MR 000.7, Sec. 2 — PUBLICITY AND PRESS

Jan-Dec, 1944
WHEN RELEASE OF TYPHOON LOSSES IS MADE DEPARTMENT WILL DO IT. YOUR 292351. INTEND WITHHELD ANY ANNOUNCEMENT FOR THE PRESENT.

DECLASSED

R. O. 11652, Sec. 2(E) and 8(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RHP, NASD Date DEC 10, 1973

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Office in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
To: War Department
No: 23479
30 December 1944
MILID sr nr 23479. From Tindell

Churchill's return Athens followed by British public's
disappointment no agreement among factions or termination
fighting has resulted. While announcement all parties and
Churchill back regency regarded as some progress this not
considered to advance solution much.

Liberal papers wondering why Eden returned so quickly
as presence high ranking British figure might aid negotiations
undertaken by Archbishop. Also ask why truce was not made
first Churchill effort in Athens.

Churchill's personal standing probably helped by
trip. He had been subject much criticism for belligerent and
uncompromising attitude on Greek situation which Athens trip
has partly removed. Conservative papers take position
Churchill and Eden have done all they can and now Greeks bear
onus for continuing Civil War.
From: US Military Attaché, Ankara, Turkey.
To: War Department.
CG, US Army Forces in Middle East, Cairo, Egypt.
Nr: 542  29 December 1944.
Number MILID 542 AMSF 1220.

Story of Editorials in Turk Press partly due to error in published translation has greeted President Roosevelt remarks recently about Atlantic Charter. Writers state that policies pursued by great powers lately in Europe are causing uneasiness and if idealistic eight points of charter are to be abandoned altogether in favor of self interest then there will follow, says Tanin of Istanbul, "Social, economic and political troubles of a graver character than the war itself." New York Times reported statement that though unsigned the charter articles are as valid as the Wilsonian fourteen points also evacues misgivings in Turk Press. Vakit in Istanbul asks whether what happened to fourteen points in peace that followed last world war has been forgotten. In one of a series of bitter articles pro-Ally Yalcin in Tanin wonders if President Roosevelt intentions to "Clip into nothing" the guiding principles which might yet save the peace.

End.

ACTION: C-2
INFORMATION: CG AAF
OSD
Col Park
Log

CM-IN-29786 (31 Dec 44) 05222
b:jn RHP, HABS Dec

000.7

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM
COMINCH and COMSFROGS

Released by
RS Edwards

Date
37 December 1944

Unless classified RESTRICTED this dispatch will be classified PLAIN.

If CONFIDENTIAL or SECRET use special blank.

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

27 2 118

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with DEFERRED precedence. Originator fill in date and time for DEFERRED and MAIL delivery. Date ____________ Time ____________ G. C. T.

TEXT:

AM TODAY RELEASING FOR PUBLICATION THE LOSS OF SHANFOLP (SS 197) X

NEXT OF KIN HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED X PRESUMED LOST BECAUSE OVERDUE FROM PATROL.

RECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 9(f) and 10(d) of (5)
OSD letter, May 8, 1972
DEC 10 1973

COPY TO: OpJ9...20...2CM...25...BUFRG...BUCED...BUCORD...DUBKIP...DUSANDA...

THIS SPACE IS FOR ABSTRACT OF PREVIOUS REFERENCES. IF THIS IS A REPLY, REFERENCE NUMBERS OF INCOMING DISPATCH MUST BE SHOWN HERE.

Deliver to Communication Office. Will be returned to File Room after being receipt stamped in Navcom.
Commander in Chief
Southwest Pacific Area
Hollandia, New Guinea

Commander in Chief
Pacific Ocean Areas
Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii

Number WARX 70546

To MacArthur and Nimitz from Joint Security Control signed Bissell

To accomplish objective in paragraph (A) of CINCSWPA's CX 52285 of 16 November and prolongation of threat against Formosa desired in CINCPAC's 190426 (22 November 44) the story to be implemented here is summarized as follows. "U.S. high command is much concerned over setback to scheduled operations resulting from determined Japanese opposition on Leyte. Seizing on this fact and possibility MacArthur may be prevented from engaging in further major operations for considerable time, proponents of direct assaults on Japan and China coast have strongly reasserted their views.

"Strong Japanese reaction in Philippines has upset our own schedule but it is estimated that it has thrown enemy off balance in Formosa. These facts are strong reason to change next main effort to Formosa while MacArthur contains enemy in Visayans with only limited means.

"Consideration is being given to target date within Christmas holidays if logistics will permit. It is argued maximum tactical surprise might be obtained on Christmas Day".

CM-OUT-70546 (30 Nov 44)
It is believed this story can be effectively implemented in short time available and will be supported by other activities in area and climaxed by carrier strikes in paragraph 2A of fivesome. The implied difficulties of logistics and large campaign plus the possible crystallization of overall strategy will provide pegs on which to hang postponement and continuation of further threat, plan for which will be submitted later.

Concurrence or comments will be appreciated.

End

ORIGINATOR: Gen Bissell
INFORMATION: JC/S, Adm Leahy, Gen Arnold, Gen Hull, Adm King (Adm Theband), C of S

CM-OUT-70546 (30 Nov 44) 2004Z bem

COPY No. 36
From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main Versailles France
To: War Department
Nr: 8 68651 28 Nov 1944

SHAEB signed Eisenhower cite SHPRD nil to AGWAR rptd TROOPERS, Admiralty, EXFOR Main, COMZONE, SHAEB Mission to Belgium, ANCXF 8-68651.

Subject our message S-68301 of 25th November covered by press censor's guidance number 643 of 24th November which forwarded you by courier. No release will be made except as stated therein.

End

NOTE: S-68301 is CM-IN-24735 (25 Nov 44) Gen Surles

ACTION: Gen Surles
INFO: Gen Arnold
Gen Somarvell
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Col Park
log

DEC 10 1973
CM-IN-27505 (28 Nov 44) 1335Z bem

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main, Versailles, France
To: War Department
Nr: S 68301 25 November 1944

SHAEN Main signed Eisenhower nil AGWAR, TROOPERS, Admiralty, EXFOR Main, COMZONE, SHAEN Mission to Belgium, Info ANCXF S 68301

It is understood that certain steps are contemplated to publicize and feature in the press the opening of Antwerp. These proposals have not the approval of this headquarters at this time.

In view of continued attacks on Antwerp by "V" weapons and urgent operational necessity of getting the maximum tonnage through this port as early as possible there should be no publicity on either the date or method of its coming into use.

End

ACTION: Gen Surles
INFO: Gen Somervell; Gen Hull; Gen Bissell; Adm King; Col Park; Log.
CM-IN-24736 (25 Nov 44) 1808Z ekk

DECLASSIFIED
JCS LETTER, 7-8-72
BY RT, DATE
DEC 10 1973
COPY NO. 23

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: CG US Army Forces China Theater, Chungking China

To: War Department

Nr: CFB 27033 22 November 1944

To Marshall for Hull nr CFB 27033 from Wedemeyer

Korean civil censorship proposals outlined in ourad WAR 63542 appear eminently practical.

I not only concur but affirmatively recommend such procedure. China Theater not equipped to handle either planning or implementation Korean civil censorship and attempt to develop in that direction would merely arouse at this time Chinese political hullaballoo.

End

ACTION: OPD

INFO: JCS ADM LEAHY
CG AAF G-2 CAD
ADM KING C OF S

CM-IN-21827 (22 Nov 44) 20542 mcs
**Naval Message**

**Originator:** CINCPAC 211265 RCN 9465

**Text of Message:**

ACTION CINCPAC INFO SEANAV FROM COM 3RD FLT.

REFERENCE CINCPAC 211266 TEXT OF MESSAGE.

"Men and women of America", FROM THE WESTERN PACIFIC OCEAN, ALL HANDS OF YOUR FIGHTING 3RD FLEET JOIN YOU IN GIVING THANKS ON THIS THANKSGIVING DAY.

IN SPITE OF HOMESICKNESS AND BATTLE AND PRIVATION THERE IS MUCH TO BE THANKFUL FOR.

BE GIVE THANKS THAT OUR EFFORTS HAVE BEEN BLESSED WITH SUCCESS.

BE GIVE GRATETFUL THANKS FOR THE TURN OF THE TIDE OF EVENTS WHICH NOW IS CARRYING THE BANNER OF DECENCY FORWARD - OVER-RUNNING THE ENEMY'S DEFENSES - PRESSING ON TO THE SOURCES OF HATRED AND OPPRESSION.

BE GIVE THANKS THAT WE HAVE A DECENT HOMELAND TO FIGHT FOR.

BE GIVE THANKS THAT WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO KEEP THE ENEMY'S FEET AND HIS BLOODY HAND FROM TOUCHING THAT HOMELAND.

AND MAY YOU AT HOME NEVER FORGET TO HUMBLY GIVE FOR THE UNFAVETING AND UNQUESTIONABLE COURAGE OF THE FINE YOUNG CONFIDENTIAL.

Make original only. Deliver to Code Radio Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (1) NAVFHS.) 211265
AMERICANS WHO HAVE MADE THE SUPREME SACRIFICE THAT WE MIGHT KEEP THE HERITAGE, FOR WHICH ABOVE ALL THINGS, WE ARE THANKFUL." HALSEY.

OOR... COG

COMINCH...

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVRAFS.)
From: Allied Force Headquarters Caserta, Italy.
To: War Department.
Nr: P 55090 20 November 1944.

P 55090 signed McNarney cite NAAGO.

Thanksgiving Day proclamation of President is the subject.

None received in this theater to date. Will one be forthcoming.

End.
Operations Div WDOS Policy Sec
WDOPD OPD 000.73 (15 Nov 44)
2971 B.B. 3E756

15 November 1944

Commanding General,
USAF China Theater,
Chungking, China

Number: WAR 63542

From Hull for Wedemeyer signed Marshall.

Joint Security Control has recommended that Joint Chiefs of Staff approve broad policy clarifying responsibility for planning and operation of civil censorship in Pacific-Asian area which proposes among other things that pending final determination of operating responsibility and interests of other United Nations, planning for censorship of civilian communications in Korea should be a responsibility of CINCPAC, who is similarly charged with Japan proper, Formosa, Southern Sakhalin and mandated islands.

Draft policy provides for transfer of plans for any areas in accordance with adjustment of theater boundaries during or subsequent to the planning stage. Similarly working censorship organization would normally be transferred when theater boundaries are altered after initiation of operations. CINCPAC now has censorship planning staff working in his area.

Your comment and recommendations are requested since proposition concerns an area within China theater.

End

ORIGINATOR: OPD

INFORMATION: JC/S
CG AAP
Adm. King
CAD
C of B
CM-OUT-63542 (16 Nov 44) 1505Z by

DECLASSIFIED
MAY 3 1974

COPY No. 35

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main Echelon
Versailles, France

Commanding General
Allied Force Headquarters
Caserta, Italy

Commanding General
U.S. Army Liaison Section
Kandy, Ceylon

Headquarters, Communication Zone
European Theater of Operations
Main Echelon
Paris, France

Commanding General
Central District
United Kingdom Base Section
London, England

Number: WARX 63045

book message to Eisenhower Versailles, Wilson Caserta,
and Mountbatten Kandy for action, to Central District United
Kingdom Base Section London pass to British Chiefs of Staff
for information. This message is PACS 108 to Eisenhower and
PAN 451 to Wilson from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

1. As there have recently been references in the press
and on the radio to the existence of cover and deception
plans, attention is again drawn to the need for maintaining

000.7
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
a high level of secrecy on all details connected with strategic and tactical deception planning and the secret methods of implementation used. The fact that the war against Germany is drawing to a close does not mean that there can be any slackening in security as methods successfully used against Germany may be needed to help defeat Japan. At the same time the necessity for inclusion in training manuals and courses of subject matter with respect to the use of special equipment and devices for tactical deception purposes is recognized. Progressive downgrading of classification presently provided by the controlling technical and training services in a manner similar to that for secret weapons and equipment is adequate and should be followed. Commanders-in-Chief abroad are requested to issue appropriate instructions within their commands.

2. All practicable steps shall be taken to prevent references to strategic or tactical deception by the press or radio.

End.

ORIGINATOR: General McFarland CC/S
INFORMATION: Adm Leahy
General Arnold
General Bull
General Bissell
Adm King
C of S

CM-OUT-63045 (15 Nov 44) 17272 ncb

DECLASSIFIED 29-71
J.C.S. Regrading Memo 34-71

By Date DEC 10 1973
From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Advance Command Post, France

To: War Department

Nr: CPA 90348 14 November 1944

For Under Secretary of War Patterson from SHAEB Adv CP SHELBURST for action AGWAR for info SHAEB Main CPA 90348

Have prepared talk for broadcast as requested. It will require about three and a half to four minutes to deliver. Will this cause any difficulty? Please let me know at once whether it must be cut down.

Before the 19th I will send you text of speech by radio, in the clear, to guard against possibility of breakdown in transmission.

End

ACTION: Mr Patterson
INFO: Adm Leahy CG AAP ASP OPD
CM-IN-13776 (15 Nov 44) 0248Z pa

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
IT IS DIRECTED THAT NO PUBLIC DISCUSSION TAKE PLACE OF JAPANESE SUICIDE PLANE ATTACKS. THE KNOWLEDGE OF POSSIBLE EFFECTIVENESS OF SUCH ATTACKS WOULD BE OF GREAT VALUE TO OUR ENEMY.
(CINCPAC HURLS ACTION COMINCH.)

AS AN EXCEPTION TO NORMAL PROCEDURE REQUEST AUTHORITY TO INCLUDE IN MY PRESS RELEASES COVERING CURRENT ACTION THE DAMAGE INFlicted BY SUBMARINES ON ENEMY CONBATANT SHIPS IN THE FOLLOWUP PHASE. OTHERWISE REPORTS OF DAMAGE TO ENEMY WILL BE INCOMPLETE.

RELEASED
R.O. 11652, Sec. (X) and (K) or (R)
OSD letter, May 5, 1973
R.H.P., NAVY Date, DEC 10 1973

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
DO NOT DESIRE RELEASE COM 3RD FLEET 251226 UNTIL SITUATION IS WELL CLARIFIED, WHICH IS NOT THE CASE WASHINGTON.
Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main Echelon
Versailles, France

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Rear Echelon
London, England

Commanding General
United Kingdom Base Section
London, England

Number: WARX 49072

TOPSEC book message to SHAEF London and Versailles for Eisenhower for action, and to Central District United Kingdom Base Section London pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information, FACS 97 from The Combined Chiefs of Staff.

In reply to SCAF 103, there is no objection to the publication of photographs of artificial harbors provided that the pictures do not reveal details of design and construction and do not furnish information as to detailed dimensions.

End

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

DECLASSIFIED
J.C.S. Rereading Memo 34 - 71
By RHP Date DEC 10 1973

CM-OUT-49072 (19 Oct 44) 2036Z es

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

COPY No. 32
Dispatch

DRAFTER OP-13-1-D/MCM Ext. 13355

FROM COMINCH AND CNO

RELEASED BY R S EDWARDS

DATE 19 OCT 1944

TO CODECIR 2142/0026

DECODED BY DIEBEL/ROWLAND

PARAPHRASED BY HARTZELL HARTIGAN

ROUTED BY HARTZELL

ADDRESSEES

CINCPAC

PRECEDENCE

ASTERISK (*) I AILGRAM ADDRESSEE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

BASEGRAM

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

192131 NCR 47464

MY SERIAL #252313 OF 12 OCTOBER EXECUTIVE ORDER TERMINATING
MARTIAL LAW IN HAWAII SIGNED 18 OCTOBER. ARRANGEMENT FOR
SIMULTANEOUS WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT AND PUBLICATION HONOLULU
ON 24 OCTOBER CONTemplates NO PUBLICITY PRIOR THERETO.

COMINCH COPIES #1 TO #8 INCLUSIVE.
COMINCH HAS DELIVERED TO NCR FOR FURTHER DELIVERY TO OP-13.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (C)
OSD letter, May 3, 1973

By RHP, NARS Date DEC-10-1973

REL IN ANAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROC. No. 4 SPECIAL

Handle only in accordance with "top secret" instructions contained in Article 78, Navy Regulations.

COPY NO. 000.7 192131 191740

OPNAV 19-76
**LAST SENTENCE OF HALSEY'S 170352 HAS ATTRACTED MUCH FAVORABLE ATTENTION HERE AMONG THOSE ENTITLED TO SEE HIS DISPATCH AND IT IS DESIRED THAT IT OR A CLOSE PARAPHRASE THEREOF BE RELEASED TO PRESS AS SOON AS YOU FEEL THAT SECURITY OF CODE WILL NOT BE COMPROMISED.**

**COMINCH: COPIES 1 TO 8 INCLUSIVE.**
FROM: THE PRESIDENT

TO : ADMIRAL NIMITZ, INFORMATION ADMIRAL HALSKY

The country has followed with pride the magnificent sweep of your Fleet into enemy waters. In addition to the gallant fighting of your flyers, we appreciate the endurance and superb seamanship of your forces. Your fine cooperation with General MacArthur furnishes another example of teamwork and the effective and intelligent use of all weapons.

Signed: Roosevelt
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: GENERAL MACARTHUR

The whole American nation today exults at the news that the gallant men under your command have landed on Philippine soil. I know well what this means to you. I know what it cost you to obey my order that you leave Corregidor in February 1942 and proceed to Australia. Since then you have planned and worked and fought with whole-souled devotion for the day when you would return with powerful forces to the Philippine Islands. That day has come. You have the nations gratitude and the nations prayers for success as you and your men fight your way back to Bataan.
THE FOLLOWING IS A COPY OF A MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT OSMEÑA

QUOTE. The suffering, humiliation and mental torture that you have endured since the barbarous, unprovoked and treacherous attack upon the Philippines nearly three long years ago have aroused in the hearts of the American people a righteous anger, a stern determination to punish the guilty, and a fixed resolve to restore peace and order and decency to an outraged world.

Until we were attacked at Pearl Harbor we had done our utmost to live as friendly self-respecting neighbors of the Japanese in the Pacific.

For half a century, in spite of signs of a decadent and militaristic Japanese leadership, we studiously avoided any acts that might provoke distrust or alarm. Our decency was mistaken for weakness.

Our plans for the dignity and freedom of the people of the Philippines have been ruthlessly - but only temporarily - brushed aside by Japanese acts of exploitation and enslavement. When the Japanese invaders have been driven out, the Philippines will take their place as a free and independent member of the family of nations.

On this occasion of the return of General MacArthur to Philippine soil with our airmen, our soldiers and our sailors, we renew our pledge. We and our Philippine brothers in arms - with the help of Almighty God - will drive out the invader; we will destroy his power to wage war again, and we will restore a world of dignity and freedom - a world of confidence and honesty and peace. UNQUOTE.
At nine this morning American troops landed on the island of Leyte in the Philippines. The invasion forces, under the command of General Douglas MacArthur, are supported by the greatest concentration of naval and air power ever massed in the Pacific Ocean.

We have landed in the Philippines to redeem the pledge we made over two years ago when the last American troops surrendered on Corregidor after five months and twenty-eight days of bitter resistance against overwhelming enemy strength.

We promised to return, we have returned.

In my last message to General Wainwright, sent on the fifth of May 1942 just before he was captured, I told him that the gallant struggle of his comrades had inspired every soldier, sailor and marine and all the workers in our shipyards and munitions plants. I said that he and his devoted followers had become the living symbol of our war aims and the guarantee of our victory.

That was true in 1942. It is still true in 1944.

We have never forgotten the courage of our men at Bataan and Corregidor. Their example inspired every American in the stern days of Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Salerno and Normandy. And in every campaign — on battlefront or homefront — we remember those men, and their memory spurs us to greater effort.

Nowhere has the desire to avenge their comrades been stronger than among the forces of the Southwest Pacific. Leyte is another rung in the long ladder General MacArthur's men have been climbing for two years.

Starting on the underside of New Guinea in the autumn of 1942 when

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date DEC 10 1973
Australia herself was in danger, pushing over the Owen Stanley Mountains, burning and blasting the Japanese out of Buna and Gona, digging them out of Newak, starving them at Hollandia — the advance has been a slow, tough struggle by our jungle fighters.

Now they have reached Leyte.

In the six years before war broke out, the Philippine government, acting in harmonious accord with the United States, made great strides towards complete establishment of her sovereignty. The United States promised to help build a new nation in the Pacific, a nation whose ideals, like our own, were liberty and equality and the democratic way of life — a nation which in a very short time would join the friendly family of nations on equal terms.

We were keeping that promise. When war came and our work was wrecked, we pledged to the people of the Philippines that their freedom would be redeemed and that their independence would be established and protected. We are fulfilling that pledge now. When we have finished the job of driving the Japs from the Islands, the Philippines will be a free and independent Republic.

There never was a doubt that the people of the Philippines were worthy of their independence. There will never be a doubt.

The Filipinos have defended their homeland with fortitude and gallantry. We confidently expect to see them liberate it with courage and audacity.

Under the leadership of President Manuel Quezon whose death came on the eve of his country’s liberation, and now under the leadership of their President Sergio Osmeña, the Filipinos have carried on, and are carrying on,
with gallantry - even in midst of the enemy.

We are glad to be back in the Philippines but we do not intend to stop there.

Leyte is only a way station on the road to Japan. It is 700 miles from Formosa. It is 850 miles from China. We are astride the life-line of the war-lords' empire; we are severing that life-line. Our bombers, our ships and our submarines are cutting off the ill-gotten conquests from the homeland. From our new base we shall quicken the assault. Our attacks of the last week have been destructive and decisive, but now we shall strike even more devastating blows at Japan.

We have learned our lesson about Japan. We trusted her, and treated her with the decency due a civilized neighbor. We were foully betrayed. The price of the lesson was high.

Now we are going to teach Japan her lesson.

We have the will and the power to teach her the cost of treachery and deceit, and the cost of stealing from her neighbors. With our steadfast allies, we shall teach this lesson so that Japan will never forget it.

We shall free the enslaved peoples. We shall restore stolen lands and looted wealth to their rightful owners. We shall strangle the Black Dragon of Japanese militarism forever - so that the Japs will never be able to make war again upon a peace-loving world.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date DEG-10 1973
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

From: U.S. Military Attaché, Guatemala City, Guatemala
To: War Department
Nr: CDC 518

19 October 1944
To MIS and CDC 518.

Danger of general strike has passed. Arevalo and principal aides leaving country. This is great relief to both govt and civilian groups.

Cruse

DECASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(c) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RHP, Date \textbf{DEC 1973}

ACTION: G-2
INFO: CG AAF, OPD, Col Park
CM-IN-18703 (20 Oct 44) 0345Z w/m

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

COPY No. 42
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY


To: War Department
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main, Versailles, France.

No: RR 12793  19 October 1944

AGWAR for Combined Chiefs Staff for Surles and for Byron Price Information Public Relations Division SHAPE Main for Public Relation Division from Allen signed Eisenhower ref nr RR - 12793 cite SHPRD Rear.

OPS Rear 47 is reference.

Francis Williams sent EMFAX for Butler from MINIFORM cable dated 19th October with reference number 543. Release time for publication of photographs and films of artificial harbors has now been fixed for 1500 British Summer Time Sunday 22nd October. An official set of 24 photographs has been placed in the hands of photo and film censors and all other picture material will be censored on the basis of these official photographs and the following guidance.

Pass:
(A) Pictures which give design in only a very general way.
(B) Panoramic or aerial views which give design only in a general way.

Stop:
(A) Any picture which gives the exact detail of design or construction of individual components or any picture showing any interior construction of any components.

CM-IN-18434 (19 Oct 44)
(B) Any dimensions of individual components or
dimensions of the port as a whole. This is to be interpreted
as allowing no dimensions in captions and will only allow
such dimensions as may be assessed by comparing components
with ships or other objects of known dimensions in the
picture.

(C) Any close-up or any picture which shows how
components are joined or fitted together.

(D) Any purely technical detail.

(E) Any aerial pictures showing full extent of destruc-
tion caused by gale. End stops.

Censors will note that this guidance for dealing
with picture material does not in fact allow any additional
specific detail besides that allowed in the original guidance
for written material and will continue to follow that guidance
for written material. Condé paragraph eight under stops of
original guidance.

End.

ACTION: OC/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy
CG AAF
OPD

G-2
Adm King
BFR
CofS

CM-IN-18434 (19 Oct 44) 2231Z bjm

DECLASSIFIED BY RT. DATE DEC 10 1973

ENT

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff
77500
19 October 1944

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main Echelon
Versailles, France

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Rear Echelon
London, England

Commanding General
United Kingdom Base Section
London, England

Number: WARX 49072

TOPSEC book message to SHAEF London and Versailles for
Eisenhower for action, and to Central District United King-
dom Base Section London pass to British Chiefs of Staff
for information, FACS 97 from The Combined Chiefs of Staff.

In reply to SCAF 103, there is no objection to the publica-
tion of photographs of artificial harbors provided that the
pictures do not reveal details of design and construction
and do not furnish information as to detailed dimensions.

End

ORIGINATOR: CC/3

INFORMATION: Adm. Leahy
Gen. Arnold
OPD
Gen. Bissell
Adm. King
Gen. Sauries
CofS

DECLASSIFIED
J.C.S. Regrading Memo 34-71
By RP Date DEC 10 1973

CM-OUT-49072 (19 Oct 44) 2036Z es

COPY No. 33

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

URGENT

From: General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area
Hollandia New Guinea

To: War Department

Nr: C 19703 18 October 1944

C 19703 from GHQ SWPA sgd MacArthur to AGWAR

Subject is CINC's recordings received W 48263 October 19th attention Bissell recordings of the CINC's personal statement and in addition the two other personal statements of President Osmena and Romulo were sent to OWI as standbys in case of failure of live broadcasts. They will be released only as specified by GHQ Forward Echelon.

End

ACTION: Gen Bissell
INFO: Gen Handy
Gen Surles
Adm King (ONI)
Gen Stoner

CM-IN-17330 (18 Oct 44) 2038Z 1a

CLASSIFIED
R.O. 11653, Sec. 3(E) and 6(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
by RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973
ACTION F-2

COPY NO.
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
Commander-In-Chief
Southwest Pacific Area
Brisbane, Australia

Number: WAR 48263

For MacArthur from Bissell Joint Security Control

Avoidance of possible misunderstanding about who will release recordings is subject reference your C19679 request Joint Security Control be advised to what addressee specific instructions will be sent and will these instructions apply to the the 2 other recordings in W47835 referred.

End

O R I G I N A T O R : Gen Bissell
I N F O R M A T I O N : Gen Handy
Gen Stoner
Adm King (ONI)
Gen Surles

CM-OUT-48263 (18 Oct 44) 1346Z 1s

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (M)
OSD letter, May 3, 1973

RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

A C T I O N F-2

COPY No. 12

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

URGENT

From: General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Areas, Hollandia, N. G.
To: War Department
No: C 19679  18 October 1944

From GHQ SWPA to AGWAR attention Bissell see your W 47835 the 17th. C 19679

Recording of CINCP personal statement is reference. The recording of CINCP statement is to be released only on specific instructions from here. Recording is official and is intended as standby in case of failure of live broadcast.

End

RECALLED
RQ 11663, Sec. (K) and (KD) on (K)
ORD letter, May 3, 1978
By RHP, Mark Date: DEC 10, 1973

ACTION: General Bissell (JSC)
INFO: General Handy, General Surles, Adm King (ONI), General Stoner.
OM-IN-16683 (18 Oct 44) 0728Z m/s

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
Commander in Chief
Southwest Pacific Areas
Brisbane Australia

Number WAR 47835

For MacArthur from Bissell Joint Security Control.

Subject is recording of CINCS personal statement reference CR 50625. Joint Security Control was informed today by OWI that their representative received from General Fellers a recording concerning operation accumulation which was brought from theater to San Francisco Officer where 2 copies made and brought here sealed. Upon breading seal an English text of CINCS personal statement to Filipinos and recording found. OWI states the release of this recording and 2 others which arrived by Army courier at San Francisco Office on October 16 was contingent on receipt of instructions from theater. Request Joint Security Control be informed if recordings are official and when, in what form and to whom instructions for release will be issued so as to coordinate instructions we have issued.

End

ORIGINATOR: Gen Bissell (Joint Security Control)

INFORMATION: Gen Handy
Gen Surles
Adm King (ONI)
Gen Stoner

CM-CUT 47835 (17 Oct 44) 1920Z khc
From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Rear, London, England

To: War Department
   Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main, Versailles, France

No: RR 12642  15 October 1944

Ops Rear 31 is reference. Refer our Ops Rear 30. Ref no RR 12642 action AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff for Surles and for Byron Price information SHAED Main for FRD from Allen signed Eisenhower cite SHFRD Rear. TOP SECRET.

Amendments to final draft prefabricated parts official handout is subject. Amendments as follows:

Page 2 Para 1 Line 3 delete "Details of these caissons are given in appendix A" line 6 add after word drawings "were substantially completed by the 20th October, all details being furnished" Para 3 Line 1 add after word five "and a half" Para 3 Line 2 delete word ship and "only a limited number of ships".

Page 3 Para 5 Line 4 delete "3500" and substitute "hundreds of".

Page 5 Para 3 Line 4 read "in the setting down of the harbour the Navy and Army worked hand in hand" Line 7 delete "1200" and substitute "hundreds of".

Page 6 Line 2 delete "were landed" add at end of sentence after word troops "were landed over the piers".

CM-IN-14650  (15 Oct 44)

DECLASSIFIED
JCS LETTER, 7-8-73
BY MT. DATE DEC 10 1973

COPY NO. 32
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

"IVI"
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Page 2

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Rear, London, England

No: RR 12642 15 October 1944

Appendix A Page 1 Para 1 delete "5 fathoms" substitute "5 1/2 fathoms"; delete "was 204 feet long by 56 feet wide by 60 feet high" and delete "being 174 feet by 28 feet by 25 feet" Para 4 delete "30" and insert "22" and delete "a caisson" and insert "the largest size caisson".

Appendix B Page 1 Para 1 Line 4 delete "80 feet" and insert "span"; End line 6 start line 7 delete "with ball and socket only" Para 3 Line 2 delete "200 feet long by 60 feet wide by 10 feet deep" Line 3 delete "1800 tons"; delete from "mechanically operated" to "with the tide" Para 5 after "Glasgow" insert "4 being built by Royal Engineers at military ports in Scotland" Line 3 before "Southampton" insert "the Army depot at"

Appendix C Para 1 delete "200 feet long and weighing about 200 tons"; delete "they were cruciform in section and floated with one arm only above water"

New subject is amendments to censorship guidance on qualified release artificial harbours. Amendments as follows:

Page 1 Para 4 delete "weighing 7000 tons and more than 200 feet long, 56 feet wide, 60 feet high, of monolithic cellular construction" Para 8 delete "200 feet long, 60 feet high and weighed 7000 tons".

Page 2 Para 11 second Line delete "80 feet"; third line delete "by ball and socket joints"; fourth line delete "and telescopic spans for tidal action" Para 12 line 2 delete "200 feet by 60".

CM-IN-14650 (15 Oct 44)
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

"IVI"
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Page 3

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Rear, London, England

No: RR 12642  15 October 1944

Page 3 Para 26 Line 4 delete "interior"; End of para add "(3) with ships alongside or other material which would give dimensions by comparison with object of known dimensions."

Page 4 Para 4 add after work guidance "particularly any dimension or detail of design"; Para 5 Line 2 delete "beyond that indicated in their guidance"; add after word component "and no dimension or design of any component"

Para 7 add para number 8 to read "any picture which would give any dimension or design of construction of any component; thus pictures with ships or other objects of known dimensions which could be compared and thus give dimensions must be stopped."

Our 0ps Rear 30 giving agreed release and embargo time for official handout first subject this message will follow soonest.

End.

ACTION: CC/5

INFO: Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Gen Surles

CM-IN-14650  (15 Oct 44)  2038Z pa

32

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN 26-73756
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces
Rear London England.

To: War Department
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main Versailles France

Nr: RR 12648 15 Oct 44

Action AGWAR for Combined Chiefs Staff for Surles
and for Byron Price information SHAEF Main for PRO from
Allen signed Eisenhower ref no RR 12648 cite SHPRD Rear.

Ops Rear 30 is reference. Release time for
harbours now set for 0030 hours British Summer Time
Monday 16 October. Full restrictions on dimensions and
detail of design and construction being observed here
pending reply our request clarification. Amendments to
final draft of official handout and amendments to censorship
guidance already sent in separate cable our reference Ops
Rear 31. We are stopping publication of all still
photos and movie film pending receipt from Combined Chiefs
of Staff of clarification of restrictions on dimensions and
details of design and construction.

End

ACTION: CC/S
INFO: Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Gen Surles
C of S

OM-IN-14649 (15 Oct 44) 2018Z pa

DEC 10 1973

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
"IVI"
URGENT

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main, Versailles, France
To: War Department
Nr: 62187 14 October 1944
S 62187 to AGWAR signed Eisenhower cite SHPRD from Allen, for Surles

View Surles message W-46162 October 13 respect harbors imperative we have immediate answer our cable S-61794 October 11 regarding restrictions imposed release. Propose release here 0030 October 15 but impossible implement this pending your reply acknowledge.

End

ACTION: Gen Surles
INFO: OPD

CM-IN-13667 (14 Oct 44) 1952Z

000.7

DEC 10 1973
DECLASSIFIED
JOSS LETTER, 7-5-75
BY ST. DATE

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN 84-75724

COPY NO.
Commander in Chief
Southwest Pacific Area
Brisbane, Australia

Number: WAR 46133

To MacArthur from Surles signed Marshall.

We are transmitting here the proposed schedules of the networks for originsations your theater for week of October 22nd. Networks advise us they have already relayed schedules to representatives for broadcasts to October 22nd. It is requested that you have officer at Hollandia who will handle the recordings advise network representatives in San Francisco on cue channel that due to recent violations of security in conversations on cue channel effective immediately no further conversations will be permitted on the cue channel. As a consequence they should be advised that they can only give the go ahead to their correspondents. Following are the schedules for each network.

1. For CBS October 22nd 13:08:30Z to 13:10:00Z. For October 23rd, 25th and 27th 12:08:10Z to 12:10:10Z and for October 26th 22:50:45Z to 22:52:45Z.

2. Blue Network schedule for October 21st is 23:08:16Z to 23:11:16Z. For October 23rd, 25th and 27th 12:35:16Z to 12:38:16Z. For October 24th and 26th 12:15:00Z to 12:18:30Z. All Blue broadcasts will be recorded in San Francisco for later transmission over network.


4. For NBC October 23rd, 25th and 27th 23:20:00Z to 23:22:00Z.

CM-OUT-46133 (13 Oct 44)
OUTGOING MESSAGE

Number: WAR 46133  13 October 1944

For October 24th, 26th and 28th 12:08:19Z to 12:12:15Z.

All return cues same as for week of October 15th in schedules already sent by network.

End

ORIGINATOR: Gen Surles

INFORMATION: JC/S, OPD, Gen Stoner

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

CM-OUT-46133 (13 Oct 44) 2125Z ekk

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN SAHIN

Subject: Censorship Ban on Production of Military Currency.

1. Mr. Bell, the Under-Secretary of the Treasury Department, called me yesterday to say that production was getting under way immediately on the Navy's order for military currency and that he would think it advisable that the Navy asks the Office of Censorship to issue a nation-wide ban on publication of matters incidental to the production of currency. He explained that the Army had done so in each case where invasion currency had been prepared.

2. To find out how the Army handles such matters, I discussed the subject with Lt. Col. Hilliard, who explained that action had been taken in the past through the Public Relations Office of the War Department; but that the officer who had handled it in the past had been transferred. Col. Hilliard pointed out the urgency of the matter as a news leak might well take place on the first day of production.

3. The matter was referred to the Officer in Charge, who, after consultation with Captain Colclough, contacted Admiral Schurman. It was agreed that this officer should call immediately on Captain Heard.

4. At Captain Heard's office, I was informed that the captain was not in his office yesterday and I was referred to Captain Kelisker (Room 4723, Ext. 4503). The latter thought I ought to get in touch instantly with Captain Penn, but as the latter was not in his office, an appointment was made with Lt. Comdr. Nesbit (Room 518, Apex Building).

5. Comdr. Nesbit took me to see Mr. Byron Price, Director of Censorship. The latter was most cooperative, but explained that the matter of a censorship ban is not as simple as it sounds. He explained that to make it reasonably effective, about 10,000 people would have to be notified. While he thought such action might prevent publication in any responsible newspaper, he felt that it involved the danger that the information might get into the hands of undesirable persons. He also explained that notification to San Francisco and Sacramento newspapers alone might defeat its own purpose by pointing up the matter to papers in other centers and he emphasized that no method could be considered as giving 100% guarantee against publication. He also said that the Army ban had in the past been rendered ineffective by a statement given out by the President in a press conference. He finally expressed
some doubt as to whether the security angle was as important as I thought. He said that statements from high ranking Army and Navy officers made it perfectly plain where we are going to strike in the Pacific, and that anybody interested in currency matters could guess that preparations would have to be made to provide invasion money. I told him that it was not for me to decide the security angle as the subject had been classified Top Secret and it was my duty to act accordingly. I pointed out, however, that any publicity at this time might well furnish a clue to enemy agents who could then check up on the timing, the amounts involved and could probably obtain valuable information by tracing the shipments to their destinations. Mr. Price appeared unconvinced about these arguments, except the one about timing.

6. In view of the mention of different methods of approach I told Mr. Price that we would have to leave it to him to make the ban as effective as possible, and that I would formulate the Navy's wishes as a request to him to accord the matter the same protection as has been given similar Army projects in the past. This was agreed to by Mr. Price.

7. Mr. Price pointed out the desirability of notifying the Public Relations Offices of the War and Navy Departments and he recommended that steps be taken through Admiral Leahy to prevent any news leaks at the White House press conferences.

8. Captain Kelsker called up this morning and said that Captain Penn had called to say that he thought Captain Sabin ought to see the President's Aide (at the Navy Department) and ask him to take the necessary steps through Admiral Leahy in respect to the White House. This step and a notification to the Public Relations Officer of the Navy Department are thus the only moves that remain to be taken. The Public Relations Office of the Army has been notified through the CAD.

Respectfully,

/s/ ERIC J. GLUCKSTADT

Eric J. Gluckstadt

DECLASSIFIED

EO 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) 53

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NASA Date DEC 10 1973

COPY
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main, Versailles, France

To: War Department
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces,
Rear London, England
United Kingdom Base Section, London, England

No: S-61794
11 October 1944

Reference message WX 39375 dated 30 September 1944
authorizing restricted release MULBERRY. To AGWAR for
Combined Chiefs of Staff, Center District UK Base Section
for British Chiefs of Staff, for Information to SHARP Rear
signed Eisenhower SCAF number 103.

Public Relations request more detailed definition of
restriction on publication dimensions of piers caissons
and causeways plus their construction and design. Purpose
is to permit efficient photographic and film censorship.
Since dimensions assessable by comparison known dimensions
other objects appearing pictures the present blanket
restriction would result prohibition of publication all
photographs and films. Furthermore most photographs would
give general indication construction and design. Public
Relations enquire if all photographs must be stopped or
if intention withhold only details internal construction with
specific dimensions. Matter has been referred to Inter-
Services Security Board who request submit to you for clarifi-
cation Public Relations.

ACTION: OCB

INPO: ADM LEAHY, GEN ARNOLD, OPD, GEN BISSELL, ADM KING

CM-IN-11645 (12 Oct 44) 20332 moa

DECLASIFIED
J.O.S. Releasing Memo

34-71

DEC 10 1973

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
NAVAL MESSAGE

CINCPOA

9 OCT 1944
0428
SEIFERT

ROUTED BY

CTG 30.2
COM 3RD FLT
CTF 38

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

090216
NCR 8547

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

HONO INTERCEPT

(CINCPOA SENDS ACTION CTG 30.2 INFO COM 3RD FLT AND CTF 38)

TO FURTHER DECEPTION DESIRE MAKE PRESS RELEASE YOUR BOMBARDMENT TODAY. UNLESS YOUR SECURITY JEOPARDIZED MAKE PRELIMINARY ACTION REPORT.

MORSE PRESS RELEASE MADE AT 0730 EWT.

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV 19-07 090216
FOLLOWING FROM MAJOR THORP:

1. ARRIVED 6TH. ADDRESS CINCPAC FOR CAPTAIN TUFNELL.

2. SURVIVORS NOW ETA PEARL HARBOR 12 OCTOBER.

3. USN PERSONNEL OF RESCUING SUBMARINES HAVE ARRIVED PEARL. DUE LARGE NUMBER PERSONS HAVING KNOWLEDGE THIS MATTER CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL HEAD OFF CORRESPONDENTS HERE AND THEREFORE HAVE ISSUED STATEMENT AS FOLLOWS IN CONJUNCTION PRO CINCPAC.

"CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESS:

1. ON 11 SEPTEMBER (WEST LONGITUDE DATE) A US SUBMARINE TORPEDOED AND SANK THE JAPANESE SHIP RAKUYO MARU IN THE CHINA SEA. ON BOARD WERE A NUMBER OF AUSTRALIAN AND BRITISH PRISONERS OF WAR, WHO WERE BEING TRANSPORTED FROM SINGAPORE TO JAPAN. OUR SUBMARINES RESCUED 162 OF THE SURVIVORS, A PORTION OF WHICH..."
| **DISPATCH** |
|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| **PAGE 2 OF 3**  | **072100**       | **NCR 8116**     | **(Use G. C. T.)** |
| **DRAFTER**      | **FROM**         | **RELEASED BY**  | **BASEGRAM**     |
| **EXT.**          | **ADDRESSEES**   | **DATE**         | **PRIORITY**     |
| **ADDRESSEES**    | **FOR ACTION**   | **TOR CODED**    | **ROUTINE**      |
| **PRECEDENCE**    | **INFORMATION**  | **DECODED BY**   | **DEFERRED**     |
| **PRECEDENCE**    | **PARAPHRASED**  | **CHECKED**      | **BASEGRAM**     |
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Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP

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**HAVE RETURNED TO AUSTRALIA. ANOTHER GROUP IS BEING RETURNED TO ENGLAND VIA THE UNITED STATES.**

**2. THIS IS OBVIOUSLY ONE OF THE GREAT STORIES OF THE WAR, BUT FOR REASONS OF MILITARY SECURITY AND HIGHER POLICY THE BRITISH AND AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENTS HAVE REQUESTED THE WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENT TO CONTINUE IN FORCE THE SECURITY POLICIES PROHIBITING THE RELEASE OF INFORMATION OF THIS NATURE, IN THE INTEREST OF THE ALLIED WAR EFFORT PRESS CORRESPONDENTS ARE URGED TO REGARD ANY INFORMATION ABOUT THE INCIDENT WHICH MAY COME TO THEIR ATTENTION AS BEING IN A HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL CATEGORY.**

REFERENCE BAD 0416472 OCTOBER TO CAPTAIN TUFNEILL. CERTIFICATES WILL BE TAKEN ON ARRIVAL PEARL BUT EFFECTIVENESS ALREADY NULLIFIED BY INEVITABLE CONTACT WITH US PERSONNEL ON BOARD TRANSPORT DURING PASSAGE SAIPAN TO PEARL.
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unless otherwise indicated, this dispatch will be transmitted with indicated precedence and as administrative.

PAGE 3 OF 3 072100 NCR 8116

(Use G. C. T.)

4. CAPTAIN TUFNELL SAW SURVIVORS SAIPAN. FULL NOMINAL ROLL WAS FORWARD BY AIR ON 29 SEPTEMBER AND INTERROGATION REPORT 4 OCT 1973, BOTH ADDRESSED BAD AND COPIES FOR ONWARD DESPATCH D1 ADMIRALTY WAR OFFICE. COPIES ALSO SENT ACNB DIRECT. CONSIDER THIS SATISFACTS PARA 3 YOUR ADM INTR N0. 105.

5. PLEASE CABLE WO REPLY TO BAS 5146 PW 2 OCTOBER SOONEST POSSIBLE.

RECEIVED AS SECRET, RECLASSIFIED AS TOP SECRET ACCORDING TO CONTENT.

ORIGINAL NCR DISTRIBUTION.

BAD(#1)....ACT
COMINCH(#2-9)....16(#10)....

RELEASED
K.O. 11682, Sec. (R) and (S) or (S)
ORD letter, May 5, 1973
by RHP, NASS Dec. 10, 1973

No. 1 ADMIRAL.  No. 2 FILE.  No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM.  No. 4 SPECIAL.

072100

Copy No. 5

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 70, Navy Regulations.
FROM PRESS WIRELESS INC HICKSVILLE, NEW YORK AT
031400 O RADIO RECIFE (NKM) PICKED UP FOLLOWING
BROADCAST OF

" NATAL BRAZIL (ASSOCIATED PRESS) A GERMAN
SUBMARINE WAS SUNK OFF THE BRAZILIAN COAST
ON 28 SEPT BY AN AMERICAN PLANE. IT WAS
FIRST U BOAT DESTROYED IN THESE WATERS IN
RECENT MONTHS. VICE ADMIRAL JONAS INGRAM,
USN HAS DECORATED THE PLANE CREW"

NOF NATAL ASCERTAIN WHO, WHEN, AND HOW INFO
RELEASED AT AND TRANSMITTED FROM NATAL. ADVISE BY
DISPATCH MAKING NOB RIO INFO ADDRESSEE. NOB RIO
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**RELEASED BY:**

**DATE:**

**TOR CODEROOM:**

**DECODED BY:**

**TIME BY:**

**ROUTED BY:**

Unless otherwise indicated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence and as administrative.

**PAGE 2 OF 2 041254 NCR 5191**

**CHECK WITH ALL APPROPRIATE BRA AGENCIES AND ADVISE.**

**INFO NOT AN AUTHORIZED RELEASE AND ADMIRAL INGRAM GREATLY CONCERNED.**

**DELAYED BY SERVICE.**

**RECEIVED E.O. 11683, Sec. (CR) and (O) or (G)**

**UDS letter, May 9, 1973 by RHP, MARS Date DEC 10 1973**

16...COG

COMINCH...20G...CNO...NAVAlDE...200P...

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver in Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

041254
Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main Echelon
London, England

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Forward Echelon
Versailles, France

Headquarters, Communications Zone
European Theater of Operations
Main Echelon
Paris, France

Commanding General
United Kingdom Base Section
London, England

Number WARX 39375

TOPSEC book message to SHAEF London, Versailles and Hq Com Zone, ETO, Paris for Eisenhower for action, to Central District United Kingdom Base Section London pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information, FACS 90 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

With further reference to SCAF 79, FACS 79 and the press release on "MULBERRIES" you furnished Secretary of the War Department General Staff in response request contained in WAR 32370, the Combined Chiefs of Staff now authorize you to release the information contained in CM-OUT-39375 (30 Sep 44)
the press release after deleting all references to dimensions of caissons, piers and causeways and details of design and construction thereof.

End.

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm. Leahy
Gen. Arnold
Gen. Bissell
Adm. King
OPD
CofS

DECLASSIFIED
J.C.S. Regrading Memo 34 - 71

By DEC 10 1973

CM-OUT-39375 (30 Sep 44) 2048Z mk

33

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
The US Chiefs of Staff are transmitting the statement on artificial harbors prepared by SCAEF to the Combined Chiefs of Staff with the recommendation that SCAEF be authorized to release the statement after deleting all reference to dimensions of caissons piers and causeways together with details of design and construction.

COMINCH: COPIES #1 TO #8 INCLUSIVE.

Declassified
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 5(D) or (D)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Forward, Versailles, France.

To: War Department

No: FWD 15427

22 September 1944

From SHAEF Forward, ref FWD 15427, to AGWAR for info SHAEF Main personal from Eisenhower to General Marshall

Please assure the President that upon the first appearance of pictures of American troops fraternizing with Germans I repeated USFOR orders against this practice and sent personal messages to all commanders insisting fraternization be suppressed completely.

In addition, I have placed on the censurable list any pictures or stories of such occurrences. They constitute direct violations of my specific orders as a United States Commander and therefore should be dealt with by disciplinary procedure.

Through personal conversations with Patton, Bradley and at least one corps commander I am convinced that the pictures in question were taken of an isolated incident and they do not represent the general attitude of our soldiers.

End

ACTION: Gen Handy

INFO: Adm Leahy, Gen Surles, C of S

CM-IN-21387 (23 Sep 44) 0458Z jb

DECLASSIFIED

JCS LETTER; 7-8-72

BY KT. DATE DEC 10 1973

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
NEWSPAPERS HERE CARRY ARTICLE FROM WASHINGTON DATED 23 SEPTEMBER STATING "NAVY DEPARTMENT TODAY CONFIRMED REPORT THAT ARGENTINE FLYING CADETS ARE BEING TRAINED AT U.S. NAVAL AIR STATION LOCATED AT CORPUS CHRISTI IN TEXAS. THE DEPARTMENT SAID THAT U.S., WHILE IT DISAPPROVES OF CURRENT ARGENTINE POLICIES, HAS NO QUARREL WITH INDIVIDUAL ARGENTINES. IT SAID THAT THE ARGENTINE FLYING PROGRAM WAS DESIGNED TO ACQUAIN A NUMBER OF ARGENTINES WITH U.S. PRACTICES. THIS HAS BROUGHT INQUIRIES FROM BRITISH NAVAL ATTACHE AND FROM ARGENTINE NAVAL CHIEF OF STAFF AS TO WHETHER IT MEANS THAT ANOTHER GROUP OF ARGENTINE NAVAL AVIATORS WILL BE INVITED. LAST GROUP RETURNED HERE SOME TIME AGO.

REQUEST CLARIFICATION.

16. ACT

CIO IN GCH. CNO. 200P. NAVAL DEP. 08213. 33. 13. 17
Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main Echelon
Versailles, France

Number WAR 34308

Personal to General Eisenhower from General Marshall.

The President desires that I transmit the following message to you: "There have appeared in the press photographs of American soldiers fraternizing with Germans in Germany.

These photographs are considered objectionable by a number of our people.

It is desired that steps be taken to discourage fraternizing by our troops with the inhabitants of Germany and that the publication of such photographs be effectively prohibited."

End

ORIGINATOR: OPD

INFORMATION: Adm. Leahy
Gen. Surles
C of S

CM-OUT-34308 (21 Sep 44) 2237Z ngs
DISPATCH

FROM: CINCPOA
RELEASED BY: 
DATE: 19 SEP 1944
TO CODEBOOK: 0603
DECODED BY: HARTIGAN
PARAPHRASED BY: HARTigan, FISHER, KLAPP, FISHER
ROUTED BY: HARTIGAN, FISHER, KLAPP, FISHER

ADDRESSEES:

CTF 32
CTF 57
CTF 36
COMGENPOA CNO
COMGEN 3RD PHIB CORPS
COMGEN 1ST MARDIV
COMGEN 81ST INFDIV

PRECEDECE:

0

ROUTINE
PRIORITY
BASEGRAM
DECODED
DEFENDED

ADDRESS

FTF 32
FTF 57
FTF 36
COMGENPOA CNO
COMGEN 3RD PHIB CORPS
COMGEN 1ST MARDIV
COMGEN 81ST INFDIV

AGREEMENT

FTF 31
FTF 32

INFORMATION

FTF 18
FTF 19
FTF 20
FTF 21
FTF 22
FTF 23
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FTF 48
FTF 49
FTF 50

UR 180240. AFTER OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF IDENTITY AND LOCATION OF ASSAULT UNITS ENGAGED IN STALEMATE OPERATION BY CINCPOA COMMUNIQUE OR PRESS RELEASE PERSONNEL OF THE ANNOUNCED UNITS PLUS PERSONNEL OF UNITS ATTACHED THERETO INCLUDING CORPS AND GROUP STAFFS DURING THE ASSAULT PHASE MAY DISCLOSE THEIR LOCATION AND RELATE THEIR PERSONAL EXPERIENCES IN THEIR PERSONAL CORRESPONDENCE. NO RELAXATION OF BASIC CENSORSHIP REGULATIONS IS AUTHORIZED. UPON COMPLETION OF THE ASSAULT PHASE DETERMINED BY DATE OF TRANSFER OF COMMAND FROM LANDING FORCE COMMANDER TO ISLAND COMMANDER.

 Originator till in DATE AND TIME GROUP

(CINCPOA SENDS ACTION CTF 32 INFO CTF 57 CTF 31 CTF 36 COMGENPOA CNO COMGEN 3RD PHIB CORPS. CTF 32 PASS INFO COMGEN 1ST MARDIV COMGEN 81ST INFDIV. CTG 32.2 ALSO INFO.

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76 of NAV 19-7A. 01D LETTER 5-3-78

OPNAV 19-7A 600.7

182213

DECLASSIFIED
DEC 10 1973
FURTHER DISCLOSURE OF LOCATION OF ASSAULT UNITS IS PROHIBITED. GARRISON AND DEVELOPMENT UNITS ARE NOT AFFECTED AND SHALL OBSERVE FULL CENSORSHIP REGULATIONS CONCERNING PROHIBITION OF REVELATION OF GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION.

ORIGINAL NCR DISTRIBUTION:
ØØR(#1) ..... Cog
COMINCH(#2-9) ..... 16(#10) ..... MARCORPS(#11) .....
Your 172016 regret that I do not have a copy of the proposed statement on Mulberry by General Eisenhower. It is being obtained as a matter of urgency and I shall communicate with you after the text is received.

\[\text{Handed}\]
\[\text{E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or 2\text{nd} section}\]
\[\text{OSD letter, May 3, 1973}\]
\[\text{RHP, NARS Date DEC 10, 1973}\]

COMINCH: COPIES 1 TO 8 INCL.

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\[\text{RHP, NARS Date DEC 10, 1973}\]

COMINCH: COPIES 1 TO 8 INCL.
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: OCTAGON

To: War Department
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

Nr: OCTAGON 41 16 Sept 1944

OCTAGON 41 to SHAPE London for Eisenhower for action,
AGWAR for information, PAC 79 from the Combined Chiefs of
Staff.

With reference to SCAF 79 the Combined Chiefs of
Staff have agreed that security implications affecting
other Theaters preclude the release of information on
Mulberry.

End

NOTE: SCAF 79 is CM-IN-11043 (12 Sep 44) CC/8

ACTION: CC/8

INFO: Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
Gen Somervell
Gen Blaxell
Adm King

CM-IN-15405 (17 Sep 44) 00357 bem
Combined Chiefs of Staff
Col G G Epley W D Ext 77500
14 September 1944

Commanding General
Allied Force Headquarters
Caserta, Italy

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main Echelon
London, England

Commanding General
United Kingdom Base Section
London, England

OCTAGON
Victor 161

Number: WARX 31166

To Wilson for action, SHAEF London for Eisenhower, United Kingdom Base Section London pass to British Chiefs of Staff and Headquarters Communication Zone Main for information, FAN 417 from The Combined Chiefs of Staff.

NAF 729 is the reference. Present Combined Chiefs of Staff policy is as follows:

POLICY ON RELEASE OF RADAR EQUIPMENT AND INFORMATION

1. Information on any radar equipment (including IFF and Racons) in operational use, may be disclosed in conformance with Paragraph 5 below to United Nations' forces acting under United States or British Theater Commanders only to the extent and only when it is necessary for those forces to have such information in order to perform the operational role allotted to them. This does not include disclosure of radar equipment in research or development stages which is not yet available for operational use.

CM-OUT-31166 (15 Sep 44)
2. Radar equipment (including IFF and Racons) may be released under the above conditions where operational necessity exists.

3. Theater commanders and other authorities should inform the Combined Chiefs of Staff through their appropriate channels of any release of radar information or radar equipments.

4. a. In the case of foreign forces or their accredited representatives not operating under or in immediate conjunction with British or United States Theater Commanders the release of radar equipment (including IFF and Racons) or information shall be the subject of separate policy decisions by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

   b. Release of information to research, development or production personnel not covered by Paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 above shall be subject to a separate decision in each specific case by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

5. The following table is supplied for the purpose of applying the policy detailed in Paragraphs 1 to 4 above:

   a. Countries to Whose Armed Forces and Accredited Representatives Disclosure is not Restricted.

      (1) Great Britain, the Dominions (except Eire), India and the Colonies.

      (2) The United States of America.
b. Countries to Whose Armed Forces and
   Accredited Representatives Disclosure is Limited
   by this Policy, but Combined United States-United
   Kingdom Consent is not Required.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Holland</td>
<td>Information in the case of each country to be limited to sets which it is necessary to release to the Armed Forces of these countries, while they are engaged in operations as part of, or in conjunction with, United Kingdom or United States Forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) France</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Belgium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Greece</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Norway</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Poland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Yugoslavia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) Czechoslovakia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) Brazil and Cuba</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Countries to Whose Armed Forces and
   Accredited Representatives Disclosure is Limited
   by this Policy and Combined United States-United
   Kingdom Consent is Required. (See Paragraph 4)

(1) U.S.S.R. United States-United Kingdom general policy has been agreed. A list of individual items released, or to be released, has been prepared.

(2) Portugal Normally to be limited to the lower frequency equipments of earlier type.

(3) Turkey

CM-OUT-31166 (15 Sep 44)
(4) Italy

Normally to be restricted to sets employing wavelengths of eight cm. or over and which have been in operational use for at least one year and which are necessary for the Italians to perform any operational role allotted to them.

(5) Sweden

Some one and one-half meter early warning equipments have already been released to Sweden by the United Kingdom.

(6) China

Some SCR 695, 535 and 595 transpondors, one SCR 602 and two QCI sets have been released by the Commanding General, United States Army Forces, New Delhi. Information to be strictly limited to that which will assist Chinese in immediate prosecution of the war as defined in C.O.S. 432/1.
d. Countries to Whom no Disclosure is Permitted.

All countries not listed in a, b, and c above.

NOTE: Release to the countries listed is to be conditional upon their treating all information released according to the current security grading for such equipment.

Any of these countries may be reconsidered for purposes of receiving equipment or information should circumstances make it desirable to do so.

End
TO WILSON FOR ACTION SHAEF LONDON FOR EISENHOWER, UNITED KINGDOM BASE SECTION LONDON PASS TO BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF AND HEADQUARTERS COMMUNICATION ZONE MAIN FOR INFORMATION, FAN 417 FROM THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF.

NAF 729 IS THE REFERENCE. PRESENT COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF POLICY IS AS FOLLOWS:

POLICY ON RELEASE OF RADAR EQUIPMENT AND INFORMATION

1. INFORMATION ON ANY RADAR EQUIPMENT (INCLUDING IFF AND RACONS) IN OPERATIONAL USE, MAY BE DISCLOSED IN CONFORMITY WITH PARAGRAPH 5 BELOW TO UNITED NATIONS' FORCES ACTING UNDER UNITED STATES OR BRITISH THEATER COMMANDERS ONLY TO THE EXTENT AND ONLY WHEN IT IS NECESSARY FOR THOSE FORCES TO HAVE SUCH INFORMATION IN ORDER TO PERFORM THE OPERATIONAL ROLE ALLOTTED TO THEM. THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE DISCLOSURE OF RADAR EQUIPMENT IN RESEARCH OR DEVELOPMENT STAGES WHICH IS NOT YET AVAILABLE FOR OPERATIONAL USE.

2. RADAR EQUIPMENT (INCLUDING IFF AND RACONS) MAY BE...

SECRET

CLASIFIED

JCS Releasing Memo

DEC 10 1973

Make original copy of this page in file room with other documents.

O NAY-19-07

0007
RELEASED UNDER THE ABOVE CONDITIONS WHERE OPERATIONAL NECESSITY EXISTS.

3. THEATER COMMANDERS AND OTHER AUTHORITIES SHOULD INFORM THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF THROUGH THEIR APPROPRIATE CHANNELS OF ANY RELEASE OF RADAR INFORMATION OR RADAR EQUIPPMENTS.

4. A. IN THE CASE OF FOREIGN FORCES OR THEIR ACCREDITED REPRESENTATIVES NOT OPERATING UNDER OR IN IMMEDIATE CONJUNCTION WITH BRITISH OR UNITED STATES THEATER COMMANDERS THE RELEASE OF RADAR EQUIPMENT (INCLUDING IFF AND RACONS) OR INFORMATION SHALL BE THE SUBJECT OF SEPARATE POLICY DECISIONS BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF.

B. RELEASE OF INFORMATION TO RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT OR PRODUCTION PERSONNEL NOT COVERED BY PARAGRAPHS 1, 2 AND 4 A ABOVE SHALL BE SUBJECT TO A SEPARATE DECISION IN EACH SPECIFIC CASE BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF.

5. THE FOLLOWING TABLE IS SUPPLIED FOR THE PURPOSE OF APPLYING THE POLICY DETAILED IN PARAGRAPHS 1 TO 4 ABOVE:

A. COUNTRIES TO WHOSE ARMED FORCES AND ACCREDITED REPRESENTATIVES DISCLOSURE IS NOT RESTRICTED.

(1) GREAT BRITAIN, THE DOMINIONS (EXCEPT EIRE), INDIA, AND THE COLONIES.

(2) THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

B. COUNTRIES TO WHOSE ARMED FORCES AND ACCREDITED REPRESENTATIVES DISCLOSURE IS LIMITED BY THIS POLICY BUT COMBINED UNITED STATES-UNITED KINGDOM CONSENT IS NOT REQUIRED.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) HOLLAND</td>
<td>INFORMATION IN THE CASE OF EACH COUNTRY TO BE LIMITED TO SETS WHICH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) FRANCE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) BELGIUM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RECEIVED
IT IS NECESSARY TO RELEASE TO THE
ARMED FORCES OF THESE COUNTRIES
WHILE THEY ARE ENGAGED IN OPERATIONS
AS PART OF, OR IN CONJUNCTION WITH,
UNITED KINGDOM OR UNITED STATES
FORCES.

C. COUNTRIES TO WHOSE ARMED FORCES AND ACCREDITED
REPRESENTATIVES DISCLOSURE IS LIMITED BY THIS POLICY
AND COMBINED UNITED STATES-UNITED KINGDOM CONSENT IS
REQUIRED. (SEE PARAGRAPH 4)

1. USSR
UNITED STATES-UNITED KINGDOM
GENERAL POLICY HAS BEEN AGREED.
A LIST OF INDIVIDUAL ITEMS RELEASED,
OR TO BE RELEASED, HAS BEEN PREPARED.

2. PORTUGAL
NORMALLY TO BE LIMITED TO THE LOWER
FREQUENCY EQUIPMENTS OF EARLIER
TYPE.

3. TURKEY
NORMALLY TO BE RESTRICTED TO SETS
EMPLOYING WAVELENGTHS OR 8 CM OR
OVER AND WHICH HAVE BEEN IN OPER-
ATIONAL USE FOR AT LEAST 1 YEAR AND
WHICH ARE NECESSARY FOR THE ITALIANS
TO PERFORM ANY OPERATIONAL ROLE
ALLOTTED TO THEM.

4. ITALY
SOME 1 AND 1/2 METER EARLY WARNING
EQUIPMENTS HAVE ALREADY BEEN
RELEASED TO SWEDEN BY THE UNITED
KINGDOM.

5. SWEDEN
SOME SCR 695, 535 AND 595 TRAN-
PONDORS, 1 SCR 602 AND 2 GCI SETS

6. CHINA

Originator: CC/S D/T Group: SEPT-46 1120 Page 3 Of 4 Pages
HAVE BEEN RELEASED BY THE COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES,
NEW DELHI. INFORMATION TO BE STRICTLY LIMITED TO THAT WHICH WILL
ASSIST CHINESE IN IMMEDIATE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR AS DEFINED IN CCS 432/1.

D. COUNTRIES TO WHOM NO DISCLOSURE IS PERMITTED.

ALL COUNTRIES NOT LISTED IN A, B, AND C ABOVE.

NOTE: RELEASE TO THE COUNTRIES LISTED IS TO BE CONDITIONAL UPON THEIR TREATING ALL INFORMATION RELEASED ACCORDING TO THE CURRENT
SECURITY GRADING FOR SUCH EQUIPMENT.

ANY OF THESE COUNTRIES MAY BE RECONSIDERED FOR PURPOSES OF RECEIVING EQUIPMENT OR INFORMATION SHOULD CIRCUMSTANCES MAKE IT DESIRABLE TO DO SO.
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

"IVI"

From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces Forward on Continent.
To: War Department
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Nr: FWD 14565  11 September 1944

From SHAEF FORWARD, ref FWD 14565 Top Secret, to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff for info SHAEF MAIN to British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower cite SHGBI this is SCAF number 79

Consider time is approaching when there would be no objection on the part of this headquarters to the release of MULBERRY stories to the press but we are aware there may be security implications affecting other theaters and we shall not release unless so instructed by you. No evidence that details construction, operation or capacity have been compromised and all steps have been taken to continue to safeguard security.

End

FOOTNOTE: This message relayed to OCTAGON.

ACTION: CC/S

INFO: Adm Leahy, Gen Arnold, Gen Somervell, Gen Bissell
Adm King, Log, OPD

CM-IN-11043  (12 Sep 44)  21052  ekk

DECLASSIFIED
J.C.S. Regrading Memo  34 - 71

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
In view leaks to press statement that Robalo is overdue and presumed lost will be released 6 Sept.
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
To: War Department
Nr: F 92072 4 September 1944

To AGWAR F92072 FMB AFHQ to OWI signed Wilson cite FHPWO.

Following is text of statement shortly to be made to Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece by Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean.

It is not-to be released until release date and time, which we shall signal later.

Please arrange to have statement included in transmissions in these languages immediately following release. Text follows.

"The Armies of the United Nations are advancing on all fronts. The Germans are falling back everywhere toward their own frontiers. Very soon all countries in Europe, including the Balkan countries, will be free.

It is reported to me that some persons and some political organizations in the Balkans are assisting the Germans to escape. These persons and organizations are also stopping patriots from performing their duties.

Such actions, of course, directly benefit the Germans. The Allies will not tolerate such persons or political groups giving assistance to the Germans. This war will soon
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

Mr: F 92072 4 September 1944

be over, and when it is over, you may be certain that war
criminals, no matter what nationality, will be punished.
(If there are misguided or badly informed persons or organi-
izations in the Balkans who have in the past, through error,
worked against the real interests of the Allies, let them
desist now before it is too late. The day for reckoning with
Germans, and those who assist Germans, is at hand. You
have your warning."

End

ACTION: 6-2 (OWI)

INFG: GSB
CG AAF
OPD
AIM KING
COL PARK
BPR
LOG

DECLASSIFIED
JOBS memo, 1-4-74
by HBP, MLR, Date

ON-IN-3652 (5 SEp 44) 04292 ms

COPY No. 65

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
To: War Department
Nr: S-58760 30 August 1944

From Supreme Commander. SCAF 69. S-58760

Telegram to Combined Chiefs of Staff on result of operations in northern France between 6 June (D Day) and 25th August. Classification Confidential until date and time of release.

1. The following facts will be released here to the press at 1900 hours double British summer time on 31 August. They may be released in Washington and London at that time and hour.

2. (Report begins) Enemy losses.

The equivalent of five Panzer Divisions have been destroyed and a further six severely mauled, including one Panzer Grenadier Division. The equivalent of 20 Infantry Divisions have been eliminated and a further 12 very badly cut up and have suffered severe losses. Included in this total of Infantry Divisions are three of the enemy's crack parachute divisions. In addition one parachute division and two Infantry divisions have no hope of escape from the fortress ports of Brittany Peninsula in which they are

CN-IN-28224 (30 Aug 44)

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By ESH, ELS, Date MAY 3 1974

0007
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COPY NO. 33

Nr: S-58700  30 August 1944

Marooned. One Infantry Division is isolated in the Channel Islands.

3. Enemy casualties.
Total enemy casualties amount to over 400,000 killed, wounded and prisoners of war, of which over 200,000 are Prisoners of War. 135,000 of these prisoners have been captured since 25 July. The total continues to mount. 1300 enemy tanks and over 20,000 MT have been captured or destroyed. About 500 assault guns and 1500 field and heavier artillery guns have been captured or destroyed. In addition the enemy has suffered very heavy losses in Coast Artillery equipment.

The German Seventh Army and newly formed Fifth Panzer Army have been decisively defeated and into this defeat have been drawn the bulk of the fighting strength of First and Fifteenth Armies. Three Field Marshalls and one Army Commander have either been dismissed or incapacitated by wounds. One Army commander, three Corps Commanders, 15 Divisional Commanders and one Fortress Commander have been either killed or captured.

4. Enemy air losses.
In the air the Luftwaffe has taken a fearful beating. Since 6 June 2478 German aircraft have been destroyed in the air and 1,167 on the ground. In addition, 270 aircraft.
From: CG Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Nr: S-58760  30 August 1944

were probably destroyed and 1,028 aircraft were damaged in the air.

5. Enemy Naval losses.
   At sea the enemy has been unable, in spite of his former boasting, to interfere seriously with the Invasion Forces. Enemy attacks on convoys have been driven off on very many occasions and losses to Allied shipping have been small. Of the enemy's Naval forces, some 300 vessels of all classes have been sunk or heavily damaged by Allied action. In addition, a number of enemy merchant ships have been sunk and the Germans themselves have been forced to scuttle, in their harbors, large numbers of all types of shipping, both Naval and mercantile.

   A large proportion of the enemy's effort has been devoted to attack by mine laying. The sustained work of minesweepers has resulted, within three months in a "Mine-Bag" off the French beaches which totals one tenth of all mines swept in five years in all Theaters of War.

6. Allied team work.
   Allied team work, extending through all services, has again demonstrated its ability to overcome the most adverse kind of conditions in defeating the enemy. Allied units from other countries have fought effectively alongside
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

URGENT

Page 4


Nr: S-58760 30 August 1944

American and British Forces and the FFI have done much valuable work.

The Command System has functioned smoothly in spite of difficulties due to enforced separation of commanders and of poor signal communications due to distances and rapidly changing situation.

Many factors are woven into the warp and woof of this great victory. Among these a few are listed below, with no attempt to give their order of importance.

One was meticulous care in planning and preparation, supported resolutely in all important aspects by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Another was the fact that we achieved some degree of surprise involving place, timing and strength of the attack. The excellence and sufficiency of amphibious equipment, with measures for dealing with beach defenses and obstacles, was also important.

The brilliant preparatory work of the Air Forces, a belief in the effectiveness of which was the very cornerstone of the original invasion conception, began months ago and reached its highest intensity at the very moment of land-}

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RRP, MNR, Date MAY 3 1974

CM-IN-28224 (30 Aug 44)

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COPY NO. 33
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

URGENT

Page 5


Nr: S-58760 30 August 1944

It is my conviction that except for this aerial preparation, including as a specific mission a prolonged campaign against the transportation systems of northwest Europe, the venture could not have logically been undertaken. The air support of Ground Forces has been most effective throughout the campaign. The supply and maintenance services have performed miracles.

But the greatest factor of all has been the fighting qualities of the Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen of the United Nations. Their valor, stamina and devotion to duty have been beyond praise. They will continue to be.

End

ACTION: CC/S
INFO: Adm. Leahy, CGAAF, OPD, Gen Bissell, Adm. King, BFR, Log

CM-IN-28224 (30 Aug 44) 2349Z Jb

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RRF, WLR, Date MAY 3 1974

COPY NO.
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
Joint Chiefs of Staff
77500
25 August 1944

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Number: WAR 86575

To Eisenhower from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

After consideration as indicated in FACS 59, it has been decided on U. S. side that the present time is not appropriate for the issue of the statement which SCAF 55 proposed.

End

ORIGINATOR: JC/8

INFORMATION: Adm. Leahy
CG AAF
OPD
Gen. Bissell
Adm. King
LOG

CM-OUT-86575 (25 Aug 44) 2024Z

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY REQUIRES ADDITION OF WORDS "TOP" TO CLASSIFICATION OF REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE.

PRIORITY

Pro: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces
     London, England

To: War Department

No: 57813

17 August 1944

S-57813 action AGWAR for Surles signed Eisenhower;
          cite SHPRD. Reused W-72750.

Release of artificial harbors in Normandy, has been
under constant review by this Headquarters. Information
will be released when it is clear from German radio or
activity that they are familiar with facts concerning
harbors. War Department will be informed when release is
to be made. All that we can say now is what the Prime
Minister said in his last speech.

End

ACTION: Gen Surles
INFO: Gen Somervell
       OPD
       Gen Bissell
       Log.

CM-IN-15562 (17 Aug 44) 1700Z

DECLASSIFIED
208 memo, 1-4-74
By HFP, MLR, Date MAY 3 1974

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
It is just thirty days since I left Washington but I have been at all times in close touch with the work there and also in daily communication with our forces in the European and Far Eastern theaters of war. It is good to come back to the Puget Sound Navy Yard, for as you know I have been coming here off and on since 1913 or 1914. Since my visit here nearly two years ago I have been glad to know of the splendid progress that is being maintained both here and at many places on the Pacific Coast in turning out ships and planes and munitions of almost every other variety and in the training of men for all of the armed services. So I have thought that you would be interested in a brief summary of my visit to Hawaii and to the Aleutian Islands and Alaska, from which I am about to step foot on shore in the continental United States.

When I got to San Diego, and for three days before going on board ship, I had the opportunity to visit many of the patients in the hospital there, a large number of whom were just back from the fighting in the Marshall and Marianas Islands. And also I witnessed a large practice landing operation on the beaches of Southern California between Los Angeles and San Diego - the kind of warfare which has been so successfully developed by us during the past two years. This is of a wholly new type, requiring all kinds of new equipment and new training, and I think I can safely say that no other nation in the world has worked it out as successfully as we have, as we have shown within the past few weeks in the capture of Saipan and Tinian and the re-capturing of Guam, resulting in new threats against Japan itself and against all of their operations in the Southwest Pacific.

It takes a personal observation of a landing maneuver, such as I saw from a high bluffs overlooking the shore below, to understand how well the application of experience is being carried out. The landing craft - a wholly new type of ship, came to the beach from the transports offshore under a cover of fog. They came on in waves, the Marines and infantry getting the first toe-hold, followed by other waves and then by all manner of equipment, ammunition and wire and tanks, all protected by air coverage, and proceed theoretically by a devastating bombardment from heavy ships lying
offshore. When a beachhead was obtained to a depth of a mile or two there followed the unloading of great quantities of supplies of all kinds, including tanks and trucks and jeeps.

Timing is of the utmost importance in an operation of this kind together with instantaneous communication from the shore to the ships and planes. Here was demonstrated the perfect cooperation between all of the services - Army, Navy and Marines - and to this should be added the teamwork for the immediate care of the wounded and their quick transfer back to the hospital ships. We in our comfortable homes ought to realize that to all troops and Marines who are to conduct a new landing expedition on some far distant island in the Pacific as well as on the coast of France, this amphibious training is being given at a number of places in the United States before the expedition even starts. Hundreds of instructors are required, nearly all men who have participated in actual combat operations beforehand. Many of these instructors will, of course, accompany the troops in the actual operations of future landings.

The cruiser on which I went from San Diego to Hawaii is one of a number of what we call "post-trency" cruisers - much larger and more powerful and faster than the pre-war cruisers, which were limited by treaty to ten thousand tons. This particular ship joined the Pacific Fleet less than a year ago but has already engaged in fifteen operations in the Western and Southwest Pacific. Her's is a magnificent record. Her skipper and crew have brought her through all of those many offensive missions unscathed, and because of the experience thus gained she is an even more powerful weapon than when she was the day she joined the Fleet.

The voyage was uneventful and we arrived at Pearl Harbor on July 26th.

What an amazing change since my visit there ten years ago! Up to that time the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard had maintained a steady growth, like most of our other navy yards, but today it is capable of turning out repairs to the heaviest ships and employs a force nearly ten times as great, many of the mechanics coming from the West Coast. All of the battleships and smaller craft which were sunk or damaged in the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941, have been repaired with the exception of the ARIZONA. In her case, because of the explosion of her forward magazine, salvage was impossible but in her case the main battery of heavy guns was removed and cannibalized and now forms a part of the coastal defenses on the Island of Oahu.

All of the other ships are afloat and in service, most of them having been put back into commission here at Puget Sound and all of them greatly improved in fire power. They have been used in action in the Pacific and elsewhere - one of them indeed, the NoVADA, having taken part in the bombardment of the coast of Normandy prior to and during the landing operations there as late as the sixth of June.

I spent three days on the Island of Oahu and everywhere, as at the navy yard, the war activities have multiplied almost beyond belief.

On the afternoon of my arrival my old friend General Douglas MacArthur arrived by air from New Guinea and we began a series of
interesting and useful conferences accompanied by Admiral Nimitz and my own Chief of Staff, Admiral Leahy, and General Richardson, the Commanding General of Army Forces in the Hawaiian Area and Admiral Halsey, Commander of the Third Fleet.

In these three days we talked about Pacific problems and the best methods of conducting the Pacific campaign in the future. The discussions developed complete accord both in the understanding of the problem that confronts us and in the opinions as to the best methods for its solution. All of us must bear in mind the enormous size of the Pacific area, keeping a mental map of the whole of it in mind.

The Hawaiian Islands used to be considered an outpost. We were not allowed to fortify Guam nor did we fortify Wake or Midway or Samoa.

Today the Hawaiian Islands are no longer a mere outpost. They constitute a major base from which, and from the Pacific Coast, front-line operations are being conducted with far away as the distance between the Coast and Hawaii. The Hawaiian Islands have helped to make possible the victories at Guadalcanal and New Guinea and the Marshall and the Marianas. The Islands will make possible future operations in China, make possible the reoccupation and the independence of the Philippines, and make possible the carrying of war into the home islands of Japan itself and its capital city of Tokyo.

In a few minutes I want to say another word about the future of the Pacific.

During the rest of my stay in Hawaii I visited many activities, including the great airfields, the hospitals, and an ambulance plane at Hickam Field which had just come in with wounded men from Saipan; and I saw a large Army group which was going through a complete course on jungle warfare - an art which we have developed so expertly that our troops are more than a match in the jungle for any Japanese who we have yet to meet.
I am very proud of the basic training and the final training our sons are getting at home and overseas.

After rejoining our ship we headed for the Aleutian Islands, four days later arriving at Adak on one of the more westerly islands of the group. There again I found intense activity at what might be called a nearly completed advanced base. It was from here that a great part of the expeditions for the reoccupation of Attu and Kiska started. Two years ago was a black and practically uninhabited island which, with the other Aleutian Islands, seemed relatively unimportant in the plans for the security of our own continent.

You here can well realize the emotion which followed the Japanese occupation of Attu and Kiska and you may have thought that the Chiefs of Staff in Washington were not paying enough attention to the threat against Alaska and the Coast. We realized, of course, that such a Japanese thrust could become serious if it was unopposed, but we knew also that Japan did not have the naval and air power to carry this into effect without greater resources and a longer time to plan. Preparations to throw the Japanese from their toeholds had been laid even before the Japanese got there, and the rest of the story you know. It took great preparations and heavy fighting to
eject them from Attu and by the time the great expedition to
recapture Kiska got there the Japanese had decided that
discretion was the better part of valor; they decided retire-
ment, and retreat was better for them than hara-kiri. They
abandoned the Aleutians.

The climate at Adak is not the most inviting in the world
but I want to say a word of appreciation to all the officers
and men of all the services who have built up this
case and other bases in the extreme Northwest in such a short
time to a point where the people of our Pacific Coast, of
British Columbia, and of Alaska can feel certain that we are
safe against Japanese invasion on any large scale.

Delayed by fog and rain, we had to give up putting in at
Dutch Harbor but we did stop at Kodiak, a large island off the
end of the Alaskan peninsula. Here, also, the three services
have completed a very excellent, though smaller, base. The
first little town we had seen in Alaskan waters and the first
trees made me think of the coasts of Maine and Newfoundland.

We were told that a number of officers and men at this.end
other ports are considering settling in Alaska after the war
is over. I hope that this is so because the development of
Alaska has only been scratched and it is still the country of
the pioneer. Only a small part of its mineral resources have
been explored and there is, of course, an abundance of fish
camp for the salmon and timber, together with great possibilities for
agriculture. I could not help remembering that the climate,
the crops and other resources are not essentially different
from those of Norway - Sweden and Finland - and the
people of these countries in spite of the cold and, in winter,
the darkness have brought their civilizations to a high and
progressive level. On my return to Washington I intend to
set up a study of Alaskan and the Alaskan Islands as a place
to which many veterans of this war, especially those who do
not have strong roots in their own homes, can go to become
pioneers. It is a land with a small population but which I
am convinced has great opportunities for those who are willing
to work and to help build up all kinds of new things in new
lands.

This trip has given me a chance to talk over the social and
economic future of the Hawaiian Islands with Governor Stanfield
and the future of the people of Alaska with Governor Gruening.
He asked me to assure you that the tone which I have acquired in
the last few days has come from the Alaskan sun. Near Juneau
I played hockey for three hours, went fishing and caught one
halibut and one flounder.

Speaking again of the future of the defense of the Pacific
and the use of its strongpoints in order to prevent attacks on
us - You who live in the Pacific Northwest have realized that
a line for sea and land navigation following the great inland
route from Puget Sound to Siberia and Northern China passes
very close to the Alaskan coast and thence westward along the
line of the Aleutian Islands. From the point of view of
national defense, therefore, it is essential that we control
this route shall be indisputable. Everybody in Siberia and
China knows that we have no ambition to acquire land on the
continent of Asia. We are a people utterly opposed to
aggression or sneak attacks - but we as a people are insistent
that other nations must not under any circumstances through
the foreseeable future omit such attacks against the United States. Therefore, it is essential that we be fully prepared to prevent them for all time to come. The word and the honor of Japan can not be trusted.

That is a simple statement from the military, naval and air point of view. But with the aid of a Japanese threat there is an excellent outlook for a permanent peace in the whole of the Pacific Area. It is, therefore, natural and proper for us to think of the economic and commercial future. It is logical that we should foresee a great interchange of commerce between our shores and those of Siberia and China - and in this commercial development Alaska and the Aleutian Islands become automatic stepping stones for trade, both by water and by cargo planes. And this means the automatic development of transportation to Alaska via British Columbia and as far north as the Yukon.

It is as long as ten years ago that I talked with Mr. Mackenzie King, Prime Minister of Canada, in regard to the development of highways and air routes and even a railroad to Alaska via British Columbia and the Yukon. Great interest in both motions was aroused but it took the war to get quick action. Today the Alaska Highway is practically completed and an air route to Fairbanks enables us to deliver thousands of planes to our ally Russia by way of Alaska, Bering Straits and Siberia. These planes are an important factor in the brilliant and brave advance of the Russian armies on their march to Berlin. And I might observe also that our close relations and true friendship with Canada during these years has proved to be an illustrious example of working hand in hand with your neighbor for the general good.

South of the Alaska-Aleutians route the use of island groups must also be considered for defense and for commerce in getting to and from the American and Asiatic continents. We understand at last the importance of the Hawaiian Islands. It is important that we have other bases - forward bases nearer to Japan than they lie. The same thing is true in regard to the defense of all the American Republics from Mexico past the Panama Canal and all the way down to Chile. There are hundreds of islands in the South Pacific which bear the same relation to South America and the Panama Canal as Hawaii bears to North America. These islands are possessions of the British Empire and the French. They are important commercially just as they are from the defense point of view for they lead to New Zealand, Australia, the Dutch Indies and the Southern Philippines. With all these places we shall undoubtedly have a growing trade.

We have no desire to ask for any possessions of the United Nations. But the United Nations who are working so well with us in the winning of the war will, I am confident, be glad to join with us in protection against aggression and in machinery to prevent aggression. With them and with their help I am sure that we can agree completely so that Central and South America will be as safe against attack from the South Pacific as North America is going to be from the North Pacific itself.

The self-interests of our Allies will be affected by fair and friendly collaboration with us. They too will gain in national security. They will gain economically. The destinies of the peoples of the whole Pacific will for many years be entwined with our own destiny. Already there are stirring among
hundreds of millions of them a desire for the right to work out their own destinies and they show no evidence of seeking to over-run the earth — with one exception.

That exception is and has been for many, many years that of Japan and the Japanese people — because whether or not the people of Japan itself know and approve of what their lords have done for nearly a century, the fact remains that they seem to be giving hearty approval to the Japanese policy of acquisition of their neighbors' lands and a military and economic control of as many other nations as they can lay their hands on. It is an unfortunate fact that other nations can not trust Japan, it is an unfortunate fact that years of proof must pass before we can trust Japan and before we can classify Japan as a member of the society of nations which seek permanent peace and whose word we can take.

In removing the future menace of Japan to us and to our continent we are holding out the hope that other people in the Far East can be freed from the same threat. The people of the Philippines never have wished and never will wish to be slaves to Japan. And the same thing is true of the peoples of Korea, that ancient kingdom which was over-run by the Japanese half a century ago, the peoples of Manchuria and all the rest of China. The same thing is true of the peoples of Indo-China, the people of Siam, the peoples of Java and even the most primitive peoples of New Guinea and of the so-called mandated islands which we are in the splendid process of throwing the Japanese out of.

I am glad to have the opportunity of taking this short trip, first for the conferences with General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz and secondly for the first-hand view of certain bases which are of vital importance to the ending of the war and to the prevention in the future of any similar attack.

More than a million of our troops are overseas in the Pacific, the war is well in hand in this vast area but I can not tell you if I knew when the war will be over either in Europe or in the Far East or the war against Japan.

It will be over the sooner if the people of this country will maintain the looking of the necessary supplies and ships and planes. By so doing we will hasten the day of peace. By so doing we will save our own pocketbooks and those of our children; by so doing we will save the lives of our sons and by so doing we will run a better chance of substantial unity among the United Nations in laying more securely the foundation of a lasting peace.

-9-
25 July 1944

Commanding General
USAF Central Pacific Area
Fort Shafter, T. H.

Number WAR 70928

For Richardson from Marshall

Glance your [redacted] R 23199 dated 23 July 44.

Does CINCPAC concur in your request to announce to Army and Navy the presence of the advanced echelon of the 10th Army in your area? Since the rear echelon is to be dispatched to your area in the latter part of August or early September would it not be advisable for security reasons to withhold announcement of the location of the 10th Army until this move is completed? Administration could be facilitated by the assignment of a separate APO number to the forward echelon of the 10th Army.

End

ORIGINATOR: OPD
INFORMATION: Gen Lear
Adm King
Cofs

ON-OUT-70928 (26 Jul 44)

ACTION: F-1

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

COPY No. 14
From: Rear Echelon General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Brisbane, Australia.

To: War Department

Nr: C 14977 17 July 1944

From GHQ SWPA sgd MacArthur C 14977 to Chief of Staff War Department.

Replying your W 65257 14th. I favor release at the discretion of a theatre commander of substantiated reports of atrocities committed by the enemy.

End

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: G-1
BFR
GUB/W
Log

CM-IN-13686 (17 Jul 44) 0653Z bjm
URDIS 152300.

ADmiralty propose release 1830 GMT Thursday, July 13, following communiqué:

THE BOARD OF ADMIRALTY REGRET TO ANNOUNCE THE FOLLOWING LOSSES IN ALLIED OPERATIONS FOR THE LIBERATION OF EUROPE. THE NEXT OF KIN OF CASUALTIES HAVE BEEN INFORMED.

DESTROYERS: HMS BOADICEA (LTCR F. W. HAWKINS RN)
HMS SHIELD (LTCR J. R. GOWER RN)
HNRMS SVENNER.

FRIGATES: HMS MOURNE (LTCR R. S. HOLLAND RD RN)
HMS BLACKWOOD (LTCR L. T. SLY RD RN)
HMS LAWFORD (LTCR H. C. MORRIS RN)
TRAILER:  HMS LORD AUSTIN (LIEUT. E. S. T. ROBINSON RNVR)
AUXILIARY:  HMS MINSTER (ACT LTCDR W. JACKSON RNFR)

ADMIRALTY SUGGESTS SIMULTANEOUS ANNOUNCEMENT BY NAVY DEPT OF
AMERICAN LOSSES AS OUTLINED YOUR DESPATCH. ADVISE.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
DEC 10 1973
NAVY DEPARTMENT PREPARED TO RELEASE TO PUBLIC AS RESULT OF ENEMY ACTION CURRENT OPERATION LOSS OF CORRY, MEREDITH, GLENNON, SUSAN B. ANTHONY, TIDE, PARTRIDGE AND RICH. WHAT IS INTENTION OF ADMIRALTY REGARDING BRITISH LOSSES. NAVY DEPARTMENT WILLING COORDINATE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT RESPECTIVE LOSSES. ADVISE.

SECRET

REMASTER
R.O. 11665, Sec. 9(e) and 9(f) or (g)
OSD letter, May 8, DECEMBER 10 1973

RIP, NARX 0007

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 7(e) 4 NAVREG.)
OPNAV 19-67
From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria.

To: War Department.

No: F 68149. 4 July 1944.

Re W 58685 from Thomson F 68149 FWB to OWI Thomson and FWB for Woodward Jackson Sherwood signed Wilson cite FHPWO.

Have had conversation with Henri Bonnet concerning hard reports of execution of German prisoners by FFI. French would like Allied radio to carry such hard reports factually avoiding commentaries on subject or speculation on consequences of action reported. For your information such executions bear direct relation to treatment FFI prisoners taken by Germans.

There are reports that the Kommandantur in certain sectors has accorded de facto recognition of regular military status of FFI prisoners. FFI hope such de facto recognition will be developed and therefore taking measures they consider necessary to promote such recognition which may occasionally involve executions as reported. They only desire that German high command should have knowledge of this fact but they wish avoid all unnecessary provocation.

Hence recommend sober factual treatment of news.

End.

ACTION: G-2 (OWI)
INFO: OPD (SOL PARK) LOG
CM-IN-3109 (4 Jul 44) 2017Z

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHF, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: CG, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces
Caserta, Italy

To: War Department

No: 22494 26 June 1944

To Arnold from Baker cite 22494.

At a special press conference held yesterday at 15th
Air Force General Salinas told correspondents that he had
been impressed by the organization and efficiency of the 15th
Air Force on every level. In answer to a correspondents
inquiry, he said that plans were underway for the training
of a Mexican Air Force unit in the United States for
service in this theater.

I have put a censorship on the above statement until
I get a definite clearance from you to release it.

End

ACTION: CG AAF

INFO: OPD

Col. Park

BPR

Log

CM-IN-21460 (26 Jun 44) 1208Z vhs

000.7
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

IMMEDIATE 21 June 1944

From: Chiefs of Staff
To: AFRHQ Algiers
Info: J.S.M. Washington
COSMED 132

Following from Chiefs of Staff.
Question of publishing Italian long armistice terms is again under consideration. Military objections seem now to carry less weight. What are your views?

End
T.O.O. 211026A

ACTION: CC/S
INFO: Gen Arnold
     OPD
     Gen Bissell
     Adm King
     Col Parnell
     Gen Hildring
     Log

CM-IN-17504 (22 Jun 44) 02072 JB

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of SM 522 - 71
8/12/71
By RAC Date DEC 10 1973

370 Italy

COPY NO.
To: War Department
Nr. 13355
Sr nr 13355.

17 June 1944

Invasion, French problem and pilotless aircraft raids principal subjects discussed in London during past week. Churchill staved off Commons debate on French relations Wednesday but press campaign for recognition FONL as provincial Govt continues and papers have prominently reported De Gaulle reception in Normandy. Press emphasizes potential threat post war Anglo-French relations of failure to deal correctly with current situation. Secret weapon raids calmly accepted as act of desperation on Germans part. Several newspapers advise against diverting any air strength from crucial invasion front to bomb pilotless aircraft installations because raids are uncomfortable but not vital to final issue. Friday home secretary Herbert Morrison successfully defended in Parliament his administration defense regulation 18B which authorizes imprisonment without trial persons deemed dangerous to national security including 1 MP Captain Ramsay. Morrison reported in 10 months prior 31 May detainers reduced from 429 to 226. Contrasts with 1426 in August 1940 which was maximum. B29 raids on Japan prominently reported British press. Current question of week: When will Stalin open first front?

End.

ACTION: G-2
INFORMATION: OG AAF, OPD, Col Park, Log.
CM-IN-14750 (18 Jun 44) 10592 bjm
From: Joint Staff Mission
To: Chiefs of Staff
Rptd: Middle East for Commanders-in-Chief and AFHQ for General Wilson
Nr: J.S.M. 101

14 June 1944
Reference J.S.M. 97

Washington Evening Star of June 13th carries article stating that Marshal Tito, after being compelled to flee from Yugoslavia, has now returned to "one of the Yugoslavian islands in the Adriatic where he is attempting to re-organize his headquarters".

T.O.O. 1419517

Note: JSM 97 is CM-IN-10035 (13 Jun 44) 008

ACTION: GCS
INFO: General Arnold
       OPD
       General Bissell
       Admiral King
       Colonial Park

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 1-17-73
BY MG DATE DEC 10 1973

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
DEC 10 1973

CM-IN-11692 (15 Jun 44) 0251Z

COPY NO. 31

000.7

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
To: War Department
Nr: 13297 12 June 1944
Sr nr 13297.

British press continues demand for agreement with French National Committee on civil affairs administration. The Times in leading editorial today repeats arguments that De Gaulle organization has as good or better claim to recognition than other exile governments, that no alternative authority exists, and that present situation jeopardizing French military aid. Issuance invasion currency without prior agreement criticized in several papers. Behind British concern over present situation is desire for strong and friendly France after war and fear that current policy will embitter Frenchmen toward their liberators.

End.

ACTION: G-2
INFO: CG AAF
OPD

CM-IN-9694 (12 Jun 44) 1500Z ejm

DEC 10 1973

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Moscow
To: Secretary of State, Washington
Dated: 9 June 1944
Number: 2063

The Russian Press during May.

In the course of this month the usual hesitation of the Soviet press between friendliness and confidence in their Allies and distrust of the motives of the capitalist world and its reactionaries, inclined more toward friendliness than has previously been the case. The offensive in Italy and the increased preparations for invasion produced better appreciation of the military contribution which the Allies are making against the Fascists.

It became more apparent also that the USSR wishes to continue and broaden her political cooperation at this time, and in the days of peace. There were editorials on the second year of the treaty between Britain and Russia which stressed the success of collaboration over such matters as Italy and the warning which was issued jointly to the satellites of Germany. The press was more reserved toward international organization which is being planned, such as projects for a world currency. The newspapers made it clear that the peculiar nature of Soviet economics and finance must be taken into consideration even though Russia has now renounced the reticence which she used to preserve.

CM-IN-10067

(13 June 1944)
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Page 2

From: Moscow

Nr: 2063

9 June 1944

Adverse criticism was expressed in treatment of
the British and U.S. policy toward France, and in the hand-
ling of the Fascist trials in the U.S. There were indications
that those who direct Russian public opinion desire to pre-
serve fear of the reactionaries and Fascists who have centers
in all the states except in the USSR.

The principal interest in Europe was focussed on
Yugoslavia and Poland. It is quite evident that Russia will
consider popular movements in those countries as the only
representative groups. In other places the press persisted
in praising the Fatherland Front in Bulgaria, the Partisans
in Italy, and so on.

There were some significant signs that there might
be a rapprochement with the Vatican and the Catholic Church
in reports of what Father Orelenski said in Moscow and New
York when he declared that Stalin favored the Catholic
Church and was opposed to any persecution of it in the USSR.

The press has urged increased war production at home
and stressed more and more the need for reconstruction.

Two themes were interwoven into this domestic prop-
aganda. In one, the unique characteristics of the Soviet
system were played up. It was declared that once a decision
has been made by the Party the members are obliged to support
this without dissent. Exhortations were made on the need for
making a study of the theories of Marx and Lenin; there was
one important article which summed up in a favorable fashion
the year's work of the newly organised primary Party groups
inside the Army. It is rather significant that most of the
material printed on the political activity of the Party was
concerned with the Army. In the armed forces there are millions
of peasants and new Party members by the hundreds of thousands
who require indoctrination.

CM-IN-10047 (13 June 44)

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date DEC 10 1973

COPY NO. 28

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Moscow

No: 2063 9 June 1944

The second theme which was interwoven was expression of pride in the victories and achievements of Russia in past and present. In articles on ideology much was said about the superiority of Russian culture to that of the Germans.

Along with these themes was expression of Soviet patriotism (sic) which the papers claim is the finest now existing in this world. There is the "new Soviet man" who is representative of this. In the paper of the Komsomols there was an article which demanded that writers should form a new "modern hero" who will possess all these virtues.

Bardin (Ambassador)
9 53516 PERSONAL FOR GENERAL MONARNEY FROM FRANK MOGARTNTRY SIGNED EISENHOWER CITE SHGS.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WISH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT RELEASED TO THE PRESS AT ONCE NO MATTER WHAT TIME OF NIGHT OR DAY.

"THE UNITED STATES JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, GENERAL MARSHALL, ADMIRAL KING, AND GENERAL ARNOLD, ARRIVED IN ENGLAND FRIDAY, JUNE 9TH."

CM IN 7316 COMINCH...COG

SUPERS...07R...CNO...NAVADM...00...200P...

CONFIDENTIAL
From: CG Strategic Air Forces in Europe London England
To: War Department
Br: U 63028 6 June 1944
To Arnold and Spaatz U 63028.
Correction on Page 2, line 2.

"Story has now come from Stockholm that 5 American airmen were lynched yesterday by angry mobs before police could interfere. There is no confirmation of this story and it is felt it may well be part of a new line of propaganda to which Goebbels has now resorted. It would be much appreciated if you would refrain from publishing it until we have confirmation it is true."

End

Supplement to CH-IN-1115 (2 Jun 44) BFR

ACTION: BFR

INFO: CG AAF
OPD

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11682, Sec. 3(E) and 6(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1973
By RHP, NARS Date: DEC 10 1973

CH-IN-6735 (6 Jun 44) 1910z msg

COPY NO. 42

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Number: WAR 46193

Eisenhower for Betts from Bissell WDGBI signed Marshall reur 53139 of June 4th and WAR 46156 same date.

Erroneous Associated Press flash is subject of this cable. Action by Combined Chief's Staff not considered necessary unless desired by Supreme Commander.

End

ORIGINATOR: Gen Bissell
INFORMATION: OPD
ADM King
Log
CM-CUT-46193 (4 Jun 44) 1908Z amb

COPY No. 25

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Number: WAR 46156

To Eisenhower for Betts cite SHOBI from Bissell WDGBI
signed Marshall reference your 53139.

Erroneous Associated Press flash was carried on
all major radio networks, short waved to Europe, and
disseminated by wire and radio channels throughout
Western Hemisphere before flashes to withhold publication
and acknowledging error were received. Denials followed
over same channels and newspapers ran accounts relating
circumstances of transmission error. Public reaction this
Hemisphere was initial excitement and continuing confusion
lasting several hours after first flash. Signal Corps
monitoring of foreign frequencies negative except for
same German broadcast reported by you. Reaction Combined
Chiefs of Staff will be furnished soon as available.

End.

ORIGINATOR: General Bissell

INFORMATION: General Arnold

CCS
OPD

Col. Park
Gen. Surles
LOG

CM-OUT-46156 (4 Jun 44) 0914Z ejv

000,7

COPY No. 23

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

URGENT

To: War Department
Nr: S-53139
4 June 1944

From SAFF, S-53139, to A/QWAR rpt to SHAEF CP to Marshall for Bissell from Betts signed Eisenhower cite SHGBI BYGO?

Through error Associated Press sent by radio the following message from London to the United States at 2237Z Saturday night, 3rd June 44. "Eisenhower’s HQ announce Allied landings in France". Story cancelled by AP by 2300Z with explanation that Joan Ellis, AP employee, while practicing setting type, set up the above message. A Russian communiqué was received by AP London and forwarded to the U.S. mistakenly including in it the above message. This AP release was broadcast over the Columbia Broadcasting System which reportedly cancelled the news upon advice from AP London. EBC Monitoring System picked up German Tel Service trans ocean broadcast of the above AP release and cancellation at 0150Z, 4th June 44. Request immediate confirmation of broadcast news in the U.S. together with comments and recommendations of the Combined Chief of Staff. Request immediate acknowledgement receipt of this message.

Footnote: Acknowledgement of receipt of this message was made by WDCMC at 0526Z.

ACTION: General Bissell
INFO: CC/S, General Arnold, General Handy, Colonel Park, General Surles, Log

CM-IN-2647 (4 June 44) 0526Z bes

DECLASSIFIED
JCS LETTER 74-72
BY MT. DATE DEC 10 1973

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
Summary of Statement to the Press by Mr. Stimson, 1 June 1944.

With 3,657,000* Army troops now overseas, "the period of decisive action is at hand."

Build-up of troops has followed over-all strategy laid down by JCS:

1. Initial shipments were to prevent further enemy expansion.
2. Means were then shipped to eliminate outer defenses and prepare bases for final phase of decisive action.
3. Hence Air Force and Service Force build-up came first and is now on decline after reaching its peak.
4. Final phase depends on Ground Forces, whose movement overseas will increase. "Increasing numbers of ground forces in England are now waiting to engage in battle."

Statistics.

Men overseas by end of this year - 5,000,000, or 2/3 strength.

Almost half of 2,357,000 Air Force strength now overseas.

More than half of 34,000 AAF combat planes overseas out of total of more than 75,000 planes.

AAF bases overseas - 925.

U.S. Forces overseas now exceed by 1,571,000 peak strength AEF, World War I.

Only 1,466,000, or 21% strength overseas year ago.

4,000,000 tons Army cargo shipped in May, 1944, nearly twice that a year ago same month.

* Figure checks closely with Status Report, dated 25 May 1944.
3. My plan in the present battle was designed first of all to take advantage of the situation into which the enemy had been forced. As a consequence of their defeat they were unable to operate effectively against our occupation of the territory that the enemy had vacated. The only advantage we are now reaping is the advantage of the enemy's defeat. The enemy's defeat has, in turn, the advantage of the concentration of our forces, and the concentration of our forces enables us to use the enemy's defeat to our advantage.

4. You will remember that when I spoke to you some time ago about the landing of American troops in France, I said that all amphibious operations were in the air. The landing at the moment has been undertaken because it is not a new operation that has been undertaken. The landing at the moment has been undertaken because the necessity for it has been created by the enemy's defeat.

5. Keep fighting on both the north and the south fronts.

[Signature]
May 29, 1944

Incoming Classified Message

War Department
been manoeuvred by the Anzio landing and by the heavy winter fighting on the Cassino and Garigliano fronts to destroy the right wing of the 10th German Army by pincer movement between the main front and the bridgehead and then to drive what remained and the 14th German Army north of Yugoslavia. You have seen for yourselves to what extent this plan has so far been successful.

4. No plan for landing operations can ever be completed unless it takes full account of the air situation and is framed in such a way as to take every advantage of the air support available. Throughout April and early May the Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force supported by the 15th American Air Force attacked the enemy's rail and road communications interfering with his supply system and so reducing his fighting capacity. Since the battle began those operations have been coupled with relentless air attacks on gun positions, troop concentrations, road communications and convoys in the battle area. Throughout the fighting the co-operation between land and air forces has been excellent.

5. Co-operation between the two armies has been of the same high order. The regrouping of the armies to produce the offensive mass required to break the Gustav and Hitler lines on the narrow front between mountains and sea was no mean feat. It called for the very highest standard of goodwill and that has always been forthcoming. So too since fighting began everywhere I see evidence of that wonderful spirit of give and take which pervades the whole of the Allied Armies in Italy. The 5th and 8th Armies are two of the finest fighting machines the world has ever seen and they fight together as one. I am immensely proud of them both and of the fine spirit of comradeship and high sense of common duty which they share with the Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force.

CM-III-23058   (30 May 44)
6. The Allied Navies have given every assistance to land operations. By their courage and skill they have not only maintained our armies in the Anzio Bridgehead since landing but have built up the large reserves of supplies and ammunition needed for the battle that is now raging. Bombarding by warships has also been a great help in repelling attacks on bridgehead and in support of land forces operating in coastal area in this offensive.

7. The Germans are still very strongly entrenched in the fortress of Europe. In this war we have got to dig them out and destroy our armed forces. That means fighting, hard and bitter fighting. However good the plan, however well it may be prepared, once the battle is joined it can only be won by dogged determined fighting. We have made a good start. We have destroyed blank German divisions and severely mauled blank more. We have captured blank prisoners. But there is much to be done and the Allied Armies in Italy will go on raining blow after blow on the enemy. We shall go on digging them out and destroying them till our duty is done.

(Cabinet ?) request that approval be given at earliest possible moment.

T.O.O. 291510Z

ACTION: OC/S
INFO: Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
SGS
Adm King
Col Park
LOG

CM-IN-23052 (30 May 44) 1517Z hrt

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO, 1417-72
BY RT, DAT.
DEC 10 1973

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
CHIEF CABLE CENSOR FROM COMNAVEU - FOR PRICE FROM PATTERTON.

ADMIRAL THOMSON ADVISES FOLLOWING PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL LETTER HAS BEEN ISSUED TODAY TO THE BRITISH PRESS:

"IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVASION THERE IS TO BE AN ADDITIONAL BBC PROGRAM FOR THE FORCES. PLEASE ON SECURITY GROUNDS MAKE NO REFERENCE WHATEVER TO THIS."

ADMIRAL THOMSON ASKS YOU TO APPRECIATE THAT THE NEW PROGRAM WILL BE A JOINT ANGLO-AMERICAN AFFAIR AND THAT THE PREPARATIONS FOR IT NOW BEING MADE ARE KNOWN IN CERTAIN QUARTERS IN THE USA. ALSO THAT IF THE ENEMY HAS THIS INFORMATION HE CAN MAKE USE OF OTHER KNOWLEDGE WHICH HE NOW MUST HAVE ABOUT CERTAIN BBC
TOGETHER THEY WOULD PROVIDE HIM WITH INFORMATION OF GREAT IMPORTANCE. IT IS REQUESTED THEREFORE THAT YOU WILL ISSUE A SIMILAR DIRECTIVE TO UNITED STATES EDITORS.

NRP/8

RELASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(e) and 5(D) or (B)
OSD Letter, May 3, 1972

RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 72

ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:

CHIEF CABLE CENSOR(1)....ACT
ADD NAVADE(2)....(PER OP20)

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3 F-I OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

To: War Department

No. E28401 18 May 1944

From Conrad signed Eisenhower ref No. E 28401 for Joint Chiefs of Staff reur WAR 34261/9 svc-3998.

Proposed plan of Mr. Byron Price to Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed and approved by all concerned this theater as follows.

All service mail of United States forces including V mail and parcels destined for the continental United States will be subjected forthwith to an artificial United delay of 10 days, to be effected in the United States. All APO traffic from United Kingdom to western hemisphere, outside of continental United States, to be delayed at

RECLASSIFIED
RG 1168, Sec. 3(E) and 4(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 4, 1972
By RHP, Mars 30, DEC 10, 1973

CM-IN-13724 (18 May 44)

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

No. E 28401 18 May 1944 Page 2

source. APO mail to Africa and Middle East not delayed. This conforms exactly with British policy.

Discontinuance of transmission by cable or radio of Expeditionary Force messages has already been accomplished. Senders composition messages 100 per cent base censored and since no delay imposed on similar type civilian traffic it is not deemed necessary to discontinue their transmission.

Practice of passing through military censorship by means of press dispatches of personal messages from soldiers or sailors overseas will be stopped immediately.

Practice of permitting military personal overseas

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11662, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1973

CM-IN-13724 (18 May 44)

COPY NO.

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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

PRIORITY

No. E 28401 18 May 1944 Page 3

To appear on exchange international broadcasts and send personal messages over the air will be prohibited effective immediately.

No Sig.

ACTION: JC/S
INFORMATION: CGAAF, OPD, G-2, Adm. King, Col. Park, BPR, Log

CM-IN-13724 (18 May 44) 1946Z jb/ojv
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE
P-R-I-O-R-I-T-Y

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria.
To: War Department
No: Unnumbered. 12 May 1944.

Hall FMB to OWI AGWAR and OWI FWE USFOR signed Wilson cite FHPWO ALWAE 12917.

There follows special directive on military developments in Italy. "The new Allied push must be reported factually following the information provided in the communiques. We should use Correspondents stories describing the fighting and emphasizing the aggressive spirit and confidence of the United Nations Armies. We must however avoid all speculation both as to the outcome and the strategic objectives of the operation. We must avoid presenting it as the battle for Rome or as an attempt to close the bridgehead. This means that both in our news presentation and in our military commentaries the offensive should not be dramatized. No invidious comparison to be made between the 8th and 5th Armies and the FEC.

Special attention Italian radio broadcasts:

1. Background.

We appreciate that resistance groups in Italy can only function for a short space of time unless conditions are really favorable and unless dramatic news can be given them to encourage their efforts.
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria.

To: Unnumbered.

12 May 1944.


We use every direct and indirect means to restrain resistance groups until substantial success has been achieved by the operation which shows that the battle is swinging in our favor. This period of waiting depends upon the course of military events and a new directive will be given when and if the time comes for us to incite the resistance groups to a supreme effort. It is most important that the above directive be scrupulously observed.

No Sig.

ACTION: Gen Bissell (OWI)

INFORMATION: CC/S

Gen Arnold
OPD
SGS
Col Park
Gen Surles
LOG

CM-IN-9054 (12 May 44) 1959Z wmd

DECLASSIFIED
JCS LETTER, 7-8-72
BY MT. DATE
DEC 10 1973
TEXT OF DECLARATION BY THE AMERICAN, BRITISH AND SOVIET GOVERNMENTS REGARDING THE FOUR AXIS SATELLITES -- HUNGARY, RUMANIA, BULGARIA AND FINLAND

Through the fateful policy of their leaders, the people of Hungary are suffering the humiliation of German occupation. Rumania is still bound to the Nazis in a war now bringing devastation to its own people. The Governments of Bulgaria and Finland have placed their countries in the service of Germany and remain in the war at Germany's side.

The Governments of Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States think it right that these peoples should realize the following facts:

1. The Axis satellites, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Finland, despite their realization of the inevitability of a crushing Nazi defeat and their desire to get out of the war are by their present policies and attitudes contributing materially to the strength of the German war machine.

2. These nations still have it within their power, by withdrawing from the war and ceasing their collaboration with Germany and by resisting the forces of Nazism by every possible means, to shorten the European struggle, diminish their own ultimate sacrifices and contribute to the Allied victory.

3. While these nations cannot escape their responsibility for having participated in the war at the side of Nazi Germany, the longer they continue at war in collaboration with Germany the more disastrous will be the consequences to them and the more rigorous will be the terms which will be imposed upon them.

4. These nations must therefore decide now whether they intend to persist in their present hopeless and calamitous policy of opposing the inevitable Allied victory, while there is yet time for them to contribute to that victory.

***
PRIORITY

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria
To: War Department
No. F 44250, 11 May 1944

F 44250 to AGWAR for Surles and OH # to Troopers for D # to USFOR for PWE from Wilson cite FHINC.

To Public Relations Officers and Censors in connection with Spring Campaign.

1. The Commander in Chief AAI attaches very considerable importance to the correct representation to the public by the press and the news services generally of the operations about to be undertaken in Italy. A correct representation will raise morale and facilitate success whereas the reverse may easily damage morale and the present excellent relationship which exists between American and British Troops.

2. The Commander in Chief AAI realises that after a period of scanty news from the battle fronts in Europe that the opening of the battle in Italy may be seized upon by the press to fill the headlines without guidance from the start, unwise statements may appear and there may be a tendency to magnify early successes and anticipate events without building up in the minds of the public a true picture of the problem that confronts the Allied Armies in Italy. It would be most unfortunate if these had to be corrected later.

3. It is thought therefore, that the following guidance for all those responsible for briefing correspondents no matter how far removed from the battlefield, will be useful and will help the press and news services to keep in line with realities.

4. When the news of the opening of the battle in Italy is first released, stress should be laid on the magnitude of the task without anticipating either the early junction with the bridgehead and still less the early capture of...

CM-IN-8287 (11 May 44) DECLASSIFIED

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3 1974
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Page #2

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

No. F 44250, 11 May 1944

Rome,

5. The attack should be presented as an attack against the Gustav Line and publicity should be given to the natural strength of this position which has been increased by concrete and field works for many months throughout the winter. Particulars of the Gustav Line will be given in on record.

6. The Gustav Line is considered to be the strongest line across Italy and represents the outer defense of Hitler's European Fortress in this Theater.

7. Behind the Gustav Line there is another very strong natural defensive position which the German military engineers have prepared for weeks past and strengthened to their utmost. To this line Hitler has given his name. It is considered that Hitler would not have given his name to such a line if he did not think that it was almost impregnable, as nothing would be so damaging to German morale as the breaking of the line which bears the Fuhrer's name. German troops will no doubt be ordered to hold the Hitler Line to the last man.

8. Even behind the Hitler Line the mountains which flank the road to Rome lend themselves to magnificent defensive positions and it is more than probable that even after the Hitler Line has fallen, one if not more fierce battles will be necessary before the Tiber is reached. The crossing of the Tiber against opposition will also be a most formidable task.

9. The Allied Armies in Italy are fully conscious of the magnitude of their task and that they are about to contribute greatly to the overall plan in the coming assault on the Fortress of Germany. It is as well, therefore, if the public have as clear a picture of the problem as possible.

CM-M-6687 (11 May 44)
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

No.  F 44250, 11 May 1944

do themselves. No one in Italy expects to give the world news of spectacular advances as was the case in the North African Campaign. They do, however, expect to give the news after heavy fighting, of the breaking of successive defensive positions in Italy into the German Fortress. Progress must, by the nature of the country, be slow. It must be judged not in terms of miles, but by defense lines broken, strong points captured and the destruction of German soldiers and equipment which will be needed to man the successive defense lines in the rear.

10. As soon as the battle starts news will be available of the regrouping of the Armies in Italy which has taken place during the last 2 months in order to assemble our forces and to accumulate reserves for the battle envisaged months ago, has been executed in a most skillful manner and completed without any enemy interference. No news of this could be released at the time for security reasons but the rather uneventful news from Italy has covered a period of intense military activity behind our lines. Publicity should therefore, be given to this and all the difficulties of the winter climate with snow, mud and rain which seriously interfered with movement and entailed considerable hardships on all the troops involved, should be recalled. In writing up this aspect the greatest care must however be taken to avoid disclosing or even indicating the present strength of the Armies in terms of Divisions or numbers of any kind.

11. The relationships between the 5th American Army and the 8th British Army are extremely good on all levels. Mutual confidence in each other's ability has been built up. This mutual confidence is probably the greatest asset we have in winning the War. What has been
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

No.  F 44250, 11 May 1944

achieved among Allies in Italy in this respect should be given publicity as an example which savours well for equal success on all other fronts. The Allied cause would be very seriously damaged if there were any unfavourable comparisons drawn between previous failures against certain sectors of the Gustav Line in less strength under winter conditions by one army and success in the same sector by another army under totally different conditions.

12. The enemy is fully conscious of his exposed flanks and may well be apprehensive of another sea or airborne landing to prevent his withdrawal when the time comes.

The press must, therefore, assist by not speculating as to the way this campaign will be fought, they must not attempt to forecast our future possible objectives or prejudge our prospects of success. These points are of the very greatest importance at all stages of the coming campaign.

13. To sum up, therefore, the following Do's and Don'ts apply:

Do's:

Portray a clear picture of the successive enemy defense lines.

Build up in the minds of the public the strength of each as they are approached upon which guidance will be given.

As each one is broken, proclaim it as a success as opening the way not to Rome or some more distant objective but to the next line of the fortress which is not many miles behind.

CM-IN-8287  (11 May 44)
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria
No. P 44350, 11 May 1944

The strength of the Hitler Line could well be magnified and in any case shown as greater than that of the Gustav Line.

The breaking of this line can then be used by us as great propaganda value to the enemy.

Don'ts:

Don't compare this Summer Campaign with desert warfare which almost always resulted in a spectacular advance after a successful battle before the enemy could stabilize again a long distance to his rear.

Don't expect a large number of prisoners to be taken as this country is unsuited to quick maneuver which alone results in the capture of much men and material.

Don't draw comparisons between success now and previous failures.

Don't speculate on the future conduct of the campaign.

Don't measure success in terms of some distant objective.

Don't magnify early successes, Play * the opening stages and as each successive line is broken proclaim the success in crescendo.

* Being Serviced.

ACTION: Gen Surles
INFO: Gen Handy, Gen Bissell for CWO, SGS, Log

DECLASSIFIED

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN.
Outgoing Classified Message

Joint Chiefs of Staff
71469

May 9, 1944

Commanding General
USAF in European Theater of Operations
London, England

Number WAR 34281

To Eisenhower for action from Joint Chiefs of Staff

Security measures for impending operations is subject of this dispatch which please pass to Commander U.S. Naval Forces in Europe.

The director of censorship, Mr. Byron Price, has suggested to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the following be urgently accomplished to eliminate dangers to security:

(A) Arbitrary delay at the source for at least 10 days of all mail including V-mail from Allied Military Personnel in U.K. to western hemisphere excluding U.S. To points in eastern hemisphere outside U.K. such mail would be delayed for 30 days. For mail addressed to U.S. the delay to be effected in the U.S. by Army and Navy Postal Services and from date you designate.

(B) Discontinuance of transmission by cable or radio in either direction of Expeditionary Force (fixed-text) messages (EFM) and senders' composition message.

(C) Ending practice of passing through Military censorship by means of press dispatches of personal messages from soldiers or sailors overseas.

(D) Discontinuance of practice of permitting Military Personnel overseas to appear on Exchange International Broadcasts and send personal messages over the air

Joint Security Control recommends approval of these measures.

DECLASSIFIED

CM-OUT-34281 (9 May 44) By RHP, NLR, Date 3-1974

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
The Joint Chiefs of Staff realize the seriousness of this situation, forward the suggestions of Mr. Price, and authorize such action as you deem appropriate. It is urgent that you give us your comments and advise us of action taken so that we may inform Mr. Price.

ORIGINATOR: JC/S
INFORMATION: General Arnold
OFD
General Bissell
Admiral King
Colonel Park
General Surles
LOG

CM-OUT-34281 (9 May 44) 2155Z mw

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

COPY No. 29
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
FROM: STATE DEPARTMENT
TO: CHIO

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM LONDON DATED APRIL 24 1944

RECD 855 PM
3361 24TH

ADMIRAL KING'S REPORT TO SECRETARY OF NAVY IS WIDELY REPORTED IN LONDON PRESS TODAY. ARTICLE BY NAVAL CORRESPONDENT OF TIMES REFERRING TO ADMIRAL KING'S CHAPTER ON ESSENTIAL CHARACTER OF THAT SPIRIT THROUGHOUT ALL ARMS AND SERVICES IN CURRENT OPERATIONS, DECLARES THAT THIS IS INDEED DOMINANT NOTE OF HIS WHOLE REPORT, AND THAT "IT IS EVIDENT THAT IN THE VITAL PROVINCE OF INTEGRATION OF THE SEPARATE SERVICES, THE U.S. FORCES HAVE MADE PROGRESS WHICH COULD WITH ADVANTAGE BE EMULATED BY THEIR ALLIES." EDITORIAL IN DAILY TELEGRAPH ASSERTS THAT ADMIRAL KING, IN HIS WAR PROGRESS REPORT, HAS PROVIDED ANOTHER BLOW TO THE ENEMY. CALLING HIS NARRATIVE "BOTH REMARKABLE AND ILLUMINATING" EDITORIAL STATES THAT "WE SHOULD BE UNRACIOUS IF WE DID NOT PAY THE HIGHEST TRIBUTE, AS A SEA-FARING NATION OURSELVES, TO THE MAGNIFICENT ACHIEVEMENT OF THE U.S."

(SIGNED) WHISNANT

DIST BY LT WIDJAH

STATE FILE 600.7

Copy 8 President for Press.
Copy held in Maps Room

1. Alice LOW
   Navy 5945
2. Commander Campbell 6184
3. John Coffee 2291
ADDRESS BY
REAR ADMIRAL FRANCIS S. LOW, U.S.N.
CHIEF OF STAFF TENTH FLEET
BEFORE
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS
22 APRIL 1944
WASHINGTON, D. C.
ADMIRAL LOW:

Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen:
I am deeply honored by the opportunity to present to
such a distinguished body of leaders of the American Press certain
features of the status of the anti-U-boat war today.

Those of us charged with carrying on the fight against
the U-boat have had to do our best to appear before the public only
as "the little man who wasn't there." In our few and unavoidable
contacts with the Press, we have found it to be in the National
interest to give the impression that we were strange and curious
individuals whose vocabulary consisted of only one word -- and that
word was "no."

On this occasion I wish to correct that impression,
at least partially, by saying "yes" to a few of the many questions
that have been put to us and that I know must be in your minds.

This does not mean a change in policy as to security
requirements. It does imply that we are now in a better position
as to the German U-boat menace than at any time since the beginning
of this war -- and that our position is not deteriorating.

Let us go back one year from this date. On April 22nd,
1943, exactly one year ago, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox made
this statement:
"The Nazis are now using every submarine they have or can build in an effort to cripple our striking power before it can be aimed at their throat. We accept that submarine challenge; and, in accepting it, we are confident of victory. Therefore, this is in effect a warning to the officers and men of the Nazi submarines that each combat voyage they undertake will be more dangerous than the last. This is an honest warning to the crews of German U-boats that, each time they go out, there will be a sharply-increasing likelihood that they will not come back."

Perhaps these might have seemed to be strong words, particularly at a time when United Nations merchant ships were being sent to the bottom by the tens and by the score.

But, on April 28th, 1943, Admiral King, Commander in Chief, made the flat statement that the German submarine menace would be under control within from four to six months. As many of you may know, Admiral King does not use words lightly.

The thought that both the Secretary and Admiral King intended to convey to the American public was their conviction that the United States Navy could, and would, deliver the goods. This feeling was largely based on their knowledge that the tools needed to do the job -- in the shape of escorts, carriers and planes -- were being delivered. They knew that the officers and crews to man these ships and planes were already in uniform and were being intensively trained.
3.

The ships were launched and commissioned. The planes were built and delivered. The weapons were tested, loaded and ready.

One might conclude that this was the simple answer to anti-submarine warfare -- enough ships and enough planes and enough men. It would be far more pleasant if that were so.

The tools and the personnel to operate ships and planes, however, are only the beginning. There must follow the constant, unending and unglamorous grind of specialized instruction in a special kind of warfare. This specialized training is not completed until each officer and man knows his duty and how to carry it out almost, if not in fact, by instinct. This training is not completed until the ships, the planes, the weapons and the men are functioning in action as single units, smooth-working teams.

Once these teams finally get into action -- equipped with the best weapons that science can offer -- their component members expect to kill every U-boat that they contact. They have developed a fighting spirit and a determination that refuses to admit of any other possibility. That is the stage toward which our people were developing in the Spring of 1943 -- that is the stage they have reached today. Of course we do not kill every U-boat we contact; but those we contact but don't kill are likely to limp home badly bruised.
The German U-boat today is sinking considerably less than one-half of one per cent of the ships being convoyed across the Atlantic by the Navies of the United Nations.

We felt that we had achieved some measure of success when we raised our score to the point where we were sinking one U-boat for each Allied merchant ship we lost. In our parlance, this is called "the exchange rate." Today our exchange rate and our score is even better. According to the latest figures, the Germans are now losing a ratio of more than one U-boat for each Allied merchant vessel they sink. How long Hitler can keep up this suicidal type of warfare -- only Hitler seems to know. At least he knows his U-boat losses, although he cannot be certain of our merchant losses; and it should be obvious by this time that the flow of men, weapons and supplies across the Atlantic has not been stopped.

The average combat life of a German submarine today is far less than it was a year ago. In fact we believe that it takes the Germans two or three times as long to build a submarine as that vessel may expect to endure on combat patrol. Such a rate of attrition, it hardly need be added, is not conducive to winning wars and influencing neutrals. And I take pleasure in emphasizing that this comparison bears no relation to our own submarine losses.

There is the possibility, of course, that the Nazis are holding vast numbers of submarines in reserve. There is the possibility that these U-boats will be used in whatever final all-out effort in the Atlantic they consider will best serve in their own defense. We accept these possibilities, just as we accept the
certainty that the Nazis will continue to develop new inventions for use in their underwater warfare.

We can only say that, as far as forethought, effort and planning can extend, we shall do our best to be ready for either or for both.

During 1943 and 1944 we shall have built more than one hundred carriers of all types -- and aircraft carriers, especially the smaller types, have proved extremely useful in the war against the U-boat.

During 1943 and 1944 we shall have built well over two hundred hard-hitting, new-type destroyers.

During 1943 and 1944 we shall have built well over six hundred destroyer escorts.

You may well ask why there is still so much secrecy and security involved with relation to the entire anti-submarine question.

The answer is very simple.

Detailed, published information as to anti-submarine warfare is a two-edged sword. It is no secret to the Germans that their U-boat warfare has degenerated from a major offensive weapon to merely a controlled menace.
A typical point, however, is that in January Hitler attributed our anti-submarine successes to a secret weapon. Modern warfare, as you know, is a race of new weapon and counter-weapon in which we are aided by the best scientific minds in the country.

It should be plainly evident, therefore, that one authentic and specific word about our weapons very easily could give our enemies invaluable knowledge. And if the Germans were to learn specifically how we are sinking their submarines, there is every reason to believe that this knowledge would be turned against our anti-submarine forces and our merchant shipping. I am confident that not one of you here is willing to see this happen. I am confident that you will be eager to withhold information about our success in the anti-submarine field, when such information would endanger the lives of Americans who are responsible for that success and of those whom they are protecting.

I know that many of you think that we in the Navy seem to lean over backwards in matters of security as to anti-submarine warfare. We are not trying to deprive you or the public of legitimate information. We are trying, and trying desperately, to prevent the possibility of a leak -- however innocent a single morsel of information might seem -- that would aid the enemy and thus endanger the lives of our own people or reduce the effectiveness of their efforts.
Not long ago the news did leak out that the Germans were using an acoustic torpedo, an explosive device which tracks a vessel by the noises generated by the target ship. Both we and the British were aware of this possibility (the thought is as old as the hills) and we knew what to do about it. But we would have preferred to have the Nazis continue the use of this torpedo in ignorance, long after we had learned to counteract its effectiveness. Instead, the Germans quickly found out that they would have to try something else. And we, in turn, shall have to try our best to counter whatever new weapon they may bring out to take the place of the one which did not live up to their expectation.

It appears to be no secret that there is to be another front. Inevitably, part of the counter to that effort will be an intensified U-boat campaign. They will probably throw the book at us. We are prepared to strike back by also using the book -- or, if necessary, by throwing the book away. And while it appears quite certain that there may be heavy attrition on each side, we are confident that when it is all over the U-boats will still be under control -- and many of them under the sea.
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

AC/AS, Intelligence Deputy
W&G/ems 4738

April 18, 1944

Commander in Chief
Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Number WAR 24639

For Eisenhower signed Arnold.

Summary of a Tokyo broadcast to Japanese home and enemy April 16 follows: Broadcast analyzes British and American Air Force operations as falling into 3 preinvasion stages. First phase indiscriminate bombing against important cities in the German mainland, second phase bombing of munition factories and challenging German Air Force to fight, third phase bombing of important rear supply points in vicinity of proposed landing places. This last is begun about a month before actual landing operations and increases in intensity. Recent attacks by fighter sweeps on 9 and 15 April are considered significant. Estimated that the second stage is completed and third stage is in initial stage. Indicates that time for landing operations in Europe continent near. Predicted that this time might be within 1 month.

1708

ORIGINATOR: CG AAF
INFORMATION: OVR
O-2
Log

CM-CUT-24639 (18 Apr 44) 1717Z lee

000.7

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: US MA London, England
To: War Department
No. 12584, 12 April 1944
Serial nr 12584.

Favorable reaction here to Hulls speech on foreign policy. Times Tuesday devotes leading editorial to address and diplomatic correspondent in another article comments approvingly on parts dealing with France and neutral countries. Times diplomatic correspondent probably reflects views of foreign office. Manchester Guardian also devotes leading editorial to speech commending Hulls realistic and practical approach. Communist Daily Worker applauds Hulls emphasis on 4 power cooperation but thinks attitude toward French National Committee still too cautious.

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: CG AAF
CPD
CM-IN-8406 (12 Apr 44) 1533Z bjm

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

URGENT

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers

To: War Department
   CG US Forces in the European Theater of Operations
   London, England

No. F27897, 5 April 1944

F27897 Top Sec to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff repeated to UNITY London and Hq MAAP for information from Freedom signed Wilson cite PHDSC.

1. I am much disturbed by a press report reproduced here today which is based on an Associated Press dispatch from Kansas City on 3 April.


   This is NAF Number 663) "News of the incident involving Lieutenant General George S Patton Jr was delayed because 'that General was to be used in a cover plan following his operations in Sicily. In view of that, the Theatre Commander was extremely desirous that his reputation should not be impaired by a wide discussion of the soldier-slaying incident'."

3. This highly undesirable publicity exposes a ruse successfully employed in the cover plan for SHINGLE and puts the enemy on his guard against similar measures we may wish to use. The exposure comes also at a time when our deception machinery is being called upon for a maximum effort to assist OVERLORD.

CM-IN-3392 (5 Apr 44)  

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLK, Date MAY 3 1974

COPY No. 29

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers

No. F27897, 5 April 1944

4. I would request that all possible steps be taken not only to prevent recurrence of similar exposure of most secret matter but also to prevent General Surles statement giving rise to further press speculation on our use of deception. This latter aspect is to my mind of the greatest importance.

ACTION: CCS

INFO: Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Col Park
Gen Surles
C of S

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

CH-IN-3392 (5 Apr 44) 1836Z mcs
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

FOR GENERAL MARSHALL'S EYES ONLY

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces London, England

To: War Department

Number S-50060, 27 March 1944

Personal from Eisenhower to General Marshall for Eyes Only. S-50060.

For the second or third time I have noticed stories apparently originated by a man named Finnerty in the United States to the effect that I have either directly or indirectly criticized proposed instructions of the President involving dealings with the French. While I know that so far as you are concerned I do not have to deny any such absurd allegation, I still think it most unfortunate that any newspaper can be allowed to insinuate that Commanders in the field are tacitly insubordinate. It is probable that nothing at all can be done about such things, but after working for 2 solid years as hard as I know how for the development of the spirit and unification and complete teamwork, it is disappointing to think that any single individual in the whole United States could be led to believe that I would myself be guilty of even a whisper of insubordination. Whenever I might consider that any proposed instructions from higher authority are based upon misconception of fact I would naturally feel free to present my case to you or to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in

CM-IN-19332 (27 Mar 44)

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

Col. Park
COPY No. 15

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

White House
From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces London, England
To: War Department
Number S-50060, 27 March 1944

The proper manner, but if I or any of my staff were guilty of direct or indirect criticism of the kind indicated in these stories I would personally relieve the offender from duty and would expect to have the same fate dealt out to me.

No Sig

ACTION: SGS
INFO: Gen Handy
Gen Surles
C of S

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 3 1974

CM-IN-19332 (27 Mar 44) 1835Z Jp

COPY No. 15
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
I hope you will not imagine I am going to try to make you any extraordinary announcement and tell you exactly how all problems are to be solved. I only hoped you would like to hear how we are getting on and to thank you for your kindness in spite of my shortcomings.

It is a year almost to the day since I spoke to you. This has been a typical year of successes but the good news has outweighed the bad and progress of the United Nations toward their goal has been solid, continual and growing quicker.

We can say with hope and reason that we shall reach the end in good order and that the tragedy which threatened the world and might have left our descendants in darkness and bondage will not come to pass.

He is a rash man who tries to prophesy when, how or under what condition victory will come; but come it will.

It is certain that unity of aims and action and singleness of purpose among us all will make it come sooner.

A year ago the 5th Army which marched 1,000 miles across the desert was in battle for the March Line. The 1st British and American armies were beating their way to Tunisia.

We were confident of victory but did not know that in less than two months the enemy would be driven from Africa, leaving at one stroke 335,000 prisoners and dead.

Since then the successful campaign in Sicily brought about the fall of Mussolini and repudiation of Fascism by the Italians. Mussolini indeed escaped. To fast the bread of Afflication at Hitler's table, to help the Germans wreak revenge on the Italian masses over whom he ruled for more than 20 years.

This fate and judgment, more terrible than death, was overtaken the Dictator, who stabbed France in the back, who thought his crime had gained him the Empire of the Mediterranean.

The conquest of Sicily and Naples brought in their train the liberation of Sardinia and Corsica. We now hold one third of the whole of Italy.

Our campaign was not as rapid as we had hoped. We shall be victors both at Anzio and on the main front to the south and Rome will be rescued.

Meanwhile, we have swept out of the stringles 65 Italian divisions and are holding in Italy in close action near 25 divisions and a notworthly part of the German Air Force. Other even more important events which might require their presence are impending elsewhere.

We have been disappointed in the Aegean and its islands, which we have not dominated, but those setbacks in the Eastern Mediterranean are more than offset by partis in Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria by continued activity of Greek Guerrillas and by the heroic stringles in Yugoslavia under Tito.

In the near and middle cold we have certainly travelled a long way from those autumn days of 1940 when we stood alone. When Mussolini was invading Egypt, when we were driven out of Somaliland. When Ethiopia was in Italian chains and we wondered if we could defend British East Africa.

There is much still to be done but I do not doubt the task will be finished in a workmanlike manner.

We in the British Isles must celebrate the deliverance from the submarine peril, which has been mastered by superior science and ingenuity and devotion to duty of the submarine crews and thousands of ships. We have been delivered from the horrors of invasion when almost unaided we faced the might of the air fury. Now the tables are turned. We had a large Air Force last year; we have a larger one today. Besides that, our American allies have outstripped us in the air force here.

The combination in Brotherhood of these two Forces, aided as it will be by a larger in Italy almost as well as European, will produce results in the coming months which will be of enormous advantage to the Allied cause. Not only have the Americans this predominance in number but also by sharing all our secrets with one another we have won leadership in radar both for attack and defense. Surveying these events on land, sea and air in the war by the two Western allies, Britain and the United States against Hitlerish, we are entitled to be encouraged, thankful and to resolve to do better than ever.
IT WOULD BE NATURAL IF OUR SOVIET FRIENDS AND ALLIES DID NOT APPRECIATE THE COMPLICATIONS AND DIFFICULTIES ATTENDING ALL SEA CROSSINGS--

AMPHIBIOUS IS THE VORD-- OPERATIONS ON A LARGE SCALE, THEY ARE THE PEOPLE OF THE GREAT LAND SPACES AND WHEN THE SACRED SOIL OF RUSSIA IS THREATENED THROUGH THE VORD OF THE VORD, EUWAH TAKES US THEY ARE THE PEOPLE OF RUSSIA WANTING THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP UNDER GENERAL STALIN, WHOSE AUTHORITY ENABLES HIM TO COMMAND AND CONTROL THE MOVEMENTS OF ARMY ON A 2,000-MILE FRONT AND IMPART

UNITY TO THE ACTION IN THE EAST WHICH IS VERY GOOD FOR SOVIET RUSSIA AND HER ALLIES. WHEN I SPOKE OF IMPROVEMENTS FOR THE ALLIED CAUSE TAKING PLACE THERE IS NO LESS I HAVE BEEN REMEMBEMENT THAT THE SOVIET ADVANCE HAD BEEN THE MAIN CAUSE OF HITLER'S DOWNFALL IN THOSE REGIONS.

I HAVE DEALT WITH THE PROGRESS OF THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY BUT I MUST ALSO SPEAK OF THE OTHER ONGOING WAR AGAINST THE ISLAND NATION. THIS IS THE MAJOR PREPARATION BY THE UNITED STATES. WE HAVE ACCEPTED THEIR LEADERSHIP IN THE PACIFIC AS THEY ACCEPTED OURS IN THE EAST. THE UNITED STATES IS ENSHRINING THE FACT THAT THEIR OPERATIONS SHIELDED AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND FROM JAPANESE DOMINATION AND MORTAL THREAT DURING THE TIME WHEN THE MOTHER COUNTRY WAS AT FULL STRETCH IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST GERMANY AND ITALY IS NEVER TO BE FORGOTTEN. WHERE THE UNION JACK IS FLOWING.

REMARKABLE SUCCESS HAS ATTENDED THE AMERICAN NAVY'S WORK AND THAT OF THE AMERICAN AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND OCCUPATIONS. PROGRESS IN THE INCREASED IS THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE JAPANESE, THE JAPANESE ARE SHOWING SIGNS OF WEAKNESS. THE ATTRACTION OF SHIPMENT AND AIR FORCES, ON ALL OF WHICH ROOSEVELT HAS IMPOSED NO CONDITIONS OR LIMITATIONS, HAS BEEN EIGHT. THE JAPANESE HAVE NOT FELT STRONG ENOUGH TO RISK THEIR FLEET IN A GENERAL ENGAGEMENT. IN THIS THEY HAVE BEEN PRUDENT, CONSIDERING THE EXPANSION OF THE JAPANESE NAVY DEFENSES ON PEARL HARBOR AND WHAT FOOLS THE JAPANESE RISING CARRIAGE WENT TO BRING ON THEMSELVES THE UNDYING FRENZY OF THE GREAT REPUBLIC, ALL FOR THE SAKES OF CARRYING OUT A BASE AND SMOOTHER AMBUSH.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE HAS PLEDGED TO FIGHT WITH THE UNITED STATES AGAINST JAPAN NO MATTER WHAT IT COSTS OR HOW LONG IT LASTS, WE HAVE SUFFERED FROM THE JAPANESE, IN OUR THEATRE IN BURMA AND THE BAY OF BENGAL WE SHALL STRIVE TO AID THE AMERICANS IN THEIR CONTACTS WITH CHINA AND TO ADD TO OUR OWN. THE MORE WE CAN FIGHT AND WIN WE CAN REDUCE OUR EFFORTS IN OTHER THEATRES AND DIVERT THE DIVISION FROM THE PACIFIC THEATRE AND THE MORE HELP TO THE OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES.

IN BURMA, THOSE PLANS PREPARED LAST MAY NOT AT QUEBEC ARE BEING PUT INTO PRACTICE. YOUTH AND 30,000 PLUS, WORLDWIDE HAS INFUSED ENERGY AND CONFIDENCE INTO THE FORCES. BY THAT MEANS THEY WILL DEFEND THE FRONTIERS OF INDIA AND REOPEN THE ROAD TO CHINA, AERIAL OPERATIONS ENABLE US TO ATTACK THE JAPS IN THE BEAR, THEY HAVE ALSO CUT BEHIND OUR FRONT AND FIERCE FIGHTING IS GOING ON AT MANY POINTS. IT IS TOO SOON TO CLAIM RESULTS IN A JUNGLE AND MOUNTAIN AREA BUT WE ARE ALMOST ALWAYS ABLE TO CLOUT 3 OR 4 TIMES JAPANESE DEAD-- WHICH IS WHAT MATTERS-- THAN WE Ourselves HAVE SUFFERED. SUPERIORITY IN JUNGLE FIGHTING HAS PASSED TO THE BRITISH AND INDIAN SOLDIERS, FURTHER NORTH AMERICAN COLUMN AND A CONSIDERABLE CHINESE ARMY UNDER STILWELL ARE PROGRESSING WITH TOUGHNESS. AS LATER I SHALL HAVE TO you OF PARLIAMENT A FURTHER REPORT ON THIS FIGHTING WHICH IS NOT DECLARED YET.

WE HAVE PLACED A POWERFUL BATTLE FLEET IN INDIAN WATERS TO FACE THE MAIN PART OF THE JAPANESE FLEET IT TURN WEST AFTER INCLINING BATTLE AGAINST THE AMERICANS.

WHEN I SPOKE A YEAR AGO I DRAWN ATTENTION TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A PROLONGED INTERVAL BETWEEN THE COLLAPSE OF HITLER AND OF JAPAN. THERE WE NEED AND AM OF THE VIEW THAT IT WILL BE IT LONG OR SHORT, WE SHALL GO THROUGH WITH OUR AMERICAN BROTHERS WITH UTMOST STRENGTH TO THE END.

I TRUST YOU HAVE GAINED SOME GLEAM OF THE SCENE AND HAVE A FEELING OF THE RELATIVE SIZE AND URGENCY OF WHAT GOES ON. THERE ARE A LOT OF THINGS GOING ON. I REMEMBER THAT WHEN I SPOKE ON MARCH 21.
I trust you have gained some glimpse of the scene and have a feeling of the relative size and urgency of what goes on. There are a lot of things going on. I remember that when I spoke on March 21 last year I gave up the main part of my speech to what we were planning to do to make the island a better place after the war. I said there would have to be a general election and a new House of Commons and that I should put to the country a 4-year plan to cover the transition period and to bring our soldiers, sailors and airmen back to our land with food, work and homes for all. I dwelt on how wrong it would be to make promises which could not be fulfilled. I mentioned the fields where action would have to be taken.

(Churchill reviews part of his speech of last year---Editor).

All this was for after the war. No promises were to be made before hand but every preparation including legislative preparation was to be set on foot. Now, I am a man who has no unsatisfied ambition except to beat the enemy and to help you in any way I think right. Don't think I am trying to get votes or glorify any party. But I may draw attention to the fact that several of these large measures have already been shaped and framed and presented to Parliament and the public. You have the scheme of improved education, the greatest ever attempted by a responsible government. It involves a heavy cost to the state but I don't think we can maintain our position after the war unless we are well educated and can handle the problems and inventions of the new age.

Then there is the National Health Service which has already been laid before Parliament and received a considerable measure of acceptance. We shall lay before you a proposal about the extension of insurance. So here you will soon have some important measures already fashioned at a time when no one can say when the war will end and without relaxing the war effort or causing any party strife, but there are several other large problems on which the Minister and his assistants have toiled and which are far advanced. If this goes on, the four-year plan may be perfected before the general election is reached. I must say that I might have expected that the government would receive many compliments on the progress made with the war and on the preparations for social and domestic welfare at the armistice or peace.

Last October I thought the time had come to ask the King to appoint Lord Woolton to a seat in the war cabinet. His record demanded respect, but there are many people not at all burdened with responsibility who have leisure on their hands and feel sincerely that their best effort at this time is to delabor the government with criticism because they are not ready at any moment to produce a full solution to future problems, as between the victor and the vanquished, capital and labor, man and man, etc. This national government which has led the nation and empire---and I hold—a large part of the world out of mortal danger through the dark valleys in which they wandered back onto the broad uplands, is reviled as a set of dandlers and nuddlers unable to frame a policy, take a decision or make a plan.

I know you will not forget that this administration formed in an hour of disaster by conservative labor and liberal leaders in good faith and good will, has brought Britain out of the jaws of death, back from the mouth of hell while all the world wondered! I know you will not forget!
THERE ARE TWO SUBJECTS OF DOMESTIC POLICY MENTIONED
LAST YEAR ON WHICH I HAVE NOT PRODUCED AN ACCOUNT OF ACTION. THE FIRST
IS HOUSING. WE SET UP FOR OURSELVES THE PROVISION OF HOMES FOR ALL
WHO NEED THEM WITH A PRIORITY FOR SERVICE-Men, AS AND WHEN THEY COME
HOME FROM THE WAR. LET ME FIRST LAY DOWN AN ABSOLUTE RULE—NOTHING
CAN BE DONE WHICH BY WEAKENING OR CLOGGING THE WAR EFFORT PROLONGS
THE WAR. NOTHING CAN IN ANY WAY HAMPER PROGRESS. THERE ARE THREE WAYS
IN WHICH THE BUSINESS OF HOUSING PEOPLE COULD BE ATTACKED. I DO NOT
TAKE THE VIEW MYSELF THAT WE ARE A NATION OF SLUM-DWELLERS. NEARLY
5,000,000 NEW HOUSES WERE BUILT BETWEEN TWO WARS. THE BRITISH PEOPLE,
AS A WHOLE, WERE BETTER HOUSED THAN ANY PEOPLE IN EUROPE OR IN
MANY PARTS OF THE UNITED STATES. BUT NOW ABOUT A MILLION HOMES HAVE BEEN
DESTROYED OR DAMAGED BY ENEMY. THIS OFFERS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR
REBUILDING OR REPLANNING AND WE HAD BETTER MAKE A CLEAN SHEET OF THE
AREAS OF WHICH WE SHOULD BE ASHAMED. I HAVE GIVEN MY WORD THAT
SOLDIERS WHEN THEY RETURN AND THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN

RESTORED TO HOMES AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT. THE FIRST ATTACK
MUST BE MADE ON DAMAGED HOUSES WHICH CAN BE REBUILT. THIS MUST GO ON
DURING THE WAR. IT IS A WAR MEASRE, OUR ALLIES ARE HERE AMONG US AND
WE MUST DO OUR BEST FOR THEM. THE SECOND ATTACK ON THE PROBLEM WILL
BE MADE BY PREFABRICATED OR EMERGENCY HOUSES, THE MINISTRY OF WORKS
IS WORKING VIOLENTLY ON THIS. I HOPE WE MAKE UP A HALF MILLION OF THEM
AND NOT ONLY PLANS, BUT PREPARATIONS ARE BEING MADE ON A NATIONAL
SCALE. FACTORIES ARE BEING ASSIGNED MATERIALS ARE BEING EARMARKED,
CONVENIENT SITES WILL BE CHOSEN AND THE WHOLE BUSINESS IS BEING
DETAILED. I HAVE HOPED THAT SEVERAL HUNDRED THOUSAND YOUNG COUPLES MAY HARRY AND
FIND THEIR OWN TWO-HUNDRD PLAN. I HAVE SEEN A FULL-SIZED MODEL OF THE
HOUSES AND STEPS ARE BEING TAKEN TO LET HOUSEHOLDS EXPRESS THEIR
VIEW. THESE WILL MAKE A HEAVY DEMAND ON THE STEEL INDUSTRY AND ABSORB
THE EXPANSION MADE FOR THE WAR. THEY ARE SUPERIOR TO THE ORDINARY
COFFEE, THEY HAVE GAS AND ELECTRIC KITCHENETTES AND THEIR WALLS
CARRY FURNITURE WHICH TODAY IT WOULD COST 80 POINTS TO BUY, STANDARD
ARTICLES OF FURNITURE WILL BE MASS-PRODUCED SO THAT NO HEAVY CHARGE
WILL FALL ON THE TENANTS.

Owing TO THE METHODS OF PRODUCTION I AM ASSURED THAT THESE HOUSES,
INCLUDING PRETTY FURNITURE, WILL BE AVAILABLE AT A MODERATE RENT.
ALL WILL BE PUBLICLY OWNED AND OCCUPIED BY TENANTS TILL THEY HAVE SERVED THE PURPOSE, AS MUCH THOUGHT
HAS BEEN AND WILL BE PUT INTO THIS PLAN AS INTO THE INVASION OF AFRICA,
THOUGH I ADMIT IT DOES NOT BEAR COMPARISON WITH THE KIND OF THING
WE ARE WORKING AT NOW. THE SLOW PRODUCTION OF HOUSES IS THE ONLY
WAY IN WHICH THE IMPENDING NERDS OF THE PEOPLE CAN BE MET IN FOUR OR
FIVE YEARS AFTER THE WAR, IN ADDITION TO THIS AND REBUILDING, WE HAVE
A PROGRAM OF PERMANENT REBUILDING WHICH THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH HAS
RECENTLY OUTLINED AND BY WHICH WE SHALL HAVE TWO OR THREE HUNDRED
THOUSAND HOUSES BUILT OR BUILDING. 200,000 SITES ARE ALREADY OWNED.

SIDE BY SIDE COMES THE QUESTION OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE
BUILDING TRADES. WE DON'T WANT THE SPLURGE TO BE FOLLOWED BY CONTRACTION.
I HAVE SYMPATHY WITH THE BUILDERS AND BRICKLayERS, IN PEACE TIME THEY
KNEW THERE WAS A JOB IS FINISHED, THEY MAY HAVE TO LOOK FOR ANOTHER.
OUR 12-YEAR PLAN FOR THE BUILDING TRADES AND THE PORTAL HAVE SPENT SO MUCH TIME TO GUARANTEE STEADY AND LONG EMPLOYMENT
MUST BE CARRIED OUT.
SIDE BY SIDE COMES THE QUESTION OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE BUILDING TRADES. WE DON'T WANT THE SQUEEZE TO BE FOLLOWED BY CONTRACT. I HAVE SYMPATHY WITH THE BUILDERS AND BRICKLAYERS. IN PEACE TIME THEY KNOW THAT WHEN A JOB IS FINISHED, THEY MAY HAVE TO LOOK FOR ANOTHER. OUR 12-YEAR PLAN FOR THE BUILDING TRADES ON WHICH BEVIN AND LORD PORTAL HAVE SPENT SO MUCH TIME TO GUARANTEE STEADY AND LONG EMPLOYMENT MUST BE CARRIED OUT.

WE ARE TOLD BY BUSY MISTAKES--NOW CAN YOU BUILD HOUSES WITHOUT LAND? WE ALREADY SAID IN 1941 THAT ALL LAND SHALL BE TAKEN AT PRICES BASED ON MARCH 31, 1940 VALUES, STOCKS AND SHARES AND MANY CLASSES OF REAL PROPERTY HAVE GONE UP. AGRICULTURAL LAND HAS ALSO RISEN IN VALUE. ON STATE HAS POWER--WHICH IT WILL ON NO ACCOUNT SURRENDER--TO CLAIM ALL LAND NEEDED BONA FIDE FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES AT VALUES FIXED BEFORE WARTIME CONDITIONS. THERE ARE HARD PLACES WHICH WILL BE BEST ADJUSTED BY PARLIAMENT. IN THE MAIN YOU MAY BE SURE THAT LAND WILL BE FORTHCOMING WHEN AND WHERE NEEDED FOR ALL HOUSES NEEDED FOR THE PEOPLE. NOBODY NEEDS TO BE DETERRED FROM PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE BY THE FEAR THAT THEY MAY NOT HAVE LAND. LEGISLATION TO ENABLE THE AUTHORITIES TO GET ANY LAND WILL BE PRESENTED AT THIS SESSION.

THERE ARE SOME PEOPLE WHO WANT TO PUT OFF EVERYTHING UNTIL A WHITE PAPER OR A BLUE PRINT IS MADE FOR THE REGENERATION OF THE WORLD BEFORE ASKING ELECTORS HOW THEY FEEL. THEY WOULD RATHER POSTPONE THE BUILDING OF HOMES FOR RETURNING TROOPS TILL THEY ARE SURE THE LANDSCAPE IS NOT SPOILED. IN WAR WE MUST FACE IMMEDIATE NEEDS AND STERN REALITY AND IT IS SURELY BETTER TO DO THAT THAN NOTHING WHILE PREPARING TO DO EVERYTHING.

THIS IS MY DIFFICULTY. I CANNOT TAKE ANYTHING THAT WILL MINDER THE WAR AND NO ONE, EXCEPT THE VERY CLEVER ONES, WILL END OR WHETHER IT WILL END SUDDENLY OR PETER OUT. THERE MUST BE AN EMERGENCY PLAN AND THAT IS WHAT THE MINISTERS HAVE BEEN WORKING AT FOR SOME TIME PAST. IN SPITE OF THIS I CANNOT GUARANTEE THAT EVERYTHING WILL BE DONE OR THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE AN INTERVAL WHEN THINGS WILL BE ROUGH. IT WILL NOT BE LONG AND IT WILL BE EXPRESSION COMPARED TO WHAT WE HAVE BEEN THROUGH, THE TASK LOOKS LIKE A SMALL ONE COMPARED TO SOME WE HAVE HANDLED AND ARE HANDLING. THE VALUE OF LAND IS BETWEEN 1/20TH AND 1/30TH OF HOUSES. OUR POPULATION IS UNHAPPILY ABOUT TO ENTER A PERIOD OF NUMERICAL DECLINE WHICH CAN BE CHECKED ONLY BY THE MOST ROBUST TREATMENT OF HOUSING.

THERE IS ONE OTHER QUESTION ON WHICH I SHOULD LIKE TO DWELL. I SHALL UTTERLY ONLY PASSING REASSURANCE. I MEAN DEMOBILIZATION. I KNOW AS MUCH ABOUT THIS AS MOST PEOPLE BECAUSE I WAS ONE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR AFTER THE LAST WAR WHEN IN 6 MONTHS WE BROUGHT HOME AND RESTORED NEARLY 3,000,000 MEN. GREAT PLANS HAD BEEN PREPARED BEFORE THE ARMISTICE TO PLANNERS TO BEING HOME ALL KEY MEN FIRST AND ANY SOLDIER WHO COULD GET A TELEGRAM SAYING HE WAS WANTED FOR A KEY JOB HAD PRIORITY. THE TROOPS DID NOT CONSIDER THIS FAIR AND A CONVULSION OF INDIVIDUALISM SHOOK THE WHOLE ARMY. I PERSUADED THE CABINET TO REVERSE THIS FOOLISH PLAN, DISCIPLINE WAS IMMEDIATELY RESTORED AND DEMOBILIZATION WENT FORWARD SMOOTHLY. BEVIN, FOR WHOM SACRIFICE I HAVE ADMIRATION, HAS DEVISED A LESS CRUDE BUT EQUALLY FAIR SCHEME IN WHICH I HAVE CONFIDENCE.

WHY AM I NOT GOING TO TELL YOU ABOUT IT? WHY WILL I NOT TELL ABOUT IT SOON? THIS IS NO TIME TO TALK ABOUT DEMOBILIZATION. THE HOUR OF GREATEST DANGER IS WITH ALLIES WHO COUNT ON US AS WE ON THEM. THE EYES OF OUR SOLDIERS, SAILORS AND AIRMEN MUST BE FIXED ON THE ENEMY. THE ONLY HOMeward ROAD LIES THROUGH THE ARCH OF VICTORY. THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES ARE HERE; OUR OWN TROOPS STAND AT THEIR SIDE IN EQUAL NUMBERS AND TRUE COMRADESHIP. LEADERS ARE APPOINTED IN WHOM WE HAVE FAITH. WE SHALL REQUIRE FROM ALL CLASSES THE SAME COOL, STRONG NERVES, THE TOUGHNESS OF FIBRE, WHICH STOOD US IN GOOD STEAD WHEN WE WERE ALONG UNDER THE GERMAN BLITZ.

HERE I MUST WARN YOU THAT TO DECEIVE AND Baffle THE ENEMY THERE WILL BE MANY FALSE ALARMS, FEINTS AND DRESS REHEARSALS. WE MAY BE THE OBJECT OF NEW FORMS OF ATTACK. BRITAIN CAN TAKE IT. SHE HAS NEVER FLINCHED. WHEN THE SIGNAL IS GIVEN THE WHOLE CIRCLE OF AVENING NATIONS WILL MURD THEMSELVES ON THE Foe, AND BATTER OUT THE WORST TYRANNY WHICH HAS EVER SOUGHT TO HALT THE PROGRESS OF MANKIND.
(COMINCH FROM ADMIRALTY)

REQUEST YOUR CONCURRENCE TO THE RELEASE FOR PUBLICATION OF THE FACT THAT ALLIED AIRCRAFT ARE USING ROCKET PROPELLED WEAPONS.

(2) IT IS CONSIDERED THAT THE ENEMY MUST BY NOW BE FULLY AWARE OF THE TECHNIQUE EMPLOYED BY US WITH RP AGAINST BOTH SURFACE FORCES AND U BOATS AND THAT PUBLICATION WILL NOT THEREFORE BE OF ANY VALUE TO HIM.

(3) NO DESCRIPTION OR DETAILS OF THESE WEAPONS WOULD BE PERMITTED.

DECASSIFIED
JCS MEMO, 1-17-73
BY RT. DATE DEC 10 1973

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVRECS.)

OPNAV-NCR-15
190405 000.7
From: CG U.S. Forces Kunming China
To: War Department
No: BH366 16 March 1944

To Bissel BH 366 for Johnston MIS-X from Wichtrick
signed Dorn.

Accurate report dated February 1944 from Intel
China gives reliable proof that release of Dyess report and
other information concerning ill treatment of our POW by
Japs has enraged Japs and has caused further ill treatment
of POWS in Indo China territory.

No Sig

ACTION: G-2
INFO: OPD "Col Mathewson Log"

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
by RHP, MARIS Date DEC 10 1973

CM-IN-11373 (16 Mar 44) 2120Z jb

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: MA London
To: MILID
No. 7075 13 March 1944

Signed Peabody.

Reaction British Press on Irish question takes general line that Dublin being foolish to reject reasonable American requested but to be expected from previous attitude and Irish character. Manchester Guardian says Eire action hardening Ulster intransigence on partition, destroying any British opinion for United Ireland and forfeiting U.S. sympathy for Irish case. States that if Portugal can grant Azores bases without considering herself unneutral Eire can make some contribution to war on which her security rests. Times says De Valera reply to US characteristic and British travel ban natural result Irish attitude.

No Sig

ACTION: G-2
INFORMATION: OPD
CG AAF
CG/8

COL. MATHESON

CM-IN-8996 (13 Mar 44) 1500% eng

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RECLASSIFIED
LG, 11653, Sec. 8(E) and 8(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
by RHP, MARs Date DEC 10 1973

COPY No. 53
From: U.S. Military Attache Bern Switzerland
To: War Department
No: 1281

1st March 1944.

Source of Legation cable 1970 ia Red Cross from official report which they have no right to release.

No Sig.

ACTION: G-2
INFO: OPD

CM-IN-627 (1 Apr 44) 19392 was

DECLASSIFIED

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SED Letter, 5-8-78
MAY 3 1974

SECRET
COPY No.

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000.7
**Combined Admiralty Air Ministry Communiqué**

Announcing destruction of 3 U-boats in approaches to and Straits of Gibraltar over a period of 11 days in November will be released 201430 BST. No convoy involved.
WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING MESSAGE  

From: Kunming  
To: War  
No: W54PN  

11 February, 1944  

For Westlake Bureau Public Relations from Buyster and Chennault W54PN. Reference letter War Department Bureau of Public Relations dated 13th January to sender.

During the past few months this Headquarters has received numerous letters, such as the one referred to, requesting stories depicting the teamwork and battle experiences of aircrews and individual fighter pilots. Having taken the matter up with the Intelligence Officer and the Operations Officer of this Headquarters, it is felt that, due to the fact this theater is unlike another theater in which United States troops are operating, it is unwise to comply with these requests. Numerous instances have occurred in which the unorthodox treatment of our pilots and crew men, by the Japanese, has been brought out, instance in which Americans have been punished, perhaps by death, for deeds which in other theaters would be considered merely in line of duty. It is felt, therefore, that stories of this Air Force operating near and over the enemy line where danger of capture is imminent should, as far as possible, remain anonymous. This is necessary in order that they be protected from possible bodily injury. Instead of respecting man for his ability as a soldier and airman, the Japs express a desire to humiliate him, thereby, in their opinion proving the superiority of the Japanese.

Effort has been made, in this theater, also, to suppress stories of the escape from enemy territory of American personnel. Newscloppings received from the states indicate that these stories are appearing, having originated in the

CH-IN-8510 (12 Feb 44)  

COPY No.  

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United States itself -- note the case of Lieutenant Thomas Harmon. In this particular case stories under an Ann Arbor, Michigan, date line, and a radio broadcast by Lowell Thomas, gave details of the manner of escape and it has been brought to the attention of this office that, already, at least 50 Chinese Patriots have paid, with their lives, for the part they are accused by the Japanese of having played in the escape of this officer. It is requested that everything possible be done by the War Department, Bureau of Public Relations to assist us in the preservation of these men.

no sig
From: SHAEF London
To: War
No. B 105. 5 February 1944

For the Combined Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower reference FACS 4. This is SCAF 3.

Brigadier General Robert A McClure has been assigned head for the Publicity and Psychological Warfare Division of the Supreme Commanders Staff of Allied Expeditionary Force.

No Sig

ACTION: CCS Capt Royal, USN

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Strong
Gen Arnold
Adm King
White House

DECLASSIFIED
J.C.S. Rerading Memo 34 - 71

By RH Date DEC 10 1973

CM-IN-3514 (5 Feb 44) 1805Z aas

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
GEORGE JONES POOL PRESS STORY RECEIVED 3 FEBRUARY 2 FROM CTF 51 STRESSED JAPANESE SYMBOLICAL SELF DESTRUCTION. THIS SHOULD BE AVOIDED FUTURE COPY. STORY ALSO VIOLATED POLICY OF REFRAINING FROM MENTIONING SPECIFIC DAMAGE INSTALLATIONS SUCH AS BLOCKHOUSES. ADDITIONAL APRTSURE PRESS MATERIAL EMANATING YOUR COMMAND CONTAINS NO REFERENCE OR SPECULATION FUTURE OPERATIONS.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of

MENOR 11-15-27
By

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-15

040243 000.7
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL BROWN:

I have been advised by General Arnold's Office that he would welcome an opportunity to discuss this matter, should the President wish to do so.

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date DEC 10, 1973
From: Hq USAFE
To: AGWAR
No: K3374  29th January 1944

To Arnold from Spaatz.

Though I still believe it essential to revise reporting policy so far as American Air Forces are concerned, Portal does not concur for RAF after consultation suggested in your A5625 January 21. Principle reasons for continuing past policy are stated by RAF as follows:

A. Policy same as used in last war has been very expedient in this war in view of probability that it adds very little to knowledge which the enemy probably has anyway:

B. Change of policy on announcing losses would assist enemy propaganda charging excessive allied losses as cause for stopping the immediate announcement of our actual losses;

C. Public confidence now established would be weakened if not destroyed. I do not agree that those reasons are sound. Aircraft frequently disinteregrate so totally before hitting ground that widely scattered losses would be difficult to count even if all parts were found. Knowledge of German official claims in many instances confirms this belief that they sometimes cannot even approximately count aircraft we know were lost over Germany or occupied Europe.

CM-IN-19938 (30 Jan 44)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 8, 1973
By RHP, NASD Dec. DEC 10 1973

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Hq U.S. Air Force
To: AGWAR
No: R3374 29th January 1944

Our announcement then enables enemy evaluation of his defensive effectiveness and insures thorough search for all possible wreckage and surviving crewmen. In view of past effect of enemy propaganda claims against naval and ground forces, all designed in part to taunt the Allies into disclosing losses and dispositions, it is not understood why we should fear enemy propaganda concerning air operations if preliminary explanation is followed by frank stories and periodic announcements of our losses over a period. Herebefore the Air Forces have in effect been taunted into disclosing valuable information which no amount of public good will can counteract. Therefore believe it necessary to change American policy eventhough RAF attitude may necessitate special handling. Following procedure advocated:

A. Announcement of change of policy should be made by the President in press conference stating reasons frankly and pointing out similarity of ground campaigns to even one air operation on present large scale. He might also point to known future operations as requiring special precautions but major emphasis should be upon of Air Forces coming of age, now well beyond the puerile stage implied by the term raid which more properly describes offensive patrols and nuisance attacks. Suggest Presidents announcement be prepared by either Lieutenant Neherakis formerly in office of Assistant Chief of Staff, Training, or by Major Merrill in AAF Branch WDBPR0, both of whom understand the desired slant.

CM-IN-19938 (30 Jan 44)
B. Simultaneously with the President's statement there should be released a tabulation by month giving losses and claims in all categories by general types and theaters. This should include a statement that similar reports will be issued at least once a month thereafter and at shorter intervals when it can be done without indicating losses on any particular mission.

C. Continue to announce claims for our fighters on each operation but omit bomber claims of enemy fighters shot down and substitute statements to the effect that the air battle was or was not ferocious and bloody or words to that effect as now used by other forces.

D. Conduct a systematic campaign of public indoctrination in the real fundamentals of air war principles to promote for the Air Forces an understanding which long usage gives automatically to other forces. The initial effort on this matter must now come from Washington but the follow through must be from this end. This will require most careful steering and considerable indoctrination of correspondents in the theater by an officer who thoroughly understands the entire objective and method and who can devote full time to this function. Believe Lieutenant Nehms is one of the few who has the desired understanding as well as an unusual ability to express himself and that his services on this headquarters would be of great value to the Air Forces. Therefore request that he be ordered to report there at once on permanent duty for this purpose. This is realized to be unorthodox but the situation is unique and requires drastic action if the entire program is not to fail before it starts.

No Sig
PROTEST RECEIVED FROM AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT QUOTE IN THE AUSTRALIAN PRESS OF 20 JANUARY A REPORT IS PUBLISHED OF AN INTERVIEW WITH REAR ADMIRAL ROBERT CARNEY, CHIEF OF STAFF SOUTH PACIFIC FORCES IN WHICH HE STATES THAT THE NEXT OBJECTIVE OF THE FORCES IN THE SOUTH AND SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREAS ARE RABUAL AND KAVIENG UNQUOTE NOTE FURTHER STATES THAT AUSTRALIA VIEWS WITH CONCERN STATEMENTS OF THIS NATURE ON PLANS INVOLVING ITS FORCES AND APART FROM RISK TO ITS OWN FORCES IT IS EMBARRASSED SINCE HEAD OF AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT IS PROHIBITED FROM MAKING ANY STATEMENTS AND THAT BY HIS DIRECTIVE GENERAL MACARTHUR IS THE ONLY ONE AUTHORIZED TO ISSUE COMMUNIQUES. FORWARD BY AIRMAIL FULL REPORT OF INTERVIEW AND ATTENDANT CIRCUMSTANCES.
MRS. SMITH, FNU, SUBJECT, DESCRIBED AS 5 FEET 2 INCHES, 168 POUNDS, 25 YEARS, GAUDY, LOUD, PEROXIDE BLONDE, WEARS HAIR COMBED UP, HAS PROMINENT DEFORMED BROKEN NOSE, WEARING BLACK HAT WITH PINK OSTRICH PLUME.

SUBJECT ON SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRAIN 4 EASTBOUND, LEFT PHOENIX 25 JANUARY 1944 AT 830 MOUNTAIN WAR TIME, OCCUPYING LOWER BERTH 2, CAR OF, WILL ARRIVE CHICAGO THURSDAY 27 JANUARY AM WILL DEPART CHICAGO FOR PHILADELPHIA AT 1630, 27 JANUARY. WILL BE MET IN PHILADELPHIA BY HER FATHER.

A CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT REPORTS SUBJECT AS MAKING THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT IN PRESENCE OF GROUP OF PEOPLE ABOARD TRAIN "MY HUSBAND IS A LIEUT. COMDR. IN THE NAVY. HE SPENT 14 YEARS IN THE MERCHANT MARINE SERVICE AND WAS
COMMISSIONED IN THE U.S. NAVY AT THE OUTBREAK OF THIS WAR. 
HE SAILLED FROM SAN DIEGO ON DECEMBER 28 WITH A CONVOY OF 5 SHIPS INCLUDING TROOP TRANSPORTS AND SUPPLY SHIPS BOUND FOR THE MARSHALL ISLANDS. BEFORE LEAVING HE TOLD ME TO WATCH THE NEWSPAPERS FOR AN ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE WHICH WOULD PROBABLY OCCUR ON FEBRUARY 5TH "AS THEY EXPECTED TO MAKE CONTACT WITH THE JAPS ON THAT DATE." NO ACTION TAKEN BY DIO 11TH NAVAL DISTRICT.

16......ACT
ADD COMINCH....
GARBLED GROUPS HAVE BEEN SERVICED

DECLASSIFIED
By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

OSD letter, May 3, 1973

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

SEALLED
Make original only. Deliver to Code Room watch officer in person. (See Art. 75 (4) NAVREGS.)
Reaction to Pravda report 17 January concerning alleged meeting British officials Ribbentrop in Spain summarized as follows:

Turkish diplomatic and other officials unanimously express opinion story was officially inspired. One Turk diplomatic source believes it may be beginning of Soviet war of nerves against allies. He said it indicated Soviet displeasure with Allies over something he did not know what.

Whatever Soviet purpose Turks are disturbed by this evidence of apparent lack of closest cooperation and agreement between Anglo Americans and Russians. They fear it means that apparent cohesion and mutual confidence at recent conferences was achieved by avoiding real issues. One comment was that perhaps as about Poland, United Nations after all have not perhaps agreed on policy about Turkey either.

Even before denials from London, Berlin and Madrid Turks did not believe story true. Their conviction that it was officially inspired is they say confirmed because Pravda is not known to have correspondent in Cairo, where report was stated in Pravda to have originated.
PRIO: MAFRA

Allan: re: POLISH

One Turk official in daily communication with Prime Minister believes Soviet purpose may have been two-fold, namely to provide smoke screen for Polish boundary issue and to retaliate for stories about German Russian peace feelers including story about British parachutists in Rumania. Another Turk official expressed astonishment any of Allies permit publication such stories since they obviously do much mischief to Allied unity. He approvingly quoted New York Herald Tribune editorial stating if editor of Pravda not yet emigrate Siberia, he should be. Press comment conspicuously absent so far.

No Sig

529 is CM-OUT-6577 (17 Jan 44) G-2

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: OPD LOC

CM-IN-14704 (22 Jan 44) 23492 cng
COMNAVEU ORIGInATES; SECNAV ACTION; INFO DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC RELATIONS

STORIES ABOUT THE SEPTEMBER 7 RELIEF OF SPITZBERGEN BY J EDGERTON LEE INTERNATIONAL NEWS SERVICE AND ARTHUR OAKSHOTT REUTERS TO BE RELEASED BY ADMIRALTY. CAN USS TUSCALOOSA BE NAMED OR FACT THAT US WARSHIP TOOK PART BE RELEASED. DITTO NAMES OF KEY OFFICERS TUSCALOOSA. HOLDING STORIES PENDING DECISION.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(K) and 5(D) or (K)
OSD letter, May 8, 1972
By RHP, NARS Date DEC 10 1973

ØØR...ACT

COMINCH...

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-15

151501 000.7
ADMIRAL HALSEY DEPARTED FOR EAST §830 TODAY WEATHER PERMITTING EXPECTS PROCEED DIRECTLY TO WASHINGTON VIA FORT WORTH AND NASHVILLE. HIS JOB HERE SUPERB FROM EVERY NAVAL AND PUBLIC RELATIONS VIEWPOINT HE STOLE THE ENTIRE SHOW MAKING 5 SPEAKING APPEARANCES IN ADDITION TO RADIO BROADCAST AND PRESS CONFERENCE. UNDERSECT OF WAR EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH NAVAL PARTICIPATION IN EVERY PHASE OF PROGRAM.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(9) and 3(D) at (D)
OSD letter, May 3, 1973
By RHP, NASB Date DEC 10 1973

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-15 091745-0007
COMMUNIQUE DEALING WITH DESTRUCTION OF 2 U-BOATS ON NOVEMBER 6 BY ESCORT GROUP WILL BE RELEASED 081000Z BST. NO CONVOY INVOLVED NO DATE WILL BE GIVEN.

RECEIVED BY PRINTED FROM BAD.

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-15

071843 000.7
TO MACARTHUR FROM MARSHALL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE HAS RECEIVED FROM THE SPANISH EMBASSY
A JAPANESE ALLEGATION THAT A UNITED STATES AIRCRAFT (CONSOLIDATED
B24) ATTACKED AND SANK THE JAPANESE HOSPITAL SHIP BUENOS AIRES
MARU BY BOMBING AT 0819 27 NOVEMBER 1943 IN POSITION 2 DEGREES 42
MINUTES SOUTH LATITUDE AND 129 DEGREES 20 MINUTES EAST LONGITUDE X
IN ADDITION TO THE MARKINGS REQUIRED BY ARTICLE 5 OF HAGUE
CONVENTION 1929, THE VESSEL BORE SPECIAL RED CROSS MARKINGS
FOR AERIAL AND NIGHT IDENTIFICATIONS X THE JAPANESE STATE THE
ATTACK WAS MADE AT AN ALTITUDE OF 1000 METERS AND THAT THE
WEATHER WAS CLEAR AT THE TIME OF ATTACK X IT IT REQUESTED
THAT AN INVESTIGATION OF THIS REPORTED ATTACK BE EXPEDITED

COMINCH...CGG
23...16...20G...20...OP11...OP12...[NAVAIDE]...13...19...19C...
FX37...39...FILE

RECLASSIFIED
R0. 11605, Sec. 1(D) and 8(D) or 8(D)
OSD letter, May 2, 1973
By RHP, MARF Date
DEC 10 1973

000.7
Believe it necessary to keep you informed as to latest use of General MacArthur's name in news. In connection with present national discussion of disunity caused by strikes which you probably know yesterday's Washington Times Herald carried 72 point banner headline "MacArthur praises labor" then quoted General MacArthur as saying "Labor has never failed the Army or the nation. May God bless you all for your splendid patriotism". This morning's Times Herald and all other papers expose attempt by American Federationist official organ of AFL to create impression by means of telegrams to editors that statement had just been made. They then reveal fact that statement was made originally April 1st 1942 in response to pledge of war support by William Green and James Carey and that deliberate attempt was made to place General MacArthur in false position in present discussion. Above is sent you solely for fill in on current information.

ORIGINATOR: GEN SURLES
INFORMATION: OPD, G OF S
CM-OUT-2082 (6 Jan 44) 21092 mos

[Signature]
Col. [Name]
**RECOMMEND IMMEDIATE PRESS RELEASE BE MADE THAT PLANES AND SURFACE SHIPS IN LAST 4 DAYS HAVE SUNK 3 GERMAN BLOCKADE RUNNERS IN SOUTH ATLANTIC AND THAT RELEASE HERE BE PERMITTED SIMULTANEOUSLY. NO NAMES OF SHIPS OR PERSONS. LANDING OF PRISONERS JANUARY 6 AT RECIFE CANNOT BE KEPT WHOLLY SECRET AND AM SURE GERMANS HAVE INFORMATION. BRITISH GOT MUCH FAVORABLE LOCAL PUBLICITY THEIR ACTION IN BAY OF BISCAY.**
press notice january 3rd states "army bombers attacked paramushiruo" "reported by navy". in order eliminate any misunderstanding, and as stated (my 01935) attack conducted by landcats (navy pby's). no combat landcats operated by army this area.
From: Moscow
To: AGWAR
No: 19 25 October 1943

For Marshall from Harriman signed Deane.

Stalin informed me today that he is most interested in having daily news Italian operations and on the progress of the bomber offensive. We have arranged to send daily summary which we now receive from the War Department. Because of communications, however, these summaries are received at best 48 hours following the events. While I do not wish to discontinue these I suggest that Eisenhower and Eaker be asked to send daily summary of operations direct to Moscow, including such matters as would be of interest to Stalin. I think this would be a measure of cooperation that would be appreciated and pay dividends.

ACTION: JOS (CAPT ROYAL USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
      GEN STRONG
      GEN ARNOLD
      LOG

Nosig

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date DEC 10 1973

CM-IN-15889 (26 Oct 43) 2233Z mcs
MEMORANDUM FOR the Naval Aide.

SUBJECT: Comparison of Japanese admissions of naval losses with our estimates.

1. The Tokyo Radio has announced Japanese losses in the Solomons between August 7th and November 30th to have been:
   (a) 41 warships and transports sunk
   (b) 206 planes lost, 31 damaged.

2. Within the above period our estimates in the same Japanese categories for purposes of comparison are:
   (a) 62 warships and transports sunk (42 warships and 20 transports).
   (b) About 650 planes believed lost.

3. It will be seen from the above that in (a) the Japanese claim is about 66% of ours, and in (b) it is about 32%. In our estimate of warships and transports sunk small craft such as subchasers, etc., were not included. If such small craft were included in the Japanese admission, the percentage would be reduced accordingly.

E. Watts
By direction.