From: CG Strategic Air Forces in Europe London England
To: War Department
Nr: U 65612 28 July 1944

Personal to Arnold from Speatz
shuttle Bombing to Soviet Basis

Third FRANTIC operation apparently highly successful based upon report just received from Walsh **FRANTIC** three mission results follow:

57 Mustangs and 72 Lightnings dispatched on strafing mission from 15th Air Force against airfields at Buzau and Ziliste. Claims in air 15-6-12. On ground 41-0-11, plus two trucks, six locomotives, three tank cars destroyed and nine trucks damaged.

Second mission claims 29-5-7 in the air, losing five Lightnings. On the ground 9-7-2 plus two buses, 13 trucks four locomotives, one staff car.

On return to Italy 3rd mission claims in air 20-0-5; on ground 6-0-0 plus considerable success strafing on ground movements, losing two Lightnings. 64-11-24 in air, 56-7-13 on ground constitute total claims, with seven Lightnings lost. Besides other damage, destroyed many motor vehicles and rolling stock and 10 locomotives.

In putting up 3rd FRANTIC operation we decided to use only fighters in order to insure maximum dispersion on Russian airfields in view of damage done to bombers on 2nd FRANTIC operation. We will use only fighters on next operation and follow that with a combined operation.

CM-IN-23796 (28 Jul 44)
From: CG Strategic Air Forces in Europe London England

Nr: U 65612 28 July 1944

New subject: Enemy jet propelled fighters encountered for the first time in bombing operations today. Five such aircraft seen in target area over Memelburg. Pilots confident aircraft recognized as Mother Edwards 163, and stated published drawing is very accurate. One pair aircraft flew tightly together, and apparently intended attack on bombers from rear. P51's got between them and bombers, and when enemy aircraft saw our escort one went into 45 degree dive other pulled up in 50 to 60 degree climb into sun using jet in spurts which our pilot described as blowing smoke rings. Rate of roll described as excellent, radius of turn very large. Estimated speed in dive 500 to 600 miles per hour, in climb 500 possibly more miles per hour. Aircraft is described as beautiful in air, camouflaged like FW 190, highly polished looked waxed. Pilots apparently very experienced but not aggressive. May have been up on exercise flight when encountered. No fire exchanged between enemy aircraft and our fighters nor did they fire on bombers. Their speed and maneuverability indicated that they could outperform P51's. These are preliminary reports. Detailed report will follow when available.

ACTION: Gen. Arnold
INFO: OPD, Gen. Bissell, Gen Henry (NDD), Col Park, Mr. Stimson, C of S

CM-IN-23796 (28 Jul 44) 2128Z eajv

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 5-3-72

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Regraded Unclassified
From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia
To: War Department
CC Strategic Air Forces in Europe, London, England
Nr: MX-20124 10 July 1944

To Spaatz USSTAF repeated to Baken MAAF and Arnold WAR for information from Deene. MX 20124 CRYPTO WAR pls pass to HQMAAF.

At conference with Gen. Nkhillin this afternoon he indicated that there is no approval yet on our winter program or for American night fighter or anti-aircraft defenses in Russia. He states that he felt certain that approval would be forthcoming and that certainly reaction of the Red Air Staff was favorable to the entire program. He agreed to assist in obtaining approval in every way that he could, but suggested that the whole program be presented to the Foreign Office.

From his talk I gathered that the delay in approval is within the Soviet Foreign Office. For this reason the Ambassador is going to see Molotov tonight and I have prepared a letter outlining the proposal in detail for the Ambassador to leave with Molotov after he discusses the matter with him orally.

I feel assured that ultimate approval will be obtained and recommend that you continue planning on that basis. However, it may take a week to 10 days to get the matter cleared.

DECLASSIFIED

CM-IN-8138 (10 Jul 44)
From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia

Nr: MX 20124 10 July 1944

through the Foreign office in which case units which have already started by air may be delayed.

End

Note: This message has been relayed to Caserta by War Department Code Center in accordance with the originators instructions.

ACTION: Gen Arnold

INFO : Gen Handy
Col Park
C of S

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 3 1974

CM-IN-8138 (10 Jul 44) 1915Z ejm

COPY NO. 16
U.S. Military Mission
Moscow, Russia

Number: WAR 60689

This replies to your dispatches 697 of June 15 to General Marshall and 718 of June 19 to General Arnold and to Olsen's 141232 to Admiral King.

In initial discussions you should emphasize our desire for early operation of U.S. heavy bombers and long range fighter escort from bases in Siberia and the Maritime Provinces. To facilitate planning we need detailed information on the location, condition, capacity, and probable availability of airfields, provisions for air defense, both anti-aircraft and fighter, and logistical capabilities to include supply, maintenance, servicing, and housing. You should stress the necessity for early preparation for air transport movement of initial American Air Forces into Eastern Siberia and the early build-up of airdrome equipment and supply levels. The size of the air forces employed will depend, to a large degree, on the logistical capabilities for their support. Detailed data on all air matters have been furnished you by General Arnold in his WAR 56070, June 23.

We do not contemplate the use of ground combat forces in Siberia, except perhaps some anti-aircraft, since it appears that all of the ground forces available will be required to carry out our operations in the Pacific. The meager information we now have for Eastern Siberia indicates that all facilities which could be made available to us would be used

CM-OUT-60689 (5 July 1944) DECLASSIFIED

\JCS memo, 1-4-74 \By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

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COPY No. 39

Regraded Unclassified
best for the logistic support of the U. S. air effort in that area.

Such plans as may result for operations in these areas will involve naval operations for opening up and securing a sea route into the Maritime Provinces. Your exploratory discussions should cover information required for this purpose. In this connection you are referred to the discussion contained in an outline of required planning information previously furnished to you.

Until discussions have progressed through the preliminary and exploratory stages we feel that you, Walsh, and Olsen are sufficiently informed to handle the situation without assistance of personnel from Washington and therefore no planner, as suggested by Olsen, will be sent at this time.

End

ORIGINATOR: JCS

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
               OPD
               Adm. King
               Adm. Leahy
               C of S

CM-OUT-60689 (5 July 1944) 2001Z emh

DECORATED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHF, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

COPY No. 39

Regraded Unclassified
From: US Military Mission, Moscow

To: War Department
    CG Strategic Air Forces in Europe, London, England

DTG: 271742Z
    June 1944

For Arnold repeated to Spaatz for information from Deane.

The Ambassador met Stalin last night to deliver some scrolls from the President. He had an opportunity to discuss briefly the German raid on our bases and told Stalin of our proposal to provide a night fighter unit. Stalin reacted favorably to the idea and so expressed himself. While this does not constitute official approval, it is indicative of favorable action when the proposal comes to Stalin from his Air Staff and his General Staff.

End

ACTION: Gen Arnold

INFO: Gen Handy
      Mr Stimson
      C of S

CM-IN-22917
(28 Jun 44) 1203Z 1s

Shuttle Bombing

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia
To: War Department
No. 753 26 June 1944
For General Arnold from Deane

At meeting with General Staff tonight proposal reference night fighter squadron in Russia was presented. Question was raised as to whether Soviet technical people could examine the equipment when in use in Russia. I said that if the equipment was to be used here we would be glad to demonstrate its use to them. I gave this reply under authority contained in Paragraph 3A (2) of War Department message 47831 dated 8 June 1944 regarding what information could be released to Soviets.

I urged on them the necessity for an early reply and was assured that the matter would be given prompt attention.

End.

ACTION: Gen. Arnold
INFO: Gen. Handy
Mr. Stimson
Col. Park
C of S

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

CM-IN-21514 (26 Jun 44) 1905Z vhm

5-30 Shuttle Bombing

COPY No. 15

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Regraded Unclassified
From: US, Military Mission, Moscow, Russia
To: War Department
No: 747 26 June, 1944

For General Arnold personal. from Deane.

Information desired concerning item 2 of your number 56070 of 25 June. Does ultimate force of 12 Heavy Bomber Groups, 15 Fighter Groups, 4 Reconnaissance Group, and 4 Troop Carrier Groups include the Russians?

End

ACTION: Gen. Arnold
INFO: Gen. Handy, Gen. Bissell, Col. Park, Mr. Stimson, C of S

CM-IN-21481 (26 Jun 44) 1830Z vhm

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RH, HL, Date MAY 3 1974

ONE COPY

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Regraded Unclassified
Commanding General
US Military Mission
Moscow, Russia (537 M)

Number WAR 56606

To Deane personal from Arnold.

What follows is answer to your number 747 of 26 June. The planned maximum availability of forces indicated to you did not include the Russians. Combat groups for the Russians would be additional thereto and would be constituted from the total number of heavy bombers and long range fighters which I have already indicated to you for offer to the Russians.

End.

3167

ORIGINATOR: Gen Arnold
INFORMATION: Gen Handy
Gen Bissell
Col Park
Mr Stimson
CofS

CM-OUT-56606 (27 Jun 44) 1342Z as

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Military Mission Moscow, Russia

To: War Department
CG, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe,
London, England

No: 746 26 June 1944

For General Arnold repeated to General Spaatz for information from Deane.

Believe Soviet decision regarding American Night Fighter Squadron referred to in your 56074 of 25 June will be made on highest level and will take several days. However, I already have an expression of approval from the Red Air Staff and I am seeing both the Red Air Staff and the Red General Staff on the matter again today. I shall do everything possible to expedite decision. Meanwhile I feel confident that you can count on approval sufficiently to justify earmarking the equipment and placing the request before the CCS.

Request that I be informed of the number of personnel involved, tentage for initial installation, and maintenance, and any other pertinent data.

ACTION: Gen. Arnold

INFO: Gen. Handy
Col. Park
Mr. Stimson
C of S

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\JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

CM-IN-21440 (26 Jun 44) 17452 vhm

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

530 Shuttle Bombing

COPY No.
From: US Military Mission Moscow, Russia
To: War Department
Nr: 749 26 June 1944

For Gen Arnold from Deane

Have presented proposal regarding night fighters to Red Air Staff both orally and in writing. Reaction favorable but no decision as yet. Will see General Staff representative tonight. Questions asked by Red Air Staff follows: number of airplanes involved, number of personnel involved, whether they will be located at one or several air bases, will they be operated from present bases, can they be operated in conjunction with Soviet night fighter aircraft, can Soviet airplanes be equipped to make certain that operations of our fighters and theirs will not conflict. Request information on these matters as soon as possible.


ACTION: Gen. Arnold

INFO : Gen. Handy
Col. Park
Mr. Stimson
C of S

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

CM-IN-21438 (26 Jun 44) 1725Z vhm

530 Shuttle Bombing

COPY No. 16

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
Commanding General
U. S. Military Mission to USSR
Moscow, Russia

Commanding General
U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe
London, England

Number WARX 56074
Arnold to Deane repeated to General Spaatz for Information

Needed from you urgently is definite information as to whether
the Russians approve our sending a squadron of night fighters
for defense of our Russian bases. I am clearing the way to
provide a P-61 night fighter squadron and GCI equipment. This
involves transfers from the United Kingdom and from the
Mediterranean, and therefore also involves approval by the
Combined Chiefs of Staff. I cannot firmly present this matter
to them until the question of Russian approval is definitely
settled.

End

ORIGINATOR: Gen Arnold
INFORMATION: Gen Handy, Col. Park, Mr. Stimson, C of S
CM-OUT 56074 (25 June 1944) 2058Z

COPY No. 15

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Regraded Unclassified
From: US Military Mission Moscow, Russia

To: War Department CG, Strategic Air Forces in Europe, London, England 9
24 June 1944

For General Arnold repeated to General Spaatz for information from Deane

Just returned from a long talk with General Mikitin. He referred to German air raids and future plans. My chief effort was to convince him that this would bring us closer together and he heartily agreed. He indicated that our new program to base three bombardment groups and one fighter group in Russia will probably be approved within the next few days.

He said that on the night of the raid at Poltava there was forty minutes warning before the attack. Medium and heavy anti-aircraft batteries fired 26,000 rounds assisted by searchlight batteries. There was a regiment of Yakos which included forty night fighters stationed at the fields. Not more than four or five of them got off the ground. They gave no reason for this and state they are still investigating. On the second night the Germans bombed Mirogorod and Piryatin. All planes had been moved to other fields and on this night the Russian fighters did not get into the air. Three German aircraft were destroyed by anti-aircraft fire and the crew of one of the destroyed planes was captured and has been brought to Moscow for interrogation. For daylight protection of the fields two regiments, or eighty Airocobras, are available at nearby fields. Their Yaks are not night fighters in the sense that we think of night fighters but simply fighter aircraft.
From: US Military Mission Moscow, Russia
To: War Department
CG, Strategic Air Forces in Europe, London, England 9

24 June 1944

with crews especially trained in night tactics and which are supposed to work as a team with searchlights. The warning system is a ground observation system. They do not have radar, however the system is apparently fairly effective because on the first night there was forty minutes warning and on the second night two hours warning. With regard to the future Nikitin said that the following steps are being taken:

There will be some increase in the anti-aircraft weapons. General Walsh, General Kessler and General Perminov are now preparing a plan for the use of alternate dispersal fields where the planes may be taken while in Russia.

Nikitin said that this plan when worked out would be approved. Revetments are to be constructed for individual aircraft. Nikitin recommended that greater dispersal be effected by not allowing more than 30 to 35 aircraft per field.

I believe that the Russians would welcome a squadron of our night fighters if you are considering sending them. I do not believe that they would consider our sending additional anti-aircraft artillery to be necessary.

The Soviets state that the German airplanes came from CM-IN-20171

(25 June 44)
From: US Military Mission Moscow, Russia

To: War Department
CO, Strategic Air Forces in Europe, London, England
24 June 1944

Baranovicz. They say that it was a specially organized task force especially set up for this raid. Nikitin feels that the attack was motivated primarily by political reasons.

New subject:

Nikitin indicated that instructions would be issued to Teheran tonight authorizing air transports to shuttle back and forth to Poltava to get stranded crews.

End

ACTION: General Arnold
INFO: General Bissell

OPD
Col. Park
C of S

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

CM-IN-20171 (25 June 44) 0215Z hle

COPY No. 18

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Regraded Unclassified
From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia
To: War Department
No: 731
Date: 23 June 1944

To AGWAR for General Marshall.

Saw General Levendovich of Red Air Staff tonight. Expressed regret at Soviet losses at our bases and admiration for behavior of their officers and men. I emphasized the Germans greatest hope was to create dissension between Americans and Russians but that it was our hope that this event would bring us closer together. He agreed.

Reports are still confused and I presume you have had them direct from bases. Soviet figures are 17 killed, 3 American and 14 Russian; 52 wounded, 12 American and 40 Russian. They say 39 American aircraft destroyed and 20 damaged; also 25 Soviet aircraft mostly fighters destroyed. Crist reports 51 Forts, 2 C 47's and 1 F-5 destroyed. 20 craters in steel mat runway and 14 in shorter concrete runway. Craters 12 feet diameter and 3½ feet deep.

German reconnaissance aircraft over field shortly after our last bomber landed and probably followed us in and photographed field. Raid started about midnight and Russians say Germans had 50 to 60 JU 88's and HE 111's which arrived in groups of 6 to 8 at 10 to 12 minute intervals. First bombing at about 10,000 feet followed later by dive bombing and strafing. Crist reports great volume of Russian flak but ineffective both with searchlights and accuracy.
To: War Department.
Nr: 13411 23 June 1944

To Arnold and Deane from Spaatz s# nr 13411.
AGWAR Washington DC.

Heavy air attack at Mirgorod tonight. Bomb dumps and fuel tanks received much damage but flying aircraft are safe, having been flown to other airdromes before sunset.

Details follow.

Peabody

ACTION: CG AAP
INFORMATION: OPD G-2
Gol Park Log
CM-IN-18721 (23 June 44) 0750Z pa

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COPY NO.
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

URGENT


To: War Department

Nr: T 159

22 June 1944

Spaatz info Arnold from Walsh T 159.

Airdrome Poltava underwent 2 hour air attack ending 2300Z. Heavy damage suffered by aircraft and fuel dumps. No damage at Mirgordod or Piryatin. Further details when available.

End

ACTION: OPD
INFO: CGAAF
G-2
Col. Park
Log

CM-IN-17926 (22 Jun 44) 1226Z

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Regraded Unclassified
From:  Hq. Eastern Command USSTAF Europe
To:    War Department
No:    T 160          22 June 1944

To Spaatz, Arnold and Deane from Walsh T 160,

Losses from air raid 1 officer killed 1 officer
seriously wounded, 3 officers wounded, 5 enlisted men wounded.

Many Soviet casualties. Destroyed are 53 Fortresses
2 C 47's a P 5. 1 airplane flyable, a C 37, in 4 hours at
Poltava. Correspondents all broadcasting heroes will be
sent to Moscow at first opportunity. Poltava airdrome not
usable for 48 hours. Aircraft at Mirgorod and Piryatin
will be moved later this afternoon to other fields being
obtained from Soviets. Radio teletype equipment out for
5 days from bomb fragments. 43 Fortresses operational in
24 hours 38 Mustangs operational 23 in 24. Mission for
23 June suspended pending your instructions and reinforce-
ment.

ACTION: CGAAF
INFO : OPD G-2 Log

CM-IN-18025 (22 Jun 44) 15182 eju

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
Estimate of damage from enemy bombing and strafing attack at Poltava is approximately 49 B-17 destroyed. Remainder appear to have major battle damage. Airdrome still has large numbers of personnel and delayed action bombs and difficult to determine exact figure. Bombardment lasted almost two hours and included heavy general purpose, fragmentation, anti-personnel and incendiary bombs. Approximately 50 bombers participated in attack apparently without night fighter opposition and local antiaircraft fire was ineffective. No evidence of enemy planes shot down. Ample air raid warning and adequate shelter kept personnel losses to a minimum. Personnel casualties are 1 dead, 1 dying, 1 seriously wounded and 7 hospitalized. Communications outside areas have been cut for 6 hours. Piryatin and Mirogorod were not attacked. Evacuating air craft and personnel from latter two stations. Damage other than above appears to be small.

ACTION: General Arnold

INFO: OPD

Generalissimi

Generalissimi

C of S

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OSD Letter, 5-3-72

JAN 5 1973

CM-IN-17997 (22 Jun 44) 1419Z ojv

530 Shuttle Bombing

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
To: War Department
Nr: 13397 21 June 1944

Deane rptd info Arnold sr nr 13397 from Spaatz

Announcement of inauguration of shuttle operations between U.K. and Russia we are leaving to you. Our flashes and communiques today omitted any reference to shuttle force and to target it attacked. Suggest that at your end press be given release.

End

ACTION: CG AAF
INFO: OPD
G-2
BPR
LOG

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 5-3-72
JAN 5 1973

CM-IN-17282 (21 June 44) 1825Z hle

Col. Park

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: CG, Strategic Air Forces in Europe, London, England
To: War Department
No. U 63891, 21 June 1944

To Arnold signed Spaatz U 63891.

Airborne on 8th Air Force operation June 21 were 1211 Heavies escorted by 1268 Fighters. One Combat Wing attacked Genshagen aircraft engine factory visually with good results. Two Combat Wings attacked aircraft engine factory at Borsdorf visually with unobserved and excellent results. One Combat Wing bombed Berlin diesel factory visually with good results and 1 Combat Wing bombed opportunity target visually with good results. Eight Combat Wings bombed Berlin by PFF method with results unobserved. Seven Combat Wings bombed Berlin visually as follows:

1 Combat Wing excellent,
4 Combat Wings good,
2 Combat Wings unobserved.

Three Combat Wings bombed Ruhland oil plant visually with 2 Combat Wings reporting good results and 1 unobserved results. These 3 Combat Wings are proceeding on to bases in Russia as planned.

ACTION: OPD INFO : CO/S, CG AAF, G-2 Col. Park, LOG.

CM-IN-17262 (21 June 44) 1744Z hle

DECLASSIFIED OSD Letter, 5-3-73

JAN 5 1973

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: CG, Strategic Air Forces in Europe London, England
To: War Department
    CG, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces Caserta, Italy
    CG, 15th Air Force, Italy
No: U-63797        19 June 1944

Eaker and Twining info Arnold Walsh signed Spaatz
U 63797.

Alerting 15th Air Force for operations to and at
Russian bases under condition similar 1st mission.
Approximate date 10 July. Suggest target planning commence.

End

ACTION: CG AAF
INFORMATION: OPD
COL PARK
LOG
CM-IN-16159  (20 Jun 44)  0658Z  pa

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: US, Military Mission, Moscow
To: War Department
No: 695 14 June 1944

To Marshall from Deane. Reference your number 45450.

Second FRANTIC operation June 6, attacked at Suyen: 34 GMT on airdrome installations at Galatz. Attack successful with bomb pattern covering hangars and shops and starting numerous fires. Several parked aircraft damaged or destroyed. Three groups loaded HE; 1 IB. Details were reported direct by General Eaker to USSTAF.

Third FRANTIC operation June 11, attack on airdrome installations at Focsani approximately same time of day. Information from photos by PRU indicates attack successful with estimate of results as follows: 12 of 19 warehouses in west target area hit or severely damaged by blast with fires burning at time PRU flight; in east area fires burning and 2 large buildings appear destroyed; 8 barracks destroyed and hits on large buildings same vicinity indicated by roof damage; hit made on long freight train on north border target area; northwest edge airdrome smoke prohbits detailed assessment, but 4 fires burning near large semicircular hangar and 5 large shops nearby appear completely destroyed. Two fighters missing on 2nd mission; 1 Bomber lost on 3rd mission.

Planes proceeded to Italian bases on 3rd mission. Prompt operational report to you being made routine in future.

ACTION: ODF
INFORMATION: CG AAF, G-2, Col Park, Log
CM-IN-12351 (15 Jun 44) 2126Z bjm

Regraded Unclassified

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: CO Strategic Air Forces in Europe, London England

To: War Department  
   CO Headquarters USSTAF, Eastern Echelon

Msg: U 63413 10 June 1944

Doolittle info Arnold [redacted] info Deane info Walsh signed Spaatz U 63413.

Commencement 8th Air Force bombing mission proceeding to Russian bases will take place first suitable weather after 15th June. Limit such force as proceeds to Russia to 140 B-17's and 70 P51's for this first mission. Communications from you to EASTCOM (JEMP) will require about 10 hours for turn around until approximately 15 June. Use redline bounce procedure.

End

ACTION: Gen Arnold
INFO: OPD  
   Gen Bissell  
   SGS  
   C of S

CM-IN-8237 (10 Jun 44) 18522 ejm

530 Shuttle Bombing

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OSD Letter, 5-3-72
JAN 5 1973

COPY No.

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Regraded Unclassified
From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia
To: War Department
Nr: 683 12 June 1944

For General Arnold from Harriman signed Deane.

Now that General Eaker has returned to Italy, successfully completing the first phase of FRANTIC, I wish to record my admiration for the United States Army Air Force in this unique achievement in so short a time.

On February 2nd Marshal Stalin gave me his approval in principle. On February 5th General Deane outlined to Marshal Novikov our proposal in general terms and since has successfully carried out the negotiations with General Nikitin and the Red Army Staff. Within four months the first mission landed on the newly prepared Soviet bases.

In spite of other preoccupations, General Spaatz and his staff have energetically supported the project. Equipment and supplies needed for the bases were rapidly landed in England to catch the last northern convoy. With the cooperation of General Connolly, the personnel and further supplies have been successfully handled through Teheran.

General Kessler has shown great skill and leadership in the preparation of the bases and in obtaining the full cooperation of the Soviet forces assigned to the operation.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parke Date MAY 3 1974

530 Shuttle Bombing

COPY NO. 46

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia
Nr: 683 12 June 1944

It is true that we have had annoying delays in connection with visas, transport plane clearances, etc, but these delays were caused not by the Red Air Force but by other departments of the Soviet Government in breaking down historic inhibitions. Interdepartmental difficulties of this character, where the responsibilities of departments overlap are not unknown in Washington. The bottleneck, however, was the arrival at the bases of our equipment and supplies from the north and not the above difficulties. The Red Air Force deserves great credit for the speed with which the installations were made and the cooperation generally given General Kessler at Poltava. General Kessler and his men have done a fine job.

On General Eaker's arrival with the first mission he found the bases well prepared and all arrangement worked smoothly. While General Eaker was here he and General Deane settled all outstanding operational questions with the Red Air Staff including exchange of intelligence information. General Eaker's coming himself and the impression he created have had a profound effect on our relations with the Soviets. He received an enthusiastic welcome from Marshal Novikov and other senior officers of the Red Air Staff.

Soviet officials, both civilian and military, place prime importance on the initiation of FRANTIC as the first combined military operation and thereby establishing a basis for lasting friendship between the two countries.
From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia

Nr: 683  12 June 1944

They do not, however, minimize the tactical value and propaganda effect of dispelling all hope in the people of the enemy countries of a division among the Allies.

For all of us here I wish to express our thanks to you and all concerned for the complete support given this operation in Washington, England, and Italy.

End

ACTION: CG AAF
INFO: OPD
      G-2
      Col Park
      Log

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 3 1974

CM-IN-10241 (13 Jun 44) 1115Z mcs

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
To: War Department  
Ref: 13294  11 June 1944  

From Speatz to Deane rptd info Arnold Eaker and Walsh
nr 13294.

Reference your unnumbered message dated 11 June to
Eaker info to me. Operations of the US Strategic Air Forces
out of the Mediterranean, Russia, and United Kingdom are under
my direction. Walsh is my Air Force Commander in Russia. All
instructions concerning operations of these forces must be
transmitted from Walsh through me. This restriction does not
apply to daily timing coordination. If the above procedure
is not followed it may lead to conflicting instructions being
issued to my forces. Agree with arrangements recommended in the
message cited above provided Walsh concurs.

End

Reference not identified by WDCMC.

ACTION: CG AAF
INFO: OPD

CH-IN-9340 (12 Jun 44) 0408Z

[Signature]

COPY NO. 30

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: War Cabinet Offices
To: Joint Staff Mission
AFHQ Algiers

02 3064

Following received from 30 Mission.

Begins: 11th June 1230.

C.C.S. Washington repeated British Chiefs of Staff London
AFHQ Algiers. MIL 1394 from Deane and Burrows.

We have agreed with the Soviet General Staff that "effective
at once the temporary bomb line Constanza-Bucharest-Ploesti-
Bracov-Debreczen-Miskolcs-Budapest will be abolished and
that co-ordination between the Allied Forces" operating in
the South Eastern Balkans will be effected through liaison
established in Moscow. For this purpose General Eaker has
sent Colonel Samuel D. Gormly who will be stationed in
Moscow and will be in close and daily contact with a re-
presentative of the Red Army General Staff. Gormly should
be kept informed as far in advance as possible of operations
of the Anglo/American Mediterranean Air Forces in South
Eastern Balkans. We have approved this change because we
feel it is in line with your original desire to effect co-
ordination through liaison.

End

T.O.O. 111604Z

ACTION: CC/S
INFO: Gen Arnold, OPD, Gen Bissell, Col Park

CM-IN-9745 (12 Jun 44) 1635Z jb

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RBP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974
From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia
To: War Department
US Military Attaché, London, England

10 June 1944

To Speatz from Deane repeated to Arnold for information.

The Red Army General Staff requests that targets for the 2nd FRANTIC mission be as follows:

1st priority rail communications at Brest Litovsk, including marshalling yards, stations, and other rail facilities.

2nd priority Bialystok. Here they give 1st priority to rail communications, but also indicate that there is a good airdrome at Bialystok which they would give 2nd priority in any attack made there.

3rd priority Czeremsha about midway between Brest Litovsk and Bialystok. Again priority to be given to an attack against rail communications. Soviets have indicated that straight lines from each of the targets indicated to our bases in Russia constitute the best routes.

The above applies to the mission out of England on the first good weather after 15th June.

ACTION: Gen Arnold
INFO: OPD, Gen Bissell, Col Park, Log

CM-IN-8867 (11 Jun 44) 12262 ejm MAY 3 1974

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

COPY No. 18

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: US Military Mission, Moscow
To: War Department

8th June 1944

For General Spaatz repeated to General Arnold for info from Deane. Request that this message be repeated to ESCOM.

Early this morning received request from General Eaker who is at Poltava to obtain Russian clearance for an attack against Constanza on return to home bases in Italy. He indicates photo-reconnaissance has established a large concentration of transports in the port. Red General Staff has promised to send reply to General Perminov at Poltava this afternoon, and if reply is favorable they will indicate the best available route to follow.

I told the Soviets that General Eaker wished to have Buzau as an alternate target for today through Tirasopol. However I did not receive your number 13246 dated the 7th until 11 AM Moscow time on the 8th. I therefore requested that this be designated as an alternate target for Constanza for either the 9th or 10th.
From: US Military Mission, Moscow

Mrs: 654 8th June, 1944

My communications with Poltava are almost impossible and will be until Saturday June 10th when I expect to open operations between the station now being installed in Moscow direct with Poltava. Once these are in, I will be able to coordinate very quickly. Between now and Saturday, the fastest way to communicate with me is to have General Perinov send the message from Poltava over Soviet channels, but even this is slow and unsatisfactory.

End.

ACTION: Gen Arnold
INFO: OPD Log

CM-IN-6535 (8 Jun 44) 2348Z JF

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

COPY No.
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Regraded Unclassified
From: U S Military Attache London, England
To: War Department

Mr: 13216 5 June 1944

Deane for Walsh rptd info Arnold from Spaatz or nr 13216 relaying Eastcom unnumbered 4 June.

Next 3 days weather prevents operation against target number 1. Attack on number 2 target and return home base early morning 6 June is now intention.

End

ACTION: CG AAF
INFO: OPD G-2
Cel Park Log

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 5-3-72
MAY 3 1974

CH-IN-3662 (5 Jun 44) 0929Z bem

5-30 Shuttle Bombing

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

COPY NO. 40

Regraded Unclassified
Military Attaché
American Embassy
London, England

US Military Mission
Moscow, Russia-M-390

Number: WAX 46206

MA London pass to USSAFE to Deane information Spatz from Arnold.

Now that our aircraft have arrived in Russia for FRANTIC operations believe time opportune for making strong representations to the Soviets that combat conditions under which our aircraft and personnel will be operating necessitates immediately dispensing with red tape and technicalities which have hampered FRANTIC operation to date. Specifically you should call their attention to the following:

A. Group visa difficulties
B. Ceiling on FRANTIC personnel
C. Delay in clearance of flights into USSR
D. Delay in clearance of FRU aircraft from and to the United Kingdom.

The above have all been discussed in numerous cables and brought to the attention of the Soviet Government without conclusive results to date.
It is realized that some of these delays are the result of interdepartmental red tape, probably centering in the Soviet Foreign Office. It is requested therefore that you enlist Ambassador Harriman's assistance in bringing these matters to the attention of the proper Soviet authorities. Suggest you take a strong stand in this matter as I want to be assured that future FRANTIC operations will not be hampered by trivialities.

End

AF 405

ORIGINATOR: CG AAF
INFORMATION: OPD
Col. Park
Log

CM-OUT-46206 (4 Jun 44) 2043Z 1s

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Regraded Unclassified
To: War Department
No.: 13204 3 June 1944

Marshall and Arnold information Deane from Spaatz serial number 13204 from Eisenhower cite WAR 45083.

Provided limitations out of Russian bases fully understood by all concerned, due to limited supplies, fully concur Deane's letter to Slavin quoted his 184 June 1. Attitude here regarding targets to be attacked and bomb line restrictions exactly as Deane recommends in same message. Above limitation actually applies only to operations from Russian bases, that is to such assistance as may be requested on northern portions Russian front.

We intend provide all assistance possible on Southern portions through use of Mediterranean based forces under conditions by Deane to Slavin stated. This has been discussed between Generals Eisenhower and Spaatz who are agreed on contents.

184 is CM-IN-1014 (2 Jun 44) Gen Arnold

ACTION: CG AAF
INFO: OPD, G-2, Col Park, Log

CM-IN-2327 (3 Jun 44) 2028Z mos

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
To: War Department
No. 13207 3 June 1944

Deane repeated information Arnold from Spaatz
serial number 13207

This is paraphrase of EASTCOM JX 194 from Baker.

Weather postpones Mission for 4th. Operation will
take place 1st day weather suitable. Request clearance
for same Mission for 5th June be secured.

Peabody

ACTION: Gen Arnold

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Bissell
Col Park
Log

CM-IN-2319 (3 Jun 44) 2008Z ss

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Regraded Unclassified
From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia
To: War Department
Nr: 629 3 June 1944

For General Arnold, personal from Deane.

First FRANTIC operation considered by all a huge success. General Eaker appeared to be well pleased with the arrangements at the bases. Present plan is Mielec on June 4 and airdromes in the Galatz area on June 6 enroute to Italian bases. Delighted that Walsh has arrived and he has already started taking over. He is at Poltava at the time and will remain there until first mission is completed. I will get to work at once with Mr. Harriman on carrying out the views you expressed to him when he was in Washington.

End

ACTION: Gen Arnold
INFO: OPD Col Park Log

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHF, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

CM-IN-2359 (3 Jun 44) 2155Z msg

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: CG, Strategic Air Forces in Europe, London, England
To: War Department
No: U 63088 3 June 1944

Arnold signed Spaatz U 63088 cite U 63082.

Indicated now that no P-51 aircraft lost. Only aircraft missing is B-17 which exploded.

End

FOOTNOTE: 63082 is CM-IN-1553 (2 Jun 44) Gen Arnold

ACTION: Gen Arnold

INFO: OPD
Gen Bissell
Col Park
Mr Stimson
Log

CM IN-1933 (3 Jun 44) 1049Z jb

TOP SECRET

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COPY No. 18

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 5-3-72
JAN 5 1973

Regraded Unclassified
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Hq AAF AC/AS, Plans AFAEP
Operational Plans Division
European Branch RWE/mc/72700
June 2, 1944

Commanding General
US Military Mission
Moscow, Russia # M-389

Military Attache
American Embassy
London, England

Number: WARX 46187

To Deane information Spaatz from Arnold signed Marshall.

Views expressed in your letter to General Slavin reference your number 620 London number 184 dated June 1, 1944 the United States Chiefs of Staff concur.

392 End

ORIGINATOR: CG AAF
INFORMATION: JC/S OPD G-2 Adm King Col Park
CM-OUT-46187 (4 Jun 44) 18297 amb

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Regraded Unclassified
Commanding General
USAF European Theater of Operations
London, England

Commanding General
US Mil Mission to USSR #3674
Moscow, Russia

Number WARX #5117

Redacted message to Eisenhower and Deane from the Joint Chiefs of Staff

When the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the instructions to Speats and Deane contained in their message of March 31, 1944 (WARX 16975) respecting publicity for FRANTIC, it was intended that unless major issues were involved, necessary coordination should be achieved directly between the concerned agencies in U.K. and U.S.S.R. without further Combined or Joint Chiefs of Staff approval. In line with this policy we are referring Eisenhower's dispatch, number S-52394, to Deane for his information with suggestion that the following be added under propaganda theme "need of Germany to regroup her already strained air defense system spread thin by air attacks from bases in Great Britain and Italy. The operation again proves that agreements reached at Tehran are being fully implemented by United Nations".

Suggest that agreed propaganda theme as finally coordinated by Deane be transmitted to London and Washington for information.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

CM-OUT-45117 Log (2 Jun 1944) 1834Z best

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

COPY No. 12

530 Shuttte Bombing

Regraded Unclassified
There is given below a paraphrase of 3 5239ª from SHAEF to U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff referred to in message immediately following.

"Early initiation of operation FRANTIC is contemplated by SHAEF and Commanding General USSTAF. This is mainly to enable Strategic Air Force to reach manufacturing targets which are difficult for US to attack at this time. A secondary purpose is to convince Russians that when we enter into joint arrangement we act promptly. FRANTIC should be most effective in keeping German fighter strength down. It should also reinforce the cover plan and open additional opportunities in psychological warfare. This should not militate against effective preparation for operation OVERLORD as number of planes involved will not be that large. Recommendation is that the Chief of the United States Military Mission to Moscow be instructed to approach the Russian Chief of Staff to obtain concurrence to the following:

1. With regard to propaganda material. Material on Russian workers building airfields, reception by Russians of US Airmen after first mission, Russian Ground Staff servicing aircraft, and Russian Airmen eye-witness stories..."
about first mission.

2. Regarding propaganda themes.

   a. Air potential of US is vast and flexible and can be rapidly shifted from base areas in UK, Italy and Russia for strategic bombing against Germany.

   b. United Nations have initiative firmly in their hands and by concerted plans can strike at Germany from all directions.

   c. Comradeship in arms of United Nations; US and USSR Airmen fighting wing to wing; USSR providing airfields, fighter escorts, Joint Staff work and planning, Maintenance Staffs.

   d. Perimeter of the German fortress is shrinking and affords Germany no opportunity for economizing resources, but will require more and more the smaller it becomes.

   e. There is no longer a "Safe" area for Germans. Eastern Germany with its evacuation areas for population, Nazis, and industry, and the Balkan satellites, are exposed to large scale attack by United Nations bombers the same degree as the remainder of Germany and German occupied territories; they have no place to hide; no place to work.

3. Method of implementation.

   a. Regarding propaganda. Joint American-Russian leaflets to be dropped and broadcasts made on first mission carrying above propaganda themes. Leaflets

   b. Radio and other media to be used to broadcast the above themes.

   c. Journalists to be used to disseminate the above themes.

   d. The above themes to be repeated in all possible ways.
to urge civil population to help rid themselves of Germans by active sabotage German war machine if first target in satellite territories.

b. Regarding publicity. Flash release of first mission to be given out from Moscow while aircraft on way to base. Followed by communique from US Headquarters Moscow. Subsequent communique to follow normal US practice.

c. If agreed, cable Russian suggestions for text of joint leaflet.

d. Suggest Russians be invited to arrange broadcast program which we will monitor and use."

End.

ORIGINATOR: JC/S

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 3 1974

CM-OUT-45116 (2 Jun 44) 1830Z lee

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: CG, Strategic Air Forces in Europe
London, England

To: War Department

No. U 63082  2 June 1944

Arnold signed Spaats U 63082

Apparent: success:ful was today's 1st FRANTIC opera-
tion. 195 planes made up this Force. Target located
Debrecen.

193 airplanes now on Russian bases. 1 Bomber
exploded over target, 1 P51 missing.

Weather good in target area but route mostly over-
cast, low clouds and rain at Russian bases.

Enemy opposition light, target appeared well hit
but no estimate damage until photos developed.

Negotiations in Moscow tonight on subsequent targets.

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 5-3-72

JAN 5 1973

CM-IN-1553 (2 Jun 44)

530 Shuttle Bombing

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: CG, Strategic Air Forces in Europe
London, England

No. U 63082 2 June 1944

Baker well received by Russians. Will keep you advised.

129 heavy bombers and 64 fighters now on the 3 bases over there.

End.

ACTION: Gen Arnold
INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Bissell
Col Park
Mr Stimson
Log
CM-IN-1553 (2 Jun 44) 20042 bjm

Regraded Unclassified

COPY No.
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From:  HQ Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, Caserta, Italy.

To:  War Department.

Br:  N-19191 WR-603 2 June 1944.

To Arnold from Baker N-19191 WR-603.

Fellows 15th Air Force missions flown today. 718 heavy bombers and 242 fighters dispatched consisting of 186 B17's and 532 B24's 145 P38's and 97 P51's. A total of 1535 tons dropped on Marshalling Yards at Szeged, Miskolc, Simeria, Szolnok, Oradea, Cluj and Debrecen. Crews report good coverage of all targets with hits on choke points, round houses and rolling stock. No enemy fighters were encountered. Flak was scant inaccurate light to scant intense heavy at Szeged, Miskolc, Simeria and Szolnok. Preliminary reports include 1 B17 and 1 B24 missing. Included in the above are 130 B17's and 69 P51's dispatched in FRANTIC operation. Eastern command reports 129 bombers landed after good trip. There were 5 P51's early returns. Fighters report few eastern command not available. FRANTIC task force arrived bases a few minutes ahead of ETA. But schedule appears to have been maintained as planned.

New subject. PRU coverage of Ploesti indicates considerable fresh damage as a result of attack of 31 May. Concordia plant particularly heavily hit.

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
Gen Bissell
Col Park
Log

CM-IN-1602 (2 Jun 44) 2043Z 1st
PRIORITY

Fair amount of mine laying indicated.

To: War Department
   CG, Strategic Air Forces in Europe, London, England
No. EX 31087 2 June 1944

G2 daily cable June 020600 hours to WDGBI from
   from Conrad signed Eisenhower EX-3108.

Effort by enemy British Isles home waters addenda
week ending 31 May British home forces report air operations
against England again directed primarily at ports and coastal
points with little result achieved. Overland daylight
activity occurred only 24 May when 1 aircraft probably Recon
flew over Thames Estuary crossing Isle Sheppey 1652 hours
and over Dover 5 minutes later no incidents.

Fighters destroyed 3 aircraft other causes 1 or
about 2 percent total forces operating over and around
British Isles. Enemy used similar technique all these
attacks being somewhat different to previous attacks. Each
case 6A force 40 to 50 aircraft operated in area while only
small percentage 10 to 15 attacked land targets. Remainder
probably engaged minelaying but no evidence in several
cases that mines were laid or such the intention. Window
usually dropped middle English Channel. Possibly enemy
thinks this approach makes defensive fighter tasks more
difficult.
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: C3 US Army Forces in European Theater of Operations
London, England

No. EX 31087 2 June 1944

31 May approximately 75 single engine fighters
reacted in very slight defense to allied raids Germany France.
10 long range 2 tactical Recon sea areas English Channel
North Sea Bay Biscay including Fockeul 200 from Trondheim
also probably Junkers 290 from Southwest France.

31 May/1 June 0315 hours 6 of 15 long range bombers
believed Messerschmitt 410 Landfall Norfolk Coast. 12
high explosive bombs and machine gun incidents reported
great Yarmouth Deopham Nethersett causing only slight
property damage. No evidence to suggest intruder activity.
Remaining aircraft operated off shore between Mouth and
Cromer possibly laying mines. 3 long range Recon sea areas
English Channel North Sea Bay Biscay. Moderate fighter
reaction to allied attacks.

1 June 3 defensive sorties North France Holland 1
Recon off Orkney Islands.

1/2 June 3 defensive patrols Dieppe 2 Pas de Calais.
1 Recon East Aberdeen Scotland reported.

ACTION: G-2

INFO: CC/3 (BSM), GGAAP, OPD, Col Park, JEIA, Log

CM-IN-1887 (3 Jun 44) 0843 Z Jb

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Regraded Unclassified
From: CG, Headquarters Mediterranean Allied Air Forces in Caserta, Italy

To: War Department

Nr: JK 147

2 June 1944

Baker and pls pass to Spaatz and Arnold from Kessler JK 147

Flash 64 B 17 planes safely down at Poltava 1125Z.
65 B 17's down at Mirollo 1125Z. Light rain.

End

Note: This message has been relayed to London, England by the War Department Code Center in accordance with the originator's request.

ACTION: Gen Arnold

INFO: OPD

Gen Biessell

Col Park

LOG

CM-IN-1373 (2 June 44) 1534Z

TOP SECRET

530 Shutter Bombing

DECATEGORIZED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

Regraded Unclassified

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: US Military Mission in Moscow, Russia
To: War Department
No. 623 2 June 1944

To Eaker. Spaatz and Arnold from Crist signed Deane WAR pass to Eaker.

Correspondents given hold for release statement on initial operation. Release planned immediately upon landing between 1030 and 1200 hours today GMT, but stories now with Soviet censors and no indication when Soviet approval forthcoming. Pressing for action and will advise immediately when and for what time release cleared by Soviets.

End.

Note: This message has been relayed to Caserta, Italy by the War Department Code Center as per originator's request.

ACTION: Gen Surles
INFO: Gen Arnold

DECCLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RNP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

SM-IN-1379 (2 June 44) 1557Z

Shuttles Bombing

COPY No.
From: CG, Strategic Air Forces in Europe, London, England
To: War Department
No: U-63026
Date: 1st June, 1944

Arnold personal from Spaatz U63026.

Scheduled for 2nd June is FRANTIC operation. Weather at 1800 hours 1st June forecast favorable.

No Sig.

ACTION: Gen Arnold
INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Bissell
Fxo Fark
CofS

CM-IN-716 (1 Jun 44) 2157Z bjm

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Office of Technical Information AFOTI/Lt. Col. Smith 11
30 128 74173
1 June 1944

U. S. Military Mission, 355M,
Moscow, Russia.

Commanding General,
Strategic Air Forces in Europe,

Commanding General,
Army Air Forces,
Mediterranean Theater of Operations,
Caserta, Italy.

Allied Force Headquarters,
Algiers, Algeria.

Number: WARY 44582

For Spaatz information Eaker Deane pass to Harriman form Arnold.

Reference your number 13159 dated 31 May the prepared answer suggested by Eaker and Harriman for Spaatz Washington Wilson should read "as announced by Moscow yesterday a force of allied strategic bombers and fighters attacked enemy targets in Rumania and proceeded to Russian bases. As is customary no further details can be given on the operation except by the Air Commander in Russia. Complete details will be made available when publication will in no way jeopardize the success of combat operations". Elimination of the suggestion that a bomber command permanently stationed in Russia is made in order not to deceive the press when the actual nature of the operations is revealed shortly. We would be in an extremely embarrassing position with the press if deception has been used. The effect Eaker and Harriman recommend will be obtained by the
revised release. This has been coordinated with General Surles who will handle the matter with OWI and censorship.
From: U.S. Military Mission, Moscow, Russia

To: War Department
CG, Strategic Air Forces in Europe,
London, England

1 June 1944

For General Marshall and General Arnold for their eyes only and repeated to General Spaatz for his eyes only from Deane [redacted]

In his message number 13113 of 26 May General Spaatz indicated that for the first FRANTIC missions it was desired to attack targets at Galatz, Mielec, and Riga with alternate targets as the marshalling yards at five different localities. These proposals were submitted to the Red Army General Staff for approval and were finally disapproved by them on May 30. I had a long argument on the subject previously reported to General Arnold.

Early this morning I was again called by the Red Army General Staff for a discussion of the subject of targets. They were concerned that our operations might interfere with some of the plans for their ground and air operations. This seemed to be particularly true in the area south and east of Riga. They wished to know if we would be willing to change our plans if they informed us that our operations would interfere with their plans, also if we would be willing to attack targets on their request in order to assist them in their plans. Finally, they wanted a clearer interpretation of our conception of the temporary bomb line established in the Balkans. They have looked upon this line as being extremely...
rigid. I emphasized that the bomb line was temporary until adequate liaison could be established, but that even while the line existed we would be perfectly willing to have them operate west of it provided we were informed of their intentions and did not have plans to operate in the same area at the same time. General Slavin indicated that the General Staff was reconsidering their disapproval of our original request, and I rather expect that they will withdraw their objections to our hitting the targets at Galats, Mielec, and perhaps at Riga. In the future I think it would be well if we would simply inform them of our plans as far in advance as possible without asking for specific approval, always being ready with alternative objectives if they request us not to attack a certain target for specific reasons.

General Slavin asked me to express these views in a letter to him. I have therefore written him a letter and a paraphrase of it as follows. Request that you either confirm the views which I have expressed in the letter or instruct me as to how you wish the letter to be altered. "May I inform you in confirmation of our conversation of last night that the United States Chiefs of Staff earnestly desire to utilise United States aircraft to assist the advance of the Red Army to the fullest possible extent consistent with carrying out the American part of the combined bomber offensive.

The United States Chiefs of Staff also desire to avoid any action which will interfere with the operational plans of the Red Army. For this reason, we shall inform you of all
targets which we propose to attack when operating from Russian bases or when operating to and from Russian bases as soon as they have been decided upon. Should you indicate in sufficient time that an American air attack on one of our proposed objectives will interfere with the operations of either the Red Army or the Red Air Force, I am certain that our attack will be shifted to another objective until your objections are withdrawn.

I have always felt that the temporary bomb line now established in Rumania is unnecessarily restrictive to both sides. May I therefore suggest that we try to arrange a Soviet-British-American agreement to establish close and daily liaison in Moscow in connection with Balkan Air Operations. Colonel Gormly in Plovdiv has been sent to the USSR to serve as a liaison officer from the Anglo-American Mediterranean Air Forces. If the Red Army General Staff could select someone to meet with him daily, I believe it would be possible to do away with the temporary bomb line and effect coordination exclusively through liaison. We now have adequate communications between Moscow and Caserta for this purpose.

Because these matters are of such importance, I request that you do not take the views that I have expressed in this letter as commitments until I have had an opportunity to obtain confirmation from the United States Chiefs of Staff. I shall cable them today requesting such confirmation."

No Sig.

FOOTNOTE: 13113 is CM-IN-19885 (26 May 44) Gen Arnold.

ACTION: Gen Arnold
INFO : OPD, Gen Bissell, Col Park, Log
CM-IN-1014 (2 Jun 44) 04572 jb

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHF, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
To: War Department
US Military Mission Moscow
Number: 13159 31 May 1944

To Arnold rptd info Deane [redacted] nr 13159 from Spaatz.

You can expect activity on FRANTIC in the next day or 2. Following is Eaker 532 to me with which I fully concur.

"In our discussions with Harriman last night a question came up not adequately covered in the PRO directive. It was pointed out that when Moscow releases the communiqué on FRANTIC arrival, you as Strategic Air Force Commander in Europe, Arnold and the War Department in Washington and General Wilson here will be asked questions immediately by the press in the respective theaters urgent from Eaker CS 532 IE to Spaatz personal TOPSEC number 90. Harriman feels very strongly that there is a grave danger that Washington may issue a release or that some spokesman in Washington may upset our agreement to have all releases emanate from Russia until the flight returns, thereafter to be handled normally. To cover this point I recommend that a brief release be prepared which will be Wilson's yours and Washingtons reply to any query on this subject."

To: 13159

31 May 1944

If you agree with this view I know that General Wilson will get along with it from this end and recommend that you pass to General Arnold the proposed release and urge that nobody in Washington give out anything else. We propose to put a censors stop on any articles on FRANTIC out of this theater except this proposed release by General Wilson, until the return of the mission. I suggest the following as the prepared answer by you Washington and Wilson when queries come in:

"As announced by Moscow yesterday a force of allied strategic bombers and fighters attacked enemy targets in Rumania yesterday and proceeded to Russian Bases. This force will continue the air offensive from Russia. Our strategic air forces are operating from Russian Bases in order to be in closer proximity to certain key targets and enabled thereby more effectively to accomplish their early destruction. As is customary no further details can be given on this operation while it is in progress except by the air commander in Russia. Complete details will be made available at a later date when publication will in no wise jeopardize the success of combat operations of our crews engaged in this mission. I feel that it is particularly important that nobody give out the size of the
force until we return to our Italian Bases and I also feel that it is important that the Germans believe that we have now moved a strategic air force to Russia which will operate from Russian Bases.

I am taking necessary steps to cause censors stop be effected here. Request you do for Washington the same.

No Sig.

ACTION: General Arnold
INFO : General Handy
General Bissell
General Surles
Col Park C of S

CM-IN-23994 (31 May 44) 1655Z bns

DECLASSIFIED
$82 Letter, 5-3-72
JAN 5 1973
From: U.S. Military Attache in London, England
To: War Department
No: 13145
30th May 1944

This is paraphrase of Kessel's unnumbered msg originated 2912293. Desne info Arnold from Spaatz sr nr 13145

Activities FRU seriously delayed by absence Moscow clearance. Shuttle trips from Bari operating satisfactorily but operations from our base held up account no clearance. Plan be presented to local Soviet 25th May calling for provision 5 corridor through which our aircraft might pass at given time daily has not been granted clearance to date. Local defense especially flak must be notified prior to passage over Soviet occupied territory and communications require 24 hours notice to accomplish for insurance safe passage for Soviet clearance. To alleviate cumbersome procedure of obtaining daily clearance and provide flexibility in operations connection shuttle FRU and AFU operation from Teheran was designed behind our plan. To expedite Moscow approval of our plan is action by you we request taken. End paraphrase.

New subject. Please do everything possible to set up working procedure for FRU operations out of Kessels base. We so not have adequate coverage of some targets in my 13113 listed.

ACTION: Gen Arnold
INFO: OPD, Gen Bissell, Col. Park, LOG
CM-IN-23036 (30 May 44) 1433Z hrt

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 5-3-72
JAN 5 1973

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

26-75724 25N

Regraded Unclassified
From: U.S. Military Mission Moscow, Russia  
To: War Department  
U.S. Military Attaché London, England  
Mr: 613  
30 May 1944  

For Connolly repeated to Spaatz and Arnold for info from Deane War please pass to Connolly.

I again went to the foreign office about the mechanics of issuing group visas to maintain 1230 permanent personnel on hand at our bases in Russia. They proposed that General Permonov notify the foreign office in Moscow daily of the total number present at our bases. The foreign office could then authorize for Soviet consul in Teheran to issue visas sufficient to bring the permanent personnel at our bases up to 1230. Our charge d'affaires and I both protested this procedure as being too slow and cumbersome. We suggested that Permonov notify the Soviet consul at Teheran daily of the number present at the bases so that he would know how many visas he could issue to maintain us at 1230. I also suggested the possibility of increasing our authorization to 1240 in order to allow a cushion to take care of time lags in communications. We have been promised an answer within the next few days. I feel that we should not make any approach to the Soviet authorities to increase our authorization beyond 1230 until after operational experience has indicated that there is a necessity for an increased number. You indicate that London is sending 38 mechanics to maintain P51's rather than the 30 authorised. If this is the case, Col. Kessler should make room for them by sending the 8 least desirable of his total personnel out of Russia. I think if he will do some weeding out, we can operate successfully in

CM-IN-23676 (31 May 44)
From: U.S. Military Mission, Moscow, Russia
30 May 1944

the total 1230 authorized. Altogether you indicate that
there are 1246 who want visas. This will mean that Kessler
should elimate 16 now present at the bases to make room for
the 16 additional people who are apparently very important.
We have a firm agreement with the Russians that we will main-
tain our personnel not to exceed 1230. We have only obtained
this number by exerting the greatest pressure possible. If
we try to boost it now before even the first operations have
started, I am afraid we will reach the Soviet breaking point
and jeopardize the success of all operations. It is requested
that you send a paraphrase of this message to Col Kessler
over your communications. The weeding to process suggested
constitutes my instructions to him, and I would appreciate
it if they would be confirmed from London or Washington.

New Subject: Foreign office states that the Russian
Consul has instructions regarding issuance of visas to
Ambassador Harriman's crew.

No Sig

This message has been relayed to Teheran by War Department
Code Center in accordance with the originator's request.

ACTION: Gen Arnold
INFO: OPD, Col Park, C of S
DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 5-3-72
JAN 5 1973

CM-IN-23676 (31 May 44) 1051Z Jb

COPY No.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE
URGENT

To: War Department
No. 13155 30 May 1944

To Deane repeated Arnold from Spaatz
Serial Number 13155.

Favorable for an early FRANTIC bombing operation
appears long range weather forecast. Essential briefing
and detailed planning now being held up by absence of
final Russian approval of primary and alternate targets see
my 13113.

15th Air Force ready and Kessler reports he is
prepared receive them. Understand Eaker has radioed you
urging earliest possible clearance. Am instructing 15th
set up proper notification and make plans conduct operation
1st June provided weather does not deteriorate. Target
enroute to bases will be our side of bomb line probably
Brasov. Am risking delay at bases pending clearance of
Kielce and Rega. Please explain this intention to Soviets
and attempt hasten their concurrence our attacking other
targets stated. Will forego, although reluctantly, marshalling
yard weather alternate targets listed cited message from
here if this will expedite Soviet concurrence two main listed
installations.

Peabody

Note: 13113 is CM-IN-19885 (26 May 44) Gen. Arnold
ACTION: General Arnold
INFO: Gen. Handy, Gen. Bissell, Col Park, Log
CM-IN-23258 (30 May 44) 2020Z

TEXT: OHD Letter, 5-3-72

JAN 5 1973

COPY No.

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24-75784 25W
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia
To: War Department

27 May 1944

For Arnold info Spaatz from Deane

Acknowledge receipt of your 41426 dated 25th May. No reason why personnel and material for maintenance of F 51's can not be included in shuttles of C 87's now operating. Reference second paragraph your message I have requested authorization to continue operation of 2 to 4 C87's.

No Sig

ACTION: Gen Arnold

INFO: OPD
Col Park
C of S

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

CM-IN-21340 (28 May 44) 1025Z mlo

TOP SECRET

530 Shuttle Bombing

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

COPY No. 15

Regraded Unclassified
To: War Department
No. 13113 26 May 1944

Deane rptd Arnold [redacted] serial number 13113 from Spaatz.

Following targets proposed for first shuttle operation. Necessary you clear with Russians not only for attack but prior authority to photograph and notify me of their approval before May 29. If you unable do this it will delay operation. Targets being considered are principal air fields in Galatz Area; enemy flying field and aircraft manufacture and repair center at Mielec approximately 150 miles west of Lwow; German aircraft factory at Riga; marshalling yards at Lwow, Brest Litovsk, Devinsk, Kaunas and Vilna. It is planned to attack airfields at Galatz Area enroute in and to attack Riga and Mielec from Russian Bases with marshalling yards at 50 locations listed as weather alternates. If Russians desire to give priority on above targets we will be glad to have it or if they desire suggest any other targets within our capabilities we will also be glad to consider them. Range and targets within our capabilities are generally as indicated by our selection of above targets. We propose initiate these operations first favorable weather after June 1 next.

No Sig.

ACTION: General Arnold
INPO : General Handy, General Bissell, Colonel Park
LOG

CM-IN-19885 (26 May 44) 1529Z

TOP SECRET

Regraded Unclassified
AC/AS, Plans, AFAFP, Operational Plans Division, European Branch
Col. Thomson 5834
May 25, 1944

Commanding General
Strategic Air Forces in Europe
London, England

U. S. Military Mission
Moscow, Russia
(M-323)

Commanding General
Army Air Forces
Mediterranean Theater of Operations
Caserta, Italy

Commanding General
USAF in North African Theater
Algiers, Algeria

Number: WARX-41541

Arnold to Spaatz info Deane and Eaker.

In substantiation of date in cable number 13053 of May 20, U. S. Mil Attache, London and considering all aspects absolutely essential this headquarters be notified when firm date frantic operation established or scheduled.

No Sig

AF 2820

ORIGINATOR: Gen. Arnold

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Bissell
Col Park
C of S

CM-OUT-41541 (25 May 44) 2110Z met

COPY No. 17

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia
To: War Department
US Military Attaché, London, England
24 May 1944

To Connolly, to Spaatz and Arnold for info from Deane War pls pass to Connolly as ULMILMIS Moscow number 155 to PGCO.

Soviet Foreign Office here has sent instructions to the Soviet Consul in Teheran to give immediate approval to 113 group Visas. In addition, they have been authorized to give approval to 30 group visas to take care of those coming in as specialists in P51 maintenance. They have further been given instructions that they are authorized to issue group visas as necessary as long as the total American Air Personnel in Russia does not exceed 1230. If you have any further difficulty in this matter please cable me at once.

No Sig

Note: This message has been relayed to Teheran by War Department Code Center in accordance with Originators request.

ACTION: Gen Arnold
INFO: OPD
Col. Park
C of S

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By HIF, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

CM-IN-18504 (24 May 44) 23482 Jb

530 Shuttle Bombing

COPY No. 15

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
To: War Department
No. S 52394

23 May 1944

From UNITY to AGWAR, S 52394, for The United States Chiefs of Staff from Eisenhower cite SHCOS

The Supreme Allied Commander and The Commanding General USSTAF contemplate early initiation of shuttle bombing (operation FRANTIC) principally to reach with air manufacturing targets that are difficult for us to attack at this time, and with the secondary purpose of convincing the Russians that we act promptly when we enter into a joint arrangement. The number of planes involved will not be so large as to militate against effective preparation for operation OVERLORD while, on the contrary, it is considered that it will be most effective in keeping German fighter strength down as well as reinforcing the cover plan. This project will open up additional opportunities in psychological warfare. It is accordingly recommended that The Chief of The United States Military Mission to Moscow be instructed to approach The Russian Chief of Staff to obtain concurrence to the following:

1. Propaganda themes.

   a. United Nations comradeship in arms; US and USSR Airmen Fighting Wing to Win: USSR providing

No. S 52394

23 May 1944

fighter escorts, airfields, maintenance staffs, joint staff work and planning.

b. Vast and flexible air potential of US which can be rapidly shifted from base areas in UK, Italy and Russia for strategic bombing against Germany.

c. Initiative firmly in hands of United Nations who by concerted plans can strike at Germany from all directions.

d. Eastern Germany with its evacuation areas for population, Nazis, and industry, and the Balkan Satellites, are exposed to large scale attack by United Nations bombers the same degree as the remainder of Germany and German occupied territories; there is no longer a "safe" area for Germans. They have no place to hide; no place to work.

e. The shrinking perimeter of the German fortress affords Germany no opportunity for economising resources, but will require more and more the smaller it becomes.

2. Propaganda material. Russian airmen eye witness stories about first mission and material on Russian workers building airfields, Russian Ground Staff servicing aircraft, reception by Russians of US airmen after first mission.

No. S 52394 23 May 1944

3. Method of implementation.

a. Publicity. Flash release of first mission to be given out from Moscow while aircraft on way to base. Followed by communique from US Headquarters Moscow. Subsequent communique to follow normal US practice.

b. Propaganda. Broadcasts and joint American Russian leaflets to be dropped on first mission carrying above propaganda themes. If first target in Satellite territories leaflets to urge civil population to help rid themselves of Germans by active sabotage German war machine.

4. Invite Russians to arrange broadcasts programme which we will monitor and use.

5. Cable Russian suggestions for text of joint leaflet if agreed.

No Sig

ACTION: JC/3

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Col/Pack
CoPS

CM-IN-17809 (24 May 44) 0413Z bjm

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Regraded Unclassified
From: U. S. Military Mission, Moscow, Russia
To: War Department

23rd May 1944

CRYPTO WAR pass to Connolly as nr 152 and also pass to Eaker. CG USSTAF rptd info to Connolly Eaker and Arnold from Deane

I have just had a long conference with Col Gen Mikitin. With reference to gas and oil supply, he has agreed to use tank storage at our 3 bases which can accommodate 2000 tons of gas at a time. As quickly as drums are emptied into large tank storage, they will be returned to Teheran. These include the drums which came to us via northern ports. As operations drain the storage at the 3 bases, tanks will be refilled from drums and drums will be shipped to Teheran. At all our bases a total of 6,000 tons should be retained in drums in addition to the 2,000 tons in large storage tanks. However each time the large storage tanks are emptied, the drums will be sent to Teheran.

The Russians do insist upon the gasoline being delivered in drums but now indicate their willingness to return drums as indicated above. It is requested that you ask the British War Office to authorize the PAI Force to release the necessary drums for shipment to our bases and inform them of the plan of returning drums to Teheran outlined above. Gen Connolly informs me that the PAI Force

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CM-IN-17594 (23 May 44)

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: U. S. Military Mission, Moscow, Russia

Nr: 168 23 May 1944

does not have authority from war office at this time to release drums from the Persian Gulf Theater. The British main difficulty at present is a shortage of electrodes needed in drum production but Gen Connolly is taking steps to obtain additional electrodes for them. He also feels that 6,500 tons per month can be shipped in drums by some adjustment in the plans for Russian Air Force commitments without reducing the Russian totals. PAI Force has been informed by Connolly of the urgency of this project and also of the readjustment in plans which he proposes, but they have not agreed. Some instructions from the War Office to the PAI will be necessary.

New subject: Connolly has no information regarding the lifting of 1,125 US barrels of 1120 Aircraft engine oil from Abadan as indicated in your nr 12517 of 5 April 44 nor of the 650 tons of aircraft engine oil being moved to Abadan as indicated in your nr 12623 of 15 April. Request that he be advised of the present status of the oil situation.

New subject: General Mikitin stated that he would like to have 3 individuals returned on the first bomber mission from Poltava to the Italian bases and return to Poltava on the second bomber operations. I assured him that this would be satisfactory to us.

New subject: In describing the first operations, I again brought out that we expected to run 2 or 3 missions out of Poltava before returning the first bombers to Italy.
From: U. S. Military Mission, Moscow, Russia
Nr: 168  23 May 1944

Gen Mikitin said that he would have to give me a clearance on this but that he did not anticipate any difficulty. I told Mikitin that Gen Anderson had already discussed the matter with him and no objection had been offered. He replied that he did not anticipate any difficulty and that we should go ahead and plan, however he would let me know definitely in a few days. My personal view is that there will be no difficulty in this matter.

New subject: I took up the question of permitting C 54's to finish out some of the 42 authorized trips from Teheran. Mikitin could not give me an immediate reply but said he thought I would receive a favorable one. He said, however, in any event we need not consider ourselves limited to 42 trips but could finish the movement in extra trips if necessary.

New subject: I presented a request that we be authorized to continue the operation of from 2 to 4 C 47's indefinitely shuttling between Poltava and Teheran. Gen Mikitin said he would get me an answer to this question. I anticipated that it would be favorable.

New subject: Gen Mikitin asked that we provide fire engines for the fields at Poltava, Mirgorod, and Piryatkin. He suggested 2 for each field. He stated that their fire fighting equipment was not adequate. Request that I be informed as to whether or not this can be delivered and when.
From: U. S. Military Mission, Moscow, Russia
Nr: 168, 23rd May 1944

New subject: Nikitin stated that the Germans now have some 50 or 60 B-17's which they are prepared to operate. He is afraid that they will follow our formations into Russia and bomb our bases while we are landing. He suggests that each flight have a password or other recognition device by which they can immediately identify any plane joining or following their formations.

New subject: Nikitin did not yet have a reply as to whether he wished to send an officer to duty with our PRU units in England.

New subject: I also went to the foreign office today to straighten out the visa situation. Soviet Consul in Teheran had instructions to stop issuing visas when he had issued 1200. At the present time he has issued 1200 but only 1,087 are in Russia or have approved visas to go to Russia. The discrepancy is caused by those who were deleted from approved visas or who have left Russia after a short stay. Foreign Office promised me an answer today or tomorrow, and Nikitin also indicated that he would call Foreign Office and urge approval of my request that instructions be issued to the Soviet Consul in Teheran to approve an indefinite number of group visas provided the net total of personnel in Russia did not exceed 1230. The 1200 being for original project and additional 30 for maintenance personnel of fighter aircraft.

No Sig.

This message has been relayed to AMFSC Teheran and MAAP Caserta by the War Department Code Center in accordance with the originator's request.

CM-IN-17594 (23 May 44)
From: U.S. Military Mission, Moscow, Russia
Nr. 168 23 May 1944

FOOTNOTE: 12623 is CM-IN-11090 (15 Apr 44) Gen Arnold

ACTION: Gen Arnold
INFO : OPD
      Col Park
      Gen Somervell
      C of S

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

CM-IN-17594 (23 May 44) 21172 Jb

15

Regraded Unclassified
From: CG, Persian Gulf Command, Teheran, Iran

To: War Department

No. PX 14444 23 May 1944

PX 14444 to Eisenhower for Spaatz information to Arnold from Kessler signed Connolly passed to Deane via Courier from Teheran.

Progress report of this project as of 18th May current year follows:

Personnel present 132 officers, 869 enlisted men.
32 officers and 288 men at Poltava,
31 officers and 228 at Mirgorod,
30 officers and 244 at Piryatin.

Housing and messing and technical facilities except for equipment is satisfactory at all 3 bases.
Health of the command is excellent.

Supplies and equipment routed by water through Murmansk arriving slowly but in excellent condition,
From: CG, Persian Gulf Command, Teheran, Iran
No. PX 14444 23 May 1944

about 1/3 having arrived to date. Air Shipments arriving from Teheran are prompt and in excellent shape. All Supplies and equipment in Teheran except late arrivals should be here within a week weather permitting.

Due to impossible rail conditions all personnel being moved from Poltava Reception Center to other bases by air. Movement of supplies and equipment by rail to other bases from Poltava is delayed and unsatisfactory due to rail congestion. Rail shipments from Teheran except troop movements greatly delayed and supplies damaged.

These conditions are of great concern to this office especially in view of the fact that our flow of supplies for continuous operation must be delivered in this manner. This matter is being taken up both locally and in Teheran. The receipt of housekeeping supplies and rations is satisfactory. However, technical supplies except for communications have not been received to date.

The matter of gasoline supply after the stocks shipped from United Kingdom have been expended is still not definitely settled. Soviets desire all future shipments to be made by nonreturnable drums. It is apparent that this procedure will not be practicable if any extended
operations are contemplated. Representations are being made to the Soviets both here and in Moscow indicating that tank car delivery and local tank storage will be necessary. The latter is being constructed; however, progress is slow since the only tanks available are those that can be salvaged in this area.

Preparations of airdromes proceeding rapidly except for the laying of steel mat runways. Delivery of the steel mat from Murmansk is now too slow to permit continuous work on the runways. Steel mat laying is now approximately 65% complete. All bases satisfactory for operation in dry weather except Piryatin where the ground is too spongy to permit operation of heavy bombers without further work.

Communications facilities nearing completion. Soviet communications are still practically nonexistent in this area.

Poltava Teheran circuit in operation REDLINE to WIDEWING and Caserta will be in operation in a few days. Interbase communication by telephone teletype or radio expected within a week. This has been delayed through non receipt of equipment, REDLINE equipment having priority.
Weather facilities progressing rapidly, have been somewhat delayed due to delay in receiving personnel but will begin functioning when FE D LINE has been established.

Intelligence data, personnel and material have just started arriving. It will be necessary that the delivery of this data and material be expedited if operations are to start in the very near future. We are now in a position to house feed and take care of the medical needs of all permanent personnel and combat crews.

Initiation of operations is dependent entirely upon receipt of technical supplies and equipment and intelligence data and material for the proper briefing of the combat crews.

New subject:

Shipments from Murmansk being critically delayed. Only 8 carloads have been delivered here in more than 3 days. Am pushing it from this end. Our great problem here is railroad shipments. Shipments from Teheran and to the other bases from here have always been unduly delayed and now Murmansk shipments are in the same position. Request any assistance you can give us.

ACTION: Gen Arnold
INFO: GF, Gen Somervell, Log
CM-IN-17706 (24 May 44) 02182 jh

No Sig.

DECLASSIFIED
ORD Letter, 5-3-72
MAR 9 1973
From: CG Strategic Air Forces in Europe London England
To: War Department
HQ Mediterranean Allied Air Forces Caserta Italy
Nr: U 62497 22 May 1944

Agreements reached during visit to Moscow on question publicity releases was to affect first release of any kind on FRANTIC operations should emanate from Moscow originated by Russians coordinated with Deane. Deane present at time agreement reached. Request all addressees take appropriate steps to honor this agreement. Releases on operations subsequent to initial shuttle can be made in normal manner.

No Sig

FOOTNOTE: Reference unidentified by WDCMC

ACTION: Gen Surles
INFO : Gen Arnold
OPD
Col Park
C of S

CM-IN-16808 (22 May 44) 2011Z JQ
From: CG Strategic Air Forces in Europe, London, England
To: War Department
No: U-62478 22 May 1944

Personal to Topsec Arnold sgd Spaatz U62478.
(Correction Page 2, Line 24).

Murmansk convoy supplies are rolling in nicely. Aviation fuel from Teheran presenting difficulty due to British request for return of empty drums and Russian reticence to allocate freight space to do so. Deane and Connolly are working on this problem.

No Sig

FOOTNOTE: Supplement to CM-IN-16895 (22 May 44) Gen Arnold
ACTION: Gen Arnold
INFO: OPD
       Gen Bissell
       COL PATE
       Log

CM-IN-17020 (23 May 44) 0250Z jb

RECLASSIFIED
SECRET Letter, 8-3-72
JAN 3 1973

COPY No. 17

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INCOMING MESSAGE
PRIORITY

From: US Military Mission Moscow, Russia
To: War Department
US Military Attaché, London, England
No. 156 21 May 1944

WAR please pass to Connolly, Number 151 from Deans repeated to CG USAF.

Steps are being taken today with the Foreign Office to clear up the visa situation. This in reference to your number P-4941 and your P-14278 of the 18th and 19th respectively. We are requesting that instructions be issued to the Soviet Embassy in Teheran that they should keep in touch with our military representatives there with a view to issuing an indefinite number of approvals for group visa. Provided the net total remaining in Russia does not exceed 1230. The additional 30 is to take care of specialist which will be coming for maintenance fighter aircraft.

New Subject: With reference to Army Post Office at Poltava. Matter is now before Foreign Office. Meanwhile you should put all FRAGTC mail on supply planes going to Poltava. I am sure this can be done without difficulty and without Soviet censorship.

New Subject: With regard to continuous ATC Service. Soviets have agreed that they will maintain sufficient transport service to meet our emergency needs averaging 5 ton per week.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHF, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

530 Shuttle Bombing

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: US Military Mission Moscow, Russia
No. 166, 21 May 1944

They have further agreed to put on additional Soviet aircraft over and above the 1 C-47 we have furnished as may be necessary.

So far nothing has occurred to indicate that they will not carry out their agreement.

Until we have some operational experience to show that present agreement is unsatisfactory, I do not believe we should suggest a change. I talked this over with Anderson, when he was here and he concurred.

New Subject: Request that you expedite shipment of equipment for AAF Station 551, marked with blue and green cross and get word to Kessler to ship this on to me in Moscow as quickly as possible. Until it arrives and is installed, I am almost completely out of touch with Kessler.

No Sig.

Note: This message has been relayed to Teheran by the War Department Code Center as per originator’s instructions.

Note: References not held by WDCC.

ACTION: Gen Arnold
INFO: OPD C of S

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74 |
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

CM-IN-16595 (22 May 44) 1419Z m-lm

COPY No. 20

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Regarded Unclassified
From: US Military Attaché London, England
To: War Department
Nr: 13056
21 May, 1944

To Deane rptd Arnold from Knerr and Spaatz sr nr 13056.

So you may be fully informed of our activities with Soviet Military Mission and advise Russian authorities if you deem it wise following report is made supplementing our 12633. On 4 May communications conference held by Signal Communications Officers, 8th Air Force at Hq USSTAF with Col Stemsov of Russian Military Mission. All phases of air to ground and air to air communications discussed. Three day visit at Hq 8th Air Force and 8th Air Force installations started 10 May in which Gen Sharapov, Colonels Stemsov and Roudoi participated with officers of this Hq. This visit included conference with CG 8th Air Force who outlined broad general phases of strategic bombing. Visit to operations block where Soviet officers were briefed on days mission. Target folders and operating procedures examined and they were shown work being performed by Combined Operation Committee (RAF and AAF). Subsequently party visited Hq 1st Bomb Div where they were briefed on next days mission they had previously seen planned at Air Force Hq. They were given complete data on field orders. Party then visited Wing Hq where they observed activities there in planning and carrying out of mission. Next morning party witnessed briefing of pilots and crews of group and witnessed take off. Party then given opportunity to examine several B17 aircraft which had received battle

CM-IN-16075 (21 May 44)

530 Shuttle Bombing

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Regraded Unclassified
Nr. 13056 21 May, 1944

Damage on previous days raid and they toured shops and hangars at that station. Visit scheduled for next week at Photo Reconnaissance Group where Russian personnel will be permitted to observe all operations of PRU. Trip also scheduled for an observation of blind landing procedure. Complete sets of technical orders, publications and charts on B17 and P38 aircraft and accessories delivered to Soviet Military Mission to be used in presentation of instructional material for Russian maintenance personnel. So as to facilitate accurate translation of this material 6 engineers of Soviet Trade Delegation proceeded to large base depot on 16 May where they will stay for 10 days or until they have finished their task. They have toured entire technical site with American personnel and interpreters who answered many questions raised. These engineers now engaged in study of various phases of maintenance at this depot including hydraulics, electrical equipment, carburetor, turbo supercharger, armament and general aircraft maintenance. Facilities of training school at that station placed at their disposal together with American engineering personnel and interpreters who are lending every possible assistance to successful accomplishment of their mission. This data forwarded to you so you can see we are making every effort this end

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OSD Letter 8-3-72
JAN 3 1973

CM-IN-16075 (21 May 44)

COPY No.
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Regraded Unclassified

Mr. 13056 21 May, 1944

to insure successful accomplishment our mission. We are giving them complete info and believe they have now thorough understanding of broad principles and administrative details of strategic bombing. Every request made by Soviet Mission has been immediately and fully complied with by this HQ and it is hoped our action will help facilitate negotiations there.

No Sig.

FOOTNOTE : 12833 is CM-IN-2743 (4 May 44) Gen Arnold

ACTION: Gen Arnold

INFO : OPD
Gen Bissell
Col. Park
C of S

CM-IN-16075 (21 May 44) 20462 jb

DECLASSIFIED

ESD Letter. 5-3-72
JAN 3 1973

COPY No. 17

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN 24-75724 25W
From: US Military Attache, London England
To: War Department

Nr: 13053
20 May 1944

To Arnold rptd Eaker and Deane from Spaatz cite WAR X38010 sr nr 13053.

Approx date given Soviets as first good weather after 27th May if bases are ready and situation allows.

A. Will fly in personnel and most essential spare parts, other supplies will be included in regular supply flow now functioning.

B. Not planning more than 50 bombers average per field.

C. Russians have agreed to our operating fighters on both our shuttle and local bomber missions.

D. Sufficient servicing supplies will be available since will limit total force to 200-225 planes. Unlikely Russian fighters can give any support beyond 200 miles from their front lines therefore missions from Russian bases will incorporate both our own and Russian fighter support.

No Sig

ACTION: General Arnold
INFO: OPD, General Bissell, (Col. Park), C of S

CM-IN-15220 (20 May 44) 1855Z

DECLASSIFIED
SD Letter, 5-3-72
JAN 3 1973

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia, via London.

To: War Department

19 May 1944.

To Speatz (War pls pass to Eaker) and Hq General Arnold for information, from Deane.

For the past month I have been pressing the Soviet General Staff to give us a list of targets which they want us to hit arranged in order of priority. Today I had a long session with General Slavin, General Staff Representative. All I could get out of him was that the Soviets wished us to continue our attacks on Balkan targets and that they are still working on a list of targets located on the remainder of their front. I made it plain that our only desire was to help their operation, and that if they did not have any targets which they wished us to attack at this time, we would be prepared at any time in the future to assist them provided they gave us ample time for preparation.

I believe that Soviets are reluctant to express any desires regarding targets at this time for the following reasons:

1. Because designation of targets by them at this time will prematurely indicate the nature of their next offensive, and,

2. Because they do not wish us to be able to say that our bombing contributed even partially to their success.

(20 May 44)
From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia,

Nr: 579 19 May 1944

I recommend that we select our own targets, but be prepared correspond to such Russian requests that may come later on.

No Sig.

This message has been relayed by WDCMC to CG, Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, Caserta, Italy, as per originators request.

ACTION: General Arnold

SUBJ: OPD C of S

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHF, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

CM-IN-15041 (20 May 44) 14172 eJv

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

COPY No. 225
From: US Military Mission in Moscow, Russia
To: War Department
Nr: 558 16 May 1944

For your files following is a translation of a letter signed by Gen Mikiitin on 15th May:

I am now able to give definite answers to the following questions given to me by Gen Anderson:

Landings will be allowed at airfields set up for bombardment aviation at Piryatin, Mirgorod, and Poltava of fighter escort aviation of USA of 50 to 70 planes, depending upon the number of bombers which are taking part in the operations.

I have the opportunity to announce to General Anderson that his wish to visit one of the aviation bases of strategic aviation may be fulfilled. General Anderson may be shown the operational night base in the region of Belya Tscherkov. The commander of strategic aviation, Marshall Golovanov, has arranged a C-47 for the flight to the base and back. This flight to the base will take 1½ days. I request that you transmit to me today the decision of Gen Anderson.

Questions relating to the mutual exchange of investigational data on German aviation, antiaircraft defense, and a series of questions given to Gen Grendel by Major Sakhooffsky will be decided definitely at their joint meeting.

ACTION: Gen Arnold
INFO: OPD, Col Park, C of S
CM-IN-12660 (17 May 44) 11012 mos

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

530 Shuttle Bombing

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: U.S. Military Mission Moscow, Russia
To: War Department
Nr: 556, 15th May 1944

For Arnold info Ambassador Harriman from Deane

Returned from trip to bases today. Found things progressing well at all of them. Over half of stripes laid and work is keeping abreast of shipments still coming from northern ports. Bottleneck appears to be installation of red line communications. All equipment has arrived at bases, and it is now a matter of physically installing it at which they are working night and day. All accommodations for men are excellent, those for transients during operations will be satisfactory. Last elements of Fourth Echelon arrived Poltava today. Still having difficulty with air movement of Third Echelon personnel from Teheran because of weather.

Kessler is working toward a goal of May 27th. I think that an operation can be carried out with safety on that date but not with the speed and efficiency that will be possible a week or so later.

Anderson was unable to leave Poltava for Teheran because of weather. He has therefore come back to Moscow and plans to leave at dawn tomorrow. We still have no answer on the fighter escorts and unless Mikitin gives us a favorable reply by tomorrow, I shall take matter up through the Foreign Office.

ACTION: Gen Arnold
INFO: Gen Handy, Gen Bissell (for State Dept), Col Park, C of S

DECLASSIFIED
To: War Department
Nr: 12969 13 May 1944

Info to Arnold from Spaatz for Deane and Kessler
sr nr 12969.

With selected combat crew to accompany, Lt Col Don D Ryan, 021117, Pilot, is being ordered to fly B17G number 42-9716 to Teheran. Baker will notify you upon departure of aircraft. As requested by you, this plane is being sent for training in identification.

No Sig

ACTION: CGAAF
INFO: OPD
G-2
Col. Park

CM-IN-9751 (13 May 44) 1736Z jb

Regraded Unclassified

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: US, Military Mission, Moscow

To: War Department

11 May 1944

Spaatz repeated to Arnold for info from Deane.

Following dinner last night General Anderson and Col Gen Nikitin, Gen Slavin, Soviet General Staff, Gen Curtis and I had a long conference.


Question of moving bases further west was discussed and it was agreed that as Soviet Front moved to the west possibility of leapfrogging bases westward would be considered.

Gen Nikitin and Gen Slavin both indicated that they considered strategic targets such as refineries at Floesti, priority at this time, and that tactical targets, such as communications toward Soviet Front, should be hit only on request to meet a specific situation. Soviets desire continuation of attacks against communications in the Balkans in accordance with priorities established by you and Eaker.

CM-IN-8506 (12 May 44)

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHF, NLR, Date May 63 1974

$30 Shuttle Bombing

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: US, Military Mission, Moscow

Nr: #53 #142 11 May 1944

The only specific request made by Soviets was that Ploesti oil refineries be hit rather than the Marshalling Yards.

A part of Anderson's Staff are leaving for Poltava today. Generals Anderson and Curtis, Colonels Weicker and Roosevelt are remaining in Moscow for day or 2 for necessary conferences.

No Sig

ACTION: Gen Arnold

INPO: OPD

Col Park
C of S

CM-IN-8506 (12 May 44) 0245Z jb

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHF, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

COPY No.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: Military Mission, Moscow
To: War Department
Nr: 531 10th May 1944

To General Spaatz rptd info General Arnold from Deane:

In pressing the Russians to find out what targets they would like to have hit they have indicated that they would like a continuance against Bucharest, Floesti, Budapest and Sofia. However they are studying the matter further and will give a more definite reply in a few days. When they do perhaps other targets will be included. In our conversation the fact was brought out that the Russians considered the oil in Floesti as being a primary objective. This was not an official statement but it is passed on to you pending receipt of their formal reply. It is my personal opinion that the Soviets consider the Rumanian front as being stabilized at least for the present and that they therefore do not attach so much importance to our attacks on communications as they might if a further advance was contemplated in the immediate future. From the above I consider that attacks on Floesti oil fields would meet with their approval.

ACTION: General Arnold
INFORMATION: OPD Col. Park C of S

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

CM-IN-7873 (11 May 44) 0951Z eJv

14

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Regraded Unclassified
May 5, 1944

From: Chiefs of Staff
To: J.S.M. Washington
Information: 30 Mission Moscow
A.F.H.Q. Algiers

Following from Chiefs of Staff C.O.S. (W) 36
Attached
Reference MIL 1205 from General Burrows and General Deane.

1. We see no advantage in proposed views released but have no objection to it, providing that it is made clear that the object of the liaison machinery is to ensure full coordination between the two Air Forces.

2. The statement "where by it is hoped interference between the two Air Forces will be avoided" does not go far enough.

T.O.O. 051730Z

ACTION: CC/S
INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Col Park
Gen Surles
Log

CM-IN-4469 (6 May 44) 1751Z amb

Copy No. 22

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Regraded Unclassified
URGENT

To: War Department
No. 12870, 5 May 1944

Deane from Anderson and Spaatz rptd info Arnold
ar nr 12870.

Absolutely essential this trip be made very quickly. In answer your S 245. We are departing in
accordance flight plan furnished you our 12883 as Amb-
bassador Harriman advised leave even if final confir-
mation had not been received. Hope delay Teheran will
not be over 3 hours. In order expedite travel and have
freedom of action desire use own airplane with Russian
navigator and radio operator procured Teheran. Also
recent model airplane and arrangements in airplane will
be of interest. We can land any place C-47 can land.
Not necessary but desirable land at all 3 airdromes. We
are also bringing you many documents and baggage which
may cause inconvenience and result in delay if necessary
change airplanes at Teheran. Appreciate very much your
interest and help.

Peabody

Note: References not in WDCMO.
See CM-IN-3624 (5 May 44) General Arnold and
CM-IN-3558 (5 May 44) General Arnold

ACTION: GENERAL ARNOLD
INFO: GENERAL HANDY, GENERAL BISSELL, COLONEL PARK, C of S.

CM-IN-3972 (6 May 44) 0058Z

DECLASSIFIED
Gadd Letter, 5-3-72
JAN 3 1973

COPY No. 16

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
To: War Department
No: 12849 5 May 1944

Dean rptd Arnold from Anderson or nr 12849.

Definitely coming. Expect arrive Tehran May 8 with party of 12 in B 170 nr 42-102642 cite my 12838.

Request group entry and exit visas be obtained for immediate continuance of flight to Moscow and clearance, Russian navigator and radio operator for airplane be arranged.

Party by name, rank, serial number, place and date of birth, occupation:

F L Anderson, Maj Gen, 017175, Kingston, New York, 4 Oct 05, Deputy CG USSTAF.

E P Curtis, Brig Gen, 0146277, Rochester, New York, 14 Jan 97, Chief of Staff USSTAF.

F J Sutterlin, Col, 021633, Frankfort, Kentucky, 24 Sept 11.

L P Weisker, Col, 0908797, Stamford, Conn, 14 Oct 03, Staff.

Elliot Roosevelt, Col, 0398475, New York City, 23 Oct 10, Staff.

OM-IN-3558 (5 May 44)

This is group to go from

TO P S-E-C-R-E-T

This is group to go from

to Russia in connection

with shuttle bombing

COPY No. 17

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

No: 12849 5 May 1944

J A Thomas, Col, 021569, Virginia, 17 March 09, Staff.

J A Lauro, Capt, 0389236, Brooklyn, New York, 26 Sept 18, pilot.

D F Bertholf, Capt, 0682278, Denver, Colo, 24 Nov 20, navigator.

J C Ragone, Capt, 0361583, Philadelphia, Penna, 18 July 16, navigator.

M H Kowal, Lt, 0795771, Clifton, New Jersey, 30 Oct 17, co-pilot.

G C Layne, M Sgt, 35040070, Biloxi, Miss, 14 Sept 19, engineer.

J D Setsec, Tech Sgt, 38235114, Sulphur Springs, Arkansas, 15 Jan 21, radio operator.

Flight plan will follow immediately. Imperative trip not be delayed Teheran account entrance arrangements.

Am also sending above to Knoll at Teheran to save time on communications. Request you have Kessler meet me Moscow Monday night.

No Sig

Reference not identified by WDCMC

ACTION: Gen ARNOLD
INFO: OPD, GEN BISSELL, SGS (Maj DAVENPORT) Col PARK, C of S
CM-IN-3558 (5 May 44) 1511Z mmnn

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 5-3-72
JAN 3 1973

COPY No. 17

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Regraded Unclassified

To: War Department.

No. 12863  5 May 1944.

To NPCNE rptd Arnold AGWAR pls pass urgent to Connolly for Knoll from Anderson serial Nr 12863.

Flight plan recor 12238 to Deane and U 61731 to Connolly set forth below all times Greenwich Civil Time depart base England 2000 Saturday 6th May arrive Casablanca 0520 Sunday, depart Casablanca 0620 arrive Cairo 1920 Sunday, depart Cairo 2020 Sunday arrive Teheran 0320 Monday, depart Teheran 0620 arrive Moscow 1520 Monday. Entire flight plan adjusted for Moscow arrival before darkness.

No Sig.

References not identified by WDNCM See CM-IN 3553 (5 May 44)

Gen. ARNOLD

ACTION: GEN ARNOLD

INFO: OPD, GEN BISSELL, SGS (MAJ DAVENPORT), CCL PARK

CM-IN-3624 (May 5 1944) 1643Z mm

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 3-3-72
JAN 3 1973

COPY No.7

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
FROM: War Cabinet Offices
TO: A.F.H.Q. J.S.M. Washington
NO: OZ 2363 MIL 1205

Following from General Barrows and General Deane.

In accordance with your directions we have established a method of liaison by which the air operations of the Red Army air forces and Anglo-American air forces in the Balkans can be coordinated in Moscow. This machinery has been used once so far with fair results. Suggest we be authorized to arrange with Russians for news release by British American correspondents in Moscow indicating that a method of liaison has been established whereby it is hoped interference between the 2 soon will be avoided and each air force can call on the other for assistance. We think that such a news clearance (?) would have propaganda value but we shall not mention it to Russians until we have your approval.

T.O.O. 04081OZ

ACTION: CC/S
INFO: Gen Arnold
Gen Bissell
Gen Surles
Col Park

CM-IN-2900 (4 May 44) 181OZ vhm

530 Shuttle Bombing

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974
URGENT

To: War Department
Number 12838, 4 May 1944
Sr. Nr. 12838.

Deane from F. L. Anderson from Speatz.

Preparatory arrangements by you and info requested soon as possible. Tentatively plan make trip myself and look over FRANTIC progress. Tentatively please arrange for party of twelve in Bl7 number 42-102642 enter Teheran proceed directly Moscow. On or about 6 May departing here. In party will be Maj Gen Anderson, Brig Gen E. P. Curtis, Col F. J. Sutterlin, Colonel E. Roosevelt, Col J. A. Thomas, interpreter Lieut M. H. Kowal, and either Col L. P. Weiher or Brig Gen O. C. McDonald, also crew 3 officers and 2 Sgts. Advise radio and weather facilities available. What field can be used at Moscow? Need info corridors of entry and means of identification also codes in use. Can you cable descriptions and locations airdromes? Want as much time as possible Russia, therefore request reception arrangements be laid as must make round trip over 10 days elapsed time. Will want to visit all three operational fields if possible while in the country. Cable all available info and advise if any special visa arrangements necessary. American Embassy here informs not necessary use individual passports can obtain group visa. Trip still tentative request not commit me definitely as coming. Tactical situation here at the time will determine ability to make visit. Can you have us met at Teheran by someone who can expedite clearance through to Moscow? Teheran arrival estimated between May 8th and 10th. Definite ETA will follow later.

ACTION: Gen. Arnold
INFO: OPD, Gen. Bissell, Maj. Davenport,

CM-IN-4285 (6 May 44) 1140Z

met

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DECLASSIFIED
5-3-72

DECLASSIFIED
USD Letter, 5-3-72

JAN 3 1973

COPY No. 17

Regraded Unclassified
From: US, Military Mission, Moscow.  
To: War Department.  
US Military Attaché Amembassy London.  
29 April 1944.  

To CG USSTAF General Spaatz AGWAR for General Arnold  
signed Deane [redacted]

Returned last night from trip to Kesslers Headquarters  
at Poltava and in this message shall give you resume of FRANTIC setup as I see it. Kesslers staff and Soviet staff  
occupy separate wings of the same building. Yesterday morn-  
ing 5 German mines were found planted in the basement of the  
building each with about 3000 kilograms of bombs. They were  
well concealed and apparently been put there by the Germans  
who failed to set them off. The headquarters have been re-  
moved from the building until the bombs are taken out. Kessler  
and Major General Perminov are working hand in hand and the  
same applies to their respective staffs. Plans are complete  
down to the last detail and will be put into effect as soon  
as men and material arrive. Communication equipment is part-  
ially installed and it is hoped that communications to Italy  
and London will be started within the next week. This of  
course will be on a smaller transmitter and not the red line.  
Brent has made a complete survey of the fields and feels that  
all will require steel mat runways and a limited amount of  
taxi strips and parking area. The field at Poltava is already  
prepared for laying the mats and there should be little delay  
ocne the mats arrive. At Pirying an old girls school is  
being completely renovated and will be sufficient to house  
the American base personnel. It has all necessary facilities.

CM-IN-22602 (30 Apr 44)  

DECLASSIFIED  

#5D Letter, 5-3-73  

JAN 3 1973  

COPY No.

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Regraded Unclassified
The bomber crews will be put in a tent camp. At Mirgorod and old artillery barracks is being renovated and will be sufficient to take care of both American base personnel and bomber crews. At Poltava both American base personnel and bomber crews will be in tent camps during the summer months. At all 3 bases Soviets are preparing adequate shelter for 900 persons at each. We now have engineer officers and a few enlisted men on each base. Movement of the Fourth Sch-elon was at first delayed by visa situation and lack of adequate facilities at Poltava. Both of these conditions have been corrected and now it is being delayed by difficulties of getting clearance for flights. Each flight of a C57 must be cleared at Moscow and all anti aircraft units enroute warned. At present there is great delay in getting this clearance because of inadequate communications. I am trying to see Nikitin today to arrange for blanket instructions for daily flights at specified hours. All ships of the northern convoy have been unloaded and the first trains dispatched on the 18 of April. None of the trains have yet reached any of the bases but the best estimate I can get is that the entire movement will be complete by May 20. Of course the work can start as soon as the first trainloads arrive. Communications have been one of our greatest difficulties; At present I am completely shut off from Kessler in Poltava except through very slow Soviet communications. I have approval in principle for establishing my own direct communications with Kessler and have already cabled you asking for release of Wilcox 96 C transmitter from AAC Cairo. As soon as I get this in I will be able to assist Kessler in overcoming his difficulties by taking direct action here promptly. We
are also trying to get authority for Kessler to communicate directly with Teheran by radio. This question is now before the foreign office and I expect approval. The Fourth Echelon is expected to arrive at Tabriz in 2 serials 1 to arrive on May 6 and the other on May 11. The Soviets have already dispatched 2 trains from Moscow of 18 cars each to pick up Fourth Echelon in Tabriz and take them to Poltava. They should therefore arrive in Poltava around the middle of May. I still have hopes for the first operations to take place before the end of May but the margin will be close. I can not emphasize too strongly what a good job Kessler and his staff are doing. They are living under the most difficult conditions in an area that was completely devastated by the Germans. The whole atmosphere of the place between the Soviets and Americans on the ground is one of extreme friendliness and cooperation. The Soviets however have very definite ideas as to how things should be done and both Kessler and I feel that many of the delays we have encountered are deliberate blocks thrown by the Russians in order to give them time to complete their preparations such as those for living accommodations preparation of fields and so on. We find that we can argue, beg unheeded and even though we get complete agreement from the Soviets the course of events remains unaltered and things progress on the tempo that they set. Although while I am greatly disappointed with the speed with which the project has gone I have no doubt as to its ultimate success. In any event it is certain that we are getting a wonderful experience in meeting and overcoming difficulties which will stand us in good stead when we turn in the other direction. Last Sunday General Miktin for the
first time raised the question of the total number of American personnel for FRANTIC also the total number of trips to be made by the C87's. He indicated Soviets want ed personnel limited to 1200 and agreed to 42 trips by C87's which would be adequate. There are 1264 set up for FRANTIC with 25 additional interpreters leaving England on May 10. I believe we should try to come as close as possible to the Soviets figure of 1200. This can be accomplished in part by weeding out undesirables particularly in the Fourth Echelon. I understand that there are about 40 that have been selected so far who should not come into Russia. Provided Kessler concurs as to types of specialists that can be best spared I think this weeding out process might get us down close to 1200.

No Sig.

ACTION: Gen Arnold

INFORMATION: GPD
Col Park
CofS

CM-IN-22602 (30 Apr 44) 1515Z bjm

COPY No. 9

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
To: Chiefs of Staff
Rptd: Joint Staff Mission, Washington
From: SACSEA
SEACOS 145 April 25, 1944

Following for Chiefs of Staff repeated Joint Staff Mission from Mountbatten.

Transport Aircraft

1. In your COSSEA 85 additional transport aircraft were loaned to me as follows-

   (a) 64 C-47's from MAAF for 30 days.
   (b) 1 RAF Squadron (reduced strength) from MAAF to be returned in May.

2. I had hoped that conditions would permit the return of these aircraft or at least the majority of them by the due dates but the course of operations in Assam is making it clear that it would not be safe to reckon on this.

3. The overriding factors to be borne in mind are-

   (a) That retention of Imphal Plain is vital to the defence of the air ferry route, the Assam L of C and the Eastern frontier of India.
   (b) Without the defeat of Japanese 33 15 and 31 Divs (we cannot) secure and exploit Mitkyina for our use as in para 14 of SEACOS 137.
   (c) Extent and difficult nature of country and bad weather which will shortly begin necessarily make operations very slow. This was proved in Arakan where although country was easier, distances much smaller and our superiority in numbers considerably greater, operations to clear L of C took a full month.

CM-IN-22242 (30 Apr 44)
4. Although concentration of reinforcing formations by air is now complete we still have 1 more LRP Bde to fly in and I am still faced with heavy commitments in transport aircraft of which the following are the principal:

   a) Advance of (CUI?) on Mojaung-Mitkyina area is and must remain almost entirely dependent on air supply.

   b) Until the Dimapur-Imphal road is reopened all forces Army and Air in 4 corps area can only be maintained by air.

   c) Long range penetration Brigades (3 Ind Div) in Central Burma must be supported by transport aircraft.

5. In addition Generalissimo has now asked for air supply to maintain advance of 4 divisions of Yunnan force. Possibility of this is being examined but it does not seem that it can be done even with aircraft now at my disposal.

6. I have under constant examination how we might reduce these commitments. CAI must however continue to be maintained by air until all-weather road catches up with the advance. The Dimapuk-Imphal Road might if all were to go exactly as we hoped, be opened for isolated convoys early in June but the road is certain to have been destroyed in several places and will take sometime to repair. It is unlikely that we shall be running regular maintenance convoys on this road before July and we cannot risk a failure of supplies to troops in 4 corps area, and we cannot suspend operations of 3 Ind Div (LRP) Bdes.

7. I cannot therefore reduce commitments without jeopardising success of battle and the commitments absorb all transport aircraft now at my disposal. I am however taking every opportunity I can to release aircraft when poss-

 só - reg"-

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Declassified
May 3 1974

Copy No. 29
sible. For example I have just ordered the return of 20 C-46's to HUMP (see my SEACOS 142). These will give additional HUMP tonnage and I hope this will make it possible to provide 14 USAAF with the nourishment they need to support the advance of Y Force. Unexpired portion of period for which they were loaned amounts to 25 days and it may still be necessary to call for them again in an emergency.

8. I suggest that if delivery of the first 79 of the 400 transport aircraft promised in COSSEA 81 could be accelerated they might go to the Mediterranean and the aircraft now on loan to me remain here permanently. This would not only get over my present difficulty but would also save the wear on aircraft of 158 flights between Algiers and Bengal.

9. I request your approval to the retention of these 79 aircraft loaned in COSSEA 85 until the battle will permit their release.

T.O.O. 251005Z

NOTE: COSSEA 85 not in WDCMC files SEACOS 137 is CM-IN-11044 (15 Apr 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFO: Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Col Park
Log

DECLASSIFIED
MAY 3 1974

CM-IN-22242 (30 Apr 44) 0309Z bem

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Chiefs of Staff
To: A.F.H.Q.
Repeated J.S.M. Washington
COSMED 96 April 27, 1944

Following for General Wilson from Chiefs of Staff.

Reference MEDCOS 68 and 90. Combined Chiefs of
Staff agree to establishment of small Russian air unit
at Bari.

2. You should make it clear to the Russians that you
will be responsible for "local coordination of all
operations of Soviet aircraft operating from Italian
bases".

T.O.O. 272147Z

FOOTNOTE: MEDCOS 68 is CM-IN-9968 (14 Mar 44) CC/S
MEDCOS 90 is CM-IN-8802 (13 Apr 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFO: Gen Arnold
      Gen Bissell
      Col Park
      C of S
      Adm King

CM-IN-21122 (28 Apr 44) 1920Z bem

DECLASSIFIED
MAY 3 1974

SECRET

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COPY No.

Reggraded Unclassified
April 27, 1944

To: A.F.H.Q. Joint Staff Mission

From: War Cabinet Offices

Number: 22236

Hereewith repetition of signal T.O.O. 251715 from Moscow.

BEGINs.


1. We have had a further talk with Slavin on subject of communications and liaison between Moscow and Caserta.

2. We suggest 3 alternatives:

(a) An American net Moscow-Poltava-Caserta. This is an extension of normal communications for PRANTIC which will be operating in about three weeks time

(b) An ACHQ net Moscow-Caserta. British Mission has (that?) available as instructed and has already cabled AFHQ Algiers repeat Air Ministry Whitehall 26 Group (Air 372 21st April) to open 24 hour watch if Supreme Allied Commander agrees with proposals in our MIL 1134.

(c) A Russian net as suggested by General Spaatz in his 12669 of 19th April addressed General Deane, MILMIS Moscow repeated to General Arnold.

3. Slavin was inclined to advocate continuation of present bombing line system as agreed in our MIL 1134 but we pressed for direct liaison and communications in order to avoid all forms of restriction of targets.
4. Slavin eventually promised to report our views and said he saw no reason why British W/T set in Moscow should not start work immediately. We have therefore taken steps to get this going but we demanded formal permission from Slavin in order to make certain the Soviet General Staff admitted existence of this link.

5. The Soviet General Staff generally fail to realise necessity for closest possible liaison and local methods insisted upon by them here may prove cumbersome. We suggest therefore that, if only for shielding purposes, HQMAAP submits now any request that occurs to them including changes of bombing line, swapping of reconnaissance information and other matters requiring liaison here. This will help us get system of liaison established.

6. We are now working on request from General Spaatz relating to bombing of Brasov which also will give us indication of efficacy of local liaison methods.

Ends.

T.O.O. 270225Z

12669 is CM-IN-14059 (19 Apr 44) Gen Arnold

ACTION: OGS

INFO : Gen Arnold
       OPD
       Gen Stoner
       C of S

CM-IN-20361 (27 Apr 44) 2016Z vh

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date
MAY 3 1974

COPY No.

Regraded Unclassified

To: War Department

No: U 61355 25 April 1944.

Reur radio WAR 26555 dated 22nd April, to Arnold from Spaatz U 61355.

We are reinforcing our liaison in Russia by assigning to Colonel Kesslers staff Colonel Samuel J Gormly who has been designated as the representative of the 15th Air Force and USSTAF. General Eaker further advises this officer authorized and qualified to represent RAQ units under Eakers command.

No Sig

ACTION: Gen Arnold

INFO: OPD

CM-IN-18588 (25 Apr 44) 1721Z

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Regraded Unclassified
From: US Military Mission, Moscow
To: War Department

For (1) CG USSTAF rptd information (2) General Arnold from Deane

Had conference with Assistant Chief of Red Army General Staff, General Antonov subject of your 12554 of 9th April and your 12625 of 16th April. Antonov indicated that our attacks on Balkan Communications have been of great assistance to Russians curtailing Axis supply and in delaying their withdrawal. He asked that attacks be continued on Bucharest, Ploesti, Budapest, Sofia and other communications in Bulgaria. He asked that General Staff would submit request on additional targets from time to time through me at General Wills suggestion and on instructions from the combined Chiefs of Staff General Burrows and I tried to get a liaison officer from AMHQ attached to the headquarters of the Southern Group of the Russian Army to coordinate the activity of the Anglo-American Air Forces and the Red Air Force in the Balkans and the Black Sea area. Antonov stated that control of the Red Strategic Air Force is centered in the General Staff in Moscow. Marshal Vasilevsky therefore desired that liaison should be effected to Moscow. Until such liaison is established with adequate communications with Moscow and Caserta Antonov agreed to a temporary bomb line:

Constanza (to Soviet Air Force)--Bucharest--Ploesti--Budapest (all to Anglo-American Air Force). Single Reconnaissance Aircraft of either Air Force to disregard bomb line but have the responsibility of avoiding clashes.

CM-IN-16301 (22 Apr 44)

DECORATED
JOE memo, 1-4-74
ME 3 1974

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COPY No. 20

Regraded Unclassified
Antonov suggested and I replied that I was sure that our High Command would agree that there be an exchange of important information obtained by means of Reconnaissance Aircraft or by other methods. Burrows and I will work out a system of rapid liaison with the Red Army General Staff which will include continuous communication with Caserta and put the system into effect if General Wilson agrees. We shall insist upon being constantly informed of the projected operations of Red Strategic Air Force and we shall keep Soviet General Staff informed of projected operations of Mediterranean Air Force. We shall submit recommendations as to whether the temporary bomb line now established should be continued subject to adjustment with the developing situation and varied from the liaison established in Moscow. General Wilson and the Combined Chiefs of Staff have been informed of the temporary bomb line now established. I assume that instructions have been issued to our Air Forces to observe this line and I have had assurance that instructions have been issued to the Red Air Force to observe it. I do not feel that we will have any difficulty in changing the bomb line to meet any desires that you or General Baker might have or in abolishing it entirely if the proposed liaison in Moscow proves to be effective.

NoSig.

12625 is CM-IN-11558 (16 Apr 44) General Arnold

ACTION: General Arnold

INFO: CPD
C of S
Colonel Park
CM-IN-16301 (22 Apr 44) 1533Z med

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

Copy No. 20

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
Commanding General
Strategic Air Forces in Europe
London, England

Number WAR 26555

To Spaatz from Arnold

Bomb line outlined in WD number WAX 26109 dated April 21, 1944 has been approved by the CCS and British Chiefs are being requested to get this information to you. This appears to be the best temporary solution toward avoiding possible complications with Red Air Force.

General Antonov states that strategic bombing by Red Air Force is controlled from Moscow and liaison with Southern Group of Armies is therefore unnecessary. Deane pursuing negotiations with a view to establishing immediately possible liaison in Moscow, provided with suitable communications.

In considering permanent liaison officer whom you desire to furnish for this post, how do you propose to handle the combined (RAF) aspect which some of these operations may entail?

ORIGINATOR: General Arnold
INFORMATION: OPD
C of 3 Col Park

CM-OUT-26555 (22 Apr 44) 1451Z med

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
April 21, 1944

TO: Joint Staff Mission
FROM: War Cabinet Offices
OZ 2082

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHF, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

Following has been received from 30 Mission Moscow.


1. Your MEDGOS 93 and in continuation of our MIL 1127 and 1128. General Antonov received us at 1700 hours today.

2. He confirmed (arranging) of temporary bomb line indicated in MIL 1127 but excepted individual reconnaissance aircraft for both airforces which he considered should not be restricted and must look after themselves. He agreed that a system of exchange of the results of these reconnaissances should be established as quickly as possible and also that it would be advantageous if each side would request reconnaissance missions from the other.

3. He agreed that the bomb line is to be considered as a temporary measure pending a final solution about the method of liaison.

4. He stated that the Soviet General Staff agreed to a continuation of Anglo-American attacks against Bucharest, Ploesti, Sofia and other Bulgarian targets but he asked that Constanza be reserved to the Soviet Air Force.

5. We presented in detail all the arguments in favor of your proposal for liaison officers at Southern group of Russian armies. General Antonov indicated that all strategic bombing by Red Air Force is controlled by the Soviet General Staff from Moscow and said that for this reason Marshal Vasilevsky considered that liaison with the Southern group of armies was unnecessary but that the necessary co-ordination should be effected in Moscow. He added that he considered that other Soviet air operations, for example fighter and close support operations, were not in conflict.

Regraded Unclassified
with Anglo-American strategic bombing and could if necessary be controlled by a bomb line adjustable through liaison established in Moscow.

6. As a result of our discussions we feel that there is little chance that the Soviet General Staff will accept liaison officers with their armies in the field. We also feel that General Antonov is stating the case correctly when he speaks of centralized control in Moscow of Soviet strategic bombing. If this is so, liaison can be best effected at the point of control in Moscow.

7. If you agree we will pursue negotiations with a view to establishing immediately best possible liaison in Moscow provided with suitable communications. T.O.O. 202050.

No Sig

T.O.O. 210200Z

FOOTNOTE: MEDCS 93 is CM-IN-10956 (15 Apr 44) CC/S
1127 is CM-IN-15507 (21 Apr 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFO: Gen Arnold
Gen Handy
SOS
C of S

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, MPL, Date
MAY 3 1974

CM-IN-15508 (21 Apr 44) 1637Z Jd

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
To: Joint Staff Mission  
From: War Cabinet Offices  
OZ 2084  

Following received from 30 Mission Moscow:

MIL 1128, 19th April. Following for General Wilson from Generals Deane and Burrows.

Our MIL 1127. Slavin has just telephoned to say Soviet General Staff agree to bomb line proposed in our para 2 as temporary measure pending our discussions with General Antonov.

No Sig  
T.O.O. 210720  

Footnote: See CM-IN-14514 (20 Apr 44) Gen Handy 1127 is CM-IN-15507 (21 Apr 44) CC/S  

ACTION: CC/S  

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold  
Gen Handy  
S&S  
C of S  

CM-IN-15506 (21 Apr 44) 1621Z cz  

DECLASSIFIED  
JOS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974  

530 Shuttle Bomb  

COPY No. 24-75724 25N  

Regraded Unclassified
FROM: War Cabinet Offices
TO: Joint Staff Mission
NO: OZ 2085

Following received from 30 Mission Moscow. MIL 1127, April 19th. Following for General Wilson from Generals Deane and Burrows.

Your MEDCOS 93 addressed British C.O.S. On instructions from Combined C.O.S. We interviewed Major General Slavin Soviet General Staff this afternoon. Slavin is only acting as intermediary pending return from the front of General Antonov, Assistant Chief of Red Army General Staff who authorized making official decision in this matter. Antonov expected Moscow 21st.

As temporary measure pending discussions of your proposal regarding liaison officers, we proposed acceptance bomb line as follows -inclusive to Soviet Air Force -Constanza, inclusive Anglo-American Air Forces - Bucharest, Ploesti, Budapest. This line to hold pending outcome discussions with Antonov in which we will press for liaison officers with H.Qs Southern Russian Army for purposes of day to day co-ordination.

We also proposed and in this case Slavin (?) agreed that both sides should issue an immediate warning of possible meeting with aircraft of Allies from other side which in all cases would bear normal markings.

Reference our para 2, Slavin promised to report to his superior authority immediately and try to obtain agreement tonight.

CM-IN-15507 (21 Apr 44)
We recommend that on our part it is advisable to accept
and use bomb line given above as it is unlikely that
Soviet Air Forces will precede advance of their land
forces by more than 200 kilometres.

No Sig
T.O.O. 210740Z

FOOTNOTE: MEDCOS 93 is CM-IN-10956 (15 Apr 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S
INFO: Gen Arnold
     Gen Handy
     SGS
     C of S

CM-IN-15507 (21 Apr 44) 1636Z vhm

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date May 3 1974

COPY No.
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
TO: War Cabinet Offices
FROM: Joint Staff Mission
DATED: April 21, 1944

J.S.M.10

We have been asked by U.S. Chiefs of Staff to signal to make quite sure that you are keeping Spaatz fully informed of the negotiations now in progress between Moscow and AFRQ Mediterranean Theater regarding the control of bombing in the Balkans. OZ 2085 refers.

2. See also today's C.C.S. signal to U.S. and British Military Missions in Moscow, AFRQ and yourselves that proposals contained in OZ 2085 were acceptable to the C.C.S.

T.O.O. 212323Z

ACTION: CCS
INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
Gen Handy
Col. Park
C of S

CM-IN-15879 (22 Apr 44) 0212Z pa

50 Shuttle Bombing

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MAY 3 1974

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COPY No. 25

Regraded Unclassified
United States Military Mission
To The USSR
Moscow Russia  (M-129)

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Commanding General
U S Army Forces
North African Theater of Operations
Algiers, Algeria

Number WARX 26459

For General Deane and General Brocas Burrows for action,
repeated to Eisenhower London for information British Chiefs
of Staff and Wilson, Freedom Algiers, for information, from
the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the proposals
contained in paragraphs 6 and 7 of your message MIL 1134 with
reference to the control of bombing in the Balkans are accept-
able so far as the Combined Chiefs of Staff are concerned.

ORIGINATOR: CCS
INFORMATION: Gen. Arnold
                      OPD
                      Col. Park
                      Corps

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

CM-OUT-26459 (22 Apr 44) 0206Z  lee

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Regraded Unclassified
To, War Department

To Deane rptd to Arnold Recur 12554 Sr Nr 12625.

We desire to help magnificent successes of Russian advance wherever possible. Have you been able to contact them on this point and state we will bomb such targets in Balkan area which will help block German retreat as the Russians deem necessary.

No Sig

FOOTNOTE: 12554 is not identified in WDCMC.

ACTION: Gen Arnold
INFO: OPD Log
CM-IN-11558 (16 Apr 44) 12132 jb

Col. Park

COPY No. 19

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 5-3-72
JAN 3 1973

Regraded Unclassified
WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
OUTGOING MESSAGE  

Combined Chiefs of Staff  
71459  
April 15, 1944  

U S Military Mission to the USSR  
Moscow, Russia  

Commanding General  
USAF European Theater of Operations  
London, England  

Commanding General  
USAF North African Theater of Operations  
Algiers, Algeria  

Number WARX 23823  

for General Deane and General Brocas Burrows from Combined Chiefs of Staff  

A. The following message from General Wilson to the British Chiefs of Staff, dated April 14, 1944, is repeated for your information.  

"MEDCO8 93. Early establishment of some form of liaison between this Headquarters and the Russians is considered to be a matter of urgent importance in view of the rapid developments in the situation in Rumania. An immediate issue is that if the Combined Air Superiority of the Russian Southern Armies and of the Mediterranean Theater of Operations is to be utilized most effectively it is essential that there be an agreed allocation of tasks for our air forces and that the execution of these tasks be coordinated properly. The MAAF and Russian Air Forces are already bombing targets well within each others range. A situation may even arise before long when it will be necessary to fix a general bomb line and vary it from time to time.  

2. It is recommended therefore that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approach the Russian High Command at once with a view to

CM-OUT-23823 (15 Apr 44)
to securing their agreement to the attachment of an Allied Air Liaison Officer to the Southern Group of Russian Armies to ensure that the action of the Strategic Bomber Force from this theater when it can be spared from POINTBLANK targets is properly coordinated with Russian plans.

3. In making this recommendation I have considered the desirability of an exchange of missions between this Headquarters and the Southern Group of Russian Armies and have reached the conclusion that this would not be desirable since,

(a) It would necessarily involve delay in establishing proper liaison which I regard as a matter of urgency.

(b) The presence of a Russian Mission here would probably lead to embarrassing pressure for the premature undertaking by Angle-American land forces of operations in the Balkans.

(c) In any case the appointment of a Liaison Officer is more likely to be accepted by the Russians than a full scale exchange of missions.

4. In addition to the coordination of strategic bombing some coordination of air supply to Tito's partisans is already becoming necessary since Russian aircraft are understood already to be operating into Tito's country from the East. This should be another function of the proposed Air Liaison Officer.

5. I should be grateful if this proposal could be treated as a matter of the highest urgency. If you agree in principle you may think it desirable when approaching the Russian High Command to seek agreement in the methods of communication to be employed, bearing in mind that it will be of the first importance for messages from the Air Liaison Officer to be conveyed with the least possible delay to HQAAF at Caserta."

B. The Combined Chiefs of Staff desire that you take the action necessary to implement paragraph 2 of the foregoing CM-OUT-23823 (15 April 44)

DECLASSIFIED
3CS memo, 1-4-74
By RHF, NLR, Date MAY
3 1974

COPY No. 28

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message and seek agreement as to methods of communication to be employed as indicated in paragraph 5. Arrange details by direct communication with APHQ.

C. You are authorized to agree to the appointment of a Russian Liaison Officer to APHQ if the Russians so request.
From: U.S. Military Attache, Moscow, Russia
To: War Department
Nr: 427
15 April 44

To Joint Meteorological Committee from Deane

Growing out of FRAMIC is agreement for exchange of long-range forecasts between Soviets and USSTAF. First Soviet forecast will be transmitted as soon after April 15th as cipher agreed upon.

Eventually these forecasts will be enciphered in common cipher to be used for basic exchange and appended thereto but temporarily may need to use at least 1 of SIGHE ciphers in numbers 29-40 inclusive. These ciphers were provided Speranski in Washington and Soviets agreed to their use.

Soviet first proposed to use British cipher used in Moscow suitable exchange but since British have not requested this data Soviets desire it be available to US only at present. Consequently it will probably be necessary to use SIGHCE. If there is any objection to its use, please advise.

Only 1 copy of code for Soviet forecasts has been received and this has been forwarded to USSTAF.

Request 1 series of Northern Hemisphere charts for presentation to Soviets.

DECLASSIFIED by sig
JCS memo, 1-4-44
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1944

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: FREEDOM, Algiers  
(signed Wilson)  
To: British Chiefs of Staff  
Rpted: J.S.M. for U. S. Joint  
Chiefs of Staff  
H.Q.M.A.A.F.  
C.-in-C. Md., Naples  

1. Despite the objections mentioned in COSMED 46 early establishment of some form of liaison between this headquarters and the Russians is considered to be a matter of urgent importance in view of the rapid developments in the situation in Rumania. An immediate issue is that if the combined air superiority of the Russian Southern Armies and of the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations is to be utilized most effectively it is essential that there be an agreed allocation of tasks for our air forces and that the execution of these tasks for our air forces and that the execution of these tasks be coordinated properly. The MAAF and Russian air forces are already bombing targets well within each others range. A situation may even arise before long when it will be necessary to fix a general bomb line and vary it from time to time.

2. It is recommended therefore that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approach the Russian High Command at once with a view to securing their agreement to the attachment of an Allied Air Liaison Officer to the Southern Group of Russian Armies to ensure that the action of the strategic bomber force from this theater when it can be spared from POINTBLANK targets is properly coordinated with Russian plans.

3. In making this recommendation I have considered the desirability of an exchange of Missions between this headquarters and the Southern Group of Russian armies and have reached the conclusion that this would not be desirable since,

CM-IN-10956 (15 Apr 44)

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(a) It would necessarily involve delay in establishing proper liaison which I regard as a matter of urgency.

(b) The presence of a Russian Mission here would probably lead to embarrassing pressure for the premature undertaking by Anglo-American land forces of operations in the Balkans.

(c) In any case the appointment of a liaison officer is more likely to be accepted by the Russians than a full scale exchange of Missions.

4. In addition to the coordination of strategic bombing some coordination of air supply to Tito's Partisans is already becoming necessary since Russian aircraft are understood already to be operating into Tito's country from the East. This should be another function of the proposed air liaison officer.

5. I should be grateful if this proposal could be treated as a matter of the highest urgency. If you agree in principle you may think it desirable when approaching the Russian High Command to seek agreement in the methods of communication to be employed, bearing in mind that it will be of the first importance for messages from the air liaison officer to be conveyed with the least possible delay to H.Q.M.A.A.F. at Caserta.

No Sig
T.O.O. 141922B

FOOTNOTE: COSMED 46 is CM-IN-483 (1 Mar 44) CCS

ACTION: CCS

INFO: Gen Arnold, OPD, Gen Bissell, Col Park, Log

CM-IN-10956 (15 Apr 44) 1709Z Jb DECLASSIFIED

JBOS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NRL, Date MAY 3 1974

COPY No. 24

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
United States Military Mission
Moscow, Russia

Number WAR 21660-M-81

for Deane Moscow from The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The rapid advance of the Russian forces into Rumania, coupled with the developing situation in the Crimea, suggests the possibility that there might be some unfortunate contacts between U. S. Strategic Air Forces and Russian Air Forces. Recognizing the primary interest of the Russians in all that pertains to the conduct of the campaign in Rumania and over the Black Sea, we would like you to inquire of the appropriate Russian officials whether or not they would care to indicate where and when they did not desire activity by U. S. Strategic Air Forces.

ORIGINATOR: JCS

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
OPD
Adm. King
Col. Park
C of S

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

CM-OUT-21660 (11 Apr 44) 215Z 1s

530 Shuttle Bombing

COPY NO. 27

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Regraded Unclassified
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: US Military Mission Moscow, Russia
To: War Department, US Military Attaché Amembassy London, England

9th April 1944

Your understanding concerning movement Fourth Echelon as outlined your 20416 April 8th is identical with mine. On 23rd March was informed by Connolly that he had suggested to London possibility of moving Fourth Echelon Cairo to Teheran by air because overland requires about three weeks as opposed to week or ten days if movement made by air. In my cover station with Soviets reported in my 48 to London and 390 to War Dept 6th April I only attempted to ascertain Soviet attitude toward moving Fourth Echelon Teheran to Poltava by air in event Gen Connolly's suggestion they come to Teheran by air was approved. No commitment was made. It appears at present choke point in starting operations will be arrival personnel Fourth Echelon. For this reason I wished to plan in advance for an air movement if such proved possible. Meantime understand arrangements being made for movement overland to Teheran and shall continue preparations movement overland to final destination.

No Sig

Note: This message has been relayed to Persian Gulf Command Teheran, Iran by the WDCC in accordance with the originator's request.

CN-IN-7115 (10 Apr 44) 22

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974
COPY No. 14

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Regraded Unclassified
From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia
To: War Department
9th April 1944

Footnote: 390 believed to be CM-IN-5114 (7 Apr 44) Gen Arnold

ACTION: Gen Arnold
INFO: OPD
Col Park
C of S

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date May 3 1974

CM-IN-7115 (10 Apr 44) 2235Z rmd
Commanding General
Strategic Air Forces in Europe
London, England

US Military Mission M-69
Moscow, Russia

Number WARX 20418

To Spaatz from Arnold information Deane

Concerned over Deanes unnumbered message dated April 6, 1944 in which he indicates possibility of moving 4th Echelon FRANTIC personnel from Cairo to Teheran by air. It was our understanding that this Echelon was proceeding by ship to Egypt, thence over land by rail to Palestine, thence by motor convoy to Teheran (see Connollys 9238 to AGWAR dated March 13th) ATC here informs us that they are not in position to move this Echelon by air without extensive diversions from present commitments.

Relative movement of 4th Echelon from Teheran to final destination, while 4 C 87's can be used to move the most important elements of this Echelon, do not count on further increase of aircraft for this purpose. If Russians cannot supply additional lift, it will be necessary to move balance of 4th Echelon to final destination by surface transportation.
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: U.S. Military Mission Moscow, Russia
To: War Department
U.S. Military Attache London, England

Unnumbered, 6 April 1944

For CG USSTAF repeated to Arnold for info from Deane

At meeting with Red Air Staff yesterday, I tried to ascertain Soviet attitude on bringing in 4th Echelon amounting to approximately 700 people from Teheran by air. I explained that there was a possibility of their being brought from Cairo to Teheran by air and that I wanted to get their reaction in order to make a recommendation to you without committing myself on the subject in any way. Gen Nkitin at first said that he would take the responsibility for approving this movement by air using the 4 C87's in Teheran to shuttle them in. However, when we considered the time element it was apparent that 4 C87's would probably have to be increased somewhat, and he said he would study the matter and let me know what their reaction would be. Request that you inform me as soon as possible if you now plan to send 4th Echelon from Cairo to Teheran by air and, if so, if you would like to have me try to arrange for them to be taken to final destination by air from Teheran.

No Sig

ACTION: General Arnold
INFO: OPD C of S

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

CM-IN-5114 (7 Apr 44) 2251Z mw
530 Shuttle Bombing

COPY No. 19

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN 34-757544-RCD-20K

Regraded Unclassified
April 3, 1944

To: Joint Staff Mission

From: Chiefs of Staff

Following from Chiefs of Staff C.O.S. (W)
Number 1255 - reference J.S.M. 1616.

We agree, and are taking action accordingly.

Time of Origin 031405Z

FOOTNOTE: 1616 is CM-IN-2274 (4 Apr 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: General Arnold
OPD
General Bissell
Admiral King
Colonel Park
General Surles
C of S

CM-IN-2275 (4 Apr 44) 0423Z mem

DECLASSIFIED
MAY 7, 1974
From: US Military Attaché London, England
To: War Department
No 12496 3 April, 1944

Dean pass to Connolly for Knoll action rptd Arnold from Knerr and Spaatz sr nr 12496 rear P-12532 March 27th.

Permanent party Air Service Command personnel at Russian bases will be approx 1200. Re para 4 USSTAF memo 18th March to Knoll. For planning suggest you prepare to provide for above personnel as well as combat crews who will be on Russian bases temporarily. Anticipate 2000 bodies participating in each mission with 4 missions scheduled per month. Desired turnaround time would be 2 days for each mission. Allowance should be made for 10% of personnel not making return trips because of casualties and aircraft battle damage. Above figures only estimated and allowances should be made for emergencies such as weather and other uncontrolable factors. Recommend direct communications with Essler for further info.

Reference is not identified in WDCMC

ACTION: General Arnold
INFO: OPD
Colonel Park
C of S

CM-IN-2068 (3 Apr 44) 2344Z med

Shuttle Bombing

COPY No. 14

Regraded Unclassified
OPD 000.7 TS (3 Apr 44)
Operations Division, WDGS
Policy Section, WDOPD
HLR 72144

April 3, 1944

Commanding General
U.S. Military Mission
Moscow, Russia

Commanding General
Strategic Air Forces in Europe
London, England

Number WARX 18541

Book message to Deane for action, to Spaatz for information from Handy signed Marshall.

British Chiefs of Staff have agreed with views expressed in WD radio 16975, March 31, 1944, from Joint Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff are taking appropriate action to insure coordination.

ORIGINATOR: OPD

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
Adm King
Col Park
Gen. Surles
LOG

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 9 1974

CM-OUT-18541 (4 Apr 44) 2212Z olp

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: U.S. Military Attache Moscow, Russia
To: War Department
      Military Attache London, England
      377
      59
2 April 1944

For Spaetz rptd to Arnold from Griffith
gd Deane.

An inspection of bases at Poltava, Mirgorod,
and Piryatin results as follows:

1. Poltava was a permanent prewar Red Air
   Force station. Germans demolished all airdrome
   buildings except 1 barracks building which is at
   present and will be used in future by Red Air Force
   personnel. There are no buildings or facilities of
   any nature on or adjacent to field. There are no
   water, sewerage, or power systems. This applies to
   all three fields. Wells must be artesian due to
   salt and shallow wells. Water is hauled by trucks
   from nearby rivers. Present runways at Poltava 1
   of 1,000 meters by 80 meters size and 1 of 500 by
   80 meters. The long runway cannot be extended due
   to obstacles and contour. There is space, however,
   for a runway of sufficient length on the dirt portion
   of the field. Russians assure that soil bakes hard
   in summertime from May to October. Determination as
   to necessity of steel mats will be made by Engineer
   Officers, Col Brent, upon arrival. Spur railroad
   track from main line Poltava to airdrome partly
   demolished by Germans but can be rebuilt. 95% of
   buildings in city of Poltava demolished by Germans.
   No rebuilding at present time.

2. Mirgorod, 50 miles west of Poltava Kiev
   railway. No buildings or facilities of any nature.
   1-1200 meter concrete block runway that could be
   extended to approximately 1700 meters. Other area sod
with space for additional 1700 meter runway. There are no obstructions anywhere adjacent to field. No spur rail line to field. No facilities are available in city of Mirgorod which is approximately 2 miles north of field with dirt road connecting.

3. Piryatin, 50 miles west of Mirgorod on Poltava Kiev railway. sod field approximately 2 kilometers square. Only markings and improvements on field are a number of small sod revetments. No facilities or buildings available in town which is about 2 miles north of field. Inspection DC 3 was unable to land on field which is not in use at present due to mud condition. Plane circled field at 50 foot altitude during time inspection was made. A request to visit field by car at this time not approved.

While above 3 fields are bare of facilities and, without improvements, would not be suitable for Bl7 operations, neither General Deane, Kesslar, or myself feel that any better sites are available or would be offered by Red Air Force at this time. We therefore have no other alternative other than to accept them and are proceeding on that basis. While it is probable that Russians can furnish services of the below mentioned categories, Russian standards of sanitation, medical, living conditions, and maintenance methods require American standards and facilities be provided and maintained. Present plans call for complete tent camps at all bases which will be suitable for operations until month of October when winter would indicate other construction.

I have attempted to present picture as it is and call attention to the fact that this project presents the same problems that are to be faced in putting an Expeditionary Force in a foreign country. We feel, however, that with the equipment enroute and available from American supply bases, we can meet and overcome our difficulties.
To: War Cabinet Offices
From: Joint Staff Mission
Number: J.S.M. 1616

In immediately following telegram are copies of messages passed between U. S. Military Mission Moscow and U. S. Chiefs of Staff regarding the release of information concerning U. S. shuttle bombing in Russia.

2. U. S. Chiefs of Staff consider that publicity in this connection should be released in Moscow before elsewhere and will appreciate the cooperation of the British Chiefs of Staff in assuring proper coordination in this matter by British Military Mission, Moscow, and the British press.

3. We have assured them that the cooperation desired will be forthcoming.

Time of Origin 011511Z

FOOTNOTE: See CM-OUT-16975 (31 Mar 44) JC/S, CM-IN-18604 (26 Mar 44) JC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: General Arnold
              OPD
              General Bissell
              Admiral King
              Colonel Park
              General Surles
              C of S

CM-IN-2274 (4 Apr 44) 0422Z

DECLASSIFIED
MAY 3 1974

COPY No. 31
Commanding General
U.S. Military Mission in U.S.S.R.
Moscow, Russia

Commanding General
Strategic Air Forces in Europe
London, England

Number: WARX 17324

To Deane from Arnold

Information Spots

Concerning your 366 dated March 30, 1944 apparently there is misunderstanding relative number of aircraft which will be used by ATC to transport 3rd Echelon FRANTIC personnel from Teheran to final destination. ATC sending 4 C-87s to Teheran for this purpose, total of 30 trips will be made by these 4 aircraft over 2 week period to lift entire 3rd Echelon, plus 70,000 pounds supplies (see our number 393 dated March 16, 1944).

You state that General Nikitin indicates that there will be no objection shipping part of house keeping supplies to our bases by air in US transport. Does this mean that Soviets have changed their attitude from that conveyed in your 356 dtd March 26, 1944 in which you stated that Soviets have approved 30 trips to transport 3rd Echelon but have disapproved our proposal for two weekly C-87 trips from Teheran to Kiev area for FRANTIC project? Limitation on number of trips these aircraft can make rests entirely with Soviet authorities, if latter approve, ATC indicates that 4 C-87s can continue on this assignment as long as needed and make up to 15 trips weekly.
US Military Mission
Moscow, Russia

Commanding General
Strategic Air Forces in Europe
London, England

Number: WARX 16975 (M-31)

Book message to Deane for action, to Spaatz for information from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that publicity concerning PRAGMATIC should be given simultaneously to British and American correspondents in Moscow prior to any release in the UK and US reference Deane's number 350. Nature and timing of release will be co-ordinated by General Deane with General Spaatz, British Military Mission in Moscow and with Soviets, and need not be submitted to Combined or Joint Chiefs of Staff for further approval.

No sig

ORIGINATOR: Joint Chiefs of Staff

INFORMATION: General Arnold OPD Admiral King Colonel Park General Surles C of S

CM-OUT-16975 (31 Mar 44) 22312 lbw

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date May 3 1974

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COPY No. 20

Regarded Unclassified
From: U.S. Mil Mission Moscow, Russia
To: War Department
Milattache Amembassy London, England

31 March, 1944

Spaatz Ldn, from Deane rptd Arnold info

Following in reply your 12440 of 29th March.

In requesting approval from Soviet Foreign Office
for U.S. aircraft to bring Third Echelon into Russia, the
Foreign Office was told that "about" 30 C87 trips would
be involved. In granting approval, the Foreign Office did
not specify any number of trips or aircraft but approved
our proposal which of course implied approval of about 30
trips, as reported in my Nr 50 of 30th March to London and
my number 366 of 30th March to Gen Arnold.

The Red Air Staff at a meeting yesterday indicated
that there would be no objections to bringing some additional
housekeeping supplies in some additional trips by C87 air-
craft used to transport Third Echelon. I feel that Foreign
Office particularly concerned in principle of allowing
United States 9 but rather would work with the Red Air Force
in making the number of trips necessary for the operation.
Any decision put up to Foreign Office involves intemal
delay and seems to be considered without reference to any-
thing that has gone before.

Soviet supply people have indicated that it will be
difficult for them to supply gasoline for our C87 Trans-
ports at intermediate base between Teheran and Poltava.
Griffith feels that for safety reasons, the planes should
carry sufficient gas to make trip in 1 flight even though
intermediate bases were to be used. He therefore recommends,
From: U.S. Mil Mission Moscow, Russia

No 370 31 March, 1944

and I concur, that planes should be based on making the trip in 1 hop. While this will perhaps cut down pay loads, it will be an added reason why more trips are necessary and also relieve Soviets of burden of establishing special facilities at intermediate points. On the other hand, if you feel that intermediate stops are necessary, I believe I can get the Soviets to provide necessary facilities. Request your decision in matter.

New Subject. Griffith, Kessler, Cullen, and Maj Speulding left today for reconnaissance of bases, so we should have decision on final selection by tomorrow night. The B17 now here is making its second test bombing run today. If successful, the aircraft should depart for London in few days.

No Sig

**Being serviced.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 3 1974

12440 is believed to be in error

366 is CM-IN-100 (1 Apr 44) General Arnold - 10 w1f

ACTION: General Arnold

INFO: OPD
C of S

CM-IN-747 (1 Apr 44) 2240Z med

COPY No. 16

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN 84-787344 ACD-255
From: U.S. Military Mission, Moscow, Russia
To: War Department
U.S. Military Attaché, London, England
30 March, 1944

Spaatz London rpt to Arnold for info from Deane.

At a meeting with top people of Red Air Staff held yesterday, we found that Soviets have been doing considerable work in planning since our last meeting.

They have promised a reconnaissance flight to the 3 proposed airfields, leaving Moscow Friday or Saturday. Soviets have completed their organization for FRAMIC and have already moved some of personnel to proposed bases on assumption that we shall approve selection after our reconnaissance. Maj Gen Perminov is in charge of Russian side of operations with an appropriate staff and a small Headquarters. At each base, his organization includes a technical battalion, service or housekeeping battalion, and a truck battalion, total personnel involved about 1,800. It was agreed that Griffith has full authority to control the organization and operation of bases and that Soviet commander at each base would furnish him Soviet personnel in numbers and types required. He plans to organize bases as in England, filling in with Russian personnel as is presently feasible and as future training permits. To avoid oversize organization, particularly Russian personnel, request you indicate maximum number of planes to be sent to single base on 1 mission. Plans now based on 67 planes per base which we feel is high and that 50 per base or a total of 120 would be more suitable. Soviets will be

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHFP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

530 Shuttle Bombing

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: U.S. Military Mission, Moscow Russia
To: War Department  No. 366
U.S. Military Attaché, London, England  No. 50

30 March, 1944

prepared to house our 3rd Echelon starting on April 7. Therefore we shall have to keep personnel in Tehran until that time. They have designated a Liaison Officer for Connolly to work with in Tehran and have agreed to take over shipment of housekeeping supplies in Tehran. These will be shipped via rail to Caspian, thence by boat to Baku, and thence by rail to destination. Soviets feel that this is fastest method of handling supplies and that time required for each shipment will be maximum of 25 days. Gen Nikitin indicated that there was no objection our shipping part of housekeeping supplies to our air bases by air in US Transports. It is possible that the 30 aircraft bringing the 3rd Echelon could make an extra trip from Tehran to Poltava and thus deliver much of non-bulky supplies. I request your decision in this matter and that I be informed of instructions, if any, that you issue to Air Transport Command.

With regard to shipment of gas and oil, Connolly states that the shipment of 10,000 tons per month possible. Red Air Force has agreed that after shipments now coming in northern convoy has been delivered, future shipments may come from Persian Gulf. They ask that regular shipments through Persian Gulf be increased by amount of our needs and they will then turn over additional amount to us from their stocks. They will provide us with equipment for testing the gasoline at bases to insure that it is proper type.

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JCS memo. 1-4-74
By RHJ, MLR, Date  MAY 3 1974

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Regraded Unclassified
From: U.S. Military Mission, Moscow Russia
To: War Department
    U.S. Military Attaché, London England

30 March, 1944

They insist, however, that gasoline be delivered in drums, which Connolly states is possible. The authority for shipments must come from War Office in London to the PAI force in Basra. Since you know now Connolly's capabilities and Russian desires, it is requested that you take necessary action in London to ensure that the gasoline be released. If there is anything further you wish me to do on subject, please inform me.

Engineer Captain Zorin at Archangel and engineer Captain Burov have been designated as Soviet representatives in charge of unloading our vessels in northern convoy and arranging for rail shipment to destination. Representatives from this mission at both of those ports have been informed.

Bl7 now here has completed 1 bombing test with Soviet bombs using modified US shackles. Small pattern of bombs was obtained but pattern was about 600 feet short of target. Corrections have been worked out and another run is to be made. As soon as this is accomplished, which should be within next few days, this aircraft will return to England with sample bombs and ballistical data together with a detached report of physical test.

ACTION: Gen Arnold

INFO: OOF, C of S

CM-IN-100 (1 Apr 44) 03192 jb

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date: MAY 3 1974

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: USMM Moscow Russia
To: War Department
NR: 347, 28th March 1944

For the Combined Chiefs of Staff from Deane.

Note: Correction of page 1, line 18.

The only outstanding matter is the entry of U.S.
Transport planes to Russia.

No Sig.

NOTE: Supplement to CM-IN-18000 (25 Mar 44) CC/S
ACTION: CC/S
INFO: Gen Arnold
       OPD
       Gen Bissell
       Col Park

DEClassified
\ JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

CM-IN-20303 (28 Mar 44) 2152Z ejm

Regraded Unclassified
From: Military Mission, Moscow
To: War Department
No: 350 25 March 1944

For Joint Chiefs of Staff from Dean.

Sufficient unusual activity has already occurred in Moscow with arrival of B17 aircraft and unusual number of American officers to indicate to news-hungry British and American correspondents that a story is in the making. To avoid any leaks I propose to give these correspondents an off the record talk emphasizing the necessity for secrecy. I should like to tell them at the same time that when and if any publicity concerning FRANTIC is released the release will be given simultaneously to British and American correspondents in Moscow prior to any release in the US and UK. I do not believe that any release should be made until after the first operational mission has been carried out but at that time I feel it would have considerable morale value. The British and American missions here, in cooperation with the Soviets, could work out the general nature of the releases and submit them for approval to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Request your instructions in the matter.

No Sig

ACTION: JC/S
INFO: General Arnold
    General Handy
    General Bissell
    Admiral King
    Colonel Mathewson
    General Surles
    Log

CM-IN-18604 (26 Mar 44) 1318% med

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

COPY No. 28

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: CG U.S. M M, Moscow, Russia
To: War Department
NR: 347, 24 March 44

For the Combined Chiefs of Staff from Deane.

Today the Soviet Foreign Office informed Mr Harriman of the request that Bogomolov and General Vassiliev submitted to General Wilson on 11 March for authority to base 6 to 8 airplanes with 60 to 80 personnel at Bari or Brindisi for the purpose of maintaining communications with the Soviets Military Mission in Yugoslavia. General Wilson informed the Soviets that he would put the matter before the British and American Governments. Mr Harriman was formally requested to inform the United States Government that the Soviet Government considers the matter to be of urgent importance and request an early decision. Both Mr Harriman and I strongly urge that the Soviet request be approved.

In the past few months the Soviets have given us concessions heretofore unheard of. In connection with FRANTIC, they have approved U S operation of communications, and admission of personnel to Russia without visas. The only outstanding matter is the status of U.S. transport planes to Russia.

U.S. transport planes to Russia.

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Regraded Unclassified
From: CG U.S. NM, Moscow, Russia

NR: 347, 24 March 44

I expect approval on this. In addition they have authorized and increased exchange of weather information and I have hopes that they will approve establishing a U.S. radio station in Moscow.

There will be many other concessions which Anglo American Forces will urgently require in the future. Prompt acquiescence to their request to base these aircraft in Italy should promote the Soviet attitude of cooperation which appears now to be well started.

Because this is a question of military significance, the Ambassador requested me to express to you directly our recommendations. It is requested that I be informed as soon as possible of the decision of the combined Chiefs of Staff. The Ambassador is submitting the Soviet request to the State Department without explanation but stating that with his concurrence I am sending this message to you recommending prompt approval.

No sig.

ACTION: CC/S

INFO: General Arnold
OPD
General Bissell
Admiral King
Colonel Mathewson
Log

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

CM-IN-18000 (25 Mar 44) 1628Z efv

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Moscow
To: AFRMAR
No. 299, 11 March 1944

For Joint Chiefs of Staff from Deane.

We are now conducting negotiations with foreign office to obtain permission for free entry to Russia without passports or visas for personnel engaged in air operations in Russia. Without such authority it will be difficult, if not impossible, to operate. At the same time, Soviets are planning to send 250 officers and enlisted men to United States to take delivery of FBN aircraft. As many as possible will make journey toward the end of this month on ships returning from convoy JW 57 now unloading. They have asked if there is not some way that this personnel can enter United States without formality of passports and visas.

I urgently recommend that you request authorization from State Department which will permit entry of Soviet personnel for the purpose stated without passports or visas. A suggested procedure would be for the Naval Division of the Military Mission to require a certificate from Soviet authorities that personnel in question is to go to United States for specific purpose of taking delivery of the aircraft. Admiral Olsen to be then authorized to give his approval in writing on 1 copy of the certificate, at the same time to give each individual concerned an identification card which

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JCS memo, 1-4-44
By RGP, NLE, Date MAY 3 1944

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Moscow
To: AGWAR
No. 299, 11 March 1944

the Soviet personnel would be required to have at Port of Entry and at all times during their stay in United States.

If this authorization can be given promptly, it will greatly facilitate our negotiations regarding air operations. It is entirely reciprocal, and to my mind the only logical basis under which we can operate in time of war.

No Sig

ACTION: JCS (Col McFarland)
INFORMATION: OPD
   Gen Bissell
   Gen Arnold
   Adm King
   Col Mathewson
   Log

CH-IN-8027 (12 Mar 44) 0148Z mos