

Folder 4. [Operation] ANVIL,
13 May-4 July 1944.

FROM: AMBASSADOR WINANT

TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 921, 4 JULY 1944

E X T R A C T

This is a follow up of my message to you last night . . . my 919 on the Prime Minister's reaction on ANVIL.

Today, Eden sat next to me at the 4th of July luncheon at which we both spoke. He told me that he thought that the misunderstanding in relation to ANVIL was due to the fact that the British Chiefs of Staff did not recognize that they were definitely committed to this operation. He blamed Sir Allan Brook, CIGS, for not raising it when our Chiefs of Staff were here and told me that he sympathized with the reaction of our Chiefs of Staff on having it raised after they had returned to the United States. He told me he felt that the failure to have minds meet would have been avoided had Sir John Dill been well enough to come on here or be present at the later conferences in Washington. He said that, for the first time, he thought the Prime Minister had come to appreciate the contribution that Sir John Dill had been making on his Washington assignment.

WINANT

Sent to the President at Hyde Park
as WHITE 120, 04/1538Z.

- 1 -

SECRET

FROM: AMBASSADOR WINANT

TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 919, 3 JULY 1944

I have seen a great deal of the Prime Minister during the last few days and I am familiar with the exchange of messages in relation to military planning.

I wanted you to know how deeply the Prime Minister has felt the differences that have ended in his accepting your decision. I have never seen him as badly shaken. He believed completely in the program he was supporting.

It was only his great friendship for you, the personal consideration you showed him in your exchange of messages, the knowledge of the greater contribution we were making in the campaign and a recognition that time was pressing that prevented continued resistance on his part and aided in his forwarding a directive to General Wilson.

WINANT

Sent as WHITE 116 to the President
at Hyde Park, 04/1245Z.

- 1 -

SECRET

TOP-SECRET
TOP SECRET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO : THE PRIME MINISTER

NO. : 577, 1 JULY 1944

Your 721.

I appreciate deeply your clear exposition of your feelings and views on this decision we are making. My Chiefs of Staff and I have given the deepest consideration to this problem and to the points you have raised. We are still convinced that the right course of action is to launch ANVIL at the earliest possible date.

Perhaps I am more optimistic than you are, but I feel that our commanders in Italy will, with the forces left to them, continue to do great things and attain all the essential objectives there.

I do not believe we should delay further in giving General Wilson a directive. We have had indicated to us the changes which the British Chiefs of Staff think necessary in the directive and they are acceptable to us. Will you ask your Chiefs to dispatch it to General Wilson at once.

As a matter of fact I personally cannot see in the short distance to go in Italy to the Pisa-Rimini Line we can destroy even a major part of the German Army. North of that Line, if we clear the Po Valley, we gain very little in the destruction of Germans as they can retreat even further north.

At Teheran what I was thinking of was a series of raids in force in Istria if the Germans started a general retirement from the Dodecanese and Greece. But it has not happened yet and Tito appears to be in less strong position than he was then.

- 1 -

TOP-SECRET

TOP-SECRET

On the same line the country in Istria has bad combat terrain in the winter time -- worse than southern France.

Therefore I am compelled by the logic of not dispersing our main efforts to a new theater to agree with my Chiefs of Staff and I think we can jointly cut any idea of 90 days to 60 if you and I insist on it.

I honestly believe that God will be with us as He has in OVERLORD and in Italy and in North Africa. I always think of my early geometry "A straight line is the shortest distance between two points."

Respectfully,

Gen. V. Smith
Lt. Colonel, USA
AUSA

- 2 -

TOP-SECRET

TOP SECRET

July 1, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

General McFarland

The attached message from the Prime Minister of Great Britain to the President, dated 1 July 1944, relative to ANVIL decisions, is forwarded to you for the information of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It is requested that this message be returned when copies have been made.

Respectfully,

J. V. Smith
Lt. Commander, USN

Aide

WHITE 102

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER

TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 721, 1 JULY 1944

Your number 574.

1. We are deeply grieved by your telegram. There are no differences whatever between my War Cabinet colleagues and the British Chiefs of Staff. The splitting up of the campaign in the Mediterranean into two operations neither of which can do anything decisive, is, in my humble and respectful opinion, the first major strategic and political error for which we two have to be responsible.

2. At Teheran you emphasized to me the possibilities of a move eastward when Italy was conquered and mentioned particularly Istria. No one involved in these discussions has ever thought of moving armies into the Balkans; but Istria and Trieste in Italy are strategic and political positions, which as you saw yourself very clearly might exercise profound and widespread reactions, especially now after the Russian advances.

3. After Teheran I was made doubtful about ANVIL by General Eisenhower's dislike for it. You will remember his words at Cairo when "General Eisenhower stressed the vital importance of continuing the maximum possible operations in an established theatre since much time was invariably lost when the scene of action was changed, necessitating, as it did, the arduous task of building up a fresh base."

4. Furthermore, I was impressed by General Montgomery's arguments when at Marrakesh, after he had been nominated to the OVERLORD Command, he

explained that it would take 90 days for a force landed at ANVIL to influence the OVERLORD operation.

5. Both these opinions are in contrast to SCAP 54. It is no reflection on these officers that they should now express a different view. But their opinions expressed so decidedly, make me less confident about an ANVIL operation. Moreover in those days the date was to be early in June. There is no doubt that an advance up the Rhone Valley begun at the end of August could easily be blocked and stemmed by a smaller number of German troops, who could come either through the tunnels from Italy or from Southern Germany. I doubt whether you will find that three American divisions, supported by seven French 80 per cent native divisions from Morocco, Algeria and Tunis, will have any important strategic effect on the tremendous battle which Eisenhower and Montgomery are fighting 500 miles away to the north. It seems more likely to prove a cul-de-sac into which increasing numbers of United States troops will be drawn, and I fear that further demands will be made even upon what is left to us in Italy. It would no doubt make sure of Be Gaulle having his talons pretty deeply dug into France.

6. I should not be frank if I did not assure you that I fear a costly stalemate for you unless far more American divisions, at the expense of Eisenhower, are thrust into ANVIL to make it good at all costs by the great power of the United States. Little account is to be taken of Alexanders' operations. The last decision given by the British and American Chiefs of Staff here a fortnight ago was: "The destruction of the German armed forces in Italy south of the Pisa-Rimini line must be completed. There should be no withdrawal from the battle of any Allied forces that are necessary for this purpose." (telegram Number 3116 dated June 14th from CCS to Generals

Wilson and Eisenhower). However, I received from Alexander on June 28th a long distressing telegram in which the following passage occurs:

"The ghost of ANVIL hangs heavily over the battlefront. For example, the Americans have been ordered to send 517 RCT and 117 Cav Recce Squadrons which are actually in contact with the enemy. They are also required to release now an engineer regiment and other service units required for the conduct of battle. The French do not appear to be putting their hearts into the present operations and reason is undoubtedly because they have their eyes turned in another direction.

"The air effort will shortly be curtailed owing to moves of fighting units to Corsica. Eighth Army are not directly concerned with ANVIL, but as long as there is doubt and uncertainty about the future so long will there be a moral weakening. Armies have a very delicate sense and they are beginning to look over their shoulders. You will no doubt remember the Biblical quotation "For if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle." If the momentum of my offensive is to be kept to its maximum, I must receive confirmation that Italian campaign is to be backed. If on the other hand it is decided to go all out for ANVIL, then I must know so that I can recast my present plans. In the event of the latter decision I have proposed to General Wilson that I should fly home and table certain proposals aimed at producing best results my emasculated forces will be able to achieve in support of the war effort."

7. I have considered your suggestion that we should lay our respective cases before Stalin. The passage in the very nice telegram I have received from him yesterday (which follows this immediately) seems

to suggest that he does not underrate the Italian front. I do not know what he would say if the issue was put to him to decide. On military grounds he might be greatly interested in the eastward movement of Alexanders Army which, without entering the Balkans, would profoundly affect all the forces there and which, in conjunction with any attacks he may make upon Roumania or with Roumania against Hungarian Transylvania, might produce the most far-reaching results. On a long-term political view, he might prefer that the British and Americans should do their share in France in the very hard fighting that is to come, and that east, middle and southern Europe should fall naturally into his control. However it is better to settle the matter for ourselves and between ourselves.

8. What can I do, Mr. President, when your Chiefs of Staff insist on casting aside our Italian offensive campaign, with all its dazzling possibilities, relieving Hitler of all his anxieties in the Po Basin (vide Boniface), and when we are to see the integral life of this campaign drained off into the Rhone valley in the belief that it will in several months carry effective help to Eisenhower so far away in the north?

9. If you still press upon us the directive of your Chiefs of Staff to withdraw so many of your forces from the Italian campaign and leave all our hopes there dashed to the ground, his Majesty's Government, on the advice of their Chiefs of Staff, must enter a solemn protest. I need scarcely say that we shall do our best to make a success of anything that is undertaken. We shall therefore forward your directive to General Wilson as soon as you let us know that there is no hope of reconsideration by your Chiefs of Staff or by yourself. Our Chiefs of Staff are letting yours know the corrections on points of detail which they think necessary in the pre-

vious draft.

10. It is with the greatest sorrow that I write to you in this sense. But I am sure that if we could have met, as I so frequently proposed, we should have reached a happy agreement. I send you every personal good wish. However we may differ on the conduct of the war, my personal gratitude to you for your kindness to me and for all you have done for the cause of freedom will never be diminished.

PRIME

All the above is fact except such sentences as were approved by instructions given by me and by General Smith in respect of conversations with the Prime Minister.

I would personally be quite happy to see General Haig's in command of the operation. I consider him a most able soldier with particular qualifications in commanding ground forces of several nations. I would like to see the Plan in the hands of the General on the basis of seeing it as strong as possible even if it were to be a mere outline. Since, in the long run, France is going to be the backbone of Great Britain than ourselves, I would be delighted to see some British divisions in that country. Another consideration is the fact that with a disaster in command there will be no holding back in the Mediterranean of resources that are vital for operations elsewhere. If this proposal should be made and accepted, I suggest that reference be included that such a plan would be undertaken for so long as I believe I can exercise discretion over the whole force in its capacity as the Allied Expeditionary Force.

If there should be any delay with respect to our own operations, it might be well to have additional parts to the westward of Dunkirk quickly, we could always then divert our divisions eastward for the later phase of the war, directly into this area.

30 JUNE 1944

WHITE 96
(MAP ROOM to HYDE PARK)

ADMIRAL LEAHY TO THE PRESIDENT.

The following message from Eisenhower to Marshall, dated 29 June, is transmitted for your information:

"It is my belief that the Prime Minister and his Chiefs of Staff are honestly convinced that greater results in support of OVERLORD would be achieved by a drive toward Trieste rather than to mount ANVIL. They are aware, of course, of the definite purpose of the United States Chiefs of Staff to mount an ANVIL and I have been even more emphatic in my support of this operation than have your telegrams on the subject. I have the further impression that although the British Chiefs of Staff may make one more effort to convince you of the value of the Trieste move, they will not permit an impasse to arise, and will, consequently, agree to ANVIL. In this event, I believe that they will propose a stronger operation than previously conceived by including in it a number of the experienced British Divisions now in the Mediterranean and with the further recommendation that Alexander take over responsibility for ANVIL as the principal offensive operation in that theater. I feel that their idea would be to keep intact the tactical ground and air staff that has been functioning so well in Italy. They would then frankly recognize the Italian area as a secondary one and turn over the troops there to General Clark or other qualified officer.

"All the above is fact tinged with conjecture but does represent the impressions gained by me and by General Smith in separate conversations with the Prime Minister.

"I would personally be quite happy to see General Alexander in command of the operation. I consider him a most able soldier with particular qualifications in commanding ground forces of several nationalities. Moreover, I would like to see the Plans in the Mediterranean drawn on the basis of making ANVIL just as strong as possible even up to something like 16 or more divisions. Since, in the long run, France is going to be more the business of Great Britain than ourselves, I would be delighted to see more British Divisions in that country. Another consideration is the fact that with Alexander in command there will be no holding back in the Mediterranean of resources that can make the operation a success. If this proposal should be made and accepted, I suggest that reminder be included that when ANVIL proceeds sufficiently far so that I believe I can exercise direction over it, the whole force is to become part of the Allied Expeditionary Force.

"If there should develop some unforeseen rapidity with respect to our own advance here allowing us to gain additional ports to the southward of Cherbourg quickly, we could always then divert any divisions scheduled for the later phases of ANVIL buildup directly into this area.

"The main factor now is the necessity for speed in decision.

"All the above is for your confidential information and is merely to apprise you in person of what I believe to be the situation here and of my own reactions.

"The weather here continues to be abominable."

SENT: 301542 Z

TOP SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356

TOP-SECRET

June 29, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

General McFarland:

The attached message from the President to the Prime Minister of Great Britain dated 29 June 1944, relative to ANVIL, and sent this afternoon, is forwarded to you for the information of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It is requested that distribution be held to the minimum necessary as this is an exact copy.

Respectfully,

J. V. Smith
Lt. Commander, USN
Aide

TOP-SECRET

TOP SECRET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO : THE PRIME MINISTER

NO : 574, 29 JUNE 1944

1. I have given careful personal consideration to your Number 718 and I have had our Joint Staffs give the whole subject further consideration.

2. I agree with you that our over-all strategic concept should be to engage the enemy on the largest scale with the greatest violence and continuity, but I am convinced that it must be based on a main effort together with closely coordinated supporting efforts directed at the heart of Germany.

3. The exploitation of OVERLORD, our victorious advances in Italy, an early assault on Southern France, combined with the Soviet drives to the West--all as envisaged at Teheran--will most surely serve to realize our object--the unconditional surrender of Germany. In this connection also I am mindful of our agreement with Stalin as to an operation against the south of France and his frequently expressed views favoring such an operation and classifying all others in the Mediterranean as of lesser importance to the principal objective of the European campaign.

4. I agree that the political considerations you mention are important factors, but military operations based thereon must be definitely secondary to the primary operations of striking at the heart of Germany.

5. I agree that the OVERLORD build-up must receive continuing attention, but consider this to be definitely Eisenhower's responsibility. The forces we are sending him from the United States are what he has asked for. If he wants divisions ahead of service troops he has but to ask--the divisions will be

ready. ~~Special material and very human reasons are inclined to disregard two vital~~

6. Until we have exhausted the forces in the United States, or it is proved we cannot get them to Eisenhower when he wants them, I am opposed to the wasteful procedure of transferring forces from the Mediterranean to OVERLORD. If we use shipping and port capacity to shift forces from one combat area--the Mediterranean--to another--OVERLORD, it will certainly detract from the build-up of OVERLORD direct from the United States and the net result is just what we don't want--fewer forces in combat areas. ~~But if, within a decisive period, it would be~~

7. My interest and hopes center on defeating the Germans in front of ~~the~~ Eisenhower and driving on into Germany, rather than on limiting this action for the purpose of staging a full major effort in Italy. I am convinced we will have sufficient forces in Italy with ANVIL forces withdrawn, to chase Kesselring north of Pisa-Rimini and maintain heavy pressure against his army at the very least to the extent necessary to contain his present force. I cannot conceive of the Germans paying the price of 10 additional divisions, estimated by General Wilson, in order to keep us out of northern Italy. ~~... but is better than~~

8. We can--and Wilson confirms this--immediately withdraw 5 divisions (3 U.S. and 2 French) from Italy for ANVIL. The remaining 21 divisions plus numerous separate brigades will certainly provide Alexander with adequate ground ~~and~~ superiority. With our air superiority there is obviously sufficient air in the Mediterranean to furnish support both for operations in Italy and for ANVIL, and to provide over-whelming air support during the critical moments of either operation. We also have virtual mastery of the sea in the Mediterranean. ~~operation~~

9. I agree that operations against Bordeaux or Cette with Mediterranean forces are out of the picture. As to Istria, I feel that Alexander and Smuts ~~can be~~ ~~accepts, without consultation with Stalin, any course of action which abandons~~

for several natural and very human reasons are inclined to disregard two vital considerations: the grand strategy firmly believed by us to be necessary to the early conclusion of the war and the time factor as involved in the probable duration of a campaign to debouch from Ljubljana Gap into Slovenia and Hungary. The difficulties in this advance would seem far to exceed those pictured by you in the Rhone Valley, ignoring the effect of organized resistance groups in France and the proximity to OVERLORD forces. I am informed that for purely logistical reasons it is doubtful if, within a decisive period, it would be possible to put into the fighting beyond the Ljubljana Gap more than six divisions. Meanwhile we will be struggling to deploy in France thirty-five U. S. divisions that are now in continental United States plus an equivalent of corps and army combat troops not to mention the necessary complement of service troops. I cannot agree to the employment of U.S. troops against Istria and into the Balkans, nor can I see the French agreeing to such use of French troops.

10. The beaches, exits, communications and cover in the Toulon area are most suitable. The Rhone corridor has its limitations, but is better than Ljubljana and is certainly far better than the terrain over which we have been fighting in Italy.

11. I am impressed by Eisenhower's statement that Anvil is of transcendent importance and that he can and will furnish the required additional means to Wilson without undue detriment to OVERLORD, and by Wilson's statement that he can conduct the operation if given an immediate directive.

12. Wilson's plans for ANVIL are well developed and hence the operation can be launched with no delay.

13. Since the agreement was made at Teheran to mount an ANVIL, I cannot accept, without consultation with Stalin, any course of action which abandons

1001

this operation. In the event that you and I are unable to agree to issue a directive to General Wilson by 1 July to launch ANVIL at the earliest possible date, we must communicate with Stalin immediately. Furthermore, I feel that if we are to abandon ANVIL we must at once discuss with the French the use of their forces, which might by this decision be kept out of the battle in France, while taking losses in a secondary effort in Italy or the Balkans.

14. I again urge that the directive proposed by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff be issued to General Wilson immediately. It is evident that the drawing out of this discussion if continued will effectively kill the prospects of ANVIL in time to be of major benefit to OVERLORD.

15. At Teheran we agreed upon a definite plan of attack. That plan has gone well so far. Nothing has occurred to require any change. Now that we are fully involved in our major blow, history will never forgive us if we lose precious time and lives in indecision and debate. My dear friend, I beg you let us go ahead with our plan.

16. Finally for purely political considerations over here I would never survive even a slight setback in OVERLORD if it were known that fairly large forces had been diverted to the Balkans.

ROOSEVELT

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER

TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 719, 28 JUNE 1944

1. I have just received your number 573. But you had not then received my number 717. Nor the memorandum referred to in paragraph two thereof, nor the important information which General Menzies is sending you separately on my instructions, nor the latest reply by the British Chiefs of Staff to the United States Chiefs of Staff.

2. I earnestly hope you will take all these into consideration and then let me know what you think. A meeting will have to be arranged unless agreement can be reached by correspondence. I agree with you that a deadlock on fundamental questions of strategy would be a cruel injury to our soldiers, who are now fighting so vehemently side by side. For this reason a careful and patient discussion is indispensable and not an over-riding decision by either side.

PRIME

ANSWERED by PRES # 574, 29 June 44.

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER

TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 718, 28 JUNE 1944

1. Following is memorandum referred to in paragraph 2 of my No. 717. Please also take into consideration the very important information which General Menzies is sending you separately on my instructions.

2. Memorandum begins:

OPERATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATRES. NOTE BY THE
PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF DEFENCE.

PART I

1. I have thought it right to put down a few points which seem to me dominant.

2. At the present stage of the war in Europe, our overall strategic concept should be the engagement of the enemy on the largest scale with the greatest violence and continuity. In this way only shall we bring about an early collapse. Here is the prime test.

3. For this purpose sufficient ports must be acquired to allow the direct and speedy deployment in Europe of the thirty or more American divisions which are in the United States.

4. In choosing points of landing or attack, regard must be paid, first to their tactical relation with the main enterprise and battle proceeding under General Eisenhower in Western France; and, secondly, to the strain produced upon the Central Power of Germany, the OKW. The optimum is to combine both.

5. Political considerations, such as the revolt of populations against the enemy or the submission and coming over of his satellites, are

a valid and important factor.

6. It is better to have two ventures than three, and there are certainly not enough LSTs, etc, available for more than two major ventures.

7. The various choices now open should be examined in the light of the above requirements.

PART II

8. The supreme priority must naturally be accorded to the support of OVERLORD, for it is certain that the number of divisions now assigned to that enterprise up to the end of August, namely, forty plus, are not sufficient to establish mastery over the enemy resources available in western France (apart from a psychological collapse which should not be reckoned upon). It was understood that United States divisions would directly reinforce OVERLORD after August at the rate of five per month. The number of divisions which can be provided to reinforce OVERLORD in this period should be limited only by shipping possibilities and port accommodation on the western shores of France. The fundamental problem for SHAEF is the reception of the maximum of divisions from any quarter, together with the necessary tail.

9. For this purpose one ought not to consider only the ports envisaged. There are many small ports besides, as port-En-Bassin, Courseulles and Ouistreham, with an aggregate capacity of four thousand tons per diem, have already been found, even on the very closely-studied beaches of the actual OVERLORD assault. The use of landing craft enormously increases the discharge from these small ports. For this reason it would seem a mistake to move large quantities of landing craft from the supreme operation across the channel to any diversion elsewhere which was not in tactical relation to

the battle. The question is how to give General Eisenhower the maximum support directly in the shortest time and without causing needless havoc elsewhere.

10. The whole facilities for reception of troops and vehicles along the French Atlantic Coast should be re-examined in the light of newly-won experience. Moreover, the gaining of new ports to the north and south of our present OVERLORD objectives is greatly facilitated by the use of shore-based airfields or fuelling grounds now soon to be available in France. The taking of Havre and St. Nazaire is a necessity in far closer relation to the battle than any ports in the Mediterranean. In short, it is the main interest of OVERLORD to receive the great volume of troops who are waiting in the United States and can, if they can take them and if they can come into action sooner, be drawn from the Mediterranean. It would be a great pity to sweep aside all possibilities of broadening the intake direct from the United States or by stages through the United Kingdom into the western coasts of France.

11. Not only should the quantity of the intake be expanded to the utmost limit, but also the quality should be related to the fighting prospects of the next few months. Attached to this paper will be found, in a note (annex) prepared for me, the arrivals in the United Kingdom during May and the estimate of arrivals for June, July and August. From this it will be seen that 553,356 American soldiers have arrived or are to arrive in these four months, but they only constitute seven divisions. The field troops of seven divisions amount to about 20,000 men a division, and with other fighting accessories, such as tank brigades and independent brigades, etc, to (say) 25,000. Total 175,000. Deducting this from 553,356 leaves 378,356. The

question arises whether it might not be possible by severe adjustments, within the limits of existing shipping-arrangements, to give a higher priority to at least four or five more fighting divisions at the expense of some 378,356 servicing troops of many details comprised in this immense figure. The battle in France in this period may turn upon the more speedy arrival of these additional fighting units. This would still leave nearly a quarter of a million for the tail. Here also it must be observed that the casualties in France have happily been much less than those provided in the scale of build up, and we should be justified on the results of May and June along in sending in two additional formed divisions instead of fifty thousand replacements.

12. There are three French divisions which could be withdrawn from North Africa and a further four French divisions which might be withdrawn from Italy if ports and shipping and tail could be found for them. General Eisenhower in his number SCAF 53, para 7 B, plainly foresees this possibility as his second choice.

13. Thus there are possibilities of a considerable increase on the schedule of arrivals in the OVERLORD area in the next three months. Let us be sure that we are right in discarding these possibilities before we turn to more sombre alternatives, for it is certain that in no other way can so great or so timely a reinforcement be given to OVERLORD.

PART III

14. We must consider the application of the axioms set forth in Part I to the Mediterranean in relation to the remarks in Part II about reinforcement of OVERLORD from the west. If there were any way of capturing

Bordeaux within the present fighting season by a thrust from the Gulf of Lions, and thus opening Bordeaux and other smaller ports near it to the advance across the ocean of the main United States Army, this would clearly take priority over any purely Mediterranean enterprise which could be launched. Let us therefore examine in this setting the variants of ANVIL which have for so many months held our thoughts. Two projects have been put forward, to wit, a landing of, say, ten divisions with a three-division lift and a seven-division follow-up at Cette or at Marseilles. Cette has the great advantage of being only 225 miles from Bordeaux and is without any serious mountain obstructions. It is, I understand, admitted by all sides that there is no possibility of any landing on the 1st August and the earliest possibility is the 15th August, and that even this is doubtful. If we attack Cette between the 15th and 30th August, we are told it would be conceivable to land up to ten divisions by the end of September or the middle of October. There would then be the 225-mile march to accomplish in the face of such opposition as might be offered. If there were any opposition worthy of the name, it would be very surprising if a rate of more than 5 miles a day could be maintained by a substantial force. Thus we could not expect to take Bordeaux from the back before the beginning or middle of December. Thereafter there would be the need to put the port in order, and therefore the Cette operation, even if the naval objection to the landing-places were overcome, would not influence the war in 1944 except in so far as German troops now on the Riviera or despatched from OKW were kept out of the OVERLORD theatre. On this plan there could not be any large oversea intake from the United States.

This heavy-footed method of approach to Brodeaux is not to be compared with the results to be obtained by a descent upon Bordeaux either from Bayonne or from neighbouring small landing points. This might by a Coup-De-Main give a port and bridgehead into which French troops from Africa and the Mediterranean could enter France, and another great port be opened directly on the Atlantic. Anyhow, in view of the naval objections, Cete has been ruled out.

15. We are therefore left with the Toulon-Marseilles operation. The more I have thought about this, the more bleak and sterile it appears. It adds another 130 miles to the march upon Bordeaux, making a total of 355 miles in all. This march would present a flank to any German forces to the northward. The landing itself cannot be begun till the 30th August, and then only if the LSTs, etc, can be spared from OVERLORD by the 10th July. All that can be said against Cete as a means of access to Bordeaux is reinforced in the case of Marseilles by these facts. Indeed the march to Bordeaux from Marseilles could not begin in ten division strength till a month after the 30th August, and could not be accomplished for probably three months after that. For these reasons I cannot feel convinced that the attack on Bordeaux from the Gulf of Lions is a practical possibility.

16. But the successful capture of Toulon and Marseilles by the 30th August and the landing of ten divisions by the 30th September would also have as a possible objective a march up the Rhone valley with Lyons, 160 miles to the north, as its first objective. Here we should have, if successful, the advantage of putting in all the French available and such American divisions as were withdrawn from Italy, from Africa or diverted from the United States at the cost of OVERLORD. We should also be in close contact with the Maquis, who

have developed a moderate guerilla in the mountains. We should have a first-class port through which to pour American troops into this part of France if and as desired. It is as easy to talk of an advance up the Rhone valley as it is of a march from Italy to Vienna. But very great hazards, difficulties and delays may menace all such projects. Once we are committed to the landing at Marseilles, all the enemy troops along the Riviera, at present seven or eight divisions, can be brought to oppose us. It will always be possible for OKW to move any forces they have in Italy through the tunnels under the Alps or till winter comes along the great motoring roads which have been made over them, and intercept our northward advance at any point they chose. The country is most formidable. Without the enemy withdrawing a single division from the OVERLORD battle, we could be confronted with superior forces at every step we advance up the Rhone Valley. The evacuation by the enemy of Piedmont would not entail more than his guarding the Corniche roads along the Riviera and the mountain passes which, with the winter coming on, would not be difficult. He can always blow up the tunnels at his discretion. If we blow them up by air action, he can always, except in the depth of winter, escape over the top or along the Riviera coast.

17. It seems to me very difficult to prove that either the Cete or the Marseilles operation would have any tactical relation to the battle we have to fight now and throughout this summer and autumn for OVERLORD. The distance, as the crow flies, from Marseilles to Cherbourg is 600 miles, and from Marseilles to Paris 400 miles. It would seem clear that, even with great success, neither of these operations would directly influence the

present battle in 1944.

18. Moreover, before we embark upon either of these two forms of ANVIL in the hopes of helping OVERLORD, it would be well to count the cost that must be paid for either of them.

PART IV

19. General Wilson's number B 12995, General Alexander's private and personal number T 1322/4 to me, and Field-Marshal Smuts' private and personal to me, put before us the project of an attack eastward across the Adriatic or/and around its shores, and General Wilson conceives it possible that, on this plan, he and General Alexander could have possession of Trieste by the end of September. This movement is of course equally unrelated tactically to OVERLORD as are the variants of ANVIL.

20. Whether we should ruin all hopes of a major victory in Italy and all its fronts and condemn ourselves to a passive role in that theatre, after having broken up the fine Allied army which is advancing so rapidly through that peninsula, for the sake of ANVIL with all its limitations, is indeed a grave question for His Majesty's Government and the President, with the Combined Chiefs of Staff, to decide. For my own part, while eager to do everything in human power which will give effective and timely help to OVERLORD, I should greatly regret to see General Alexander's army deprived of much of its offensive power in northern Italy for the sake of a march up the Rhone Valley, which the Combined Chiefs of Staff have themselves described as unprofitable, in addition to our prime operations of OVERLORD.

21. To sum up--

a. Let us reinforce OVERLORD directly, to the utmost limit

of landings from the west.

b. Let us next do justice to the great opportunities of the Mediterranean Commanders, and confine ourselves at this phase to minor diversions and threats to hold the enemy around the Gulf of Lions.

c. Let us leave General Eisenhower all his landing craft as long as he needs them to magnify his landing capacity.

d. Let us make sure of increasing to the maximum extent the port capacity in the OVERLORD battle area.

e. Let us resolve not to wreck one great campaign for the sake of winning the other. Both can be won.

W.S.C. 10 Downing Street, SW 1, 28th June, 1944

See ANNEX attached.

ANNEX

U.S. ARMY (INCLUDING AAF) ARRIVALS IN U.K., MAY TO AUGUST, 1944

1. Serial
2. Detail
3. Arrivals in U.K. during May 1944
4. U.S. estimate of arrivals in U.K. for
 - (a) June
 - (b) July
 - (c) August

1.				
1	US Army (excluding Air Force)	88,432	(a) 135,775 (b) 107,639 (c) 189,541	
2	US Army Air Force	16,257	(a) 7,196 (b) 3,301 (c) 5,215	
3	Total US Army (including AAF)	104,689	(a) 142,971 (b) 110,940 (c) 194,756	
4	Number of Inf Divs	1	(a) 1 (b) 0 (c) 2	
5	Number of Armd Divs	0	(a) 1 (b) 0 (c) 1	
6	Number of A/B Divs	0	(a) 0 (b) 0 (c) 1	

TOP-SECRET

To: Joint Staff Mission

From: Chiefs of Staff

Dated: 28 June 1944

O.T.P.

TOP SECRET

IMMEDIATE

COS(W) 135

Following from Chiefs of Staff.

Reference J.S.M. 114.*

We deeply regret that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff find the proposals contained in COS(W) 130 unacceptable. We share their anxiety to get an early decision, but it would be unthinkable for want of patient discussion to risk taking a false step at this critical period of the war. We therefore earnestly hope that they will give careful consideration to this telegram.

2. Our comments on J.S.M. 114* are as follows:-

Reference paragraphs 2 and 3. When the U.S. Chiefs of Staff despatched their telegram they would not have seen Boniface of 28 June from G2 TAY 175 para. 1. This telegram completely vindicates our estimate of the enemy reaction to a full scale campaign in Italy and establishes the correctness of our plan. It would be a grave strategic error not to take advantage of this opportunity of destroying the German forces at present in Italy and thus drawing further reserves on to this front. Alexander's offensive in Italy has already drawn four O.K.W. Reserve Divisions on to his front. The destruction of Kesselring's army cannot fail to draw further German divisions away from OVERLORD, and moreover will draw them away earlier than they would be by an ANVIL launched about the end of August. General Wilson estimates in para 10 of his B/12995 that to hold a full strength advance by Alexander the Germans would have to bring down not less than 10 Divisions into North Italy, and even then he sees no reason to suppose that the advance could be stopped. As we made clear in our last telegram we are convinced that ANVIL cannot be staged without impairing the possibility of destroying Kesserling's forces.

3. Reference paragraph 4. We do not at all agree that the proposal to concentrate all our air resources in the Mediterranean to assist one major land campaign is a reflection on the quality of our ground troops, though it may be a testimonial to the German army in defence. General Alexander's break through was no walk over. It needed all our air power. Having regard

*C.C.S. 603/2

TOP-SECRET

- 1 -

TOP-SECRET

to the difficulties of the country which lie ahead, he will continue to need it all, and the same would apply to the Rhone Valley if we did an ANVIL. We remain convinced that there are not sufficient air resources to do ANVIL properly, and to effect the most rapid destruction of the German Forces in Italy. To divide our air forces between both operations would be a violation of the principle of concentration of force. We believe that this view is shared by the commanders on the spot, including the air commander-in-chief.

4. Reference paragraph 5. We recognize General Eisenhower's responsibility for the success of OVERLORD itself, but we cannot admit that he has any responsibility for European strategy as a whole. This responsibility must rest with the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and cannot be delegated to any commander-in-chief.

5. Reference paragraph 6. We cannot attach any importance to the suggestion that the possibility of Hitler's surrendering control to the German generals is a factor which should influence our strategy at this time. Should the eclipse of Hitler occur there would be incalculable counter-availing advantages in the non-military field, one of which might well be the complete collapse of the Nazi Regime and the early termination of the war.

6. Finally, we are still absolutely convinced that continuity of the use of maximum force wherever the enemy can be induced to fight must be the foundation of our strategy. In fact, we feel that we should never be forgiven in history if we now invested substantial forces in a project which cannot mature during the next three critical months and even then may pay only a negligible dividend for a further three. In the light of developments since our meeting at Stanwell we feel so strongly on this matter that at present we see no prospect of being able to advise His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom on military grounds in a sense contrary from that we have set forth.

T.O.O 282145Z

DISTRIBUTION

Restricted
U.S. Secretariat (15)

Original with copy of 147
delivered to Comdr. Smith
for J.C.S.

TOP-SECRET

- 2 -

TOP-SECRET

TOP-SECRET

June 28, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

The President has directed that a copy of the enclosed despatch be sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their information. He invites attention that the reference number of this despatch is within a few minutes of his despatch to the Prime Minister on the same subject sent this morning.

The President directs that immediately upon the receipt of the Prime Minister's message promised to be sent this evening, a copy be sent to the Joint Staffs. He requests that a seriatim reply be prepared without delay and that the reply include a discussion of the difficult terrain advocated by the Prime Minister as a substitute for ANVIL and that they also emphasize the promises and commitments at Teheran to carry out ANVIL.

WILSON BROWN,
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.

Attachment:

Copy of Prime Minister's
message No. 717, 6-28-44,
to the President.

Copy to:

Admiral Leahy

Original and copy of 717
delivered to Comdr. Smith
for J.C.S.

TOP-SECRET

TOP SECRET

US

28 June 1944

From: U. S. Military Attache, London, England
To: The President of the United States
Number 717 Filed: 28/1620Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt
strictly private, personal and top secret.
Number 717.

1. The deadlock between our Chiefs of Staff raises most serious issues. Our first wish is to help General Eisenhower in the most speedy and effective manner. But, we do not think this necessarily involves the complete ruin of all our great affairs in the Mediterranean, and we take it hard that this should be demanded of us.

2. I am sending you, in a few hours, a very full argument on the whole matter which I have prepared with my own hands, and which is endorsed by the Chiefs of Staff. I shall consult the War Cabinet on the subject tomorrow, 29th, and I have already circulated the paper to them. Those who have seen it completely

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

From: U. S. Military Attache, London, England
To: The President of the United States
Number 717 Filed: 28/1620Z

endorse it, including those members who belong to the Defense Committee. I have very little doubt of unanimous support upon this issue.

3. I most earnestly beg you to examine this matter in detail for yourself. I think the tone of the United States Chiefs of Staff is arbitrary and, certainly, I see no prospect of agreement on the present lines. What is to happen then? It was such a pity that they all separated before this issue arose, just like we separated before the Italian climax after QUADRANT.

4. Please remember how you spoke to me at Teheran about Istria, and how I introduced it at the full conference. This has sunk very deeply into my mind, although it is not, by any means, the immediate issue we have to decide.

5. I am shocked to think of the length of the message that I shall be sending you tonight. It is a purely personal communication between you and me in our capacity as heads of the two western democracies.

No Sig
TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO : THE PRIME MINISTER

NO : 573, 28 JUNE 1944

Your 714.

I have examined the problem of assistance for OVERLORD by operations in the Mediterranean which our Chiefs of Staff have been discussing. On balance I find I must completely concur in the stand of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. General Wilson's proposal for continued use of practically all the Mediterranean resources to advance into northern Italy and from there to the northeast is not acceptable to me, and I really believe we should consolidate our operations and not scatter them.

It seems to me that nothing can be worse at this time than a dead-lock in the Combined Staffs as to future course of action. You and I must prevent this and I think we should support the views of the Supreme Allied Commander. He is definitely for ANVIL and wants action in the field by August 30th, preferably earlier.

It is vital that we decide at once to go ahead with our long agreed policy to make OVERLORD the decisive action. ANVIL, mounted at the earliest possible date, is the only operation which will give OVERLORD the material and immediate support from Wilson's forces.

ROOSEVELT

281631 1066

RED 92

25 JUNE 1944

(MAP ROOM to SHANGRI LA)

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER

TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 714

I have just read memorandum CCS 603 from the United States Chiefs of Staff and also the immediately following containing the proposed draft orders. These very grave questions will immediately be examined by the British Chiefs of Staff and by the War Cabinet. I earnestly hope you will consent to hear both sides. Our answer will be given within 48 hours.

PRIME

NOTE: CCS 603 is a memorandum from U.S. Chiefs of Staff to the British in which we press for an early ANVIL.

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

IMMEDIATE

May 17, 1944

**TOP
SECRET**

Pouch?

To : British Chiefs of Staff

Rptd: Joint Staff Mission for U.S. Chiefs of Staff,
SHAEP for Eisenhower, AFHQ.

From: AFHQ Adv. CP from Wilson.

MEDCOS No. 110

I am most grateful for the increased allocation of assault shipping and craft, as notified in COSMED 106.

2. The various alternatives for amphibious operations have now been reviewed in the light of this provision. You will appreciate that final choice must depend on progress both of DIADEM and NEPTUNE.

3. The most likely period for the successful launching of a major amphibious operation using my full resources of assault shipping and craft, and with sufficient ground forces available for assault and follow up, is between mid-August and mid-September. This estimate is based on the following factors:

- (a) The additional craft are due to complete arrival in the theatre by July 20.
- (b) With the exception of 91 U.S. Division and the 2 French Armoured Divisions, all available major ground force formations are in Italy. Only when the main front and bridgehead are joined is it likely that any divisions in Italy will become available for employment other than in DIADEM. Allowing for the hard fighting ahead of us and for the subsequent inevitable period of preparation and loading of assaulting divisions, concurrent refitting and loading of immediate follow up divisions, and sailing of the force, it is unlikely that the course of events will allow staging of a major amphibious operation, involving both assault and subsequent build up, before mid-August.

CM-IN-13590 (18 May 44)

TOP SECRET

SECRET

COPY No. *39*

310 *Annul - bmk*
General

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

14-75724

20X

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

**TOP
SECRET**

NECDCOS No. 110

May 17, 1944

Page two

- (c) Due to deterioration of weather conditions, maintenance over beaches should, at latest, be completed by end of September; preferably by the middle of that month. The operation should therefore be landed in time to ensure its possession of a sufficient port by middle or end of September.

In accordance with your wishes as set out in COSMED 106, para. 5, all effort will therefore be made to stage a major amphibious operation in the period stated. Should the course DIADEM result in further delay, a major amphibious operation would not be precluded, provided that conditions, and area selected, were such as to provide for immediate seizure of a port by the assaulting force.

Operations on a smaller scale (and not including subsequent build up) such as those for seizure of Elba or in close tactical conjunction with battle in Italy, can, if required, be launched before August.

Areas for Major Amphibious Operation.

Southern France.

4. The biggest amphibious operation likely to be practicable is one to introduce substantial forces into Southern France.

5. Area of Operation. There appear to be 2 areas, within Southern France, in which a Mediterranean Force is likely to be called upon to operate after securing its base. These areas are:

- (a) The Rhone Valley, leading to Lyons, Vichy. At the request of SHAEF planners, as co-ordinators, existing plans for operations in Southern France are based on an advance, through the Rhone Valley, on Lyons-Vichy.
- (b) The Toulouse Gap, leading to Bordeaux. It is realized that the progress NEPTUNE and German dispositions, may result in a call for employment of our force in the Toulouse Gap area rather than in the Rhone defile.

CM-IN-13590 (18 May 44)

TOP SECRET

SECRET

COPY No. 39

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

54-78784

358

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

MEDCOS No. 110

May 17, 1944

Page three

6. Suitable Areas for Obtaining a Lodgement. I am of the opinion that, in order to effect entry of a substantial force, with the assault lift which will now be available, at the earliest stage of increasing German resistance, the most promising area in Southern France is that at present selected for operation ANVIL: i.e., the stretch of coast to the east of Toulon, the location of the landing being approximately between Cap Cavalaire and Agay.

The principal alternative to the above lodgement area would lie between the Rhone Valley and the Spanish border, particularly in the vicinity of the Port of Sete. This general area is however considered unsuitable for obtaining entry into Southern France at earliest possible stage of declining German resistance, for the following reasons (which resulted in its rejection when full operation ANVIL was being considered):

- (a) The Port of Sete consists of narrow channels which could, and almost certainly would, be badly blocked. The beaches in the vicinity have bad gradient with an uneven bottom and sand bars. The exits from the beaches are bad. Unless the full harbour facilities of Sete were at once available, maintenance of a force landed anywhere near Sete would be an extremely doubtful proposition, especially towards the end of summer.
- (b) The whole of the area west of the Rhone Valley is out of reach of effective shore-based air cover. Although a landing, supported by carrier-based aircraft and long range fighters, could doubtless be made at some stage of declining German resistance, it would only be likely to become possible considerably later than a landing in the ANVIL area supported by the great weight of Mediterranean tactical and coastal air forces operating from Corsica.

I am therefore planning an assault against the ANVIL area as first planning priority. Alternative plans, in as much detail as possible, will however be held to cover the following cases:

- (a) Case where an initial landing is made in the ANVIL area, and the Port of Toulon seized, but subsequent

CM-IN-13590. (18 May 44)

TOP SECRET

COPY No. 39

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

14-78784

204

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

**TOP
SECRET**

MEDCOS No. 110

May 17, 1944

Page four

German dispositions are such that operations in the Rhone Valley offer little promise; in such conditions the area of the Toulouse Gap might be largely denuded of German forces, and it might be profitable, having established a base and airfields in the Toulon area, to conduct subsequent operations to secure an advanced base at Sete with a view to operating in Toulouse Gap.

- (b) Case where operations in Toulouse Gap offer best promise, in view of general strategic situation in France during progress of OVERLORD, and where, by the time the Mediterranean amphibious operation is launched, German strength west of the Rhone has fallen so low that the initial landing can be made at Sete with a view to seizing port substantially intact.
- (c) Case in which German withdrawal, or collapse, occurs in Southern France and conditions thus permit a landing in immediate vicinity of ports of Toulon, or Marseilles, or both.

7. Build up of Forces into Southern France. With the assault shipping and craft now becoming available, and assuming my full requirements of merchant shipping are allotted, implementation of plan of assault east of Toulon should result in completion of transference of divisions to Southern France approximately as follows:

- (a) On D plus one - from Italy 2, from Corsica nil, from North Africa nil; total 2.
- (b) On D plus 4 - from Italy 4, from Corsica nil, from North Africa nil; total 4.
- (c) On D plus 10 - from Italy 4, from Corsica one, from North Africa nil; total 5.
- (d) On D plus 40 - from Italy 5, from Corsica one, from North Africa one (armoured); total 7.

CM-IN-13590 (18 May 44)

TOP SECRET
SECRET

COPY No. 39

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

16-75724

223

SECRET

**WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER**

INCOMING MESSAGE

**TOP
SECRET**

MEDCOS No. 110

May 17, 1944

Page 1

- (e) On D plus 90 - from Italy 7, from Corsica one, from North Africa 2 (armoured); total 10.

8. Ultimate effect, on Italy, of implementation of present planned build up in Southern France, would therefore be reduction of infantry divisions in Italy to 15. Of these some divisions might be seriously depleted due to anticipated excess of British wastage over replacements during coming months.

While, therefore, it is reasonable to expect that, in the conditions in which a major operation would be launched against Southern France, the formations remaining in Italy would be sufficient for security, it is clear that:

- (a) Once priority were transferred to Southern France, the ground forces in Italy would have very limited offensive power against any determined German stand. Moreover, air support in Italy would, under these conditions, only be on a scale to support a defensive policy.
- (b) The development of the campaign in Southern France may well be such as to require additional divisions. In that event, decision will have to be made, in the light of the general conditions existing at the time, as to whether additional U.S. divisions be removed from Italy, or, alternatively further divisions be brought into the Mediterranean Theatre.

Italy.

9. The object of operation DIADEM is to destroy German armies in Italy to maximum possible extent. It is possible that the course of NEPTUNE and of DIADEM may result in conditions where the German is still making a determined stand on some line south of Pisa-Rimini and that, in such a case, the best assistance which this theatre can give may be the launching of an amphibious operation against the coast in rear of enemy position.

10. The conditions for an assault on the coast of Italy require that any operation there should be almost entirely of a "shore to shore" type. Therefore the assault lift available

CM-IN-13590 (18 May 44)

TOP SECRET

SECRET

COPY No. 31

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

16-76784

22X

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

**TOP
SECRET**

MEDCOS No. 110

May 17, 1944

Page 11

can hardly be regarded as sufficient for a major operation in Italy out of close supporting distance on the mainland battle. It is thus not possible to give firm proposals as to the exact location of any such operation as locations must depend on the progress of our advance in Italy. In general, the most profitable areas appear to be

- (a) Rather south of Civitavecchia.
- (b) Close north and south of Piombino.
- (c) In the vicinity of Fisa and Lucca.

Beaches between Civitavecchia and San Stefano are indifferent.

Once the enemy has withdrawn his main forces to the Pisa-Rimini Line, and we have established our force confronting him there, no effective major amphibious outflanking operations are likely to be feasible with the resources which will be available, apart from the fact that the season may by then be too far advanced. A landing in the Genoa area, even if it obtained secure lodgement, would be relatively ineffective in that we would be right up against the Appenine Mountains, and would have little effect against communications the principal of which is that running from Florence through Bologna and Verona.

General.

11. It has been accepted by both British and U.S. Chiefs of Staff that definite choice of operation cannot be made now. Yet, if I am to be able to mount my first-planning priority - an operation at ANVIL scale in area chosen for ANVIL - in mid-August, the necessary additional shipping must be assembled in the Mediterranean by late June, and must be arranged now. Unless decision is taken now to provide the shipping, I shall be restricted largely to a land battle in Italy, with no flexibility in use of my strategic reserve, and will be unable to take advantage of opportunities elsewhere.

The estimate of shipping required for this operation has been set out in MEDCOS 107. On the same grounds, I request:

- (a) That such naval bombardment forces, as may be
- OM-IN-13590 (18 May 44)

TOP SECRET

SECRET

COPY No. 39

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

24-75762 3 121

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

MEDCOS No. 110

May 17, 1944

Page 5

required for a specific operation, be made available on release from NEPTUNE.

- (b) That shipment to this theatre of all stores and supplies required for initial ANVIL assault be completed.
- (c) That all administrative units and resources, previously allocated for operation ANVIL, remain allocated for major amphibious operation, and that shipment be completed.

No Sig

T.O.C. 171000B

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Gofs

CM IN-13590 (18 May 44) 1600Z jb

TOP SECRET

SECRET

COPY No. 31

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

16-75724

25M

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

To: British Chiefs of Staff
Rptd: Joint Staff Mission for U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff
HQ. MAAF.
From: A.F.H.Q. (Signed Wilson)
MEDCOS 107

In reply to COSMED 107.

My shipping requirements for any amphibious operation which I may decide to undertake cannot be submitted until I have given detailed consideration to the effect which the new allocation of assault shipping and craft given by COSMED 106 will have on future strategy in this theatre. It is important however that my general shipping requirements for all purposes should be represented as a matter of urgency.

2. The shipping requirements of this theatre are listed below as follows -

- (a) Normal internal housekeeping.
 - (b) Maintenance of DIADEM.
 - (c) Movement for an amphibious operation.
3. (a) Normal internal housekeeping. Shipping required is now greater than previously anticipated due to the necessity for closing out certain administrative installations with the consequent movement of stocks contained therein. This closing out of administrative installations is in connection with the conservation of man power and a saving of overheads in this theatre on the part of U.S. forces.
4. (b) Maintenance of DIADEM. Every means available for the maintenance of DIADEM will be used but limitations of road and rail capacity due to enemy demolitions will be such that a considerable proportion of the supplies necessary to maintain the impetus of the attack must be moved by sea.

CM-IN-10691

(14 May 44)

TOP SECRET

310 *Amil*

SECRET

Col Park
COPY No.

39

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

24-75724

25M

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

MEDCOM 10 INCOMING MESSAGE.

~~SECRET~~

Our experiences at and in Anzio have proved the feasibility of landing large quantities of supplies from ocean beaches over beaches and into smaller ports. Lighters for unloading such discharge are available.

5. (c) An amphibious operation. It is not possible until Rome is captured to decide what amphibious operation will be my best course of action. In the meantime preparations must be made and sufficient resources must be available to give me freedom of choice when the time comes to make a decision. My greatest need for merchant shipping will arise if I decide to undertake a major amphibious operation of the scale of the current ANVIL plan.

6. In view of the indication I have received from both London and Washington that cargo shipping is now planned on very fine margins I have ordered that no movement shall take place which is not absolutely essential and have directed that the number of sailings which I originally intended to submit and which have formed the basis of informal exchanges between this headquarters and the shipping authorities in London and Washington be reduced to 100 cargo sailings in June and 90 cargo sailings in July for internal housekeeping and maintenance of DIADDEM.

7. I must emphasize that this represents the absolute minimum demand and assumes no reduction in the (oceanstery) fleet now available.

8. The present available lift of 21,000 in personnel shipping is sufficient for internal Mediterranean movement in June and July.

9. To mount a major amphibious operation similar to that planned for ANVIL, I shall require 100 cargo ships for preloading in mid-July and a 32,000 (30,000?) lift in personnel shipping. For subsequent follow-up convoys sufficient cargo shipping to give 150 sailings in each of the 1st and 2nd 30-day periods with 50 sailings in the 3rd 30-day period is required. A lift in personnel shipping of 16,000 for follow-up convoys of the operation is also required.

10. The extent to which I can combine a major amphibious operation with continued operations in Italy is now under examination

OM-IM-10691

(14 May 44)

T O P S E C R E T

SECRET

COPY No.

39

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

~~TOP SECRET~~
INCOMING MESSAGE

MEDCOS 107

Page

~~TOP SECRET~~

and my total shipping requirements in these circumstances depend on the results of this examination. The battle in whatever other commitments are undertaken will be continued with forces remaining in Italy to the maximum extent possible and will require considerable shipping resources for the movement of maintenance supplies which will not necessarily decrease if an amphibious operation is launched.

11. As future strategy will be governed by the shipping resources placed at my disposal I would be grateful for early confirmation that the requirements outlined above will be met.

T.O.O. 131630B

Footnote: COSMED 106 not received by WDCMC

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
Gen Somervell
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Col ~~PAK~~
LOG

CM-IN-10691

(14 May 44)

2136Z

hrt

T O P S E C R E T

SECRET

COPY No. 39

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

24-75724

25X

Regraded Unclassified