Folder 5. MR 370 Italy (1) Sec. 3—Surrender of Italy, 16 September–31 December 1943.
Subject is restoration of occupied territory to Italian jurisdiction as proposed in your NAF 534. In restoring territories mentioned to Italian jurisdiction it is important that no rights under terms of surrender be compromised by any agreement with the Italian Government or any representative thereof. In this connection see final paragraph of cable number 9763, October 9, 1943, where it is said, in substance, that the relationship of co-belligerency between the governments of the United Nations and Italy cannot of itself affect the terms of surrender which retain their full force and can only be adjusted by agreement between the Allied governments in the light of such assistance as may be afforded to the United Nations cause by the Italian government. It is believed that the surrender terms, in particular paragraph 10 of short terms and paragraphs 22, 36, and 42 of long terms, are sufficiently broad in scope to give you authority to direct the Italian government to do anything which you might feel necessary for it to do, without the necessity of a secret agreement as proposed in your document number 1. The question of occupation costs is already adequately provided for in paragraph 33 of long surrender terms. In view of these factors, and since we are not transferring "sovereignty" or "territory," but rather administration of territories, the proposed secret document is considered inadvisable and should not be entered into.

As regards remaining documents, complete texts of which we have not seen, we are ready to leave responsibility for details with you. The reference to formal transfer of territory to crown of Italy should however be eliminated from the second
document, which is a proclamation announcing termination of military government. Your proposed reservation of all rights of the Allied Commander in Chief and of the Allied Control Commission should of course be included in this proclamation.

As regards proclamations, decrees and technical decrees to be issued by the Italians, these should be in the name of the Italian government rather than of the King if this is in accordance with constitutional processes. Proclamation and decree mentioned in your fourth paragraph should refer to assumption of administration of government rather than to assumption of "powers" of government. It is important in connection with all proposed documents that royalty, crown and king be not emphasized.

Addendum. Drafts of your proposed documents have just been received and are receiving consideration. No action should be taken by you until you receive our further directive concerning these drafts.

ORIGINATOR: CCS (Capt Royal USN)
INFORMATION: OPD
GENERAL STRONG
GENERAL ARNOLD
ADMIRAL KING
ADMIRAL HORNE
LOG

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RFP, NLR, Date MAY 1 1974

CM-OUT-3624 (9 Dec 43) 2323Z law

SECRET
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INCOMING MESSAGE

SECRET
SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers
To: War

No. W 6488/7495, 30 November 1943

To AOWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff to USBFOR for British Chiefs of Staff and to USAFIME for Combined Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower cite FMDOS MAF 534.

It is proposed to restore all occupied territory south of the northerly boundary of Salerno, Potenza and Bari provinces, including Sicily but excluding Pantelleria, Lampedusa and Linosa, to Italian jurisdiction during the first week in December. In restoring this territory to Italian Sovereignty certain formal steps are being taken to preserve various rights needed by the Military Forces in such territories for the effective prosecution of the war, and to insure the recognition by Italian Government of the validity of the acts of the Allied Military Government. Three documents have been prepared to accomplish these purposes.

The first is a proposed secret document to be signed by General Alexander as Military Governor, transferring the territories to the Italian Crown upon certain terms and conditions therein set forth. The document also extends these rights to all other Italian Territory not at present occupied by Allied Forces, which has been liberated and is now under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government, so as to include Appulia and Sardinia. The rights in question are in addition to and without prejudice to rights reserved under the existing armistice terms in occupied territory. This document also provides for the inclusion of the maintenance cost of Allied Troops or other personnel within the area restored as occupation costs.

CM-IN-18600 (30 Nov 1943) SECRET

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Algiers
To: War
No. W 6488/7495, 30 November 1943

The second is a short proclamation to be published by the Military Governor announcing the termination of military government and of all proclamations and orders issued thereunder and formally transferring the territory to the Crown of Italy, subject to all rights of the Allied Commander in Chief and the Allied Control Commission. This document does not list the particular rights reserved.

The third is a proclamation and decree to be issued by the King of Italy simultaneously with the issuance of document B. By this document the King assumes the powers of government in the restored territory and declares that all proclamations, orders, sentences, and other official acts of the Allied Military Government will be recognized as valid in Italian courts, and calls on the Italian people to cooperate with the Allied Forces in driving the Germans out of Italy.

In addition to the above documents, further technical decrees to be executed by the King are in course of preparation. Their purpose is to continue in force certain provisions of proclamations and general orders issued by the Allied Military Government, such as wage and price regulations, etc., so as to prevent a lapse between the date of restoration and the time the Italian Government may act upon such subjects itself. They are what is commonly known as "Transit Time Legislation". Approval of the foregoing is sought.

No Sig.

ACTION: CC/S (Captain Royal USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
General Arnold
General Strong
General Hilldring
Admiral King
Admiral Horne
Log

CM-IN-18600 (30 Nov 43) 1850Z med

SECRET

COPY No. 18

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Regraded Unclassified
From: APHQ in North Africa
To: War

No. W-5549/2830, 19th November 1943  NAF 523.

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFOR for
British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower cite FFMGS
NAF 523.

Paraphrase of message from Joyce follows:

Messages sent by Reuters correspondent after interviews with Sforza. Croce and others in Naples shown to us. These messages and other evidence show that Badoglio's Provisional Government of technicians is not acceptable to Naples politicians. They insist on immediate elimination of all obstacles to formation of Political Government. By obstacles they mean King whose immediate abdication they demand. Croce states Allies should not support King because they found him reigning at time of armistice.

Joyce adds Sforzas attitude not yet verified. Joyce asks whether Allied Governments might not want to take advantage of opportunity offered by Sforzas letters to Berle and Eden to influence his attitude. His strength in Italy derived from impression which he promotes that he is in confidence of British and American Governments.

ACTION: CCS
INFORMATION: OPD
GEN ARNOLD
GEN HILLDRING
GEN STRONG
ADM KING
LOG

CM-IN-11707 (19 Nov 43) 1429Z mcs

Regraded Unclassified
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

Joint Chiefs of Staff
November 18, 1943

COMMANDING GENERAL
ORAN ALGERIA

Number 577

For Lt. Col. Frank McCarthy for delivery to Bloom from Sexton, my number 31.

You were advised by memorandum which left here by courier November 18 that [NAF 520] had been referred CCG for study, recommendation and preparation suitable papers to be forwarded to SEKTANT for final action on a high level. Extracts from Hilldring's report read as follows:

"Conclusion.

"1. The position which General Eisenhower has taken is sound. The change in the Cunningham Agreement proposed by Badoglio is objectionable in that it would deprive the Allied Commander-in-Chief of the rights he now enjoys by virtue of the surrender terms and subject any additional proposals which the United Nations might wish to present concerning the disposition and use of Italian ships to discussion with and agreement by the Italian government.

"2. Under the terms of unconditional surrender the authority of the Allied Commander-in-Chief over the use and disposition of Italian ships is supreme and this authority should not be compromised by any subsequent agreement with the Italian government.

"Recommendation.

"It is recommended that there be referred to SEKTANT for consideration a proposed reply to NAF 520."

CM-OUT-7427 (18 Nov 43)

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 1 1974
COPY No.

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Regraded Unclassified
Proposed reply to NAF 520:

"Amendment to Cunningham Agreement proposed by Badoglio is not acceptable. Under terms of unconditional surrender your authority over use of Italian ships is supreme and this authority should not be compromised by any subsequent agreement with Italian government. The position which you have taken with Badoglio has our full approval. Accordingly, if Italian government fails to sign Cunningham Agreement with proposed amendment, the terms of surrender heretofore signed will stand as originally written, and provisions of proposed Cunningham Agreement will become an ad hoc working arrangement subject to change as circumstances may require."

The foregoing proposed reply has approval of State, War and Navy Departments.

Hilldring’s complete report will follow by next courier leaving here November 20th.

ORIGINATOR: JC/S (Capt Royal USN)
INFORMATION: SGS

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 1 1974

CM-OUT-7427 (18 Nov 43) 2344Z ejv

COPY No.
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Regraded Unclassified
From: Algiers  
To: War, NAF 520  

To AGWAR for The Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff personal from Eisenhower. This is NAF 520.

Amendment to the Cunningham agreement, see paragraph number 1 of FAN 268, was presented to the Head of Italian Government by the Military Mission. Both Marshal Badoglio and the Minister of Marine refused to sign. Appreciating fully the implications of the phrase "The right of the United Nations to make such other disposition of any or all Italian ships as they may think fit", The Marshal has proposed the following modification "It is understood and agreed that the provisions of the present agreement relative to the use and disposition of Italian warships and merchant ships do not preclude the possibility that all or a part of the Italian vessels may be employed (foregoing word underlined) in other ways the United Nations may consider suitable for the purposes of the war in general. Their proposals in this respect shall be discussed from time to time with the Italian Government." (The entire preceding sentence underlined)

Marshal Badoglio states that he will sign the amendment to the Cunningham agreement proposed in FAN 268 providing I will recommend to my Governments the acceptance of the suggested modifications as quoted above.

This was the procedure followed in the case of the signature of the long term document at Malta, but on that occasion I had some hope that my recommendations would be accepted. I can not in honesty give the same encouragement.
to Badoglio in the present instance as I have been advised informally of a possible intention to allot units of the Italian fleet to others of the United Nations. This would certainly mean the lowering of the Italian Flag and the complete removal of Italian crews.

In reporting the situation as it exists now, I wish to point out the following. In the initial surrender the principal fact to which the Italians clung as a SOP to their military self respect was the fact that they were not required to haul down their flag on the Italian Fleet. By way of compensation for this concession, the cooperation of the Italian Minister of Marine with the CINC Mediterranean has been full and complete. Aside from provision of work organizations and civil police units, the value of Italy as a co-belligerent lies, in a large measure, in the service we are receiving from Italian merchant ships, war vessels, and from dock yards etc. From the viewpoint of CINC Med it would be most unfortunate if DeCurtis, the present Minister of Marine, were to resign or if, as a result of our pressure, the Badoglio Government should fall.

On the other hand, the United Nations probably believe that we have gone too far to recede from our demand for signature of the Cunningham agreement in some form which will guarantee to our Navies the unrestricted use of Italian warships and merchant ships in the prosecution of the war. Under the circumstances, I have instructed Joyce to inform Badoglio that the British and American Governments agreed to the modifications proposed by the Italians in the long term document, but to clarify and define their position and rights with respect to the Italian Navy and Merchant Marine, they demand an additional statement in the Cunningham agreement asserting the right of the United Nations to make such disposition of any or all Italian ships as they may think fit. If Badoglio can not accept this Quid pro quo, then the long term document as signed at Malta must stand as originally written without modification, thus affirming the unconditional surrender.

CM-IN-9227 (15 Nov 43)

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified
From: Algiers
To: War, MAF 520
Nr: W5251/1082, 15 November, 1943.

of the Italian Ground, Air and Naval Forces. The Cunningham agreement, which has not yet been signed, thus becomes an Ad Hoc working arrangement subject to variation as we desire. Badoglio must take his choice.

No Sig.

Footnote: FAN 268 is CM-OUT-1612 (4 Nov 43) CCS

ACTION: CCS (Capt Royal, USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Strong
Gen Arnold
Adm King
Log

CM-IN-9227 (15 Nov 43) 1756Z cw
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Algiers
To: WAR

W 5020
12th November 1943

I have just received from Joyce the following message which I will quote for your information. "Sadoglio invited me to see him this evening to discuss the political situation. After reviewing the events leading up to the current situation, he reiterated his intention to carry on only until Rome when he would resign and permit the organization of a broad based ministry of political leaders. In the meanwhile, since it was impossible to form such a government for the present, he was organizing an ad interim government of experts, the ministries headed by qualified undersecretaries authorized by special decree to sign with the full powers of a minister. The Marshal stated that he believes that he can have such an organization ready to function within about a week. He estimated the advantages to be:

(A). Continuity of the present government without radical change likely to cause disorder in our communication zone;

(B). Prompt organization of effective collaboration with the Allied Control Commission;

(C). Creation of an administrative organization which can function regardless of the damage done by the Germans to the governmental machinery in Rome."
Several times in the course of the conversation, the Marshal stated that he considers a reaction in favor of the King was setting in throughout the country, and that he anticipated serious difficulties within the armed forces if an abdication were forced at this time."

No sig

ACTION: CCS (Capt Royal USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
            GEN STRONG
            GEN ARNOLD
            SGS
            ADM KING
            GEN HILLDRING
            LOG

CM-IN-7501 (12 Nov 43) 2047Z vo
12 November 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The attached message for you from General Eisenhower was forwarded to me from the War Department by courier today.


Eisenhower-Pres.  W-H08,
10 November 1943

Copy and 11 X 20.
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

FROM: Algiers
To: War
No: W-4808, 10 November 1943

For Sexton Secretary General Staff for the personal attention of the President from Eisenhower. Reference your 2091.

My opinion of the top man in Italy is the same as yours. Any reports which I have received from Italy lead me to believe that he himself does not count for much although his house remains a rallying point for the military and naval factions. When Smith was in Naples he noted that there was very little enthusiasm among the people when the King drove through the city. Certainly the anti-fascist elements in Italy remember well his policy with respect to Mussolini. The Crown Prince was even more closely identified with the Fascist party. Badoglio impresses us as honest and well intentioned although hesitant and uncertain in political matters. However, the Army and, I believe, the people generally seem to have confidence in his integrity although doubtful of his capacity as a military leader because of his age. Ambrosio, chief of the joint staff, seems to possess the confidence of the vast majority of Army and Navy officers. With respect to Sforza, I now believe that he does not carry as much weight in Italy as we originally supposed except with a minority group. He has been so long away from Italy that he is felt to have lost touch with the Italian people and Italian affairs. The fact is that there is no one man who can inspire the Italian people with any enthusiasm for "fighting or dying".

My personal opinion is that the best thing that could happen eventually is for the King and the Prince of Piedmont to disappear from the picture and for the grandson to become King, possibly with Badoglio as regent and with Sforza or some other outstanding anti-fascist as Prime Minister. Badoglio has been informed unofficially of this view. But I am confident that until we attain our military objective north of Rome it would be better for us if no radical changes were to take place in the present setup be-

Regraded Unclassified
cause the King and Badoglio represent the only, even if
tattered and shop worn, symbol of legal government.

The situation at the moment is that the king has
refused to accept Badoglio's resignation and has told him
to carry on and to form an administration from the best
available experts and technicians with which to insure the
tranquility of the country and the maximum useful coop-
eration with the Allied Commission. Badoglio has consented
to carry on until Rome is reached, but intends to resign
when the Government is established in Rome, leaving it to
the king to appoint a new Prime Minister. In the mean time,
Badoglio apparently intends to do nothing about Sforza since
the latter has refused to enter the Government as long as
the King is on the throne. Badoglios present plan is to see
Sforza and to talk to him more as a friend than as Prime
Minister, appealing to his patriotism not to make trouble
politically before Rome is reached. He may even attempt to
get Sforza to accept, in the mean time, some mission abroad.

Our own position, of course, is much stronger than
it was when we entered North Africa and confronted a some-
what similar political situation because we are prepared,
if necessary, to continue military government, in fact if
not in name, to include the Rome area. We will not turn over
areas to the control of the Italian government until the
government has assumed a complexion appropriate to the prin-
ciples for which the United Nations are fighting this war.
I have instructed my representatives in Italy to refrain
from direct interference in Italian internal affairs ex-
cept as they deviate from the policies which you and the
Prime Minister have enunciated with respect to Italy. We
have made it very clear to the King, Badoglio, and all im-
portant members of the present government that it is our
sincere hope that the Italians will be able to get together
and establish a broad based, anti fasciat coalition govern-
ment, and that this is the desire of the United States. If
they are unable to do this and disagreement increases, the
obvious alternative is the continuation of military govern-
ment for the time being. I feel that we must refrain from
any attempt to establish a "Puppet" government. Such an
arrangement would be dependent for its influence entirely
upon our military strength and if we have to rule in this

CM-IN-6205 (10 Nov 43)
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Algiers
To: War
No: W-4808, 10 November 1943

We do not propose to exercise political censorship and will refrain from expressing opinions of internal Italian political matters, giving only general guidance to the press from our own viewpoint. Neither will we undertake to determine the policy of the King or Badoglio with respect to publicity. We shall, however, without taking the initiative, do whatever we can in a material way to further conferences between Badoglio and Sforza. The actions and attitude of divergent political groups in Italy will depend in a large measure on the success of our own military operations and particularly on the length of time it takes us to reach Rome. All factions are struggling to obtain Allied support and, at present at least, I believe that the King is as anxious as any of the others to conciliate our governments by establishing, at least initially, a democratic form of government although his main interests are the preservation of his own position or that of his son, and failing this, the preservation of the House of Savoy. The latter seems to me to be desirable until an election can be held.

We had excellent guidance so far through the Combined Chiefs of Staff, but it is an immeasurable help to me to know your personal thoughts in these matters, I truly appreciate your action.

No Sig

Note: 2097 is CM-OUT-3373 (9 Nov 43) White House
ACTION: WHITE HOUSE
INFORMATION: C of 3

CM-IN-6205 (10 Nov 43) 2118Z mjc

SECRET
COPY No. 1

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

Secretary of State
Washington

7847, November 11, 8 p.m.

At today’s meeting of the London Political Warfare Coordinating Committee the following agenda was considered.

(A). A memorandum submitted by FWE in which the question of possible Russian participation in the preparation of propaganda directives was presented; FWE proposed that the British and American Governments should anticipate a Russian demand by inviting at least a limited Russian participation.

(B). A memorandum prepared by the Foreign Office in which there was proposed a directive for Italy as a result of what the Foreign Office informed us was a joint decision on the part of the American and British Governments that "it would be best that the King and Badoglio should temporarily carry on as at present in view of the difficulties in the way of broadening the Government until the Allied forces reach Rome."

With regard to (A) above, it was agreed that this was a question
was a question of policy rather than propaganda and that the PWE proposal would be presented by OWI and PWE to the two Governments for a decision as to whether or not the Russians should be invited to cooperate in propaganda activities and if so, if the two governments desired a recommendation from OWI and PWE to this end. OWI will telegraph text.

With regard to (B) above, Sir Orme Sargent informed the Committee that the British and American Governments had agreed that while they did not want to be made responsible for deciding what government Italy is to have, it would be best that the King and Badoglio should temporarily carry on as at present in view of the difficulties in the way of broadening the Government until the Allied forces reach Rome. He added that the King has now rejected Badoglio's resignation and has asked him to carry on until Rome is reached. Sir Orme added that this decision had been endorsed by the combined Chiefs of Staff and finally had received the approval of the very highest levels of both Governments. Since the American representatives on the Committee were completely uninformed with regard to any such decision reached or even with regard to the fact of the King's refusal to
King's refusal to abdicate, they were forced to accept the British version and to proceed on that basis. A proposed directive received from General Eisenhower was also considered in this connection. It was agreed that in the event some defense became necessary of the attitude of the two Government's regarding the new Italian situation that the following propaganda line should be generally adopted:

"The refusal of Sforza and Croce to join a government unless the King abdicated, and the refusal of the King to give up his throne, has produced a deadlock which only the Italian people can resolve. Pending the resolution of this deadlock by the Italian people, the Allies do not propose to concern themselves with this controversy but this does not mean that they have departed in the least from the Moscow declaration that the Italian Government should be made more democratic."

It was also agreed that the Committee should telegraph to General Eisenhower suggesting that the above be incorporated in Paragraph two of his proposed directive embodied in his telegram to AGWAR No. 1910 of November 10 in the event criticism of the two Government's decision should arise.

The American members...
The American members of the Committee desire respectfully to invite the attention of the joint Chiefs of Staff, the OWI and the Department of State to the fact that in the present instance they were dependent entirely upon information received from their British colleagues and were thus forced to take a decision which should this information be not entirely accurate might have serious consequences. They therefore respectfully reiterate their request that any such decisions which would require an ad hoc decision on propaganda directive be supplied them at once whether it should emanate from General Eisenhower's headquarters or from a decision of the combined Chiefs of Staff or of the Department of State or from the highest levels.

Please inform Chiefs of Staff and OWI.

The Ambassador asks that the above message be brought to the attention of the President.

WINANT

LMS