THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 4, 1942.
11:40 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL KING

Miss Tully has just handed this to me, stating as she did so that the President was dissatisfied with the draft of the message and that he desired that you redraft it.

Very respectfully,

[Signature]

JOHN L. McCREA,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.
The convoy routes into northern Russia are now heavily compromised by three factors: first, lengthening days; second, enemy surface submarine and air activity based in northern Norway; third, the unusual southward drift of the ice which severely restricts detour routes.

Para The three factors combine to make the difficulties of safe passage of convoys so great that the current and prospective results of deliveries are such that the British who handle matters in that part of the ocean have reluctantly come to the conclusion in which we concur that they are unable to send through more than three convoys every two months of twenty-five to thirty-five ships each and this only when Russia shall be able to assist at the eastern end by adequate air and surface coverage and by sustained attacks on enemy air, submarine, and surface bases in northern Norway.

Para Sufficient American and British vessels are already loaded or are already on the high seas bound for Soviet Arctic ports to fill such convoys for at least two months. We have, therefore, acquiesced in the conclusion that it would be a waste of shipping space to load additional ships for Soviet Arctic ports until escorts are available for them or until navigation conditions become more favorable and enemy action
is reduced by appropriate Soviet support. Equipment manufactured
particularly for the Soviet Union is being stored for later shipment
and materials such as tanks and planes which may be diverted to other
uses will be replaced just as soon as it is possible to transport them.
The Soviet Ambassador has already been informed of the situation and
has undoubtedly informed his Government.

Para There are three important military factors which also have

a marked bearing on the munitions situation first their mandatory commitments
of the United States and Britain second the growing production of munitions
in Soviet Russia which makes convoy delivery a lessening part of
the whole third the shipping and munitions requirements involved in
arrangements now in hand for mounting an offensive in Western Europe.

Para You are authorized in case the Soviet authorities should
mention the matter to you to emphasize the fact that the adjustment of
shipments is due entirely to the three physical and the three military
factors which call for appropriate revision of the munitions protocol
in the interests of the common purpose of all of us to win the war.
The convoy routes into northern Russia are now heavily compromised by three factors first lengthening days second enemy surface submarine and air activity based in northern Norway third the unusual southward drift of the ice which severely restricts detour routes.

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Para There are three important military factors which also have a marked bearing on the munitions situation first other voluntary commitments of the United States and Britain second the growing production of munitions in Soviet Russia which makes convey deliveries a lessening part of the whole third the shipping and munitions requirements involved in arrangements now in hand for mounting an offensive in Western Europe.

Para You are authorized in case the Soviet authorities should mention the matter to you to emphasize the fact that the adjustment of shipments is due entirely to the three physical and the three military factors which call for appropriate revision of the munitions protocol. We retain in full measure in the interests of the common purpose of all of us to win the war.
IN SPITE STRONG SOVIET PRESS PROPAGANDA AGAINST TURKISH TRIAL OF SOVIETS CONNECTED VON PAPEN CASE AND UNANNOUNCED DEPARTURE TURK AMBASSADOR CONVERSATION TURK MILITARY ATTACHE LEADS BELIEF SERIOUS BREAK USSR RELATIONS NOT LIKELY BUT MERELY BEING "TESTED" TO CLARIFY COUNTRIES POSITION.
| Lt(JG) German | 221823 | NCR 4586 |

**NAVAL MESSAGE**

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<tr>
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<th>EXTENSION NUMBER</th>
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<td>DATE</td>
<td>22 APRIL 1942</td>
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<td>FOR CODEROOM</td>
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<td>DECODED BY</td>
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<td>PARAPHRASED BY</td>
<td>FL THOMPSON</td>
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RELIABLE SOVIET INFORMANT KHO JUST ARRIVED FROM HOME IN BIROBIDZHAN NEAR Khabarovsk States JAP AND SOVIET MASSED ON BORDER. EVERY MOVEMENT MADE IN DEPLOYING TROOPS IS COUNTERED BY OPPOSITE COUNTRY.

**CLASSIFIED**

By: 11602. Sec (G) and (C) or (C)

Date: May 3, 1972

By: NHF, NAVY Date: Nov 14, 1973

16...ACTION

COMINCH...19/11...20G...OPDO

FILE...2OP...P1A...80...

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver in communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (A) NAVREGS.)
SECTION ONE. ON APRIL 16 PRIME MINISTER CALLED CONFERENCE ANKARA OF ABOUT TWENTY NEWSPAPER EDITORS. FOREIGN MINISTER ADDRESSED CONFERENCE SAYING RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA VERY DELICATE SINCE VON PAPEN BOMBING INCIDENT FEB 24 AND RUSSIA BRINGING Tremendous pressure bear on TURKEY FOR RELEASE OF TWO RUSSIANS ON TRIAL SINCE APRIL 1.

DISTRIBUTION
16...ACTION

RECORD COPY: COMINCH....

FILES: ONS....290P....00....P1A....
SECTION 2. HE COMPARED PRESENT RUSSIAN PRESSURE WITH PRESSURE BEFORE GERMANS APPLIED TO AUSTRIA PRIOR TO ANSCHLUSS. HE STATED RUSSIAN EMBASSY MAKES DAILY VISITS TO FOREIGN OFFICE WITH COMPLAINTS REGARDING CONDUCT OF TRIAL AND THAT SINCE BOMBING INCIDENT WAR WITH RUSSIA HARASSLY AVOIDED ON 2 OR 3 OCCASIONS. PRESS WAS INSTRUCTED AVOID AT ALL COSTS ANTAGONIZING RUSSIA.
**SECRET**

16....ACT.

RECORD COPY TO...COMINCH...S...CHOL...XX(P1A)....DP-29....FILE...

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 24 (4) NAVREGS.)
SECTION 4. INFORMANT IS PRO ALLY AND HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY OPTIMISTIC REGARDING TURKEY NOT BECOMING INVOLVED IN WAR BUT AS RESULT FOREIGN MINISTERS STATEMENT IS DEFINITELY PESSIMISTIC NOW. HE MAY HAVE INSPECTED THIS WOULD BE FORWARD. IN THIS COUNTRY PENALTY FOR DIVULGING INFORMATION FROM SUCH A CONFERENCE IS DEATH.
NAVAL MESSAGE

DRAFTED

FROM DUNCAN (MOSCOW)

RELEASED BY

18 APRIL 1942

TOR CODEROOM 1803/18

DECODED BY FISHWICK

PARAPHRASED BY HEINE

ADDRESSEES OPNAV

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY ROUTINE DEFERRED

DECLASSIFIED

GERMAN 18735 NCR1698

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DESPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

DATE TIME OCT

TEXT

UPON OCCASION OF MY FIRST VISIT RUSSIA'S NAVY DEPARTMENT I WAS TOLD THEY WERE FULLY PREPARED FOR A FREE AND FULL EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION. MATERIAL WHICH I BROUGHT WITH ME WAS MOST GRATEFULLY RECEIVED AND I WAS INFORMED THEY NOW FEEL PARTICULAR CONCERN AS TO SITUATION IN FAR EAST. AS EVIDENCE THIS CONCERN I WAS GIVEN SECRET INFORMATION AS TO PARTICULAR CARE THEY ARE TAKING IN THAT AREA WHICH INFORMATION THEY REQUESTED I GIVE THE AMBASSADOR. THEY ASKED I NOT TRANSMIT THIS INFORMATION WHICH ALTHOUGH EVIDENCING THEIR REAL CONCERN WOULD BE OF LITTLE VALUE TO OPNAV.

THEY STATE KURILE ISLAND PASSES ARE NOT BELIEVED WINED AND TRANSIT THROUGH THEM IS NOT DENIED RUSSIAN SHIPS.

HOWEVER JAPS REQUIRE THEY BE INFORMED PRIOR TO SAILING OF SHIPS WHICH WILL USE THESE PASSES. AS TO WEATHER INFORMATION THEY REGRET NEGOTIATIONS HAVE TAKEN SO LONG AND HOPE MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE SPEEDILY CONCLUDED.

THE BROUGHT UP THE QUESTION OF STATIONING TAECKER AT VLADIVOSTOK. THEY NOW SEEM ANXIOUS TO HAVE HIM THERE AND THAT WE HAVE CLOSE LIAISON WITH THE COMMANDER OF THEIR PACIFIC FLEET. THEY PREFER HE OBTINIBLY APPEAR AS ATTACHE OF OUR CONSULATE.

TEACHER HAS REPORTED HIS DEPARTURE TEHERAN ENROUTE MOSCOW.

SECRET (CONTINUED)

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
IN COMPANY OF AMBASSADOR I CALLED ON NAVY COMMISSAR. CUTTING INITIAL FORMALITIES SHORT, HE ASKED ADMIRAL STANLEY "WHAT DO YOU CONSIDER JAPAN'S GREATEST WEAKNESS FROM NAVAL POINT OF VIEW?" THE ADMIRAL REPLIED THEIR SHIPPING AND GREATLY LENGTHENED LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS AND STATED FURTHER IN EFFECT THAT SUBMARINES WERE THE ANSWER.

THIS REPLY OBVIOUSLY PLEASED THE COMMISSAR AND HE SAID HE HAD REACHED THE SAME CONCLUSION. ALTHOUGH KUHRY SHEV IS NOMINALLY SEAT OF GOVERNMENT ALL IMPORTANT OFFICIALS ARE NOW HERE IN MOSCOW. BULLARD REPORTS FROM THERE OUR LAST NAVY CONTACT, A LIEUTENANT, HAS LEFT. BRITISH NAVAL ATTACHÉ HAS BEEN REFUSED PERMISSION TO LEAVE KUHRY SHEV, BUT ALLEN HAS REMAINED HERE ALMOST 3 MONTHS WITHOUT OBJECTION. I HOPE TO REMAIN, BUT QUESTION HAS NOT BEEN MENTIONED YET. CERTAIN CHARTS HAVE BEEN HANDED HE FOR DELIVERY WASHINGTON.

SOVIETS REQUEST CERTAIN OUR CHARTS WEST COAST, UNITED STATES, GALAPAGOS ISLANDS, PANAMA, MEXICO AND WEST INDIES AND OUR CHART CATALOG. RECOMMEND CATALOG AND PORTFOLIOS COVERING THESE REQUESTS BE SHIPPED FRANKEL FOR DELIVERY AND I BE SO INFORMED.
THEY ALSO REQUEST INFORMATION ON THE NUMBER OF MERCHANT SHIPS OVER 10,000 TONS AT BEGINNING OF WAR.
NUMBER OF OILERS, WHAT ACQUISITIONS SINCE WAR FROM ASSOCIATED POWERS AND NEUTRALS AND WHAT ACQUISITIONS ABOVE SHIPS FROM UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND; ALSO EXTENT OF ORANGE LOSSES; HOW MANY SHIPS NOW COMprise ORANGE MERCHANT FLEET AND ESTIMATE THEIR ABILITY TO REPLACE LOSSES BY NEW CONSTRUCTION.
FROM CTG 24.6 (Recent Contact Iceland)  
RELEASED BY  
DATE 6 MAY 1942  
TOR CODEROOM 14B/6  
DECODED BY ATKIN/LOVELL  
PARAPHRASED BY JENKINS  

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

COPELAND 11312/6 NCR 1922  
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ACTION OPNAV INFO ADMIRALTY COAC FROM CTG 24.6

YOUR DISPATCH 14B/6 2ND TOTAL MAY ICE-BOUND RUSSIAN BOUND SHIPS 26 AT WALEFJORDUR AND 30 IN REYKJAVIK ROADS LATTER ANCHORAGES SUBJECT TO RISK OF SUBMARINE ATTACK. SERVING LARGE NUMBER OF SHIPS WITH DOCKS PRESENTS MAJOR PROBLEM.

17 SHIPS FOR RUSSIA NOW AT WALEFJORDUR WITH 6 MORE ARRIVING FROM SC 81. CINC HALIFAX HAS RECOMMEND NOT MORE THAN 25 SHIPS PER CONVOY.

DISTRIBUTION:  
37...ACTION  
RECP;  
F35...FILE...

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)