Folder 6. MR 530 Japan (1)—Air Operations
Against Japan,
3 February–24 September 1944.
In General Deane's report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the meeting of Stalin, Harriman, and Clark-Kerr on 23 September 1944, he stated, "Harriman discussed with Marshal Stalin Soviet participation in the Japanese war... He made it plain that he was interested in participating in the overall strategic plan with all the Soviet ground and air forces that could be logistically supported and wished such participation to be the subject of our discussions rather than confining the conversations to the narrower subject of the operation of strategic air forces from the Maritime Provinces."

Complete file of messages on Russian participation in Japanese war contained in "MR 310 JAPAN (1)."

---

1. DEANE-JCS, 2438462 NCR 8000, 24 Sept 44.
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
NO: 54, 30 AUGUST 1944.

With reference to your No. 201550Z August, the following reply was received on August 22nd.

QUOTE. PREMIER STALIN TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.

I have received your message on the Pacific Ocean matters.
I understand the significance you attach to these matters.

We also attach great importance to your successes there. I am confident at the same time that you are well aware to what an extent our forces are strained in order to secure success at the present time by way of struggle in Europe. All this allows to hope that the time is not far off when we shall attain a solution of our urgent task and will be able to take up other questions. I hope that General Deane will already now successfully cooperate with our staff. UNQUOTE.

Please inform General Deane.

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED

Published in Stalin's Correspondence with Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman:
Volume 2 Page(s) 152
FROM The President TO Ambassador Harriman

SERIAL or FILE NO. #54, 30 Aug 44.

DATE 30 Aug 44.

TOR Map Room VIA

SUBJECT: Use of Soviet far eastern bases.

ACTION:


2. Quotes STALIN-PRES, 22 Aug 44, to Ambassador Harriman for his information.

3. No reply.

530 JAPAN.

COPY

Regraded Unclassified
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER
NO: 606, 26 AUGUST 1944

... In view of current American conversations in regard to the subsequent use of other Soviet bases, I do not consider it advantageous to the long range general war prospect for me to join with you in proposed message to U.J. [re relief of Poles in Warsaw]. . .
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: AMBASSADOR WINANT, LONDON.
NO: 50, 26 AUGUST 1944

... In view of current American-Soviet conversations that promise success in the subsequent use of air fields, I do not believe it would be good for our long range general war prospects to make a further endeavor to induce Stalin to reverse his present attitude in regard to the use of Soviet air fields to assist Warsaw...
FROM: PREMIER J. V. STALIN
TO: PRESIDENT F. D. ROOSEVELT
DATE: 22 AUGUST 1944.

I have received your message on the Pacific Ocean matters. I understand the significance you attach to these matters. We also attach great importance to your successes there. I am confident at the same time that you are well aware to what an extent our forces are strained in order to secure success for the unfolding struggle in Europe. All this allows to hope that the time is not far off when we shall attain a solution of our urgent task and will be able to take up other questions. I hope that General Deane will already now successfully cooperate with our staff.
SUBJECT: Use of Soviet Far Eastern bases.

ACTION:

1. Answers message sent to Stalin 19 Aug 44, through Ambassador Harriman. (See PRES-HARRIMAN #44, 19 Aug 44.) In his 201550Z, Harriman notified President that message had been delivered to Stalin.

2. Referred to Admiral Leahy, 28 Aug 44, by President with notation, "I think this does not need an answer. F.D.R."

3. Returned to Map Room for file by Admiral Leahy, 29 Aug 44. No reply.

4. Copy sent to Ambassador Harriman for his information, see PRES-HARRIMAN, #54, 30 Aug 44.
FROM: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN

TO: THE PRESIDENT

NO: 201550Z NCR 719, 21 AUGUST 1944.

I have today transmitted to Stalin message contained in your
191720 (WH #44).

HARRIMAN

TOP-SECRET

ORIGINAL filed "PRESIDENT-HARRIMAN FILE."

COPY

Regraded Unclassified
Ambassador Harriman

The President

201550Z, 21 Aug 44.

Delivery of President's message to Stalin re use of Far Eastern Soviet Bases.

1. Answers PRES-HARRIMAN #44, 19 Aug 44, to President as RED 339, HP.
2. No reply to Harriman. (See PRES-HARRIMAN #54, 30 Aug 44.)
3. See Stalin's message to the President, 22 Aug 44, for Stalin's reply to message delivered in PRES #44.
4. Stalin's message to President transmitted to Harriman for his information as #54, 30 Aug 44.

Regraded Unclassified
TOP SECRET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN
NO: 44, 19 AUGUST 1944

Your message 180235Z received.

If in your discretion the following message will be helpful you may deliver it to Marshal Stalin:

QUOTE. PRESIDENT TO STALIN. I have just seen our commanders in the Pacific Theater. I am highly pleased with the progress that is being made but greatly impressed with the magnitude of the task. Harriman has reported to me your agreement to inaugurate promptly planning for future joint cooperation between our respective forces.

General Deane has told me of the proposals which he submitted to the Red Army General Staff concerning Soviet American collaboration. I hope that you will instruct your staff to pursue expeditiously the joint preparation of plans with the United States Military Mission in Moscow which has been authorized to represent the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff in this planning in preparation for the time when you are ready to act. I feel that there is nothing we could do now that would be of more assistance in preparing to bring the Pacific war to a speedy conclusion. ROOSEVELT. UNQUOTE.

Please inform me whether or not you deliver the above message.

ROOSEVELT
FROM The President TO Ambassador Harriman

SERIAL or FILE NO. 44, 19 Aug 44.

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Use of Soviet Far Eastern bases.

ACTION:

1. Answers HARRIMAN's 180235Z.
2. Prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President 19 Aug 44.
3. In 201550Z, Harriman reported that message to Stalin contained in PRES #44 had been transmitted to Stalin.

COPY: TO:

DATE:

BY DIRECTION OF:

ORIGINAL: "MR PRESIDENT-HARRIMAN FILE"

COPY: "MR PRESIDENT-STALIN FILE"

000.9 PRES; 530 JAPAN

COPY
FROM: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN, MOSCOW.

TO: THE PRESIDENT

NO: 180235Z NCR 8589, 18 August 1944.

In closing the conversation about aid to the Poles fighting in Warsaw reported in my State Department cable today Molotov said that he wished to take this occasion to inform me that the military authorities needed the bases which our shuttle bombers were using and that after the summer operations were concluded they would no longer be made available to us. This statement was made in front of the British Ambassador and as part of our discussion.

I told Molotov that if this action was taken it would have the most serious repercussions in our relations and that I insisted on an opportunity to discuss the matter with him fully. I told him further that we had been very patient in connection with the delays that had occurred over the planning for cooperation by our air forces in other directions and that I wished to take this occasion to tell him that we felt the time had come for conversations to take a definite form.

Although I did not specifically name the subject as the British Ambassador was present, Molotov clearly understood that I was referring to our use of Soviet Far Eastern bases. My statement was intentionally aggressive and I left no doubt in his mind that we were dissatisfied with the lack of progress in the planning which Stalin had agreed to months ago.

Molotov attempted to explain that there were many considerations that had to be weighed but that I need have no concern over the outcome.
FROM: Ambassador Harriman
TO: The President

SERIAL or FILE NO.: 1802352, 18 Aug 44.
DATE: 18 Aug 44.

VIA: TO MAP Room

SUBJECT: Shuttle bombing; far eastern bases.

ACTION:

1. To President via breakfast tray.
2. Draft reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President 19 Aug 44; sent to Harriman as PRES #64, incorporating message to be delivered by Ambassador Harriman to Marshal Stalin.

Regraded Unclassified

Extract: "530 UK-USSR-ITALY SHUTTLE BOMBING"

530 SHUTTLE BOMBING; 530 JAPAN

COPY
Personal and secret for the eyes of the President only from Harriman.

After persistent pressure on Molotov he arranged a meeting this evening for General Deane with General Antonov, Deputy Chief of the Red Army staff, to discuss plans for use of Siberian air bases and their supply. Antonov is the permanent senior officer in Moscow as Vaselevski is socally at the front. Antonov listened attentively for two hours to Deane presenting our proposals and questions. He took complete notes and asked questions to clarify. He stated at the conclusion that the matters raised would be given consideration.

Original distribution: NAVAIDE(#1-42) ... action

Sealed secret

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

 Maurice F. Harriman

File Copy

Sent at Red 174 25/01402 At

Copy #1
FROM Ambassador Harriman TO The President

SERIAL or FILE NO. 242230Z, 25 July 44.

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM 25/0140Z VIA Navy Code Room

SUBJECT: Use of Siberian air bases.

ACTION:

1. Sent to President on Hawaii-Alaska trip as RED 174.
2. No reply by the President.
FROM: OPNAV
TO: AMBASSADOR HARRITMAN, MOSCOW

12 JUNE 1944

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR HARRITMAN.

Receipt is acknowledged of your seven interesting messages dated 11 June, 110523, 110529, 110549, 112325, 112335, 112340, and 112359.

We will take every precaution to preserve secrecy of these messages and assume you are doing same.

ROOSEVELT
FROM The President TO Ambassador Harriman

SERIAL or FILE NO. 121711 NCR 8233, 12 June 44

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Acknowledgment of 7 messages from Harriman re conversation with Stalin.

ACTION:

1. Acknowledges HARRIMAN's 110523, 110529, 110549, 112325, 112335, 112340, and 112359.
2. Answer prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved by the President 12 June 44.

ORIGINAL filed "MR PRESIDENT-HARRIMAN FILE"

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

530 Shuttle bombing; 530 Japan.

COPY

TOP-SECRET

Regarded Unclassified
TOP SECRET DISPATCH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DRAFTER</th>
<th>EXT.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALUSNA MOSCOW</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RELEASED BY</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>TOR CODED BY</th>
<th>DECODED BY</th>
<th>PARAPHRASED BY</th>
<th>ROUTED BY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11 JUNE 1944</td>
<td>1735/11</td>
<td>REEGAN</td>
<td>REEGAN</td>
<td>REEGAN CHECKED</td>
<td>REEGAN DITTOED</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FOR ACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THE PRESIDENT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ADDRESSEES</th>
<th>PRECEDENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asterisk (*) Mailgram Address</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority Routine Confidential</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deferred</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basegram</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deferred</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basegram</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INFORMATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unless otherwise indicated, this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence and as administrative.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top Secret 115529 NCR 3900</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Originator Hill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>On Outgoing Dispatches Please Leave About One Inch Clear Space Before Beginning Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PART 1 IS 115527 NCR 4084</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PERSONAL SECRET FOR THE EYES OF THE PRESIDENT ONLY FROM HARRIMAN.

IN MY TALK WITH STALIN YESTERDAY EVENING WE DISCUSSED IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL THE PARTICIPATION OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE JAPANESE WAR AND IN THAT CONNECTION CHINA. I BROUGHT UP THE QUESTION OF THE Basing OF OUR BOMBERS IN THE SOVIET FAR EAST AND STATED THAT YOU AND OUR CHIEFS OF STAFF BELIEVED NO TIME SHOULD BE LOST IN COMING TO AN AGREEMENT AND IN WORKING OUT THE NECESSARY PLANS FOR SUPPLIES. HE AGREED THAT THIS WAS DESIRABLE AND STRESSED THE NECESSITY FOR THE UTMOST SECRECY. HE ADDED THAT IT WASH NOT ONLY A QUESTION OF THE AIR FORCE BUT THAT THE GROUND OPERATIONS AND NAVAL OPERATIONS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS WELL. HE EXPLAINED THAT THERE WERE NOW 12 AIR FIELDS SOME OF THEM NEW IN THE AREA BETWEEN VLADIVOSTOK AND SOVIETSKAYA GAVTOI SUITABLE FOR HEAVY BOMBERS AND THAT WE COULD EXPECT TO RECEIVE THE USE OF 6 OR 7 OF THEM. MORE WITH METALLED STRIPS COULD BE PROVIDED IF NECESSARY. IT IS EVIDENT THAT SINCE MY TALK WITH STALIN IN FEBRUARY THE SOVIETS HAVE GONE AHEAD WITH THE CONSTRUCTION OF HEAVY BOMBER BASES IN THE FAR EAST USING 1 BELIEVE THE EXPERIENCE GAINED

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 File. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

TOP SECRET

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations.

Copy # 76.

Regraded Unclassified
FROM US IN PREPARATION OF THE FIELDS FOR SHUTTLE BOMBING. STALIN AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO START PROMPTLY IN BUILDING UP RESERVES OF GASOLINE AND OTHER SUPPLIES USING THE PACIFIC ROUTE AS THE JAPANESE NO LONGER INTERFERED. I EXPLAINED THAT IT WAS HOPED THAT THE NORTHERN CONVOYS COULD BE RESUMED AGAIN AT A LATER DATE SO THAT THIS STOCKING COULD BE DONE WITHOUT INTERFERENCE WITH THE PROTOCOL COMMITMENTS. STALIN ASKED WHETHER THE BRITISH WOULD HAVE TO PARTICIPATE IN THESE DISCUSSIONS AND STATED BLUNTLY THAT HIS MILITARY DID NOT TRUST GENERAL BURROWS THE PRESENT HEAD OF THE BRITISH MILITARY MISSION. HE EXPLAINED THAT THIS WAS PERSONAL IN RESPECT TO GENERAL BURROWS AND HE WAS NOT SPEAKING OF THE BRITISH IN GENERAL. IN REPLY TO MY DIRECT INQUIRY HE STATED THAT THEY HAD FULL CONFIDENCE IN GENERAL DEANE. I SAID THAT THESE DISCUSSIONS COULD BE CARRIED ON BETWEEN GENERAL DEANE HIS AIR OFFICER GENERAL WALSH AND NAVAL OFFICER ADMIRAL OLSEN WITH THE APPROPRIATE SOVIET OFFICERS AND THAT IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO INVOLVE THE BRITISH AT THIS TIME AS THEY DID NOT HAVE DAY BOMBERS. AT A LATER STAGE WHEN THE ENTIRE STRATEGY OF THE PACIFIC WAR WAS CONSIDERED THE BRITISH OF COURSE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DRAFTER</th>
<th>EXT.</th>
<th>ADDRESSEES</th>
<th>PRECEDENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FROM</td>
<td>ALUSNA MOSCOW</td>
<td>THE PRESIDENT</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELEASED BY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>11 JUNE 1944</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOR CODE RED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DECODED BY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARAPHRASED BY</td>
<td>CHECKED</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROUTED BY</td>
<td>DITTOED</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

FROM US IN PREPARATION OF THE FIELDS FOR SHUTTLE BOMBING. STALIN AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO START PROMPTLY IN BUILDING UP RESERVES OF GASOLINE AND OTHER SUPPLIES USING THE PACIFIC ROUTE AS THE JAPANESE NO LONGER INTERFERED. I EXPLAINED THAT IT WAS HOPED THAT THE NORTHERN CONVOYS COULD BE RESUMED AGAIN AT A LATER DATE SO THAT THIS STOCKING COULD BE DONE WITHOUT INTERFERENCE WITH THE PROTOCOL COMMITMENTS. STALIN ASKED WHETHER THE BRITISH WOULD HAVE TO PARTICIPATE IN THESE DISCUSSIONS AND STATED BLUNTLY THAT HIS MILITARY DID NOT TRUST GENERAL BURROWS THE PRESENT HEAD OF THE BRITISH MILITARY MISSION. HE EXPLAINED THAT THIS WAS PERSONAL IN RESPECT TO GENERAL BURROWS AND HE WAS NOT SPEAKING OF THE BRITISH IN GENERAL. IN REPLY TO MY DIRECT INQUIRY HE STATED THAT THEY HAD FULL CONFIDENCE IN GENERAL DEANE. I SAID THAT THESE DISCUSSIONS COULD BE CARRIED ON BETWEEN GENERAL DEANE HIS AIR OFFICER GENERAL WALSH AND NAVAL OFFICER ADMIRAL OLSEN WITH THE APPROPRIATE SOVIET OFFICERS AND THAT IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO INVOLVE THE BRITISH AT THIS TIME AS THEY DID NOT HAVE DAY BOMBERS. AT A LATER STAGE WHEN THE ENTIRE STRATEGY OF THE PACIFIC WAR WAS CONSIDERED THE BRITISH OF COURSE

No. 1 ADMIRAL
No. 2 FILE.
No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM
No. 4 SPECIAL

TOP SECRET

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations.

OPNAV 19-76

Regraded Unclassified
WOULD BE INVOLVED. HE AGREED THAT THESE DISCUSSIONS SHOULD START PROMPTLY. I COULD NOT PIN HIM DOWN ON A DATE BUT HE ASSURED ME THAT

IT WOULD NOT BE LONG DELAYED SAYING "THE SOONER THE BETTER". STALIN BROUGHT UP THE QUESTION OF THE SUPPLYING BY US OF HEAVY BOMBERS FOR

THE RED AIR FORCE. I EXPLAINED THAT GENERAL ARNOLD WAS READY TO BEGIN TO DELIVER THEM BEGINNING IN THE AUTUMN AFTER AGREEMENT HAD

BEEN REACHED REGARDING OUR OPERATION FROM SOVIET EASTERN BASES.

WE WOULD NOT ONLY GIVE THEM THE PLANES BUT WOULD HELP TRAIN THE

SOVIET CREWS IN THE FLYING OF THE BOMBERS AND IN THE TACTICAL OPERATIONS EITHER IN THE UNITED STATES OR BY SENDING INSTRUCTORS TO THE

SOVIET UNION. HE SAID HE WOULD PREFER TO HAVE INSTRUCTORS COME TO

THE SOVIET UNION AS ONLY TRAINED PILOTS AND NAVIGATORS WOULD BE USED.

THESE ARE OF COURSE DETAILS THAT CAN BE WORKED OUT LATER.

P1A......ACTION
FROM: Ambassador Harriman
TO: The President

SERIAL or FILE NO.: 110529 NCR 3900, 11 June 44.

DATE: 110529 NCR 3900, 11 June 44.

TOR Map Room: 11915Z
VIA: Navy Code Room

SUBJECT: Basing bombers in Soviet Far East.

ACTION:

1. To President via usher.
2. Answered by PRESIDENT'S 121711 NCR 8233 June 44, written by Admiral Leahy.
(PERSONAL SECRET FOR THE EYES OF THE PRESIDENT ONLY FROM HARRIMAN)

I ASKED MOLOTOV AGAIN LAST NIGHT HOW SOON THE CHIEF OF THE FAR EASTERN AIR FORCE WOULD BE IN MOSCOW FOR CONFERENCES WITH GENERAL DEANE. HE READILY AGREED TO FIND OUT AND INDICATED HE DID NOT KNOW WHY THERE HAD BEEN DELAY.

NAVAIDE (FOR THE PRESIDENT) . . . . ACTION
FROM: Ambassador Harriman  
TO: The President  
SERIAL: 180915  NCR 1211  
DATE: 18 April 1944  

DATETIME OR FILE NUMBER

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Conference with Chief, Far Eastern Air Force

ACTION

To President at Waccamaw as WHITE 64, 18/1725Z.

In BLACK 44, 20/0220Z, Apr, the President stated:
"No acknowledgement or reply will be made to WHITE 64."

COPIES TO: INDEXED: "MR PRESIDENT-HARRIMAN FILE"

DATE:  
BY DIRECTION OF:  

ACTION COMPLETED:  
530 JAPAN  
FILeD: TOP-SECRET
THIS IS PERSONAL FOR THE EYES OF GENERAL ARNOLD ONLY FROM DEANE.

IN THE CONVERSATION WHICH THE AMBASSADOR HAD WITH STALIN WHICH WAS REPORTED TO THE PRESIDENT AND WHICH YOU REFERRED TO IN YOUR NAVY CABLE Q815560, THE AMBASSADOR TOLD STALIN THAT HE UNDERSTOOD YOU WOULD LIKE TO OPERATE UP TO ONE THOUSAND BOMBERS IN SIBERIA. STALIN SAID THAT FACILITIES NECESSARY FOR BOMBERS IN EXCESS OF THREE HUNDRED WOULD HAVE TO BE SPECIALLY CONSTRUCTED, AND THE MATTER WOULD BE GIVEN CONSIDERATION. REQUEST THAT YOU INFORM ME APPROXIMATELY WHAT NUMBERS YOU HAVE IN MIND FOR OPERATION IN SIBERIA BOTH INITIALLY AND AS AN EVENTUAL PROGRAM.
FROM General Deane TO General Arnold

SERIAL or FILE NO. 102310 NCR 3661, 11 Feb 44.

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Basing bombers in Far East.

ACTION:

1. Answers ARNOLD-DEANE, 8 Feb 44.
2. Copy delivered to General Arnold, 112020Z.
3. NCR gave copy to Gen Marshall after clearing with Map Room.
4. No answer sent through Map Room.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

530 JAPAN

Regraded Unclassified
SECRET

SECRET PRIORITY

FROM: OPNAV
TO: AJSNA, MOSCOW

8 FEBRUARY 1944

PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET FROM GENERAL ARNOLD TO GENERAL DEANE.

Prior to making any definite plans relative to air operations from
Eastern Siberia, it is essential that information outlined hereafter
be obtained from the Russians.

(a) Number and size of airfields in Vladivostok area available to
U.S. Army Air Forces. These fields should be located in Vladivostok
area as Kamchatka is too distant from targets for continuous destructive
bombing. Four or five fields within the Tambovsk-Khabarovsk area can
be used for very long range bombers.

(b) What facilities are there on the fields for housing personnel,
repair and maintenance of planes, storage of equipment and offices?

(c) How much gasoline and oil can we secure from the Russians over
the railroad or what is nearest port or station from which we can secure
gasoline and oil?

(d) Will the Russians be able to furnish us bombs? If so, in what
sizes? Can they be delivered by rail within the operating area?

(e) What facilities will there be for air transport service for U.S.
Army cargo planes between Nome and the Vladivostok area?

(f) Is there any possibility of opening a port of debarkation on
the eastern coast of Kamchatka in a locality where air fields are avail-
able or can be built? It would seem to us that much saving in time and
cargo planes would be effected if such a port could be opened for
shipments from the U.S. and cargo planes used for balance of trip pending
opening of port nearer to Vladivostok.

Plans here are being worked up for 300 bombers to operate from
Siberian bases. However, the above factors must be known to determine
exact number of planes to be employed. Information here indicates that
weather in Kamchatka much better than in Kuriles or Aleutians and
Kamchatka can be used as base for cargo planes. This statement should
be checked by you.

Can we assume that there will be fields available for 300 fighters
in addition to those required for 300 bombers? Fighters are needed to
furnish protection for airfields and for bombers en route to and from
targets.

Suggest that you explore possibility of increasing number of fields
available to provide for bombers in excess of 300.

Harriman can assure Marshal Stalin that these discussions will be
kept within narrowest limits and for the present will not go beyond
President, Leahy, Marshall, King, Arnold, and ciphering clerk.

Another subject. General Spaatz has been given instructions to
communicate directly with you and make arrangements for sending represe-
tatives to Moscow for conferences to implement shuttle bombing from
England and Italy to Russia and return. You probably have already heard
from him.

ARNOLD

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1205, EWT, 8 February 1944.

Regraded Unclassified
Message (2)
Arnold to IKE — 8 Feb 44

Prior to making any definite plans relative to air operations from "Eastern" Sicily, it is essential that information outlined hereafter be obtained from the Russians.

(a) Number and size of airfields in Vladivostok area available to U.S. Army Air Forces, these fields should be located in Vladivostok Kamchatka area as Kamchatka is too distant from targets for continuous destruction bombing. Forward five fields within the Farabovsk Khabarovsk Khabarovsk area can be used for very long range bombers —
(b) What facilities are there on the fields for housing personnel, repair and maintenance of planes, storage of equipment and offices.

(c) How much gasoline and oil can we secure from the Russians over the Railroad, or what is nearest port or station from which we can secure gasoline and oil.

(d) Will the Russians be able to furnish us bombs, if so, what sizes. Can they be delivered by rail within the operating area.
(2) What facilities will there be for Air Transport Service for U.S. Army Cargos planes between Nome and the Vladivostok area.

(4) Is there any possibility of opening a port for debarkation in the Eastern Coast of Kamchatka in a locality where air fields are available or can be built? It would seem to us that much saving in time and Cargos planes would be effected if such a port could be opened for shipments from the U.S. and Cargos planes used for balance of
trip pending opening of port
near to Vladivostok.

Plans here are being worked
up for 300 bombers to operate
from Siberian bases. However, the
above factors must be known to
determine exactly the number of
planes to be employed. Information
here indicates that weather in Kamchatka
much better than in Kuriles or Aleutians.
Kamchatka
and can be used as base for
cargo planes. This statement should
be checked by you.
Can we assume that there will be fields available for 300 fighters in addition to those required for 300 bombers. Fighters are needed to furnish protection for airfields and for bombers en route to and from targets.

Suggest that you explore possibility of increasing number of fields available to provide for bombers in excess of 300.

Harried. Can assume Marshall Stalini that these discussions will be kept within narrowest limits.
and for the present will not go beyond President, Leahy - Marshall, Kemp - Arnold and Ciphering Clerk.

Another subject, General Spaatz has been given instructions to communicate directly with you and make arrangements for sending representatives tomorrow for conferences to implement shuttle bombing from England and Italy to Russia and return. You probably have already heard from them.
FROM General Arnold TO General Deane

SERIAL or FILE NO. 081650 NCR 5461, 8 Feb 44.

DATE

TOR MAP ROOM VIA

SUBJECT: Basing bombers in Far East.

ACTION:

1. This message written by General Arnold; original handwritten message sent to Admiral Leahy. For security reasons, and at General Arnold's request, this message was transmitted to Deane through Navy Department channels.

2. Answered by Deane in Aluspa, Moscow, 102310, NCR 3661.

3. (Copy of 081650 to Major Lester, Class. Msg. Center, by direction of Colonel Mathewson. Maj Lester called Navy Code Room requesting copy of above msg; Cmdr Smith suggested that copy not be given because of General Arnold's original request for security; Col Mathewson, however, directed copy be sent to Maj Lester.)

COPIES TO: DATE: BY DIRECTION OF:

530 JAPAN
FROM: OPNAV
TO: ALUSNA, MOSCOW

FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN PERSONAL AND SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT.

All knowledge of your message of 2 February reference U.S. Army
Air Force Operations in Eastern Siberia and our reply thereto is
confined to the four members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the ciphering
clerk and myself.

Arnold has sent Deane a message covering information which must
be secured and discussed to permit us to make plans for such operations.

Please convey to Stalin my appreciation of the information contained
in your message and my congratulations on the daily successes of his
valiant Army. Please also tell him that our operations in the Pacific
are increasing their tempo and that the success of our amphibious
attacks have met expectations.

ROOSEVELT

Released from the White House Map Room
at 1145, EWT, 6 February 1944.

GEORGE M. ELSEY,
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
February 8, 1944

PRESIDENT TO HARRIMAN:

All knowledge of your message of 2 February reference U.S. Army Air Force Operations in Eastern Siberia and our reply thereto is confined to the four members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the ciphering clerk and myself.

Arnold has sent Deane a message covering information which must be secured and discussed to permit us to make plans for such operations.

Please convey to Stalin my appreciation of the information contained in your message and my congratulations on the daily successes of his valiant Army. Please also tell him that our operations in the Pacific are increasing their tempo and that the success of our amphibious attacks have met expectations.
Use of Soviet Far Eastern air bases in war against Japan.

1. Answers HARRIMAN-PRES 022120, 3 Feb 44, which by direction of the President was forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
2. Reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved 8 Feb by President.
3. Answered by DEANE-ARNOLD, 102310 NCR 3661, 11 Feb 44.
MEMORANDUM FOR:

ADMIRAL LEAHY,

I suggest that special attention be given to the following sentences in Ambassador Harriman's message to the President of 2 February 1944 when copies are forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

"Marshal Stalin emphasized that these discussions must be kept within the narrowest limits. I explained that I would explain it to you and that you would undoubtedly inform Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral King and General Arnold but that I could assure him that it would not be communicated to anyone else except those immediately involved."

Wilson Brown,
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENTS EYES ONLY FROM HARRIMAN.

I SAW MARSHALL STALIN THIS AFTERNOON AND DISCUSSED IN DETAIL THE MILITARY PROPOSALS YOU SUBMITTED TO HIM AT TEHERAN. HE AGREED TO PROVIDE FACILITIES FOR SHUTTEE BOMBING ON SOVIET AIRFIELDS FOR 150 TO 200 US HEAVY BOMBERS AS A STARTER AND FOR DAILY US PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE PLANES FROM BOTH ENGLAND AND ITALY. THIS IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH REQUEST WE HAVE RECENTLY RECEIVED FROM GENERAL ARNOLD APPROVED BY EISENHOWER. DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN US AND THE SOVIET AIR STAFF WILL BE ARRANGED IMMEDIATELY TO IMPLEMENT THIS DECISION. DEANE IS CABLING ARNOLD FURTHER DETAILS. I THEN RAISED THE QUESTION OF PLANNING FOR USE OF SOVIET AIR BASES ON THE EAST BY AMERICAN HEAVY BOMBERS AFTER RUSSIA ENTERS THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN. MARSHALL STALIN SAID THAT HE COULD NOT AFFORD TO PROVOKE AN INCIDENT NOW AND REPEATED AND AMPLIFIED WHAT HE STATED AT TEHERAN IN REGARD TO SOVIET PRESENT AIR AND GROUND STRENGTH IN THE EAST. HE ADDED THAT THEY WERE INCREASING...
Their air strength but could not yet strengthen their army because of their preoccupation in the West.

After I had explained in detail the importance of our knowing at the earliest moment what facilities could be made available he told me we could count on facilities to base 300 US heavy bombers in addition to Soviet bombers and agreed to have the chief of their Far Eastern air forces come to Moscow shortly to discuss the location of suitable bases with Deane. I explained that General Arnold had contemplated the basing of as many as a thousand bombers in this area. Stalin replied "then we must build new fields. We will see what is possible."

Marshall Stalin emphasized that (this) these discussions must be kept within the narrowest limits. I explained that I would *it to you and that you would undoubtedly inform Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral King and General Arnold but that I would assure him that it would not be communicated to anyone else except those immediately involved. I hope this commitment can be respected. General Deane should be informed by General Arnold promptly as to the preferred general locations of the air fields as between Kamchatka and

*No Garble. As received. Apparently word "explain" omitted.

Sealed secret

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
AND THE VLADIVOSTOK AREA AND BE GIVEN ANY FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS OR DETAILS REQUIRED FOR HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FAR EASTERN AIR

CHIEF.

MARSHALL STALIN AGREED IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR REQUEST AT TEHERAN TO EXCHANGE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REGARDING JAPAN BUT STATED THAT THE SOVIET INFORMATION WAS NOT RPT NOT "RIGOR". HE ALSO XXXXX AGREED TO EXPAND THE WEATHER INFORMATION WE ARE NOW RECEIVING.

ALTHOUGH I BROUGHT UP THE REQUEST YOU MADE FOR ADVANCE PLANNING OF NAVAL OPERATIONS HE DID NOT * TO BE FAMILIAR WITH THE SUBJECT AND

NO CONCLUSION WAS REACHED. HE GAVE HIS APPROVAL TO CERTAIN OTHER MILITARY MATTERS WE HAVE UP. THE CONVERSATION LASTED FOR AN HOUR AND A HALF. IT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN MORE FRIENDLY AND STALIN COULD NOT HAVE SHOWN A GREATER DISPOSITION TO BE COOPERATIVE. HE ASKED DETAILED QUESTIONS BEFORE GIVING HIS APPROVAL TO EACH POINT. HE VOLUNTEERED AT SOME LENGTH INFORMATION AT HIS DISPOSAL INDICATING THE EXTREME CONCERN OF THE JAPANESE REGARDING THEIR PRESENT POSITION AND ALSO TOUCHED ON POLAND. I WILL COVER THESE ASPECTS OF OUR CONVERSATION IN SUBSEQUENT CABLES.

* NO GARBLE. WORD APPARENTLY OMITTED. SUGGEST "SEE."
FROM: Ambassador Harriman
TO: The President

DATE: 022120  NCR 8052, 3 February 1944

SUBJECT: Use of Soviet Far Eastern air bases in war against Japan.

ACTION:

1. To President via Admiral Brown.
2. By direction of the President, copies to Joint Chiefs of Staff by Admiral Leahy.
3. Reply prepared by Admiral Leahy; approved with change by the President; to Ambassador Harriman on 8 February 1944.

Copies to: Joint Chiefs of Staff
Date: 4 Feb 44

Extract: "MR 530 UK-USSR-ITALY (1)"

Indexed: "PRESIDENT-HARRIMAN FILE"

530 JAPAN; 530 UK-USSR-ITALY.