SPECIFIC NUMBER AND TYPES WE BELIEVE WOULD BE USEFUL. THIS SHOULD ONLY BE DONE AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF THE NUMBERS AND TYPES THAT THEY HAVE THE CAPACITY TO USE AND MAINTAIN.

IT IS THE OPINION OF OUR NAVAL OFFICERS HERE THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN MODEST IN THEIR REQUEST BECAUSE OF THEIR INABILITY TO EMPLOY ADDITIONAL VESSELS AND THAT THEY WOULD FEEL EMBARRASSED IF THEY WERE FACED WITH THE NECESSITY OF ADMITTING THAT THEY DID NOT HAVE THE ABILITY TO UTILIZE AT THE PRESENT TIME THEIR FULL ONE-THIRD SHARE.

DISTRIBUTION:

NOTE: PART 1 ORIGINALLY WRITTEN UP AND DISTRIBUTED AS ALUSNA MOSCOW 21257 NCR 4553.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

To State for info - Your staff for recommendation.

Delivered 04/11/85

[Signature]

[Covered by black ink]
4 November 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MATTHEWS:

The President has directed that the attached secret message from the Secretary of State be transmitted to the Department of State for its information and file.

Your attention is invited to the fact that this message is an exact copy and therefore must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

L. MATHENSON
Colonel, General Staff
4 November 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

The President has directed that the attached secret message from the Secretary of State be transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their consideration and preparation of appropriate recommendation.

L. MATHEWSON
Colonel, General Staff
MR EDEN SENT ME TODAY A CABLE WHICH HE HAD DISPATCHED TO THE PRIME MINISTER COVERING THE POINTS OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH MOLOTOV ON THE TURKISH QUESTION YESTERDAY AFTERNOON 31 OCT. AS FOLLOWS.

FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER.

1. MOLOTOV AND I DISCUSSED THE TURKISH QUESTION THIS AFTERNOON. TURING AND THE AMBASSADOR WERE WITH ME.

2. OUR URGENT NEED FOR AIRFIELDS IN SOUTHWEST ANATOLIA WAS EXPLAINED TO ME AND LATER BISHAY DEVELOPED THIS POINT IN DETAIL. I EXPLAINED THAT I WAS PREPARED TO SEE THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER IN CAIRO ON MY RETURN JOURNEY TO THE UNITED STATES.

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
KINGDOM AND INFORM HIM THAT WE REQUIRED (A) IMMEDIATE USE OF AIRFIELDS; AND (B) AUTHORITY TO PASS SUBMARINES IN COMPANY WITH TWO OR THREE MERCHANT SHIPS CARRYING IMPORTANT STORES INTO BLACK SEA.

I SHOULD TELL HIM IF HE WERE NOT TO CONCEDE THESE POINTS AT ONCE THAT OUR SUPPLY OF ARMS AND EQUIPMENT WOULD STOP FORTHWITH. I SAID THAT THIS WOULD BE A FIRST STEP ONLY AND IF TURKISH ACQUIESCEENCE DID NOT INVOLVE HER IN WAR WITH GERMANY WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER WITHIN A MONTH THE IMPORT OF TURKEY WITH A FORMAL DEMAND ON PART OF SOVIET UNION UNITED KINGDOM AND UNITED STATES TO ENTER WAR IMMEDIATELY.

3. MOLOTOV DISAGREED WITH THIS SORT OF APPROACH. WHY SHOULD TIME BE WASTED WITH RELATIVELY TRIVIAL MATTERS SUCH AS BASES WHEN IT WAS OUR RIGHT TO INSIST THAT TURKEY IMMEDIATELY ENTER WAR AS A FULL PARTNER AND IT WAS HER DUTY TO COMPLY.

4. THE FIRST TWO SENTENCES OF YOUR PARAGRAPH TWO WERE QUOTED TEXTUALLY TO MOLOTOV WITHOUT MOVING HIM. HE REITERATED
AGAIN AND AGAIN THAT IF OUR THREE COUNTRIES WERE REALLY DETERMINED THAT TURKEY SHOULD ENTER THE WAR SHE WOULD HAVE NO CHOICE; AND HE STRESSED THE FACT THAT WHILE THE CONFERENCE HAD FOR THE MOST PART GONE EXCEEDINGLY WELL, TO HIS MILITARY COLLEAGUES IT HAD BEEN A BITTER DISAPPOINTMENT THAT NOT ONE SUGGESTION PRESENTED BY THE RUSSIAN DELEGATION FOR SHORTENING THE WAR HAD BEEN APPROVED; AND ALSO THAT ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS TO THAT END HAD NOT BEEN PUT FORWARD BY EITHER THE AMERICANS OR OURSELVES. OBTAINABLE HE FELT THAT THIS WAS A SORE WHICH MIGHT FESTER ONCE THE GOOD EFFECTS OF THE CONFERENCE HAD WORN OFF. WHY COULD IT NOT BE DECIDED HERE AND AT ONCE THAT IT WAS DESIRABLE FOR TURKEY TO ENTER INTO THE WAR NOW.

ONCE THAT PRINCIPLE WAS ACCEPTED OUR TACTICS COULD BE CONSIDERED FURTHER.

5. I INFORMED THAT OUR GOVERNMENT WAS IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT THAT BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR TURKEY SHOULD ENTER THE WAR, AND THAT I WAS PREPARED TO SIGN AT ONCE ON THE DOTTED LINE TO THAT EFFECT. QUESTION OF TACTICS WAS ONLY DIFFERENCE

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UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRIORITY.
BETWEEN US, HE WANTED ONLY ONE BITE ON CHERRY WHILE I WANTED TWO. I HAD PUT FURTHER ON FACT THAT IN SOUTHWEST ANATOLIA AIRFIELDS WERE URGENTLY NEEDED FOR OUR OPERATIONS, NOT ONLY TO PREVENT A DISASTER AT EROS AND DAMOS, BUT ALSO TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR US TO CAPTURE AND SUPPORT RHODES WHICH WE FELT WAS THE KEY TO THE AEGEAN AND WOULD LEAD TO SUBSTANTIAL RESULTS; AND I POINTED OUT THAT IF WE WERE TO MAKE A FORMAL DEMAND TO TURKEY TO ENTER THE WAR AND SHE WERE TO REFUSE THERE WAS A DANGER THAT WE WOULD NOT ONLY HAVE LOST NOTHING BUT ALSO HAVE LOST ALL CHANCE FOR AIRFIELDS.

6. OBVIOUSLY MOLOTOV WAS PLEASED BY MY STATEMENT THAT WE SHARED FULLY THE VIEW THAT TURKEY SHOULD BE BRIGHT INTO WAR THIS YEAR; BUT HE DID NOT AGREE TO MY ARGUMENT THAT IF WE ATTEMPTED TO RUSH THINGS OUR AIR BASES MIGHT BE LOST QUICKLY IN ANY CASE UNQUOTE HE SAID QUOTE LET US AGREE AS FAR AS THE PRINCIPLE IS CONCERNED AND LATER WORK OUT THE TACTICS UNQUOTE I AGREED TO THIS AND STATED THAT I WOULD GIVE MUCH TO BE ABLE TO PUT THE COPING STONE ON THE CONFERENCES.
I shall see him again.

During discussion Molotov asked if American delegation would go with us in this matter. I replied that I could not say for sure as a matter of fact Hull and I had had a talk before by meeting with Molotov and he indicated that he was in favor of the line I proposed to take with the Russians.

EDENS MESSAGE.

I have replied to Mr. Eden as follows quote my dear Mr. Eden thank you for your letter of Oct 31st enclosing a memorandum of your conversation with Mr. Molotov on the afternoon of October 31st on subject of Turkey.

I am quote glad to have benefit of your enclosure. While as I stated to you some days ago I should be glad to see a full examination and if necessary reexamination of the Turkish matter in the direction of Turkey's entry into the war.

I must repeat what I stated to you and Mr. Molotov during the earlier stages of the discussion of Turkey, that the govern-
MENT AT WASHINGTON MUST MAKE THE DECISION. I SHALL THEREFORE BE GLAD TO ACQUAINT MY GOVERNMENT WITH THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF YOUR CONVERSATION WITH MR. MOLOTOV ON YESTERDAY IN WHICH YOU PROPOSE MORE ADVANCED AND EXPEDITIOUS STEPS THAT THEREFORE. SINCERELY YOURS CORDELL HULL UNQUOTE END LETTER.

MR. EDEN CALLED ON ME THIS AFTERNOON TO ACQUAINT ME WITH A FURTHER CONVERSATION HE HAD TODAY WITH MOLOTOV IN WHICH HE AGAIN URGENTLY ASKED FOR AGREEMENT THAT THE BRITISH BRING PRESSURE ON THE TURKS TO GIVE THEM USE OF AIR BASES. HE EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD HAD WORD FROM PRIME MINISTER THAT UNLESS THIS PRIVILECE WAS FORTHCOMING FROM THE TURKS PROMPTLY IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO HOLD LEROS.

MOLOTOV CONTINUED TO OBJECT BUT AFTER A LONG DISCUSSION THEY FINALLY CAME TO FOLLOWING AGREEMENT.

SoviET GOVT WOULD APPROVE THE BRITISH IMMEDIATE DEMANDS ON TURKEY FOR THE AIR BASES AND EDEN AGREED THAT BRITISH GOVT WOULD JOIN WITH RUSSIA AT A LATER DATE TO BRING PRESSURE ON TURKEY TO COME INTO WAR BEFORE END OF YEAR.
MOLOTOV asked whether I would join in this and add it as a part of the conference understandings. I explained to Mr. Eden that I had no authority to join in such an agreement. Eden has undertaken to explain this to Molotov. If there is time Eden will put his verbal agreement with Molotov into memorandum form.

You may wish to reexamine this question from the standpoint of Turkey's entry into the war. Politically I would favor this. Since the British and Russians are going forward with the matter you may wish to send instructions to Harriman.

See Potus. Harriman 0/1707 Nov 43.
URGENT

From: Moscow
To: AGWAR
No. 38, 2nd November 1943.

For Joint Chiefs of Staff from Deane.

However, inasmuch as an entry on the 2nd front discussion had been agreed upon for inclusion in the record which was satisfactory to both the Soviets and us, the Secretary of State thought it better not to present the views expressed in (your number 792 of the 28th and 797 of the 29th were received in time for consideration.) above messages to the Soviets until after the conference had been concluded for fear of prolonging these discussions. I now intend to present these to the Soviet Military authorities and to request Mr. Harriman to present them to the highest political authorities, provided I can successfully collaborate in the matter with the British Mission. I think this was a wise decision as it will give us ammunition for the reactionary period that will probably follow upon the departure of the delegates to the conference. I am grateful to you for both messages. In the case of your Nr 797 of the 29th, General Eisenhower's comments on General Alexander's estimate were not included in the message which the Prime Minister directed to be shown to Stalin.

Tonight Soviets agreed that your proposals regarding shuttle bombing, weather information, and improved air transport should be included in the proceedings of the conference. The Russian conclusion which appears opposite these proposals reads as follows.

"V. M. Molotov said that the USSR agreed to the US proposals in principle and that the appropriate Soviet authorities will be given instructions to meet with Generals Deane and Vandenberg for the consideration of concrete measures which would be necessary to
From: Moscow  
To: AGWAR  
No. 38, 2nd November 1943,

carry out these proposals. The Soviet delegates did not want to put this entry in the conclusions and based their objections on the fact that the proposals had not been discussed in detail at the conference and therefore should not form part of the record. I discussed this with Vyshinsky for several hours yesterday without success. We succeeded in having it included as the result of a personal letter from Secretary Hull to Mr Molotov which was accompanied by another letter indicating a more favorable US attitude with regard to the Italian Naval and merchant vessels.

Vyshinsky showed his bitterness about our attitude on Turkey and asked why the Soviets should obligate themselves concerning our proposals when we had refused to agree to their proposals on Turkey and Sweden. He said that the immediate entry of Turkey into the war would take 15 Divisions from the Russian Front and if this were brought about the Russians would be in Prussia in 2 months. I explained our attitude on Turkey. I emphasized our commitments on OVERLORD, the Mediterranean, the Pacific, and the delivery of Lend-Lease to Russia, and pointed out that any new undertakings such as Turkeys entry into the war would create an additional vacuum into which some or our resources would have to be diverted. I told him that such diversion would jeopardize our success in carrying out our present commitments. His response to this was that it was necessary for us to pour supplies into Turkey. His attitude was that Turkey, if she were to expect participation in the peace, would have to suffer during the war as the Russians were suffering. He felt that she should be required to fight with the resources she now has, plus those we would give her without jeopardizing our other commitments. The Soviets resent our giving any arms to Turkey unless she is to use them against the enemy and feel that the most effective time for such use is now.
Today Mr Eden and Mr Molotov came to an agreement that Turkey should be told at once that she shall either permit British use of Turkish air bases or cease receiving supplies from Britain. He agreed further with Molotov that efforts should be made to force Turkey's entry into the war before the close of this year. Mr Molotov only agreed to these tactics after long discussion. He thought the demand for air bases was a half measure and that the demand for Turkey's entry into the war should be made at once. On behalf of Mr Molotov and himself, he asked if Mr Hull would go along with this agreement. Mr Hull replied that he did not have authority to enter into such an agreement. Tonight Mr Hull is sending a long telegram to the President quoting a message which Eden sent to the Prime Minister, a copy of which had been furnished Mr Hull. Mr Hull also quoted his reply to Eden in the message to the President. He recommended to the President that from the political standpoint the US should go along with the UK and the USSR.

The above is sent you for your information and without recommendation on my part. There is strong feeling in the matter here, much stronger than the discussions at the conference indicated. Mr Harriman suggests, and I believe he is right, that Vyshinsky was instructed to object strongly to including our proposals on the shuttle bombing and so on in the report of the conference in order that he could express the Russian bitterness about our attitude on Turkey to me with the full knowledge that his opinions would be passed on to my superiors.

The Secretary is being delayed by weather and his departure date is uncertain. I shall advise you as soon as a decision is made.

Nosig.

FOOTNOTE: 792 is CM-OUT-12663 (10-28-43) Gen Handy
797 is CM-OUT-13223 (10-29-43) OPD

ACTION: JCS (CAPT. ROYAL USN)

INFORMATION: GEN'L HANDB, GEN'L ADNED, ADM KING, LOG

21-TR-238 (2 Nov 43) 1754Z

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLH, Date

APR 24 1974

Copy No. 15

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Moscow
To: AGWAR

No. 34, 31st October 1943

For Joint Chiefs of Staff from Deane.

Following is paraphrase of statement which will appear in the record of the proceedings of the conference concerning the Russian proposals about measures for shortening the war. Paraphrase starts:

A. In connection with the proposal to begin preparations now which will insure an invasion of northern France by Anglo-American forces, coupled with powerful blows of the Soviet forces, Mr Eden and Mr Hull, on the 20th of Oct, endorsed the statements made by Ismay and Deane as being an accurate disclosure of the latest decisions of the US and UK taken at Quebec (Colonel McCarthy is bringing a copy of the statements referred to). With regard to statement made by Mr Churchill and President Roosevelt in June 1943 that there was to be a cross channel operation in the Spring of 1944, the Soviet delegates asked if the decision was still valid. Mr Eden and Mr Hull answered in the affirmative and declared that the decision had been reaffirmed in Quebec subject to the conditions given in Ismay's statement and said that it still holds good, and that preparations for the operation are progressing as fast as possible.

Mr Molotov said that the Soviet Government took note of Mr Hull's and Mr Edens statements as well as those of Ismay and Deane and expressed the hope that the operation would be carried out on time.

B. In regard to points 2 and 3 Mr Hull, Mr Eden and Mr Molotov took note of the desirability of their 3 governments continuing to study these subjects. End of paraphrase.

CM-IN-655 (2 Nov 43)
From: Moscow
To: AGWAR

No. 34, 31st October 1943

We are trying to have all 3 proposals concerning shuttle bombing etcetera put into the record with the statement that the Soviet has approved them in principle and that future discussions will be arranged. We may have some difficulty in getting this included. The promise for discussions was made about 10 days ago and so far we have not been approached. We shall take the initiative on the subject once the conference is concluded.

During the conference I had asked the Soviets to give us their attitude on extending US subversive activities in the Balkans. They said they would take the matter under consideration but so far there has been no reply. I did not press the subject because the Balkans area is primarily a sphere of British responsibility and they wish to avoid much discussion of the subject. I feel, however, that I have given the Soviet authorities an opportunity to express disapproval of our activities in the Balkan Countries if they cared to do so. Since they did not react at all, my recommendation is that you advise the OSS to carry out such projects as you approve in coordination with the British.

Mr Stalin gave an off the record dinner party at the conclusion of the conference last night. The atmosphere was one of complete desire for cooperation and I feel that Mr Hull has done a great job in this regard in the conference. It was significant that after the dinner we were shown a lengthy picture of Japanese penetration in Siberia in 1921. It was distinctly anti-Japanese propaganda and we all felt it was an indirect method of telling us their attitude with regard
In private conversation with Molotov, Vashinsky and others we have heard more direct statements indicating that they will join in the Pacific war as soon as Germany is defeated.

Receipt is acknowledged of the decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff contained in your nr 799 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning disclosure of information to Soviets. I do not know the considerations that led to this reversal to my letter of instructions. No information has been given to the Soviets that has not been cleared with the British. I feel that a real opportunity exists for cooperative action during the war that will carry over into the post war period but I am afraid that the veto power of British conservatism will place severe limitations on the advantage we might take of the present situation.

No Sig

799 is CM-OUT-13427 (30 Oct 43) JCS

ACTION: JCS (CAPT ROYAL USN)

INFORMATION: GEN HANDY
             GEN ARNOLD
             GEN STRONG
             LOG

CM-IN-655 (2 Nov 43) 0520Z ms

DECLASIFIED

JOFS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date APR 24 1974
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Moscow

Dated November 1, 1943

Rec'd 11:15 a.m., 2nd.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

1914, November 1, 5 p.m., (SECTION ONT)

Decl 84.

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND ACTING SECRETARY FROM THE SECRETARY.

Referring to Wilson's telegram No. 1863, October 29, 1914, 8 p.m. from Algiers to the Department. We are now able to give you the terms of reference of the commissions provided for by the Conference as they were agreed to at the closing session.

On the proposal of the British the functions of the Political Military (Mediterranean) Commission have now been divided between two commissions known as the Advisory Council for Italy and the European Advisory Commission. The first is to have its headquarters near the Allied Commander in Chief in Italy and the second to sit in London.

The Advisory Council for Italy will be composed in the first instance of representatives of the United States, United Kingdom and the Soviet Governments and the French.
the French Committee of National Liberation. Provisions made for the addition to the council as soon as practicable of representatives of Greece and Yugoslavia in viewing their special interests arising out of the aggressions of Fascist Italy upon their territory during the present war. This council will deal with day to day questions other than military questions. The members will consult among themselves and refer to their Governments matters on which they desire political direction and may give advice to the Allied CINC with regard to matters other than military operations. They may also make separate recommendations with regard to any action they feel should be taken by the CINC or the control commission requesting the British and United States Governments to ask the combined Chiefs of Staff to instruct the Allied CINC accordingly. They are specifically expected to keep a watch over the operations of the Allied Control Commission and its functions. Furthermore it is provided that the Advisory Council will assume the direction of the Control Commission at such time as the Allied CINC believes it possible to turn over control to it by reason of cessation of active military operations in Italy or termination of need of military control.

In a separate
In a separate public declaration the Conference here placed itself in favor of the progressive democratization of Italy, the timing for putting such measures into effect being left to the Allied CINC under instructions received from the combined Chiefs of Staff. The Conference further agreed, however, that the three Governments would consult with one another on the matter of timing at the request of anyone of them.

The European Advisory Commission which is to have its headquarters in London will be composed of representatives of the three Governments in the first instance, with a proviso that other Governments may be added later or may be brought in for participation in the discussion of matters of concern to them. This Commission is charged with the drawing up terms of surrender and provisions for execution of such terms with respect to enemy states and deciding upon the functions and jurisdiction of the control machinery required for such execution. In its work of drawing up the terms of surrender and methods of control, the Commission is to use as a basis the British side memoir of July 1 on the subject and is also to select as it finds appropriate whatever material it may find useful in the United States.
-4-, #1314, November 1, 5 p.m., (SECTION ONE) from Moscow.

States proposals with regard to the treatment of Germany as contained in the papers submitted by us here on item seven of the conference agenda.

The Conference has also sent to the London Commission for its consideration the statement proposed by the British here on liberated areas a copy of which was received by us in Washington before we left and the Washington document.

HARRIMAN

WFS
SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

1814, NOVEMBER 1, 5 P.M. (SECTION TWO)

Entitled "Civil Affairs for France" which resulted from discussion between the Department and the British Embassy in Washington and which received the oral approval of the President on October 6.

The members of both of these commissions will be expected to make recommendations to their governments but they will not have the power of final decision.

It is provided that each commissioner member of either of these commissions is to have technical assistants, civilian and military.

It will be noted that the only information with regard to these commissions which is authorized to be made public by the conference is the references to them contained in the official communiqué of the conference.

Repeated to Algiers for Murphy and Wilson and to London. For the Ambassador and Phillips.

(END MESSAGE)

HARRIMAN

WBB
TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF TRIPARTITE CONFERENCE
AT MOSCOW

The Conference of Foreign Secretaries of the United States of America, Mr. Cordell Hull; of the United Kingdom, Mr. Anthony Eden; and of the Soviet Union, Mr. V. M. Molotov; took place at Moscow from the 19th to 30th of October 1943. There were twelve meetings. In addition to the Foreign Secretaries, the following took part in the Conference:

For the United States of America: Mr. W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador of the United States; Major-General John R. Deane, United States Army; Mr. H. Hackworth, Mr. James C. Dunn, and experts.

For the United Kingdom: Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, Ambassador; Mr. William Strang; Lieutenant General Sir Hastings Ismay, and experts.

For the Soviet Union: Marshal K. E. Voroshilov, Marshal of the Soviet Union; Mr. A. Y. Vyshinski; Mr. M. M. Litvinov, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs; Mr. V. A. Sergeyev, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade; Major General A. A. Gryzlov, of the General Staff; Mr. G. F. Saksin, Senior Official for People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and experts.

The agenda included all questions submitted for discussion by the three governments. Some of the questions called for final decisions, and these were taken. On other questions, after discussion, decisions of principle were taken. These questions were referred for detailed consideration to commissions specially set up for the purpose, or reserved for treatment through diplomatic channels. Other questions again were disposed of by an exchange of views. The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union have been in close cooperation in all matters concerning the common war effort, but this is the first time that the Foreign Secretaries of the three governments have been able to meet together in conference.

In the first place there were frank and exhaustive discussions of the measures to be taken to shorten the war against Germany and her satellites in Europe. Advantage was taken of the presence of military advisers representing the respective
respective Chiefs of Staff in order to discuss definite military operations with regard to which decisions had been taken and which are already being prepared in order to create a basis for the closest military cooperation in the future between the three countries.

Second only to the importance of hastening the end of the war was the recognition by the three governments that it was essential in their own national interests and in the interest of all peace-loving nations to continue the present close collaboration and cooperation in the conduct of the war into the period following the end of hostilities, and that only in this way could peace be maintained and the political, economic, and social welfare of their peoples fully promoted.

This conviction is expressed in a declaration in which the Chinese Government joined during the conference and which was signed by the three Foreign Secretaries and the Chinese Ambassador at Moscow on behalf of their governments. This declaration published today provides for even closer collaboration in the prosecution of the war and in all matters pertaining to the surrender and disarmament of the enemies with which the four countries are respectively at war. It sets forth the principles upon which the four governments agree that a broad system of international cooperation and security should be based. Provision is made for the inclusion of all other peace-loving nations, great and small, in this system.

The Conference agreed to set up machinery for ensuring the closest cooperation between the three governments in the examination of European questions arising as the war develops. For this purpose the Conference decided to establish in London a European Advisory Commission to study these questions and to make joint recommendations to the three governments.

Provision was made for continuing when necessary the tripartite consultations of representatives of the three governments in the respective capitals through the existing diplomatic channels.

The Conference also agreed to establish an Advisory Council for matters relating to Italy to be composed in the first instance of representatives of their three governments and of the French Committee of National Liberation. Provision is made for addition to this Council of Representatives of Greece and Yugoslavia in view of their special interests arising out of aggressions of Fascist Italy upon their territory during the present war. This Council will deal with day to day questions other than military preparations and will make recommendations designed to coordinate Allied policy with regard to Italy.

The three Foreign Secretaries considered it appropriate to reaffirm by a declaration published today, the attitude of the Allied Governments in favor of the restoration of Democracy in Italy.

The three Foreign Secretaries declared it to be the purpose of their governments to restore the
independence of Austria. At the same time they reminded Austria that in the final settlement, account will be taken of efforts that Austria may make towards its own liberation. The Declaration on Austria is published today.

The Foreign Secretaries issued at the Conference a Declaration by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Premier Stalin containing a solemn warning that at the time of granting any armistice to any German Government, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi Party who have had any connection with atrocities and executions in countries overrun by German forces, will be taken back to the countries in which their abominable crimes were committed to be charged and punished according to the laws of those countries.

In an atmosphere of mutual confidence and understanding which characterized all the work of the Conference, consideration was also given to other important questions. These included not only questions of a current nature but also questions concerning treatment of Hitlerite Germany and its satellites, economic cooperation and assurance of general peace.

* * *
The Governments of the United States of America, United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China:

united in their determination, in accordance with the Declaration by the United Nations of January 1, 1942, and subsequent declarations, to continue hostilities against those Axis powers with which they respectively are at war until such powers have laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender;

conscious of their responsibility to secure the liberation of themselves and the peoples allied with them from the menace of aggression;

recognizing the necessity of ensuring a rapid and orderly transition from war to peace and of establishing and maintaining international peace and security with the least diversion of the world's human and economic resources for armaments;

jointly declare:

1. That their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war against their respective enemies, will be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security.

2. That those of them at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy.

3. That they will take all measures deemed by them to be necessary to provide against any violation of the terms imposed upon the enemy.

4. That they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states,
states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

5. That for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the reestablishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security, they will consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations.

6. That after the termination of hostilities they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation.

7. That they will confer and cooperate with one another and with other members of the United Nations to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the post-war period.
The United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union have received from many quarters evidence of atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded mass executions which are being perpetrated by Hitlerite forces in many of the countries they have overrun and from which they are now being steadily expelled. The brutalities of Hitlerite domination are no new thing and all peoples or territories in their grip have suffered from the worst form of Government by terror. What is new is that many of these territories are now being redeemed by the advancing armies of the liberating powers and that in their desperation, the recoiling Hitlerite Nazis are redoubling their ruthless cruelties. This is now evidenced with particular clearness by monstrous crimes of the Hitlerites on the territory of the Soviet Union which is being liberated from Hitlerites, and on French and Italian territory.

Accordingly, the aforesaid three Allied Powers, speaking in the interests of the thirty-three United Nations, hereby solemnly declare and give full warning of their declaration as follows: At the time of granting of any armistice to any government which may be set up in Germany, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi Party who have been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres and executions will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and of the free governments which will be erected therein. Lists will be compiled in all possible detail from all these countries, having regard especially to invaded parts of the Soviet Union, to Poland and Czechoslovakia, to Yugoslavia and Greece including Crete and other islands, to Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France and Italy.
Thus, Germans who take part in wholesale shooting of Polish officers or in the execution of French, Dutch, Belgian or Norwegian hostages or of Cretan peasants, or who have shared in slaughters inflicted on the people of Poland or in territories of the Soviet Union which are now being swept clear of the enemy, will know they will be brought back to the scene of their crimes and judged on the spot by the peoples whom they have outraged. Let those who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with innocent blood beware lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly the three Allied Powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth and will deliver them to their accusers in order that justice may be done.

The above declaration is without prejudice to the case of German criminals, whose offenses have no particular geographical localization and who will be punished by joint decision of the Governments of the Allies.
CONFIDENTIAL RELEASE FOR PUBLICATION AT 1:00 P.M., E.W.T., MONDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 1943. NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED, QUOTED FROM OR USED IN ANY WAY.

DECLARATION REGARDING ITALY

The Foreign Secretaries of the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union have established that their three Governments are in complete agreement that Allied policy towards Italy must be based upon the fundamental principle that Fascism and all its evil influence and configuration shall be completely destroyed and that the Italian people shall be given every opportunity to establish governmental and other institutions based upon democratic principles.

The Foreign Secretaries of the United States and United Kingdom declare that the action of their Governments from the inception of the invasion of Italian territory, in so far as paramount military requirements have permitted has been based upon this policy.

In furtherance of this policy in the future the Foreign Secretaries of the three Governments are agreed that the following measures are important and should be put into effect:

1. It is essential that the Italian Government should be made more democratic by inclusion of representatives of those sections of the Italian people who have always opposed Fascism.

2. Freedom of speech, of religious worship, of political belief, of press and of public meeting shall be restored in full measure to the Italian people who shall also be entitled to form anti-Fascist political groups.

3. All institutions and organizations created by the Fascist regime shall be suppressed.

4. All Fascist or pro-Fascist elements shall be removed from the administration and from institutions and organizations of a public character.

5. All political prisoners of the Fascist regime shall be released and accorded full amnesty.

6. Democratic
6. Democratic organs of local Government shall be created.

7. Fascist chiefs and Army Generals known or suspected to be war criminals shall be arrested and handed over to justice.

In making this declaration the three Foreign Secretaries recognize that so long as active military operations continue in Italy the time at which it is possible to give full effect to the principles stated above will be determined by the Commander-in-Chief on the basis of instructions received through the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The three Governments, parties to this declaration, will, at the request of any one of them, consult on this matter. It is further understood that nothing in this Resolution is to operate against the right of the Italian people, ultimately to choose their own form of Government.

* * *

...
Declaration on Austria.

The Governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of America are agreed that Austria, the first free country to fall a victim to Hitlerite aggression, shall be liberated from German domination.

They regard the annexation imposed on Austria by Germany on March 15, 1938 as null and void. They consider themselves as in no way bound by any changes effected in Austria since that date. They declare that they wish to see reestablished a free and independent Austria and thereby to open the way for the Austrian people themselves as well as those neighboring states which will be faced with similar problems, to find that political and economic security which is the only basis for lasting peace.

Austria is reminded, however, that she has a responsibility, which she cannot evade, for participation in the war at the side of Hitlerite Germany, and that in the final settlement account will inevitably be taken of her own contribution to her liberation.

* * *
FM CONNOLLY TO MARSHALL IN RE AMPOG #1751#

CONTENTS OF PROPOSED BRITISH LETTER TO SOVIET AUTHORITIES
NOT MADE KNOWN BY GENERAL DEANE. MESSAGE SENT THIS DATE TO
GENERAL DEANE REQUESTING CONTENTS OF PROPOSED BRITISH LETTER.
UPON RECEIPT OF REPLY MY COMMENTS WILL BE FORWARDED
PROMPTLY.

NO SIG

#1751 IS CM-OUT 13065 (30 OCT 43) OPD
CM-IN 18948

DECLASSIFIED
APR 24 1974
I sat by Marshal Stalin for two hours at his dinner Saturday night. I presented to him in the strongest way possible all considerations calling for the joining by him of his leadership and cooperation with that of yourself and Mr. Churchill.

At one stage he volunteered to bring up the proposed Basra meeting. In so many words he renewed what he and his associates and advisers considered as compelling military reasons for not going beyond Teheran. He said in effect that we must give him credit for being sincere about this. He then said that he would send the official ranking next to himself in the Soviet government, namely Mr. Molotov. He inquired what I thought of him as a substitute. I replied parenthetically that he would do in the sense of understanding the questions that would probably arise, but that that was not the point from your and my

---

**Sealed Secret**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 38
VIEWPOINTS. THAT THE IMPORTANT FACTOR WAS THE BROAD PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT THROUGHOUT THE WORLD OF THE PRESENCE AT SUCH A MEETING OF THE MARSHAL HIMSELF. I ARGUED THE MATTER FURTHER BUT GOT NO FAVORABLE REACTION.

NOTE. PART TWO AND THREE OF THIS DESPATCH HAVE BEEN RECEIVED BUT ARE UNDECIPHERABLE. VERIFICATION AND REPEAT OF ENCRYPTMENT HAS BEEN REQUESTED BY NCR.
THE SITUATION RELATING TO THE SEEMING STATE OF MIND OF THE MARSHAL IS THAT HE TALKS AND ACTS ONE HUNDRED PERCENT IN FAVOR OF OUR NEW GENERAL FORWARD MOVEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN EVERY WAY WHICH THE FOUR NATION DECLARATION PROCLAIMS, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, MILITARY, SPECIALLY INCLUDING POSTWAR ORGANIZATION FOR PEACE, WORLD ORDER UNDER LAW, ECONOMIC BENEFITS ETC ETC. AT THE SAME TIME HE IS INFLEXIBLE AT THIS TIME ABOUT ATTENDING A MEETING WITH YOU AND MR. CHURCHILL AT ANY PLACE BEYOND TEHERAN. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES I THINK IT ADVISABLE AT PRESENT TO ALLOW OUR COLLABORATION AND COOPERATION MOVEMENT LAUNCHED HERE TO BE CEMENTED BY INCREASING METHODS OF CONTACT FROM THE STANDPOINT OF CLOSER MILITARY RELATIONS IN VAR-
**ALUSNA MOSCOW**

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**INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.**

312031 NCR 3441

**UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.**

**ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME**

**DATE**

**TIME**

**SECRET**

**NO. 1 ADMIRAL.**

**NO. 2 FILE.**

**NO. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM.**

**NO. 4 SPECIAL.**

**SEALED SECRET**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVRECS.)

NCR 18

10-2030-1  W. A. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
TEXT

THAT AFTER INVITING STALIN AND IN EVENT HE DECLINES YOU THEN INVITE HIM TO SEND MOLOTOV AND A GENERAL OF HIGH RANK. THIS MATTER COULD BECOME DELICATE UNLESS EVEN IN THE FACE OF THE MARSHALS ATTITUDE YOU INVITE MOLOTOV AND A MILITARY MAN TO YOUR CONFERENCE. YOU CAN CABLE ME BOTH AT TEHERAN AND CAIRO AS TO WHAT YOU MAY HAVE IN MIND IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS WHICH YOU ALREADY HAVE IN MIND.

312031 NCR 3441

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

P1A ACTION

FILE

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
GIVE TO VICE CNO. THIS MESSAGE FROM OLSN.

CONFERENCE CONCLUDED SATURDAY NIGHT WITH OFF THE RECORD DINNER, FOR ABOUT 60 AT THE KREMLIN DURING WHICH MANY TOASTS MADE TO COOPERATIVENESS OF PERSONNEL AND GREAT SUCCESS ATTAINED. GENERAL DEANE STOLE THE SHOW PRESENTING MILITARY MISSION AS AN ADVANCE GUARD TO RUSSIA AND TOASTING TO A FUTURE MEETING OF OTHER OF OUR ADVANCE GUARDS IN THE STREETS OF BERLIN. WAS ONLY TOAST LOUDLY APPLAUDED BY ALL AND MR. STALIN ROSE TO WALK AROUND THE TABLE TO PERSONALLY CLINK GLASS WITH DEANE. SIGNIFICANT THAT NO MENTION MADE OF JAPAN IN ANY CONVERSATIONS DURING CONFERENCE OR DINNER BUT ON CONCLUSION MR. MOLTOV ANNOUNCED THAT WE WOULD NOW SEE A MOVING PICTURE HAVING SOMETHING TO DO WITH JAPAN. PICTURE WAS EXCELLENT RUSSIAN PRODUCTION PROPAGANDA TYPE OF JAPS PENETRATING INTO SIBERIA SHOWING...
THEIR TREACHEROUS AND BARBARIOUS CAPACITY WHICH OF IS OUTSMARTED BY RUSSIAN GUERRILLA LEADER WHO DRIVES JAP OUT. STOLID HATRED OF JAPS CLEARLY SHOWN THROUGHOUT PICTURE. OCCASION AND CHOICE OF PICTURE MOST SIGNIFICANT OF SOVIET POLICY WHICH THEY CANNOT AND WILL NOT OPENLY EXPOSE.

DECLASSIFIED

APR 24 1974

ACTION .... OP-13 (3 COPIES).

NAVATDE .... (2 COPIES). Uncopy destroyed.

FILE

Not sent to President.

FILE

Not copy of State message.

SEALEO

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
Secretary of State,
Washington.

MOST IMMEDIATE
1799, October 31, 10 p.m.
DELAM 48.

Declaration on Austria.
The Government's of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the U.S. of America are agreed that Austria, the first free country to fall a victim to Hitlerite aggression, shall be liberated from German domination.

They regard the annexation imposed on Austria by Germany on March 15, 1938 as null and void. They consider themselves as in no way bound by any changes effected in Austria since that date. They declare that they wish to see reestablished a free and independent Austria and thereby to open the way for the Austrian people themselves as well those neighboring states which will be faced with similar problems, to find that political and economic security which is the only
-2- "1799, October 31, 10 p.m. from Moscow

the only basis for lasting peace.

Austria is reminded, however, that she has a responsibility, which she cannot evade, for participation in the war at the side of Hitlerite Germany, and that in the final settlement account will inevitably be taken of her own contribution to her liberation.

HARRIMAN

HTM
From: Moscow
To: The President of the United States

For the President from the Secretary of State

On instructions from the Prime Minister, Eden presented General Alexander's estimate of the Italian situation to Stalin. Stalin was very reasonable and realistic in his attitude. He indicated that the Italian operation must be supported and that a defense should be established north of Rome. He accepted the fact that an adverse situation in Italy might of necessity delay OVERLORD and suggested that Italy might constitute the second front. However, he urged that the OVERLORD concept should be adhered to. The British impression of the meeting was entirely favorable.

At yesterday's meeting, some questions were asked regarding the statements made by Generals Ismay and Deane on the QUADRANT decisions regarding OVERLORD. The questions had to do with, how we should determine whether or not the conditions necessary for the operation would in fact exist. General Ismay pointed out the effectiveness of our Intelligence Service in France and also indicated the intention to utilize fully the bomber offensive aircraft to support the operations and thus insure that the necessary conditions would be created. He also indicated the necessity of continued pressure on other fronts so that German reinforcements could not be quickly concentrated.

The answers to questions asked were accepted as satisfactory and the question then arose as to what record would be made of the second front discussion in the proceedings of the conference. Mr. Molotov had a proposal in this regard which we shall examine carefully as soon as it has been translated. Our position will be that Generals Deane and Ismay were authorized only to impart decisions already made and to describe preparations which are under way in carrying out these decisions. It will be made clear that we have made no commitments.

The question regarding Turkey's entering the war then came up for discussion. The views expressed in your telegram to me were communicated to the conference delegates. The British indicated they thought
SECRET

This is a top-secret document. The content is not to be shared or disclosed without authorization.

[Redacted text]

[Redacted text]

[Redacted text]

[Redacted text]

[Redacted text]
SFC
This telegram must be close paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MCA)

Moscow
Dated October 30, 1943
Rec'd, 16:50 p.m. 31st

Secretary of State
Washington
1797, October 30, 8 p.m.
SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT AND ACTING SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR.

Last night (Saturday) Stalin invited us to dinner at the Kremlin. It was smaller and more select than the previous two I have attended. There were twelve of us Americans including the four members of the military mission, a similar number from the British, in all a total of about sixty including from the Soviet side all the commissioner members of the defense committee and ranking officers from the three services.

This dinner was also more genuine, genial and intimate. The conversation during and after dinner was free and uninhibited with plenty of humor about past misunderstandings. Stalin appeared to enjoy himself as much as anyone else. During the toasts General Deane stole the show in responding to Stalin's toast "to the American forces" by offering one to the day when advance detachments of American and British troops would meet similar...
-2-1797, October 30, 8 p.m.

similar Soviet forces in the streets of Berlin. Marshal Stalin paid him along the high honor of walking around the table to his seat to click his glass and drink the toast with him personally.

After dinner a film was shown depicting the bitter fight of the Red partisans against the treacherous Japs in Siberia during the revolutionary period of 1919. This film was produced in 1938 and when shown publicly in Moscow evoked a strong protest from the Japanese Ambassador. There was no attempt to obscure the purpose behind the selection of this film.

Stalin seemed genuinely pleased that the Secretary remained to the end for a concert by leading Moscow opera stars. All of the Russians went out of their way to show their hospitality to our party, their appreciation of the Secretary's presence, and their solid satisfaction with the results of the conference.

HARRIMAN
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MCh)

Moscow
Dated October 30, 1943
Recl'd 3:26 a.m., 31st

MAKE NO TRUE COPY
RETURN TO
SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary of State,
Washington,
U.S. URGENT
1793, October 30, 1 p.m.
Dolam 44.
SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ACTING SECRETARY
ONLY FROM THE SECRETARY

At the final formal session of the Conference today a few remaining drafting changes in the resolutions and agreements by the Conference were referred to the Drafting Committee for final settlement. The communiqué to be issued probably on November 1st at a time which will be communicated later, was agreed on in substance. The protocol of the conference which will be secret will indicate the action taken on each item of the agenda. The protocol will be edited by the Drafting Committee and will be signed by the three Foreign Ministers tomorrow. At 6:30 p.m., the Four Nation Declaration was signed by the Three Foreign Ministers and the Chinese Ambassador at Moscow but the fact of its signature
-2- #1793, October 30, 1 p.m. from Moscow

its signature will not be made public until the
communique is published. Other resolutions and
agreements of the Conference which are to be made
public will be released at the same time as the
communique.

The Conference closed with warm expressions.
Molotov thanked Mr. Eden and me for our cooperation
and I replied on our behalf with an expression of
our admiration for the skill with which he conducted
the proceedings and the hospitality and many kindnesses
which we had received at his hands throughout our
stay in Moscow. The Conference closed in an atmosphere
of great friendliness and cordiality.

HARRIMAN

CCP

SEALED SEC.
FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HULL.

YOUR OCT 28TH JUST RECEIVED. I HAVE BEEN KEPT HERE LONGER THAN I HAD EXPECTED AND WILL NOT BE ABLE TO LEAVE BEFORE THE 31ST. UNDER MOST FAVORABLE CONDITIONS I WOULD NOT REACH WASHINGTON PRIOR TO THE 11TH OR 12TH.

I SHALL BE GLAD TO MEET YOU ON THIS SIDE OF THE ATLANTIC AT ANY TIME OR PLACE THAT WOULD SUIT YOUR CONVENIENCE.

I HAVE INCREASING INDICATIONS THAT THE MARSHAL WILL NOT GO BEYOND TEHERAN. I DOUBT SERIOUSLY WHETHER MOLOTOV NOT BEING A MILITARY MAN WOULD BE SENT AS SUBSTITUTE. WITHOUT HIS KNOWLEDGE OF MY PURPOSE I SOUNDED HIM OUT INDIRECTLY.

I WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS THE STALIN MATTER AND HARRIMAN WILL AFTER I LEAVE.

WIRE ME AT TEHERAN AND CAIRO AS TO WHERE YOU DESIRE ME TO MEET YOU.
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

FROM MOLOTOV'S ATTITUDE AT THE CONFERENCE AND FROM WHAT HE SAID AT A PERSONAL VISIT HE PAID ON ME LAST NIGHT I AM CONVINCED THAT THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES ARE BITTERLY DISAPPOINTED AT OUR REACTION TO THEIR REQUEST FOR ITALIAN NAVAL AND MERCHANT VESSELS. MY IMPRESSION IS THAT THEY DESIRE THIS SHIPPING AS A TOKEN TO CONVINCE THEIR PEOPLE OF OUR RECOGNITION OF THE PART THE SOVIET FORCES HAVE PLAYED IN THE COLLAPSE OF ITALY AND AS AN INDICATION THAT OUR THREE COUNTRIES ARE COLLABORATING. I BELIEVE IT IS THEIR FEELING THAT THEY HAVE MADE EVERY EFFORT TO MEET US IN OUR PROPOSALS IN OTHER MATTERS AND ARE AT A LOSS TO UNDERSTAND OUR RELUCTANCE TO MAKE THIS WHAT SEEMS TO THEM SMALL GESTURE, PARTICULARLY AS WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO AGREE TO THEIR ONLY TWO PROPOSALS CONCERNING TURKEY AND SWEDEN. I CANNOT OVEREMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE THEY APPEAR TO PLACE ON THE ACCEPTANCE BY US OF THIS REQUEST AND I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE IN CEMENTING THE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION INITIATED IN THIS CONFERENCE IF AN ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR REQUEST IN PRINCIPAL AT LEAST

SEALLED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVRECS)
COULD BE GIVEN PROMPTLY, EVEN THOUGH THE TECHNICAL QUESTIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE RESERVED FOR DETAILED EXAMINATION AND NEGOTIATION.

FILE........

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
From: Moscow
To: AGWAR
No. 28
29 October 1943

Eden presented Alexanders estimate of Italian situation last night. Stalin asked at once what effect the Italian situation would have on OVERLORD. Eden said that it might or might not have a delaying effect. Stalin felt that Rome should be captured and a defensive line north of Rome should be held while the main effort continued to be OVERLORD although he did indicate that operations might be developed as the second front. He thought a diversion against Southern France would be profitable if we could spare the landing craft. This the first time he has recognized that landing craft exist. Stalin said the Russian victories would not have been possible had not our Italian operations and the threat of a cross channel operation kept forty divisions from the eastern front. Eden and Ismay were elated when they left Stalin because of his reasonable attitude.

After some minor questioning today on OVERLORD by Voroshilov, Molotov suggested that the second front discussion should appear in the report of the conference. He proposed that Ismay's and my statements be included in the record with endorsement by Hull and Eden and the remark that they had been nodded by *.

No Sig

ACTION: JCS (CAPT ROYAL USN)
INFORMATION: OPD GEN ARNOLD SGS ADM KING

CM-IN-18276 (30 Oct 43) 17:53Z

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74 APR 24 1974
By RHP, NLR, Date

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

28-5339/6SCU
October 29, 1943

MEMORANDUM

TO: Miss Grace Tully
FROM: E. R. Stettinius, Jr.

I think the President would like to have this with him tomorrow.

Many thanks!

[Signature]

Attachment
October 29, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

For your convenience I have prepared the attached statement showing the Joint Four Power Declaration as originally approved by you with the changes made at Moscow marked thereon.

Attachment
COMPARATIVE TEXTS OF ORIGINAL AND FINAL DRAFT OF JOINT FOUR-NATION DECLARATION

Explanation: Wording in original and final texts is identical except when indicated as follows:

1. Wording given in parentheses is that of original draft;

2. Changes incorporated in final draft are underlined.

The Governments of the United States of America, (Great Britain) United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China:

united in their determination, in accordance with the Declaration by the United Nations of January 1, 1942, and subsequent declarations, to continue hostilities against those Axis powers with which they respectively are at war until such powers have laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender;

conscious of their responsibility to secure the liberation of themselves and the peoples allied with them from the menace of aggression;

recognizing the necessity of ensuring a rapid and orderly transition from war to peace and of establishing
and maintaining international peace and security with the least diversion of the world's human and economic resources for armaments;

jointly declare:

1. That their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war against their respective enemies, will be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security.

2. That those of them at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy.

3. That they will take all measures deemed by them to be necessary to provide against any violation (requirements) (their present enemies) of the terms imposed upon the enemy.
4. That they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

5. That for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the reestablishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security, they will consult with one (act jointly in behalf of the Community of Nations) and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations with a view to joint action on behalf of the Community of Nations.

6. That after the termination of hostilities they will not employ their military forces within

* This paragraph appeared as paragraph 8 in the original text.
the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation (and agreement)

7. That they will confer and cooperate with [each other] one another and with other members of the United Nations to bring about a practicable general agreement of the burden of armaments for themselves and forment with respect to the regulation of armaments in the world.

the postwar period.

8. (That, in connection with the foregoing purpose, they will establish a technical commission to advise them on the military problems involved, including the composition and strength of the forces available in an emergency arising from a threat to the peace.)

* This paragraph was paragraph 6 of the original text. It was deleted from the final draft of the declaration.
It was my impression that the Soviet delegate was not impressed by our refusal to grant the request for Italian naval and merchant vessels. Both Hull and Eden promised to pursue the subject further upon their return home. I feel certain that the Russians will consider this matter again.

In discussing our attitude toward Poland, Mr. Eden asked the Soviet what their attitude toward Poland would be. Mr. Holovtsov replied that the Russians favored the Polish resistance groups and the present Polish government in exile, but not favoring the present composition. He stated definitely, however, certain sentences that were ambiguous in the draft which we had written. He asked if we could have been accepted as written because they would have been accepted as written, which we shall try and clear up as soon as I return.

In the proceedings of this conference there were no new commitments or promises. The Russian proposal as to what record should be made of this conference were received and translated as written and so is my reply. I have prepared a revised draft which we shall try and clear up as soon as I return.
the Russians want some token to show their people of
the part that their armies played in the defeat of
Italy. They feel that they played a large part although
they were not in at the kill. We do not have a copy of
Admiral Cunningham's agreement regarding Italian naval and
merchant shipping, nor do I recall exactly what it was.
The US refusal to consider this request was based on
sound logic providing the psychological factors receive
full consideration. I know the Russians feel that they
made a great concession to us when they signed the 4
dpower declaration with China enjoying full participation
and I think perhaps they felt that would make some con-
cession to them regarding Italian shipping.

In view of the changed attitude of the Soviet
authorities and their apparent desire to cooperate with
us I recommend that the matter of the Italian shipping
be given reconsideration. I probably have "localities"
but I have been tremendously impressed with the possibili-
ities for cooperation engendered during this conference.

No Sig

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74 /
By RHP, NLR, Date APR 24 1974

ACTION: JC/9 (CAPT. ROYAL USN)
INFORMATION: OPD
GEN. ARNOLD
ADM. KING
LOG
CM-IN-18659 (31 Oct 43) 0242Z cng
From: Moscow
To: AGWAR
No: 28 29 October 1943

From Deane for Joint Chiefs of S.

Eden presented Alexanders estimate of Italian situation last night. Stalin asked at once what effect the Italian Situation would have on OVERLORD. Eden said that it might or might not have a delaying effect. Stalin felt that Rome should be captured and a defensive line north of Rome should be held while the main effort continued to be OVERLORD although he did indicate that operations might be developed as the second front. He thought a diversion against Southern France would be profitable if we could spare the landing craft. This was the first time he has recognized that landing craft exist. Stalin said the Russian victories would not have been possible had not our Italian operations and the threat of a cross channel operation kept forty divisions from the eastern front. Eden and Ismay were elated when they left Stalin because of his reasonable attitude.

After some minor questioning today on OVERLORD by Voroshilov, Molotov suggested that the second front discussion should appear in the report of the conference. He proposed that Ismays and my statements be included in the record with endorsement by Hull and Eden and the remark that they had been noted by the Soviet delegates. Mr Hull asked for their proposal in writing. Ismay and I gave information only concerning QUADRANT decisions on OVERLORD and the Mediterranean and made no commitments of any sort. We emphasized that while QUADRANT reaffirmed TRIDENT, the decisions were subject to change as the situation might dictate. Soviet acceptance of our statements and of possible delays to OVERLORD opens up the possibility

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date APR 24 1974

CM-IN-1369 (3 Nov 43)

COPY No. 17

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24-533948CD
that their attitude on the subject is to some extent reversed because of their recent successes.

Soviet position on Turkey was that her entry into the war would cause more difficulty to Germany than to us. Molotov thought the threat of stopping supply of arms to Turkey would make her enter war. He asked why we are equipping Turkey if we do not want her to fight now when she can do most good. Mr Hull presented US view and adhered to it. He offered to inform the President of Soviet views and subject was dropped pending future considerations by the three heads of Government.

The question of Swedish bases was discussed briefly and held over for future discussion by heads of government.

It seems probable party will leave Sunday if doubtful weather permits.

Grateful for your complete instructions on Soviet bases for shuttle bombing. Will press for immediate discussion following conference.

No Sig

Corrected copy of CM-IN-18276 (30 Oct 43) JCS

ACTION: JCS (CAPT ROYAL USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
SGS
GEN ARNOLD
ADM KING

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date APR 24 1974

CM-IN-1369 (3 Nov 43) 05142 mos

COPY No.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MCI)

Moscow
Dated October 29, 1943
Read 7:30 p.m., 31st.

Copy send by 

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1764, October 29, Midnight.
SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ACTING SECRETARY FROM THE SECRETARY. DELIM NO. 42.

At the regular session today Vyshinski delivered the report of the Drafting Committee concerning their work on the draft proposals for the settling up of (one) the Inter Allied Advisory Council for Italy and (two) the London Commission. With reference to the Inter Allied Advisory Council on Italy Vyshinski in addition to a few minor points of drafting, said that main difficulty was whether this council should be composed of four members namely representatives of the U. S., Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the French Committee of National Liberation, or whether it should be composed of six members to include representatives of Greek and Yugoslav Governments after discussion the question of resolving this difficulty was resubmitted to Drafting Committee.

In regard to (two) the London Committee,

Vyshinski
Vyskiniski pointed out that chief difficulty lay in the terms of reference of this Committee, that in the view of the Soviet delegation this Committee should confine itself in the first instance to the consideration of armistice terms for all European enemy states, in addition he said there was difference of opinion as to the original composition of this Committee, that the English and American representatives on Drifting Committee preferred to confine it in first instance to representatives of the three governments whereas Soviet Government desired to make provision for including other members of the United Nations.

Eden proposed a number of corrections which might meet the Soviet objections but Molotov suggested, which was accepted by the Conference, that the terms of reference to the London Commission be referred back to the Drifting Committee. Molotov then pointed out that in the last message from you to Marshal Stalin in regard to the Politico-Military Commission of Algiers you had expressed yourself in favor of a limited participation by the French Committee. I pointed out that I thought that in your mind there was a distinction between the Politico-Military Committee as originally
as originally proposed for Algiers and the present committee in regard to Italy which was under discussion, that I thought in the first instance it was undesirable to allow voting powers to more than the three principle governments represented. Eden said that originally there were two commissions which we had to consider, the original Political-Military Commission which we felt was now the London Commission, and the advisory council for Italy. Molotov raised objections to the wide scope of terms of reference of the London Commission during this discussion since he felt that under the British draft for this Commission it would be given powers that should rightly belong to the Ambassadors or Foreign Ministers of the three countries. He suggested therefore that the terms of reference of London Commission as well as its composition be confined to the contents of the British memorandum of July 1.

After the
-3½- Oct 29, Midnight, from Moscow

After the intermission the Conference turned to the consideration of the economic proposals which the U. S. delegation had submitted under item 15 of the combined agenda which had already been communicated to the Conference several days ago. These documents which constituted our general views on economic questions provided for (A) the question of international participation in the rehabilitation of the devastated regions of the USSR (B) joint action on the part of the three governments for assistance to other United Nations. (C) international cooperation in such matters as food, agriculture, transport, finance and trade (D) general principles affecting the question of reparations from enemy countries. In introducing
these documents I pointed out that they merely represented the preliminary views of my government and reflected the results of studies which had been made in Washington on these most important economic questions.

Molotov in general expressed himself in agreement with the first three measures but offered certain objections to the views set forth in the fourth paper concerning reparations.

I expressed the view that it would be a great mistake for the representatives of the three governments here to neglect consideration of these vital economic matters until the end of hostilities. Since I recalled that one of the great failures of the Versailles Peace Conference was the fact that economic questions were not given sufficient preparation and that the world had suffered accordingly. Molotov asked a number of questions as to our proposal to set up a commission in regard to reparations. He said that since his government was unable to agree in full with the document submitted by the U. S. delegation on the general question of reparations he had some doubt as to the advisability of a special commission to study that question without a clearer indication of the principles which they should follow in their work. I explained that the American document submitted
had been little more than a preliminary outline of the subject which had been submitted in order to acquaint the British and Soviet Governments with our line of thinking on these questions and to make sure that the importance of the economic aspects of international collaboration would not be lost sight of to our present preoccupations. It was decided by the Conference that the U. S. document on reparations would be given further study.

I then said that I had circulated to the Conference a document concerning dependent peoples but I understood that time was short and that it probably would not be possible to discuss that question at this meeting. Eden said confirming a personal letter which he had written me that his government had not had time to consider the full implications of this document but in general it could not agree with its contents, Molotov said that he would like to consider further this question to which the Soviet Government attached very great importance.

The Conference then turned to the consideration of the question of Poland. Eden stated that it was a matter of great regret to the British Government that no diplomatic relations existed between the Soviet Union
Union and Poland both members of the United Nations. He said that if there was any contribution which this conference could make for the reestablishment of those relations he was prepared to do what he could. He mentioned that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had recently received a request from the Polish Government to supply arms to the Polish underground movement for the purpose of carrying on sabotage and other activities against the German occupation forces but that no decision had been reached on this request because of the desire of the British Government to consult with the Soviet Government.

Molotov said that on any question of supplying arms to the Poles the most important aspect was whether those arms would fall into reliable hands. He said that from the Soviet point of view the relations with Poland or any Polish Government were very important since Poland was a neighboring state and that therefore it was one which concerned primarily the Soviet and Polish Governments. He stated that the Soviet Government stood definitely for the independence of Poland but it also desired to see a Polish Government which entertained friendly
-7- #1784, October 29, Midnight, from Moscow

friendly feelings towards the Soviet Government. He added that it was precisely this element which was lacking in the Polish Government in exile. He went on to say that there were other nations through no fault of the Soviet Union which did not maintain relations with them but in the case of Poland he felt that it was a matter of direct concern to Poland and the Soviet Union.

I then said that when neighbors fell out without going into the causes of the dispute we nevertheless felt entitled to express the hope that these differences would be composed and the two neighbors would resume friendly relations. Molotov said his government felt exactly the same in regard to Poland. I then pointed out that in the U.S. we had groups who were very friendly towards Poland and others who were very friendly towards the Soviet Union and that their only desire was to see relations established.

Eden agreed
Eden agreed with my observations and said that their position was even more difficult since the British Government had treaties with both Poland and the Soviet Union. He went on to say that the Polish Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister just before his departure from London had expressed the desire to establish friendly relations with the Soviet Union. Molotov said that the Soviet Government had not been informed of this desire and he merely wished to add that the Polish Division on the Polish Division on the German front was fighting heroically against the common enemy.

Eden then pointed out that there would be other Polish divisions engaged in our common struggle and that any delay in their participation was due to the British belief that these troops were insufficiently trained and not to any lack of desire on the part of the Polish military leaders.

In answer to my inquiry, Molotov said that the four nation declaration might be signed at the end of the session tomorrow. He then referred to his proposal that there be set up a commission of representatives of the three powers here to work out a plan
out a plan for a world organization in accordance with Article Four of the declaration. I said that
I was in complete sympathy with the aims suggested by Molotov, but that I felt that our joint desire
might best be achieved without setting up a special commission which might attract undesirable publicity
and that the same aim could be accomplished by informal
exchanges in one or another of our three capitals. Molotov accepted this suggestion and turned to the
question of the Italian ships. He said that he did
not consider that the reply of the United States
which I had submitted was very satisfactory since
to refer this question to a meeting of the three
heads of state, which was still very indefinite,
would appear to postpone a decision of this matter.
I pointed out that in suggesting the reference of
the matter to the three heads of state was merely
one of the means by which it might be settled and
I personally on my return to Washington would
be more than glad to take up this question with
my government in the event that the meeting of
the three heads of state was long delayed.

The Conference then adjourned until tomorrow
at four o'clock.

WASHINGTON

WKC

HARRISON
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MCA)

Secretary of State
Washington

1755, October 28, 8 a.m.
SECRET FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY FROM MCDERMOTT
DELAN No. 35.

American and British correspondents in Moscow are very patient and cooperative despite decision to withhold news until end of conference. At appropriate time they expect to have first page stories and want to be first to break news of results in the U.S. and Great Britain. They have had difficulties in the past because Berlin picked up their news radiograms in transmission and immediately broadcast distortions of the news. Correspondents and delegations believe that following plan will give them the desired break and circumvent Berlin. Delegations will wire State Department and Foreign Office texts of statements, declarations, etc., as far in advance as possible. Later Department will be informed which texts will be made public. Texts will be available to correspondents in Moscow but they will not transmit them depending on their
2-1738, October 28, 8 a.m., from Moscow

their colleagues in Washington and London to get them from State Department and Foreign Office. Correspondents here will confine themselves to interpretations, general roundups, overall coverage, atmosphere of conference etcetera. Transmission time may take as long as seven hours. Meantime Berlin will take transmissions. It is suggested that Department discuss this problem with Elmer Davis, Byron Price, press associations and broadcasting companies and request that anything from Berlin or Moscow radios received in advance of correspondents' stories be voluntarily withheld from publication or rebroadcast pending arrival of Moscow stories. Every American correspondent will ask his editor to notify the Department immediately his story reaches the newspaper. Department is requested not to make texts available until three such notifications shall have been received and then to release pertinent texts immediately.

We are confident everybody will be glad to cooperate. Please report reaction. Please keep Elmer Davis confidentially informed regarding publicity plans.

SECRET

To assure security of British and American delegations it is most important that nobody say anything about closing date of conference until I wire Department
-2- 1758. October 28, 8 a.m., 8 a.m., from Moscow

Department. I shall also at same time wire Embassy, Moscow, after which press stories will be released by Soviet censorship.

Please request Byron Price to contact army, navy, British and Brazilian censorships to make doubly sure nothing is printed or transmitted regarding movements of American delegation.

HARRIMAN

EMB