

Folder 2. MR 370 Bulgaria (1)—Peace Feelers,
9 February—26 August 1944.

Map Room
Box 35
Folder 2

August 26, 1944

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Armistice Terms For Bulgaria

The Department has received information from London that on August 26 the European Advisory Commission discussed and drafted the text of a draft armistice with Bulgaria. This text has received the approval of the British Government and has been sent to Moscow by the Soviet Ambassador for Soviet approval. The document was drawn up on the basis of the materials furnished by the Department in February and July, 1944, and cleared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The text of this document is attached.

The Department is informing the Embassy in London that it approves the document as it now stands pending clearance by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It suggests, however, that as the negotiations proceed, thought might be given to an alteration of Article Three by adding the words, 'their withdrawal to be carried out according to a schedule laid down by the Allied occupation authorities.' The Department has in mind the possibility that the immediate withdrawal of the Bulgarian forces from the occupied territories in Yugoslavia and Greece might result in wide-spread disorder, and invites the views of the Joint Chiefs on this matter.

The European Advisory Commission has also raised the questions whether Bulgaria should be assured of its future independence at the time of the negotiations as a means of facilitating its acceptance of the terms, and regarding the form which the assistance of Greece and Yugoslavia as signatories of the armistice should take. The Department is informing its representative on the Commission that in its view Bulgaria might, at the discretion of the Allied representatives, be given orally

such

such assurance of future independence, and that Greek and Yugoslav representatives should be invited to assent to the surrender terms without signing them. It is proposed that the other Governments at war with Bulgaria should be informed of the terms at the time of their acceptance.

A memorandum on this subject, identical in text, is being addressed to Admiral Leahy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Enclosure:

Armistice Terms
for Bulgaria

TOP SECRET

Armistice Terms For Bulgaria

"The following conditions have been accepted by the Bulgarian Government:

"One. Hostilities to cease between Bulgaria and the United Nations at blank space.

"Two. Bulgaria to sever all relations with Germany and other enemy powers, to disarm and intern enemy forces and nationals and to control enemy property.

"Three. Bulgarian forces, officials and nationals to withdraw from all Allied territory at present occupied by Bulgaria.

"Four. The Supreme Allied Command to have the right to move their forces freely into or across Bulgarian territory at the cost of Bulgaria if the military situation requires or if the Bulgarian Government fail in any respects to fulfill the terms of the armistice.

"Five. Bulgaria to carry out such measures of disarmament and demobilization, as may be required.

"Six. Bulgaria to release Allied prisoners of war and internees.

"Seven. Bulgaria to comply with Allied requirements for the use and control of transport including Danubian navigation and transport facilities.

"Eight. Bulgaria to release all persons detained for political reasons or as a result of discriminatory legislation. Such legislation to be repealed.

"Nine. Bulgaria to cooperate in the apprehension and trial of persons accused of war crimes.

"Ten. Bulgaria to restore all United Nations property and to make reparation for war damage.

"Eleven. Bulgaria to make such contribution towards general relief and rehabilitation as may be required of her.

"Twelve.

"Twelve. Bulgaria to comply with any further Allied instructions for giving effect to the armistice; and to meet Allied requirements for the reestablishment of peace and security."

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: U.S. Military Attache Ankara, Turkey

To: War Department

No. 90 6 April 1944

MILID number 90 AMSME 707.

Report of Consul General Istanbul recommends United States Britain and Russia come to immediate agreement on terms of settlement with Bulgaria and so get her out of war. Says demand for unconditional surrender by Bulgaria is quite unrealistic now moreover Bulgarians will not join Tito. Increasing number Bulgarians believe Soviet policy aims at control of Balkans in interests Russian power as Guarantee Russian security. Bulgarian leaders believe Russia regards Bulgaria as necessary to their control of Balkans and inclined satisfy Bulgarian territorial demands.

Bulgaria likely continue hesitate until further Russian advance in Rumania or until Russia demands decision by Bulgars. Reaction in Bulgaria to Molotov statement will be favorable to Russia. Report points out that least Russia would favor for Bulgaria would be infinitely better from Bulgarian viewpoint than unconditional surrender terms we offer.

Bulgarian expert in Consulate thinks Molotov statement cuts ground from under our unconditional surrender stand. As far as Bulgaria goes he would like to see it dropped. Also he objects to our pattern of bombing which has supported German propoganda that air attacks are purely terroristic. Russian Air Attache says Russian post war reconstruction

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Jack L. Guthrie, 2-3-71

CM-IN-5135 (7 Apr 44)

370

~~SECRET~~

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SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Page -2-

From: U.S. Military Attache Ankara, Turkey
No. 90 6 April 1944

problems will be too vast for them to undertake burden of dominating Bulgaria or other extensive part of Balkans. Said Russia would probably ask Bulgaria not allow passage German Troops through Bulgaria, troops from Greece and escaping troops from Crimea. He thinks Bulgaria would cooperate to this extent.

Tindall

ACTION: G-2

INFO: CGAAF
OPD
Col Perk
Log

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Jack L. Guthrie, 2-3-71

CM-IN-5135 (7 Apr 44) 2340Z mv

~~SECRET~~

COPY No. 40

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SECRET

8 MARCH 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO : ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 491. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL
PERSON, SECRET AND PERSONAL.

Your 607.

Mr. MacVeagh will act for us, his instructions at this
stage being only to listen to what the Bulgarians have to
say. He is being informed that Mr. MacMillan will be the
British representative, and directed to keep in touch with
him.

We agree that General Wilson, who will be responsible
to the Combined Chiefs in matters pertaining to the activities
of the Bulgarian Mission, should be kept fully informed of
developments, and that he be directed to have a military
representative present.

ROOSEVELT

SECRET

- 1 -

Copy

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON


March 7, 1944

*File
Gus*

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL MATHEWSON

Subject: Cable from the Prime Minister on Bulgaria.

With reference to your memorandum of March 1, in which you enclosed a message from the Prime Minister to the President on Bulgaria, I attach herewith a paraphrase of the telegram to ambassador MacVeagh authorizing him to take part in any eventual discussions with the Bulgarians, and a copy of a memorandum of conversation between Mr. Cannon of the Department and Mr. Sheperdson of OSS regarding the sending of a message to the Bulgarian Minister in Turkey.



Enclosures:

1. Paraphrase of telegram.
2. Copy of memorandum of conversation.

PARRHRASE OF TELEGRAM

SENT

FROM: THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE, Washington, D.C.

TO: AMERICAN LEGATION, Cairo

DATED: March 3, 1944.

NUMBERED: YUGOS 7, 7 p.m.

In conformity with an agreement between the British Prime Minister and the President, following Moscow's approval, the Bulgarians have been sent a message to the effect that the three principal Allies are prepared to have their representatives meet a fully qualified Bulgarian Delegation in Cairo, Egypt.

If such a Bulgarian Delegation should eventually reach Cairo to meet the Allied representatives, you may join your Soviet and British colleagues for the purpose of listening to the Bulgarian proposals. These proposals can then be submitted for further consideration by the three Governments.

As of possible help with regard to any conversations which you may in the meantime have with the British and Soviet Ambassadors it is remarked that there may at some time arise some question as to the extent to which the Russians may wish to participate because of the fact that Soviet Russia and Bulgaria are not at war. It is intended in all events that the Soviet Government be held fully informed and that it have every opportunity to give expression to its views.

BTETTINIUS

C O P Y

MEMORANDUM

February 2, 1944.

By arrangement made yesterday Mr. Whitney Shepherdson of the OSS came to see me this morning.

I told him that we had been directed by the President to arrange that the Jadwin mission inform the Minister of Bulgaria in Turkey that representatives of the three principal Allies are prepared to meet a fully qualified Bulgarian Mission in Cairo. Since the connection through which this project had been handled had been the OSS mission referred to, it seemed to me that the OSS here would be the proper channel for conveying this information to Colonel Jadwin.

Mr. Shepherdson said he would get the instructions out at once.

I then added that it was my understanding that the American representative in any talks which may ensue would be Mr. MacVeagh, our Ambassador to the governments of Greece and Yugoslavia at Cairo. Mr. Shepherdson said that the purpose of the Jadwin mission would have been fulfilled if it facilitates the contact, as now seems to be the case that, however, the Jadwin people could follow on to Cairo after the Bulgarian mission passes through Turkey, if it appeared to be useful to have them standing by, but that this would be thought over, having in mind, as I pointed out, that the idea was only to have the designated Allied representatives listen to what the Bulgarians have to say, and the Jadwin group would therefore not be taking part in the conversation.

SE:CWCannon:EJS



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 7, 1944

S E C R E T

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY

Admiral Leahy

Colonel Mathewson's memorandum for the Acting Secretary of State of March 6, 1944, transmitted a paraphrase of the Prime Minister's message no. 607 to the President and suggested the preparation of a reply to be sent after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

A suggested draft of reply from the President to the Prime Minister is attached hereto which before laying before the President you may wish to clear with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There is also enclosed a paraphrase of the Department's instruction to Ambassador MacVeagh in the premises.

Enclosures:

1. Draft reply to the Prime Minister.
2. Department's paraphrase of telegram to Mr. MacVeagh.



Department of State

BUREAU
DIVISION

2 ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted 3-7-44

ADDRESSED TO

Admiral Leahy

SECRET

~~PROPOSED TEXT OF PRESIDENT'S REPLY
TO PRIME MINISTER'S TELEGRAM NO. 607~~

#491

Your 607.

Mr. MacVeagh will act for us, his instructions at this stage being only to listen to what the Bulgarians have to say. He is being informed that Mr. MacMillan will be the British representative, and directed to keep in touch with him.

We agree that General Wilson, who will be responsible to the Combined Chiefs in matters pertaining to the activities of the Bulgarian Mission, should be kept fully informed of developments, and that he be directed to have a military representative present.

Roanick

SECRET

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM SENT

TO: AMERICAN LEGATION, Cairo
FROM: DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington D.C.
DATED: March 7, 1944.

Mr. Churchill has informed the President that the British will be represented by MacMillan in any conversations which may eventuate with British representatives. You should, therefore, keep in close touch with him in this connection.

By agreement between the Prime Minister and the President, General Wilson, who will have responsibility to the Combined Chiefs with regard to the activities of the Bulgarian delegation, should be kept informed of all developments and will be authorized to have a military officer present.

STETTINIUS

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY
CONTROL

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

To: A.F.H.Q.

Info: J.S.M. Washington

From: Chiefs of Staff

Dated: 6 March 1944

COSMED 53

Following for General Wilson from Chiefs of Staff.

Reference MEDCOS 61

1. Reference paragraph 3 of MEDCOS 61. There is nothing to prevent you using the 15th Air Force against Bulgaria at a moment when you consider it might be the primary factor in deciding the course of Bulgarian affairs.

Time of Origin 062155Z

MEDCOS 61 is CM-IN-3407 (5 Mar 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
GEN. BISSELL
GEN. ARNOLD
CofS
ADM. KING
COL. MATHEWSON

CM-IN-4575 (7 Mar 44) 1510Z cng

370 Bulgaria

SECRET

COPY No.

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24-53394AB 1800*

6 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has directed that the attached paraphrased copy of message No. 607 from the Prime Minister be furnished to the Department of State for preparation of reply after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In order that you may be fully informed, a paraphrased copy of the President's message No. 487 to the Prime Minister is also furnished.

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.

2 Incls.
Incl 1-PM-President #607,
5 March 1944.
Incl 2-President-PM, #487,
6 March 1944.
3

SECRET

5 March 1944

From: London

For: The President of the United States

Number 607

Filed 052040Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Most secret and personal. Number 607.

Your number 487.

We agree about this being in General Wilson's sphere. But I think that the mission should in the first place be received by representatives of the three Allies and a military representative of General Wilson and the first contacts established through diplomatic channels. General Wilson would, of course, be kept informed and would be responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff if and when it came to dictating armistice terms. No doubt you will instruct your representative to keep in touch with Mr. MacMillan who will act for us. I think it most important, however, that you and I should watch this from day to day and settle on the highest level, of course in conjunction with U.J.

No Sig

SECRET

Answered by [Signature] 491, 8 Mar 43.

copy

SECRET

3 MARCH 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO : ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 487. SECRET AND PERSONAL, FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT.

Referring your 596 (29 Feb 1944). In agreement with your suggestion we have instructed Jadwin Mission to inform Minister of Bulgaria that representatives of the three Allies are prepared to confer in Cairo with a fully qualified Bulgarian Mission. Jadwin also directed to telegraph immediately to Washington any reply that he may receive.

In view of the inclusion of the Balkans in General Wilson's area it seems to me that he is the correct official to control any mission to discuss surrender terms of Bulgaria.

ROOSEVELT

THIS COPY for "MR 370 BULGARIA (1)"

031643 NCR 9467

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

[Handwritten signature]
SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

4 March 1944

To: A.F.H.Q.

Info: JOINT STAFF MISSION WASHINGTON AND MIDEAST

From: CHIEFS OF STAFF

Number: COSMED 52

Following from Chiefs of Staff for General Wilson.

We approve your recommendations as set out in Paras 3

and 4 of MEDCOS 58.

*
Military terms for Bulgaria.

T. O. O. 04223Z

MEDCOS 58 is CM-IN-1145 (2 Mar 44) CCS

ACTION: CCS

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Bissell
Gen Arnold
C of S
Adm King
Col Mathewson

CM-IN-3885 (6 Mar 44) 1437Z mcs

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370 Bulgaria

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24-53394AB 1800*

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Cur

②

March 4, 1944

TO: BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

INFO: JOINT STAFF MISSION FOR U.S. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MIDEAST
AND HQ MAAF

FROM: FREEDOM

Number MEDCOS 61

Signed Wilson cite FHCOS

1. Further to MEDCOS 58. ✓

sent to Mah Room

I am somewhat concerned at the course events appear to be taking in relation to the Bulgarian situation. By the terms of my directive I am responsible to the British and United States Governments for the direction of our military policy in Bulgaria and the other Balkan States. A supremely important factor in this policy is any question of armistice negotiations. Yet apparently some such negotiations are taking shape of which I know virtually nothing. I was of course aware that there had been some form of contact with the Bulgarians through the Jadwin Mission but I now hear from a reference in a telegram from Mideast that there has been some preliminary approach in writing since some words from that approach are actually quoted. But I have no means of judging whether or to what extent the possibility of these negotiations is genuine or imminent and have no instructions as to how they are to be conducted, what policy I am to pursue in them, how they are to be related to policy in respect of Rumania and Hungary or how Russia fits into the picture.

2. I am receiving from Mideast Defence Committee certain advice dealing with military policy vis-a-vis Bulgaria and including recommendations about such matters as bombing policy with relation to these possible negotiations. I realize that the situation is somewhat complicated by the fact that Balkan affairs have in the past largely been handled in Cairo and that the bulk of our information from the Balkans centres there. But these recommendations from Cairo though they may be sound enough on the face of it, are made against the background of necessarily incomplete knowledge of the latest turns in our overall Mediterranean strategy of the

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(5 Mar 44)

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36

370 Bulgaria

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Ed Mathewson

INCOMING MESSAGE
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
NAVY DEPARTMENT

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Number MEDCOB 61

PAGE TWO

March 4, 1944

possibilities of air operations in Bulgaria in the light of our POINTBLANK policy and of the practical limitations such as those of weather or our ability to carry out such operations.

3. If the possibility of putting Bulgaria out of the war and still more of swinging her over against the Axis is genuine and imminent then I should be fully informed and should at the earliest possible date receive appropriate instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In view of the extreme importance of this (? possibility) (? on) our whole European strategy particularly at this time in containing enemy forces away from OVERLORD I hope some temporary modification of strategic priorities for the 15th Air Force will receive due consideration since the immediate use of this force at a suitable moment may well be the primary factor in deciding the course of Bulgarian affairs.

4. I should be grateful if I could receive as soon as possible the fullest available information on this subject and an indication of your views since if these negotiations are to be taken seriously as an imminent development I propose to send Air Marshal Blesser to Cairo to represent me in connection with them and shall require to give him full instructions.

T.O.O. 041525A

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MEDCOB 58 is CM-IN-1145 (2 Mar 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Bissell
Gen Arnold
Gen Hildring
C of S
Adm King
Col Mathewson

CM-IN-3407

(5 Mar 44)

1859Z

vh

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INCOMING MESSAGE
SECURITY CONTROL

fu
SECURITY CONTROL

March 2, 1944

*File with
Medcos 58*

TO: British Chiefs of Staff
J.S.M. Washington for Joint Chiefs of Staff

FROM: AFHQ signed Wilson cite FHGCT No 58925

INFO: Mid East HQ MAAF

Number MEDCOS 59.

Second sentence of para 1 MEDCOS 58 should be interpreted to mean that instructions to Jadwin Mission should be conducted through Allied CINC AFHQ.

FOOTNOTE: MEDCOS 58 is CM-IN-1145 (2 Mar 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Bissell
Gen Arnold
C of S
Adm King
Col Mathewson ✓

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CM-IN-1371 (2 Mar 44)

2115Z amr

370 Bulgaria

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~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

for
SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

From: FREEDOM

To: British Chiefs of Staff
Rptd: J.S.M. Washington for
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and to Mid-East.

Dated: 1 March, 1944

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MEDCOS 58

For information only. Signed Wilson. Cite FHGCT
58847.

M. E. Defense Committee have informed me that Foreign Office have suggested to State Department with agreement of Soviet Government that Jadwin Mission be instructed to inform Bulgarian Minister that representatives of the three Allies would be prepared to meet a fully qualified Bulgarian Mission in Cairo. I should be grateful if you would affirm that all negotiations with Bulgarians, including issue of instructions to Jadwin Mission, should be conducted through me. I assume that agreement of Soviet Government would be obtained to my acting with their authority as well as that of the Governments of U. S. and G. B., and that their agreement would be obtained to provisional armistice terms on lines of those in MEDCOS 49.

Defense Committee further recommend that present program of bombing Bulgarian targets be continued unaltered till Mission is on its way, but at this point bombing should be suspended while negotiations in progress provided overriding priority is given to immediate resumption bombing on major scale if negotiations prove dilatory or unsatisfactory - such resumption being used as a threat if necessary.

I do not agree with this recommendation. I consider that any sign of Bulgarian willingness to negotiate calls for intensification of bombing against Bulgaria which should be

CM-IN-1145 (2 Mar 44)

370 *Bulgaria*

~~SECRET~~

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INCOMING MESSAGE

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

page 2

carried out whenever weather permits, subject only to POINTBLANK and essential defensive requirements of battle in Italy.

I consider there should be no relaxation of this policy while negotiations are in progress. In my view nothing is more likely to prevent them becoming dilatory or unsatisfactory than to continue bombing against as many targets in Bulgaria, including Sofia, as the weather and our other prior commitments permit. I recommend, therefore, that if these negotiations materialize my representative should be instructed not to discuss cessation of bombing.

It may be relevant to point out that Russians do not appear to have considered it desirable to relax bombing of Finland during present negotiations.

T.O.O. 011600A

MEDCOS 49 is CM-IN-1027 (2 Mar 44)CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
General Bissell
General Arnold
C of S
Admiral King
Colonel Mathewson

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CM-IN-1145 (2 Mar 44) 1422Z med

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1 March 1944

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has directed that the attached message from the Prime Minister be referred to you for necessary action.

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.

Inc: Prime Minister
Msg. No. 596

*See President's Black 9, 292337Z, Feb 44,
which directed PM 596 (White 44) be
given to Mr. Stettinius for necessary
action. I*

SECRET

SECRET

WAZ

44

29 February 1944

From: London

For: The President of the United States

Number 596

Filed 292040Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and most secret. Number 596.

Your last message ^(white 19) about the peace feelers from Bulgaria.

We have already had the same reply through Clark Kerr and agree that Cairo is probably the best rendezvous.

I think the only thing to do now is for the Jadwin mission to inform the Bulgarian Minister that representatives of the three Allies are prepared to meet a fully qualified Bulgarian mission in Cairo. If the Bulgarians send a mission, we can then listen to what it has to say.

The Foreign Office have already suggested that the State Department should send the necessary instructions to the Jadwin mission.

No Sig

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INCOMING MESSAGE

~~SECURITY
CONTROL~~

SUPPLEMENTARY COPY

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers
To: WAR

Number 58355, 29 February 1944

Correction from Sub Paragraph N to end of message:

N. The Bulgarian Government will immediately comply with such orders as the Allied C in C Mediterranean may issue in respect disarmament, demobilization and demilitarisation.

O. The Bulgarian Government will furnish such information as may be required and within the period specified by the Allied C in C Mediterranean and in addition will ensure the security of all records of the enemy's military and civil authorities and organizations in Bulgaria.

P. Further conditions of a political, economic and financial nature with which Bulgaria will be bound to comply with will be transmitted at a later date. Any further terms of the present armistice will be kept secret until permission of their publication is granted by Allied C in C Mediterranean. The English version will be considered the official text.

Q. The Bulgarian Government understands that in event their not keeping to the terms of this armistice, the Allied C in C Mediterranean reserves the right to take such action as he considers fit.

CM-IN-2223 (3 Mar 44)

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370 Bulgaria

Col. Mathewson

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INCOMING MESSAGE

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers
To: WAR
Number 58355, 29 February 1944

Page 2

5. To Mideast only. The above for your information and terms are purely tentative. No action will be taken by you pending further instructions.

Signed Wilson cite FEGCT.

No Sig

FOOTNOTE: Supplementary copy of CM-IN-1027 (2 Mar 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S (Capt. Royal USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Bissell
Gen Arnold
Gen Hilldring
C of S
Adm King
Col Mathewson

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CM-IN-2223 (3 Mar 44) 2350Z jb

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~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

for
SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: Algiers
To: WAR

Nr: 58355, 29th February 1944

From Allied Forces Headquarters to Air Ministry for the British Chiefs of Staff repeated to Britman Washington for the USA Joint Chiefs of Staff and Mideast 58 Reconnaissance Battalion 5 291800. This is ~~CRACK~~ number 49.

In para 3 of ^{Medcos} ~~CRACK~~ number 35, I requested that you forward any further instructions you may have for my guidance should a request for conversation between the accredited representatives Bulgaria and the Allied Nations be received. To date no instructions have been forwarded to me.

2. I am informed that His Majesty's Government and USA Government have proposed to the Soviet Government that Bulgarian Government should be directed to send qualified mission to meet our representatives at a place to be indicated later, probably Cyprus or Cairo. I am further advised that a Rumanian emissary selected arriving 27th February in the Mideast. In view of this, I feel that it is necessary that I be furnished immediately guidance as requested in CRACK number 35.

3. Projected military terms for Bulgaria generally as follows and should be grateful if you would indicate any changes you desire.

4. The following conditions of an armistice are presented by "Blank", CINC of the Allied Forces in the Mediterranean, acting by authority of the Governments of the U.S.A. and Great Britain and in the interests of the United Nations are accepted by "Blank", if desired of Bulgarian Government.

CM-IN-1027 (2 Mar 44)

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370 Bulgaria ~~SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers Page 2
To: WAR
Nr: 58355, 29th February 1944

A. The Bulgarian Government will cease untenable hostile activities by its armed forces against any forces of the United Nations and any forces coordinating with them.

B. The Bulgarian Government will arrange for the immediate withdrawal of Bulgarian Armed Forces from all participation in current war from whatever areas in which they may now be engaged or employed, and such areas as may be designated by the Allied C in C.

C. Bulgaria will deny to the Germans and satellite powers all facilities and all resources that might be used against the United Nations, and hold them at the disposal of the Allied C in C. All external communications and commercial exchange including gold in transit, by air, sea, land and the Danube will be stopped except as authorized by the Allied C in C.

D. The Bulgarian Government will take steps to secure against seizure or attack by enemy and prevent the removal or destruction of any parts thereof by the first authority of the Allied C in C, all radio location apparatus, radio navigational aids, radio, cable and other telecommunication stations and systems under Bulgarian control, whether owned by Bulgaria or its Nationals, or any other nation or its Nationals not of the United Nations. These stations and systems will be surrendered to the Allied C in C, if required, in good repair together with all operating plans, diagrams, instructions and pertinent records, if deemed advisable by the Allied authorities, qualified personnel to operate such equipment. No radio or telecommunication installations or other forms of intercommunication ashore or afloat, whether belonging to Bulgaria or any other nation other than the United Nations will transmit until the directions for the control of these installations have been laid down by the Allied C in C.

CM-IN-1027 (2 Mar 44)

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35

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~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

~~SECURITY
CONTROL~~

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers Page 3
To: WAR
Nr: 58355, 29th February 1944

E. The Bulgarian authorities will intern all Germans and satellite personnel and agents within their territory. Any attempt by Germans or satellite powers to enter Bulgarian territory will be resisted by force.

F. All prisoners internees of the United Nations will be turned over immediately in accordance with instructions to be issued by the Allied C in C Mediterranean, and none of them may now or at any time be evacuated to Germany or satellite Countries or surrendered to the enemy armed forces.

G. All Bulgarian naval and merchantile vessels, including all seagoing and rivercraft, and Bulgarian aircraft, both civil and military, will be moved on orders of Allied C in C Mediterranean to such points as may be designated, and details of disarmament being by him. All ships and aircraft which cannot be prevented from falling into enemy's hands will be destroyed.

H. Equipment of Germans and satellite powers will be retained intact and handed over as directed by the Allied C in C Mediterranean, unless in danger of falling into enemy's hands in which case it will be destroyed.

I. The Bulgarian Government will give an immediate guarantee of the acceptance of forces of United Nations being stationed in Bulgaria, with full facilities for the successful prosecution of the war against Germany and her satellite powers, and all the rights of a military occupant.

J. The Bulgarian Government will with your approval immediately guarantee the use by the United Nations of all Bulgarian airfields. These airfields will be protected by the Bulgarian armed forces until this function is taken over by the forces of the United Nations.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers Page 4
To: WAR
Nr: 58355, 29th February 1944

K. Bulgaria will employ every effort to give access to all Bulgarian ports and facilitate entries, operations and maintenance of any of the United Nations forces.

L. The Bulgarian Government will guarantee to employ all its available military and civilian forces and authorities to ensure prompt and exact compliance with the provisions of this armistice.

M. Transfer to the Allied Commander in Chief Mediterranean reserves to himself the right to take any of the steps which in his opinion may be necessary for the protection of the interests of the United Nations for the prosecution of the war, and the Bulgarian Government binds itself to take such administrative or other actions which the Commander in Chief Mediterranean may require.

N. The Bulgarian Government will immediately comply with such orders as the Allied C in C Mediterranean may issue in respect disarmament, demobilization, and character.

O. The Bulgarian Government will furnish such information as may be required and within the period specified by the Allied C in C Mediterranean and in value will ensure the security of all records of the enemy's military and civilian authorities and consigned to the State of Bulgaria.

P. Further conditions of a political, economic and financial nature with which Bulgaria will be bound to comply will be transmitted at a later date. Any further changes of the present armistice will be kept secret until permission of their publication is granted by Allied C in C Mediterranean. The English version will be considered the official text.

Q. The Bulgarian Government understands that in

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to NLR, 11-30-7D

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers Page 5
To: WAR
Nr: 58355, 29th February 1944

event their not keeping to the terms of this armistice, the Allied C in C Mediterranean reserves the right to take such action as he considers fit.

5. To insure only. The * reserves for your information and terms are purely tentative. No action will be taken by you pending further instructions. * telegraph instructions that I segregate cite FHGCT.

No Sig

* Being serviced.

ACTION: CC/S(CAPT. ROYAL, USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
GEN. BISSELL
GEN. ARNOLD
WHITE HOUSE
CofS
ADM. KING
GEN. HILLDRING

CM-IN-1027 (2 Mar 44) 1022Z ong

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TAGO to NLR, 11-30-70

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24-53394AB 1800*

SECRET

SECRET
PRIORITY

26 FEBRUARY 1944

FROM: OPNAV

TO : ALUSNA, MOSCOW

ADMIRAL LEAHY TO AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN.

The receipt is acknowledged of your 210931 reporting Soviet reaction to Bulgarian approach to conversations.

The matter therein contained is now under consideration by the President and the Prime Minister.

LEAHY

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1010, EWT, 26 Feb 44.

Franklin H. Graham
FRANKLIN H. GRAHAM,
1st Lieutenant, AGD.

SECRET

- 1 -

File Copy

261448 NCR 8474

Regraded Unclassified

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356

Leahy to Harriman

The receipt is acknowledged of
your 210931 reporting Soviet
reaction to Bulgarian approach
to conversations.

The matter therein contained is
now under consideration by the
~~Prime Minister and the President~~
President and the Prime Minister

SECRET
PRIORITY

25 FEBRUARY 1944

FROM: OPNAV

TO : ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 482, PERSONAL AND SECRET, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER
NAVAL PERSON.

I have received the following message dated 21 February from
Harriman in regard to our report of an attempt at peace conversations by
Bulgaria:

QUOTE. First -- The Soviet Government agrees that Bulgaria should
be asked to send a fully qualified mission to confer with representatives
of the United States, Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. Cairo is preferred
by the Soviet Government as the place for such a conference because a
responsible Soviet Representative is now there. Second -- The Soviet
Government considers that it is for the Governments of the United States
and Great Britain to reach a decision in connection with the request of
the Bulgarian Government that Allied air raids and bombing of Bulgaria be
stopped for a few days. UNQUOTE.

I would be pleased to have your reaction to this message and, if
you approve of the Soviet attitude, a suggested line of approach to the
Bulgarians.

ROOSEVELT

Printed in FRUS, 1944,
III, 302

- 1 -

Copy

February 24, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State.

We have received from Mr. Harriman under date of 21 February, the following information:

Paraphrase -- Mr. Molotov, in reply to a request for an expression of his views regarding a reported attempt by Bulgaria to arrange peace conversations, made the following statement:

The Soviet agrees that Bulgaria should be induced to send a fully qualified mission to confer in Cairo with representatives of the U.S., G.B., and U.S.S.R.

Cairo is preferred because there is now a responsible Soviet representative in Cairo.

The Soviet Government is of the opinion that Great Britain and the U.S. should make a decision on the request of Bulgaria that there be a limited postponement of Allied air raids on Bulgarian cities.

Lacking knowledge as to whether or not you have been previously informed, this note is sent for your information.

W.P.L.

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW (HARRIMAN)		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	URGENT
RELEASED BY _____	FOR ACTION	THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES	PRIORITY
DATE _____			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM _____	INFORMATION		DEFERRED
DECODED BY _____			PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY _____			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY _____			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW <input type="checkbox"/>
PAGE 2 OF 2	210931	NCR 1139	

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

PLACE FOR SUCH A CONFERENCE BECAUSE A RESPONSIBLE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE IS NOW THERE. SECOND - THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THAT IT IS FOR THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN TO REACH A DECISION IN CONNECTION WITH THE REQUEST OF THE BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT THAT ALLIED AIR RAIDS AND BOMBING OF BULGARIA BE STOPPED FOR A FEW DAYS.

WHITE HOUSE (FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES)...ACTION

No. 1 ADMIRAL	No. 2 FILE.	No. 3 F-I OR CHARTROOM.	No. 4 SPECIAL
---------------	-------------	-------------------------	---------------

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
NCR 18

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

To: Freedom Algiers
Rptd: J.S.M. Washington
From: Chiefs of Staff
Dated: 18th February, 1944

COSMED 38

Reference MEDCOS 51.

U.S. Chiefs of Staff have agreed proposals in our
OZ 780 (T.O.O. 111225Z). Bombing of Bulgarian targets should
be resumed forthwith subject to conditions contained in

COSMED 33 *Filed 530 E wing*

T.O.O. 180940Z

Footnote: COSMED 33 is CM-IN-10557 (15 Feb 44) CC/S
MEDCOS 51 is CM-IN-12758 (18 Feb 44) CC/S

*sent to map room
-not here*

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
GEN. BISSELL
GEN. ARNOLD
ADM. KING
WHITE HOUSE
LOG

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CM-IN-12759 (18 Feb 44) 1713Z ov

~~SECRET~~

COPY No. 26
24-53394ABC

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370 Bulgaria

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

February 17, 1944

TO BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

FROM: FREEDOM FROM WILSON CITE FHSGS

INFO: J.S.M. Washington for U.S. Chiefs of Staff,
Fairbanks.

MEDCOS 51

In MEDCOS No. 35 our intention not to bomb targets
in Bulgaria pending outcome of impending conversations
in Istanbul was outlined and the concurrence of the
Chiefs of Staff requested. Is COSMED 33 ^{Filed 530Burst} to be construed
as instruction to resume bombing (forthwith) of Bulgarian
targets.

MEDCOS 35 is CM-IN-6840 (10 Feb 44) CC/S COSMED 33 is
CM-IN-10557 (15 Feb 44) CC/S

T.O.O. 171931A

ACTION: CCS

INFORMATION: OPD
GEN BISSELL
GEN ARNOLD

WHITE HOUSE
ADM KING
LOG

*Not to
sent to
Map Room.*

CM-IN-12758 (18 Feb 44) 1711Z pa

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to NLR, 11-30-70

370 Bulgaria

~~SECRET~~

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24-53394ABC

SECRET

SECRET
PRIORITY

16 FEBRUARY 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO : ALUSNA, MOSCOW

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN FROM THE PRESIDENT.

I have received information that the Bulgarian Minister to Turkey has stated that the Premier and leaders of the opposition in Bulgaria desire to discuss with the United States arrangements for joining the Allies in a combatant status. The Minister has requested that a preliminary mission be sent to Istanbul at once to discuss this proposal, and the Bulgarians have asked that air raids be suspended for ten days in order to give the Bulgarian Mission time to reach Istanbul. They believe that the time element is important or even vital to success.

I have considered this matter with the Prime Minister of Great Britain and we are in agreement as follows:

It is undesirable to hold conversations in Constantinople, but if the Bulgarian Government really means business it would be an error to rebuff them because they do not in the beginning offer to surrender unconditionally.

They should be advised to send a fully qualified mission to meet U.S., Soviet, and British representatives in some place which will be indicated, possibly Cairo or Cyprus. The latter has the advantage of being less distant from Bulgaria and of being secret.

It would be a mistake to suspend the bombing attacks before we know that the Bulgarian proposal is serious, and when they might hope for freedom from attack during practicable conversations.

SECRET

File Copy

161641 NCR 6790

SECRET

Therefore, we intend to continue bombing attacks on Bulgarian targets.

It is desired that together with your British colleague you convey to Molotov the views of the Prime Minister and myself as expressed herein and seek his agreement to the suggested line of action.

I am informed that the British Ambassador will receive similar instructions from his government.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1215, EWT, 16 Feb 44.

George M. Elsey
GEORGE M. ELSEY,
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

SECRET

SECRET

February 16, 1944

WST

PRESIDENT TO HARRIMAN:

I have received information that the Bulgarian Minister to Turkey has stated that the Premier and leaders of the opposition in Bulgaria desire to discuss with the United States arrangements for joining the Allies in a combatant status. The Minister has requested that a preliminary mission be sent to Istanbul at once to discuss this proposal, and the Bulgarians have asked that air raids be suspended for ten days in order to give the Bulgarian Mission time to reach Istanbul. They believe that the time element is important or even vital to success.

I have considered this matter with the Prime Minister of Great Britain and we are in agreement as follows:

It is undesirable to hold conversations in Constantinople, but if the Bulgarian Government really means business it would be an error to rebuff them because they do not in the beginning offer to surrender unconditionally.

They should be advised to send a fully qualified mission to meet U.S., Soviet, and British representatives in some place which will be indicated, possibly Cairo or Cyprus. The latter has the advantage of being less distant from Bulgaria and of being secret.

161641 NCR 6790


SECRET

It would be a mistake to suspend the bombing attacks before we know that the Bulgarian proposal is serious, and when they might hope for freedom from attack during practicable conversations.

Therefore, we intend to continue bombing attacks on Bulgarian targets.

It is desired that together with your British colleague you convey to Molotov the views of the Prime Minister and myself as expressed herein and seek his agreement to the suggested line of action.

I am informed that the British Ambassador will receive similar instructions from his government.



INDEX SHEET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO : THE PRIME MINISTER
NO : 469, 16 FEBRUARY 1944

COPY

NUMBER 469, PERSONAL AND SECRET, FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON
FROM THE PRESIDENT.

Replying to your 580, I am in agreement with your proposed
telegram to Clark Kerr and I am today sending identical instructions
to Harriman together with such details of the Bulgarian proposal
as are available here.

I have also informed Jadwin of our decision.

ROOSEVELT

ORIGINAL in "PRESIDENT-PRIME MINISTER" file.

Show classification number and date of communication on first line, drop two spaces, show source of communication and to whom addressed, then drop two spaces again and give a brief synopsis of subject matter sufficient to identify the document.

SECRET

SECRET

From: Amembassy London

To: The President of the United States

Number 580

February 44
Filed 15/16312

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and most-secret. Your number 465.

Para 1. I would propose to telegraph as follows to Ambassador Clark Kerr:

"Your United States colleague, who will be receiving from Washington identical instructions to those contained in this telegram, will be able to furnish you with full details of proposals made on February 6th by Bulgarian Minister to Turkey on behalf of the Regent, the Bulgarian Prime Minister and the principal opposition leaders for the initiation of discussions with the USA with a view to Bulgaria joining the United Nations.

"These proposals have been considered by the President and the Prime Minister whose views are as follows: It is undesirable that a Bulgarian mission should open conversations in Constantinople. If the Bulgarian Government really mean business it would be a mistake to rebuff them because they do not at the outset offer unconditional surrender. They should be told to send a fully qualified

SECRET

COPY

SECRET

SECRET

-2-

mission to meet United States, Soviet and British representatives at a place which will be indicated and which might be Cyprus or Cairo. Advantage of Cyprus is that it is nearer to Bulgaria and absolutely secret.

"This Bulgarian peace feeler shows that the air bombing of Sofia appears to have had exactly the effect which was hoped for. In these circumstances it would be a mistake to suspend it at the request of the Bulgarian Minister to Turkey before it is known whether the Bulgarian proposals really are serious ones and when it is probable that the Bulgarian Government hope for a respite from bombing during protracted conversations. It is therefore proposed to continue with the bombing of Bulgarian targets.

"In concert with your United States colleague, please convey views of President and Prime Minister to Molotov and seek his agreement to proposed line of action."

Para 2. On hearing from you that you consider this message suitable, I would at once despatch it.

Para 3. Meanwhile you will no doubt have informed the Jadwin mission of our decision.

No Sig

SECRET

SECRET

12 FEBRUARY 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO : ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 465, SECRET AND PERSONAL, FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON
FROM THE PRESIDENT.

I wholly agree with your 576. Let the good work go on.

Please send me a draft of the message which you consider sending
to our representatives in Moscow for delivery to Molotov with the
purpose of getting his approval.

ROOSEVELT

- 1 -

Copy

SECRET

fm

0
- 5760 -

From: Amembassy London

To: The President of the United States

Number 576

12 February 1944.
12/WFT

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal
and most secret.

Para 1. Many thanks for your telegram number 463
of February 9th.

Para 2. It seems to me most undesirable that a
Bulgarian Mission should open conversations in ^{CONSTANTINOPLE} Convtantinoich.
If the Bulgarian Government really mean business, they
should be told to send a fully qualified mission to meet
representatives of the Three Powers at a place which will be
indicated and might be Cyprus or Cairo. Cyprus is absolutely
secret and nearer.

Para 3. Our bombing of Sofia appears in fact to have
had exactly the effect we hoped for, in that the Bulgarians
are falling over each other in their haste to make contact
with us. That being so, would it not be a mistake to suspend
it at the request of the firstcomer who no doubt hopes for a
respite during protracted conversations.

Para 4. If you agree, therefore, I hope we may send

SECRET

Copy

SECRET

-2-

identical instructions to our representatives in Moscow
on the above lines and get Molotov's agreement to our pro-
posed line of action.

No Sig

Recd 121355Z NWJ

To Per via a/c 121355Z-osc

SECRET

SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

FROM: CHIEFS OF STAFF

TO: J.S.M., WASHINGTON, REPEATED A.F.H.Q.

February 11, 1944.

C.O.S. (W) 1144

Reference MEDCOS 35. Following for U. S. Chiefs of Staff, Repeated General Wilson from British Chiefs of Staff.

We consider that bombing of Bulgarian targets should be persisted in to the utmost possible without regard to the alleged overtures for peace.

T.O.O. 111225Z

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
General Bissell
General Arnold
White House
~~Admiral King~~
Log

CM-IN-7875 (11 Feb 44) 2112Z jt

26

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*Admiral Brown
to file*

SECRET

W

0 - 140715 - PM

From: London
To: The President of the United States
No: 575, Filed 10/2320Z

Prime Minister to President. Personal.

Eden and I are agreed here that the bombing of Bulgarian targets as weather permits should not be stopped because of the peace overtures. If the medicine has done good, let them have more of it.

No Sig

SECRET

COPY

146-38124 - 0

SECRET

9 FEBRUARY 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO : ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 463, PERSONAL AND SECRET, FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT.

I have received an unconfirmed report that the Bulgarian Government desires to send a mission to Istanbul to discuss conditions under which Bulgarian Army would join the Allies.

If this report should prove to be true it appears to me that it would be worth while for us to make some concessions such as suspending the bombing attacks on Bulgaria for a limited period and with your sending representatives to meet the Bulgarian Mission at Istanbul. Probably the Russians should be in on this too.

It is assumed that your sources of information in Turkey have heard the same story if it has any validity.

I am repeating this to you only for what it is worth in anticipation of possible future developments.

ROOSEVELT

- 1 -

Copy

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

9th February, 1944

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

To: British Chiefs of Staff
Info: J.S.M. for U.S. Chiefs of Staff
Rptd: Mideast No. 49441 091545
From: A.F.H.Q. signed Wilson

Number: MEDCOS No. 35

Through Mideast from Jadwin Mission I am informed

- (a) That on 6th February Bulgarian Minister to Turkey arrived Istanbul from Sofia informing that Regent, Prime Minister and principal opposition leaders wish discussions with America, looking to Bulgaria joining United Nations. Minister states he was empowered to give this message to Kuyumdjiisky (who I understand to be OSS agent).
- (b) During discussion it was proposed that Bulgarian mission be sent Istanbul to say under what general terms Bulgarian Army would engage in battle along side Allied Nations. This preliminary mission is being sent for by Minister to talk with Kuyumdjiisky at Istanbul at once.
- (c) Conditions referred to in (b) are to be sent Washington and Cairo immediately they are presented. It is proposed that they should if acceptable form basis for further discussions between representatives of the two countries.
- (d) They accept it that we will be unwilling to discuss territorial matters but seek assurance that old Bulgaria as nation will be preserved.
- (e) Pending arrival of mission in Istanbul they request suspension of bombing for ten days stating they realize time is important factor in the proposal. Kuyumdjiisky and Packey with former's associates think chances of success will be much improved if we accede to request, failing which our mission might fail utterly. Paget recommends we agree.
- (f) Paget reports that there is some substantiation that important proposal will follow since report from Istanbul to Force 133 indicates that Sevov, one of the three or four most powerful men in Bulgaria, formerly most intimate advisor to late King Boris, has reached that place.

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to NLR, 11-30-70

CM-IN-6840 (10 Feb 44)

White House

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

~~SECURITY CONTROL~~

Number: MEDCOS 35

SECURITY CONTROL
9th February 1944

Page 2

2. Acting on above information I have ordered the suspension of bombing until further instructions. You are aware of present policy under which Strategic Air Force is bombing Bulgaria in priority after POINTBLANK and Battle for Italy. I repeat I consider that there will be small loss of profitable targets over a reasonable period of time as there is the good possibility that they would not be engaged in any event. I am however instructing Paget that Bulgarians are not to be informed of this action.

3. Since political considerations appear predominant I request that you will give concurrence in my decision and forward any further (?instructions) you may have for my guidance should a request for conversations between accredited representatives be received.

T.O.O. 091631A

ACTION: CCS

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Bissell
Gen Arnold
Adm King
(White House)
Log

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CM-IN-6840 (10 Feb 44) 1228Z mcs

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