

MR
R-100

Folder 1. MR 300 Spain, Portugal, Azores (2)
Sec. 1—Occupation of the Azores,
18 May 1943—17 November 1944.

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED] HR
PRIORITY

From: US Military Attache, Lisbon, Portugal

To: War Department

No: 516 17 November 1944

To MILID Washington, DC. 516 further to my 514 for Bissell George and Arnold.

Upon closer scrutiny of Chancery cable file I find that in Norweb's recent cables to State dealing with the controversial passage concerning "Direct Participation" the words "it is expected that" have been omitted.

I wish to have it clearly understood that, in suggesting that our commitment, if any, would not be strengthened by substitution of "will" for "may", I have not contemplated elimination of "it is expected" without which phrase the context places whatever conditional complex it contained and becomes definite insofar as working out of plans is concerned.

I believe therefore that should JCS agree to the compromise the words "it is expected" should be left in. I fully appreciate that we are now dealing with "finesse" of language but at this late stage of negotiations, short of cancelling everything that has been said and done and reopening the whole matter on a different basis and under different circumstances, there is nothing else left to do.

Solberg

FOOTNOTE: 514 is CM IN 14489 (15 Nov 44) CG AAF
ACTION: CG AAF
INFO : OPD, G-2, Col Park, Log
CM-IN-17511 (18 Nov 44) 1009Z m/m

[REDACTED]
DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 5-8-72
DEC 30 1972

Spain
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SECRET "UHR"

From: U.S. Military Attache, Lisbon, Portugal
To: War Department
No. 514 15 November 1944
For Bissell George and Arnold 514

As to observation contained your 60947 relative to Ambassador's statement in his 3291 to State, he requests me convey to you as follows:

"I appreciate the opportunity for this exchange of views especially when we are of the same mind as to Portuguese tactics and shabby neutrality. In the light of this and of the whole back ground you will understand that my observation of what Hull referred to in your message did not reflect an overall opinion but was in relation to the recently revised texts and to the fact that unless necessary changes strengthening one side and weakening the other prolong discussion and work against prompt settlement. At all events we now have a firm basis for an agreement the work is going ahead and the end is in sight."

I concur in Ambassadors view that firm basis for agreement exists embodying "juridicial position" so close to Salazars heart and supplying US with the primary and all important objective namely unrestricted use command and control of Santa Maria major air base. I feel that our commitments, if any, re Timor operation is not strengthened by the proposed substitution of "plans will be worked out" for "plans may be worked out" as entire phraseology of pertinent passage is conditional and plans which will be worked

CM-IN-14489 (15 Nov 44)

SECRET

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SECRET "UHR"

Page -2-

From: U.S. Military Attache, Lisbon, Portugal
No. 514 15 November 1944

out" as entire phraseology of pertinent passage is conditional and plans which will be worked out may never be utilized. I also feel that reference to commercial company contract in the Santa Maria agreement is innocuous and in this respect I should recommend that immediately after consumation of agreements US Army uniforms begin to make their appearance on the island as a prelude to substitution of military for civilian personnel. I believe that this operation taken in easy stages will gradually serve to painlessly remove the cover.

In view of the foregoing and the fact that under existing circumstances maximum has been obtained from Salazar I recommend that the Ambassador be authorized to exchange signatures forthwith. Norwebs message 3953 to State please see.

Solborg

3291 1s OM-IN-28855 (31 Oct 44) G-2

ACTION: CG AAF

INFO : OPD
G-2
COL PARK
C OF S

OM-IN-14489 (15 Nov 44) 1800Z mcs

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AFATC/OG/RGP/ adn
Robert G Payne, Lt Col., AC
73018

10 November 1944

Military Attache
American Embassy
Lisbon, Portugal.

Number: WAR 60947

To Solborg from George and Arnold.

Drafts re Santa Maria and Timor as finally approved by Joint Chiefs have been forwarded to Norweb (see States 2903 of 8 November).

In Norweb's 3291 to State he comments upon advance copies of the drafts by stating in effect "The US position appears in all respects to seek to obtain considerably more than is promised by US". We do not concur in such an analysis. We seek a temporary airbase on Santa Maria for use in connection with the prosecution of the Pacific war. Portugal has a considerable stake that is dependent upon our winning such war. Upon this consideration alone Portugal should be anxious to furnish us the facility in question. In addition we will have the use of the airfield for a comparatively short period of time, whereas Portugal, while paying only a small fraction of the cost of the field, will enjoy its use permanently. We are familiar with Salazar's stated position that he prefers Lagens as the primary field for post war use. While we attach little weight to such position (an obvious one while Santa Maria negotiations are in progress) he might be reminded that we also built Lagens. These considerations should be called to Norweb's attention.

While the Timor paper may not give Salazar all the assurances he would like to have, it should furnish his "Juridical basis". For that matter, the Santa Maria agreement,

CN-OUT-60947

(1) Nov 44)

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WAR 60947

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which contains substantial consideration moving to both countries, forms ample legal basis in itself. In this connection you might find it opportune in your discretion to indicate that we find it difficult to understand why a nation, whose territory (Timor) has been overrun by foreign troops, feels that it must have additional justification for taking steps (furnishing airbase facilities at Santa Maria) to recover its own territory.

Let us have your full report of developments.

Ed End

ORIGINATOR: CG AAF

INFORMATION: JC/S
OPD
G-2
C of S

CM-OUT-60947

(11 Nov 44)

0109Z hrt

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**TOP
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TOP SECRET UHR

URGENT

From: US Military Attache, Lisbon, Portugal

To: War Department

No: 494

24 October 1944

494 TOPSEC to Bissell for Arnold and Handy from Chaney.

Ourselves and British made no recommendations in our own report for Combined Chiefs. This our 7th msg on staff talks last being 493. Each group will make such recommendations to its joint chiefs as it considers appropriate. We had reasons to believe and fully expected to have a satisfactory agreement on Santa Maria as to its use and control as well as its construction by this time and our recommendations to joint chiefs would be based thereon. From a purely military point of view the transportation of a Portuguese force to theater of operations in my opinion would not contribute to war effort and on those grounds alone we would recommend against it.

In our report to Combined Chiefs we set forth following decisions required from Combined Chiefs if a decision is made that a Portuguese expeditionary force is acceptable to the Allies:

- A. Will Allies provide vehicles, facilities, supplies and equipment requested.
- B. Can force be trained in theater.
- C. Should air component be included.
- D. What Portuguese shipping will be required.
- E. Which military force will be acceptable.

493 is CM-IN-22437 (24 Oct 44) GEN ARNOLD

Solberg

ACTION: GEN ARNOLD

INFO : GEN HULL, GEN BISSELL, ADM KING, C OF S

CM-IN-23016 (24 Oct 44) 2141Z mcs

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ACTION: F-1

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SECRET "UHR"

From: US Military Attache Lisbon, Portugal

To: War Department

No: 461 4 October 1944

461 for Bissell.

Per talk I had today with Carvalhaes it seems probable Salazar seriously considering rupture with Japan. Source says Salazar is working on important paper which he will present to National Assembly convoked for 23 October. Carvalhaes Salazar expects staff talks to terminate Oct 15 and that timing is not coincidental.

Carvalhaes obviously called to receive reaction on Global proposal presented our Embassy by Port Govt last Manday. I told him that I felt our Govt will find it extremely difficult to adopt favorable attitude on Global demands in light of Salazars refusal to allow US to proceed with construction on Santa Maria. They will further look askance I added at Salazars determined stand on this obvious and logical question after having authorized large quantities of materiel to be landed which he knows are destined for other than Pan Air Project.

ACTION: G-2

Solborg

INFO : CGAAF, OPD, Col. Park C of S

CM-IN- 4478 (5 Oct 44) 07322 wk

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PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM FOR INFO WAR DEPARTMENT

From: American Embassy, Lisbon

To : Secretary of State

No : 3013

28 September 1944

The conclusions drawn from a careful review of the Santa Maria project file are:

A connection between Portugal's desire to participate in liberating Timor, which was to be the subject of the staff conversations, and our desires regarding the Santa Maria project was finally fixed in Salazar's mind as soon as the CCS decision was made known to him. (Refer Embassy's 2236, July 19, 9 p.m.). It was apparent as his thoughts developed in this direction that he foresaw the staff conversations as a way of clarifying his mind regarding general relations with Japan and the liberation of Timor on the one hand and the Santa Maria project on the other, and that both phases constituted one important problem. We believe that he is therefore linking these two questions together and arriving at "you grant my requests and I will grant yours."

In the present circumstances and in view of the somewhat restricted directives of both the British and American missions it would seem that we must develop some formula as a consequent of the staff talks which will be satisfactory to the Prime Minister regarding the participation of Portugal in Timor's liberation which could then be presented to Salazar through diplomatic channels before the mission leaves. This procedure is suggested provided Salazar would in turn reciprocate by furnishing us with the necessary assurances for construction, use, and control of the Santa Maria airbase.

CM-IN-1650 (2 Oct 44)

SECRET

Col Park

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Page 2

From: American Embassy, Lisbon

No : 3013

28 September 1944

If we have put the right interpretation on Salazar's thinking as reflected in my last conversation with Sampayo and in the views exchanged in the staff talks, we have reason to hope that the Santa Maria question may be solved favorably, provided I can be directed to give that Prime Minister some sort of assurance at the conclusion of the staff conversations, that his desires re the liberation of Timor will be realized. Of course I am aware of the fact that the CCS would necessarily have to approve these formal assurances and that it is hardly possible to receive this approval in the short time left before the end of staff talks. Salazar, however, may be satisfied with a written assurance from me that the American mission--as distinct from the British--will recommend to the JCS acceptance of the formula to be arrived at. To me, this would be practically the same as eventual approval by the CCS, unless the British wanted to assume the burden of blocking Salazar on the Timor question.

It is therefore largely a question of timing--we want to receive the required authorization from Salazar on the Santa Maria project before approval of the matters resolved in staff conversations, whereas Salazar wants simultaneous agreement on the two questions.

I believe that the entire matter will be brought to a satisfactory conclusion if a concerted effort is made to settle the above questions (re Department's 2611, September 27th). The question brought up on Colonel Solborg's 445, September 24, forms a part of the whole problem which we

CM-IN-1650 (2 Oct 44)

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From: American Embassy, Lisbon

No : 3013

28 September 1944

are now trying to settle.

End

2236 is CM-IN-20313 (24 Jul 44) Gen Arnold

ACTION: Gen Handy

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
Gen Bissell
Col Park
CofS

CM-IN-1650 (2 Oct 44) 2014Z bjm

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PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM
FOR INFO WAR DEPARTMENT

From: American Embassy, Lisbon

To : Secretary of State

No : 3008

28 September 1944

At a meeting held on September 27 the senior members of the American and British Delegations informally discussed with Admiral Botelho Sousa the considerations introduced by Paragraph 5 of the first Portuguese Paper along with Paragraph 10 in the addendum to their second paper (Embassy's 2948, September 22, noon). It appears from this discussion (which the Admiral has agreed to confirm in writing) that the matter in its technical aspect has been satisfactorily adjusted.

In other words, the Admiral agrees that any Portuguese troops sent to Timor would be placed under the overall Far Eastern Command. The Portuguese would also allow the Allies to use Timor as an operating base. Admiral Sousa also revealed that he recognized that as soon as Portuguese troops left Mozambique Portugal would cease to be a neutral.

Politically, the question of the time element regarding a break in Portuguese-Japanese relations remains the same. From our standpoint, however, the sooner Portuguese troops are on their way the better--so far as Portuguese-Japanese relations are concerned.

ACTION: Gen Handy
INFORMATION: Gen Arnold, Gen Bissell, ^{Norvah} Col Park, CofS

OM-IN-1655 (2 Oct 44)

2015Z bjm

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US

SECRET - UHR

From: US Military Attache, Lisbon, Portugal
To: War Department
No: 437 15 September 1944
For Bissell WDGBI 437.

Salient points of Wednesday's conversation Norweb Salazar are communicated for attn those concerned.

Answering Norweb's query if rumors of Japs willingness to evacuate Timor are founded in truth, Prime Minister answered that he had approached Jap Minister with such a request but received noncommittal procrastinating answer. Further answering Norweb's question whether in light of above approach staff talks should take place as planned Salazar answered in affirmative.

Salazar expressed appreciation of importance we attach to Santa Maria and stated his interest in outcome of staff talks on Timor. When pressed by Ambassador on subject of Santa Maria he stated he was unaware of any delays in work now in progress and added he knew of no request for action which had not been satisfied. He agreed that piece meal settlement of operational details on Santa Maria was not the best procedure and stated that after receipt from us of a master plan with full details he will examine whole project afresh and will try to develop a new approach to Santa Maria problem which could then be reduced to a written formula presumably embodying all aspects of situation including use of island.

CM-IN-14245 (15 Sep 44)

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Col Park
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Page 2.

From: US Military Attache Lisbon Portugal

No: 437

15 September 1944

Ambassador reconfirmed time is of essence and brought to Salazar's attention Quebec Conference now in progress largely concerned with far eastern problems. Statement relative to work progress on Santa Maria is not consonant with General Smith's anxiety expressed to Colonel Serrano as reported to Ambassador. Clarification would seem desirable.

B. While holding out little hope for diplomatic settlement with Japs of Timor question Salazar nonetheless considers this approach in conjunction with staff talks as trumps in his favor.

C. Re use and control of Santa Maria his policy continues to be one of asking us to adopt his line of thought and to place trust in his equity of judgment. His declared willingness however to reduce to written form all aspects of Santa Maria situation conveys the hopeful sign that his resistance is being gradually overcome.

It would be helpful for us to know the nature of requests made by Smith to Serrano and when they were made also if any of them have so far been satisfied. Preliminary investigation at Port War Office fails to reveal any other items than those pertaining to construction of Port.

This message Ambassador and Gen Cheney have seen.
Solberg

ACTION: G-2

INFO: CG AAP

OPD

COL PARK

LOG

CM-IN-14245 (15 Sep 44) 1953Z mcs

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From: US Military Attache Lisbon, Portugal

To: War Department

No: 386 1 Aug 1944

TOP SECRET 386 for Bissell WDGBI.

Contents 71539 from you thoroughly discussed with Norweb and Culbertson before latter's departure today via North Africa. Chancery contends approval of staff talks presupposed that they would be used as aid to obtain US control and use of airfield therefore reluctance to proceed on this basis is considered as reversing stand previously held by War Dept I represented contrary view endeavored to explain that while CCOFS action was released by War Dept to us so that it may be used as lever in direct negotiations with Salazar it was never War Dept's intention nor was it implied in any cables that control and use of Santa Maria should form part of agenda for staff talks. However whether or not strategy employed in negotiations with Salazar made sufficient capital out of CCOFS release and whether timing was psychological becomes now a matter of conjecture which flows in stream of proverbial water over dam.

Two hard facts facing us now:

A. Put ratchet behind construction wheel by making the work on Santa Maria project proceed apace.

B. Leave no stone unturned to force Salazar's early commitment in our favor on use and control of field.

CM-IN-913 (2 Aug 44)

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Col Park

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From: US Military Attache Lisbon, Portugal
No: 386 1 Aug 1944

Re B I am compelled to conclude after my last conference in Ambassadors office that on level available to us at this end no further demarche of normal persuasive nature will hasten Salazars unequivocal decision. Our approaches to this task are limited now to two factors:

Trend in war and staff talks.

Collapse of Germany and or Port embroglio with Japan should force Salazars hand without delay.

On the other hand since discussion of use and control of field between military staffs seems to be closed to Salazars heads I can see in it possibility of turning matters to our profit without allowing British participants to reopen decisions previously arrived at. I can conceive Chief of American Mission who should be chairman of proceedings informally arrange with Brits to devote required number meetings with Ports alone at which time use and control only would be treshed out. Since Port officers are in favor of US control I can see a situation arising where wholly satisfactory recommendation may be submitted to Salazar eliciting his immediate decision. In other words I see a possibility of vesting the informal and behind closed doors discussions I am now leading with Port officers with cloak of official deliberations.

From the foregoing it will be seen why I have insisted on the caliber and briefing of officers who may be selected for this mission. In addition to the purely technical information to be obtained reur 65065 a task of diplomatic nature is to be performed which will require a

CM-IN-913 (2 Aug 44)

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From: US Military Attache Lisbon, Portugal
No: 386 1 Aug 1944

leader capable of gaining confidence of the Port, knowledge of handling the British and interpreting Ambassadors over all wishes. No mean job but it can be done.

Long left this morning with Culbertson. Serrano expected leave by Clipper on next flight or by Port Liberator event delay Clippers departure.

Solborg

ACTION: GEN BISSELL
INFO : GEN ARNOLD
GEN HANDY
COL PARK
MR STIMSON
C OF S

CM-IN-913 (2 Aug 44) 0342Z mos

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From: US Military Attache, Lisbon, Portugal

To: War Department

No: 371

26 July 1944

Top sec 371 for Bissell WDGBI.

Result today's conference Norweb Culbertson Salazar. Prime Minister accepted Panairs tender and authorized immediate construction Santa Maria Airfield. This will be embodied in his letter of acceptance expected tomorrow here use and control Salazar appreciates our wishes but maintains his previous stand requesting we bear in mind his methodical manner of handling things. In other words what he meant to convey as reported by Amb and Culbertson was that having said A Survey B Construction, by implication C Decision on use and control will follow.

Request you communicate rest this cable to Panair.

Salazar desires Serrano leave for Terceira earliest possible where boat will be made available for him and our group to proceed Santa Maria. Therefore Long Serrano and Culbertson leaving here July 31 for Casa where please clear priority for Long and Culbertson to fly to US via Legens forthwith. Request you make nec arrangements with Algiers for Serrano transit Casablanca enroute Legens. Long returning home in order prepare detailed contract agreement

CM-IN-21886

(26 Jul 44)

TOP SECRET

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From: US Military Attache, Lisbon, Portugal

No: 371

26 July 1944

with plans and specifications in accordance with Salazar requirements.

Solberg

ACTION: Gen Arnold

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Bissell
Col Park
Log

CM-IN-21886

(26 Jul 44)

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PARAPHRASE OF STATE DEPARTMENT CABLE

From: AmEmbassy, Lisbon

To : Secretary of State

No : 2236 (Section 1)

19 Jul 1944

The Prime Minister and I have just concluded a three-hour conversation.

He informed me that he was most disturbed at being confronted with a request for answers to the two questions I had put to him in my note and said that I must remember the always-present consideration of Portuguese-Japanese neutrality. As far as construction is concerned, he told me that he was ready to ask Panair to move forward at once but within the restrictions of his memorandum of July 14th to Long. He could not issue orders for construction, however, until Panair had resolved their estimate into a final tender stipulating the costs. He stated that, although he fully understood that Panair must secure materials and personnel from the Government of the United States and while Panair might properly be considered by me as a guise, he would have to continue dealing with Panair alone so that his action might be justified to Japan and Germany with the defense that he was merely negotiating a commercial transaction with a private company of America. He further stated that Colonel Serrano had been instructed to prepare the Santa Maria emergency landing field and that this operation could commence at once without writing for Panair's presentation of costs for the construction of the principal airbase.

Concerning the problem of ultimate control and use, he indicated that this should be the chief topic of discussion during the coming staff talks. Although he appreciated the fact that the United States Government was pledging itself for a great deal in entering into promises as to

CM-IN-20313

(24 Jul 44)

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Col Stark

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From: AmEmbassy, Lisbon

No : 2236

19 July 1944

personnel, supplies, and materials, still we would have to trust to luck in this connection counting on the many times he had indicated in previous conversations with me that all roads were leading to the possibility that the ultimate control and use could be settled to our satisfaction. In relation to this he cited the inclusion in his memo of the long runways as indicating his understanding of the aims of the Santa Maria operation. He stated that although he was trying through diplomatic channels to persuade Japan to return Timor to the Portuguese, he was not properly able now to give us the affirmative reply which we wished in connection with the question of control and use of the airbase.

SECTION 2

We reviewed the whole history of our discussions on this topic and at one point I hinted that we had been given grounds for assuming certain particulars which were developing in our interview today as not completely justified at this time, but I could not move him from his attitude regarding "Juridical" neutrality towards the Japanese.

In conclusion, he restressed his desire to commence construction as soon as possible and said that the main goal during the staff conversations would be to decide when and how the United States Government could avail itself of the Santa Maria facilities.

I told the Prime Minister that I very much doubted if the United States Government would approve, even in view of the information he had furnished me today as to the working of his mind for the future, taking a risk on such an immense operation involving the placement

CM-IN-20313

(24 Jul 44)

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From: AmEmbassy, Lisbon

No : 2236

19 July 1944

of a vast amount of shipping, materials and personnel from other areas in need merely in the hope that the situation would ultimately result to our satisfaction. I concluded by saying that I would naturally inform my Government and he replied that he would be glad to see me after I had received some indication of how my Government felt.

In my opinion, the Prime Minister is in hopes that a defeat of Germany will solve his problem before the question of use of the airbase arises, in which case he could then grant all our requests with no risk whatsoever.

With the time element in view, we are fixing a cost figure tonight which will cover the construction of the field as defined within the restrictions of the Prime Minister's memorandum of July 14th to Long. I plan to communicate this figure to Dr. Salazar tomorrow and tell him that if he approves I will telegraph my Government recommending agreement to it and authorization to Panair accordingly. I will ask him at the same time whether he will request Panair to commence construction immediately if Washington agrees to this figure. In the event that he replies affirmatively, I believe, judging from my conversation today, that the War Dept may want to weigh the advantages of forwarding instructions to Panair to present the Portuguese Government immediately with a formal tender; such action is considered on the basis of the foregoing and would enable construction to be commenced forthwith, thus establishing a definite footing on Santa Maria.

Norweb

ACTION: General Arnold
INFO : OPD
General Bissell
Colonel Park
Log

CM-IN-20313

(24 Jul 44)

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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	FX-38	EXTENSION NUMBER	3858	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	COMINCH	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE			1
RELEASED BY	R. S. EDWARDS	FOR ACTION	CINCLANT	PRIORITY	2
DATE	28 JULY 1944		COM 12TH FLT	DEFERRED	3
TOB CODEROOM	0002/21	INFORMATION	COMAFLANT	PRIORITY	4
DECODED BY			COMNAVZOR	DEFERRED	5
PARAPHRASED BY	O'LEARY/Comer		COMORSEAFRON	DEFERRED	6
ROUTED BY	HARRINGTON	ADMIRALTY			7
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.					
			281900Z	NCR 45691	IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
					<input type="checkbox"/>
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME			GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

TEMPORARY DUTY ASSIGNMENT VB-114 MY 121458 FEB NOT TO ALL CANCELLED. CINCLANT ESTABLISH THAT SQUADRON IN AZORES AS LANTFLT A/S UNIT UNDER BRITISH OPERATIONAL CONTROL WITH 6 AIRCRAFT AND 9 FLIGHT CREWS CONTINUING TEMPORARY DUTY IN FAIRWING 7. COMORSEAFRON 181355 OF JUNE REFERS. AIRCRAFT IN AZORES SHALL BEAR BRITISH AIRCRAFT MARKINGS IN ADDITIONS TO US MARKINGS. WHEN SQUADRON IS OPERATIONALLY READY IN AZORES COM12THFLT DIRECT COMNAVZOR REPORT CINCLANT FOR DUTY AS MY 071338 OF JANUARY.

ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:

RAFDEL...BADO...ARMY(COS USA)...19...
 COMINCH...ORIG 19C...201...CNO...
 OP03...12...13...16...38...31...32...34...36...39...
 BUORD...BUAER...BUPERS...BUSANDA...BUIED...NAVAIDE...

ACTION	
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SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPRAY 18-07-3as Spain

TOP SECRET DISPATCH

DRAFTER		EXT.	ADDRESSEES		PRECEDENCE
FROM: ONO			ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE		1
RELEASED BY: HORNE			FOR ACTION	ALUSNA LISBON	PRIORITY 2
DATE: 19 JULY 44 17 JULY 44					ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROO: 1845					DEFERRED 4
DECODED BY: BECKMAN/LYNN			INFORMATION		BASEGRAM 5
PARAPHRASED BY: WIDMAN	CHECKED BY: WIDMAN				PRIORITY 6
BY: WIDMAN	BY: WIDMAN				ROUTINE 7
ROUTED BY: WIDMAN	DITTOED BY: WIDMAN				DEFERRED 8
					BASEGRAM 9
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.					10
191845 NOR 4523					11
					IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW 12
					<input type="checkbox"/> 13
Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP				(Use G. C. T.)	

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

REGARDING FAR EAST QUESTIONS YOUR 082030 NY
 131320 PENDING FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS YOU WILL BE GUIDED
 BY WAR 65065 OF 14 JULY TO MA LISBON SIGNED BISSELL.
 ADD TO ITEM A AS MATTER OF PRIMARY IMMEDIATE INTEREST
 ENTRY NAVY SQUADRON INTO LAGENS. KEEP NAVY DEPARTMENT
 ADVISED CURRENTLY OF CONVERSATIONS REGARDING FAR EAST
 MATTER.

ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:

13(#1)...ORIG
 COMINCH(2-9)...16(#10)...**NAVAIDE(#11-12)**...

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM No. 4 SPECIAL

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET DISPATCH

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	ALUSNA LISBON	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION	PRIORITY
DATE	19 JULY 1944		ROUTINE
TOX CODEROM	0105/19		DEFERRED
DECODED BY	BEECHLER	INFORMATION	BASEGRAM
PARAPHRASED BY	REEGAN CHECKED REEGAN		PRIORITY
BY	BY		ROUTINE
ROUTED BY	REEGAN DITTOED REEGAN		DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			BASEGRAM
181830 NCR 5390			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
			<input type="checkbox"/>

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

Azores.

(LISBON TO CNO TOP SECRET)

US AMBASSADOR HAS RECEIVED WRITTEN NOTE FROM PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT GRANTING REQUEST FOR US NAVY SQUADRON TO OPERATE ON TERCEIRA. SQUADRON TO CONTINUE OPERATING AS PART OF COASTAL BOMBER COMMAND UNDER BRITISH COMMANDING OFFICER. PLANES MUST BEAR BRITISH MARKINGS BUT MAY HAVE US MARKINGS IN ADDITION. AMBASSADOR SEEING SALAZAR 19TH AT 1700 TO DISCUSS OTHER PENDING MATTERS.

ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:

16(#1)....ACTION

COMINCH(#2-#9)....13(#10)....NAVAIDE(#11-#12)....

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM

No. 4 SPECIAL

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OPNAV 19-78

3as Spain

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TOP SECRET

**TOP
SECRET**

Military Intelligence
Division G-2 JW/dwj
72577

14 July 1944

Military Attache
American Legation
Lisbon, Portugal

Number WAR 63065

Signed Bissell

Arrangements made by Norweb with Salazar for Military Attache and Naval Attache to conduct preliminary orientation talks with Portuguese military representatives regarding Timor and for follow through by representatives of the War and Navy Departments have been noted. This subject and the question of instructions to be issued to any representatives that may be designated must be presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for decision. Meanwhile, with reference to the preliminary conversations, you will be guided by the following:

(A) Our primary immediate interest is to secure the United States airbase requested on Santa Maria. This must be approved at once to permit construction this year. Your conversations with Portuguese regarding Timor should be delayed, if possible, until Salazar has authorized this base. The US request for a Santa Maria airbase should not be linked with these discussions in any way that would permit Salazar to further delay pending final outcome of such discussions.

(B) Pending further instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you will confine your discussions to inquiry regarding the nature, extent and timing or participation envisaged by the Portuguese in the military operations in question. Within this framework you may develop

CM-OUT-65065 (14 Jul 44)

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**TOP
SECRET**

Number WAR 65065

Page 2

information regarding:

1. Portugese forces available for use in any Timor operation;
2. Training and state of fitness of such forces;
3. Equipment and supplies of such forces including reserves and resources for continuous supply;
4. Shipping available to transport forces to the Southwest Pacific Area, to continue to supply such forces, and to participate in any amphibious operations that may be undertaken against Timor.

(C) You will keep the War Department advised currently of conversations re this subject.

The foregoing will indicate that any preliminary discussions will be concerned entirely with Portugese capabilities. These conversations are exploratory and will involve no commitments whatever.

For your information, but not to be disclosed to Portugese, it is questionable whether the Joint Chiefs of Staff will at any time permit the disclosure to the Portugese of plans for future operations in the Southwest Pacific Area and if it is decided that Portugese forces are to be employed in a Timor operation, it is probable that they would be made available to the Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area, to be employed by him in the same manner that he now employs US, Australian, New Zealand and Dutch forces in operations developed by his planning staff

End.

ORIGINATOR: Gen Bissell
INFORMATION: JC/S Adm King
 Gen Arnold Adm Leahy
 OPD Log

OM-OUT-65065 (14 Jul 44) 2053Z ss

TOP SECRET

42

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TOP SECRET DISPATCH

DRAFTER	OP13/EAH	EXT.	2612	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE		
FROM	CNO	FOR ACTION		ALUSNA LISBON	PRIORITY 1		
RELEASED BY	L. HOWE				ROUTINE RRRRRR 2		
DATE	13 JULY 1944				DEFERRED 4		
TOX CODEROM	131441				BASEGRAM 5		
DECODED BY	FISHER	FOR INFORMATION			BASEGRAM 6		
PARAPHRASED BY	BALDWIN				CHECKED BY	BALDWIN	PRIORITY 9
ROUTED BY	BALDWIN				DITTOED BY	BALDWIN	ROUTINE 10
							DEFERRED 11
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.					BASEGRAM 12		
131320					BASEGRAM 13		
NCR 3433					IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW		
					<input type="checkbox"/>		

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

REPLYING TO YOUR ~~082030~~ RESTATEMENT OF PRESENT NECESSITY FOR NAVY SQUADRON IN AZORES HAS BEEN FURNISHED STATE DEPARTMENT FOR TRANSMISSION TO AMBASSADOR NORWEB. REGARDING FAR EAST QUESTIONS THERE ARE NO INSTRUCTIONS FOR NAVAL ATTACHE AT PRESENT.

ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:

- 13(#1).....ORIG
- COMINCH(#2-9)....16(#10)....NAVAIDE(#11).....

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OPNAV 19-78 *For Spain*

17

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DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	ALUSNA LISBON	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION CNO	PRIORITY 2
DATE	9 JULY 1944		ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOM	0100		DEFERRED 4
DECODED BY	MONROE/MCCOMB/HOFNER		BASEGRAM 5
PARAPHRASED BY	GIBSON	INFORMATION	PRIORITY 9
CHECKED BY	GIBSON		ROUTINE 10
DITTOED BY	GIBSON		DEFERRED 12
ROUTED BY	COOK		BASEGRAM 13
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PAGE 1 OF 2	082030	NCR 7233	<input type="checkbox"/> 16

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ALUSNA TO CNO. TOP SECRET.

ALUSNA ADVISED BY US AMBASSADOR THAT SALAZAR TOLD BRITISH AMBASSADOR YESTERDAY HE HAD NOT YET REACHED DECISION ON NAVY SQUADRON AND STILL WAS NOT CONVINCED OF PRESENT NEED FOR IT. BRIT AMB IS PRESENTING SALAZAR WITH MEMORIAL REVIEWING RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND PRESSING REQUEST FOR FAVORABLE ACTION BASED ON FORMULA OF USING BRITISH AND SS MARKINGS. THUS IMPASSE CONTINUES AND IN LIGHT OF PAST NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN BRIT AND PORTUGUESE ON THIS PARTICULAR SUBJECT POSSIBILITIES OF BREAKING IT QUICKLY DO NOT APPEAR BRIGHT. ALUSNA BELIEVES ONLY COURSE WHICH MIGHT NOW SPEED DECISION OR BREAK DEADLOCK WOULD BE TO HAVE CLEAR RESTATEMENT OF PRESENT NECESSITY FOR US SQUADRON AT LAGENS GIVEN TO US AMB FOR PRESENTATION BY HIM

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DRAFTER		EXT.	ADDRESSEES		PRECEDENCE	
FROM	ALUSNA LISBON		FOR ACTION	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1	
RELEASED BY					PRIORITY	2
DATE	7 JULY 1944				ROUTINE	3
TOR CODEROOM					DEFERRED	4
DECODED BY			INFORMATION		5	
PARAPHRASED BY	CHECKED BY				BASEGRAM	6
ROUTED BY	BY					7
	DITTOED BY				PRIORITY	8
				ROUTINE	9	
				DEFERRED	10	
				BASEGRAM	11	

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PAGE 2 OF 2

082431

NCR 7233

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PERSONALLY TO SALAZAR. THIS RESTATEMENT SHOULD BE PHRASED SO AS TO ELIMINATE ANY QUESTIONS SALAZAR MAY RAISE ABOUT THE IMPROVING CONDITIONS IN THE ATLANTIC AND SHOULD BE COMPLETELY SEPARATED FROM OTHER PENDING ISSUES.

US AMB HAS SEEN THIS DESPATCH.

RE US AMB RECENT DISCUSSION WITH SALAZAR RE IIMOR AND FAR EAST QUESTIONS ALUSNA REQUESTS BE ADVISED IF DEPT HAS ANY INSTRUCTIONS. SEE STATE DEPT TELEGRAM 2109 JULY 7 7 PM.

NCR ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:

16 (#1)....ACT

COMINCH (#2-#9)....13 (#10)....NAVAIDE (#14, 12)....

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OPNAV 15-78

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CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY REQUIRES ADDITION OF LETTERS
"UHR" TO CLASSIFICATION OF REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

**TOP
SECRET**

From: US Military Attache, Lisbon, Portugal

To: War Department

No: 332

7 July 1944

332 TOP SEC for Bissell George Arnold MILID, Washn.

Following his meeting with Salazar today, Ambassador informed me Salazar has favorably received proposition jointly presented with Brit Amb to engage in staff talks covering eventual Port participation in liberation Timor. Salazar stated his talks with Japs over past year have not produced any tangible results and his delegates investigation in Timor has not added to info already available. He remarked that he broached this question to British in June 43 and to US in October same year and stated that initiation of talks will be useful as insurance against future events. Fruition of plans stemming from these staff talks will depend on future development of Port Jap diplomatic relations added Prime Minister and intimated that he was not hopeful of obtaining satisfaction thru present diplomatic channels.

Norweb and Campbell suggested that in order to gain time preliminary talks can be entered into by milattaches of 2 respective embassies with staff officers designated by Salazar for that purpose. Salazar answered he will instruct War Sub Sec to appoint 1 Army and 1 Navy Officer without delay. It was agreed that preliminary orientation talks would be followed thru by officers delegated by War Dept and War Office and Salazar stressed fact they should be thoroughly familiar with Far Eastern affairs.

Salazar emphasized need for secrecy as he stated having been recently asked by Jap Minister if it was true that he was discussing with Americans joint action on Timor. To

CM-IN-6152 (8 Jul 44)

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Page 2

~~TOP SECRET~~

From: US Military Attache, Lisbon, Portugal

No: 332

7 July 1944

this Salazar states to have replied "Not yet". Salazar will inform Ambassador when his officers are ready for first conference. Campbell remained with Salazar after Norwabs departure allegedly to discuss naval squadron for Lagos.

Solborg

ACTION: General Arnold

INFORMATION: General Handy
General Bissell
Colonel Park
C of 3

CM-IN-6152

(8 Jul 44) 0927Z

ejv

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18

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CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY REQUIRES ADDITION
OF LETTERS "UHR" TO CLASSIFICATION OF
REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE

**TOP
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TOP SECRET

From: US Military Attache, Lisbon, Portugal

To: War Department

No. 330 7 July 1944

330 TOPSEC for George and Payne from Love.

Subsequent to his talk yesterday with Salazar Norweb says Doctor appreciates time problem and promised further study last night. No discussion re actual construction or use request only being made for 20 men and temporary runway. I have told Norweb my doubt as to possibilities diverting equipment and men without construction and use being settled but he prefers piece meal course. Report of Portuguese Colonel on mission not into Salazar yet but since he did not plan to submit other than concurrence on ours believe this no problem unless Salazar deliberately stalling in which case you may forget deal. Phone call helpful.

Solborg.

ACTION: GEN ARNOLD

INFO : OPD
GEN BISSELL
LOG

CM-IN-5595 (7 Jul 44) 2001Z rmg

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Col Park
23

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URGENT
CORRECTED COPY

~~SECRET~~
SECRET

From: US Military Attache, Lisbon, Portugal

To: War Department

Nr: 265

29 May 1944

Reur 42748 personal for Bissell our 265.

Indications make it appear evident that Salazar intends to use Wolfram as bargaining point against unrestricted use of Second Air Field according to our wishes. I believe that immediate introduction of staff talks as envisaged in CC of S action might relieve tension and influence Salazar in favor of more immediate concretization of his decision covering use of airfield. It would seem that such staff talks regardless of their outcome constitute too valuable a trading instrument to be forfeited by hopes of a satisfactory solution being reached under Russo-British agreement. Question of Portugals voluntary entry into war need never be raised unless initiated by Salazar.

Solborg.

Corrected copy of CM-IN-22802 (30 May 44) Gen Bissell

ACTION: Gen Bissell

INFO : Gen Arnold

OPD

Col Park

C of S

CM-IN-23798 (31 May 44) 1325Z mcs

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

3 cc Spain

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**TOP
SECRET**

URGENT

PERSONAL FOR GENERAL BISSELL

From: US Military Attache, Lisbon, Portugal

To: War Department

No. 255, 23 May 1944

TOP SECRET 255 personal for Bissell.

Result today's conference with Salazar Ambassador related to me as follows:

A. Salazar agrees to immediate survey of Santa Maria by Plan Air jointly with Mission he will delegate. All appearances must be preserved of Port character of undertaking and he insists on paying both for survey and subsequent construction, which should be of permanent nature to enable Ports to use facilities after emergency for inter-island and metropolitan air traffic. He understands that use of Air Base during emergency will necessitate additional buildings and equipment which will have to be scrapped when Base reverts to peace time traffic. He appreciates cost will be high, but is ready to budget accordingly. He reserves final determination of Command and use of Air Base for later date. Salazar agreed to embody foregoing in letter, which he will send to Ambassador tonight as guidance for Plan Air action.

B. He told Ambassador he is most anxious to receive our Government's reaction to his desire to be included in plans for liberation of Timor which he considers indispensable to maintenance of Port prestige and dignity when history is written. He stated his relation to Japan now is not dissimilar to that of US and Japan prior to Pearl

CN-IN-18233 (24 May 44)

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Col. Park

See Spain

SECRET

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INCOMING MESSAGE

**TOP
SECRET**

Page #2

From: US Military Attache, Lisbon, Portugal

No. 255, 23 May 1944

Harbor and opined that this state of affairs will most likely remain until some overt act is committed. Ambassador replied that he hoped to supply him with our Government's reaction on the subject very soon.

C. As Ambassador was leaving Salazar stated to him that he received reports about Bianchi's talks with Stettinius and George on Wolfram and added that he was disappointed at our Government's lack of understanding of his position in that regard. He further stated, that while he was always endeavoring to segregate political matters from economic British and ourselves have always attempted to play one against the other. He quite plainly intimated to Ambassador he now intends to do likewise and that our attitude on Wolfram will greatly influence his future decision use of Santa Maria.

I evaluate situation as follows:

A. Survey and construction on Santa Maria can now be undertaken and Salazar will not alter this decision irrespective of Wolfram

B. His present intransigence on Wolfram may be changed when he learns that Staff talks have been approved re his participation in Timor.

C. European picture between now and ready date of Santa Maria will have changed to the extent that our present

OM-IN-18233 (24 May 44)

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**TOP
SECRET**

Page #3

From: US Military Attache, Lisbon, Portugal

No. 255, 23 May 1944

concern re his future attitude on disposition of Air Field
will no longer obtain.

It is obvious Salazar will continue play for time
pending development of fortunes of War and will expect our
concessions on Wolfram situation in exchange for his more
immediate and concrete commitments re second Base. I firmly
believe that short of complete showdown in keeping with CC of
of S decision moderation of our Wolfram demands will be
necessary and advisable in order to obtain clear cut stand
on Santa Maria.

Solborg

ACTION: General Bissell

INFO : General Arnold
OPD
Col. Park
O of S

CM-IN-18233 (24 May 44) 1539Z

ejv

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24-75724

20M

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1

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US

SECRET

Number: WARK 36636

OPD 384 Africa (14 Apr 44)
Subject: Creation of Azores
Base Command Responsible Direct-
ly to the War Department. OPD
WDGS, Theater Op, American Thre
WDOPD 6623-JKF-36830

May 13, 1944

Commanding General
USAF in North African Theater
Algiers, Algeria

Commanding General
Eastern Defense Command
Governors Island, New York

Commanding Officer
North Atlantic Wing
Air Transport Command
Manchester, Connecticut

Commanding General
Air Transport Command
Station 15, Azores

Number: WARK 36636

Book message from Marshall for Devers, Grunert, Frits, and
Smith.

Effective May 20, 1944, CG, NATOUSA is relieved of command
of USAF in the Azores. Concurrently USAF in the Azores is
established as a separate command designated USAF in the
Azores, under CG, EDC, Governors Island, New York. No in-
crease of personnel currently allotted to ATC Station 15 is
authorized. Commander and staff will function in dual capa-
city for USAF in the Azores and Station 15, NAW, ATC. Briga-
dier General A. D. Smith is designated as CG of both organiza-
tions. Supply responsibility is assigned to NY POE under Phase

CM-OUT-36636 (14 May 44)

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300 Spain

47
COPY *Ad. Parks*

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S E C R E T

Number: WARK 36636

May 13, 1944

Page - 2 -

3 requisition basis. Direct communication is authorized. In local emergencies USAFAZ will operate under the tactical control of SACMED thru the Senior Allied Commander in the Azores. CG USAF Azores is authorized to conduct negotiations involving administration, supply, land acquisition, and construction in his area with appropriate commands of US Naval Forces, Allied Armed Forces, and local government agencies. Channel of command and communication for AAF technical and operational matters will be through NAW, ATC. Direct communication is authorized.

No sig

ORIGINATOR: OFD

INFORMATION: ASF-CG

TAG

Plans

Trans

CG AAF

G-1

G-2

G-3

G-4

Admiral King

Colonel Park ✓

Statistics

Log

CM-OUT-36636

(14 May 44)

1713Z

mem

47

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S-E-C-R-E-T

From: US Military Attache Tanger

To: War Department

NR: 12362, 7th May 1944

Msg Srl Nbr 12362.

In conversation with Lt Colonel Rea who has just spent 3 days in Melilla he informed me that recent arrests in Melilla and Malaga had revealed orders given to American Agents to get in touch with elements in Spain opposed to Franco Regime. He added that this was proof of intention on part of Americans to over throw present Regime by supporting Spanish Communists. It is believed that this is official attitude of Spanish General Staff.

Babbitt

ACTION: G-2

INFO : OED

Col Park
Log

CM IN-5426

(8 May 44)

0014Z wh

S E C R E T

For Spain

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S E C R E T

PARAPHRASE OF STATE DEPARTMENT CABLE

From: Lisbon

To : Secretary of State, Washington

Number: 1282

April 28, 1944

British Minister Campbell talked with Premier Salazar last evening about Azores matters but Salazar would not discuss the matter of the second field. He also attempted to put Campbell off in the matter of the Navy Squadron but when Campbell asked whether he should tell London that the subject should be considered closed even though American and British representatives had brought it up repeatedly, a negative reply was given by Salazar, who implied that if British markings could be put on the plane by some formula, he would perhaps reconsider. Campbell told Salazar the proposal would be referred to London having in mind that a preliminary agreement on this subject had been reached between Combined Chiefs of Staff representatives, at Cairo.

Norweb (Minister)

Note: See CM-IN-15667 (21 Apr 44) OPD

ACTION: General Handy

INFO : General Arnold
General Bissell
Log

CM-IN-22812

(30 Apr 44)

2119Z

ejv

S E C R E T

3 as Spain

Carl Bank
COPY NO. 21

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA LISBON		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY		CNO	PRIORITY
DATE 28 APRIL 1944			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM 280408		FOR ACTION	DEFERRED
DECODED BY WOLQUITT			FOR INFORMATION
PARAPHRASED BY KOHOUTEK			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY KNIGHT			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
PAGE 2	280130	NCR 9082	<input type="checkbox"/>

duplicate sent by pouch - 0900 EST. 4/28

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT
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(FROM ALUSNA TO CNO)
 TOP SECRET.
 BRIT AMBASSADOR HAS ADVISED US AMBASSADOR HE TOOK UP NAVY SQUADRON WITH SALAZAR YESTERDAY. AFTER SOME SPARRING SALAZAR SAID QUESTION NOT YET DECIDED BUT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES COULD HE CONSENT TO US SQUADRON OPERATING WITHOUT BRITISH MARKINGS BEING DISPLAYED. IMPRESSION WAS THAT BOTH BRITISH AND US MARKINGS COULD BE USED. NO MENTION MADE OF UNIFORMS. SALAZAR MAY BE STALLING BUT US AMBASSADOR BELIEVES THIS ^{PERMITS} ~~ADULTS~~ NAVY SQUADRON TO BE DISCUSSED SEPARATELY AND ADVISABLE TO STRIKE QUICKLY. LONDON ADVISED BY BRITISH AMBASSADOR TODAY. REQUEST BE ADVISED DEPTS INSTRUCTIONS OR THAT
 PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

No. 1 ADMIRAL	No. 2 FILE	No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM.	No. 4 SPECIAL
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SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18 280130 300 Spain

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA LISBON		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION CNO	PRIORITY
DATE 28 APRIL 1944			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM		INFORMATION	DEFERRED
DECODED BY			PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
PAGE 2	280130	NCR 9082	<input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ACTION BE TAKEN THRU OTHER APPROPRIATE CHANNELS.
REHDE STATE BE ADVISED.

16.....ACT.
 COMINCH.....NAVAIDE.....13.....

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
 NCR 18

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

KS

SECRET

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM FOR INFO OF WAR DEPT.

To: Secretary of State April 18, 1944
From: American Legation, Lisbon 10 p.m.
No. 1161

I had a long interview this afternoon with Salazar at which time he finally announced that our request for navigational aids in the Azores had been denied in a negative report from his experts. It was my definite feeling that he considered our request unimportant by itself, but rather that it served to cover some hidden motive. For example, he stated that his experts were fully convinced that the small angle resulting from the use of even the most isolated islands of the group could not be employed effectively: consequently he could not understand the motive behind our request.

Nevertheless, after more debate, he did consent to receive further expert advice on the subject, and he is willing to assign one or more experts to America for the purpose of studying the plan or to permit one or more U. S. technicians to come to this country with the idea of explaining the matter more completely to his experts.

Lest this phase of further discussion drag on for an inconvenient length of time, I recommend that a U. S. technician or technicians be sent to Portugal immediately. In addition, with the thought that this might provide a chance for starting survey operations for the additional airfield, (the need for which Salazar still says he does not understand), it would be advantageous for these U.S. technicians to be able to discuss the technical details of our necessity for the additional field, such as the need of an alternative air base at times of unfavorable weather, the inadequacy of legends and extensions to take care of the expected amount of traffic, etc. Of course, these points have been made clear to Salazar in earlier conversations, but we must not relax our efforts to convince him.

OW-YN-15668 (21 Apr 44)

SECRET

3 as Spain

COPY NO.

48

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Cal Bank

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
CENTRAL MESSAGE CENTER
WAR DEPARTMENT

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

Page 2

The Prime Minister expects the Delgada Mission to finish its survey in not later than two weeks; consequently, I believe it would be desirable for our technicians to arrive in Lisbon before that time.

NORWEB

ACTION: OPD
INFORMATION: CG AAF
G-2
Log

CM-IN-15668 (21 Apr 44) 2012Z hrt

S E C R E T

48

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM COMNAVEU		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		COMINCH	PRIORITY 3
DATE 6 MAR 44			PRIORITY 4
TOR CODEROOM 1902		GNO	DEFERRED 6
DECODED BY BENNETT		FOR ACTION	7
PARAPHRASED BY HILL			8
ROUTED BY HILL			9
			10
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			11
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061737 NCR 1468

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(HICOM FROM COMNAVEU TO COMINCH CNO.)

AD CONFERENCE WITH BRITISH AMBASSADOR PORTUGAL NOW SCHEDULED WEDNESDAY EIGHTH. WILL PRESS FOR BRITISH TO REQUEST REPLACEMENT

OF LOSSES IN AZORES WITH OUR 'AS' AIRCRAFT BUT NO INTERMIXING OF CREWS. THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL BY BRITISH THERE AS AGREED

LOCALLY APPEARS SATISFACTORY. TOMLINSON FEELS SALAZAR WILL CONTINUE PLAY FOR TIME AND NOT GIVE DEFINITE DECISION. HE

SUGGESTS IF FAVORABLE DECISION NOT OBTAINED PROMPTLY THAT A DECISION BE DEMANDED ON ASSUMPTION THAT ASW WILL BE OF DIMINISH-

ING IMPORTANCE AND WE WILL NOT HAVE MUCH TO LOSE IF REPLY NEGATIVE. THENCE RELY ON NATS AND ARMY ATC TO ESTABLISH AND RETAIN AMERICAN

INTERESTS. THIS LATTER INVOLVES REEXAMINATION OF PROBLEM AND WOULD CONTEMPLATE TURNING NAVY CAMP OVER TO NATS AND ARMY THUS

RELIEVING ARMY OF THEIR CAMP CONSTRUCTION SO THAT WORK ON NEEDED PERMANENT RUNWAYS COULD BE ACCELELERATED AND SAVE SUPERFLUOUS

CONSTRUCTION AND SOME DUPLICATION OF AMERICAN FACILITIES NOT REQUIRED TO MEET ESTIMATED FUTURE NEEDS. ADVISE.

COMINCH.....ACTION 12....13....NAVAIDE.....

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR IN 061737 300 Spain (2)

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

RAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ADMIRALTY		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		COMNAVEU <i>WRB</i>	PRIORITY 2
DATE FEB 27 1944	FOR ACTION		ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOM 1845			DEFERRED 4
DECODED BY			5
PARAPHRASED BY YORK	INFORMATION	BAD WASHINGTON RAFDEL AIR MINISTRY	PRIORITY 6
ROUTED BY			ROUTINE 7
			DEFERRED 8

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

LT GLUNT PAGE 1 OF 2 271200

NCR 11216-S

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(RECEIVED FROM BAD VIA COURIER)

[REDACTED] IMMEDIATE.

AD

attached

HAVE DISCUSSED COMINCH'S 212141 WITH AIR MINISTRY AND FOREIGN OFFICE AND WE AGREE THAT THE POINT IS TO FIND SOME MEANS OF OVERCOMING PORTUGUESE OBJECTION TO ENTRY OF NON-BRITISH OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE SOME DOUBT WHETHER REPLACEMENTS FORMULA WILL BE EFFECTIVE FOREIGN OFFICE ARE FULLY PREPARED TO TRY IT OUT.

2. H.M. AMBASSADOR LISBON IS NOW BEING RECALLED TO LONDON FOR URGENT CONSULTATIONS CONCERNING WOLFRAM, FOREIGN OFFICE THEREFORE, SUGGEST THAT ACTION ON COMINCH'S FORMULA BE DEFERRED UNTIL H.M. AMBASSADOR

DECLASSIFIED JCS MEMO. 1-17-73

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE BY RT. DATE APR 24 1974 HARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED

[REDACTED]

Agony file

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE	
FROM _____	FOR ACTION	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY 1	
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE 2	
DATE _____			DEFERRED 3	
TOR CODEROOM _____				
DECODED BY _____			INFORMATION	PRIORITY 9
PARAPHRASED BY _____				ROUTINE 10
ROUTED BY _____				DEFERRED 11
				DEFERRED 12
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW 13	
PAGE 2 OF 2	271200	NCR 11255-8	<input type="checkbox"/> 14	

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ARRIVAL. IT WOULD BE MOST VALUABLE IF YOU OR A MEMBER OF YOUR STAFF WOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM AND WE HOPE COMINCH WILL APPROVE THIS COURSE.

AD) 3. IF COMINCH AGREES FOREIGN OFFICE WILL HASTEN RETURN OF H.M. AMBASSADOR.

4. B.A.D. PASS TO RAFDEL.

DECLASSIFIED
 JCS MEMO. 1-17-73
 BY RT, DATE APR 24 1974


No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED



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NCR 18

DRFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM COMINCH AND CNO		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY ADM. KING		COMNAVEU	PRIORITY 3
DATE 21 FEBRUARY 1944			ROUTINE 4
TOR CODEROOM 0051/22		<i>WAS</i>	DEFERRED 5
DECODED BY			DEFERRED 6
PARAPHRASED BY PURDY			7
ROUTED BY			8
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			9
	212141	NCR 42483	PRIORITY 10
			ROUTINE 11
			DEFERRED 12
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			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW 16
			<input type="checkbox"/> 17
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ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

YOUR, 162046, AS THE MAIN PORTUGUESE OBJECTION TO ENTRY OF U.S. OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT HAS BEEN ON BASIS THAT LANDING OF **ADJ** "NON BRITISH" PERSONNEL WHICH CONSTITUTE AN ELEMENT OF AIRPLANE CREWS CONTRAVENES THE AGREEMENT OF AUGUST 17, IT APPEARS THAT REMOVAL OF THIS OBJECTION IS NECESSARY TO PERMIT ENTRY OF U.S. OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT UNDER ANY CONDITIONS. I AM NOT INCLINED THEREFORE TO ACCEPT DISADVANTAGES OF MIXING U.S. AIRCRAFT WITH BRITISH UNITS AND PREFER TO EMPHASIZE THE POINT THAT U.S. AIRCRAFT ARE TO ENTER AS REPLACEMENTS FOR BRITISH AIRCRAFT WHICH JUDGING BY CINMED 162301 THE BRITISH CANNOT READILY REPLACE AND WILL BE UNDER BRITISH OPERATIONAL CONTROL BUT BECAUSE OF DIFFERENCES IN TRAINING AND OPERATING METHODS WILL OPERATE AS A UNIT. LAST SENTENCE MY 121840 STILL HOLDS.

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE. No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL

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NCR 18

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER COMINCH AND CNO		EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ADM. KING	FOR ACTION	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE		PRIORITY
RELEASED BY 29 JANUARY 1944		ALUSNA LISBON		ROUTINE
DATE 1502/28				DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM		INFORMATION		
DECODED BY PURDY			PRIORITY	
PARAPHRASED BY			ROUTINE	
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED	

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

281430 NCR 41971-C

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

ORIGINATOR	FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT
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ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

NAVY DEPARTMENT VIEWS REGARDING ENERGY VLR SQUADRON
 IN REPLY PARA 8 OF YOUR ^{POUCH 26/JAN} 252324, BASED UPON SALAZAR'S
 ASSURANCES AT DECEMBER 31ST CONFERENCE SQUADRON WAS
 MADE READY INVOLVING EXPENDITURE OF TIME AND MATERIALS
 INCLUDING MOVEMENT OF CONSTRUCTION TECHNICIANS AND
 MATERIALS AND IMMOBILIZING CERTAIN AIR AND SURFACE
 UNITS IN PREPARATION FOR MOVE TO LAGENS. FOREGOING
COUPLED WITH NEED FOR THESE ANTI-SUBMARINE AIRCRAFT
AT LAGENS MAKES REVERSAL IN SALAZAR'S ATTITUDE
PARTICULARLY SERIOUS. FURTHERMORE IT SHOULD BE
REALIZED THAT FORMULA OF OUR SQUADRON OPERATING FROM
L'AGENS UNDER BRITISH OPERATIONAL CONTROL IS NO DIFFERENT
FROM SITUATION IN ALL OTHER AREAS OF THE ATLANTIC
 WHERE ANTI-SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN IS VIEWED AS AN EFFORT
 IN WHICH ALL FORCES INVOLVED WORK IN MUTUAL SUPPORT

ACTION	
F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-07	26
F-1	27
F-2	28
F-20	29
F-3	30
F-30	31
F-31	32
F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
FX01	37
FX30	38
FX37	39
FX40	40
IG-00	41
VCMO	42
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SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-15
281430

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE	1
		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE		2
FROM	FOR ACTION		PRIORITY	3
RELEASED BY			ROUTINE	4
DATE			DEFERRED	5
TOR CODEROOM	INFORMATION			6
DECODED BY			PRIORITY	7
PARAPHRASED BY			ROUTINE	8
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED	9
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND IS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW	10
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ORIGINATOR: FILL IN DATE AND TIME:		DATE	TIME	GCT
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ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

WITH OPERATIONAL CONTROL NORMALLY VESTED IN THAT NATION IN WHOSE AREA OPERATIONS ARE CONDUCTED. SOME EXAMPLES HAVE BEEN BRITISH SQUADRON UNDER US CONTROL IN WEST INDIES, US SQUADRONS IN NEWFOUNDLAND UNDER CANADIAN CONTROL AND IN ICELAND AND UK UNDER BRITISH CONTROL. DECISION ON EXACT DATE FOR ENTRANCE VLR SQUADRON PREVIOUSLY SET AT 31 JANUARY AND NOW BEING HELD IN ABEYANCE PENDING FURTHER CLARIFICATION PRESENT SITUATION.

ACTION		
F-0		22
F-01		23
F-02		24
F-05		25
F-07		26
F-1		27
F-2		28
F-20		29
F-3		30
F-30		31
F-31		32
F-32		33
F-33		34
F-34		35
F-4		36
FX01		37
FX30		38
FX37		39
FX40		40
IG-00		41
VCNO		42
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SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
OPNAV-NCR-13

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALUSNA LISBON</u>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY _____		CNO	2
DATE <u>14 JAN 1944</u>			3
TOR CODEROOM <u>140216</u>			4
DECODED BY <u>SCHNEIDER</u>			5
PARAPHRASED BY <u>BATTY</u>			6
ROUTED BY <u>SCRUGGS</u>			7
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			8
132030			9
NCR 4565			10
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ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT
ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT			

(ALUSNA LISBON TO CNO.)

INTERVIEW WITH SALAZAR 12TH FOLLOWS:

SALAZAR SAID THAT AFTER REFLECTION HE CANNOT GRANT PERMISSION NAVY SQUADRON OPERATE LAGENS. IN HIS VIEW

DIFFERENCE EXISTS BETWEEN USE OF FIELD BY TRANSIENT AIRCRAFT AND OPERATIONS CONDUCTED FROM BASES ON

PORTUG SOIL AGAINST ENEMY AND NOTHING IN ANGLO-PORTUG AGREEMENT CAN BE CONSTRUED AS PERMITTING THESE

OPERATIONS. STATES SUCH A SQUADRON COULD NOT BE MERGED WITH BRITISH AND WOULD RETAIN AMERICAN

IDENTITY. REASONS FOR THIS CHANGE SALAZARS ATTITUDE NOT KNOWN. IMPLICATIONS ARE THAT ANGLO PORTUG

AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE MODIFIED. CONSIDER REQUEST FOR ENTRY NAVY SQUADRON ABLY AND FORCE FULLY PRESENTED

AND FROM ALL INDICATIONS IT HAS BEEN STRONGLY BACKED BY BRITISH AMBASSADOR. BRITISH AMBASSADOR AND CUR

MINISTER SEEKING FORMULA UNDER WHICH NAVY WOULD OPERATE LAGENS BUT GREAT DIFFICULTY SEEN. PERMISSION

OBTAINED FOR ENTRY ARMY PERSONNEL ARRIVING TERCEIRA THIS WEEK-END BUT AS YET NO ADDITIONAL. SALAZAR

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-15

132030

ACTION	
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F-05	25
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F-30	31
F-31	32
F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
FX01	37
FX30	38
FX37	39
FX40	40
IG-00	41
VCNO	42
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MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM _____		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY _____		FOR ACTION	PRIORITY 3
DATE _____			ROUTINE 4
TOR CODEROOM _____			DEFERRED 5
			6
DECODED BY _____		INFORMATION	7
PARAPHRASED BY _____			PRIORITY 10
			ROUTINE 11
			DEFERRED 12
ROUTED BY _____			13
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			14
PAGE 2 OF 2	132030	NCR 4565	15
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ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT 20

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

PREPARING DISCUSS SURVEY WITH HIS EXPERTS. THIS CONNECTION CONSIDER PARTY SHOULD BE AS PATENTLY

PANAMERICAN AS POSSIBLE TO REDUCE OPPORTUNITIES SALAZAR INTRODUCED DIFFICULTY OR DELAYS. RECENT

REQUEST BRITISH FOR LAND TO CONSTRUCT ADDITIONAL RUNWAYS LAGENS LEAD TO BELIEF ON SALAZARS PART

2ND FIELD NOT NEEDED. STATED IN ANY CASE CONSTRUCTION AND USE MUST COME UNDER ANGLO PORTUG AGREEMENTS

SALAZAR STILL MOST INTERESTED IN FIELD ON FAYAL.

WITH PORTUGAL AND PRINCIPLE OF USE OF THESE FACILITIES BY TRANSPORT UNITED STATES AIRCRAFT. BRITISH AUTHORITIES ADVISED NOTIFIED LOCAL PORTUGUESE MILITARY COMMANDER OF EXPECTED ARRIVAL TERCEIRA TWO LIBERTY SHIPS WITH AMERICAN PERSONNEL APPARENTLY USING BOARDS TRANSPORTS

16...ACT LOCAL NOTIFIED SALAZAR WHO COMINCH...CNO...NAVAIDE...13...OP13...FILE

SECRET

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 OPNAV-NCR-15

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F-03	25
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F-05	27
F-06	28
F-07	29
F-1	30
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DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM COMINCH		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY R S EDWARDS		COMNAVAZORES	PRIORITY 2
DATE 12 JANUARY 1944			ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOM			DEFERRED 4
DECODED BY		CINCLANT	5
PARAPHRASED BY GRUNEWALD			6
ROUTED BY			7
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			8
PAGE 1 OF 2	PART 1-132153	PART 1 41597	9
	PART 2-132200	NCR PART 2 41598	PRIORITY 10
			ROUTINE 11
			DEFERRED 12
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			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW 16
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ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT 20
ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT			21

THIS IS BRIEF OF ALUSNA LISBON DESPATCHES 082020, 091550, 101400 AND CNO 111636. BRITISH REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RUNWAYS LAGENS, DOCKING PRIVILEGES FOR CARRIERS AT PONTA DELGADA AND SITES FOR RDF STATIONS ON TERCEIRA AND INFORMATION THAT NAVY VLR SQUADRON WOULD OPERATE UNDER GUISE OF LOAN TO BRITISH RESULTED IN REPUTED STATEMENT TO BRITISH AMBASSADOR BY SALAZAR THAT THIS USE OF OUR VLR SQUADRON NOT IN CONFORMANCE WITH PRACTICE AND PRINCIPLE OF USE OF THESE FACILITIES BY TRANSPORT UNITED STATES AIRCRAFT. BRITISH AUTHORITIES AZORES NOTIFIED LOCAL PORTUGUESE MILITARY COMMANDER OF EXPECTED ARRIVAL TERCEIRA TWO LIBERTY SHIPS WITH AMERICAN PERSONNEL APPARENTLY USING WORDS "TRANSPORTS AND TROOPS". LOCAL AUTHORITIES NOTIFIED SALAZAR WHO WAS PREPARED TO USE FORCE TO PREVENT LANDING. MISIN-

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
OPNAV-NCR-15

ACTION		GCT
F-0		22
F-01		23
F-02		24
F-05		25
F-07		26
F-1		27
F-2		28
F-20		29
F-3		30
F-30		31
F-31		32
F-32		33
F-33		34
F-34		35
F-4		36
FX01		37
FX30		38
FX37		39
FX40		40
IG-00		41
VCNO		42
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DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM _____	FOR ACTION	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY 1
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE 2
DATE _____			DEFERRED 3
TOR CODEROOM _____	INFORMATION		4
DECODED BY _____			PRIORITY 5
PARAPHRASED BY _____			ROUTINE 6
ROUTED BY _____			DEFERRED 7

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

PAGE 2 OF 2

PART 1 132153 NCR 41597
PART 2 132200 NCR 41598

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ACTION 21

F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-07	26
F-1	27
F-2	28
F-20	29
F-3	30
F-30	31
F-31	32
F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
FX01	37
FX30	38
FX37	39
FX40	40
IG-00	41
VCND	42
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TERPRETATION CORRECTED BY BRITISH AMBASSADOR INFORMING SALAZAR PERSONNEL WERE CONSTRUCTION AND TECHNICAL NOT COMBAT TROOPS. SALAZAR ACQUIESCED IN LANDING. BRITISH CONSUL PONTA DELGADA ADVISES PORT COMMANDER TERCEIRA AUTHORIZED LANDING 522 MEN BUT ISSUED ORDERS THAT PENDING INSTRUCTIONS FROM LISBON ANY PERSONNEL OTHER THAN CONSTRUCTION PERSONNEL LANDING THERE WOULD BE TREATED AS "ENEMIES". NO CHANGE IN PLANS FOR BOMBON 114 TO AZORES CONTEMPLATED. SEEMING CHANGE IN SALAZARS ATTITUDE MAY BE THE BRITISH FAILURE TO GIVE A CLEAR PICTURE US PROJECTS AZORES TO SALAZAR. REPORT OF MEETING AMERICAN MINISTER AND SALAZAR SCHEDULED 11 JANUARY NOT YET RECEIVED BUT PRESUME MISUNDERSTANDING AMERICAN PLANS WILL BE CLARIFIED. FOREGOING FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY.

PASSED TO ARMY ^(OPD) VIA SCRAMBLER AS SCR #6.

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-15

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>COMNAV AZORES</u>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		COMINCH	PRIORITY 2
DATE <u>12 JAN 1944</u>	FOR ACTION		ROUTINE <u>ROUTINE</u> 3
TOR CODEROOM <u>0138</u>			DEFERRED 4
DECODED BY <u>MC CLELLAN/DECKMAN</u>			5
PARAPHRASED BY <u>ROWLAND /GZ</u>	INFORMATION		PRIORITY 6
ROUTED BY <u>SCRUGGS</u>			ROUTINE 7
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			DEFERRED 8
092330Z*			PRIORITY 9
NCR 3316			ROUTINE 10
			DEFERRED 11
			PRIORITY 12
			ROUTINE 13
			DEFERRED 14
			PRIORITY 15
			ROUTINE 16
			DEFERRED 17
			PRIORITY 18
			ROUTINE 19
			DEFERRED 20
			PRIORITY 21
			ROUTINE 22
			DEFERRED 23
			PRIORITY 24
			ROUTINE 25
			DEFERRED 26
			PRIORITY 27
			ROUTINE 28
			DEFERRED 29
			PRIORITY 30
			ROUTINE 31
			DEFERRED 32
			PRIORITY 33
			ROUTINE 34
			DEFERRED 35
			PRIORITY 36
			ROUTINE 37
			DEFERRED 38
			PRIORITY 39
			ROUTINE 40
			DEFERRED 41
			PRIORITY 42
			ROUTINE 43
			DEFERRED 44
			PRIORITY 45
			ROUTINE 46
			DEFERRED 47
			PRIORITY 48
			ROUTINE 49
			DEFERRED 50
			PRIORITY 51
			ROUTINE 52

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: _____ DATE _____ TIME _____ GCT _____

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

FROM COMNAV AZORES. MY 092330 PART 2 FINAL.

SUGGEST ACT WITH ARMY OFFICER COMMANDING LISBON INSTRUCT LOCAL GOVERNMENT CONCERNING ARMY SHIPMENT AND 2 AVP'S COMAIRLANT INTENDS USE FOR HEDRON DELIVER HERE. ADVISE LATTER 27TH MY RECOMMENDED DATE THIS DELIVERY HERE. BELIEVE TODAY'S MISUNDERSTANDING WOULD NOT HAVE ARISEN EXCEPT THAT FRIENDLY MILITARY GOVERNOR TERCEIRA REMOVED AND RECALLED 3 DAYS AGO.

*RECEIVED IN REPLY TO SERVICE MESSAGE D/T 111425 REQUESTING PART 2 OF 092330 REFERRED TO IN 092327.

COMINCH PASSED TO NCR FOR FURTHER DISTRIBUTION
 19...CNO...NAVAIDE...

TOR NCR 0628/12

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
 OPNAV-NCR-15

ACTION	
F-0	
F-01	
F-02	
F-05	
F-07	
F-1	
F-2	
F-20	
F-3	
F-30	
F-31	
F-32	
F-33	
F-34	
F-4	
FX01	
FX30	
FX37	
FX40	
IG-00	
VCND	

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALUSNA LISBON</u>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		CNO	2 PPPPPP PRIORITY
DATE <u>11 JAN 44</u>	FOR ACTION		4 ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM <u>2140/11</u>			5 DEFERRED
DECODED BY <u>PERRY/CROMPTON</u>	INFORMATION		6
PARAPHRASED BY <u>HAMILTON</u>			7
ROUTED BY <u>V. IDMAN</u>			8
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			9
111728 NCR 3195			10 PRIORITY
			11 ROUTINE
			12 DEFERRED
			13
			14
			15
			16 IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
			17 <input type="checkbox"/>
			18
			19

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

T. CNO FROM ALUSNA AND HUFF

IF SECURITY PERMITS REQUEST WE BE ADVISED DATES OF SAILING AND APPROXIMATE DATES ARRIVAL T. RCEIRA VESSELS CARRYING U.S. PERSONNEL. ALSO NUMBERS AND CATEGORIES OF MEN IN EACH MOVEMENT. ABOVE NEEDED SO THAT MINISTER MAY COMMUNICATE INFORMATION TO SALAZAR AND ATTEMPT AVOID REPETITION DIFFICULTY REPORTED OUR 091550.

19... ACT

COMINCH... 31... 16... OP#3... 12... 39... NAV/IDE...

CNO... ARMY(OPD)... OP#5G...

NAV/IDE... ARMY(OPD)...

ACTION	
F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-07	26
F-1	27
F-2	28
F-20	29
F-3	30
F-30	31
F-31	32
F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
FX01	37
FX30	38
FX37	39
FX40	40
IG-00	41
VCNO	42
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SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 74 (4) NAVREGS.)
OPNAV-NCH-18

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>CNC</u>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY <u>COLCLOUGH</u>	FOR ACTION	ALUSNA LISBON	OP CP OP PRIORITY 2
DATE <u>11 JAN 1944</u>			ROUTINE 4
TOR CODEROOM <u>1654</u>			DEFERRED 6
DECODED BY	INFORMATION		7
PARAPHRASED BY <u>SAMUEL</u>		PRIORITY 10	
ROUTED BY <u>J ALLEN</u>		ROUTINE 12	
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			DEFERRED 14
111636		NCR 838	15
			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW <input type="checkbox"/> 16
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	17
			18
ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT			19

REPLYING HUFFS ~~182220~~. NO CHANGE IN PLANS FOR SENDING NAVY SQUADRON TO AZORES CONTEMPLATED. CLARIFICATION OF SALAZARS ATTITUDE WILL PRESUMABLY BE OBTAINED BY MINISTER IN TODAYS INTERVIEW. POSSIBILITY RECOGNIZED THAT SEEMING CHANGE IN SALAZARS ATTITUDE MAY BE DUE BRITISH FAILURE TO GIVE CLEAR PICTURE OF OUR PROJECTS. REPLYING NEXT TO HUFFS ~~1,14,10~~ PERSONNEL NOW AT TERCEIRA 14 OFFICERS 538 ENLISTED ALL NAVY AND ALL CONSTRUCTION. STATE HAS SEEN AND CONCURS.

13....ORIG.

COMINON...16....31....OP-13....CP-15G....12....39....

NAVAIDE...CNC....ARMY(OPD)....

ACTION	
F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-07	26
F-1	27
F-2	28
F-20	29
F-2	30
F-3	31
F-30	32
F-31	33
F-32	34
F-33	35
F-34	36
F-4	37
FX01	38
FX30	39
FX37	40
FX40	41
IG-00	42
VCND	43
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SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-15
111636

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE	
FROM	HUFF (ALUSNA LISBON)	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	DEFERRED	1
RELEASED BY		CNO	ROUTINE	2
DATE	11 JAN 44		DEFERRED	3
TOR CODEWORD	102113			4
DECODED BY	SCHNICK		PRIORITY	5
PARAPHRASED BY	THOLSON		ROUTINE	6
ROUTED BY	HILL		DEFERRED	7
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW	8
101400			<input type="checkbox"/>	9
NCR 2539				10

ORIGINATOR: FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

FROM HUFF TO CNO.

NY 091550 AND 091800. BRITISH CONSUL PONTA DELGADA ADVISES PORT UC COMDR TERCEIRA AUTHORIZED LANDING 522 MEN BUT WHEN INFORMED PERSONNEL TO CONSTRUCT FACILITIES FOR US AIR FORCES ORDERS ISSUED THAT ANY PERSONNEL OTHER THAN CONSTRUCTION PERSONNEL WHO MIGHT LAND NOW OR LATER BE TREATED AS "ENEMIES" PENDING INSTRUCTIONS FROM LISBON NO DEFINITE INFO NUMBER PERSONNEL ALREADY LANDED BUT BELIEVE ALL NOW SHORE. REQUEST ADVISE IMMEDIATELY NUMBER MEN INTENDED LAND THIS MOVEMENT, IF ALL NAVY AND WHETHER OTHER THAN CONSTRUCTION PERSONNEL INVOLVED. MINISTER IN INTERVIEWS SALAZAR 11TH.

13...ACT

COMMING...16...31...OP03...12...OP05G...39...NAVAIDE...

CNO..OPDO...

SECRET

ACTION		
F-0		21
F-01		22
F-02		23
F-05		24
F-07		25
F-1		26
F-2		27
F-20		28
F-3		29
F-30		30
F-31		31
F-32		32
F-33		33
F-34		34
F-4		35
FX01		36
FX30		37
FX37		38
FX40		39
IG-00		40
VCND		41
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Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
OPNAV-NCR-15

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM COMNAV AZORES		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION	PRIORITY
DATE 10 JAN 44			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM 101437			ROUTINE DEFERRED
DECODED BY MCCLELLAN/PAUL		INFORMATION	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY JOHNSON			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
092330Z		NCR 2387	<input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ACTION

F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-07	26
F-1	27
F-2	28
F-20	29
F-3	30
F-30	31
F-31	32
F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
FX01	37
FX30	38
FX37	39
FX40	40
IG-00	41
VCN0	42

PART 1 RECEIVED AS 092327Z NCR 2387.

(COMINCH FROM COMNAV AZORES)

PORTUGUESE G.O.C PONTA DELGADA NOT INFORMED BY LISBON ARRIVAL ABRAHAM LINCOLN RESULT HE ISSUES ORDER LOCAL ACTING COMMANDER TO WITHHOLD AUTHORITY FOR LANDING OF PERSONNEL AND LATTER PROPOSES DELAY UNTIL HE OBTAINS FURTHER ORDERS HIS GOVERNMENT EVEN IF ONLY TECHNICAL STAFF INVOLVED. *Air Vice Marshall* AVM BROMET RECONCILED DIVERGENT VIEW IN FIRM AND SKILLFUL MANNER AND ASSURANCE ALL PERSONNEL TECHNICAL STAFF SO THAT UNLOADING NOW PROCEED.

MY 092330Z PART 2 FINAL FOLLOWS.*

*PART 2 AS YET NOT RECEIVED.

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
OPNAV-NCR-15

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALUSHA LISBON (HUFF)</u>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		GNO	2
DATE <u>15 JAN 1944</u>	FOR ACTION		3
TOR CODER ROOM <u>092349</u>			4
DECODED BY <u>CHERNOCK</u>	INFORMATION		5
PARAPHRASED BY <u>PARKER</u>			6
ROUTED BY <u>HILL</u>			7
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			8
	<u>091800</u>	<u>NCR 2110</u>	9
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ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

HUFF SENDS TO GNO

MY 091550 BRITISH AT TERCEIRA ADVISE LANDING MADE WITHOUT INCIDENT.

COMINCH...ACT
13...16...0P-03...12...0P-05G...39...NAVAIDE...
GNO.....

ACTION	
F-0	21
F-01	22
F-02	23
F-05	24
F-07	25
F-1	26
F-2	27
F-20	28
F-3	29
F-30	30
F-31	31
F-32	32
F-33	33
F-34	34
F-4	35
FX01	36
FX50	37
FX57	38
FX40	39
IG-00	40
VCNO	41
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SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
OPNAV-NCH-15

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA LISBON (HUFF)	FOR ACTION	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		CNO	2
DATE 10 JAN 1944			3
TOR CODEROD 092148	INFORMATION		4
DECODED BY CHERNOCK			5
PARAPHRASED BY PARKER			6
ROUTED BY HILL			7
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			8
091550			9
NCR 2038			10
			11
			12
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ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ACTION

FROM HUFF TO CNO

BRITISH AUTHORITIES AZORES NOTIFIED LOCAL PORTUGUESE MILITARY COMMANDER EXPECTED ARRIVAL TYRCEIRA 2 LIBERTY SHIPS WITH AMERICAN PERSONNEL. APPARENTLY BRITISH USED WORDS "TRANSPORTS AND TROOPS" SALAZAR NOTIFIED BY CABLE AND WAS PREPARED TO ORDER USE OF FORCE TO PREVENT LANDING. BRITISH AMBASSADOR INFORMED SALAZAR PERSONNEL WERE CONSTRUCTION AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL NOT COMBAT TROOPS. SALAZAR THEN WILLING PERMIT THEIR LANDING WITHOUT FORCE.

COMINCH...ACT

13...16...0P-03...12...0P-05G...39...NAVAIDE...

CNO.....

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
OPNAV-NCR-15


F-0		22
F-01		23
F-02		24
F-05		25
F-07		26
F-1		27
F-2		28
F-20		29
F-3		30
F-30		31
F-31		32
F-32		33
F-33		34
F-34		35
F-4		36
FX01		37
FX30		38
FX37		39
FX40		40
TG-00		41
VCNO		42
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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

 SECURITY

9 January 1944.



MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN FRESEMAN:

Subject: Use of Facilities in the Azores
by U.S. Aircraft.

Reference: a. Memorandum from Captain Freseman
to Captain Royal dated 5 December
1943.

Enclosure: a. U.S. Army message, White 92.

1. Reference a forwarded the enclosure to the
Secretariat for the consideration and recommendations
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and return of original
papers. Action on this subject was completed with the
forwarding to the State Department of the Enclosure to
J.C.S. 589/3. The enclosure is returned as requested.


FORREST B. ROYAL,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Secretary.

DECLASSIFIED

\ JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date APR 24 1974

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 5, 1943.

Memorandum for:

Admiral ~~Brown~~ *Leahy*.

The President has read the attached message (White 92) and directed that I refer it to you.

Respectfully,

Wilson Brown.

SECRET

WHITE 92: 4 December 1943

Hull to the President.

Lisbon's 2906 of December 2 reports that the following developed from a further conversation between Salazar and Kennan yesterday:

While maintaining neutrality Salazar is unwilling to grant our desires outright. He is presently willing to extend to the British further facilities for their or our use but is prepared to do so when he can be shown that the general military situation has changed in a manner to diminish the German menace to Portugal as compared with last August. He will go the limit to extend us immediate use of existing British facilities if an appearance can be maintained of adherence to the British agreement. He demonstrated willingness to examine arrangements to allow us forthwith to proceed to constructing an airport on Santa Maria Island for Portugal, with a view to Anglo-American use when completed.

Lisbon's 2911 of December 2 furnishes the following additional comment: The Prime Minister agrees definitely to our full use of Terceira under a suitable formula reconciling such use with the British agreement, but he wishes to know what formula will be used. In his view a nominal marking of the planes as British would suffice. When Kennan appraised him of our plans for sharing in anti-submarine patrol activity in Terceira, Salazar raised no objections and displayed no surprise but remarked that this must also be under a formula reconciling activities with the British agreement.

SECRET

- 1 -

Doctor Salazar indicated that he would consider our proposal to construct in Santa Maria a new airport, and Kennan's impression was that he would consider the proposal benevolently. He felt that he could not grant us these facilities outright now. His thought evidently is that we should construct the airfield for Portugal and on completion, if it could be demonstrated that we and the British require such facilities beyond those already granted in the British agreement and that to grant them would not augment Portugal's risk, the field would then be made available under the existing agreement and utilized by us as in the case of Lagens and Horta. As long as some formula covered Salazar's position, it would be immaterial that the United States should make 95% use of the field. This is not a specific proposal, but is the trend of Salazar's thought.

He mentioned an extraordinary display of curiosity by the German Minister respecting American use of the Azores, which led the Prime Minister to suspect that our use of the Islands might constitute a turning point in German policy vis a vis Portugal. He wishes to be able, as in the case of Terceira, officially to deny to the Germans that he has accorded us any special facilities in the Azores.

In wishing to make the new airfield available under Section 8 of the Anglo-Portuguese agreement, the interpretation of Article 8 was his own and did not, according to the British Ambassador in Lisbon, result from any misunderstanding with the British.

Since his last conversation with Kennan, Salazar has ascertained for himself that Azores is unsuitable for aviation, but he admits the advantages

SECRET

of Santa Maria. Should our views concerning Santa Maria undergo any early change, or should we have any specific additional desires along these lines, he wished us to inform him immediately.

As Ponta Delgada remains, according to the Prime Minister, the only insular port the Portuguese Navy can now call its own and is also the seat of Portuguese administration, he wishes to avoid granting facilities at this time in San Miguel Island. Kennan said we needed a port with nearby airfield for the use of carrier based planes and suggested an informal arrangement for utilizing Ribo De Peize field. The Prime Minister seemed dubious, and pointed out that under the British agreement that field was to be reserved for the Portuguese fighter forces in the islands. He thought the British and our naval authorities had underestimated the potentialities of Horta, and felt we could have all facilities we require for such aircraft in Horta. We might station an American tanker and repair ship in Horta, for example, if we wished.

The Prime Minister did not wish to relate these questions to any hypothesis to eventual Portuguese co-belligerency against Japan. He instinctively thought there was agreement concerning Timor between Germany and Japan and feared the Timor question might complicate his relations with Germany. To this regard he is extremely anxious to have an answer to his overtures for Portuguese participation in liberating Timor.

Our Legation in Lisbon thinks it could be useful for us to be helpful in this regard.

The Legation recommends that our military authorities reach agreement with the British as to the formula to be used to cover our activities at

SECRET

- 3 -

Lagens, and that the Legation should communicate this to Doctor Salazar.

The Legation also recommends that we immediately draft a preliminary proposal for the airport construction on Santa Maria, and that this be communicated to the Legation. The proposal should be in broad, concise terms, leaving details for subsequent agreement. It should embody provision for immediate survey by our technicians and should establish most favored nation treatment for us respecting later use by commercial aviation. The Legation suggests that this matter be taken care of in a preliminary exchange of notes to permit us to go ahead with technical planning and survey.

With regard to Salazar's anxiety respecting Germany, the Legation points out that the agreement with the British specifically signifies a desire that Portugal remain neutral, and that if this is our attitude the extent to which Salazar has gone represents real progress of which we should take advantage. The Legation desires to know precisely the extent to which our military and naval authorities desire to make use of the opportunity.

My heartiest congratulations and felicitations on magnificent achievements of yourself, Prime Minister and your other associates.

Signed,

Hull

SECRET

- 4 -

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER		EXTENSION NUMBER		ADDRESSEES		PRECEDENCE		
FROM <u>ALUSNA LISBOA</u>		FOR ACTION		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE		P P P P P P P P		
RELEASED BY						CNO		ROUTINE
DATE <u>9 JANUARY 1944</u>		INFORMATION				DEFERRED		
TOR CODEROOM <u>792229</u>						PRIORITY		
DECODED BY <u>LARKIN/RISHI</u>						ROUTINE		
PARAPHRASED BY						DEFERRED		
ROUTED BY <u>STEEN HUTCHINSON</u>								
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.							IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW	
PAGE 1 OF 2		<u>082020</u>		NCR 1567		<input type="checkbox"/>		

ORIGINATOR	FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT
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ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

HUFF SENDS TO CNO.

BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN RECENT INTERVIEW PRESENTED NOTE TO SALAZAR CONTAINING REQUEST FOR ACQUISITION LAND FOR ADDITIONAL RUNWAYS LAGESN, DOCKING PRIVILEGES FOR CARRIERS AT PONTA DELGADA, AND SITES FOR RDF STATIONS ON TERCEIRA. NOTE ALSO CONTAINED INFO THAT U.S. NAVY VLR SQUADRON WOULD OPERATE LAGENS UNDER BRITISH CONTROL AND UNDER FORMULA ON LOAN TO BRITISH. SALAZAR REPUTEDLY TOLD BRITISH AMBASSADOR THAT HE COULD NOT PERMIT THIS AS IT DIFFERS IN PRACTICE AND PRINCIPLE FROM THE USE THESE FACILITIES BY TRANSPORT U.S. AIRCRAFT. THIS STATEMENT NOT IN ACCORD STATEMENTS MADE ON TWO PREVIOUS OCCASIONS TO OUR DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES. MINISTER SEEKING EARLY INTERVIEW TO CLARIFY THIS CONFUSED SITUATION AS WELL AS TO TAKE UP MATTER OF SURVEY PARTY. IN VIEW

ACTION	
F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-03	25
F-04	26
F-05	27
F-06	28
F-07	29
F-1	30
F-2	31
F-3	32
F-4	33
F-5	34
F-6	35
F-7	36
F-8	37
F-9	38
F-10	39
F-11	40
F-12	41
F-13	42
F-14	43
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SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
OPNAV-NCR-15

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	
FROM		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY	FOR ACTION		ROUTINE
DATE			DEFERRED
TO: CODE ROOM			
DECODED BY	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

PAGE 2 OF 2

082020

NCR 1567

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

ORIGINATOR: FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

EXTENSIVE PREPARATIONS ALREADY MADE, AGREEMENTS WITH BRITISH AND OTHER FACTORS, AM UNDER IMPRESSION THAT IN ACCORDANCE PREVIOUS UNDERSTANDINGS NAVY SQUADRON WILL BE SENT TO AZORES REGARDLESS OF SALAZAR'S ATTITUDE. REQUEST CONFIRMATION THIS OPINION AND ADVISE AS TO WHETHER THIS SHOULD BE COMMUNICATED TO SALAZAR AT PROPER TIME IF SITUATION NOT OTHERWISE SATISFACTORILY CLARIFIED. SEE LEGATION AIRMAIL DISPATCH NUMBER 100 JAN 7.

16....ACT.

COMINCH...CNC...21G...NAVAIDE...21OP...13...31...OP03

ACTION	
F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-07	26
F-1	27
F-2	28
F-20	29
F-3	30
F-30	31
F-31	32
F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
FX01	37
FX30	38
FX37	39
FX40	40
IG-00	41
VCNO	42

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.) OPNAV-NCR-18

SECRET

8 January 1944

Present Status of Allied Operations in the Azores



Salazar on the second of December agreed to the maximum use by the British and the United States of Terceira as a base provided British markings were used on United States planes. He has turned down several Allied requests for the right to use São Miguel Island for air bases. On December 31 he indicated to the American Minister in Lisbon that he was willing to allow a survey party to visit the Islands, provided that they appeared to be employees of a private aviation concern -- although he indicated indirectly that some of the members of the party would be expected to be civilian-attired military personnel.

- 1 -

SECRET

SECRET

Survey parties, ostensibly employed by Pan American Airways, are now standing by to undertake an island survey. Subject to their recommendations, COMINCH has ordered United States military representatives in Lisbon to obtain Salazar's approval of: (1) the construction and operation of airfields on Santa Maria or Fayal or both and the construction of a safety strip on Flores; (2) the construction and operation of Communication facilities and radio navigational aides on Flores, Pico, Santa Maria and Fayal; (3) the entrance of necessary Coast Guard personnel to guard these facilities and the necessary ships to supply them and to act as sea rescue units.

Captain W. G. Tomlinson, U.S.N., Commander of the U.S. Naval Forces in the Azores, and Commander Courier (with a small survey party) have arrived in the Azores. A squadron of U.S. patrol planes is due to arrive at Terceira during first ten days of February. On December 31 one-half a battalion of CBs with equipment for the Aviation Headquarters departed from the United States for Terceira. On January 23 a small patrol plane tender with Headquarters Personnel is due to arrive at Terceira. Army personnel and equipment for Terceira is scheduled to leave the U. S. in a few days.

The British have based on the Azores to date 21 heavy bombers (B-17's) plus 15 light and medium bombers (Wellingtons and Hudsons). The port of Horta is being used by them to refuel their naval ships. A complete report on British air and radio facilities in these islands is not as yet available to the Navy Department.

- 2 -

SECRET

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE	
FROM COMNAV AZORES		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1	
RELEASED BY		COMINCH	PRIORITY	
DATE 8 JAN 44			ROUTINE	
TOR CODEROOM 0058			DEFERRED	
DECODED BY HOFNER		FOR ACTION	9	
PARAPHRASED BY QUINN			INFORMATION	PRIORITY
ROUTED BY WILLIAMS				ROUTINE
				DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW	
	071900	NCR 847	<input type="checkbox"/>	

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT
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ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(ACTION COMINCH)

OUR FRIENDS REPRESENTED WITH CONSIDERABLE RANK AND WELL ESTABLISHED. YESTERDAY AIR VICE MARSHAL GAVE LUNCHEON IN HONOR LOCAL PORTUGUESE MILITARY GOVERNOR AND COMNAV AZORES WHO REPORTS WAS SEATED WELL DOWN THE TABLE. RECOMMEND LATTERS REPLACEMENT WITH REAR ADMIRAL OR TEMPORARY PROMOTION THAT GRADE FOR HIM IN ORDER WE HAVE REPRESENTATION AT HEAD OF TABLE. AOC VERY POLITE AND SPEAKS OF AUTONOMY OF COMMAND BUT NOTE UNDERLYING TENDENCY ABSORB OUR SQUADRON. HOWEVER WHEN TIME COMES WILL INSURE THIS WILL NOT OCCUR.

ACTION	
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F-01	
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F-20	
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F-31	
F-32	
F-33	
F-34	
F-4	
FX01	
FX30	
FX37	
FX40	
IG-00	
VCNO	

13 ONLY...ACT ADD COMINCH....

ACTION CHANGED TO COMINCH.....(PER 19C)

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
OPNAV-NCR-16

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRIORITY
FROM COMINCH & CNO		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY ADMIRAL KING	FOR ACTION		PRIORITY
DATE 8 JANUARY 1944			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM 1829/07			DEFERRED
DECODED BY	INFORMATION	LANTFLEET COM8THFLT COM EASTSEAFRON COMNAVEU COM GULFSEAFRON COM CARIBSEAFRON COM PASEAFRON COM ORSEAFRON CINCPAC	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY HERWITZ			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY HILL			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
071330		NCR 41425	<input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

THERE IS HEREBY ESTABLISHED COMMANDER U.S. NAVAL FORCES AZORES (SHORT TITLE COMNAVZOR) EFFECTIVE ABOUT 8 JANUARY UPON THE ARRIVAL IN AZORES OF CAPTAIN W.G. TOMLINSON USN PROSPECTIVE COMMANDER WHO WILL REPORT INITIALLY TO COMMANDER 12TH FLEET UNTIL U.S. A/S AIR SQUADRON IS ESTABLISHED OPERATIONALLY IN AZORES AT WHICH TIME WHEN DIRECTED BY COMMANDER 12TH FLEET HE WILL REPORT FOR DUTY TO CINCLANT. NECESSARY ACTION HAS BEEN SEPARATELY DIRECTED.

COMINCH & CNO.....ORIG
 BUSHIPS....BUPERS....BUORD....BUSANDA....BUMED....31...
 BUDOCKS....BUAER....28...21...23...19...19C...20M...0P03
 00...NAVALDE...CNO...20P...20S2...20P1...
 20S...20S1...20S3...20P3...12...0P05G...13...16...0P05

ACTION	
F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-07	26
F-1	27
F-2	28
F-20	29
F-3	30
F-30	31
F-31	32
F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
FX01	37
FX30	38
FX37	39
FX40	40
IG-00	41
WQ00	42
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SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-15
 071330 851

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM COMINCH		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY EDWARDS	FOR ACTION	ALUSNA LISBON	PRIORITY 2
DATE 8 JAN 1944			RRRR 3
TOR CODEROOM 0222			DEFERRED 4
DECODED BY	INFORMATION		5
PARAPHRASED BY OBERHOLTZER			6
ROUTED BY PARMENTER			7
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			8
PAGE 1	061722	NCR 41411	9
			PRIORITY 10
			ROUTINE 11
			DEFERRED 12
			13
			14
			15
			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW 16
			<input type="checkbox"/> 17
			18
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT 19
			20
ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT			ACTION 21

FOR MASON AND HUFF FROM COMINCH AND CHIEF OF STAFF ARMY
 AMPLIFYING COMINCH ^{attached} 061719 SURVEY PARTIES WILL TOTAL
 ABOUT 12 PERSONS AND 1 TON TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT. ALL
 MEMBERS UNDER GUISE PAN AIR EMPLOYEES IN CIVILIAN
 CLOTHES WITH CIVIL PASSPORTS. AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS
 OF EXACT LOCATIONS NECESSARY PART OF NAVIGATIONAL
 FACILITY SURVEY. SURVEY PARTIES READY ON SHORT NOTICE
 CONTINGENT ON RESULTS OF SURVEY DESIRE APPROVAL
 U S CONSTRUCT AND OPERATE AIRFIELDS SANTA MARIA, FAYAL
 OR POSSIBLY BOTH PLUS SAFETY STRIP ON FLORES AND
 CONSIDERING ADDITIONAL AIRFIELDS HAVE PARAMOUNT IM-
 PORTANCE, DESIRE APPROVAL U S CONSTRUCT AND OPERATE
 COMMUNICATION FACILITIES AND RADIO AIDS TO NAVIGATION
 ON FLORES, PICO, SANTA MARIA AND FAYAL.

F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
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F-07	26
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F-20	29
F-3	30
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F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
FX01	37
FX30	38
FX37	39
FX40	40
IG-00	41
VCNO	42
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SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-15

061722 851

DRFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE	1
FROM		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY	2
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION	ROUTINE	3
DATE			DEFERRED	4
TOR CODEROOM		INFORMATION		5
DECODED BY			PRIORITY	6
PARAPHRASED BY			ROUTINE	7
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED	8

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

PAGE 2

061722

NCR 41411

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT
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ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

NAVIGATIONAL AIDS WILL REQUIRE APPROXIMATELY 20 ACRES EACH ON FLORES, PICO, AND SANTA MARIA 5 ACRES ON FAYAL. SINCE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF DIRECTIVE REQUIRES SYSTEM BE HELD SECRET FOR DURATION PRESENT WAR FENCES AND SENTRIES WILL BE NECESSARY TOGETHER WITH ASSURANCE OF EXEMPTIONS FROM ALL INSPECTIONS. TECHNICAL OPERATING COMPLEMENTS EACH LARGE STATION 1 OFFICER 26 ENLISTED PLUS 11 TEMPORARY FOR CONSTRUCTION; SMALL STATION 1 OFFICER 12 ENLISTED ALL US COAST GUARD PERSONNEL. DESIRABLE ALSO OBTAIN APPROVAL MAINTAIN 1 OR MORE NAVAL VESSELS IN ISLAND WATERS FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT ALL U S FACILITIES AND AIR SEA RESCUE DUTIES.

ACTION	
F-0	22
F-01	23
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F-07	26
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F-32	33
F-33	34
F-4	35
FX01	36
FX30	37
FX37	38
FX40	39
IG-00	40
VCN0	41
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COMINCH...ORIG

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-15

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE	1
FROM COMINCH		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE		2
RELEASED BY EDWARDS		ALUSNA LISBON	PRIORITY	3
DATE 6 JANUARY 1944	FOR ACTION		ROUTINE	4
TOR CODEROOM Ø62157			DEFERRED	5
DECODED BY	INFORMATION		PRIORITY	6
PARAPHRASED BY GWIN			ROUTINE	7
ROUTED BY HILL			DEFERRED	8
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.				9
Ø61719			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW	10
NCR 4141Ø			<input type="checkbox"/>	11
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME		12
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ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT				14
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(FROM COMINCH AND CHIEF OF STAFF ARMY TO COLONEL MASON AND COMMANDER HUFF)

ALUSNA Ø2193Ø STATE DEPARTMENT IS REQUESTING MINISTER OBTAIN THIS DISPATCH FROM YOU. U S DESIRES EARLY SURVEY AIRFIELD SITES ALSO OF COMMUNICATION AND NAVIGATIONAL FACILITY SITES FLORES PICO SANTA MARIA AND FAYAL. PAN AIR IS APPROVED AND PREPARED TO RECEIVE INVITATION TO MAKE SURVEYS. FURTHER DETAILS LATER.

COMINCH....ORIG

ARMY(OPD--AAF)....OPØ3....16....12....OPØ5G....

13(FOR STATE)....36....2ØP4....2ØE....2ØP1....19C....

31....CNO....

SECRET

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Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-15

061719 851

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM CND		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY COLCLOUGH		FOR ACTION ALUSNA LISBON	PRIORITY 2
DATE 4 JAN 44			ROUTINE RRRRR 4
TOR CODEROOM			DEFERRED 6
DECODED BY		INFORMATION	9
PARAPHRASED BY THOMAS			PRIORITY 10
ROUTED BY SCRUGGS			ROUTINE 11
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			DEFERRED 13
PAGE 1 OF 2			15
			16
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SUMMARY AZORES PROJECTS FOR INFORMATION. PASS TO MINISTER AND HUFF. LIBERTY SHIP DEPARTED 31 DECEMBER FOR TERCEIRA WITH 1/2 BATTALION SEABEES AND EQUIPMENT FOR AVIATION HEADQUARTERS. 1 SQUADRON PATROL PLANES SCHEDULED ARRIVE TERCEIRA 31 JANUARY-10 FEBRUARY AND ABOUT 23 JANUARY SQUADRON HEADQUARTERS PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT WILL ARRIVE BY SMALL PATROL PLANE TENDER. LIBERTY SHIP AND 2 LST DEPARTING IN FEW DAYS WITH ARMY PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT FOR TERCEIRA. CAPTAIN W.G. TOMLINSON USN ORDERED COMMAND U.S. NAVAL FORCES AZORES DEPARTING WITH PARTY OF 10 FOR AZORES BY AIR 5 JANUARY. COMMANDER CURRIER AND SURVEY PARTY OF 5 DEPARTED WASHINGTON BY AIR 31 DECEMBER FOR AZORES. CONTEMPLATED COMMANDER HUFF REMAIN LISBON WHILE SERVICES ARE REQUIRED BY MINISTER. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION YOUR 21930

SECRET

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VCND	

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-15 031700 851

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

77605
62997

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALUSNA LISBOA</u>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
RELEASED BY _____		CNO <i>Huff</i>	PPPPP PRIORITY ROUTINE DEFERRED
DATE <u>3 JANUARY 1944</u>			
TOR CODEROOM <u>0120</u>		INFORMATION	
DECODED BY <u>SAPP/KNAPP</u>			
PARAPHRASED BY <u>SANDBERG</u>			
ROUTED BY <u>HUTCHINSON</u>			
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			16 17 18 19
(PAGE 1 OF 3)	021930	NCR 7563	IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW <input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ACTION	
F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-07	26
F-1	27
F-2	28
F-20	29
F-3	30
F-30	31
F-31	32
F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
FX01	37
FX30	38
FX37	39
FX40	40
IG-00	41
VCNO	42
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PART 1 021910 NCR 7551
PART 2 021920 NCR 7564
PART 3 021930 NCR 7563

(FOR CNO, FROM HUFF.)

OUR MINISTER HAD INTERVIEW WITH SALAZAR EVENING OF 31ST. ENTIRE DISCUSSION ON CORDIAL AND COOPERATIVE BASIS. SALAZAR INFORMED THAT NAVY VLR SQUADRON WOULD OPERATE FROM LAGENS UNDER BRITISH CONTROL AND UNDER FORMULA THAT SQUADRON WAS ON LOAN TO BRITISH. ALSO INFORMED EARLY ARRIVAL TERCEIRA AMERICAN TECHNICAL AND CONSTRUCTION PERSONNEL AND IN GENERAL TERMS OF ARMY PROGRAM REGARDING FERRYING AIRCRAFT. SALAZAR SATISFIED WITH ALL ABOVE. DEFINITE INTEREST SHOWN IN CONSTRUCTION SECOND AIR BASE. SALAZAR CONCEDES

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-15
021930

851

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALUSNA LISBOA</u>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY	FOR ACTION		PRIORITY 2
DATE			ROUTINE 4
TOR CODEROOM			DEFERRED 6
DECODED BY	INFORMATION		PRIORITY 10
PARAPHRASED BY			ROUTINE 12
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED 14

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

(PAGE 2 OF 3)

021930 NCR 7563

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	QCT
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ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

SANTA MARIA BEST SITE BUT IS MORE INTERESTED IN AIR BASE ON FAYAL FOR SPECIAL REASONS PROBABLY POST WAR. QUESTION OF BRITISH OR AMERICAN CONTROL THIS SECOND AIR BASE OR OF FORMULA UNDER WHICH IT MIGHT BE CONSTRUCTED NOT RAISED THIS INTERVIEW. SALAZAR WILLING TO PERMIT SURVEY PARTY TO VISIT ISLANDS BUT DOES NOT WISH MILITARY PERSONNEL TO COMPRISE PARTY. SUGGESTED THAT US SELECT RELIABLE COMMERCIAL COMPANY WHEREUPON PORTUGAL WOULD INVITE THAT COMPANY TO MAKE SURVEY IN CONJUNCTION WITH PORTUGUESE AT PORTUGUESE EXPENSE. HE INDICATED INDIRECTLY THAT SOME MEMBERS OF PARTY MIGHT BE EXPECTED TO BE MILITARY OR NAVAL PERSONNEL UNDER GUISE EMPLOYEES PRIVATE CONCERN INFERRING THAT HE WAS MERELY SEEKING FORMULA OR CLOAK COVERING ENTRY OF PARTY. SALAZAR ALSO AGAIN INFORMED OF NEED FOR SITES FOR COMMUNICATION FACILITIES INCLUDING

ACTION	
F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-07	26
F-1	27
F-2	28
F-20	29
F-3	30
F-30	31
F-31	32
F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
FX01	37
FX30	38
FX37	39
FX39	40
IG-00	41
VCNO	42

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.) OPNAV-NCB-15

DRAFTER ALUSNA LISBOA	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	FOR ACTION	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY			ROUTINE
DATE			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM			
DECODED BY	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
(PAGE 3 OF 3) 021930 NCR 7563			<input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: _____ DATE _____ TIME _____ GCT _____

Radio message

LORAN SYSTEM STATIONS AND THAT SOME MEMBERS OF PARTY WOULD BE RADIO TECHNICIANS. NO OBJECTIONS RAISED. IF THIS SURVEY APPROVED BELIEVE SELECTION OF COMPANY SHOULD BE EXPEDITED SINCE ANOTHER INTERVIEW SCHEDULED IN FEW DAYS. SUGGEST PAN AMERICAN AS MOST LOGICAL COMPANY BECAUSE OF THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF AZORES, PREVIOUS PREPARATIONS FOR SIMILAR SURVEY, EXCELLENT STANDING IN PORTUGAL AND FACT THAT THIS SURVEY IF CONDUCTED BY PANAM WOULD AROUSE LEAST COMMENT. MASON MAKING SAME RECOMMENDATIONS TO WAR DEPT. QUESTION PORTUGUESE PARTICIPATION IN FREEING TIMOR STILL OF INTEREST TO SALAZAR. BOTH HE AND MINISTER HOPE FOR EARLY REPLY.

16....ACT
COMINCH....CNC....20G....NAVAIDE....20OP....BUAER....
13....30....20E....20P4....0P03....

ACTION	
F-0	
F-01	
F-02	
F-05	
F-07	
F-1	
F-2	
F-20	
F-3	
F-30	
F-31	
F-32	
F-33	
F-34	
F-4	
FX01	
FX30	
FX37	
FX40	
IG-00	
VCNO	

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
OPNAV-NCR-15

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM (ALUSNA LISBON) HUFFAN		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEES	
RELEASED BY		CNO	PRIORITY
DATE 23 DEC 43			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM 230823			DEFERRED
DECODED BY YOUNG		CNO	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY THOMSON			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY ROLL			DEFERRED

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE

222255 NCR 1076

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

FOR CNO FROM HUFFAN.

OUR MINISTER INFORMED BY BRITISH AMBASSADOR THAT HE ACTING UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM BRITISH GOVT HAS HAD DISCUSSION WITH SALAZAR RELATIVE TO INCREASED USE BY BRITISH OF SANTA ANA AIRFIELD. APPARENT MOTIVE FOR REQUEST RECENT OPERATIONAL ACCIDENTS DUE TO BAD WEATHER LAGENS. UNDERSTAND BRITISH REQUESTED PERMISSION FOR FAMILIARIZATION FLIGHT CREWS WITH APPROACHES AND LOCAL CONDITIONS AND SUGGESTED AID IN NECESSARY DEVELOPMENT. SALAZAR APPARENTLY RELUCTANT TO GRANT FURTHER USE AND DEFINITELY AVERSE TO BRITISH LOCAL FLIGHT CONTROL AND TO THEIR OPERATION SANTA ANA RADIO.

ACTION	
F-0	
F-01	
F-02	
F-05	
F-07	
F-1	
F-2	
F-20	
F-3	
F-30	
F-31	
F-32	
F-33	
F-34	
F-4	
FX01	
FX30	
FL37	
FX40	
IG-00	
VCHO	

16....ACT

COMINCH....CNO. 200 NAVAIDE 200P 13...31..0P03..

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-15 A 33052

222255

851

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE	1
FROM ALUSNA LISBON		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEES		2
RELEASED BY		CNO	PRIORITY	3
DATE 3 DEC 43	FOR ACTION		ROUTINE	4
TOR CODEROOM 0951			DEFERRED	5
DECODED BY PAUL/KNAPP/DIEBEL/ KIRKBRIDE/WOODWARD	INFORMATION		PRIORITY	6
PARAPHRASED BY QUINN			ROUTINE	7
ROUTED BY HUTCHINSON			DEFERRED	8

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE

PAGE 1

022355

NCR 8063

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT	20
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ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

PART 1 - 022310 NCR 8068
 PART 2 - 022330 NCR 8060
 PART 3 - 022345 NCR 8059
 PART 4 - 022355 NCR 8063

ACTION	
F-0	23
F-01	24
F-02	25
F-05	26
F-07	27
F-1	28
F-2	29
F-20	30
F-3	31
F-30	32
F-31	33
F-32	34
F-33	35
F-34	36
F-4	37
FX01	38
FX30	39
FX37	40
FX40	41
IC-00	42
VCHO	43

(LISBON ORIGINATES. FOR CAPTAIN MOON, CNO, ALUSNA AND HUFF) RESULTS SECOND INTERVIEW WITH SALAZAR. PRESERVATION NEUTRALITY STILL DOMINANT HIS MIND HE WILL NOT AT PRESENT AGREE TO GRANTING ANY FACILITIES DIRECT TO US IN VIEW LACK OF CLOAK SUCH AS AFFORDED BY ANGLO PORTUGUESE ALLIANCE. PROBABLE NO ADDITIONAL FACILITIES WILL BE GRANTED BRITISH UNTIL HIS INTERPRETATION ARTICLE 8 PRESENT AGREEMENT FULFILLED VIZAN INCREASED NEED ARISES AND UNTIL DEFINITE CHANGE IN STRATEGICAL SITUATION THIS THEATRE OCCURS RESULTING IN REDUCTION OF RISK TO PORTUGAL. SALAZAR CONVINCED SPECIAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN JAPAN AND GERMANY EXISTS WHICH MIGHT RESULT IN GERMAN ACTION

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-15 A 33052

022355 851

001

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA LISBON		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEES	
RELEASED BY	FOR ACTION		PRIORITY 5
DATE			ROUTINE 6
TOR CODEROOM			DEFERRED 7
DECODED BY			
PARAPHRASED BY	INFORMATION		PRIORITY 11
ROUTED BY			ROUTINE 12
			DEFERRED 13
			DEFERRED 14
			15

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE

PAGE 2

Ø22355

NCR 8063

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
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ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

SHOULD TIMOR QUESTION PRODUCE STATE OF HOSTILITY WITH JAPAN BUT SALAZAR STILL CONCERNED WITH ANSWER TO QUESTION OF PORTUGUESE MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN FREEING THAT COLONY. SALAZAR FEELS THAT HE CANNOT GIVE CONSIDERATION TO REQUEST FOR FACILITIES ON SAN MIGUEL FOR FOLLOWING REASONS: FIRST, THAT ISLAND CONSIDERED PART OF CONTINENTAL PORTUGAL AND IS SEAT OF ISLAND GOVERNMENT; SECOND, PORT NAVY INSISTS ON HARBOR FOR ITS EXCLUSIVE USE; AND THIRD, FIELD AT CABO DE PEIZE MUST BE RESERVED FOR PORT AIR FORCE FOR DEFENSE OF ISLANDS AS PROVIDED IN BRITISH PORTUGUESE DISCUSSIONS. SUGGESTION SUBMITTED TO HIM THAT US CONSTRUCT FIELD FOR PORTUGUESE ON SANTA MARIA WITH UNDERSTANDING THAT UPON COMPLETION IF STRATEGIC SITUATION WARRANTS ANGLO PORTUGUESE AGREE-

ACTION	
F-0	23
F-01	24
F-02	25
F-05	26
F-07	27
F-1	28
F-2	29
F-20	30
F-3	31
F-30	32
F-31	33
F-32	34
F-33	35
F-34	36
F-4	37
FX01	38
FX30	39
FX37	40
FX40	41
IG-00	42
VCNO	43
	44
	45
	46
	47
	48
	49
	50
	51
	52

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-15 A 33052

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALUSNA LISBON</u>	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEES		PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____	FOR ACTION		ROUTINE
DATE _____			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____			
DECODED BY _____	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY _____			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY _____			DEFERRED

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE

PAGE 3

022355

NCR 8063

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
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ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

MENT WOULD BE ENLARGED TO PERMIT ITS USE BY ALLIED MILITARY AIRCRAFT. IT IS ENVISAGED THAT THIS FIELD WOULD BE NOMINALLY FOR BRITISH USE BUT THAT US WOULD CONDUCT GREAT MAJORITY OF OPERATIONS THEREFROM. CONSIDER THAT CONSTRUCTION MIGHT BE DONE UNDER SPONSORSHIP OF COMMERCIAL FIRM PREFERABLY PAN-AMERICAN USING CONTRACTOR OR POSSIBLY SEABEES OR ARMY ENGINEERS NOT IN UNIFORM. THIS SUGGESTION NOT REJECTED BY SALAZAR AND BELIEVED UNDER STUDY. SALAZAR IN FULL ACCORD MAXIMUM US USE TERCEIRA INCLUDING ASW AIRCRAFT PROVIDED FORMULA FOUND WHICH PROVIDES APPEARANCE OF USE BY BRITISH. HE OBVIOUSLY WISHES TO BE ABLE TO SAY TO GERMANS THAT HE KNOWS OF NO AMERICAN OPERATIONS IN AZORES. FURTHER HE WISHES BE INFORMED OF FORMULA SELECTED SO PORTUGUESE AUTHORITIES

ACTION	
F-0	
F-01	
F-02	
F-05	
F-07	
F-1	
F-2	
F-20	
F-3	
F-30	
F-31	
F-32	
F-33	
F-34	
F-4	
FX01	
FX30	
FX37	
FX40	
IG-00	
VCNO	

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-15 A 33052

DRAFTER		EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALUSNA LISBON</u>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEES		PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____	FOR ACTION			ROUTINE
DATE _____				DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____				
DECODED BY _____	INFORMATION			PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY _____				ROUTINE
ROUTED BY _____				DEFERRED

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE

PAGE 4

022355

NCR 8063

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
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ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

CAN BE ADVISED. BELIEVE SMALL BRITISH MARKING ON PLANES SUPPLEMENTARY TO US MARKINGS SATISFACTORY. UNDERSTAND GREENWOOD MAKING SAME RECOMMENDATION. //SITUATION NOW SEEMS TO BE AS FOLLOWS. CERTAIN ADVANTAGES MOSTLY AFFECTING ARMY OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED AND OTHERS SEEM POSSIBLE IN FUTURE. HOWEVER NAVY DESIRES AS REGARDS USING FACILITIES ON SAN MIGUEL HAVE MET SOLID RESISTANCE IN DISCUSSION SO FAR BETWEEN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES AND SALAZAR. CHARGE FEELS ADVISABLE TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPENINGS OFFERED AND NOT INSIST NOW ON SAN MIGUEL FACILITIES. // IN VIEW THIS SITUATION REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS. LEGATION VIEWS WHICH GIVE FAIR PICTURE OF NEGOTIATIONS TO DATE FORWARDED IN STATE DISPATCHES 2906 AND 2911 DEC 2.

ACTION	
F-0	23
F-01	24
F-02	25
F-05	26
F-07	27
F-1	28
F-2	29
F-20	30
F-3	31
F-30	32
F-31	33
F-32	34
F-33	35
F-34	36
F-4	37
FX01	38
FX30	39
FX37	40
FX40	41
IG-00	42
VCNO	43
	44
	45
	46
	47
	48
	49
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	51
	52

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-15 A 33052

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
ALUSNA LISBON		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEES	
FROM	FOR ACTION		PRIORITY 5
RELEASED BY			ROUTINE 6
DATE			DEFERRED 7
TOR CODEROOM			8
DECODED BY	INFORMATION		PRIORITY 10
PARAPHRASED BY			ROUTINE 11
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED 12
			13

PAGE 5

Ø22355

NCR 8Ø63

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
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ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

16...ACT

13...NAVAIDE...COMINCH...ØPØ3...CNO...2ØG...2ØØP...

ACTION	
F-0	23
F-01	24
F-02	25
F-05	26
F-07	27
F-1	28
F-2	29
F-3	30
F-30	31
F-31	32
F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
FX01	37
FX30	38
FX37	39
FX40	40
IG-00	41
VCNO	42

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-18 A 33052

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA LISBON (& HUFF)		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION CAPT MOON CNO	PRIORITY 3
DATE 1 DEC 43			ROUTINE 4
TOR CODEROOM 011034			RRRR 5
DECODED BY YORK/ROBERTS			DEFERRED 6
PARAPHRASED BY THOMSON		INFORMATION	7
ROUTED BY SOBEL			8
			PRIORITY 10
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			11
			ROUTINE 12
			DEFERRED 13
			14
			15
			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW 16
			17
PAGE 1	302355	NCR 6553	<input type="checkbox"/> 18
			19
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT 20

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

PART 1	302310	NCR 6544
PART 2	302340	NCR 6539
PART 3	302355	NCR 6553

ACTION	
F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-07	26
F-1	27
F-2	28
F-20	29
F-3	30
F-30	31
F-31	32
F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
FX01	37
FX30	38
FX37	39
FX40	40
IG-00	41
VCNO	42
	43
	44
	45
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	48
	49
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	51
	52

FOR CAPT MOON CNO FROM HUFF AND ALUSNA LISBON.

SUMMARY OF SITUATION TO DATE IS FORWARDED. IN FIRST INTERVIEW SALAZAR FRIENDLY AND GAVE INDICATION THAT HE WAS RECEPTIVE TO IDEA OF US PARTICIPATION IN AZORES PROVIDED FORMULA COULD BE FOUND COMPATIBLE WITH NEUTRALITY OF PORTUGAL. WE WERE ADVISED BRITISH HERE HAVE EMPHASIZED TO PORTUGUESE FOREIGN OFFICE IMPORTANCE OF US PARTICIPATION TIMOR QUESTION EXPECTED PLAY IMPORTANT PART IN FINAL RESULTS. THIS BELIEF STRENGTHENED BY SALAZAR'S RECENT AND UNEXPECTED SPEECH ON THIS SUBJECT. FROM INFO AVAILABLE HERE UNDERSTAND PROPOSAL FOR ARMED PARTICIPATION OF PORTUGUESE IN FREEING OF THIS COLONY HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY SUB-

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-15

302355

851

NAVY DEPARTMENT

EXTENSION NUMBER		ADDRESSEES		PRECEDENCE
FROM _____	FOR ACTION	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE		PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____				ROUTINE
DATE _____				DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____				
DECODED BY _____	INFORMATION			PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY _____				ROUTINE
ROUTED BY _____				DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.				IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
PAGE 2		302355	NCR 6553	<input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: _____ DATE _____ TIME _____ GCT _____

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

MITTED TO BRITISH AND TO US. CONSIDERED HERE THAT EARLY AND DEFINITIVE REPLY ON THIS POINT WOULD BE OF AID IN PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS. DIFFICULTIES STILL SEEN ANY ARRANGEMENTS FOR USE FACILITIES ON SAN MIGUEL. UNDERSTAND RECENT BRITISH REQUEST TO LAND ONE SEA PLANE PONTA DEL GADA PROMPTLY REFUSED. CHARGE DE AFFAIRS WITH APPROVAL OF MINISTER HAS AT PRESENT 3 POSSIBLE APPROACHES IN MIND VIZ (1) REQUEST FOR OUTRIGHT GRANT OF FACILITIES WHICH APPEARS DIFFICULT AS ABANDONMENT TO PORTUGUESE NEUTRALITY INVOLVED (2) IF THIS REFUSED 2ND PROPOSAL WOULD BE THAT NAVAL AND AIR BASES ON SAN MIGUEL BE CONSTRUCTED FOR PORTUGUESE BY US WITH UNDERSTANDING THAT BY DATE OF COMPLETION PORTUGAL WOULD JOIN IN WAR AGAINST JAPAN THUS MAKING BASES AVAILABLE TO US AND (3) IF FIRST 2 REFUSED, TO ASK FOR EXTENSION OF FACILITIES ON SAN MIGUEL TO BRITISH AS AN EM-

ACTION	
F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-07	26
F-1	27
F-2	28
F-20	29
F-3	30
F-30	31
F-31	32
F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
FX01	37
FX30	38
FX37	39
FX40	40
IG-00	41
VCND	42
	43
	44
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SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
OPNAV-NCR-13

NAVY DEPARTMENT

EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY _____	FOR ACTION	PRIORITY
DATE _____		ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM _____		DEFERRED
DECODED BY _____		
PARAPHRASED BY _____	INFORMATION	PRIORITY
ROUTED BY _____		ROUTINE
		DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.		IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
PAGE 3	302355	NCR 6553
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME

PAGE 3 302355 NCR 6553

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

OR OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

LARGEMENT OF BASIC AGREEMENT. FOR YOUR INFO. FROM ARMY HERE LEARN THAT MASON FROM AERIAL SURVEY HAS REPORTED AIRFIELD CONSTRUCTION ON FLORES IMPRACTICABLE. ARMY ALSO STATED THAT AERIAL SURVEY SAN MIGUEL SHOWED SITE AT SANTA ANA NOT EASILY SUSCEPTIBLE TO REQUIRED DEVELOPMENT. ARMY EXPECTED REQUEST SITE FOR THEIR 2ND FIELD AT SANTA MARIA. REQUEST THAT ALL INFO ON SUBJECT OF AZORES BE FORWARDED AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE NOT ONLY AS AN AID TO THE LEGATION BUT ALSO AS AN INDICATION OF THE NAVY'S VITAL INTEREST IN SECURING THESE FACILITIES. SECOND INTERVIEW WITH SALAZAR SCHEDULED FOR 1 DEC.

COMINCH....ACT
16...CNO...NAVAIDE...13...31...OP03...

SECRET

ACTION	
F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-07	26
F-1	27
F-2	28
F-20	29
F-3	30
F-30	31
F-31	32
F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
FX01	37
FX30	38
FX37	39
FX40	40
IG-00	41
VCNO	42
	43
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Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
OPNAV-NCR-15

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ADMIRALTY		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY 1
RELEASED BY		A.G.M. HOME AND ABROAD. (A OR R)	PRIORITY 2
DATE 28 NOVEMBER 1943		ADMIRALTY GEN MSG 66A	ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEBOOK 1938/28			DEFERRED 4
DECODED BY		BRITISH NAVAL ATTACHE LISBON	PRIORITY 5
PARAPHRASED BY THOMASSON /RM		COMINCH	ROUTINE 6
ROUTED BY WILLIAMS			DEFERRED 7
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND IS ADMINISTRATIVE.			
PAGE 1.	271958	NCR 16178	IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW <input type="checkbox"/>
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	SET

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT (RECEIVED BY HAND FROM BAD)

ACTION	
F-0	
F-01	
F-02	
F-05	
F-07	
F-1	
F-2	
F-20	
F-5	
F-50	
F-51	
F-52	
F-53	
F-54	
F-4	
F201	
F230	
F237	
F240	
TC-00	
TC00	

FUELLING AT AZORES.
PONTA DELGADA.

FOR FUEL
CAFO 1924/42 REMAINS IN FORCE FOR ALL VISITS TO PONTA DELGADA WITH ADDITION THAT ALL SIGNALS SHOULD BE REPEATED TO S.B.N.O. AZORES. REQUIREMENT IN PARA 2. OF THE CAFO THAT ALL SIGNAL SHOULD BE REPEATED TO BRITISH NAVAL ATTACHE, LISBON AND F.O.C. GIBRALTAR SHOULD BE STRICTLY OBSERVED.

2. HORTA.
A) UNITED NATIONS HAVE UNRESTRICTED FUEL FACILITIES AT HORTA. AS NOTIFICATION OF VISIT IS NOT REQUIRED SIGNALS NEED NOT IN GENERAL BE REPEATED TO S.N.A. LISBON. ALL SIGNALS ARE, HOWEVER, TO BE REPEATED TO S.B.N.O. AZORES TO GIVE MAXIMUM NOTICE SHOULD BE



DECLASSIFIED
APR 24 1974

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 78)
1271957 857

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM _____	271950	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE _____			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____			
DECODED BY _____	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY _____			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY _____			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
PAGE 2.		NOR 16170	<input type="checkbox"/>
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ACTION	
F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-06	26
F-07	27
F-1	28
F-2	29
F-20	30
F-3	31
F-30	32
F-31	33
F-32	34
F-33	35
F-34	36
F-4	37
FX01	38
FX30	39
FX37	40
FX40	41
IG-00	42
VONO	43
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
GIVEN OF E.T.A. AND FUEL REQUIREMENTS.

B) WHEN A SHIP CANNOT BE ACCEPTED AT HORTA FOR FUEL AND HAS TO BE DIVERTED TO PONTA DELGADA, S.B.N. AZORES WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR INITIATING ACTION AND FOR INFORMING B.N.A. LISBON. IN ORDER TO FACILITATE NOTIFICATION TO PORTUGUESE IN SUCH CASES SIGNALS CONCERNING VISIT TO HORTA NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARRANGED PROGRAMM SHOULD BE REPEATED B.N.A. LISBON.

C) FUEL STOCKS AT HORTA ARE LIMITED AND FUEL USE SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE MADE OF PONTA DELGADA IN SUBJECT TO PROVISION OF CAGO 1924/42.

3. FOLLOWING IS FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING POSITION AT HORTA.

A) HORTA IS NOT BRITISH NAVAL BASE AND LOCAL DEFENCES ARE IN THE HAND OF PORTUGUESE.



DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 1-17-73
BY RT. DATE APR 24 1974

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
OPNAV-NCR-15

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM _____	FOR ACTION	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____		INFORMATION	ROUTINE
DATE _____			DEFERRED
TOR CODEBOOK _____			PRIORITY
DECODED BY _____	ROUTINE		
PARAPHRASED BY _____			DEFERRED
ROUTED BY _____			

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND IS ADMINISTRATIVE.

PAGE 3 OF 3. 271958 HCR 16173

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME SEC

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT


B) AVAILABLE. DEPTH CHARGES. MEDXENOG AMMUNITION - AMMUNITION UP TO AND INCLUDING 4-7 INCH. ASDIC SPARES AND MAINTENANCE. SMALL STOCK VICTUALLING STORES. VERY LIMITED SUPPLY FRESH PROVISIONS. ENGINEERING REPAIRS OF ALL KIND. DIVER.

C) NO RADAR SPARES OR MAINTENANCE ARE AVAILABLE.

ACTION	
P-0	23
P-01	24
P-02	25
P-05	26
P-07	27
P-1	28
P-2	29
P-20	30
P-3	31
P-30	32
P-31	33
P-32	34
P-33	35
P-34	36
P-4	37
PX01	38
PX30	39
PX37	40
PX40	41
IG-00	42
YCND	43

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO, 1-17-78
BY RT, DATE APR 24 1974

COMINCH.....COG
2; P1A.....39.....ANPD.....39.....
ADD 13....(PER CCWO)
ADD: OP13.....OP15G.....12....(PER CCWO)
ADD 39..... ADD: ~~NAVAIDE.....~~ (PER 34)



HEADQUARTERS
U.S. ARMY FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

CLASSIFICATION

MESSAGE FORM
IN COMING

SECRET

No. 251642b FROM COMINCH HEADQUARTERS DATE 26 NOV
RECEIVED 26 NOV
DECODED _____
FOR COMINCH

HICOM X ALUSNA LISBON TWO FOUR TWO TWO ZERO ZERO X COMINCH SENDS X BEGINS FIRST AND
EXPLORATORY CONVERSATION BETWEEN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES AND SALAZAR DEVELOPED PREMISE THAT
PORTUGUESE ARE NOT LIKELY TO BE CONCERNED OR TAKE COGNIZANCE OF ANY USE BY US OF
FACILITIES NOW AFFORDED BRITISH IN AZORES WHICH MAY BE INTERPRETED AS PURSUANT TO
EXISTING AGREEMENT X THIS INCLUDED USE AMERICAN CREWS TECHNICIANS GROUND PERSONNEL
COMMA USE CONSTRUCTION PERSONNEL IN FIELD EXPANSION OR USE FACILITIES BY PLANES WHICH
MAY BE CONSTRUED DESTINED ?? BRITISH USE REGARDLESS PLANE MARKINGS X ON THIS BASIS
ARMY REPRESENTATIVES HERE UNDERSTOOD TO BE RECOMMENDING INAUGURATION FERRY REPEAT
FERRY SERVICE THRU AZORES X RECOMMEND ARRANGEMENTS MADE WITH BRITISH IN WASHINGTON
FOR SUBSTITUTION PETER BAKER YOKE DASH AFIRM SQUADRON FOR HUDSON SQUADRON NOW
UNDERSTOOD OPERATING OUT OF LAGENS OR FOR OTHER SUITABLE ARRANGEMENT X BELIEVE THIS
MAY AND SHOULD BE DONE ON BASIS OF ACTUAL OR OSTENSIBLE USE THIS SQUADRON BY BRITISH
IN ANTI SUB WARFARE AND COPY OF ALUSNA DISPATCH HAS BEEN PASSED TO WAR DEPT X HAVE
HAD NO REPLY FROM ADMIRALTY TO DISPATCH SENT ACCORDANCE MY TWO TWO ONE FOUR FOUR ZERO

DECODED 251642b 26 NOV

Leahy

WHITE 36

23 NOVEMBER 1943

SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE PRESIDENT

LISBON REPORTS THAT AN INTERVIEW WITH SALAZAR REGARDING AZORES FACILITIES HAS BEEN FIXED FOR NOVEMBER 23, 1943, 5 P.M. THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR HAS RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO SUPPORT APPROACH TO PORTUGUESE. THE CHARGE PLANS TO ASK SALAZAR TO CONFIRM THAT PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT OBJECT TO USE BY AMERICAN FORCES OF HORTA AND TERCEIRA FACILITIES OR TO PARTICIPATION BY UNITED STATES ENGINEERING UNITS IN IMPROVEMENT OF THESE FACILITIES. THE CHARGE INTENDS AT THE SAME INTERVIEW, INFORMALLY TO SOUND OUT SALAZAR REGARDING DESIRE UNITED STATES ARMY AND NAVY FOR THE FURTHER FACILITIES REQUIRED.

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

File

SECURITY CONTROL

OPD 580.82 Sec. (18 Nov 43)
Strategy & Policy Group Operations
Division, WDGS

November 20, 1943

SEXTANT

Number 1005

Azores

From Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff for US Chiefs of Staff
reference JCS 586

Paraphrase British COs (W) 956 dated November 16, 1943 is transmitted for your information. "Recent decision of US Government to take up directly with Portuguese the question of obtaining facilities in the Azores, of which we have no exact details, makes us believe US Chiefs of Staff probably will agree that the present is not a propitious time to begin even on a small scale ferrying American aircraft through Lagens. Nevertheless, we should be willing to review this subject in accordance with US Chiefs of Staffs opinion.

"In our COs (W) 821 we advised that it would have been best for the Americans to 1st use Lagens in a modest manner for transit of aircraft and approach Salazar with requirements only when gradually extended use had reached a substantial scale. We have received reliable evidence bearing out the wisdom of this advice and normally would have recommended that the time was now right for US to dispatch aircraft in small numbers in transit through Lagens.

"However the US decision to proceed independently with Salazar may make it unwise to inaugurate even modest ferrying of aircraft."

We do not concur here in the British recommendations that the US follow only a cautious alternative policy and this view has the approval of the Secretary of State. There would appear to be no real objection to our continuing direct negotiations while building up De Facto privileges at Lagens through progressive utilization of its facilities. For your information
CM-OUT-8157 (20 Nov 43)

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

BY RHP, NLR, Date

APR 24 1974 23

COPY No.

Map Room

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL Number 1005 November 20, 1943 Page 1.

a pilot airplane will be dispatched through Legens in the near future under pretext of gasoline shortage enroute from Bermuda to Marrakech.

ORIGINATOR: OPD

INFORMATION: General Somervell
 General Strong
 JCS (CAPT ROYAL USN)(COL PECK)
 Admiral King
 General Arnold
 C of S

CM-OUT-8157 (20 Nov 43) 2053Z mjc

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date APR 24 1974

23

~~SECRET~~

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

WHITE SEVENTEEN

NAVY:

ATLANTIC. AZORES. ALUSNA LISBON REPORTS EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH THAT PORTUGUESE NAVAL VIEW CMA PRESENTED BY PORTUGUESE COMINCH, IS THAT HORTA IS ENTIRELY IN BRITISH HANDS AND NO NOTIFICATION OF ITS USE BY U S NEED BE MADE TO PORTUGUESE. ALUSNA BELIEVES TERCEIRA IN SAME CATEGORY AND INDICATES PORTUGUESE WISH NO ADVICE ABOUT PLANES LANDING AT LAGENS . CHARGE HOPE TO CONFIRM IN INTERVIEW WITH SALAZAR TODAY THE VIEW THAT ARRANGEMENTS FOR IMMEDIATE USE OF FIELD MAY BE MADE WITH BRITISH. CHARGE AND ALUSNA BELIEVE IMMEDIATE USE OF FIELD WONT HAMPER NEGOTIATIONS AND MAY PROVE BENEFICIAL IN DEMONSTRATING NEED FOR ADDITIONAL FACILITIES. FOR THESE REASONS THEY SUGGEST PREPARATIONS TO BASE ONE SQUADRON AT LAGENS AT FIRST OPPORTUNITY.

*Order to Lisbon
units*

SECRET

9 November 1943

From: CTF 61
To : COMINCH

No. : 091955, NCR 123

ComDesDiv 38 reports on his visit made in accordance CinCLant's secret serial 001085 October 23 as follows:

Entry was expected. Had prompt and excellent pilot service. Three ships fueled simultaneously at rate of 60 tons per hour each. This service also prompt. Fuel was stated to be property of Portuguese Government. Consul paid. Attitude of Portuguese Navy including senior officer Azores and Senior afloat extremely cordial. British evidently arranged everything. No British uniformed personnel seen. No British war ships in or off port. British official of some sort on board Portuguese Naval Patrol Vessel which controls entrance. United States Consul was interned on October 7 for 13 days. His local title now is Maritime Delegate. All Belligerent Consuls interned at same time, same hotel, except British. (British changed title of the Consul to Maritime Delegate).

At written request of United States Consul I authorized Vice Consul Manuel Codoner to take passage in Kalk to Casablanca. This US officer is under orders from State Department to report to Washington for consultation early as practicable. All confidential codes held by Consul Leonard Dawson were destroyed by him when he received internment orders from Portuguese Government. Opinions held by Consul on subject of British are extremely strong and positive. Population seemed to be very friendly. I called on British Maritime Delegate (Ex Consul) Senior Portuguese Naval Officer Azores and Sopa who is a Captain. Port Facilities appear to be same as shown on current charts and sailing directions. Piers mentioned in sailing directions have been completed. CTF 61 is informed that the American Consul, Mr. Leonard Dawson plans to submit a report to State Department via Mr. Manuel Codoner now a passenger in Kalk for Casablanca. Further information concerning American British Portuguese relations will be submitted as soon as conversations can be held with Mr. Codoner. It is believed that this additional information will contain observations by the American Consul of the above relations.

SECRET

From: CTG 21.11
To: COMINCH

No: 071935 NCR 8658, 7 November 1943.

Two P4F4 aircraft, Lieutenant Harry B. Gafs and Lieutenant (j.g.) Bruce D. Jacques, became lost from SANTEE afternoon 6th, landed Lagens Field, Terceira, and returned carrier today. Pilots report very cordial reception by RAF, local civil authorities and civilian populace. Air Vice Marshal Bromet, senior British officer, gave assurance of welcome to any American carrier aircraft. Brigadier Joao Tamagnini De Souza Barboza, Governor of Terceira, welcomed pilots to Angra to a ball which they attended. The Governor's nephew and aide, His Excellency Lieutenant Tamagnini, was extremely pro American, spent entire evening entertaining pilots, requesting that all Americans be told that Portuguese people were with them one hundred per cent. Lagens Field has a 6000-foot Marston mat runway with clear approaches under construction; expected completion 19 November. Present runway firm sod estimated 4500 feet; fueling facilities adequate, with no hangars. 30 B-17's and 9 Hudsons equipped with rocket projectiles together with 2 Walrus operate there. Seaborne supplies require unloading by lighter open harbor Angra. This is from Com Task Group 21.11, who is proceeding general area 44-00 N 25-00 W. and the Pan American Airways representative, Mr. Long. All stated that the friendliness was genuine. No facilities other than those noted on present charts and sailing directions were observed facilities extremely limited.

From: CTF 61
To: COMINCH

No: 071305 NCR 8402 7 November 1943

Comdesdiv 58 in BULMER and BARKER joined UGS 22 at 071100Z.

Comdesdiv 58 reports on visit as follows. BULMER and BARKER entered Horta Fayal 060800Z. We were cordially received. Conversations with Port Captain, Commander Bello, P.N., the port health officer and the pilot made it apparent that Americans were held in highest regard. Comdr. Bello was most friendly. He offered the use of his barge, suggested liberty for the crew and seemed very sincere in his efforts to help us in every way. He was keenly interested in the prosecution of the war particularly Brazil's action in sending troops to the war zone and appeared pleased that Portugal was now helping. The health officer appeared delighted to see the U.S. ships enter and stated many people on the beach were thrilled to see the U.S. flag. The pilot stated that the people had expected U.S. ships to base there after the British-Portuguese treaty. They were disappointed when only British ships arrived. The pilot was believed prejudicial since he has 2 sons serving in U.S. armed forces. The impression of primarily friendliness was verified by the senior British naval officer, the U.S. Vice Consul, Mr. Kebole, and the Pan American Airways representative, Mr. Long. All stated that the friendliness was genuine. No facilities other than those noted on present charts and sailing directions were observed facilities extremely limited.

From: The Prime Minister

To: The President

No: 483, 1 November 1943.

Your Nr. 398. I send you herewith a Staff and Foreign Office note on your specific proposal about American Engineers:

"It would be impossible to send American Army Engineers until Portuguese agreement is obtained. We are not in occupation of any of the islands and the facilities granted to us by the Portuguese only cover the airfield in Terceira and limited port facilities in Fayal. The Portuguese civil and military administration is still functioning in all the islands.

"It would be helpful and save time if you could send the Engineer equipment already suggested by our Chiefs of Staff on 9th October.

"It quite apart from securing Portuguese agreement, a necessary preliminary to the construction of new airfields will be the survey by aircraft photography for map making and by a reconnaissance party on foot both of which have been arranged by our two staffs.

"We will of course give you all possible facilities for transmit aircraft at Lagens airfield as soon as Portuguese agreement to your military aircraft landing there has been obtained. The facilities at this airfield are fortunately better than our earlier report had indicated."

PRIME

SECRET

29 October 1943

To: The Prime Minister
From: The President
Re: 399, 29 October 1943
To : The Prime Minister
No. : 399, 29 October 1943.

In view of the high importance of using the Azores as a
land American transport planes, it is suggested that you
authorize the utilization of American engineers and American facilities.
Our Charge d'Affaires in Lisbon, on October 21, was instructed
to request transport planes in those Azores islands now occupied by
as follows: This will quiet many of my troubles.

QUOTE. It is desired that the Legation take no comprehensive
action at the present time on our request for air facilities in the
Azores, but the Legation should keep in mind that we must have the
use of some air facilities there as soon as possible.

The Legation should, therefore, make as much progress toward that
end as appears practicable from the Lisbon point of view and should
keep us fully informed. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

From: The President
To: The Prime Minister
No: 398, 26 October 1943

In view of the high importance of using the Azores as a landing for American transport planes, it is suggested that you authorize the utilization of American engineers and American facilities under British Command to construct quickly airfields to accommodate transport planes in those Azores Islands now occupied by British forces. This will quiet many of my troubles.

ROOSEVELT

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM SENT

NO DISTRIBUTION

U.S. URGENT

AMERICAN LEGATION

LIBBON

No. 1836, October 21, 1943

SECRET FOR CHARGE D'AFFAIRES

Careful consideration has been given by the President and the State Department to the thorough exposition of your thoughts in your telegram No. 2489 of October 20. In view of the considerations outlined it is desired by the President that you use your discretion and judgment with respect to the method of approach in the negotiations and in what measure our desires be presented to Salazar. It should not be forgotten, however, that there is an urgent and imperative need for certain port and air facilities in the Azores. In view of your understanding and knowledge of the local situation and of Portuguese psychology and of the possibilities of German reactions we have confidence in your estimate of the practical limits to which you should go. In this connection it should be mentioned that the maximum desired by our Navy and Air Corps is represented in the Department's telegram No. 1798 of October 16.

In

In the light of your statement (your No. 2469) regarding no quid pro quo for Salazar we have several considerations which we believe important and which you may mention to Salazar. The first in importance is the assurances, so far withheld, regarding Portugal's entire colonial empire and its sovereignty. The second is the economic material support already given and being given which is to say the least not unimportant in maintaining Portugal's economic life during the war and its internal stability. Furthermore the Portuguese Government, as you may know, has asked us for a number of PT's, arrangements for the granting of which are now near completion. In addition Dr. Salazar may well ask for further economic assistance which we may be in a position to consider granting.

We are sure you will keep us thoroughly informed.

SECRET

October 21, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State:

Referring to Lisbon's Message 2469, October 20, 2:00 p.m., the President desires that the following information be sent to the United States Legation in Portugal:

It is desired that the Legation take no comprehensive action at the present time on our request for air facilities in the Azores, but the Legation should keep in mind that we must have the use of some air facilities there as soon as possible.

The Legation should, therefore, make as much progress toward that end as appears practicable from the Lisbon point of view and should keep us fully informed.

/s/ WILLIAM D. LEAHY.

COPY

copies to
Gen Marshall
Gen Arnold
Adm King

WDL (E)

DAD
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

Lisbon
Dated October 20, 1943
Rec'd 10:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

U. S. URGENT

2469, October 20, 2 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

SECRET FOR THE UNDERSECRETARY AND MATTHEWS

Department's 1816, October 19, 1 p.m.

My telegram was based on the belief that if we approach Salazar with this entire program, at this time, he will not only refuse us outright but will henceforth view with great suspicion even any minor desiderata we may later advance with respect to the Azores. In other words, he will slam the door entirely and it will not be easy to get him to open it again. The reasons for this belief are as follows:

One. Salazar is not prepared for anything of this sort.

No mention of it was made to him during British negotiations. He assented to British requests reluctantly and only in part. Even this assent was given solely on basis of alliance and he thought that when

he

-2- #2469, October 20, 2 p.m. (SECTION ONE), from Lisbon

he had given it he had satisfied all demands.

Two. He feels that he has strained his relations with the Germans to utmost already and that he will be lucky if he gets off with sinking of a ship or two and possibly some reprisals in Azores area. The idea of giving the Germans further cause for offense at this moment would appall him.

I cannot disagree with this analysis. German-Portuguese relations seem indeed perilously close to the breaking point. Any further strain may well cause complications which would run counter to our desire to keep the Peninsula quiet at this juncture.

Three. Salazar who fears association with us only slightly less than with the Russians has made a great point of the argument that in dickering with the British, he was only honoring an agreement which existed long before this war began and that his concessions were not to the United Nations as such, a temporary anti-Axis constellation but only to Portugal's historic relationship to England. This was one of the arguments on which he relied to keep the Germans quiet.

Four. German propaganda directed to Portugal has recently plugged the line "now you'll see what you've gotten yourselves in for; the British agreement was

only

-3- #2469, October 20, 2 p.m. (SECTION ONE), from Lisbon

only the beginning, other demands will follow from other members of the United Nations, the Americans are in the background and will soon want facilities of their own et cetera."

Five. What we are asking is not only much more than what the British got: It considerably surpasses what they originally requested.

Our existing program advanced at this time would confirm Salazar's fears that we want nothing less than the whole archipelago, lock, stock and barrel, and it might very well make him adamant against even the mildest of further requests. It is true that when the Portuguese are willing to dicker, it is well to start by asking for plenty. When they are afraid to dicker and fear that their hand is going to be forced, the opposite is more apt to apply.

Six. I have no quid pro quo to offer to Salazar.

While the British did not definitely undertake to defend the Portuguese mainland, they went so far as they could in this direction and Salazar probably feels that by honoring the alliance, he has in effect engaged them to do the same. He knows that they have guaranteed to respect the integrity of his empire. He also has
their

-4- #2469, October 20, 2 p.m. (SECTION ONE), from Lisbon

their assurance that they will get out of the islands when the war is over. He doubtless hopes that he has committed them by implication to the support of his regime. He has also obtained advantages in the line of supplies from overseas and merchant shipping facilities for which he is inclined to thank the British.

← KENNAN

WNP
EMB

DLA
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

Lisbon

Dated October 20, 1943

Rec'd 6:43 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

U.S.URGENT

2469, October 20, 2 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

SEVEN. The British Ambassador here has
no instructions which would enable him to
support us in these requests.

He has in fact the impression that our
program is the same one which was at one time
submitted to London by the American Committee
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was rejected
by London as excessive, and he is at a loss to
explain its reappearance here. He has instruct-
ions to support us only in certain specific requests
for the use by us in individual instances of facilities
already granted to the British and in our general
desire to operate ferry service via the Azores.
He fears that if I go to Salazar with the existing
program Salazar will only call him at once to
account and reproach him for not giving warning
in the preceding

-2- #2469, October 20, 2 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Lisbon

in the preceding negotiations that any concessions made to England would be followed by even greater demands from us.

Eight. A number of the facilities we are asking for are ones which were flatly refused to the British.

Salazar in his talks with the British would not hear of facilities on St. Miguel Island for the reason that it is the center of Portuguese administration in the islands. The permission to use an airfield there occasionally for emergency landings was granted only with much reluctance. Santa Maria and Flores Islands never came into question. At no place did the British request a full fledged naval base of their own. Our desire to station naval vessels in any Azores ports we like goes much beyond the British desire to have a mercantile marine tanker and tug at Horta. Finally what we are asking in the line of communications not only exceeds British requests but would turn both British and American cable facilities in the islands into relay stations for our conduct of the war in Europe.

So much

-3- #2469, October 20, 2 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Lisbon

So much for the negative side. The question now arises what can we then do to gain our objective.

My answer to this is as follows:

Unless we are willing to connive at the overthrow of Dr. Salazar, which would involve a responsibility I shudder to contemplate, we must gain his confidence. Our assurances of last fall and our forbearance during the British talks have already made a beginning in this direction. I have reason to believe that my recent talk with him was likewise helpful.

My suggestion would be that instead of calling upon him to make another anti-German demonstration on the heels of the first one--which was quite enough for his nerves--we now endeavor first to slip quietly and gradually through the gap which the British have succeeded in opening for us. The Portuguese are allergic to theory but relatively impervious to practice. They can tolerate all sorts of things as long as they are not required to give them formal approval. A hundred American planes which landed at Terceira without their official knowledge would disturb them less than one landing which they were asked to approve in principle.

KENNAN

WTD

CAM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Lisbon

Dated October 20, 1943

Rec'd 11:03 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

US URGENT

2469, October 20, 2 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

I think that for the moment we should proceed in the most disarming and inconspicuous manner possible to work in an occasional American ship and plane to the use of the facilities, gradually increasing this practice, according to the degree of resilience we encounter.

Once the Portuguese have been conditioned to the presence of American planes and ships around the islands and we have thus gotten our foot in the door, I think we could well approach Salazar with the proposition that the intertwining of our war effort with that of England makes it impossible for our armed forces to be excluded from bases used by England but that administrative considerations require in some cases that the physical facilities used by our forces at those bases be kept separate from those of the British; that for this reason we must ask Portugal

-2- 2469, October 20, 2 p.m. (SECTION THREE) from Lisbon

ask Portugal to permit us to set up certain separate establishments of our own in the islands similar -- and wherever possible adjacent -- to those of the British. The British Ambassador would presumably be able to support us in such a proposal and he could then make good use of the "friends of friends" argument which is a brilliant and constructive thought. Whoever negotiates the agreement on our behalf should be authorized to make judicial use at the proper time of assurances to respect Portuguese sovereignty in all Portuguese possessions and also not to retain the facilities after the war without the agreement of the Portuguese Government. He should know just how far he can go in promising military support in the event of repercussions from Germany. He should be allowed also to play with our economic warfare pressure which might well be built up in advance as a bargaining factor. Finally, he should know whether it is the intention of our Government to make an open agreement which would be published to the world like the recent British arrangement; or whether we would be prepared to make an informal arrangement and to play down publicity to the maximum degree with a view to easing the shock to German-
Portuguese

-3-2469, October 20, 2 pm; (SECTION THREE) from Lisbon

Portuguese relations. The latter should not be technically impossible in view of the rigid censorship in the islands; and it would undoubtedly sweeten the pill for Salazar. The above procedure may not give us all that we want. But it would reduce the risk of our getting nothing at all.

I appreciate deeply the President's generosity in allowing me to state these views. They reflect of course only a local outlook and are not intended to constitute a general picture of all the broader factors involved which I realize only the President is in a position to survey.

(END OF MESSAGE)

KENNAN

EEC

EMB

SECRET - SECURITY

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

COPY NO. 67

532-24
(C.C.S. 270/10)

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

19 October 1943

532

(1) JCS 399	(13) CCS 270/7
(2) CCS 270	(14) JPS 224
(3) CCS 270/1	(15) JPS 224/1
(4) JCS 399/1	(16) JPS 224/2
(5) CCS 270/2	(17) JPS 224/3/D
(6) CCS 270/3	(18) JPS 224/4
(7) CCS 270/4	(19) JCS 270/8
(8) CCS 270/4 (Rev)	(20) JPS 224/5
(9) CCS 270/5	(21) CCS 270/9
(10) CCS 270/6	(22) JPS 297/D
(11) JCS 399/2	(23) JCS 399/3
(12) JCS 472	

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

LAND AIRPORT FACILITIES IN THE AZORES

Reference: C.C.S. 270/9

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COPY NO. 67
(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

C.C.S. 270/10
19 October 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

LAND AIRPORT FACILITIES IN THE AZORES
Reference: C.C.S. 270/9

Memorandum from the United States Chiefs of Staff

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff have studied the memorandum from the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff, on the same subject (C.C.S. 270/9), dated 10 October 1943, and noted the British plans therein outlined, to expedite preparation of the airfield at LAGENS for United Nations use.

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff, accordingly, propose to follow the initial United States entry as agreed between the President and the Prime Minister on 6 October 1943, by the following steps:

a. Not to exceed ten U. S. Army and Navy personnel will be sent to Fayal, Terceira, or both, by air on or about 15 November to join the British survey party in a reconnaissance of the Azores.

b. Unless previously advised that British photo-reconnaissance will provide photo-maps of all the islands, U. S. Army Air Forces will make a complete photo-reconnaissance on or about 10 November.

3. As regards paragraph 2 a above and the British preference for the U. S. survey party to travel in civilian clothes, it is thought it would be most unconvincing for officers, thus attired, to emerge from U. S. Navy combat air-craft at Lagens. It is therefore planned that these officers will be sent, in civilian clothes, by Pan-American clipper; inter-island transport to be arranged by the local British commander.

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

4. Regarding sending in materials in anticipation of development of U. S. facilities, arrival of such material before U. S. personnel are in the islands to handle it would accomplish no useful purpose and might embarrass the small British construction party. It is therefore deemed advisable to postpone shipment of any material pending further clarification of the extent of U. S. participation.

SECRET

19 October 1943

From: The Prime Minister

To : The President.

No. : 466, Filed 192215Z

I fear there may be some misunderstanding about your proposed direct approach to Portuguese concerning use of Azores.

When you told me you had received information from Lisbon that Portuguese Government would not object to direct negotiations with your Government on this subject, I encouraged you to go ahead, thinking that all you had in mind were the facilities for the ferry service referred to in my number 444, because in reply you said you were delighted with these arrangements.

Now I learn from Lisbon that you are instructing your Charge D'Affaires to put the demands formulated by United States Chiefs of Staff on September 8th. Difficulties inherent in these were telegraphed from here to Joint Staff Mission on September 18th.

I cannot help feeling that we could not obtain these for you immediately, and I wonder whether you have any definite information from Lisbon that you would be able to obtain them by direct approach.

STANTON
(Acting)

Regraded Unclassified

Secretary of State

Lisbon
October 18, 1943
Raid 11:40 p.m.

Washington
22 Urgent
1943, October 18, 1943

October 19, 1943
1:00 p.m.

Secret for the Undersecretary and Mr. Nathan.

AMERICAN LEGATION, LISBON

Department's 1788, October 18.

1816

There are in my opinion compelling reasons why we should not

advance these requests in the described scope and at this particular

Secret for the Charge D'Affaires.

Your 2449, October 18, 8 p.m., has been shown to the President who has directed me to state that a brief delay in opening negotiations will have no damaging effect from our point of view. He sees no reason however for your return here but wishes you to submit your view in full by cable.

I am reluctant to enter into a discussion with the Department

or to ask the Department to do so with the **STETTINIUS** over an instruction given me by the President. For this reason, I shall not cite here the

various reasons for these opinions. But I should like to make it plain

that I am willing to take full personal responsibility for this

position; and I should welcome it if the Department instead of requiring

me to proceed at once with the execution of the instruction would permit

me to return immediately to Washington and to explain, if necessary

personally to the President, the reasons for my views.

If the Department should approve this plan, I could proceed

to North Africa Wednesday morning by plane on the pretext--as far as

Lisbon is concerned--of paying a visit to Alpiers. I could presumably

Secretary of State

Lisbon
October 18, 1943
Recd 11:46 p.m.

Washington
US Urgent
2449, October 18, 1943

Secret for the Undersecretary and Mr. Mathews.

Department's 1798, October 18.

There are in my opinion compelling reasons why we should not advance these requests in the prescribed scope and at this particular moment. I believe that to do so would prejudice rather than benefit the chances--which are otherwise not unfavorable--of our ultimately coming to share the use of the facilities already granted to the British, and that it might cause complications in British-Portuguese relations not to mention our own.

I am reluctant to enter into a discussion with the Department or to ask the Department to do so with the President, over an instruction given me by the President. For this reason, I shall not cite here the various reasons for these opinions. But I should like to make it plain that I am willing to take full personal responsibility for this position; and I should welcome it if the Department instead of requiring me to proceed at once with the execution of the instruction would permit me to return immediately to Washington and to explain, if necessary personally to the President, the reasons for my views.

If the Department should approve this plan, I could proceed to North Africa Wednesday morning by plane on the pretext--as far as Lisbon is concerned--of paying a visit to Algiers. I could presumably

TELEGRAM COPY

proceed at once from North Africa to Washington returning to Lisbon as soon as my mission is accomplished. It is not probable that much comment would be caused in Lisbon by a short absence. I would of course, require specific authorization by return cable; and the Air Transport authorities at Algiers would have to be asked to cooperate.

As regards the delay in this case to the execution of the instruction, I may say that the Portuguese are not yet by any means sufficiently reassured about German intentions to provide the atmosphere envisaged in the instructions. It was only three days ago that they received the German note of protest worded in somewhat ominous terms and they are all gloomily awaiting some form of retribution. For this reason, I think that any delay is to the good.

The British Ambassador has been informed by his Government that I was receiving instructions of this general nature although his Government did not seem to have been aware of the full extent of our program. I have asked him to request his Government to make no comment to Washington in this respect before I could have an opportunity to make my own because I have no desire to evade the direct responsibility which I bear for the execution of these orders.

- (1) Peral Island. One seaplane base at North.
- (2) San Miguel Island. One seaplane base.

KENNAN

3. For U. S. Army Air Force aircraft,

(1) Corvoira Island. One landing base for air transport and ferry operations, and accommodations for personnel.

(2) Flores Island. One landing base for air transport and ferry operations. In the absence of Flores Island does not permit adequate air base construction. She base may be placed on Santa Maria Island. Housing facilities to be provided to accommodate personnel.

TELEGRAM SENT

JH
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SU)

WASHINGTON
October 16, 1943
10 p.m.

NO DISTRIBUTION

U.S. URGENT

AMERICAN LEGATION

LISBON

1798

SECRET FOR THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES

The following instructions are given you by direction of the President, to be executed on October 18 or as soon thereafter as possible, if at such time no military action has been taken by Germany against Portugal.

You are aware that we have held in suspense certain negotiations in order to avoid interference with the negotiations leading up to the Anglo-Portuguese Agreement of August 17. Our negotiations were designed to make available for us certain facilities in the Azores for our Army and Navy. You are now directed to seek an interview with Dr. Salazar and to request the following facilities:

a. For U.S. Naval surface craft: San Miguel Island. One operating and dupply base at Ponta Delgada.

b. For U.S. Naval aircraft:
(1) Fayal Island. One seaplane base at Horta.
(2) San Miguel Island. One landplane base.

g. For U. S. Army Air Force aircraft.

(1) Teresira Island. One landplane base at Lagens Field for air transport and ferry operations, and accommodations for personnel.

(2) Flores Island. One landplane base for air transport and ferry operations. If the terrain of Flores Island does not permit adequate air base construction, the base may be placed on Santa Maria Island. Housing facilities to be provided to accommodate personnel.

d. Existing cable systems and communications facilities essential to the operations of U. S. forces based on and operating through the Azores and to the operations of U. S. forces in the North African and European theaters of operations.

e. Observation posts, Radar, etc., as required.

Where aircraft facilities are mentioned, we understand unrestricted use, as for example of Lagens Airfield and Rabo de Peixe Airfield.

In connection with these facilities we shall require:

(1) Unrestricted port facilities and shore accommodations for necessary personnel in Azores ports and the privilege of placing in each port affected a station ship of the United States Navy and necessary tankers, tenders, tugs, etc.;

(2) Prompt admission of necessary American personnel for the improvement, construction, and operation of these facilities;

(3) Prompt customs clearance for necessary material and supplies for the improvement, construction and operation of these facilities and for the maintenance of personnel.

We propose to restrict the use of facilities to an indispensable minimum but confidently expect Portugal will give friendly consideration to eventual further requests.

The request for these facilities should be based upon the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1373 and particularly upon the QUOTE Friends to Friends UNQUOTE Phrase therein. This is in article one of that treaty. We may require British support in gaining these objectives, and if so we have the assurance of the British Prime Minister that this support will be forthcoming to the fullest extent. It is intended however that you shall take the lead in these negotiations.

The marine facilities should contemplate all the usual port facilities including refueling, water, food and other stores, repairs, etc., according to local resources.

We realize that some of the landing fields are non-existent today and consequently the facilities should embrace authorization to construct or improve fields as may be necessary in order to make fully available the facilities we have in mind.

Some

Some of these facilities have already been extended to our British allies and in granting the same to us it is understood of course that the extent of our participation in their operation will be a matter for discussion between the appropriate British and American services.

For your confidential information the War and Navy Departments expect to send to Lisbon as soon as possible technical advisers to cooperate with you in your negotiations, but in view of the directive of the President you should not await their arrival but proceed to open negotiations as indicated in the first paragraph of this cable.

To insure priority treatment and secrecy at this end you should mark all cables on this subject U. S. Urgent, Secret for the Under Secretary and Matthews.

HULL

16 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE

By direction of the President there is furnished you herewith the attached paraphrase of a message from the Prime Minister to President Roosevelt, #458, dated 15 October 1943.

The President desires that you carry out the action called for in the attached message with our Charge d'Affaires in Lisbon on Monday, 18 October, if at that time Germany has not taken action against Portugal.

Very respectfully,

CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aide.

1 Incl.

- 1 -

Regraded Unclassified

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12358. S

PARAPHRASE

15 October 1943

From the Prime Minister to the President. Number 458.

Your Number 387.

Make your own request to the Portuguese Government by all means. Quoting particularly the "Friends to Friends" phrase in the Treaty of 1373, we will support you to the fullest extent. With your man now taking the lead, our two ambassadors should play the hand together.

The one remaining question open is whether you should allow them a few more days to judge the reaction of the Germans. This decision will be yours.

SECRET

WDL (e)

HH

els

From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 458

Filed 151739Z October

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.
Personal and most secret. Number 458. Your number 387.

By all means make your own request to the Portuguese Government. We will back you to the full, quoting particularly the "Friends to Friends" phrase in the Treaty of 1373. Our two ambassadors should play the hand together, your man now taking the lead.

The only question open is whether you should give them a few more days to watch the German reaction. We leave this to you.

No Sig

SECRET

Admiral Brown wrote on original:

"A paraphrase to Secy Stettinius with instructions to carry out with our Charge d'Affaires on Monday, 18 Oct, if at that time Germany has not taken action against Portugal."

COPY

Is Bill via Miss Gully at 151445

From: The President

To: The Prime Minister

No: 387, 14 October 1943

You will recall agreement, made during your recent Portuguese negotiations, that any direct approach by U.S. Government to Portuguese Government would be suspended until those negotiations were concluded. Those negotiations were, as you know, concluded on 17 August with signing of INGOT agreement.

It was not practicable, however, to have included in that agreement adequate provision for U. S. Navy facilities in Azores, or any provision whatever for facilities for U. S. air transport and air ferrying operations.

We both fully realize the tremendous importance to combined war effort of establishing Central Atlantic air transport and ferry route via Azores, with resultant saving of millions of gallons of high octane gasoline and many thousands of pilot and engine hours per month.

We have received information from Lisbon that the Portuguese Government would not object to direct negotiations with the United States looking toward the use by U. S. airplanes of the islands, and I should like to suggest for your consideration that the U. S. State Department be directed by me to make a direct approach to the Government of Portugal with the purpose of obtaining agreement to permit us to provide aviation facilities in the Azores and to use such facilities for our combatant and transport airplanes in the furtherance of the Allied war effort.

I hope you will agree to this line of approach to our common problem and that if practicable your representatives in Portugal may assist and join with ours in the discussions.

ROOSEVELT

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

COPY NO. 59

532-21

(C.C.S. 270/9)

10 October 1943

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

532

(1) JCS 399	(11) JCS 399/2
(2) CCS 270	(12) JCS 472
(3) CCS 270/1	(13) CCS 270/7
(4) JCS 399/1	(14) JPS 224
(5) CCS 270/2	(15) JPS 224/1
(6) CCS 270/3	(16) JPS 224/2
(7) CCS 270/4	(17) JPS 224/3/D
(8) CCS 270/4	(18) JPS 224/4
(Rev)	(19) JCS 270/8
(9) CCS 270/5	(20) JPS 224/5
(10) CCS 270/6	

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

LAND AIRPORT FACILITIES IN THE AZORES

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

COPY NO. 59

C.C.S. 270/9

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

10 October 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

LAND AIRPORT FACILITIES IN THE AZORES

Memorandum from the Representatives of the
British Chiefs of Staff

After Air Vice Marshal Medhurst's talk to U.S. Chiefs of Staff on 6th October, a message was dispatched to the British Chiefs of Staff emphasizing:

- a. the concern of U.S. Chiefs of Staff in the use for their ferry route as early as possible of the facilities granted at Terceira; and
- b. the desire of U.S. Chiefs of Staff to dispatch a small survey party to Terceira to ascertain what improvements, if any, can be made to the airfield to enable their aircraft to pass through.

We are informed by British Chiefs of Staff that the ALACRITY convoy contains a British reconnaissance party and the necessary equipment and personnel for the development of the airfield at Lagens. They would be very pleased if the American survey party would join in a reconnaissance of the Azores as soon as this can be arranged, in order to enable preparations to be made for development when the political situation allows. Air Marshal Bromet, who is in charge of the operation, has been informed by British Chiefs of Staff that he must give first priority to development of the Lagens airfield up to Fortress requirements.

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

The British Chiefs of Staff think it necessary for the U.S. survey party to travel in civilian clothes. They suggest that the party should arrive by naval aircraft, if possible from an aircraft carrier, as soon as the airfield at Lagens is reported fit. They add that the smaller the party the easier it will be to avoid difficulty with the Portuguese at this early stage.

As regards material being sent in, the British Chiefs of Staff say that there is no objection to this but the first consignment should not exceed what can reasonably be used by the British construction party of 250 men, and should purport to be for their use. Later consignments would depend on the result of the reconnaissance of the island as a whole and on the progress of political developments which the British Chiefs of Staff will try to encourage.

We are arranging to get the earliest possible report as to fitness of the Lagens airfield and will be glad to communicate to the British Chiefs of Staff for Air Marshal Bromet any detailed proposals that you may wish to send.

SECRET

9 October 1943

From: The President.

To : The Prime Minister.

No. : 384

Replying to your 444, I am delighted with arrangements to provide in the Azores facilities for our ferry service as pointed out in my 376. The improvement in efficiency of the Allied war effort by directing our ferry service via the islands is so valuable as to justify its commencement at the earliest practicable date.

I hope you will succeed in convincing Salazar of the value to Portugal that will result from his taking with us an active part in the war.

He may be assured that the United States has no desire to remain after the war in any Portuguese territory, and that we will welcome him as a belligerent on our side.

The first temporary visit of escort vessels and two aircraft will be made approximately on 6 November as stated in detail in my 375.

It is good to know that the landings are going forward so well.

SECRET

8 October 1943

From: The Prime Minister.
To : The President.

No. : 444, Filed 081835Z

Your number 376.

I fully recognize all the advantages set forth. Our forces were admitted to these islands on October 8th, and publicity will be given on the 12th. It will be necessary to see what the German reaction is. If, as I expected, it is merely abusive, Salazar will be reassured and I will then immediately ask Salazar, either by a direct message or through our ambassador, that you should have the necessary facilities for the ferry service, which is of vital consequence, and I will explain or have explained the full force of the argument to him.

I shall of course argue that Salazar has taken the plunge and to a large extent joined the Allies, and that he runs no greater risk by your being in the Islands too. On the contrary, by so doing he gets the added support and friendship of the United States, and the American guarantee about respecting Portuguese colonies similar to that which we have given. I assume I may make full play with this argument since we already informed the Portuguese last June, on your authority, that we understood the United States Government would associate itself with our colonial guarantees. I have also received Mr. Winant's message that your charge d'affairs at Lisbon has been instructed to communicate such guarantees only if requested to do so by Dr. Salazar. It should therefore be possible to keep this card in our hand for the present, and it should assist us materially in playing our game.

I am communicating through the State Department a Portuguese communication showing that they contemplate eventually taking an active part in the war, at least in the Far East. Our task will be much easier if and when Portugal joins us as a belligerent, and it is very much better in these matters to work things up gradually.

Supposing that Salazar refuses, being afraid that you will stay there after the war and of the ambitions of Pan American Airways, I will immediately report to you. Then is the moment for your ambassador to come forward or for you to address Salazar personally, it being of course understood that we shall give you the fullest help and support by every means. We have in any case already provided under our own agreement with the Portuguese for the arrival of the first mixed convoy early in November, to which you refer in your number 375. I agree with the detailed arrangements proposed in that telegram, which should not give rise to any difficulties. I hope that the Portuguese may be brought along in a friendly way and that they will listen to the many good reasons we can both advance for their doing so.

Pray let me know how you view this programme.

From: The President
To: The Prime Minister
No: 376, 6 October 1943.

I have just received the following recommendation from the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to convey to you their serious concern regarding the situation which has developed with respect to the use of the Azores.

"The importance of the central Atlantic air transport and ferry route to the United Nations war effort cannot be over-emphasized. Briefly summarized, it represents:

"a. Potential saving over the six months period (November 1943-April 1944) of approximately fifty-one and one-half million gallons of high octane aviation fuel; sufficient to support 5,400 heavy bomber sorties per month for the same period or the rough equivalent of one month's consumption by the combined operations of the RAF and USAAF in and from the United Kingdom.

"b. Potential saving in engine hours of each bomber ferried to the United Kingdom, sufficient to permit six or more additional combat missions before engine over-haul.

"c. The release of approximately 150 transport aircraft, which could thus become available for service in the India-Burma-China area where they are so urgently needed.

"d. Some 15,000 trained ground personnel released for duty elsewhere.

"This gasoline consumption required by the longer southern route is at the direct expense of the U.S. Army Air Forces Training Program which has just been temporarily curtailed due to fuel shortage. Unless immediate action is taken to effect a saving, the flow of replacement combat crews to theaters of operation will soon be reduced. Alternatively, the reserve levels of gasoline now maintained in theaters of operations will have to be lowered.

"The present British-Portuguese agreement covering facilities in the islands does not provide facilities for air transport and air ferrying operations. We have advised the British Chiefs of Staff of our requirements and of additional steps which we feel should be taken, but we have little confidence that the British will provide facilities for a central Atlantic air route in time to be of value to the OVERLORD buildup during the coming winter months.

"We consider this matter to be so serious that we are suggesting that you bring it to the attention of the Prime Minister, emphasizing the grave implications of delay in securing facilities for air ferrying and air transport operations. Our suggestion is that a specific request be made to the Prime Minister to make Lagens Field, Terceira, available for air transport and air ferrying purposes immediately following our initial entry and that further negotiations with the Portuguese be instituted in which the United States will participate with Great Britain to secure the additional facilities so urgently required."

I agree that this is a very important matter.

ROOSEVELT

From: The President
To: The Prime Minister
No: 375, 6 October 1943

1. In accordance with our agreement at Quebec initial entry of the United States into the Azores will be by two or more United States escort vessels from UGS-22, sailing on 25 October 1943, and two aircraft from a CVE. In addition to the convoy escorts, there will be at least two others over and above those normally provided. The convoy will be routed so as to pass the Azores on approximately 6 November and the carrier will be within near aircraft range of Lagens Field, Terceira Island, the afternoon of 6 November and the morning of 7 November.
2. Two escort vessels will proceed to Horta, Fayal, at time to be designated by the convoy commander, for the purpose of fueling from a British oiler stationed there; to remain not longer than 24 hours and to rejoin convoy or carrier group after fueling.
3. At the discretion of the convoy commander, up to three more escorts will be fueled at Ponta Delgada, Sao Miguel. This fueling will be dependent upon the submarine situation as existing at the time and the convoy commander's opinion whether the escorts may be spared long enough to accomplish the fueling. It is expected this fueling will be accomplished unless there is good reason to the contrary.
4. Dependent upon weather conditions, two carrier-borne aircraft will be flown off the carrier when near Lagens Field the afternoon of 6 November, to remain there overnight, and after fueling, rejoin the carrier the following day. This date may be delayed if required by weather conditions.
5. The routing of the convoy and carrier, with due regard to the submarine situation, will be such as to make the above operations feasible.
6. Commanding officers of ships and planes will have plausible reasons for entry. They will obtain such intelligence information as practicable in regard to reactions to their presence and facilities observed. The convoy commander will forward items of value if radio silence is broken for other reasons or upon arrival in port.
7. Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet, will be charged with the further development and execution of this plan.

ROOSEVELT

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(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

532-19
(C.C.S. 270/8)

532

20 September 1943

- | | |
|---------------------|----------------|
| (1) JCS 399 | (11) JCS 399/2 |
| (2) CCS 270 | (12) JCS 472 |
| (3) CCS 270/1 | (13) CCS 270/7 |
| (4) JCS 399/1 | (14) JPS 224 |
| (5) CCS 270/2 | (15) JPS 224/1 |
| (6) CCS 270/3 | (16) JPS 224/2 |
| (7) CCS 270/4 | (17) JPS 224/3 |
| (8) CCS 270/4 (Rev) | (18) JPS 224/4 |
| (9) CCS 270/5 | |
| (10) CCS 270/6 | |

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

LAND AIRPORT FACILITIES IN THE AZORES

References: C.C.S. 118th Mtg., Item 9
C.C.S. 270/7

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
C.C.S. 270/8
20 September 1943

COPY NO. 63
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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

LAND AIRPORT FACILITIES IN THE AZORES

References: C.C.S. 118th Mtg., Item 9
C.C.S. 270/7

Memorandum by the Representatives of
the British Chiefs of Staff

1. We have now received a reply from the British Chiefs of Staff in answer to the U.S. proposals regarding the use of the Azores set out in C.C.S. 270/7. They repeat the assurances given at QUADRANT that as soon as possible after the British entry into the Azores they will do all they can to make arrangements for the operational and transit use of the Azores by U.S. aircraft. In view, however, of the history of the negotiations with the Portuguese and of the extreme undesirability of Portugal becoming actively involved in the war under present conditions, the British Chiefs of Staff are confident that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff are not expecting them to obtain immediate agreement to their full program, which far exceeds the total facilities for which the Portuguese have been asked. It has always been the policy to rely upon a gradual expansion of facilities step by step in the light of Axis reaction and the British Chiefs of Staff are convinced that immediate disclosure of U.S. plans on the scale described in C.C.S. 270/7 will merely scare the Portuguese and cause greater delay in the end than would be involved in a more gradual approach.

2. The British Chiefs of Staff suggest that quicker progress is likely to be made in the initial stages if American activities in the Azores are at first developed as far as possible under British

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

cover. In any case, they consider that all anti-submarine air forces operating from the Azores should operate under one command. The best plan would probably be for the Americans to start using Lagens in a small way in the transit of transport and reinforcing aircraft. This use could be extended gradually and when it had reached a substantial scale the agreed transit and operational requirements could be put to Salazar.

3. The actual use to which the facilities in the Azores can be put during this winter both by the Americans and ourselves is conditioned by

- a. The terms of the INGOT Agreement (Enclosure "A") which necessarily imposes severe limitations at first, and
- b. The actual physical difficulties of developing the facilities required, particularly airfields.

4. With regard to 3 a. the following points are of importance:

- a. The Portuguese during INGOT negotiations declined absolutely to grant us any naval base in the Azores and all that we succeeded in obtaining were refuelling and re-victualling facilities at Horta. At Ponta Delgada we are therefore restricted to the normal facilities available under International Law. The facilities at Horta are available to the ships of the United Nations operating in convoys and there is therefore no difficulty about the proposed Anglo-American convoy which will pass the islands early in November. It would, however, not be possible to use Horta as a full naval base in the early stages, though we hope to achieve this ultimately.

- b. The only airfield immediately available will be Lagens, since we have only been granted emergency facilities at Rabo de Peixe. It is certainly our intention to increase our use

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

of the latter airfield but it hardly seems necessary to plan for as many as four squadrons of American V.L.R. aircraft. In the opinion of the British Chiefs of Staff three G.R. squadrons are sufficient for the protection of all convoys on the southern route.

c. During the INGOT negotiations the Portuguese were insistent on reducing to the absolute minimum the number of British personnel to enter the islands. We are starting with a total of about 2,000, and the early introduction of the very much larger numbers proposed in C.C.S. 270/7 is likely to be resisted most strongly by the Portuguese. Indeed course of negotiations has shown that the whole principle of the permanent stationing of U.S. ground forces in the islands is one which will cause great difficulty with the Portuguese.

5. With regard to 3 b, information available about the possibility of airfield development is scanty but what we have leads us to believe that the construction of airfields in Flores and Santa Maria would be a difficult engineering task which could not in any event be undertaken until next spring. Apart from this the port facilities in these islands would be quite insufficient for the construction and maintenance of the proposed air bases.

6. The detailed comments of the British Chiefs of Staff on the U.S. proposals in C.C.S. 270/7 are as follows:

Reference paragraph 1.

a. As stated above we consider three G.R. squadrons sufficient. We are necessarily limited at first to operating two Fortress squadrons at Lagens but intend later to secure Portuguese agreement to development of second air base at Rabo de Peixe.

b. We agree, and one such support group will be operating in the area using Horta as a fuelling and emergency repair and

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replenishment port as soon as we are established. See however paragraph 4 a above.

c. It is hoped to secure these facilities.

Reference paragraph 2.

a. Portuguese have made it clear that they wish to retain Ponta Delgada as their own base and seat of Government and that the only facilities they will give us there are the normal facilities available under International Law. We can however use Horta initially only as a refuelling and emergency repair port but we anticipate its full use ultimately.

b. (1) and (2). We expect that facilities at Fayal for flying boats will be made available, but at San Miguel considerable construction work on the airfield will be necessary before it will be able to accommodate the air forces referred to.

c. (1). The airfield at Lagens will have to be extended to meet this requirement if it is intended to continue A/S operations from this airfield.

(2). See paragraph 5 above.

d. The existing cable facilities will be available to the American and British authorities in accordance with operational priorities and should be adequate.

Reference paragraph 3.

See paragraph 4 c above. Portuguese collaboration should in our opinion enable smaller numbers to prove adequate if agreement was reached with the Portuguese on the admission of American personnel.

Reference paragraph 4.

We agree early planning is advisable but assume that U.S. Chiefs of Staff will wish to reconsider their first proposals in the light of above comments and of study of the text of our

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agreement. We feel that they do not perhaps appreciate that the agreement of the Portuguese to the use of the Azores for military purposes has been secured solely by virtue of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. The alliance is Dr. Salazar's justification for Portuguese departure from strict neutrality and the documentary record of our negotiations in Lisbon will show that the action proposed by the U.S. would involve major political and strategical complications for H.M. Government for a gain which is not even counterbalanced by the present needs of the anti-U-boat war. Events concerning Portugal will have their effects on Iberian Peninsula as a whole and therefore on general Mediterranean and North African situation.

7. It is felt that perhaps the U.S. Chiefs of Staff have not yet realized the difficulties with which the British have had to contend in the recent delicate negotiations. In order to explain some of these difficulties the following will be found as

Enclosures to this paper:

- Enclosure "A" A copy of the "INGOT" agreement with the Portuguese regarding the use of the Azores.
- Enclosure "B" A copy of the "ALACRITY" plan for the initial British entry into the Azores, which is to take place on October 8.
- Enclosure "C" A copy of the original British draft agreement
and of the Portuguese counter-proposals.
- Enclosure "D"

In addition certain further documents giving the background of the Lisbon negotiations are being sent by air to the British Embassy and will be passed on to you when received.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

"INGOT" AGREEMENT REGARDING THE USE OF
FACILITIES IN THE AZORES

No. 15.

British Embassy,
LISBON,

17th August 1943.

Your Excellency,

1. In replying to my note of the 16th June, Your Excellency was so good as to inform me in your note of the 23rd June that the Portuguese Government accepted in principle the request of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom for certain facilities in the Azores but deemed it their duty to subordinate the actual use of these facilities to the previous examination by the two Governments of the political, military and economic considerations involved.

2. A delegation of British experts was sent to Portugal early in July to assist me in conducting conversations with the Portuguese Government on the lines set out above. As a result of these conversations His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Portuguese Government have reached agreement upon the conditions governing the use by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of facilities in the Azores as set out in the enclosed document* signed today by the heads of the British and Portuguese military delegations and hereinafter described as the main agreement. His Majesty's Government have noted with satisfaction the decision of the Portuguese Government to permit the use of the facilities specified therein as from 8th October 1943. They have for their part entered into the undertakings towards Portugal also set out in the main agreement.

* Appendix "A"

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3. Reference is made at various points in the main agreement to complementary agreements now under discussion between the two Governments. These complementary agreements will be concluded as soon as possible and will then be deemed to form part of the present agreement between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Portuguese Government, which is constituted by this note and by Your Excellency's reply. It is however understood between the two Governments that the main agreement enters into force as from the date of signature.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) R. H. CAMPBELL

His Excellency
Dr. Antonio de Oliveirs Salazar

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APPENDIX "A"

COPY

LISBON

Most Secret

17 August 1943

Senhor Embaixador,

Under today's date Your Excellency was good enough to address me a note in the following terms:

(Here follows an exact translation of Sir R. Campbell's note of August 17th.)

The Portuguese Government is in agreement with the substance of the note which I have just transcribed, and also agrees that this document and my reply should be regarded as approving the agreement reached between the delegations and thus as constituting the agreement reached between the two Governments.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Sgd)

SALAZAR

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APPENDIX "B"

AGREEMENT REGARDING THE USE OF
FACILITIES IN THE AZORES

1. The Portuguese Government agree to grant to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom:

a. Unrestricted facilities for refuelling, the supply of fresh water and fresh edible stores and repairs according to available local resources, in the port of HORTA, and the accommodation ashore of such personnel as are required in connection with these facilities. These facilities include the stationing there of a tanker and a tug, both of the mercantile marine.

b. The use of the port of PONTA DELGADA, such use being restricted to the facilities normally accorded to a belligerent by a neutral state, in accordance with international law (XIII Convention of the Hague Conference 1907).

c. Unrestricted use by aircraft of the British Commonwealth // of LAGENS airfield, in Terceira Island.

d. Use of the ports and harbor facilities in Terceira Island, necessary for the supply and maintenance of Lagens airfield. The protection of merchant ships, British or Allied, destined for this purpose shall be provided by warships and aircraft of the British Commonwealth.

e. Facilities for the use, by aircraft of the British Commonwealth, of the airfield at RABO DE PEIXE, on the island of S. Miguel, as an emergency landing ground, for forced landings, landings due to lack of fuel, or for reasons of damage of such a nature as to prevent the aircraft from reaching the Lagens airfield, it being understood that the resources available at the airfield shall be placed at their disposal.

f. Facilities for the occasional refuelling of some sea-planes of the British Commonwealth in the port of HORTA.

g. A complementary agreement will be made providing for the same rapid clearance through the customs in the Azores of war material and supplies for the British forces as in the case of war material and supplies for the Portuguese forces.

h. The refuelling facilities referred to in a and b will be available not only to ships of the British Commonwealth, but also to ships of the United Nations operating in convoys or in connection with them.

i. Permission to lay a submarine cable between Horta and Terceira Island to be used only for communications of a military nature and only for the duration of the war. The laying of the cable to be begun after the signature of the present agreement.

2. a. The Portuguese Government continue to be responsible for the sea, land and air defense of the Azores, with the exception of the local defense of the Lagens airfield, which shall be assured by British forces.

b. Special precautions shall be taken with regard to the security of the submarine cable stations at Horta.

3. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom agree as to the necessity of making the commencement of the use of the facilities in the Azores dependent upon the following:

a. An undertaking on the part of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that, in the event of an attack on the Portuguese mainland as a result of the grant to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of facilities in the Azores, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will afford the Portuguese Government all military support and assistance in their power, namely for effective defense against such an attack.

b. An undertaking to draw up a plan providing for British cooperation in the defense of Portugal against attack. This plan to be prepared taking into account the views put forward by the British delegation as to the possibilities of enemy action. A Portuguese delegation will be sent immediately to the United Kingdom for this purpose.

c. The furnishing of war material and of specialized technical personnel as laid down in the appendices and in accordance with the stated time-table for the convoys which will be attached to the present agreement. The question of title and the conditions governing these supplies will be the subject of a complementary agreement without prejudice to their delivery in accordance with the above arrangements or to their utilization.

4. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom agree to give all protection which it is possible for them to give to Portuguese merchant ships including deep sea fishing vessels, and especially cod fishing vessels, and to facilitate the arrangements necessary for ensuring the inclusion of the first named in convoys.

5. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom agree to give their most friendly consideration to new supplies of material for the Portuguese Government, should the evolution of the strategic situation necessitate this.

6. Given that the existence of a stable economic situation is considered absolutely necessary for the effectiveness of the policy of collaboration now envisaged; taking into consideration the manifestly deficient state of supplies in the country; and taking also into consideration the losses which Portuguese shipping, already insufficient, may suffer as a result of this very concession of facilities in the Azores, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom agree that the war trade and

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supply purchase agreements should be reviewed and that transport facilities should be granted, all in order to solve the difficulties of supplies for the public, in particular of food and fuel. Complementary agreements will be concluded concerning these matters.

7. It is agreed between the Portuguese Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that the effective use of the facilities may commence on 8th October.

8. Bearing in mind that the Portuguese Government has followed a policy of neutrality, in agreement with His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, as the higher interests of both countries dictated, the two Governments have agreed to reduce the facilities in the Azores to the indispensable minimum in the light of the present strategic situation. Nevertheless, the Portuguese Government will give its most friendly consideration to an eventual request for revision of the present agreement, in the light of new circumstances.

9. Complementary agreements will be made between the two Governments relative to the military security of the Azores and in particular (a) for the control of communications and especially of the submarine cable stations at Horta (b) as regards "Axis" nationals and other foreigners.

10. As it is not possible to cover at the present stage all the details arising out of the application of the general principles set out above, it is understood between the two Governments that any practical adjustments which may prove necessary, will be made in agreement between the respective local authorities, Portuguese and British, in the spirit of mutual cooperation

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underlying the present conversations but to become effective they shall have higher sanction, whenever the local Portuguese authorities deem this necessary.

11. This agreement has been done in duplicate in English and Portuguese texts, which shall be considered to have equal value.

LISBON

17th August, 1943

C.E.H. MEDHURST
Air Vice-Marshal.

ALFREDO BOTELHO DE SOUSA
Vice-Admiral.

APPENDIX "C"

PROTOCOL

With reference to the Anglo-Portuguese agreement signed today regarding the use by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of certain facilities in the Azores, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Portuguese Government have agreed on the following points arising out of paragraph 3.

Paragraph 3(a)

The text of paragraph 3 (a) already covers the case of any attack upon Portugal by countries with which His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are at war. It is however also understood that in the event of an attack on Portugal by Spain His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will declare and make war on Spain. This paragraph 3(a) should not be interpreted as a commitment by His Majesty's Government to do more than give such support as they can having regard to the general strategic situation at the time and to their other commitments.

Paragraph 3(b)

Although every effort will be made to complete this plan and secure its approval by the two Governments by the commencement of the use of the facilities, it is understood that, if this is not possible, the arrival of the British convoy in the Azores shall not be delayed pending the conclusion of the necessary staff conversations.

LISBON,

17th August, 1943.

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(NOTE: Should the detail of these Annexures be required, they can be obtained from the Secretaries.)

ANNEX "A"

Army Equipment in First Convoy

ANNEX "B"

Balance of Equipment for the Portuguese Army.

ANNEX "C"

Note on Air Equipment and Personnel.

ANNEX "D"

Naval Material and Personnel.

ANNEX "E"

Program of Shipments.

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ENCLOSURE "B"

J.P.(43) 307 Final

OPERATION "ALACRITY"

7 September 1943

Report by the Joint Planning Staff
(As approved by the British Chiefs of Staff)

1. In anticipation of instructions we have examined the Force Commander's plan for Operation "Alacrity" and submit the following report.

2. Since the preparation of the plan, many problems have arisen which have involved minor amendments to the plan as set out. These problems, and any which may subsequently arise, are settled at meetings of the Executive Planning Section and Force Commanders' representatives and therefore we do not propose to comment on these further.

3. There are, however, the following major points to which we wish to draw the attention of the Chiefs of Staff.

SCALE OF ESCORTS

4. The present scale of escorts provided is:

1 Escort Carrier
6 Escort vessels
6 A/S M/S Trawlers

5. These are considered adequate for the protection of shipping on passage to the Azores but we do not consider them sufficient for the protection of vessels during unloading and of such inter-island traffic as will be found necessary.

6. The Naval Force Commander has estimated that 6 U-Boats will be in the vicinity of the Azores at the time of the arrival of the convoys, and that this number may be substantially increased during the first 3 to 4 weeks.

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7. Owing to the unprotected nature of the port of Angra, the ships of the convoy will unload in what amounts to an open anchorage. In the present plan an attempt is being made to unload ships simultaneously, whereas no more than 2 ships of medium size can lie in the inner harbor. The remainder will, therefore, be lying exposed for a period of from 14 to 25 days. One of these ships - the DEWDALE - is one of our only 3 gantry ships which carry 16 L.C.M.'s and is thus very valuable.

It is considered, therefore, that DEWDALE should be sent to Horta as soon as she has unloaded her L.C.M.'s, and return if necessary for their maintenance at intervals. This will involve landing crews being accommodated ashore, and a risk of damaging the L.C.M.'s which cannot then be hoisted in the event of bad weather.

8. In accordance with the terms of the INGOT Agreement, 6 A/S M/S trawlers are to be turned over to the Portuguese on the day of arrival and will thus be no longer available for the Naval Force Commander to assist him in the defense of the ships unloading. Furthermore these trawlers will be flying the Portuguese ensign, and will not take belligerent action except inside territorial waters at Fayal and San Miguel.

9. In view of the above, and also of the fact that it has been found necessary during detailed planning to increase the amount of shipping originally allotted to the force, we consider that the following additional escort vessels should be made available during the unloading period:

6 Escort Vessels
6 A/S M/S Trawlers

AVAILABILITY OF FORCES

10. The Admiralty have already allocated 3 additional Escort Vessels for the Escort Carrier which will be withdrawn as soon

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as Hudson aircraft begin operating from Lagens airfield (D + 5 approximately for a period of about 1 month).

11. The remaining 3 Escort Vessels could only be withdrawn from the support groups in the Bay of Biscay and the 6 Trawlers from those which have recently been lent by Western Approaches to the C-in-C Home Fleet.

12. It may be necessary to utilize the comparatively safe anchorage at Horta for some ships of the convoy while the remainder are unloading, in which case a certain amount of inter-Island traffic will take place and require escorts.

AIRFIELD CONSTRUCTION

13. The primary object of the operation is the establishment of an air base on the Island of Terceira for the operation of G.R. aircraft taking part in the Battle of the Atlantic.

14. Provision is made in the plan for the early setting up of a permanent camp at Lagens airfield and for the rapid installation of certain signals communication. No particular mention is made throughout of actual work in connection with the preparation of the surface of the airfield.

15. In view of the possibility of the early deterioration in weather conditions we consider that this work is of the utmost importance and the deployment of engineer personnel and stores should be effected with the object of having the airfield working as soon as possible.

FUELLING FACILITIES

16. One object of the operation is that of increasing the fuelling facilities at present available at Ponta Delgada. This will necessitate the stationing of an oiler in Horta harbor.

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17. No mention of this is made in the plan, but we understand that the gantry ship can initially perform the necessary functions as well as that of carrying L.C.M.'s. This type of ship is, however, in great demand and cannot be allowed to remain at Horta in the role of an oiler. We suggest that the Admiralty in consultation with the Ministry of War Transport should be asked to provide an additional oiler to arrive at Horta on approximately D + 8, by when the necessary boom defense should have been laid.

ESTABLISHMENT OF NAVAL H.F.D./F. STATION AT TERCEIRA

18. No reference is made in the plan to the establishment of an H.F.D./F. station, which is considered by the Admiralty as of first importance in one of the major objects of the operation, as this station has been an obvious requirement in the Battle of the Atlantic for Naval 'Y' purposes. Provision for the establishment of such a station should be made in the plan.

FACILITIES FOR THE AMERICANS

19. There is a further matter, outside the Force Commanders' plan, which arose during the discussions at the Quadrant Conference, but which will affect the execution of the plan. At the first plenary meeting of the Conference, it was suggested by the President and agreed by the Prime Minister that at an early date after the British entry into the Azores "a British and American convoy and some British and American air units" should proceed to the Azores and should make use of the facilities of those islands. The U.S. Navy Department have now put forward proposals in pursuance of this suggestion, for a U.G.S. convoy to call at the Azores very soon after our arrival there. The date of arrival of the convoy is still under discussion between the British Chiefs of Staff and the Americans*, but the proposal now put forward by the British Chiefs of Staff is that the U.G.S. convoy sailing from U.S.A. on 25 October should call at the Azores.

* C.O.S.(43) 208th Meeting (O) Item 6.

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20. We recommend that the Chiefs of Staff should:

a. Invite the Admiralty to provide 6 additional Escort vessels and 6 A/S M/S Trawlers for the protection of the convoy during the unloading period. This would include the 3 Escort Vessels attached to the Escort Carrier.

b. Draw the Force Commander's attention to the need for priority being given to the work in connection with the preparation of the airfield for operations.

c. Instruct the Force Commander to make provision in his plan for the establishment of a naval H.F.D./F. station.

d. Instruct the Force Commander to arrange for DEWDALE to be withdrawn to Horta for her better protection at the earliest possible moment.

e. Invite the Admiralty in consultation with the Ministry of War Transport to provide an oiler to enable Horta to be used as a fuelling base.

f. Inform the Force Commander of the situation with regard to facilities for the Americans in the Azores as set out in paragraph 19 above.

/s/ C. E. LAMBE
W. ELLIOT
W. H. RAY

Offices of the War Cabinet,
S.W.1.

7 September 1943

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ENCLOSURE "C"

BRITISH DRAFT

(C 8428/46/G)

Draft Agreement between the British and Portuguese Military Delegations on the principles governing the grant of facilities in the Azores by the Portuguese Government to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom

1. The Portuguese Government agree to grant the following facilities to His Majesty's Government:

a. Use of the port of Horta, including full facilities for unrestricted refuelling and repairs and the supply of fresh water and fresh edible stores according to available local resources, and the accommodation ashore of such personnel as are required in connection with these facilities. These facilities also cover the stationing there of a tanker and a tug of the mercantile marine.

b. The use of the port of Ponta Delgada, such use however being restricted to the facilities normally accorded to a belligerent by a neutral State under international law.

c. The full and unrestricted use of the airfield at Lagens in Terceira.

d. Full use of all harbors on Terceira island, this being required for the supply and maintenance of the airfield at Lagens and of British forces stationed in Lagens in connection with the protection and operation of the airfield, it being understood that these facilities include the right to provide adequate naval and air protection of shipping against all forms of attack from within territorial waters.

e. The use of the airfield at Rabo de Peixe on the island of Sao Miguel by British aircraft as an emergency landing ground, e.g., in the event of forced landings, of refuelling requirements

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or of repair of damaged aircraft. The airfield facilities, stores etc. at Rabo de Peixe will be built up for normal use by Portuguese forces so that the above emergency facilities may be readily available.

f. The refuelling of seaplanes or flying-boats at Horta.

g. All stores required for British forces in the Azores to be given rapid clearance through the customs in accordance with the arrangements set out in the Annex to the present agreement.

h. It is understood that the fuelling facilities under a, b and d will be available not only to British vessels but also to other United Nations vessels operating in or in connection with Allied convoys.

2. In accordance with the wishes of the Portuguese Government, the latter will

a. Continue to undertake sea, land and air defense of the Azores, with the exception of the local air defense of Lagens airfield in Terceira, which will be assured by British forces;

b. Take special precautions for the security of the cable station in Fayal.

3. Having regard to the desire of the Portuguese Government to remain outside the war, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have in paragraph 1 above restricted their request for immediate facilities to the absolute minimum in the light of the present strategical situation. They have agreed to this on the clear understanding that the Portuguese Government will be prepared to give the most sympathetic consideration to any subsequent request for a revision of the present arrangements in the light of future developments.

4. Separate arrangements* will be made in agreement between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Portuguese

* See draft at Appendix.

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Government to cover the normal requirements of military security in the Azores, such arrangements to include control of (a) communications and in particular of the cable station at Horta and (b) of Axis nationals and other foreigners.

5. It is not possible to cover at this stage all details arising out of the application of the general principles set out above and it is understood between the two Governments that any practical adjustments which may prove necessary will be made in agreement between the respective Portuguese and British local authorities in the spirit of mutual cooperation underlying the present conversations.

APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE "C"

1. Arrangements will be made to enable the local British military authorities to maintain the necessary control either independently or in cooperation with the local Portuguese authorities over all communications with and in the islands of Fayal and Terceira including in particular all traffic passing through the cable station at Horta. Outgoing messages from this station should be controlled from a moment immediately prior to the arrival of British shipping, personnel and stores in the Azores.

2. All nationals of states with whom His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are at war, including consular officials, will be removed from the Islands of Terceira and Fayal. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have agreed not to press for the similar removal of enemy nationals from other islands in the Azores on the understanding that strict measures of control will be applied to such persons by the local Portuguese authorities and in particular that a most rigorous search will be made to ensure that none of them possess wireless sets or other means of communication with the outside world. Such control should also extend to nationals of neutral states other than Portuguese citizens throughout the Azores including the islands of Fayal and Terceira. These measures of control will apply also to Axis Consular Officials from whom, moreover, all cypher and bag facilities will be withdrawn. In this connection the local British military authorities in the Azores will be given every facility to cooperate with the competent Portuguese authorities in the application of Portuguese censorship regulations. Detailed arrangements to this end will be elaborated in consultation between His Majesty's Government and the Portuguese Government.

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3. Although the necessary measures will require advance preparation, the action summarized in paragraph 2 above will only be taken simultaneously with but not before the arrival of British shipping, personnel and stores in the Azores.

ENCLOSURE "D"

PORTUGUESE COUNTER PROPOSAL

1. The Portuguese Government agree to grant the following facilities to His Majesty's Government:

a. Unrestricted facilities for refuelling, the supply of fresh water and fresh edible stores, and repairs, according to available local resources, in the port of Horta, and the accommodation ashore of such personnel as are required in connection with these facilities. These facilities also cover the stationing there of a tanker and a tug of the mercantile marine.

b. The use of the port of Ponta Delgada, such use being restricted to the facilities normally accorded to a belligerent by a neutral State, in accordance with International Law (thirteenth convention of the Hague Conference, 1907).

c. Unrestricted use of the airfields of Lagens, in Terceira, by aircraft of the British Empire.

d. Use of the bays of Terceira Island, this being required for supply and maintenance of the airfield at Lagens. Protection to the merchant ships, British or Allied, destined for this purpose, shall be provided by warships and aircraft of the British Empire.

e. Facilities for the use, by aircraft of the British Empire, of the airfield of Rabo de Peixe, in the Island of Sao Miguel, as an emergency landing ground, for forced landings, landings due to lack of fuel, or for reasons of damage such as to prevent the aircraft from reaching the airfield of Lagens, it being understood that the resources available at the airfield shall be placed at their disposal.

f. Facilities for the occasional refuelling of some flying boats of the British Empire at the port of Horta.

g. All material and supplies necessary to the British forces in the Azores shall be given rapid clearance through the customs, in accordance with arrangements to be agreed which shall be set out in an Annex to the present agreement.

h. The refuelling facilities under a and b will be available not only to the ships of the British Empire, but also to ships of the United Nations operating in or in connection with convoys.

2. a. The Portuguese Government continue to be responsible for the sea, land and air defense of the Azores, with the exception of the local defense of the airfield of Lagens, which shall be assured by British forces.

b. Special precautions shall be taken with regard to the submarine cable station at Horta.

3. Inasmuch as the Portuguese Government have followed a policy of neutrality, in agreement with the British Government, and in accordance with the higher interests of both countries, and since for this reason neither of the two Governments would be in a position to face the consequences of a fundamental change in the situation, the two Governments have agreed to reduce the facilities in the Azores to the absolute minimum in the light of the present strategic situation. Nevertheless, the Portuguese Government will give the most friendly consideration to any subsequent request for a revision of the present arrangements in the light of future developments.

4. Separate agreements shall be made between the two Governments relative to military security in the Azores, and in particular (a) for the control of communications and in particular of the submarine cable station at Horta, and (b) as regards Axis nationals and other foreigners.

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5. It is not possible to cover at this stage all details arising out of the application of the general principles set out above and it is understood between the two Governments that any practical adjustments which may prove necessary will be made in agreement between the respective Portuguese and local British authorities in the spirit of mutual cooperation underlying the present conversations, but to become effective they shall have higher sanction whenever the local Portuguese authority deems it necessary.

LISBON,

24th July, 1943

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COPY NO. 55

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

532-13
(C.C.S. 270/7)
7 September 1943

532

- (1) JCS 399
- (2) CCS 270
- (3) CCS 270/1
- (4) JCS 399/1
- (5) CCS 270/2
- (6) CCS 270/3
- (7) CCS 270/4
- (8) CCS 270/4 (Rev)
- (9) CCS 270/5
- (10) CCS 270/6
- (11) JCS 399/2
- (12) JCS 472

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

PLANS FOR THE USE OF THE AZORES

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COPY NO. 55
(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

C.C.S. 270/7

7 September 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

PLANS FOR THE USE OF THE AZORES

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

1. With reference to C.C.S. 270/4, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff present to the British Chiefs of Staff for their information a brief outline of operations in the Azores contemplated by the U.S.:

a. The employment of anti-submarine aircraft initially in the coverage of all convoys on the Middle Atlantic lanes, and eventually for patrol around the Azores as necessary to obtain effective anti-submarine aircraft coverage of the Middle Atlantic.

b. The employment initially of not to exceed two naval support groups from the Azores bases in anti-submarine operations on Middle Atlantic convoy routes; to be subsequently expanded should adjustment of convoy routes dictate.

c. Operations of air transport service and ferry delivery service to the United Kingdom, the Mediterranean areas, India and China.

2. It is estimated that the above proposed operations will require the following facilities:

a. For U.S. Naval surface craft: San Miguel Island.
One operating and supply base at Ponta Delgada.

b. For U.S. Naval aircraft:

(1) Fayal Island. One seaplane base at Horta, with sufficient facilities to accommodate 6 ASW seaplanes, and 6 NATS seaplanes.

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(2) San Miguel Island. One landplane base with three 6,000 ft. runways, and facilities for 12 VLR landplanes and 1 group (approximately 30) of CVE aircraft, capable of expansion to provide for 4 squadrons of VLR aircraft.

c. For U.S. Army Air Force aircraft.

(1) Terceira Island. One landplane base at Lagens Field with two 7,000 ft. runways for air transport and ferry operations, and accommodations for 3,500 personnel.

(2) Flores Island. One landplane base with two 7,000 ft. runways for air transport and ferry operations. If the terrain of Flores Island does not permit adequate air base construction, the base may be placed on Santa Maria Island. Housing facilities to be provided to accommodate 3,300 personnel.

d. Existing cable systems and communications facilities essential to the operations of U.S. forces based on and operating through the Azores and to the operations of U.S. forces in the North African and European theaters of operations.

3. Ultimate U.S. forces for which accommodations will be required are estimated to amount to:

U.S. Army 6800

U.S. Navy 1400

4. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff plan preliminary preparations at this time in order that these facilities can be established in the Azores at the earliest practicable date.

U.S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

24 August 1943

EXTRACTS FROM FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER,
C.C.S. 319/5.

The Enclosure is the final report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the QUADRANT Conference. It has been approved by the President and the Prime Minister.

ENCLOSURE

EXECUTION OF THE OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

The following operations in execution of the over-all strategic concept are agreed upon:

THE U-BOAT WAR

Facilities in the AZORES Islands.

The facilities of the AZORES Islands will be used for intensified sea and air operations against the U-boat.

NOTE: On the successful conclusion of the negotiations for the use of the AZORES we have taken note of the assurance given by the British Chiefs of Staff that everything will be done by the British as soon as possible after actual entry into the AZORES has been gained to make arrangements for their operational and transit use by U.S. aircraft.

11 August 1943

C.C.S. 270/6

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
LAND AIRPORT FACILITIES IN THE AZORES

Memorandum from the U. S. Chiefs of Staff

1. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff have noted the progress of the British-Portuguese negotiations and also certain decisions taken by the British regarding these negotiations which are set forth in C.C.S. 270/5. They wish to reiterate, with the approval of the President:

a. That any British-Portuguese agreement limiting the use of facilities in the Azores to British Empire aircraft is not acceptable to the United States.

b. That regardless of what may be agreed as to other United Nations forces, it is of vital importance that Azores facilities be made available for U.S. military, air ferry and transport operations.

2. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff are convinced that the sense of all discussions on this subject held at the TRIDENT conferences sustains the United States view. This is perhaps best expressed in the final report to the President and Prime Minister in Section IV, paragraph 1, as follows:

"The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the occupation of the Azores is essential to the efficient conduct of the anti-U-boat war for the reasons set forth in the annex. The preparation of this plan is a responsibility of the British, and accordingly plans are actively in preparation under their authority. The British Chiefs of Staff have made a preliminary examination of these plans. It is proposed that the expedition should be mounted from the United Kingdom and that, in the first place, the islands of Fayal and Terceira should be seized. It is expected that a force of about nine battalions will be required. The availability of landing craft is likely to be the limiting factor regarding date, and as far as can be seen at present, the earliest date for arrival of the force in the Azores will be about the end of August. It is agreed that the land, air, and sea facilities will be available to all United Nations forces.

C.C.S. 270/5
BRITISH ARMY
GENERAL
SECRET

"The possibility of an earlier move on the Azores will receive further study. Meanwhile, the political decisions involved will be settled by the two governments."

3. In the recommendations sent from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and Prime Minister, the Combined Chiefs of Staff stated:

"In submitting this recommendation, the Combined Chiefs of Staff propose that while the diplomatic approach is being made, forces should be prepared for the prompt seizure and use of the Azores if diplomacy fails."

4. From the above it appears evident:

a. That the use of the facilities of the Azores was to be obtained by the forces of the United Nations.

b. That this end was to be attained by force if necessary, and that in any event force was to be used if diplomatic means failed.

c. That the political questions involved are to be settled by both the United States and British Governments.

5. From the information set forth in C.C.S. 270/5 the U.S. Chiefs of Staff feel that diplomatic negotiations have failed of achieving the results which it was agreed are necessary.

9 August 1943

C.C.S. 270/5

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
LAND AIRPORT FACILITIES IN THE AZORES

Memorandum by the Representatives
of the British Chiefs of Staff

1. Further information has now been received from the British Chiefs of Staff in relation to the subject of the facilities in the Azores.

2. As you know, both diplomatic and neutral channels have been concerned and we feel that perhaps a brief summary of the action that has taken place in this matter may be of value.

3. As long ago as 29 June the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs handed the U.S. Ambassador in London a message from the Prime Minister for the President, informing him of the progress then made in connection with our request to the Portuguese for facilities and in particular of Salazar's stipulation that under no circumstances could he agree to admit forces other than British, except perhaps in the event of Portugal becoming fully involved in the war. In this message hope was expressed that in view of approach to the Portuguese being made on the basis of Anglo-Portuguese alliance, the President would agree that we should conclude an agreement with the Portuguese on the lines desired by Salazar. At a later stage it should be possible to secure Portuguese assent to the use of the facilities by the forces of other of the United Nations. No reply had ever been received previously, indicating the views of the President, and in the absence of any expression of disagreement, it was reasonable to assume that no serious U.S. objection was seen to any of the proposals. The U.S. Government have been kept fully informed of the trend of the negotiations.

4. Subsequently, you will remember, came the U.S. proposal set out in C.C.S. 270. This proposal, which was to the effect that landing rights should be granted to American land planes in the Islands, might have raised difficulties in the delicate negotiations that were then in progress and at the request of the British the U.S. Government agreed that their proposal should not to (sic) be pressed at the present time since no great difficulty was anticipated in arranging landing rights for American aircraft as soon as negotiations were satisfactorily concluded. It was then decided on 16 July that this matter of landing rights for American aircraft should be left over pending the conclusion of the present negotiations and a notification to this effect was given through both diplomatic and military channels.

5. It was in the light of the above, therefore, that the following decisions were taken:

(a) To seek the inclusion of reference to transit facilities for aircraft of the United Nations in the agreement but not to press proposal so far as to risk breakdown on this issue.

(b) Not at this stage to ask for full operational facilities in the Islands for U.S. military, air ferry and transport operations.

(c) To seek to extend benefit of our arrangements to the U. S. immediately we ourselves have entered the Islands.

6. We hope that this will make the situation clear. We have every intention of insuring that such facilities as may become available shall be at the disposal of both the U.S. and the British. The approach, however, is a delicate one and is based on the long-standing Anglo-Portuguese alliance. Once the scruples and fears of the Portuguese have been overcome we feel that everything should soon progress steadily.

C.C.S. 270/5 and 270/6

LAND AIRPORT FACILITIES IN THE AZORES

Reference: C.C.S. 111th Meeting, Item (8)
1st Citadel Meeting
2nd Citadel Meeting, Item (1)

A memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff, C.C.S. 270/5, was circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 9 August 1943. The reply from the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, C.C.S. 270/5, was circulated, 11 August and both papers were considered at Quadrant in the 111th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Final action on the subject was taken in C.C.S. 319/5.

SECRET

30 July 1943

From: The President.
To : The Prime Minister.

No. : 335

Your number 390.

Grand hunting in the Bay of Biscay. We got one too off Recife, Brazil. We still need Lifebelt nevertheless.

From: The Prime Minister
To: The President
No: 369, 16 July 1943.

You may like to know the types of aircraft we intend putting into the Azores.

We propose to begin with a flight of Hudsons at Lagens in Terceira to protect the initial convoy while it unloads. They will be drawn from Gibraltar and should be operating a few days after arrival of the convoy. Hudsons are comparatively light aircraft and should be able to use the airfield without any work being done on it; their range is however only 460 miles and they must therefore be replaced by aircraft with longer range.

The ground personnel and equipment of two squadrons of Fortresses will be sent out in the ships, and the aircraft (30 in all) will be flown out to replace the Hudsons as soon as we are satisfied that the airfield is fit for them.

Later on we hope to send Liberators since their longer range will make them even more useful than the Fortresses. Some work on the runways is sure to be needed before we can do this, and the necessary construction personnel are being sent in the convoy.

PRIME

SECRET

15 July 1943

From: The President.
To : The Prime Minister.
No. : 316

Your Number 364.

I am delighted with the progress in regard to LIFEBELT.

Regraded Unclassified

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, S

From: The Prime Minister
To: The President
No: 364, 15 July 1943.

I have had the following digest of the Portuguese negotiations about "Lifebelt" prepared for you and your staffs. You will see we have decided to insert the thin end of the wedge. I am more than pleased with the way in which the Portuguese have responded to the invocation of our ancient alliance. The plan is, no publicity and a gradual build-up. We are hoping to dispatch our occupation guests and some Hudson squadrons within a week. Mums the word.

Digest begins:

THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PORTUGUESE

The following is a summary of the progress reached in the negotiations with the Portuguese.

The Portuguese consider that they can offer us facilities in Terceira and Fayal but that any further facilities in San Miguel would amount to a definite participation in the war. Their idea seems to be that having granted us the initial facilities in Terceira and Fayal, they would then see what the effect is on Spain and the Axis. If little happens, we have no doubt that they will gradually give us more and more until we have everything we want.

Facilities offered:

The facilities which the Portuguese are in principle ready to concede are as follows:

- a. Unrestricted use of the Port of Horta.
- b. Such facilities in the harbour of Ponta Delgada as a neutral is permitted to accord to a belligerent under international law. If we accept the Portuguese interpretation of this, it means that any individual warship can only visit the harbour once in 3 months for a period not exceeding 24 hours, and that warning of the visit must be given in advance.
- c. Full use of Lagens Airfield on Terceira.
- d. "Harbours" in Terceirato be available to us for the supply and maintenance of Lagens. As large a volume of supplies as possible to be put in during the summer months to avoid the bad weather in the winter.

e. The airfields at Rabo De Peive to be available only as an emergency landing ground, i.e., for forced landings, refueling, etc.

f. Land, sea and air defense of the islands to remain a Portuguese responsibility, except that local defense of the airfield at Lagens would be a British responsibility.

g. The Portuguese to continue to take special precautions for the security of the cable station in Fayal.

h. The Portuguese to be responsible for protection by sea patrol while in territorial waters of the first British supply ship to come to the islands. Further air protection of supply ships to be provided by the British from their resources at Lagens, once we are established.

Given the unrestricted use of Horta and the harbours of Terceira, we shall, in fact, have all we want for Naval and maintenance purposes. Our delegation in Lisbon feel strongly that we should clinch with the Portuguese offer and consider that it would only be a question of time before we get our full requirements.

We are telling our delegation that we agree with their view, subject to the following points on which they must insist:

a. That the sea protection of our shipping while it is unloading at Terceira will be a British responsibility, and

b. That the control of the signal traffic passing through the cable station at Horta will be in British hands.

The delegation have been told to make it clear that we regard these facilities as being the first step towards our full requirements. We are not however imposing any time limit on the Portuguese for meeting us in full.

Consequent upon the above we are dismounting the assault force which was being prepared in case the negotiations broke down and re-constituting the expedition which is now quite small for organizing the facilities which the Portuguese appear likely to concede to us. We are moreover keeping going with our preparations for sending some day and night fighter squadrons and anti-aircraft guns for the defense of Lisbon and Oporto in case the Portuguese ask us to help them with protection against air attack.

P.M. ROOSEVELT

SECRET

6 July 1943

From: The Prime Minister.
To : The President.

No. : 347

I have asked Winant to send you the enclosed about Lifebelt as it is the best we have had so far. The enemy already know something is afoot and we are making all possible haste. Following from Medhurst. Begins:

"We had our first meeting this afternoon in a private house in an atmosphere of genuine cordiality. After a welcoming speech by the Major General of the Armada to which I replied, I made a statement on the general strategical situation on land and in the air followed by Admiral Servaes on the war at sea.

"A discussion then followed on future procedure from which it seemed clear that the Portuguese representatives had been instructed not to waste time on fruitless side issues. Before any further progress could be made, they wished to know in as much detail as possible exactly what our use of the Azores would mean in men facilities and installations and how our garrison would be disposed. Provided with these details they could then assess what the Axis reactions were likely to be and what they would want from us in the way of material.

"Our statement is now being prepared and will be handed over at 900 hours July 6th and the next meeting will be at 16 hours the same day.

"Our first impressions are that the Portuguese are willing and even anxious to give us what facilities we want. They are in hopes, however, that our demands will be so moderate that the Germans may take some time before they realize what is happening. Meantime, they would have the opportunity to prepare themselves with our material assistance against retaliation.

"We do not of course intend to be deterred from stating our full requirements."

SECRET

4 July 1943

From: The Prime Minister.
To : The President.

No. : 343

Your number 301.

I thank you very much. We will certainly do as you suggest if Salazar raises the point. I agree with you that we could not get them into trouble and do nothing to help them afterwards. I do not think they will get into trouble if they agree, but at present I am far from sure they will be so obliging. At any rate, they will probably spin things out.

SECRET

July 3, 1943

From: The President.
To : The Prime Minister.

No. : 301

I had no thought of forcing ground or air forces on the Portuguese, but I think we can tell Salazar what we could send if he asks for them, pointing out that there will be of necessity a little delay in getting them there. I have a hunch that in order to maintain non-belligerency they will not ask for any troops or planes, and I agree with you that Germany will probably not do any bombing. If we can put Lifesteel through that will be a major accomplishment at this time.

SECRET

3 July 1943

From: The Prime Minister.
To : The President

No. : 341

Thank you very much for your No. 299, which we have deeply considered.

Our discussions with Salazar about "Lifebelt" are proceeding on the basis that Portugal maintains non-belligerency. We know this is what Salazar wants. If successful, which is far from certain, we shall secure "Lifebelt" islands without deranging our present agreed strategy in the European and Mediterranean theatres. We do not believe that the Portuguese desire Allied Ground Forces on their mainland, and sending them might increase the risk of a German invasion. We share your view that our occupation of "Lifebelt" will not, by itself, be likely to bring on a German ground invasion of the Iberian Peninsula. Anyhow the Spaniards are more likely to resist such invasion if we have not provoked it by landing troops.

Apart from a serious ground invasion, it would hardly pay the Germans to bomb Lisbon and Oporto. By so doing, they would only blot out a valuable listening post and enable us to base air squadrons in Portugal which would, Inter Alia, protect our convoys from German air attack and also strengthen the bay patrol. They would also lose their vital Wolfram. If, therefore, we are right in thinking the Germans will not attack by ground forces, they are also unlikely to attack by air merely out of spite.

We have got ready to send simultaneously with the dispatch of the "Lifebelt" Brigade about a hundred Ack Ack guns as part of the local defences of Lisbon and Oporto, as well as 2 day and 1 night fighter squadrons which Portal considers sufficient to deal with any bomber attack the Germans could make at this present time. We do not yet know what the Portuguese will ask for. They may be shy even of taking the forces aforesaid, lest it prejudice their non-belligerency.

Should, per Contra, the Portuguese make our sending of ground forces a condition of granting "Lifebelt", we must discuss with you what this would mean to our whole strategy.

We can, in any case, afford to await the outcome of "Husky", by which time we shall have learnt the extent and character of the Portuguese demands.

From: The President
To: The Prime Minister
No: 299, 30 June 1943

The circumstances of our peaceful occupation of the Azores and the attitude of cooperation and common endeavor of the Government of Portugal in my opinion, place an obligation upon us to furnish military assistance to Portugal. Under these circumstances, I believe that Salazar should be assured that military forces will be sent to Portugal.

The Axis thus far has avoided commitment in the Iberian Peninsula under very favorable circumstances, and even though the movement of United Nations' forces into Portugal might precipitate an Axis invasion of Spain, that action appears unlikely. However, we must expect Germany to launch concentrated air and submarine attacks upon Portugal as retaliation and in order to impress neutral nations. It is inevitable that grave consequences would result if adequate provision were not made by the United Nations to meet this contingency.

A defensive force capable of providing the necessary initial assistance might include one infantry division, plus strong air defense elements consisting of 26 anti-aircraft battalions, ten day and two night fighter squadrons, two anti-submarine squadrons, together with supporting and service troops. Combat elements (less anti-aircraft troops) and possibly, though not probably, a part of the service units for this force could be obtained from the Mediterranean area with, however, a limiting effect on the scope of PRICELESS. The anti-aircraft and the remainder of the service troops must be secured elsewhere, with a resulting effect on OVERLORD.

A preliminary examination indicates that the provision of shipping for this force would limit the scope of PRICELESS and would cost OVERLORD from two to four divisions.

My suggested action in these circumstances will cause certain delays in operations agreed to in Trident. However, I believe that we must accept this interference.

I should appreciate having your views on the foregoing. I think there is something to be said for the thought that a peninsular campaign would be very difficult for the Axis and that secure landing places for us are not to be laughed off.

ROOSEVELT

From: The Prime Minister

To: The President

No: 331, 27 June 1943

Your telegram No. 292 of June 22nd.

I agree that questions of Timor and Macao can well be left until after the war. Meanwhile we have told the Portuguese that if they help us now we are ready to give them assurances regarding maintenance of Portuguese sovereignty over all Portuguese colonies. In reply to their enquiry we told them that this assurance covered Timor and Macao. The Portuguese would therefore probably resent any early suggestions concerning the disposal of Timor and we shall have to tread warily. They are particularly touchy about Timor in view of Allied military occupation without prior agreement in December 1941 which imposed a severe strain upon our relations with Portugal.

PRIME

From: The President
To: The Prime Minister
No: 292, 21 June 1943

I am very happy at the way things are going with Portugal.

The thought has come to me that if any question arises in regard to Timor, Australia might be interested in purchasing it in the interest of the defense of the Southwest Pacific. I think it has never brought the Portuguese Government any interest on the investment.

On the other hand, there is no reason why such questions should not be left until after the war is over. The same thing applies to Macao.

ROOSEVELT

From: The Prime Minister

To: The President

No: 319, 19 June 1943

1. Pursuant to what we have agreed, Ambassador Campbell yesterday spoke to Salazar about "Lifebelt". He reports that although Salazar showed no great surprise he was evidently not expecting an appeal to the alliance. He took it calmly but declined to be drawn. He said that the communication would require very careful consideration. When Campbell asked if Salazar would authorize him to say that it would receive sympathetic consideration, Salazar replied "Yes of course". The Ambassador says further "On a first approach I think that the omens are not too bad."

2. At the same time the Foreign Secretary saw Monteiro, the Portuguese Ambassador in London, and opened the same matter to him. Monteiro is very friendly to the alliance and of considerable influence in Portugal. He said frankly he had been expecting something of the kind and seemed ready to help in every way. He may go back to Portugal by air. He attaches the greatest importance first to the alliance and secondly to the guarantee of the future of the Portuguese Colonial Empire and was further fortified by the fact that Smuts was a party to the demarche and undertakings.

3. On the whole things have moved more favourably than I expected when I was with you in Washington. Meanwhile all the necessary preparations are going ahead and, if permission is granted, will operate before the end of the month.

PRIME

From: The Prime Minister

To: The President

No: 314, 16 June 1943

From Former Naval Person to President personal.

Thank you for your telegram Number 282. You will have seen from my telegram Number 313 that Smuts is also in agreement with our proposed approach. We have accordingly sent instructions to HM Ambassador, Lisbon, to make an immediate approach to Dr. Salazar.

PRIME

From: The Prime Minister

To: The President

No: 313, 15 June 1943

My telegram No. 305.

I have now had a reply from Smuts agreeing with our method of approach to the Portuguese about "Lifebelt". Smuts considers that the association of the United States with the approach will carry great weight with the Portuguese Government. If the Portuguese accept our proposals he agrees that the Union Government should be associated with the assurances about the Portuguese East and West African Colonies. Smuts feels that the fear of what may happen to his African Colonies and to the Azores may be a powerful factor influencing Salazar in favour of accepting our proposals.

If the Portuguese Government reject our proposals the Union Government wish however to remain free to shape their policy as union interests may dictate.

PRIME

From: The Prime Minister
To: The President
No: 312, 13 June 1943

I send you herewith a paraphrase of a telegram just received from Lisbon which bears on my 308. Begins.

His Majesty Ambassador in Lisbon had thought that we should probably decide to answer Dr. Salazar's approach by suggesting renewal of conversations in London and that at an early stage we would enlarge their scope to embrace complete review of Portugal's position in regard to the war. Not being absolutely sure that Dr. Salazar has so rapidly and so completely changed his mind as actually to be anxious to come into the war at comparatively early date, Sir R. Campbell thought this method would have the advantage of being less abrupt.

Sir R. Campbell thinks there is perhaps, however, not much in it worth while and sees no objection to making the approach forthwith and in the more direct manner proposed if we prefer that method as being more expeditious.

As regards manner of approach, he has only the following comments to offer. It may be that for reasons of national pride Dr. Salazar would prefer that Portugal should give the appearance of collaborating as a full ally rather than hand over the Islands to us on the basis of a commercial arrangement on the West Indies analogy. Presumably local civil administration would remain but Sir R. Campbell asks if it was our idea that Portuguese troops should be withdrawn. If so, he thinks this would be regarded as humiliating and possibly therefore affect Dr. Salazar's decision. No doubt he would be willing even anxious to reduce their number considerably but the Army would certainly be mortified if it were to have no opportunity of seeing some active service. On the other hand, Dr. Salazar might think complete withdrawal of Portuguese forces might reduce the probability or severity of Axis counteraction. Sir R. Campbell inclines, however, to the view that the other consideration would predominate and that Dr. Salazar would be likely to insist on Portuguese collaboration.

He asks if we would see any objection to expressing the hope that this will be forthcoming in conditions to be agreed and then going on to say (more in the nature of an afterthought) that of course if Dr. Salazar preferred to lease the Islands on the West Indies analogy, His Majesty's Government would agree.

Sir R. Campbell asks whether the answer is in the affirmative, if Dr. Salazar says interrogatively that he assumes assurances in regard to Portuguese Colonial Empire include Timor and Macao.

From: the President
To: The Prime Minister
No: 282, 11 June 1943

Referring to your No. 305 of June 11, I am in full agreement with your proposal to instruct your Ambassador to make an immediate proposition to Mr. Salazar along the lines suggested by you.

My only thought about Brazil is that Salazar might be glad to return some of his first line troops from the Azores to Portugal and that Brazil would be happy to replace them in the Azores.

ROOSEVELT

From: The Prime Minister

To: The President

No: 308, 11 June 1943

My telegram 305. Following is gist of conversation referred to:

Dr. Salazar informed HM Ambassador at Lisbon that he thought that the time had perhaps come when our two governments should review the conclusion reached in the London conversations which had been based on the premises that Germany could and might invade the Peninsula and that Great Britain was not then strong enough to meet that threat. Those premises said Salazar no longer held good. Since the occupation of North Africa Germany, even if she were in a position to attempt the operation, could hardly hope to establish a footing on the Straits of Gibraltar; whilst Great Britain on the other hand was not immeasurably stronger in every way. It was therefore for consideration whether the decision that Portugal should only put up a token fight on the mainland and that a centre of resistance should be established in the islands, any longer corresponded to the circumstances of the hour.

In this connection you will remember that as a result of our staff conversations with the Portuguese it was agreed with Portugal that in the event of a German invasion a token resistance only should be offered on the mainland and that the government should retire to the Atlantic Islands to carry on the fight.

HM Ambassador comments are as follows: Dr. Salazar is obviously worried about relations with Brazil and disappointed in his hopes of a Latin Bloc. He is anxious about possible changes in Spain which affect his own regime in Portugal and no longer puts much confidence in the Iberian Bloc. He therefore seems to be turning to the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance as his best security and to be considering whether he would not be well advised to honour the alliance whilst he can still render valuable services to the United Nations. But he would obviously prefer that the appeal should come from us rather than from him.

PRIME

From: The Prime Minister

To: The President

No: 305, 11 June 1943

In accordance with the decisions reached at "Trident", plans and preparations for capturing the Azores are being pushed on as fast as possible. My military advisers are, however, emphatic that it is impossible to mount a full-scale operation before the end of August without impinging upon operations in the Mediterranean.

Meanwhile, His Majesty's Ambassador at Lisbon has reported a conversation with Dr. Salazar on 8th June, the gist of which is contained in my immediately following telegram. Dr. Salazar has asked for a renewal of our staff conversations, about which I have informed you in the past, having regard to the changed military prospects of the Axis and the United Nations. His Majesty's Ambassador reports that Dr. Salazar may well be considering the advantages of associating Portugal with the United Nations before this is too late, and that he appears no longer to fear German military reactions as he had done hitherto.

It seems to us that Dr. Salazar's approach provides us with a good opportunity to ask immediately for the facilities which we require in the Azores. If he agrees, we will at once move in with a brigade which is being specially prepared for immediate dispatch, and we shall thus be saved all the trouble and expense of mounting a considerable expedition and any stigma that may attach to threatening or using force against our oldest ally. If he refuses and we apparently acquiesce, and nothing happens for some months, we are of the opinion, in which our military advisers concur, that no great harm will have been done. Meanwhile full military preparations to occupy the islands at the end of August will continue. The War Cabinet are agreed that if we have invoked the alliance in vain on the present occasion, and if all other means fail, we should not in August hesitate to use all necessary force, after then making the last-minute appeal to Dr. Salazar at least to avert bloodshed by yielding under protest.

I therefore propose, if you agree, to instruct His Majesty's Ambassador to make an immediate approach to Dr. Salazar, invoking the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. We shall provide Sir R. Campbell with strong arguments regarding the improbability of a German invasion of Portugal or of adverse Spanish reactions. We cannot, however, meet Dr. Salazar's obvious desire for adequate military assistance on the Portuguese mainland. We can however offer now:

(1) A measure of assistance against the possibility of German air attacks on Lisbon, and

(2) The protection of Portuguese seaborne commerce and the replacement of Portuguese ships sunk by the enemy.

To these we would add assurances regarding the maintenance or restoration of Portuguese sovereignty over the whole of her colonial empire, including of course the Azores, after the war. We can offer him a lease arrangement, if this appeals to him, and the free enjoyment after the war of any improvements on the islands effected by us.

We have carefully considered your suggestion of using the influence of Brazil, but we think that in the first instance it would be best to rely on the undoubted force and validity of our 600-year-old Alliance. Our requests and assurances would of course be much more effective if I could have your authority to associate the United States Government with them. If this should fail or hang in the balance, then might well be the moment when you should come into action and the United States Ambassador should make a separate, joint or anyhow additional request, using the Brazil argument to the full. If all fails, then we shall have to wait till August.

I should be glad to know as soon as possible whether you agree with an approach on the above lines and whether you will authorize me to associate the United States Government with the above assurances regarding the Portuguese colonies.

I am asking Smuts to agree to endorse our assurances regarding the Portuguese Colonial Empire.

PRIME

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY

May 19, 1943

May 19, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In accordance with our personal conversation I herewith enclose a draft of the proposed message from you to President Vargas.

Please advise me as to whether you approve its sending.

"CH"

Admiral Brown
to file.

NOT SENT

Since the time of our meeting I have become increasingly convinced because of the constantly expanding role on the part of the German Government to extend the theater of operations of the war in the Atlantic and particularly because of the efforts which the Germans are making to establish bases either on the coast or on islands which by their very situation in the Atlantic threaten the shipping routes and, consequently, the security of the Western Hemisphere. In the last few years I pointed out the danger to our hemisphere which would result if certain of these Atlantic islands were to come under the control or domination of Germany which solely pursues a policy of world conquest.

Information is now at hand which indicates that the German Government has actually under consideration the establishment of U-boat bases and U-boat supply stations in the Azores without any previous warning to the Government of Portugal. We say at any time we deal with a fait accompli.

There are deep interests in this question and your own offer of help, cooperation in the solution of this problem should the need

May 19, 1943

AMEMBASSY

RIO DE JANEIRO.

SECRET FROM THE SECRETARY FOR THE AMBASSADOR.

Please communicate orally and in the utmost secrecy the following message from the President to President Vargas:

You will remember that when I had the opportunity of meeting with you at Natal last winter and of talking over with you the problems with which our two countries are confronted, we agreed upon the necessity of taking every precaution to see that certain islands of the Atlantic should not become a source of grave danger to the defense of the interests of the Western Hemisphere.

As you know, this Government has stated officially and publicly to the governments of both Spain and Portugal that it harbored no aggressive intentions against the sovereignty or territorial integrity of any other country. The policy of the United States today, like the policy of Brazil, is based upon the inalienable right of self-defense which we recognize as the rightful policy of other sovereign nations.

Since the time of our meeting I have become increasingly anxious because of the constantly expanding acts on the part of the German Government to extend the theater of operations of its submarines and particularly because of the efforts which the Germans are making to establish bases either openly or secretly on islands which by their very situation in the Atlantic threaten the shipping routes and, consequently, the security of the Western Hemisphere. As far back as 1941 I pointed out the dangers to our hemisphere which would result if certain of these Atlantic islands were to come under the control or occupation of forces which solely pursue a policy of world conquest.

Information is now at hand which indicates that the German Government has actually under contemplation the establishment of U-boat bases and U-boat supply stations in the Azores without any previous warning to the Government of Portugal. We may at any time be faced with a fait accompli.

Your own deep interest in this question and your own offer of helpful cooperation in the solution of this problem should the need

therefor arise leads me now to ask whether you would be disposed to consider a secret approach on your part to the Government of Portugal in order to ascertain whether the Portuguese Government would be willing for the period of the war either to lease these islands to the Government of Brazil or to authorize the Government of Brazil together with the Governments of the United States and of Great Britain to establish such air bases and security controls in the Azores as would protect them not only from aggression by the Axis powers, but which would likewise prevent the use of the harbors and local resources of the islands by enemy submarines now preying on United Nations shipping.

Should you be willing to consider such an approach to the Portuguese Government I would of course be glad to have you restate the assurances I have offered in the name of this Government regarding the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Portuguese territories as set forth in my message to General Carmona in November 1942. I would assume that the terms of the British-Portuguese alliance would need no reaffirmation.

Because of the special ties which unite Brazil and Portugal, I feel as I have already said to you that any confidential and friendly approach which you would be willing to make in this matter to the Portuguese Government would be exceptionally helpful.

I shall be most grateful if you will let me have your views with regard to this question and inform me whether you would consider it possible for you now to take the initiative in this matter on behalf of the three Governments, Brazil, Great Britain and the United States, which are primarily concerned in maintaining the security of the Atlantic.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON

18 May 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER:

Subject: Use of Portuguese Atlantic
Islands.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff are agreed as to the tremendous benefits which the United Nations would gain from the earliest possible use of the Azores Islands. They recommend that the Portuguese Government should be approached at once on this subject, but that no guarantee should be given and that every endeavor should be made to persuade the Portuguese that no threat exists. They consider that Germany is unlikely to invade the Iberian Peninsula if the Azores Islands are so used, and that the risk is acceptable.

In submitting this recommendation the Combined Chiefs of Staff propose that while the diplomatic approach is being made forces should be prepared for the prompt seizure and use of the Azores if diplomacy fails. Plans are therefore being prepared and will be submitted, showing the earliest date for their execution and how, if at all, they will affect operations now in view.

A. F. BROOKE,
General,
Chief of the Imperial
General Staff.

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.