

Folder 6. MR 370 Italy (1) Sec. 4—Surrender of
Italy, 1 January–22 October 1944.

*Advised Bureau
to file*

SECRET

Answered by 498

From: London
To: The President of the United States
No: 610, Filed 08/1244Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal.

1. Your number 490 causes me concern. It is a departure from your agreement with me of February 11 (your 464) which you kindly reaffirmed in your number 483 describing the matter as "finished business". On the strength of the first assurances I made my statement to Parliament.

2. My advices do not lead me to believe that any new facts of importance have arisen or that the Allied forces are not capable of maintaining order in the regions they have occupied as the result of the "unconditional surrender" of Italy. It would in my opinion be a very serious mistake to give way to agitation especially when accompanied by threats on the part of groups of office seeking politicians. We should then be liable to set up in Italy an administration which might not command the allegiance of the armed forces, but which would endeavour to make its position with the Italian people by standing

SECRET

Copy

SECRET

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up to the Allies. In fact we should have another but more intractable version of the De Gaullist Committee. Meanwhile in the midst of a heart-shaking battle we are to get rid of the tame and helpful government of the King and Badoglio, which is doing its utmost to work its passage and aid us in every way.

3. I readily admit that the course you recommend would be the more popular and would have at least a transitory success. But I am sure that for the victorious conquerers to have their hands forced in this way by sections of the defeated population would be unfortunate. So also would be the obvious open division between you and me and between our two governments. I gave you and the State Department loyal and vigorous support over the Darlan affair. Unity of action between our two governments was never more necessary than at the present time considering the great battles in which we are engaged and which lie ahead.

4. I am quite ready to take up with you now the proposals put forward by General Wilson set out in his number 634, whereby the Crown Prince becomes lieutenant of realm. I have no confidence in either Gröce or Sforza for

SECRET

SECRET

-3-

this job. MacMillan tells me Croce is a dwarf professor about 75 years old who wrote good books about aesthetics and philosophy. Vyshinsky who has tried to read the books says they are even duller than Karl Marx. Sforza has definitely broken his undertakings given in his letter to Mr. Berle of September 23. I hope therefore we may open discussions with you on the basis of the Foreign Secretary's telegram number 1783 to Halifax. I repeat I am most anxious to see a broadly based government assume power in Italy, but this ought not to be done under duress by the Allies and can certainly be done with far better advantage when the battle has been gained or, best of all, when Rome is taken. MacMillan is returning at once.

No Sig

SECRET


THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 10, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT COLLINS

Subject: Anthony Eden's No. 1783
to Lord Halifax

With reference to our telephone conversation of this morning, I enclose herewith an aide memoire from the British Embassy which conveys the substance of the information in Mr. Eden's message to Lord Halifax, No. 1783, referred to in the final paragraph of the Prime Minister's No. 610 to the President.



SECRET

AIDE MEMOIRE

It is understood that as a result of the exchange of telegrams between the Prime Minister and the President the decision has been reached that there should be no change in the present Italian administration or in the position of King Victor Emmanuel until after the liberation of Rome. His Majesty's Government have been considering the course of action which should be followed in Italy as a result of this decision, and have come to certain conclusions. These conclusions rest on the assumption that the capture of Rome will not be unduly delayed and will take place within a period not much exceeding three months. If it appears that this assumption will not be realized the policy proposed may require reconsideration.

2. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government it is necessary, in order to hold the position in Italy to the agreement reached between the Prime Minister and the President, that King Victor Emmanuel, Marshal Badoglio and the Opposition Leaders both in Southern Italy and in Rome should immediately receive a firm warning from the Allied Control Commission that while all their various plans and suggestions will be taken note of and used in arriving at a solution of the problem at the appropriate time, no agitation calculated to disturb the military situation will meanwhile be tolerated. His Majesty's Government consider that the Advisory Council for Italy should be asked as a matter of urgency to recommend to the Commander-in-Chief the best method of communicating

/ this

this warning to the persons concerned. The Council should also be informed of the various proposals made by the King and by the Opposition affecting the former's position and the formation of a new Government. But His Majesty's Government feel that the Council, which is of an advisory and not of a policy-making character, should not embark on the discussion of these proposals until requested to do so. Meanwhile the use of the machinery of the Council in this way will have the effect of bringing the other Governments represented on it into the picture.

3. The steps proposed in the preceding paragraph are designed for the immediate future. His Majesty's Government have also considered the eventual solution which it would be in the common interest to see emerge when the liberation of Rome obliges the King and Marshal Badoglio to implement their respective pledges. In the view of His Majesty's Government recent developments indicate that in all probability a compromise solution of this problem is likely to be built up round Crown Prince Umberto. This solution may take the form either of His Royal Highness's being appointed Lieutenant of the Realm to perform the Royal functions without the formal abdication of King Victor Emmanuel, or of his becoming King with either full or restricted powers, following the abdication of his father. His Majesty's Government feel that the present stage is too early for an attempt to estimate which of the above solutions

is the more likely to be realized. But they feel that the negotiations to be undertaken after the fall of Rome should enable an agreement to be reached somewhere within the above framework and without revolutionary methods. Meanwhile it is undesirable for the Allied Governments to declare themselves for any of the possible variants of the above solutions, and their policy should be to watch the development of events.

4. If the United States Government concur in the course of action outlined in paragraph 2 above, instructions on these lines should no doubt be sent to General Wilson through the Combined Chiefs of Staff, in addition to those which will be received through the diplomatic channel by the United Kingdom and United States representatives on the Advisory Council for Italy.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

March 6th, 1944.

SECRET

8 MARCH 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO : ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 494. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL
PERSON. SECRET AND PERSONAL.

Your 610. My Number 490 was sent with the purpose of
attempting to meet the difficult situation reported by
General Wilson in his NAF 634.

I wish much you would send me suggestions as to a
method that will be acceptable to your Government of cor-
recting the serious situation reported by General Wilson.

It is my strongest wish that you and I should continue
to work in complete harmony in this matter as in all others.
We may differ on timing but things like that can be worked
out, and on the big objectives like self-determination we
are as one.

ROOSEVELT

Paraphrase sent to
State Department.

~~SECRET~~
- 1 -

Copy

8 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE.

Attached are paraphrase copies of two messages which the President has directed be furnished to you for your information.

**L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.**

POTUS # 490
PM # 610.

SECRET
PARAPHRASE

8 March 1944

From: The Prime Minister

To : The President

No. : 610

I am concerned about your Number 490. This message is a departure from your agreement with me of February 11 (your 464) which in your Number 483 you kindly reaffirmed describing the matter as "finished business". I made my statement to Parliament on the strength of the first assurances.

I do not find any reason to believe from my advices that any new facts of importance have arisen or that order cannot be maintained by the Allied forces in the regions which they occupy as the result of the Italian "unconditional surrender". I think it would be a very grievous mistake to yield to agitation especially when accompanied by threats on the part of groups of politicians who are seeking office. We should then be liable to establish in Italy an administration which might not command the allegiance of the armed forces, but would attempt to make its position with the Italian people by standing up to the Allies. In fact we should have another but more intractable version of the De Gaullist Committee. Meanwhile we are to get rid of the tame and helpful government of Badoglio and the King in the midst of a heart-shaking battle, which is trying to aid us and work its passage.

The course you recommend, I readily admit, would have at least a transitory success and would be more popular. But it would be unfortunate, I am sure, for the victorious conquerers to have their hands forced this way by sections of the defeated population. The obvious open division be-

tween you and me and between our two Governments would likewise be unfortunate. I gave loyal and vigorous support over the Darlan affair to you and the State Department. It was never more necessary than at the present time to have unity of action between our two Governments considering the great battles in which we are engaged and which lie ahead. I am quite willing to discuss with you now the proposals set forth by General Wilson in his NAF 634 whereby the Crown Prince becomes lieutenant of the realm. I understand from MacMillan that Croce is a dwarf professor about 75 years old who wrote good books about aesthetics and philosophy. I have no confidence in either Sforza or Croce. Vyshinsky tried to read these books and found them even duller than Karl Marx. In his letter to Mr. Berle of September 43, Sforza has definitely broken his undertakings. I hope therefore that we may open discussions with you on the basis of Eden's telegram No. 1783 to Halifax. I repeat that I am most anxious to have a broad based government assume power in Italy, but this can certainly be done with far better advantage when the battle has been gained or, best of all, when Rome is taken, and ought not to be done under duress by the Allies. MacMillan is returning immediately.

8 March 1944

SECRET
PARAPHRASE

From: The President

To : The Prime Minister

No. : 490

Your 610. My dispatch No. 490 on the Italian political situation was sent with the purpose of trying to meet the difficulties presented in NAF 634 by General Wilson.

I would appreciate your sending me suggestions as to a way to remedy the serious situation which will be acceptable to your Government.

That you and I should continue to work in complete harmony in this matter as in all others is my strongest wish. Things like timing, on which we may differ, can be worked out, and on the big objectives like self-determination we are in complete agreement.

SECRET

SECRET

7 MARCH 1944

FROM: OPNAV

TO : ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 490. PERSONAL AND SECRET. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Our advices from Italy indicate that the political situation there is rapidly deteriorating to our disadvantage and that an immediate decision in breaking the impasse between the present Government and the six opposition parties is essential.

General Wilson has had to forbid a strike called by three of the anti-Fascist parties in the Naples area. I fear we are moving into a situation in which the Allied authorities will have to use force against the anti-Fascist leaders and groups.

One of General Wilson's telegrams of February 29 (NAF 634) reports that the Government and the opposition are waiting for an indication of Allied policy with regard to their respective plans. I would like to give General Wilson an immediate reply. As you know, we prefer the program put forward by the six opposition parties which involves the abdication of Victor Emmanuel and the delegation of the powers of his successor to a QUOTE Lieutenant UNQUOTE of the realm, acceptable to the six political parties. Croce has been mentioned as their probable choice. General Wilson and his advisers have recommended the acceptance of this proposal and are awaiting our approval. My feeling is that we should assure at the earliest opportunity the active cooperation of the liberal political groups by bringing them into the Italian Government.

If you will send instructions to your Chiefs of Staff here, we can send an agreed directive to General Wilson in the early part of the week.

SECRET

ROOSEVELT

Copy

filed 2/6/44

OK
Smedley

PROPOSED CABLE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER

Our advices from Italy indicate that the political situation there is rapidly deteriorating to our disadvantage and that an immediate decision in breaking the impasse between the present Government and the six opposition parties is essential.

General Wilson has had to forbid a strike called by three of the anti-Fascist parties in the Naples area. I fear we are moving into a situation in which the Allied authorities will have to use force against the anti-Fascist leaders and groups. ~~I feel strongly that our policy should be so designed that it would never be necessary to suppress these elements by using force against them.~~

One of General Wilson's telegrams of February 29 (NAF 634) reports that the Government and the opposition are waiting for an indication of Allied policy with regard to their respective plans. I would like to give General Wilson an immediate reply. As you know, we prefer the program put forward by the six opposition parties which involves the abdication of Victor Emmanuel and the delegation of the powers of his successor to a QUOTE Lieutenant UNQUOTE of the realm, acceptable to the six political parties. Croce has been mentioned as their probable choice. General Wilson and his advisers have recommended the acceptance of this proposal and are awaiting our approval. My feeling is that we should assure at the earliest opportunity the active cooperation of the liberal political groups by bringing them into the Italian Government.

If you will send instructions to your Chiefs of Staff here, we can send an agreed directive to General Wilson in the early part of the week.

S/ Roosevelt

GEORGE
March 4, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposed Cable to the Prime Minister
on the Italian Political Situation.

In compliance with your memorandum of March 4, I have prepared a proposed cable to the Prime Minister for your consideration and dispatch if you approve. In view of the rapid political developments of the past two weeks in Italy, we feel that General Wilson is in urgent need of guidance. As far as we are aware he has not had any reply to his several telegrams, at least in which this Government participated.

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.

Enclosure:

Draft cable to the
Prime Minister.

Original filed with POTUS #490.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*file
personal*

March 4, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

Will you try your hand at drawing a telegram for me to send to Churchill indicating what you have said in your memorandum to me on March 2nd in regard to the Italian situation? I, too, fear that we are drifting into a more difficult situation.

F. D. R.

Unger

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, 1944

March 2, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Italian Political Situation

You have no doubt seen General Wilson's telegrams (NAF 634 and 635 of February 29) with further reference to the Italian political situation. The latter telegram refers to the protest strike called by three of the six anti-Fascist parties for Saturday. If the Churchill policy of insisting on the postponement of political decisions until after the Allies are in Rome is persisted in, I fear that we are swiftly moving into a situation in which the Allied authorities may have to use force against the anti-Fascist leaders and groups. Our policy should be so designed that it will never be necessary to suppress these elements by using force against them.

With reference to the first telegram (NAF 634) the Government and the opposition are waiting for an indication of our policy. The solution put forward by De Nicola and acceptable to the King has been studied. In our opinion any solution which brings the liberal political groups immediately into the Government is preferable to the present stalemate. It is our considered opinion, however, that the original plan proposed by the Executive Junta, which you approved in the form of a cablegram to General Wilson last Tuesday, was preferable because it had the agreement of all six opposition parties. It is generally agreed that the "King's plan" described in NAF 634 would not enjoy the support of the three opposition political groups on the left.

E. A. Tamm

SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

Gu

P R I O R I T Y

From: Algiers
To: WAR

Number W 4378/60465, 5 March 1944

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff pass to President and State Department repeated USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff pass to Prime Minister and Foreign Office repeated UNITY London signed Wilson cite FHMGS. This is NAF 638.

→ Look at NAF 635. *sent to Mac Room*

After MacFarlane had seen Giunta leaders they finally decided to call off strike and with concurrence MacFarlane announcement was made in following terms in press and over radio.

"On the precise instructions of the Allied Supreme Command, and prompted by the desire of upholding the war effort of the United Nations, the action, Socialist and Communist parties, despite their absolute disapproval of the policy being pursued in Italy, have decided while awaiting the answer of the Allied Governments to the concrete proposals put forward by the executive Giunta for the solution of the Italian crisis, to suspend the demonstrations organized for Saturday, March 4 for a ten minute suspension of work. The three parties desire in this way to provide yet another proof of their complete support of the measures necessitated by the war, which is being fought against the common enemy. In place of the suspension of work, the three parties are organizing a mass meeting which will take place in a large city square on Sunday, March 12.

CM-IN-3572 (6 Mar 44)

SECRET

COPY No. 36

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

col Mathewson

SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Algiers
To: WAR
Number W 4378/60465, 5 March 1944

Page 2

"At the same time all necessary measures will be taken from March 13 to initiate a popular petition taken by signature. This decision has been endorsed by the representatives of the worker trade unions belonging to the General Confederation of Labour."

It has been made clear that meeting on March 12 can only take place in accordance with arrangements approved by Regional Commissioner. The Commission feel it is essential to allow parties some lawful and orderly method of demonstrating weight of public support they claim.

No Sig

NAF 635 is CM-IN-20373 (29 Feb 44)CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
General Bissell
General Arnold
Colonel Mathewson
Admiral King
General Hilldring
Log

CM-IN-3572 (6 Mar 44) 0034Z med

SECRET

COPY No. 36

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SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: Algiers
To: WAR

No. W-3972/58306 NAF 63529 29 February 1944

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff, pass to President and State Department. To USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff, pass to Prime Minister and Foreign Office. Repeated to Unity London for information. From Wilson cite FHCIC. This is NAF 635.

1. MacFarlane reports Socialist Communist and Action Parties propose call 10 minutes strike in Naples area on Saturday 4th March, as protest against Prime Ministers statement. Apparently intend instruct workers to work 15 minutes overtime in lunch hour to compensate.

2. MacFarlane seeing Junta leaders tomorrow. Have instructed him inform them that any strike action is inimical to war effort and cannot be tolerated.

3. Stop placed on publicity in Italy but some messages may have anticipated implementation.

4. General attitude of Junta is querulous concerning Prime Minister's speech asking if it is to be regarded official answer to their memorandum.

ACTION: CC/S (Capt Royal USN)

No Sig

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Bissell
Gen Arnold
Gen Hilldring
Adm King
White House ✓
Log

CM-IN-20373

(29 Feb 44)

2137Z

ejm

45

SECRET

COPY No.

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SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

February 29, 1944

FROM: AFEQ

TO: AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff pass to
President and State Dept. (Britman please
pass) USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff
pass to Prime Minister & Foreign Office
(AMSSO please pass)
RPTD: Unity (AMSSO please pass) Hq MAAF

MOST SECRET

IMMEDIATE

Signed Wilson cite FHCIC (57977W3915)

This is NAF 634. Reference NAF 612, 622, 624, and 628.

1. The situation has developed owing to king having expressed willingness to accept a proposal put forward by the liberal political leader de Nicola which is also acceptable to Sforza and Croce. This proposal is that the king should appoint the Crown Prince Lieutenant of the realm, and himself withdraw into private life. An announcement to this effect would be made immediately but the proposal would only take effect when Rome is reached. The Crown Prince would then proceed to form a new government on a broad base.

* 2. The present situation is that neither the political leaders nor the king will make any further move or continue negotiations until they have the views of the Allied Governments. Their position is that they have put forward their respective proposals for a solution of the political (crisis?) and they await guidance.

3. Meanwhile Allied Control Commission has been instructed to avoid conversations involving commitments as to future policy.

No Sig

* cf Poland.

Time of Origin 291130A

GN-IN-20393 (29 Feb 44)

Brindisi *Scott*

SECRET

COPY No.

45

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SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

NAF 634

February 29, 1944

PAGE TWO

NOTE: NAF 628 is CM-IN-14896 (21 Feb 44) CC/S
NAF 624 is CM-IN-14474 (21 Feb 44) CC/S
NAF 622 is CM-IN-13297 (19 Feb 44) CC/S
NAF 612 is CM-IN-6425 (9 Feb 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S (Capt. Royal USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Bissell
Gen Arnold
Gen Hilldring
Adm King
White House ✓
Log

CM-IN-20393 (29 Feb 44) 2211Z mlc

SECRET

COPY No. 45

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

SECRET

27 February, 1944

UNCLASSIFIED

From: Military Attache London
To: The President of the United States
No. 594 27/1920Z filed

Prime Minister to President. Personal and secret.
Number 594.

Your 483. (photo x5)

I am really most grateful to you for the consideration with which you treat me.

No Sig

photo 33

SECRET

Copy

SECRET

WHL

SECRET
PRIORITY

26 FEBRUARY 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO : ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 483, FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON,
SECRET AND PERSONAL.

Your 593. I find upon inquiry that message DON 170 was sent by your Joint Staff Mission in Washington to "War Cabinet Officers" and it was my understanding at that time that it was being sent by your staff representatives for your consideration.

It was not my intention to give any approval to the proposal in DON 170 without your concurrence, and I regret the misunderstanding.

Referring to paragraph four of your 593, my attitude as expressed in my 464 has not changed.

In view of the fact that the campaign in Italy is under the operational control of General Wilson, I should like to meet your desires as to details of handling the problem referred to in DON 170, which with your disapproval seems now to be finished business for the present.

ROOSEVELT

Draft of this message sent to the President at Hyde Park as WHITE 25, 262005, together with POTUS #464 and explanation of misunderstanding of DON 170. The President approved this message in BLACK 6, 262314.

SECRET

- 1 -

Copy

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON


26 February 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

The telegram quoted in DON 170 is merely a proposed cable for the Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, from the British side of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and does not represent final action of any sort. It has been approved by the U.S. Government, subject to the concurrence of the Government of the United Kingdom (the President approved draft presented to him by Mr. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, 22 February).

DON 170 was apparently not presented to the Prime Minister in its proper light. It did not represent a telegram from the President as the Prime Minister alleges in his 593, but simply British Staff action to place the matter before the Prime Minister for his approval or disapproval.

The Prime Minister's public statement of 22 February in itself constitutes disapproval of the recommended action (DON 170) of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee. It would therefore appear that the issues raised by General Wilson are dead and that we are right back to the line of action expressed in the President's 464 of 11 February.


L. MATHEWSON
Colonel, U. S. Army



SECRET

SECRET

25 February 1944

From: London

For: The President of the United States

Number 593

Filed 252013Z

Prime Minister to President. Personal and most secret. Number 593.

1. Relying upon your 464 of 11/2/44, I made my statement in Parliament about the Italian Government with the full assent of the Cabinet. The statement was very well received by the House and no criticisms of any kind arose from Left Wing elements. I am, of course, now publicly committed.

2. Meanwhile, on receipt of telegrams from General Wilson, ^{NAF} numbers 622 and 624, you authorized on February 22 the telegram DON 170. I freely admit that General Wilson's attitude was a surprise to me and I did not and do not agree with the view he took. On the contrary, I think it would be very dangerous indeed to give way to threats from people who have so recently surrendered unconditionally. It was quite natural for you to telegraph as you did because you might well think I should be influenced by General Wilson's attitude and I am not making the slightest complaint.

SECRET

The President did not telegraph (km)

Copy

SECRET

From: London

To: The President of the United States

Page 2

Number 593

Filed 252013Z

3. At the same time, I hope you will allow matters to rest where they were in your 464. This would not preclude reconsideration of the position if the fall of Rome is unduly protracted and after the crisis of the battle has passed. If the Italian political parties think they can play one of us off against the other, we shall have the worst of both worlds. Moreover, I gather that General Wilson acted in the sense of my public statement and it would be a great pity to throw things into the melting pot again.

No Sig

SECRET

EXTRACTS CONCERNING ITALY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPORT
TO PARLIAMENT OF 22 FEBRUARY 1944.

Thus in Italy we are working for the present to aid the Government of the King and Badoglio. In Yugoslavia we give aid to Tito. In Greece, in spite of the fact that a British officer was murdered by the guerrilla organization Ellas, we are doing our utmost to bring about a reconciliation, or at least a working agreement, between the opposing factions.

I would say a word or two about each of these unhappy countries. I wish to show first of all the principle which should govern us and which we are certainly following.

We signed the Italian armistice on the basis of unconditional surrender with King Victor Emmanuel and Marshal Badoglio, who were and up to the present are the legitimate Government of Italy. On their authority the Italian Navy, not without risk and loss, surrendered to us, and practically all Italian troops and airmen who were not dominated by the Germans also obeyed the orders they received from the Crown.

Cooperation by Italians

Since then these Italian forces have cooperated with us to the best of their ability. Nearly 1,100 Italian ships of war are discharging valuable services in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Italian troops have entered the front line in Italy, and though on one occasion they suffered severe casualties they continue to fight alongside our men. Very much larger numbers are engaged in indispensable services to the Allied armies behind the front. Italian airmen are also fighting on our side.

The battle for Italy, for reasons I have already explained, will be hard and long. I am not yet convinced that any other government can be formed at the present time in Italy which would command the same obedience from the Italian armed forces.

Should we succeed in the present battle and enter Rome—as I trust and believe we shall—we shall be free to review the whole Italian political position and we shall do so with many advantages which we do not possess at the present time. It is from Rome that a more broadly based Italian government can best be formed.

Whether such a government—and I throw this out as a thought—will be as helpful to the Allies as the present dispensation I cannot tell. It might, of course, be a government which would try to make its position good with the Italian people by resisting as much as they dare the demands made upon them by the Allied armies.

I should be sorry, however, to see an unsettling change made at a time when the battle is at its climax, swaying to and fro.

you have to hold a hot coffee pot it is better not to break off the handle until you are sure that you can get another equally convenient and serviceable, or at least that you will find a dish-cloth handy.

Party Leaders at Bari

Representatives of the various Italian parties who assembled a fortnight ago at Bari are, of course, eager to become the government of Italy. They will have, of course, no electoral authority and no constitutional authority until the present King either abdicates or he or his successor invites them to take office. It is by no means certain that they would have effective authority over the Italian armed forces now fighting with us.

ITALY IS a prostrate in her miseries and her disasters. Food is scarce. Shipping to bring it is voraciously absorbed by the ever-expanding military operations. I think we have gained 12,000,000 tons this year, yet the shortage continues because our great operations absorb every ship as it comes and the movement of food is difficult. It would be a mistake to suppose that the kind of political conditions or forces exist in Italy such as have worked so happily in the unbeaten lands and in the countries that have not been shattered by war or stifled by a prolonged period of Fascist rule.

We shall see much more clearly how to proceed and have much more varied resources at our disposal if and when we are in possession of the capital city. The policy therefore which His Majesty's Government have agreed on, provisionally with the Government of the United States, is to win the battle for Rome and take a new view when we are there.

NEW YORK TIMES,
23 February 1944.

White 26.

Quoted for your information.

Lt Collins
Rep Room, White
House

COPY NO. 23

[One Time Pad]

To: War Cabinet Offices
From: Joint Staff Mission
Dated: 21st February, 1944

IMMEDIATE
DON 170

Following is draft cable in reply to NAFs 622 and 624 agreed by the Civil Affairs Division and State Department. Not yet cleared with Operations Division but no reason to suppose they will object.

Telegram BEGINS: If you are able to make satisfactory arrangements with respect to the points mentioned in paragraph four of NAF 624 and any other points deemed essential by yourself and your U.K. and U.S. political advisers, authority is granted by Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, provided it will not, in your judgment, cause difficulty with military operations, to notify the six opposition parties that their program as outlined in your NAF 622 and NAF 624 has your support and the support of the two governments. The representatives of the six opposition parties should then inform the King of their program and they will be at liberty to state that such program has the support of the Military Commander-in-Chief and the governments of the U.S. and U.K. You may, if you find it necessary or advisable, confirm to the King the Allied support of the opposition program. It is understood that an undertaking from the opposition parties, severally and collectively to subscribe to all engagements of the Badoglio Government with the Allies will be secured before the steps authorized above are taken. ENDS.

T.O.O. 211555Z

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LSM

CONFIDENTIAL
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Algiers
To : War

No. W 3267/54638, 21 February 1944

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated USFOR British Chiefs of Staff signed Wilson cite FHMGS this is MAT 152.

Reactions to the recent transfer back of territory to the Italian Government have been collected. These show that generally speaking the people are apathetic in the matter being more concerned with living conditions but preference for the continuation of AMG or at least ACC for some considerable time is expressed in all regions and both Army areas. This due to fear that the Italian leaders are not capable of governing. No reports of demonstrations for or against the hand over have been received. Two specific reactions of interest which may be quoted are in 5th Army area where fears are expressed that it strengthens the Kings hand and thereby defers formation of sound Democratic Government, and in Cotenza (region 2) where people have welcomed turnover as gesture of Allied sympathy and confidence.

No Sig.

ACTION: CCAC

INFORMATION: OPD
G-2
ASF
WHITE HOUSE
CC/S (CAPT. ROYAL, USN)
ADM. KING
MR. MCCLOY
LOG

CM-IN-15114 (21 Feb 44) 2258Z cng

33


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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE



OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: Algiers
To: War

No: W-3222/54410, NAF 628, 21st February 1944

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff for President and State Department repeated USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff for Prime Minister and Foreign Office and SHAEF signed Wilson Cite PEMGS. This is NAF 628.

Message NAF 624 of 20th February conveyed General Wilson's comments on opposition program contained in message FARGO 1112 dated 19th February from MacFarlane to AFHQ. Here follows text of FARGO 1112.

Pass following to CC for President and State Department and to London for Prime Minister and Foreign Office information Civil Affairs and British Resident Minister.

Oppositions program of action is contained in a memorandum addressed to me for submission to the Allied Governments. Copies in translation are being forwarded by air to Algiers to be communicated to the members of the Advisory Council.

In submitting its proposals the executive Giunta states that the object is to permit within the frame work of the constitution a postponement of the institutional problem until the end of hostilities, and the creation of an Anti-Fascist government representative of the Italian nation.

The six parties agree that the present King should abdicate forthwith to be succeeded by the Prince of Piedmont, who however, must agree to delegate the exercise of his

CM-IN-14896 (21 Feb 44)

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Algiers
To: War
No: W-3222/54410, NAF 628,

Page 2

21st February 1944

constitutional powers to a single or collective lieutenancy which would not include either a member of the House of Savoy or a soldier but would have powers enabling it to proceed at once to the immediate constitution of an Anti-Fascist representative government. This delegation of powers would remain in effect until war conditions would permit the convocation of an assembly regularly elected by the Italian people. In agreeing to the accession of Humbert, the Giunta nevertheless points out that his adherence to Fascism and his responsibility for the attack on France can not be forgotten.

Inasmuch as not only had Royal Powers been previously delegated under the constitution to a lieutenant, but the present King had also ceded certain of his royal prerogatives in permitting the establishment of the Fascist Grand Council and granting to Mussolini the supreme command of the armed forces, there is no juridical reason why in the opinion of the Giunta and the Crown should not at present accept for a limited period, the foregoing procedure, the object of which is clearly defined.

The expressed policy of the Allies is to guarantee to the Italian people the free choice of their own government and institutions and to maintain strict neutrality in all internal Italian political matters. But since this neutrality does in fact constitute support for the King who has stubbornly refused to give way the Giunta considers that it becomes necessary if the Allies approve the Giunta's program for the Allies themselves to make it clear to the King and Humbert that they must follow the proposed course of action. Only by taking such action can the Allies avoid blocking the will of the Italian people and maintain their

CM-IN-14896 (21 Feb 44)

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Algiers Page 3
To: War
No: W-3222/54410, NAF 628, 21st February 1944

expressed principles.

According to the Giunta action is required immediately for two reasons,

First, because the situation is steadily worsening and the moderate solution now advanced might not later prove possible either because of the state of public opinion or because of more serious events;

And second, the parties and patriots of northern Italy, faced by the prolongation of this unsatisfactory situation, might decide to have recourse to more radical solutions of their own. Such action might in turn force the Giunta to review its present attitude. In submitting these proposals to the Allied Governments the Giunta further states that it would not be fulfilling its duty if it did not point out the gravity of the Italian situation and cites several examples of alleged reactionary tactics of the King of causes of friction.

I have informed the Giunta Council, agreeing to forward the above program to the Allied Governments, I must insist that pending a reply, no action be taken to interfere with the Badoglio government or to aggravate the present situation and likewise that the program should be considered confidential and should not be communicated to the press. To forestall possible indiscreet announcements on the part of the Giunta or any of its members I am, however, informing the press that I have received a program and am forwarding it to the said governments for their consideration. This is end of message FARGO 1112. Look at NAF 624 for General Wilson's comments.

Following are our comments.

ACTION: CC/S (Capt Royal USN) No Sig
INFORMATION: OPD, Gen. Bissell, Gen. Arnold, Gen Hildring,
Adm. King, White House, Log
CM-IN-14896 (21 Feb 44) 1718Z lbw

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CONFIDENTIAL
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: FBS Naples
To: War

No.: FBS 8942, 20 February 1944

Ensuing message is intended for USFOR PWE London and AGWAR OWI New York. PENBASE (Boydall) to Freedom for Psychological Warfare Branch attention Bessie Radford. Cite BPGBI.

Giunta resistance story asked for your signal sent 18th. February 17 Giunta issued text circular addressed all civil and military state servants. Circular repeats usual accusations against king and government. States Giunta on 9th warned King of Bari Congress divisions and stated if abdication not forthcoming. King is in open rebellion against nation. Giunta therefore calls on state servants not to support King in this rebellion. State servants should perform duties faithfully in interests nation but not help monarchical manoeuvres. Anyone exceeding his powers of intimidation purposes will be held responsible and later brought to trial ACC objected to certain passage in message as likely to cause disorder. Publication of whole message was stopped. Further communiques by Giunta released publications following by press channels.

ACTION: G-2 (OWI)

INFORMATION: OPD

WHITE HOUSE

CM-IN-15013 (21 Feb 44) 2002Z cng

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

JM
SECURITY CONTROL

**URGENT
SECURITY CONTROL**

From: AFHQ Cmd Post, Caserta, Italy
To : War - 898 NAF 624
ETOUSA - No #
SHAEF - No #
Algiers - No #

20th February 1944

To AGWAR for CCS for President and State Department
to USFOR for BCS for Prime Minister and Foreign Office and
SHAEF to Freedom for information MGS British Resident Minis-
ter and American Diplomatic Advisor from Wilson. This is

NAF 624.

After consultation with Devers, MacFarlane, Caccia
and Reber, my comments on opposition program forwarded in
FARGO number 1112 dated 19th February, are as follows:

1. This program is as moderate as anything with which we are likely to be faced. If Allied answer is long delayed or insists upon a status quo till Rome, parties will no doubt turn towards more positive action to gain their ends. Some of them might even welcome arrest and consequent "Martyrdom".
2. Should Allied Governments be prepared to agree to this program as a basis of discussion between the parties and the Crown there are several points needing clarification and possible negotiation in which we may well have to intervene.
 - (A) Present program calls for delegation of all powers by the new King. There are, however, indications that the parties might be prepared to accept the retention by the Crown of some nominal

CM-IN-14474 (21 Feb 44)

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White House
COPY No. 31

24-53394AB 1800

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY
CONTROL

From: AFHQ Cmd Post, Caserta, Italy
To : War - 898 NAF 624
ETOUSA - No #
SHAEP - No #
Algiers - No #
20th February 1944

Page 2.

powers. It might be possible to persuade Humbert to take a command in the field in which case there would be ample precedent for a Lieutenancy.

(B) Present proposal for Lieutenancy excludes appointment of a soldier. This is aimed amongst others at Badoglio; but provided that there were not a single Lieutenant, it might be possible for him to be included. The advantages of a collective Lieutenancy of say three are obvious. We should, of course, require to be informed who the parties propose as candidates for Lieutenancy.

(C) Present program does not indicate who would be parties candidate for post of Prime Minister.

(D) It is noteworthy that this program contains no specific mention of any envisaged change in the composition of the Government on reaching Rome.

(E) As program does not indicate period for which it should run, it would be necessary that explicit guarantees be ~~attempted~~ attempt to revise the basic principles of any settlement now reached until constituent assembly has decided future regime and that they will abide by its decisions.

*given both by
town and
parties that they
will not*

3. As the opposition is not able to effect a change in the present government without Allied assistance

*Being Serviced

CM-IN-14474 (21 Feb 44)

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

From: AFHQ Cmd Post, Caserta, Italy
To : War - 898 NAF 624
ETOUSA - No #
SHAEP - No #
Algiers - No #
20th February 1944

Page 3.

and has requested Allied intervention, we are at the moment in a particularly advantageous position to obtain anything deemed in our interest including naturally the reaffirmation of all Badoglio's commitments. This would not necessarily be the case to the same degree in other circumstances or in Rome.

4. It will be seen, therefore, that if it is decided to support program of opposition, the following action by the representatives of the Allied Governments will be necessary:

(A) Ascertain from the opposition their candidate for the Premiership.

(B) Obtain through him a guarantee from all parties of opposition that they subscribe to all engagements entered into by the Badoglio Government with the Allies.

(C) Ascertain the nominees of the opposition for the Lieutenantcy.

5. If and only if these three points are all settled satisfactorily from the Allied point of view should we proceed with following steps:

(A) Inform the King that the Allied Governments insist upon his bowing to the will of the people and abdicating.

CM-IN-14474 (21 Feb 44)

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31

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

From: AFHQ Cmd Post, Caserta, Italy
To : War - 898 NAF 624
ETOUSA - No #
SHAETF - No #
Algiers - No #
20th February 1944

Page 4.

(B) Inform the Crown Prince that he must call upon the opposition candidate for the Premiership to form a Government.

(C) Assist if necessary in persuading Humbert to delegate such of his powers as the opposition requires and the Allies deem advisable to the Lieutenancy.

No Sig

ACTION: CC/S(CAPT. ROYAL, USN)
INFORMATION: CPD
GEN. BISSELL
GEN. ARNOLD
ADM. KING
WHITE HOUSE
GEN. HILLDRING
LOG

CM-IN-14474 (21 Feb 44) 0006Z cng

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

22 Feb

President has read

File
WAL

SECURITY CONTROL
URGENT

From: AFHQ CP Caserta Italy
To: War 861 NAF 622
ETOUSA No #
Algiers No #
SHAEP No #

19 February 1944

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff, please pass to President and State Department, USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff, please pass to Prime Minister and Foreign Office repeated Freedom and SHAEP from General Wilson. This is

NAF 622.

Political situation is developing faster than had been foreseen and has outrun previous telegrams from Algiers. There are already indications that opposition tactics may threaten to dislocate administration. I have discussed the situation with Devers, Alexander, MacFarlane, Caccia, Reber and submit the following:

1. I am convinced that a clear decision cannot be delayed and cannot be made dependent on the progress of the battle for Rome.

2. The opposition have agreed a policy and have submitted for communication to the Allied Governments their suggested program of action. (In accepting this for onward transmission I am telling them that it is being forwarded only on condition that they indulge in no activity against the Badoglio Government while under consideration.) Briefly put, the 6 opposition parties have agreed upon a program to permit the accession of the Crown Prince provided the latter would agree to delegate his powers to a Lieutenantcy of single individual or of a group until constituent assembly can decide the constitutional question at the end of this war.

CM-IN-13297 (19 Feb 44)

Rec'd 19/0800Q
B.P.P.

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37 destroyed
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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

From: AFHQ CP Caserta Italy
To: WAR 861 NAF 622
ETOUSA No #
Algiers No #
SHAEP No #

Page 2

They have requested Allied assistance in putting this program into effect, pointing out that if no action is taken they cannot continue to guarantee the actions of less responsible elements. At the same time their executive committee has issued an appeal to all those in the service of the State to regard the King and Government as rebels and not to take part in their rebellion against the Italian people. Circulation of and publicity for this appeal have been stopped as far as possible. The committee have been informed such action cannot be tolerated and they have been very severely warned. They have been operating from AMGOT Italy and any action against them for subversive activity against the Badoglio Government can only be taken by us. We cannot possibly allow this sort of thing to go on. The present attitude of the opposition threatens to interfere with our military operations more seriously than any likely repercussions to an abdication and a change in the Government. If we take the obvious course in support of Badoglio's Administration or allow Badoglio to do so in Kings Italy and arrest and take proceedings against the members of the opposition executive committee we lay ourselves open to a storm of protest from almost every direction. But if we continue to support Badoglio we can hardly adopt any other course.

3. There are 2 main alternative courses.

1. To bring pressure on the King to abdicate in favor of Humbert whose succession in accordance with the constitution should in our opinion insure the loyalty of the Italian Armed Forces. And,

2. To inform the opposition that the Allied

CM-IN-13297 (19 Feb 44)

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INCOMING MESSAGE

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

Page 3

From: AFHQ CP Caseria Italy
To: WAR 861 NAF 622
ETOUSA No #
Algiers No #
SHAEP No #

Governments will not tolerate any change in the political situation until Rome is reached and that any attempt to interfere with the Badoglio Government will be instantly repressed. In either case intervention on our part is now required.

4. In view of situation described in para 2, we are inevitably faced with having to decide between these 2 courses at a early date and we are in a better position to control the consequences now than we shall be immediately before or after capture of Rome.

5. From local angle, I recommend therefore that the Allied Governments should agree at the earliest possible moment to inform the King that they insist upon his bowing to the will of his people and abdicating immediately in favor of the Crown Prince and that the Crown Prince should then be informed that he should summon the chosen representative of the opposition to form immediately a fresh Government. It of course goes without saying that before any steps are initiated we would obtain an undertaking from the opposition, severally and collectively, to subscribe to all the engagements entered into with the Allies by Badoglio.

6. Full details of opposition program and our comments follow earliest possible.

ACTION: CC/S (Captain Royal USN)

No Sig.

INFORMATION: OPD, General Bissell, General Arnold,
General Hilldring, White House, Admiral King,
Log

CM-IN-13297 (19 Feb 44)

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DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALGIERS		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY		WAR (FOR CCOS)	ROUTINE
DATE 19 FEB 1944	FOR ACTION		DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM 1301/19			
DECODED BY			PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY ZIMMERMAN	INFORMATION		ROUTINE
ROUTED BY MORRIS			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS MESSAGE WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
NOT LOGGED		NO. W 3051/53470 18 FEB. NCR 19888	<input type="checkbox"/>
CM-IN-13254			

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: _____ DATE _____ TIME _____ GCT _____

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

RECEIVED BY HAND FROM ARMY

(TO AGWAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
 INFO USFOR INFORMATION BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF
 SIGNED WILSON CITE FHNGS THIS IS MAT 151)

INFORMATION RECEIVED THAT BADOGLIO IS NOW CREATING GOVERNMENT OF MINISTERS RATHER THAN UNDER SECRETARIES. SO FAR AS PERSONNEL ARE CONCERNED THOSE LATELY HOLDING UNDER SECRETARYSHIPS NOW HOLD MINISTRIES IN SAME FIELDS EXCEPT THAT CASATI OF SUPREME COURT HAS BEEN APPOINTED MINISTER OF JUSTICE, LUCIFERO LATELY PREFECT AT CATANERO BECOMES MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE AND SICILVANI HAS TAKEN OVER COMMUNICATIONS INSTEAD OF AGRICULTURE. APPOINTMENTS OF NEW UNDER SECRETARIES TO THE MINISTRIES WILL FOLLOW.

COMINCH....COG
 50E...13...NAVAIDE...CNO.....

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ACTION	
F-0	21
F-01	22
F-02	23
F-05	24
F-07	25
F-1	26
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Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Office in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

Brindisi Isout,

INDEX SHEET

E X T R A C T

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO : THE PRESIDENT

NO : 13 FEBRUARY 1944, #577

(11 Feb 44)
1. Many thanks for your number 464. I fully agree we should review the whole scene after we are settled in Rome. We have not got there yet, and Lincoln's Birthday celebrations remind me about not crossing the Fox River till you get to it.

2. The present regime is the lawful government of Italy with whom we have concluded an armistice in consequence of which the Italian Navy came over and with some of the Italian Army and Air Force are fighting on our side. This Italian Government is tame and completely in our hands. It will obey our directions far more than any other that we may laboriously constitute. On the other hand, it has more power over the Fleet, Army, Officials, etc., than anything else which can be set up out of the worn out debris of political parties, none of whom have the slightest title by election or prescription. A new Italian Government will have to make its reputation with the Italian people by standing up to us. They will very likely try to wriggle out of the armistice terms. As for being instrumental in handing over without a mutiny part of the Italian Fleet to Russia, I cannot conceive that they would do so or that, if they did, their writ would run with the Italian Navy. I hope therefore that when the time comes we shall consult together. I gave strong support to the State Department over Darlan. They seem rueful about that episode now. Looking back upon it I consider it was right. Several thousand British and American soldiers are alive today because of it and it got us Dakar at a time when we could ill have spared the large forces needed for its capture.

3.

ORIGINAL filed "PRESIDENT-PRIME MINISTER" file.

Show classification number and date of communication on first line, drop two spaces, show source of communication and to whom addressed, then drop two spaces again and give a brief synopsis of subject matter sufficient to identify the document.

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CORRECTED COPY
PRIORITY

From: Algiers
To: WAR

No. W-2407/50087, 11 February, 1944.

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff signed Wilson cite FHMGS, FBSGS. This is NAF 616.

Announcement of transfer of territory to Italian Government.

By message received AFHQ last evening, Deputy President of Allied Control Commission advised that territory was being transferred to Italian Government at 0001 hours 11 February; that local publicity was essential and impossible to keep secret; that he was holding a press conference afternoon of 10 February and was releasing at midnight 10/11 February the press announcement in form settled by AFHQ and submitted to CCS.

In light of the foregoing the Allied CINC directed release of the announcement in same form at AFHQ and this has accordingly been done.

Corrected copy of CM-IN-7721 (11 Feb 44) CCS No Sig
ACTION: CCS (Capt Royal, USN)
INFORMATION: OPD, Gen Bissell, Gen Arnold, Gen Hilldring
White House, Adm King, Log

CM-IN-7782 (11 Feb 44) 1823Z mcs

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42

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Charles L. Hart

Am

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From Algiers
To WAR

Number W 2407/50087 11 February 1944

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFOR
for British Chiefs of Staff signed Wilson cite FHMGS

Announcement of transfer of territory to Italian
Government. * This is NAF 616.

By message received AFHQ last evening, Deputy
President of Allied * advised that territory was being
transferred to Italian Government at 0001 hours 11 February;
* impossible to keep secret; that he was holding a press
conference afternoon of 10 February and was releasing at
midnight 10/11 February the press announcement in form
settled by AFHQ and submitted to CCS.

In light of the foregoing the Allied CINC directed
release of the announcement in same form at AFHQ and this
has accordingly been done

No Sig

ACTION: CCS (Capt Royal, USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Bissell
Gen Arnold
Gen Hilldring
Adm King
White House
Log

*Being Svc'd

CM-IN-7721 (11 Feb 44) 1617Z mcs

Brindley Point

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C O P Y

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO : THE PRIME MINISTER

NO : 464, 11 FEBRUARY 1944

Your 573. I have directed the Department of State to take no action toward effecting any change in the existing Government of Italy at the present time and until our military situation in the Italian campaign is sufficiently improved to warrant risking the disaffection of those Italians who are now assisting the Allied Forces.

I think though that you and I should regard this only as a temporary reprieve for the two old gentlemen.

ROOSEVELT

NOTE: PM #573, dated 8 February 1944.

ORIGINAL filed "PRESIDENT-PRIME MINISTER" file.

answered by PM #577, 13 Feb 44.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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OUTGOING MESSAGE

mm
SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

Combined Chiefs of Staff

February 10, 1944

CG, FREEDOM, ALGIERS

Number 9453

USFOR, LONDON ENGLAND

Number R-9225

For Wilson Freedom Algiers, FAN 334, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Kindly advise date selected regarding announcement of transfer of territory to the Italian Government which is to be made at such time as you may deem appropriate, reference NAF 608 and NAF 611. Simultaneous release in London, Washington and Moscow is unnecessary. Your announcement in Algiers is sufficient. Draft announcement contained in NAF 608 is disapproved. Press release should read as follows: "By agreement between the Governments concerned, arrangements have now been completed for transfer to Italian Administration of that part of the mainland of Italy lying south of the Northern boundary of the Province of Salerno, Potenza and Bari. The territory handed over also includes the islands of Sicily and Sardinia."

ORIGINATOR: CC/S (Capt. Royal, USN)

INFORMATION: White House
OPD
Gen. Bissell
Gen. Arnold
Gen. Hilldring
Adm. King
Mr. McCloy
Gen. Surles
Log

Huf

CM-OUT-4391

(10 Feb 44)

2247Z

OW

Brindisi Sv't,

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COPY No. ²⁴

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February 10, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State:

I have received the following messages in regard to the question of effecting any change in the Government of Italy at this time:

From the Prime Minister of Great Britain:

"I am much concerned at any attempt at working with Sforza and the Italian Junta at this critical moment in the battle. If you read Sforza's original letter to Berle you will see how completely he has broken his undertaking. I do beg that no decisions will be taken without our being consulted and without you and me trying to reach agreement. We are in for a very heavy struggle on the Italian front."

From the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean Area, General Wilson:

"I should be much embarrassed if steps were taken by one or the other Government which would have the effect of showing that any divergence of view existed.

"As regards the immediate future, I should much

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SECRET

regret any action being taken which could increase internal difficulties or political unrest at a moment when with good hope of success I am committed to a major battle for the capture of Rome. I should not wish to have to take any precautionary measures which might involve an alteration of military plans and it would therefore suit me best to leave the political set up in Italy as it is until the issue of the battle is decided."

Please take such action as is necessary and feasible in the Department of State to insure that no effort is made by the United States Government to effect any change in the existing Government of Italy at the present time, and until our military situation in the Italian campaign is sufficiently improved to warrant risking the disaffection of those Italians who are now assisting the Allied Armies.

F. D. R.

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*Admiral Brown
to file*

February 9, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

What is the status of
this?

What should we reply
to the Prime Minister?

F. D. R.

Letter from the Secretary of State,
dated Jan. 25, 1944, re the Prime
Minister's message relating to the
Italian political situation in the
light of recent military developments
in Italy, together with draft of
reply to the Prime Minister.

Also the Prime Minister's No.
573 on the same subject.

January 25, 1944

My dear Mr. President:

I have received through the office of your Military Aide a memorandum dated January 24 enclosing a paraphrased copy of a message (no. 553) from the Prime Minister concerning the Italian political situation in the light of recent military developments in Italy.

I and my advisers on the Department's Policy Committee have reached the conclusion that any political reconstruction in Italy is impossible under the present King and that there should be no further delay in the reconstruction on a broad political base of the present Italian Government.

I consider this an admirable opportunity to submit our views, if you approve, to the Prime Minister and enclose a suggested draft telegram in reply.

I am receiving indications continually from various serious sources that there is widespread feeling in this country concerning what appears to be our continued support of a discredited King. While I recognize that it has been
the

The President,

The White House.

-2-

the British policy to support the King, I feel that it is now essential for us to state our position to the British Government and to make that position public if necessary.

Faithfully yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosure:

Draft telegram.

DRAFT TELEGRAM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER FROM THE PRESIDENT

Thank you for your telegram no. 553, January 23, containing the text of a message which you have sent to Harold MacMillan concerning our policy with respect to the King of Italy and Marshal Badoglio in the light of recent military developments in Italy. I have come to the conclusion that there can be no political reconstruction in Italy or any effective and united cooperation from the Italian people under the present King. While I have no desire to see the constitutional question of the monarchical institution in Italy raised until the entire country is liberated, I am convinced that Victor Emmanuel, in view of his long association in the minds of Italians with the Fascist regime, must complete the anti-Fascist revolution begun on July 25 by withdrawing himself from the Italian political scene. I am informed that he will never abdicate voluntarily and it is obvious that the longer his abdication is postponed the more difficult it will be to facilitate it. Consequently, I am opposed to his return to Rome, even for a visit, since this indication of our support for him would strengthen, if anything, his own determination to remain.

In brief, our position is that the reorganization of the Italian Government on a broad political base should no longer be delayed and that, since Victor Emmanuel is an obstacle to the cooperation of the liberal anti-Fascist forces in liberated Italy, his abdication must be arranged without further delay. The formula suggested by the anti-Fascist groups in Naples last November providing for the King's abdication in favor of his grandson, the Prince of Naples, would appear to be most satisfactory under the circumstances. American public opinion would never

understand

understand our continued tolerance and apparent support of
Victor Emmanuel.

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

From: Algiers
To: War

Wr: W-2331/49750-NAF 615- 10 February, 1944

To AGWAR for CCS repeated USFOR for British Chiefs
of Staff signed CINO cite FEMGS this is NAF 615.

Transfer of territory to Italian Government will
take place at 0001 hours 11th February. NAF 611 and 614
apply.

No Sig.

ACTION: CCS (Capt Royal, USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Bissell
Gen Arnold
Adm King
White House
Log

CM-IN-6915 (10 Feb 44) 1414Z mcs

Brindisi Govt

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31

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

[Handwritten signature]
SECURITY CONTROL

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers
To: WAR

No: W-2311/49574, 9 Feb 1944

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff signed Wilson cite FHMGS reference our NAF 611. This is NAF 614.

General MacFarlane wishes to make transfer of territory announcement from ACC HQ. Propose that announcement be made from AFHQ and ACC HQ simultaneously. If you wish to have transfer also announced from Washington, London and Moscow, request arrangements be made from Washington for those cities. We shall advise day and hour as soon as you approve text. Latest word from MacFarlane indicates Badoglio was expected to sign last night or this morning and that transfer would be effected as of 0001 hours 11 February. Your approval of press announcement, therefore, awaited urgently.

No Sig

NAF 611 is CM-IN-5507 (8 Feb 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S (CAPT. ROYAL, USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
GEN. BISSELL
GEN. ARNOLD
GEN. HILLDRING
MR. MCCLOY
ADM. KING
WHITE HOUSE
LOG

CM-IN-6371 (9 Feb 44) 0125Z cng

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24-53394ABC-25000

Brindisi

SECRET

8 February, 1944

URGENT
URGENT

From: Military Attache London
To: The President of the United States

No. 573 Filed ⁰⁹08/0110Z

Prime Minister to President. Personal and secret.
Number 573.

I am much concerned at any attempt at working with Sforza and the Italian Junta at this critical moment in the battle. If you read Sforza's original letter to Berle you will see how completely he has broken his undertaking. I do beg that no decisions will be taken without our being consulted and without you and me trying to reach agreement. We are in for a very heavy struggle on the Italian front.

No Sig

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COPY

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Jm
SECURITY CONTROL

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY
SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers
To: War

No. W-2178/49019, 8 February 1944, NAF 611.

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated
USFOR information British Chiefs of Staff signed Wilson
cite FHMGS this is NAF 611

Appears possible Badoglio may agree tonight to
documents for restoration of territory to Italian Govern-
ment. Look at NAF 608 which sought approval of proposed
press announcement. Reply requested soonest. Do you
desire release at any place other than AFHQ. If yes, we
will endeavor to communicate in advance date when turnover
is to take place.

Description in paragraph 2 of territory to be restored
should read as follows: "That part of the Italian Peninsula
which lies south of the northern boundaries of the provinces
of Salerno, Potenza and Bari together with the islands of
Sicily and Sardinia."

NAF 608 is CM-IN-1812 (8 Feb 44) CC/S

reached
ACTION: CC/S (CAPT. ROYAL, USN)

INFORMATION: OPD GEN. BISSELL GEN. ARNOLD GEN. HILLDRING
MR. MCCLOY ADM. KING WHITE HOUSE LOG

CM-IN-5507 (8 Feb 44) 1809Z cng

Brindisi Sort.

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DIGEST OF NAF 608

From: General Wilson

To : (1) Combined Chiefs of Staff
(2) British Chiefs of Staff

On 27 January MacFarlane gave Badoglio terms for transfer of territory. Favorable response expected within 48 hours. Date of transfer 10 February, new seat of Government, Salerno.

Following is draft of proposed announcement to be made AFHQ on date to be fixed. Request approval of proposed action. Suggest simultaneous announcement London, Washington, Moscow.

Announcement of Restoration of Italian Territory:

1. As CinC, Allied Forces, I wish to make the following announcement.

2. On (date) Italian territory south of provinces of Salerno, Potenza and Bari, plus Sicily ^{and Sardinia} will be restored to Italian Government. This will be done without prejudice to the rights which the United Nations have under the armistice. In this area AMG will cease operating.

3. When Allied Forces first occupied Italy, military operations and interests of civilians made military government a necessity. Order had to be established and maintained so that our troops could fight. It was necessary that civilians be relieved from distress ^{that} ~~they~~ ^{been} had brought upon them. Therefore AMG was established and administered with humanity and justice.

4. Fundamental aims of AMG were eradication of Fascism and restoration of freedom of speech and of the press. Allies believed that Italian people should enjoy as soon as possible after liberation the free institutions

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of democracy. In practice AMG carried out these aims to fullest extent consistent with military necessity.

5. Whenever Allied arms made it possible the vast majority of Italians repudiated Fascism. The armistice of 3 September was not only admission of military defeat but a condemnation of the people which had placed Italy in Germany's hands. The final break with Fascism came when Italy declared war 13 September.

6. The Moscow Declaration on 1 November expressed policy toward Italy of USSR, UK and US: "Fascism will be destroyed. Italians shall be given opportunity to establish democratic government and institutions".

7. To carry this out, Allied Control Commission was formed on 10 November. Its duties were to carry out armistice terms with end that Italy could effectively wage war against Germany. The commission also was to plan to restore territory to Italian Government.

8. On 15 December the Advisory Council for Italy, consisting of representatives from US, UK, USSR, and FCNL recommended that the above Italian territory be restored, subject to guidance of Allied Control Commission for Italy. Transfer has two conditions: (1) Italian officials to be of proven good faith and allied sympathies and (2) transfer involves no commitments to the present administration after the capture of Rome.

9. These conditions are consistent with Allied larger principles. Italian people must lay groundwork for their country's future.

10. Allied Control Commission will be channel for United Nations to communicate with Italy and to insure effective use of Italian resources in war. The Commission will also see to it that Italian people develop their political activities in atmosphere of freedom and fairness.

11. AMG will continue to function in combat zones. As Allied Armies

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SECRET

advance further transfers will be effected. It is hoped that by then Italy will have grown in strength and stature and that the Italian people will work to this end and for the common victory.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE
SECURITY CONTROL

Security Control
SECURITY CONTROL

This is msg. brought - (K)

URGENT

CORRECTED COPY

From: Algiers
To: WAR

No. W1396/4465 NAF 608 3 February 1944

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated Troopers for British Chiefs of Staff repeated Fairbanks signed Wilson cite FHMGS this is NAF 608.

Mason MacFarlane presented to Badoglio on 27 January terms for transfer of territory to Italian Government and expected favorable response within 48 hours. In anticipation of acceptance, Badoglio agreed that date of transfer should be 10 February, and to move his Government to Salerno by that time.

Following is draft of proposed announcement to be made at AFHQ at date to be fixed here. Request approval of proposed action. Suggest you consider simultaneous release in London, Washington, and Moscow. Intend to set date earliest practicable after approval by you, in order to secure benefit in advance of actual transfer and to prepare the way.

Announcement of restoration of Italian territory:

1. As Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces, I wish to make the following announcement.

2. On blank date, 1944 all that part of the Italian Peninsula which lies south of the northern boundaries of the Provinces of Salerno, Potenza and Bari together with the Island of Sicily will be restored to the jurisdiction of the Italian Government. Without prejudice to the rights of which the United Nations have under the Armistice and which are exercised in their behalf by the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces and his representatives including

CM-IN-1812

(3 Feb 44)

White House

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INCOMING MESSAGE
SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers

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To: WAR

No.

W1396/4465

NAF 608

3 February 1944

the Allied Control Commission, all powers of government will henceforth belong to the Government of Italy. Where the Allied Military Government has been operating within the territory restored, it will accordingly be brought to an end.

3. When the Allied Forces first occupied the territory of Metropolitan Italy, military operation and the best interests of the civil population made Military Government a necessity. It was a military necessity that order should be reestablished and maintained among the civil population behind the lines so that troops could continue their fighting under the most favourable conditions. It was a human necessity that the men, women and children in the occupied territory should be relieved as far as possible from the distress which military operations had brought upon them. Accordingly, Allied Military Government was established on the basis of International Law. It was conducted with humanity and justice.

4. The eradication of Fascism and the restoration of freedom of speech and of the press to the Italian people were established in the original plans as fundamental aims of Allied Military Government. These aims emanated from the firm belief that our war in Italy was being waged against the Fascists and their Nazi Masters and that the Italian people should be given the earliest opportunity after their liberation to enjoy the free institutions which are an inherent part of political democracy. In the field, Allied Military Government undertook to realize these aims to the fullest extent consistent with military necessity.

CM-IN-1812

(3 Feb 44)

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**SECURITY
CONTROL**

From: Algiers
To: WAR
No. W1396/4465

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3 February 1944

5. Wherever the success of Allied Arms made it possible, the vast majority of Italians repudiated Fascism in all its forms and manifestations. The Armistice of September 3rd was not only an admission of military defeat; it was an official condemnation of the political group which had placed Italy in German hands. Italy's declaration of war against Germany on October 13th marked the final break of the Italian people with German dominated Fascism.

6. On November 1st, the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union expressed their basic policy towards Italy in the Moscow Declaration of their respective Foreign Secretaries. The declaration reiterated the fundamental principle that "Fascism and all its evil influences and emanations shall be utterly destroyed" and added that "The Italian people shall be given every opportunity to establish governmental and other institutions based upon Democratic principles."

7. This statement was reflected in the formation of the Allied Control Commission which assumed its powers and duties on November 10th. The principal duty assigned to it was to take such measures of control according to the terms of the Armistice that Italy should be transformed into an effective instrument of war against Germany. But the Commission was also charged with planning for the gradual transfer of territory to the Italian Administration. The Italian Government has been enjoined to strengthen its administrative structures in preparation for the transfer.

CM-IN-1812 (3 Feb 44)

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INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

From: Algiers
To: WAR
No. W1396/4465. 3 February 1944

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8. On December 15th, the Advisory Council for Italy, composed of representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Soviet Union and the French Committee of National Liberation, recommended that the Italian Territory which I have described above should be transferred to Italian Administration subject to the guidance and instruction of the Allied Control Commission for Italy. The transfer was recommended with the understanding that it should be subject to two conditions: that the Administration, both central and local, should be carried on by officials of proven good faith and Allied sympathies and that the transfer should involve no commitment to the present administration after the capture of Rome.

9. These conditions are consistent with the larger principles which the Allied Governments have already declared. Italians of honest democratic convictions must lay the foundation for their Country's future. They must work out that future democratically according to the will of the Italian people when that will can be adequately expressed.

10. The Allied Control Commission will see that this is done. According to the terms of Armistice, it will be the channel for communicating the desires of the United Nations to the Italian Government, and will insure the effective use of Italian resources in the common war. At the same time it will see that opportunity is given to the people of Italy to develop their political activities in an atmosphere of fairness and freedom.

11. For the reasons given at the beginning of this announcement, it will be necessary for Allied Military Government to continue to function in the

CM-IN-1812 (3 Feb 44)

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**SECURITY
CONTROL**

From: Algiers
To: WAR
No. W1396/4465 3 February 1944

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combat zone. But it is also foreseen that as our Armies advance and normal conditions are restored in the territory progressively occupied, future transfers will be effected. The situation now in the making will make it possible for these transfers to be made to an Italy which has grown in strength and stature. We look to the Italian people to translate this possibility into a firm reality and to work together toward the common victory.

No Sig

Note: Corrected copy of NAF 608

ACTION: CC/S (Capt Royal, USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
General Strong
General Arnold
Admiral King
General Hilldring
Mr. McCloy
White House
LOG

CM-IN-1812 (3 Feb 44) 1208Z ejv

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From: Amembassy London

To: The President of the United States

Number 564

February 14
Filed 03/14/02

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal
and most secret.

I earnestly hope that the existing regime in Italy will be allowed to function at least until the great battles now being fought by the soldiers of our two countries have resulted in our capture of Rome. I am sure that a disturbance now of such authority as remains in the Italian State and the attempt to create a new authority out of political groups with no real backing will add greatly to our difficulties. Moreover these groups when formed into a government, in order to win credit from the Italian people would feel it essential to assert Italian interests in a much stronger form than the King and Badoglio dare to do. I feel it would be a great pity if Badoglio threw in his hand, and our reports show that the Italian Navy might be powerfully affected by action against the King. Much British and American blood is flowing, and I plead that military considerations should carry weight.

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COPY

Index Number

INDEX SHEET

C O P Y

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO : THE PRIME MINISTER
NO : 450, 25 JANUARY 1944

Thank you for your . . . 553.

ROOSEVELT

ORIGINAL filed in "PRESIDENT-PRIME MINISTER" file.

☛ Show classification number and date of communication on first line, drop two spaces, show source of communication and to whom addressed, then drop two spaces again and give a brief synopsis of subject matter sufficient to identify the document.

SECRET

23 January 1944

From: H A London
For: The President of the United States

Number 553 Filed 231550Z

~~Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal
and most secret. Private also. Number 553.~~

I should like you to see the following telegram I have sent to Harold MacMillan which is of course one of our internal messages, so I send it to you quite informally.

Text begins.

"Prime Minister to Mr. Harold MacMillan. Most secret and personal.

"1. I have talked over the whole position with the Foreign Secretary and we are both agreed that we should hold on to Badoglio and the King till we can be sure of something better and more effective for our purpose. It would follow, therefore, that we should do nothing to weaken them in the interval. On the contrary, should we become masters of Rome in the near future the early return to the Capital of Badoglio and the King would be beneficial. Thereafter at leisure we can survey the scene and see what other alternatives are in sight. No doubt the Vatican would play a part in this.

SECRET

COPY

-2 SECRET

From: M A London
For: The President of the United States

Number 553 Filed 231550Z

"2. You should be on your guard against the kind of views put forward by Massigli. President Roosevelt has misgivings about our having let the French in on this Italian business on account of the hatred prevailing between the two nations. I too was chilled by Massigli's views. Vyshinsky seems to chop and change. You are quite right to keep in close touch with him but it does not follow we have to obey everything he says."

No Sig

*Rec'd 231335-08c
Send ad White 11 231752-08c*

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**SECURITY
CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

Combined Chiefs of
Staff

January 22, 1944

CG
FREEDOM ALGIERS

Number 7850

CG
USFOR LONDON ENGLAND

Number R 8448

For Wilson Freedom Algiers, FAN 327, from the Combined
Chiefs of Staff.

You are hereby authorized to proceed as outlined in your
NAF 587 in regard to the transfer of the responsibility
for administration to the Italian government.

ORIGINATOR: CC/S (Capt Royal USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Strong
Gen Arnold
Gen Hilldring
Adm King
White House
Log

CM-OUT-8792

(22 Jan 44)

1707Z

bjm

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

for
SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL
URGENT

From: Algiers
To: War

Nr: W 757/4109 - 21st January 1944

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff repeated to Fairbanks signed Wilson cite FHMGS.

Message NAF 587 of 13th January asked reconsideration of directive in FAN 315 and authority to transfer certain Italian territory on basis there indicated. This is NAF 605. It is vital in view of operations to have early decision on matter submitted.

No Sig

⁰¹¹
FAN 315 is CM-OUT-1543 (5 Jan 44) CC/S
NAF 587 is CM-IN-8811 (14 Jan 44) CCS/S

72. Do not have
ACTION: CC/S (Capt. Royal, USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen. Arnold
Gen. Hilldring
Adm. King
Gen. Strong
White House
Log

CM-IN-13816 (21 Jan 44) 1959Z cw

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011 Italy
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INCOMING MESSAGE

[Signature]
SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL
PRIORITY

file

From: Algiers.
To: AGWAR.

No. W/95/28188 13 January 1944.

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff Personal from Wilson cite FHMGS this is NAF 587.

1. Your FAN 315 of 5th January was fully discussed this morning with General Mason MacFarlane, General W B Smith and Mr MacMillan. All agreed that to present such documents at this time may well be regarded by Badoglio as amounting to a breach of the understandings we have reached with him. The repeated insistence upon the expression "occupied territory" added to the long and elaborate reservations may seem to be taking away with one hand even more than is being given with the other.

2. Badoglio's Regime is being very hard pressed by internal political ambitions and by external criticism. For this reason it is quite likely, and General MacFarlane from his experience thinks more than likely, that Badoglio will refuse the transfer on these terms; in such an event the chance of obtaining a more amenable alternative government would appear small. A keen-sighted *royalist* might advise the king to do the same. We should then be in a serious predicament since our plans have been laid upon the assumption that there will be early transfer of territory and that the control commission will come into early and effective operations.

3. A further point is that there is danger of confusion arising now or later as to the status of Sardinia and Apulia on the one hand where military Government proclamations have never been posted, and the remaining regions on the other

The heel of ITALY - a general area in that location

CM-IN-8811 (14 Jan 44)

011 Italy

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY
CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers.
To: AGWAR

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No. W/95/28188 13 January 1944.

hand where proclamations have been posted.

4. The main reason for the documents in your FAN 315 seems to be that the clauses of the "long terms" amplifying para 12 of the "short terms" are not sufficiently all-embracing, but we believe that this gap would be fully covered by the reservations in document A as drafted 22nd December referred to below. It is true that there is a possibility that something may have been over-looked, but this appears remote. Such a contingency would be covered, in any case, by the over-riding powers of a Commander-In-Chief in time of War to take such measures as are necessary on military grounds. Further there are in reserve strong sanctions which we must inevitably continue to hold over any Italian Government unable to maintain the economic life of its people without Allied assistance.

5. For these reasons, I strongly urge that in place of the documents referred to in your FAN 315 I be authorized to instruct General MacFarlane to present to Padaglio documents A, B, and C as drafted 22nd December. Detailed identification of these documents follows as part 2 of this cable.

6. If you cannot accept this recommendation, I will, of course, instruct General MacFarlane to proceed on lines of FAN 315. Meanwhile I shall have to prepare the necessary measures to protect our position in the event of its being impossible to find an Italian Government willing to proceed on the basis of FAN 315, part 2 follows: Documents A, B, and C referred to in paragraph 4 of part 1 are identical with

CM-IN-8811 (14 Jan 44)

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY
CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers.

To: AGWAR

No. W/96/28188

13 January 1944.

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documents A, B and C dated 13th December, and taken back by Mr McCloy to Washington referred to in AGWAR message 5378 of 21 December except for following changes:

(A) In document A, insert new paragraph after paragraph 2, reading: "To hold or require the Italian Government to hold in custody prisoners of War and civilian employees as may be directed by the Allied commander in chief." *internees*

(B) In document C, paragraph 2, line 2, substitute the word "terminated" for "suspended", in line 4 insert the words "as having been validly issued" between the words "government" and the words "and are declared".

(C) In document C, strike out the words " head of the Italian government" in the proclamation clause immediately following the preamble this cable in 2 parts. Part 1 consisting of 6 paras as follows:

No Sig.

FOOTNOTE: FAN 315 is CM-OUT-1543 (5 Jan 44) CC/s
5378 is CM-OUT-7975 (21 Dec 43) Gen Hilldring

ACTION: CC/s (Capt. Royal USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Strong
White House
Gen Hilldring
Mr. McCloy
Gen Arnold
Adm King
LOG

CM-IN-8811 (14 Jan 44) 0642Z jb

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24-53394ABC

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

SECURITY CONTROL
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OUTGOING MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff
71469

January 5, 1944

CG FREEDOM ALGIERS

Number 6446

USFOR LONDON ENGLAND FOR BRITISH C OF S

Number R 7712

For Eisenhower Freedom Algiers, PAN 315, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff

MAF 534 is your reference in which you propose to restore certain territories to the Italian Government. The following is your directive concerning the transfer.

You are directed to implement the instruments of transfer which follow:

DOCUMENT A.

Following is text of 1st of 3 documents referred to as Document A.

DRAFT PROCLAMATION FOR MILITARY GOVERNOR

Whereas I assumed all the powers of Government and jurisdiction in the territory of Italy and Sicily occupied by my troops and over its inhabitants and established Military Governments to exercise these powers in such territory under my direction, and

Whereas in exercise of such powers proclamations and orders have been issued from time to time by me or under my authority throughout such territory, and

Whereas an armistice has been concluded with the Italian Government and an Allied Control Commission has been appointed, and

Whereas the Italian Government has declared war on Germany and has become cobelligerent with United Nations, and

CM-OUT-1543 (5 Jan 44)

011 Italy

SECRET

COPY No. 38

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**SECURITY
CONTROL**

Book Message

January 5, 1944

PAGE TWO

Whereas the United Nations have consented at the request of the Italian Government to restore the jurisdiction of the Italian Government in the occupied territory to such extent as may be compatible with military exigencies,

Now, therefore, I, Harold R. L. G. Alexander, GCB, CSI, DSO, MC, General, General Officer commanding allied forces in Sicily and on the mainland of Italy and Military Governor of all occupied territory, by virtue of authority vested in me by Commander in Chief of Allied Forces, hereby proclaim as follows:-

Without prejudice to the continued status of the territory concerned as occupied territory, to the position and powers therein of the forces of the United Nations, or to the rights of the Allied Commander in Chief in regard thereto, all proclamations and orders heretofore issued by me or if not, by my Chief of Staff in the occupied territory, are hereby terminated as at 0001 hours on this date and all powers of Government and jurisdiction in such territory and over its inhabitants will henceforth be exercised by the government of Italy subject to the guidance and instructions of the Allied Control Commission and on the understanding that the powers in question will be exercised by officials of proven good faith and allied sympathies.

(2). The said powers or any part of them (including the right to cancel or override any act of the Italian Government) may at any time be resumed or exercised by the Allied Commander in Chief or anyone acting under his authority, if in his opinion this should be rendered necessary by military exigencies or in the interests of public order or good government.

(3). Nothing herein shall affect

(A) The right of the Allied Commander in Chief to take all steps necessary to ensure the security, maintenance, welfare, accommodation, communications, movements and operations of the occupying forces or any other United Nations Forces, and to issue all such proclamations or orders as may be necessary for any of these purposes, with which all Italian authorities and the inhabitants of the territory concerned will be bound to comply;

CM-OUT-1543 (5 Jan 44)

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PAGE THREE

(B) The right of the Allied Control Commission to take any action necessary for the execution of the armistice with Italy.

DOCUMENT B.

Following is text of 2nd of 3 documents referred to as Document B.

DRAFT PROCLAMATION BY ITALIAN GOVERNMENT TO THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

Whereas, the United Nations have agreed to the request of the Italian Government that they should henceforth exercise all powers of government and jurisdiction in certain territories upon such terms and conditions as are necessary for the proper prosecution of the war,

Now, therefore, I, (head of the Italian Government) by virtue of the authority vested in me hereby proclaim and decree as follows:

- (1) Military Government in the said territory having been terminated by the Allied Military Government, all powers of Government and jurisdiction in the said territory and over its inhabitants, subject only to the rights therein reserved to the United Nations, are vested in the government of Italy.
- (2) All proclamations and orders which have heretofore been issued by the Military Governor or under his authority in the said territory and which have been terminated therein by the Military Governor as upon its restoration, are hereby recognized by the Italian Government and are declared to be of the same legal effect as if they had been issued by the Italian Government in accordance with Italian law, and they will be so recognized by all Italian courts and officials.
- (3) All acts done by any member of the United Nations Forces in pursuance of such proclamation or orders, and all official actions of any nature taken by the Allied Military Government in pursuance thereof including all appointments to and removals from any office, public or private will be recognized by all Italian courts and officials as legal, valid and binding, except that any person so appointed may be removed at any time

CM-OUT-1543 (5 Jan 44)

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SECURITY CONTROL

by the Italian Government with the consent of the Allied Control Commission.

(4) All sentences imposed by allied military courts are hereby recognized by the Italian Government as valid and legal and of the same effect as if imposed by an Italian court and will be so recognized by all Italian courts and Italian officials unless set aside or modified by or with the consent of the Allied Control Commission.

(5) The allied forces are fighting our common enemy against whom Italy has declared war for the purpose of driving the German invader from Italian territory and restoring Italy as a free nation, liberating thousands from Axis domination and from all trace of Fascism. I call upon all Italians in every walk of life to aid in this fight upon the successful outcome of which the future of Italy depends.

(6) It will be necessary for the prosecution of the war for the forces of the United Nations to continue to occupy the said territory. It is the duty of every Italian to cooperate fully with all these forces and to obey all orders and regulations which may from time to time be posted by the Commander of the United Nations force in the said territory.

(7) Only by the most wholehearted cooperation can our war be won. Any person doing any act hostile to the Allied or Italian forces or any member thereof, or doing any act which in any way impedes the war effort or aids the enemies of Italy, will be severely punished either by Italian courts or by Allied Military courts.

DOCUMENT C.

Following is text of last of 3 documents referred to as Document C.

DRAFT SECRET DOCUMENT

Whereas the Italian Government have requested that the exercise be henceforth vested in them of governmental and jurisdictional powers in certain territory occupied by the allied forces:

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January 5, 1944

PAGE FIVE

And whereas the Allied Commander in Chief is prepared to accede to this request on the terms set out in the proclamation issued under his authority, dated (blank space), and provided the requirements of the United Nations in regard to certain Italian provinces, namely (blank space) are complied with:

It is hereby agreed between (blank space) representing the Allied Commander in Chief and (blank space) representing the Italian government, duly authorized to that effect, as follows:

(1). The Allied Commander in Chief and any such officer or other representative, including the Allied Control Commission, as the Allied Commander in Chief may designate, shall have the following rights and powers in the province above mentioned.

- (i) To operate and use such ports and airfields and all such means of transportation or communication within the said territory as he may desire:
- (ii) To quarter Troops in such parts of the said territory as he may see fit:
- (iii) To declare any area within the said territory which may be needed for operation of ports, airfields, transport or communication facilities for quartering of troops or for such other purpose as he may deem necessary for successful prosecution of the war as an allied military zone:
- (iv) To assume full administrative jurisdiction over such military zones and to issue and enforce such orders and regulations for the conduct of all persons in and about such zones as he may see fit:
- (v) To convene allied military courts for the trial of any person violating any such orders or regulations and of any person otherwise doing any act hostile to the allied forces or any member thereof in any part of the said territory and to inflict such punishment upon such person as such court may direct:
- (vi) To retain the right through Allied Military courts to conduct and carry to ultimate conclusion the trial of any person charged with an offense heretofore committed and cognizable under any proclamation or

CM-OUT-1543 (5 Jan 44)

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order heretofore issued by or on behalf of allied
Military Government:

- (vii) To exercise the same rights to requisition private or public property in unoccupied territory as he possesses in occupied territory:
 - (viii) To import and control and supervise the distribution to the civilian population of such civilian supplies as the allied forces may determine without payment of any impost tax charge or duty of any kind whatsoever either to the Italian Government or to any of its political subdivisions or agencies:
 - (ix) To engage in such operations and import such military or other supplies or property of any nature as may be deemed necessary for the proper prosecution of the war free from imposition of any impost tax charge or duty of any kind whatsoever by the Italian Government or any of its political subdivisions or agencies.
 - (x) Any official or other representative or agent of the United Nations, civilian or military, may enter and remain within the said territory free from the imposition of any impost, tax, charge or duty of any kind whatsoever by the Italian Government or any of its political subdivisions or agencies.
 - (xi) No member of the allied forces or any official or other representative or agent of the United Nations, civilian or military, shall be brought to trial in any Italian court for any cause whatsoever either civil or criminal without the consent of the allied powers.
 - (xii) All expenses and costs arising from the maintenance of allied troops or other personnel within the said territory will be chargeable to the Italian Government as a part of the costs of occupation.
- (2). The foregoing provisions shall form an integral part of the terms on which governmental and jurisdictional powers in

CM-OUT-1543

(5 Jan 44)

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**SECURITY
CONTROL**

Book Message

January 5, 1944

PAGE SEVEN

certain parts of Italian territory are vested in the Italian Government in virtue of the aforesaid proclamation, and shall be without prejudice to the exercise of any allied rights or powers under the armistice with Italy.

(End of Document C)

You are to make certain that the proclamations issued on the Italian side are issued in the name of the Italian Government and not in the name of the King.

The US and UK Governments do not consider it essential that the draft document referred to as the secret document be kept secret. In the event the Italians for internal reasons prefer to withhold publicity as to that instrument the US and UK Governments have no objection thereto.

ORIGINATOR: CC/S (Capt Royal USN)

INFORMATION: OPD,
Gen Arnold
Adm King
Gen Strong
Gen Hilldring
White House
Log

CM-OUT-1543

(5 Jan 44)

2005Z

pp

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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JL [REDACTED]
Combined Chiefs of Staff
77500

31 October 1944

Commanding General
Allied Force Headquarters
Caserta Italy

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main Echelon
Versailles France

Headquarter's Communications Zone
European Theater of Operations
Main Echelon
Paris France

Commanding General
United Kingdom Base Section
London, England

Number WARX 55197

Book message to Wilson for action, to SHAEP Versailles for Eisenhower and to Central District United Kingdom Base Section London pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information, FAN 444 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

With reference to your letter of 2nd September 1944 and enclosures, your recommendation that the long terms of the Italian armistice should not be published at this time is approved. Suggest you return no reply to the Italian Government unless they revert to question, when you should inform them matter is still under consideration, but in the absence of instructions, they must assume British and U. S. Governments are not anxious to proceed with publication at present. Consider it unwise to give definite refusal in case Italian Government raises strong protest in a form which it would be impossible to refuse.

CM-OUT-55197 (31 Oct 44)
[REDACTED]

370 Italy

33
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Number WARK 55197

Page 2

When, in your opinion, a proper occasion does arise for publishing the terms or when military conditions do permit the publication, you will so advise the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It is considered presently that if at any time the terms are to be published responsibility for the initiative should be placed on the Italian Government.

End

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm. Leahy
CG AAF
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Log

CM-OUT-55197 (31 Oct 44) 2043Z ngs

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16-39509-1 GPO

Regraded Unclassified

WAR DEPARTMENT
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PRIORITY

From: CG Allied Force Headquarters, Command Post,
Caserta, Italy

To: War Department
CG US Forces in the European Theater of Operations
London, England.
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England.
Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria.

Nr: B-12960 18th June

B-12960 to for action AGWAR for Combined Chiefs
of Staff and to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff TO for
information Unity London, AFHQ, ACC signed Wilson cite FHCIC.
This is NAF 715.

The Advisory Council for Italy passed following
resolution yesterday: "The Advisory Council for Italy have
examined the events leading up to the formation of the
proposed new government by Signor Bonomi, and they consider
that in all the circumstances this government should prove
satisfactory in furthering the main purpose of the Allied
Powers which is the final defeat of Germany.

They must however insist that; (1) The new govern-
ment express their readiness in writing to accept all obliga-
tions towards the Allies entered into by the former Italian
governments since the conclusion of the armistice signed on
September 3, 1943, and that every member of the government

CM-IN-15372 (19 Jun 44)

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Col. Park

370 *Italy*

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PRIORITY

2nd Page.

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Command Post,
Caserta, Italy

Nr: B-12960 18th June

should be personally acquainted with the terms of all such obligations including the terms of the armistice signed on September 29, 1943.

(2) The new government undertake not to reopen the institutional question until such time as Italy has been liberated and the Italian people can freely express their views."

Since presumably each member was following instructions of his government and after taking advice of Murphy and MacMillan, I have accepted Councils recommendations subject to the terms proposed. I have added the following in my formal reply to the President of the Council:

"I take the opportunity of reaffirming that under the regime of the armistice, the Italian Government is bound to carry out promptly and efficiently all orders given by the United Nations. It is therefore essential that the prior agreement of myself as President of the Control Commission should be obtained and that the governments concerned should be consulted through the machinery established for this purpose, before any important decisions of policy are put into effect."

CM-IN-15372 (19 Jun 44)

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PRIORITY

3rd Page.

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Command Post,
Caserta, Italy.

Nr: B-12960 18th June

I have instructed the Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission, to inform Signor Bonomi accordingly and after the necessary formalities required by the conditions have been observed the government will be announced.

End

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: CG AAF
OPD
Gen Bissell
Aim King
Col Park
Gen Hilldring
Log

CM-IN-15372 (19 Jun 44) 0452Z bjm

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SECRET

PRIORITY

Cryptographic security requires addition of letters, "GOBP", to classification of reply to this message.

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria.

To: War Department.

Re: P 57498 10 June 1944

P 57498 to AGMAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff reported USFOR Information British Chiefs of Staff signed Wilson site FHBEG this in MAR 217.

This supplements MAR 216.

Now reported by MacFarlane that at initial conversations in Rome it became clear that Badoglio could not form all party government and would have been faced with strong very active and vocal opposition which would have been serious handicap to tranquility and administration of country. Badoglio was however pressed by Bosoni to accept post in new government but proved adamant in circumstances in determination to retire.

Exact constitution of new government not yet known but understood will reaffirm undertakings given by last government on subject institutional question and obligations to Allies.

Likely that cabinet will number 19 of which 8 will be without portfolio, including Fogliati, Croce and Sforza. Now expected cabinet will be completed night 10 June.

As undesirable to separate Bucini from contact Crown Prince until his consent obtained by new government, Crown Prince will remain in Rome if necessary until 11 June.

OM-IN-8418 (10 Jun 44)

SECRET

61

Colonel Park

370 Italy

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PRIORITY

Page 2

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria.

Er: F 57498

10 June 1944

MacFarlane reports there has been no trace of hostility to Crown Prince in Rome and that he saw large crowd demonstrating outside Quirinal in his favour.

Arrangements made for General Infante and Marquis Lucifero, late Minister for Agriculture, to join personal staff of Crown Prince and MacFarlane considers these will help Crown Prince considerably.

End

ACTION: CCAC

INFORMATION: CC/S
ASF
OPD
G-2
Adm King
Col Park
Mr McCloy
Log

OM-IN-8418 (10 Jun 44)

2340Z
SECRET

bjm

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PRIORITY

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria.

To: War Department.

Nr: F 56993

9 June 1944

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated
USFOR information British Chiefs of Staff signed Wilson
cite F 56993. TOP SECRET. FHGBI this is MAT 216.

Look at MATS 209 and 211. Meeting between Badoglio
and representatives of his old government and leaders of
six parties in Rome took place there 8 June. Parties
were divided in support of Badoglio but decided unanimously
to serve in government under leadership of Bonomi. Latter
is former Prime Minister and is President Rome Committee
of National Liberation.

On report from Badoglio Lieutenant of Realm in-
vited Bonomi to form a government. Invitation was
accepted and Bonomi hopes complete formation 9 June. ^{Please}
Badoglio and Crown Prince will leave Rome 1700 hours 9 _{omit}
June.

MacFarlane has impressed on Lieutenant of Realm
necessity for any Italian government reaffirming under-
takings given by last government of Badoglio on subject
of institutional question and obligations to Allies.

CM-IN-7293 (9 Jun 44)

TOP SECRET

370 Italy

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Col. Park

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**TOP
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Page 2

PRIORITY

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria.

Wt: F 56993

9 June 1944

Lieutenant of Realm visited Vatican 8 June.
MacFarlane states he received spontaneous and enthusiastic
ovation in Rome.

End

FOOTNOTE: MAT209 is CM-IN-5082 (7 Jun 44) CCAC
MAT211 is CM-IN-5689 (7 Jun 44) CCAC

ACTION: CCAC

ONPC : CC/S
Gen Somervell
OPD
Adm King
Mr McCloy
Log

CM-IN-7293 (1 Jun 44) 1910Z jb

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SECRET
PRIORITY

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria
To : War Department
Nr : F-56113 7 June 1944

F 56113 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated USFOR information British Chiefs of Staff signed Wilson cite FHGGG this is MAT 211.

Following on transfer by King of Italy of his powers to Crown Prince as Lieutenant Of The Realm Badoglio has been submitted resignation of his government to Crown Prince who has accepted it and instructed Badoglio to form a new government to include political leaders in Rome. Until new ministry is constituted present ministry will remain in office to deal with current matters. Arrangements being made for Crown Prince to pay one day visit to Rome to see the Pope.

End.

ACTION: CCAC

INFO : CC/S, OPD, G-2, Adm. King, Col. Park, Mr. McCloy, Log

CM-IN-5689 (7 Jun 44) 2146Z JB

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PRIORITY

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria
To: War Department
CG US Forces in European Theater of Operations
London, England
Nr: F-55885 6 June 1944

F-55885 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated USFOR information British Chiefs of Staff signed Wilson site FHGEG this MAT 209.

Reports received that members of Committee of Liberation in Rome have been contacted there by political representatives ACC. All members of Committee still in Rome except Buozi who has been taken north by Germans. Committee unanimously agreed to discussions with Badoglio for reforming government and after preliminary contact in Rome to continue discussions in Salerno. Badoglio and party consisting of Croce, Rodina, Cerabona, Longobardi, Togliati and possibly representative Action Party ready to proceed Rome for preliminary contact. It is hoped to arrange this for 7 June or soonest possible date afterwards.

End

ACTION: CCAC

INFO : CC/S
OPD
G-2
~~Adm. King~~
~~Col. Park~~
Mr. McCloy
Log

CM-IN-5082

(7 Jun 44)

0241Z 1b

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PRIORITY

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria
To: War Department
No: F51659 27 May 1944

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated
USFOR information British Chiefs of Staff and AFHQ
Adv CP signed Wilson cite FEMGS F 51659 this is
MAT 204

After interview with Badoglio MacFarlane reports
that preliminary discussions regarding arrangements for
retirement of King and announcement of Crown Prince as
Lieutenant of the Realm when Rome reached have taken place.
Proposed that on receipt official information that Allied
Troops have reached Rome Badoglio will notify King who will
at once effect transfer of powers to Crown Prince. Badoglio
will then formally tender resignation of his government to
Crown Prince who will invite him to carry on. Badoglio
with Crown Prince and leaders of 6 parties will proceed to
Rome as soon as practicable to contact party leaders and
leading politicians there with view to making changes in
government to secure adequate representation of political
resources there. In the earlier stages of the occupation
a visit by the King to Rome will not be allowed.

No Sig.

ACTION: CCAC

INFO : CCS, ASF, OPD, Adm. King, Col. Park, Mr. McCloy,
Log

CM-IN-21151 (28 May 44) 0235Z ejv

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1
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S E C R E T
P R I O R I T Y

From: CG, US Army Forces in North African Theater of
Operations, Algiers, Algeria.

To: War Department.

Nr: F 45435 13 May 1944.

F 45435 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated
ETOUSA information British Chiefs of Staff signed Wilson
cite FHMGS this is MAT 193.

At Italian cabinet meeting held 11th May cabinet
discussed at length Crown Prince's recent interview given
to correspondent London Times in which he indicated Italian
people had a certain responsibility for Italy's entrance into
the war and following communique was issued:

"The Council of Ministers, referring to the interview
that the Prince of Piedmont gave the correspondent of the
London Times and holding that it is not in the constitutional
and democratic tradition that representatives of the Crown
make political statements not agreed by the government, the
council therefore unanimously refuses any invitation directed
toward the people in regard to any responsibility
for the Fascist war".

Badoglio has stated to MacFarlane that he much regretted
whole affair but that cabinet had been insistent on
passing resolution and that action party had threatened to

CM-IN-10324 (14 May 44)

S E C R E T

370 Italy

Cal Parks
52

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S E C R E T
P R I O R I T Y

Page 2

From: CG, US Army Forces in North African Theater of
Operations, Algiers, Algeria.

Nr: F 45435 13 May 1944.

resign unless a resolution on subject was passed. Badoglio
intends replacing personal staff of Prince whom he blames
for allowing original interview and intends replacements
should include at least one reliable civilian political
advise.

No Sig

ACTION: CCAC

INFO : CCS
ASF
OPD
G-2
Adm King
Col Park
Mr McCloy
Log

CM-IN-10324 (14 May 44) 1028Z mcs

S E C R E T

52

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This was signed 4-30-44.

My dear Marshal Badoglio:

Your letter of April 3, 1944, informing me that a new government would shortly be formed, reached me just as the first announcement came that a new cabinet comprising representatives of the leading Italian parties had, in fact, been constituted. This is indeed welcome news to the Government and the people of the United States, who earnestly hope that this step will serve to unite the spiritual and physical forces of the nation in the struggle against our common enemy.

You ask that this event be accompanied by a reexamination of the armistice terms. Any revision of the terms, of course, could come about only after consultation with the military authorities and as a result of concerted action among the Allied Governments. The matter is, however, receiving my full consideration. The American people are not insensible to the peculiar moral tragedy of Italy's situation, nor am I insensible to the grave difficulties which beset the Italian Government.

May I meanwhile speak again with that frankness which my countrymen and yours prefer? Now that Italy has moved in the direction of truly democratic government, public opinion in the United States is watching earnestly for clear evidence that the Italian people are sincerely and passionately resolved to drive the invader from their soil and contribute to that common victory which Italy's defection under Fascism rendered so much costlier. I know that all Italian patriots share the feeling of the peoples of the United Nations that it is for the Italians themselves to prove that they do not seek spurious rehabilitation through external acts but Italy's national and international regeneration through their own courageous efforts. Every sign that Italy has truly shouldered the burden of her responsibilities and has aligned herself in deed and spirit with those who fight for the triumph of humanity will, I am sure, be received with genuine sympathy by the peoples of all the United Nations.

Very sincerely yours,

(signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

His Excellency
Marshal Pietro Badoglio,
Head of the Italian Government.

*Returned to Mrs.
Letta to be sent
 thru State channels*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 28, 1944

My dear Admiral Leahy:

Will you be kind enough to bring to the President's attention the enclosed memorandum, to which are attached the text and translation of Marshal Badoglio's communication of April 3, 1944 requesting reexamination of the armistice terms and a draft reply for the President's signature?

Sincerely yours,

Enclosure:

Memorandum for the President.

Admiral William D. Leahy,
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy,
The White House.



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In accordance with your memorandum of April 21, there are attached a translation of Marshal Badoglio's communication of April 3, 1944 and a reply to that communication which has been drafted for your signature, if you approve.

In this communication the Marshal refers to your letter of February 21, 1944 (a copy of which is also attached), announces the imminent formation of a broadly based government, and suggests a full reexamination of the terms of the armistice looking toward a new status for Italy as an ally rather than a cobelligerent.

This matter is being brought to the attention of the United States representatives in Italy.

Enclosures:

1. From Marshal Badoglio,
April 3, 1944.
2. From Marshal Badoglio,
April 3, 1944 (translation).
3. Draft reply to Marshal Badoglio.
4. To Marshal Badoglio,
February 21, 1944.

(TRANSLATION)

Salerno, April 3, 1944

My dear Mr. President:

I wish indeed to thank you for your letter of February 21. I am particularly grateful to you for the frankness with which you expressed yourself. In the very difficult and very grave hours through which Italy is passing, your word serves me as consolation and at the same time as a spur.

You write me that until such time as the Italian Government includes also the representatives of the leading anti-fascist political groups, it is not possible for a Head of Government to organize the conduct of the war on such a broad national scale as the status of an ally would require.

Now Italy is on the eve of such an event. I hope, that is, within a very short time to present to the country, after the many recent vicissitudes, a truly national government which will include within its composition the representatives of all the leading parties, organized and finally and solely directed toward the war against the Germans. And I wish to notify you thereof before anyone else, since to you more than to anyone else I feel bound by friendship and gratitude for the great deal you have already done for my country and for that which - I firmly hope - you will continue to do to restore it to that honorable place in the world of which you spoke in the unforgettable and dark hours of the armistice.

Fully aware of the importance of your precious time and the great burden of work that weighs upon your shoulders, I wish merely to tell you how wise and humane it would be if the advent of the new democratic Italian Government were accompanied by full reexamination of the very harsh terms made to us six months ago: that is, briefly, Italy's transition from cobelligerency to alliance.

No occasion could be more propitious, no occasion more favorable. You yourself, moreover, refer to it explicitly in your letter. And no living man could better than yourself, Mr. President, perform this task of synchronizing the imminent advent of the new democratic Italy with her definitive alignment among the Allied nations.

The

The United States would in this way assume in Italy and the Mediterranean a leading part vis-à-vis all the other Powers; she would assure for herself a decided and decisive influence on Italy and Italian affairs; would neutralize any action and influence from the East; would thaw the rigid, intransigent British policy, impelling it toward more constructive goals and tasks. Moreover, she would galvanize the whole nation, both in the south and the north, for the final struggle against the Germans and for the work of rebuilding the country on those liberal and democratic bases which are your and our common ideal.

Italy has, as you know, passed through the sorriest phase of her history; other hard phases await her. Her cities are semi-destroyed; three-fourths of her people groan beneath the German heel; suffering is the lot of each and all.

It is not vain and empty rhetoric to tell you, Mr. President, that all Italy is at this moment looking to you, and these, I believe, are rare moments in the lives of men and peoples.

It is certain that a word and a move from you in this direction could do more than anything else for Italy's revival and regeneration, which are and must be spiritual above all.

Please accept the assurance, Mr. President, of my loyal and cordial friendship.

(s) Badoglio

COPY

February 21, 1944

My dear Marshal Badoglio:

General Donovan has handed me your letter of January 27, which will have my most earnest attention.

I thank you for expressing in this forthright way, as a soldier and patriot, your desire to give the greatest possible effectiveness to the effort the Italian armed forces are making to drive the Germans from their country, and to find every means to unite, to strengthen, and to sustain the Italian people in this task.

I appreciate the candor of your letter. You will understand if I am equally frank. I do not underestimate the difficulties under which you and your countrymen have had to work in rendering that effective assistance so necessary to an early expulsion of the enemy. At the same time I feel that events since October 13 have made it evident that until the Government of Italy can also include the articulate political groups of anti-Fascist, liberal elements within its composition it will not be possible for any Head of Government to organize the conduct of the war on such a broad national scale as the status of an ally would require. There is, I understand, a plan for the reconstruction of the Italian Government on a broad political basis as soon as the present critical military situation will permit and not later than the liberation of Rome.

With all these considerations in mind I feel that it would be better to hold in abeyance any major changes in our present relationship.

Very sincerely yours,

(s) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

His Excellency
Marshal Pietro Badoglio,
Head of the Italian Government.

Translation by
Miss Belle Barnack

File
422

Salerno 3 April, 1944

My dear Mr. President,

Many thanks a ringraziar of your letter of Feb. 21. I am very grateful for the frank way you wished to express yourself. Our hour is very hard and very grave that Italy is going through, your word is for me comfort and together *"di incitamento"*.

You wrote that *"sino"* (except or only) when the Gov. of Italy not included also representatives of large political antifascisti groups it is not possible for the head of the Gov. to organize the conduit of the war on such a large *national* plane as the status of allied *"richiederebbe"*.

Then Italy will watch an event *"siffatto"*. I hope that you will briefly present at the Peace since the very recent vicende, a really national Gov. which will include in your *"compagine"* representatives of all the organized parties and finally and uniquely *"orientati"* against the war against the tedeschi. And I should like to announce to you first and nobody else, because to you and nobody else I feel leagued in friendship and gratitude for what you have done for my country and for which I have the firm hope you will continue to do for riportarlo in this onorevole post in the world, you will speak with *"indimenticabili"* and obscure hour of the armistice.

Pienamente consapevole the importance of your precious time and great *"fardello"* load which encumbers only you *"spalle"* wanted only to say

to you how and when sarebbe knows is "umano se all'avvenimento of the new Italian democratic Gov corresponds integral riasame of the hard situation fattaci or sono sei mesi e cioe', in few words, the passage of Italy from co-belligerent to the allies.

No occasion could be more propitious, no occasion more favorable. You know vi accenna of the rest, explicitly in you letter. And no living man potrebbe than you can solve, Mr. President, this compito to synchronize this next event of the new democratic Italy because your definitive schieramento in the allied Nations.

The U. S. will assume in this method in Italy and the Mediterranean a directing ruolo not confronted by all the other powers; si assicurerebbero a decisa and decisive influence on Italy and on the Italian cause; neutralizzerebbero una qualunque azione and influence in the east; scongelerebbero the rigid and intransigent british politica, trascinandola opposite mete e compiti piu' costruttivi. E galvanizzerebbero for the nation entered if at the south or the north by the final law against i tedeschi and for the compito to ricostruire the Peace on the liberal and democratic basis which are yours and our common ideal.

Italy has, as you know, passed the most sad phase of her history, otherhand fates await her, her città' cities are half destroyed; three quarters of her gemona people are under heel tedesco sufferance are di ciascuno and of all.

Nothing goes e sterile retorica speaking, you Mr. President know all Italy in this moment towards you and are questi , believe me momenti

to non how and when
new Italian democracy
attribution testis
of Italy from co-pilger
No occasion could be
know at sacams in
new bottrepps then
sarcitry
rel

rari nella vita degli uomini e dei popoli,
^{and of the people}

Certain that one word from you and your initiative in this sense
potrebbero contribute better and also what ever is resolved e alla
rigenerazione of Italy che sono e debbono assere sopratutte spiri-
tuali.

Please Mr. President believe my loyal and cordial amitie

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

P R I O R I T Y

[REDACTED]

From: Allied Control Commission, Naples Italy.

To: War Department

No: 3732 24th April 1944

To War for State Department and to Freedom for info
MGS for Civil Affairs from FATIMA from Murphy signed MacFarlane.

The Advisory Council at its meeting in Naples on
April 8th has taken note of recent developments in the political
situation in Italy.

It would welcome a satisfactory adjustment of the
institutional question and the formation by Marshal Badoglio
of a broad based government, representative of all parties,
without further delay.

At the same time it feels that it is its duty to
advise the Supreme Allied Commander that the following prin-
ciples must be fully safeguarded.

1 That the new Government must formally declare its
willingness to assume all the obligations towards the Allies
entered into by the old Government.

2 That any adjustment of the institutional question
which may now be reached should be regarded as stable until
such time as the Italian people can freely express their views.

No Sig

ACTION: G-2 (St Dept)

INFO : OPD, CAD, Col. Park, Mr. McCloy, Log

CM-IN-18134 (25 Apr 44) 0202Z ejm

[REDACTED]

34

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 2 1974
COPY NO.

370 Italy

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A

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

P R I O R I T Y

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

To: War Department

Nrs: F 35809 22 April, 1944

F 35809 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated USFOR information British Chiefs of Staff signed Wilson cite FHMGS. This is MAT 179.

Composition of broad based Italian government which includes all 6 parties announced 21st April. Appointments appear in following paragraphs with party designation where persons are definite party members.

1. Badoglio as Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

2. Corce, Sforza, Rodino (christian democrat), Mancini (socialist), Togliattp (otherwise Ercoli) (communist) as ministers without portfolio.

3. Aldisio (christian democrat) as Minister of Interior with Salerno (socialist) and Caracciola (party of action) as Under Secretaries.

4. Arangio Ruiz (liberal) as Minister of Justice with Lombardi (labor democrat) as Under Secretary.

5. Tarchiani (party of action) as Minister Public Works with Cilento (labor democrat) as Under Secretary.

6. Gullo (communist) Minister of Agriculture with Bergami (liberal) as Under Secretary.

CM-IN-16362 (22 Apr 44)

C O N F I D E N T I A L

370 Italy

Col. Park
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59

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Page 2

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria
Nr: P 35809 22 April, 1944

7. Di Napoli (socialist) as Minister Industry and Commerce with Yansonetti (christian democrat) as Under Secretary.

8. Orlando as Minister of War with Palermo (communist) as Under Secretary.

9. De Courten Minister of Navy with Albergo (socialist) as Under Secretary.

10. Sandali Minister of Air.

11. Morullo (liberal) Under Secretary of Presidency of Council.

12. Quintieri as Minister of Finance with Pesenti (communist) as Under Secretary.

13. Cerabona (labor democrat) communications with Di Raimondo and Fano as Under Secretaries.

14. Omodeo (party of action) Education with Jervolino (christian democrat) as Under Secretary.

No Sig

ACTION: CCAC
INFO: CC/S
ASF
OPD
G-2
Adm King
Mr McCloy
Log
Colonel Park

CM-IN-16362 (22 Apr 44) 1757Z med

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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59

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**WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER**

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff 71469

April 9, 1944

WST

Commanding General
USAF North African Theater of Operations
Algiers Algeria

Commanding General
USAF European Theater of Operations
London England

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Number WARX 20937

[REDACTED] for Wilson, Freedom Algiers, ETOUSA pass to the British
Chiefs of Staff, FAN 354, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff

Your action in directing MacFarlane to inform Badoglio that the
Italian Government are not entitled to enter into any engage-
ment with any foreign power, whether Allied or neutral, with-
out the consent of the Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean,
which should be sought through the Allied Control Commission
for Italy, is confirmed. NAF 652 and NAF 653 are the references

ORIGINATOR: CCS

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Log

CM-OUT-20937

(9 Apr 44)

17522 vn

Cal Park

370 Italy

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: CG, Mediterranean Base Section Oran, Algeria
To: War Department
CG, U.S. Forces in the European Theater of
Operations London, England
No: F 27150 03 April 1944
F 27150 Hall FWB to PWR and OWI signed Wilson
site PHPWO

Radford relays following from Naples. Statement made by Reale at Potenza recalling former declaration made by King that he intended to remain in power until liberation of all Italy appears to contradict definite information about negotiations regarding retirement of King to background.

Following explanation which comes from most reliable sources should be regarded as most secret. The King attended a cabinet meeting week before last, an unusual step, and informed ministers he intended to retire to background at fall of Rome and hand over to Lt General. The decision was taken without consulting cabinet and ministers were offended. In order to commit King publicly Reale recalled Mason Macfarlane letter containing Kings earlier statement.

ACTION: G-2 (OWI) No Sig **DECLASSIFIED**
JCS memo, 1-4-74
INFO : OPD, Col. Park, Log By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 2 1974
CM-IN-2385 (4 Apr 44) 08012 jb

370 Italy

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

P R I O R I T Y

TOP SECRET

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Alstera

To : War Department

No. P 22 NAF 655 25th March 1944

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated USFOR
Information British Chiefs of Staff. Unity London Hq NAAF
signed Wilson cte PHMGs P22 RKMR 26. This is NAF 655.

Reference is made to

(A) NAFs 622, 624 and 628 which set out in detail the
proposals of the 6 opposition parties for dealing with the
future policy to be adopted in Italy so far as the Crown and
Government is concerned.

(B) NAF 634 expressing the Kings willingness to
accept a proposal put forward by De Nicola and acceptable
to Storza and Croce.

(C) NAF 638 which indicated that in conjunction with
the meeting to be held 12th March it was proposed by the three
parties organizing the meeting to initiate a popular petition

MacFarlane has stated that he has received a communica-
tion from the Secretary of the Junta pointing out that more
than a month has elapsed since they submitted their memorandum
and that it would be of assistance to him if some reply, even
if of an interim nature, could be given at an early date.

In a message sent off by MacFarlane after the above it
is stated that the Soviet initiative in establishing relations
with Italian Government is having direct effect in South
Italy upon the internal political situation.

OW-IM-18318 (26 Mar 44)

Cal
MacFarlane

34

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

Page 2

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers

No. F 22 NAF 655 25th March 1944

It is further stated that the Communist Party prior to 16th March had not only publicly announced that the Russian decision had made no difference to their policy but had continued as prime movers in demanding that the three party petitions should go forward on Junta basis and had even offered to pay 1/3 of whole expenses involved. On 16th March however at Junta meeting they completely changed their attitude and MacFarlane states he has been informed by the Secretary that proposal for the petition is in process of being shelved. Moreover at Bari on 19th March Tedeschi refrained from attacking the King and Badoglio and argued that only necessity was that Italy should have a strong government, this being completely at variance with line of argument contained in his previous speeches and particularly to that delivered by him at Naples meeting. It has also been stated by member of Junta closely associated with Tedeschi that the Communist Party no longer insist on the abdication of the King as a condition precedent to joining in a government and would accept Kings plan or might even be willing to serve under Badoglio though the King made no concession.

Mac Farlane says that while there is evidence from other sources that the Communist Party and the Christian Democrat party may now be expected to join the Government it seems clear that no formal negotiations have yet begun. Should these parties do so it is likely that only the party of action would hold out and if the King makes some gesture even they might withdraw their objections.

The changed attitude of the Communist Party brought about by the Soviet initiative and presumably under orders from Moscow would appear to have loosened the structure of the Junta although it is still endeavoring to maintain some form of unity. The view is expressed that the fact that the allied governments have made no reply to the Junta

CM-IN-18318 (26 Mar 44)

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INCOMING MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

Page 3

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers

To: F 22 NAF 655 25th March 1944

memorandum has clearly affected their ability to withstand Russian activity and that while the other parties and members of the government are fully aware of the potentialities of the Communist game they feel that is such a move is made they are not in a position to stand out.

No Sig

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Col. Mathewson ✓
Gen Hilldring
Log

CM-IN-18318 (26 Mar 44) 0250Z jd

SECRET

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: Allied Force Headquarters Algiers, Algeria

To: War Department

No. NAF 653 12612 22 March, 1944

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff repeated UNITY London for information and to FATIMA for MacFarlane and to MID-EAST for General Wilson Cairo please pass and to Hq MAAF. Signed Wilson cite FHCOS. This is NAF 653.

Following received from MacFarlane. Begins we do not understand in what clause of the armistice we should base the representations to Italian government proposed in your 67463 March 21.

In any event would not such representations at this stage indicate a lack of unity between three principal United Nations? In our opinion to reveal this to the Italian government would not be to our advantage pending further consideration of this point by Washington and London. Ref NAF 652 last para.

In view of these representations request early instructions as to policy to be followed and what instructions should be issued to MacFarlane.

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: GEN. ARNOLD
OPD
GEN. BISSELL
ADM. KING
COL. MATHEWSON
GEN. HILDRING
LOG

CM-IN-15974 (22 Mar 44) 2111Z cng

370 Italy

SECRET

COPY No.

FAN-NAF

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

O P E R A T I O N A L
P R I O R I T Y

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria
To: War Department

No. W 5747/67532, NAF 652, 21 March 1944

To AGHAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff repeated to UNITY London, to Supreme Allied Commander Mideast and HQ MAAP for information signed Wilson cite PHSQS. This is NAF 652.

1. Following received from MacFarlane:

" 1. Prunas yesterday warned the political section that Bogomolov had told him in strict confidence that the Soviet decision to exchange Diplomatic representatives was not to be regarded as an isolated act but would be followed by other Soviet proposals based on a political closer relations with Italy. According to Prunas, Bogomolov frankly admitted that the Soviets intended to exploit their privileged position in Italy where there was no Soviet Army of occupation and where in the minds of the Italian people that were not directly associated with the restrictions imposed by Military Government.

2. Bogomolov did not indicate the nature of any new proposals but Prunas surmised that they might take the form of agreement on the lines of the Soviet-Gresh accord. Prunas also felt that the Soviets might put forward some guarantee of Italy's Eastern frontier where on account of their relations with Tito their influence was becoming predominant. It might even be that Soviet Russia was considering a change in its relations with the Italian Government which would eliminate the present paradox of co-belligerency and exchange of Diplomatic representatives on one side and an armistice on the other.

CM-IM-15184 (21 Mar 44)

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370 *Stahly*

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

Page #2

No. W 5747/67532, NAF 652, 21 March 1944

3. Prunas said that the Soviet move had been very well received. The Italian people, particularly in the north insofar as the limited information from that area could determine. For this reason he emphasized that it would not be possible for any Italian Government to decline any further offer of Soviet friendship although the Government did not wish for such a one sided development of Italy's International position. On the contrary, they wished to base the rehabilitation of the country upon a closer association with the United States and Great Britain. They felt however, that they were being pushed in the opposite direction.

4. It was the earnest desire of the Italian Government that something should be done to neutralize the present trend. Prunas himself realized that the moment had not yet come for Italy to be acceptable as an ally. He believed however, that something might be done to regularize the present position whereby Italy was both co-belligerent and a "Defeated enemy". Many of the Armistice clauses in his opinion have already been carried out and are no longer applicable. He asked whether the time had not now come when the American and British Governments could consider a substitute agreement which would retain all the Military requirements of the Armistice and leave over questions that could not be decided now but which would give Italy some of the legal and formal benefits that it might expect to derive from the fact of co-belligerency."

2. The following message has been sent to MacFarlane:

Reference your M 118 of 20 March. You should point out to Prunas that the Italian Government is not in a position to enter into any engagement with any country without the consent of Supreme Allied Commander which must be sought through the control commission. You will be kept informed of British and United States Government's reaction to Prunas statements.

ACTION: CC/S

No Sig.

INFORMATION: OPD, Gen Bissell, Gen Arnold,
Col Mathewson, Adm King, Gen Hilldring, Log

CM-IN-15184 (21 Mar 44) 2011Z bjm

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

OPERATIONAL

PRIORITY

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

To: War Department

No. W 5747/67532, NAF 652, 21 March 1944

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff repeated to UNITY London, to Supreme Allied Commander Mideast and Hq MAAF for information signed Wilson cite FHSQS. This is NAF 652.

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CM-IN-15184 (21 Mar 44)

18

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SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

Page #2

No. W 5747/67532, NAF 652, 21 March 1944

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ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD, Gen Bissell, Gen Arnold,
Col Mathewson, Adm King, Gen Hilldring, Log

No Sig.

CM-IN-15184 (21 Mar 44) 2011Z bjm

18

SECRET

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3-F-17

*Advised Bureau
to file*

SECRET

From: London
To: The President of the United States

No: 619, Filed 14/1148Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal.

Your 498 has crossed my 618. Meanwhile the Russians have announced that they have sent a fully-accredited ambassador to the present Italian Government with whom we are still technically at war. I do not think it would be wise, without further consideration, to accept the programme of the so-called six parties and demand forthwith the abdication of the King and the installation of Signor Croce as Lieutenant of the Realm. I will however consult the War Cabinet upon what you justly call a "major political decision". Our war with Italy has lasted since June 1940 and we have suffered 232,000 casualties in men, as well as the losses in ships which I mentioned in my number 608. I feel sure that in this matter our view will receive consideration from you. We ought to make every effort to act together. Pray remember that on the strength of your number 464 I committed myself in public and that any divergence will certainly become known.

No Sig

SECRET

Copy

SECRET

13 March 1944

From: London

For: The President of the United States

Number 618

Filed 132118Z

Prime Minister to President. Personal and secret.

Number 618. Your number 494.

1. I should be most grateful if you would read Eden's number 1783 to Halifax, which shows the kind of policy we should like to embark upon. I am entirely at one with you in the big objective of self-determination. All I plead for is "timing". I do not believe the ambitious wind-bags, now agitating behind our front that they may themselves become the government of Italy, have any representative footing. I fear that if we drive out the King and Badoglio at this stage, we shall only have complicated the task of the armies.

2. I see that this is also the Soviet view. They are certainly realistic but of course their aim may be a Communist Italy, and it may suit them to use the King and Badoglio till everything is ready for an extreme solution. I can assure you that this danger is also in my mind. My

SECRET

To *George H. Hall*
with copy of 494

Copy

SECRET

From: London

For: The President of the United States

Page 2

Number 618

Filed 132118Z

idea remains that we should try to construct a broadly-based government, taking into account the opinion of the democratic North of Italy and seeking representatives from there. Of course, if we cannot get Rome for several months, we shall have to act earlier, but without the favourable conditions which will be open to us once we are in possession of the capital. We shall then have much better chances of finding a really representative footing.

No Sig

SECRET

SECRET

13 MARCH 1944

WAL

FROM: OPNAV
TO : ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 498, PERSONAL AND SECRET, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

With further reference to your No. 610, I am sorry if my earlier messages were not clear. I did not at any time intend to convey to you my agreement that we postpone all political decisions until after Rome had been taken. The political situation in Italy has developed rapidly since our earlier messages; the military situation has not kept pace. The capture of Rome is still remote and major political decisions must be taken.

I do not like having to use stern measures against our friends in Italy, except for good reason. In the present situation the Commander-in-Chief and his political advisers, both British and American, have recommended that we give immediate support to the program of the six opposition parties. Thus we have, happily for once, our political and military considerations entirely in harmony.

We do not need to intervene beyond informing the Executive Junta of our support of their program, as described in NAF 622, 624 and 628, and confirm this to the King if necessary. The Italians can present the solution to the King and work out the program among themselves.

I cannot for the life of me understand why we should hesitate any longer in supporting a policy so admirably suited to our common military and political aims. American public opinion would never understand our continued tolerance and apparent support of Victor Emmanuel.

ROOSEVELT

March 11, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Proposed Cablegram to the Prime Minister
on the Italian Political Situation.

Thank you for your memorandum of March 8 to Mr. Stettinius enclosing a copy of Mr. Churchill's message no. 610, and your acknowledgment, on the Italian political situation. You may consider it advisable to answer some of the points raised in his telegram and I have drafted the proposed cablegram for your signature and despatch to the Prime Minister, if you approve.

CH

Enclosure:

Draft reply. (Sent unchanged
as POTUS # 498).

10 March

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Map Horn

When Admiral
Leahy visits the
Map Horn please
invite his
attention to the
sentence I have
underlined on last
page of this message.

Have we a copy of
the Halifax telegram?
(over) WJ

MEMO FOR ADM BROWN

The message in reply to this 610, having been drafted by the State Department and sent on #498, it does not appear wise for us to open up the underlined paragraph on page 3, as it probably was purposely omitted by the "diplomats".

WAL

13 March

WS

(over)