Folder 2. MR 370 Bulgaria (1)—Peace Feelers, 9 February–26 August 1944.
ATTENTION OF THE ATTACHED REPRESENTATIVE, BE GIVEN.--

At the recommendation of the President, the question of
the adoption of the annexed resolution has been referred
for the consideration of the President by the
Council of the States, and the President asks the
question of the adoption of the annexed resolution has
been referred for the consideration of the President by the
Council of the States, and the President asks the
question of the adoption of the annexed resolution has
been referred for the consideration of the President by the
Council of the States, and the President asks the

The President.

NOTICE OF THE PRECEDING ADMINISTRATION

for the President.

August 26, 1944
such assurance of future independence, and that Greek and Yugoslav representatives should be invited to assent to the surrender terms without signing them. It is proposed that the other Governments at war with Bulgaria should be informed of the terms at the time of their acceptance.

A memorandum on this subject, identical in text, is being addressed to Admiral Leahy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Enclosure:

Armistice Terms for Bulgaria
Armistice Terms For Bulgaria

"The following conditions have been accepted by the Bulgarian Government:

"One. Hostilities to cease between Bulgaria and the United Nations at blank space.

"Two. Bulgaria to sever all relations with Germany and other enemy powers, to disarm and intern enemy forces and nationals and to control enemy property.

"Three. Bulgarian forces, officials and nationals to withdraw from all Allied territory at present occupied by Bulgaria.

"Four. The Supreme Allied Command to have the right to move their forces freely into or across Bulgarian territory at the cost of Bulgaria if the military situation requires or if the Bulgarian Government fail in any respects to fulfill the terms of the armistice.

"Five. Bulgaria to carry out such measures of disarmament and demobilization, as may be required.

"Six. Bulgaria to release Allied prisoners of war and internees.

"Seven. Bulgaria to comply with Allied requirements for the use and control of transport including Danubian navigation and transport facilities.

"Eight. Bulgaria to release all persons detained for political reasons or as a result of discriminatory legislation. Such legislation to be repealed.

"Nine. Bulgaria to cooperate in the apprehension and trial of persons accused of war crimes.

"Ten. Bulgaria to restore all United Nations property and to make reparation for war damage.

"Eleven. Bulgaria to make such contribution towards general relief and rehabilitation as may be required of her.

"Twelve."
"Twelve. Bulgaria to comply with any further Allied instructions for giving effect to the armistice; and to meet Allied requirements for the reestablishment of peace and security."
From: U.S. Military Attaché Ankara, Turkey
To: War Department
No. 90  6 April 1944
MILID number 90 AMSME 707.

Report of Consul General Istanbul recommends United States Britain and Russia come to immediate agreement on terms of settlement with Bulgaria and so get her out of war. Says demand for unconditional surrender by Bulgaria is quite unrealistic now moreover Bulgarians will not join Tito. Increasing number Bulgarians believe Soviet policy aims at control of Balkans in interests Russian power as Guarantee Russian security. Bulgarian leaders believe Russia regards Bulgaria as necessary to their control of Balkans and inclined satisfy Bulgarian territorial demands.

Bulgaria likely continue hesitate until further Russian advance in Rumania or until Russia demands decision by Bulgars. Reaction in Bulgaria to Molotov statement will be favorable to Russia. Report points out that least Russia would favor for Bulgaria would be infinitely better from Bulgarian viewpoint than unconditional surrender terms we offer.

Bulgarian expert in Consulate thinks Molotov statement cuts ground from under our unconditional surrender stand. As far as Bulgaria goes he would like to see it dropped. Also he objects to our pattern of bombing which has supported German propaganda that air attacks are purely terroristic. Russian Air Attaché says Russian post war reconstruction

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
RECLASSIFIED

CM-IN-5135 (7 Apr 44)

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Col. Pack

COPY No.

370

Regarded Unclassified
problems will be too vast for them to undertake burden of
dominating Bulgaria or other extensive part of Balkans.
Said Russia would probably ask Bulgaria not allow passage
German Troops through Bulgaria, troops from Greece and
escaping troops from Crimea. He thinks Bulgaria would
cooperate to this extent.

Tindall

ACTION: G-2

INFO: CGAAF
OPD
Col Perk
Log

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
Jack L. Guthrie, 2-3-71

CM-IN-5135 (7 Apr 44) 2340Z mw

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Regraded Unclassified
FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 491. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON, SECRET AND PERSONAL.

Your 607.

Mr. MacVeagh will act for us, his instructions at this stage being only to listen to what the Bulgarians have to say. He is being informed that Mr. MacMillan will be the British representative, and directed to keep in touch with him.

We agree that General Wilson, who will be responsible to the Combined Chiefs in matters pertaining to the activities of the Bulgarian Mission, should be kept fully informed of developments, and that he be directed to have a military representative present.

ROOSEVELT
MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL MATHEWSON

Subject: Cable from the Prime Minister on Bulgaria.

With reference to your memorandum of March 1, in which you enclosed a message from the Prime Minister to the President on Bulgaria, I attach herewith a paraphrase of the telegram to ambassador MacVeagh authorizing him to take part in any eventual discussions with the Bulgarians, and a copy of a memorandum of conversation between Mr. Cannon of the Department and Mr. Sheperdson of OSS regarding the sending of a message to the Bulgarian Minister in Turkey.

Enclosures:
1. Paraphrase of telegram.
2. Copy of memorandum of conversation.
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM

SENT

FROM: THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE, Washington, D.C.

TO: AMERICAN LEGATION, Cairo

DATED: March 3, 1944.

NUMBERED: YUGOS 7, 7 p.m.

In conformity with an agreement between the British Prime Minister and the President, following Moscow's approval, the Bulgarians have been sent a message to the effect that the three principal Allies are prepared to have their representatives meet a fully qualified Bulgarian Delegation in Cairo, Egypt.

If such a Bulgarian Delegation should eventually reach Cairo to meet the Allied representatives, you may join your Soviet and British colleagues for the purpose of listening to the Bulgarian proposals. These proposals can then be submitted for further consideration by the three Governments.

As of possible help with regard to any conversations which you may in the meantime have with the British and Soviet Ambassadors it is remarked that there may at some time arise some question as to the extent to which the Russians may wish to participate because of the fact that Soviet Russia and Bulgaria are not at war. It is intended in all events that the Soviet Government be held fully informed and that it have every opportunity to give expression to its views.

STETTINIUS
MEMORANDUM

February 2, 1944.

By arrangement made yesterday Mr. Whitney Shepherdson of the OSS came to see me this morning.

I told him that we had been directed by the President to arrange that the Jadwin mission inform the Minister of Bulgaria in Turkey that representatives of the three principal Allies are prepared to meet a fully qualified Bulgarian Mission in Cairo. Since the connection through which this project had been handled had been the OSS mission referred to, it seemed to me that the OSS here would be the proper channel for conveying this information to Colonel Jadwin.

Mr. Shepherdson said he would get the instructions out at once.

I then added that it was my understanding that the American representative in any talks which may ensue would be Mr. MacVeagh, our Ambassador to the governments of Greece and Yugoslavia at Cairo. Mr. Shepherdson said that the purpose of the Jadwin mission would have been fulfilled if it facilitates the contact, as now seems to be the case that, however, the Jadwin people could follow on to Cairo after the Bulgarian mission passes through Turkey, if it appeared to be useful to have them standing by, but that this would be thought over, having in mind, as I pointed out, that the idea was only to have the designated Allied representatives listen to what the Bulgarians have to say, and the Jadwin group would therefore not be taking part in the conversation.

SE: CW Cannon: BJS

Regraded Unclassified
SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY

March 7, 1944

Colonel Mathewson's memorandum for the Acting Secretary of State of March 6, 1944, transmitted a paraphrase of the Prime Minister's message no. 607 to the President and suggested the preparation of a reply to be sent after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

A suggested draft of reply from the President to the Prime Minister is attached hereto which before laying before the President you may wish to clear with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There is also enclosed a paraphrase of the Department's instruction to Ambassador MacVeagh in the premises.

Enclosures:

1. Draft reply to the Prime Minister.
2. Department's paraphrase of telegram to Mr. MacVeagh.
Department of State

ENCLOSURE

Letter drafted 3-7-44

ADRESSED TO

Admiral Leahy
SECRET

PROPOSED TEXT OF PRESIDENT'S REPLY
TO PRIME MINISTER'S TELEGRAM NO. 607

#491

Your 607.

Mr. MacVeagh will act for us, his instructions at this stage being only to listen to what the Bulgarians have to say. He is being informed that Mr. MacMillan will be the British representative, and directed to keep in touch with him.

We agree that General Wilson, who will be responsible to the Combined Chiefs in matters pertaining to the activities of the Bulgarian Mission, should be kept fully informed of developments, and that he be directed to have a military representative present.

[Signature]

Regraded Unclassified
SECRET

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM SENT

TO: AMERICAN LEGATION, Cairo
FROM: DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington D.C.
DATED: March 7, 1944.

Mr. Churchill has informed the President that the British will be represented by MacMillan in any conversations which may eventuate with British representatives. You should, therefore, keep in close touch with him in this connection.

By agreement between the Prime Minister and the President, General Wilson, who will have responsibility to the Combined Chiefs with regard to the activities of the Bulgarian delegation, should be kept informed of all developments and will be authorized to have a military officer present.

STETTINIUS
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE
SECRET
CONTROL

To: A.F.H.Q.
Info: J.S.M. Washington
From: Chiefs of Staff
Dated: 6 March 1944

COSMED 53

Following for General Wilson from Chiefs of Staff.

Reference: MEDCOS 61.

1. Reference paragraph 3 of MEDCOS 61. There is nothing to prevent you using the 15th Air Force against Bulgaria at a moment when you consider it might be the primary factor in deciding the course of Bulgarian affairs.

Time of Origin 062155Z

MEDCOS 61 is CM-IN-3407 (5 Mar 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
GEN. BISSELL
GEN. ARNOLD
CofS
ADM. KING
COL. MATHEWSON

CM-IN-4575 (7 Mar 44) 1510Z ccg

370 Bulgaria

SECRET

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

COPY No. 30

Regraded Unclassified
6 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has directed that the attached paraphrased copy of message No. 607 from the Prime Minister be furnished to the Department of State for preparation of reply after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In order that you may be fully informed, a paraphrased copy of the President's message No. 467 to the Prime Minister is also furnished.

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.

2 Incis.
Incl 1-PM-President #607,
5 March 1944.
Incl 2-President-PM.#467,
6 March 1944.
From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 607

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Most secret and personal. Number 607.

Your number 487.

We agree about this being in General Wilson's sphere. But I think that the mission should in the first place be received by representatives of the three Allies and a military representative of General Wilson and the first contacts established through diplomatic channels. General Wilson would, of course, be kept informed and would be responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff if and when it came to dictating armistice terms. No doubt you will instruct your representative to keep in touch with Mr. MacMillan who will act for us. I think it most important, however, that you and I should watch this from day to day and settle on the highest level, of course in conjunction with U.J.

No Sig

Answered by Mar 43.
SECRET

3 MARCH 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 487. SECRET AND PERSONAL, FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT.

Referring your 596 (29 Feb 1944). In agreement with your suggestion we have instructed Jadwin Mission to inform Minister of Bulgaria that representatives of the three Allies are prepared to confer in Cairo with a fully qualified Bulgarian Mission. Jadwin also directed to telegraph immediately to Washington any reply that he may receive.

In view of the inclusion of the Balkans in General Wilson’s area it seems to me that he is the correct official to control any mission to discuss surrender terms of Bulgaria.

ROOSEVELT
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

4 March 1944

To: A.F.H.Q.
Info: JOINT STAFF MISSION WASHINGTON AND MIDWEST
From: CHIEFS OF STAFF
Number: COSMED 52

Following from Chiefs of Staff for General Wilson,

We approve your recommendations as set out in Paras 3 and 4 of MEDCOS 58.

*Military terms for Bulgaria.

MEDCOS 58 is CM-IN-1145 (2 Mar 44) CCS

ACTION: CCS
INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Bissell
Gen Arnold
C of S
Adm King
Col Mathewson

CM-IN-3885 (6 Mar 44) 1437Z mos

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED TAO to NLR, 11-30-70

SECRET

COPY No. 30

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Regraded Unclassified
March 4, 1944

TO: BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

INFO: JOINT STAFF MISSION FOR U.S. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MIDEAST AND HQ MAEF

FROM: FREEDOM

Number MECOS 56

Signed Wilson cite MECOS 58.

1. Further to MECOS 58.

I am somewhat concerned at the course events appear to be taking in relation to the Bulgarian situation. By the terms of my directive I am responsible to the British and United States Governments for the direction of our military policy in Bulgaria and the other Balkan States. A supremely important factor in this policy is any question of armistice negotiations. Yet apparently some such negotiations are taking shape of which I know virtually nothing. I was of course aware that there had been some form of contact with the Bulgarians through the Jadwin Mission but I now hear from a reference in a telegram from Mideast that there has been some preliminary approach in writing since some words from that approach are actually quoted. But I have no means of judging whether or to what extent the possibility of these negotiations is genuine or imminent and have no instructions as to how they are to be conducted, what policy I am to pursue in them, how they are to be related to policy in respect of Rumania and Hungary or how Russia fits into the picture.

2. I am receiving from Mideast Defence Committee certain advice dealing with military policy vis-à-vis Bulgaria and including recommendations about such matters as bombing policy with relation to these possible negotiations. I realize that the situation is somewhat complicated by the fact that Balkan affairs have in the past largely been handled in Cairo and that the bulk of our information from the Balkans centres there. But these recommendations from Cairo though they may be sound enough on the face of it, are made against the background of necessarily incomplete knowledge of the latest turns in our overall Mediterranean strategy of the
possibilities of air operations in Bulgaria in the light of our
PIEVEBLANK policy and of the practical limitations such as those
of weather on our ability to carry out such operations.

3. If the possibility of putting Bulgaria out of the war and
still more of swinging her over against the Axis is genuine and
imminent then I submit I should be fully informed and should at
the earliest possible date receive appropriate instructions from
the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In view of the extreme importance of
this (?) possibility (?) on our whole European strategy particular-
ly at this time in containing enemy forces away from OVERLORD I
hope some temporary modification of strategic priorities for the
15th Air Force will receive due consideration since the immediate
use of this force at a suitable moment may well be the primary
factor in deciding the course of Bulgarian affairs.

4. I should be grateful if I could receive as soon as possible
the fullest available information on this subject and an indication
of your views since these negotiations are to be taken seriously
as an imminent development. I propose to send Air Marshal
issar to Cairo to represent me in connection with them and shall require
him to give full instructions.

T.O.O. 041525a

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
NLR-20-7O

REGNDOSS 52 is CH-IN-1148 (2 Mar 44) 00/3
ACCTION: 00/3

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Bissell
Gen Arnold
Gen Hillaring
C of S
Adm King
Col Mathewson

CH-IN-3407 (5 Mar 44) 1859Z VH

COPY No. 36

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Regraded Unclassified
By #1 priority, kindly notify MacFarland personally of the material below. He is also to transmit it by highest priority to Mission. "We have today been directed and authorized by high authority to empower and instruct the so-called Jacob Mission to inform the Minister of Bulgaria that the representatives of the B Allies are prepared to confer in Cairo with a fully qualified Bulgarian Mission. The OSS Mission is directed in the same manner to accept any answer the Bulgarian Minister may give and relay it through OSS channels to Washington as quickly as possible.

In addition, the Mission is authorized, until it receives further or contrary orders, to receive any relevant messages and to act as the communicating agency until the arrival of the Bulgarian Mission in Cairo, at which time authorization ceases.

Extreme exactitude is necessary in handling this assignment, and the utmost speed in communications is also essential. The individual who you and the Mission consider to be most fitted for the job will handle the actual transmission of the message to the Bulgarian Minister. The same thing will be true in case of any answer which may follow.

TOD: 3/2/44 4:56 PM
SECRET

Regraded Unclassified
TO: British Chiefs of Staff  
J.S.M. Washington for Joint Chiefs of Staff  

FROM: AFHQ signed Wilson cite FHGCT No 58925  
INFO: Mid East HQ MAAP  
Number MEDCOS 59.

Second sentence of para 1 MEDCOS 58 should be interpreted to mean that instructions to Jadwin Mission should be conducted through Allied CINC AFHQ.

FOOTNOTE: MEDCOS 58 is CM-IN-1145 (2 Mar 44) CC/S  

ACTION: CC/S  

INFORMATION: OPD  
Gen Bissell  
Gen Arnold  
C of S  
Adm King  
Gen Mathewson  

CM-IN-1371 (2 Mar 44) 2115Z amr

370 Bulgaria

SECRET

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

COPY No. 30

Regraded Unclassified
M. E. Defense Committee have informed me that Foreign Office have suggested to State Department with agreement of Soviet Government that Jadwin Mission be instructed to inform Bulgarian Minister that representatives of the three Allies would be prepared to meet a fully qualified Bulgarian Mission in Cairo. I should be grateful if you would affirm that all negotiations with Bulgarians, including issue of instructions to Jadwin Mission, should be conducted through me. I assume that agreement of Soviet Government would be obtained to my acting with their authority as well as that of the Governments of U. S. and G. B., and that their agreement would be obtained to provisional armistice terms on lines of those in MEDCOS 49.

Defense Committee further recommend that present program of bombing Bulgarian targets be continued unaltered till Mission is on its way, but at this point bombing should be suspended while negotiations in progress provided overriding priority is given to immediate resumption bombing on major scale if negotiations prove dilatory or unsatisfactory - such resumption being used as a threat if necessary.

I do not agree with this recommendation. I consider that any sign of Bulgarian willingness to negotiate cells for intensification of bombing against Bulgaria which should be
carried out whenever weather permits, subject only to
POINTBLANK and essential defensive requirements of battle
in Italy.

I consider there should be no relaxation of this
policy while negotiations are in progress. In my view
nothing is more likely to prevent them becoming dilatory
or unsatisfactory than to continue bombing against as
many targets in Bulgaria, including Sofia, as the weather
and our other prior commitments permit. I recommend,
therefore, that if these negotiations materialize my
representative should be instructed not to discuss cessation
of bombing.

It may be relevant to point out that Russians do
not appear to have considered it desirable to relax bombing
of Finalnd during present negotiations.

T.O.O. 011600A

MEDCOS 49 ia CM-IN-1027 (2 Mar 44) CC/S
ACTION: CC/S
INFORMATION: OPD
General Bissell
General Arnold
C of S
Admiral King
Colonel Mathewson

CM-IN-1145 (2 Mar 44) 1422Z mod

COPY No. 25-53994AB 1800 Cl

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Regraded Unclassified
1 March 1944

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has directed that the attached message from the Prime Minister be referred to you for necessary action.

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.

Inc: Prime Minister
Msg. No. 596

See President's Black 9, 2723372, Feb 44, which directed PM 596 (White 44) be given to Mr. Stettinius for necessary action.

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified
29 February 1944

From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 596 File 292040Z
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and most secret. Number 596.
Your last message about the peace feelers from Bulgaria.

We have already had the same reply through Clark Kerr and agree that Cairo is probably the best rendezvous.

I think the only thing to do now is for the Jadwin mission to inform the Bulgarian Minister that representatives of the three Allies are prepared to meet a fully qualified Bulgarian mission in Cairo. If the Bulgarians send a mission, we can then listen to what it has to say.

The Foreign Office have already suggested that the State Department should send the necessary instructions to the Jadwin mission.

No Sig
Correction from Sub Paragraph N to end of message:

N. The Bulgarian Government will immediately comply with such orders as the Allied C in C Mediterranean may issue in respect disarmament, demobilization and demilitarisation.

O. The Bulgarian Government will furnish such information as may be required and within the period specified by the Allied C in C Mediterranean and in addition will ensure the security of all records of the enemy's military and civil authorities and organizations in Bulgaria.

P. Further conditions of a political, economic and financial nature with which Bulgaria will be bound to comply with will be transmitted at a later date. Any further terms of the present armistice will be kept secret until permission of their publication is granted by Allied C in C Mediterranean. The English version will be considered the official text.

Q. The Bulgarian Government understands that in event their not keeping to the terms of this armistice, the Allied C in C Mediterranean reserves the right to take such action as he considers fit.

CM-IN-2223 (3 Mar 44)

[Handwritten note: Bulgaría]
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers
To: WAR
Number 58355, 29 February 1944

5. To Mideast only. The above for your information and terms are purely tentative. No action will be taken by you pending further instructions.

Signed Wilson cite FEGCT.

No Sig

FOOTNOTE: Supplementary copy of CM-IN-1027 (2 Mar 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S (Capt. Royal USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Bissell
Gen Arnold
Gen Hildring
C of S
Adm King
Col Mathewson

CM-IN-2223 (3 Mar 44) 2350Z Jb

Regraded Unclassified
From: Algiers
To: WAR
Nr: 58355, 29th February 1944

From Allied Forces Headquarters to Air Ministry for the British Chiefs of Staff repeated to Britman Washington for the USA Joint Chiefs of Staff and Mideast 58 Reconnaissance Battalion 5291800. This is CRACK number 49.

In para 3 of CRACK number 35, I requested that you forward any further instructions you may have for my guidance should a request for conversation between the accredited representatives Bulgaria and the Allied Nations be received. To date no instructions have been forwarded to me.

2. I am informed that His Majesty's Government and USA Government have proposed to the Soviet Government that Bulgarian Government should be directed to send qualified mission to meet our representatives at a place to be indicated later, probably Cyprus or Cairo. I am further advised that a Rumanian emissary selected arriving 27th February in the Midast. In view of this, I feel that it is necessary that I be furnished immediately guidance as requested in CRACK number 35.

3. Projected military conditions for Bulgaria generally as follows and should be grateful if you would indicate any changes you desire.

4. The following conditions of an armistice are presented by "Blank", CINC of the Allied Forces in the Mediterranean, acting by authority of the Governments of the U.S.A. and Great Britain and in the interests of the United Nations are accepted by "Blank", if desired of Bulgarian Government.

CM-IN-1027 (2 Mar 44)

370 Bulgaria SECRET

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Regraded Unclassified
From: Algiers
To: WAR
Nr: 58355, 29th February 1944

A. The Bulgarian Government will cease untenable hostile activities by its armed forces against any forces of the United Nations and any forces coordinating with them.

B. The Bulgarian Government will arrange for the immediate withdrawal of Bulgarian Armed Forces from all participation in current war from whatever areas in which they may now be engaged or employed, and such areas as may be designated by the Allied C in C.

C. Bulgaria will deny to the Germans and satellite powers all facilities and all resources that might be used against the United Nations, and hold them at the disposal of the Allied C in C. All external communications and commercial exchange including gold in transit, by air, sea, land and the Danube will be stopped except as authorized by the Allied C in C.

D. The Bulgarian Government will take steps to secure against seizure or attack by enemy and prevent the removal or destruction of any parts thereof by the first authority of the Allied C in C, all radio location apparatus, radio navigational aids, radio, cable and other telecommunication stations and systems under Bulgarian control, whether owned by Bulgaria or its Nationals, or any other nation or its Nationals not of the United Nations. These stations and systems will be surrendered to the Allied C in C, if required, in good repair together with all operating plans, diagrams, instructions and pertinent records, if deemed advisable by the Allied authorities, qualified personnel to operate such equipment. No radio or telecommunication installations or other forms of intercommunication ashore or afloat, whether belonging to Bulgaria or any other nation other than the United Nations will transmit until the directions for the control of these installations have been laid down by the Allied C in C.
E. The Bulgarian authorities will intern all Germans and satellite personnel and agents within their territory. Any attempt by Germans or satellite powers to enter Bulgarian territory will be resisted by force.

F. All prisoners internees of the United Nations will be turned over immediately in accordance with instructions to be issued by the Allied C in C Mediterranean, and none of them may now or at any time be evacuated to Germany or satellite Countries or surrendered to the enemy armed forces.

G. All Bulgarian naval and merchantile vessels, including all seagoing and rivercraft, and Bulgarian aircraft, both civil and military, will be moved on orders of Allied C in C Mediterranean to such points as may be designated, and details of disarmament being by him. All ships and aircraft which cannot be prevented from falling into enemy's hands will be destroyed.

H. Equipment of Germans and satellite powers will be retained intact and handed over as directed by the Allied C in C Mediterranean, unless in danger of falling into enemy's hands in which case it will be destroyed.

I. The Bulgarian Government will give an immediate guarantee of the acceptance of forces of United Nations being stationed in Bulgaria, with full facilities for the successful prosecution of the war against Germany and her satellite powers, and all the rights of a military occupant.

J. The Bulgarian Government will with your approval immediately guarantee the use by the United Nations of all Bulgarian airfields. These airfields will be protected by the Bulgarian armed forces until this function is taken over by the forces of the United Nations.
K. Bulgaria will employ every effort to give access to all Bulgarian ports and facilitate entry, operations and maintenance of any of the United Nations forces.

L. The Bulgarian Government will guarantee to employ all its available military and civilian forces and authorities to ensure prompt and exact compliance with the provisions of this armistice.

M. Transfer to the Allied Commander in Chief Mediterranean reserves to himself the right to take any of the steps which in his opinion may be necessary for the protection of the interests of the United Nations for the prosecution of the war, and the Bulgarian Government binds itself to take such administrative or other actions which the Commander in Chief Mediterranean may require.

N. The Bulgarian Government will immediately comply with such orders as the Allied Commander in Chief Mediterranean may issue in respect of disarmament, demobilization, and character.

O. The Bulgarian Government will furnish such information as may be required and within the period specified by the Allied Commander in Chief Mediterranean and in value will ensure the security of all records of the enemy's military and civilian authorities and consigned to the State of Bulgaria.

P. Further conditions of a political, economic and financial nature with which Bulgaria will be bound to comply will be transmitted at a later date. Any further changes of the present armistice will be kept secret until permission of their publication is granted by Allied Commander in Chief Mediterranean. The English version will be considered the official text.

Q. The Bulgarian Government understands that in

After reading the document, the text is translated and then checked for accuracy.
event their not keeping to the terms of this armistice, the Allied C in C Mediterranean reserves the right to take such action as he considers fit.

5. To insure only. The * reserves for your information and terms are purely tentative. No action will be taken by you pending further instructions. * telegraph instructions that I segregate citie FROG.

No Sig

* Being serviced.

ACTION: CC/S(CAPT. ROYAL, USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
GEN. BISSELL
GEN. ARNOLD
WHITE HOUSE
CofS
ADM. KING
GEN. HILLDRING

CM-IN-1027 (2 Mar 44) 1022Z ong

TAGO to NLR, 11-30-70

Regraded Unclassified
ADMIRAL LEAHY TO AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN.

The receipt is acknowledged of your 210931 reporting Soviet reaction to Bulgarian approach to conversations.

The matter therein contained is now under consideration by the President and the Prime Minister.

LEAHY

Released from the White House Map Room at 1010, EWT, 26 Feb 44.

FRANKLIN H. GRAHAM,
1st Lieutenant, AGD.

File Copy
Leary to Harriman

The receipt is acknowledged of your 210931 reporting secret
reaction to Bulgarian approach
to Conversations.
The matter therein contained is
now under consideration by the
Prime Minister and the President

President and the Prime Minister
SECRET
PRIORITY

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 482, PERSONAL AND SECRET, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER
NAVAL PERSON.

I have received the following message dated 21 February from
Harriman in regard to our report of an attempt at peace conversations by
Bulgaria:

QUOTE. First -- The Soviet Government agrees that Bulgaria should
be asked to send a fully qualified mission to confer with representatives
of the United States, Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. Cairo is preferred
by the Soviet Government as the place for such a conference because a
responsible Soviet Representative is now there. Second -- The Soviet
Government considers that it is for the Governments of the United States
and Great Britain to reach a decision in connection with the request of
the Bulgarian Government that Allied air raids and bombing of Bulgaria be
stopped for a few days. UNQUOTE.

I would be pleased to have your reaction to this message and, if
you approve of the Soviet attitude, a suggested line of approach to the
Bulgarians.

ROOSEVELT

Printed in FRUS, 1944,
III, 302
- 1 -
February 24, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State.

We have received from Mr. Harriman under date of 21 February, the following information:

Paraphrase -- Mr. Molotov, in reply to a request for an expression of his views regarding a reported attempt by Bulgaria to arrange peace conversations, made the following statement:

The Soviet agrees that Bulgaria should be induced to send a fully qualified mission to confer in Cairo with representatives of the U.S., G.B., and U.S.S.R.

Cairo is preferred because there is now a responsible Soviet representative in Cairo.

The Soviet Government is of the opinion that Great Britain and the U.S. should make a decision on the request of Bulgaria that there be a limited postponement of Allied air raids on Bulgarian cities.

Lacking knowledge as to whether or not you have been previously informed, this note is sent for your information.

W.D.
From Harriman. Personal and Secret for the President.

Reference my 200004. Following is translation of reply dated February 20 which I have just received from Molotov. Quote I communicate the following in reply to your note of the 18th of February in which, on instructions from the President of the United States, you communicated his views and those of Mr. Churchill regarding an attempt at peace conversations by Bulgaria. First - The Soviet Government agrees that Bulgaria should be asked to send a fully qualified mission to confer with representatives of the United States, Great Britain and the USSR. Cairo is preferred by the Soviet Government as the
PLACE FOR SUCH A CONFERENCE BECAUSE A RESPONSIBLE
SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE IS NOW THERE. SECOND - THE
SOVIET GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THAT IT IS FOR THE
GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN
TO REACH A DECISION IN CONNECTION WITH THE REQUEST
OF THE BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT THAT ALLIED AIR RAIDS
AND BOMBING OF BULGARIA BE STOPPED FOR A FEW DAYS.

WHITE HOUSE (FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES) ...ACTION
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN.

THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR AND I SAW YSHINSKY YESTERDAY AS MOLOTOV WAS NOT AVAILABLE AND DELIVERED TO HIM YOUR MESSAGE AND THAT OF THE PRIME MINISTER REGARDING BULGARIA.

YSHINSKY DISCUSSED THE QUESTION OF THE PROPRIETY OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATING IN THE DISCUSSION AT SOME LENGTH. HE AGREED TO TAKE THE SUBJECT UP WITH MOLOTOV AND GIVE US A REPLY PROMPTLY.

DATE/TIME GROUP AS RECEIVED NCR HAS SERVICED.

P1A. ACTION FILE.
To: Freedom Algiers
Rptd: J.S.M. Washington
From: Chiefs of Staff
Dated: 18th February, 1944

Reference MEDCOS 51.

U.S. Chiefs of Staff have agreed proposals in our
OZ 780 (T.O.O. 111225Z). Bombing of Bulgarian targets should
be resumed forthwith subject to conditions contained in

T.O.O. 180940Z

Footnote: COSMED 33 is CM-IN-10557 (15 Feb 44) CC/S
MEDCOS 51 is CM-IN-12758 (18 Feb 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
GEN. BISSELL
GEN. ARNOLD
ADM. KING
WHITE HOUSE
LOG

CM-IN-12759 (18 Feb 44) 1713Z GW

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED per TAGO
to NLR, 11-30-70

COPY No. 28

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
28-533948BC

Regraded Unclassified
TO BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF
FROM: FREEDOM FROM WILSON CITE FHSGS

MEDCOS 51

In MEDCOS No. 35 our intention not to bomb targets in Bulgaria pending outcome of impending conversations in Istanbul was outlined and the concurrence of the Chiefs of Staff requested. Is COSMED 33 to be construed as instruction to resume bombing (forthwith) of Bulgarian targets.

MEDCOS 35 is CM-IN-6840 (10 Feb 44) CC/S COSMED 33 is CM-IN-10557 (15 Feb 44) CC/S

ACTION: CCS
INFORMATION: OPD
GEN BISSELL
GEN ARNOLD

CM-IN-12758 (18 Feb 44) 1711Z pa

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED per TAGO to NLR, 11-30-70
SECRET

FROM: CPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, MOSCOW

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN FROM THE PRESIDENT.

I have received information that the Bulgarian Minister to Turkey has stated that the Premier and leaders of the opposition in Bulgaria desire to discuss with the United States arrangements for joining the Allies in a combatant status. The Minister has requested that a preliminary mission be sent to Istanbul at once to discuss this proposal, and the Bulgarians have asked that air raids be suspended for ten days in order to give the Bulgarian Mission time to reach Istanbul. They believe that the time element is important or even vital to success.

I have considered this matter with the Prime Minister of Great Britain and we are in agreement as follows:

It is undesirable to hold conversations in Constantinople, but if the Bulgarian Government really means business it would be an error to rebuff them because they do not in the beginning offer to surrender unconditionally.

They should be advised to send a fully qualified mission to meet U.S., Soviet, and British representatives in some place which will be indicated, possibly Cairo or Cyprus. The latter has the advantage of being less distant from Bulgaria and of being secret.

It would be a mistake to suspend the bombing attacks before we know that the Bulgarian proposal is serious, and when they might hope for freedom from attack during practicable conversations.
SECRET

Therefore, we intend to continue bombing attacks on Bulgarian targets.

It is desired that together with your British colleague you convey to Molotov the views of the Prime Minister and myself as expressed herein and seek his agreement to the suggested line of action.

I am informed that the British Ambassador will receive similar instructions from his government.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1215, EWT, 16 Feb 44.

GEORGE M. ELSEY,
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
February 16, 1944

PRESIDENT TO HARRIMAN:

I have received information that the Bulgarian Minister to Turkey has stated that the Premier and leaders of the opposition in Bulgaria desire to discuss with the United States arrangements for joining the Allies in a combatant status. The Minister has requested that a preliminary mission be sent to Istanbul at once to discuss this proposal, and the Bulgarians have asked that air raids be suspended for ten days in order to give the Bulgarian Mission time to reach Istanbul. They believe that the time element is important or even vital to success.

I have considered this matter with the Prime Minister of Great Britain and we are in agreement as follows:

It is undesirable to hold conversations in Constantinople, but if the Bulgarian Government really means business it would be an error to rebuff them because they do not in the beginning offer to surrender unconditionally.

They should be advised to send a fully qualified mission to meet U.S., Soviet, and British representatives in some place which will be indicated, possibly Cairo or Cyprus. The latter has the advantage of being less distant from Bulgaria and of being secret.
It would be a mistake to suspend the bombing attacks before we know that the Bulgarian proposal is serious, and when they might hope for freedom from attack during practicable conversations.

Therefore, we intend to continue bombing attacks on Bulgarian targets.

It is desired that together with your British colleague you convey to Molotov the views of the Prime Minister and myself as expressed herein and seek his agreement to the suggested line of action.

I am informed that the British Ambassador will receive similar instructions from his government.
INDEX SHEET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER
NO: 469, 16 FEBRUARY 1944

COPY

NUMBER 469, PERSONAL AND SECRET, FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON

FROM THE PRESIDENT.

Replying to your 580, I am in agreement with your proposed

telegram to Clark Kerr and I am today sending identical instructions
to Harriman together with such details of the Bulgarian proposal

as are available here.

I have also informed Jadwin of our decision.

ROOSEVELT

ORIGINAL in "PRESIDENT-PRIME MINISTER" file.

---

Show classification number and date of communication on first line, drop two spaces, show source of communication and to whom addressed, then drop two spaces again and give a brief synopsis of subject matter sufficient to identify the document.

W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0822
May 20-23

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified
From: Embassy London
To: The President of the United States
Number 580

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt, Personal and most-secret. Your number 465.

Para 1. I would propose to telegraph as follows to Ambassador Clark Kerr:

"Your United States colleague, who will be receiving from Washington identical instructions to those contained in this telegram, will be able to furnish you with full details of proposals made on February 6th by Bulgarian Minister to Turkey on behalf of the Regent, the Bulgarian Prime Minister and the principal opposition leaders for the initiation of discussions with the USA with a view to Bulgaria joining the United Nations.

"These proposals have been considered by the President and the Prime Minister whose views are as follows: It is undesirable that a Bulgarian mission should open conversations in Constantinople. If the Bulgarian Government really mean business it would be a mistake to rebuff them because they do not at the outset offer unconditional surrender. They should be told to send a fully qualified
mission to meet United States, Soviet and British representatives at a place which will be indicated and which might be Cyprus or Cairo. Advantage of Cyprus is that it is nearer to Bulgaria and absolutely secret.

"This Bulgarian peace feeler shows that the air bombing of Sofia appears to have had exactly the effect which was hoped for. In these circumstances it would be a mistake to suspend it at the request of the Bulgarian Minister to Turkey before it is known whether the Bulgarian proposals really are serious ones and when it is probable that the Bulgarian Government hope for a respite from bombing during protracted conversations. It is therefore proposed to continue with the bombing of Bulgarian targets.

"In concert with your United States colleague, please convey views of President and Prime Minister to Molotov and seek his agreement to proposed line of action."

Para 2. On hearing from you that you consider this message suitable, I would at once despatch it.

Para 3. Meanwhile you will no doubt have informed the Jadwin mission of our decision.

No Sig

Regraded Unclassified
SECRET

12 FEBRUARY 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 465, SECRET AND PERSONAL, FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON
FROM THE PRESIDENT.

I wholly agree with your 576. Let the good work go on.

Please send me a draft of the message which you consider sending
to our representatives in Moscow for delivery to Molotov with the
purpose of getting his approval.

ROOSEVELT
From: Embassy London
To: The President of the United States
Number 576
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and most secret.
Para 1. Many thanks for your telegram number 463 of February 9th.
Para 2. It seems to me most undesirable that a Bulgarian Mission should open conversations in Constantinople. If the Bulgarian Government really mean business, they should be told to send a fully qualified mission to meet representatives of the Three Powers at a place which will be indicated and might be Cyprus or Cairo. Cyprus is absolutely secret and nearer.
Para 3. Our bombing of Sofia appears in fact to have had exactly the effect we hoped for, in that the Bulgarians are falling over each other in their haste to make contact with us. That being so, would it not be a mistake to suspend it at the request of the firstcomer who no doubt hopes for a respite during protracted conversations.
Para 4. If you agree, therefore, I hope we may send
identical instructions to our representatives in Moscow on the above lines and get Molotov's agreement to our proposed line of action.

No Sig

Reid 12/3552

To Reviser 12/3552-020
FROM: CHIEFS OF STAFF

TO: J.S.M., WASHINGTON, REPEATED A.F.H.Q.

February 11, 1944.

C.O.S. (W) 1144

Reference MEDCOS 35. Following for U. S. Chiefs of Staff, Repeated General Wilson from British Chiefs of Staff.

We consider that bombing of Bulgarian targets should be persisted in to the utmost possible without regard to the alleged overtures for peace.

T.O.O. 111225Z

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
General Bissell
General Arnold
White House
Admiral King
Log

CM-IN-7875 (11 Feb 44) 2112Z jt
From: London
To: The President of the United States
No: 575, Filed 10/2320Z

Prime Minister to President. Personal.

Eden and I are agreed here that the bombing of Bulgarian targets as weather permits should not be stopped because of the peace overtures. If the medicine has done good, let them have more of it.

No Sig
FROM: OPMNAV
TO: ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 463, PERSONAL AND SECRET, FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT.

I have received an unconfirmed report that the Bulgarian Government desires to send a mission to Istanbul to discuss conditions under which Bulgarian Army would join the Allies.

If this report should prove to be true it appears to me that it would be worth while for us to make some concessions such as suspending the bombing attacks on Bulgaria for a limited period and with your sending representatives to meet the Bulgarian Mission at Istanbul. Probably the Russians should be in on this too.

It is assumed that your sources of information in Turkey have heard the same story if it has any validity.

I am repeating this to you only for what it is worth in anticipation of possible future developments.

ROOSEVELT
To: British Chiefs of Staff  
Info: J.S.M. for U.S. Chiefs of Staff  
Rptd: Mideast No. 49141 091545  
From: A.F.H.Q. signed Wilson

Number: MEDOOS No. 35

Through Mideast from Jadwin Mission I am informed

(a) That on 6th February Bulgarian Minister to Turkey arrived
Istanbul from Sofia informing that Regent, Prime Minister and
principal opposition leaders wish discussions with America, look-
ing to Bulgaria joining United Nations. Minister states he
was empowered to give this message to Kuyumdjiisky (who I
understand to be OSS agent).

(b) During discussion it was proposed that Bulgarian mission
be sent Istanbul to say under what general terms Bulgarian Army
would engage in battle along side Allied Nations. This pre-
liminary mission is being sent for by Minister to talk with
Kuyumdjiisky at Istanbul at once.

(c) Conditions referred to in (b) are to be sent Washington and
Cairo immediately they are presented. It is proposed that they
should if acceptable form basis for further discussions between
representatives of the two countries.

(d) They accept it that we will be unwilling to discuss
territorial matters but seek assurance that old Bulgaria as
nation will be preserved.

(e) Pending arrival of mission in Istanbul they request
suspension of bombing for ten days stating they realize time is
important factor in the proposal. Kuyumdjiisky and Packey with
former's associates think chances of success will be much im-
proved if we accede to request, failing which our mission might
fail utterly. Paget recommends we agree.

(f) Paget reports that there is some substantiation that im-
portant proposal will follow since report from Istanbul to Force
133 indicates that Sevov, one of the three or four most powerful
men in Bulgaria, formerly most intimate advisor to late King
Boris, has reached that place.
2. Acting on above information I have ordered the suspension of bombing until further instructions. You are aware of present policy under which Strategic Air Force is bombing Bulgaria in priority after POINTBLANK and Battle for Italy. I repeat I consider that there will be small loss of profitable targets over a reasonable period of time as there is the good possibility that they would not be engaged in any event. I am however instructing Paget that Bulgarians are not to be informed of this action.

3. Since political considerations appear predominant I request that you will give concurrence in my decision and forward any further (instructions) you may have for my guidance should a request for conversations between accredited representatives be received.

T.0.0. 091631A

ACTION: CCS

INFORMATION: OPD
   Gen Bissell
   Gen Arnold
   Adm King
   (White House)
   Log

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED per TAGO to
NLR, 11-30-70

CM-IN-6840 (10 Feb 44) 1228Z mos

Regraded Unclassified