

Box-35

3

**Folder 3. MR 371 Germany, Occupied
Countries—Zones of Occupation,
7 February—10 April 1945.**

CONTINUED

TOP SECRET DISPATCH

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM COMNAVEU		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		COMINCH	OP OP OP PRIORITY 2
DATE 26 SEPTEMBER 1944			ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOM 0113			DEFERRED 4
DECODED BY LYNN			BASEGRAM 5
PARAPHRASED BY LYNN	CHECKED BY ROWLAND	<i>WAL</i>	6
ROUTED BY	DITTOED BY		7
			8
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			9
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES	252341	NCR 8913	10
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Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP			12
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IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

THIS IS TOP SECRET. COMNAVEU SHOOTS TO COMINCH FOR ACTION.

REGARDING COMPOSITION OF US GROUP NUCLEUS CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY JCS 923 SERIES, STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT NUMBER OF DIRECTORS BE INCREASED FROM 3 TO 5 THEREBY GIVING ARMY, NAVY AND AIR EACH A DIRECTOR. THIS AGAIN PROVIDES FOR DIRECT ARMY, NAVY AND AIR REPRESENTATION AT TOP LEVEL, IN ACCORDANCE WITH PRINCIPLE UNDERLYING JCS 723/6.

THIS AMENDMENT IS BELIEVED TO HAVE THE ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGE OF ALSO BEING MORE IN LINE WITH UK AND USSR THINKING.

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

TOP SECRET

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations. COPY NO.

OPNAV 19-75 **371** **252341** **4**

TOP SECRET DISPATCH

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY			PRIORITY 2
DATE			ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOM			DEFERRED 4
			BASEGRAM 5
DECODED BY			6
PARAPHRASED BY	CHECKED BY		7
ROUTED BY	DITTOED BY		8
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			PRIORITY 10
			ROUTINE 11
			DEFERRED 12
			BASEGRAM 13
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252341

NCR 8913

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP

(Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ALSO BELIEVE THAT CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO CHANGING ARMY FORCES DIVISION FROM FUNCTIONAL TO A SERVICE BASIS AND TO INSURE ADEQUATE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR REPRESENTATION IN PROPOSED A AND B DIVISIONS OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT WHERE THEIR INTERESTS ARE PRESENT.

GENERAL MEYER AND COLONEL WILLIAMSON CONCUR.

COMINCH: COPIES 1 TO 8 INCLUSIVE.

No. 1 ADMIRAL.

No. 2 FILE.

No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL.

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252341

OPNAV 19-78

DRAFTER F-07	EXT. 3704	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM COMINCH & CNO		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY ADM. E. J. KING		COMNAVEU 	PRIORITY 2
DATE 17 SEPTEMBER 1944			ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOM			DEFERRED 5
DECODED BY			BASEGRAM 6
PARAPHRASED BY LAWRENCE	CHECKED BY POWLEY	FOR ACTION	7
BY LAWRENCE	DITTOED BY LAWRENCE		8
ROUTED BY			PRIORITY 9
		INFORMATION	ROUTINE 10
			DEFERRED 12
			BASEGRAM 13
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			14
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Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF HAVE APPROVED THE FOLLOWING WITH RESPECT TO THE ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY:

1. FOR THE PRESERVATION OF ORDER, POLICING AND DISARMAMENT, BRITISH FORCES UNDER A BRITISH COMMANDER WILL OCCUPY GERMANY

IN THE AREA WEST OF THE RHINE RIVER AND EAST OF THE RHINE NORTH OF THE LINE FROM COBLENTZ WHICH FOLLOWS THE NORTHERN BORDER OF HESSEN AND NASSAU TO THE BORDER OF THE AREA ALLOCATED TO THE USSR. US FORCES WITH A US COMMANDER WILL OCCUPY GERMANY EAST OF THE RHINE AND SOUTH OF THE LINE MENTIONED IN THE PRECEDING SENTENCE.

2. THE COMMANDER OF THE US ZONE WILL HAVE CONTROL OF THE PORTS OF BREMEN AND BREMERHAVEN AND THE NECESSARY STAGING AREAS IN THAT IMMEDIATE VICINITY. IN ADDITION US FORCES WILL HAVE ACCESS THROUGH THE WESTERN AND NORTHWESTERN SEAPORTS TOGETHER WITH PASSAGE THROUGH THE AREA CONTROLLED BY THE BRITISH.

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

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TOP SECRET DISPATCH

EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM _____	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY 1
RELEASED BY _____		ROUTINE 2
DATE _____		DEFERRED 3
TOR CODEROOM _____		BASEGRAM 4
DECODED BY _____		BASEGRAM 5
PARAPHRASED BY _____	INFORMATION	PRIORITY 6
CHECKED BY _____		ROUTINE 7
DITTOED BY _____		DEFERRED 8
ROUTED BY _____		BASEGRAM 9

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PAGE 2 OF 2 **181412** **NCR 46845**

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ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

3. THE LOGISTICS INVOLVED IN THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPH HAVE BEEN REFERRED TO THE COMBINED ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE. THE US AREA COMMANDER WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DISARMAMENT OF HOSTILE FORCES IN THE PORTS OF BREMEN AND BREMERHAVEN AND THEIR STAGING AREAS.

COMINCH: COPIES 1 TO 8 INCLUSIVE.

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

**TOP
SECRET**

TOP SECRET "IVI"
CORRECTED COPY
URGENT

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
Forward on Continent

To: War Department

No: FWD 13854

5 September 1944

TOP SECRET FWD 13854 AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff for Combined Civil Affairs Committee repeat for information to SHAEF Main for ~~9-5~~ and BC/S signed Eisenhower reference GOV 103. This is SCAF 74.

My main comment.

1. In general is that during the active military phase I must rely on agreed Combined Chiefs of Staff policies and on my existing staff in controlling Western Europe. Full use will be made of the Nucleus Control Commission/Council, both in planning and ultimately in an executive capacity under my control for matters concerning Germany. While fully appreciating that ultimately the Control Commission and Control Council will act independently on a national basis yet during my period of responsibility I will not be able to depart from the Allied concept of my authority and responsibility, nor from the need of appointing a coordinator for each sphere of activity, for example, legal, movements, finance, disarmament, et cetera. All activities in Germany during the period of SHAEF's responsibility will, in so far as the military situation permits, be in conformity with the known desires of the Nucleus Commission/Council for the longer term.

2. The following comments apply to the renumbered paragraphs in the appendix to CCAC 119/1:

OM-IN-5929 ✓

(7 Sep 44)

TOP SECRET

35

COPY NO.

371 Germany

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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

**TOP
SECRET**

TOP SECRET

Page 2

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
Forward on Continent

Nr: FWD 13854

5 September 1944

(4) During the period of SCAEF's control planning must be the responsibility of SHAEF. Our relations with the Control Commission/Council are such that they can afford great assistance to SHAEF in formulating plans. It is agreed that the Control Commission or the Control Council should represent their governments, and through them to the CCS any points on which there are policy disagreements, but pending a decision by the CCS, SCAEF's decision must be binding.

(5), (6) It is agreed that the Nucleus Council should be set up in Berlin as soon as conditions permit and that when set up it will operate under SHAEF and will be the channel through which orders are conveyed to the German central authorities. During the march (or fight) in, however, military government must follow the normal chain of command, SCAEF cannot place the Commission/Council in a position of executive authority in Berlin until stability has been effected and adequate communications established.

(7) It is assumed that this paragraph in no way interferes with SCAEF's prerogative to decide on the composition of the Nucleus Control Commission/Council during the various stages of his control, or of his appointment of coordinating authorities.

End

FOOTNOTE: Corrected copy of CM-IN-4402 (6 Sep 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
Gen Handy
Gen Bissell
Gen Hilldring
Adm King
Mr McCloy
C of S

CM-IN-5929

(7 Sep 44) 1915Z amb

TOP SECRET

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COPY NO.

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August 29, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: The American Position as Regards an Eventual Allied Occupation of Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria.

The Department understands that the decision has already been taken that American ground forces are not to participate in operations in the three satellite countries of Southeastern Europe. There have been, of course, considerable air force operations, under the Mediterranean command, probably the greater part of them conducted by American planes. In the case of Rumania, General Wilson has now ordered more intensive air operations, in the light of the events of the last few days, and these may now or at a later stage involve airborne troops, but we are not informed that any American personnel are being used. It seems to be, however, our basic military policy not to use U. S. forces in Balkan operations.

The O.S.S. does, however, have teams ready, or in process of organization, for use in these countries, chiefly for intelligence but also for special operations.

As regards occupation, the documents to be used as the basis for terms of surrender, and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provide for Allied occupation, but it is understood that our military policy is not to use American forces as a part of the army of occupation.

It is supposed that American missions will go into each of the countries after surrender. These missions will have political, military and technical functions. The Department has not been informed of the Army's plans for assigning military personnel for this work.

As regards civil affairs in the Balkans, it has been decided that the United States will participate in relief and rehabilitation work

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work in the military period, but this, so far, has been planned only for "liberated" territory; namely, Greece, Yugoslavia and Albania, and not for the satellite states.

The terms of surrender contemplate, however, the utilization of the resources or supplies which may be available in the satellite countries and useful to the Allies in the prosecution of the war. Technical personnel in the form of Allied missions will be necessary for the administration of this program. This has been in discussion with the F.E.A. The present disposition is not to send American personnel into the countries for this purpose. This would be in line with the general policy to hold to a minimum actual American participation both in the operations stage and the occupation stage.

(State Dept)

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

Combined Chiefs of Staff
77500

19 August 1944

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Commanding General
Allied Force Headquarters
Advanced Command Post
Caserta, Italy

Commanding General
U. S. Army Forces
European Theater of Operations
London, England

Number: WARX 83792

To Eisenhower for action, to Wilson for information and guidance, and to ETOUSA for information of British Chiefs of Staff. This message is FACS 60 to Eisenhower and FAN 397 to Wilson from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

1. Questions raised in paragraph seven of VOG 71 refer:

A. As to planning SCAEF has a responsibility to plan for the distribution of relief supplies for Germany both for the period prior to defeat or surrender and for the period immediately following defeat or surrender, and until the combined command is terminated. Since no arrangements have as yet been made with the U. S. S. R. with regard to the use of resources within areas under U. S. S. R. occupation, your planning for the present must be based upon the assumption that the only indigenous resources available to you will be those within the U. S. and U. K. Zones of Occupation.

B. For planning purposes the responsibility prior to defeat or surrender should cover all of the population within SCAEF combat zones and within those areas essential to the

CM-OUT-83792

(20 Aug 44)

SECRET

371 Germany

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SECRET

Number: WARK 83792

19 August 1944

Page two.

maintenance of lines of communication and supply and after defeat or surrender all of the population in areas under occupation by U. S. and U. K. forces while under SCAEF command.

C. The categories of items to be planned are those set forth in C. C. S. 324/1.

D. For planning purposes the standards to be applied for such categories of items will be the same as those for liberated countries, i. e. the minimum required to prevent disease and unrest.

2. As to operations SCAEF will plan for the importing of civilian supplies to supplement indigenous resources only to the extent that critical shortages arise in the categories of items enumerated in C. C. S. 324/1 and imports from outside sources are absolutely essential. Every effort will be made:

A. To limit the extent to which imports will be required.

B. To utilize German food and other German supplies to the end that there will be a surplus for export to deficiency areas. If it appears that imports may be necessary, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be promptly advised so that decision may be made as to whether and to what extent supplies will be made available to SCAEF since no supplies or funds have been set aside for this purpose. Meanwhile, studies are being undertaken here as to whether and to what extent there may be requirements in the areas of Germany under your command.

3. The responsibilities of SCAEF for planning for military government in Austria, prior to the surrender of Germany are set forth in FACS 44. Your planning responsibilities for relief during the post-surrender period would be similar to that stated for Germany in paragraph 1 above. In connection

CM-OUT-83792

(20 Aug 44)

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SECRET

Number: WARK 83792 19 August 1944 Page three.

with SCAF 60 and NAF 749, the question of military govern-
ment for Austria is receiving further consideration.

End.

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy
CGAAF
OPD
G-2
Gen Hildring
Adm King
Log

CM-OUT-83792 (20 Aug 44) 0205Z smd

SECRET

COPY NO. 33

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RED 243

5 August 1944

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM STETTINIUS

We have communicated your instructions to Winant on German zones of occupation. Although we may likewise fail to understand the reason for pressure by Russians on this point, they have made it very clear that they do not wish to proceed until it is settled. We are cabling Harriman urging him to have Russians permit their representative on the European Advisory Commission continue discussions pending settlement of the matter of zones with the British.

This action follows BLUE 72.

RED 237 (MAP ROOM to BALTIMORE)

4 August 1944

SPECIAL STATE DEPARTMENT TELEGRAM NUMBER 6: (EXTRACT)

* * * * *

Your message on surrender terms and on zones of occupation received. Forwarding text of surrender term document by pouch and will take up the zone question again with military today.

E. R. STETTINIUS,

Acting.

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

3 August 1944

From: Opnav

To : Alusna, Moscow

NUMBER 34. PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR
AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN.

I am sending you the following exchange of messages on the allocation of occupation zones for your information.

QUOTE. Personal and secret to the President from Stettinius, Acting. Winant has cabled State Department that Russians are insisting that allocation of occupation zones in Germany as between us and the British be settled at the earliest possible moment.

We believe that it is possible to come to an agreement on the following basis.

1. That Churchill agree unequivocally and by cable to you that the British will undertake, without use of any United States troops the occupation of France, Italy and the Balkans if and when that should be necessary, for any reason, in any of these countries.

2. That we have joint use or control of sufficient northwest ports either in Low countries or Germany for supply and evacuation of our troops when that becomes necessary thus avoiding any dependence on French routes.

3. That we occupy the southwest rather than the Northwest Hinterland of Germany.

The Army tells me that supplies can readily be moved to our troops through the northern ports and the divisions readily evacuated using the same United States lines of communication and transportation.

Believe that the northern area may have a good many headaches and not a little shooting will have to be done in that area and that the British are in the mood to do it and will probably have substantial forces in Germany for a longer period of time than will we.

Hope you will agree to this because time is so urgent and we are in danger of developing a bad situation as between ourselves and the British of which the Russians and other countries will be aware.

Think the British will make every effort to get us to agree to the use of our forces in France, Italy and the Balkans, but feel we should stand pat on that under all circumstances.

Have consulted Stimson and Forrestal who approve foregoing plan.

Would appreciate it if we could have your advice as soon as possible in regard to this urgent matter. UNQUOTE.

QUOTE. From the President to Acting Secretary Stettinius.

Replying to your message of August 2, inform Winant that I am awaiting an agreement by the Prime Minister that American troops will police northwest Germany and will not police southern Europe. It is essential that American troops of occupation will have no responsibility in southern Europe and will be withdrawn from there at earliest practicable date.

In view of agreement already made that Soviet may police all that part of Germany in which they have expressed a desire to exercise control, I am unable to understand that any further discussion with the Soviets is necessary at this time.

No possible difficulty with England is foreseeable in regard to her Naval problems in northwestern Germany. They can march hand in hand with the supply of our troops but in consideration of our 3,000 miles of transport, I want to be able to carry this out through Holland and Hamburg and Bremen. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

BLUE 72 (USS BALTIMORE to MAP ROOM)

3 August 1944

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO : ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE STETTINIUS

Replying to your RED 225, inform Winant that President is awaiting an agreement by Prime Minister that American troops will police northwest Germany and will not police southern Europe. It is essential that American troops of occupation will have no responsibility in southern Europe and will be withdrawn from there at earliest practicable date.

In view of agreement already made that Soviet may police all that part of Germany in which they have expressed a desire to exercise control, I am unable to understand that any further discussion with Soviet is necessary at this time.

No possible difficulty with England foreseeable in regard to her naval problems in northwestern Germany. They can march hand in hand with the supply of our troops but in consideration of our 3000 miles of transport I want to be able to carry this out through Holland and Hamburg and Bremen.

ROOSEVELT

NOTE TO MAP ROOM FROM ADMIRAL LEAHY: Send for information to Joint Staff and to Harriman RED 225 and this reply with first paragraph of RED 225 modified by the deletion of the following words "and state that they will not proceed on further discussions of occupation until this is done."

President to Stethemus

BLUE 72

Replying to your Red 225 inform Wm ant
that President is awaiting an agreement by
Prime Minister that American troops will police
north west Germany and will not police
Southern Europe. It is essential that
American troops of occupation ^{will have no responsibility}
^{in Southern} ~~from~~ ^{and will be withdrawn from there} ~~be withdrawn~~
impose at earliest practicable date.

In view of agreement already made
that Soviet may police all that part
of Germany in which they have
expressed a desire to exercise control
I am unable to understand that
any further discussion with
Soviet is necessary at this time.

No possible difficulty with England foreseeable in
regard to ^{her} naval problems in Northwestern
Germany. They can march land in hand
with the supply of our troops lent in con-
sideration of our 3,000 miles of Transport
I want to be able to carry this out through
Holland and Hamburg and Bremen
Ravich

2 August 1944

PERSONAL AND SECRET TO THE PRESIDENT FROM STETTINIUS, ACTING:

Winant has cabled State Department that Russians are insisting that allocation of occupation zones in Germany as between U.S. and the British be settled at the earliest possible moment and state that they will not proceed on further discussions of occupation until this is done.

We believe that it is possible to come to an agreement on the following basis:

1. That Churchill agree unequivocally and by cable to you that the British will undertake, without use of any United States troops the occupation of France, Italy and the Balkans if and when that should be necessary, for any reason, in any of these countries.

2. That we have joint use or control of sufficient northwest ports either in the low countries or Germany for supply and evacuation of our troops when that becomes necessary thus avoiding any dependence on French routes.

3. That we occupy the southwest rather than the northwest hinterland of Germany.

The Army tells me that supplies can readily be moved to our troops through the northern ports and the divisions readily evacuated using the same United States lines of communication and transportation.

Believe that the northern area may have a good many headaches and not a little shooting will have to be done in that area and that the British are in the mood to do it and will probably have substantial force

in Germany for a longer period of time than will we.

Hope you will agree to this because time is so urgent and we are in danger of developing a bad situation as between ourselves and the British of which the Russians and other countries will be aware.

Think the British will make every effort to get us to agree to the use of our forces in France, Italy and the Balkans, but feel we should stand pat on that under all circumstances.

Have consulted Stimson and Forrestal who approve foregoing plan.

Would appreciate it if we could have your advice as soon as possible in regard to this urgent matter.

STETTINIUS, Acting.

TOP SECRET

31 May 1944

From: U.S. Military Attache London, England

To: The President of the United States

Number 686

Filed 31/0708Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and top secret. Number 686.

Reference your number 545. As you had not reverted to the question of the zones of occupation by our respective forces since I sent you my number 589 of 23rd February, I had the impression that all this was settled.

It has however occurred to me that in sending your number 545 you might possibly have overlooked the arguments in my number 589 which, in our view, are just as cogent now as they were in February last.

I hope that if there has been a misunderstanding we can clear it up, as a change of policy such as you now propose would have grave consequences.

No Sig

Recd 31/0850Z - Hurl

TOP SECRET

~~TOP-SECRET~~
TOP SECRET

May 27, 1944

From: The President
To : The Prime Minister
No. : 545

I propose that the Combined Chiefs of Staff be directed by both of us to send the following message to Eisenhower:

QUOTE. You are hereby directed to make such plans as are practicable to send American troops to the Netherlands and northwest Germany as forces of occupation when hostilities with Germany cease. For planning purposes, the area in Germany to be occupied by U. S. Forces will comprise the states of Schleswig, Hanover, Brunswick, Westphalia, Hesse-Nassau and the Rhine Province.

It will be assumed in this plan that France, Austria and the Balkans will not be included in an American zone of responsibility and that Berlin will be occupied jointly by the U.S., British and Soviet Forces. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

TOP-SECRET

26 May 1944

General Marshall did not send this statement to Eisenhower, but returned it with recommendation from the Combined Chiefs of Staff that this directive be first sent to the Prime Minister for his comments and approval.

President approved; proposed directive sent to the Prime Minister as PRES #545, 27 May 44.

(Above per Admiral Leahy)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

My Room

May 22, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

What is the status of this?

F. D. R.

White No. 116, together with
copy of the President's letter to
Prime Minister Churchill and the
Secretary of War.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 22, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL LEAHY

What is the status of this?

F. D. R.

*File
WHL*

5-25-44

*(see note on
following page)*

admiral Leahy says

*General Marshall was this date
(5-25-44) instructed to send
to General Eisenhower the
directive contained in
White 116 (attached hereto)*

*Noted File dr. m. Rigdon
W. [initials]*

Signal Corps, United States Army

Received at

BLACK NO. _____

April 25, 1944.

Redwood to General Marshall. Please send to General Eisenhower the directive contained in your message of April twenty fifth Paren White one one six Paren .

Released:

William M. Rigdon,
Lieut(jg), U.S.N.

Signal Corps, United States Army

WSE

Received at

TOP SECRET

APRIL 25, 1944

WHITE NUMBER 116:

FROM GENERAL MARSHALL FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

DRAFT DIRECTIVE FOR EISENHOWER RE YOUR BLACK 64 FOLLOWS:

*JK
LHP*

"THE PRESIDENT DIRECTS THAT YOU MAKE SUCH PLANS AS ARE PRACTICABLE TO SEND AMERICAN TROOPS TO THE NETHERLANDS AND NORTHWEST GERMANY AS FORCES OF OCCUPATION WHEN HOSTILITIES WITH GERMANY CEASE. FOR PLANNING PURPOSES, THE AREA IN GERMANY TO BE OCCUPIED BY U. S. FORCES WILL COMPRISE THE STATES OF SCHLESWIG, HANOVER, BRUNSWICK, WESTPHALIA, HESSE-NASSAU AND THE RHINE PROVINCE.

IT MAY BE ASSUMED ^{*in this plan*} THAT FRANCE, AUSTRIA AND THE BALKANS WILL NOT BE INCLUDED IN AN AMERICAN ZONE OF RESPONSIBILITY AND THAT BERLIN WILL BE OCCUPIED JOINTLY BY THE U. S., BRITISH AND SOVIET FORCES."

THE ABOVE DIRECTIVE WOULD NORMALLY BE ISSUED TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF. IT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PROPOSALS OF THE BRITISH AND SOVIETS AND THE EUROPEAN ADVISORY

TOP SECRET

Signal Corps, United States Army

Received at

TOP SECRET

(PAGE 2 OF WHITE 116)

COMMISSION INSOFAR AS BOUNDARIES BETWEEN THE SOVIET FORCES IN EASTERN
GERMANY AND THE U. S. AND BRITISH FORCES IN WESTERN GERMANY ARE
CONCERNED.

NO SIG

RECEIVED



APR 25 1944 AM

TOP SECRET

BLACK 85

30 April 1944

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

The recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff made in JCS 57//10, quoted herewith following, is approved:

"1. Ambassador Winant should be instructed to concur in a recommendation by the Commission that the boundaries of the Soviet zone of occupation be defined as proposed by the Soviet delegation.

"2. Ambassador Winant should be instructed to concur in a recommendation by the Commission that the boundary between the northwestern zone and the southern zone be defined as proposed by the British Delegation.

"3. With respect to the zones to be occupied by the United Kingdom and the United States, Ambassador Winant should be instructed to adhere to the directives which were given him under date of 25 February 1944 (EACOM 7) setting forth the decision of the President that American forces should occupy the northwestern zone. This Government is of the opinion that the southern zone and Austria should be occupied by British forces."

RECD 301900Z

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

[REDACTED]
28 April 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Allocation of zones of occupation in Germany.

As you were recently informed by Mr. Kennan of the State Department, Ambassador Winant has requested a restatement of the views of this Government with respect to the allocation of zones for the occupation of Germany and Austria after surrender, for presentation to the European Advisory Commission.

The views of the Governments of the United Kingdom and Soviet Union have already been submitted to the European Advisory Commission. Ambassador Winant has considered it inadvisable to present the views of this Government to the Commission because (1) the United States proposal would considerably reduce the Soviet zone from what the Soviets and British have already agreed to, and would deprive the Soviets of the important railway junction of Cottbus; (2) our proposed borders of zones do not coincide with German administrative boundaries; and (3) the United States proposal does not state where the line would be drawn between the Soviet zone and the proposed British zone in the South. He has requested further instructions, and has expressed the hope that it will be found possible to accept the boundaries of the Soviet zone as already agreed to by the Soviets and British. Maps describing the proposals of each government and the differences between the United States and Soviet proposals as to populations and areas are enclosed.

A proposed restatement of the views of this Government, which has State Department approval and has been concurred in by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is enclosed. This proposed restatement would authorize Ambassador Winant to concur in the proposal to define the zones in

(Copy to accompany original)
[REDACTED]

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 2 1974

[REDACTED]

Germany in accordance with the British and Soviet plans, maintaining, however, the position of this Government as expressed in your memorandum to the Acting Secretary of State on 21 February 1944 that U.S. forces should occupy the Northwestern zone. The statement also expresses the view that Austria should be occupied by British forces, rather than by United States forces as proposed by the British or by forces of all three powers as proposed by the Soviets.

Subject to your approval, it is recommended that the views of this Government be transmitted to Ambassador Winant for presentation to the European Advisory Commission.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

Enclosures:

- (1) British proposal.
- (2) Soviet proposal.
- (3) U. S. proposal.
- (4) Map showing differences between the U.S. and Soviet proposals.
- (5) Statement of views.

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 2 1974

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UNITED STATES VIEWS ON ALLOCATION OF ZONES OF
OCCUPATION IN GERMANY

1. Ambassador Winant should be instructed to concur in a recommendation by the Commission that the boundaries of the Soviet zone of occupation be defined as proposed by the Soviet Delegation.

2. Ambassador Winant should be instructed to concur in a recommendation by the Commission that the boundary between the Northwestern zone and the Southern zone be defined as proposed by the British Delegation.

3. With respect to the zones to be occupied by the United Kingdom and the United States, Ambassador Winant should be instructed to adhere to the directives which were given him under date of 25 February 1944 (EACOM 7) setting forth the decision of the President that American forces should occupy the Northwestern zone. This Government is of the opinion that the southern zone and Austria should be occupied by British forces.

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 2 1974

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DGC, March 1, 1944 1242 E




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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

PROPOSALS FOR THE OCCUPATION OF GERMANY

POPULATION IN MILLIONS
AREA IN THOUSANDS OF SQUARE MILES



Population figures based on Census of 1939

MAJOR POLITICAL DIVISIONS OF GREATER GERMANY

JANUARY 1943



--- State or Province Boundary	● Capital of State or Province
..... Gau Boundary	○ Capital of Gau
- - - Reichsgau Boundary (Lines of state or province and Gau boundaries)	● Capital of State or Province and Gau
— Boundary of the Greater Reich	⊗ Capital of Reichsgau

ANNAU Name of State or Province
 ESSEN Name of Gau
 WIEN Area of Reichsgau

0 100 200 300 400 500
 KILOMETERS
 0 100 200 300 400 500
 MILES
 January 1943 20-24-2

To Admiral Leahy from General Marshall.

Draft directive for Eisenhower follows:

"The President directs that you make such plans as are practicable to send American troops to the Netherlands and northwest Germany as forces of occupation when hostilities with Germany cease. For planning purposes, the area in Germany to be occupied by U.S. forces will comprise the states of Schleswig, Hanover, Brunswick, Westphalia, Hesse-Nassau and the Rhine province.

"It may be assumed that France, Austria and the Balkans will not be included in an American zone of responsibility and that Berlin will be occupied jointly by the U.S., British and Soviet forces."

The above directive would normally be issued to the Supreme Commander by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It is consistent with the proposals of the British and Soviets and the European Advisory Commission insofar as boundaries between the Soviet forces in eastern Germany and the U.S. and British forces in western Germany are concerned.

23 April 1944

FROM ADMIRAL LEAHY FOR GENERAL MARSHALL.

The President desires that you send by telegraph draft directive to General Eisenhower to make such plans as are practicable to send American troops to the Netherlands and Northwest Germany as forces of occupation when an armistice is signed by Germany.

RECD 232220Z

Answered by WHITE 116.

March 21, 1944.

Dear Winston,

As I told you in my letter of February 29th, I have been putting the finishing touches on a directive to Eisenhower which would make him solely responsible for OVERLORD and for the administration of good order and reasonable justice when we get ashore.

The paper is now being cleared through the usual channels of the Combined Chiefs of Staff for presentation to Eisenhower, and I am sending you a copy herewith.

I hope you will agree that my efforts to keep it simple and to provide primarily for the first few months of occupation are on a sound basis and have not been in vain.

With warm regards,

As ever,

F.D.R.

The Rt. Honorable Winston S. Churchill,
10 Downing Street,
London, W. 1,
England.

GENERAL EISENHOWER:

This memorandum is directed to you as Supreme Allied Commander in the event of the occupation of French territory:

I.

The three paramount aims which are to be the landmarks of your policy are the following:

- A. The prompt and complete defeat of Germany.
- B. The earliest possible liberation of France from her oppressors.
- C. The fostering of democratic methods and conditions under which a French government may ultimately be established according to the free choice of the French people as the government under which they wish to live.

II.

The following powers and instructions are given you for your guidance in the achievement of the foregoing aims:

1. The Supreme Allied Commander will have supreme authority in order that the war against Germany may be prosecuted relentlessly with the full cooperation of the French people. As such Allied Commander you will have the ultimate determination as to where, when, and how the civil administration in France shall be exercised by French citizens, remembering always that the military situation must govern.
2. When and where you determine that there shall be set up a civil administration in any part of France, so far as possible there shall not be retained or employed in any office any person who has wilfully collaborated with the enemy or who has acted in any manner inimical to the cause of the United States.
3. In order to secure the setting up of any such civilian administration locally in any part of France, you may consult with the French Committee of National Liberation and may authorize them in your discretion to select and install the personnel necessary for such administration. You are, however, not limited to dealing exclusively with said Committee for such purpose in case at any time in your best judgment you determine that some other course or conferee is preferable.

4. Nothing that you do under the powers conferred in the preceding paragraph 3 in connection with the French Committee of National Liberation or with any other group or organization shall constitute a recognition of said Committee or group as the government of France even on a provisional basis.

5. In making your decision as to entering into such relations with the French Committee of National Liberation or other committees or persons for that purpose, you should as far as possible obtain from it the following restrictions upon its purposes:

a. It has no intention of exercising indefinitely in France any powers of government, provisional or otherwise, except to assist in the establishment by the democratic methods above mentioned a government of France according to the free choice of the French people, and that when such government is established it will turn over thereto all such powers as it may have.

b. It favors the reestablishment of all the historic French liberties and the destruction of any arbitrary regime or rule of personal government.

c. It will take no action designed to entrench itself or any particular political group in power pending the selection of a constitutional government by the free choice of the French people.

6. In any area of liberated France, whether or not there has been set up local control of civil affairs as aforesaid, you will retain the right at any time to make such changes in whole or in part which in your discretion may seem necessary (a) for the effective prosecution of the war against Germany; (b) for the maintenance of law and order; and (c) for the maintenance of civil liberties.

7. As Supreme Commander you will seek such uniformity in the administration of civil affairs as seems advisable, issue policy directives applicable to British, French, and American commands, and review all plans.

8. You may at your discretion incorporate in your Civil Affairs Section members of the French Military Mission and other French officials.

9. You will have no talks or relations with the Vichy regime except for the purpose of terminating its administration in toto.

10. Instructions on economic, fiscal, and relief matters will be furnished you later by the Prime Minister, by the President, or by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

C
O
P
Y

February 29, 1944.

Dear Winston:-

I have been worrying a good deal of late on account of the tendency of all of us to prepare for future events in such detail that we may be letting ourselves in for trouble when the time arrives.

As you doubtless remember, at Quebec last Summer the Staff people took a shot at drawing up terms of surrender for Italy. The American draft was short and to the point and was finally adopted and presented.

But later on the long and comprehensive terms, which were drawn up by your people, were presented to Badoglio.

I did not like them because they attempted to foresee every possibility in one document. But, as so often happens, when such an attempt is made, certain points were omitted and additional protocols with respect to naval and other questions had to be later presented.

That is a good deal the way I feel about all this detailed planning that we are jointly and severally making in regard to what we do when we get into France. I have been handed pages and pages with detailed instructions and appendices. I regard them as prophecies by prophets who cannot be infallible.

Therefore, I re-drew them with the thought of making the Commander-in-Chief solely responsible for OVERLORD and for the maintenance of law, order and reasonable justice for the first few months after we get into France. I have suggested that he get in touch with local persons and with representatives of the French National Committee in such places as they have military status, but that he and his Staff bear the sole responsibility.

Now comes this business of what to do when we get into Germany. I understand that your Staff presented a long and comprehensive document -- with every known kind of terms -- to the European Advisory Commission, and that the Russians have done somewhat the same.

COPY

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My people over here believe that a short document of surrender terms should be adopted. This, of course, has nothing to do with the locality of the occupying forces after they get into Germany, but it is an instrument of surrender which is in conformity with the general principles.

I am enclosing (a) an argument -- facts bearing on the problem and (b) a proposed acknowledgment of unconditional surrender by Germany.

*No copies
rec'd for file
Rigdon*

I hope much that you will read the argument. I think it is very cogent.

I am trying as hard as I can to simplify things -- and sometimes I shudder at the thought of appointing as many new Committees and Commissions in the future as we have in the past!

I note that in the British proposal the territory of Germany is divided up in accordance with the British plan. "Do please don't" ask me to keep any American forces in France. I just cannot do it! I would have to bring them all back home. As I suggested before, I denounce and protest the paternity of Belgium, France and Italy. You really ought to bring up and discipline your own children. In view of the fact that they may be your bulwark in future days, you should at least pay for their schooling now!

With my warm regards,

As ever yours,

Honorable Winston S. Churchill,
Prime Minister of Great Britain,
London,
England.

(Enclosures)

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*Original
Return to Chart R.
with*

From: Amembassy London

To: The President of the United States

Number 589

Feb.
Filed 23/1016Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and most secret.

Para 1. Reference your telegram number 457 on the question of countries and areas to be occupied by British and US forces in RANKIN, or after OVERLORD, the position seems to me to be as follows.

Para 2. COSSACS original plan suggested three zones to be occupied by our forces, your forces and the Russians, respectively. Our sphere included NW Germany, Norway, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland and Denmark: Your sphere southern Germany, France and possibly Austria. The Russian sphere lay to the east of the British area.

Para 3. On the basis of this allocation which was approved in principle at QUADRANT, planning proceeded both for OVERLORD and RANKIN. At SEXTANT when plans were already far advanced, your Chiefs of Staff proposed that the allocation should be virtually reversed, but gave no reason.

Para 4. I agree that your proposals might be military feasible for the true RANKIN case "C" (i.e. the collapse of Germany before the launching of OVERLORD). But even then

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there would, from our point of view, be the following serious objections:-

1. The whole of the German coastline in the North Sea and a large part of their coastline in the Baltic, and therefore all the German naval establishments of any importance and the majority of the naval and shipbuilding yards, would be included in the United States area. The naval disarmament of Germany is a matter of peculiar interest to us and we are better equipped and situated than any other power to ensure that this process is carried out with the maximum thoroughness.

2. There is close liaison between the Royal Air Force and the Norwegian and Netherlands Air Force which we have trained and organized, and it is desirable that this should be continued after the war. It will be extremely difficult to maintain this association if these countries ~~which~~ are outside our zone of responsibility. On the other hand, you have had the major responsibility for re-equipping the French land and air forces.

Para 5. If, however, the collapse of Germany occurs after allied forces have been committed to the continent in OVERLORD, which seems almost certain, most serious practical objections must be added to those in 4 sub para 1 and sub

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para 2 above. Our forces would be operating on the left flank of OVERLORD with their overseas Bases in the Havre Cherbourg area, whilst the United States forces, on the right flank, would have their overseas bases in the Brittany ports.

Para 6. Your proposals therefore would involve either the crossing of the land lines of communication of the two parts of the Allied force advancing on Germany, or the withdrawal and re-embarkation of the US forces. Both these would cause severe administrative difficulties and delays. It is obviously too late to replan OVERLORD with British forces on the right and US forces on the left.

Para 7. In view of the serious objections which I have described and the fact that at this late stage all our thoughts and energies must be given to making a success of OVERLORD, I consider that only reasons of overriding importance could justify such a fundamental change of plan as that proposed.

Para 8. As I understand it your proposal arises from an aversion to undertaking police work in France and a fear that this might involve the stationing of US forces in France over a long period. I rather think, however,

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7 February 1944

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From: Opanav

To : Alusna, London

NUMBER 457. PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Combined Chiefs of Staff have reached an impasse on the subject of countries and areas to be occupied by British and United States forces in Rankin or following Overlord. U.S. Chiefs of Staff have pointed out that a change-over from spheres of responsibility connection Overlord to spheres of later occupational responsibility desired by U.S. is militarily feasible and no vital objection can be made on that score. Matter now appears necessary for study by you and me in order to have decision before Overlord and to proceed with plans. United States proposals are set out in C.C.S. four two six slant one paragraph eighteen. (Report to President and Prime Minister, Sextant Conference.)

I am absolutely unwilling to police France and possibly Italy and the Balkans as well. After all, France is your baby and will take a lot of nursing in order to bring it to the point of walking alone. It would be very difficult for me to keep in France my military force or management for any length of time.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1220, EWT, 7 February 1944

George M. Elsey, Lt., USNR

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SECRET

18 November 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Europe-wide RANKIN.

General Morgan, Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander for operations in Western Europe has submitted a preliminary draft of a revised outline plan for the occupation of German-held Europe upon the surrender of, or cessation of hostilities by, Germany. This revision was based on two other papers. The first was prepared by the British Joint Planning Staff and is entitled "Disintegration of European Axis--Areas of Immediate Occupation." It is understood to have been prepared in consultation with the Foreign Office and hence is probably consistent with the views of the British Government concerning post-war Europe. The second was prepared by the Post-Hostilities Planning Subcommittee of the War Cabinet and is entitled "Military Occupation of Germany after her Defeat." Thus the plan proposed by General Morgan is consistent with these two papers which reflect deep and careful study and which indicate British political and economic as well as military policy.

Briefly the proposed plan provides for the division of Europe into three "spheres of responsibility", in which the occupational forces would be directed by the U.S., British, and U.S.S.R., respectively. The U.S. area includes France, Germany generally south of the Moselle River, and possibly Austria. The British area includes Northwest Germany, Belgium, Luxemburg, Holland and Denmark. The Soviet zone is presumed to be generally eastern Germany. However, the boundaries between the British, U.S., and U.S.S.R. zones cannot be defined until an agreement on this subject has been reached by the Governments of the United Kingdom, United States, and the U.S.S.R. The Balkans are excluded from consideration because they are not in General Morgan's theater of operations. Nor, for similar reasons, does his plan include specific provision for the employment of either General Eisenhower's forces or British Middle East forces.

We feel that the German situation is such that we must certainly be prepared to occupy German-held Europe, or any

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 2 1974

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areas from which she withdraws forces, on short notice. We believe this must be done in collaboration with the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain.

We, therefore, feel the need of guidance in the preparation of a Europe-wide occupation plan so that it will be in absolute consonance with United States political and economic policies, and with international agreements. We shall appreciate, therefore, an expression of your desires in these matters.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 2 1974

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