Folder 1. MR 370 Germany (2) Sec. 1—Italian Negotiations, 27 February–12 April 1945.
12 April 1945

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, Moscow 121829Z, NCR 818

NUMBER 230. AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR
AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN.

Replying to your message 121031 I have replied to Churchill's
940 by quoting my message to Stalin. Churchill is therefore fully
informed and there is no necessity of your delaying delivery of my
message to Stalin.

Your second question. I do not wish to delete the word
"minor" as it is my desire to consider the Berne misunderstanding
a minor incident.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 121829Z, April 1945.

F. H. GRAHAM
Captain, A.G.D.
From: THE PRESIDENT
To: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN

Serial or File No.: 230, 12 April 1945

Date: 121829Z

TOR Map Room: VIA

Subject: German surrender negotiations.

Action:

1. Answers HARRIMAN-PRES 121031, 12 April 1945, which was sent to the President at Warm Springs as MR-OUT-409, 121405Z.
2. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy, sent to the President for approval as MR-OUT-411, 121550Z.
3. President approved in MB-IN-198 (121806Z).
4. Dispatched to Moscow at 121829Z.

Of interest is the fact that this is the last message sent by President Roosevelt. Approved by the President at approximately 12:45 CWT, it was transmitted to the Map Room at 1306 CWT, at about the same time the President was stricken.
12 April 1945

FROM: ADIMRAl LEAHY
TO : THE PRESIDENT

The following draft reply to Harriman 121031 is forwarded for consideration:

QUOTE: Replying to your message 121031 I have replied to Churchill's 940 by quoting my message to Stalin. Churchill is therefore fully informed and there is no necessity of your delaying delivery of my message to Stalin.

Your second question. I do not wish to delete the word "minor" as it is my desire to consider the Berne misunderstanding a minor incident. UNQUOTE.

12 April 1945

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO : ADIMRAL LEAHY

Reference MR-OUT-411. APPROVED.
PERSONAL AND FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN

BRITISH AMBASSADOR HAS THIS MORNING SHOWN ME A COPY
OF A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO YOU
NUMBER 940 IN WHICH HE SUGGESTS CONCERTING WITH YOU ON
THE LINE TO TAKE IN REPLYING TO MARSHAL STALIN S LATEST
MESSAGES REGARDING THE BERNE INCIDENT. FROM THE RESPECTIVE
TIMES OF DISPATCH IT WOULD SEEM THAT YOUR MESSAGE TO
MARSHAL STALIN (WHITE HOUSE NUMBER 229 NAVY NUMBER 120221)
HAD BEEN SENT PRIOR TO THE RECEIPT OF THE PRIME MINISTER S
UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES I AM WONDERING WHETHER YOU
WISH ME TO HOLD UP DELIVERY OF YOUR MESSAGE TO MARSHAL
STALIN. SINCE THE TIME OF DELIVERY DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE
OF PRIME IMPORTANCE, I AM HOLDING YOUR MESSAGE UNTIL RECEIPT OF FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOU.

IF YOU ARE PREPARED TO RECONSIDER THE WORDING OF YOUR MESSAGE MAY I RESPECTIVELY SUGGEST THAT THE WORD "MINOR" AS A QUALIFICATION OF "MISUNDERSTANDINGS" BE ELIMINATED. I MUST CONFESS THAT THE MISUNDERSTANDING APPEARED TO ME TO BE OF A MAJOR CHARACTER AND THE USE OF THE WORD "MINOR" MIGHT WELL BE MISINTERPRETED HERE.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By [Signature] Date [MAR 9, 1972]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>THE PRESIDENT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>121031 NCR 9544, 12 April 1945</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>TO NAVY CODE ROOM</td>
<td>120850Z</td>
<td>VIA</td>
<td>Navy Code Room</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUBJECT:</td>
<td>German surrender negotiations</td>
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</table>

**ACTION:**

1. This message concerns delivery and proposed changes in PRES-STALIN #229, 11 April 1945.
2. Sent to the President at Warm Springs as MR-OUT-409, 121405Z.
3. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy, sent to the President for approval as MR-OUT-411, 121550Z.
4. President approved in MR-IN-198 (121806Z).
5. Answer sent to Harriman as PRES #230, 12 April 1945.

**COPIES TO:**

- ORIGINAL Mr 370 Germany (2)
- INDEXED: HARRIMAN-PRES FILE

370 GERMANY
11 April 1945

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, MOSCOW

120221Z NCR 737

NUMBER 229, PERSONAL ANDconfidential FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR MARSHAL STALIN.

Thank you for your frank explanation of the Soviet point of view of the Bern incident which now appears to have faded into the past without having accomplished any useful purpose.

There must not, in any event, be mutual distrust and minor misunderstandings of this character should not arise in the future. I feel sure that when our armies make contact in Germany and join in a fully coordinated offensive the Nazi Armies will disintegrate.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House
Map Room at 120221Z April 1945.

HENRY W. PUTNAM,
Major, A. C.
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: MARSHAL STALIN

SERIAL or FILE NO.: #229, 11 April 1945

DATE: 11 April 1945

TOR MAP ROOM: Via Navy Code Room

SUBJECT: German surrender negotiations.

ACTION:

1. Answers STALIN-PRES 7 April 1945, which was sent to the President at Warm Springs as MR-OUT-377, 9 Apr 45.
2. President, in his MR-IN-189, 9 Apr 45, referred the message to Admiral Leahy with following comment: "Re MR-OUT-377. I think no reply necessary unless you or Gen Marshall want to make reply."
3. See memo from Admiral Brown to Admiral Leahy, 9 Apr 45, with suggested reply to Marshal Stalin. This suggested reply was not used.
4. Reply, drafted by Admiral Leahy, sent to the President at Warm Springs for his approval as MR-OUT-402, 11 Apr 45. (See PM-PRES #940 and #941, transmitting Stalin's msg to Churchill on this subject.)
5. MR-OUT-402 approved by the President in MR-IN-402 (111610Z). In MR-OUT-402, Admiral Leahy had also asked permission to send to Churchill a copy of the President's reply to Stalin, for Churchill's information and as an answer to Churchill's #940.
6. Reply sent to Stalin at 120221Z as attached #229; quoted to Churchill as PRES-PM #741, 11 Apr 45 (120159Z).
7. See HARRIMAN-PRES 121031, 12 Apr 45, concerning delivery of PRES-STALIN #229, and suggested changes in the message.

COPIES TO:
MR 370 GERMANY (2)

ORIGINAL: PRES-STALIN FILE

370 GERMANY
11 April 1945

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

120159Z NCR 736

NUMBER 741, AND PERSONAL FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE
PRIME MINISTER.

Your 940. I am sending the following message to Stalin and quoting
it for your information:

QUOTE. PRESIDENT TO MARSHAL STALIN.

Thank you for your frank explanation of the Soviet point of
view of the Bern incident which now appears to have faded into the past
without having accomplished any useful purpose.

There must not, in any event, be mutual distrust and minor mis-
understandings of this character should not arise in the future. I feel
sure that when our armies make contact in Germany and join in a fully
coordinated offensive the Nazi Armies will disintegrate. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House
Map Room at 120159Z April 1945

HENRY W. PUTNAM,
Major, A. C.
FROM: THE PRESIDENT  
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER

SERIAL or FILE NO. #741, 11 April 1945

DATE

TO MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: German surrender negotiations.

ACTION:

1. Answers PM-PRES #940, 11 April 1945, which was sent to the President at Warm Springs as MR-OUT-396, 110035Z.
2. In MR-OUT-402 (111610Z) from Admiral Leahy to the President, Leahy submitted for approval a draft reply to Stalin's message of 7 Apr 45 to the President. He also requested permission to send this reply, if approved by the President, to Churchill as an answer to #940.
4. President's message was sent to Stalin as PRES-STALIN #229, 11 Apr 45; message quoted to Churchill in attached #741 for Churchill's information and in answer to PM-PRES #940.

COPIES TO:

MR 370 GERMANY (2)

DATE:  

BY DIRECTION OF:

ORIGINAL: PRES-PM FILE

370 GERMANY
11 APRIL 1945

MR-OUT-402 (1116102)

FROM: ADMIRAL LEAHY

TO : THE PRESIDENT

The following draft reply to Stalin's message of April 7 is submitted for consideration:

QUOTE: PRESIDENT TO MARSHAL STALIN.

Thank you for your frank explanation of the Soviet point of view of the Bern incident which now appears to have faded into the past without having accomplished any useful purpose.

There must not, in any event, be mutual distrust and minor misunderstandings of this character should not arise in the future. I feel sure that when our armies make contact in Germany and join in a fully coordinated offensive the Nazi Armies will disintegrate. UNQUOTE.

New subject: The above message to U. J. should be quoted to Prime in reply to his 940

11 April 1945

MR-IN-196 (1200122)

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO : ADMIRAL LEAHY

MR-OUT-402...approved.

Declasified
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. MAR 9 1972

By W. J. Stewart Date

Copy 1
11 APRIL 1945

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, MOSCOW

NUMBER 228, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR
AMERICAN HARRIMAN.

The following message from Stalin, in reply to my message Number 222 of 4 April, is quoted for your information:

QUOTE. FROM PREMIER STALIN TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, 7 APRIL 1945.

I have received your message of April 5th.

In my message of April 3 I spoke not about honesty and dependability. I never doubted your honesty and dependability, as well as the honesty and dependability of Mr. Churchill. I speak about the fact that in the course of this correspondence between us has been revealed a difference of opinions as to what can an Ally allow himself to do in respect to the other Ally and what he should not allow himself to do. We, Russians, believe that in the present situation at the fronts when the enemy is confronted by the inevitability of capitulation, at any meeting with the Germans on questions of capitulation by representatives of one of the Allies arrangements have to be made for the participation in this meeting of representatives of the other Ally. At any rate this is absolutely necessary if this Ally is seeking participation in such a meeting. Americans, however, and the Englishmen think differently, considering the Russian point of view wrong. Proceeding from this fact they rejected the Russians the right of participation in the meeting with the Germans in Switzerland. I have already written to you and consider it not unnecessary to repeat that the Russians in a similar situation
under no circumstances would have refused the Americans and Englishmen the right for participation in such a meeting. I continue to consider the Russian point of view as the only right one as it excludes any possibility of mutual distrust and does not permit the enemy to sow distrust among us.

It is difficult to agree that lack of resistance on the part of the Germans on the Western front can be explained only that they are defeated. The Germans have on the Eastern front 147 divisions. They could without harm to their cause take from the Eastern front 15-20 divisions and shift them to the aid of their troops on the Western front. However, the Germans did not do it and are not doing it. They continue to fight savagely with the Russians for some unknown junction Zemlianitsa in Czechoslovakia which they need as much as a dead man needsoulitices, but surrender without any resistance such important towns in Central Germany as Osnabruk, Mannheim, Kassel. Don't you agree that such a behavior of the Germans is more than strange and incomprehensible.

As regards my informers, I may assure you that they are very honest and modest people who carry out their duties accurately and have no intentions of insulting anyone. These people have been manyfold tested by us by their deeds. Judge for yourself. In February, 1945, General Marshall has given a number of important information to the General Staff of the Soviet troops, where he, on the basis of data he had on hand, warned the Russians that in March there will be two serious counter-attacks of the Germans on the Eastern front one of which will be directed from Pomerania on Torun and the other from the region of Moravska Ostrava on Lodz. In fact, however, it proved that the principal blow of the Germans was being prepared and was realized not in the above-mentioned regions but in an entirely different region,
namely in the region of Lake Balaton, to the Southwest of Budapest. As it is known the Germans have concentrated in this region up to 35 divisions, including 11 tank divisions. This was one of the most serious blows in the course of the war with such great concentration of tank forces. Marshal Tolbukhin succeeded in avoiding a catastrophe and in complete defeat of the Germans later, because my informers have uncovered, true a little late, this plan of the main blow of the Germans and immediately informed Marshal Tolbukhin. Thus I had another occasion to convince myself in the accuracy and knowledge of Soviet informers.

For your orientation in this matter I am enclosing a letter of the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Army General Antonov, addressed to Major General Deane. UNQUOTE.

The letter referred to in the last paragraph of Stalin's message was dated 30 March 1945 and may be obtained from General Deane.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 111732Z April 1945:

F. H. GRAHAM,
Captain, AGD.
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN

SERIAL or FILE NO. #228, 11 April 1945

TO MAP ROOM

VIA

SUBJECT: German surrender negotiations.

ACTION:

1. Quotes to Ambassador Harriman for his information the reply received from Stalin to the President's #222 of 4 April 1945.

2. Authorization for sending message requested by Admiral Leahy in MR-OUT-402; approved by the President in MR-IN-196.

Regraded Unclassified
MR-OUT-397

TOP SECRET

TOPSECRET - IV

11 April 1945

From: U. S. Military Attache, London
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 941 Fld: 110015Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and

Reference my immediately preceding telegram. Following
is Marshal Stalin's message dated 7 April.

Your message of 5th April received. In my message of
7th April to the President, which I am sending to you also, I
have already replied to all the fundamental points raised in
your message regarding the negotiations in Switzerland. On
the other questions raised in your message I consider it neces-
sary to make the following remarks.

1. Neither I nor Molotov had any intention of "blacken-
ing" anyone. It is not a matter of wanting to "blacken"
(anyone) but of our having developed differing points of view
as regards the rights and obligations of any ally. You will
see from my message to the President that the Russian point of
view on this question is the correct one, as it guarantees each
ally's rights and deprives the enemy of any possibility of
sowing discord between us.

2. My messages are personal and strictly confidential. This makes it possible to speak one's mind clearly and frankly. This is the advantage of confidential communications.

If, however, you are going to regard every frank statement of mine as offensive, it will make this kind of communication very difficult. I can assure you that I had and have no intention of offending anyone.

ECH/cvl

End.
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT

Serial or File No. 941, 11 April 1945

Date

TOR Map Room 110003Z VIA Army Code Room

Subject: German surrender negotiations.

ACTION:

1. Continuation of PM #940, 11 Apr 45. For implementation on this message, see Status Report attached to PM #940, 11 April 1945.

2. NOTE: This message quotes to the President a message from Stalin to Churchill, replying to Churchill's message to Stalin on the Bern Surrender negotiations quoted to the President by Churchill in PM-PRES #935, 5 April 1945.
MR-007-396

From: Military Attaché, London
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 940

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Top Secret.

Your No. 734 about CROSSWORDS. I send you a private message I have received from Stalin covering the official telegram which he has sent to you with copy to me. I have a feeling that this is about the best we are going to get out of them, and certainly it is as near as they can get to an apology.

However, before considering any answer at all from His Majesty's Government, please tell me how you think the matter should be handled so that we may keep in line together.

End.

Rei 8/11/00032
Sent 8/11/00032

Copy

Regraded Unclassified
1. Further reply to PRES-PM #734, 4 April 1945. (Also see PM #934, PM #935, PM #936, PRES #736, STALIN-PRES 7 Apr 45)
2. Also see PM #941, which is continuation of this message.
3. Sent to the President at Warm Springs as MR-OUT-396, 110035Z.
4. In MR-OUT-402 (111610Z) from Admiral Leahy to the President, Leahy submitted for approval a draft reply to Stalin's message of 7 Apr 45 to the President. He also requested permission to send this reply, if approved by the President, to Churchill as an answer to #940.
5. President approved MR-OUT-402 in his message MR-IN-196 (1200122).
6. The President's message was sent to Stalin as PRES-STALIN #229, 11 Apr 45; the message was quoted to Churchill in PRES-PM #741, 11 Apr 45, for Churchill's information and in answer to PM-PRES #940.
April 9, 1943.

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

I suggest the following for consideration in reply to
Marshal Stalin:

"I thank you for your frank explanation of your sentiments
about the Berne incident and I hope that similar frankness in the
future may help us to work more effectively toward our common goal.
On our side perhaps we have been too reluctant to complain of
actions by your government that we do not understand. I hope you
will send for Ambassador Harriman and learn from him the long list
of complaints that we have. After agreeing to work with us on
various projects our representatives have been denied admission to
territory under your control. I believe that if we trust each
other more we will work together better.

For the sake of the record I must repeat the following:

(a) The only purpose of the Berne discussions was to
ascertain whether any German in authority wished to discuss
surrender or whether the enquiries were a ruse which they
now appear to have been.

(b) We recognize that our recent glorious successes
on the Western Front are due in a large measure to the fact

-1-
TOP SECRET

that your army has fully engaged the attention of 350 (?) enemy divisions, but we insist that our successes have been won by hard fighting, first west of the Rhine where the enemy army was thoroughly defeated, and now east of the Rhine where our fast moving columns have penetrated his outer defenses and he has no reserves to offer effective resistance. Nevertheless, every day our armies are fighting hard for everything they gain and we are reaping the benefit of our sustained heavy air attack on enemy communications and forces.

"We are now faced with the all-important task of joining our effort to yours in the final kill. Let us do this intelligently as good allies with good understanding. I know that you agree with me that therein lies the hope of a better world."

ROOSEVELT."
SECRET

TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM MARSHAL STERN

7 April 1943

I have received your message of April 29.

I never doubted your honesty and dependability, as well as the honesty and dependability of Mr. Churchill. I speak about the fact that in the course of the war.

The C. I. T. at the same time that the American and British armies are fighting on the other side of the world.

It is difficult to agree that much of poise or prudence.

The German on the first line can be exalted only by that they are determined. The Germans on the Western Front can be exalted only by that they are defeated. I am determined to follow this track of poise or prudence on the part of the

[...]

I am determined to follow this track of poise or prudence on the part of the
I immediately informed Marshal Tukhachevsky. Thus I had another occasion to convince myself in the accuracy and knowledge of Soviet informers.

This was one of the most serious blows in the course of the war with such great concentration of tank forces. Marshal Tukhachevsky succeeded in avoiding a catastrophic blow at the outset. The German divisions were already on the line of Narva-Ostrava in the region of Lake Balaton, to the South-West of Budapest. As is known, the German divisions were not completely prepared and were realised too late to the above-mentioned region. In February, 1945, General Staff of the Soviet troops, there will be too serious counter-attacks of the German on the Eastern Front. The German divisions were already on the line of Narva-Ostrava in the region of Lake Balaton, to the South-West of Budapest. As is known, the German divisions were not completely prepared and were realised too late to the above-mentioned region. In February, 1945, General Staff of the Soviet troops, there will be too serious counter-attacks of the German on the Eastern Front.

In the course of the war with such great concentration of tank forces, the German divisions were already on the line of Narva-Ostrava in the region of Lake Balaton, to the South-West of Budapest. As is known, the German divisions were not completely prepared and were realised too late to the above-mentioned region. In February, 1945, General Staff of the Soviet troops, there will be too serious counter-attacks of the German on the Eastern Front.

In the course of the war with such great concentration of tank forces, the German divisions were already on the line of Narva-Ostrava in the region of Lake Balaton, to the South-West of Budapest. As is known, the German divisions were not completely prepared and were realised too late to the above-mentioned region. In February, 1945, General Staff of the Soviet troops, there will be too serious counter-attacks of the German on the Eastern Front.

3. As regards my informers, I may assure you that they are very honest and modest people who carry out their duties accurately and have no intentions of insulting anyone. These people have been manyfold tested by us by their deeds. Judge for yourself. In February, 1945, General Staff of the Soviet troops, there will be too serious counter-attacks of the German on the Eastern Front. However, the Germans did not do it and are not doing it. They continue to fight secretly with the Russians for the aid of their troops on the Western Front. However, the Germans did not do it and are not doing it. They continue to fight secretly with the Russians for the aid of their troops on the Western Front.

Regraded Unclassified
For your orientation in this matter I am enclosing a letter of the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Army General Antonov, addressed to Major General Dean.
A possibility is not excluded that some of the sources of this information correspond to the actual course of events in the Eastern Front in March. The fact shows that the information used by General Marshall did not correspond to the actual course of events on the Eastern Front in March.

The German attacks in the region of Karasch Octova were not confirmed by him as those battles showed that the main grouping of German troops, including the 6th tank army, was concentrated not in Pomerania and not in the eastern front in the course of March but not confirmed the information that the military actions on the eastern front were to be those of the Soviet Fronts and to include the 6th tank army. On February 29, 1945, I received General Marshall's communication to the effect that the German attacks were not confirmed by him as those battles showed that the main grouping of German troops, including the 6th tank army, was concentrated not in Pomerania and not in the eastern front in the course of March but not confirmed the information that the military actions on the eastern front were to be those of the Soviet Fronts and to include the 6th tank army.

I am extremely grateful to General Marshall for the information which he has kindly put at our disposal. At the same time I consider it my duty to inform General Marshall that the information which he has kindly put at our disposal. At the same time I consider it my duty to inform General Marshall that the information which he has kindly put at our disposal.

From Colonel Bredya, head of the army section of the British military mission, I received similar information on February 12.
and to divert the attention of the Soviet Command from the region where the principal offensive operation of the Germans was being prepared on the Eastern front.

In spite of the above-said I ask General Marshall, if possible, to continue to inform us regarding available data about the enemy. I consider it my duty to inform General Marshall regarding the above with the only purpose that he could make certain conclusions regarding the source of this information.

I beg you to transmit to General Marshall my respect and gratitude.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Antonov, Army General
Chief of General Staff
of the Red Army
FROM          Marshal Stalin  TO  The President

DATE          7 April 1945

SUBJECT:  German surrender negotiations at Berne.

ACTION:

1. Answers PRES-STALIN #222, 4 April 1945.
2. Sent to the President at Warm Springs as MR-OUT-377, 9 Apr 45.
3. President, in his MR-IN-189, 9 Apr 45, referred the message to Admiral Leahy with following comment: "Re MR-OUT-377. I think no reply necessary unless you or Gen Marshall want to make reply."
4. (See memo from Admiral Brown to Admiral Leahy, 9 Apr 45, with suggested reply to Marshal Stalin. This suggested reply was not used.)
5. Reply, drafted by Admiral Leahy, sent to the President at Warm Springs for his approval as MR-OUT-402, 11 Apr 45.
6. Stalin's message of 7 Apr 45 sent to Ambassador Harriman as PRES-HARRIMAN #228, 11 Apr 45, for his information.
7. (See also PM-PRES #940 and #941, transmitting Stalin's msg to Churchill on this subject.)
8. MR-OUT-402 approved by the President in MR-IN-196 (120122Z). In MR-OUT-402, Admiral Leahy had also asked permission to send a copy of the President's reply to Churchill for his information and in answer to the Prime's #940.
9. Reply sent to Stalin as PRES-STALIN #229, 11 Apr 45 (120221Z); quoted to the Prime Minister as PRES-PM #741, 11 Apr 45 (120159Z).

COPIES TO:  
MR 370 GERMANY (2)  

DATE:  

BY DIRECTION OF:  

ORIGINIAL: PRES-STALIN FILE  

370 GERMANY
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
To: War Department
Nr: FX 56050 NAF 913 6 April 1945

FX 56050 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and AMSSO for British Chief of Staff repeated SHAFF Forward for Eisenhower and US Military Mission Moscow for Deane and Archer for information signed Alexander cite PHCOS. This is NAF 913 TOP SECRET

CROSSWORD

1. My representatives have now returned to Caserta.
2. Their impressions gained during their three weeks in Switzerland are as follows:
   A. They feel that there is only a slight chance of surrender of German forces in north Italy as it will now be clear to the enemy that parlementaires could only be received on basis of an unconditional surrender of those forces In Situ.
   
   B. From information reported by Critic through intermediary Parrilli, Glazier and his Chief of Staff Roettiger are in agreement with his project. However, there is vast difference between merely being in general agreement and in taking positive action to achieve desired results. My representatives feel, however, that their attitude may become more positive as overall enemy military situation deteriorates or as result of Allied pressure on Italian Front.
   
   C. While Critic himself has never referred to any conditions of surrender, Parrilli at final meeting on

DECASSIFIED
J.C.S. Rerading Memo 29-71
By: Date: MAR 10 1971

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

2 April, probably acting on Critic's behalf, hinted that Germans might like to make some arrangement whereby they could be permitted to withdraw over Italian Frontier after having given up their arms. Parrilli, however, was told that such action was entirely out of question and could not be considered. In any case it was made clear to all concerned that my representatives were interested only in arranging passage of any parlementaires which Germans desired to send to negotiate surrender with proper British, Russian and US authorities.

D. As Critic is in a position to prevent widespread destruction in north Italy, and is presumably anxious to re-insure himself, my representatives feel that he may use his position to prevent such destruction when German forces evacuate north Italy.

E. If information received from Critic via Parrilli concerning telephone conversation between Himmler and Critic is correct, Himmler is not a part of the plot, nor does he approve of it. It must be emphasized, however, that this impression is based entirely on information which Critic is alleged to have given intermediary Parrilli and which may well have been false.

3. Critic has been informed through intermediary Parrilli that way has been left open and complete arrangements made to receive Glazier's parlementaires, should the Germans desire to surrender in Italy. It was pointed out that German parlementaires could be sent either through Switzerland or directly through the lines to an appropriate Allied Headquarters where detailed arrangements could be made.
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

Subject: INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

URGENT

4. I wish to stress that no negotiations of any nature whatsoever were entered into with Germans by my representatives while in Switzerland. Their activities were confined merely to making arrangements whereby German parlementaires could be brought to an appropriate Allied Headquarters in event of Germans deciding to surrender on Italian front.

End

ACTION: CC/S
INFO: Adm Leahy, General Arnold, General Hull, General Bissell, Adm King, C of S

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Regarded Unclassified
From: U.S. Military Mission, Moscow, Russia
To: War Department
Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy.

Nr: MX 23663 4 April 1945.

For Field Marshal Alexander, Combined Chiefs of Staff
and British Chiefs of Staff from Archer and Deane
MX 23663. WAR please pass to Central Base Section
UK London for British Chiefs of Staff.

CROSSWORD. The information contained in FX (54695), 4
April (NAF 911) was sent to General Antonov. It was arranged
in such a way as to emphasize that all negotiations thus far
have been solely for the purpose of arranging a meeting at
Field Marshal Alexander's headquarters.

End.

"This Message has been relayed to Central Base Section
UK London, by the WDCC, as per the originator's request."

NOTE: 54695 is CM-IN-3081 (4 Apr 45) CC/S.

ACTION: CC/S
INFO: Adm Leahy; Gen Arnold; Gen Hull; Gen Bissell; Adm King;
C of S.

CM-IN-3904 (5 Apr 45) DTG 042020Z rel

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHF, NLR, Date MAY 2 1974
COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
24-78786
FROM: ADMIRAL LEAHY
TO: THE PRESIDENT (WARM SPRINGS)

State Department proposes the following reply to Myron Taylor and will send it immediately if you approve. War Department concurs.

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR TAYLOR ONLY:

QUOTE. While fully appreciating the high purpose which motivated the suggestion in your No. 73 of April 5, I must disapprove any idea of your going to Paris for purpose indicated. In present circumstances I feel that you should refuse absolutely to accept or listen to any approaches. The danger of misinterpretation by the enemy of our position on unconditional surrender is too great, and I must, therefore, request you to abstain from any further discussions on this subject with the Vatican. With best personal regards. END QUOTE.

W.D.L.

Approved by MR. N. 182. Sent to Taylor by State Department.
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER
NO: 736, 6 APRIL 1945

I am in general agreement with your opinion expressed in 934, and I am pleased with your very clear strong message to Stalin No. 935.

We must not permit anybody to entertain a false impression that we are afraid.

Our Armies will in a very few days be in a position that will permit us to become "tougher" than has heretofore appeared advantageous to the war effort.

ROosevelt

Released 0618072.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
MAR 9 1972
By W. J. Stewart Date
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO: THE PRIME MINISTER

SUBJECT: German surrender negotiations.

ACTION:

1. Answers PM-PRES #934 and #935, which were sent to the President at Hot Springs as WH-OUT-352 and WH-OUT-353 respectively.

2. President referred #934 to Admiral Leahy in WH-IN-181, 060250Z, for preparation of draft reply.

3. Draft prepared by Admiral Leahy; sent to the President for approval as WH-OUT-359, 061540Z. Approved by the President in WH-IN-182, 061708Z.

4. Sent to London at 061750Z.

5. See Prime's next message, PM-PRES #940, 11 Apr 45.
FROM: AMBASSADOR WINANT
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 2122, 6 APRIL 1945

I have just read the Prime Minister's Number 934 and 935. They were received at our sending station at such a late hour that I was unable to discuss them with him prior to dispatch.

I have followed the Bern incident and the chronology of events that took place thereafter. I stated some time ago my regret that you were not informed prior to informing the Russians of the British decision to exclude the Russians from the preliminary meeting at Bern. It seemed to me not improbable that this approach was incident to the transferring of Kesselring from the Italian theater to the German western front and done to create dissension in Allied ranks. Its timing immediately preceded Ribbentrop's desire to approach the Russians. It is possible that the Japanese were used by the Germans to misinform the Russians. It is my own opinion that your message to Stalin was responsible for the breaking of the Russian-Japanese agreement and the resignation of the Japanese cabinet. I may be wrong but I believe you have completely wiped out Russian distrust. I am not sure that the timing of the Prime Minister's message to Stalin (935) will be particularly helpful. The third paragraph of the Prime Minister's Number 934 relating to "provisional zones of occupation in Austria" is not completely accurate. Only yesterday Goussev advanced in the European Advisory Commission a compromise proposal on zoning in Austria and control machinery that seemed to me to show a desire on the part of his government to reach agreement in this area.
TO: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: AMBASSADOR WINANT

DATE: 6 April 1945

SUBJECT: Zones of occupation in Austria; German surrender negotiations.

ACTION:

1. Winant's comments on PM-PRES #934 and #935.
2. Sent to the President at Warm Springs as MR-OUT-355, 6 Apr 45.
3. No answer.

COPIES TO:

MR 370 GERMANY (2)

ORIGINAL: PRES-WINANT FILE

370 GERMANY; 371 AUSTRIA
You will have seen Myron Taylor's telegram no. 73 of April 5 to you. We in the State Department strongly recommend that his suggestion to go to Paris be disapproved by you. In the circumstances we feel it would also be wise for you to direct him to cease any conversations which he is having in Rome.

ERS
Mr CEB.

SENT: 052242 E

Reference message did not go thru the Map Room. I informed Mr Callin and requested he let me know if already there.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter: 1-11-72
By R. Date MAR 9 1972

Answered MR-IN-179

Regraded Unclassified
Vatican City
Dated April 5, 1945
Rec’d 1:30 p.m.

LC - 386
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

US URGENT
73, April 5, 4 p.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Following extended audience today with Pope and preparatory to possible approach of peace through His Holiness would not be wise procedure in case actual proposal is made for me secretly and at once to visit Eisenhower in person at Paris headquarters which I can reach in five hours or less. I have in mind your recent public statement that Eisenhower only was authorized to conclude unconditional surrender. Conditional offer made and being discouraged today. Hope to send details of latter tomorrow.

TAYLOR

MR - 017 - 254

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By [Signature] Date MAR 9 1972

060250Z
TOP SECRET

To: The President of The United States.
Nr: 936

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and TOP SECRET. Number 936.
My number 935.

In Paragraph eight of message to Stalin for "Charges which you have made" read "Charges which are made".

Prime.

FA: 1MV

TOP SECRET

Reid 06/12/52
Sent 06/12/52

Regraded Unclassified
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT

SERIAL or FILE NO. 936, 6 April 1945

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM 06/1215Z VIA Army Code Room

SUBJECT: German surrender negotiations.

ACTION:

1. Correction to PM #935, 5 April 1945.
2. To President at Warm Springs as MR-OUT-356, 06/1225Z. PM #935 previously sent as MR-OUT-353, 06/0202Z.
3. No answer.

COPIES TO:
MR 370 GERMANY (2)

DATE: 

BY DIRECTION OF: 

ORIGINAL: PRES-PM FILE

370 Germany
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 935

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Top Secret.

Following is text of my telegram to Stalin referred to in my immediately preceding telegram:

"Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin. Personal and Top Secret.

1. The President has sent me his correspondence with you about the contacts made in Switzerland between a British and an American officer on Field Marshal Alexander's staff and a German General named Wolff relating to possible surrender of Kesselring's army in northern Italy. I therefore deem it right to send you a precise summary of the action of His Majesty's Government. As soon as we learned of these contacts we immediately informed the Soviet Government on March 12th and we and the United States Government have faithfully reported to you everything that has taken place. The sole and only business mentioned or referred to in any way in Switzerland was to test the credentials of the German
emissary and try to arrange a meeting between a nominee of Kesselring's, with Field Marshal Alexander at his headquarters or some convenient point in northern Italy. There were no negotiations in Switzerland even for a military surrender of Kesselring's army. Still less did any political-military plot, as alleged in your telegram to the President, enter into our thoughts, which are not as suggested of so dishonourable a character.

2. Your representatives were immediately invited to the meeting we attempted to arrange in Italy. Had it taken place and had your representatives come, they would have heard every word that passed.

3. We consider that Field Marshal Alexander has full right to accept the surrender of the German army of 25 divisions on his front in Italy and to discuss such matters with German envoys who have the power to settle the terms of capitulation. Nevertheless we took especial care to invite your representatives to this purely military discussion at his headquarters should it take place. In fact however nothing resulted from any contacts in Switzerland. Our officers returned from Switzerland without having succeeded in fixing a rendezvous in Italy for Kesselring's emissaries to come to. Of all this the Soviet Government have been
fully informed step by step by Field Marshal Alexander or by Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, as well as through United States channels. I repeat that no negotiations of any kind were entered into or even touched upon, formally or informally, in Switzerland.

4. There is however a possibility that the whole of this request to parley by German General Wolff was one of those attempts which are made by the enemy with the object of sowing distrust between allies. Field Marshal Alexander made this point in a telegram sent on March 11th in which he remarks, "Please note that two of the leading figures are S.S. and Himmler men which makes me very suspicious". This telegram was repeated to the British Ambassador in Moscow on the 12th of March for communication to the Soviet Government. If to sow distrust between us was the German intention, it has certainly for the moment been successful.

5. Sir Archibald Clark Kerr was instructed by Mr. Eden to explain the whole position to M. Molotov in his letter of March 21st. The reply of March 22nd handed to him from M. Molotov contained the following expression: "In this instance the Soviet Government sees not a misunderstanding but something worse". It also complains that, "In Berne for two weeks behind the backs of the Soviet Union, which is
bearing the brunt of the war against Germany, negotiations have been going on between representatives of the German military command on the one hand and representatives of English and American commands on the other. In the interests of Anglo-Russian relations, His Majesty's Government decided not to make any reply to this most wounding and unfounded charge but to ignore it. This is the reason for what you call in your message to the President, "The silence of the British". We thought it better to keep silent than to respond to such a message as was sent by M. Molotov, but you may be sure that we were astonished by it and affronted that M. Molotov should impute such conduct to us. This however in no way affected our instruction to Field Marshal Alexander to keep you fully informed.

6. Neither is it true that the initiative in this matter came as you state to the President wholly from the British. In fact the information given to Field Marshal Alexander that the German General Wolff wished to make a contact in Switzerland was brought to him by an American agency.

7. There is no connection whatever between any contacts at Berne or elsewhere with the total defeat of the German armies on the western front. They have in fact fought
with great obstinacy and inflicted upon us and the American armies since the opening of our February offensive up to March 28th upwards of 87,000 casualties. However being outnumbered on the ground and literally overwhelmed in the air by the vastly superior Anglo-American air forces, which in the month of March alone dropped over 200,000 tons of bombs on Germany, the German armies in the west have been decisively broken. The fact that they were outnumbered on the ground in the west is due to the magnificent attacks and weight of the Soviet armies.

8. With regard to the charges which you have made in your message to the President of April 3rd, which also asperse His Majesty’s Government, I associate myself and my colleagues with the last sentence of the President’s reply."

END

* See 448-PM-PRES # 936.
1935, 5 April 1945.

German surrender negotiations.

ACTION:

1. See "Immediately preceding telegram", PM-PRES #934, 5 Apr 45.
2. Sent to the President at Warm Springs as MR-OUT-353, 5 Apr 45.
3. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; sent to the President as MR-OUT-359, 061504Z.
4. Approved by the President in MR-IN-182, 061708Z.
5. Reply to Churchill sent as PRES-PM #736, 6 April 1945.
MR-OUT-352 (0602062)

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT
NO: 934, 5 April 1945

Your No. 734.
1. I am astounded that Stalin should have addressed to you a message so insulting to the honour of the United States and also of Great Britain. His Majesty's Government cordially associate themselves with your reply and the War Cabinet have instructed me to send to Stalin the message in my immediately following.

2. There is very little doubt in my mind that the Soviet leaders, whoever they may be, are surprised and disconcerted at the rapid advance of the Allied armies in the west and the almost total defeat of the enemy on our front especially as they say they are themselves in no position to deliver a decisive attack before the middle of May. All this makes it the more important that we should join hands with the Russian armies as far to the east as possible and if circumstances allow, enter Berlin.

3. I may remind you that we proposed and thought we had arranged six weeks ago provisional zones of occupation in Austria, but since Yalta the Russians have sent no confirmation of these zones. Now that they are on the eve of taking Vienna and very likely will occupy the whole of Austria, it may well be prudent for us to hold as much as possible in the north.

4. We must always be anxious lest the brutality of the Russian messages does not foreshadow some deep change of policy for which they are preparing. On the whole I incline to think it is no more than their natural expression when vexed or jealous. For that very reason I deem it...
of the highest importance that a firm and blunt stand should be made at this juncture by our two countries in order that the air may be cleared and they realize that there is a point beyond which we will not tolerate insult. I believe this is the best chance of saving the future. If they are ever convinced that we are afraid of them and can be bullied into submission, then indeed I should despair of our future relations with them and much else.
German surrender negotiations; zones of occupation in Austria.

1. Answers PRES-PM #734, 4 April 45, which quoted to the Prime Minister an exchange of messages between the President and Stalin.
2. Sent to the President at Warm Springs MR-OUT-352, 060202Z.
3. See also PM-PRES #935, which is continuation of PM #934.
4. President referred #934 to Admiral Leahy in MR-IN-181, 060250Z, for preparation of draft reply.
5. Draft reply for PM #934 and #935 prepared by Admiral Leahy; sent to the President for approval as MR-OUT-359, 061540Z. Approved by the President in MR-IN-182, 061708Z.
6. Answer sent to Churchill as PRES-PM #736, 6 April 1945.
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Cerreta, Italy
To: War Department
Mr: FX 54695 NAF 911 4 April 1945

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff repeated SHAFF Forward for Eisenhower and US Military Mission Moscow for Deane and Archer FX 54695. Signed Alexander cite FHCOS. This is NAF 911.

CROSSWORD (Negotiations for surrender in Italy)

1. Report received from my representatives that the Italian intermediary Parrilli crossed frontier and conferred with them (believed on 2nd April) at Locarno. For reasons stated below CRITIC and others of his entourage did not accompany intermediary. Parrilli reported.
   
   A. CRITIC had arranged for conference night 1-2 April at GLAZIER's Headquarters.
   B. Meanwhile on 1st April Himmler phoned CRITIC and ordered him to remain in Italy. To insure compliance Himmler proposed to phone CRITIC periodically and ordered the move of CRITIC's family from the vicinity of the Brenner, where CRITIC had placed them, to the Salzburg area.
   C. CRITIC held conference with GLAZIER on night 1-2 April as arranged. GLAZIER's Chief of Staff also present. CRITIC reported both agreed with his project.

DECLASSIFIED

CM-IN-3062 (4 Apr 45)

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

COPY No. 11

Regraded Unclassified
2. My representatives sent message back to CRITIC through intermediary, as GLAZIER and his Chief of Staff were convinced of desirability of surrender in north Italy, there was nothing to prevent parliamentarians being sent directly to Allies through lines in order to put military machinery for surrender into effect. A password for use in this event was agreed. It was also suggested that Germans should inform us through OSS channels in Switzerland of the place, time and date at which parliamentarians would be sent over. Intermediary was also instructed to remind CRITIC of his undertaking not to carry out orders for destruction in North Italy.

3. In view of foregoing, I consider that both CRITIC and GLAZIER are waiting for project to be overtaken by events and that CRITIC at least hopes his contacts with Allies will in some degree have reinsured him personally. In particular it is noteworthy that neither GLAZIER nor CRITIC sent any concrete suggestions via their intermediary as to what should happen next.

4. I have therefore instructed my representatives to return to Caserta. The OSS link in Switzerland will remain open for any further contacts.

End
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

On April 3d the Soviet Ambassador called on the Secretary and stated that the British Government had introduced into the European Advisory Commission a document which it was suggested might be substituted for the unconditional surrender terms already agreed upon between the three Governments for application to Germany. The Ambassador stated that this new British proposal omitted any reference to unconditional surrender. The Ambassador stated he was instructed to inquire as to the attitude of this Government toward this British proposal.

Having no knowledge of this new proposal, we telegraphed Mr. Winant and received a report thereon this morning. It appears the British Government distributed, but has not yet placed before the European Advisory Commission officially for consideration, a proposed proclamation which might be issued by all of the Allied Commanders in case there was neither a German Government nor a German High Command available for unconditional surrender.

Mr. Winant reported that the omission of the words "unconditional surrender" apparently greatly disturbed the Soviet representative on the Commission, who assumed that this was an evidence of a change in policy. Mr. Winant said that he himself had made it clear to the Soviet representative that there was no change of policy so far as we were concerned and that the unconditional surrender instrument and the other agreements reached in the European Advisory Commission with respect to Germany were still binding upon this Government. (Mr. Winant's telegram from London, no. 5408, April 4, noon, copy attached.)

The Secretary had promised Mr. Gromyko that we would communicate with him as soon as we heard from Mr. Winant, therefore we informed the Soviet Ambassador today.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By Date, DEC 9 1972
today of the character of the new British proposal as described to us by Mr. Winant. We further gave cate-
goric assurance to Mr. Grenville that we considered the agreed unconditional surrender instrument as binding
upon this Government, and that we had no thought or idea of any change whatever in that policy. Upon his
inquiry as to our attitude toward the new British pro-
posal, we stated that we would not favor the substitu-
tion of any document or proposal which would modify the
agreed unconditional surrender instrument.

Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

From London, no. 3405,
April 4, noon.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By [Signature] Date [MAR 9 1972]
LC-1965
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

US URGENT
NIAC' 34.05, April 4, Noon.

FOR THE SECRETARY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY DUNN AND MR.

MATTHEWS.

Document referred to in Department's 2577, April 3, 8 p.m., forwarded by my despatch No. 22112 of April 2 (E & C 54/28 of March 30).

This document has simply been distributed and not placed before the European Advisory Commission. It was an effort on the part of Strang to prepare a proclamation which might be issued by all the Allied Commanders in Chief in the event that there was neither a German Government nor a German High Command available to sign the unconditional surrender. The omission of the words "unconditional surrender" and other modifications of the surrender instrument greatly disturbed Gousev as he assumed it was evidence of a change of policy. I made it clear to him last night that there was no change of policy whatsoever as far as we were concerned and that the agreed documents—unconditional surrender instrument, protocol on zones of occupation, agreement on control machinery—stood as binding on our government.

I am sure there has been no intention of changing the policy as far as the British Government is concerned. I think myself that it was a DECASSIFIED State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

Regraded Unclassified
mistake to circulate such a document at this time without a verbal explanation to the members of the Commission. The intention was to cover a contingency that might face the armed forces in the final stages of German disintegration.

I feel basically that Gousev and possibly his government is disturbed because the American-British forces are rapidly penetrating the German defense while the Russians are meeting strong resistance in the east. They are therefore sensitive to any apparent change of policy at the moment. In this connection the introduction of the United States memorandum of March 23 has not been an easy matter. I went over the document with Gousev personally before introducing it into the Commission in order to facilitate its early consideration.

WINANT

RR

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By [Signature] MAR 9 1972

- 2 -
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER
NO: 734, 4 APRIL 1945

The following message from Stalin dated 3 April and my reply thereto are quoted for your information:

QUOTE. MARSHAL STALIN TO PRESIDENT.

(Quotes verbatim Stalin's message of 3 April to the President.)

UNQUOTE.

QUOTE. PRESIDENT TO STALIN.

(Quotes verbatim the President's message #222 to Marshal Stalin, 4 April 1945.)

UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO: THE PRIME MINISTER

DATE: 734, 4 April 1945

SUBJECT: German surrender negotiations.

ACTION:

1. Quotes to Churchill for his information the exchange of messages between the President and Stalin (STALIN-PRES 3 Apr 45; PRES #222, 4 Apr 45.)

2. When Admiral Leahy sent to the President a draft reply to Stalin's message of 3 Apr 45, he requested permission to send copies of the exchange of messages to the Prime Minister and to Ambassador Harriman. President approved in his MR-IN-176, 4 Apr 45.

3. Answered by PM-PRES #936, 5 April 1945.

4. Further answered by PM-PRES #940, 11 Apr 45.
4 APRIL 1945

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, MOSCOW

042023Z NCR 9549

NUMBER 223, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN.

The following message from Stalin, dated 3 April, and my reply thereto are quoted for your information:

QUOTE. Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt, 3 April 1945.

I have received your message on the question of negotiations in Bern. You are absolutely right that in connection with the affair regarding negotiations of the Anglo-American Command with the German Command somewhere in Bern or some other place 'has developed an atmosphere of fear and distrust deserving regrets.'

You insist that there have been no negotiations yet.

It may be assumed that you have not been fully informed. As regards my military colleagues, they, on the basis of data which they have on hand, do not have any doubts, that the negotiations have taken place and that they have ended in an agreement with the Germans, on the basis of which the German commander on the Western Front, Marshal Kesselring, has agreed to open the front and permit the Anglo-American troops to advance to the East, and the Anglo-Americans have promised in return to ease for the Germans the peace terms.

I think that my colleagues are close to truth. Otherwise one could not have understood the fact that the Anglo-Americans have refused to admit to Bern representatives of the Soviet Command for participation in the
negotiations with the Germans.

I also cannot understand the silence of the British who have allowed you to correspond with me on this unpleasant matter, and they themselves remain silent, although it is known that the initiative in this whole affair with the negotiations in Bern belongs to the British.

I understand that there are certain advantages for the Anglo-American troops as a result of these separate negotiations in Bern or in some other place since the Anglo-American troops get the possibility to advance into the heart of Germany almost without any resistance on the part of the Germans, but why was it necessary to conceal this from the Russians, and why your Allies—the Russians—were not notified?

As a result of this at the present moment the Germans on the Western Front in fact have ceased the war against England and the United States. At the same time the Germans continue the war with Russia, the Ally of England and the United States. It is understandable that such a situation can in no way serve the cause of preservation of the strengthening of trust between our countries.

I have already written to you in my previous message and consider it necessary to repeat it here that I personally and my colleagues would have never made such a risky step, being aware that a momentary advantage, no matter what it would be, is fading before the principle advantage on the preservation and strengthening of trust among the Allies. UNQUOTE.

For my reply to above message, see my Number 222 to Stalin which is being transmitted through you today.
German surrender negotiations.

1. Quotes to Harriman for his information a message received from Marshal Stalin, dated 3 April 45. The President's reply to this message was not quoted to Harriman in this message since the original message (PRES-STALIN #222) would be handled by Harriman. (See STATUS REPORTS attached to Stalin's msg of 3 Apr 45 and to PRES-STALIN #222 for full report.)

2. When Admiral Leahy sent to the President his suggested reply to Stalin's message of 3 April 45, he requested permission to send copies to Prime Minister Churchill and Ambassador Harriman. President approved this in his MR-IN-176, 4 Apr 45.
4 APRIL 1945

FROM: OPHAV
TO: MOSCOW

NUMBER 222, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR MARSHAL STALIN.

I have received with astonishment your message of April 3 containing an allegation that arrangements which were made between Field Marshals Alexander and Kesselring at Bern, "permitted the Anglo-American troops to advance to the East and the Anglo-Americans promised in return to ease for the Germans the peace terms."

In my previous messages to you in regard to the attempts made in Bern to arrange a conference to discuss a surrender of the German Army in Italy, I have told you that,

(1) No negotiations were held in Bern;
(2) That the meeting had no political implications whatever;
(3) That in any surrender of the enemy army in Italy there could be no violation of our agreed principle of unconditional surrender;
(4) That Soviet officers would be welcomed at any meeting that might be arranged to discuss surrender.

For the advantage of our common war effort against Germany, which today gives excellent promise of an early success in a disintegration of the German armies, I must continue to assume that you have the same high confidence in my truthfulness and reliability that I have always had in yours.

I have also a full appreciation of the effect your gallant army has had in making possible a crossing of the Rhine by the forces under General

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 9, 1972

Regraded Unclassified
Eisenhower and the effect that your forces will have hereafter on the eventual collapse of the German resistance to our combined attacks.

I have complete confidence in General Eisenhower and know that he certainly would inform me before entering into any agreement with the Germans. He is instructed to demand and will demand unconditional surrender of enemy troops that may be defeated on his front. Our advances on the Western Front are due to military action. Their speed has been attributable mainly to the terrific impact of our air power resulting in destruction of German communications, and to the fact that Eisenhower was able to cripple the bulk of the German Forces on the Western Front while they were still west of the Rhine.

I am certain that there were no negotiations in Bern at any time, and I feel that your information to that effect must have come from German sources which have made persistent efforts to create dissenion between us in order to escape in some measure for responsibility for their war crimes. If that was Wolff’s purpose in Bern your message proves that he has had some success.

With a confidence in your belief in my personal reliability and in my determination to bring about together with you an unconditional surrender of the Nazis, it is astonishing that a belief seems to have reached the Soviet Government that I have entered into an agreement with the enemy without first obtaining your full agreement.

Finally I would say this, it would be one of the great tragedies of history if at the very moment of the victory, now within our grasp, such distrust, such lack of faith should prejudice the entire undertaking after the colossal losses of life, materiel and treasure involved.

Frankly I cannot avoid a feeling of bitter resentment toward your
informers, whoever they are, for such vile misrepresentations of my
actions or those of my trusted subordinates.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 04201 April 1945.

F. H. GRAHAM
F. H. GRAHAM,
Captain, AGD.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
MAR 9 1972
By W. J. Stewart Date
**FROM** THE PRESIDENT  
**TO** MARSHAL STALIN  

**DATE** #222, 4 April 1945  

**SUBJECT:** German surrender negotiations.  

**ACTION:**

1. Answers STALIN-PRES 3 Apr 45, which was sent to the President at Warm Springs and referred by the President to Admiral Leahy, to "take the necessary steps for the preparation of an immediate reply."

2. Admiral Leahy referred to General Marshall on 4 April 1945 by memo stating: "Please give me a memorandum upon which I can base a reply and can inform the President that you have been consulted."

3. Draft reply prepared in General Marshall's office; Admiral Leahy revised the draft; sent to the President for his approval as MR-OUT-344, 041625Z. In this message, Admiral Leahy asked the President's permission to send copies of Stalin's message of 3 April and the President's reply to Prime Minister Churchill and Ambassador Harriman for their information.

4. President's reply to Admiral Leahy, MR-IN-176, 041915Z, stated: "Yr MR-OUT-344. Approved for transmission including repeating to Harriman and Churchill the interchange of messages."

5. Message to Stalin dispatched 042017Z as attached #222. Messages quoted to Prime Minister Churchill in PRES #734, 4 Apr 45; Stalin's message of 3 Apr 45 quoted to Ambassador Harriman as PRES #223, 4 Apr 45.

6. Answered by STALIN-PRES, 7 April 1945.

**COPIES TO:**  
MR 370 GERMANY (2)  

**DATE:**  

**BY DIRECTION OF:**  

**ORIGIN AL:** PRES-STALIN FILE  

370 GERMANY
FROM: MARSHAL STALIN

TO: THE PRESIDENT

NO: UNNO, 3 APRIL 1945

I have received your message on the question of negotiations in Bern. You are absolutely right that in connection with the affair regarding negotiation of the Anglo-American Command with the German Command somewhere in Bern or some other place "has developed an atmosphere of fear and distrust deserving regrets."

You insist that there have been no negotiations yet.

It may be assumed that you have not been fully informed. As regards my military colleagues, they, on the basis of data which they have on hand, do not have any doubts, that the negotiations have taken place and that they have ended in an agreement with the Germans, on the basis of which the German commander on the Western front—Marshal Kesselring—has agreed to open the front and permit the Anglo-American troops to advance to the East, and the Anglo-Americans have promised in return to ease for the Germans the peace matter that it would be, in fading before the principle advantage of the preservation and strengthening of trust among the Allies.

I think that my colleagues are close to truth. Otherwise one could not have understood the fact that the Anglo-Americans have refused to admit to Bern representatives of the Soviet Command for participation in the negotiations with the Germans.

I also cannot understand the silence of the British who have allowed you to correspond with me on this unpleasant matter, and they themselves remain silent, although it is known that the initiative in this whole affair...
with the negotiations in Bern belongs to the British.

I understand that there are certain advantages for the Anglo-American troops as a result of these separate negotiations in Bern or in some other place since the Anglo-American troops get the possibility to advance into the heart of Germany almost without any resistance on the part of the Germans, but why was it necessary to conceal this from the Russians, and why your Allies—the Russians—were not notified?

As a result of this at the present moment the Germans on the Western front in fact have ceased the war against England and the United States. At the same time the Germans continue the war with Russia, the Ally of England and the United States. It is understandable that such a situation can in no way serve the cause of preservation of the strengthening of trust between our countries.

I have already written to you in my previous message and consider it necessary to repeat it here that I personally and my colleagues would have never made such a risky step, being aware that a momentary advantage, no matter what it would be, is fading before the principle advantage on the preservation and strengthening of trust among the Allies.
VI.


Answer Press Stalingrad 217, 31 Mar 45.

2. To the President at Warm Springs as MR-OUT-339, 040340Z.

3. President to Admiral Leahy, MR-IN-174, stated: "Reference MR-OUT-339. Take the necessary steps for the preparation of an immediate reply."

4. Referred to General Marshall by Admiral Leahy on 4 April 1945, by memo stating: "Please give me a memorandum upon which I can base a reply and can inform the President that you have been consulted."

5. Draft reply prepared in General Marshall's office; Admiral Leahy revised the draft; sent to the President for his approval as MR-OUT-344, 041625Z. In this message, Admiral Leahy asked the President's permission to send copies of Stalin's message of 3 April and the President's reply to Prime Minister Churchill and Ambassador Harriman for their information.

6. President's reply to Admiral Leahy, MR-IN-176, 041915Z, stated: "Yr MR-OUT-344. Approved for transmission including repeating to Harriman and Churchill the interchange of messages."

7. Message sent to Stalin as PRES #222, 4 April 1945; messages quoted to Prime Minister Churchill in PRES #734, 4 April 1945; Stalin's message of 3 April 45 quoted to Ambassador Harriman as PRES #223, 4 April 1945.
From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia
To: War Department
CG, United Kingdom Base Section, London, England
Nr: MX 23608 2 April 1945

For Alexander FHCOS, information to Combined Chiefs of Staff and British Chiefs of Staff from Archer and Deane
TOP SECRET MX 23608.

CROSSWORD. Request contained in your FX 53675 has
been complied with. In informing the Soviets, we have given
them information contained in FX 53447 but emphasized through-
out that your representatives were attempting only to arrange
a meeting at your headquarters where actual negotiations would
take place.

End.

This message relayed to U K Base Section as CRYPTO
WAR SVC 5426 by WDC per originator’s request.

FOOTNOTE: P 53675 is CM-IN-1336 (2 Apr 45) CC/S.
FX-53447 is CM-IN 1485 (2 Apr 45) CC/S.

ACTION: CC/S
Adm. King, C of B.

CM-IN-1954 (3 Apr 45) DTG: 021730Z ngr

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Date:_____________ by_____________

NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
BOD Dir. 5200.10

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Regraded Unclassified
From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia
To: War Department
Nr: MX 23589 2 April 1945

To AFHQ for Field Marshal Alexander's eyes only, AGWAR for the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and Central Base UK for the British Chiefs of Staff from Archer and Deane TOP SECRET MX 23589.

We have withheld from the Soviet General Staff the information contained in your F 53774 of 1st April (not sent to the Combined or British Chiefs of Staff) pending your reply to this message.

We feel that your message as written would convey a definite impression to the Soviet authorities that negotiations for a German surrender had been initiated in Berne.

Your message goes on to state the progress of these negotiations. It does not make any mention of negotiations to be held in Caserta.

We feel certain that the Soviets would take your message as a direct contradiction to the information which has been given them on two occasions by our governments with the concurrence of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and on two occasions by the President.

This information may be summed up in the most recent message from the President delivered to Marshal Stalin on

CM-IN-1244 (2 Apr 45)

TOP SECRET NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

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Date: __________________ by __________________

TOP SECRET

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Regraded Unclassified
From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia

Mr: MX 23589 2 April 1945

April 1st which stated:

"No negotiations for surrender have been entered into, and if there should be any negotiations they will be conducted at Caserta with your representatives present throughout."

While we feel certain that your representatives are merely acting at the present time to arrange a meeting in Caserta, the information as given in your message would not be construed by the Russians in this sense.

We therefore recommend that you amend the message which you desire us to give to the Soviet authorities to conform to the assurances already given them by our respective governments and by our heads of state.

End

NOTE: Corrected copy is CM-IN-1065 (2 April 45) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFO: Adm Leahy Adm King
General Arnold C of S
General Hull
General Bissell

CM-IN-1244 (2 Apr 45) DTG: 020015Z

TOP SECRET

SECRET

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
FROM: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
To: War Department
Nr: EX 53675 NAF 908 2 April 1945

EX 53675 to US Military Mission Moscow for Deane and Archer repeated for information to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff, AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff and SHAPE Forward for Eisenhower signed Alexander cite FHCOS this is NAF 908. Reference your MX 23589 dated 2nd April.

CROSSWORD

1. My F 53774 of 1st April was dispatched to furnish background and information of events to date as reported by my representatives.

2. My representatives are following the instructions issued by me and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the effect that they are not to enter into negotiations but are to contact authorities and if negotiations seem feasible to return to Caserta with accredited German officers. Negotiations would then take place at Caserta with Russian officers present.

3. Request convey to Soviet General Staff the information contained in F 53774 but in such a way as to insure that it is understood my representatives are not entering into negotiations for surrender.

End

MX 23589 is CM-IN-124 (2 Apr 45) CCS
F 53774 has been requested.

ACTION: CCS
INFO: ADM LEAHY, GEN ARNOLD, GEN HULL, GEN HISSELL, ADM KING, C OF S

CM-IN-1336 (2 Apr 45) DTG 021138B mcs

DECLASSIFIED
J.C.S. Regrating Memo 29-71

By 8680s Date MAR 10 1971
From: Allied Force Headquarters Caserta, Italy
To: War Department
Nr: FX 53675  NAF 908  2 April 1945

FX 53675 to US Military Mission Moscow for Deane and Archer repeated for information to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff, AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff and SHAEF Forward for Eisenhower sgd Alexander cite PHOOS, this is NAF 908. TOPSEC. Reference your MX 23589 dated 2nd April.

Reference F 53774 referred to in Par 1 and 3 should be F 53447.

End

F 53447 is CM-IN 1485 (2 April 45)
ACTION: CC/S
INFORMATION: Adm. Leahy; Gen. Arnold; Gen. Hull; Gen. Bissell; Adm. King; C of S
CM-IN-2296 (3 Apr 45) DTG 021138Z es

COPY NO.
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN 24-75724
TOP SECRET

FROM: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
To: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia

First line: event it appears likely that CRITIC, in order to attempt to cover himself
for Deane and Archer from Alexander cite RHOCOS.

No: F 53447 2 April 1945

TOP SECRET. CROSSWORD. Action to US Military Mission Moscow F 53447
for Deane and Archer from Alexander cite RHOCOS.

Para 1. Following information passed to you for transmission to
Soviets.
Note: This message originally sent to Moscow only.

Para 2. After a meeting between an OSS official and CRITIC, it
appeared to my representatives that the time had come to undertake with
the latter a definite discussion of a plan for military surrender. They
therefore met him on 19 March, being introduced as military colleagues of the
OSS official and high-ranking Allied officers, but without disclosing their
names, ranks or headquarters of origin.

Para 3. CRITIC was told there was no time to lose if results were to
be achieved, as EMPEROR'S move to the West Front had basically altered
the position. Whether CRITIC should play his hand with GLAZIER (EMPEROR'S succe-
sor) or whether he should go to EMPEROR'S Headquarters and take the matter up
with him before seeing GLAZIER, was therefore the main problem.

Para 4. Though willing to go to see GLAZIER, CRITIC was of opinion
that he should first contact EMPEROR, as GLAZIER was a non-political soldier
and would need to be assured of strong support within the Wehrmacht before he
would react favorably. Moreover, CRITIC confidently expected a sympathetic
hearing from EMPEROR.

Para 5. It was therefore decided that CRITIC should leave on 20 March
for EMPEROR'S Headquarters to obtain his support. This was expected to take
some five to seven days and on returning CRITIC would make definite proposals
to GLAZIER. It was stressed to CRITIC that he must produce qualified officers
with full powers to plan a military surrender. He agreed with this and it was
arranged that if he was successful such officers would be delivered to a point
on the Swiss-Italian frontier.

Para 6. Subsequently, it was ascertained from GRADUATE, who was a party
to the plans, that CRITIC was delayed at EMPEROR'S Headquarters largely due to
the changed situation in the west. It is now confirmed that CRITIC has returned
to his headquarters in Northern Italy and it is believed that, though he received
a sympathetic hearing from EMPEROR, the latter was too much surrounded by un-
trustworthy personnel to be able to participate. However, CRITIC stated that
EMPEROR had authorized him to speak with GLAZIER on his behalf.

Para 7. A further meeting between CRITIC and my representatives is now
planned for 2 or 3 April. It is reported that CRITIC appears to be extremely
optimistic. However, while my representatives feel he will almost certainly
arrive, no great hope is placed in his ability to make GLAZIER act. In that

TOP SECRET

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event it appears likely that CRITIC, in order to attempt to cover himself personally, will make some offer regarding surrender or rear areas under his control. This is unlikely to be practicable.

End

Note: This message originally sent to Moscow only. Repeated to WAC at request of WDCMC.

ACTION: CC/S

CM-IN-1485 (2 Apr 45) DTG 021700B.

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Date ______________ by __________

NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
BOD Dir. 5200.10
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
To: War Department
Nr: FX 53446 NAF 907 1 April 1945

FX 53446 TOP SECRET to AG WAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff repeated SHAEBF Forward for Eisenhower signed Alexander cite HICOS this is NAF 907.

CROSSWORD.

1. Following further information received from my representatives.
   A. Confirmed CRITIC has returned to his headquarters at Fasano.
   B. Intermediary reports CRITIC received sympathetic hearing from EMPEROR but latter too much surrounded by untrustworthy personnel to be able to participate. EMPEROR had authorized CRITIC to speak with GLAZIER on his behalf and this meeting was to take place on 31 March. VON VIERTINGHOFF
   C. Further meeting between my representatives and CRITIC in Locarno area is expected on 2nd or 3rd April. Although he appears to be very optimistic, no great hope is placed on his being able definitely to commit GLAZIER.

2. If nothing concrete comes out of this meeting, propose to recall my representatives to APHQ.

3. Archer and Deane now fully informed to date.

ACTION: Gen. McFarland (CC/S)
CM-IN-745 (1 Apr 45) DTG 011739A g3g

DECLASSIFIED
J.C.S. Rerading Memo 29-71
By [Signature] Date MAR 10 1971
COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN 24-55724

Regraded Unclassified
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
To: War Department
Nr: PX 53310 NAF 906 1 April 1945

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff repeated SHARP Forward for Eisenhower sgd Alexander PX 53310 cite PHGOS this is NAF 906. TOP SECRET.

Acknowledged is your PAN 516. Action being taken accordingly.

End

NOTE: PAN 516 is CM-OUT-61566 (31 Mar 45)
ACTION: CC/S

CM-IN-557 (1 Apr 45) DTG 011303A gfg

370 Germany

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
31 MARCH 1945

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSHA, MOSCOW

NUMBER 217, TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR MARSHAL
STALIN.

It seems to me in the exchange of messages we have had on possible
future negotiations with the Germans for surrender of their forces in Italy,
that although both of us are in agreement on all the basic principles, the
matter now stands in an atmosphere of regrettable apprehension and mistrust.

No negotiations for surrender have been entered into, and if there
should be any negotiations they will be conducted at Caserta with your repre-
sentatives present throughout. Although the attempt at Bern to arrange for
the conduct of these negotiations has so far been fruitless, Marshal Alex-
ander has been directed to keep you informed of his progress in this matter.

I must repeat that the meeting in Bern was for the single purpose of
arranging contact with competent German military officers and not for nego-
tiations of any kind.

There is no question of negotiating with the Germans in any way which
would permit them to transfer elsewhere forces from the Italian front.

Negotiations, if any are conducted, will be on the basis of unconditional
surrender. With regard to the lack of Allied offensive operations in Italy,
this condition has in no way resulted from any expectation of an agreement
with the Germans. As a matter of fact, recent interruption of offensive
operations in Italy has been due primarily to the recent transfer of Allied
forces, British and Canadian divisions, from that front to France. Prepara-
tions are now made for an offensive on the Italian front about April 10th,
but while we hope for success, the operation will be of limited power due to the lack of forces now available to Alexander. He has seventeen dependable divisions and is opposed by twenty-four German divisions. We intend to do everything within the capacity of our available resources to prevent any withdrawal of the German forces now in Italy.

I feel that your information about the time of the movements of German troops from Italy is in error. Our best information is that three German divisions have left Italy since the first of the year, two of which have gone to the Eastern front. The last division of the three started moving about February 25, more than two weeks before anybody heard of any possibility of a surrender. It is therefore clearly evident that the approach made by German agents in Bern occurring after the last movement of troops began could not possibly have had any effect on the movement.

This entire episode has arisen through the initiative of a German officer reputed to be close to Himmler and there, of course, is a strong possibility that his sole purpose is to create suspicion and distrust between the Allies. There is no reason why we should permit him to succeed in that aim. I trust that the above categorical statement of the present situation and of my intentions will allay the apprehensions which you express in your message of March 29.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at
2119432 March 1945.

OGDEN KNIFFIN,
Major, C.R.
FROM  THE PRESIDENT  TO  MARSHAL STALIN

SUBJECT: German surrender negotiations.

ACTION:

1. Answered STALIN-PRES 29 March, 1945, which was sent to the President at Warm Springs as WH-OUT-305, 291222E.
2. President's reply to Admiral Leahy, WH-IN-164, stated: "Re WH-OUT-305. Please let me know if you consider reply necessary and if so prepare and send draft for my approval."
3. Admiral Leahy, with assistance of General Marshall, prepared reply. Sent to the President as WH-OUT-313, 311532Z.
4. President approved message in WH-IN-187, 311904Z, dispatched to Moscow at 311943Z.
5. Answered by STALIN-PRES 3 Apr 45.

Regraded Unclassified
Comanding General
Allied Force Headquarters
Caserta, Italy

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Forward Echelon
Rheims, France

British Joint Staff Mission
Washington, D. C.

Number: WARX 61566

TOPSEC book message to Alexander for action, to SHAEF Rheims for Eisenhower and to AMSSO pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information. This message is PAN 516 to Alexander from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Your attention is drawn to paragraph 4 of the message to the U.S. and British Ambassadors in Moscow quoted in PAN 508, in which an undertaking was given to report to the Soviets the results of any CROSSWORD contact in Berne, through Archer and Deane.

If you have not already done so, request you report at once results of meeting of 19th March referred to in NAF 891, and that you continue to keep the Soviets informed of any further results, in accordance with the undertaking referred to above.

End

Note: PAN 508 is CM-OUT-53452 (15 Mar 45).
NAF 891 is CM-IN-22385 (21 Mar 45).

ORIGINATOR: CO/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy; Gen Arnold; Gen Hull; Gen Bissell; Adm King; Mr. Stimson; C of S.

CM-OUT-61566 (Mar 45) DTG 312046Z rel

COPY No. 5

Regraded Unclassified
For your information I have to tell you that the Germans have already made use of the negotiations with the Allied Command and during this period have succeeded in shifting three divisions from Northern Italy to the Soviet Front.

I gave consideration to the question you raised before me in the letter of March 25, 1945, and have found that the Soviet Government could not have given a different answer after the Soviet representatives were refused participation in the discussions in Bern with the Germans regarding the possibility of capitulation of German troops and opening the front to Anglo-American troops in Northern Italy.

I am not against and, more than this, I am fully for using the opportunity of disintegration in the German armies and to hasten their capitulation in any section of the front, to encourage them in the opening of the front for the Allies quickly in order not to miss an opportunity. It would be the case if But I agree to negotiations with the enemy on such matter only in the case when these negotiations will not make the situation of the enemy easier, if there will be excluded a possibility for the Germans to manoeuvre and to use these negotiations for shifting of their troops to other sections of the front and, first of all, to the Soviet front then far to the West, to the Oder. Only with the purpose of creating such a guarantee was the participation of representatives of the Soviet Military Command in such negotiations with the enemy considered necessary by the Soviet Government, no matter where they would take place—in Bern or Caserta. I cannot understand why representatives of the Soviet Command were refused participation in these negotiations and in what way could they cause inconvenience to the representatives of the Allied Command.
For your information I have to tell you that the Germans have already made use of the negotiations with the Allied Command and during this period have succeeded in shifting three divisions from Northern Italy to the Soviet front. They have no secrets from each other.

The task of coordinated operations with a blow upon the Germans from the West, South and East, announced at the Crimea Conference is to bind the troops of the enemy to the place of their location and not to give the enemy any possibility to manoeuvre and shift troops in the necessary for him direction. This task is being carried out by the Soviet Command. This is being violated by Fieldmarshal Alexander.

This circumstance is irritating the Soviet Command and creates ground for distrust.

"As a military man", you write me, "you will understand, that it is necessary to act quickly in order not to miss an opportunity. It would be the same if your general at Koenigsberg or Danzig would be approached by the enemy with a white flag." It is regretted that an analogy does not suit this case. German troops at Koenigsberg and Danzig are surrounded. If they surrender they will do it in order to avoid annihilation but they cannot open a front to the Soviet troops as the front has moved away from them far to the West, to the Oder. An entirely different situation is that of the German troops in Northern Italy. They are not surrounded and they do not face annihilation. If the Germans in Northern Italy, in spite of this seek negotiations in order to surrender and to open the front to Allied troops, this means that they have different, more serious aims relating to the fate of Germany.

I have to tell you, that if on the Eastern front, somewhere on the Oder, similar conditions of a possibility of capitulation of the Germans and opening
the front to Soviet troops would arise, I would not hesitate to inform immedia-
tely the Anglo-American Military Command and to request it to send their
representatives for participation in negotiations as in such cases the Allies
should have no secrets from each other.

March 29, 1945.
FROM MARSHAL STALIN TO THE PRESIDENT

DATE: 29 March 1945

TO MAP ROOM VIA Russian Embassy

SUBJECT: German surrender negotiations.

ACTION:

1. Answers PRES-STALIN #212, 29 March 1945.

2. Sent to the President at Warm Springs as MR-OUT-305, 2912202.

3. President's reply to Admiral Leahy, MR-IN-164, stated: "Be MR-OUT-305. Please let me know if you consider reply necessary and if so prepare and send draft for my approval."

4. Admiral Leahy, with assistance of General Marshall, prepared reply. Sent to the President as MR-OUT-313, 311530Z.

5. President approved message for transmission to Stalin in MR-IN-167, 311904Z. Dispatched to Moscow at 311943Z March as PRES-STALIN #217.

COPYED TO:
MR 370 GERMANY (2)

DATE: ___________________________ BY DIRECTION OF: ___________________________

ORIGINAL: PRES-STALIN FILE

370 GERMANY
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
To: War Department
Nr: FX 51093 NAF 302 28 March 1945

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff repeated to SHAPE Forward for Eisenhower cite HFCOS signed Alexander. FX 51093

This is NAF number 902.

Para 1. CROSSWORD. My representatives report on 27th March that they have not had another meeting with CRITIC as he has not yet returned from EMPEROR's Headquarters.

Para 2. Contact is established with GRADUATE, who is CRITIC's aide and party to the plans. GRADUATE has been in touch with CRITIC by telephone.

Para 3. These telephone conversations, as reported, indicate that CRITIC is still anxious that military contacts remain open but does not desire to leave EMPEROR's Headquarters until he can return with a complete plan. Due to offensive in the west, EMPEROR has been extremely busy and CRITIC has not been able to spend much time with him.

Para 4. It is expected that CRITIC will return to Switzerland the latter part of this week and that he may bring mandates from both EMPEROR and GLAZIER.

ACTION: Gen McFarland CO/S
INFO: Adm Leahy; Gen Arnold; Gen Hull; Gen Bissell;
Adm King; Mr Stimson; C of S

CM-IN-29592 (28 Mar 45) DTG: 281300A eje

DECLASSIFIED
J.C.S. Regrading Memo 29-21

By Germany Date MAR 10 1971 COPY NO.
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

To: War Department

Nr: FX 51088  NAFO 901  28 March 1945

To AGWAR for CCS and to AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff repeated SHAPE Forward for Eisenhower for information FX 51088 signed Alexander cite FHCOS. This is NAFO 901.

Reference my immediately preceding telegram, code word is GRADUATE.

End

See CM-IN-29593 (28 Mar 45) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFO: Adm Leahy, Gen Arnold, Gen Hull, Gen Bissell, Adm King, Mr Stimson

CM-IN-29594 (28 Mar 45) DTG: 281217Z.

DECLASSIFIED
J.O.S. Rerading Memo 29-71
By:  Date: MAR 1 0 1971
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
To: War Department
Nr: FX 51087 NAF 900 28 March 1945

To AGWAR for CCS and to AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff repeated SHAEF Forward for Eisenhower for information FX 51087. Signed Alexander cite FHCO. This is NAF 900.

Further to NAF 883 and 884 dated 15th March 1945.
Codeword in my immediately following telegram is allotted to denote Zimmer who is ADC to Wolff.

End

NAF 883 is CM-IN-15836 (15 Mar 45) CCS
NAF 884 is CM-IN-15858 (15 Mar 45) CCS

ACTION: CCS
INFO: Adm Leahy; Gen Arnold; Gen Hull; Gen Bissell;
SGS (Col Newsome); Adm King; Mr. Stimson

CM-IN-29593 (28 Mar 45) DTG: 281216Z.
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: MARSHAL STALIN
NO: 212, 24 MARCH 1945 (2420472)

I have received from Ambassador Harriman a letter addressed to him
by Mr. Molotov regarding an investigation being made by Field Marshal Alex-
ander into a reported possibility of obtaining the surrender of part or all
of the German Army in Italy, in which letter Mr. Molotov demands that this
investigation to be undertaken in Switzerland be stopped forthwith because
of the non participation therein of Soviet officers.

I am sure that the facts of this matter, through misunderstanding,
have not been correctly presented to you.

The facts are as follows: Some few days ago unconfirmed information
was received in Switzerland that some German officers were considering the
possibility of arranging for the surrender of German troops that are opposed
to the British-American Armies in Italy commanded by Field Marshal Alexander.

When this information reached Washington, Field Marshal Alexander was
authorized to send an officer, or officers, of his staff to Switzerland to
ascertain the accuracy of the report, and if it appeared to be of sufficient
promise, to arrange with any competent German officers for a conference with
Field Marshal Alexander at his headquarters in Italy to discuss details of
the surrender. Soviet representatives would, of course, be present if such a
meeting could be arranged.

The Soviet Government was immediately informed of this investigation
to be made in Switzerland and was later informed that it will be agreeable
for Soviet officers to be present at Field Marshal Alexander's meeting with
German officers when and if such a meeting is finally arranged in Berne to
discuss details of a surrender at Caserta.

Attempts by our representatives to arrange a meeting with German officers have met with no success up to the present time, but there still appears to be a possibility of such a meeting.

You will, of course, understand that my government must give every assistance to all officers in the field in command of American Forces who believe there is a possibility of forcing the surrender of enemy troops in their area. It would be completely unreasonable for me to take any other attitude or to permit any delay which must cause additional and unavoidable loss of life in the American Forces. You as a military man will understand the necessity for prompt action to avoid losing an opportunity. It is in the same category as would be the sending of a flag of truce to your general at Koenigsberg or Danzig.

In such a surrender of enemy forces in the field, there can be no political implications whatever and no violation of our agreed principle of unconditional surrender.

At any discussion of details of surrender by our commanders of American Forces in the field, I will be pleased to have the benefit of the experience and advice of any of your officers who can be present, but I cannot agree to suspend investigation of the possibility because of objection on the part of Mr. Molotov for some reason that is completely beyond my understanding.

I do not expect much from the reported possibility, but I hope you will, with the purpose of preventing misunderstanding between our officers, point out to the Soviet officials concerned the desirability and necessity of our taking prompt and effective action without any delay to accomplish the
surrender of any enemy military forces in the field that are opposed to American forces.

    I am sure that when a similar opportunity comes on the Soviet front you will have the same attitude and will take the same action.

    ROOSEVELT
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO MARSHAL STALIN

SERIAL or FILE NO. #212, 24 March 1945.

DATE

TO MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Surrender negotiations with Germans.

ACTION:

1. For "Ambassador Harriman's letter", see War Department message M 23247 (CM-IN-17375) 16 March 1945, from Harriman to Sec State, filed MR 370 GERMANY (2).

2. Message drafted by State Department and Admiral Leahy; approved by the President with several changes; dispatched 24204,72.

3. Answered by STALIN-PRESIDENT 29 Mar 45.

COPIES TO:

MR 370 GERMANY (2) DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

ORIGINAL: PRES FILE

370 GERMANY
RA-1.4
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Secretary of State
Washington

URGENT
367, March 23, 3 a.m.

FOR THE SECRETARY.
REDEPTS 652, March 20, 1 p.m.

I have tonight March 22 received a reply from Molotov to my communication to him concerning the meeting at Bern reading in paraphrase translation as follows: your letter of March 21 concerning the meeting between the officers of Field Marshal Alexander's staff with General Wolff in Bern has been received. I must state that I see no basis for your statement to the effect that the Soviet Government has incorrectly understood the reasons for the contact between Wolff and Field Marshal Alexander's representatives in Bern since in the present case it is not a question of incorrect understanding of the objectives of this contact or of misunderstanding—it is something worse.

The German General Wolff and the persons accompanying him, according to your letter of March 12, arrived in Bern in order to carry on conversations with representatives of the American and British Command concerning the surrender of German troops in the north of Italy. When the Soviet Government stated that representatives of the Soviet Military command should participate in these
conversations the Soviet Government received a refusal in this respect. During the last two weeks, therefore, in Bern, behind the back of the Soviet Government which has been carrying on the main burden of the war against Germany, representatives of the American and British Command on the one part and representatives of the German Military Command on the other are carrying on negotiations. The Government of the USSR considers that this is absolutely inadmissible and insists on the fulfillment of the statement of the Soviet Government contained in my letter of March 16.

End of Molotov's letter.

HARRIMAN
From: Allied Force Headquarters Caserta, Italy

To: War Department

Nr: FX 48804 23 March 1945

FX 48804 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to AMSEC for British Chiefs of Staff repeated SHAEF Main for information. To be signed Alexander cite FHQCT.

This is NAF 897 in two parts. Part 1.

1. In event of local surrender of enemy forces in Italy, I intend to impose instrument detailed in part two following. I would appreciate your early approval of this instrument which has been prepared in light of directions given in FAN 395.

2. I propose to arrange for similar instrument to be imposed in the event of enemy surrender in Crete and the Dodecanese.

3. Following applies to Paragraphs 3 and 4 of instrument in Part 2. Appendixes A, B and C are not included in this signal and draft copies will follow shortly by air. Appendix A details conditions which will be applied to and action required to be taken by the enemy land forces. Appendixes B and C deal similarly with enemy Naval and air forces. Main provisions of appendix A cover following matters. Stand-fast of all formations and units in present positions and absolute prohibition of all movement ex Italy. Disarmament. Status of surrendered personnel. Prohibition of destruction and damage of all kinds. Provision of information and facilities required by allies. Disposal of prisoners of war and other persons in enemy custody.

CM-IN-25098 (24 Mar 45)

DECLASSIFIED
J.O.S. Regrading Memo 29-71

By PECHEE Date MAR 10 1971

COPY NO. 26

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Allied Force Headquarters Caserta, Italy

Mr: FX 48804 23 March 1945

Control of radio and telecommunications. Treatment of Allied Liaison Officers and Italian Government Forces in German occupied Italy.

Part 2.

Title of instrument. Begins. Instrument of local surrender of German and other forces under the command or control of the German Commander in Chief Southwest. Title ends. Text of instrument begins.

1. The German Commander in Chief Southwest hereby surrenders unconditionally all the forces under his command or control on land, at sea and in the air, and places himself and these forces unconditionally at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations.

2. All armed forces under the command or control of the German Commander in Chief Southwest will cease all hostilities on land, at sea and in the air at blank hours (Greenwich mean Time) blank (date). The German Commander in Chief Southwest undertakes to arrange accordingly.

3. The German Commander in Chief Southwest undertakes to carry out the orders set out in appendixes A, B and C and any further orders of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations. Disobedience of such orders or failure to comply with them will be dealt with in accordance with the accepted laws and usages of war.
From: Allied Force Headquarters Caserta, Italy  
Nr: FX 48804 23 March 1945

4. This instrument will enter into force immediately on signature, and the orders in appendixes A, B and C will become effective on the date and at the time specified in Paragraph two above.

5. This instrument and accompanying orders are drawn up in the English and German languages. The English version is the authentic text. If any doubt as to meaning or interpretation arises, the decision of the Supreme Allied Commander is final.

6. This instrument is independent of, without prejudice to, and shall be superseded by any general instrument of surrender imposed by or on behalf of the United Nations and applicable to Germany and the German armed forces as a whole. Text ends. Instrument will be signed at bottom by myself and German Commander in Chief Southwest or his accredited representative. Place, date and hour will be specified.

End

FAN 395 is CM-OUT-81701 (16 Aug 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy  
Gen Arnold  
Gen Hull  
Gen Bissell  
Adm King  
CofS

DECLASSIFIED J.C.S. Regrading Memo 29-71

CM-IN-25098 (24 Mar 45) DTG 23/NFT bjm

COPY No. 26

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Regraded Unclassified
From:  Allied Force Headquarters Caserta Italy
To:  War Department
Nr:  FX 47971 NAF 895  22 March 1945

FX 47971.  To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff repeated SHAEF FORWARD for Eisenhower signed Alexander cite FHCOS.  This NAF number 895.

1. Following intelligence emerged from meetings of my representatives with CRITIC on 19th March near Locarno.

2. CRITIC is both Hoochster SS and Polizei Fuehrer and Bevolimaechtigster General Der Deutschen Wehrmacht in Italy. CRITIC is active, intelligent, but with a crafty appearance, and has a strong personality. He is disillusioned and takes a realistic view of the situation.

3. CRITIC claims to control rear areas approximately north of Po including Brenner and Innsbruck area. As Polizei Fuehrer, he disposes of approximately 15,000 Germans, 20,000 Russians (Cossacks, Donkubens and Turcomans), 10,000 Serbs, 10,000 Slovenes, 5,000 Czechs, Indian Legion and 100,000 Italians including militia, Black Shirts and "X" MAS. As Revolimaechtigster General he also commands 10,000 Germans and can call on 55,000 German administrative troops if necessary for tactical use in rear areas. Above heterogeneous command not very dependable, widely scattered and with only light armament except for a few old tanks. Serbs and Slovenes centered around Goers in extreme east.

4. GLAZIER was due at Army Group Headquarters on the 16 April.

CM-IN-23605 (22 Mar 45)

DECLASSIFIED
J.C.S. Regrading Memo 29-71
By JCS Date MAR 10 1971

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Regarded Unclassified
From: Allied Force Headquarters Caserta Italy  
Nr: FX 47971 HAF 895  22 March 1945

19th. Described as non-political soldier, not easy to win over to political action unless supported by others in Wehrmacht.

5. CRITIC stated that Hitler had intended to evacuate a large part of northern Italy in September 1944 and preparations had been made. Plan would have released nine divisions for other theaters. Plan was abandoned because military command in Italy felt line could be held for some time, there were considerable quantities of food supplies available in north Italy, remaining Italian industry had some value and it was dangerous to open airfields in north Italy to the Allies.

6. CRITIC expressed himself as strongly opposed to the self-destruction concept of a national redoubt in the south.

End

ACTION: CC/S
INFO: Adm. Leahy; Gen. Arnold; Gen. Hull; Gen. Bissell; Adm. King; C of S
CM-IN-23605 (22 Mar 45) DTG: 221757A ejc

DECLASSIFIED
J.C.S. Redegrading Memo 29-71
By Date MAR 1971

COPY NO.
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
To: War Department
Nr: FX 47221 NAF 391 21 March 1945

CROSS WORD to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff repeated SHARP for Eisenhower FX 47221 signed Alexander cite FHCOS. This is NAF 391.

1. My representatives returned to Berne 20th March and have furnished me with a report on their meeting with CRITIC on 19th.

2. As a result of conference between CRITIC and OSS official, my representatives concluded that the time had arrived to move discussions out of conspiratorial phase into definite discussion of plan for military surrender. They accordingly were introduced as high-ranking Allied Officers and Military Colleagues of OSS official, but no names, ranks or Headquarters of origin were given.

3. My representative informed CRITIC that there was no time to lose if he desired his proposals to achieve results because EMPEROR's transfer to the west and the fact that Vietinghof had not yet taken over had fundamentally altered the situation. The main problem therefore was whether CRITIC should play his hand with Vietinghof or should go to EMPEROR's Headquarters and take the matter up with him before seeing Vietinghof.

4. CRITIC expressed willingness to go direct to Vietinghof, but was strongly of the opinion he should first see EMPEROR. CRITIC's reasons for this were that Vietinghof was purely a soldier and as such would not react favorable without strong support within the Wehrmacht. Moreover, the ground was not prepared with him as in the case of EMPEROR. CRITIC was confident of sympathetic hearing from EMPEROR and stated that WESTPHAL, man of broad political outlook, was also likely to react favorably in conjunction with EMPEROR.

5. CRITIC therefore planned to leave on 20th March for EMPEROR's Headquarters to obtain support of EMPEROR and WESTPHAL. CRITIC estimated he would be away from five to seven days. Upon returning he would then make definite proposals to Vietinghof. It was pointed out to CRITIC that he must produce qualified officers with full power to make plans for a military surrender; that it would be advisable for these officers to proceed to an appropriate Allied Military Headquarters to arrange details. CRITIC agreed and stated that possibly EMPEROR might also send an officer back with him.

6. If CRITIC was successful, the officers would be delivered to Chiasso, on the Swiss-Italian Frontier, and arrangements would be made to forward them on to APHQ.
7. During the entire meeting, CRITIC made no attempt to bargain and did not refer to any conditions for surrender. The impression of my representatives was that CRITIC had considerable confidence in obtaining support and that he had already gone further with EMPEROR than had been previously admitted. They were also of the opinion that CRITIC represents the feeling of certain generals and that there is a chance that they will use this opportunity to arrange a surrender.

8. Further report concerning movements of my representatives expected today.

End

Note: "My representatives" are Maj Gen Sennitzer, USA, and Maj Gen Airey, British.
March 19, 1945

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff, from General Alexander.

CROSSWORD.

1. I forward the following information as reported by my representatives who are now located at Locarno.

2. An intermediary, who was dispatched to contact Wolff (SS General) spent all Friday night, 16th March, at Wolff's Headquarters and returned to Locarno Saturday noon. He reported Wolff willing to confer with OSS officials in Locarno area Monday. Wolff is expected to arrive meeting place this morning.

3. Wolff informed intermediary Friday that:

   A. Kesselring had not returned to Italy but had been given command of the Western Front.

   B. Westphal will be Kesselring's chief of staff in the west.

   C. Kesselring was being replaced by Vonvietinghof (Commander of Tenth Army in east Italy), who was known very well by Kesselring.

   D. Vonvietinghof had not arrived at Kesselring's old Headquarters by Friday night. Wolff had therefore been unable to contact him.

   E. Kesselring's new appointment would delay any immediate move in north Italy but the appointment might open up possibilities on the Western Front in view of close relationship between Wolff and Kesselring.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 2 1974

Regraded Unclassified

Germany
FROM: US Military Mission, Moscow
To: War Department
Nr: MX 23276 18 March 1945

To Combined Chiefs of Staff and British Chiefs of Staff from Archer and Deane MX 23276. Crypto War please pass to Central Base, UK.

Late of the night 16 March we received a message from Field Marshal Alexander asking us to inform the Soviet representatives that it would be desirable for Security reasons that they not proceed to Allied Force Headquarters until he requested them to do so. Further that if the negotiations being conducted at Berne were successful Field Marshal Alexander would give all possible advance warning so that the Soviet representatives could arrive in ample time for negotiations at Caserta, but that meanwhile the Soviet representatives should hold themselves ready to move at 24 hours notice.

We received Field Marshal Alexander's message just after our ambassadors had received a message from Molotov insisting that the negotiations at Berne be broken off. We quoted General Antonov a paraphrase of Field Marshal Alexander's message as though we had heard nothing of Molotov's letter to our ambassadors.

Tonight we were called to a meeting by the Soviet General Staff and given the following letter addressed to us jointly from General Antonov. The letter follows in full:

"Regarding your letter of 17 March 1945, I wish to inform you as follows: The Soviet Government received information on the 16th of March 1945 from the Governments of Great Britain and the United States that representatives of the Soviet Military Command were refused the right to take part in the negotiations which are going on in Berne between British and American representatives on the one side and the German General Wolf on the other side.

"In view of this, the Soviet Government on the same day, 16 March, informed the Governments of Great Britain and the United States that it insists that the negotiations in Berne of the British and American representatives with the German representatives be immediately discontinued, and that in the future, all possibility of separate negotiations with the Germans by one or two of the Allied powers without participation of the third Allied power be ruled out.

"In connection with the above Generals Susloparov and Dragun, as well as the third Soviet officer who would have taken part in the negotiations at Berne, have been given instructions that they should not go to Caserta.

"In view of this, Field Marshal Alexander's letter should be considered as having been based upon a misunderstanding. Sincerely yours, signed Antonov."
Since to our knowledge Field Marshal Alexander has not been informed of Soviet insistence that the Berne negotiations be broken off we have not included either him nor General Eisenhower as addressees in this message, or otherwise notified them of the contents of Antonov's letter quoted above.

Col-IN-19531 (19 Mar 45.)
From: U.S. Military Mission, Moscow  
To: War Department  
Nr: M 23249  
17 March 1945

To the Secretary of State from Harriman and to General Marshall for information signed Deane M 23249 to be delivered with least delay and time of delivery to both addresses be furnished.

Molotov's letter contained in my last Army cable M 23247 regarding the Berne meeting confirms the growing impression that General Deane and I have received, particularly since the Crimea Conference, that the Soviet leaders have come to believe that they can force their will on us on any issue.

They have, arbitrarily, and in disregard of the facts, placed their own interpretation on the Yalta agreements regarding Poland, liberated areas as applied to Rumania, and liberated prisoners of war.

In the present case, Molotov again bases his position on a distortion of the facts. In a letter of March 12 he stated that the Soviet Government had no objections to the Berne meeting and expressed the wish that the Soviet Government might be represented. Now he contends that the Soviet Government acquiesced to the meeting on the condition that Soviet representatives would participate. The arrogant language of Molotov's letter, I believe, brings out in the open a domineering attitude toward the United States which we have before only suspected.

It has been my feeling that sooner or later this attitude would create a situation which would be intolerable to us.

I, therefore, recommend that we face the issue now by adhering to the reasonable and generous position that we have taken and by advising the Soviet Government in firm, but friendly, terms to that effect.

ACTION: Gen Bissell (Mr. Stettinius)
INFO: Gen Hull
C of S.

CM-IN-17670 (17 Mar 45) DTG 170045Z

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By PHB
Date MAR 9 1972
From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia
To: War Department

Nr: M 23247 16 March 1945

To the Secretary of State from Harriman signed Deane M 23247.

Request following be urgently delivered to Secretary of State.

I have received the following letter from Molotov tonight in reply to my letter delivered 24 hours ago regarding Soviet participation in the proposed talks in Bern:

"In connection with your letter received by me March 16th concerning negotiations in Bern, I communicate to you the following:

On March 12th you informed me that on March 9th in Bern there arrived the German General Karl Wolff and his companions Dollmann and Zimmer, for discussion with representatives of the Armies of the United States and Great Britain of the question of the capitulation of the German Armed Forces in Northern Italy. You further communicated that Field Marshal Alexander had been directed to detail his officers to Bern for a meeting with these persons and you inquired the point of view of the Soviet Government on this question.

On that same day, the 12th of March, I informed you that the Soviet Government did not object to negotiations with General Wolff in Bern as long as officers representing the Soviet Military Command would take part in these negotiations. In giving this answer the Soviet Government did not doubt that the Government of the United States would take an affirmative attitude to its proposal for the participation of Soviet officers in negotiations with the German General Wolff in Bern, and it named its representatives then and there.

Today, the 16th of March, I received from you a letter from which it appears that the Government of the United States refuses to the Soviet Representatives the
right to participate in the negotiations in Bern. The refusal of the Government of the United States to admit the participation of the Soviet Representatives in the negotiations in Bern was for the Soviet Government utterly unexpected and incomprehensible from the point of view of Allied relations between our countries. In view of this the Soviet Government considers it impossible to give its agreement to negotiations of American and British Representatives with representatives of the German Commander in Bern and insists that the negotiations already begun in Bern be broken off.

The Soviet Government, furthermore, insists that also from now on all possibility of the conduct of separate negotiations by one or two of the Allied powers with German Representatives without the participation of the third Allied power be ruled out."

Clark Kerr has received an identical letter. I will comment in a subsequent message.

End

ACTION: GEN BISSEL (MR STETTINIUS)
CM#IN-17379 (17 Mar 45) DTG 162130Z mcs

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By [Signature] Date MAR 9 1972
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
To: War Department
Nr: FX 44419 NAF 888 16 March 1945

FX 44419 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff repeated to SHAEF Forward for information signed Alexander cite FHCOS [redacted]. This is NAF 888.

Acknowledged is your FAN 508. Action being taken.

End

ACTION: CC/S
INFORMATION: Adm Leahy, Gen Arnold, Gen Hull, Gen Bissell, Adm King, C of S
CM-IN-16209 (16 Mar 45) DTG 160034Z.

DECLASSIFIED
J.C.S. Rerading Memo 29-71
By [Signature] Date MAR 10 1971

- 1 -
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
To: War Department
Air Ministry Special Signals Office
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
Forward, Rheims, France

No. FX 44366  NAF 887  15 March 1945

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to AMSO for
British Chiefs of Staff repeated SHAEF Forward for information signed
Alexander FX 44366 cite FHCOS. This is NAF 887.

1. CROSSWORD. I forward the following information which has been
received by me from my representatives who are scheduled to be in Berne at
1200Z hours today March 15.

2. At some time between the 12 March and yesterday, OSS knowing
of EMPEROR's absence from his headquarters, suggested to Baron Parbiolli
that he query CRITIC and ask him to indicate his actions in certain cir-
cumstances. CRITIC's replies to these questions are reported as follows:

A. What would he propose to do if EMPEROR does not return
from visit to Hitler? CRITIC states proposes to go ahead if EMPEROR does
not return but points out if a successor is appointed, CRITIC would delay
action in an attempt to win over successor. If that failed, would act
alone.

B. What would he do if he likewise were ordered to report to
Hitler? CRITIC's answer was that if EMPEROR were not present, he would not
leave to report. If EMPEROR's successor were present, he would delay his
reply to the order.

C. If he refuses to report to Hitler what would be his plan
and what forces would he have available to carry it out? CRITIC replied he
would come along with military advisors if the conditions described above
in respect to EMPEROR or his successor existed.

D. What area could he control temporarily for possible contact
with our forces even assuming that principal Army Commanders would not
cooperate? CRITIC's military advisors would bring this information with them
to the meeting.

3. OSS official further states that CRITIC has taken the position
described as an honorable one and that he is committed to go through with
his decisions and plans.

4. On the 13 March, it was evident that CRITIC did not know whether
there was a successor being appointed for EMPEROR.

DECLASSIFIED
J.C.S. Regrading Memo 29-71
By R. O.  Date  MAR  1 0 1971

Regraded Unclassified
5. Regret ambiguity of certain statements as Paras two and three but these statements are as reported and I am at present unable to clarify further.

End
From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
To: War Department
No: FX 43879  NAF 884  15 March 1945

This is NAF 884. FX 43879 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff, AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff, SHAPE Forward for information signed Alexander cite FHGM.

Code words corresponding to immediately preceding message are:

Number one CROSSWORD.
Number two CRITIC.
Number three EMPEROR.
Number four COACHMAN.

End

FOOTNOTE: NAF 883 is CM-IN-15836 (15 Mar 45) CC/S

ACTION: Gen McFarland (CC/S)

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy, Gen Arnold, Gen Hull, Gen Bissell, Adm King, Mr Stimson, C of S.

CM-IN-15858 (15 Mar 45) DTG 151136A.

DECLASSIFIED
J.C.S. Regrading Memo 29-71
By RIVER Date MAR 10 1971

Regraded Unclassified
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
To: War Department

Nr.  FX 43878  NAF 883  15 March 1945

Look at NAF 878 RFX 4441 of 11th March. FX 43878 to AGWAR for CCS, AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff, SHAFF forward for information signed Alexander cite FHGI. This is NAF 883.

Code word for this project is number one in my immediately following message.

Further code words in immediately following message represent:

Number two—SS Obergruppenfuehrer Karl Wolff
Number three—Marchal Albert Kesselring.
Number four—SS Obergruppenfuehrer Ernst Kaltenbrunner

End

ACTION: General McFarland (CC/S)
INFO: Admiral Leahy, General Arnold, General Hull, General Bissell,
      Admiral King, Mr. Stimson, C of S.

CM-IN-15836  (15 Mar 45)  DTG 151136A.

DECLASSIFIED
J.C.S. Rerading Memo 29-71
By  Date MAR. 1 0 1971

- 1 -
Commanding General
Allied Force Headquarters
Caserta, Italy

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Forward Echelon
Rheims, France

British Joint Staff Mission
Washington, D. C.

Number WARA 53452

Write book message to Alexander for action, to SHAEF Rheims for Eisenhower
and to AWSSO pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information. This message
is FAN 508 to Alexander from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Further to FAN 506.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have now heard that Soviet Government
considers proposed talks of highest importance and agrees to their being
held. Soviet Government would like Soviet officers to take part and are
sending instructions to General Susalaperov, General Dragun and a third officer
whose name will be communicated later. In consultation with SCAEF you should
assist Russians in getting these officers to AFHQ in Italy.

Following is text of message which State Department and Foreign Office
are transmitting to U. S. and British ambassadors in Moscow.

Begins:

1. You should inform Soviet Government substantially as follows:

2. The Berne meeting is only for the purpose of establishing con-
tact with a view to getting German representatives to Field Marshal
Alexander's headquarters where all matters concerning surrender will be
discussed. Field Marshal Alexander's representatives are already sec-
retly in Berne and, in view of the time element, they are being instructed
to give to the representatives of the German commander the instructions
which have already been communicated to the Soviet Government.

3. Field Marshal Alexander is being instructed to make all
necessary arrangements for the presence of Soviet representatives at

[DECLASSIFIED]
J.C.S. Rerading Memo 29-21

By MAR 10 1973

Regraded Unclassified
any discussions which may take place at A.F.H.Q.: But, as the German proposal is for the surrender of a military force on a U.S./British front, Field Marshal Alexander, as supreme commander in this theater, would alone be responsible for conducting negotiations and reaching decisions.

"4. Field Marshal Alexander is being instructed to communicate to the Soviets through Admiral Archer and General Deane the results of any contact in Berne and to use this channel for any contact in Berne and to use this channel for any subsequent arrangements connected with the presence of Soviet representatives at his headquarters."

You should proceed at once with the contact in Berne. This telegram disposes of your request in NAF 885.

End

FAN 506 is CM-OUT-51675 (12 Mar 45)
NAF 885 is CM-IN-15724 (15 Mar 45)

ORIGINATOR: CC/S
INFORMATION: Admiral Leahy General Arnold General Hull General Bissell Adm. King Mr. Stimson CofS.

CM-OUT-53452 (Mar 45) 1517482 rb

- 2 -
Mr. 808
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Secretary of State

Washington
US URGENT
728, March 13, 1 p.m.

PERSONAL AND FOR THE SECRETARY AND THE UNDERSECRETARY FROM HARRIMAN.

REDEPT'S 564, March 11, 6 p.m. and Embassy's 723, March 12, 5 p.m.

It would appear that the Soviet request for participation by their officers in the discussions at Bern has no justification. The German proposal is for the surrender of a military force on an Anglo-American front. Although there would be indirect political repercussions, it is not a capitulation of a government as in the case of Rumania and Bulgaria.

The question of acceding to the Soviet request appears therefore to be one of policy in our relations with the Soviet Government. I am satisfied that the Soviets would never allow our officers to participate in a parallel situation on the eastern front and in fact I doubt whether they would even inform us of negotiations for such a surrender.

I feel that we would gain no advantages in good will or otherwise acceding to the Soviet request; rather the Soviets would consider it a sign of weakness and it would lead to even more untenable demands from them in the future.

Furthermore, I believe that the presence of Soviet officers and the embarrassing demands they might make would jeopardize the success of the Bern negotiations.

General Deane concurs and is cabling General Marshall direct.

HARRIMAN

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-45

By Date MAR 10 1971

-1-
From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia
To: War Department
Nr: M 23187

13 March 1945


Harriman has shown me a State Department message in which he was directed to inform the Soviet Government of possible negotiations in Bern, Switzerland, with regard to enemy surrender, together with Field Marshal Alexander's proposed method of handling. He has also shown me his reply to the State Department which indicates that the Soviet Government agrees that the negotiations should be held and asks that three Soviet General Officers participate.

I strongly recommend that the Soviet request for participation in the proposed negotiations be approved. It is my understanding the Field Marshal Alexander proposes to keep the discussion on a purely military basis and that the negotiations will not directly concern political issues nor attempt to settle them.

Since military operations in the Italian Theater have been conducted under Anglo-American command, I can see no reason why their conclusion, the surrender of enemy military forces, should require Soviet participation in the handling. A parallel case might be if the United States were to insist on participating in possible future negotiations for the surrender of 28 to 30 German divisions now cut off in Latvia. While I am certain we would not seek such participation, I am more certain that the Soviet Authorities would not permit it. Furthermore, I believe that the success of the project might be jeopardized if Soviet representatives were to participate. From a military point of view it would appear to be neither necessary, desirable nor proper to approve the Soviet request. I make this recommendation because I feel certain, from my limited view of the picture, that approving the Soviet request will be an act of appeasement which will react against us in future negotiations. There may, of course, be other factors of which I am unaware. Harriman concurs and has expressed his views in State Department cable number 728, this date, which you may wish to see.
NCB-687
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. [REDACTED]

Secretary of State,

Washington.

URGENT

723, March 12, 5 p.m.

FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY

I have received a reply this evening from Mr. Molotov to my letter transmitting contents of your 564, March 11, 6 p.m. Mr. Molotov states that the Soviet Government has considered this communication very important and that it does not object to the proposed conversations of the Anglo-American officers with General Wolff. Molotov continues that the Soviet Government on its part would like to have officers representing the Soviet Military Command take part in these conversations. For this purpose, the Soviet Military Command designates General Susloparov, Chief of the Soviet Military Mission in France, General Drun, head of the Soviet Mission on War Prisoners also in France and in addition one officer whose name will be communicated at a later date. Molotov adds that the Soviet Government hopes the United States Government will facilitate the travel of these officers to Bern since the Soviet Government has no diplomatic relations with Switzerland. Molotov informs me further that a letter in the same sense has been transmitted to the British Ambassador in Moscow.

HARRIMAN

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-41

-1-

By [REDACTED] Date [REDACTED]
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy.

To: War Department

Nr: FX 41441 [NAF 878] 10 March 1945

FX 41441 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff repeated SHAPE Forward for information signed Alexander cite MIDSC. TOPSECRET. This is NAF 878.

1. OSS in this theatre on 8th March made information available that Waffen SS General Karl Wolff, top SS officer north Italy, together with OKW representative, presumably from Kesselring's staff, plus Dollmann and Simmer, were expected to arrive at Lugjfo Switzerland prepared to discuss capitulation German forces in north Italy. Subsequent information 9th March confirms that Wolff has in fact arrived and has indicated willingness to try to develop programme to take north Italy out of conflict. He considers mere military surrender difficult and prefers that capitulation be preceded by statement to German people from German leaders north Italy that struggle is hopeless and is merely causing needless German bloodshed. He states Kesselring not yet won over and his adherence is considered essential to plan. Wolff however states that Rahn who is German ambassador to Fascist Italian Government is in accord with him. Wolff claims Himmler unaware of his activities. Wolff is proceeding immediately to Kesselring to endeavor to tell plan to him and will keep in touch with OSS representatives.

2. Prior to meeting in Switzerland Dollmann promised to produce recently captured CLNAI leader Parri as evidence of their good faith and ability to act. Information now received that Parri was in fact delivered unconditionally in Switzerland 9 March and is in good health.

3. Further discussions being held by OSS with Wolff but results not yet available here. In view of these discussions OSS suggest representatives my headquarters be prepared to go to Switzerland to deal with situation in case of favorable developments.

4. If further negotiations between OSS and Wolff develop to extent that German representatives appear genuine and have specific proposals to discuss, I propose to act on following lines:

(a) The German Parliamentairey must come to Berne with signed authority from Marshal Kesselring that they have authority to treat.

(b) OSS to arrange a meeting place either at American or British Embassies at night. If Embassies too difficult, another meeting place can be considered.

(c) I will send Major General Loman L. Lemnitzer, my American Deputy Chief of Staff, and Major General T. S. Airey, my British Chief Intelligence Officer, to Berne.
(d) They will be instructed to tell the Germans:

(1) That they must come to AFHQ for detailed military discussions:

(2) That they must arrange a method of communication with Kesselring:

(3) That the discussions will only deal with the method of surrender on a purely military and not a governmental or political basis.

5. Please note that two of the leading figures are SS and Himmler men which makes me very suspicious. Nevertheless it is as well to be prepared.

6. Request your agreement with above proposed procedure. I shall not send representatives to Berne as proposed in para three (c) above until I receive your authorization. You will be kept fully informed of future developments.

End

ACTION: Gen McFarland (JCS)
INFO: Adm Leahy, Gen Giles, Gen Hull, Gen Bissell, Adm King, Mr. Stimson, C of S.

CM-IN-11150 (11 Mar 45) DTG: 11000Z.
From: Supreme Headquarters, AEPFE, Rheims, France

To: War Department

SCAF 217

27 February 1945

I have received word via OSS channels of a possible approach by one or more senior German officers with the proposal of facilitating an Allied victory in the west in order to end the war promptly.

I understand that OSS has reported the facts in detail to Washington with a copy to London.

I have replied to my informant that, as these reports have gone to my governments, any action on political levels will obviously be taken at their direction, and that so far as any purely military approach is concerned, the channels should be those which are recognized by the customs and usages of war. However, I have no intention of choking off this channel of possible communication with me.

CM-IN-28214

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of JCS

Crosby to NLE, 4/21/71

Regraded Unclassified