

**Folder 9. President-Stalin Messages,  
17 July 1944-17 January 1945.**

FROM: THE PRESIDENT  
TO : MARSHAL STALIN  
NO : 170, 17 JANUARY 1944

Thank you for your encouraging message dated January 15 in regard to Air Marshal Tedder's conference with you, and in regard to the offensive of your Armies on the Soviet-German front.

The past performances of your heroic soldiers and their already demonstrated efficiency in this offensive, give high promise of an early success to our armies on both fronts.

By skillful coordination of our combined efforts, the time required to force a surrender upon our barbarian enemies will be radically reduced.

As you know, Americans are putting forth a great effort in the Pacific at a distance of 7,000 miles, and it is my hope that an early collapse of Germany will permit the movement of sufficient forces to the Pacific Area to quickly destroy the Japanese menace to all of our Allied Nations.

ROOSEVELT

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO : MARSHAL STALIN

NO : 153, 30 DECEMBER 1944

Poland. Copy filed MR 210 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.

Regraded Unclassified

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E. O. 12356**

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO : MARSHAL STALIN

NO : 144, 23 DECEMBER 1944

I wish to direct General Eisenhower to send to Moscow a fully qualified officer of his staff to discuss with you Eisenhower's situation on the Western Front and its relation to the Eastern Front, in order that all of us may have information essential to our coordination of effort. We will maintain complete secrecy.

I hope you will see this officer of Eisenhower's Staff and arrange to exchange with him information that will be of mutual benefit. The situation in Belgium is not bad but it is time to talk of the next phase.

In view of the emergency an early reply to this proposal is requested.

ROOSEVELT

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO : MARSHAL STALIN

NO : 136, 16 DECEMBER 1944

POLAND. See copy filed MR 052 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.

Regraded Unclassified

DECLASSIFIED  
E. O. 12356

**TOP-SECRET**

FROM: THE PRESIDENT  
TO : MARSHAL STALIN  
NO : 133, 6 December 1944

Thank you for your two informative messages of December two and December three.

In regard to a proposed Franco-Soviet pact along the lines of the Anglo-Soviet pact of mutual assistance, this Government would have no objection in principle if you and General De Gaulle considered such a pact in the interests of both your countries and European security in general.

I am in complete agreement with your replies to General De Gaulle with regard to the post-war frontier of France. It appears to me at the present time that no advantage to our common war effort would result from an attempt to settle this question now and that its settlement subsequent to the collapse of Germany is preferable.

ROOSEVELT

Released 061652Z

**TOP-SECRET**

- 1 -

Regraded Unclassified

FROM: OPNAV

TO : ALUSNA, MOSCOW

TOP SECRET. FOR THE URGENT AND PERSONAL ATTENTION OF AMBASSADOR HARRI-  
MAN FROM STETTINIUS, STATE DEPARTMENT NUMBER 2784.

1. Please arrange to call in person on Marshal Stalin in order to  
deliver the following message from the Pres to him, Number 132.

Message, re voting in Security Council, filed  
MR 210 SECURITY ORGANIZATION.

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO : MARSHAL STALIN

NO : 124, 18 NOVEMBER 1944

All three of us are of one mind -- that we should meet very soon, but problems chiefly geographical do not make this easy at this moment. I can, under difficulties, arrange to go somewhere now in order to get back here by Christmas, but quite frankly, it will be far more convenient if I could postpone it until after the Inauguration which is on January twentieth.

My Navy people recommend strongly against the Black Sea. They do not want to risk a capital ship through the Aegean or the Dardenelles, as it would involve a very large escort much needed elsewhere. Churchill has suggested Jerusalem or Alexandria, and there is a possibility of Athens, though this is not yet sure.

Furthermore, I have at this time a great hesitation in leaving here while my old Congress is in its final days, with the probability of its not adjourning finally until December fifteenth. Also, I have to be here, under the Constitution, to send the Annual Message to the new Congress which meets here in early January.

What I am suggesting is that we should all meet about the twenty-eighth or thirtieth of January, and I should hope that by that time you will have rail travel to some port on the Adriatic and that we should meet you there or that you could come across in a few hours on one of our ships to Bari and then motor to Rome, or that you should take the same ship a little further and that we should all meet in a place like Taormina, in eastern Sicily, which

should provide a fairly good climate at that time.

Almost any place in the Mediterranean is accessible to me so that I can be within easy air distance of Washington in order to carry out action on Legislation -- a subject with which you are familiar. I must be able to get Bills or Resolutions sent from here and returned within ten days.

I hope that your January military operations will not prevent you from coming at that time, and I do not think that we should delay the meeting longer than the end of January or early February.

Of course, if in the meantime the Nazi Army or people should disintegrate quickly, we would have to meet earlier, though I should much prefer the meeting at the end of January.

A further suggestion as to a place would be one on the Riviera but this would be dependent on the withdrawal of German troops from northwestern Italy. I wish you would let me know your thoughts on this.

I hope to talk over many things with you. We understand each other's problems, and, as you know, I like to keep these discussions informal, and I have no reason for formal agenda.

My Ambassador in China, General Hurley, is doing his best to iron out the problem between the Generalissimo and the forces in North China. He is making some progress but nothing has been signed yet.

My warmest regards to you.

ROOSEVELT

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO : MARSHAL STALIN

NO : 114, 10 NOVEMBER 1944

Acknowledgment of Stalin's election congratulations.

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO : MARSHAL STALIN

NO : 100, 24 OCTOBER 1944.

CHURCHILL-STALIN conference. See copy filed MR 210 CHURCHILL-STALIN  
CONFERENCE

AMEMBASSY

20 October 1944

MOSCOW

SECRET FOR THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES

Please deliver the following message from the President to Marshal Stalin.

QUOTE. PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT.

We have been giving active consideration to the diplomatic recognition of the existing French authorities as the Provisional Government of France. The recent enlargement of the Consultative Assembly has made these authorities more representative of the French people. It is expected that in the very near future the French, with the agreement of General Eisenhower, will set up a real zone of the interior which will be under French administration and that when this is done it would be an appropriate time to recognize the French authorities as the Provisional Government of France. I am informing you in advance of our intentions in this regard in case you wish to take some similar action at the time the zone of the interior is set up under French administration.

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO : MARSHAL STALIN

NO : 76, 4 OCTOBER 1944

CHURSHILL-STALIN meeting. See copy filed MR 210 CHURCHILL-STALIN  
CONFERENCE.

FROM: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT  
TO : MARSHAL STALIN  
NO : 66, 18 SEPTEMBER 1944

1. In our conference at Quebec just concluded we have arrived at the following decisions as to military operations.

Operations in North West Europe.

2. It is our intention to press on with all speed to destroy the German armed forces and penetrate into the heart of Germany. The best opportunity to defeat the enemy in the west lies in striking at the Ruhr and Saar since it is there that the enemy will concentrate the remainder of his available forces in the defence of these essential areas. The northern line of approach clearly has advantages over the southern and it is essential that we should open up the northwest ports, particularly Antwerp and Rotterdam, before bad weather sets in. Our main effort will therefore be on the left.

Operations in Italy.

3. As a result of our present operations in Italy

(a) Either Kesselring's forces will be routed, in which case it should be possible to undertake a rapid regrouping and a pursuit towards the Ljubljana gap; or

(b) Kesselring's army will succeed in effecting an orderly withdrawal, in which event we may have to be content with clearing the Lombardy Plains this year.

Our future action depends on the progress of the battle. Plans are being prepared for an amphibious operation on the Istrian

Peninsula to be carried out if the situation so demands.

Operations in the Balkans

4. Operations of our air forces and Commando type operations will continue.

Operations against Japan.

5. We have agreed on further operations to intensify the offensive against the Japanese in all theaters, with the ultimate objective of invading the Japanese homeland.

6. Plans for the prompt transfer of power to the Pacific theater after the collapse of Germany were agreed upon.

ROOSEVELT. CHURCHILL.

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO : AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN

NO : 58, 8 SEPTEMBER 1944

Please deliver the following message from the President to Marshal Stalin:

QUOTE. SECRET AND PERSONAL FOR MARSHAL STALIN FROM THE PRESIDENT.

I have just had a pleasant and interesting talk with your Ambassador in regard to the progress of the Dumbarton Oaks talks. There is apparently only one issue of importance on which we have not yet reached agreement and that is the question of voting in the Council. The British and ourselves both feel strongly that parties to a dispute should not vote in the decisions of the Council even if one of the parties is a permanent member of the Council, whereas I gather from your Ambassador that your Government holds the opposite view. Traditionally since the founding of the United States parties to a dispute have never voted in their own case and I know that public opinion in the United States would neither understand nor support a plan of international organization in which this principle was violated. Furthermore I know that this same view is held by many nations of the world and I am entirely convinced that the smaller nations would find it difficult to accept an international organization in which the great powers insisted upon the right to vote in the Council in disputes in which they themselves were involved. They would most certainly see in that an attempt on the part of the great powers to set themselves up above the law. Finally, I would have real trouble with the Senate. For these reasons I hope you will find it possible to instruct your delegation to agree with our suggestion on voting. If this can be done the talks at Dumbarton Oaks can be speedily concluded with complete and outstanding success. ROOSEVELT. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT.

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO : AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN, FOR MARSHAL STALIN

NO : 55, 31 AUGUST 1944

Please deliver the following message from the President to Marshal Stalin:

QUOTE. PERSONAL AND SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR MARSHAL STALIN.

I am much concerned at the reference made by your delegation at Dumbarton Oaks that the Soviet Government might desire to have the sixteen constituent republics considered for individual membership in the new international organization. Although it was made clear by your delegation that this subject would not be raised again during this present stage of the conversations, I feel I must tell you that to raise this question at any stage before the final establishment and entry into its functions of the international organization would very definitely imperil the whole project, certainly as far as the United States is concerned and undoubtedly other important countries as well. I hope you will find it possible to reassure me on this point.

This would not prejudice later discussion of the question after the organization came into being. The Assembly would then have full authority to act. UNQUOTE.

ROOSEVELT

FROM: THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER

TO : MARSHAL STALIN

20 AUGUST 1944

POLAND. See copy in MR 210 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS (1) Sec 2.

FROM: THE PRESIDENT  
TO : MARSHAL STALIN  
NO : 19 AUGUST 1944

I have just seen our commanders in the Pacific Theater. I am highly pleased with the progress that is being made but greatly impressed with the magnitude of the task. Harriman has reported to me your agreement to inaugurate promptly planning for future joint cooperation between our respective forces.

General Deane has told me of the proposals which he submitted to the Red Army General Staff concerning Soviet American collaboration. I hope that you will instruct your staff to pursue expeditiously the joint preparation of plans with the United States Military Mission in Moscow which has been authorized to represent the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff in this planning in preparation for the time when you are ready to act. I feel that there is nothing we could do now that would be of more assistance in preparing to bring the Pacific war to a speedy conclusion.

ROOSEVELT

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO : MARSHAL STALIN

NO : 42, 12 AUGUST 1944

POLAND. (Copy filed MR 210 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS, (1) Sec 2.)

FROM: THE PRESIDENT  
TO : MARSHAL STALIN  
NO : 32, 27 JULY 1944

I can fully understand the difficulty of your coming to a conference with the Prime Minister and me in view of the rapid military progress now being made but I hope you can keep such a conference very much in mind and that we can meet as early as possible. Such a meeting would help me domestically and we are approaching the time for further strategical decisions.

ROOSEVELT

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO : MARSHAL STALIN

NO : 31, 27 JULY 1944

Poland. Copy filed MR 210 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS, (1) Sec. 2

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO : MARSHAL STALIN

NO : 27, 17 JULY 1944

Things are moving so fast and so successfully that I feel there should be a meeting between you and Mr. Churchill and me in the reasonably near future. The Prime Minister is in hearty accord with this thought. I am now on a trip in the far West and must be in Washington for several weeks on my return. It would, therefore, be best for me to have a meeting between the tenth and fifteenth of September. The most central point for you and me would be the north of Scotland. I could go by ship and you could come either by ship or by plane. I hope you can let me have your thoughts. Secrecy and security can be maintained either aboard ship or on shore.

ROOSEVELT

FROM: MARSHAL STALIN

TO : THE PRESIDENT

15 JANUARY 1945

Today, on January 15, I had a conversation with Marshal Tedder and the generals who accompanied him. As it seems to me, mutual information is sufficiently complete. The exhaustive answers have been given on the matters in question by both sides. I should say that Marshal Tedder makes the most favourable impression.

After four days of offensive operations on the Soviet German front, now I have a possibility to inform you that in spite of unfavourable weather the offensive of the Soviet troops is going on satisfactorily. The whole Central Front from the Carpathians to the Baltic Sea is moving westward. Although the Germans are resisting desperately, they, however, are forced to retreat. I have no doubt that the Germans will have to disperse their reserves between two fronts, as a result they will be obliged to abandon the offensive on the Western front. I am glad that these circumstances will relieve the situation of the Allied troops in the West and will accelerate the preparation of the offensive planned by General Eisenhower.

As to the Soviet troops, you may be sure, that they in spite of existing difficulties will do everything in their power so that the blow undertaken by them against the Germans would be most effective.

FROM: MARSHAL STALIN

TO : THE PRESIDENT

1 January 1945

POLAND. Copy in MR 210 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.

POLAND. Copy in MR 210 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS.

FROM: MARSHAL STALIN  
FROM: MARSHAL STALIN  
TO : THE PRESIDENT  
TO : THE PRESIDENT

27 December 1944

NO : 26 December 1944

POLAND. Copy in MR 210 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS. SECURITY ORGAN-

IZATION.

FROM: MARSHAL STALIN

FROM: MARSHAL STALIN

TO : THE PRESIDENT

25 DECEMBER 1944

NO : 26 December 1944

I have received your message regarding sending to Moscow a case-  
pilot INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. Copy in MR 210 SECURITY ORGAN-  
IZATION. Naturally, I agree with your proposal as well as I agree to  
meet the officer from General Eisenhower and to arrange an exchange  
of information with him.

FROM: MARSHAL STALIN

TO : THE PRESIDENT

25 DECEMBER 1944

I have received your message regarding sending to Moscow a competent officer from Gen Eisenhower.

Naturally, I agree with your proposal as well as I agree to meet the officer from General Eisenhower and to arrange an exchange of information with him.

**TOP-SECRET**

FROM: MARSHAL STALIN

TO : THE PRESIDENT

10 DECEMBER 1944

Thank you for your reply on the French question. Together with General De Gaulle we came to a decision that the conclusion of the Franco-Soviet pact of mutual assistance will be beneficial to the cause of the French-Soviet relations as well as for the European security in general. Today the Franco-Soviet Pact was signed.

As to the post-war border of France, the consideration of this question, as I have already written to you, has been postponed.

STALIN

**TOP-SECRET**

**TOP-SECRET**

FROM: MARSHAL STALIN

TO : THE PRESIDENT

3 DECEMBER 1944

The meeting with General De Gaulle gave the possibility for the friendly exchange of opinions on the questions of Franco-Soviet relations. In the course of the conversation, as I had supposed, General De Gaulle touched two main questions: about the frontier of France on the Rhine and about the conclusion of Franco-Soviet pact of mutual assistance similar to the Anglo-Soviet Treaty.

As to the frontier of France on the Rhine I expressed the idea that this question cannot be solved without knowledge and consent of our main Allies, whose forces are carrying on the struggle for liberation against the Germans on the French territory. I stressed the complexity of the solution of this question.

In connection with the proposal of Franco-Soviet pact I pointed out the necessity of close study of this question, the necessity of clarification of juridical nature of such pact, in particular such question as who will ratify this pact in France under the present conditions. Thus the Frenchmen should still give some explanations which we have not yet received from them.

In sending you this message I would appreciate your reply and your comments on these questions.

Similar message I sent to Mr. Churchill.

I send you my best wishes.

STALIN

**TOP-SECRET**

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**TOP-SECRET**

FROM: MARSHAL STALIN

TO : THE PRESIDENT

2 DECEMBER 1944

According to all data General De-Gaulle and his friends who arrived in the Soviet Union, will put two questions.

1. About the conclusion of Franco-Soviet pact of mutual assistance similar to Anglo-Soviet pact.

It is difficult for us to object. But I would like to know your opinion on this question. I ask you to give me your advice.

2. Probably General De-Gaulle will raise a question about the change of the eastern frontier of France with the expansion of the French frontier to the left bank of the Rhine. It is also known that there is a project about the establishment of the Rhine-Westphalia region under the international control.

It is possible that this control provides the participation of France. Thus the proposal of the French concerning the shift of the frontier to the Rhine will compete with the project of establishment of the Rhine region under the international control.

I ask your advice on this question as well.

I sent a similar message to Mr. Churchill.

**TOP-SECRET**

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FROM: MARSHAL STALIN

TO : THE PRESIDENT

23 November 1944

It is greatly regretted that your naval organs doubt the expedience of your initial supposition that the Soviet coast of the Black Sea should be chosen as the meeting place for the three of us. The suggested by you date of the meeting at the end of January or beginning of February has no objections on my part, but at the same time I have in mind that we shall succeed in chosing as a meeting place one of the Soviet port cities. I still have to take into consideration the advice of the doctors about the danger of long trips.

I still hope, however, that we shall succeed, if not right now, then somewhat later to agree finally upon an acceptable for all of us meeting place.

I am sending you my very best wishes.

FROM: MARSHAL STALIN

TO : THE PRESIDENT

9 NOVEMBER 1944

Congratulations to the President on re-election. Full copy not included.

FROM: MARSHAL STALIN

TO : THE PRESIDENT

29 OCTOBER 1944

I have received your message of October 25.

If the idea that was expressed earlier about the possibility of our meeting on the Soviet <sup>Black</sup> Balck Sea coast appears to be acceptable for you I would consider it extremely desirable to realize this plan. The conditions for a meeting there are absolutely favorable. I hope that by that time it will be also possible to provide a safe entrance of your vessel into the Black Sea. Since the doctors do not recommend to undertake any big trips at the present time, I have to give consideration to that.

I shall be glad to see you as soon as you find it possible to undertake the trip.

FROM: MARSHAL STALIN

TO : THE PRESIDENT

22 OCTOBER 1944

I received your message of October 21 about the intention to recognize the existing French authorities as a Provisional Government of France and to create an internal zone under the French Administration's control. The British Government has also informed the Soviet Government about its desire to recognize the Provisional Government of France. As to the Soviet Government, it welcomes the decision to recognize the Provisional French Government, and has already given an appropriate instruction to its representative in Paris.

FROM: MARSHAL STALIN

TO : THE PRESIDENT

19 OCTOBER 1944

Resume of Churchill-Stalin meeting. Copy filed MR 210 CHURCHILL-  
STALIN CONFERENCE.

FROM: MARSHAL STALIN and PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL

TO : THE PRESIDENT

10 OCTOBER 1944

CHURCHILL-STALIN conference. (Exact copy of PM-PRES #794, filed  
MR 210 CHURCHILL-STALIN CONFERENCE.)

FROM: MARSHAL STALIN

TO : THE PRESIDENT

8 OCTOBER 1944

CHURCHILL-STALIN conference. (Copy filed MR 210 CHURCHILL-STALIN CONFERENCE.)

FROM: MARSHAL STALIN

TO : THE PRESIDENT

29 SEPTEMBER 1944

I have received your and Mr. Churchill's message on the Conference in Quebec with information regarding your further military plans. It is clear from your message what important tasks are to be solved by the American and British armed forces. Allow me to wish you and your troops all success.

At the present time the Soviet forces are busy with the annihilation of the Baltic group of German troops hanging over our right flank. Without the liquidation of this group it is impossible for us to advance into Eastern Germany. Besides, our troops have two immediate tasks: to knock Hungary out of war and feel through the German defenses on the Eastern front by an onslaught of our troops, and, under favorable circumstances-- to smash them.

REPORT OF CONVERSATIONS  
BETWEEN  
MARSHAL STALIN  
AND  
AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN and AMBASSADOR CLARK KERR

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23 SEPTEMBER 1944  
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FROM: AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN  
TO : THE PRESIDENT  
(5 MESSAGES FOLLOW)

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232021Z NCR 7494

The British Ambassador and I had a most satisfactory talk with Stalin this evening. We handed him your and the Prime Minister's message regarding the Quebec decisions. He indicated satisfaction with the plan to take the Ruhr and commented that when the Red Army took Katowicx and upper Silesia it would deprive Germany of her coal and much of her industry. He said that he considered the operations in France as "most bold and daring." He said that "great risks had been taken but no success could be attained without risks" and that "there had been nothing to equal it here," referring to the Russian front.

In discussing the Pacific war I explained that the plans referred to in your message covered the use of British and American resources. Stalin inquired whether we wished to bring Japan to her knees without Russian assistance or whether you still wished as you suggested in Teheran Russian participation. The British Ambassador and I both assured him that Russian participation was desired but that no plans could be made for the use of Soviet resources until Marshal Stalin was ready to initiate discussions. He then stated that there was no change in his attitude as he had expressed it to you at Teheran. Russia is ready to participate in the war against Japan after Germany is defeated.

He asked what were the plans for the defeat of Japan and particularly what part the Allies desired to assign to Russia. I explained that General Deane had been authorized to discuss with the Red Army Staff plans for Russia's participation in the Japanese war. He said that would be desirable and the discussions could proceed in a few days. I referred to our previous talks regarding the use of air bases in the Maritime Provinces and Stalin said "that

is not the most important question." He stated further that it would be necessary for the Red Army to move 25 to 30 divisions to the far east.

He was somewhat surprised that after the assurances he had given at Teheran we were not taking into account in our planning the participation of Russia and he appeared anxious to know specifically what role we would want Russia to play. He gave every indication of being ready and willing to cooperate but did not want to be an uninvited participant. It seems clear that we will get greater cooperation from him if we will suggest the operations that we would like the Russians to undertake rather than wait their proposals. Because of this new aspect General Deane is cabling the Joint Chiefs of Staff for more detailed instructions than he has previously received.

I strongly recommend that we follow the course Stalin has indicated and that General Deane be authorized to discuss with the Red Army Staff in broad outline at least our Pacific strategy and to propose the full measure of Russian participation desired. For reasons described later in this cable the British Military Mission should not be involved in these discussions at the present time.

I mentioned the concern that you had over the Military situation in China and specifically asked for permission to send 500 trucks through Russia to our air force in China. He readily agreed and appeared not to have known about our request before. He even offered to supply trucks from Russia if they were needed quickly to be replaced later.

I took up with him also the proposal of the Chiefs of Staff to set up a tri-partite committee in Moscow for consultation on strategical and tactical matters of mutual interest in the European war. After discussion the purpose in some detail he agreed that the committee should be established. He asked who would be the American representative and was satisfied when I told him it would be General Deane. When the British Ambassador stated that Gen Burrows would be appointed he said that Burrows would not be satisfactory. The British Ambassador did his best to defend Burrows but Stalin maintained that it was the opinion of Marshal Vasilevski and other senior Red Army officers that Burrows considered them "savages" and that they had no confidence in him. The British Ambassador will of course report this to the Prime Minister and it seems evident that the British will have to replace him. It is obvious the committee will not function until Burrows replacement arrives unless Gen Deane could be authorized in the meantime to have preliminary discussions. From Burrows own account to me of his talk with Marshal Vasilevski when he went to the front in July and Vasilevski's comments to Deane the main difficulty appears to be a personal misunderstanding in all probability due to Gen Burrows' manner of approach which is unconsciously high hat as is typical of some British officers but is interpreted by the Russians as arrogance.

May I suggest that this cable be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as it will supplement Gen Deane's cable to them. I will report the other matters that were discussed in separate cables.

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232038Z NCR 7498

This evening I explained to Marshal Stalin that you had asked General Hurley to call on him to explain your concern over China and to give him personally a message regarding a future meeting. Stalin interrupted to say that he had been ill with the grippe when Hurley was in Moscow. That in the past he had been able to shake it in a few days but that this time he had been ill for several weeks. He looked more worn out than I have ever seen him and not as yet fully recovered. I explained that you had in mind a meeting in the latter part of November and that as it was too late for Alaska the Mediterranean might provide a suitable place. He said that a meeting was very desirable but that he was afraid his Doctors would not allow him to travel. It had taken him two weeks to get over an ear attack he had had from his flight from Teheran and his recent illness had been due to a trip to the front. I suggested that the warm weather in the Mediterranean would do him good but he said his doctors considered any change of climate would have a bad effect. Molotov claimed that his associates felt Stalin must protect his health and that travelling was not good for him.

Stalin then said that Molotov was strong and vigorous and that as his deputy a man in whom he had great confidence he could meet you and the Prime Minister any time you wished. I assured Stalin that you liked Molotov and were always glad to see him but suggested that his doctors might later on take a different view of the desirability of a warm climate particularly if the trip would be made by sea. Jokingly I suggested also the possibility of his having some new doctors by that time. He agreed that might be a good idea but gave no further encouragement.

I am satisfied that Stalin is anxious to meet you but he is definitely worried about his health. Although Stalin showed the effects of his grippe, I do not feel that you need have any concern over the possibility of serious illness.

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232314Z NCR 7551

I asked Stalin this evening whether the battle for Warsaw was going to his satisfaction. He replied in the negative explaining that it had proved impossible to get tanks across the Vistula on account of the heavy German shelling. The city could only be taken by a wide encirclement. In the meantime, on General Berlings insistence against the better judgment of the Red Army, 4 Polish infantry battalions had crossed the river. These had suffered heavy losses and unfortunately would have to be withdrawn. He said that the insurgents were still fighting but were causing more difficulty and assistance. There were groups in 4 different isolated parts of the city who were engaged in attempting to defend themselves without offensive ability. In all there were some 3,000 with arms but many sympathizers were giving assistance where

they could. The insurgents were intermingled with the Germans and therefore it was difficult to bomb or shell the German's positions. For the first time Stalin spoke with sympathy for the insurgents. He said that the Red Army was in contact with each of the groups both by radio and by men going back and forth. It was now understood why the insurrection had been started prematurely. The Germans had threatened to deport all of the male population from Warsaw and it became necessary for the men to fight. They had no choice as they faced death either way. The men therefore who were organized had started resistance and the other men had gone under ground hiding themselves in sewers. Stalin never mentioned the government in London but said they had not found General Bor who had evidently left that city and was "commanding a radio station", in some unknown place.

Contrary to the information given to General Deane he said that the Red Army had dropped small arms including machine guns and mortars and ammunition as well as food and medical supplies. Receipt had been acknowledged. This was done by small training planes at an altitude of 300 feet 400 meters. He observed that our planes at an altitude had parachuted supplies from such high altitude that the wind had taken much of them away from the targets. Supplies had landed in some instances as much as 30 kilometers away. When Praga was liberated the Red Army found the population starving. The Germans had tried to deport all the men and used police dogs to hunt them out.

Stalin showed understanding and concern for the Poles in Warsaw and none of his previous vindictiveness. He explained that after Praga had been taken it was possible to judge the situation more clearly.

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232319Z NCR 7553

At the conclusion of the conversation with Stalin this evening I thanked him for the cooperation of the Red Army in the evacuation of our prisoners of war from Rumania. I mentioned to him that the Bulgarians had seriously abused our prisoners of war and that we would expect full investigation and reprehension of those responsible. Stalin readily concurred stating that the Bulgarians were brutal people many of whom had come under Nazi influence. He said the Rumanians on the other hand had behaved better and they were "more simple people."

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251400Z NCR 8691

In my cable 232021 I find I failed to report that the British Ambassador mentioned the proposed British landings in Greece.

Stalin commented, "Good. It's high time."

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FROM: MARSHAL STALIN

TO : THE PRESIDENT

14 SEPTEMBER 1944

I have received your message regarding the discussions at Dumbarton Oaks.

I also hope that these important discussions may end successfully. This may be of serious significance for the further strengthening of cooperation of our countries and for the whole cause of future peace and security.

I must say that for the success of the activities of the international security organization of great significance will be the order of voting in the council, having in mind the importance that the council work on the basis of the principle of coordination and unanimity of the four leading powers on all questions, including those which directly relate to one of these nations. The initial American proposal that there should be established a special procedure of voting in case of a dispute in which one or several members of the council, who have the statute of permanent members, are directly involved, seems to me correct. Otherwise will be brought to naught the agreement achieved among us at the Teheran Conference which is proceeding from the principle of provision, first of all, the unanimity of agreement of four powers necessary for the struggle against aggression in the future.

Such a unanimity proposes, of course, that among these powers there is no room for mutual suspicions. As to the Soviet Union, it cannot also ignore the presence of certain absurd prejudices which often hinder an actually objective attitude toward the U.S.S.R. And the other nations also should

weigh the consequences which the lack of unanimity among the leading powers may bring about.

I hope that you will understand the seriousness of the considerations expressed here and that we shall find a harmonious solution of this question as well.

FROM: MARSHAL STALIN

TO : THE PRESIDENT

7 SEPTEMBER 1944

I have received your message on the question of participation of the Union Soviet Republics in the International Security Organization.

I attach exceptional importance to the statement of the Soviet delegation on this question. After the known constitutional reforms in our country in the beginning of this year, the governments of the Union Republics are extremely alert as to what attitude the friendly states will take toward the adopted in the Soviet Constitution broadening of their rights in the sphere of international relations. You, of course, know that for instance the Ukraine, Byelorussia which are constituent parts of the Soviet Union, by the number of their population and by their political importance are surpassing certain countries in respect to which all of us agree that they should belong to the number of initiators of the establishment of the International Organization. Therefore, I hope to have an opportunity to explain to you the political importance of the question brought up by the Soviet delegation at Dumbarton Oaks.

FROM: MARSHAL STALIN

TO : THE PRESIDENT

22 AUGUST 1944

I have received your message on the Pacific Ocean matters.

I understand the significance you attach to these matters.

We also attach great importance to your successes there. I am confident at the same time that you are well aware to what an extent our forces are strained in order to secure success for the unfolding struggle in Europe. All this allows to hope that the time is not far off when we shall attain a solution of our urgent task and will be able to take up other questions. I hope that General Deane will already now successfully cooperate with our staff.

(Retranslation by Colonel Park of last sentence: I hope nothing will interfere with General Deane's successful cooperation with our Army General Staff.)

FROM: MARSHAL STALIN

TO : THE PRESIDENT/PRIME MINISTER

22 AUGUST 1944

Polish situation. Copy filed MR 210 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS,  
(1) Sec. 2)

FROM: MARSHAL STALIN

TO : THE PRESIDENT

9 AUGUST 1944

Polish situation. Copy filed MR 210 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS, (1)  
Sec. 2)

FROM: MARSHAL STALIN

TO : THE PRESIDENT

2 AUGUST 1944

I have received your messages of July 28.

I share your opinion regarding the significance which our meeting could have, but circumstances, connected with military operations on our front about which I wrote previously, do not allow me, to my regret, to count on an opportunity of such a meeting in the nearest future.

As regards the Polish question, the matter depends, first of all, on the Poles themselves and on the capability of these or other persons from the Polish emigre government to cooperate with the already functioning in Poland Polish Committee of National Liberation around which more and more are rallying the democratic forces of Poland. On my part, I am ready to render to all Poles any possible assistance in this matter.

FROM: MARSHAL STALIN

TO : THE PRESIDENT

23 JULY 1944

Polish situation. Copy filed MR 210 POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS (1) Sec 2.

FROM: MARSHAL STALIN

TO : THE PRESIDENT

22 JULY 1944

I share your thought about the desirability of a meeting between you, Mr. Churchill and myself.

However, I must say, that now, when the Soviet Armies are involved in battles on such a wide front, it would be impossible for me to leave the country and depart for a certain period of time from the conducting of front matters. All my colleagues consider it absolutely impossible.