

#48 - Combined Chiefs of Staff

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~~SECRET~~

Map Room
Box 38

By [signature]

COPY NO. 23

TO: AEDACOM

Repeated BURLAKY for
General Wavell,
Chiefs of Staff, London.

From: Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Dated: 6th February, 1942.

IMMEDIATE

[REDACTED]

D.B.A. 11

Chiang Kai-Shek has agreed to
retaining squadron A.V.G. at Rangoon
until British reinforcing army units
arrive.

T.O.O. 1255R/6

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 1 1974

COPY NO. 26

To: BURMARMY, RANGOON, for General Wavell.

Repeated (i) ABDACOM

(ii) Chiefs of Staff, London.

From: Combined Chiefs of Staff, Washington.

Dated: 4th February, 1942.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

D.B.A. 10.

1. In a telegram received by U.S. authorities from Chiang Kai-Shek, dated 28th January, he complains that the British still do not wish Chinese armies to enter Burma and co-operate in its defence although, in his opinion, if this were done, North Burma could certainly be held even if Rangoon were lost.

2. We understand that Chiang Kai-Shek offered you an Army Corps of about 50,000 men and that you accepted initially two Divisions from the 6th Army of which 93rd Division is already in Northern Burma and H.Q. 6th Army is moving to Burma as soon as possible to reconnoitre sector before 49th Division and probably 55th Division arrive. We understand also that 5th Army is near Northern border and you are considering whether G.O.C. should be asked to come to Burma forthwith for reconnaissance. We understand also that supply of rice from Burma presents no difficulty.

3. In view of your acceptance of Chiang Kai-Shek's offer, his attitude is difficult to understand, but we feel that, considering the critical situation in the whole ABDA Area, nothing should stand in the way of the acceptance of any Chinese forces which might be of

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

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By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 1 1974

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COPY NO. 24

To: ABDACOM
Repeated: Chiefs of Staff, London
From: Combined Chiefs of Staff
Dated: 4th February, 1942.

IMMEDIATE.

D.B.A. 9.

Your 00522 of 30/1.

Alternative methods of transporting 50 P-40's to Java from Brisbane if air ferry route becomes closed through loss of Koepang are as follows:

- (a) ATHENE could transport one load of about 35 partially stripped P-40's from Australia after delivering 39 Hurricanes in Java on about 6th February.
- (b) U.S.S. HAMMONDSPOUT, Naval Aircraft Transport is due Brisbane 4th February with 111 P-40 cased aircraft. This ship could on-carry to Java via Darwin as required either whole load of 111 cased P-40's or 48 erected P-40's plus 32 additional cased. This would entail delay of about 25 days in return of HAMMONDSPOUT to U.S. for next loading and would consequently delay arrival of subsequent air reinforcements or reserves. Ship can hoist out own load on to jetty or into lighters.
- (c) No British or U.S. carrier could be made available for ferrying these fighters at any rate before return of INDOMITABLE with next load of Hurricanes due end February. (Her availability would depend on situation at that date).

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 1 1974

(d) Possibilities of using Langley are best known to you.

2. In considering above alternatives you will doubtless bear in mind problem of stowage, off loading and erection of partially stripped P-40 type fighters whose undercarriages are incorporated in wings.

3. Request you will select course of action to be followed and report immediately to us so that HAMMONDSPORT's programme can be adjusted forthwith, if necessary.

T.O.O. 1931R/4

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/U.C.S. 26 refers/

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By RHP, NLR, Date

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COPY NO. 24

To: ABDACOM
Repeated: Chiefs of Staff, London
From: Combined Chiefs of Staff,
Washington
Dated: 3rd February, 1942.

IMPORTANT.

D.B.A. No. 8

1. Our D.B.A. 5 and your 00649, paragraph 4.
To meet immediate needs for the defence of the North-East approaches to Australia, and to ensure continuity of communications between Australia and United States, we are diverting from U.S. squadrons now being organised in Australia one Fighter group of 80 planes to operate under command of R.A.A.F.
2. Chiefs of Staff please inform Australia.

T.O.O. 1915R/3

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By RHP, NLR, Date

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COPY NO. 24

To: ABDACOM

Repeated: Chiefs of Staff, London.

From Combined Chiefs of Staff, D.B.A. No. 7.

The following arrangements for the establishment of the ANZAC Area have been agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

1. BOUNDARIES: Beginning at longitude 141° East at the Equator eastward along the Equator to longitude 170° East thence southeasterly to point in latitude 20° South longitude 175° West thence due South; from point of beginning South along Meridian 141° East to South coast of New Guinea thence eastward along said coast to Meridian 143° East thence due South in sea areas only.
2. ANZAC Force to be under strategic direction of the United States exercised by Commander-in-Chief U.S. Fleet through one or more U.S. Flag Officers assisted by one or more Flag Officers named by Australia and/or New Zealand.
3. All practicable use will be made of naval supply communication and repair facilities in Australia and New Zealand.
4. Initial assignment of ships to ANZAC forces British one carrier, United States one heavy or one new light cruiser and two destroyers, New Zealand two light cruisers, one auxiliary cruiser, Australia two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, three auxiliary cruisers, two destroyers, two anti-submarine patrol vessels, six 600 ton anti-submarine vessels. Remainder of Australian and New Zealand forces namely two light cruisers, two destroyers, three sloops to be assigned to ARDA command. All other Australian and New Zealand naval units to remain at disposal of their respective

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By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 1 1974

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Governments for local defence. The disposal of additions to Dominion Naval Forces will be decided by agreement at the appropriate time.

5. Tasks to be assigned ANZAC force, in co-operation with air forces available in the area, are first cover Eastern and Northeastern approaches to Australia and New Zealand by destroying enemy forces, second protect shipping including coastwise shipping and safeguard convoys in ANZAC Area by escort patrol and/or covering operations, third support defence of islands in ANZAC Area with emphasis on key points and attack adjacent enemy island key points, fourth correlate operations with forces in ABDA Area and with United States Pacific Fleet as well as with local defence forces of Australia and New Zealand.
6. Naval forces assigned to ANZAC and adjacent areas authorised to extend operations into other areas as circumstances may require.
7. Effective date of foregoing organisation allocation and appropriate control of operations will be communicated shortly.

T.O.O. 1823R/30

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

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COPY NO. 24

To: Abdacom
Repeated Chiefs of Staff.
(Reference W.15)
From: Joint Staff Mission.

Dated: 30th January, 1942.

IMPORTANT

From Combined Chiefs of Staff D.3.A. No. 6
Your 00058 15/1

1. Understanding was reached in Lisbon on 22nd January whereby we undertake that Australian and Netherlands troops will be withdrawn when Portuguese reinforcements numbering 700 arrive in Timor in return for a secret undertaking that in the event of a Japanese attack Allied Forces will be called in again to assist in defence of territory and that Staff Conversations will take place at once at your Headquarters to make the necessary arrangements for provision of such assistance and for actual change-over when Portuguese troops arrive. See paragraphs 8 and 9 of our No. (S.I.P.)4. Portuguese Government are simply announcing that as result of talks with us orders have been sent for dispatch to Timor of troops from Portuguese East Africa. It is not proposed that any announcement shall be made about withdrawal of Allied troops until after event.
2. Portuguese force has still to be brought up to full strength of 700. American source reports that ship believed to be carrying 290 Portuguese, 320 native troops with white officers (total 610) was due to leave Lourenco Marques for Timor January 26th. Portuguese military officer who is proceeding to your Headquarters will no doubt give full particulars. Any further information will be signalled.
3. Portuguese military officer, Major S. A. Nogueiro, will leave Lisbon by flying-boat about 27th January and should reach N.E.I. about 8th February. Although basis of agreement with Portuguese Government is

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

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that Allied assistance will be invited "as soon as any attack shall begin", we have strongly impressed on Portuguese Government that for practical purposes this is not enough. For fear of compromising their neutrality Portuguese Government have not felt able to go further than to agree to contacts being maintained between Portuguese Commandant and the Allied Commanders in the neighbouring territory. H.M. Ambassador states that Portuguese Representative will have no authority to discuss anything beyond this and suggest that attempt to do so will create suspicion and perhaps prejudice outcome of Staff discussions. It is nevertheless our hope that by tactful negotiations with Portuguese Representative you may be able to make some provision for the summoning of assistance when air attack is imminent. This point is however the crux of recent incidents and in view of H. M. Ambassador's warning will require most delicate handling.

4. Portuguese Government have agreed that Australian and Netherlands Representatives should be "associated" in discussions. We suggest that you should assume that this means direct participation. If Portuguese Representative raises formal objection you may have to devise some informal arrangements for maintaining contact with Australia and Dutch who are of course vitally interested parties.

5. Portuguese Government have sent instructions to Governor of Portuguese Timor to improve the roads between Dilli and Frontier. They have also undertaken to renew instructions to him not to obstruct the Allied Commanders although they cannot undertake to allow him to co-operate with them. Portuguese Government states that they are studying means of preventing Japanese infiltration after Allied Forces have withdrawn. Pending their withdrawal enemy aliens in Island are presumably harmless.

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 1 1974

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We cannot expect Portuguese Government to remove these people themselves and it may be that only solution will be for Allied Force to remove them themselves when they withdraw. But we shall send you further telegram giving our definite views on this later.

T.O.G. 1545R/30

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U.S. Chiefs of Staff
(C.C.S. 16 refers)

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By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 1 1974

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

Ed. McDowell

COPY NO. 24

To Chiefs of Staff, London, from
Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Our 2157R/27 and A.C.N.B's 0927Z/29.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff request the British Chiefs of Staff to promulgate the revised Anzac Agreement to all British and Dominion authorities concerned. We propose that agreement should be brought into force upon the arrival of the United States Admiral in Anzac Area. This date will be communicated shortly. Our D.B.A. No.7 to AEDACOM, repeated to you gives final agreed text.

T.O.O. 1821R/30

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, MLR, Date MAY 1 1974

COPY NO. 24

To: ABDACOM

Dated: 29th January, 1942.

IMMEDIATE

From Combined Chiefs of Staff D.B.A. No. 5.

The Australian Government is greatly concerned over the advance of the Japanese via Rabaul. Japanese occupation of Port Moresby would close Torres Strait and subject North-east Australia to constant attack. Their defences are very weak, particularly in the air. They urge the United States to allot to the R.A.A.F. a number of U.S. Pursuit planes already in Australia or which are due to arrive there shortly. They have further requested an immediate allotment for station at Port Moresby of one squadron of the U.S. Fighters now being assembled at Townsville.

2. Since all U.S. airplanes now in or under orders for Australia are allotted to the ABDA Area for employment under your Supreme Command, the Combined Chiefs of Staff desire your views and advice before making an answer to the Australians.

3. The point at issue is whether we should divert to Australia aircraft allotted to you or whether you should assume responsibility for covering the North-east Approaches to Australia operating your aircraft from Australian bases outside the ABDA Area in accordance with paragraph 2 of your Directive.

T.O.O. 1231R/29

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

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MAY 1 1974

COPY NO. 24

To: ABDACOM

Repeated Chiefs of Staff London

IMPORTANT.

From Combined Chiefs of Staff D.B.A. No. 4

Lieutenant Governor Van Mook of N E I has made request on the U.S. Government for immediate allocation of one hundred pursuit planes per month beginning at once and continuing for six months for the purpose of equipping the N E I Air Force. He states that trained air organisations thoroughly familiar with the area now exist in the N E I and believes that the suggested allocation would place this additional pursuit strength on the front as soon as planes could arrive. To meet his request completely would require reductions in numbers now being delivered to British, Russia, China, and/or the United States. One important question is that of the total pursuit strength required for support of operations of the near future in ABDA Area. Approximately 320 pursuit planes, including those already arrived in Australia, are now enroute to equip the four U.S. pursuit groups in ABDA Area. For replacement purposes an additional 320 pursuit planes will be delivered to U.S. Forces in your theatre by April 15. Van Mook's proposal might be partially met by diverting to N E I Air Force a portion of the replacement planes allotted to U.S. Forces in your area. If Dutch organisations are ready to operate effectively upon receipt of equipment this plan would place maximum effective strength on the front at earliest possible date but might have the effect, later, of entailing some insufficiency in replacements for U.S. pursuit groups.

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

- 1 - By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 1 1974

Your comments and recommendations are requested. Please expedite reply.

T.O.O. 1627R/28.

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 1 1974

COPY NO. 25

NAVAL MESSAGE

T.O.O. 2157R/27

OUT

Date: 27.1.42

Addressed: ADMIRALTY for
British Chiefs of Staff
A.C.N.B.
N.Z.N.B.

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From: Combined Chiefs of Staff

IMMEDIATE

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have to-day considered the several replies to the proposals for the Anzac Area contained in B.A.D.'s 1923R/25.

2. The United States Admiral in command of Anzac forces will be responsible for the protection of coast-wise shipping in the Area which he will deal with through an appropriate subordinate, preferably Australian. He will co-operate with the ACNB and NZNB in the control of shipping. In consequence the Combined Chiefs of Staff consider that the original allocation of vessels to the Anzac Area proposed in B.A.D.'s 1923R/25 should stand.

3. To clarify the situation the Combined Chiefs of Staff suggest the following two amendments to proposed agreement in B.A.D.'s 1923R/25:

Para. four add the following sentence -
"the disposal of additions to Dominion Naval Forces will be decided by agreement at the appropriate time."

Para. five amend "second task" to read -
"second protect shipping including coastwise shipping and safeguard convoys in Anzac Area by escort patrol and/or covering operations."

4. Any delay in availability of vessels allocated to ABDA Area will have an unfavourable effect on the protection of northwestern Australia. Consequently it is the considered opinion of the Commander in Chief United

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By RHP, NLR, Date

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States Fleet that H.M.A.S. PERTH would be of greater value to the common cause in the ABDA rather than the Anzac area. The Combined Chiefs of Staff concur in this opinion and consider that H.M.A.S. PERTH should not repeat not be retained in the Anzac Area until H.M.A.S. CAPEBERRA can be repaired.

5. The situation in the Anzac Area impels the Combined Chiefs of Staff to urge that this agreement be adopted in order that implementation may be expedited.

2157R/27

Originator: Admiral Little

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U.S. Chiefs of Staff

Commander Harris^c
Commander Bailey.

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\ JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 1 1974

COPY NO. 24

To: ABDACOM.

[REDACTED]

From Combined Chiefs of Staff, D.B.A. No. 3.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff regret that it is impracticable, from a Naval viewpoint, to carry out the reinforcing operations for Mindanao in the manner suggested in paragraph 8 your number 00100 January seventeenth. They are hopeful that blockade running operations already initiated from Australia and the N.E.I. will succeed in delivering small arms ammunition to defending forces on that island.

T.O.O. 1155R/27.

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By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 1 1974

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By RHP, NLR, Date

Capt. to [unclear]

COPY NO. 24

To: AEDACOM

Repeated Chiefs of Staff London
for Transmission to
Australian Government.

IMPORTANT.

From Combined Chiefs of Staff D.B.A. No. 2.
Reference your 00053 of 15th January.

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff agree with proposal made by Government of Australia that responsibility should be laid on you, not only for the defence of Darwin, but also such portion of North West coast of Australia as is necessary for successful defence of Darwin against enemy landings and for air operations from a base on the Australian coast in that area.
2. The Southern limit of AEDA Area is hereby extended to include the mainland of Australia northward of a line running from Onslow on western coast to South-East corner of Gulf of Carpentaria.
3. You are being informed as soon as possible by Australian Government of the forces allotted by them to you for operations in this area.

T.O.O. 1743R/24

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 1 1974

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COPY NO. 23

To: AEDACOM

Repeated (1) BURMARMY for
General Wavell
(11) Chiefs of Staff
London

IMPORTANT. (IMMEDIATE to BURMARMY)

Following from Combined Chiefs of Staff,
D.B.A. No. 1.

Following information is furnished you
as of primary interest in connection with mutual
co-operation between yourself and CHIANG KAI-SHEK in
the employment of American units assigned for
service in or in support of the China theatre and
dispatched for use in Burma.

(a) The A.V.G. was organised as a Chinese unit
for employment in China or in support of China.
Accordingly Chiang Kai-Shek is being informed that
the A.V.G. Squadrons which may now be operating in
Burma may be withdrawn from Burma by General Magruder,
Chief of the U.S. Military Mission in China, if such
action should be desired by Chiang Kai-Shek, subject
to giving you timely notice of such intention.
The A.V.G. is now in process of induction into
(incorporation in) the Army of the United States.
Instructions have been issued that its assignment
to the China theatre and its Mission to operate in
support of China will remain unchanged upon its
induction as an American unit.

(b) Upon completion of induction of the A.V.G.
into the U.S. Army as the Twenty-third Pursuit Group,

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 1 1974 47

General Magruder has been directed to assume command of American Forces in Burma and China. His control of American Forces in China will be exercised under Supreme Command of Chiang Kai-Shek, and the operations of American Forces in Burma will be exercised under your Supreme Command. This does not repeat not debar Local Commander A.V.G. Forces in Burma being placed under operational control of Air Officer Commanding Burma as may be arranged by you with General Magruder. General Magruder is being informed that American Forces which now or in the future are assigned to China theatre and which may be, pursuant to agreement between Chiang Kai-Shek and yourself, dispatched to Burma for operations will be returned to him by you for operations in China on call from Chiang Kai-Shek. General Magruder has been instructed to advise Chiang Kai-Shek that this information is being transmitted to you.

2. Copy of above is being sent to Magruder.
3. Reference penultimate sentence of paragraph 1 (b), the following personal message from General Marshall has been sent to General Magruder. Begins.

Referring further to our number one zero eight of January 17th report as soon as material progress has been made on induction A.V.G. General Wavell has been informed that any U.S. Forces allotted for service in or in support of China, and which may, by mutual agreement between the Generalissimo and General Wavell, be stationed in Burma, will operate there under the supreme command of Wavell. He understands that upon call

from the Generalissimo he is to release such troops
for return to the China theatre. As explained in
former telegram, if occasion should arise that
makes necessary such withdrawal, General Wavell
or such representative as he may designate must
receive timely notice of the intended movement so
that he may be enabled to make proper arrangements.
Colonel St. John was directed in separate cable to-day
to spare no expense in getting vital items of lease-
lend materials from Rangoon into China. It is felt
that liberal pay and bonuses may assist in
expediting this movement. Ends.

T.O.O. 1729R/24

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By RHP, HLR, Date MAY 1 1974