

Folder 4. MR 450 Italy (2) Sec. 1—Transfer of
Italian Ships to the Soviet Union,
28 August 1943—20 January 1945.

MR 450
Box 35
Folder 4

TOP SECRET DISPATCH

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE	
FROM FOGMA		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1	
RELEASED BY _____		COMORSEAFRONFORCES	PRIORITY 2	
DATE 20 JAN 1945			ROUTINE 3	
TOR CODEROOM 0607			ROUTINE 4	
DECODED BY KARABINUS			DEFERRED 5	
PARAPHRASED BY _____			BASEGRAM 6	
BY WHITTINGTON	CHECKED BY GERMAN			7
ROUTED BY WHITTINGTON	BY WHITTINGTON			8
		FOR ACTION		
		FOR INFORMATION		
		COMEIGHTHFLEET	PRIORITY 9	
		CNO	ROUTINE 10	
			DEFERRED 11	
			BASEGRAM 12	
			13	
			14	
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW 15	
181513A		NCR 2474	<input type="checkbox"/> 16	
			17	

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

FOGMA SENDS TO COMORSEAFRONFORCES INFO COMEIGHTHFLEET AND CNO.

ITALIAN CRUISER ATILIO REGOLO, ITALIAN DESTROYERS MITRAGLIERE FUCILIERE CARABINIERE, ITALIAN TB ORSA LEFT PORT MAHON FIFTEENTH ARRIVED ALGIERS SIXTEENTH. YOUR 140949 REFERS.

NOTE: REC'D SECRET, RECLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO CONTENT.

NCR ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:
 COMINCH(#1-#8).....COG
 2OG(#9).....

ACTION F-2

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

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OPNAV 19-78 *US Italy*

TOP SECRET DISPATCH

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	COMMORSEAFRON	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY	14 JANUARY 1945	FOGMA	PARRRRPP 1
DATE	1145	COM 8TH FLEET CNO	ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOM	IMRTE		DEFERRED 4
DECODED BY	FISHER	FOR ACTION	BASEGRAM 6
PARAPHRASED BY	FISHER		PPPPRRPP 8
ROUTED BY	GLUNT		PRIORITY 9
CHECKED BY	FISHER		ROUTINE 11
DITTOED BY	FISHER	DEFERRED 12	
		BASEGRAM 13	
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			14
140949		NCR 6139	IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW 15
			<input type="checkbox"/> 16

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

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(COMMORSEAFRON SENDS ACTION FOGMA INFO COM 8TH FLEET CNO.)

THIS IS TOP SECRET.

ULTRA REPORT, ITALIAN WARSHIPS INTERNED BALEARICS AUTHORIZED DEPART FREELY BEFORE JAN 141420A, BUT WILL BE REINTERNEED IF NO DEPARTURE BEFORE THAT TIME. NECESSARY FUEL LOADED 13TH.

NCR ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION.

~~10(11).....~~

COMINCH(12-9).....200(#10).....

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

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Is Italy
OPNAV 19-78

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE	
FROM <u>ALUSNA MADRID</u>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	URGENT ROUTINE DEFERRED PRIORITY ROUTINE DEFERRED	
RELEASED BY		CNO		FOR ACTION
DATE <u>30 DEC 1944</u>				INFORMATION
TOR CODEROOM <u>2013</u>				
DECODED BY <u>SACHS</u>				
TYPED BY <u>LYON</u>				
ROUTED BY <u>VOSSBURGH</u>				
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW <input type="checkbox"/>	
301212		NCR 1200		

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT
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ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ALUSNA MADRID TO CNO.
REF NA MADRID S 3944.

EMBASSY SEEKING JUSTIFICATION RELEASE ITALIAN WARSHIPS AT BALEARES. INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE NAVY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNING MARITIME AND ARE ON PAGE 4 QUOTE ART HAGUE 1907 CONVENTION AS STATING THAT IF SHIPS NOT SUPPLIED WITH FUEL UNTIL 24 HOURS AFTER ARRIVAL LAWFUL DURATION OF STAY MAY BE EXTENDED REASONABLE PERIOD BY NEUTRAL AUTHORITIES. ON PAGE 152 SAME ARTICLE STATES THAT IF COAL NOT SUPPLIED UNTIL 24 HOURS AFTER ARRIVAL LAWFUL DURATION OF THEIR STAY IS EXTENDED 24 HOURS. FIRST QUOTATION OF ARTICLE FAVORS ALLIED CASE FOR RELEASE WHAT IS YOUR ZERC REASONABLE PERIOD STATEMENT ON PAGE

ACTION	
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F-33	
F-34	
F-4	
FX01	
FX37	
FX49	
IG-00	
VCNO	

16...ACT
COMINCH...

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPR *Staley*

301212

WB

DRAFTER CALLAGHAN DE NET EXT. 62135 FROM SECNAV(DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC RELATIONS) RELEASED BY J L COLLIS DATE 20 DEC 1944 TOR COVERNOO: 201442 DECODED BY _____ PARAPHRASED BY KOHOUTEK CHECKED BY _____ ROUTED BY COOK BY _____	ADDRESSEES ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE COMNAVEU INFORMATION ACTION	PRECEDENCE PRIORITY ROUTINE DEFERRED BASEGRAM PRIORITY ROUTINE DEFERRED BASEGRAM IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW <input type="checkbox"/>
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.		201420 NCR 482

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

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INSTRUCT SHAEF U.S. NAVAL CENSORS TO PASS NOTHING INDICATING
 CRUISER MILWAUKEE TRANSFERRED TO RUSSIANS UNLESS CLEARED
 THROUGH RESPONSIBLE RUSSIAN AUTHORITIES. HAVE STOPPED PARIS
 DATED STORY CONCERNING YEOMAN HARRY SKLENAR.

ØØR(Ø1).....ORIG.

ØØINCH(Ø2-Ø).....

ACTION F-2

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

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 OPNAV 19-76 *450 Italy* 201420

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

**TOP
SECRET**

Combined Chiefs of Staff
77500

December 4, 1944

Commanding General
Allied Force Headquarters
Caserta, Italy

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main Echelon
Versailles, France

Commanding General
United Kingdom Base Section
London, England

Number WARX 72580

Attention invited to NAF 763. TOPSEC book message to Wilson Caserta and Eisenhower Versailles for action, to Central District United Kingdom Base Section London pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information. This message is FAN 463 to Wilson and FACS 113 to Eisenhower from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

1. Combined Chiefs of Staff agree with your proposals for the handling of Italian warships and merchant vessels captured in ports of Southern France. This is to say, these ships will be dealt with under the surrender instrument and the Cunningham-Courtin agreement, being turned over to the Italians for operations of care and maintenance pending ultimate settlement concerning the Italian fleet and merchant shipping.

2. With regard to recaptured Allied ships, Combined Chiefs of Staff agree that these should be treated in accordance with SHAEF AG 546-1 GDS-AGM of 30 May, which means that they will be returned to the Ally concerned.

CM-OUT-72580 (5 Dec 44)

TOP SECRET

SECRET

COPY No. 33

450 Italy

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TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

WARX 72580

December 4, 1944

The disposal of Ex-Yugoslav ships would follow the arrangements made between Dr Subasic and Marshall Tito.

3. Treatment of enemy ships captured in French ports is more difficult in that no agreement exists comparable to that concerning recaptured Allied ships upon which SHAEF's instructions of 30 May are based. Question is a general one not confined to ports of Southern France and Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed on the following policies concerning enemy ships captured before the surrender of Germany:

a. SCAEF and SACMED should have first call for the purpose of their operations on enemy ships captured in ports within their command as they have on Ex-Allied ships.

b. When enemy merchant ships captured or found in ports within the command of SCAEF and SACMED are no longer required for military operations under such Commanders, they should be turned over to the representatives of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board who will arrange for manning and for operation within the Combined Shipping pool, such vessels to remain subject to all claims including salvage claims and to be accounted for in the ultimate shipping settlement.

c. Captured enemy warships other than Ex-Allied ships should be at the disposal of SCAEF and SACMED who should refer to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for direction concerning their assignment.

CM-OUT-72580

(5 Dec 44)

TOP SECRET

SECRET

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**TOP
SECRET**

WARX 72580

December 4,

4. Any negotiations to obtain Allied agreement to the above policy will be conducted by the appropriate merchant shipping authorities of the United States and United Kingdom. Meanwhile, the above direction will be operative.

End

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: Gen Somervell
Gen Arnold
Adm Leahy
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
CofS

CM-OUT-72580

(5 Dec 44)

0133Z

fbh

TOP SECRET

SECRET

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TOP SECRET DISPATCH

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE	
FROM <u>ALUSNA MOSCOW</u>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1	
RELEASED BY _____		CNO	PRIORITY 2	
DATE <u>18 NOV 1944</u>			ROUTINE 3	
TOR CODEROOM _____			DEFERRED 4	
DECODED BY _____			BASEGRAM 5	
PARAPHRASED BY _____	CHECKED BY <u>PIPP</u>		MB2	6
BY <u>FISHER</u>	DITTOED BY _____			PRIORITY 9
ROUTED BY <u>PIPP</u>	BY <u>FISHER</u>			ROUTINE 10
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			DEFERRED 11	
			BASEGRAM 12	
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PAGE 1 OF 4 171410 6163			18	
Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP			(Use G. C. T.) 19	

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TOP SECRET.

FOLLOWING LIST OF MATERIALS REQUESTED BY SOVIETS FOR IMPROVING INSULATION AND COLD WEATHER PERFORMANCE OF EX-MILWAUKEE PLUS GENERAL REPAIR. SOVIET PURCOM HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO REQUISITION ITEMS AND CAPT. 1ST RANK SERBIN IN WASHN AVAILABLE FOR QUESTIONS. SUBJECT TO REVISION OF LIST ^{AS} BUSHIPS DEEMS ADVISABLE, RECOMMEND APPROVAL AND EARLIEST PRACTICABLE SHIPMENT. THIS LIST SUBMITTED AS LAST ALTERNATIVE TO SOVIET EFFORTS TO GET SHIP RETURNED TO US NAVY YARD FOR OVERHAUL. IN MY 011315 SEPT, I REPORTED OFFERING TO ASSIST IN OBTAINING MATERIALS WHILE DENYING RETURN OF SHIP TO US WHICH ACTION APPROVED BY COMINCH IN USNAVCOM 081530 OF SEPT.

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OPNAV 19-78

450 Italy

171410

TOP SECRET DISPATCH

FROM _____	EXT. _____	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
RELEASED BY _____		FOR ACTION	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE
DATE _____			PRIORITY 1
TOR CODEROOM _____			ROUTINE 2
DECODED BY _____			DEFERRED 3
PARAPHRASED BY _____	CHECKED BY _____	FOR INFORMATION	BASEGRAM 4
ROUTED BY _____	DITTOED BY _____		PRIORITY 5
			ROUTINE 6
			DEFERRED 7
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			BASEGRAM 8
PAGE 2 OF 4	171410	NCR 6163	IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW 9
			<input type="checkbox"/> 10

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

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<u>NAMES OF ITEMS:</u>	<u>SIZE: (THICKNESS IN MILLIMETERS UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED)</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
CORK IN SHEETS OR OTHER APPROPRIATE INSULATING MATERIAL	20	15 TONS
CORK IN SHEETS OR OTHER APPROPRIATE INSULATING MATERIAL	40	60 TONS
CANVAS		10000 SQ METERS
SHEET STEEL	90	50 TONS
SHEET STEEL	23.50	50 TONS
SHEET STEEL STANDARD LENGTHS STANDARD WIDTHS	1.5	500 SQ. METERS EQUALS 6 TONS
GALVANIZED IRON	COMMERCIAL STANDARD SIZE	7 TONS
STEEL RIVETS	3/4 INCH	5 TONS
HIGH PRESSURE STEAM GASKET MATERIAL IN SHEETS		500 KILOGRAMS

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OPNAV 19-78 171410

TOP SECRET DISPATCH

HAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY			PRIORITY 2
DATE			ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOM			DEFERRED 4
			BASEGRAM 5
DECODED BY			6
PARAPHRASED BY	CHECKED BY		PRIORITY 9
BY	DITTOED BY		ROUTINE 10
ROUTED BY	BY		DEFERRED 11
		BASEGRAM 12	

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IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

PAGE 3 OF 4

171410

NCR 6163

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP

(Use G. C. T.)

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STEEL PIPE	(INSIDE MEASUREMENT FOR ALL STEEL PIPE)	54 BY 2.5	1000 METERS	21
STEEL PIPE		44.5 BY 2	1500 METERS	22
STEEL PIPE		38 BY 1.5	700 METERS	23
STEEL PIPE		32 BY 1.5	500 METERS	24
STEEL PIPE		22 BY 2	500 METERS	25
STEEL PIPE		14 BY 2	1600 METERS	26
ASBESTOS CORD FOR INSULATION		10	51000 METERS	27
BRONZE STEAM TRAPS FOR HEATING SYSTEM LOW PRESSURE			20 PEICES	28
INLET VALVES FOR STEAM HEATING BRONZE		10	760 PIECES	29
OUTLET VALVES FOR STEAM HEATING BRONZE		10	760 PIECES	30
BRONZE GATE VALVES			60 PIECES	31

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No. 2 FILE.

No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL.

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TOP SECRET DISPATCH

DRAFTER _____	EXT. _____	ADDRESSEES _____	PRECEDENCE _____
FROM _____	FOR ACTION	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY 2
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE 3
DATE _____			DEFERRED 4
TOR CODEROOM _____			BASEGRAM 5
DECODED BY _____	INFORMATION		6
PARAPHRASED BY _____			PRIORITY 9
CHECKED BY _____			ROUTINE 10
DITTOED BY _____			DEFERRED 11
ROUTED BY _____			BASEGRAM 12
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			13
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PAGE 4 OF 4 171410 NCR 6163			<input type="checkbox"/>

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP _____ (Use G. C. T.)

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NCR ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:

- 16(#1).ACT
- 12(#2)....COMINCH(#3-10)....BUSHIPS(#11)....

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171410

TOP SECRET DISPATCH

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM COMMORSEAFRON		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY _____		COM 8TH FLT	P P P PRIORITY
DATE SEPT 6 1944			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM 062258			DEFERRED
			BASEGRAM
DECODED BY HOFNER		CNO FOGMA	P P P P PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY MONTGOMERY	CHECKED BY MONTGOMERY		ROUTINE
ROUTED BY MONTGOMERY	DITTOED BY MONTGOMERY		DEFERRED
			BASEGRAM
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
061729B		NCR 2842	<input type="checkbox"/>
Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP			(Use G. C. T.)
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THIS IS TOP SECRET.

ULTR

*ICL (NEW)
300*

COM EIGHTH FLT INFO CNO FOGMA FROM CMSF X

CREWS OF ITALIAN WARSHIPS INTERNED AT MAHON ARE THREATENING TO MUTINY. SEVERAL SAILORS OF FUCILIERE WHO TRIED TO ESCAPE VIA POLLONZA HAVE REFUSED TO RETURN TO THEIR SHIP

DD

NCR ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:

16(#1).....COG

COMINCH(#2 TO #9).....NAVAIDE(#10)(#12)...

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OPNAV 19-78 *450 Italy* **061729B**

COPT NO. **#10**

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

HOD

September 3, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL BROWN:

Please let me see copy of
proposed reply.

F.D.R.

4 Sep/44

Naval Aide to the President

Despatch reply (draft) herewith

EJK

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

WZ WZ

DRAFTER P-2	EXTENSION NUMBER 3926	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM COMINCH	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE		1
RELEASED BY	FOR ACTION	ALUSNA MOSCOW	PRIORITY 2
DATE 4 SEPTEMBER 1944			ROUTINE RRRRR 3
TOR CODEROOM			DEFERRED 5
DECODED BY			DEFERRED 6
PARAPHRASED BY	INFORMATION		DEFERRED 7
ROUTED BY			PRIORITY 8
			PRIORITY 9
			ROUTINE 10
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			DEFERRED 11
			DEFERRED 12
			DEFERRED 13
			DEFERRED 14
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			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW 16
			<input type="checkbox"/> 17
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ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	19
			GCT 20

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WE CONCUR IN YOUR REPLY TO VICE ADMIRAL ALAFUKOV AS EXPRESSED IN
 YOUR 011315 X IF QUESTION AGAIN RAISED POINT OUT THAT WE HAVE
 EMPLOYED SISTER SHIPS OF THE MILWAUKEE IN THE ALEUTIANS AND ON
 NORTH ATLANTIC CONVOY IN WINTER WITHOUT ANY LOSS IN OPERATING
 EFFICIENCY FROM COLD AND WITHOUT MAJOR ALTERATIONS.

7 Sept 44
President approved
by phone
Adm Edwards informed
WZ

TOP SECRET TOP SECRET

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM No. 4 SPECIAL

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MCN 38 *450 Italy*

TOP SECRET DISPATCH

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
ALUSNA MOSCOW		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
FROM		CNO	2
RELEASED BY	1 SEPTEMBER 1944		3
DATE	1645		4
TOR CODEROOM	ALTENHOF/HANSEN		5
DECODED BY	REEGAN	CNO	6
PARAPHRASED BY	REEGAN		7
CHECKED BY	REEGAN		8
DITTOED BY	REEGAN		9
ROUTED BY			10
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			11
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ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT			21
PART 1 IS Ø113ØØ NCR 8999			22
PART 2 IS Ø11315 NCR 9ØØ5			23
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Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

PART 1 IS Ø113ØØ NCR 8999
PART 2 IS Ø11315 NCR 9ØØ5

TOP SECRET.

VICE ADMIRAL ALAFUXOV NEW CHIEF OF SOVIET NAVAL GENERAL STAFF YESTERDAY BROACHED QUESTION OF SENDING EX MILWAUKEE TO STATES FOR OVERHAUL ON UNEXPECTED GROUNDS THAT SHE IS NOT SUFFICIENTLY INSULATED OR HEATED TO OPERATE IN ARCTIC AREA THAT EXTREME COLD WILL EFFECT NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT THAT WORK BEYOND THEIR CAPACITY AND THAT THEY LOATH TO MAKE MAJOR ALTERATIONS WHILE SHIP ON TEMPORARY LOAN BASIS. HE STATED QUESTION NOT YET DISCUSSED WITH COMMISSAR AS HE WANTED MY ESTIMATE OF POSSIBILITY FIRST. I INFORMED HIM THAT BASED ON DISCUSSIONS OF HIS PEOPLE WITH FRANKEL ON SUBJECT HAD DISCUSSED POSSIBILITY WHILE IN WASHINGTON AND THAT OVERHAUL WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED BECAUSE OF LABOR SHORTAGE BUILDING OVERLOAD BATTLE DAMAGE REPAIR OVERLOAD ETC. FURTHER POINTED OUT THAT IF ITALIAN SHIPS HAD BEEN RECEIVED FOR WHICH MILWAUKEE GIVEN AS TEMPORARY REPLACEMENT THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN IN MUCH WORSE CONDITION THAN MILWAUKEE AND NO QUESTION OF REPAIRING OR MODERN-

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OPNAV 19-78

450 Italy Ø11315

TOP SECRET DISPATCH

DRAFTER _____	EXT. _____	ADDRESSEES _____	PRECEDENCE _____
FROM _____		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE _____	1
RELEASED BY _____	FOR ACTION		PRIORITY 2
DATE _____			ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOM _____			DEFERRED 4
			BASEGRAM 5
DECODED BY _____	INFORMATION		6
PARAPHRASED BY _____			PRIORITY 9
CHECKED BY _____			ROUTINE 10
DITTOED BY _____			DEFERRED 11
ROUTED BY _____			BASEGRAM 12
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			13
(PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES)		Ø11315 NCR 9ØØ5	14
			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
			<input type="checkbox"/>

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP _____ (Use G. C. T.) _____

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

IZING THEM IN U.S. BEFORE OR AFTER DELIVERY WOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED. QUESTION OF OBTAINING MATERIAL FOR INSULATION FOLLOWED ON WHICH I AGREED WE COULD PROBABLY HELP THEM THROUGH PURCHASING COMMISSION WITH COPY OF REQUESTED MATERIAL LIST TO MY OFFICE FOR CONSIDERATION AND RECOMMENDATION. THIS HE WILL DISCUSS WITH HIS ENGINEERS. REGARDING QUESTION OF SOVIETS MAKING ALTERATIONS TO SHIP I ASSURED ALAFUXOV THAT WE HAD NO OBJECTION TO THEIR MAKING ANY ALTERATION THEY FELT DESIREABLE TO ADAPT HER TO THEIR SERVICE. WHEN ASKED WHAT THEY COULD DO REGARDING WINTERIZATION OF EX BRITISH BB AND DD HE CONSIDERED THEY WERE OKAY ALTHOUGH IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT THE DD WERE MUCH THINNER SKINNED THAN THE MILWAUKEE. REQUEST INFO IF ATTACHE OR PURCHASING COMMISSION BROACH SUBJECT IN WASHINGTON.

ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:
 16(#1).....ACTION
 COMINCH(#2-#9)..... NAVAIDE (#1Ø-#11).....

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

TOP SECRET

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations. Ø11315 COPY NO.

OPNAV 19-78

1Ø

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM FRANKEL, MURMANSK		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		CNO	PRIORITY
DATE 26 AUGUST 44	FOR ACTION		RRRRRRRR
TOR CODEROOM 261804			DEFERRED
DECODED BY HERWITZ	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY BODE <i>[Signature]</i>			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY GILBERT			RRRRRRRRRR DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
260910 NCR 4678			<input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT
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ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

SHIPS TURNED OVER TO RUSSIANS BY BRITISH 1 BATTLESHIP
AND 8 EX US DESTROYERS ARRIVED FROM UK 24 AUGUST

ACTION		
F-0		22
F-01		23
F-02		24
F-03		25
F-04		26
F-05		27
F-06		28
F-07		29
F-1		30
F-2		31
F-3		32
F-20		33
F-3		34
F-30		35
F-31		36
F-31		37
F-32		38
F-32		39
F-33		40
F-33		41
F-34		42
F-4		43
F-4		44
FX01		45
FX30		46
FX37		47
FX37		48
FX40		49
FX40		50
IG-00		51
VCNO		52

16....ACT

COMINCH/.....CNO.....20G...NAVAIDE...200P....

SECRET

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OPNAV-NCR-15

260910

450 Russian Itah

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET "IVI"
PRIORITY

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
To: War Department
No: FX 85287 NAF 763 20 August 1944

FX 85287 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff repeated SHAEF for info signed Wilson cite FHCOS

This a NAF 763.

1. The question has arisen of the procedure to be adopted in respect of Italian warships and merchant vessels either in service or capable of salvage which will eventually be captured in ports of southern France.

2. The warships are not likely to be of value to the war effort and I intend to lay them up in accordance with appendix to CCS 515/1.

3. In accordance with the terms of the armistice all Italian merchant vessels will be handed over to the Supreme Allied Commander and utilized by the allies. All other vessels will be treated in accordance with SHAEF AG 546-1 GDS-AGM 30th May.

4. I am informing you of this in case there may be some protest through diplomatic channels by the French against the adoption of the procedure outlined above since not only will they have been captured in French ports but the forces which effected their capture will be partially French.

End.

ACTION: CC/S

INFO: Adm Leahy CGAAF Gen Somervell OPD Gen Bissell Adm King Log
CM-IN-18675 (20 Aug 44) 2035Z bem

SECRET

33

COPY No.

450 Italy

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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTM

DRAFTER

EXTENSION NUMBER

ADDRESSEES

PRECEDENCE

FROM ASTALUSIA ARCHANGEL

RELEASED BY

DATE 1 JULY 1944

TOR CODEROOM 2059

DECODED BY KIRKBRIDE

PARAPHRASED BY VOSBURGH/

ROUTED BY ROLL

ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE

CNO

FOR ACTION

INFORMATION

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

011300

NCR 1819

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:

DATE

TIME

GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ACTION

RECEIVED CONF SERIALED PUBLICATIONS FROM SOVIET
NAVY ON TIME TIDE TABLES 1944 WHITE SEA AND DYLNABAR
WILL FORWARD SAME IF DESIRED TO BE RETURNED SOONEST.
BRITISH BATTLESHIP ROYAL SOVEREIGN TURNED OVER TO
SOVIETS, NOW NAMED ARCHANGEL.

F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-07	26
F-1	27
F-2	28
F-20	29
F-3	30
F-30	31
F-31	32
F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
FX01	37
FX30	38
FX37	39
FX40	40
IG-00	41
VCNO	42

16....ACT

28....COMINCH....19....19C....BADO....NMCS....

20G....NAVAIDE....CNO....

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art 761D NAVREGS.)

450 Italy

TOP SECRET DISPATCH

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		CNO	PRIORITY
DATE 30 JUN 44			ROUTINE
TOR CODER ROOM 1137			DEFERRED
DECODED BY ALTENHOF			BASEGRAM
PARAPHRASED BY WIDMAN	CHECKED BY WIDMAN	INFORMATION	PRIORITY
BY WIDMAN	DITTOED BY WIDMAN		ROUTINE
ROUTED BY	BY		DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			BASEGRAM
300935Z NCR 726			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
			<input type="checkbox"/>

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

TOPSECRET

FROM **ALUSNAMOSCOW TO CNO**

INFO ON EX MILWAUKEE. IN MEETING WITH CHIEF OF NAVAL GENERAL STAFF YESTERDAY INQUIRED ABOUT OPERATION AND

STATUS OF EX MILWAUKEE WITH NO INFERENCE INFO MY 070503. SHE IS BEING OVERHAULED AT MOLOTOVSK AND SAID

TO BE PREPARING FOR EARLY PLANNED OPERATIONS. REPLY TO QUESTION REGARDING HER OPERATION THEY EXPRESSED NO

FAULT FINDING AND WERE GRATEFUL FOR EXCELLENT INSTRUCTION BY NUCLEUS CREW. ABOUT MATERIAL CONDITION REPLY WAS

INDEFINITE AS SHIPS COMPANY WAS STILL SOUNDING OUT THE SHIP. SUGGESTION MOLOTOVSK OF COURSE CAPABLE OF HANDLING

ALL NECESSARY REPAIRS WAS DODGED BY INFERENCE THAT EXTENT REPAIRS FOUND NEEDED WOULD REQUIRE A DETAILED PLAN UPON

WHICH LOCATION REPAIR WORK WOULD BE DETERMINED THAT SHIP WAS OLD AND SOMETIMES IN SOUNDING FOR DEFECTS IN SUCH

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

TOP SECRET

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OPNAV 19-78 *450 Staley*

TOP SECRET DISPATCH

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE	
FROM _____		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1	
RELEASED BY _____			PRIORITY 2	
DATE _____			ROUTINE 3	
TOR CODEROOM _____			DEFERRED 4	
			BASEGRAM 5	
				6
				7
				8
DECODED BY _____			PRIORITY 9	
PARAPHRASED BY _____	CHECKED BY _____		ROUTINE 10	
	BY _____		DEFERRED 11	
	DITTOED BY _____		BASEGRAM 12	
ROUTED BY _____	BY _____			13

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IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

PAGE TWO OF 300935Z NOV 726

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP

(Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

SHIPS UNEXPECTED WEAKNESSES IN UNDERWATER BODY WERE DEVELOPED. HE MADE NO REFERENCE TO COMMENTS

PREVIOUSLY MADE BY ENG RADM DUBROVIN.

ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:

16(#1)....ACTION

COMINCH(#2-9)....12(#10) ...NAVAIDE(#11-12)....

No. 1 ADMIRAL.

No. 2 FILE.

No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL.

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COPT NO. 12

OPNAV 19-78

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

Combined Chiefs of Staff
71469

14 June 1944

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Commanding General
USAF North African Theater of Operations
Algiers, Algeria

Commanding General
USAF European Theater of Operations
London, England

Number: WARX 50973

To Wilson for action, to SHAEP for Eisenhower and ETCUSA
pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information, FAW 365
from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Subject is NAF 687. Policy for repairs, maintenance
and supply of Italian naval units contained in C.C.S. 515/1
which assigns primary responsibility therefor to the U.K.
and limits U.S. responsibility to issue of supplies from
U.S. stocks direct to Italian naval vessels in the Mediter-
ranean which will be made only to meet minimum essential
operational requirements of those Italian naval vessels
operating from U.S. controlled ports. It is therefore in
the first instance the responsibility of the Royal Navy to
obtain supplies for Italian personnel inasmuch as they are
under the command of the Royal Navy. In view of the fore-
going, the number of personnel of Italian armed forces whose
operations are in the first instance the responsibility of the
U.S. should be reduced by strength of Italian Navy and
should be confined to exact strength of Italian Army and
Air Forces since stockpiling for this purpose not considered
favorably.

ORIGINATOR:	CC/S		End
INFORMATION:	Gen Arnold	OPD	Gen Bissell
	Adm King	Col Park	LOG
CM-OUT-50973	(15 June 44)		02232 hrt

SECRET

450 Italy

41
COPY NO.

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15-30909-1 GPO

TOP SECRET DISPATCH

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		CNO	PRIORITY 2
DATE 8 JUNE 1944			ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOM 1808/7			DEFERRED 4
DECODED BY KRANING/ALTENHOF			BASEGRAM 5
PARAPHRASED BY REEGAN	CHECKED BY ROONEY		6
ROUTED BY REEGAN	DITTOED BY REEGAN		7
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			8
PAGE 1 OF 4	070803	NCR 858	9
Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP			10
			11
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No. 1 ADMIRAL.	No. 2 FILE.	No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM.	No. 4 SPECIAL.
			50
			51
			52

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PART 1 070801 NCR 1044 PART 2 070803 NCR 858

TOPSEC. ALUSNA MOSCOW SENDS TO CNO.

MURMANSK REPAIR OFFICER INFORMED CAPT FRANKEL RECENTLY OF SOVIET DESIRE SEND MILWAUKEE TO US FOR MAJOR OVERHAUL. WHEN QUESTIONED STATED MATTER HAD BEEN PASSED TO NAVY COMMISSAR WHO HAS NOT MENTIONED IT HERE YET. IN EVENT SOVIETS SHOULD TAKE UP SUBJECT DIRECTLY WITH NAVY DEPARTMENT FOLLOWING INFO AND COMMENT IS SUBMITTED. IF SOVIETS BROACH SUBJECT HERE I INTEND TO TAKE STAND INDICATED IN FOLLOWING UPON WHICH YOUR COMMENT IS REQUESTED. ENGINEER ADMIRAL BUBROVIN PROPOSED SUBJECT TO FRANKEL INDICATING THEY PREPARING LIST OF WORK WHICH WOULD REQUIRE LONG OVERHAUL. FRANKEL DISCUSSED WITH LT WILLIAMS SENIOR US OFFICER STILL ON BOARD WHO HAD HELPED PREPARE LIST OF ROUTINE REPAIR AND OVERHAUL ITEMS FOR SOVIETS TO DO BUT WHO SAW NO REAL REASON FOR MAJOR OVERHAUL. ONLY BIG ITEM APPARENT WAS LIFTING OF REDUCTION GEAR CASING WHICH NOT DONE IN OVER 5 YEARS AND ALTHOUGH RECENTLY FULL POWER RUN SUCCESSFUL GEARS ADMITTEDLY MADE SLIGHT NOISE. FEW PITS

TOP SECRET

SECRET DISPATCH

DRAFTER		EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	ALUSNA MOSCOW		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY			FOR ACTION	PRIORITY 2
DATE	8 JUNE 1944			ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOM				DEFERRED 4
DECODED BY				BASEGRAM 5
PARAPHRASED BY	CHECKED BY		FOR INFORMATION	6
ROUTED BY	DITTOED BY			7
				8
				9
				10
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				12
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PAGE 2 OF 4

070803 NCR 858

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP

(Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

IN TANKS REDS POINTED OUT AS STRUCTURAL WEAKNESS. SOVIET COMMANDING OFFICER INTIMATES SHIP NOT SEAWORTHY AND 7 OR 8 MONTHS OVERHAUL REQUIRED. SOVIETS CONSIDERING CUTTING DOWN STACKS AND COMBINING INTO 2 STACKS TO IMPROVE APPEARANCE. ALSO THEY HAVE BEEN MEASURING ARCS OF FIRE WITH POSSIBLE INTENTION OF REMOVING CATAPULTS AND INSTALLING ADDITIONAL GUNS. SOVIETS CONSIDER ALL WORK CAN BE DONE QUICKER AND BETTER IN US THAN IN THEIR YARD AT ARCHANGEL AND THAT IF THEY UNDERTAKE WORK IT MAY EFFECT THEIR ABILITY TO DO EMERGENCY WORK ON MERCHANT VESSELS OF CONVOYS AS IN PAST. OPINION THIS OFFICE IS THAT (A) SOVIETS GOING BACK ON ALL THEIR STATEMENTS ABOUT URGENT NEED FOR SHIP AND ON HOW QUICKLY THEY WOULD GET IT INTO ACTION ON ESCORT DUTY AND IN ATTACKS ON ENEMY SHIPPING. (B) SOVIETS HAVE SEEN IN BRITISH SHIPS ITEMS NOT ON MILWAUKEE AND ANXIOUS TO REQUEST EVERYTHING MODERN. IN THIS RESPECT THEY UNDERSTOOD TO BE DRIVING BRITISH FRANTIC IN EXPRESSING DISSATISFACTION WITH BRITISH SHIPS DEMANDING ADDITIONAL WORK AND COMPLETE MODERNIZATION. (C) ALTHOUGH SHIP HAD 18 MONTHS

No. 1 ADMIRAL.

No. 2 FILE.

No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL.

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OPNAV 10-78

SECRET DISPATCH

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY _____		CNO	PRIORITY 2
DATE 8 JUNE 1944			ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOM _____			RRRR 4
			DEFERRED 5
			BASEGRAM 6
			7
			8
DECODED BY _____			PRIORITY 9
PARAPHRASED BY _____	CHECKED BY _____		ROUTINE 10
			DEFERRED 11
			DEFERRED 12
ROUTED BY _____			BASEGRAM 13
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			14
PAGE 3 OF 4	070803	NCR 858	IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW 15
			<input type="checkbox"/> 16
			17

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.) 18

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT 20

SPARES ON BOARD WELL STORED AND INDEXED THEY HAVE RESTOWED OR ISSUED EVERYTHING WITH RESULTING CONFUSION. THEY UNDERSTAND SOME ITEMS OF SPARES INVOICED TO SHIP WERE NOT DELIVERED AND STRESS DELIVERY. WE BELIEVE ONCE SHIP IS IN US DEMANDS FOR SPARES AND STORES WILL BE UNENDING IMPOSSIBLE AND INTOLERABLE. (D) FROM LITTLE INFO AVAILABLE BELIEVE THEY ENDEAVORING WORK UP BIG REPAIR LIST TO BUILD UP CASE. RECOMMENDATION THIS OFFICE IS THAT WE TAKE VERY FIRM STAND DENYING RETURN OF SHIP FOR OVERHAUL IN GROUNDS THAT (A) SHIP WHEN TURNED OVER WAS MOST MODERNIZED OF HER CLASS AND IN EXCELLENT CONDITION WHICH REQUIRED ONLY ROUTINE OR MINOR REPAIR WITHIN CAPACITY OF SHIPS FORCE OR ANY SMALL REPAIR SHIP OR YARD. (B) SHIP WAS EXECUTING ACTIVE WAR MISSIONS OF MOST EXACTING ENDURING AND HAZARDOUS NATURE INCLUDING TRIP TO MURMANSK AND WAS CONSIDERED FULLY SEAWORTHY AND CAPABLE OF ANY TYPE NAVAL REQUIREMENT WHEN TURNED OVER. (C) US YARDS ARE ALREADY OVERTAXED WITH URGENT REPAIR OF BATTLE DAMAGED VESSELS NEW CONSTRUCTION AND URGENT FLEET MAINTENANCE. PROGRAM DOES NOT EVEN PERMIT

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL. 49

TOP SECRET

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SECRET DISPATCH

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		CNO	PRIORITY 2
DATE 8 JUNE 1944			ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOM			DEFERRED 4
			BASEGRAM 5
DECODED BY			6
PARAPHRASED	CHECKED	INFORMATION	PRIORITY 9
BY	BY		ROUTINE 10
ROUTED BY	DITTOED		DEFERRED 12
	BY		BASEGRAM 13
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			14
PAGE 4 OF 4	070803	NCR 858	IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW <input type="checkbox"/> 15

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

MODERNIZING OUR OWN VESSELS BEYOND MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS.
 (D) OVERHAUL WOULD KEEP SHIP OUT OF ACTIVE SERVICE FOR EXTEND-
 ED PERIOD OVER WHICH WE UNDERSTOOD SOVIETS TO HAVE URGENT NEED
 OF HER SERVICES. SUBJECT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH AMBASSADOR
 WHO CONCURS THAT WE SHOULD TAKE FIRM STAND AGAINST PERMITTING
 SHIP COME TO US FOR OVERHAUL FOR REASONS INDICATED ABOVE.
 FRANKEL LEAVING FOR US ON NEXT PLANE AND DIRECTED DISCUSS
 SUBJECT IMMEDIATELY ON ARRIVAL.

ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:
 16(f1).....ACTION
 COMINCH(f2-f9).....NAVAIDE(f10-f11).....

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

TOP SECRET

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW		ASTERISK (*) MAILGPAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		CNO	PRIORITY
DATE 29 MAY 1944	FOR ACTION		ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM 2159/29			DEFERRED
DECODED BY SMITH	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY REEGAN			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY ROONEY			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW <input type="checkbox"/>
271503 NCR 3098			

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

TOPSEC.

FOLLOWING INFO RECEIVED FROM ROULLARD "SHANGHAI RADIO BROADCAST TODAY (25 MAY) SAYS SENATOR BRIDGES REVEALED TRANSFER 2 OR MORE US CRUISERS TO USSR. MILWAUKEE DEFINITE OTHERS SOON. STEPHEN EARLY ASKED CONFIRM DECLINED COMMENT. SENATOR BREWSTER ASKING FOR SENATE INVESTIGATION".

ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:

16(#1).....ACTION

COMINCH(#2-#9).....13(#10).....NAVAIDE(#11-#12).....

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL

~~SEALED~~ ~~SECRET~~

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NCR 18

271503 450 **TOP SECRET**

COPY NO. 12

ORIGINATOR	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM COM 12TH FLEET		ASTERISK (*) MAILGPAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY		COMINCH AND CNO	ROUTINE
DATE 12 MAY 1944			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM 1338		<i>WAL</i>	PRIORITY
DECODED BY ROBERTS/YORK			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY FISHER/GLUNT			DEFERRED
ROUTED BY			
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
	121041	NCR 552	<input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(FROM COM 12TH FLEET ACTION COMINCH AND CNO.)

TOPSEC.

OFFICIAL MAIL AND MINOR SPARE PARTS EX-MILWAUKEE
 RECEIVED SUBSEQUENT 26 FEBRUARY NOW SEGREGATED LONDON.
 REQUEST AUTHORITY DESTROY ALL MAIL THAT DOES NOT RE-
 QUIRE ACTION. RETAIN FOR DISTRIBUTION BY COMNAVEU
 USABLE PAMPHLETS AND SPARE PARTS.

OFFICIAL MAIL ON WHICH ACTION CANNOT BE TAKEN HERE
 TO BE RETURNED CNO FOR RELEASE TO APPROPRIATE BUREAUS
 OR AGENCIES WHEN VESSEL'S STATUS IS REVEALED.

IF NOT ALREADY DONE REQUEST BUREAUS AND OFFICES NAVY
 DEPARTMENT BE INSTRUCTED STOP FORWARDING OR ORIGINATING

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 NO OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

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NCR 18

78
COR 72

MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

EXTENSION NUMBER		ADDRESSEES		PRECEDENCE
FROM _____	FOR ACTION	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE		PRIORITY 1
RELEASED BY _____		INFORMATION		ROUTINE 2
DATE _____				DEFERRED 3
TOR CODEROOM _____				
DECODED BY _____			PRIORITY 9	
PARAPHRASED BY _____			ROUTINE 10	
ROUTED BY _____			DEFERRED 11	

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

PAGE 2 OF 2

121041

NCR 552

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

MAIL TO MILWAUKEE.

SO FAR AS I KNOW NO PROVISION HAS BEEN MADE TO ESTABLISH ANY AUTOMATIC FLOW OF SPARE PARTS, AMMUNITION, ET CETERA TO EX-MILWAUKEE.

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM No. 4 SPECIAL

~~SEALED SECRET~~

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTM

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM COMINCH AND CHO		ASTERISK (*) MAILGPAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY ADM E J KING		FOR ACTION COMNAVEU <i>WBS</i>	PRIORITY
DATE MAY 3 1944			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM 0338/0510			DEFERRED
DECODED BY HARTZELL/DIEBEL		FOR INFORMATION ALUSNA MOSCOW	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY HARTZELL/ROWLAND			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW <input type="checkbox"/>
	022037	NCR 44082	

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: _____ DATE _____ TIME _____ GCT _____

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

INFO ADEE 29173. PASSED TO YOU. INSURE EX-MILWAUKEE
CREW BRIEFED TO PREVENT PREMATURE LEAK OF INFORMATION
REGARDING TRANSFER.

Europe

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCH IN

430 Italy

TOP SECRET

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTM

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW		ASTERISK (*) MAILGPAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		COMINCH	PRIORITY 2
DATE APRIL 29 1944	FOR ACTION		ROUTINE 4
TOR CODEROOM 1940			DEFERRED 6
DECODED BY ANDERSON		DECLASSIFIED JCS memo, 1-4-74 By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 2 1974	PRIORITY 9
PARAPHRASED BY KOTEEN/GLUNT	INFORMATION		ROUTINE 11
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED 13
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			15
PAGE 1 OF 2	29173	NCR 337	IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW 16
			<input type="checkbox"/> 17

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

SHOW THIS ONE FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW TO COMINCH [REDACTED] FROM GENERAL DEANE.

WHEN WE FIRST BROACHED SUBJECT OF PUBLICITY OF MILWAUKEE WE THOUGHT BRITISH SHIPS MIGHT ALSO BE TURNED OVER IN NORTH RUSSIA, BUT SINCE THEY ARE BEING TURNED OVER IN U. K. CONSIDERABLY LATER THAN MILWAUKEE QUESTIONS ARISE AS TO EFFECT RELEASE MAY HAVE ON TURNOVER. JUST PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE TO MEET MR STETTINIUS AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN SAW MR MOLOTOV AGAIN ON THE SUBJECT OF YOUR 281321. MR MOLOTOV STATED THAT HE CONSIDERED IT MIGHT BE ADVISABLE TO POSTPONE ANY ANNOUNCEMENT FOR THE TIME BEING SINCE PUBLICITY MIGHT RESULT IN THE GERMANS OR FINNS ENDEAVORING TO BOMB THE SHIPS. THE AMBASSADOR REPLIED THAT OF COURSE THE ENTIRE QUESTION WAS IN MR MOLOTOV'S HANDS. MEANWHILE THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED

~~SECRET~~

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCH 18
450 Italy

[REDACTED]

ACTION F-2

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
		ASTERISK (*) MAILGPAM ADDRESSEE	
FROM _____	FOR ACTION		PRIORITY 1
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE 4
DATE _____			DEFERRED 6
TOR CODEROOM _____	INFORMATION		
DECODED BY _____			PRIORITY 10
PARAPHRASED BY _____			ROUTINE 11
ROUTED BY _____			DEFERRED 13
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW <input type="checkbox"/>
PAGE 2 OF 2		29173	NCR 337

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT
ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT			

CLARK KERR HAS RECEIVED NO VIEWS FROM HIS GOVERNMENT AND HAS JUST REQUESTED SAME. HE FEELS, HOWEVER, THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WILL WANT TO HOLD UP UNTIL TURNOVER OF BRITISH SHIPS IS COMPLETED AND THE SOVIETS MAY WISH TO HOLD UP UNTIL SHIPS ARE SAFELY IN RUSSIAN WATERS. CREWS TO TAKE OVER BRITISH SHIPS HAVE JUST LEFT NORTH RUSSIA IN RA 59. CONSEQUENT TO ABOVE NO PROBABLE DATE HAS BEEN REACHED.

DECLASSIFIED
 JCS memo, 1-4-74
 By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 2 1974

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE No. 3 F-I OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED

[REDACTED]

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
 NCR 18

[REDACTED]

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTM

FW WISE

DRAFTER EXTENSION NUMBER ADDRESSEES PRECEDENCE

FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW

ASTERISK (*) MAILGPAM ADDRESSEE

RELEASED BY

FOR ACTION

COMINCH

PRIORITY
~~ROUTINE~~

DATE APRIL 29 1944

DEFERRED

TOR CODEROOM 1940

INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED

PRIORITY

DECODED BY ANDERSON

JCS memo, 1-4-74

ROUTINE

PARAPHRASED BY KOTEEN/GLUNT

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 2 1974

DEFERRED

ROUTED BY

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

PAGE 1 OF 2

29173

NCR 337

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:

DATE

TIME

GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

SHOW THIS ONE FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW TO COMINCH [REDACTED] FROM GENERAL DEANE.

WHEN WE FIRST BROACHED SUBJECT OF PUBLICITY OF MILWAUKEE WE THOUGHT BRITISH SHIPS MIGHT ALSO BE TURNED OVER IN NORTH RUSSIA, BUT SINCE THEY ARE BEING TURNED OVER IN U. K. CONSIDERABLY LATER THAN MILWAUKEE QUESTIONS ARISE AS TO EFFECT RELEASE MAY HAVE ON TURNOVER. JUST PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE TO MEET MR STETTINIUS AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN SAW MR MOLOTOV AGAIN ON THE SUBJECT OF YOUR 281321. MR MOLOTOV STATED THAT HE CONSIDERED IT MIGHT BE ADVISABLE TO POSTPONE ANY ANNOUNCEMENT FOR THE TIME BEING SINCE PUBLICITY MIGHT RESULT IN THE GERMANS OR FINNS ENDEAVORING TO BOMB THE SHIPS. THE AMBASSADOR REPLIED THAT OF COURSE THE ENTIRE QUESTION WAS IN MR MOLOTOV'S HANDS. MEANWHILE THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED

[REDACTED]

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18

[REDACTED]

NAVY DEPARTMENT

EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
FROM _____	FOR ACTION	PRIORITY 1
RELEASED BY _____		ROUTINE 4
DATE _____		DEFERRED 6
TOR CODEROOM _____	INFORMATION	PRIORITY 9
DECODED BY _____		ROUTINE 11
PARAPHRASED BY _____		DEFERRED 13
ROUTED BY _____		14.
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.		15
PAGE 2 OF 2	29173	NCR 337
		IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW <input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT
ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT			

CLARK KERR HAS RECEIVED NO VIEWS FROM HIS GOVERNMENT AND HAS JUST REQUESTED SAME. HE FEELS, HOWEVER, THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WILL WANT TO HOLD UP UNTIL TURNOVER OF BRITISH SHIPS IS COMPLETED AND THE SOVIETS MAY WISH TO HOLD UP UNTIL SHIPS ARE SAFELY IN RUSSIAN WATERS. CREWS TO TAKE OVER BRITISH SHIPS HAVE JUST LEFT NORTH RUSSIA IN RA 59. CONSEQUENT TO ABOVE NO PROBABLE DATE HAS BEEN REACHED.


DECLASSIFIED
 JCS memo, 1-4-74
 By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 2 1974

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE No. 3 F-I OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED

~~SECRET~~

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
 NCR 18



DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ASTALUSNA MURMANSK-FRANKEL		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		CNO ALUSNA LONDON	PRIORITY 2
DATE 26 APRIL 1944			ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOM 261348			DEFERRED 4
DECODED BY YORK			
PARAPHRASED BY SHUGG		ALUSNA MOSCOW	PRIORITY 9
ROUTED BY DE LA MATYR			ROUTINE 10
			DEFERRED 11
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			12
251425 NCR 7791			13
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ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT


TOPSEC.

CAPT FIELDING REPORTS CREW EX MILWAUKEE EMBARKED 24 APRIL
FOR UK EXCEPT 32 MEN 6 OFFICER SPECIALISTS REMAINING.

COMINCH...ACT
16...13...NAVAIDE...

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED



Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18
251425 450 Italy

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ASTALUSNA MURMANSK FRANKEL		ASTERISK (*) MAILGPAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		CNO	PRIORITY
DATE 21 APRIL 1944			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM 211904			DEFERRED
DECODED BY KNAPP		ALUSNA LONDON COM 12TH FLT ALUSNA MOSCOW	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY SHUGG			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY SMITH			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
201914 NCR 3961			<input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

LONDON PASS TO COM 12TH FLT.

ARRANGEMENTS MADE REPATRIATION MILWAUKEE PERSONNEL ALL
 WHOM REMAINING ABOARD AS GUESTS SOVIET UNTIL EMBARKATION.
 6 OFFICERS AND 32 MEN WILL REMAIN FOR INSTRUCTION PURPOSES FOR ABOUT ONE MONTH.

COMINCH... *act*
 13...16... NAVAIDE...

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18
 201914 #50 Italy

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM COMINCH		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY	20 APRIL 1944	CINCLANT	ROUTINE
DATE			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM			DEFERRED
DECODED BY	201908	NOB BERMUDA COMSUBLANT	ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY RASH / THOMPSON			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY ROLL			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
	201817	RCR 7725	<input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

PROCEED WITH TRANSFER TO U.S. OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ITALIAN SUBMARINE MAMELI. PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS RELATIVE OTHER ITALIAN SUBMARINES NOB BERMUDA 121856 ARE APPLICABLE TO MAMELI.

ACTION	
F-0	
F-01	
F-02	
F-05	
F-1	
F-2	
F-20	
F-3	
F-30	
F-31	
F-32	
F-33	
F-34	
F-4	
FX01	
FX30	
FX37	
FX40	
IG-00	
VCNO	

COMINCH.... ORIG JAG...BUMED...~~00~~...NAVAIDE...
 BADO...BUSHIPS...BUORD...BUSANDA...BUPERS...
 OP05...12...23...CNO...19...19C...FX37...20F...
 20Y...20P3...OP05G...20M...20R...21...20E...

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-10

201817

450 Italy

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

Handwritten mark

DRAFTER EXTENSION NUMBER ADDRESSEES PRECEDENCE

FROM **MURMANSK (FRANKEL)**

ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE

RELEASED BY

FOR ACTION

**COMINCH
COM 12TH FLEET
AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN**

PRIORITY
ROUTINE

DATE **21 APRIL 1944**

DEFERRED

TOR CODEROOM **1905**

DECODED BY **KNAPP**

INFORMATION

PRIORITY

PARAPHRASED BY **KNAPP/GLUNT**

ROUTINE

ROUTED BY

DEFERRED

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

201750

NCR 3950

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(THIS TOPSECRET. FOR COMINCH COM 12TH FLEET AND AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN.)

CAPTAIN FIELDING REPORTS USS MILWAUKEE FORMALLY TRANSFERRED TO AND ACCEPTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION WITH APPROPRIATE CEREMONIES AT 0804 GCT ON 20 APRIL. VESSEL NOW BEARS NAME OF MURMANSK.

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE No. 3 F-1 OF CHARTROOM No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR IS **201750 450 Italy**

STATION: F-30

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM COMINCH		ASTERISK (*) MAILGPAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY COOKE		COMNAVEU	PRIORITY 3
DATE 19 APRIL 1944	FOR ACTION		ROUTINE DEFERRED 5
TOR CODEROOM 0037			DEFERRED 6
DECODED BY	INFORMATION		PRIORITY 10
PARAPHRASED BY KNAPP / POWLEY		CINCLANT COMSERVLANT COM11TH PHIB COMLANCRAB 11TH PHIB BUPERS	ROUTINE DEFERRED 12
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED 13
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			14
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182210

NCR 43800-8

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

COMNAVEU 171821 NOT TO ALL. ON THEIR ARRIVAL UK YOU ARE AUTHORIZED RETAIN ALL EX-MILWAUKEE ENLISTED MEN ON SUCH TEMPORARY DUTY AS YOU MAY ASSIGN IN 12TH FLEET, DURATION NOT MORE THAN THREE MONTHS, AFTER WHICH THEY ARE TO BE RETURNED TO COMSERVLANT. LAST PARA MY 251338 FEB NOT TO ALL MODIFIED ACCORDINGLY.

PASSED TO NCR FOR FURTHER DISTRIBUTION TO BUPERS AND OP 12.

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE No. 3 F-I OR CHARTROOM No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR IN 450 Italy
C. Moore

SECRET

SECRET

18 April 1944

PRIORITY

From: Opanav

To: Alusna, Moscow

Info: Secnav

SECRET FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN FROM THE PRESIDENT.

Replying your message 17235⁰, I consider it preferable that name and place of delivery MILWAUKEE be not rpt not formally announced unless Soviet Government particularly desires that such a formal announcement be made.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 2300, EWT, 18 April 1944

BOYCE P. PRICE
Captain, C.E.

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356

FROM The President	TO Ambassador Harriman
SERIAL Wnno	DATE 18 April 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	
TOR MAP ROOM	VIA
SUBJECT Announcement of transfer of MILWAUKEE	

ACTION

Answers HARRIMAN's 172350 NCR 1094 Apr 44, which was sent to the President at Waccamaw as WHITE 59, 18/1200Z. President's reply received as BLACK 30, 190230Z.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
ACTION COMPLETED:	FILED:	
450 Italy ②		

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	URGENT
RELEASED BY		CNO	PRIORITY
DATE 18 APRIL 1944	FOR ACTION		ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM 0809/18.			DEFERRED
DECODED BY GERMAN		<i>White 59, 18/2200 Z</i>	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY GERMAN	INFORMATION		ROUTINE
ROUTED BY GERMAN			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
172350 * NCR 1094			<input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(FOR THE PRESIDENT. SECRET FROM HARRIMAN)

I SPOKE TO MOLOTOV THIS EVENING REGARDING PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF LOAN MILWAUKEE. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD TAKE IT UP WITH THE NAVAL AUTHORITIES AND WOULD ADVISE ME. HE DID NOT HOWEVER PERSONALLY BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS NEED TO POSTPONE THE ANNOUNCEMENT FOR LONG. GENERAL DEANE HAS A CABLE FROM CONTINCH INDICATING THAT NAME OF SHIP AND PLACE OF DELIVERY ARE TO BE WITHHELD. AS SEVERAL THOUSAND AMERICAN MERCHANT SEAMEN ARE AWARE OF THE MILWAUKEES PRESENCE IN MURMANSK AND THE PROBABLE REASON FOR HER BEING THERE I AM CONCERNED THAT THESE FACTS WILL LEAK OUT. ALSO THE DETAILS REGARDING THE MANNER OF TURNOVER HAVE SUCH PUBLIC INTEREST THAT I SUGGEST THIS QUESTION BE GIVEN FURTHER CONSIDERATION PROVIDING THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AGREES.

I WOULD APPRECIATE ADVICE FOR MY NEXT TALK WITH MOLOTOV.

NAVAIDE.....ACTION(FOR P1A). FILE. (*) - SUBJECT TO CORRECTION.

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE No. 3 F-I OR CHARTROOM No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18

Rec'd. 18/0915 Z

FROM	Ambassador Harriman	TO	The President
SERIAL	172350 NCR 1094	DATE	18 April 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER			
TOR MAP ROOM 18/0915Z		VIA Navy Code Room	
SUBJECT Announcement of transfer of MILWAUKEE			

ACTION

Answers PRES-HARRIMAN 160106 Apr.

To President at Waccamaw as WHITE 59, 18/1200Z.
 President's reply received as BLACK 38, 19/0230Z, 18
 Apr 44. Sent to HARRIMAN 18 Apr 44.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY	DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: 450 Italy ②	FILED:
----------------------------------	--------

SECRET

FROM: OPNAV
TO : ALUSNA, MOSCOW

15 APRIL 1944

FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN FROM THE PRESIDENT.

Referring your message of 15 April, you may make
announcement regarding MILWAUKEE at any date and time
acceptable to the Soviet, informing me in advance as
previously directed.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1935, EWT, 15 April 1944.

HENRY W. PUTNAM,
Captain, A. C.

76-160106

NCR 6950

SECRET

FROM The President	TO Ambassador Harriman
SERIAL 160106 NCR 6950	DATE 15 Apr 44
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	
TOR MAP ROOM	VIA
SUBJECT Press announcement on transfer of MILWAUKEE	

ACTION

Answers Harriman's 141430 NCR 8858, which was sent to the President at Waccamaw as WHITE 35, 15/0400Z. Answered by BLACK 24, 15/2225Z.

Answered by Harriman's 172350 Apr.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: <i>450 Italy</i>	FILED:
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DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM HARRIMAN (MOSCOW)		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEES	
RELEASED BY _____	FOR ACTION	THE PRESIDENT	PRIORITY
DATE 15 APRIL 1944			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM _____			DEFERRED
DECODED BY _____	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY _____			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY _____			DEFERRED

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE

141430 NCR 8858

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	OCT
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ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

EXTRACT

(SECRET AND PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN.)

AS I RETURNED LAST NIGHT FROM MURMANSK AND ARCHANGEL I HAVE NOT YET HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF MILWAUKEE LOAN. AM SATISFIED SOVIETS FOR OPERATIONAL REASONS WILL WISH TO POSTPONE ANNOUNCEMENT AS LONG AS YOU ARE WILLING. FOR MY GUIDANCE I WOULD APPRECIATE BEING INFORMED OF YOUR WISHES AS TO DATE. AT MURMANSK ADMIRAL OLSEN AND I FOUND ARRANGEMENTS FOR TURNING OVER MILWAUKEE PROGRESSING MOST SATISFACTORILY. SOME 330 SOVIET OFFICERS AND MEN ARE LIVING ON BOARD WITH OUR OFFICERS AND CREW WHICH HAS BEEN REDUCED TO ABOUT 400. THE AMERICAN OFFICERS AND RATINGS I TALKED TO TOLD ME THAT THEIR RUSSIAN OPPOSITE NUMBERS WERE WELL TRAINED, KEEN AND WERE LEARNING FAST THE NEW EQUIPMENT.

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEES	
FROM _____	FOR ACTION		PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE _____			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
DECODED BY _____			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY _____			DEFERRED
ROUTED BY _____			

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE

HARRIMAN TO PRESIDENT, PAGE 2

141430 NCR 8858

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ACTUAL TURNOVER WILL PROBABLY TAKE PLACE ABOUT APRIL 20.

MOST OF OUR MEN WILL RETURN ON THE NEXT CONVOY APRIL 25. ABOUT 50 TO 60 WILL REMAIN FOR SOME WEEKS TO ASSIST FURTHER THE SOVIET ADM COMMANDING THE NORTHERN FLEET TOLD ME THAT HE INTENDED TO PUT THE SHIP IN OPERATION AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT USING HER WITH DESTROYERS AGAINST ENEMY SHIPPING SUPPLYING GERMAN FORCES AND EXPORTING NICKEL FROM PETSAMO ALSO TO ASSIST THE ARMY IF THE NORTHERN FRONT GETS ACTIVE. THE MILWAUKEE WILL BE THEIR ONLY SHIP HEAVIER THAN A DESTROYER AVAILABLE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE SOVIET ADM PLACE GREAT IMPORTANCE THEREFORE ON THE ADDITION OF THE SHIP TO HIS COMMAND. THE SOVIETS ARE CONSTANTLY ATTACKING ENEMY SHIPPING WITH GOOD RESULTS BY SUBMARINE U.S. BUILT MTB AND AIR LARGELY BOSTONS AND AIRCOBRAS.

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR 18

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-50620-2

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM _____	FOR ACTION	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEES	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE _____			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____			
DECODED BY _____	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY _____			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY _____			DEFERRED

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE

HARRIMAN TO PRESIDENT, PAGE 3 141430 NCR 8858

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
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ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

WHILE I WAS AT MURMANSK A CONVOY OF 3 CARGO SHIPS LOADED WITH NICKEL WAS SUNK WITH MOST OF THE EXCORTS. GREAT SATISFACTION WAS EXPRESSED WITH THE RESULTS OBTAINED FROM AMERICAN AIRCRAFT. THE DELIVERY OF THE MILWAUKEE AT MURMANSK AND THE MANNER IN WHICH CAPT. FIELDING IS HANDLING THE TURNOVER WILL, I AM SURE, CREATE LASTING GOODWILL AMONG ALL CONCERNED IN THE NORTH. IT IS MY IMPRESSION THE MILWAUKEE WILL BE HANDLED AND PUT TO GOOD USE.

* * * * *

ORIGINAL filed "PRESIDENT-HARRIMAN" file.

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE No. 3 F-I OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

FROM Ambassador Harriman	TO The President
SERIAL 141430 NCR 8858	DATE 15 Apr 44
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	
TOR MAP ROOM	VIA
SUBJECT Transfer of MILWAUKEE--press release.	

ACTION

To President at Waccamaw as WHITE 35, 15/0100Z.
 Answered by BLACK 24, 15/2225Z. Reply sent to Harriman as 16/0106 NCR 6950.

(E X T R A C T of original message, which is filed "PRESIDENT-HARRIMAN" file.)

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY	DIRECTION OF:

ACTION COMPLETED: <i>See Italy</i>	FILED:
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DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION COMINCH <i>WLP</i>	PRIORITY
DATE 14 APRIL 1944			RRRR PRIORITY
TOR CODEROOM 140730			DEFERRED
DECODED BY KRANING		FOR INFORMATION COMNAVEU CNO USS MILWAUKEE ASTALUSNA MURMANSK	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY SHUGG			RRRR PRIORITY
ROUTED BY DE LA MAYTR			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
PAGE 1	132007	NCR 8350	<input type="checkbox"/>
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

THIS TOPSEC FOR COMINCH INFO COMNAVEU WHO PASS TO CNO AND INFO MURMANSK WHO HAS BY OTHER MEANS TO PASS TO MILWAUKEE.

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN RADM OLSEN AND PARTY RETURNED MOSCOW THIS DATE. AMBASSADOR MADE GREAT IMPRESSION ON ALL NORTHERN RUSSIA OFFICIALS WHO WERE AND ARE NOW MORE THAN EVER EXTENDING THEMSELVES TO COOPERATE IN ALL PROBLEMS. TURNOVER OF MILWAUKEE PROCEEDING WITH GREAT SUCCESS AND UNEXPECTED SMOOTHNESS. ABOUT 350 SOVIETS LIVING ON SHIP WITH 420 US. REMAINDER SOVIETS TO COME ABOARD ON DEPARTURE US PERSONNEL, CAPT FIELDING HAS PLACED TASK ON A HIGH LEVEL OF EFFICIENCY COOPERATION AND FRIENDLINESS. HE MUCH LIKED BY SOVIET STAFF AND CREW AND HAS BEEN FONDLY DUBBED "THE OLD SEA WOLF" BY THE SOVIET PROSPECTIVE CO. RED OFFICERS AND CREW APPEAR OF HIGH STANDARD AND ARE TAKING HOLD QUICKLY AND WELL. EXPECT

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

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NCR 18

132007

450 Italy

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE	
FROM _____	FOR ACTION	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY 1	
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE 4	
DATE _____			DEFERRED 6	
TOR CODEROOM _____				
DECODED BY _____			INFORMATION	PRIORITY 10
PARAPHRASED BY _____				ROUTINE 12
ROUTED BY _____				DEFERRED 13
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW <input type="checkbox"/>	
PAGE 2	132007	NCR 8350		

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

TO HOLD SEA TRIALS GUNNERY AND AVIATION EXERCISES WITH US CREW INSTRUCTING ABOUT 15TH AND HAVE FORMAL TURNOVER ABOUT 20TH. ALL BUT FEW KEY PERSONNEL WILL GO ON RA 59. CAPT FRANKEL WILL TAKE CHARGE FEW REMAINING AND REPATRIATE AS POSSIBLE. ALL RUSSIANS ARE DELIGHTED WITH THE SHIP AND ARE PARTICULARLY GRATEFUL TO US FOR DELIVERY HER TO NORTH RUSSIA. ASSUMING ALL CONTINUES AS NOW INDICATED CAPT FIELDING HIS OFFICERS AND CREW DESERVE THE HIGHEST PRAISE FOR THE TACTFUL AND EFFICIENT WAY IN WHICH THEY WILL HAVE DONE A DIFFICULT TASK. THEY ARE SHOWING THE RUSSIANS A SPENDID EXAMPLE OF THE US NAVY IN MATERIAL PERSONNEL AND SPIRIT.

COMINCH...ACT
13...16...NAVAIDE...SHO 20...

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

MCM 18

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM COMNAVNAV		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		COMINCH	PRIORITY 2
DATE 08 APRIL 1944	FOR ACTION		ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOM 1829/08			DEFERRED 4
DECODED BY HARRINGTON			5
PARAPHRASED BY FRANTZ	INFORMATION		6
ROUTED BY PIPP			7
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			8
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071519 NCR 4599

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ACTION	
F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-07	26
F-1	27
F-2	28
F-20	29
F-3	30
F-30	31
F-31	32
F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
FX01	37
FX30	38
FX37	39
FX40	40
IC-00	41
VCNO	42

ACTION COMINCH FROM COMNAVNAV.

IS UNITED STATES POLICY WITH RESPECT TO SALVAGED ITALIAN SHIPS SIMILAR TO THAT OUTLINED IN ADMIRALTY 240627A FEBRUARY.

COMINCH...ACT

CONFIDENTIAL

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OPNAV-NCR-16

071519 450 Italy

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE	
FROM AST ALUSNA MURMANSK		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1	
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION INFORMATION COMINCH COM 12TH FLT	PRIORITY 2	
DATE 6 APRIL 1944			ROUTINE 3	
TOR CODEROOM 060426			DEFERRED 4	
DECODED BY MERZ			5	
PARAPHRASED BY BIDWELL/FMW/MURRAY			6	
ROUTED BY MORRIS			7	
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.				8
	042045		NCR 2854	9
		IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW <input type="checkbox"/>	10	

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(LONDON INFORM COMINCH AND COM 12TH FLT. MOSCOW
INFORM AMBASSADOR)

CRUISER USS MILWAUKEE ARRIVED KOLA INLET.

COMINCH.....COG.

ACTION: F-30

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE No. 3 F-I OR CHARTROOM No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED

~~SECRET~~

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT



DRAFTER		EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	COMINCH		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY	VADM EDWARDS		FOR ACTION DEANE COMGEN U.S. MIL. MISSION MOSCOW	PRIORITY 2
DATE	5 APRIL 1944			ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOM	2157			DEFERRED 4
DECODED BY				5
PARAPHRASED BY	YORK		FOR INFORMATION COM 12TH FLEET	DEFERRED 6
ROUTED BY				PRIORITY 7
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.				8
LT GLUNT	052111	NCR 43490		PRIORITY 9
				ROUTINE 10
				DEFERRED 11
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			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW	16
			<input type="checkbox"/>	17
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME		18
				GCT 19
				20

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

Regarding handling of Milwaukee

URDIS 030826 ENTIRELY SATISFACTORY. PLEASE
 EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION TO THE AMBASSADOR FOR
 HIS ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE IN THIS MATTER.

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL ✓

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALUSNA MOSCOW</u>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION COMINCH	PRIORITY RRRRRRRR
DATE <u>5 APRIL 1944</u>			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM <u>050629</u>			DEFERRED
DECODED BY <u>HANSEN</u>		INFORMATION COMNAVEU ASTALUSNA MURMANSK	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY <u>MONROE</u>			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			15
POWLEY	030826	NCR 2214-S	IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW <input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(ACTION COMINCH INFO COMNAVEU AND ASTALUSNA MURMANSK WHO HAS BY OTHER MEANS. COMNAVEU PASS TO OPNAV)

TOPSEC FOR ADMIRAL KING FROM DEANE.

MOLOTOV HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THE AMBASSADORS LETTER REGARDING AGREEMENT TO TERMS OF TRANSFER OF THE MILWAUKEE WHICH INCORPORATED YOUR CHANGE AND AGREES THAT ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE LETTER IS SUFFICIENT TO CONCLUDE THE MATTER. HOWEVER HE STATES "IN THE OPINION OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT THE QUESTION REGARDING THE PORT OF DELIVERY OF THE MILWAUKEE ON TERMINATION OF ITS USE SHALL BE DECIDED SUBSEQUENTLY BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT". IT IS NOT OUR INTENTION TO MAKE AN ISSUE OF THIS POINT. FOR THE ACTUAL TRANSFER HE PROPOSES A BILATERAL RECEIPT IN SUBSTANCE THE SAME AS WE HAD PROPOSED. RADM OLSEN WILL CARRY COPIES OF LETTER AND RECEIPT FORM TO CO MILWAUKEE WITH LETTER OF

No. 1 ADMIRAL	No. 2 FILE	No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM	No. 4 SPECIAL
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SEALED

~~SECRET~~

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18

PAGE 1 OF 2

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 2 1974

030826 450 Italy

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM _____	FOR ACTION	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY 1
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE 2
DATE _____			DEFERRED 3
TOR CODEROOM _____			
DECODED BY _____	INFORMATION		PRIORITY 4
PARAPHRASED BY _____			ROUTINE 5
ROUTED BY _____			DEFERRED 6
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
030826		NCR 2210-S	<input type="checkbox"/>
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

INSTRUCTION. COPIES FORWARDED BOTH ADEES.

"SCR HAS NOT PASSED TO OPNAV"

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 2 1974

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

SEALED

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18 PAGE 2 OF 2

TOP-SECRET

TOP SECRET

FROM: OPNAV

4 APRIL 1944

TO : ALUSNA, MOSCOW

PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR
AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN.

In order that announcement of loan MILWAUKEE may
be made here simultaneously, please inform us by telegraph
in advance date and time announcement will be made in
Moscow.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1145, EWT, 4 April 1944.

Richard Park, Jr.
RICHARD PARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.


TOP-SECRET

TOP SECRET

April 4, 1944

PRESIDENT TO HARRIMAN:

In order that announcement of loan
MILWAUKEE may be made here simultaneously,
please inform us by telegraph in advance
date and time announcement will be made in
Moscow.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Roosevelt", with a long, sweeping flourish extending to the right.



NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		COMNAVEU USS MILWAUKEE	PRIORITY 2
DATE 30 MAR 44	FOR ACTION		ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOM 1430		INFORMATION	DEFERRED 4
DECODED BY HARTZELL	CNO ASTALUSNA MURMANSK ASTALUSNA ARCHANGEL		DEFERRED 5
PARAPHRASED BY WIDMAN			DEFERRED 6
ROUTED BY WIDMAN			DEFERRED 7
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			8
291403 NCR 7528			9
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ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

COMNAVEU PASS TO MILWAUKEE. INFO CNO, MURMANSK, ARCHANGEL.

SOVIETS HAVE DECIDED TAKE OVER MILWAUKEE AT MURMANSK INSTEAD ARCHANGEL BECAUSE OF ICE IN WHITE SEA.

COG.....COM INCH

ACTION: F-30

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3 F I OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NC 11 18

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM COMNAVEU		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		ALUSNA MOSCOW GENERAL DEANE AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN	PRIORITY 3
DATE MAR 28 1944	FOR ACTION		ROUTINE 5
TOR CODEROOM 1703			DEFERRED 6
DECODED BY DECKMAN			
PARAPHRASED BY YORK	INFORMATION	COMINCH	PRIORITY 10
ROUTED BY			ROUTINE 11
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			DEFERRED 13
BENNETT PAGE 1 OF 3	281158Z	NCR 5818	14
			15
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			18
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT 19
			20

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

COMES TOPSECRET. COMNAVEU SENDS ACTION ALUSNA MOSCOW INFO COMINCH. ALUSNA MOSCOW PASS TO GENERAL DEANE AND AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN.

MILWAUKEE SAILED IN JW58 FOR MURMANSK. ALL CRYPTOGRAPHIC AIDS AND PUBLICATIONS EXCEPT THOSE REQUIRED FOR VOYAGE HAVE BEEN REMOVED. COMMANDING OFFICER HAS BEEN DIRECTED

(1) UPON ARRIVAL MURMANSK TRANSFER UP TO 300 OFFICERS AND MEN NOT REQUIRED FOR TURNOVER OR REMAINDER VOYAGE TO BRITISH ESCORTS FOR IMMEDIATE RETURN TO UK THEN REPORT TO SENIOR SOVIET NAVAL OFFICER PRESENT FOR ONWARD ROUTING TO ARCHANGEL UNDER SOVIET ESCORT. HEAD RUSSIAN MILITARY MISSION LONDON STATES SOVIETS

ACTION: F-30

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

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NCR 18

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM _____	FOR ACTION	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE _____			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____			
DECODED BY _____	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY _____			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY _____			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
PAGE 2 OF 3	281158Z	NCR 5818	<input type="checkbox"/>
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

PREPARED TO PROVIDE THIS ESCORT AND ALUSNA MOSCOW IS REQUESTED TO FOLLOW THROUGH.

(2) ON ARRIVAL ARCHANGEL REPORT BY DESPATCH TO AMERICAN AMBASSADOR INFO COMINCH, COM 12TH FLEET AND ALUSNA MOSCOW.

(3) DEAL DIRECTLY VADM LEUCHENKO ON DETAILS OF-TURNOVER CONFORMING USSR DESIRES WHERE PRACTICABLE ON DIMINISHING CREW. TO REFER MAJOR DECISIONS TO AMERICAN AMBASSADOR OR COM 12TH FLEET.

(4) OBTAIN RECEIPT AS DIRECTED BY AMBASSADOR.

(5) EXPEDITE TURNOVER AND ARRANGE FOR RETURN OF REMAINDER OF CREW IN RA59 AND 60 EXCEPT SMALL NUCLEUS.

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
FROM _____	FOR ACTION		PRIORITY 1
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE 4
DATE _____			DEFERRED 6
TOR CODEROOM _____			
DECODED BY _____	INFORMATION		PRIORITY 9
PARAPHRASED BY _____			ROUTINE 10
ROUTED BY _____			DEFERRED 12
			DEFERRED 13
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW 14
PAGE 3 OF 3	281158Z	NCR 5818	<input type="checkbox"/> 15
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT 16

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(6) CARRY INVENTORIES BACK TO COM 12TH FLEET.
 (7) DELIVER COPIES OPORDER TO AMERICAN AUTHORITIES CONCERNED. 7 U S NAVY OFFICER INTERPRETERS AND 1 SOVIET LIAISON OFFICER IN SHIP'S COMPANY.

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
 NCR 18

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>COMINTCH & CNO</u>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY <u>ADMIRAL E.J. KING</u>		CONGEN U.S. MILITARY MISSION, MOSCOW	2
DATE <u>27 MARCH 1944</u>			3
TOR CODEROM <u>271855</u>			4
DECODED BY _____			5
PARAPHRASED BY _____		COM 12TH FLEET	6
ROUTED BY _____			7
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			8
<u>POWLEY</u>	<u>271802</u>	<u>NCR 43284-S</u>	9
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	10
ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT			11
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attached
 NICO: TOPSEC. URDIS 261600 SATISFACTORY IN ALL RESPECTS
 EXCEPT IN FIRST SENTENCE OF PROPOSED LETTER DESIRE
 WORDS "MADE AVAILABLE" BE CHANGED TO "TEMPORARILY
 LOANED"

COPY TO: ADM. LEAHY WITH COPY OF REFERENCE (261600)

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM GENERAL DEANE (COMNAVEU)		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION ADMIRAL KING <i>WLB</i>	PRIORITY
DATE 27 MARCH 1944			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM 2266			DEFERRED
DECODED BY WILLIAMS		FOR INFORMATION ADMIRAL STARK DECLASSIFIED JCS memo, 1-4-74 By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 2 1974	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY MCCOMB			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE			15
PAGE 1 OF 3	261666	NCR 4921	16
MONTGOMERY			17
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME			18
ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT			19
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(THIS IS HICOM [REDACTED] FOR ADMIRAL KING INFO ADMIRAL STARK FROM GENERAL DEANE. COMNAVEU PASS TO OPNAV.)			23
REGARDING LAST 2 PARAGRAPHS OF YOUR 221319 OUR PROPOSAL OFFER-			24
ED TO YOU FOR CONSIDERATION IS THAT AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN SEND			25
THE BELOW QUOTED LETTER TO MR. MOLOTOV. YOUR COMMENT OR CON-			26
CURRENCE WILL BE APPRECIATED. IF THE LETTER IS GENERALLY			27
AGREEABLE TO YOU IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE AMBASSADOR BE			28
AUTHORIZED TO MAKE MINOR MODIFICATIONS AS NECESSARY TO GET			29
SOVIET CONCURRENCE. PARTICULARLY ON THE PORT OF RETURN DEL-			30
IVERY WHICH MAY HAVE TO BECOME SUCH A PORT AS MAY BE MUTUALLY			31
AGREED UPON. PARAPHRASE OF PROPOSED LETTER TO MR. MOLOTOV			32
FOLLOWS. QUOTE. BY ARRANGEMENTS MADE BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT			33
AND MARSHALL STALIN AS YOU KNOW 1 UNITED STATES CRUISER WILL			34
BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE USSR NAVAL COMMAND UNTIL A REPLACE-			35
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No. 1 ADMIRAL	No. 2 FILE	No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM.	No. 4 SPECIAL
SEALED		ACTIVITY	
Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See [REDACTED] INSTRUCTIONS.)			
NCR 18			


DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM _____		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY _____		FOR ACTION	PRIORITY
DATE _____			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM _____			DEFERRED
DECODED BY _____		INFORMATION	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY _____			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY _____			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
PAGE 2 OF 3 MONTGOMERY		261600	<input type="checkbox"/>
		NCR 4921	
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

MENT FROM THE ITALIAN FLEET CAN BE PLACED AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE SOVIET UNION. ACCORDINGLY THE USS MILWAUKEE WILL BE DELIVERED TO THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES IN THE NEAR FUTURE AT A PORT IN NORTH RUSSIA. THE ACTUAL TURNOVER OF THE SHIP CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE EXCHANGE OF A SIMPLE RECEIPT BETWEEN THE US AND USSR COMMANDING OFFICERS WITH SIGNED COPIES OF MUTUAL INVOICES AFFIXED THERETO. UPON TERMINATION OF THE USE OF THE MILWAUKEE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOREGOING ARRANGEMENTS IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WILL DELIVER HER TO THE US AUTHORITIES AT A US PORT OR SOME OTHER PORT ACCEPTABLE TO THE US GOVERNMENT COMPLETE WITH ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT. ANY EVENTUALITIES WHICH MIGHT ARISE AND ARE NOT COVERED BY THIS EXCHANGE OF LETTERS WILL BE DEALT WITH ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE US AND USSR GOVERN-

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED



Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM _____	FOR ACTION	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY 1
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE 2
DATE _____			DEFERRED 3
TOR CODEROOM _____			DEFERRED 4
DECODED BY _____	INFORMATION		PRIORITY 5
PARAPHRASED BY _____			ROUTINE 6
ROUTED BY _____			DEFERRED 7
			DEFERRED 8
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
PAGE 3 OF 3	261600	NCR 4921	<input type="checkbox"/>
MONTCOMERY			
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

MENTS. YOUR ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THIS LETTER TO CONFIRM THE ABOVE AGREEMENT WOULD BE APPRECIATED. UNQUOTE.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 2 1974

SCR HAS NOT PASSED TO OPNAV

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
NCR 18

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>GENERAL DEANE (COMNAVEU)</u>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY _____	FOR ACTION	ADMIRAL KING	PRIORITY
DATE <u>27 MARCH 1944</u>			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM <u>2246</u>			DEFERRED
DECODED BY <u>WILLIAMS</u>	INFORMATION	ADMIRAL STARK	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY <u>MCCOMB</u>			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY _____			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
PAGE 1 OF 3 MONTGOMERY		261600	NCR 4921
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(THIS IS HICOM TOPSEC FOR ADMIRAL KING INFO ADMIRAL STARK FROM GENERAL DEANE. COMNAVEU PASS TO OPNAV.)

REGARDING LAST 2 PARAGRAPHS OF YOUR 221319 OUR PROPOSAL OFFERED TO YOU FOR CONSIDERATION IS THAT AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN SEND THE BELOW QUOTED LETTER TO MR. MOLOTOV. YOUR COMMENT OR CONCURRENCE WILL BE APPRECIATED. IF THE LETTER IS GENERALLY AGREEABLE TO YOU IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE AMBASSADOR BE AUTHORIZED TO MAKE MINOR MODIFICATIONS AS NECESSARY TO GET SOVIET CONCURRENCE. PARTICULARLY ON THE PORT OF RETURN DELIVERY WHICH MAY HAVE TO BECOME SUCH A PORT AS MAY BE MUTUALLY AGREED UPON. PARAPHRASE OF PROPOSED LETTER TO MR. MOLOTOV FOLLOWS. QUOTE. BY ARRANGEMENTS MADE BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND MARSHALL STALIN AS YOU KNOW 1 UNITED STATES CRUISER WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE USSR NAVAL COMMAND UNTIL A REPLACE-

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Office in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
 NCR 18
 JCS memo, 1-4-74
 By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 2 1974

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM _____	FOR ACTION	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY 1
RELEASED BY _____		INFORMATION	ROUTINE 3
DATE _____			DEFERRED 4
TOR CODEROOM _____			PRIORITY 6
DECODED BY _____	ROUTINE 7		
PARAPHRASED BY _____	DEFERRED 8		
ROUTED BY _____			PRIORITY 10
			ROUTINE 11
			DEFERRED 12
			DEFERRED 13
			DEFERRED 14
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW 15
PAGE 2 OF 3	261600	NCR 4921	<input type="checkbox"/> 16
MONTGOMERY			17
			18
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT 19

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

MENT FROM THE ITALIAN FLEET CAN BE PLACED AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE SOVIET UNION. ACCORDINGLY THE USS MILWAUKEE WILL BE DELIVERED TO THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES IN THE NEAR FUTURE AT A PORT IN NORTH RUSSIA. THE ACTUAL TURNOVER OF THE SHIP CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE EXCHANGE OF A SIMPLE RECEIPT BETWEEN THE US AND USSR COMMANDING OFFICERS WITH SIGNED COPIES OF MUTUAL INVOICES AFFIXED THERETO. UPON TERMINATION OF THE USE OF THE MILWAUKEE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOREGOING ARRANGEMENTS IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WILL DELIVER HER TO THE US AUTHORITIES AT A US PORT OR SOME OTHER PORT ACCEPTABLE TO THE US GOVERNMENT COMPLETE WITH ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT. ANY EVENTUALITIES WHICH MIGHT ARISE AND ARE NOT COVERED BY THIS EXCHANGE OF LETTERS WILL BE DEALT WITH ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE US AND USSR GOVERN-

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communications Section, Navy Department. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 2 1974

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM _____	FOR ACTION	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY 1
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE 2
DATE _____			DEFERRED 3
TOR CODEROOM _____			
DECODED BY _____	INFORMATION		PRIORITY 4
PARAPHRASED BY _____			ROUTINE 5
ROUTED BY _____			DEFERRED 6
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			15
PAGE 3 OF 3	261600	NCR 4921	IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW 16
MONTGOMERY			<input type="checkbox"/> 17
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT 18

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

MENTS. YOUR ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THIS LETTER TO CONFIRM THE ABOVE AGREEMENT WOULD BE APPRECIATED. UNQUOTE.

SCR HAS NOT PASSED TO OPNAV

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 2 1974

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	ALUSNA MOSCOW	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE	1
FROM			ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY	2
RELEASED	23 MARCH 1944		CNO	ROUTINE	3
DATE	231406			DEFERRED	4
TOR CODEROOM	KARABINUS		WLC		5
DECODED BY	SHUGG			PRIORITY	6
PARAPHRASED BY	DELAMAYTR			ROUTINE	7
ROUTED BY				DEFERRED	8
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND IS ADMINISTRATIVE.					9
221443 NCR 2720					10
				IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW	11
				<input type="checkbox"/>	12
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ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

FROM OLSEN SIGNED DEANE. TO JCS.

SOVIETS DESIRE DELIVERY MILWAUKEE AT ARCHANGEL AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE. USNAVCOM 191727. IF SHE ARRIVES IN TIME SOME PERSONNEL CAN RETURN ON RA 58. OTHERS ON RA 59 AND LEFTOVERS BY TRAIN TO TEHERAN AND OUT. SOVIETS INVESTIGATING POSSIBILITY RETURN SOME BY AIR TO UNITED KINGDOM OR ICELAND. AM ADVISING ADMIRAL STARK DIRECT. SOVIETS HAVE CREW ASSEMBLED BUT WOULD LIKE A SUMMARY OF OUR RATINGS FOR WAR COMPLEMENT TO ASSIST PLANNING. REQUEST SAME BE FORWARDED BY DISPATCH.

COMINCH...ACT
NAVAIDE...

ACTION: F-30

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3 F I OR CHARTROOM No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER F30	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE	1
FROM COMINCH AND CNO		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE		2
RELEASED BY	FOR ACTION	CHIEF OF AM.MIL.MISSION, MOSCOW	PRIORITY	3
DATE 21 MARCH 1944			ROUTINE	4
TOR CODEROOM	INFORMATION	COML2THFLT	ROUTINE	5
DECODED BY			DEFERRED	6
PARAPHRASED BY				7
ROUTED BY				8
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			PRIORITY	9
			ROUTINE	10
			ROUTINE	11
			DEFERRED	12
				13
				14
				15
			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW	16
			<input type="checkbox"/>	17
				18
				19
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME		GCT 20

221319

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

HICOM FOR GENERAL DEANE FROM ADMIRAL KING X

THE PRESIDENT'S TELEGRAM TO AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN WITH REFERENCE TO DELIVERY OF USS LIGHT CRUISER MILWAUKEE TO THE NAVAL COMMAND OF THE USSR AT A NORTH RUSSIAN PORT HAS BEEN PASSED TO ADMIRAL STARK X

I HAVE INSTRUCTED ADMIRAL STARK TO SAIL THE MILWAUKEE IN CONFORMITY WITH THE INFORMATION FROM THE AMBASSADOR UPON ITS RECEIPT AND TO CARRY THROUGH DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DELIVERY OF THE SHIP AND DISPOSITION OF THE U.S. CREW, COORDINATING WITH BRITISH IF SIMILAR DELIVERY IS REQUIRED FOR ROYAL SOVEREIGN X

I AM INFORMED THAT TRANSFER OF MILWAUKEE SHOULD BE ON A QUOTE TEMPORARY LOAN UNQUOTE BASIS AND IS NOT COVERED BY ANY SPECIAL FORM OF AGREEMENT, BUT THAT THE AMBASSADOR IS SUFFICIENTLY INTERESTED TO GIVE ANY PRACTICABLE ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE X SO FAR ADMIRAL STARK HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO RETAIN APPROPRIATE INVENTORIES AND TOLD THAT HE WOULD BE FURTHER ADVISED OF THE FORM OF RECEIPT, IF ANY, WHICH THE COMMANDING OFFICER IS TO REQUIRE FROM THE USSR UPON DELIVERY X

I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR PRESENTING THIS MATTER TO THE AMBASSADOR'S ATTENTION AND COMMUNICATING HIS ADVICE TO ME AND ADMIRAL STARK AS TO THE FORM OF WRITTEN AGREEMENT TO BE REACHED AND RECEIPT TO BE TAKEN AT DELIVERY X I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF HE WOULD HAVE THE NECESSARY NEGOTIATIONS UNDERTAKEN AND COPIES OF THE ACCEPTED VERSIONS DELIVERED TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER MILWAUKEE UPON ARRIVAL AT THE DESIGNATED NORTH RUSSIAN PORT

COPY TO: ADM. LEAHY...

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18 *European*

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM COMINCH AND CNO		COM 12TH FLEET	PRIORITY RRRRRRR
RELEASED BY ADMIRAL KING			ROUTINE
DATE MARCH 20, 1944			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM 1423		CINCLANT	PRIORITY RRRRRRR
DECODED BY STONE/BENNETT			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY BENNETT			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

LT. POWLEY PAGE 1 OF 2 201407 NCR 43118-S

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME OCT

TEXT FURTHER TO MYDIS 251338. FOLLOWING TELEGRAM HAS BEEN SENT BY THE PRESIDENT TO AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN QUOTE MILWAUKEE CAN BE DELIVERED AT A NORTH RUSSIAN PORT. PLEASE INFORM ADMIRAL STARK PORT AT WHICH DELIVERY IS DESIRED AND INFORM US BY TELEGRAM WHAT ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE FOR AN EARLY RETURN OF MILWAUKEE'S PERSONNEL UNQUOTE.

UPON RECEIPT OF NECESSARY INFORMATION FROM AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN YOU WILL ARRANGE TO SAIL MILWAUKEE IN CONFORMITY THEREWITH AND CARRY THROUGH DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS FOR DELIVERY OF MILWAUKEE AND DISPOSITION OF THE SHIP'S COMPANY. I AM NOT INFORMED AS TO WHETHER BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS ACCEPTED A SIMILAR COMMITMENT WITH RESPECT TO ROYAL SOVEREIGN. IF SO, COORDINATION OF NECESSARY TRANSPORT ARRANGEMENTS IS INDICATED.

NOTE THAT TRANSFER IS CHARACTERIZED AS A LOAN. YOU WILL BE

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM. *C*

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18

Europe

16-50220-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM _____			PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE _____			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
DECODED BY _____			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY _____			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

PAGE 2 OF 2

201407

NCR 43118-S

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
TEXT			

ADVISED LATER OF THE FORM OF RECEIPT IF ANY WHICH THE COMMANDING OFFICER IS TO REQUIRE FROM THE U.S.S.R. UPON DELIVERY.

COMINCH DELIVERED TO NCR FOR:

VCNO.....BUPERS.....

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-I OR CHARTROOM

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18

16-60500-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

SECRET

19 MARCH 1944

FROM: OPNAV

TO : ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 504. PERSONAL AND SECRET. FROM THE PRESIDENT
FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

For your information I have today sent the following
message to Harriman:

QUOTE. Your 142215. The Milwaukee can be delivered
at a North Russian Port. Please inform Admiral Stark port at
which delivery is desired and inform us by telegram what
arrangements can be made for an early return of Milwaukee's
personnel. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

W. H. R. HARRIS,
Colonel, General Staff.

Copy sent to the Chief Clerk
of the President's Staff, 19 March 1944.

File Copy
COPY

SECRET
- 1 -

SECRET

19 March 1944

SECRET
PRIORITY

From: Opanv

To : Alusna, Moscow

PERSONAL AND SECRET. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR
HARRIMAN.

Your 142215. The Milwaukee can be delivered at a North
Russian Port. Please inform Admiral Stark port at which
delivery is desired and inform us by telegram what arrange-
ments can be made for an early return of Milwaukee's personnel.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1245, EWT, 19 March 1944

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.

Above message quoted to the Prime Minister
as President's #504, 19 March 1944.

File Copy

RUB

SECRET

191727. NCR 2151

FROM	The President	TO	Ambaswador Harriman
SERIAL	Unnumbered	DATE	19 March 1944
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER			
TOR MAP ROOM		VIA	
SUBJECT	Delivery of MILWAUKEE to north Russian port.		

ACTION

Answers HARRIMAN-POTUS 142215 NCR 7072, 15 Mar 44.

President directed that MILWAUKEE be sent to Russian port as requested. This reply prepared by Admiral Leahy. Same message sent to the PM as POTUS #504 for his information.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

ACTION COMPLETED: MR 450 ITALY (2)	FILED:
---------------------------------------	--------

March 18, 1944.

SECRET

PRESIDENT TO HARRIMAN

Your 142215. The Milwaukee can be delivered at a North Russian Port. Please inform Admiral Stark port at which delivery is desired and inform us by telegram what arrangements can be made for an early return of Milwaukee's personnel.

Rosen

File Copy

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ADMIRALTY		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION	PRIORITY
DATE 18 MARCH 1944			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROM 1929			DEFERRED
DECODED BY KIRKBRIDE		INFORMATION	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY REA			COMINCH
ROUTED BY			ROUTINE
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			DEFERRED
DIEBEL	161311A*	NCR 9380	IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW <input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT
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ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

COMNAVNAV PASSES ADMIRALTYS 161311A TO COMINCH FOR INFO.

"A M 070536 NOT TO FOCWAF.

CINCOMED HAS REPORTED THAT ITALIAN CRUISERS CAN BE USEFULLY EMPLOYED IN MED FOR HEAVY TROUP MOVEMENTS INTO ITALY AND OTHER TRANSFERS OF PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL. OF THESE WHICH HAVE BEEN OPERATING ON THESE SERVICES 1 HAS BEEN MINED AND THE OTHER 3 ARE TEMPORARILY OUT OF ACTION DUE TO DEFECTS.

(2) AS THERE IS NO IMMEDIATE STRATEGICAL NECESSITY FOR ITALIAN CRUISERS ON WEST AFRICAN STATION ABRUZZI AND GARIDALDI ARE BEING SENT TO THE MED TEMPORARILY AS WELL AS ROSTA."

*COMNAVNAV REENCIPHERED AS 180921.

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-15
161311 450 Italy

ACTION	
F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-07	26
F-1	27
F-2	28
F-20	29
F-3	30
F-30	31
F-31	32
F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
FX01	37
FX30	38
FX37	39
FX40	40
IG-00	41
VCNO	42
	43
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	51
	52

TOP-SECRET

C
O
P
Y

PERSONAL AND SECRET
FROM
PREMIER J.V. STALIN
TO
PRESIDENT F.D. ROOSEVELT
AND
PRIME MINISTER W. CHURCHILL

I have received your message regarding the transference by the British Government of eight destroyers to the Soviet Union. I am ready to agree that these destroyers are quite good for escort duty but you, of course, understand that the Soviet Union needs destroyers good also for other military operations. The right of the Allies to control the Italian fleet is, of course, quite indisputable, and it is necessary to make this point clear to the Italian Government, and in particular regarding the Italian vessels which are subject to transference to the Soviet Union.

17 March 1944

TOP-SECRET

FROM Marshal Stalin	TO The President
SERIAL Unnumbered	DATE 17 Mar 44
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	
TOR MAP ROOM	VIA
SUBJECT Transfer Italian ships to Russia.	

ACTION

Answers message from PRESIDENT and PM, 8 Mar 44.

Per Admiral Leahy and Admiral Brown, President does not wish to answer this.

COPY

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
ACTION COMPLETED: 450 Italy	FILED:	

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 16, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F. D. R.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

10
to
MS

March 16, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL LEAHY
FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F. D. R.

Cable from Ambassador
Harriman to the President,
dated March 15, 1944, re
delivery of Cruiser MILWAUKEE
to one of the North Russian
ports.

3/18 - not yet approved.

*3/22
Answered by Opnav 191727 NCR 2151,
19 Mar 44, to Harriman, approving
delivery of Milwaukee to Russian
port. Message quoted to Prime
Minister in President's #504, 19 Mar.*

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

AFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE	
FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	URGENT	1
RELEASED BY		CNO		PRIORITY
DATE 15 MARCH 1944			FOR ACTION	ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM 1653/15		INFORMATION		DEFERRED
DECODED BY ALLENSWORTH			WAL	
PARAPHRASED BY ALLENSWORTH				PRIORITY
ROUTED BY ALLENSWORTH			ROUTINE	7
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			DEFERRED	8
				9
			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW	10
			<input type="checkbox"/>	11
142215				12
NCR 7072				13
				14
				15
				16
				17
				18
				19
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME		GCT 20

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN)

VYSHINISHI TOLD ME THIS AFTERNOON THAT HE HAD BEEN INST-
 RUCTED TO ASK ME TO CABLE YOUR REQUEST OF THE SOVIET GOVERN-
 MENT THAT THE CRUISER MILWAUKEE BE DELIVERED IN ONE OF THE
 NORTH RUSSIAN PORTS. HE EXPLAINED THE DIFFICULTY TO THE SOVIET
 GOVERNMENT OF ACCEPTING DELIVERY OF THE SHIP IN THE UNITED
 KINGDOM. IT WOULD TAKE SOME MONTHS TO WORK THE CREW IN AND IT
 WOULD BE MUCH EASIER FOR THEM TO TRAIN THE CREW IN THEIR OWN
 WATERS, ETC. A SIMILAR REQUEST WAS MADE TO THE BRITISH AMBAS-
 SADOR. ALTHOUGH I ASSUME IT WILL BE DESIRABLE TO CONCERT OUR
 REPLY WITH THAT OF THE BRITISH I DO NOT BELIEVE WE SHOULD
 HESITATE TO MAKE DELIVERY OF THE SHIP AS REQUESTED IF WE ARE
 WILLING TO DO SO EVEN THOUGH THE BRITISH MAY NOT FIND IT POSS-
 IBLE TO DO THE SAME FOR THEIR PART BECAUSE OF THE VERY MUCH
 LARGER NUMBERS OF MEN INVOLVED. THEN TOO THE BRITISH ARE PLA-
 NNING DELIVERY IN THEIR OWN PORTS WHERE THEIR MEN ARE NEEDED.

NAVAIDE.....ACTION (FOR P1A)

Recd: 151730Z. To Pres via Miss Jolly.

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

File Copy

FROM	Ambassador Harriman	TO	The President
SERIAL	Unnumbered	DATE	15 Mar 44.
DATE/TIME OR FILE NUMBER	142215	NCR	7072
TOR MAP ROOM	15/1730Z	VIA	Navy code room
SUBJECT Delivery of MILWAUKEE to north Russian port.			

ACTION

To the President via Miss Tully.

Referred to Admiral Leahy for action. President directed that MILWAUKEE be sent to Russian port as requested. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President 19 Mar 44; sent to Ambassador Harriman on 19 Mar 44. Same message sent to the PM as POTUS #504 for his information.

COPIES TO:	DATE:	BY DIRECTION OF:
ACTION COMPLETED: MR 459 ITALY (2)		FILED:

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM FOTALI		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PPPPPP PRIORITY
RELEASED BY		COMNAVNAV	ROUTINE
DATE 13 MARCH 1941	FOR ACTION		DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM 191107			
DECODED BY ADAMS			PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY RODGERS/GIBSON	INFORMATION		ROUTINE
ROUTED BY HUTCHINSON			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
		121821	NCR 5598

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(COMNAVNAV REENCIPHERED AND PASSED TO COMINCH FOR INFO AS 13/852Z)

REQUEST FOLLOWING MESSAGES FROM MINISTER MARINU MAY BE PASSED FOR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION ITALIAN FLAG AND COMMANDING OFFICER IN YOUR COMMAND.

MY TELEGRAM 5TH (3 CRPS) THAT ACCORDING OFFICAL COMMUNICATION ANY TRANSFER OF ITALIAN SHIP TO RUSSIA IS NOT FORESEEN AS UNITED NATIONS WILL MAKE PROVISIONS WITH THEIR OWN SHIPPING TO SUPPLEMENT RUSSIAN FLEET IN PROPORTION INCREMENT THEY HAVE RECEIVED FROM ITALIAN FLEET. YOU CAN THUS CARRY ON WITH YOUR WORK SERENELY. DECOURTEN "

ACTION	
F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-07	26
F-1	27
F-2	28
F-20	29
F-3	30
F-30	31
F-31	32
F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
FX01	37
FX30	38
FX37	39
FX40	40
IG-00	41
VCNO	42
	43
	44
	45
	46
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	48
	49
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	51
	52

COMINCH.....OOO

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
OPNAV-NCR-16

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE	1
FROM	FOTALI (SUSNO ITALY)	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PPPPPP	2
RELEASED BY	MARCH 13, 1944	COMNAVNAV	PRIORITY	3
DATE	1107		ROUTINE	4
TOR CODEROOM	YORK	COMINCH	DEFERRED	5
DECODED BY	BENNETT		PPPPPPPPPP	6
PARAPHRASED BY			PRIORITY	7
ROUTED BY			ROUTINE	8
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			DEFERRED	9
LT. GLUNT	121551	NCR 5596		10
			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK, BELOW	11
			<input type="checkbox"/>	12

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

THIS IS HICOM. COMNAVNAV REENCIPHERS FOTALI'S 121551 TO COMINCH FOR INFO. QUOTE. ACTION COMNAVNAV. SENIOR US NAVAL OFFICER ITALY SENDS.

COMNAVNAV'S 101451 SUBSTANCE OF COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CONVEYED TO ITALIAN MINISTER OF MARINE JOINTLY BY REAR ADMIRAL MCGREGOR AND COMMODORE ZIROLI YESTERDAY EVENING 11TH MARCH. MINISTER EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH STATEMENT AND APPRECIATION FOR CLARIFICATION OF SITUATION. CONSIDER MAINTENANCE PRESENT POLICY WILL ENCOURAGE CONTINUED COOPERATION ITALIAN NAVY.

ACTION: F

SEND TO COMINCH FOR INFO BY COMNAVNAV AS 130807

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3 F I OR CHARTROOM No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

No. 450 Italy

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRIORITY	1
FROM COMNAVNAV		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE		2
RELEASED BY 13 MARCH 1944	FOR ACTION	FOTALI (FOR COMMODORE ZIROLI)	PRIORITY	3
DATE 2/26/13			ROUTINE	4
TOR CODEROOM B.A.D.	INFORMATION	COMVINCH	DEFERRED	5
DECODED BY PURDY			PRIORITY	6
PARAPHRASED BY			ROUTINE	7
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED	8
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRIORITY AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.				9
ROYLAND	101451A*	NCR 5834	IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW	10
			<input type="checkbox"/>	11
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME		12
				13
				14
				15
				16
				17
				18
				19
				20

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

THIS FROM COMNAVNAV REENCIPHERS AIRMINISTRY'S DISPATCH OF 9 MARCH TO FOTALI FOR COMMODORE ZIROLI FOR ACTION:-

*REFERENCE NUMBER THIS MESSAGE 02-1304, COSMED 56. REFERENCE COSMED 54.

PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT HAVE AGREED FOLLOWING COMMUNICATION FROM COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF FOR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION OF ITALIAN OFFICER FOR USE AT YOUR DISCRETION. BEGINS:-

AT TEHRAN IT WAS AGREED THAT SHIPS OF THE ITALIAN NAVY SHOULD BE USED WHERE THEY COULD BE EMPLOYED MOST EFFECTIVELY AGAINST THE COMMON ENEMY. IT WAS ALSO AGREED IN PRINCIPLE THAT RUSSIA IS ENTITLED TO HER SHARE IN THE INCREASE OF ALLIED NAVAL STRENGTH RESULTING FROM THE SURRENDER OF THE ITALIAN FLEET. RUSSIA IS NOW IN URGENT NEED OF ADDITIONAL NAVAL STRENGTH. FOR THE PRESENT

ACTION: F-1

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3 F.I. OR CHARTROOM No. 4 SPECIAL.

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

MADE IN *Italy*
450

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM _____	FOR ACTION	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY 2
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE 3
DATE _____			DEFERRED 4
TOR CODEROOM _____			DEFERRED 5
DECODED BY _____	INFORMATION		PRIORITY 6
PARAPHRASED BY _____			ROUTINE 7
ROUTED BY _____			DEFERRED 8
			DEFERRED 9
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
SHEET TWO OF NCR 5634			<input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT
ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT			

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES WILL LEND SOME OF THEIR SHIPS TO RUSSIA TO COMPENSATE FOR THE HELP THEY ARE RECEIVING FROM THE ITALIAN NAVY. IT IS NOT INTENDED TO TRANSFER ANY ITALIAN SHIPS TO RUSSIA AT PRESENT."

PASSED TO COMINCH FOR INFO BY COMNAVNAV AS 132816.

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
NCR 15

U. S. Scoop on Italian Fleet Is Attacked in the Commons

By JAMES B. RESTON
By Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

LONDON, March —The recent statements of the executive and legislative branches of the United States Government on oil, Palestine and the Italian Fleet have produced no adverse public reaction by the British Government, but this should not be taken to mean that the British approve everything that has been said in Washington on these subjects.

On the contrary, it is only fair to say that underneath the correct British manner of dealing with these delicate subjects there is a considerable amount of irritation, which was politely expressed in today's exchanges in the House of Commons and is discussed in a more direct fashion by Tomorrow's Economist.

Badgered for an explanation of President Roosevelt's announcement on the Italian fleet—an announcement the British Government asked the British press not to comment on—Prime Minister Churchill explained to the Commons that while discussions were going on about "the future employment and disposal of the Italian fleet" it may be found that the final disposal of the fleet should be left over until the end of the war against Japan.

Meanwhile, he added, "no change is contemplated in the arrangements with the Italian naval authorities under which the Italian ships and their crews take part in the common struggle against the enemy in the theatres where they now operate."

This explanation, however, did not satisfy Mr. Churchill's colleagues who on this issue, as on the Palestine and oil questions, are not so upset about what the United States has been doing as by the way in which it has been doing it.

Mr. Churchill clearly did not want to get into a discussion on this Italian fleet question but Opposition members and one of his own supporters forced him into it.

They did not complain about the proposed division of the Italian fleet among the United States, Russia and Britain but about Mr. Roosevelt's unilateral announcement of it and the British Government's request to the press that nothing be said about it.

The exchange came to nothing, partly because of Mr. Churchill's own record on the timing of news breaks was not unassailable and partly because Mr. Churchill is still incomparably the best parliamentary debater in the House, but irritation over the Washington announcement was expressed and it should not be ignored.

It should not be ignored because it followed the Congressional controversy over Palestine and the United States announcement that it intended to build a pipeline from the Persian Gulf refineries to the Mediterranean, both of which disturbed some observers here, again, at least regarding the pipeline, not because of what was being proposed but because of the way in which it was proposed.

Economist Gives British View

The Economist tomorrow will state a view widely held here that American intervention in the Middle East, whether on the oil question or on Palestine, will be welcomed in Britain provided the United States is prepared not only to give advice but also to take responsibility or at least part of the responsibility for what it does or proposes.

Observing that Anglo-American cooperation in the Middle East supply center had had a salutary effect in bringing the nations in that region into closer economic relations and pointing out that there is plenty of opportunity for both nations to work together

there after the war. The Economist remarked:

"If the Americans adopt a policy of intervention after the war its value as a stabilizing factor in Middle Eastern politics will depend on its manners and methods. The general case for the Americans' accepting definite responsibility is, of course, obvious, but if their intervention is to be unilateral, spasmodic and uninformed the final result will be worse than straight isolationism.

"Unhappily the two recent excursions into Middle Eastern politics show little sign of forethought and even less of any desire to coordinate the American policy with that of Great Britain.

"There is, of course, no threat to British oil interests in the proposed pipe line. Marketing agreements already cover most of the British and American oil companies and the development of new fields in Saudi Arabia will not affect the holdings of the Anglo-Iranian Company yet the manner in which this American pipe line scheme was made public showed that there had been no prior consultation with the British nor any attempt to relate the new scheme to the interests of the Middle East as a whole."

The Economist stresses that the United States cannot divorce its actions in the economic field from political consequences of those actions and suggests that Congress refrain from making proposals it is not prepared to help enforce.

In discussing the British Government's White Paper for Palestine the Economist says:

"Congress has afforded itself the luxury of criticizing where it has no intention of constructive action and proposing solutions which it has neither the power nor the intention to enforce."

Divergent Views in Britain

There are, of course, divergent points of view on this question. There are oil interests in this country that would like to see the United States stay out of the Middle East oil picture entirely, even if this meant another United States retreat into isolation, and here, as in the United States, there is a strong movement that welcomes the Congressional intervention in the Palestine question, but on the balance it is perhaps fair to say that most observers here agree with The Economist that there is no satisfactory solution to either the oil or Palestine questions if the United States does not accept part of the responsibility for its actions in this region.

"The problem of a Jewish national home," the economist concludes, "is not a single question unrelated to any other military political and economic problem in the Middle East. Its solution depends upon such matters as the Arab federation, soil fertility, rising living standards, freedom of emigration to other parts * * *."

"The building of the pipe line, the construction of more refineries and 'oil towns,' and the development of harbor facilities will radically effect employment, immigration, living standards and social services through the Middle East.

"The manner in which the growing oil industry is developed can be a vital factor in determining whether the economic expansion of the area goes forward on regional or on narrow nationalist lines. This, in turn, may well decide the rate of possible immigration into the Levant and is thus inseparable from the problem of the national home for the Jews."

Fleet Is Still Problem

WASHINGTON, March 9 (AP)—The Italian Fleet problem developed into something of an international political mystery today.

The betting in Washington is that the most of the ships that go to the Russians would be American-built with possibly a few British. Because of political difficulties, possible effects on crew morale and the mechanical difficulties of Russian operation of Italian ships there is little prospect of any sizeable number of Italian ships going over, if any.

The President, continuing work on a problem only half-solved last Friday, apparently is looking for a formula to effect the transfer to Russia in such a way as to advance the common cause of victory.

SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

March 9, 1944

From: Chiefs of Staff

To: A.F.H.Q.

Info: J.S.M., Washington

Number: COSMED 56.

Following for General Wilson.

Reference COSMED 54.

Prime Minister and President have agreed following communication from Combined Chiefs of Staff for confidential information of Italian officers for use at your discretion.

BEGINS At Teheran it was agreed that ships of the Italian Navy should be used where they could be employed most effectively against the common enemy. It was also agreed in principle that Russia is entitled to her share in the increase of Allied naval strength resulting from the surrender of the Italian Fleet. Russia is now in urgent need of additional naval strength. For the present Great Britain and the United States will lend some of their ships to Russia to compensate for the help they are receiving from the Italian Navy. It is not intended to transfer any Italian ships to Russia at present. (ENDS)

T.O.O. 091800Z

ACTION: CCS

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Bissell
Gen Arnold
Sec. Gen. Staff
Adm King
Col Mathewson
LOG

CM-III-6787

(10 Mar 44)

1345Z

amr

30

SECRET

COPY No.

450 Italy

(THE) MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

24-53394ABC-25000

9 March 1944

Prime Minister Churchill told Commons today that no change was contemplated at present in the status or disposition of the Italian Fleet, strongly implying that any transfer of Italian warships to Russia had been shelved, at least temporarily.

"As President Roosevelt has said, the question of the future employment and disposition of the Italian Fleet has been subject to much discussion, and in particular consideration has been given to the immediate reinforcement of the Soviet Navy" Churchill said.

"I have no statement to make on these discussions other than to say that at present no change is contemplated in the arrangements with Italian Naval authorities under which Italian ships and crews take part in the common struggle against the enemy in theatres where they now operate."

"It may well be found that consideration of the Italian Fleet would best be left open until the end of the war against both Germany and Japan."

440 Italy

9 March 1944

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR:

VICE ADMIRAL R. S. EDWARDS

1. The Prime Minister has agreed to the following statement to be given confidentially to Italian officials. He has sent it to General Wilson as from Combined Chiefs Staff for use at his discretion:

"It was agreed at Teheran that the ships of the Italian Navy should be used where they could be most effectively employed against the common enemy. In principle it was also agreed that Russia is entitled to her share in the increase of Allied Naval strength which resulted from the Italian Fleet surrendering. Additional Naval strength is now urgently needed by Russia. The United States and Great Britain will for the present lend to Russia some of their ships to compensate for the help they are receiving from the Italian Navy. It is not intended at present to transfer to Russia any Italian ships."

Very respectfully,

WILSON BROWN,
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.

SECRET

SECRET

From: London
To: The President of the United States

No: 612, Filed 09/1620Z

Prime Minister to President. Personal.

Your 489* for confidential information of Italian officers. We entirely agree and have signalled Wilson accordingly as from Combined Chiefs of Staff for use at his discretion.

No Sig

* Extract from #489: "What do you think of sending the following to General Wilson and to the Naval Commanders in the Mediterranean for confidential information of Italian Officials:

"At Teheran it was agreed that ships of the Italian Navy should be used where they could be employed most effectively against the common enemy. It was also agreed in principle that Russia is entitled to her share in the increase of Allied Naval strength resulting from the surrender of the Italian Fleet. Russia is now in urgent need of additional Naval strength. For the present Great Britain and the United States will lend some of their ships to Russia to compensate for the help they are receiving from the Italian Navy. It is not intended to transfer any Italian ships to Russia at present."

SECRET

Copy

Regraded Unclassified

SECRET

8 MARCH 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO : ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 492. PERSONAL AND SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT TO
THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Referring to your 608, I can find no fault in your
proposed statement to Parliament contained in the last para-
graph thereof.

Please give me your reaction to the message proposed in
my 489 to be sent to General Wilson and to our naval commanders
in the Mediterranean for confidential information of Italian
officials.

ROOSEVELT

SECRET
- 1 -

Copy

SECRET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER
TO : MARSHAL STALIN
DATE: 8 MARCH 1944

Although the Prime Minister instructed Ambassador Clark Kerr to tell you that the destroyers we are lending you were old, this was only for the sake of absolute frankness. In fact they are good, serviceable ships, quite efficient for escort duty. There are only 7 fleet destroyers in the whole Italian Navy, the rest being older destroyers and torpedo boats. Moreover these Italian destroyers, when we do get them, are absolutely unfitted for work in the North without very lengthy refit. Therefore we thought the 8 which the British Government have found would be an earlier and more convenient form of help to you.

The Prime Minister regrets that he cannot spare any new destroyers at the present time. He lost 2 last week, one in the Russian convoy, and for the landing at OVERLORD alone he has to deploy, for close inshore work against the batteries, no fewer than 42 destroyers, a large proportion of which may be sunk. Every single vessel that he has of this class is being used to the utmost pressure in the common cause. The movement of the Japanese fleet to Singapore creates a new situation for us both in the Indian Ocean. The fighting in the Anzio bridgehead and generally throughout the Mediterranean is at its height. The vast troop convoys are crossing the

SECRET

Copy

SECRET

Atlantic with the United States Army of Liberation. The Russian convoys are being run up to the last minute before OVERLORD with very heavy destroyer escorts. Finally there is OVERLORD itself. The President's position is similarly strained, but in this case mainly because of the great scale and activity of the operations in the Pacific.

Our joint intentions to deliver to you the Italian ships agreed upon at Moscow and Teheran remain unaltered, and we shall put the position formally to the Italian Government at the time when it is broadened and the new ministers take over their responsibilities. There is no question of our right to dispose of the Italian Navy, but only of exercising that right with the least harm to our common interests. Meanwhile, all our specified ships are being prepared for delivery to you on loan as already agreed.

ROOSEVELT. CHURCHILL.

This message to STALIN, signed jointly by the PRESIDENT and the PRIME MINISTER, was dispatched from London to Moscow on 8 March 1944, through British communication channels. (See attached background material).

SECRET

- 2 -

Background of joint PRESIDENT/PRIME MINISTER message to MARSHAL STALIN, dated 8 March 1944:

STALIN-POTUS/PM, 26 Feb 44, answers POTUS/PM-STALIN message of 7 Feb 44, and also answers POTUS-STALIN messages of 23 and 24 Feb 44. In this message of 26 Feb 44, STALIN requests that 4 new destroyers be included among those being sent to him by Britain and the U.S.

In PM-POTUS, #595, 29 Feb 44, the PRIME MINISTER quotes message received from Ambassador CLARK AERR, giving STALIN's reactions to joint message of 7 Feb 44.

The PRESIDENT, in POTUS-PM #485, 3 Mar 44, advises the PRIME MINISTER that he has received STALIN's joint message of 26 Feb 44, and requests that the PRIME MINISTER suggest something which could be used in making reply to STALIN.

The PRIME MINISTER forwarded for the PRESIDENT's approval a proposed joint message to STALIN (PM-POTUS #601, 4 Mar 44), which the PRESIDENT approved in POTUS-PM #489, 7 Mar 44.

The message to STALIN, signed jointly by the PRESIDENT and the PRIME MINISTER, was dispatched from London to Moscow on 8 March 1944, through British communication channels.

Answered by STALIN's message to the PRESIDENT and the PRIME MINISTER, 17 March 1944.

SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

fm

U R G E N T

From: Algiers
To: War

NO. W-4567/61516 7th March, 1944

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff rptd Unity London and Hq MAAF this is NAF 644 from Wilson signed Wilson cite FHINC.

General MacFarlane is being pressed by Marshal Badoglio for official information in regard to statement reported to have been made by the President at press conference on 3rd March concerning disposal of the Italian Fleet. Badoglio has been very much disturbed by the press and radio reports on the subject and threatens to resign on the grounds that his position has been made untenable. Please inform me what I should tell MacFarlane to say to Badoglio to reassure him in order to sustain Italian morale and to preserve the cooperation of Italian Fleet on the basis of co-belligerency.

No Sig.

ACTION: CCS (Capt Royal USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
General Bissell
General Arnold
General Hilldring
Admiral King
Colonel Mathawson
Log

CM-IN-4816 (7 March 44) 2213Z ejv

450 Italy

42

SECRET

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

SECRET

7 March 1944

From: Opnav

To : Alusna, London

NUMBER 489. PERSONAL AND SECRET. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Receipt is acknowledged of your messages 598 to 607 inclusive. Thank you for your very kind message to Mrs. Roosevelt.

Reference your 601, I agree with your proposed joint message to U.J. about destroyers to be sent.

I am sending you by the following message (490) my recommendation about the Italian Government.

In order to try to put at rest the concern of the Italian Navy about their ships what do you think of sending the following to General Wilson and to the Naval Commanders in the Mediterranean for confidential information of Italian officials:

QUOTE. At Teheran it was agreed that ships of the Italian Navy should be used where they could be employed most effectively against the common enemy. It was also agreed in principle that Russia is entitled to her share in the increase of Allied Naval strength resulting from the surrender of the Italian Fleet. Russia is now in urgent need of additional Naval strength. For the present Great Britain and the United States will lend some of their ships to Russia to compensate for the help they are receiving from the Italian Navy. It is not intended to transfer any Italian ships to Russia at present. UNQUOTE.

Your 608 has just come after what appears above had been prepared. I do not think there is any essential conflict. I will wire you again in a short time.

ROOSEVELT

SECRET

WDCC
7 Mar
1432 Z

*answered by #492
WDC*

From: MA London
To: The President of the United States
No. 608 Filed: 071236 Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and most secret. About the Italian ships.

1. I have never agreed nor have you ever asked me to agree to a division of the Italian Fleet into 3 shares. If this claim were to be based on the fact that we 3 Powers signed the Italian Armistice together, what about all the other Powers that fought Italy? Greece for instance would have an irrefutable claim. It was not until after the Cairo conference that I heard you had mentioned about the 1/3 for Russia. Averell was however able to assure you that nothing of the sort had been said to the Russians. See your number 437. You are therefore quite uncommitted so far as they are concerned.

2. His Majesty's Government would not be able to agree to a division of the Italian Fleet by 1/3 or a pro rata division among signatories to the Armistice. We hold very strongly that losses entailed in the Italian war must be

SECRET

Copy

SECRET

considered. We bore the whole weight of that war from 1940 onwards until British and American troops entered Tunisia as the result of "TORCH". Our Naval losses alone have been very heavy indeed. For instance, from Italy's declaration of war until her unconditional surrender, the Royal Navy lost in the Mediterranean the following major warships:

1	Battleship
2	Aircraft Carriers
1	Monitor
14	Cruisers
48	Destroyers
13	Escorts
3	Fast Minelayers
2	Depot Ships
40	Submarines

and the following merchant shipping: 129 vessels of 780,000 gross tonnage. We certainly feel that we are entitled to have our claims for replacements duly considered by our closest Ally.

3. Here I must mention that excepting only Vanguard we have suspended our whole battleship programme including the four 16-inch battleships authorized by Parliament even before the war began in order to concentrate upon short-term war necessities freely expended in the common cause. We have borne the whole burden of warship losses in the Russian convoys, to wit:

2	Cruisers
5	Destroyers
3	Minesweepers
1	Fleet Oiler.

4. Up to the present I have been content to leave

the

SECRET

(3) SECRET

these matters for adjustment at the end of the war when His Majesty's Government would certainly have represented that they were justly entitled to the 2 surviving Littorios on account of their heavy battleship losses. I do not wish to prejudge this question at the present time. We must however bear in mind that about 100 Italian Warships have been and up to the present moment are still doing useful and important work for both our countries. I therefore suggest that all further discussion of a division of the Italian Fleet apart from what we agreed with Stalin at Teheran, stand over till the end of the war, when no doubt the Japanese Fleet will also come into consideration.

5. At the Moscow conference the Russians asked for certain specified types of Italian ships, namely

1	Battleship
1	Cruiser
8	Destroyers
4	Submarines

and 40,000 tons of merchant shipping. At Teheran we assented to this. The Combined Chiefs of Staff subsequently became alarmed lest the announcement that we meant to turn over Italian ships to the Soviets should impair cooperation by the Italian Naval Forces and possibly lead to scuttling. You and I then agreed to propose to Russia that we lend her the same quantity of ships until the matter could be adjusted with the Italians after the present critical stage of the war in Italy and in the Mediterranean was over. This was accepted by the Russians. I am sure you will recognize that

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the British Admiralty made a generous contribution to the plan by providing in fact 13 warships out of 14 and half the merchant tonnage. This plan is in actual process of being carried out.

6. Our relations with the Italian Government in this matter must also be considered. They surrendered their fleet and there is no doubt of the ultimate right of the Allies to dispose of it as they may decide. However Admiral Andrew Cunningham, with General Eisenhower's full assent, made an agreement at Taranto in consequence of which the Italian Fleet, which had bravely escaped from the clutches of the Germans not without heavy loss, thenceforward became actively employed in the Allied interest. A relationship has been established between the Italian Fleet and the British and American Fleets alongside of whom they are operating which certainly implies that we should treat them properly and with due consideration. A prisoner of war is one thing but once you accept a man's services and he fights at your side against the common enemy, a different status and relationship are established. I hope this may be patiently looked into because at present the British Admiralty feel uncomfortable about the position into which we have got.

7. I shall no doubt have to make a statement to Parliament in the near future and would propose, subject to your agreement, something as follows:

As President Roosevelt has said the question of

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the future employment and disposal of the Italian Fleet has been the subject of some discussion. In particular consideration has been given to the immediate reinforcement of the Soviet Navy either from Anglo-American or Italian resources. On these discussions I have no statement to make other than to say that at present no change is contemplated in the arrangements with the Italian Naval Authorities under which Italian ships and their crews take part in the common struggle against the enemy in the theatres where they now operate. It may well be found that the general question of enemy or ex-enemy fleet disposal should best be left over till the end of the war against both Germany and Japan, when the entire position can be surveyed by the victorious Allies and what is right and just can be done.

No Sig

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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>COMNAVNAV</u> <i>Admiral Hewitt</i>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION INFORMATION COMINCH <i>WHE</i>	PRIORITY ROUTINE DEFERRED
DATE <u>MARCH 6, 1944</u>			PRIORITY ROUTINE DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM <u>0041</u>			16 17 18 19
DECODED BY <u>BENNETT</u>			20
PARAPHRASED BY <u>BENNETT</u>			21
ROUTED BY			22
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AN ADMINISTRATIVE.			23
LT. GLUNT	PAGE 1 OF 2	052311	24
		NCR 1089	25
			26
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	27
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ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT			29
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HERE IS A HICOM FROM COMNAVNAV ACTION TO COMINCH.

COMMODORE ZIROLI U.S. NAVAL REPRESENTATIVE WITH ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION INFORMS ME FROM TARANTO "THAT THE PRESS RELEASE OF 3 MARCH RELATIVE TURNING OVER A PORTION OF ITALIAN NAVY TO RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT COMING WITHOUT WARNING AND IN THE FORM RELEASED WILL BE RECEIVED BY THE ITALIAN NAVY MOST UNFAVORABLY AND WITH POSSIBLE DISASTROUS RESULTS. NEWS IS INTERPRETED BY ITALIANS THUS FAR AS UNJUST AND UNTIMELY IN VIEW OF THEIR ACTIONS AND SINCERE PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR AS CO-BELLIGERENTS. BELIEVE OFFICIAL CLARIFICATION AND MORE SPECIFIC DETAILS SHOULD BE FURNISHED IMMEDIATELY IN ORDER THAT SOME REMEDIAL OFFERS CAN BE MADE TO INSURE THE CONTINUAL EMPLOYMENT

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS)

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ACTION: F-2

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
FROM _____	FOR ACTION		PRIORITY 3
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE 4
DATE _____			DEFERRED 6
TOR CODEROOM _____			
DECODED BY _____	INFORMATION		PRIORITY 10
PARAPHRASED BY _____			ROUTINE 12
ROUTED BY _____			DEFERRED 13
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
PAGE 2 OF 2	052311	NCR 1089	<input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

OF ITALIAN NAVY FOR ALLIED CAUSE."

COMPLETE REPORT WILL BE FORWARDED BY NEXT COURIER.
 REQUEST I BE GIVEN ALL POSSIBLE OFFICIAL INFORMATION. IT
 WOULD BE OF CONSIDERABLE ADVANTAGE IF THE TERM "TURN OVER"
 COULD BE DEFINED AS OPERATIONAL CONTROL RATHER THAN TRANS-
 FER OF FLAG.

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
 NCR 18

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALUSNA MADRID</u>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION OPNAV INFORMATION COMNAVEU COMNAVNAV	2
DATE <u>6 MAR 44</u>			3
TOR CODEROOM <u>0029</u>			4
DECODED BY <u>SCHMICK/TABB</u>			5
PARAPHRASED BY <u>HILL</u>			6
ROUTED BY <u>HILL</u>			7
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			8
	<u>051712</u>	<u>NCR 1035,1031</u>	9
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ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(ALUSNA MADRID TO OPNAV INFO COMNAVEU AND COMNAVNAV)

Naval Attache

ITALIAN NAVAL ATTACHE CALLED TODAY REGARDING PRESS AND RADIO STATEMENTS AS TO POSSIBILITY ONE THIRD THEIR NAVY SHIPS BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO RUSSIA. STATED THIS INFORMATION HAS ALREADY CREATED DANGEROUS MORALE CONDITION AMONG OFFICERS AND CREWS 5 WARSHIPS INTERNED BALEARICS. 53 MEN AND 11 OFFICERS PREVIOUSLY DISSIDENT ARE BEING PLACED UNDER ARREST ASHORE. ITALIAN ATTACHE DOING UTMOST CONTROL SITUATION. HAS URGED SOPA MAINTAIN CALM AND DISCIPLINE PENDING RECEIPT OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION.

(CONTINUED PAGE TWO.)

ACTION: F-2

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NOTE: *MEDATO Italy*

MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM _____	FOR ACTION	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY 1
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE 2
DATE _____			DEFERRED 3
TOR CODEROOM _____	INFORMATION		PRIORITY 4
DECODED BY _____			ROUTINE 5
PARAPHRASED BY _____			DEFERRED 6
ROUTED BY _____			PRIORITY 7
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			ROUTINE 8
			DEFERRED 9
			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW 10
			<input type="checkbox"/> 11
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051712 CONTINUED

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

EXPRESSED URGENT HOPES FOR FURTHER REASSURING INFORMATION IN ORDER PREVENT UTTER COLLAPSE MORALE AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF SHIPS FROM INTERNAL SABOTAGE. OTHERWISE STATED HE COULD NOT ANSWER FOR CONSEQUENCES. POINTED OUT UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR NAVY WHEN MADE CO-BELLIGERENTS WAS THAT THEIR SHIPS WOULD BE MANNED BY LOYAL ITALIAN CREWS AND OPERATE WITH AMERICANS AND BRITISH. ALUSNA HAS INFORMED AMBASSADOR.

13....ACTION
 16....COMTICH....NAVAIDE....

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
 N C H 10

OFFICER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM COMNAVNAW		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PPPPPPP
RELEASED BY _____	FOR ACTION	COMINCH	PRIORITY
DATE MARCH 6, 1944			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM 0041	INFORMATION		DEFERRED
DECODED BY BENNETT			PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY BENNETT			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY _____			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
LT. GLUNT	PAGE 1 OF 2	052311	NCR 1089
			<input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: _____ DATE _____ TIME _____ GCT _____

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

HERE IS A HICOM FROM COMNAVNAW ACTION TO COMINCH.

COMMODORE ZIROLI U.S. NAVAL REPRESENTATIVE WITH ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION INFORMS ME FROM TARANTO THAT THE PRESS RELEASE OF 3 MARCH RELATIVE TURNING OVER A PORTION OF ITALIAN NAVY TO RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT COMING WITHOUT WARNING AND IN THE FORM RELEASED WILL BE RECEIVED BY THE ITALIAN NAVY MOST UNFAVORABLY AND WITH POSSIBLE DISASTROUS RESULTS. NEWS IS INTERPRETED BY ITALIANS THUS FAR AS UNJUST AND UNTIMELY IN VIEW OF THEIR ACTIONS AND SINCERE PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR AS CO-BELLIGERENTS. BELIEVE OFFICIAL CLARIFICATION AND MORE SPECIFIC DETAILS SHOULD BE FURNISHED IMMEDIATELY IN ORDER THAT SOME REMEDIAL OFFERS CAN BE MADE TO INSURE THE CONTINUAL EMPLOYMENT

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
NCR 18

RAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
FROM _____	FOR ACTION		PRIORITY 1
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE 2
DATE _____			DEFERRED 3
TOR CODEROOM _____			
DECODED BY _____	INFORMATION		PRIORITY 4
PARAPHRASED BY _____			ROUTINE 5
ROUTED BY _____			DEFERRED 6
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
PAGE 2 OF 2	052311	NCR 1089	<input type="checkbox"/>
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

OF ITALIAN NAVY FOR ALLIED CAUSE."

COMPLETE REPORT WILL BE FORWARDED BY NEXT COURIER.
 REQUEST 1 BE GIVEN ALL POSSIBLE OFFICIAL INFORMATION. IT
 WOULD BE OF CONSIDERABLE ADVANTAGE IF THE TERM "TURN OVER"
 COULD BE DEFINED AS OPERATIONAL CONTROL RATHER THAN TRANS-
 FER OF FLAG.

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
 NCR 10

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>FOTALI</u>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1 PPPPPPPPP
RELEASED BY _____		FOR ACTION VA MALTA FOLEM FOCWA FO CEYLON FOWIT	2 PRIORITY
DATE <u>6 MARCH 1944</u>			3 ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM <u>1740</u>			4 DEFERRED
DECODED BY <u>DOCKWEILER</u>		FOR INFORMATION COMNOB BERMUDA SNORSCA SNOESY COMINCH SNOAL COMNAVNAW CINCMED	5 DEFERRED
PARAPHRASED BY <u>HOFNER</u>			6 PRIORITY
ROUTED BY _____			7 ROUTINE
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			8 DEFERRED
<u>ROWLAND</u>	<u>51237</u>	<u>NCR 1429</u>	9 PPPPPPPPP
			10 PRIORITY
			11 ROUTINE
			12 DEFERRED
			13 DEFERRED
			14 DEFERRED
			15 DEFERRED
			16 DEFERRED
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			18 DEFERRED
			19 DEFERRED
			20 DEFERRED

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: _____ DATE _____ TIME _____ GCT _____

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(VA MALTA FOLEM FOCWA FO CEYLON FOWIT FOR ACTION.
INFO COMNOB BERMUDA SNORSCA SNOESY SNOAL COMNAVNAW FROM FOTALI.)

FOLLOWING FOR ITALIAN SHIPS IN YOUR COMMAND.
FROM MINISTER OF MARINE BEGINS: DO NOT HASTILY DRAW
DEDUCTIONS FROM RADIO NEWS AND HAVE FAITH IN ACTIONS
OF YOUR GOVERNMENT WITH USUAL UNANIMOUS DISCIPLINE
THAT IS SO GREAT A FORCE FOR THE COUNTRY.
DE COURTEN ENDS.

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F-07	
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F-4	
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FX37	
FX40	
IG-00	
VCNO	

(CONTINUED PAGE TWO)

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
4/3/44 Daily transfer to Bureau

AL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	FOR ACTION	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY 1
RELEASED BY			ROUTINE 2
DATE			DEFERRED 3
TOR CODEROOM			4
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UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			9
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051712 CONTINUED

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT
ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT			

EXPRESSED URGENT HOPES FOR FURTHER REASSURING INFORMATION IN ORDER PREVENT UTTER COLLAPSE MORALE AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF SHIPS FROM INTERNAL SABOTAGE. OTHERWISE STATED HE COULD NOT ANSWER FOR CONSEQUENCES. POINTED OUT UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR NAVY WHEN MADE CO-BELLIGERENTS WAS THAT THEIR SHIPS WOULD BE MANNED BY LOYAL ITALIAN CREWS AND OPERATE WITH AMERICANS AND BRITISH. ALUSNA HAS INFORMED AMBASSADOR.

13....ACTION

16....COMINCH....NAVALDE....

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
 NCR 18

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>COM 3</u>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION ONO	PRIORITY 2
DATE <u>5 MARCH 1944</u>			ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOM <u>052317</u>			DEFERRED 4
DECODED BY <u>YOUNG</u>		FOR INFORMATION	5
PARAPHRASED BY <u>MOORHEAD/THOMPSON</u>			PRIORITY 6
ROUTED BY <u>PIPP</u>			ROUTINE 7
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			DEFERRED 8
			PRIORITY 9
			ROUTINE 10
			DEFERRED 11
			PRIORITY 12
			ROUTINE 13
			DEFERRED 14
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			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW 16
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NCR 1028

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

FOR DNI.

RE TT VANU B. MONTANA 4 MARCH '44. INFORMATION RATING A-2 THAT SUBJECTS CABLE ADDRESSED CARLOS SPORZA NAPLES ITALY UNACCEPTED RCA WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE US PRESS IN EFFORT TO GET TRANSMISSION TO ITALY AS NEWS ITEM INFORMANT RATING F-0 REPORTS BELIEF OF ^{Italy} ITALIAN LABOR LEADERS OF POSSIBILITY ITALIAN FLEET WILL ATTEMPT SCUTTLING IN KING AND BADOGLIO REGION AS PROTEST AGAINST DELIVERY 1/3 FLEET TO RUSSIA. ITALIAN FLEET REGARDED INTENSELY ROYALIST AND ANTI-COMMUNIST.

16...ACT

COMINCH...NAVAIDE...200P....13....

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VCNO	

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OPNAV-NCR-10

450 Italy

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y

From: Algiers
To: AGWAR

Nr: W 4397/60672 5 March, 1944

Signed Wilson cite PHINC to Hq Acmf for Love (Field Press Censor) to Mideast for PRS to Commandeth Malta for Trudgeon (Civil Censor) for action to TROOPERS for IP 3 to AGWAR for Bissell for information 5th March W 4397/60672.

No further mention whatever of handing over Italian fleet to Russia. Please inform all censors.

No Sig

FOOTNOTE: Corrected copy of CM-IN-3597 (6 Mar 44) G-2

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: OPD
CC/S (Capt. Royal USN)
BPR

CM-IN-3752 (6 Mar 44) 0828Z jb

Adm. Sealy

28

SECRET

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

450 Italy (2)

SECRET

4 March 1944

From: MA London
For: The President of the United States

Number 602 Filed 041925Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal
and most secret. Number 601. Number 602.

My immediately preceding telegram. The Admiralty
state that one third of the Italian ships in our possession
would amount to:

1.7	battleships
2	6 inch cruisers
0.7	5.3 inch cruisers
3.3	destroyers
7.7	torpedo boats
6.7	corvettes
7.3	submarines

Whereas what the Russians ask for and what the
British agreed to was:

1	battleship
1	cruiser
8	destroyers
4	submarines

40,000 tons of merchant shipping.

No Sig

SECRET

Copy

SECRET

WDCC
Mar 4
1853 Z

From: MA London
To: The President of the United States
No. 601 Filed: 041925 Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and most secret.

Your number 485. Thank you very much for your assurances about no sheeps eyes at our oilfields at Iran and Iraq. Let me reciprocate by giving you the fullest assurance that we have no thought of trying to horn in upon your interests or property in Saudi Arabia. My position on this, as in all matters, is that Great Britain seeks no advantage, territorial or otherwise, *see* the result of the war. On the other hand she will not be deprived of anything which rightly belongs to her after having given her best services to the good cause—at least not so long as your humble servant is entrusted with the conduct of her affairs. I will bring the matter before the Cabinet on Monday and hope to telegraph you immediately thereafter.

About the India Ocean situation. I hope the enemy

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Copy

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fleet will stay at Singapore, as this should give you fine opportunities in the main Pacific theatre. Thank you very much for the carrier. I shall be sending you a signal shortly on the wider aspects of our joint action against Japan.

About U.J. and the Poles. I am waiting to receive the official answer of the Soviet Government before attempting to make up my mind whether there is anything else we can do.

About the Italian ships et cetera. I was much startled by the press accounts of your talk with them. The Russians have never asked for one-third of the Italian ships. But only for the specific vessels mentioned at Moscow and agreed to by us at Teheran. See last which follows. We have never agreed, as you know, to anything beyond this. We shall now see what the Italian reaction will be and whether the Combined Chiefs of the Staff were right in their apprehensions set forth in J.S.M. 1372 dated 28th-12-43. From your 483 I infer that we are to go on with the policy of loaning U.J. some British and American ships till we can get the Italians'. I therefore suggest the following joint message to U.J. from you and me:
Begins.

Although the Prime Minister instructed Ambassador Clark Kerr to tell you that the destroyers we are lending you were old, this was only for the sake of absolute frankness. In fact they are good, serviceable ships, quite efficient for escort duty. There are only 7 fleet destroyers in the whole

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SECRET

Italian Navy, the rest being older destroyers and torpedo boats. Moreover these Italian destroyers, when we do get them, are absolutely unfitted for work in the North without very lengthy refit. Therefore we thought the 8 which the British Government have found would be an earlier and more convenient form of help to you. The Prime Minister regrets that he cannot spare any new destroyers at the present time. He lost 2 last week, one in the Russian convoy, and for the landing at OVERLORD alone he has to deploy, for close inshore work against the batteries no fewer than 42 destroyers, a large proportion of which may be sunk. Every single vessel that he has of this class is being used to the utmost pressure in the common cause. The movement of the Japanese fleet to Singapore creates a new situation for us both in the Indian Ocean. The fighting in the Anzio bridgehead and generally throughout the Mediterranean is at its height. The vast troop convoys are crossing the Atlantic with the United States Army of Liberation. The Russian convoys are being run up to the last minute before OVERLORD with very heavy destroyer escorts. Finally there is OVERLORD itself. The President's position is similarly strained, but in this case mainly because of the great scale and activity of the operations in the Pacific. Our joint intentions to deliver to you the Italian ships agreed upon at Moscow and Teheran remain unaltered, and we shall put the position formally to the Italian Government at the time when it is broadened and the new ministers take over their

SECRET

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SECRET

responsibilities. There is no question of our right to dispose of the Italian Navy, but only of exercising that right with the least harm to our common interests. Meanwhile all our specified ships are being prepared for delivery to you on loan as already agreed. Signed: Roosevelt. Churchill. Message to Stalin ends.

I must send you my warmest congratulations on the grand fighting of your troops, particularly the United States Third Division in the Anzio bridgehead. I am always deeply moved to think of our men fighting side by side in so many fierce battles and of the inspiring additions to our history which these famous episodes will make. Of course I have been very anxious about the bridgehead where we have so little ground to give. The stakes are very high on both sides now and the suspense is long-drawn. I feel sure we shall win both here and at Cassino.

We certainly do have plenty to worry us now that our respective democracies feel so sure the whole war is as good as won.

No Sig

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Deal for Italian Ships

Plan to Give Third of the Fleet To Russia Has World Importance

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

President Roosevelt's almost casual statement at his press conference yesterday that it had been decided that about one-third of the Italian fleet or the equivalent would be turned over to the Russians has a great deal more political than military significance.

As the President said, the future of the Italian Navy was discussed at Teheran, and it was undoubtedly at that conference that Premier Stalin claimed part of the surrendered fleet. Premier Stalin obviously believed the transfer of approximately a third of the ships to Russia at least until the war's end, had been settled, because, according to the President yesterday, the Russian Ambassador brought to the White House two weeks ago a question from Mr. Stalin as to what Italian ships or their equivalent would go to Russia.

There can be little doubt of the international political importance of this announcement. Perhaps 110 to 150 Italian naval units of all sizes, from battleships to minesweepers, surrendered to the British and Americans in British and North African ports at the time of the Italian armistice last September. Some of these have since been under refit; some have been more or less idle. But scores of them, manned by their Italian crews with Italian and British officers aboard and accompanied by Allied warships, have engaged in transport and convoy work in the Mediterranean since then.

Nearly 100 Ships at War

In his recent speech Prime Minister Churchill said that "nearly 100 Italian ships of war are discharging valuable services in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic."

In the same speech Mr. Churchill indicated the continued British support of the "monarchical" principle in Italy and specifically of the Badoglio-House of Savoy government, which is much opposed by Italian left wing and liberal groups. What effect yesterday's announcement will have on the tangled Italian political situation remains to be seen, but that it must affect it seems certain.

Sweden will certainly regard the prospective naval transfer with much interest, for her navy has been built chiefly as a buffer against the Russian fleet in the Baltic, and possibly any potential increase in the Russian naval strength would be regarded by the Swedes with some suspicion. The announcement might even influence the course of the unofficial Russian-Finnish peace discussions.

Other Ships May Be Bought

Russia's interest in the disposition of the Italian fleet might indicate a future interest in the disposition of the German and Japanese fleets. Her own navy, never large and most of its units quite old, has had heavy losses in the war.

Russia, even in the days of the Czars, has always wanted a "warm-water" port, but if Russia ever has any intentions of trying to become a great sea power—something that seems a remote possibility at the moment—she will need more than a "warm-water" port; she will need a port facing on the high seas, not virtually landlocked in the Baltic or Black Sea.

As an alternative to this, some complete internationalization of the shores commanding the entrances to the Baltic and Black Seas might be suggested; indeed, there have been some reports that, as far as the Baltic is concerned, this proposal would be made.

The immediate importance of the proposed transfer seems slight. If the transfer is made Russia might acquire two Italian battleships, considerably more modern than any capital ships she possesses. She might get three or four cruisers, nine to a dozen destroyers, six or eight submarines and a considerable number of auxiliary vessels, plus perhaps a considerable quantity of merchant tonnage.

None of these surface ships could be used at this time in the Black Sea or the Baltic; the Germans command the approaches to both beyond much hope of immediate challenge. The surface ships could be used, however, in the Arctic and on the Murmansk convoy route, and in time possibly in the Pacific. The submarines might be able to get into the Black Sea, particularly if they could get Turkish permission to go through the Straits, and they could probably penetrate the Baltic, though the

passage through the Straits to the Baltic would be very hazardous.

Immediate Use Not Likely

But it will be some time before the Russians can make much use of these ships or of substitute ships if they receive other vessels. First, the ports does not appear to have been completely worked out. Second, Russian crews or at least nuclear crews will have to be found and specially trained. Third, the ships will probably require some outfitting. Fourth, if the ships are to be based on Russian ports, stockpiles of ammunition and other equipment will probably have to be transported to those ports.

It does not seem likely, therefore, that the transfer will have any immediate military significance. Eventually it might aid the Russians in any amphibious operations they might wish to undertake against the German divisions now based in northern Finland and northern Norway by supplying the heavy naval support the Russians now lack.

Eventually, if the Russians should enter the Pacific war—and perhaps this is one of the parts of the bargain—the ships might be useful in the East.

But there is little immediate military significance in the potential transfer, though a great deal of political and psychological significance.

RUSSIANS TO SHARE ITALIAN FLEET

STALIN SEEKS THIRD

Roosevelt Says Division Was Arranged When Italy Surrendered

DETAILS TO BE SETTLED

Soviet Will Get Vessels or Their Equivalent—Status of Crews Not Yet Decided

By JOHN H. CRIDER

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, March 3—President Roosevelt disclosed today that the Italian Fleet would be distributed equally among the United States, Britain and Russia for purposes of prosecuting the war.

The matter was not finally decided, the President said, but Russia would get one-third of the Italian Fleet or the equivalent in ships from the United States or British navies.

[The French Committee of National Liberation on Friday received control of French ships requisitioned by the Allies. The committee placed at the disposal of the United States and Britain all its ocean-going ships.]

The President apparently made the disclosure regarding the Italian ships without forethought, perhaps even inadvertently, in answering a question at his news conference.

Stalin's Question Recalled

A correspondent asked the President whether he had found the answer to Premier Stalin's question, recalling that the Chief Executive had said at a recent news conference that he had received a message from the Soviet leader which asked a question on which the President was working.

The President, not recalling the matters referred to by his questioner, asked what question. Several correspondents refreshed the President's memory.

Mr. Roosevelt then leaned back in his chair and replied, off-handedly, that that was an old matter, the question from the Soviet Premier having been what particular ships would go to the Russian Navy from the Italian Navy and, if we did not want to send them those particular vessels, what ships the British and ourselves would send in place of them.

The President's statement on the Stalin question implied that

there had been a previous agreement between the three powers that Russia was to get certain specific vessels or that Russia had at least named specifically the vessels she wanted.

Agreed Before Teheran

Asked if the agreement as to a three-way division of the Italian Navy dated from the Teheran conference, Mr. Roosevelt replied that it went back further, to the Italian surrender. Italy surrendered to the United States, Britain and Russia.

Asked if there was to be a distribution of the Italian Navy, the President replied that this was war, and in war we are going to run everything that floats for the benefit of the war.

Then he was asked, whether the present three-way split was a temporary war measure. The President replied that it was and that afterward we might do something more permanent.

Asked if the division included the Italian warships interned in ports of the Balearic Islands, the President replied that that was another matter, a Spanish problem and that they were still talking about it. A London report of last September said that seven Italian warships were being held in Balearic ports and that Britain was endeavoring to obtain their release.

In detailing this explanation of the fleet division after a number of questions indicated the matter was not entirely clear, the President said that on the surrender of Italy the Allies came into possession of munitions, in this case ships, which were divided roughly on a one-third basis.

The President said it was impossible to say whether the Italian vessels turned over to Russia would be manned by Italian crews, that being a matter determined by the task to which they were assigned.

More than 100 Italian naval vessels reached Allied hands after the Italian armistice agreement of last September, including at least six battleships and eight cruisers.

New York Times,
4 March 1944

ALLIES' SHIP DEAL DISAPPOINTS MANY

French Had Asked for Some
Italian Vessels to Replace
Their Lost Craft

Roosevelt News a Shock

Greeks and Yugoslavs Also
Had Been Expecting Share
—Blow to Crews Is Seen

By JAMES B. RESTON

By Cable to The New York Times.

LONDON, March 2.—President Roosevelt's announcement that the Italian fleet would be divided among the United States, Britain and Russia came as a surprise to the British, who fear that the announcement at this time may have "awkward repercussions."

It was not explained precisely what these "awkward repercussions" might be, but the general feeling here is that the announcement at this time is not likely to inspire much confidence in the Italian crews who appear to be manning these ships in important naval operations.

It is realized here that when it comes to scooping the world on Allied news Prime Minister Churchill is not wholly harmless, but this particular scoop seems to London to be somewhat less than worth the trouble it is likely to cause.

French Wanted Some Ships

There are one or two points about this Italian Fleet worth reporting. In the first place the French feel they have a claim on it. Their argument is that they were attacked first by the Italians and since their fleet was virtually wiped out they contend it would be fair to hand over to France at least some of the Italian Fleet, which was designed mainly for operations in the Mediterranean.

The French argument is not being put forward merely as a result of President Roosevelt's announcement.

It was first placed before Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden by Rene Sassioli of the French Committee for National Liberation when Mr. Eden stopped in Algiers on his way back from the Moscow conferences at the end of last year. It was made the subject of a memorandum early this year when Gen. Charles de Gaulle and M. Sassioli asked the Allied Council for Italy to turn over several units of the Italian fleet to French sailors, thousands of whom are unemployed and are prepared to man Italian units in naval operations deemed essential to the Allied cause. The French understood that their proposals were being considered seriously when they read Mr. Roosevelt's announcement today.

[Control of requisitioned French ships was returned to the French Committee of National Liberation Friday, marking another step toward recognition by Washington of that group as the provisional authority for France. At the same time the committee put at the disposal of the United States and Britain all its ocean-going tonnage.]

Others Also Disappointed

The Greek and Yugoslav Governments, also vitally interested in future naval dispositions in the Mediterranean, have also shown considerable interest in getting Italian ships to replace some of the tonnage they have lost in the war, and their officials also were disappointed by the decision to divide the ships equally among the United States, Britain and Russia.

The Italian fleet is now operating under its own officers, taking directions from Marshal Pietro Badoglio's Admiralty, which in turn is under control of the Allied High Command. There is little sympathy here for Marshal Badoglio and the admiration for the fighting qualities of his forces is not great, but there is a feeling that of all Italians the naval men have shown more desire to cooperate with the Allies and their record of fighting their way into Allied ports at the time of the Italian armistice has made an impression in London.

Therefore, the reaction to the President's announcement was not very well received, though it is perhaps accurate to say that the complaint here is not so much about who got the fleet but that it was made known who was going to get it.

Churchill

Admiral Brown

SECRET

WDCC
03 Mar
1829 Z

From: MA London
To: The President of the United States

No. 600 Filed: 3/1805Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and most secret.

Reference my immediately preceding telegram. Washington Friday from Reuter. Time of receipt 1720 3rd March. Msg begins:

President Roosevelt today announced that Italian warships are ready to be sent to the Russian Navy. Discussions for transferring roughly 1/3 of the Italian Fleet to Russia, the President said, were about half completed.

President Roosevelt said that the U.S. and Britain are already using some Italian tonnage. Efforts are now being made to determine how many of these ships or their equivalent can be turned over to the Russian Navy. Marshal Stalin had raised the question through his Ambassador in Washington.

President Roosevelt stressed that so long as the war lasted the Allies will use everything afloat against the enemy. After the war something more permanent would have to

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SECRET

be decided. Asked whether the ships would be manned by Italians, the President replied that some may and some may not. Italian ships which had escaped to the Balearic Islands, he said, were a Spanish problem.

President Roosevelt explained that since Italy surrendered to the U.S., Britain and Russia, it was thought advisable to distribute the Italian Fleet roughly on the basis of 1/3 each. He would not say how much tonnage was involved.

No Sig

SECRET

Admiral Brown

SECRET

WDCC
03 Mar
1820 Z

THE PRESIDENT
THE PRIME MINISTER, 5186
MARSHAL PALAZZO, 011628 WGB 9464

In reply to urgent communication received from the
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, London, 1805Z
18 March 1944, regarding the Italian armistice and the
situation in Italy, and in view of the war effort by the Allied

From: MA London
To: The President of the United States

No. 599 Filed: 3/1805Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and
most secret.

Reuter announces the message in my immediately
following. Can this be true?

No Sig

SECRET

Copy

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

3 MARCH 1944

TO : THE PRIME MINISTER, #486
MARSHAL STALIN, 031628 NCR 9464

In reply to insistent questioning at a press conference today I stated that Italian merchant ships and war ships are now being used in our war effort by the Allied Mediterranean command and that some of the Italian ships or substitutes therefor from the British and American tonnage will be allocated to the Soviet Navy to assist in their requirements for their war effort.

ROOSEVELT

E X T R A C T

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO : THE PRIME MINISTER
NO : 485, 3 MARCH 1944

Referring to 595

I have Stalin's message of February 26th addressed to both of us in regard to the loan of eight destroyers and requesting that at least half of them be of a modern type. It would seem that the destroyers you agreed to deliver would be very useful to the Soviet Navy. I find them highly efficient for escort duty.

Can you suggest anything that would assist in making a reply to U.J.'s message regarding the destroyers?

ROOSEVELT

031630 NCR 9465

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

February 29, 1944

FROM: AFHQ

TO: AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff pass to President and State Dept. (Britman please pass) USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff pass to Prime Minister & Foreign Office (AMSSO please pass)
RPTD: Unity (AMSSO please pass) Hq MAAF

MOST SECRET

IMMEDIATE

Signed Wilson cite FHCIC (57977W3915)

This is NAF 634. Reference NAF 612, 622, 624, and 628.

1. The situation has developed owing to king having expressed willingness to accept a proposal put forward by the liberal political leader de Nicola which is also acceptable to Sforza and Croce. This proposal is that the king should appoint the Crown Prince Lieutenant of the realm, and himself withdraw into private life. An announcement to this effect would be made immediately but the proposal would only take effect when Rome is reached. The Crown Prince would then proceed to form a new government on a broad base.

2. The present situation is that neither the political leaders nor the king will make any further move or continue negotiations until they have the views of the Allied Governments. Their position is that they have put forward their respective proposals for a solution of the political (crisis?) and they await guidance.

3. Meanwhile Allied Control Commission has been instructed to avoid conversations involving commitments as to future policy.

No Sig

Time of Origin 291130A

GM-IN-20393 (29 Feb 44)

14

SECRET

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

WAF 634

February 29, 1944

PAGE TWO

NOTE: WAF 628 is CM-IN-14896 (21 Feb 44) CC/S
WAF 624 is CM-IN-14474 (21 Feb 44) CC/S
WAF 622 is CM-IN-13297 (19 Feb 44) CC/S
WAF 612 is CM-IN-6425 (9 Feb 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S (Capt. Royal USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Bissell
Gen Arnold
Gen Hilldring
Adm King
White House
Log

CM-IN-20393 (29 Feb 44) 2211Z mlc

SECRET

COPY No.

14

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO : THE PRESIDENT
NO : 595, 29 FEBRUARY 1944

I have received from Ambassador Clark Kerr the two following telegrams about Poland and the substitute Italian ships. They are not very pleasant. I will cable you later about them.

Telegram about Poland begins.

* * * * *

Second telegram begins:

1. Stalin assured me last night that he was satisfied that this matter had been put right. He made a sort of gruff apology for having had to keep me waiting explaining that he had been away.
2. He referred to his message to you of February 26th and pressed strongly for the four modern destroyers he had asked you to let him have. He claimed that it should be within reach of the two leading naval powers to find them.
3. In reply to a question from myself he said that in the North, the Baltic and Black Sea, the Red fleet since the beginning of the war had lost 32 destroyers including 3 Flotilla leaders. This represented more than half its whole strength in these vessels. He said that if you wished it he would give you full particulars.

FROM: PREMIER J. V. STALIN

TO : PRESIDENT F. D. ROOSEVELT
PRIME MINISTER W. S. CHURCHILL

DATE: 26 FEBRUARY 1944

I have received through Ambassador Harriman your two messages of February 24, and 25 regarding the Italian vessels. I have also received your joint with Mr. Prime Minister message of February 7, transmitted to me by the British Ambassador Kerr on February 24. Thank you and Mr. Prime Minister for the communication about your decision to accomplish the transference for temporary use to the Soviet Union by Great Britain of 8 destroyers and 4 submarines, and also a battleship and 20,000 tons of merchant vessels, and by the United States of a cruiser and 20,000 tons of merchant vessels. Since Mr. Kerr specially warned that all the destroyers are old, I have a certain fear regarding the fighting qualities of these destroyers. Meanwhile it seems to me, that for the British and American fleets it will not present much difficulty to allot in the number of eight destroyers at least half of them modern and not old ones. I still hope that you and Mr. Prime Minister will find it possible that among the destroyers being transferred there be at least four modern ones. In the issue of military operations on the part of Germany and Italy we lost a considerable part of our destroyers. Therefore it is quite important for us to have at least a partial replacement of these losses.

SEALED SECRET

SECRET

- 1 -

Copy

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM COMINCH & CNO		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY ADM E. J. KING		COM 12TH FLEET	2
DATE 26 FEBRUARY 1944	FOR ACTION		3
TOR COODEROOM 0135			4
DECODED BY MITCHELL		CINCLANT	5
PARAPHRASED BY MCCOMB	INFORMATION		6
ROUTED BY			7
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			8
MONTGOMERY	261545	NCR 42586-S	9
			10
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			18
			19
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT 20

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ADMIRALTY REQUESTS MILWAUKEE BE SAILED SCAPA FLOW.
 MY DIS 251338. PENDING SETTLEMENT OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR
 TRANSFER.

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
 NCR 18

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM COMINCH & CNO		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY ADM. E. J. KING		COM 12TH FLEET	PRECEDENCE 3
DATE 25 FEB 1944			ROUTINE 5
TOR CODEROOM 1403		CINCLANT	DEFERRED 6
DECODED BY			PRECEDENCE 10
PARAPHRASED BY E. ROBERTS			ROUTINE 12
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED 13
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			15
PAGE 1 OF 2.	251338	NCR 42557-3	IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW <input type="checkbox"/> 16

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

MILWAUKEE (CL5) BEING SENT TO U.K. TO BE LOANED TO NAVAL
 COMMAND OF U.S.S.R. CINCLANT 231855. SIMILAR LOAN OF ROYAL
 SOVEREIGN BEING EFFECTED BY BRITISH. ON ASSUMPTION TRANSFER OF
 BOTH SHIPS WILL TAKE PLACE UNDER SAME CIRCUMSTANCES DESIRE YOU
 CONSULT ADMIRALTY AND COORDINATE U.S. ACTION WITH BRITISH.

YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO DELIVER MILWAUKEE TO NAVAL COMMAND OF
 U.S.S.R. COMPLETE WITH EQUIPMENT AND STORES INCLUDING AIRCRAFT,
 INSTALLED SEARCH AND FIRE CONTROL RADARS, AMMUNITION AND TOR-
 PEDOES RETAINING APPROPRIATE INVENTORIES. SHIP HAS BEEN CHECKED
 FOR SECURITY OF SECRET MATERIAL BY REPRESENTATIVES OF COMINCH
 AND BUORD. YOU WILL ARRANGE FOR REMOVAL OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC OUTFIT.

WITH RESPECT TO RETAINING A LIAISON GROUP ON BOARD BE GUIDED
 BY U.S.S.R. DESIRES AND ADMIRALTY EXAMPLE ADVISING CHIEF OF NAVAL

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE.

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
FROM _____	FOR ACTION		PRIORITY 1
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE 2
DATE _____			DEFERRED 3
TOR CODEROOM _____	INFORMATION		4
DECODED BY _____			PRIORITY 5
PARAPHRASED BY _____			ROUTINE 6
ROUTED BY _____			DEFERRED 7
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			8
PAGE 2 OF 2	251338	NCR 42557-S	IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW <input type="checkbox"/> 9

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

PERSONNEL DIRECT WHO WILL ISSUE NECESSARY ORDERS FOR LIAISON GROUP AND FOR DISPOSITION BALANCE OF SHIP'S COMPANY.

COMINCH PASSES TO NCR FOR FURTHER DISTRIBUTION TO:
 BUPERS..... BUORD...VICE CNO....

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE No. 3 F-I OR CHARTROOM No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
 NCR 18

SECRET
PRIORITY

24 FEBRUARY 1944

FROM: OPNAV

TO : ALUSNA, MOSCOW

FOR MARSHAL STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT.

Referring to my message of 23 February 1944, I have had a reply from the Prime Minister, and our understanding as expressed to you is now confirmed.

ROOSEVELT

- 1 -

Copy

SECRET

23 February 1944

From: London

For: The President of the United States

Number 590 filed 232300Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal
and most secret. Number 590.

Your 475. Delivery of our joint telegram to Stalin
about the ships was delayed by the absence of Stalin from
Moscow, it being hoped that the personal delivery of this
information by the Ambassador would possibly evoke some
expression of pleasure from the Potentate, which would
cheer our way. However, I yesterday told Clark Kerr to
hand it in. I am sorry there should have been some delay,
he was expected back every day.

I am very glad to have your telegram about Spain.

No Sig

SECRET

Copy

SECRET

23 FEBRUARY 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO : ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 475, SECRET AND PERSONAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Reference your 565 and 567.

The following message from Stalin and my reply thereto are quoted for your information:

QUOTE. STALIN to ROOSEVELT. I have received your message of February 18. Thank you for the information.

It, however, does not exhaust the question since there is nothing mentioned in it about the Anglo-American destroyers and submarines instead of Italian ones (8 destroyers, 4 submarines), as it was agreed upon at Teheran. I hope to receive a speedy reply regarding these questions, touched in my communication of January 29th. UNQUOTE.

QUOTE. ROOSEVELT to STALIN. I have received your message of February 21 regarding the loan of Anglo-American ships to the Soviet Navy.

It was my understanding that Great Britain would provide the one battleship, the eight destroyers and the four submarines. I have telegraphed to Prime Minister Churchill in regard to this and will let you know when I hear from him. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT.

Copy

SECRET

23 FEBRUARY 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO : ALUSNA, MOSCOW
NO : 231559 NCR 7950

MARSHAL STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT

I have received your message of February 21 regarding the loan of Anglo-American ships to the Soviet Navy.

It was my understanding that Great Britain would provide the one battleship, the eight destroyers and the four submarines. I have telegraphed to Prime Minister Churchill in regard to this and will let you know when I hear from him.

ROOSEVELT

SEALED SECRET

- 1 -

Copy

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>CINCLANT (INDEF CALL)</u>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		USS MILWAUKEE <i>WKS</i>	PRIORITY
DATE <u>FEB. 23, 1944</u>			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM <u>1949</u>			DEFERRED
DECODED BY <u>POWLEY</u>			
PARAPHRASED BY <u>POWLEY</u>		COMINCH CTF 69 COM 12TH FLEET	PRIORITY
ROUTED BY			ROUTINE
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			DEFERRED
231855		NCR-2809	IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(CINCLANT SENDS)

HICOM

REPORT TO COMTASKFORCE 69 CAPTAIN KRAKER IN MARBLEHEAD FOR INCLUSION IN TASKFORCE 69 SAILING 27 FEBRUARY FOR UKAY. UPON ARRIVAL REPORT COM 12TH FLEET FOR FURTHER ORDERS.

Milwaukee sails for UK also

ACTION: F-30

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR to Italy

SECRET

21 FEBRUARY 1944

FROM: MARSHAL STALIN

TO : THE PRESIDENT

I have received your message of February 18. Thank you for the information.

It, however, does not exhaust the question, since there is nothing mentioned in it about the Anglo-American destroyers and submarines instead of Italian ones (8 destroyers, 4 submarines), as it was agreed upon at Teheran. I hope to receive a speedy reply regarding these questions, touched in my communication of January 29th.

ORIGINAL filed "PRESIDENT-STALIN" folder.

SECRET
- 1 -

SECRET
PRIORITY

17 FEBRUARY 1944

FROM: OPNAV

TO : ALUSNA, MOSCOW

PERSONAL AND SECRET. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR MARSHAL STALIN.

Replying to your message of January 29, I am pleased to inform you that the following United States ships are available for temporary use by the Naval Command of the U.S.S.R. until adequate Italian tonnage to replace them can be placed at the disposal of the Soviet Union.

The merchant ship (10,000 tons) "HARRY PERCY," now at Glasgow.

The merchant ship "JOHN GORRIE" (10,000 tons), now at Liverpool.

The cruiser "MILWAUKEE" will arrive in some port in the United Kingdom March 8.

ROOSEVELT

SECRET

COPY

SECRET
PRIORITY

17 FEBRUARY 1944

FROM: OPNAV

TO : ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 470, PERSONAL AND SECRET, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

I have today sent the following quoted message to Uncle Joe:

QUOTE. Replying to your message of January 29, I am pleased to inform you that the following United States ships are available for temporary use by the Naval Command of the U.S.S.R. until adequate Italian tonnage to replace them can be placed at the disposal of the Soviet Union.

The merchant ship (10,000 tons) "HARRY PERCY," now at Glasgow.

The merchant ship "JOHN GORRIE" (10,000 tons), now at Liverpool.

The cruiser "MILWAUKEE" will arrive in some port in the United Kingdom March 8. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

SEALED SECRET

SECRET

COPY

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>COMINCH</u>		CINCLANTC	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY <u>ADM EDWARDS</u>			ROUTINE
DATE <u>16 FEB 1944</u>			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM <u>161822</u>	INFORMATION	WAL	PRIORITY
DECODED BY <u>POWLEY/4</u>			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY <u>STRICKLAND</u>			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

161816

NCR 42394-8

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
TEXT			

IMMEDIATELY UPON ARRIVAL MILWAUKEE HAVE CAPTAIN INFORMED ORALLY OF SENSE OF MYDIS 111950 TOGETHER WITH POSSIBILITY THAT TRANSFER MAY BE DELAYED OR CANCELLED AND VESSEL MAY BE USED IN EUROPEAN OPERATIONS WITH U.S. CREW. INSTRUCT HIM TO PASS INFORMATION TO NO OTHERS AND TO MAKE NO OBVIOUS PREPARATIONS FROM WHICH THE EVENTUALITY MIGHT BE INFERRED. COMDR. BEARD AND CAPT. MURPHY FROM COMINCH AND BUORD RESPECTIVELY HAVE INSTRUCTIONS TO DISCLOSE REASON FOR THEIR PRESENCE TO CAPTAIN ONLY.

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-I OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18

16-50630-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

16 February 1944

Admiral Leahy informed by telephone from Rear Admiral Land that the HARRY PERCY, 10,000 tons, is available in Glasgow and the JOHN GORRIE, 10,000 tons, in Liverpool.

COPY

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356

UNITED STATES FLEET
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

FF1/A4-3

Serial: 00448

SECRET - SECURITY

11 FEB 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

U.S.S. MILWAUKEE is designated for temporary use of the
Naval Command of the U.S.S.R.

In anticipation of the directive contained in your
memorandum of February 10, MILWAUKEE was ordered from the South
Atlantic, departed Bahia 8 February to arrive New York about 21
February. Six days will be allowed for voyage repairs at New
York. MILWAUKEE will be sailed to a United Kingdom port in company
with convoy UT-9, departing New York 27 February arriving United
Kingdom 8 March.

/s/ E. J. King

Admiral, U.S. Navy

COPY

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

February 10, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

Admiral King:

The President desires that one light cruiser be dispatched without delay to a port in the United Kingdom for temporary use of the Naval Command of the U.S.S.R.

Please inform me as to the name of the cruiser and the date of its arrival in the United Kingdom in order that the Soviet Government may be informed by telegram.

/s/ WILLIAM D. LEAHY

COPY

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

February 10, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

Administrator of War Shipping
Administration

The President desires that 20,000 tons of merchant shipping be made available at the earliest practicable date in a port or ports of the United Kingdom for temporary use by the Naval Command of the U.S.S.R. until such time as an equivalent tonnage of Italian merchant shipping can be made available.

Please inform me as to the names and number of the ships, the ports in which they will be made available to the U.S.S.R., and the time that they will be available in order that the Soviet authorities may be informed by telegraph.

/s/ WILLIAM D. LEAHY

SECRET

COPY

Regraded Unclassified

SECRET

9 FEBRUARY 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO : ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 462, PERSONAL AND SECRET, FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM
THE PRESIDENT.

Your 572 is acknowledged. I will be very much interested in
Uncle J's reply and I hope it will quiet the growl on this subject
for some time.

ROOSEVELT

- 1 -

COPY for "MR 460 ITALY (2)"

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE	
FROM <u>COMINCH</u>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PPPPPP	1
RELEASED BY <u>ADM. EDWARDS</u>	FOR ACTION	CINCLANT	PRIORITY	2
DATE <u>FEB. 7, 1944</u>			ROUTINE	3
TOR CODEROOM <u>1952</u>			DEFERRED	4
DECODED BY <u>BENNETT/YORK</u>				5
PARAPHRASED BY <u>BENNETT</u>	INFORMATION	<i>WLP</i>	PRIORITY	6
ROUTED BY			ROUTINE	7
			DEFERRED	8
				9
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW	10
		<u>071931</u> <u>NCR 42217</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	11
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME		12
ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT				13
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No. 1 ADMIRAL	No. 2 FILE.	No. 3 F-I OR CHARTROOM.	No. 4 SPECIAL	51
SEALED		SECRET		52
Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)				
<i>Atlantic</i>				

FROM: THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER

TO : MARSHALL STALIN

DATE: 7 FEBRUARY 1944

The receipt is acknowledged of your message in regard to handing over Italian shipping to the Soviet.

It is our intention to carry out the transfer agreed to at Teheran at the earliest date practicable without hazarding the success of ANVIL and OVERLORD which operations we all agree should be given first priority in our common effort to defeat Germany at the earliest possible date.

There is no thought of not carrying through the transfers agreed at Teheran. The British battleship and the American cruiser can be made available without any delay, and an effort will be made at once to make available from the British Navy the eight destroyers. Four submarines will also be provided temporarily by Great Britain.

I am convinced that disaffecting the Italian Navy at this time would be what you have so aptly termed an unnecessary diversion and that it would adversely affect the prospects of our success in France.

ROOSEVELT. CHURCHILL

The above message to STALIN, signed jointly by the PRESIDENT and the PRIME MINISTER, was dispatched from London to Moscow on 7 February 1944, through British communication channels.

SECRET
- 1 -

SECRET

7 February, 1944 *WAL*

URGENT

URGENT

From: Military Attache London
To: The President of the United States
No. 572 Filed 07/2315Z

Prime Minister to President personal and most secret. Number 572.

Many thanks for your number (458) I have dispatched the message to U. J.

No Sig

Sent today approving his #567 covering submarines to U.S. and stating cruiser will be sent to UK upon receipt of U.S.'s acceptance of proposal.

SECRET

COPY

SECRET
OF PRIORITY

7 FEBRUARY 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO : ALUSNA, LONDON

PERSONAL AND SECRET. NUMBER 458. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

YOUR 567 MEETS WITH MY APPROVAL. UPON RECEIPT OF UNCLE JOE'S
ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROPOSAL I WILL SEND THE CRUISER TO U.K.

ROOSEVELT

- 1 -

COPY for "450 ITALY"

From: Military Attache London
To : The President of the United States
No : 567, 5 February 1944.

PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT. PERSONAL AND MOST
SECRET. NUMBER 567.

Your 456. Although we have a perfect right I still shrink from taking the four Italian submarines as it would seem to raise the whole issue we have been trying to avoid for such a small return. I will therefore provide four of ours to bridge the gap till we can take the Italians'. They are modern vessels and we shall want them later on against Japan. For the next six months we can spare them. I will therefore send on your telegram with the following amendments:

About the 80th word for "Discussed" say "Agreed", and about 35 words further on insert "Four submarines will also be provided temporarily by Great Britain." On receipt of your OK I will dispatch signed "Roosevelt. Churchill."

SECRET
- 1 -

COPY

SECRET

4 FEBRUARY 1944

FROM: OPNAV
TO : ALUSNA, LONDON

NUMBER 456. PERSONAL AND SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Referring to your 562 and 565 it is suggested that our reply to
U.J. should be in effect as follows:

"The receipt is acknowledged of your message in regard
to handing over Italian shipping to the Soviet.

"It is our intention to carry out the transfer agreed
to at Teheran at the earliest date practicable without hazard-
ing the success of ANVIL and OVERLORD which operations we
all agree should be given first priority in our common
effort to defeat Germany at the earliest possible date.

"There is no thought of not carrying through the trans-
fers discussed at Teheran. The British battleship and the
American cruiser can be made available without any delay,
and an effort will be made at once to make available from
the British Navy the eight destroyers. Four submarines
will be taken from Italy.

"I am convinced that disaffecting the Italian Navy at
this time would be what you have so aptly termed an unnec-
essary diversion and that it would adversely affect the
prospects of our success in France."

If we sent to U.J. a message similar to the above, it will in-
volve making available the battleship and cruiser at once, sending
the merchant shipping to him without avoidable delay, and taking from
Italy four submarines from those now in our possession which I believe
number about thirty.

Under the conditions existing at present and prior to a success
in landing OVERLORD and ANVIL I would prefer that the U.K. find the

- 1 -

COPY for "450 ITALY (2) Sec. 1"

Regraded Unclassified

destroyers for this contribution as so kindly offered in your 565. I need all of ours that can be made available for current and pending operations in the Pacific.

It seems to me that, if this matter of joining with Britain and the United States in providing Russia with needed ships should be diplomatically presented, the Italian Government could offer no valid objection to taking part in the common effort by the provision of four submarines at this time; or it might be best to simply direct the Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, Wilson, to send four Italian submarines in tow to a port in U.K. without making any explanation to the Italians of their future use.

Please let me have your reaction to these suggestions and your draft of a proposed reply to U.J.'s growl.

ROOSEVELT

FROM: AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO : THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

NO : 565, 3 FEBRUARY 1944.

PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT. PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET.

1. Further to my 562. We could revert to the idea of asking the King and Badoglio to hand us over 8 destroyers and 4 submarines for transfer to the Russians. This might easily cause a mutiny in the Italian Fleet at the present very dangerous time. I am told that the Italian Navy is already worried by the attacks that are made on the government they have hitherto obeyed. I should think it quite likely that Badoglio would throw in his hand rather than agree to this demand. As he is so often being told that he is to be kicked out as soon as we get to Rome, he does not seem to have much to lose. There are only 7 Italian destroyers in the whole Italian Navy and these are all being used in the heavy operations now in progress in the Mediterranean.

2. In these circumstances his Majesty's Government is prepared to find 8 destroyers for loan to the Russians pending delivery of the Italian vessels. These will of course be old destroyers, most of them, those that we got from you in 1941. They are however serviceable and will steam and fight. The Russians will not use them in the same continuous sea service as we are accustomed to maintain. They will probably lie in harbour in Northern Russian Ports. Here they will be available for training the crews which can man the Italian destroyers when these are handed over and have been fitted for Arctic work. In view of the ungracious tone of Stalin's reply and evident Soviet refusal to try

to understand our position which was so patiently and considerately explained, I have little doubt that they will reproach us upon the quality of these vessels. It is however the best we can do.

3. It will be more difficult for us to find 4 old submarines, and we cannot spare any of the new ones which are in constant action. We should be glad therefore if you could supply these on loan until we can get the Italian craft.

4. Let me know how you feel about all this, and I will then submit to you a draft from us both to Uncle Joe.

PRIME

FROM: AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO : THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
NO : 562, 1 February 1944.

PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT. PERSONAL AND SECRET.

The following has just arrived from U.J. and as I do not know whether you have a separate copy I repeat it to you with the following comment: "What can you expect from a bear but a growl?"

"From Premier Stalin to Prime Minister and President Roosevelt. Personal and secret.

"I received on the 23rd January both your joint messages, signed by you Mr. Prime Minister, and you, Mr. President, regarding the question of the handing over of Italian shipping for the use of the Soviet Union.

"I must say that, after your joint affirmative reply at Tehran to the question which I raised of the handing over to the Soviet Union of Italian shipping by the end of January 1944. I considered this question settled and the thought never entered my mind of the possibility of any kind of reconsideration of this decision which was taken and agreed between the three of us. All the more so since, as we agreed at the time, this question was to be completely settled with the Italians. Now I see that this is not so and that nothing has ever been mentioned to the Italians on the subject.

"In order however not to complicate this question, which is of such great importance for our common struggle against Germany, the Soviet Government is prepared to accept your proposal regarding the despatch from British Ports to the USSR of the Battleship Royal Sovereign and one cruiser, and regarding the temporary use of these vessels by the Naval High Command of the USSR until such time as the appropriate Italian shipping is made available to the Soviet Union. Similarly we shall be prepared to accept from the USA and Great Britain 20,000 tons of merchant shipping which will also be used by us until such time as a similar tonnage of Italian shipping is handed over to us. It is important that there should be no delays now regarding the matter and that all the shipping indicated should be handed over to us during the month of February.

"In your reply however there is no mention of the handing over to the Soviet Union of 8 Italian destroyers and 4 submarines, to

the handing over of which to the Soviet Union at the end of January you, Mr. Prime Minister, and you, Mr. President, agreed in Teheran. Meanwhile, for the Soviet Union this very question, the question of destroyers and submarines, without which the handing over of one battleship and one cruiser has no significance, is of capital importance. You understand yourselves that a cruiser and a battleship are powerless without escorting destroyers. Since the whole of Italy's fleet is under your control, to carry out the decision which was taken at Teheran to hand over for the use of the Soviet Union 8 destroyers and 4 submarines out of that fleet should present no difficulties. I am agreeable (literally "I agree") that, instead of Italian destroyers and submarines, a similar number of American or British destroyers and submarines should be handed over to the Soviet Union for our use. Moreover, the question of the handing over of destroyers and submarines cannot be postponed, but must be settled at one and the same time with the handing over of the battleship and cruiser, as was definitely agreed between us at Teheran."

PRIME.

Index Number

INDEX SHEET

FROM: MARSHAL STALIN

TO : THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER

DATE: 29 JANUARY 1944

For the PRESIDENT's copy of message sent by STALIN jointly to the PRESIDENT and the PRIME MINISTER (paraphrase of which was sent by the PRIME MINISTER to the PRESIDENT in his #562), see "PRESIDENT-STALIN" file.

Show classification number and date of communication on first line, drop two spaces, show source of communication and to whom addressed, then drop two spaces again and give a brief synopsis of subject matter sufficient to identify the document.

W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0622
May 10-23

3-6414

Regraded Unclassified

FROM: THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER

TO : MARSHAL STALIN

DATE: 23 JANUARY 1944

With regard to the handing over to the Soviets of Italian shipping asked for by the Soviet Government at the Moscow Conference and agreed to with you by us both at Teheran, we have received a memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff contained in our immediately following telegram. For the reasons set out in this memorandum we think it would be dangerous to our triple interests actually to carry out any transfer or to say anything about it to the Italians until their co-operation is no longer of operational importance.

Nevertheless, if after full consideration you desire us to proceed, we will make a secret approach to Badoglio with a view to concluding the necessary arrangements without their becoming generally known to Italian Naval Forces. If in this way agreement could be reached, such arrangements with Italian Naval authorities as were necessary could be left to him. These arrangements would have to be on the lines that Italian ships selected should be sailed to suitable Allied port where they would be collected by Russian crews who would sail into Russian northern ports which are the only ones now open where any refitting necessary would be undertaken.

We are, however, very conscious of dangers of above course for the reasons we have laid before you and we have, therefore, decided to propose the following alternative, which, from the military point of view, has many advantages.

SECRET

- 1 -

PRESIDENT/PRIME MINISTER--STALIN,
23 JANUARY 1944.

The British battleship, ROYAL SOVEREIGN, has recently completed refitting in the U.S.A. She is fitted with radar for all types of armament. The United States will make one light cruiser available at approximately the same time.

His Majesty's Government and the United States are willing for their party that these vessels should be taken over at British ports by Soviet crews and sailed to North Russian ports. You could then make such alterations as you find necessary for Arctic conditions.

These vessels would be temporarily transferred on loan to the Soviet and would fly the Soviet flag until without prejudice to military operations the Italian vessels can be made available.

His Majesty's Government and the United States will each arrange to provide 20,000 tons of merchant shipping to be available as soon as practicable and until the Italian merchant ships can be obtained without prejudice to projected essential operations OVERLORD-ANVIL.

This alternative has the advantage that the Soviet Government would obtain the use of vessels at a very much earlier date than if they all had to be refitted and rendered suitable for northern waters. Thus if our efforts should take a favorable turn with Turks and the Straits become open these vessels would be ready to operate in the Black Sea. We hope you will very carefully consider this alternative which we think is in every way superior to first proposal.

ROOSEVELT. CHURCHILL

The above message to STALIN, signed jointly by the PRESIDENT and the PRIME MINISTER, was dispatched from London to Moscow on 23 January 1944, through British communication channels.

SECRET

- 2 -

FROM: THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER

TO : MARSHAL STALIN

DATE: 23 JANUARY 1944

Our Combined Chiefs of Staff have made the following positive recommendation with supporting data:

(a) The present time is inopportune for effecting the transfer of captured Italian ships because of pending Allied operations.

(b) To enforce the transfer at this time would remove needed Italian resources now employed in current operations, would interfere with assistance now being given by Italian repair facilities, might cause the scuttling of Italian war ships, and result in loss of Italian cooperation thus jeopardizing OVERLORD and ANVIL.

(c) At the earliest moment permitted by operations the implementation of the delivery of Italian vessels may proceed.

ROOSEVELT. CHURCHILL.

The above message to STALIN, signed jointly by the PRESIDENT and the PRIME MINISTER, was dispatched from London to Moscow on 23 January 1944, through British communication channels.

SECRET

SECRET

23 January 1944

From: M. A. London

To: The President of the United States

Number 551

Filed 23/0055Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and most secret No. 551.

I thank you so much for your No. 447. I have dispatched joint messages tonight and Harriman is being informed.

(Map Room Note. No 447 agreed to omission of paragraph from joint message to U. S.)

No Sig

*Recd 222300
Held to AM
rhtes7 231308Z-05C*

BN

SECRET

COPY

-1-

Regraded Unclassified

From: Opnav

22 January 1944

To : Alusna, London

NUMBER 447, PERSONAL AND SECRET. FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

Your 550. I agree to your suggestion that the following paragraph in my 444 be omitted from your message to U.J.

QUOTE. An effort will be made at once to make available from the surrendered Italian war ships eight destroyers and four submarines to be taken over by the Soviet as soon as they can be made available under conditions stated above for the British and U. S. ships. UNQUOTE.

Please let me know when your message is sent and ask your Ambassador to inform Harriman.

ROOSEVELT

Above message drafted by Admiral Leahy; sent to the President at Hyde Park at 22/1400Z as WHITE 1; approved by President at 22/1443Z in his BLACK 1; sent to PM at 22/1500Z, (221528 NCR 2741).

SECRET

WAL

21 January 1944

From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 550 Filed 211754Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt.. Personal
and most secret. Number 550. Your numbers 444 and 445.

1. I deprecate the inclusion in the second of the alternatives we are putting before U.J. of an offer to obtain at once eight Italian destroyers and four Italian submarines. My idea in suggesting that Royal Sovereign and a cruiser should be offered was to avoid any immediate approach to the Italians and thus escape the dangers stressed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. We fear that the second alternative as formulated in your draft may give us the worst of both worlds.

2. I, therefore, hope you will agree to the omission from the message of the following passage in your draft:

"An effort will be made at once to make available from the surrendered Italian war ships eight destroyers and four submarines to be taken over by the Soviet as soon as they can be made available under conditions stated above for the British and U S ships."

SECRET

COPY

Regraded Unclassified

SECRET

From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 550 Filed 211754Z

Page 2

Let me know if I may despatch the message as amended and the accompanying telegram on behalf of us both. The British Ambassador in Moscow has just been reminded by the Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs that the delivery date is February 1st.

3. The eight destroyers could not be found from British resources since all the ships in Halifax and Bermuda are now manned and we expect to man every ship completing according to programme and will assuredly need them all to meet our huge commitments for "OVERLORD" and the battle of the Atlantic.

No Sig

SECRET

SECRET

19 January 1944

FROM: The President
TO : The Prime Minister
NO : 445

Your 545. If you are in agreement with my 444 it is suggested that "our immediately following telegram" referred to therein be as follows:

"Our Combined Chiefs of Staff have made the following positive recommendation with supporting data:

"(a) The present time is inopportune for effecting the transfer of captured Italian ships because of pending Allied operations.

"(b) To enforce the transfer at this time would remove needed Italian resources now employed in current operations, would interfere with assistance now being given by Italian repair facilities, might cause the scuttling of Italian war ships, and result in loss of Italian cooperation thus jeopardizing OVERLORD and ANVIL.

"(c) At the earliest moment permitted by operations the implementation of the delivery of Italian vessels may proceed."

ROOSEVELT

- 1 -

COPY

Regraded Unclassified

1711 E)

SECRET
PRIORITY

19 January 1944

From: The President
To : The Prime Minister
No : 444.

Replying to your No. 545, I propose the following message to Uncle Joe:

"With regard to the handing over to the Soviets of Italian shipping asked for by the Soviet Government at the Moscow conference and agreed to with you by us both at Teheran we have received a memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff contained in our immediately following telegram. For the reasons set out in this memorandum we think it would be dangerous to our triple interests actually to carry out any transfer or to say anything about it to the Italians until their cooperation is no longer of operational importance.

"Nevertheless, if after full consideration you desire us to proceed, we will make a secret approach to Badoglio with a view to concluding the necessary arrangements without their becoming generally known to Italian Naval Forces. If in this way agreement could be reached, such arrangements with Italian Naval authorities as were necessary could be left to him. These arrangements would have to be on the lines that Italian ships selected should be sailed to suitable Allied port where they would be collected by Russian crews who would sail into Russian northern ports which are the only ones now open where any refitting necessary would be

undertaken.

"We are, however, very conscious of dangers of above course for the reasons we have laid before you and we have, therefore, decided to propose the following alternative, which, from the military point of view, has many advantages.

"The British battleship, ROYAL SOVEREIGN, has recently completed refitting in the U.S.A. She is fitted with Radar for all types of armament. The United States will make one light cruiser available at approximately the same time.

"His Majesty's Government and the United States are willing for their part that these vessels should be taken over at British ports by Soviet crews and sailed to North Russian ports. You could then make such alterations as you find necessary for Arctic conditions.

"These vessels would be temporarily transferred on loan to the Soviet and would fly the Soviet flag until without prejudice to military operations the Italian vessels can be made available.

"His Majesty's Government and the United States will each arrange to provide 20,000 tons of merchant shipping to be available as soon as practicable and until the Italian merchant ships can be obtained without prejudice to projected essential operations
OVERLORD - ANVIL.

"An effort will be made at once to make available from the surrendered Italian war ships 8 destroyers and 4 submarines to be taken over by the Soviet as soon as they can be made available under conditions stated above for the British and U. S. ships.

"This alternative has the advantage that the Soviet Government would obtain the use of vessels at a very much earlier date than if they all had to be refitted and rendered suitable for northern waters. Thus if our efforts should take a favorable turn with Turks and the Straits become open these vessels would be ready to operate in the Black Sea. We hope you will very carefully consider this alternative which we think is in every way superior to first proposal."

It is my opinion that the Italian Government and the Italian Navy might not seriously object to joining with us in providing the Soviet with ships "needed" in the war effort.

If we cannot get this contribution by Italy to the common effort an alternative is suggested as follows:

"The British Navy furnish 8 destroyer escorts from the U.S. production which vessels are now in Halifax or Bermuda waiting for crews."

I do not know where we can get any submarines except from Italy, or possibly from the French Committee of Liberation.

It would seem that even a beginning of the delivery of ships to Russia in the near future as suggested above would meet the Soviet request for early action on their Teheran understanding of this problem.

ROOSEVELT

The message to the Prime Minister proposed in the attached memorandum for the President from the Joint Chiefs of Staff was revised by Admiral Leahy who prepared #444 POTUS-PM in its stead.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
18 January 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Assignment of ships surrendered to the Allies.

1. In paragraph IV of the message from the Prime Minister it is proposed that the United States and United Kingdom offer as an alternative to the assignment of Italian ships to the Russians the leasing of certain U.S. and British combatant and merchant ships. The total numbers involved are one battleship, one cruiser, eight destroyers, four submarines, and 40,000 tons of shipping. The Prime Minister proposes that the British might furnish one battleship, one cruiser, and perhaps one-half of the shipping. He hopes the United States will find it possible to furnish the cruiser, all the destroyers, and all the shipping. No mention is made of the submarines.

2. The President has indicated that every practicable effort be made to spare from our naval forces one battleship, one or two cruisers, some destroyers and destroyer escorts, and some merchant ships to match the British offer. He has also indicated that the naval ships offered should be of the same vintage as the Italian ships that are available.

3. The U.S. could without serious effect on prospective operations spare one battleship of the NEW YORK or ARKANSAS Class, one or two cruisers of the CONCORD Class, and 20,000 tons of shipping. Any loss of destroyers or destroyer escorts would have material effect on planned operations as we require for operations in the Pacific, for ANVIL and

[REDACTED]
DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 2 1974

COPY

Regraded Unclassified

[REDACTED]

OVERLORD, all the modern destroyers which we can muster. To get the required numbers it is necessary to substitute all our available DE's in the anti-submarine forces in the Atlantic.

4. As to the matching the Italian vintage, the NEW YORK or ARKANSAS are approximately of the age of the ANDREA DORIA Class. To match the Italian class would require a NORTH CAROLINA. The Italian cruisers which date from 1931 to 1941 would require cruisers of the INDIANAPOLIS class or later. The CONCORD class is probably a better ship for Russian purposes than the Italian ships.

5. The following alternatives to the Prime Minister's proposal are recommended:

(a) That the U.S. lease one cruiser of the CONCORD class, and 20,000 tons of shipping. That the British furnish one battleship of the ROYAL SOVEREIGN Class, half the merchant shipping, and eight destroyer escorts from U.S. production for which they have found difficulty in providing crews and which are now in Halifax or Bermuda.

(b) As an alternative to (a), that inasmuch as the Italians are cobelligerents, they furnish destroyers and submarines, while the British furnish the battleship and one-half the shipping, and the U.S. the cruiser and half the shipping.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff propose the following despatch to the Prime Minister.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 2 1974

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER

RELATIVE TO YOUR _____ WHILE IT WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR THE UNITED STATES TO FURNISH ONE BATTLESHIP OF THE ARKANSAS OR NEW YORK CLASS, ONE CRUISER OF THE CONCORD CLASS, AND TWENTY THOUSAND TONS OF MERCHANT SHIPPING, NO U.S. DESTROYERS OR DESTROYER ESCORTS CAN BE FURNISHED WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO PLANNED OPERATIONS. I SUGGEST IT MAY BE PRACTICABLE FOR YOU TO RELEASE CERTAIN BRITISH DE'S WHICH HAVE BEEN BUILT IN THIS COUNTRY AND FOR WHICH YOU HAVE NOT HAD AVAILABLE CREWS. I SUGGEST AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE FOREGOING THAT, INASMUCH AS THE ITALIANS ARE NOW COBELLIGERENTS WITH US, WE MAKE THEM FURNISH THE DESTROYERS AND TORPEDO BOATS, WHILE THE U.S. AND U.K. FURNISH THE BATTLESHIP, CRUISER, AND SHIPPING. WITH NAVAL SHIPS GOING FROM THE THREE NATIONS TO RUSSIA FOR THE PURPOSE OF BETTER PROSECUTION OF THE WAR THE ADVERSE EFFECT ON ITALIAN PSYCHOLOGY OF TAKING ITALIAN SHIPS ALONE WOULD BE OBIATED.

NOT USED

SECRET

SECRET
PRIORITY

17 January 1944

From: Opnav

To : Alusna, Moscow

PERSONAL AND SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT TO AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN.

Replying to your message 160711 matter of Italian ships is still under consideration with the British.

I hope to have something on this subject within the next few days.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room at 1125, EWT, 17 January 1944.

George M. Elsey
GEORGE M. ELSEY
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

DECLASSIF
E. O. 12356

President to Harrieman

Replying to your message 160711
matter of Italian ships is still
under consideration with the
British.

I hope to have something on
this subject within the next
few days

Roosevelt
WR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

File WLB
[Signature]

January 18, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND
THEN GIVE TO WILSON BROWN TO FILE.

F. D. R.

SEALED

MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

ORIGINATOR	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE	
FROM <u>HARRIMAN</u>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEES	PPPPPPPP PRIORITY	
RELEASED BY _____		<u>PRESIDENT</u>	ROUTINE	
DATE <u>JAN 16, 1944</u>			DEFERRED	
TOR CODEROOM _____		FOR ACTION		
DECODED BY <u>COOK</u>			FOR INFORMATION	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY <u>COON</u>				ROUTINE
ROUTED BY <u>KNIGHT</u>				DEFERRED

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE

160711

NCR 6246

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

MOLOTOF ASKED ME TO COME TO SEE HIM THIS EVENING.
 HIS FIRST QUESTION WAS WHETHER I HAD ANY INFORMATION
REGARDING THE ITALIAN SHIPS AS THE END OF JANUARY
 (THE DATE AGREED ON AT TEHRAN FOR THEIR DELIVERY)
 WAS APPROACHING. I EXPLAINED THAT I KNEW YOU WERE GIVING
 THE MATTER CONSIDERATION IN CONSULTATION WITH THE
 PRIME MINISTER BUT I HAD NO OTHER INFORMATION.
 IN COMPLIANCE WITH HIS REQUEST I AGREED TO CABLE
 YOU FOR INFORMATION.

NAVAIDE ACT
 Received in Maj Room at
 1545, 16 Jan 44. TPVU-1547/169.

No. 1 ADMIRAL.

No. 2 FILE.

No. 3 F-I OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL.

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR 18

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-30420-2

Regraded Unclassified

SECRET

16 January 1944

From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 545 Filed 161120Z

Prime Minister to President. Personal and most secret. No. 545.

I. Further to my reply to your 437. Would you please see the memorandum by Combined Chiefs of Staff to us both about transference of Italian ships to Russia. My recollection is clear that nothing was said at Teheran about "one third" but that promise was made to meet the Russian claim put forward at Moscow to have transferred to them one battleship, one cruiser, eight destroyers, four submarines, and forty thousand tons of merchant shipping.

On the other hand, the main difficulties raised by C.O.S. are solid and I think very likely that once Stalin is convinced of our intentions and our good faith he will leave us to handle the matter in smoothest and swiftest way possible.

I suggest, therefore, that we now signal him jointly to the following effect.

1. With regard to the handing over to the Soviets of Italian shipping asked for by the Soviet

SECRET

COPY

SECRET

From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 545 Filed 161120Z

Page 2

Government at the Moscow conference and agreed to with you by us both at Teheran we have received a memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff contained in our immediately following telegram. For the reasons set out in this memorandum we think it would be dangerous to our triple interests actually to carry out any transfer or to say anything about it to the Italians until their cooperation is no longer of operational importance.

2. Nevertheless, if after full consideration you desire us to proceed, we will make a secret approach to Badoglio with a view to concluding the necessary arrangements without their becoming generally known to Italian Naval Forces. If in this way agreement could be reached, such arrangements with Italian Naval authorities as were necessary could be left to him. These arrangements would have to be on the lines that Italian ships selected should be sailed to suitable Allied port where they would be collected by Russian crews who would sail into Russian northern ports which are the only ones now open where any refitting necessary would be undertaken.

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Regraded Unclassified

SECRET

From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 545 Filed 161120Z

Page 3

II. We are, however, very conscious of dangers of above course for the reasons we have laid before you and we have, therefore, decided to propose the following alternative, which, from the military point of view, has many advantages.

1. The British battleship, Royal Sovereign, has recently completed refitting in the U.S.A. She is fitted with Radar for all types of armament. Great Britain has also a cruiser available. His Majesty's Government are willing for their part that these vessels should be taken over during February at British ports by Soviet crews, and sailed to North Russian ports. You could then make such alterations as you find necessary for Arctic conditions. These vessels would be temporarily transferred on loan to the Soviet Government and would fly the Soviet Flag until, without prejudice to the military operation, the necessary transfer of Italian vessels could be arranged.

III. This alternative has advantage that Soviet Government would obtain the use of vessels at a very much

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Regraded Unclassified

SECRET

From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 545 Filed 161120Z

Page 4

earlier date than if they had to be refitted and rendered suitable for northern waters. This if even it should take a favourable turn with [✓] Turks and the Straits become open these vessels would be ready to operate if desired in the Black Sea. We hope you will very carefully consider this alternative which we think is in every way superior to first proposal.

IV. The above message the line of which I venture to suggest to you would be of course incomplete without a statement of what the United States will do. If, for instance, you could find the cruiser instead of our having to do so, we should be relieved. We cannot do anything about eight destroyers but perhaps you may be able to supply this need. Otherwise we must say we have absolutely not got them until after OVERLORD and ANVIL. As to the forty thousand tons of merchant shipping I should think that with your great supply and vastly improved sinkings you might supply these but we should be willing to share fifty-fifty.

V. I hope, my dear friend, you will consider all these possibilities and let me know how you feel. In my opinion, Stalin will be moved in a favourable manner by this handsome proposal. At any rate, it shows our faith and our goodwill. I doubt whether having this alternative

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Regraded Unclassified

SECRET

From: London
For: The President of the United States
Number 545 Filed 161120Z

Page 5

before him he will press for the premature raising of
Italian problem but we shall have done the right thing.

No Sig

SECRET

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Regraded Unclassified

SECRET

9 January 1944

From: London
For: The President of the United States

Number 543 091705Z

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal
and most secret. Number 543. Your 437.

I entirely agree with you that we must not
break faith with Stalin about the ships. I have been
for a week in correspondence with Anthony on subject
and hope to submit a proposal to you for a joint
communication from you and me in a day or two.

No Sig

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SECRET

8 January 1944

From: Opnav
To: Alusna, London

Personal and secret, Number 437. For the Former Naval Person from the President.

As I told you in my 422, Harriman requested information on the action we were taking to carry out our commitments to turn over Italian ships to the Soviet by 1 February so that he could discuss the matter with Molotov if he were queried. I told him it was my intention to allocate one-third of the captured Italian ships to the Soviet war effort beginning 1 February as rapidly as they could be made available.

Harriman then reminded me that Stalin's request at Teheran was a reiteration of the Soviet request originally made at Moscow in October (namely for one battleship, one cruiser, eight destroyers and four submarines for North Russia and 40,000 tons displacement of merchant shipping for the Black Sea) and that no mention was made at Moscow or Teheran of the Russians' getting additional ships up to one-third of those captured. Accordingly Harriman regarded my cable of December 21 as being for his information and he has not discussed the question of one-third with Molotov.

Harriman also emphasized the very great importance of fulfilling our pledge to yield these ships. For us to fail or to delay would in his opinion only arouse suspicion in Stalin and in his associates as to the firmness of other commitments made at Teheran.

On the other hand, the Chiefs of Staff have raised numerous objections to the transfer based on probable effects that this course would have on

SECRET

- 1 -

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Regraded Unclassified

pending operations. They fear a loss of Italian naval and military cooperation, and the scuttling or sabotage of valuable ships which we need for ANVIL and OVERLORD. They foresee no material benefit to the Russian war effort at this time since the warships are presently quite unsuited for Northern waters and the Black Sea is closed to merchant vessels.

The very wise provisions of the modified Cunningham Agreement give the United Nations the right to make disposition of any or all Italian ships as they may think fit. It is of importance that we shall acquire and maintain the confidence of our Ally and I feel that every practicable effort should be made to arrive at a solution whereby the Italian ships requested by the Soviets be turned over to them beginning about February first.

Do you believe it wise to present to U.J. the possible effect on OVERLORD--ANVIL as expressed by our Staffs, and suggest a delay in assigning Italian ships to him until after the launching of OVERLORD--ANVIL. I am particularly desirous of having an expression of your opinion in view of the present British command of the Mediterranean theater and in order that we may reach a complete agreement as to the action to be taken. It is patently impracticable for either of us to act singly in this matter, but I think you will agree that we must not go back on what we told U.J.

ROOSEVELT.

SECRET

- 2 -

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SECRET

SECRET
PRIORITY

8 January 1944

From: Opnav

To : Alusna, Moscow

PERSONAL AND SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR HARRIMAN.

Referring to your message 301823 the matter of delivery of Italian ships to the Soviet is under discussion with the Prime Minister. Please take no action in the matter until you receive further advice.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1150, EWT, 8 January 1943

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff

081642
NCR 363
648.
SECRET

✓

President to Harriman

Referring to your message 301823
the matter of delivery of Italian
ships to the Soviet is under
discussion with the Prime
Minister - Please take no
action in the matter until
you receive further advice

Roosevelt
W.L.

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

P R I O R I T Y

From: Algiers.
To: WAR

No. W-9339 5 January 1944.

Personal for General Marshall signed Eisenhower
cite PHDCS. Reference your 5911 of 29 December.

Commander in Chief Mediterranean states that it is
difficult for him to designate ships by name as the matter
is not one affecting only the Mediterranean theater and
requests that this matter be referred to the Combined Chiefs
of Staff if so desired. Discreet enquiries are being
made meanwhile to ascertain which will be the most suitable
ships. It is however emphasized that at this moment to
go so far as to designate particular ships is highly
undesirable if it can possibly be avoided as the repercuss-
ions would be very serious indeed if the Italians were to
become aware of the fact.

No Sig.

5911 is CM-OUT-10698 (29 Dec 43)SGS

ACTION: CC/S (Captain Royal USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
C of S

CM-IN-2891 (5 Jan 44) 1651Z med

29

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COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 4, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

H.L.H.

Does this need an answer?

F.D.R.

on original in pencil by H.L.H. -

"To take up when I get back"

by Tim Krause 10 Feb -

"No answer necessary, file."

COPY

Regraded Unclassified

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

December 24th, 1943.

Dear Mr. President,

Mr. Eden has asked me to let you know that the question of Italian ships for the Russians, which was dealt with in your telegram No. 422 of December 21st to the Prime Minister, has been considered in London in the light of the telegram which you sent to Mr. Harriman.

His Majesty's Government feel that there are two very important points to be taken into consideration. The first is that if the Italians are informed too abruptly of our intention of turning some of their ships over to the Russians, we will run the risk not only of losing the co-operation which we are at present receiving from the Italian naval authorities, including the use of Taranto Dockyards, which is apparently vital, but perhaps also of ships themselves which the Italians might scuttle. The second point is that the ships are unsuitable for
Arctic/

The Honourable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States.

Arctic conditions and their delivery to the Russians through the Black Sea is dependent on the opening of the Dardanelles. We obviously wish to avoid the danger of being accused of bad faith if when February 1st arrives it should prove impossible to hand any Italian ships to the Russians at all.

The British Chiefs of Staff, who agree with the foregoing, are communicating their views to the United States Chiefs of Staff with a view to a recommendation being made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to yourself and to the Prime Minister.

In the light of the above His Majesty's Government feel that if Mr. Harriman could avoid saying anything at all to Molotov immediately, so much the better, but if he is obliged to say something, they hope that he will take account of these points. They suggest that he might also point out that the best way for the Soviet Government to raise the question would be through their member on the Advisory Council for Italy. Our Chargé d'Affaires at Moscow has been instructed to put these considerations urgently to Mr. Harriman and to inform him that we are explaining

to/

to you what we have done. Eden hopes that you will approve His Majesty's Government's action.

There is a further point on which there appears to be some uncertainty in London. According to our record of what was said at Tehran, it seems to have been agreed there between yourself and the Prime Minister to assign "a battleship and a cruiser" for Soviet use "about the end of January", the title of ownership to be decided upon after the surrender of Germany. The suggestion mentioned in your telegram to Mr. Harriman of handing over to the Russians a third of surrendered Italian ships appears to be a different one. (The request which the Soviet Government made at the Moscow Conference was for one battleship, one cruiser, 8 destroyers, 4 submarines and 40,000 tons of merchant shipping.)

Eden has not specifically asked me to put to you the point contained in this last paragraph, but he has put it to our Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow, who may therefore be speaking to Harriman about it.

Believe me,
Dear Mr. President,
Very sincerely yours,

Halifax

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM (HARRIMAN) ALUSNA MOSCOW	FOR ACTION	FOR THE PRESIDENT	OP OP OP PRIORITY
RELEASED BY			ROUTINE
DATE 1 JANUARY 1944	FOR INFORMATION		DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM 1926/1			PRIORITY
DECODED BY MITCHELL			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY VALENTINE			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE ³⁰¹⁸²³ ^{NCR 6699}

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GCT
TEXT

PART 1 301814 NCR 6710
 PART 2 301817 NCR 6677
 PART 3 301823 NCR 6699

WAL
fu

(FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN)

YOUR 291729. THE MINUTES PREPARED BY BOHLEN RELATING TO THE QUESTION OF THE ITALIAN SHIPS WILL BE FOUND BEGINNING WITH THE 2ND PARAGRAPH OF THE MINUTES OF THE 6 PM MEETING 1 DECEMBER. THESE MINUTES ARE AS FOLLOWS "MR MOLOTOV INQUIRED WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN ANY ANSWER ON THE SOVIET UNIONS REQUEST FOR ITALIAN SHIPS. THE PRESIDENT REPLIED HIS POSITION ON THIS QUESTION WAS VERY CLEAR THAT THE ALLIES HAD RECEIVED A LARGE NUMBER OF ITALIAN MERCHANT SHIPS AND A LESSER NUMBER OF WARSHIPS AND THAT HE FELT THEY SHOULD BE USED BY OUR 3 NATIONS IN THE COMMON CAUSE UNTIL THE END

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18

16-50520-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

CHAPTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM _____			PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE _____			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____			PRIORITY
DECODED BY _____			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY _____			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

PAGE 2 OF 5 341823 NCR 6699
 UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
TEXT			

OF THE WAR WHEN THE DIVISION BASED ON TITLE AND POSSESSION MIGHT BE MADE. MR MOLOTOV ANSWERED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD USE THESE SHIPS DURING THE WAR IN THE COMMON WAR EFFORT AND AFTER THE WAR THE QUESTION OF POSSESSION COULD BE DISCUSSED. THE PRIME MINISTER ASKED WHERE THE SOVIET UNION WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THESE SHIPS DELIVERED. MARSHAL STALIN REPLIED IN THE BLACK SEA IF TURKEY ENTERED THE WAR. IF NOT TO THE NORTHERN PORTS. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID IT WAS A SMALL THING TO ASK IN THE FACE OF THE TREMENDOUS SACRIFICES OF RUSSIA. MARSHAL STALIN SAID THAT HE KNEW HOW GREAT THE NEED FOR WAR VESSELS WAS ON THE PART OF ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES BUT THAT HE THOUGHT THE SOVIETS REQUEST WAS MODEST. BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THEY WERE IN FAVOR OF ACCEPTANCE OF THE SOVIET SUGGESTION. THE

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18

16-50030-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

DRAFTER		EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM _____	FOR ACTION			PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____				ROUTINE
DATE _____				DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____	INFORMATION			PRIORITY
DECODED BY _____				ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY _____				DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

PAGE 5 OF 5

301823

NCR 6699

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT

TEXT

AND NO MENTION WAS MADE OF 1/3 OF THE ITALIAN FLEET BEING TURNED OVER TO THE SOVIET UNION, NOR DO WE KNOW OF ANY DISCUSSION ABOUT ITALIAN SHIPS AT ANY OTHER TIME DURING THE TEHERAN CONFERENCE.

*Recd: 012130Z RUB
Admiral Leahy directed us to hold until morning. A copy has been placed in his box. —*

*Admiral Leahy's copy returned and destroyed, 18 Feb 44.
ame*

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Makes original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

SECRET

SECRET
PRIORITY

29 DECEMBER 1943

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, MOSCOW

PERSONAL AND SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT TO AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN.
PLEASE SEND ME BY TELEGRAPH MR. BOHLEN'S MINUTES BEARING ON
AGREEMENT MADE IN TEHERAN BY CHURCHILL AND ME TO TURN OVER ITALIAN
SHIPS TO SOVIET.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1255, EWT, 29 December 1943.

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.

SECRET

- 1 -

ck
291729

SECRET

December 29, 1943.

PRESIDENT TO HARRIMAN

Please send me by telegraph

Mr. Boland's minutes bearing on agreement made
in Teheran by Churchill and me to turn over
Italian ships to Soviet.

*Changed to "Bohlen's"
per Captain Freeman*

WHL

ams.

Regraded Unclassified

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356

SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING MESSAGE

Secretary, General Staff

December 29, 1943

COMMANDING GENERAL
FREEDOM, ALGIERS

Number 5911

Personal for Eisenhower signed Marshall.

The President desires that you furnish the names of a battleship, a cruiser, a destroyer, and submarines among surrendered Italian warships and names of surrendered Italian merchant ships that can be turned over to the Soviet Government in the near future as at least a token meeting of commitment made at Teheran and without adversely affecting your pending operations.

ORIGINATOR: SCS

INFORMATION: OPD
C of S

CM-OUT-10698 (29 Dec 43) 1912Z ejv

SECRET

COPY No. 18

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

WFO 16-33864-1

Col. Mathewson

December 29, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR

General Marshall

The President desires that Eisenhower be asked to send us the names of a battleship, a cruiser, a destroyer, and submarines among surrendered Italian war ships, and names of surrendered Italian merchant ships that can be turned over to the Soviet Government in the near future as at least a token meeting of commitment made at Teheran and without adversely affecting his (Eisenhower's) pending operations.

/s/ WILLIAM D. LEAHY

COPY

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

December 29, 1943.

SECRET

PRESIDENT TO PRIME

The following is a draft message to Stalin regarding transfer of Italian ships to the Soviet prepared by the American Chiefs of Staff and with which the British Staff Representatives in Washington are in agreement.

I would like to have an expression of your opinion in regard to this question.

*This message was not sent.
See President - Prime Minister
#437, 8 January 1944.*

SECRET-SECURITY

DRAFT OF PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER TO THE BRITISH AND U.S. AMBASSADORS IN MOSCOW.

1. It is desired that you go directly to Premier Stalin and explain to him in full the situation with regard to the transfer of Italian naval units and merchant shipping as indicated below:

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have given careful consideration to the manner and timing of the delivery of captured Italian vessels to be transferred to the U.S.S.R. and have advised us of their conclusions on this subject as follows:

There are grave military objections to the transfer of Italian vessels at this time because of the probable effects that this course will have on pending operations. These effects are as follows:

a. Loss of Italian Navy cooperation. Valuable assistance is now being obtained in the Mediterranean from units of the Italian Fleet on the basis of Italian co-belligerency.

Should the transfer of Italian units to the Soviets alienate ~~the~~ sympathies of the Italian officers and men thus serving the Allied cause, replacements could only be found ~~to~~ at the expense of naval strength in other areas. Moreover this would occur at a moment when our combined Atlantic and Mediterranean naval resources would be very hard stretched to provide the needs of OVERLORD and ANVIL.

Not sent

SECRET-SECURITY

Regraded Unclassified

SECRET-SECURITY

b. Indirect assistance from Italian dockyards and ports.

The U.K. and U.S. are receiving important assistance from Italian yards. The withdrawal of this willing assistance, particularly at Taranto, would throw a serious additional burden on repair and manpower resources and in providing dock-side labour in Italy.

c. Scuttling and Sabotaging.

The ships to be turned over might be scuttled and the remainder sabotaged when the news became known. Apart from the material loss, the psychological effect of such an act would be far reaching.

d. Merchant Shipping.

Most of the Italian ships are presently employed on the Italian coast and in neighbouring waters. These are mostly small coastal vessels. In general, their condition is poor and precludes movement far from their own repair facilities. Removal of this shipping from the Mediterranean at present would leave the Allied Commander-in-Chief with a shortage which could not be made up from other sources without detriment to other operations. It is understood this merchant shipping is desired for employment in the Black Sea, the entry to which is now denied.

SECRET-SECURITY

SECRET-SECURITY

e. Loss of Italian Army Troops.

At the present time Italy, acting as a co-belligerent, is furnishing valuable assistance, including labour and security troops, along our lines of communication in Italy. Some Italian troops have already engaged in action and there is possibility of further assistance from this source. It is considered that this valuable assistance may be lost to the Allies if the transfer of Italian vessels is enforced at this time.

In brief, to initiate transfer of Italian ships to Russian control at this time may cause serious harm to the war effort since:

- (a) Without extensive alterations the Italian ships are quite unsuited for Northern waters and they cannot yet be introduced into the Black Sea.
- (b) Proper operation of these ships in Soviet waters would in any event be impossible without Italian type spares and ammunition supplies, of which there is no great quantity in Italy.
- (c) It would be a considerable time before Soviet crews could work up the ships and in the interval any ships now actively employed, if transferred, would be a dead loss to our naval resources.

SECRET-SECURITY

SECRET-SECURITY

The Combined Chiefs of Staff conclude that:

(a) The present time is inopportune for effecting the transfer of captured Italian ships because of pending Allied Operations

(b) To enforce the transfer at this time would remove needed Italian resources now employed in current operations, and probably result in loss of Italian co-operation thus jeopardising OVERLORD and ANVIL.

~~In~~ In view of the foregoing, the President and Prime Minister believe that, in the interests of the Allied war effort, the implementation of our agreement concerning the Italian ships should be delayed for the time being. In the meantime preparations will be made for delivery at the earliest moment permitted by operations.

SECRET-SECURITY

SECRET
141
STATE TO SYDNEY OFFICIAL

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

SECRET

28 December 1943.

SECRET - SECURITY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER:

Subject: Assignment of ships surrendered to the Allies by Italy.

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have been considering the manner and the timing of the delivery of captured Italian vessels to be transferred to the U.S.S.R. In the examination certain conclusions have been reached which are presented for your consideration.

2. There are grave military objections to the transfer of Italian vessels at this time because of the probable effects that this course will have on pending operations. These effects are as follows:

a. Loss of Italian Navy cooperation.

Valuable assistance is now being obtained in the Mediterranean from 4 Italian cruisers and 3 escort groups. Other escort groups are being formed. Submarines are scheduled for immediate and important anti-submarine training with U.S. and British Navies. Two cruisers are now being used on Atlantic Blockade Runner Patrols. Should the transfer of Italian units to the Russians alienate the sympathies of the Italian officers and men thus serving the Allied cause, replacements could only be found at the expense of the build-up of the British Eastern Fleet and British Pacific Force. Moreover, this would occur at a moment when our combined Atlantic and Mediterranean naval resources would be very hard stretched to provide the needs of OVERLORD and ANVIL.

b. Indirect assistance from Italian dockyards and ports.

The U.K. and U.S. are receiving important assistance from Italian yards. The withdrawal of this willing assistance, particularly at Taranto, would throw

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Regraded Unclassified

SECRET

a serious additional burden on repair and manpower resources and in providing dock-side labour in Italy.

c. Scuttling and Sabotaging.

The ships to be turned over might be scuttled and the remainder sabotaged when the news became known. Apart from the material loss, the psychological effect of such an act would be far-reaching.

d. Merchant shipping.

The most important merchant shipping available consists of one 24,000-ton passenger ship shortly to be employed in Allied trooping, and two 9,000-ton hospital ships, all of which are urgently needed. Most of the Italian ships presently employed on the Italian coast and in neighboring waters are supporting Italian economy. These are mostly small coastal vessels. In general, their condition is poor and precludes movement far from their own repair facilities. Removal of this shipping from the Mediterranean at present would leave the Allied Commander in Chief with a shortage which could not be made up from other sources without detriment to other operations. It is understood this merchant shipping is desired for employment in the Black Sea, the entry to which is now denied.

e. Loss of Italian Army Troops.

At the present time Italy, acting as a co-belligerent, is furnishing valuable assistance, including labor and security troops, along our lines of communication in Italy. Some Italian troops have already engaged in action and there is possibility of further assistance from this source. It is considered that this valuable assistance may be lost to the Allies if the transfer of Italian vessels is enforced at this time.

3. In brief, to initiate transfer of Italian ships to Russian control at this time may cause serious harm to the war effort without compensating gain to the Russian effort since:

a. Without extensive alterations the Italian ships are quite unsuited for Northern waters and they cannot yet be introduced into the Black Sea.

SECRET

SECRET

b. Proper operation of these ships in Soviet waters would in any event be impossible without Italian type spares and ammunition supplies, of which there is no great quantity in Italy itself.

c. It would be a considerable time before Soviet crews could work up the ships and in the interval any ships now actively employed, if transferred, would be a dead loss to our naval resources.

4. It is recommended the U.S.S.R. be informed that:

a. The present time is inopportune for effecting the transfer of captured Italian ships because of pending Allied operations.

b. To enforce the transfer at this time would remove needed Italian resources now employed in current operations, and probably result in loss of Italian cooperation, thus jeopardizing OVERLORD and ANVIL;

c. At the earliest moment permitted by operations, the implementation of the delivery of Italian vessels will proceed.

For the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

William D. Leahy
WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy.

SECRET

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

COPY NO. 18

925-3
(C.C.S. 448/2)

925

28 December 1943

{1} CCS 448
{2} CCS 448/1

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

ASSIGNMENT OF SHIPS SURRENDERED TO THE ALLIES BY ITALY

U.S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

COPY NO. 18

C.C.S. 448/2

28 December 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

ASSIGNMENT OF SHIPS SURRENDERED TO THE ALLIES BY ITALY

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, a memorandum for the President and the Prime Minister, prepared by the Combined Staff Planners, as amended and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff by informal action was dispatched 28 December 1943.

H. REDMAN,
F. B. ROYAL,
Combined Secretariat.

ENCLOSURE

28 December 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER:

Subject: Assignment of ships surrendered to the Allies by Italy.

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have been considering the manner and the timing of the delivery of captured Italian vessels to be transferred to the U.S.S.R. In the examination certain conclusions have been reached which are presented for your consideration.

2. There are grave military objections to the transfer of Italian vessels at this time because of the probable effects that this course will have on pending operations. These effects are as follows:

a. Loss of Italian Navy cooperation.

Valuable assistance is now being obtained in the Mediterranean from 4 Italian cruisers and 3 escort groups. Other escort groups are being formed. Submarines are scheduled for immediate and important anti-submarine training with U.S. and British Navies. Two cruisers are now being used on Atlantic Blockade Runner Patrols. Should the transfer of Italian units to the Russians alienate the sympathies of the Italian officers and men thus serving the Allied cause, replacements could only be found at the expense of the build-up of the British Eastern Fleet and British Pacific Force. Moreover, this would occur at a moment when our combined Atlantic and Mediterranean naval resources would be very hard stretched to provide the needs of OVERLORD and ANVIL.

b. Indirect assistance from Italian dockyards and ports.

The U.K. and U.S. are receiving important assistance from Italian yards. The withdrawal of this willing assistance, particularly at Taranto, would throw a serious addi-

tional burden on repair and manpower resources and in providing dock-side labor in Italy.

c. Scuttling and Sabotaging.

The ships to be turned over might be scuttled and the remainder sabotaged when the news became known. Apart from the material loss, the psychological effect of such an act would be far-reaching.

d. Merchant shipping.

The most important merchant shipping available consists of one 24,000-ton passenger ship shortly to be employed in Allied trooping, and two 9,000-ton hospital ships, all of which are urgently needed. Most of the Italian ships presently employed on the Italian coast and in neighboring waters are supporting Italian economy. These are mostly small coastal vessels. In general, their condition is poor and precludes movement far from their own repair facilities. Removal of this shipping from the Mediterranean at present would leave the Allied Commander in Chief with a shortage which could not be made up from other sources without detriment to other operations. It is understood this merchant shipping is desired for employment in the Black Sea, the entry to which is now denied.

e. Loss of Italian Army Troops.

At the present time Italy, acting as a co-belligerent, is furnishing valuable assistance, including labor and security troops, along our lines of communication in Italy. Some Italian troops have already engaged in action and there is possibility of further assistance from this source. It is considered that this valuable assistance may be lost to the Allies if the transfer of Italian vessels is enforced at this time.

3. In brief, to initiate transfer of Italian ships to Russian control at this time may cause serious harm to the war effort without compensating gain to the Russian effort since:

a. Without extensive alterations the Italian ships are quite unsuited for Northern waters and they cannot yet be introduced into the Black Sea.

b. Proper operation of these ships in Soviet waters would in any event be impossible without Italian type spares and ammunition supplies, of which there is no great quantity in Italy itself.

c. It would be a considerable time before Soviet crews could work up the ships and in the interval any ships now actively employed, if transferred, would be a dead loss to our naval resources.

4. It is recommended the U.S.S.R. be informed that:

a. The present time is inopportune for effecting the transfer of captured Italian ships because of pending Allied operations.

b. To enforce the transfer at this time would remove needed Italian resources now employed in current operations, and probably result in loss of Italian cooperation, thus jeopardizing OVERLORD and ANVIL.

c. At the earliest moment permitted by operations, the implementation of the delivery of Italian vessels will proceed.

For the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy.

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

COPY NO. 66

925-2
(C.C.S. 448/1)

925
(1) C.C.S. 448

25 December 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

ASSIGNMENT OF SHIPS SURRENDERED TO THE ALLIES BY ITALY
Reference: C.C.S. 448

C.C.S. 448/1

25 December 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

ASSIGNMENT OF SHIPS SURRENDERED TO THE ALLIES BY ITALY
Reference: C.C.S. 448

Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff

The British Chiefs of Staff have now sent us a further message giving their views with regard to Italian merchant ships. The message is as follows:-

"1. Up to the present the only Italian ships which have been found capable of service outside the immediate theater of Italian operations are one 24,000-ton passenger ship allocated to the United States for trooping and two 9,000-ton hospital ships, neither of which could be spared. There are also two 10,000-ton cargo liners. Other ships captured may, on completion of repairs, be available for service in other waters but they are not likely to be ready for some months.

2. It is not known here what type of merchant ships the Russians have in mind. Most of the Italian ships at present employed on the Italian coast and neighboring waters could not physically be moved to other theaters. Further, the removal of shipping from the Mediterranean at present would leave the Allied Commander-in-Chief with a serious shortage which could not be made good. The Allied Commander in Chief must be given an opportunity to express his views. There is no possibility of replacement from British resources or, we understand, from American. We assume there is no question of handing over ships to Russian control while they are operating in the Italian theater.

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

3. Subject to the views of the Allied Commander-in-Chief we are quite prepared to discuss with the Russians the allocation of suitable ships for their purposes when things have moved far enough to permit them to be used in Russian war service.

4. Terms of employment by the Russians would require consideration as presumably Italian crews could not serve in a Russian theater. No question of assigning title to the Russians would arise at present until the claims of all the United Nations can be taken into account."

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

COPY NO. 65

925-1
(C.C.S. 448)

24 December 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

ASSIGNMENT OF SHIPS SURRENDERED TO THE
ALLIES BY ITALY

U.S. SECRET

COPY NO. 65

BRITISH MOST SECRET

C.C.S. 448

24 December 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

ASSIGNMENT OF SHIPS SURRENDERED TO THE
ALLIES BY ITALY

Memorandum by the Representatives of the British
Chiefs of Staff

1. We have now received the attached Appreciation from the British Chiefs of Staff regarding the President's instructions to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the subject of transfer of Italian ships to the U.S.S.R.

2. We recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should report to the President and the Prime Minister in the sense of this Appreciation.

E N C L O S U R E

APPRECIATION BY THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

1. As we understand it the situation before the Teheran Conference was that the Russians had laid claim to the following Italian Fleet units and merchant shipping - 1 battleship, 1 cruiser, 8 destroyers, 4 submarines, 40,000 tons merchant shipping.

2. During the visit to Moscow the British Foreign Secretary informed the Soviet Government that we agreed in principle that they should have a share of the captured Italian ships and that the proportion for which they asked was reasonable. Details and dates of delivery were to be settled with regard to operations and not losing Italian aid by precipitate publicity.

3. It now appears that the President on the basis of a discussion at Teheran has informed Mr. Harriman that "It is his intention that Italian surrendered ships to the number of one-third of the total be allocated to the Soviet commencing about 1 February as rapidly as they can be made available from their present employment in the Allied war effort." This means that Soviet would get about 1 or 2 battleships, 2 or 3 cruisers, 3 destroyers, 6 torpedo boats, 6 corvettes and 10 submarines.

4. We are alarmed at the new proposals which may well have the following effects:

a. Loss of Italian Navy's cooperation. Although no battleships are being employed in the war effort, 4 Italian cruisers and 3 escort groups, besides a number of individual vessels, are actively employed in the interests of the Allied cause in the Mediterranean. Further escort groups are being formed. Moreover, 2 cruisers are being used on Atlantic blockade runner patrols. Fourteen submarines are scheduled for immediate A/S training with both the U.S. and British Navies. More are expected to be employed in this valuable

service in due course. Should the transfer of Italian units to the Russians alienate the sympathies of the Italian officers and men thus serving the Allied cause replacements could only be found at the expense of the build-up of the British Eastern Fleet and British Pacific Force. Moreover this would occur at a moment when our combined Atlantic and Mediterranean naval resources would be very hard stretched to provide the needs of OVERLORD and ANVIL.

b. Indirect assistance in Italian dockyards, ports, etc.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff are aware of the heavy congestion imposed on U.K. conversion and repair facilities by the needs of OVERLORD. This congestion is already delaying the modernization of British warships for the war against Japan and the repair of damaged units. Moreover the date of the withdrawal of landing ships and craft from Mediterranean operations for OVERLORD is dependent on the refit and repair facilities both on that station and at home which are fully stretched. This state of affairs is accentuated by the recent decision to execute ANVIL. In the light of the foregoing the withdrawal of the willing Italian cooperation we are now receiving in Italian yards, particularly at Taranto, would be disastrous and would necessitate a complete recasting of the Mediterranean and U.K. refitting programmes. It would also throw a serious additional burden on our manpower resources in provision of dockside labor in Italy.

c. Scuttling and Sabotage. The ships to be turned over might be scuttled and the remainder sabotaged when the news became known.

5. It is not clear from the President's telegram what procedure is to be used for obtaining transfer of the ships. If however we proceed to enforce a transfer of Italian Fleet units to the Soviet at the present time, we must be prepared to face some or all of the above consequences. We consider this risk unacceptable. Given time and a tactful diplomatic approach, we do not however exclude the possibility of arranging transfer in due course particularly if it is made plain that compliance with

our proposals will stand them in good stead in the post war settlement.

6. Once our armies and air force are established ashore in France with the consequential loss to the Germans of their main Atlantic and Mediterranean U-boat bases, the situation will alter and the consequences outlined in para. 4 a. and 4 b. above might be risked.

7. Even if the Italians willingly acquiesced in the transfer of naval units to the Soviet, this would involve the immobilization of Italian naval personnel at a time when we ourselves are desperately short. Such a state of affairs cannot be beneficial to the common war aim and could only be relieved by the transfer of certain unmanned vessels to the Italians in lieu in order to maintain our naval effort at its maximum. This would create serious difficulties with our other Allies.

8. No corresponding gain would result to the common war effort from the immediate transfer of the ships or even to Soviet naval operations, since -

a. Without extensive alterations the Italian ships are quite unsuited for Northern waters and they cannot yet be introduced into the Black Sea.

b. Proper maintenance of these ships in Soviet bases would in any event be impossible without adequate spares and ammunition supplies, of which there is no great quantity in Italy itself.

c. It would be a considerable time before Soviet crews could work up the ships and in the interval any ships now actively employed, if transferred, would be a dead loss to our naval resources.

9. Taking into consideration the above factors we consider that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be invited to report in the above sense to the President and Prime Minister.

DRAFT

U.S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

D R A F T

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER:

Subject: Assignment of Ships surrendered to the Allies by Italy.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have been considering the manner and the timing of the delivery of captured Italian vessels to be transferred to the U.S.S.R. In the examination certain conclusions have been reached which are presented for your consideration.

2. There are grave military objections to the transfer of Italian vessels at this time because of the probable effects that this course will have on pending operations. These effects are as follows:-

(a) Loss of Italian Navy co-operation.

Valuable assistance is now being obtained in the Mediterranean from 4 Italian cruisers and 3 escort groups. Other escort groups are being formed. Submarines are scheduled for immediate and important anti-submarine training with U.S. and British Navies. Two cruisers are now being used on Atlantic Blockade Runner Patrols. Should the transfer of Italian units to the Russians alienate the sympathies of the Italian officers and men thus serving the Allied cause replacements could only be found at the expense of the build-up of the British Eastern Fleet and British Pacific Force. Moreover, this would occur at a moment when our combined Atlantic and Mediterranean naval resources would be very hard stretched to provide the needs of OVERLORD and ANVIL.

(b) Indirect assistance from Italian dockyards and ports.

The U.K. and U.S. are receiving important assistance from Italian yards. The withdrawal of this willing assistance, particularly at Taranto, would throw a serious

additional burden on repair and manpower resources and in providing dock-side labour in Italy.

(c) Scuttling and Sabotaging.

The ships to be turned over might be scuttled and the remainder sabotaged when the news became known. *Apart from the material loss, the psychological effect of such an act would be far-reaching.*

(d) Merchant Shipping.

The most important merchant shipping available consist of one 24,000-ton passenger ship shortly to be employed in Allied trooping, and two 9,000-ton hospital ships, all of which are urgently needed. Most of the Italian ships presently employed on the Italian coast and in neighbouring waters are supporting Italian economy. These are mostly small coastal vessels. In general, their condition is poor and precludes movement far from their own repair facilities. Removal of this shipping from the Mediterranean at present would leave the Allied Commander-in-Chief with a shortage which could not be made up from other sources without detriment to other operations. It is understood this merchant shipping is desired for employment in the Black Sea, the entry to which is now denied.

(e) Loss of Italian Army Troops.

At the present time Italy, acting as a co-belligerent, is furnishing valuable assistance, including labour and security troops, along our lines of communication in Italy. Some Italian troops have already engaged in action and there is possibility of further assistance from this source. It is considered that this valuable assistance may be lost to the Allies if the transfer of Italian vessels is enforced at this time.

3. In brief, to initiate transfer of Italian ships to Russian control at this time may cause serious harm to the war effort without compensating gain to the Russian effort since:-

(a) Without extensive alterations the Italian ships are quite unsuited for Northern waters and they cannot yet be introduced into the Black Sea.

(b) Proper operation of these ships in Soviet waters would in any event be impossible without Italian type spares and ammunition supplies, of which there is no great quantity in Italy itself.

(c) It would be a considerable time before Soviet crews could work up the ships and in the interval any ships now actively employed, if transferred, would be a dead loss to our naval resources.

4. It is recommended the U.S.S.R. be informed that:

(a) The present time is inopportune for effecting the transfer of captured Italian ships because of pending Allied operations;

(b) To enforce the transfer at this time would remove needed Italian resources now employed in current operations, and probably result in loss of Italian co-operation thus jeopardising OVERLORD and ANVIL;

(c) At the earliest moment permitted by operations, the implementation of the delivery of Italian vessels will proceed.

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

COPY NO. 23

24 December 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 172

EMPLOYMENT AND DISPOSITION OF THE ITALIAN
FLEET AND MERCANTILE MARINE
(Cunningham-de Courten Agreement)

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, the Cunningham-de Courten Agreement on the employment and disposition of the Italian Fleet and Mercantile Marine, as amended at Brindisi on 17 November 1943, is circulated for the information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

H. REDMAN,
F. B. ROYAL,
Combined Secretariat.

E N C L O S U R E

New Armistice having been signed between the head of the Italian Government and the Allied Commander in Chief under which all Italian warships and the Italian Mercantile Marine were placed unconditionally at the disposal of the United Nations, and His Majesty the King of Italy and the Italian Government having since expressed the wish that the fleet and the Italian Mercantile Marine should be employed in the Allied effort to assist in the prosecution of the war against the Axis Powers, the following principles are established on which the Italian Navy and Mercantile Marine will be disposed.

It is understood and agreed that the provisions of this agreement as to immediate employment and disposition of Italian warships and merchant ships do not affect the right of the United Nations to make such other dispositions of any or all Italian ships as they may think fit. Their decisions in this respect will be notified to the Italian Government from time to time.

(A) Such ships as can be employed to assist actively in the Allied effort will be kept in commission and will be used under the orders of the Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, as may be arranged between the Allied Commander in Chief and the Italian Government.

(B) Ships which cannot be so employed will be reduced to a care and maintenance basis and be placed in designated ports, measures of disarmament being undertaken as may be necessary.

(C) The Government of Italy will declare the names and whereabouts of warships, merchant ships, now in their possession which previously belonged to any of the United Nations; these vessels are to be returned forthwith as may be directed by the Allied Commander in Chief. This will be without prejudice to negotiations between the governments which may subsequently be made in connection with replacing losses of ships of the United Nations caused by Italian action.

(D) The Allied Naval Commander in Chief will act as the agent of the Allied Commander in Chief in all matters concerning the employment of the Italian Fleet or Merchant Navy, their disposition and related matters.

(E) It should be clearly understood that the extent to which the terms of the armistice are modified to allow the arrangements outlined above and which follow, are dependent upon the extent and effectiveness of Italian cooperation.

Method of operation. The Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, will place at the disposal of the Italian Ministry of Marine a high ranking Naval Officer with the appropriate staff who will be responsible to the Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, for all matters in connection with the operation of the Italian Fleet, and be the medium through which dealings will be carried out in connection with the Italian Mercantile Marine. The Flag Officer acting with these duties (Flag Officer, Liaison) will keep the Italian Ministry of Marine informed of the requirements of the Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, and will act in close cooperation as regards issue of all orders to the Italian Fleet.

Proposed disposition of the Italian Fleet.

(A) All battleships will be placed on a care and maintenance basis in ports to be designated and will have such measures of disarmament applied as may be directed. These measures of disarmament will be such that the ships can be brought into operation again if it so seems desirable. Each ship will have on board a proportion of Italian Naval personnel to keep the ships in proper condition and the Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, will have the right of inspection at any time.

(B) Cruisers. Such cruisers as can be of immediate assistance will be kept in commission. At present it is visualized that 1 squadron of 4 cruisers will suffice and the remainder will be kept in care and maintenance as for the battleships but at a rather greater degree of readiness to be brought into service if required.

(C) Destroyers and Torpedo boats. It is proposed to keep these in commission and to use them on escort and similar duties as may be requisite. It is proposed that they should be divided into escort groups working as units and that they should be based in Italian Ports.

(D) Small craft. MAS, Minesweepers, Auxiliaries and similar small craft will be employed to the full, detailed arrangements being made with the Flag Officer (Liaison) by the Italian Ministry of Marine for their best employment.

(E) Submarines. In the first instance submarines will be immobilized in ports to be designated and at a later date these may be brought into service as may be required to assist the Allied effort.

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

Status of Italian Navy. Under this modification of the Armistice Terms, all the Italian ships will continue to fly their flag. A large proportion of the Italian Navy will thus remain in active commission operating their own ships and fighting alongside the forces of the United Nations against the Axis powers.

The requisite Liaison Officers will be supplied to facilitate the working of the Italian ships in cooperation with Allied Forces. A small Italian Liaison Mission will be attached to the headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, to deal with matters affecting the Italian fleet.

Mercantile Marine. It is the intention that the Italian Mercantile Marine should operate under the same conditions as the merchant ships of the Allied Nations. That is to say, all mercantile shipping of the United Nations is formed into a pool which is employed as may be considered necessary for the benefit of all the United Nations. In this will naturally be included the requirements for the supply and maintenance of Italy. The system will be analagous to that used in North Africa, where the North Africa shipping board controls all United States, British and French shipping under certain agreements which will have to be arranged in detail in so far as Italian ships are concerned. While it may be expected that a proportion of Italian ships will be working within the Mediterranean and to and from Italian Ports, it must be appreciated that this will not always necessarily be the case and ships flying the Italian Flag may be expected to be used elsewhere as is done with the merchant ships of all the United Nations. Italian ships employed as outlined in this paragraph will fly the Italian Flag and will be manned so far as possible by crews provided by Italian Ministry of Marine and will fly the Italian flag.

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEES	
RELEASED BY _____	FOR ACTION	CNO	PRIORITY
DATE 24 DECEMBER 1943.			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM 1325/24.			DEFERRED
DECODED BY GERMAN	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY GERMAN			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY GERMAN			DEFERRED

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE

232019 NCR 1812

ORIGINATOR	FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
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ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

PART 1 232015 NCR 1813 PART 2 232019 NCR 1812

(PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN.)

REFERRING TO YOUR CABLE TO ME USNAVCOM 211720 OF DECEMBER 1 BEG RESPECTFULLY TO MENTION THAT THE REQUEST STALIN MADE TO YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER AT TEHERAN WAS FOR THE FULFILLMENT OF THE SOVIET REQUEST FOR A SPECIFIC NUMBER OF ITALIAN SHIPS, NAMELY ONE BATTLESHIP, ONE CRUISER, EIGHT DESTROYERS AND FOUR SUBMARINES FOR DISPATCH TO NORTH RUSSIA AND 40,000 TONS DISPLACEMENT OF MERSHIPPING FOR USE IN THE BLACK SEA.

AFTER SOME DISCUSSION BOTH YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER AGREED THAT THE SOVIET REQUEST SHOULD BE APPROVED AND THAT THE DELIVERY OF THE SHIPS WAS TO BE MADE BY THE 1ST OF FEBRUARY. NO MENTION WAS MADE AT MOSCOW OR TEHERAN OF THEIR GETTING ADDITIONAL SHIPS UP TO ONE-THIRD OF THOSE CAPTURED.

I BELIEVE STALIN EXPECTS ALL THE SHIPS HE REQUESTED

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-I OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

*Copy to [unclear]
 241800Z
 PUB*

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

WDL (2)
mf

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALUSNA MOSCOW</u>		OPNAV	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY			ROUTINE RRR
DATE <u>23 DECEMBER, 1943</u>	FOR ACTION	DECLASSIFIED JCS memo, 1-4-74 By RHP, NLR, Date	DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM <u>1736</u>			PRIORITY
DECODED BY <u>KEENER</u>			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY <u>ROBINSON</u>	INFORMATION		DEFERRED
			MAY 2 1974

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

221429 NCR 1294

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	ACT
TEXT			

*Returned copy to
Ad. Leahy 2418002
RUB*

(FOR JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF FROM DEANE)

U.S. NAVCOM 221720 RECEIVED FROM THE PRESIDENT INDICATES HIS INTENTION (TO ALLOCATE TO THE SOVIET WAR EFFORT ITALIAN SURRENDERED SHIPS TO A NUMBER OF ONE THIRD OF THE TOTAL COMMENCING ABOUT ONE FEBRUARY, AND FURTHER THAT HE HAS REQUESTED THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF TO ISSUE NECESSARY ORDERS TO GEN. EISENHOWER. IN ANTICIPATION OF SOVIET QUESTIONS WE ASK THAT THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH MISSIONS BE INFORMED WHETHER INTENTIONS ^{IS} ~~AS~~ TO HAVE SHIPS ITALIAN MANNED OR TURN SOME DIRECTLY OVER TO SOVIETS. IS LOCAL ESTIMATE DESIRED AS TO NUMBER SOVIETS CAN MAN. ALSO REQUEST EARLY INFO ON NAMES SHIPS ALLOCATED, SCHEDULE AND PLACE DELIVERY AND OTHER PERTINENT INFORMATION.

ACT: JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.....

NAVAIDE...FILE.

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED



Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

From: Opanav
To : Alusna, London

NUMBER 422, PERSONAL AND SECRET, FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE NAVAL PERSON.

I have just received the following message from Harriman 20 December:

"Request that I be informed of the action taken to carry out the commitment made by you and the Prime Minister at the Teheran Conference that the Italian ships requested by the Soviets should be delivered on one February, as I shall undoubtedly be queried at a meeting with Molotov scheduled for Friday or Saturday to discuss unfinished business of Teheran."

I have sent the following reply:

"It is my intention that Italian surrendered ships to a number of one-third of the total be allocated commencing about one February to the Soviet war effort as rapidly as they can be made available from their present employment in the Allied war effort.

"After the surrender of our common enemies the title of ownership will be decided.

"I have requested Combined Chiefs of Staff to issue necessary orders to General Eisenhower."

ROOSEVELT

SECRET

- 1 -

COPY

December 21, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR

Combined Chiefs of Staff:

The President and the Prime Minister at Teheran agreed to assign for Soviet war use one-third of the ships surrendered to the allies by Italy, to begin the assignment about February first, title of ownership to be decided upon after the surrender of our common enemies. *note! here*

The President desires that the Combined Chiefs of Staff issue to General Eisenhower the orders necessary to accomplish this.

/s/ WILLIAM D. LEAHY

COPY

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356

SECRET
PRIORITY

21 DECEMBER 1943

FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, MOSCOW

Cew

Minister x
FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN FROM THE PRESIDENT *Referred to Prime*
REFERRING TO YOUR MESSAGE, ALUSNA MOSCOW 201719 DECEMBER, IT IS
MY INTENTION THAT ITALIAN SURRENDERED SHIPS TO A NUMBER OF ONE THIRD
OF THE TOTAL BE ALLOCATED TO THE SOVIET WAR EFFORT AS RAPIDLY AS THEY
CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE FROM THEIR PRESENT EMPLOYMENT IN THE ALLIED WAR
EFFORT COMMENCING ABOUT FEBRUARY FIRST.

TITLE OF OWNERSHIP TO BE DECIDED AFTER THE SURRENDER OF OUR
COMMON ENEMIES.

I HAVE REQUESTED COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF TO ISSUE NECESSARY
ORDERS TO GENERAL EISENHOWER.

ROOSEVELT

FOR

*Released by President
at 1230 Dec. 21, 1943
with direction that a
copy be sent to Prime
Minister. Cew*

*Released copy to
Ad. Leahy. 29/1800Z
RWB*

211720
NER 7416

SECRET

December 21, 1943.

PRESIDENT TO HARRIMAN

Referring to your message, ~~the~~ _____

Alusna Moscow 201719,

of 21 December it is my intention that Italian surrendered ships to a number of one third of the total be allocated to the Soviet war effort as rapidly as they can be made available from their present employment in the allied war effort commencing about February first.

Title of ownership to be decided after *the* surrender of our common enemies.

I have requested Combined Chiefs of Staff to issue necessary orders to General Eisenhower.

WS

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALUSNA MOSCOW</u>		OPNAV	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			RRRRRRR
DATE <u>21 DEC., 1943</u>			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM <u>0839</u>	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
DECODED BY <u>HATCH</u>			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY <u>HATCH</u>			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

201719 NCR 9929

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
TEXT			

PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN.
 AT THE TEHRAN CONFERENCE YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER AGREED
 THAT THE ITALIAN SHIPS REQUESTED BY THE SOVIETS SHOULD BE
 DELIVERED ON ONE FEBRUARY. REQUEST THAT I BE INFORMED OF
 THE ACTION TAKEN TO CARRY OUT THIS COMMITMENT AS I SHALL
 UNDOUBTEDLY BE QUERIED BY MOLOTOV AT A MEETING WITH HIM
 SCHEDULED FOR FRIDAY OR SATURDAY TO DISCUSS UNFINISHED
 BUSINESS OF TEHRAN.

*Retained copy
 do not leaky
 241800
 RUS*

NAVAIDE.....ACTION

Delivered to President via usher

210925

No. 1 ORIGINAL No. 2 FILE No. 3 CHARTROOM No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18

16-30620-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

SECRET SECRET

SECRET

30 November 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

1. This paper has been prepared at the instance of Mr. Hopkins, to be available if needed.

2. It is believed that this matter should not be brought up or initiated by the U. S. side unless the occasion demands.

ROYAL.

This has been cleared with General Marshall, Admiral King and General Arnold.

ROYAL

SECRET

SECRET SECURITY

30 November 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

From: The United States Chiefs of Staff.

Subject: Allocation of Italian Ships to the U.S.S.R.

The question of the allocation of Italian ships to the U.S.S.R., as requested at the Moscow Conference, may be brought up during the EUREKA proceedings.

9/11/44 (//) (//)
The original Russian request was for 1 battleship, 1 cruiser, 8 destroyers, 4 submarines and 40,000 displacement tons of merchant shipping. This request is the subject of the exchange of a number of dispatches between our delegation in Moscow and the President. During these exchanges the allocation, or possible allocation, of one-third of the Italian Fleet for the use of the U.S.S.R. was concurred in by the United States. However, it is understood that the U.S.S.R. would not be prepared at this time to man and employ one-third of the Italian Fleet.

If the allocation of Italian ships to the U.S.S.R. is brought up at this time, the action agreed upon should be solely with regard to its influence on the prosecution of the war. The following factors are to be considered:

a. The turning over of Italian ships to the Russians at this time would have a serious adverse effect on the prosecution of the war in Italy and in such other places as Italian forces are now cooperating. It seems quite possible that the Italian crews, before surrendering the ships to the Russians would scuttle. Italy has been accepted as a co-belligerent. The surrender of Italian ships would provide valuable propaganda for use by the enemy with the Italians in Germany, occupied Italy, even elsewhere.

b. Italian ships would not come provided with spare parts and ammunition. Further, they would probably require some modernization, especially as regards anti-aircraft armament, which the U.S.S.R. has no means of effecting.

- 1 -

SECRET SECURITY

SECRET SECURITY.

It is recommended that it continue to be agreed in principle that one-third of the Italian warships that are allocated for transfer to powers other than Italy be allocated for the use of the U.S.S.R. It is further recommended that any question of the allocation of Italian naval ships to other powers be deferred, at least until after the conclusion of Allied offensive operations in Italy.

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

- 2 -

SECRET SECURITY.

Regraded Unclassified

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

CDA 343
31/2305
mjk

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

U R G E N T

From: MA Lisbon
To: MILID Washington, DC
No: 926 31 August 1943

Kennan's reply to Strong's 648,

"Solborg and I have now conferred personally with man in question. As he was not prepared to be sufficiently detailed about present position of ships and plans for their departure we did not feel justified in telling him destinations to which they might go. Talk thus remained exploratory. He leaves for Italy tonight and proposes communicate with us further as soon as company is prepared to give full data on position and condition of ships and plans for departure. Evacuation of ships would obviously be most difficult without connivance of WOP Naval Authorities. We do not believe from talk that such collaboration has yet been worked out by company. It has occurred to me that entire action might conceivably be absorbed by scope of any armistice arrangements affecting WOP Naval ships which are being or might be considered. In that case WOP Navy could handle liaison with company and further contact thru us would not be necessary."

In spite of Kennan's request not repeated to Eisenhower because of secret security.

Hosig

648 is CM-OUT-12468 (30 Aug 43) GEN STRONG
ACTION: GEN STRONG
INFORMATION: OPD, C OF S, ADM KING

CM-IN-76 (1 Sep 43) 0223Z mcs

SECRET

COPY No. 20

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SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

CDA 354
Filed 31/2305
erb

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL
COPY 1 1943
1904

SECURITY CONTROL

CORRECTED COPY

URGENT

From: Lisbon
To: MILID

No. 927, 31st August 1943

Personal study and interrogation of man in question lead me to believe his original statements were given too hopeful interpretation and were passed to Kennan in terms not warranted by subjects declarations. Personal to Strong re my 926 I conclude he is very junior in firm he represents and could not have made any declarations which would allow assumption that his company was ready to turn over ships. He insisted to me that his statements are personal conversational and almost casual. I believe matter was not mature enough to alert high levels. I am inclined to doubt further development within this framework. Following Danish events it would be well to assume Germ vigilance over WOP shipping is intensified. Not repeated anywhere.

Solborg

NOTE: Corrected copy of CM-IN-123 (1 Sep 43) Gen Strong.

ACTION: General Strong

INFORMATION: OPD
Admiral King

CM-IN-140 (1 Sep 43) 0454Z ems

SECRET

White House
COPY No. 17

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SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

JDJD C 73
1911B/30
EW

INCOMING MESSAGE

30 August 1943
1808Z

SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

URGENT

From: Algiers
To: AGWAR

No. W 8724, 30 August 1943

Plan outlined approved (for the personal attention of General Strong WDGBI from Eisenhower reference your 6272 of August 28th) provided ships concerned can reach Malta, Tripoli, or Bizerte where they will be refueled for passage to Gibraltar, refueled there and directed to proceed United States. Air coverage and escort can be provided. Malta should be approached on easterly course. Request I be given detailed information as much in advance as conditions permit.

No Sig

FOOTNOTE: 6272 is CM-OUT-11687 (28 Aug 43) Gen Strong

ACTION: GEN STRONG

INFORMATION: OPD
C of S

CM-IN-22935 (30 Aug 43) 1844Z fbh

1N-76 Linton 926 ?
1N 140 Linton 927 }

SECRET

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COPY No. 29

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

Executive Office G-2 MIS
WDGBI GVS/td

August 30, 1943

MILATTACHE AMLEGATION
LISBON PORTUGAL

Number 648

Pass to Kennan at once citing his 1906 27th August to state. (Secret security) in view of urgent importance of matter and time element involved the following information is given you direct rather than being sent through State Department.

Eisenhower was informed of substance of your 1906 and states in reply that he approves plan provided ships can reach either Malta, Tripoli or Bizerte at which places they can be refueled for passage to Gibraltar and there fueled before proceeding to this country. Air coverage and escort can be provided by Eisenhower who requires detailed information as early as conditions permit. He likewise specifies that Malta should be approached on an Easterly course.

It is requested that in developing this matter you deal with Eisenhower through Military Attache who is directed to place all facilities of his office at your disposal. If necessary he may also utilize facilities of Military Attache Madrid.

State Department is being informed of substance of this message. We would appreciate being kept informed through your Military Attache of developments and message to Kennan.

Some doubt exists in our mind as to whether Malta should be approached on an Easterly course or Westerly course. Before final action is taken check either direct or through Madrid with Eisenhower as to bearing.

Strong

ORIGINATOR: General Strong (State Dept)

INFORMATION: OPD, C of S, Adm King

CM-OUT-12468

SECRET

(30 Aug 43)

2047Z GOPY No. 22

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W. House

SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING MESSAGE

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

G-2--MIS, Executive Office
WDGBI/GVS/ml

August 28, 1943

CG ALLIED FORCE HQS
FREEDOM ALGIERS

Number 6272

Legation in Lisbon reports arrival of representative of Italian Consulich Steamship Company making contact with Winchester of Pan American to transmit the following information for Eisenhower in person from Strong WDGBI signed Marshall. Following vessels are in Italian ports: Rex, Duilio, Vulcania, Saturnia, Comte de Savoia, Giulio Cesare along with a number of unnamed freighters. Company wishes to deliver ships which are generally in good condition to our authorities without delay for fear they be seized or scuttled by Germans. They prefer that we rather than British have them. Fuel is short but they probably have enough to move from 1 Italian port to another. Agent expects to return to Italy on August 31st.

Above is furnished for your information in the event that you have not already been notified from Lisbon. Since policy involved is covered by general instructions already sent you and since decision as to procedure must be made by you no action will be taken here except Navy is furnishing you full details as to ships in question. Attaches in Madrid and Lisbon are entirely at your disposal.

ORIGINATOR: Gen. Strong

INFORMATION: OPD
SGS
LOG

CM-OUT-11687 (28 Aug 43) 1438Z lee

White House

SECRET

COPY No.

21

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

WHITE 142

28 August 1943

From: Map Room

To: The President, ^{Hyde Park} Quebec, Canada.

Supplement to WHITE 141. Navy has supplied General Eisenhower with full information on the vessels in question and has placed Alusna Lisbon at his disposal for any negotiations he may wish to undertake.

August 28 1943 2140Z

WHITE 141

28 August 1943.

From: Map Room

To: The President, ^{Hyde} Quebec, ^{Canada} Canada.

Reference BLACK 15.

Dispatch from Lisbon about Italian ships had already been sent by General Marshall to Eisenhower for action. Admiral King has been informed.

August 28 1943 1917Z

Regraded Unclassified

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356

BLACK 15

August 28, 1943

Hyde Park
From: The President, Quebec, Canada.

For: Colonel Hammond

Reference to WHITE 139.

Ask General Marshall and Admiral King how the dispatch from Lisbon about Italian ships is being handled and say that my impression is that it should be handled by Eisenhower.

SECRETPARAPHRASE

August 28, 1943

From: Lisbon

Dated: August 27, 9 p.m.

Telegram no. 1906

Rec'd: August 27, 10:57 p.m.

There has just arrived in Lisbon an official of the Consulich Steamship Company. He has made contact with Winchester of Pan American, whom he knew in Italy formerly. This official's authority to speak for the company cannot be questioned. He came to Lisbon in order that the following information might be transmitted to the American authorities:

Following vessels of the Consulich Company are now in Italian ports: GIULIO CESARE, COMTE DE SAVOIA, SATURNIA, REX, DUILIO, and VULCANIA. In addition to these there are several new freighters. Passenger vessels have not been altered for other uses and the ships are in generally good condition. The company wishes to deliver them up at once to our authorities, as they are apprehensive lest they be taken over or scuttled at any moment by the Germans. It is their preference that we, rather than the British, take them over. They do not have fuel for long voyages, but it is his belief that sufficient fuel to move them from one Italian port to another is on hand. It is his desire to receive instructions as to how and where delivery should be effected. On August 31, he expects to return to Italy, but if necessary, in order to take back our reply, he will postpone his trip.

Ports in which these vessels are now located were not indicated by this official. Presumably some are in Trieste. Of course, the GIULIO CESARE is now engaged in prisoner of war exchange, and is at Las Palmas according to press reports.

I am repeating this message to Algiers, in the event that it is a matter for operational headquarters. The Naval Attache has been requested by me to obtain confirmation through his own channels. I will be happy to transmit any reply we may care to make through Winchester.

KENNAN

American Charge d'Affaires
ad interim