

4/24

MR 201, Sec. 1 -- COMMUNICATION, CORRESPONDENCE

MR 201, Sec. 1 -- COMMUNICATION, CORRESPONDENCE

1943 - 1945

*Map Room
Box 52
Folder 6*

1944 - 1945

DISPATCH

| DRAFTER | EXT. | ADDRESSEES | PRECEDENCE |
|------------------------------|-------------------------------|---|-----------------------|
| FROM CINCPA | | ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE | 1 |
| RELEASED BY _____ | | ALPOA CLASSIFIED E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(b) and 5(D) or (E) OSD letter, May, 1, 1972 By SLR Date DEC 10 1973 | PRIORITY 2 |
| DATE 19 JAN 45 | | | ROUTINE 3 |
| TOR CODEROOM #100 | | | DDDDDDDD 4 |
| DECODED BY DORSEY | | | BASEGRAM 5 |
| PARAPHRASED BY DORSEY | CHECKED BY <i>[Signature]</i> | | BASEGRAM 6 |
| ROUTED BY _____ | DITTOED BY _____ | | PRIORITY 7 |
| | | | ROUTINE 8 |
| | | DEFERRED 9 | |
| | | BASEGRAM 10 | |

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE. IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES. 150647/21 NCR 1169

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

CINCPA SENDS. THIS IS ~~TOP SECRET~~.

THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT ENEMY HAS BEEN OBTAINING VITAL INFORMATION INCLUDING INTELLIGENCE AND OUR FUTURE PLANS FROM OUR PILOTS CONVERSATION WHEN IN FLIGHT AND WHEN TAKEN PRISONERS OF WAR. DISREGARDING THE MERITS OF INDIVIDUAL DISCLOSURES OR ENEMY METHODS OF OBTAINING INFORMATION FROM PRISONERS IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE MORE ENEMY INTELLIGENCE AND KNOWLEDGE OF OUR PLANS WHICH A PILOT HAS THE GREATER JEOPARDY TO OUR INTERESTS AND HIS OWN HE BECOMES WHEN TAKEN PRISONER. IT IS DESIRED THAT PILOTS BE BRIEFED TO A POINT WHERE THEY CAN FUNCTION INTELLIGENTLY BUT THIS NEED NOT INCLUDE THE SOURCE OR COMPLETE SCOPE OF INTELLIGENCE NOR KNOWLEDGE OF PLANS BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE OPERATION.

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3 ~~FOR CHARTROOM.~~ No. 4 SPECIAL.

~~TOP SECRET~~

REF ID: A66000
CHICAGO

~~TOP SECRET~~ **DISPATCH**

| DRAFTER | EXT. | ADDRESSEES | | PRECEDENCE | |
|--|------------------|-------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------|----|
| FROM _____ | | FOR ACTION | ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE | 1 | |
| RELEASED BY _____ | | | | PRIORITY | 2 |
| DATE _____ | | | | ROUTINE | 3 |
| TOR CODEROOM _____ | | | | DEFERRED | 4 |
| | | | | BASEGRAM | 5 |
| | | | | | 6 |
| | | | | | 7 |
| DECODED BY _____ | | INFORMATION | | 8 | |
| PARAPHRASED BY _____ | CHECKED BY _____ | | | PRIORITY | 9 |
| | | | | ROUTINE | 10 |
| | | | | DEFERRED | 11 |
| | | | | BASEGRAM | 12 |
| ROUTED BY _____ | DITTOED BY _____ | | | 13 | |
| UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE. | | | | 14 | |
| PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES. | | | 150647/21 | NCR 1169 | |
| | | | | IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW | |
| | | | | <input type="checkbox"/> | |

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

LACK OF PERSONAL SENSE OF SECURITY ON THE PART OF FORCE
 OR GROUP COMMANDERS AND SENIOR COMMANDING OFFICERS IS
 FREQUENTLY THE CAUSE OF THIS INFORMATION REACHING
 SUBORDINATE PERSONNEL WHO DO NOT NEED TO KNOW. UNNECESSARY
 LOSS OF LIFE IS THE RESULT. PASSING OF ONLY SUFFICIENT
 INFORMATION TO SUBORDINATES FOR EFFICIENT FUNCTIONING
 IS A REFINEMENT IN WHICH IT IS DESIRED THAT ALL RESPONSIBLE
 COMMANDERS PERFECT THEMSELVES.

COMINCH: COPIES 1 TO 8 INCLUSIVE.

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May, 3, 1972

DEC 10 1973

By SLR Date _____ No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations. COPY NO.

*Superb
Example of
Navy English!*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 12, 1945

Memorandum for Map Room:

~~TOP SECRET~~ HARRITTAN & PRESIDENT
A Navy message (believed to be No. 111535) was delivered to the office of Admiral Leahy on the morning of 12 January by the Orderly, Sgt. John Henry, USMC. Sgt. Henry received the sealed envelope, addressed to Admiral Leahy, from "Charlie", a White House mail room messenger.

"Charlie" said he received the envelope from Miss Turner for delivery to the Admiral's office. → File Room

It is reputed that Miss Turner was given the message by Mrs. Brady on the evening of January 11, with instructions that it be delivered to Admiral Leahy's office. It is believed that the message was put away in a locked file or safe over night.

D. F. Ringquist
D. F. Ringquist

J

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of The Chief of Naval Operations
Washington 25, DC

Op-02B-MD
Serial 202

1 January 1945

WS

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL DIVISIONS OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Subj: Identification of Classified Outgoing Correspondence.

Ref: (a) Paragraph 38(b)(1), Office Orders of the Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations, 15 May 1944.

1. In order to distinguish the classification of CNO outgoing
correspondence by serial number, the following will become effective
on 1 January 1945:

A zero (0) will precede all serial numbers assigned
to confidential correspondence.

A double zero (00) will precede all serial numbers
assigned to secret correspondence.

A triple zero (000) will precede all serial numbers
assigned to top secret correspondence.

2. Reference (a) will be amended accordingly.

W. S. Farber
Sub Chief of Naval Operations

AUTHENTICATED:

T. C. Parker
T. C. PARKER, CAPTAIN, USN.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

20 November 1944

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Communications for Warm Springs Trip.

1. During the President's Warm Springs trip the White House Signal Detachment will act in the capacity of and perform duties similar to those performed by the Army Signal Center in Washington. The Map Room duty officer will perform functions similar to those performed by the Map Room in Washington.

*on the
at Warm
Springs
Trip*

2. It shall be the duty of the Commanding Officer, White House Signal Detachment to receive and transmit all messages to and from the White House Map Room. It shall be the primary duty of the Commanding Officer, White House Signal Detachment to encode and decode messages received and transmitted. The Map Room Duty Officer will aid in the encryption and decryption of messages to the extent that the Commanding Officer, White House Signal Detachment desires.

*on the
at Warm
Springs
Trip*

3. It shall be the duty of the White House Map Room watch officer, ^{on Warm Springs Trip} to receive messages from the Commanding Officer, Signal Detachment, process them (insert code words, draw up maps, and locate references) and turn them over to the President; to receive messages from the President, process them and take them to the Commanding Officer, White House Signal Detachment, for encoding and transmission to the White House.

Richard Park, Jr.

RICHARD PARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.

CC: Major Greer ✓
White House Map Room
Watch Officer

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED] AMUG

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
To: War Department
No: FX 52919 MEDCOS 209 15 November 1944

For British Chiefs of Staff repeated Britman Washington for US Joint Chiefs of Staff reference number FX 52919 signed Wilson cite FHSIG this is MEDCOS 209

In view advance of Russian forces through Balkans consider it essential that closer tie-up exist between this headquarters and Russian authorities on questions of wireless frequencies.

Matter has already been raised with War Office through signals channels and understand War Office have:

- (A) Discussed with Russian reps who have referred it to Moscow and
- (B) Suggested the permanent attachment to this headquarters of a Russian signals officer.

Understand question of SHAEP sending signals mission to Moscow also under discussion. It might be of value if reps of this headquarters were included in discussion.

Would be grateful your assistance in obtaining Russian collaboration in this matter.

End

ACTION: CC/S
INFO : Adm Leahy, CG AAF, ASF, OPD, General Bissell, Adm King,
Log.
CM-IN-15199 (16 Nov 44) 1037Z m/m

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[REDACTED]
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 15 1974

COPY No.

35

201
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

| DRAFTER | EXTENSION NUMBER | ADDRESSEES | PRECEDENCE |
|--|------------------|---|----------------------------|
| FROM CINCPDA | | ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE | |
| RELEASED BY | | ALPOA DECLASSIFIED | PRIORITY |
| DATE 13 NOV 1944 | | E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) of | ROUTINE |
| TOR CODEROM 130734 | BOWMAN | OSD letter, May, 8, 1972 | DDDDDD |
| DECODED BY SHOAF/STORM/RISHIN/ | | By SLR Date DEC 10 1973 | DEFERRED |
| PARAPHRASE BY TILLERY/HALVORSON | <i>Read...</i> | COMINCH | PRIORITY |
| ROUTED BY PARMENTER | | CINCSOWESPAC | ROUTINE |
| | | DEPT COMDR 20TH | DDDDDD |
| | | AIR FORCE | DEFERRED |
| UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE. | | | IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW |
| PAGE | | NCR 1087 | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 1 OF 2 120650/43 | | | |

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: _____ DATE _____ TIME _____ GCT _____

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT
(CINCPDA SENDS ACTION ALPOA INFO COMINCH CINCSOWESPAC DEPT COMDR TWENTIETH AIR FORCE)

IT IS ESSENTIAL TO THE SATISFACTORY CONDUCT OF THE WAR EFFORT IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS THAT STANDARD PRACTICE BE EMPLOYED BY ALL SERVICES IN THE PRECEDENCE CLASSIFICATION OF DESPATCH TRAFFIC AND THAT RADIO TRAFFIC BE REDUCED TO A MINIMUM. THE LOWEST PRECEDENCE CLASSIFICATION THAT WILL MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE DESPATCH SHOULD BE USED WHENEVER PRACTICABLE SPEED LETTERS OR AIR MAILGRAMS SHOULD BE EMPLOYED. THIS A COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND FAILURE IN THIS REGARD IS SO REFLECTED. OVER-ALL RADIO TRAFFIC HAS PROGRESSIVELY INCREASED SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR AND CIRCUITS FREQUENCIES

| ACTION | |
|--------|--|
| F-0 | |
| F-01 | |
| F-02 | |
| F-05 | |
| F-07 | |
| F-1 | |
| F-2 | |
| F-20 | |
| F-3 | |
| F-30 | |
| F-31 | |
| F-32 | |
| F-33 | |
| F-34 | |
| F-4 | |
| FX01 | |
| FX30 | |
| FX37 | |
| FX40 | |
| TG-00 | |
| VCNO | |

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

201

120650/43

MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

| | | | |
|---------------------|------------------|---------------------------------|-------------|
| DRAFTER | EXTENSION NUMBER | ADDRESSEES | PRECEDENCE |
| FROM CINCPQA | | ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE | 1 |
| RELEASED BY | FOR ACTION | | PRIORITY 3 |
| DATE | | | ROUTINE 4 |
| TOR CODEROOM | | | DEFERRED 6 |
| DECODED BY | | | |
| TYPED BY | INFORMATION | | PRIORITY 10 |
| BY | | | ROUTINE 12 |
| | | | DEFERRED 13 |
| ROUTED BY | | | |

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

PAGE 2 OF 2

120650/43

NCR 1087

| | | | |
|-----------------------------------|------|------|-----|
| ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: | DATE | TIME | GCT |
|-----------------------------------|------|------|-----|

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL ARE DEFINITELY LIMITED.
 PRECEDENCE CLASSIFICATIONS ARE CLEARLY DEFINED IN
 ARMY BASIC FIELD MANUAL (FM 24-5) PART 19 AND NAVY
 COMMUNICATION INSTRUCTIONS (DNC 5) ARTICLE 2012.

COMINCH...COG

19....19C....20K....DIV....ALPOAFILE....20P4....

ADD: (PER CCWO)

BUPERS...BUDOCKS...BUORD...BUSHIPS...BUSANDA...BUMED
 BUAER...MARCORPS...CG...OO...OOR...S01...S02...S02AER...
 S04...S06...S08...S09...CB...JAG...OP&M...SOTB...CNO...
 OP02...OP03...OP05...OP05E...OP05G...OP07...12...13...16
 17...20A...20P...20B...20E...20F...20G...20...20M...20N
 20P1...20P2...20P3...20R...20S...20Y...20Z...20-4...
 20-5...21...23...28...29...30...39...31...32...33...34...
 36...37...ANPB...NAVAIDE...FX37...13-2...ATCC...NWC...

| ACTION | |
|--------|--|
| F-0 | |
| F-00 | |
| F-01 | |
| F-02 | |
| F-05 | |
| F-07 | |
| F-1 | |
| F-2 | |
| F-20 | |
| F-3 | |
| F-31 | |
| F-32 | |
| F-33 | |
| F-34 | |
| F-4 | |
| FX01 | |
| FX37 | |
| FX40 | |
| IG-00 | |
| VCNO | |

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May, 1, 1972

By SLR

Date

DEC 10 1973

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV 19-6E

120650/43

2
WB

HOLD FOR PRESS.

YAP ISLAND CABLES

1914

In 1914 a German Cable Company owned cables running from Guam to Yap, Yap to the Dutch Celebes and Yap to Shanghai. The Guam end of the German-owned cable from Yap to Guam was operated by the United States.

A cable from the United States to the Philippine Islands and China was owned and operated by an American company. Its stations were San Francisco, Honolulu, Midway, Guam, Manila and Shanghai.

SERVICE OVER

During interruptions of the American cable from Guam to Manila or Shanghai, American messages were diverted via Yap Island to Shanghai over the German-~~owned~~ system. Hence the alternate circuit via Yap was regarded by American interests as of utmost importance in maintaining uninterrupted communications with China and the Philippines.

World War

The Japanese seized Yap and diverted the Yap-Shanghai cable into one of the Japanese Islands (Okinawa -- Nansei Shoto group). This deprived the United States of the alternate circuit to China and meant that all traffic for China and the Philippines, in case of interruptions in the Guam-Manila cable, had to pass through Japan.

Peace Conference

The United States recommended that the ex-German cable system on Yap be turned over to Great Britain, Japan, China and the United States for joint control. The American motive was to prevent the Japanese from obtaining permanent control of the three German lines from Yap. The proposal of the Americans was not accepted.

On November 12, 1920 the United States informed Japan that her mandate over the German Islands did not include Yap and that its disposition would be reserved for later agreement to place the island under international control as a cable station.

The Council of the League of Nations rejected this proposal of the United States and on December 17, 1920, the Council confirmed Yap as one of the Japanese mandates. United States protests to the League of Nations had no results and the Japanese continued control of the German cable station on Yap.

1921-1941

The cables from Yap to Guam and Yap to the Dutch Celebes were placed out of commission by the Japanese in 1921 and the only cable in use was the one between Yap and Nansei Shoto. The Guam-Yap

cable could have been used at any time had the Japanese been willing to place it in operation. It is assumed that the Japanese used this cable after they captured Guam in December, 1941.

[Faint signature]

Op-19C/gk
Serial 12619

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.


21 September 1944

From: Chief of Naval Operations.
To: All Bureaus and Offices, Navy Department.
Subj: Discontinuance of the Sealed Secret method of
handling and classifying despatches within the
Navy Department.
Ref: (a) Opnav serial 6819 of 6 June 1944.

1. The Sealed Secret method of classifying and handling messages was established for use within the Navy Department to provide a secure means of delivering certain messages containing highly classified information to the addressees.
2. The recent addition of Top Secret to the classifications of messages now eliminates the need for the Sealed Secret classification. Therefore, the use of Sealed Secret will be discontinued, effective immediately. Hereafter, originators of despatches will use one of the four basic classifications - Top Secret, Secret, Confidential, and Restricted, in classifying their outgoing despatches.
3. The instructions contained in ref. (a), which provide for the delivery of Top and Sealed Secret despatches, will in the future apply only to the delivery of Top Secret despatches.
4. All activities are requested to return Sealed Secret despatch blanks to the Code Room (Room 2625).

JOSEPH R. REDMAN
By direction

AUTHENTICATED:


E.E. BERTHOLD, CONDR. U.S.N.

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

Joint Chiefs of Staff
71469 JMC JVB

10 July, 1944

U. S. Military Mission,
Moscow, Russia.

Number: WAR 62999

For Deane Moscow from Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Alterations to Khabarovsk broadcasting facilities are suggested for consideration by Soviets. Desirable that present bulletins from that station also be received in Marianas Group as well as in Hawaii, San Francisco and Alaska. Investigation reveals that present frequencies assigned to RYP and RFL would normally be satisfactory for receiving in that locality with the exception of the 2020Z broadcast for which presently assigned frequencies of 10500 KCS and 10220 KCS would be slightly low in the winter time for reliable reception. However this is minor part of problem. Principal problem and proposal to be made to Soviets is that they be requested to make necessary arrangements at Khabarovsk so that signal will be reliably received at the Marianas.

New subject. Central Pacific operations will ultimately require that reliable radiosonde and upper wind reports be received from Siberia and eastern USSR regularly. Soviets should be asked to provide minimum of one and preferably two radiosonde and pibal observations daily from following numbered stations:

| | |
|--------------------|------------------|
| 298 Vladivostock, | 220 Kyakhta, |
| 269 Khabarovsk, | 238 Yakutsk, and |
| 292 Petropavlovsk. | |

If necessary United States is prepared to furnish all necessary radiosonde equipment including receivers and transmitters for these installations and also such equipment as is required for pilot balloon reports. It has been suggested here that Rawin observations be established at these points in order that regularity of upper winds will be

CM-OUT-62999 (10 Jul 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 15 1974

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36

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Number: WAR 62999

10 July, 1944

Page 2.

guaranteed and in order that such observations will not be precluded by low ceilings (Rawin observations are upper wind observations made by tracking by radar a tinfoil target attached to a hydrogen filled balloon). However the difficulty with regard to Rawins is that ground receiving equipment is highly technical in nature and generally requires a minimum of seven experienced personnel with each unit, three weather observers and four radar technicians.

Another subject: Moscow broadcasts are still being received spasmodically. Reports from United Kingdom indicate that many transmissions appear to be missing. Following is list of recent scheduled transmissions which have not been heard:

A schedule at 0420Z on 6 July and 8 July.

B schedule at 1000Z on 7 July and 8 July.

C schedule at 2010Z on 7 July.

With regard to the presently established Khabarovsk transmissions a scarcity of reports on some broadcasts has been noted. Broadcasts average 20 to 30 surface reports including late reports and 2 to 3 RAOB reports twice daily. For your basis of discussion our average group count for each transmission to Moscow has been 350 groups of stations reports plus two analyses.

End.

ORIGINATOR : JCS
INFORMATION: CG AAF
OPD
ADM KING

CM-OUT-62999 (10 Jul 44) 2226Z mcs

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 15 1974

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16-20600-1 GPO

WB

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY REQUIRES ADDITION OF LETTERS
"IVI" TO CLASSIFICATION OF REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

To : War Department
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England
CG, Air Force Command Post, Caserta, Italy
CG, U.S. Army Forces in European Theater of
Operations, London, England

No. FX 69485, 7 July 1944

From AFHQ for action AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff for info USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff, SHAEF, AFHQ Adv Cp FX 69485 NAF 737 signed Wilson cite FHSIG. Signed Bethouart.

Translated text of French reply to AFHQ letter directed by your message 2477 dated 10 follows: In answer to your letter dated 21 May 1944, about the subject of security of ciphers and of communication procedure, I have the honor to inform you of the French point of view. It is out of the question for the French authorities to release their codes or their ciphers. Under this condition, I agree on the points.

1. Administrative messages that do not deal with operations shall continue to be sent by French means.

2. The use of ciphers or of joint procedures supplied by American or British authorities can be considered only for traffic dealing with future operations and those combined with the Allies. Particularly in matters involving vessels and formations of French Naval Forces taking part in operations

CM-IN-6245 (8 Jul 44)

[REDACTED]

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JOS memo, 1-4-74,
State Dept. letter, 2-5-73
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 15 1974
47

Admiral Leahy

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

(Page 2)

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

No. FX 69485, 7 July 1944

fixed under the direction of Allied authorities and requiring absolute secrecy, it is understood that only Allied codes will be used.

3. The use of French ciphers and means must continue in use so as to allow the commander of the French forces, in operations under Allied command, to report directly to French higher echelons their situations and important events which concern them, and also strictly French operations (Such as the sending of daily reports and documents of a similar nature).

Concerning paragraph 2 above, the Army Cryptographic Service will make contact with AFEQ for a joint study with the Allied technicians, of combined cipher methods supplied by the British and American authorities. The cryptographic principles of the French means and procedures could be submitted to the Allies who would thus judge their degree of security. (The Navy ciphers, chiefly, are fruits of long experience; they are particularly secure and the Allied Command can rest assured against the risks of compromise which they may run). Such contacts would tend to maintain and develop technical liaisons with the Allied Cryptographic Services that are already set up, particularly with the British and Americans. As to the risk of compromise of our ciphers, you may count on the eagerness of the French Ground, Sea and Air armed forces to maintain the security of these codes and you will be kept advised of all that which might lead us to believe that one of the codes or means employed has been compromised.

Second and 3rd sentences para 3 apparently intended to uphold point of national pride rather than suggest practicable solution cipher problem. Solution in substantial CM-IN-6245 (8 Jul 44)

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74,
State Dept. letter, 2-5-73
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 15 1974 7

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

(Page 3)

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

No. FX 69485, 7 July 1944

conformity with principles of message cited had been worked out prior to receipt of message. It is believed that this can be continued in effect by informal arrangement between AFHQ and General Staff of national defence. Request permission to handle in this manner.

End

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74,
State Dept. letter, 2-5-73
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 15 1974

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : CGAAF, OPD, Gen Bissell,
Adm King, Adm Leahy, Log

CM-IN-6245 (8 Jul 44) 1204Z jb

[REDACTED]

47

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~~SECRET~~
WHITE HOUSE SIGNAL DETACHMENT
54 TREASURY BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D. C.


DG/pet

29 June 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel R. Park,
The Map Room,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

Confirming telephone conversation of
28 June 1944, the attached memorandum is forwarded
for the information of yourself and Captain Wood.

The SIGABA is at present employed for
cryptographic security over the WAR-Moscow circuit.


DEWITT GREER,
Major, Signal Corps,
Commanding Detachment.

1 Incl.
Memo dated
28 June 1944

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) of (b)

OSD letter, May, 3, 1972

By SLR

Date DEC 10 1973

201

~~SECRET~~

DC/pet

29 June 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel R. Park,
The Map Room,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

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28 June 1944, the attached memorandum is forwarded
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Major, Signal Corps,
Commanding Detachment.

1 Incl.
Memo dated
28 June 1944

~~SECRET~~

E. O. 11652, Sec. 8(b) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May, 1, 1972

By SLB

Date DEC 10 1973

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
ARMY SERVICE FORCES

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER
WASHINGTON

SPSCC 676.3-USSR

BY AUTHORITY OF THE
CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER

INITIALS DATE

SPSCC-2

37R

6/28/44

28 June 1944.

MEMORANDUM for Commanding Officer, White House Signal Detachment,
94 Treasury Building, Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Major Greer.

Subject: WAR-Moscow Circuit.

A direct radioteletypewriter circuit now is in operation between WAR Signal Center and the American Military Mission at Moscow. This circuit is used jointly by the Russians and the U. S. Army, and circuit time is divided equally between both users. Traffic for Moscow may be filed with WAR Signal Center in the usual way.

By order of the Chief Signal Officer:

Frank E. Stoner,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Chief, Army Communications Service.

V. H. Bagnall
V. H. Bagnall,
Lt. Col., Signal Corps,
Chief, Communications Engineering Branch.



RECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (B)

OSD letter, May, 3, 1972

By SLR

Date DEC 10 1973

62227

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

24 June 1944

From: Commanders in Chief, Mideast
To : Chiefs of Staff
Info: Freedom, Joint Staff Mission, Washington
CG/429

Following for Chiefs of Staff from Commanders in Chief. Ref C.O.S. (ME) 4 of 12 June.

1. Possibility of clandestine passing of messages from ME to Mihailovich has been investigated on previous occasions. Position at present is that 3 sets are known to be in possession of Yugoslavs, 1 at Yugoslav Hq and 2 which were gift of Americans to Yugoslav forces. The first of these was monitored up till 2 months ago but no evidence was found that it was being used for purpose suggested. Snap monitoring will be undertaken again for a short period. Remaining 2 are in use officially for training purposes only at Yugoslav base depot.
2. The possibility cannot however be excluded that transmissions are carried out by sets whose existence is not known to us.
3. We have indication that information could have been carried to Yugoslavia by individuals travelling from ME and increased control over such movements has recently been imposed.
4. To sum up though the possibility of leakage of information from ME does exist we have no evidence to show that any such information has in fact passed.

T.O.O. 241800Z

Footnote: COS (ME) 4 is CM-IN-10034 (13 June 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Gen Arnold, Gen Handy, Gen Bissell, Adm King,
Col Park, Mr Stimson, C of S.

CM-IN-21240 (26 June 44) 1243Z mmd DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 15 1974

COPY NO. 41

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*Naval file
from 2078*

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



Op-16-B-4
ALO-3/EN3-10
Serial No. 1654816

9 June 1944

From: Chief of Naval Operations.
To : All Bureaus and Offices, Navy Department.
Subject: U. S. and British Classified Documents - Reclassification of.
Reference: (a) JCS ltr., No. 71469, dated 10 May 1944.

1. By reference (a) the Joint Chiefs of Staff have provided facilities for the adjustment and reconciliation of security classifications, as applied by the armed forces of the U. S. and British Empire. Joint Security Control is the representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in all matters pertaining to security classifications. For their representation, the British have established in Washington a security classification board. This body is authorized to review and reclassify any matter originated by the British Government, when in the interests of uniformity, such action is necessary.

2. The Office of Naval Intelligence, which centralizes the distribution of British documents within the Naval Establishment, will represent the Navy in the presentation to the aforesaid board of matters relating to security classifications. The addressees are requested to submit to the Office of Naval Intelligence any British documents which are identified by a security classification which differs from that applied by the U. S. Navy to similar subject matter. The recommendation of the Bureau or Office should be by memorandum, should briefly explain the reason for the Navy's classification, and should contain reasons which appear to justify the conformance of the British classification to that of the Navy.

3. After consideration by the British security classification board, the Office of Naval Intelligence will advise the Bureau or Office, which originated the submission, of the decision of that Board. Should the Bureau or Office concerned be dissatisfied with the Board's determination, they should so advise the Office of Naval Intelligence. That Office will thereupon refer the disputed matter to Joint Security Control for the latter's consideration and final disposition.

/s/ F. J. Horne
Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

Standard Distribution;
List 11 and 12.

201

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE



From: US Military Mission Moscow, Russia.

To: War Department.

Nr: 583 21 May 1944.

For General Arnold pass for info to Harriman

Supplementing my number 571 of 18 May, following info is furnished.

The present British agreement with the Soviets is for a period of 2 years but may be terminated on 3 months notice by either party. Otherwise info I gave you in my original message has been verified as correct.

The British, of course, will be reluctant to accept a three-cornered contract feeling that it will vitiate all of their efforts to date and necessitate that negotiations be started from scratch. If we decide to allocate the aircraft to the Soviets for the British, I think we should have a definite understanding with the British for a portion of the capacity of the airline to be reserved for our use. However, I adhere to the recommendations submitted by me in my previous message.

No Sig.

571 is CM-IN-14296 (19 May 44) CG AAF
no record

ACTION: CG AAF

INFORMATION: OPD
G-2 (State Dept)
Log


DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 15 1974

CM-IN-16434 (22 May 44) 0807Z

bjm



ed Park

201

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45

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE



PRIORITY

From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia
To: War Department
Nr: 571 18 May 1944
To Arnold, info Ambassador Harriman.

British negotiations for an air line to Russia have been in progress for more than a year. This in reply to your numbers 37485 and 37486 of 17th May. The British line will be a commercial proposition and I do not believe that it is being negotiated strictly as a war-time measure. The negotiations provide for parallel operations by the British and the Russians, each acting independently but with some reciprocal rights as to the use of facilities and services. Negotiations provide for a direct route from London to Moscow when weather and seasonal conditions permit; otherwise for a UK-Teheran-Moscow route. These negotiations met with countless Soviet delays until early this year when they finally countered with a proposal that the British furnish them with four 4 engine transports. This proposal was made directly by Stalin to the British Ambassador. Since that time the delay in concluding the negotiations has been on the part of the British, waiting, I believe, for an appropriate time to obtain transports from us.

On receipt of your number 30270 dated 30th April, I prepared a letter for our Embassy to send to the Soviet Foreign Office setting forth the proposals contained in your message. This has not been sent however as the State Department had previously instructed the Embassy that further instructions would be forthcoming. Such instructions were requested of the Embassy in State Department message 1590

CM-IN-14296 (19 May 44)


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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 15 1974

Col. Park

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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PRIORITY

Page 2

From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia

Nr: 571

18 May 1944

of 6th May 44.

While any measures that will improve communications will be beneficial to the war effort, we must recognize that we will be aiding the establishment of a long-term British air line. In the past the Soviets have resisted our proposals for any ATO lines into Russia on the grounds that the Soviets can furnish adequate services. The establishment of a parallel British-Soviet route direct from the UK to Moscow will strengthen the Soviet argument.

In view of the fact that we are furnishing much of the equipment for all Russian transport lines and that it is now proposed we should furnish equipment for the combined British-Russian lines, I believe we should have an agreement now which will provide for our direct participation in air transport operations. I recommend that an immediate Soviet-British-American conference be held in any of the 3 capitols in order to set up a workable scheme in which all 3 countries will participate. Such conference might provide for parallel British, Soviets and American operations between the UK and Moscow; parallel communications between the Soviets and the US for either the Teheran-Moscow route or a Washington-Moscow route; Soviets and American use of capacity of air craft being delivered over the Siberian route under lend lease; American participation in traffic over east-bound Siberian route; the military and commercial aspects of the services to be set up; and the reciprocal privileges in the use of all services set up. I suggest that our State Department take the lead and propose such a conference in Moscow as I believe

CM-IN-14296 (19 May 44)

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date


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PRIORITY

Page 3

From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia

Nr: 571

18 May 1944

it could be buttoned up here quicker than elsewhere. You could give me or any other representative you might designate such ammunition as you are prepared to use in this matter and let us make the best dicker possible. If this matter is in fact one of urgency it will be settled quickly. If, on the other hand, it has considerable post-war implications it may be prolonged.

No sig

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 15 1974

ACTION: CGAAF

INFO: OPD
G-2 (State Dept)
Lcg

CM-IN-14295 (19 May 44) 1303Z foh


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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Hq AAF ACAS Plans AFAEP
71127 GCJ:mec

May 16, 1944

Commanding General
US Military Mission
Moscow, Russia, M 276

Number: WAR 37485

To Deane from Arnold signed Marshall

British representative in Washington states British Government pressing Soviet Government for permission to establish regular air communication service between Moscow and London. Terms of proposed agreement as drafted by Soviets provides for reciprocal facilities and Soviets will not sign until they are in position to operate Soviet service to United Kingdom. British have made formal request that 4 C-87 transports be taken from British allocations in May and allocated to the Soviets for operations Moscow to United Kingdom. Soviets have not submitted request or mentioned the subject here. Request you submit information available to you on the subject particularly in regard effect this British-Soviet airline would have on prejudicing our Air Transport Command operations United Kingdom to Moscow.

1817

ORIGINATOR: CG AAF

INFORMATION: OPD
LOG

CM-OUT-37485

(16 May 44)

2303Z hrt

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 15 1974

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

May 14, 1944

From: War Cabinet Offices

To : A.F.H.Q.

Info: J.S.M., Washington

No : OZ 2562

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of JCS

memo, SM-522-71

By SR Date DEC 10 1973

Herewith special encyphered version of 30 Mission's Air 814.

"To A.F.H.Q. Algiers (R), Combined Chiefs of Air Staff, Washington, British London and C.G.U.S.S.T.A.F., from 30 Mission.

Air 814. May 14th. For General Wilson, from Generals Deane and Burrows.

1. Communications Moscow/Caserta now (? established) through Air Section, British Military Mission.
2. We suggest that Soviet General Staff should not be allowed to forget this and that proposals in para. 5 of our MIL 1168, April 25th, should be implemented especially with regard to swapping of reconnaissance information.
3. We are anxious that Soviet General Staff should not think that we made unnecessary fuss in establishing this communication rather than agreeing to work on a fixed line as they wanted and we recommend that they should be accustomed to co-operating with preparation for possible matters of urgent operational necessity later on."

MIL 1168 is CM-IN-20361 (27 Apr 44) CC/S T.O.O. 142225Z

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold, OPD, Col Park, Gen Stoner, CofS

CM-IN-11317 (25 May 44) 21422 ss

Col Park
40

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~~SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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[REDACTED]
Army Communications Service
CEB SP8OC-1 6926

May 13, 1944

US Military Mission
Moscow, Russia

Number: WAR 36463 (264-#)

For Deane signed Ingles SP8OC 1

Informal advice received from State Department reference
unread number 538 dated May 12 indicates they will dispatch
message to Embassy saying in substance that WD requests
General Deane be authorized to enter agreement covering
operation of Military Circuits. No objection indicated
by Department of State.

ORIGINATOR: Gen Somervell

INFORMATION: JC/S
Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Gen Stoner
Adm King
~~Col Park~~
C or S

CM-OUT-36463

(13 May 44) 2338Z amb

[REDACTED]
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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 15 1974
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[REDACTED]
U R G E N T

From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia

To: War Department

No. 538, 12 May 1944

For General Ingles from Deane.

Soviets have announced that they are willing to sign agreement along lines previously indicated to you. They wish agreement signed by Monday afternoon. Request that you have the State Department cable our Embassy in Moscow that I am authorized to sign this agreement for the United States Government.

No Sig.

ACTION: Gen Somervell for CSO

INFO : JC/S, General Arnold, OFD, General Bissell,
Admiral King, Colonel Park, General Stoner, C of S

CM-IN-9793 (13 May 44) 1827Z jb

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 15 1974

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10 May 1944

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

Captain Wood
Colonel Park
Major Greer
Lt. Comdr. Kevers
Mr. Dewey Long
All Map Room Watch Officers

Subject: Communications Between Map Room and
Shangri-La.

1. While the President is in residence at Shangri-La, communications between the White House Map Room and the President will be via the White House telegraph or telephone system as circumstances warrant.
2. A designated representative of the Map Room will accompany the President to Shangri-La and will be responsible for all cryptographic operations involved, filing of traffic, and delivery of traffic to the Presidential party.
3. Cryptographic systems will be designated in separate memoranda issued by me or my representative.
4. The officer in charge of the White House Signal Detachment is requested to render such material assistance as is necessary and practicable.
5. The representative of the Map Room at Shangri-La should be assigned suitable quarters in the telephone house where he may keep his cryptographic material in proper state of security.

WILSON BROWN,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date

DEC 10 1973

C. C. WOOD
By direction

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED]
May 10, 1944

From: Combined Chiefs of Staff

To : AFHQ
SACSEA

Info: J.S.M., Washington
C. in C. Middle East
SHAEP

No : OZ 2477

1. Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that letters similar to following be forwarded Chiefs of Naval and Air Staff as listed below:

- (A) By Supreme Allied Cdr. Med. Theater to Chief of Military, Naval and Air Staff of French Committee of National Liberation and of Greece.
- (B) By Supreme Cdr. South East Asia Command to appropriate inter-communication authorities.

2. Message begins: Because at this stage of the war it is of monumental importance that our cyphers and communication procedures give a maximum of security. Insecure cyphers or communication procedures by any of Allied procedures may easily result in enemy obtaining information fatal to our interests.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have recently completed intensive study regarding the security of their cryptographic devices and systems. In order that benefit derived from these studies may be fully realized the Combined Chiefs of Staff respectfully request in common interest of all Allied nations you will agree to following arrangements regarding

GM-IN-7984 (11 May 44)

[REDACTED]
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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

Col. Park
MAY 15 1974 65

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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Number OZ 2477

Page 2

use of cyphers and communication procedures of forces under your direction:

I. All messages containing matters of importance or significance to enemy, particularly messages relating to operations, shall be sent (a) under British or United States cypher and where practicable through British or U.S.A. channels, or (b) where communications through British or United States channels is not practicable such messages shall be sent under proper Combined Cyphers supplied by British or U.S. authorities and used in accordance with instructions and with Combined communication procedure.

II. No cypher, code, communications system or signal procedure will be used which in the opinion of appropriate British or U.S. authorities is not secure. These authorities (? together) afford all facilities necessary to enable them to satisfy themselves in this respect and that these cyphers are being used in accordance with instructions.

III. Allied authorities will bring to the notice of British or United States authorities any evidence which may at any time come to their knowledge suggesting the compromise of any cypher used by any of the United Nations. In asking you to accept these arrangements the Combined Chiefs of Staff (1) are influenced by the wide scope of British and American experience on questions relating to communications security and by the fact that because of certain wartime exigencies it is inevitable that your resources in the field are limited, and (ii) desire to emphasize the urgent need for uniform Allied acceptance of common standard of cypher security for operational purposes such as at present exist between U.S. and British. Message ends.

3. It is further desired upon receipt of replies from
CM-IN-7984 (11 May 44)

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 15 1974

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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Number OZ 2477

Page 3

those staffs listed above you communicate the contents thereof to Combined Chiefs of Staff.

4. S. C. A. E. F. is communicating on same lines with Allied contingents under his command. British Chiefs of Staff on behalf of Combined Chiefs of Staff are approaching Chiefs of Military, Naval and Air Staffs of Belgium, Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

T.O.O. 101035Z

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 15 1974

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: CG AAF
ABF
OPD
G-2
Adm. King
Col. Park

CM-IN-7984 (11 May 44) 1401Z ss

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

P R I O R I T Y

From: U.S. Military Mission, Moscow

To : War Department

Nr. : 482 27 April, 1944

For Ingles from Deane info Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Tonight Soviets agreed to go ahead with our communications proposal, although we have not as yet signed agreement. They say they have accepted all of my points, but want to change form of agreement and will be ready to sign in a few days.

I have instructed Persian Gulf to turn equipment over to Soviets for on shipment to Moscow. Only 5 boxes of the 80 boxes have arrived. Request you follow up with ATC to expedite.

Please send me the names of the 8 persons you are sending to supervise installation with their duties, who will be in charge, their rank, passport numbers, dates and places of birth. This information should be sent as quickly as possible. Personnel should get passports at once and apply in Washington for visas to be stamped on passports in Teheran. Personnel should leave for Teheran as soon as possible with highest possible air priority.

Request personnel bring complete set of instructions

CM-IN-21465 (29 Apr 44)

[REDACTED]

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 15 1974

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Page 2

From: U.S. Military Mission, Moscow

Nr. : 482 27 April, 1944

and drawings by hand, and also 5 copies current operating
procedure manuals and combined operating signals.

No sig.

ACTION: Gen Somervell (for CSO)

INFORMATION: JC/S
Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Col Park
Gen Stoner
CofS

CM-IN-21465 (29 Apr 44) 0437Z bjm

[REDACTED]

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 15 1974

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WAR DEPARTMENT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
W-R-G-R-5-2

26 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN WOOD, USN,
White House Map Room.

At the suggestion of Colonel Park, I am writing this memorandum to let you know that this office and the Headquarters, Air Transport Command are anxious to have all requests for air transportation for personnel and mail to Georgetown, South Carolina, channeled through this office. It is understood from the Air Transport Command that in the past few days they have received numerous requests from various sources in the White House for this transportation, and the requests have been directed to various people in the Headquarters, Air Transport Command and to the Commanding Officer of the National Airport. Of course, the Commanding Officer of the National Airport is in no position to comply with the requests himself and must refer them to the Headquarters, Air Transport Command.

I think that you will find that requests for this type of transportation can be handled more expeditiously and efficiently through this office, since we are in a position to issue the necessary orders to the Air Transport Command. I therefore suggest that for the duration of the President's current absence and in cases of his future absences the Office of the Secretary of the War Department General Staff be notified when air transportation is needed.

D. W. DAVENPORT,
Major, G. S. C.,
Asst. Secretary, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May, 3, 1972

By SLR

Date DEC 10 1973

201
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
U-R-G-E-N-T

~~SECRET~~

From: US Military Attache Stockholm Sweden

To: War Department

No: 290 24 April 1944

290 repeated London. To MILID

All airline, railway and ferry traffic as well as telegraph, telephone and radio communications between Sweden and Denmark and Sweden and Germany stopped by Germans at 1630 today for reasons unknown. Please notify State.

Rayens

ACTION: G-2

INFO : OPD
Col. Park
Log

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May, 3, 1972

By SLR

Date DEC 10 1973

CM-IN-18077 (25 Apr 44) 0007Z jb

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~
P R I O R I T Y

~~SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~
WHL
P-

From: US Military Attache, London, England

To: War Department

Nr: 12669, 19 April, 1944

To Deane rptd Arnold from Spaatz TOP SECRET
sr nr 12669.

Ensuing msg received from Wilson " In conducting conversations with Russian High Command in interest of implementing paragraphs 2 and 5 of our msg quoted in WAR X 23823 of April 16th, you should know that Russians have established a direct radio link between Moscow and their representatives in Italy, which should be a strong argument for reciprocity on part of Russians in granting our Liaison Officers direct radio communication from HQ Southern Group of Armies. We consider this direct link of great importance in expediting action. Request you keep us informed." //WHS

Reour 12625 and WAR X 23823 April 16th, the communication channel referred to might be used to expedite coordination until our own channels of communications are established between Russia and USSTAF and Russia and Caserta. We have asked 15th Air Force to send an additional Liaison Officer to be attached to Kessler's Staff who can be used for coordination with HQ Southern Group of Armies if you and Russians so desire. Request advice on any progress.

12625 is CM-IN-11558 (16 Apr 44) Gen Arnold
40-W/H
NoSig.
RECLASSIFIED

ACTION: Gen Arnold

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

INFORMATION: OPD, Log

OSD letter, May, 3, 1972

CM-IN-14059 (19 Apr 44)

By SLR Date DEC 10 1973

2100Z bjm

~~SECRET~~

201

~~SECRET~~

col Park

19

COPY No.

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: U.S. Military Mission, Moscow

To : War Department

No. 440, 17 April 1944

For Ingles and info Joint Chiefs of Staff from Deane.

At meeting with Red Army General Staff and Soviet communication authorities this afternoon we discussed agreement as to communications between Washington and Moscow. The following points arose:

(A) Soviets insist on 3 teletypewriter terminals in Moscow. They will settle for 1 in Washington and 1 in New York. Soviets are willing to start installation with 1 station in Moscow and 1 in Washington provided they have assurance that they will have 3 in Moscow and have the additional 1 in New York within a specified period of time. They would of course rent the private line from New York to Washington to connect New York Terminal with Washington transmitter. Considering that this is an opportunity to establish rapid communications between 2 great Allies and in view of recent refusal to permit them to operate station in U.S., I urgently recommend that we make this concession and give them 3 stations in Moscow, 2 in Washington, and 1 in New York. I do not feel that we can reach an agreement otherwise. How many terminals am I authorized to offer them and where and within what period of time? What will be the cost to Soviet Government for lease of private line between New York and Washington?

(B) Request description of 2.5 kilowatt (continuous rating) transmitting station. Soviets were afraid strength would not be adequate.

CM-IV-13389 (19 Apr 44)

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 15 1974
23

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

From: U.S. Military Mission, Moscow (Page 2)
No. 440, 17 April 1944

(C) Soviets think that 3 receivers will be needed for diversity reception. Request information as to why only 2 are necessary or desirable.

(D) Soviets accept our supervisory installation personnel of 8 specialists and have guaranteed that they will witness and be consulted in all phases of installation.

(E) Soviets insist on Soviet operation of transmitter and receiving station in accordance with agreement which I previously made to them which was based on information contained in your 298 of 18 February. They agree to having U.S. specialists instruct them in use of the equipment for such period as may be necessary to insure efficient operation. They wish to know how many such specialists will be necessary and desire that their number be kept to a minimum. I recommend that they be all or part of the 8 specialists who are to supervise the installation but request information on subject.

(F) Soviets wish specification in agreement regarding number of U.S. personnel necessary to provide adequate maintenance for terminals, transmitting station, and receiving station in Moscow. Request information on this.

(G) Soviets will deliver equipment from Teheran but wish to know weight and number of packages in shipment.

(H) Soviets have agreed to follow technical radio procedure established by United States Army Signal Corps but wish to be informed what such procedure will be. Request that I be sent a brief summary of procedure the Soviets will be required to follow. Also by air mail pamphlets on operating procedure.

CM-IN-13389 (19 Apr 44)

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 15 1974

COPY No. 23

[REDACTED]

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

From: U.S. Military Mission, Moscow
No. 440, 17 April 1944

(Page [REDACTED])

(I) Request that you send me frequencies which you recommend be used for this communication as well as call signs which you recommend be designated and assigned to all terminals.

(J) Soviets desire description of equipment and instructional data as to its installation and operation as early as practicable. If this could be turned over to Soviet Embassy in Teheran for delivery to Major General Slavin in Moscow, it will reach Soviet authorities quicker than through our diplomatic pouch.

(K) Soviets request name, rank, date and place of birth passport number of all U.S. personnel to be sent on this project as early as practicable in order that visas may be expedited.

Conclusion of agreement depends on your decision as to number of terminals. If you decide to meet their demands, I will sign an agreement with them on behalf of the United States unless directed to the contrary which will include the following:

1. Establishment of communications with least practicable delay.
2. Facilities to be used only for important government messages.
3. Communications to be continuous until 6 month following end of war.
4. Equipment to Soviet government on Lend Lease basis. Operational expenses in Washington by U.S. in Moscow by Soviet government except for private line between New York and Washington which will be leased by Soviet government.

5. All installations and operation in Moscow to be under Soviet control with U.S. supervisory installation personnel, U.S. instructors for operational per-

CM-IR-13389 (19 Apr 44)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 15 1974

23

COPY No.

[REDACTED]

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

From: U.S. Military Mission, Moscow
No. 440, 17 April 1944

(Page 4)

sonnel, and U.S. personnel for maintenance.

6. Complete control of terminals by user.

7. U.S. to deliver equipment to Soviets in Teheran prior to 1 May and Soviets to move equipment to Moscow within 2 weeks after receipt.

8. Installation to start immediately upon arrival of equipment in Moscow.

9. Operation to be on 24 hour basis each side using alternate hours.

10. Facilities not to be used for commercial purposes.

11. Call signs and frequencies to be by mutual agreement.

No Sig.

298 is CM-OUT-7905 (18 Feb 44) Gen Somervell (for CSO)

ACTION: Gen Somervell

INFORMATION: JC/S
OPD
Gen Bissell
Gen Stoner
Cofs

CM-IN-13389 (19 Apr 44)

00102 bjm

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 15 1974

COPY No.

23

COMINCH FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

FF1/A6-3

Serial: 2714

6 - APR 1944

~~RESTRICTED~~

From: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
To : All Ships and Stations.

Subject: Code Names - Purpose and Use of.

Reference: (a) COMINCH Restricted Ltr. Serial 7152
dated 29 October, 1943.

1. It has been noted that code names are being improperly used in Action Reports, War Diaries and similar communications. This letter is intended to clarify the situation regarding the use of code names.
2. Code names are assigned primarily as a security measure, to facilitate planning, and to permit reference to highly classified matter without revealing to unauthorized persons the true significance of the matter.
3. Recently, action reports and other correspondence have been received, some classified SECRET, some CONFIDENTIAL and some unclassified, in which code names with their meanings included in parenthesis, or vice versa, were used. It will be apparent that the further use of such code names would be undesirable and dangerous to subsequent operations, as well as endangering our cryptographic systems.
4. Certain code names assigned to operations, plans, etc., are classified TOP SECRET before the operation takes place. As soon as practicable after the completion of the operation they are reduced in classification to SECRET. They should never be used in communications or documents of a lesser classification. Code names assigned to geographic locations are always classified SECRET and should never be used in communications or documents of a lesser classification.
5. Unless necessary for security purposes or clarity code names assigned to geographic locations should not be used in Action Reports, War Diaries, and similar communications. When code names are used the document must be classified SECRET.

DECLASSIFIED

E. G. 11852, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May, 3, 1972

By SLR

Date DEC 10 1973

Naval Aide
Room 2078

COMINCH FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

FF1/A6-3

Serial: 2714

6 - APR 1944

~~RESTRICTED~~

Subject: Code Names - Purpose and Use of.

6. A code name and its meaning shall not be used together in the same communication except when such communication is intended to inform the addressee of the meaning of such code name, and is confined solely to this one purpose. This does not apply to an operation plan or operation order and the appendices thereto.

7. TOP SECRET code names should never be used over the telephone. SECRET code names may be so used in properly safeguarded conversations, when necessary to expedite urgent matters.

R. S. Edwards
R. S. EDWARDS,
Chief of Staff.

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May, 1, 1972

By SLR

Date DEC 10 1973

201

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SIGNAL DETACHMENT
94 TREASURY BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DG/pet

24 March 1944.


MEMORANDUM for Officer in Charge, Map Room,
The White House.

Reference is made to letter from the Naval Aide to the President, to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief Signal Officer, Army Service Forces, 20 March 1944, Subject: Communications Plan - Presidential Trip, and to conference between yourself, Colonel Park, and the undersigned, this date, on the same subject. In this connection the following supplemental communications plan is suggested, covering the standby period during which time the Map Room desires to communicate with the Presidential Train for the purpose of issuing instructions concerning special movements of the train:

a. The Communications Car, which operates under the supervision of the undersigned, will remain on continuous watch with radio station WAR for any messages transmitted from the Map Room. In addition to maintaining a continuous watch with WAR, the Presidential Communications Car will actually contact WAR at 1200Z, 1600Z, 2000Z, and 2400Z on schedule daily throughout the standby period.

b. All messages handled between the Map Room and the Communications Car, Presidential Train, should of course be enciphered using one of the Army Presidential Cryptograph Systems which are at present in the custody of the undersigned, and copies of which will be held only by the Map Room and the Army Cryptograph Section on the Presidential Train. Complete cryptographic equipment and associated documents will be furnished the Map Room at the proper time. The radio frequencies to be used by both radio station WAR and radio station located in the Communications Car will be as follows:

For daylight operation 9410 Kc and 13095 Kc
For night operation 4655 Kc and 6350 Kc


DEWITT GREER,
Major, Signal Corps.

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 6(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLR

Date

DEC 10 1973

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS, SERVICES OF SUPPLY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DD/pet

24 March 1944.

MEMORANDUM for Officer in Charge, Map Room,
The White House.

Reference is made to letter from the Naval Aide to the President to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief Signal Officer, Army Service Forces, 20 March 1944, Subject: Communications Plan - Presidential Trip, and to conference between yourself, Colonel Park, and the undersigned, this date, on the same subject. In this connection the following supplemental communications plan is suggested, covering the standby period during which time the Map Room desires to communicate with the Presidential Train for the purpose of issuing instructions concerning special movements of the train:

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For daylight operation 9410 Kc and 13095 Kc
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DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May, 1, 1972

By SLR

Date - DEC 10 1973

DEWITT GREER,
Major, Signal Corps.



~~SECRET~~

74329

BOARD OF WAR COMMUNICATIONS
Washington, D. C.

RESTRICTED

20 March 1944

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 20, 1944.

From: The Naval Aide to the President.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.
The Chief Signal Officer, Army Service Forces.

Subject: Communication Plan -- Presidential trip.

1. It is requested that the following communication plan be adhered to, insofar as it affects your organization, during a forthcoming trip of the President away from Washington. Certain details as to times and places have been omitted from this plan for reasons of security. Essential information will be forwarded at a later date.

2. GENERAL

(a) All classified traffic between Washington and the Presidential party will be handled through the White House Map Room in Washington and through the communication unit in company with the President.

(b) While the President is within the continental limits of the United States, traffic will be handled by Army channels whose Washington terminus is the War Department. While the President is outside the continental limits of the United States, Navy channels will be utilized. Their Washington terminus is the Navy Department Communication Office. The Map Room and the Communication unit with the President will route traffic accordingly.

(c) Transmittal of messages between the Map Room and the War and Navy Departments will be in encrypted form. The encrypted messages will be forwarded to or from the War Department via the direct teletype between the War Department Code Center and the White House telegraphic office. Transmittal of messages between the Navy Department Communication Office and the White House Map Room will be via courier service.

(d) Traffic between the President and foreign sources will be handled as it is when the President is in Washington. Unless otherwise directed by the President, all such traffic will be handled via the Map Room.

3. PROCEDURE.

(a) The address and serial number of all messages between the Presidential Party and the Map Room will be buried in the text.

(b) Rotating external indicators will be used to identify Presidential traffic. These indicators will be taken from Channel No. 9 of CSP 1465 (2) and 1465 (AA). A list of the effective indicators

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

-1-

By W. J. Stewart Date DEC 10 1973

~~SECRET~~

March 20, 1944

Subject: Communications Plan - Presidential trip.

for each day will be furnished to the pertinent Army channels by the Map Room.

(c) In order to disguise the nature of the traffic, no label of precedence will be assigned by the originator. However, it is requested that all traffic receive the handling ordinarily accorded Operational-Priority traffic. Each message should, therefore, be placed on the circuit as soon as received and labeled with the precedence of messages which are being handled at that time. If relays are involved, suitable instructions should be issued. The Navy should handle all such traffic as "Operational" (using "QPE" in handling.).

4. CRYPTOGRAPHIC AIDS.

(a) The primary system will be that utilizing the following Navy Publications:

| | |
|--------------|--------------|
| CSP889 | CSP 1149 (D) |
| CSP 1471 (D) | CSP 1100 (B) |

(b) The secondary system will be that utilizing the following Navy publications:

| | |
|--|--------------|
| CSP 2061 (A) (to be used by Map Room when Originator). | CSP 1680 (B) |
| CSP 2062 (A) (to be used by Presidential Party when Originator). | |

(c) Normally, the SECRET channel of the primary system (defined in sub-paragraph (a) above will be used. If it appears to either originator (Presidential Party or Map Room) that the set-up for any one day has been compromised, the CONFIDENTIAL channel of the primary system will be used for the remainder of the day. The corresponding CONFIDENTIAL rotating indicator will be used in such a case. The proper SECRET channel will be reverted to on the following day.

(d) The Communication Unit with the President and the Map Room will be responsible for possession of the publications listed above.

(e) Normal Army and Navy cryptographic channels may be used for messages in connection with Presidential traffic, provided no information concerning the type of traffic is divulged.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.,

By W. J. Stewart Date

DEC 10 1973

-2-

~~SECRET~~

March 20, 1944.

Subject: Communication Plan - Presidential trip.

5. Addressees are requested to forward copies of all supplementary instructions issued in connection with this plan to the Naval Aide to the President in order that he may have a clear understanding of the over-all system.

WILSON BROWN

Copies to:

Major Greer
Map Room

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date DEC 10 1973

[REDACTED]


JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

15 March 1944

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS DELIVERED
BY J.C.S. COURIERS:

SUBJECT: Revised Authorized Signature List.

In accordance with the attached letter from Joint Security Control, it is requested that the attached authorized signature list be completed and returned to the Message Center, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1901, Constitution Ave., N.W., Washington 25, D. C. not later than 20 March 1944.



C. R. PECK,
Colonel G.S.C.,
Executive Secretary.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 15 1974

MF/XZ

TELEPHONE EXT. NO. 4981

FROM: SECNAV

TO: ALNAV #57

RELEASED BY: FRANK KNOX

DATE: 9 MARCH 1944

-D- QNL -A- SNOW 092029/57 RAFT - QXL - GR 92 BT

REFERRING TO COMINCH SERIAL 540 THE TERMS SECRET SECURITY
COMMA SECURITY CONTROL PROCEDURE AND SECURITY CONTROL CHANNELS
ARE HEREBY CANCELLED AS OF 0001 ZED 15 MARCH 1944 AND THE TERMS
TOP SECRET COMMA TOP SECRET PROCEDURE AND TOP SECRET CHANNELS
RESPECTIVELY SUBSTITUTED THEREFOR X PENDING RECEIPT OF CHANGES
TO NAVY REGULATIONS PURSUANT TO ALNAV 44 THE PROVISIONS OF
COMINCH SERIAL 540 FOR CLASSIFYING AND HANDLING SECRET
SECURITY MATTER REMAIN IN EFFECT FOR CLASSIFYING AND HANDLING
TOP SECRET MATTER EXCEPT THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL TOP
SECRET MATTER BE TRANSMITTED BY REGISTERED MAIL BT 092029/57
NAC NAD NAF NAI NAH NAM NAO NBL NFV NSO NJC NAJ NAT
NAU NBA-QYB NSF NWU NKM-QYB/QYR NTL NYS NPM FOX SUBFOX
NCD NST-T-J40/QYB BN CN-QYB L NHK AN-TWX CG NP
(QYR NOI NYM) SA NY NV CS RD CB DY

DISTRIBUTION

LISTS: 5, 11

201

JSC/D8
Serial 320

JOINT SECURITY CONTROL
WASHINGTON, D. C.

8 March 1944

MEMORANDUM for Assistant Security Control Officers.

Subject: Authorization to receive Security Control or TOP SECRET Papers.

1. Investigation has brought out that in some offices, lists of persons authorized to sign for CCS and JCS SECRET-SECURITY papers, contain names other than officers of the armed services. This practice is not authorized under either Security Control Procedure or the new TOP SECRET Control Procedure.

2. Security Control Officers will take immediate action to have such lists revised in all offices now receiving such papers from JCS messengers.

3. After 15 March JCS messengers will be instructed to deliver TOP SECRET papers to OFFICERS ONLY.

For Joint Security Control:

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 15 1974

/s/ FORREST B. VOLKEL,
Colonel, CAC,
Secretary.

JSC/D8
Serial 320

JOINT SECURITY CONTROL
WASHINGTON, D. C.

 8 March, 1944.

MEMORANDUM for Assistant Security Control Officers.

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For Joint Security Control:

Forrest B. Volkel
FORREST B. VOLKEL,
Colonel, CAC,
Secretary.

DECLASSIFIED

\ JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 15 1974

201

JSC/c15.
Serial 317

JOINT SECURITY CONTROL
Washington, D. C.

7 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretaries of all J.C.S. Committees.

Subject: Clearance of Working Members of Committees for TOP SECRET Projects.

1. The following procedure is hereby established for the control of Working Committees formed to study projects which are classified TOP SECRET:

a. The Steering Member of each Working Committee formed will be furnished a copy of J.S.C./C15, Serial 2992 of 28 February 1944, subject: "TOP SECRET Control Procedure," by the Committee Secretariat.

b. Individual members will be instructed to:

(1) Report to the TOP SECRET Control Officer of the organization to which he is assigned and sign the register maintained for the operation or project under study.

(2) Receive instructions from the TOP SECRET Control Officer of his organization for special handling and safeguarding matters in TOP SECRET Control Channels.

2. The Committee Secretariat will furnish Joint Security Control with a copy of the directive to the Working Committee together with a list of appointees.

For Joint Security Control:

Forrest B. Volkel
FORREST B. VOLKEL
Colonel, CAC
Secretary.

Copy to:
TOP SECRET Control Officers.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 15 1974

201

JSC/A6-3
Serial 306

JOINT SECURITY CONTROL
Washington, D. C.

1 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR: Security Control Officers.

Subject: TOP SECRET Control Procedure.

References: (a) Alnav 44, 29 February 1944
(b) W.D. Circular 91, 29 February 1944.
(c) C.C.S. 210/4

Enclosure: JSC/C15, Serial 2992 of 28 February 1944,
subject: "TOP SECRET Control Procedure."

1. The enclosure establishes a TOP SECRET Control Procedure which will replace Security Control Procedure on 15 March 1944. The instructions contained therein supplement those contained in the references and will govern until new Army and Navy Regulations are issued.

2. Security Control officers will take the action necessary to establish the new procedure.

For Joint Security Control:

Forrest B. Volkel
FORREST B. VOLKEL
Colonel, CAC
Secretary.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 15 1974

201

JSC/CL5
Serial 2992

JOINT SECURITY CONTROL
Washington, D. C.

28 February 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization
War Department General Staff
War Department Special Staff
Secretary, War Department General Staff
CG, Army Ground Forces
CG, Army Air Forces
CG, Army Service Forces
Theater Commanders
Defense Commanders
Service Commanders
Base Commanders
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet
Vice Chief Naval Operations
Chiefs of Bureaus of the Navy Dept.
Fleet Commanders
Sea Frontier Commanders
Commandants of Naval Districts
Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps.
TOP SECRET Control Officers.

Subject: TOP SECRET Control Procedure.

1. AUTHORITY. a. Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Joint Security Control is the agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization charged . . . with preventing information of military value from falling into the hands of the enemy . . ." (J.C.S. 234/2/D March 17, 1943).

b. War Department. AR 380-5 provides the basis for safeguarding military information for all commanders within all echelons of the War Department.

c. Navy Department. U.S. Navy Regulations, Articles 75 $\frac{1}{2}$ and 76 form the basis for safeguarding classified information within all bureaus, stations, and forces of the Navy.

d. Joint Agreement. The Combined Security Classification Agreement will cause the Regulations of the War and Navy Departments mentioned above to be revised. This agreement has been issued to U.S. and British armed services and will be the guide to classification on and after 15 March 1944, until the above Regulations are revised. The agreement introduces a category called TOP SECRET, which is new to the U.S. armed services.

2. ADDITIONAL MEASURES. Additional precautionary measures necessary to safeguard all matters falling within the TOP SECRET category are laid down herein and will be referred to as TOP SECRET CONTROL MEASURES and TOP SECRET CONTROL CHANNELS. The current Security Control Procedure is, in general, functioning satisfactorily and will be continued with such modifications as appear below, under the new title of TOP SECRET CONTROL.

3. GENERAL PRINCIPLES. The principles set forth below must guide each individual who originates a paper falling within the TOP SECRET category, and similarly, each individual who receives such a paper for

action. The responsibility for their observance rests with each commander concerned. These principles are:

- a. The unnecessary spread of information must be avoided.
- b. Only the minimum information necessary to the proper planning and appropriate action of a subordinate echelon will be released to it.
- c. The transmission of information in the TOP SECRET category should be effected by direct contact wherever practicable.

4. TOP SECRET CONTROL CHANNELS. In the War and Navy Department offices in Washington Joint Security Control will normally maintain contact in security matters with the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization, War Department General and Special Staffs, Headquarters of the Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, Army Service Forces; the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, the Office of Naval Operations, and the Bureau and Offices of the Navy, through officers specifically designated in each agency. These officers are known as TOP SECRET Control Officers and all TOP SECRET Control matters will be transmitted through them. This method of transmission will be referred to as the TOP SECRET Control Channel. The appointment of TOP SECRET Control Officers in the lower echelons of the major components mentioned above is authorized. Theater, Defense and Service Commands of the Army and Fleet and Sea Frontier Commands and Commandants of Naval Districts of the Navy will be responsible for establishing the necessary TOP SECRET Control channels in their commands.

5. REGISTER OF CONTROL OFFICERS. Joint Security Control maintains an accurate up-to-date register of TOP SECRET Control Officers of the offices named in paragraph 4, plus the offices of certain civilian agencies in Washington. The headquarters of each Theater Commander, Defense Commander, and Commanding General, Service Command of the Army, and the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet and each Fleet and Sea Frontier Commander and Commandant of a Naval District of the Navy will maintain a similar Register in their own organizations.

6. TOP SECRET CONTROL PROCEDURE. a. Purpose. This procedure is designed primarily to safeguard and limit the spread of information falling within the TOP SECRET category.

(1) In the case of plans or particulars of future major or special operations such information includes the plans proper, their code names; contemplated areas of action, dates, certain special equipment, and all matters which tend to reveal the foregoing.

(2) In the case of particulars of important dispositions or impending moves of our forces or convoys in connection with future major or special operations such information includes:

(a) Movement of our forces (Army, Naval or Air) from a rear area to a theater of operation to the battle or assault area by land, by sea, or by air.

(b) The movement of a convoy carrying troops including the particulars of the dates, rendezvous, composition, route and destination.

(3) In the case of critical information of new and important munitions, including approved scientific and technical developments, the materiel itself will seldom, if ever, be placed in

[REDACTED]

the TOP SECRET category and then only in the development and testing phases. The technical service or bureau in charge of the development will determine the classification and will request from Joint Security Control the assignment of a code name, if deemed necessary.

b. Announcement. The announcement of a code word for a TOP SECRET plan or project in the War and Navy Departments will, in all cases, be initiated by or through Joint Security Control via TOP SECRET Control Channels to the offices who are required to have same. Commanders in the field who initiate a plan or project falling within the TOP SECRET category will notify Joint Security Control through command channels as soon as such plan or project is forwarded outside of the theater or Defense Command so that announcement can be made of the code word and its meaning to the offices who are required to have same.

c. Register of Individuals. Each of the offices listed in paragraph 5 above will maintain a register of individuals to whom information concerning TOP SECRET matters has been released.

d. Marking and Transmission. All TOP SECRET documents will be enclosed in double sealed envelopes for transmission. The inner envelope will be marked TOP SECRET. Such documents will be transmitted by especially designated couriers who shall, in all cases where at all practicable, be officers of the U.S. armed services. In cases of extreme importance the inner envelopes will be directed to a particular addressee by name or office.

e. Message Centers - TOP SECRET Control Sections. The organization of a TOP SECRET Control Section composed of specially selected officers may be set up in each Classified Message Center to receive, open and deliver TOP SECRET correspondence. Material specifically addressed will be handed unopened to the addressee or his specifically designated representative.


f. Processing. It is not contemplated that this procedure will limit the processing of TOP SECRET material to listed TOP SECRET Control Officers only. It is obvious that in any headquarters certain officers and clerks not so listed must see and work on such matters. THIS GROUP MUST BE KEPT TO A MINIMUM, and the clerks, both military and civilian, must be specifically selected and approved. Each office will maintain an up-to-date list of such personnel.

g. Administrative details growing out of TOP SECRET matter may be classified in accordance with their own contents when they do not of themselves reveal, in fact or by inference, information requiring TOP SECRET classification. Such administrative matters include movement orders for personnel, equipment or material which, when properly prepared, can be sent through usual channels with the proper SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL or RESTRICTED classification. Such communications should be prepared so that they do not disclose the projected operation or project for which the personnel, equipment or material is intended, nor contain vital parts of the plan proper, nor references to special equipment the nature of which would divulge the plan or project. It is essential that all matter be examined prior to its release from TOP SECRET channels to insure that there is no compromise of information through comparison with other communications.


7. Reclassification. When an appropriate authority in the War and Navy Departments in Washington decides to reclassify a TOP SECRET subject and its code word from TOP SECRET to some lower category, Joint

Security Control will be notified and will be responsible for notifying all others in the War and Navy Departments who are concerned. Theater and Defense Commanders who take similar classifying action will themselves notify all concerned.

8. RESCISSIONS. Memorandum, this office, dated 23 June 1943, subject: "Security Control Procedure," is rescinded 15 March 1944.



R. E. SCHUIRMANN
Rear Admiral, U. S. N.
Member, Joint Security Control.



CLAYTON BISSELL
Major General
Member, Joint Security Control.

CIRCULAR
No. 91WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 29 February 1944.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved an agreement made between the American and British services on the definition, classification, and handling of matters to be safeguarded. Procedures, names, definitions, and handling hereinafter set forth are to be put in effect by all War Department offices and United States Army headquarters on *zero zero one Z, 15 March 1944*.

2. Instructions to the same effect are being issued for the same effective date to the United States Navy and to the British Armed Forces.

3. It is contemplated that a complete revision of AR 380-5 embodying the details of the new agreement will be printed and distributed to the War Department on or about 1 April 1944.

4. From 15 March 1944 to date of receipt of the revision of AR 380-5, the policy hereinafter outlined will be followed by all concerned. No change in the classification of existing documents is necessitated by this agreement.

5. Combined Security Classifications Agreement.

NEED FOR CLASSIFICATION

1. To safeguard official matter, it must be examined and graded into categories so that it may be recognized and accorded proper handling. To grade matter accurately and uniformly, the following general policy and definitions have been agreed upon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to become effective *15 March 1944*. The detailed instructions based thereon will be issued by the several services concerned not later than *1 April 1944*.

DEFINITIONS

2. For the purpose of this agreement, the following definitions apply:

- a. Documents: Any form of recorded information.
- b. Matériel: Any article, substance, or apparatus.
- c. Handling: Care in transmission and custody.
- d. Distribution: Extent of actual or authorized issue of specific matter.
- e. Cryptographic system: Code and/or cipher and instructions therefor.
- f. Registered matter (document): Any classified document or device registered usually by number and periodically accounted for.
- g. Order of Battle: Important dispositions of our forces with the identities of the units and formations composing those forces in or adjacent to operational theaters.
- h. Munitions of war: Any item used for war.

CATEGORIES

3. Official matter requiring classification shall be examined and graded under one of the following categories:

TOP SECRET (signal abbreviation, TOPSEC)

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED

4. The United States regards TOP SECRET as a subdivision of SECRET. On the other hand, the British regard TOP SECRET as a distinct category. Although this difference of view is recognized it is immaterial to this agreement under which complete working uniformity is obtained by the adoption of agreed definitions, examples and rules of treatment, for the handling of all classified matter.

5. Providing the following definitions and rules for handling are mutually accepted and rigorously implemented, the difficulties can be overcome.

TOP SECRET

6. Certain secret documents, information, and matériel, the security aspect of which is paramount, and whose unauthorized disclosure would cause exceptionally grave damage to the nation shall be classified TOP SECRET.

7. The following are some examples of matter which normally will be graded TOP SECRET:

- a. Plans or particulars of future major or special operations.
- b. Particulars of important dispositions or impending moves of our forces or convoys in connection with a above.
- c. Very important political documents dealing with such matters as negotiations for alliances and the like.
- d. Information of the methods used or success obtained by our Intelligence Services and Counter-Intelligence Services or which would imperil secret agents.
- e. Critical information of new and important munitions of war, including approved scientific and technical developments.
- f. Important particulars of cryptography and cryptanalysis.

SECRET

8. Documents, information, or matériel, the unauthorized disclosure of which would endanger national security, cause serious injury to the interests or prestige of the nation, or any governmental activity thereof, or would be of great advantage to a foreign nation shall be classified SECRET.

9. The following are some examples of matter which normally will be graded SECRET:

- a. Particulars of operations in progress.
- b. Plans or particulars of operations not included under TOP SECRET.
- c. Instructions regarding the employment of important new munitions of war.
- d. Order of Battle information and locations and moves affecting the Order of Battle.
- e. Knowledge of enemy matériel and procedure, the value of which depends upon the enemy not knowing that we possess it.
- f. Vital military information on important defenses.
- g. Certain reports of operations containing information of vital interest to the enemy.
- h. Adverse reports on general morale affecting major operations.
- i. Important improvements to existing munitions of war until accepted for service use.
- j. Photographs of vulnerable points or vital installations under our control.
- k. Certain development projects.
- l. Important cryptographic devices unless assigned to a lower category.

CONFIDENTIAL

10. Documents, information, or matériel, the unauthorized disclosure of which, while not endangering the national security, would be prejudicial to the interests or prestige of the nation, any governmental activity, an individual, or would cause administrative embarrassment, or difficulty, or be of advantage to a foreign nation shall be classified CONFIDENTIAL.

11. The following are some examples of matter which normally will be graded CONFIDENTIAL:

- a. Matters, investigations, and documents of a personal and disciplinary nature, the knowledge of which it is desirable to safeguard for administrative reasons.
- b. Routine operational and battle reports which do not contain information of vital interest to the enemy.
- c. Routine intelligence reports.

- d. General military radio frequency allocations.
- e. Military call signs, unless so collected together that they reveal the Order of Battle.
- f. Meteorological information of designated areas.
- g. Unit movements of nonoperational significance in areas within or adjacent to operational theaters.
- h. Certain technical documents and manuals used for training, maintenance and inspection of important new munitions of war.
- i. General tactical lessons learned as a result of operations.
- j. Aerial photographs of territories under our control in or adjacent to operational theaters.

RESTRICTED

12. Documents, information, or matériel (other than TOP SECRET, SECRET, or CONFIDENTIAL) which should not be published or communicated to anyone except for official purposes shall be classified RESTRICTED.

13. The following are some examples of matter which normally will be graded RESTRICTED:

- a. Information of moves of nonoperational significance in areas remote from theaters of war.
- b. Training and technical documents for official use only or not intended for release to the public.
- c. Certain routine documents relating to supply and procurement.
- d. Aerial photographs of territories under our control remote from operational theaters.
- e. Photographs of enemy, enemy occupied or dominated, areas except those which reveal secret sources.
- f. Strength returns of units remote from operational theaters.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

GRADING

14. The designation of persons responsible for grading and regrading will be a function of the appropriate authorities.

15. Each document should be graded according to its own content and not necessarily according to its relationship to another document. This also applies to extracts from graded documents.

16. The grading of a file or group of physically connected documents shall be that of the highest graded document therein.

REGRAIDING

17. IT IS THE OBLIGATION OF ALL AUTHORITIES TO KEEP CLASSIFIED MATTER CONSTANTLY UNDER REVIEW AND TO DOWNGRADE IT AS SOON AS CONDITIONS PERMIT.

TRANSMISSION BY ELECTRICAL MEANS

18. Messages which have been transmitted or are to be transmitted in a high-grade cryptographic system of one nation will not be relayed or transmitted by the other nation between point of origin and destination by electrical means in clear language or unapproved "scrambler" system, or low-grade cryptographic system.

HANDLING (TREATMENT)

19. No person is entitled solely by virtue of his rank or position to knowledge or possession of classified matter. Such matter is entrusted only to those individuals whose official duties require such knowledge or possession.

SECRET

20. SECRET matter will be handled in accordance with the following rules:

- a. The highest grade cryptographic systems available will be used for the transmission of SECRET messages.

b. SECRET documents will be transmitted only by officially designated courier in double sealed envelopes, the inner one being marked SECRET, and will be opened only by the addressee or his authorized representative. Where officially designated courier service is not available, SECRET documents may be transmitted by registered mail service or mail service superior to registered mail service, if the service is completely within national control.

c. Transmission and custody of these documents and matériel will normally be covered by a receipt system and registered documents or matériel periodically accounted for. It is mandatory that registered documents be covered by a receipt system.

d. SECRET messages will not be transmitted by electrical means in the clear, except over approved circuits and providing the rule in paragraph 18 is not violated.

Notes: (1) An approved circuit is:

A circuit approved by the theater commander. The British Services "Defence Teleprinter Network" in the United Kingdom.
(2) This item will not appear in U. S. Regulations on cryptographic security. It will be released immediately to responsible commanders in special letters of instructions.

e. It is the responsibility of the commissioned officer or equivalent civilian holding custody of SECRET documents to insure that all security precautions are taken to guard such documents at all times.

TOP SECRET

21. TOP SECRET matter will be handled in accordance with the above rules, with additional safeguards as follows:

a. Under no circumstances will such matter be transmitted by registered mail.

b. Under no circumstances will messages so graded be transmitted by electrical means in the clear.

c. It is mandatory that transmission and custody of such matter be covered by a receipt system.

d. TOP SECRET documents will be handled only by persons specifically designated and may not be disclosed to any person solely by virtue of his rank or office.

CONFIDENTIAL

22. CONFIDENTIAL matter will be handled in accordance with the following rules:

a. CONFIDENTIAL documents, except registered, will be transmitted by approved official means. Registered CONFIDENTIAL documents will be handled in the same manner as registered SECRET documents.

b. It is the responsibility of the commissioned officer or equivalent official holding custody of CONFIDENTIAL documents to insure that appropriate security precautions are taken at all times.

RESTRICTED

23. RESTRICTED matter will be handled in accordance with the following rules:

a. RESTRICTED documents will be transmitted by such approved channels as will provide a reasonable degree of security.

b. Registered RESTRICTED documents will be transmitted to and from foreign countries in the same manner as registered SECRET documents.

[A. G. 390.01 (29 Feb 44).]

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

OFFICIAL:

J. A. ULIO,

Major General,

The Adjutant General.

G. C. MARSHALL,

Chief of Staff.

AGO 234

DOORNEKI NYHEN COGON YMA CTYRILIED DOCUMENT OF DEANCE RECEIPIED
YND INSEMPATIONS INREVELS SPP-BYNYOYEN E RECEIPIED NYHEN NYHEN
MF/XM

TELEPHONE EXT. NO. 4515

FROM: SECNAV TO: ALNAV # 44
RELEASED BY: FRANK KNOX AIRMAIL - BASEGRAM
DATE: 29 FEBRUARY 1944

D - QNL - A - SNOW 292213/44 RAFT - QIR - QWM - GR 1937 BT
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF HAVE AGREED UPON IDENTICAL DEFINITIONS
AND POLICY CONCERNING CLASSIFIED MATTER TO BE EFFECTIVE IN ARMED
FORCES U S AND BRITISH EMPIRE X THIS AGREEMENT HEREINAFTER QUOTED
HEREBY ISSUED FOR COMPLIANCE BY ALL MEMBERS NAVAL ESTABLISHMENT
WHERESOEVER LOCATED X ACCORDINGLY THOSE PORTIONS OF NAVY
REGULATIONS COMMA GENERAL ORDERS COMMA LETTERS AND INSTRUCTIONS
INCONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT QUOTED HEREIN
ARE SUSPENDED PENDING FORMAL CHANGES IN REGULATIONS AND INSTRUC-
TIONS TO BE ISSUED IN DETAIL NEAR FUTURE X PERSONNEL ARE NOT TO
PRESUME THAT ADOPTION OF ADDITIONAL CLASSIFICATION QUOTE TOP SECRET
UNQUOTE REDUCES PRESENT INTEGRITY OF EXISTING CLASSIFICATIONS X
DISTRIBUTION

(BASEGRAM DELIVERY AUTHORITIES) (AIRMAIL)
APPENDIX IV, COMINST.
LISTS 4, 5, 6 (FOR 8, 9, 10,) 7, 11, 13, 14 (ORDINARY MAIL)

ATTENTION.
THIS IS THE ACTION COPY OF AN ORIGINAL TRANSMISSION BY DISPATCH
MAIL. DELIVER TO RADIO ROOM. IN ORDER TO VALID
AUTHENTICATED BY YK FOR NAVY DEPARTMENT
COMMUNICATION WATCH OFFICER, DATE 1 MARCH 1944
TIME 0530

BYGE IHO DE NINE

MATERIAL MUST BE CLASSIFIED IN STRICT ACCORDANCE WITH DEFINITIONS AND SAFEGUARDED AS DIRECTED BY EXISTING REGULATIONS AND MODIFICATIONS CONTAINED IN AGREEMENT QUOTED X ALL HANDS ARE ENJOINED TO GRADE AND CLASSIFY MATTER WITH EXACTING CARE IN ORDER TO AVOID OVER-CLASSIFICATION X THIS ORDER EFFECTIVE 0001 ZED 15 MAROH 1944 X CLASSIFIED MATTER ORIGINATED PRIOR EFFECTIVE DATE NEED NOT BE RECLASSIFIED TO ACCORD WITH THIS ORDER EXCEPT WHEN SUCH MATTER IS STILL CURRENT OR PERPETUATED BY ADDITIONS OR ACCESSIONS ISSUED AFTER EFFECTIVE DATE X COMBINED SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS AGREEMENT IS QUOTED AS FOLLOWS COLON COMBINED SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS AGREEMENT NEED FOR CLASSIFICATION PARAGRAPH 1 TO SAFEGUARD OFFICIAL MATTER COMMA IT MUST BE EXAMINED AND GRADED INTO CATEGORIES SO THAT IT MAY BE RECOGNIZED AND ACCORDED PROPER HANDLING X TO GRADE MATTER ACCURATELY AND UNIFORMLY THE FOLLOWING GENERAL POLICY AND DEFINITIONS HAVE BEEN AGREED UPON BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF TO BECOME EFFECTIVE 15 MARCH 1944 X THE DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS BASED THEREON WILL BE ISSUED BY THE SEVERAL SERVICES CONCERNED NOT LATER THAN 1 APRIL 1944 DEFINITIONS PARAGRAPH 2 FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS AGREEMENT COMMA THE FOLLOWING DEFINITIONS APPLY COLON SUB-PARAGRAPH A DOCUMENTS COLON ANY FORM OF RECORDED INFORMATION SUB-PARAGRAPH B MATERIEL COLON ANY ARTICLE COMMA SUBSTANCE COMMA OR APPARATUS SUB-PARAGRAPH C HANDLING COLON CARE IN TRANSMISSION AND CUSTODY SUB-PARAGRAPH D DISTRIBUTION COLON EXTENT OF ACTUAL OR AUTHORIZED ISSUE OF SPECIFIC MATTER SUB-PARAGRAPH E CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEM COLON CODE AND SLANT OR CIPHER AND INSTRUCTIONS THEREFOR SUB-PARAGRAPH F REGISTERED MATTER PAREN DOCUMENT PAREN COLON ANY CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT OR DEVICE REGISTERED

PAGE THREE OF NINE

ALNAV #44

USUALLY BY NUMBER AND PERIODICALLY ACCOUNTED FOR SUB-PARAGRAPH G ORDER OF BATTLE COLON IMPORTANT DISPOSITIONS OF OUR FORCES WITH THE IDENTITIES OF THE UNITS AND FORMATIONS COMPOSING THOSE FORCES IN OR ADJACENT TO OPERATIONAL THEATERS SUB-PARAGRAPH H MUNITIONS OF WAR COLON ANY ITEM USED FOR WAR CATEGORIES PARAGRAPH 3 OFFICIAL MATTER REQUIRING CLASSIFICATION SHALL BE EXAMINED AND GRADED UNDER ONE OF THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES COLON TOP SECRET PAREN SIGNAL ABBREVIATION COMMA TOPSEC PAREN COMMA SECRET COMMA CONFIDENTIAL COMMA RESTRICTED PARAGRAPH 4 THE UNITED STATES REGARDS TOP SECRET AS A SUBDIVISION OF SECRET X ON THE OTHER HAND COMMA THE BRITISH REGARD TOP SECRET AS A DISTINCT CATEGORY X ALTHOUGH THIS DIFFERENCE OF VIEW IS RECOGNIZED IT IS IMMATERIAL TO THIS AGREEMENT UNDER WHICH COMPLETE WORKING UNIFORMITY IS OBTAINED BY THE ADOPTION OF AGREED DEFINITIONS EXAMPLES AND RULES OF TREATMENT FOR THE HANDLING OF ALL CLASSIFIED MATTER PARAGRAPH 5 PROVIDING THE FOLLOWING DEFINITIONS AND RULES FOR HANDLING ARE MUTUALLY ACCEPTED AND RIGOROUSLY IMPLEMENTED COMMA THE DIFFICULTIES CAN BE OVERCOME TOP SECRET PARAGRAPH 6 CERTAIN SECRET DOCUMENTS INFORMATION AND MATERIEL THE SECURITY ASPECT OF WHICH IS PARAMOUNT AND WHOSE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE WOULD CAUSE EXCEPTIONALLY GRAVE DAMAGE TO THE NATION SHALL BE CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET PARAGRAPH 7 THE FOLLOWING ARE SOME EXAMPLES OF MATTER WHICH NORMALLY WILL BE GRADED TOP SECRET COLON SUB-PARAGRAPH A PLANS OR PARTICULARS OF FUTURE MAJOR OR SPECIAL OPERATIONS SUB-PARAGRAPH B PARTICULARS OF IMPORTANT DISPOSITIONS OR IMPENDING MOVES OF OUR FORCES OR CONVOYS IN CONNECTION WITH A ABOVE SUB-PARAGRAPH C VERY IMPORTANT POLITICAL DOCUMENTS DEALING WITH SUCH MATTERS AS NEGOTIATIONS FOR ALLIANCES

AND THE LIKE SUB-PARAGRAPH D INFORMATION OF THE METHODS USED OR SUCCESS OBTAINED BY OUR INTELLIGENCE SERVICES AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OR WHICH WOULD IMPERIL SECRET AGENTS SUB-PARAGRAPH E CRITICAL INFORMATION OF NEW AND IMPORTANT MUNITIONS OF WAR COMMA INCLUDING APPROVED SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS SUB-PARAGRAPH F IMPORTANT PARTICULARS OF CRYPTOGRAPHY AND CRYPTANALYSIS SECRET PARAGRAPH 8 DOCUMENTS COMMA INFORMATION COMMA OR MATERIEL COMMA THE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF WHICH WOULD ENDANGER NATIONAL SECURITY COMMA CAUSE SERIOUS INJURY TO THE INTERESTS OR PRESTIGE OF THE NATION COMMA OR ANY GOVERNMENTAL ACTIVITY THEREOF COMMA OR WOULD BE OF GREAT ADVANTAGE TO A FOREIGN NATION SHALL BE CLASSIFIED SECRET PARAGRAPH 9 THE FOLLOWING ARE SOME EXAMPLES OF MATTER WHICH NORMALLY WILL BE GRADED SECRET COLON SUB-PARAGRAPH A PARTICULARS OF OPERATIONS IN PROGRESS SUB-PARAGRAPH B PLANS OR PARTICULARS OF OPERATIONS NOT INCLUDED UNDER TOP SECRET SUB-PARAGRAPH C INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING THE EMPLOYMENT OF IMPORTANT NEW MUNITIONS OF WAR SUB-PARAGRAPH D ORDER OF BATTLE INFORMATION AND LOCATIONS AND MOVES AFFECTING THE ORDER OF BATTLE SUB-PARAGRAPH E KNOWLEDGE OF ENEMY MATERIEL AND PROCEDURE COMMA THE VALUE OF WHICH DEPENDS UPON THE ENEMY NOT KNOWING THAT WE POSSESS IT SUB-PARAGRAPH F VITAL MILITARY INFORMATION ON IMPORTANT DEFENSES SUB-PARAGRAPH G CERTAIN REPORTS OF OPERATIONS CONTAINING INFORMATION OF VITAL INTEREST TO THE ENEMY SUB-PARAGRAPH H ADVERSE REPORTS ON GENERAL MORALE AFFECTING MAJOR OPERATIONS SUB-PARAGRAPH I IMPORTANT IMPROVEMENTS TO EXISTING MUNITIONS OF WAR UNTIL ACCEPTED FOR SERVICE USE SUB-PARAGRAPH J PHOTOGRAPHS OF VULNERABLE POINTS OR VITAL INSTALLATIONS UNDER OUR CONTROL SUB-PARAGRAPH K CERTAIN DEVELOPMENT

PROJECTS SUB-PARAGRAPH L IMPORTANT CRYPTOGRAPHIC DEVICES UNLESS
ASSIGNED TO A LOWER CATEGORY CONFIDENTIAL PARAGRAPH 10 DOCUMENTS
COMMA INFORMATION COMMA OR MATERIEL COMMA THE UNAUTHORIZED
DISCLOSURE OF WHICH COMMA WHILE NOT ENDANGERING THE NATIONAL
SECURITY COMMA WOULD BE PREJUDICIAL TO THE INTERESTS OR PRESTIGE
OF THE NATION COMMA ANY GOVERNMENTAL ACTIVITY COMMA AN INDIVIDUAL
COMMA OR WOULD CAUSE ADMINISTRATIVE EMBARRASSMENT COMMA OR
DIFFICULTY COMMA OR BE OF ADVANTAGE TO A FOREIGN NATION SHALL
BE CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL PARAGRAPH 11 THE FOLLOWING ARE SOME
EXAMPLES OF MATTER WHICH NORMALLY WILL BE GRADED CONFIDENTIAL
SUB-PARAGRAPH A MATTERS COMMA INVESTIGATIONS COMMA AND DOCUMENTS
OF A PERSONAL AND DISCIPLINARY NATURE COMMA THE KNOWLEDGE OF
WHICH IT IS DESIRABLE TO SAFEGUARD FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REASONS
SUB-PARAGRAPH B ROUTINE OPERATIONAL AND BATTLE REPORTS WHICH DO
NOT CONTAIN INFORMATION OF VITAL INTEREST TO THE ENEMY
SUB-PARAGRAPH C ROUTINE INTELLIGENCE REPORTS SUB-PARAGRAPH D
GENERAL MILITARY RADIO FREQUENCY ALLOCATIONS SUB-PARAGRAPH E
MILITARY CALL SIGNS COMMA UNLESS SO COLLECTED TOGETHER THAT
THEY REVEAL THE ORDER OF BATTLE SUB-PARAGRAPH F METEOROLOGICAL
INFORMATION OF DESIGNATED AREAS SUB-PARAGRAPH G UNIT MOVEMENTS
OF NON-OPERATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE IN AREAS WITHIN OR ADJACENT TO
OPERATIONAL THEATERS SUB-PARAGRAPH H CERTAIN TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS
AND MANUALS USED FOR TRAINING COMMA MAINTENANCE AND INSPECTION
OF IMPORTANT NEW MUNITIONS OF WAR SUB-PARAGRAPH I GENERAL
TACTICAL LESSONS LEARNED AS A RESULT OF OPERATIONS SUB-PARAGRAPH
J AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS OF TERRITORIES UNDER OUR CONTROL IN OR

ADJACENT TO OPERATIONAL THEATERS RESTRICTED PARAGRAPH 12 DOCUMENTS
COMMA INFORMATION OR MATERIEL PAREN OTHER THAN TOP SECRET COMMA
SECRET COMMA OR CONFIDENTIAL PAREN WHICH SHOULD NOT BE PUBLISHED
OR COMMUNICATED TO ANYONE EXCEPT FOR OFFICIAL PURPOSES SHALL BE
CLASSIFIED RESTRICTED PARAGRAPH 13 THE FOLLOWING ARE SOME EXAMPLES
OF MATTER WHICH NORMALLY WILL BE GRADED RESTRICTED COLON
SUB-PARAGRAPH A INFORMATION OF MOVES OF NON-OPERATIONAL SIGNIFI-
CANCE IN AREAS REMOTE FROM THEATERS OF WAR SUB-PARAGRAPH B
TRAINING AND TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY OR NOT
INTENDED FOR RELEASE TO THE PUBLIC SUB-PARAGRAPH C CERTAIN
ROUTINE DOCUMENTS RELATING TO SUPPLY AND PROCUREMENT SUB-PARAGRAPH
D AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS OF TERRITORIES UNDER OUR CONTROL REMOTE
FROM OPERATIONAL THEATERS SUB-PARAGRAPH E PHOTOGRAPHS OF ENEMY
COMMA ENEMY OCCUPIED OR DOMINATED AREAS EXCEPT THOSE WHICH REVEAL
SECRET SOURCES SUB-PARAGRAPH F STRENGTH RETURNS OF UNITS REMOTE
FROM OPERATIONAL THEATERS GENERAL PRINCIPLES GRADING PARAGRAPH
14 THE DESIGNATION OF PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR GRADING AND
REGRADING WILL BE A FUNCTION OF THE APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES
PARAGRAPH 15 EACH DOCUMENT SHOULD BE GRADED ACCORDING TO ITS
OWN CONTENT AND NOT NECESSARILY ACCORDING TO ITS RELATIONSHIP
TO ANOTHER DOCUMENT X THIS ALSO APPLIES TO EXTRACTS FROM GRADED
DOCUMENTS PARAGRAPH 16 THE GRADING OF A FILE OR GROUP OF
PHYSICALLY CONNECTED DOCUMENTS SHALL BE THAT OF THE HIGHEST
GRADED DOCUMENT THEREIN RE-GRADING PARAGRAPH 17 IT IS THE
OBLIGATION OF ALL AUTHORITIES TO KEEP CLASSIFIED MATTER
CONSTANTLY UNDER REVIEW AND TO DOWNGRADE IT AS SOON AS CONDITIONS

PERMIT TRANSMISSION OF CERTAIN MESSAGES BY ELECTRICAL MEANS

PARAGRAPH 13 MESSAGES WHICH HAVE BEEN TRANSMITTED OR ARE TO BE TRANSMITTED IN A HIGH-GRADE CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEM OF ONE NATION WILL NOT BE RELAYED OR TRANSMITTED BY THE OTHER NATION BETWEEN POINT OF ORIGIN AND DESTINATION BY ELECTRICAL MEANS IN CLEAR LANGUAGE OR UNAPPROVED QUOTE SCRAMBLER UNQUOTE SYSTEM OR LOW-GRADE CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEM HANDLING PAREN TREATMENT PAREN

PARAGRAPH 19 NO PERSON IS ENTITLED SOLELY BY VIRTUE OF HIS RANK OR POSITION TO KNOWLEDGE OR POSSESSION OF CLASSIFIED MATTER X SUCH MATTER IS ENTRUSTED ONLY TO THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHOSE OFFICIAL DUTIES REQUIRE SUCH KNOWLEDGE OR POSSESSION X SECRET PARAGRAPH 20 SECRET MATTER WILL BE HANDLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING RULES COLON SUB-PARAGRAPH A THE HIGHEST GRADE CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS AVAILABLE WILL BE USED FOR THE TRANSMISSION OF SECRET MESSAGES SUB-PARAGRAPH B SECRET DOCUMENTS WILL BE TRANSMITTED ONLY BY OFFICIALLY DESIGNATED COURIER IN DOUBLE SEALED ENVELOPES COMMA THE INNER ONE BEING MARKED SECRET COMMA AND WILL BE OPENED ONLY BY THE ADDRESSEE OR HIS AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE X WHERE OFFICIALLY DESIGNATED COURIER SERVICE IS NOT AVAILABLE COMMA SECRET DOCUMENTS MAY BE TRANSMITTED BY REGISTERED MAIL SERVICE OR MAIL SERVICE SUPERIOR TO REGISTERED MAIL SERVICE COMMA IF THE SERVICE IS COMPLETELY WITHIN NATIONAL CONTROL SUB-PARAGRAPH C TRANSMISSION AND CUSTODY OF THESE DOCUMENTS AND MATERIEL WILL NORMALLY BE COVERED BY A RECEIPT SYSTEM AND REGISTERED DOCUMENTS OR MATERIEL PERIODICALLY ACCOUNTED FOR X IT IS MANDATORY THAT REGISTERED DOCUMENTS BE COVERED BY A RECEIPT SYSTEM SUB-PARAGRAPH

REGISTERED DOCUMENTS BE CONSIDERED AS Y MESSAGE PARLEN 200-6740078
PAGE EIGHT OF NINE
SECRET MESSAGES WILL NOT BE TRANSMITTED BY ELECTRICAL MEANS IN
THE CLEAR COMMA EXCEPT FOR APPROVED CIRCUITS AND PROVIDING THE
RULE IN PARAGRAPH 18 IS NOT VIOLATED X NOTES PAREN ONE PAREN C
AN APPROVED CIRCUIT IS COLON A CIRCUIT APPROVED BY THE THEATER
COMMANDER X THE BRITISH SERVICES QUOTE DEFENCE TELEPRINTER
NET-WORK UNQUOTE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM PAREN TWO PAREN THIS ITEM
WILL NOT APPEAR IN U S REGULATIONS ON CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY X
IT WILL BE RELEASED IMMEDIATELY TO RESPONSIBLE COMMANDERS IN
SPECIAL LETTERS OF INSTRUCTIONS SUB-PARAGRAPH E IT IS THE
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COMMISSIONED OFFICER OR EQUIVALENT CIVILIAN
HOLDING CUSTODY OF SECRET DOCUMENTS TO ENSURE THAT ALL SECURITY
PRECAUTIONS ARE TAKEN TO GUARD SUCH DOCUMENTS AT ALL TIMES X
TOP SECRET PARAGRAPH 21 TOP SECRET MATTER WILL BE HANDLED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE ABOVE RULES COMMA WITH ADDITIONAL SAFEGUARDS
AS FOLLOWS COLON SUB-PARAGRAPH A UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL SUCH
MATTER BE TRANSMITTED BY REGISTERED MAIL SUB-PARAGRAPH B UNDER
NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL MESSAGES SO GRADED BE TRANSMITTED BY
ELECTRICAL MEANS IN THE CLEAR SUB-PARAGRAPH C IT IS MANDATORY
THAT TRANSMISSION AND CUSTODY OF SUCH MATTER BE COVERED BY A
RECEIPT SYSTEM SUB-PARAGRAPH D TOP SECRET DOCUMENTS WILL BE
HANDLED ONLY BY PERSONS SPECIFICALLY DESIGNATED AND MAY NOT BE
DISCLOSED TO ANY PERSON SOLELY BY VIRTUE OF HIS RANK OR OFFICE
CONFIDENTIAL PARAGRAPH 22 CONFIDENTIAL MATTER WILL BE HANDLED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING RULES COLON SUB-PARAGRAPH A
CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS COMMA EXCEPT REGISTERED COMMA WILL BE
TRANSMITTED BY APPROVED OFFICIAL MEANS X REGISTERED CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE NINE OF NINE

ALNAV #44

DOCUMENTS WILL BE HANDLED IN THE SAME MANNER AS REGISTERED SECRET DOCUMENTS SUB-PARAGRAPH B IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COMMISSIONED OFFICER OR EQUIVALENT OFFICIAL HOLDING CUSTODY OF CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS TO INSURE THAT APPROPRIATE SECURITY PRECAUTIONS ARE TAKEN AT ALL TIMES RESTRICTED PARAGRAPH 23 RESTRICTED MATTER WILL BE HANDLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING RULES COLON SUB-PARAGRAPH A RESTRICTED DOCUMENTS WILL BE TRANSMITTED BY SUCH APPROVED CHANNELS AS WILL PROVIDE A REASONABLE DEGREE OF SECURITY SUB-PARAGRAPH B REGISTERED RESTRICTED DOCUMENTS WILL BE TRANSMITTED TO AND FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES IN THE SAME MANNER AS REGISTERED SECRET DOCUMENTS
BT 292213/44

UNITED STATES FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

FF1/A7-3

Serial: 540

29 JAN 1944

~~RESTRICTED~~

From: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet
and Chief of Naval Operations.
To: All Ships and Stations.
Subject: SECRET-SECURITY, Origin, Procedure and Use.
Reference: (a) Arts. 75 $\frac{1}{2}$ & 76, U.S. Navy Regs. 1920.
(b) J.C.S. 234/2/D of 17 March, 1943,
(Directive to Joint Security Control).
(c) COMINCH & CNO Ltr. Serial 1219 of
20 Feb. 1943.

1. Reference (c), not to all addressees, is hereby cancelled. There appears to be considerable confusion and misunderstanding in regard to the meaning and use of the term "SECRET-SECURITY", especially when any document so marked is received outside of Washington. This letter is intended to clarify this situation.

2. Reference (a) forms the basis for safeguarding classified information within the Naval establishment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have found it necessary to institute further security measures governing the handling of SECRET documents relating to certain of the following:

- (a) Operations, current and future, and plans relating thereto.
- (b) Targets and target dates.
- (c) Special equipment.
- (d) Research and development of new weapons and devices.
- (e) Related matters which would tend to reveal any of the foregoing, including code names which may have been assigned to them.

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May, 3, 1972

By SLR

Date DEC 10 1973

-1-

201

UNITED STATES FLEET
 HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
 NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

FF1/A7-3

Serial: 540

29 JAN 1944

~~RESTRICTED~~Subject: SECRET-SECURITY, Origin, Procedure and Use.

3. JOINT SECURITY CONTROL is the agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization charged with, among other things, the establishment of the additional security measures referred to in paragraph 2.

4. Pursuant to the above, Joint Security Control has established the following for use WITHIN THE WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS IN WASHINGTON:

(a) SECURITY CONTROL CHANNELS. Joint Security Control normally maintains contact in security matters with the War Department General Staff, Headquarters of the Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, Army Service Forces, and the Inspector General of the Army; and Naval Operations, Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department, acting through officers specifically designated in each agency. These officers are known as Assistant Security Control Officers and all security control matters are transmitted through them. This method of transmission is referred to as the Security Control Channel.

(b) SECURITY CONTROL PROCEDURE.

(1) Purpose. This procedure is designated primarily to safeguard and limit the spread of information relating to a designated project or operation in all its phases.

(2) Initiation. The announcement of a security project and its designation as such, is, in all cases, initiated by Joint Security Control via Security Control Channels.

NOTE: This is not intended to discourage elements of the Naval Establishment from initiating a request to COMINCH & CNO that certain operations or projects, as described in paragraph 2, be given SECRET-SECURITY handling.

(3) Register of Code Names. Each Assistant Security Control Officer maintains a

~~RESTRICTED~~

-2-

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (B)

OSD letter, May, 3, 1972

By SLR

Date DEC 10 1973

UNITED STATES FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

FF1/A7-3

Serial: 54¹⁾

29 JAN 1944

~~SECRETED~~
Subject: SECRET-SECURITY, Origin, Procedure and Use.

register for each security project or operation. This register contains the names of those individuals within his activity to whom information concerning that particular security project has been released.

(c) MARKING AND TRANSMISSION. Documents relating to subjects placed in Security Control Channels by Joint Security Control are handled in accordance with the following:

(1) The word "SECURITY" in addition to "SECRET" appears prominently on each page of the document to indicate that the subject matter shall receive special handling.

(2) Are enclosed in a double sealed envelope with the inner envelope marked "SECRET-SECURITY".

(3) Are transmitted by officer messenger only.

(4) Are opened only by those officers in the organization of the addressee who are authorized by him to handle such documents.

(d) PROCESSING. This procedure does not limit the processing of security material to listed Assistant Security Control Officers only. It is obvious that in any activity certain officers and confidential clerks not designated as Assistant Security Control Officers must see and work on such matters. THIS GROUP IS KEPT AT A MINIMUM.

5. It will be noted that the term "SECRET-SECURITY" is not an additional classification but indicates a "method of handling". It is only used in connection with those subjects referred to in paragraph 2 above, when specifically directed by Joint Security Control.

6. Elements of the Naval Establishment OUTSIDE THE WASHINGTON AREA, including the Fleet, may, from time to time receive documents marked "SECRET-SECURITY". Documents so marked and correspondence and reports relating thereto should be handled strictly as directed by Reference (a) for the handling of SECRET documents. The subject matter should be carefully guarded and divulged only to those to whom it is essential

DECLASSIFIED

-3- E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May, 3, 1972

By SLR

Date DEC 10 1973

UNITED STATES FLEET
 HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
 NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

FF1/A7-3

Serial: 540

~~SECRET~~D

29 JAN 1944

Subject: SECRET-SECURITY, Origin, Procedure and Use.

for the efficient prosecution of the war. Under no circumstances should such documents and related correspondence and reports be transmitted outside the continental United States by other means than officer messenger. Within the continental United States such documents may be transmitted by U.S. registered mail only when both of the following conditions exist:

- (a) Officer messengers or specially designated couriers are not available, and
- (b) When the importance to the war effort of the delivery of such material forbids its being held until an officer messenger is available.

7. When the necessity for maintaining a plan or project in a SECRET-SECURITY status has ceased to exist, Joint Security Control directs the removal of that plan or project and its associated code word from Security Control Channels. The word "SECURITY" is then deleted from all documents relating thereto and such documents are handled in the method prescribed by Reference (a) for SECRET documents, unless the classification has been even further reduced by competent authority.

E. J. KING.

Copy to:

SecNav.
 Vice CNO.
 All Offices, Navy Dept.

Howard E. Oren
 HOWARD E. OREN,
 Flag Secretary.

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 2(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OBD letter, May, 3, 1970

DEC 10 1973

By SLR

Date _____

JAFS 11
25173

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

fm

P R I O R I T Y

Comelius

From: Sac London
To: War

No: B-44, 25 January 1944

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower.

In answer to your FACS 1 this is SCAF number 1
Copies of all FACS-SCAF messages will be passed to the British Chiefs of Staff.

ACTION: CCS (Capt. Royal USN)

No Sig

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen. Strong
Gen. Arnold
Adm. King

CM-11 - 16625

(25 Jan 44)

1932Z jt

DECLASSIFIED
J.O.A. Regrading Memo 34-71
By SR Date DEC 10 1973

White House

~~SECRET~~

COPY No. ³⁸

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

LM

Cornelius

Combined Chiefs of Staff

January 24, 1944

SUPREME COMMANDER, ALLIED
EXPEDITIONARY FORCE LONDON
SAC

Number 25

FACS 1 FOR EISENHOWER FROM THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF.

Procedure for communication. The following procedure is set up for handling communications between Supreme Commander, Allied expeditionary force and Combined Chiefs of Staff.

A new series of cables known as FACS SCAF is hereby established. This is FACS 1 for General Eisenhower from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Your next cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff after receipt of this message should be designated as SCAF 1. It is presumed you will make necessary arrangements your Headquarters to circulate automatically copies of all FACS SCAF messages to the British Chiefs of Staff.

DECLASSIFIED

J.C.S. Regrading Memo 34-71

By SR Date DEC 10 1973

ORIGINATOR: CC/S Capt. Royal, USN
INFORMATION: OPD
Gen. Strong
SGS
Gen. Arnold
Adm. King
White House

White House

CM-OUT-9516 (24 Jan 44) 2205Z cv

COPY No. 39

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201

22 January 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GREER:

General Watson desires that you submit a detailed statement of improvements which it is desired to make in the present leased car, together with estimated cost in each case.

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

20 January 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON:

You will recall the attached papers regarding a proposed new communications car.

I took this matter up with General Stoner, Chief of the Army Communications Service, and asked him to talk to Colonel Mathewson about it. General Stoner has now advised me that the purchase of a new communications car is not recommended due to the high price and the cost of remodeling as compared with the comparatively limited use that would be made of the car. General Stoner has recommended, however, that consideration be given to improving the present leased car, and has suggested that technical assistance of the Chief Signal Officer be requested with respect to this proposal.

B. W. DAVENPORT,
Major, G. S. C.,
Asst. Secretary, General Staff.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May, 3, 1972

By SLR Date DEC 10 1973

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

12 January 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE GENERAL STAFF:

1. It is requested that the attached correspondence be referred to the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, for the consideration of appropriate agencies under his control.
2. Particularly desired are remarks and recommendations on which further action with regard to paragraph 3 of letter dated 11 January 1944, Subject: "Proposed New Communications Car," may be based.

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant Military Aide to the President.

1 Incl. -
Ltr. fm. Major Greer,
11 Jan 44, with 3 Incls.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 5(B) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May, 1, 1972

By SLR

Date DEC 10 1973

11 January 1944.

Subject: Proposed New Communications Car.

To: Colonel L. Mathewson,
Assistant Military Aide to The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to recent conversation between yourself and the undersigned regarding a proposed new communications car (railroad). In this connection, your attention is invited to the inclosed plans for modifying an existing combination baggage and club car, now the property of The Pullman Company, together with a letter from The Pullman Company quoting their price for the outright sale of the car to the Government and their quotation for the necessary alterations.
2. The proposed new car is to replace a similar car leased from The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company with certain technical equipment installed thereon which has been successfully used for Presidential and Secret Service communications between the Presidential train and the White House in Washington for the past twenty months.
3. In talking over this proposed change with Brigadier General Frank E. Stoner, Chief of Army Communications Service, Office of the Chief Signal Officer, General Stoner suggested that the War Department purchase the new car from The Pullman Company, and that same be turned over to the Army Transportation Corps for the necessary alterations in accordance with our specifications. General Stoner further stated that in order for the War Department to authorize this purchase it would be necessary for your office to make a request for same through the Office of The Chief of Staff. In this connection, your attention is invited to the inclosed letter from the Chief of the U. S. Secret Service indicating his approval of the change.
4. In discussing with the U. S. Secret Service the outright purchase by the Government of the proposed new car, the question of liability, in case of a derailment or other accident, the cause of which could be traced to the car in question was brought up. In this connection, I contacted a Major Sawtelle of the Legal Department, Office of the Chief of Transportation, who stated that a Maintenance Contract, which would be necessary in any event, could be made with The Pullman

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Colonel Mathewson, 11 January 1943.

Company containing certain clauses protecting the Government in case of accidents caused by defective parts of Government owned cars.

5. The procurement of the new car is essential to the further improvement of Presidential communication facilities and to provide comfortable living accommodations for operating personnel which is impracticable with existing equipment. The technical equipment to be installed will include Diesel powered electric power units, eliminating fire hazards, and larger, more powerful and more flexible radio transmitters which cannot be accommodated in our present car.

DEWITT GREER,
Major, Signal Corps,
Commanding Detachment.

3 Incls.
Incl. #1 - Ltr. fm.
Chief, U. S.
Sec. Service.
Incl. #2 - Ltr. fm.
The Pull. Co.
Incl. #3 - BluePrint
Plan #3951-X.

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May, 3, 1972


By SLR

Date

DEC 10 1973

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THIS OVERSIZE ITEM HAS BEEN
MICROFILMED IN SECTIONS.



NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

| | | | |
|--|------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| DRAFTER | EXTENSION NUMBER | ADDRESSEES | PRECEDENCE |
| FROM <u>COMINCH</u> | | ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE | 1 |
| RELEASED BY <u>C M COOKE</u> | FOR ACTION | ALUSNA CHUNKING | PRIORITY 3 |
| DATE <u>17 JANUARY, 1944</u> | | | ROUTINE 4 |
| TOR CODEROOM <u>2112</u> | INFORMATION | | DEFERRED 6 |
| DECODED BY | | | DDDDDDDD 7 |
| PARAPHRASED BY <u>FORCE</u> | | | PRIORITY 10 |
| ROUTED BY | | | ROUTINE 12 |
| UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE. | | | DEFERRED 13 |
| | | | 14 |
| | | | 15 |
| | | | IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW 16 |
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172043

NCR 41699

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|-----------------------------------|------|------|-----|
| ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: | DATE | TIME | GCT |
| | | | |

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF HAVE APPROVED FOLLOWING POLICY QUOTE "INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN TO THE CHINESE SHOULD BE STRICTLY LIMITED TO INTELLIGENCE NEEDED BY CHINESE IN PROSECUTION OF THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN UNQUOTE. INFORMATION ABOUT WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT ISSUED TO CHINESE FORCES INCLUDED IN ABOVE. INFORMATION IN REGARD TO ORGANIZATION TACTICAL HANDLING AND TRAINING OF UNITED STATES AND BRITISH FORCES SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THAT NECESSARY TO INSURE EFFECTIVE COLLABORATION WITH CHINESE TROOPS. INFORM MILES OF ABOVE.

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 E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 OSD letter, May, 3, 1972
 By SLR Date DEC 10 1973

| ACTION | |
|--------|----|
| F-0 | 22 |
| F-01 | 23 |
| F-02 | 24 |
| F-05 | 25 |
| F-07 | 26 |
| F-1 | 27 |
| F-2 | 28 |
| F-20 | 29 |
| F-3 | 30 |
| F-30 | 31 |
| F-31 | 32 |
| F-32 | 33 |
| F-33 | 34 |
| F-34 | 35 |
| F-4 | 36 |
| FX01 | 37 |
| FX30 | 38 |
| FX37 | 39 |
| FX40 | 40 |
| IG-00 | 41 |
| VCN0 | 42 |
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SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

172043 201

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

11 January 1944

To: AFHQ ALGIERS
Rptd. to: JSM WASHINGTON as C.O.S. (W) 1058

From: CHIEFS OF STAFF

Number: COSMED NO. 1

Following from Chiefs of Staff. Reference your 25728 and FAN 317.

1. Final sentence of FAN 317 is interpreted in Washington to refer to operational directives only.
2. The FAN-NAF series should therefore continue to be used except for operational telegrams.
3. It is proposed to start a new operational series of which this is the first entitled COSMED and MEDCOS.
4. You should repeat all MEDCOS telegrams to the Joint Staff Mission Washington for the information of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff.
5. For this series of telegrams you should use the British channel, i.e. to Air Ministry London and to Britman Washington.

FAN 317 is CM-OUT-2757 (8 Jan 44) CCS
25728 unidentified by WDCMC.

ACTION: CCS (CAPT ROYAL, USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
GEN STRONG
GEN ARNOLD
ADM KING
WHITE HOUSE
LOG

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By Authority of JCS

Memo, SM-522-71

By SR Date DEC 10 1973

CM-IN-9070 (14 Jan 44) 1658Z mcs

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~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

~~SECURITY CONTROL~~

P R I O R I T Y

~~SECURITY CONTROL~~

From: USAWW London
To: WAR

Nr.: K 3008 8th January, 1944

Spatz to Arnold cite A 5246.

Established U S Strategic Air Force in conformity with radio orders 0001 January 6th. Headquarters AAF Station 586 (WIDEWING) 8th Air Force closed Headquarters WIDEWING same time and opened AAF Station 101 (PINETREE). Method of handling communique and operations reports now being studied and will be discussed with Giles upon arrival. For present releases will be through theaters respective.

Nosig

Footnote: 5246 is CM-OUT-1273 (5 Jan 44) JCS (Capt Royal USN)

ACTION: Gen Arnold

INFORMATION: OPD
C of S
JCS (Capt. Royal USN)

CM-IN-5028 (8 Jan 44) 1608Z pp

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May, 3, 1972

By SLR

Date DEC 10 1973

White House Map Room

COPY No. 23

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24-53394ABC

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
WASHINGTON

From: Vice Chief of Naval Operations.
To: All Ships and Stations.

~~SECRET~~
Op-16-F
AS/EN3-10
Serial 4312416
November 18, 1942

Subject: INTELLIGENCE REPORTS - Reliability Rating Designated by use of Symbols.

Reference: (a) Naval Intelligence Division Circular Letter No. Gen. 4-41,
Serial 1181816, dated May 21, 1941.

1. Reference (a) defined the symbols to be used to indicate the reliability of information disseminated by the Division of Naval Intelligence. Reference (a) is hereby canceled and is superseded by this letter.

2. When reports are known to be true, they will be reported as such. For instance, occurrences witnessed by the reporting officer would be in this category.

3. Reports not constituting "first-hand" or eyewitness information will be graded according to the reliability of the source, and also the probability of the news, and will be designated by the following symbols:

Evaluation of Information
as to
SOURCE

Evaluation of Information
as to TRUTH
CREDIBILITY OR PROBABILITY

A - Completely reliable.
B - Usually reliable.
C - Fairly reliable.
D - Not usually reliable.
E - Unreliable.
F - Reliability of source is unknown

1.- Report confirmed by other sources.
2.- Probably true report.
3.- Possibly true report
4.- Doubtfully true report.
5.- Improbable report.
0 - Truth cannot be judged.

For example, "C-2" indicated a report from a fairly reliable source, and the information is probably true. Also, "C-0" indicated a report from a fairly reliable source, the truth of which cannot be judged.

4. If a report is known to be false, it will be reported as such, as it may be possible to deduce the truth from the fact that certain reports are being circulated by the enemy.

5. The rating "A-1" will be used only when the information is received from the most authentic source, and is confirmed beyond doubt. Due consideration will be given before designating a report "A-1."

RECLASSIFIED

-1-

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May, 3, 1978

By SLR

Date

DEC 10 1973

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE REPORTS - Reliability Rating Designated by use of Symbols.

6. When reports contain information on several parts or phases of a subject, such as to require separate rating action on the several parts, such separate ratings will be made by marginal notation.

7. When intelligence is forwarded in dispatch form, the reliability rating will be given as appropriate.

8. The symbols for indicating the evaluation of intelligence, as set forth in this letter, are identical with those being used by the British Naval Intelligence. The same system is being adopted by the United States Army.

9. All reporting officers will commence the use of the new symbols upon receipt of this letter.

H. C. Train,
By direction.

C O P Y