

MR 203 (12) Sec. 4 OSS NUMBERED BULLETINS

MR 203(12) O.S.S. NUMBERED BULLETINS

January thru May, 1944

Jan thru May, 1944

Map Room  
Box 73


**SECRET**  
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

31 May 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of a dispatch from the Madrid office of this agency, setting forth the comments of a French Regular Army Colonel on the bombing of Paris railroads, and recommendations concerning targets and propaganda.

  
Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.  
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS  
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Department of State

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By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_

CIA 006687

By SR Date 6-1-7

MAY 5 1975

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**SECRET**



**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**  
**WASHINGTON, D. C.**

**SECRET**

31 May 1944

FRANCE:    Comments on the Bombing of Paris Railroads;  
              Recommendations Concerning Targets and Propaganda.

Source of the following information is a French Regular Army Colonel, stationed in Paris.

He discussed the raids on Parisian railroads, stating that heavy damage was done at Juvisy, and Villeneuve-Saint-Georges whose civilian population was very critical of the first raid. They believe that the raiders confused the Marne with the Seine and missed their railroad target.

Although the raids on La Chapelle and Noisy-le-Sec were successful, the railroad supply lines to Paris were too badly damaged to justify the results. According to the Colonel, the Director of the Nord Railway has stated that 10 years will be required to rebuild La Chapelle and source thinks the Allies could have raided the marshalling yards and junctions at greater distances from Paris. He recommends that the junctions and yards of Germany and northeastern France between the Dutch frontier and Alsace be subjected to concentrated raids. It is through them that supplies must reach German industry and troops.

Source feels that delayed-action bombs should not be used. He also recommends that heavy raids be made on key viaducts, bridges and yards in the open country, which his group has pointed out to the British, and which his saboteurs cannot destroy because they lack explosives.

In the opinion of the Colonel, Allied propaganda should emphasize the fact that raids of such severity are part of the plans for the imminent invasion of liberation; this assurance is necessary for French public opinion to tolerate these raids. If the invasion is held up too long, he thinks there is a chance that the Resistance will collapse.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Madrid, 23 May)

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CIA      006687

By SR      Date MAY 5 1975

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.


30 May 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Reports Received in OSS, No. 122

Submitted herewith are some additional items received from our secret sources abroad.

Unless otherwise indicated, the items of information transmitted are reports just as received from agents, and have not been evaluated as to degree of reliability other than as stated.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.  
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS  
Intelligence Service

Enclosures.

cc: Department of State  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_

CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

29 May 1944

IRAQ: Plans for a Soviet Legation Abandoned

The OSS representative in Baghdad reports that Soviet plans for establishing a Legation at Baghdad have been cancelled, the Iraqi being cool toward the Soviet proposal.

Mounting pro-Soviet sentiment in the north among the Christian minorities and the Kurds, and growing evidence of a trend toward Communism throughout the country causes them to fear that Moscow might use the Legation for propaganda purposes.

On the other hand, the OSS representative comments, Soviet broadcasts in Arabic (reception in Iraq is frequently bad) include science and news items but no trace of propaganda. Only a few intellectuals listen to these broadcasts, which therefore are not very effective.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Baghdad, 27 May, rated A-2)

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CIA - 006687

By SK Date MAY 5 1975

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

29 May 1944 .

YUGOSLAVIA:    Nazi Paratroops Attack Tito's Headquarters.

According to information received by OSS in Algiers, German glider troops and paratroopers are reported to have attacked Tito's headquarters at Drvar on 25 May. The attack was made by a division, but the OSS representative thinks it unlikely that it was made by more than a battalion. The Partisan airfield at Petrovac was also attacked and taken. The report states that Tito and the members of the American Mission are safe.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Algiers, 27 May)

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CIA    006687

By SR    Date MAY 5 1975

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

29 May 1944

RUMANIA: Soviet Occupation Policy

The following information was obtained in Bern from a good Rumanian source:

The present Soviet occupation policy in Rumanian territory is much the same as it was in 1940, except that native Rumanian Communists are used in place of the Russian political organization. Source believes that only Soviet-supported Rumanian Communists will be able to seize the Rumanian government; thus he feels there is no hope for his country.

Maniu, he reports, is still very popular and might be able to run the government for a brief time after the present one is removed, but probably will not be physically strong enough, or sufficiently determined, to direct a government for a long period.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 26 May, rated F-2)

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CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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
**SECRET**  
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

27 May 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Arrest by Germans of Military and  
Political Personages in Greece.

Transmitted herewith for your information  
is copy of a dispatch from the Cairo office of this  
agency, giving details of the arrest by Germans of  
military and political personages in Greece.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.  
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS  
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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CIA 006687

By SK Date MAY 5 1975

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

27 May 1944

GREECE:   Germans Arrest Military  
              and Political Personages

Arrests of both military and political figures were still being made in Athens on 23 May. In all probability, the military arrests are continuing because the Nazis now have papers proving the collaboration between Zervas (head of the republican EDES), Dertilis (head of the Security battalions), and the Cairo Government, as well as the desertion of the Security battalions to ELAS. It seems possible that the political figures are being arrested because of their contributions to their Beirut Conference and because they would prove troublesome at the German-inspired conventions in Greece for the creation of a Fascist government.

Meanwhile, effective 16 May the peloponnesus was declared a military area and all communications have ceased. Severe counter-steps are being initiated by the Nazis in opposition to increased guerrilla warfare.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Cairo, 23 May, rated B-2)

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By **SR** Date **MAY 5 1975**

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
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

26 May 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Reported Reactions to Certain  
U. S. Policies in Norway.

Transmitted herewith for your information  
is copy of a report of a conversation recently had  
by an officer of this agency with a high official  
of the Norwegian Government, concerning reactions  
to certain policies of the U. S. in Norway.

  
Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.  
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS  
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_

CIA 006687

By SK Date MAY 5 1975

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**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**  
**WASHINGTON, D. C.**

26 May 1944

NORWAY: Reported Reactions to Certain U. S. Policies.

A well-informed person in Norwegian official circles, former member of Parliament and economic expert, states that: .

(1) Norway resents being treated less favorably than certain neutrals, like Sweden. Norway considers herself a fighting ally of the U. S., but frequently encounters treatment more fit for an enemy country than an ally. Source mentioned the loss of various Norwegian patent rights in the U. S. and the virtual confiscation of property by the Alien Property Custodian. In contrast to this, the Norwegians see SKF still flourishing in the U. S., and Sweden's South American market booming.

Source admits that the general situation is better now than a year ago when AMGOT intended to administer Norway in the same manner as conquered Germany. However, Norwegians trust Lehman and have no doubts as to the satisfactory working of the UNRRA program. But here, again, there was the feeling that the U. S. Department of Agriculture is using UNRRA as a counterpoise to future surpluses, by preventing Norway from using her own money to buy wheat and corn in markets cheaper than the U. S., like Mexico and South America.

(2) Norwegians, according to source, are especially disappointed and occasionally bitter over what they call U. S. "dussyfooting" with regard to both Finland and Sweden. They are convinced that we could have forced Finland out of the war within a week's time if the pressure had really been put on. They feel that Americans do not know the true nature of Finns, who are Mongolians, primitive and barbarous in many ways, and utterly unlike the Scandinavians.

It is felt, further, that so long as the U. S. dallies over the SKF problem, just so long with the Swedes play with Germany. Strong action will bring Sweden to terms immediately, but, short of such action, the Swedes would be fools in voluntarily giving up a lucrative trade with Germany.

(3) The Norwegians are thoroughly disgusted with the American Minister in Stockholm. They look on him as the agent of Sweden rather than of America, and resent the fact that Norway--fighting

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**CIA** 006687

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Date MAY 5 1975



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Germany as an ally of the U.S.--"finds the alleged U. S. representative so unsympathetic and so unhelpful."

(4) Martin Tranmael, Norwegian labor leader in Sweden, definitely is not linked with the Communists, source claims, and cited talks with a reliable mutual friend who, having conferred with Tranmael in March 1944, feels that Tranmael's only weakness is his perhaps too great friendliness for Sweden.

(5) As for Communism, the Norwegians do not fear Russia nor her intentions in the north. Before 1940 no Soviet influence was apparent in the elected bodies of Norwegian people, like the Storting and the Oslo Municipal Council. More recently, however, Norwegians expect that Russian troops will be in North Norway, and hence they took the initiative in getting Russia to sign the civil affairs agreement. Source does not appear at all concerned with Soviet meddling in Norwegian affairs, nor with partisan activities.

(6) According to our informant, there are indications that various U. S. and British "imperialists" want to take advantage of Norway's merchant shipping losses, and take over Norway's trade after the war. President Roosevelt, however, is regarded by Norwegians as a deterrent to any such policy, since he favors a restoration of shipping fleets in approximately the same proportions as before the war, which would give Norway the third or fourth fleet in the world.

(7) Finally, the source voiced his indignation over the way the British are keeping the Norwegian Ambassador, Morgenstjerne, from returning to his post in Washington. Morgenstjerne was to return a week ago, but cannot leave because of the embargo on all travel. Some Norwegians look on this as an insinuation that the Ambassador is a potential spy, and not the chief representative of an active ally in the war against Germany. "While the Ambassador cannot leave England, Norwegian merchant sailors come and go as before, and it is definitely more possible that a Nazi agent might be among the sailors rather than in the Embassy."

As a general covering remark, source stated that he hopes many of these instances of discriminatory treatment against Norway would not become known in the home country. Such knowledge

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would only lower U. S. prestige and influence, which already has suffered because of American policies toward Finland and Sweden.

/OSS COMMENT: Accurately reflects views held by Norwegians both inside and outside Norway. Antagonism to Sweden is deep-seated, and exaggerated since 1940. Norsk orientation being toward the Atlantic, not Baltic, Norway does not share Sweden's antipathy to Russia and, with great faith in her own institutions, she fears no Communist rise within her own country.

/The Norsk are friendly toward Russia, friendly (though critical) toward Britain and the U. S., and severely critical of Sweden and Finland.

/Having lost 50% of the merchant ships she had in 1939, Norway worries about her post-war merchant marine, and looks to Roosevelt for sympathy and help.

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
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

26 May 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Wolfram Developments in Portugal.

Transmitted herewith for your information  
is copy of a dispatch from the Lisbon office of this  
agency, setting forth reported developments in Por-  
tugal concerning the exporting of wolfram to Germany.

  
Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.  
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS  
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Department of State

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CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

26 May 1944

PORTUGAL: Wolfram Developments.

During the first week in May, Salazar reportedly told the Allied Ambassadors in Lisbon that he was planning to cut down Portugal's annual export of wolfram to Germany to 900 tons. He considers this figure to represent the production of the German mines in Portugal. This means that only the exports which Germany has hitherto received from Portuguese-owned mines will be stopped. The reduction will therefore amount to 500 tons, since, according to Salazar's minimum figure, the Germans took 1400 tons of wolfram during the year ending 29 February. Salazar's plan is to set up export controls with the help of Allied advice, and either to halt all production of the German share from Portuguese-owned mines or to sell it to the Allies, either now or after the war.

It is further reported, however, that Hans Weber, head of the German mining operations in Portugal, has said that the proposals which Salazar offers the Allies did not surprise the Nazis, who were prepared for them and perhaps even instigated them. As long as the figure agreed upon does not indicate a serious political defeat, the Nazis are not much worried over restriction of wolfram exports.

Germany demands 200 tons of wolfram from Portugal each month. If Portugal agrees to reduce wolfram exports to Germany, the Nazis plan to complete their requirements by means of their own mines, contraband shipments, and smuggling of wolfram from Portuguese-owned to German-owned mines. Contrary to previous reports, the Vale das Gatas mine (which the Germans apparently acquired in 1942, but which the Portuguese do not acknowledge to be German-owned) was in operation during March and April, and it is anticipated that 50-60 tons--or more than 25% of Germany's total requirements--can be produced from this mine each month.

Source points out that any agreement proposed to Salazar, which allows the Nazis to export all the wolfram produced from their own mines, could specifically exclude the production of any mines which are not acknowledged as German by the Portuguese. The production from Vale das Gatas could certainly be so excluded, as well as the production from all other mines acquired by the Germans since March 1942, since Portugal does not admit that any of these mines are German-owned.

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CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 5 1975

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C. (25)

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25 May 1944

The White House Map Room  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Colonel Richard Parks, Jr.

Gentlemen:

I am transmitting herewith Copy No. 36 of R & A  
No. 1693, "Native Nationalism in French North Africa", prepared  
in the Research and Analysis Branch of this office and classified  
as secret.

Sincerely yours,

*William L. Langer*

William L. Langer  
Chief, Research and  
Analysis Branch

(Enclosure)

*↓*  
*Destroyed by burning 6/2/44.*  
*EXH.*

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State Dept. letter, 1-11-73

By *RHP* Date *2-10-72*

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Letter; 1-11-73  
Date


**SECRET**  
**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**  
**WASHINGTON, D. C.**

25 May 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Failure of EAM-EDES Conference;  
ELAS Unyielding, Confident.

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of a report received in this agency, which is an appreciation of the current situation within Greece, with special reference to the continuing strife between the guerrilla factions.

  
Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.  
Acting Deputy Director, OSS  
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

Copies to:  
Assistant Secretary  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Mr. Fletcher Warren  
Department of State

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By Authority of

CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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24 May 1944

GREECE: Failure of EAM-EDES Conference;  
ELAS Unyielding, Confident.

British and American liaison officers attended a conference in early May between representatives of the EAM-ELAS and EDES factions at Koutsaina. The U. S. officer reports that, up to 8 May, the meeting had been a failure. He attributes this to intransigence on the part of the ELAS representatives, and believes that ELAS, now feeling itself strong enough to disregard the Allied military missions, contemplates the possibility of liquidating all the EDES forces.

At the same time the British officer states that the discussions were limited to considering disputes over boundaries between ELAS and EDES areas, as determined at the Plaka Conference last February.

He says further that Politis, who spoke for ELAS at the May negotiations, denied the authority of GHQ Middle East over the ELAS forces, and declared they were responsible only to the EAM Political Committee in Greece.

The Allied officers at the conference told the ELAS representatives that the Middle East command was seriously disturbed by the recent attacks against EKKA, and cited other cases of bad faith on the part of ELAS. Despotopoulos, ELAS representative, denied any knowledge of aggressive acts and claimed that they were continually being accused falsely. Politis, however, openly admitted that the attack on Psarros had been ordered by ELAS headquarters, and the British liaison officer adds that he saw documents which purport to show that a guerrilla leader, professing allegiance to ELAS, ordered the recent slaughter of 200 EKKA prisoners (including Colonel Psarros).

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By Authority of

CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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On 8 May, at a Middle East command meeting in Cairo, General Sarafis (Commander-in-Chief of ELAS, en route to the Lebanon conference) refused urgent British requests that he order the withdrawal of an ELAS regiment in southern Epirus. This regiment is stationed across the only route by which British seaborne supplies can be transmitted to the EDES troops of General Zervas. However, Sarafis did send the request to GHQ for "study".

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
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

24 May 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: The Allied Joint Declaration  
and the Axis Satellites.

Transmitted herewith for your information  
is copy of a dispatch from the Bern office of this  
agency, setting forth the views of our representa-  
tive in Bern concerning the Allied Joint Declara-  
tion and the Axis satellites.



John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

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By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_

CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

24 May 1944

THE ALLIED JOINT DECLARATION AND  
THE AXIS SATELLITES

This agency has received from its representative in Bern certain comment on the situation in Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria, with reference to the recent American, British and Soviet declaration to the Axis satellites. Our representative feels that the declaration had the great merit of indicating a common attitude on the part of the western Allies and Russia and believes that this made a distinct impression. He also feels that the Allied statement brought home to the peoples of those countries the fact that their declarations of war on the United States and Great Britain were senseless and needless acts of obedience to German pressure for which the leaders of those countries and the people who supported them must bear the consequences.

With regard to future declarations to the satellites, or other approaches to them, our representative believes that the divergent situations existing in these countries might justify the Allies in dealing separately with each satellite. The following are his comments in this respect:

HUNGARY: Hungary was occupied last March because for the first time the Hungarian government under Kallay was beginning to show some realization of the fact that Germany has lost the war. Hungary was endeavoring to ease away from the German Reich or at least to render as little help to Germany as she could, while at the same time withdrawing troops from the Russian front. The situation reached the point in Hungary where the Germans decided that they could no longer tolerate what they considered to be a tricky and doubtful ally between them and the vital southeastern front. They therefore occupied Hungary and our friends in that country were either liquidated or forced to run for cover. We can probably get real assistance in Hungary if we recognize this fact, indicate that we will not forget the risks which our

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By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_

CIA 006687

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Date MAY 5 1975

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friends have taken, or their present persecution by the Gestapo, and state that we will doubly recognize any persons in Hungary who now, under the existing difficult conditions of German occupation, continue actively to oppose the Germans. The present government of Hungary might well be treated as a quisling government, and everything possible done to destroy its feeble authority in the country. Horthy could be dealt with as a German prisoner, a Hungarian Petain or Darlan. While generally it may be dangerous to appeal to a people over the heads of their government, this does not apply where one has a quisling government. It is quite useless to expect Herr Sztojay and Company to do anything whatever for us. Our only hope is to get the people and the army more and more to repudiate and refuse obedience to their quislings. Not much in the way of serious opposition is likely while the German occupying troops are there, but the more we can hold there, the better.

RUMANIA: The situation of Rumania is slightly different. German occupation is not yet a formal fact, although a practical reality. Personally, I do not feel that much is to be gained by attacking the two Antonescus. This would tend to throw them more and more into the arms of the Germans. They are not yet complete quislings, particularly the younger Antonescu, and the older Antonescu knows that the Germans will desert him as soon as it suits their fancy and their military strategy. It is possible, though not very probable, that the older Antonescu may later be of use by resigning and effecting a legal transition to a government which would work with us and hold the army in line.

BULGARIA: The situation in Bulgaria is still different. Bulgaria has somewhat greater freedom of action than even Rumania, because the German military occupation is probably less complete, and Bulgaria is not yet directly involved in the area of major military operations. The weakness of our position with regard to Bulgaria lies in the fact that the Bulgarians now feel that they can continue to do nothing and still enjoy, after defeat, a measure of Russian protection for their territorial aspirations. It would have a real effect in Bulgaria if they could be persuaded that the Russians would no longer give them this protection unless they immediately abandon the German alliance. Unfortunately, the Bulgarians feel that Russia has a fundamental interest in building up a strong Bulgaria, and that nothing that is said now will alter this situation.

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**SECRET**  
**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**  
**WASHINGTON, D. C.**

20 May 1944

**FRANCE:** Resistance Group, Comité National, Reorganized;  
Wants Liaison with Allied Governments.

**TO:** Colonel Richard Park, Jr.  
White House Map Room

**SUBJECT:** French Resistance Group, Comité National,  
Reorganized; Wants Liaison with Allied  
Governments.

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of a dispatch from the Bern office of this agency, concerning the reorganization of the Comité National des Corps Elus de la République, a resistance group in Metropolitan France, and the desire of the Comité to establish liaison with the Allied Governments.

*OSG Comment:* Such a committee, headed by Laurent-Eynac, has been known to exist in France as a separate resistance group since January 1944. Laurent-Eynac was formerly a senator from the Department of Haute-Loire under

*John Magruder*  
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

allies who have been active under the Comité National. Local organizations are now associated with the Comité National. Local organizations are being established in the east, north and Paris regions. Others are already in existence in Brittany, Normandy and in the southwest.

Enclosure.

The Comité National wishes to establish a liaison with the Allied Governments and to dispatch a representative to assure such liaison. They ask how liaison can be established and in what place security for such liaison can be properly effected.

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The Comité National By Authority of John Magruder  
Allied Governments concur with the Comité National's proposals of their Committee for Re- CIA 006687  
Territories: "The Comité National shall be guaranteed

By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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**SECRET**

CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 5 1975



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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

18 May 1944

FRANCE: Resistance Group, Comité National, Reorganized:  
Wants Liaison with Allied Governments.

The source of the following information is completely reliable, one of the best of Bern sources, evaluated as "A", with considerable army, political and business (railroad) experience under the Third Republic. This source has submitted the following report dated 15 May 1944:

Important developments have just occurred with respect to the reorganization of the Comité National des Corps Elus de la Republique, a resistance group in Metropolitan France.

The Comité National, composed of elective officials representing all French political parties (with the possible exception of the Communists) is guided and inspired by LAURENT-EYNAC and members of the Radical-Socialist Party.

OSS Comment: Such a committee, headed by Laurent-Eynac, has been known to exist in France as a separate resistance group since January 1944. Laurent-Eynac was formerly a senator from the Department of Haute-Loire under the Third Republic.

Source stated that some 300 leading personalities who have held office under the Third Republic are now associated with the Comité National. Local organizations are being established in the east, north and Paris regions. Others are already in existence in Brittany, Normandy and in the southwest.

The Comité National wishes to establish a liaison with the Allied Governments and to dispatch a representative to assure such liaison. They ask how liaison can be established and in what place security for such liaison can be properly effected.

The Comité National wishes to know if the Allied Governments concur with the following formula of their Committee for Re-administration of Liberated Territories: "The Comité National shall be guaranteed

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By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_

**CIA 006687**

By **SR** Date **MAY 5 1975**

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by a French civil administration under the Allied High Command while military operations are in progress. Since no administrative function can legally be carried on without the consent of elected officials, the latter, acting under local mandates of the Comité National, would necessarily have to be consulted about the appointment of new officials. New officials would be regarded merely as having been mobilized and their appointment would be temporary."

The Comité wishes to know whether the Allies are prepared to examine with them such extremely important problems as rehabilitation of industrial and agricultural machinery during hostilities; restoration of transportation facilities; provision of medical supplies and food. They guarantee the cooperation of able officials who are cognizant of the local situation.

In addition, the Comité National submits a declaration adopted 7 May 1944 as follows in summarized form:

First: The Comité National des Corps Elus de la République is made up of customarily mandated representatives of elected assemblies: Conseils Municipaux, Conseils d'Arrondissement, Conseils Generaux, Parliament. They are members of various political parties. The Comité National has local representation through departmental and regional delegates. Persons who have not held a mandated office or mission under the Vichy Government are alone eligible. Only persons who have taken part effectively in the Resistance are included.

Second: The Vichy Regime violated the decisions of the National Assembly and its obligations to the Assembly when it suppressed public institutions and set up a personal government. Therefore, it is unauthorized to represent France at home or abroad.

Third: The affirmation is made by the Comité National that there can be no lawful authority except that based on respect for the Constitution. For this reason, only elected representatives of France have the right to speak in the name of their country. The Comité National considers that it is

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the only expression of sovereign national will, since Parliament and the local constitutional assemblies are not able to exercise their authority.

Fourth: General de Gaulle has, since the Armistice, represented France's profound sentiments of resistance to Germany. Now, at the time when De Gaulle is at the head of our forces abroad and preparing for combat on French soil side by side with our Allies, the Comité National indicates its confidence in him, promises complete collaboration with him and guarantees full participation by Metropolitan France in the task of freeing France.

Fifth: Our nation, France, is at war. The Germans continually violate the Armistice. On behalf of the elected of the nation, the Comité National asks all Frenchmen to regard themselves as mobilized in the service of France. In addition, the Comité National directs all of its delegates to give all possible assistance to qualified military authorities.

Sixth: Further, the Comité National relieves all elements of any obligation toward the Vichy Regime and enjoins them to think of themselves solely as servants of their nation regardless of the position they occupy. It directs them to protect property and persons and, as mobilized agents, to lend every support to qualified military officials.

Seventh: On the eve of momentous happenings, all Frenchmen are reminded by the Comité National that only in discipline, united action and respect for legality can they be guided to deliverance and be returned to the freedom and order which France, after so many mistakes, now more than ever seeks.

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**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**  
**WASHINGTON, D. C.**

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By Authority of	
Deputy Director, OSS - IS	
19 May 44	hba
Date	Initials

19 May 1944

TURKEY: Reported Violation of Chrome Embargo  
TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Reported Violation of Chrome Embargo. 18  
May, has been received by OSS Cairo, and is rated  
there at B-3:

Transmitted herewith for your information  
is a copy of a dispatch from the Cairo office of  
this agency, reporting violations of chrome embargo  
in Turkey. Salonika.

(OSS Official Dispatch)  
*John Magruder*  
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

Attachment

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By Authority of  
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**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**  
**WASHINGTON, D. C.**

SECRET	
By Authority of _____	
Deputy Director, OSS - IS _____	
19 May 44	hda
Date	Initials

18 May 1944

19 May 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.  
**TURKEY: Reported Violation of Chrome Embargo**

SUBJECT: Statement by the Bulgarian Minister to  
Switzerland on Conditions in his Country.

The following information, dated 14 to 16  
May, has been received by OSS Cairo, and is rated  
there at B-3:

Transmitted herewith for your information

The Bulgarian station master at Sufla has  
been arrested for disclosing the fact that sealed  
cars are still carrying shipments of Turkish chrome  
into Germany. Different local sub-sources confirm  
this information and state further that a large  
number of these shipments are sent over the southern  
route, via Salonika.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Cairo, 17 May)

*John Magruder, Brig. Gen.*  
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

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By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_

CIA 006687

By SK Date MAY 5 1975

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

28 May 1944  
18 May 1944

STATEMENT BY THE BULGARIAN MINISTER TO SWITZERLAND

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Statement by the Bulgarian Minister to  
Switzerland on Conditions in his Country.

The source is the Bulgarian Minister to Bern, who is the present Bulgarian Minister to Switzerland, who was Prime Minister of his country from 1935 to 1940. He had just returned to Bern. Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of a dispatch from the Bern office of this agency, which is a statement by the Bulgarian Minister to Switzerland on conditions in his country.

The Germans completely control the Bulgents and Filov, who, almost a Nazi agent, notifies the German Minister in full concerning every Bulgarian action. The highest Bulgarian officers, including the Prime Minister, are German sympathizers. Prince Cyril is a German sympathizer. Prince Cyril has no personal policy, but follows the German line. The negotiations with the Russians are highly recommended by Bourrov, one of the richest men in Bulgaria, who has been pro-Ally and who urged Mossaivahov to form a coalition with that point of view in mind.

Enclosure.

[OSS Comment: Bourrov, once the head of the conservative Rodnik or People's Party, has been reported recently to have become disgusted with the Anglo-American bombings of Sofia and to be now pro-Russian. This report emanates from another source.]

The Soviets are taking a tougher attitude toward Bulgaria and dispatched a strong note protesting German use of Black Sea bases and Bulgarian airplanes. They were not satisfied with Bulgaria's reply. The Soviets, furthermore, have not responded to a request for the appointment of a new Bulgarian Minister to the Soviet Union.

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By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

According to Kiosseivanov's observation and information, there are no Nazi airplanes in his country. 18 May 1944  
Furthermore, there are only approximately 100 German Marines at Bulgarian Black Sea bases, though there are many German services in the country.

STATEMENT BY THE BULGARIAN MINISTER TO SWITZERLAND

ON CONDITIONS IN HIS COUNTRY

The source of the information set forth is Kiosseivanov, the present Bulgarian Minister to Switzerland, who was Prime Minister of his country from 1935 to 1940. He had just returned to Bern from a visit to Sofia and sent the information to the OSS representative in Bern through a reliable and tested intermediary. Kiosseivanov, during his visit to Bulgaria, talked at length with the Regents on three different occasions but was not able to see any one of them alone. He also conferred frequently with Prime Minister Bozhilov and with other leading personalities. The following are his statements:

The Germans completely control the Regents and Filov who, almost a Nazi agent, notifies the German Minister in full concerning every Bulgarian action. The highest Bulgarian officers, including Gen. Lukacs, are German sympathizers. Prince Cyril is disappointing, since he seems to have no personal policy, or if he has, he is astutely keeping it to himself. The majority of the people, however, are looking to the Russians. Negotiations with the Soviets are highly recommended by Bourov, one of the richest men in Bulgaria, who has always been pro-Ally and who urged Kiosseivanov to form a cabinet with that point of view in mind.

[OSS Comment: Bourov, once the head of the conservative Rodnak or People's Party, has been reported recently to have become disgusted with the Anglo-American bombings of Sofia and to be now pro-Russian. This report emanates from another source.]

The Soviets are taking a tougher attitude toward Bulgaria and dispatched a strong note protesting German use of Black Sea bases and Bulgarian airdromes. They were not satisfied with Bulgaria's reply. The Soviets, furthermore, have not responded to a request for the agreement to the appointment of a new Bulgarian Minister.

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By SK Date MAY 5 1975

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According to Kiosseivanov's observation and information, there are no Nazi airplanes in his country, and no concentration of troops. Furthermore, there are only approximately 100 German Marines at Bulgarian Black Sea bases though there are many German services in the country.

Bozhilov also insisted that Kiosseivanov should head a new government and Bozhilov said he would work under him. The same request was made by the Regents and political leaders including the old democratic leader Muchanov, Bourrov, and Gitchev, the Agrarian leader. Gitchev promised to issue a party proclamation giving full support. Judging from a comment made to Bourrov by the Russian Chargé, Kiosseivanov believed the communists would also welcome him.

Kiosseivanov indicated that he was not willing to take on the position and become the Kerensky of his country. He feels that Soviet government in Bulgaria will be the result of Russian occupation. He also told an intermediary that the following conditions would have to be met before he would accept: dismissal of the existing corrupt and thoroughly compromised parliament together with absolute freedom to set his own foreign policy and choose his own co-workers without regard for the Regents. Kiosseivanov is sure the Regents would have rejected the foregoing conditions and utilized the situation to discredit him.

Kiosseivanov told the Prime Minister and the Regents that he was convinced Germany had lost the war, and his interlocutors either concurred or could not give arguments for the opposite view. He feels that the Regents' current policy is incomprehensible and that it is guiding Bulgaria to disaster. Though his means are limited, the Prime Minister, an intelligent crook, is attempting to alter the policy, and is trying to establish some contact with the Russian Legation.

Kiosseivanov could not see many of the deputies because of the disorganization as a result of bombings. He found that most of the Zveno adherents were interned and not able to take action. Although the Sobranje does not convene legally until the end of October, it is probable that there will be a crisis soon in the Regency and in the government. This will probably mean another invitation to Kiosseivanov to form a government. If this comes up, Kiosseivanov indicated that he wanted to make personal contact with the British and Americans.

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The Russian Legation has permitted the rumor to be disseminated that Russia looks favorably upon the creation of an autonomous Macedonia and would not be against some Bulgarian territorial gains in Thrace. In contrast to this, the Western Allies have kept the unconditional surrender formula. Nevertheless, Kiosseivanov has not abandoned the idea of Anglo-Saxon orientation for Bulgaria and he reveals his reluctance to assume power unless the ground were to be previously cleared with the British and Americans.

Since the bombings, Sofia is a forsaken and ruined town and no longer a political center. Though the property classes have been tremendously affected, the peasantry remain rather unimpressed, feeling that this destruction is the logical result of the Bulgarian leaders' folly in declaring war on England and the United States.

There is a contact in existence between the forces of Mihailovitch and the Bulgarian Army in Yugoslavia. There are approximately 15,000 men in the latter. Since the Bulgarian troops are regarded as a safeguard against the excesses of Tito's Army, relations are amicable.

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
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

17 May 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Civilian Casualties in France Reported Dis-  
proportionate to Military Value in Recent  
Allied Bombings; Mounting French Hostility

Transmitted herewith for your information is  
copy of a dispatch from the Madrid office of this agen-  
cy, setting forth reactions of the French resistance to  
recent Allied bombings in France, and the facts concern-  
ing mounting French hostility to these bombings.

  
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.

Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

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By SK Date MAY 5 1975

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WASHINGTON, D. C.

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By SK Date MAY 5 1975

17 May 1944

FRANCE: Civilian Casualties Reported Disproportionate  
to Military Value in Recent Allied Bombings;  
Mounting French Hostility.

The situation described below was reported by a leader of the French resistance who left Paris on 29 April and whose loyalty and intelligence are assured:

The strategic value of the mass bombings of French rail centers near Paris last month was so small in comparison to the large number of civilian casualties, that hostility towards the British and Americans is beginning to manifest itself in French opinion. Typical of the areas bombed are Le Sel, Choisy, Juvisy, Creil, Villeneuve St. Georges, La Chapelle, and Rouen, in which a large section of the ancient city was seriously damaged.

Within 48 hours of the bombing of Juvisy and Villeneuve St. Georges, normal Nazi traffic had been re-established, giving top priority to military transportation. The following is the toll of French civilians who were killed: 500 at Villeneuve St. Georges, 600 at La Chapelle, and 600 at Rouen. Use of delayed-action bombs prevented the rescue of many wounded who were buried under the ruins. Despite the fact that much of the historic city has been demolished, there seems to have been no military damage at Rouen. The French and Nazi radio is taking advantage of the situation to broadcast themes such as "British savagery is once again sacrificing Jeanne d'Arc".

The informant reiterates that the reaction of the French resistance is such that, in order to avoid a current of dangerous sentiment against the British and Americans, we must explain the bombings now in progress and prove their necessity.

French opinion wishes to know why Rhine bridges are not concentrated upon, and why specialized parachute saboteurs are not sent quickly to cooperate with the French maquis in strategic demolitions with decreased losses to both the civilians and the attackers. They would also like to be informed as to why successful attacks from low levels could not be carried out to hit such non-defended military objectives as viaducts and bridges in open country.

As Allied air attacks are now conducted, the people of France feel that their situation is no better than that of the Nazis in Germany.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Madrid, 11 May)

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WASHINGTON, D. C.


By Authority of	
Deputy Director, OSS - IS	
18 May 44	HSA
Date	Initials

18 May 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS

Transmitted herewith for your information  
is copy of a dispatch from the Bern office of this  
agency, giving details of the number of men now in  
the French underground, together with their need  
for certain supplies.



John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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18 May 1944

CIA 006687  
By SR Date MAY 5 1975

The following information, forwarded from Bern to OSS London for action, was supplied by a French Army officer of unquestionable reliability and with long experience with the French underground:

About 20,000 men are now available in the following ten departments, 6000 of which are mobilized and in the Maquis: Ain, Ardeche, Drome, Haute Savoie, Jura, Loire, Isere, Rhone, Saone-et-Loire, and Savoie. In addition, the Communists have between 6000 and 8000 men in these departments under FTP leadership, although there is no close relationship with FTP.

Supplies of arms are being received satisfactorily via parachute, and the resistance forces will be fairly well armed in about a month. The following supplies, however, are urgently needed:

- (1) Clothing and tent canvas;
- (2) Cartridge belts;
- (3) Shoes;
- (4) Radios for local communication between various groups. (The radios sent from Algiers have a blind spot in the range from 50 to 150 kilometers.)
- (5) More money. The ten departments are now receiving approximately 18,000,000 francs per month for military organization. If it becomes necessary to mobilize the entire force, 50,000,000 francs a month will be needed, and a like sum for the Marseille command. The informant thinks we should be ready to take care of this, in case the necessity arises.

Cadres are also urgently needed. The present ratio is one officer to 200 men. The informant asks whether it would be possible to drop French officers in by parachute to improve this situation.

Complete H-Day plans for cutting railroad and road communications have reached the source from Allied GHQ, and he is ready to put them into operation. In addition, he

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Complete H-Day plans for cutting railroad and road communications have reached the source from Allied GHQ, and he is ready to put them into operation. In addition, he has a broader scheme of action which includes a plan for clearing up the Alpine region in case the invasion is from the south, and if parachute reinforcements are available to him. Specifically, some 8 battalions would be needed and should be dispersed as follows: 2 in the region of Moirans, 2 a combe de Savoie, 2 in Vercor Massif, and 2 north of Annecy.

The informant is aware that the Glieres engagement was an error in judgment because valuable officers and 300 men were lost. The wisest course would have been to scatter, and not try to fight off the German attack despite the heavy casualties that were inflicted on the Germans.

The informant stresses the fact that the resistance forces are very anxious for America, in whom they have a great deal of confidence, to give them more direct help. He believes that the morale and eagerness of his men would be increased tremendously if they were given some evidence of American aid and, later on, some personnel from the U. S..

The OSS representative in Bern states that, in his opinion, it is very important for us to activate U. S. assistance, so that the French resistance forces will feel that the Americans as well as the British are supporting them.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 11 May)

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
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

17 May 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Overtures by German Generals and  
Civilian Opposition for a Separate Armistice

There is enclosed herewith copy of a document concerning the above subject, which has been prepared by this agency. The information contained in this document was obtained from a series of cables from our Bern office, the most recent of which is dated May 13.



John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

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CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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May 16, 1944

**OVERTURES BY GERMAN GENERALS AND  
CIVILIAN OPPOSITION FOR A SEPARATE ARMISTICE**

1. Since early 1944 the OSS representative in Bern has been approached periodically by two emissaries of a German group proposing to attempt an overthrow of the Nazi regime. The group includes Leuschner, socialist leader and former Minister of Interior in Hesse; Oster, a general formerly the right-hand man of Canaris, arrested in 1943 by the Gestapo, kept under surveillance after his release, and recently discharged from official functions by Keitel; Goerdler, former Mayor of Leipzig; and General Beck. The last two men have been described by the OSS representative as leaders of the group; it is from them that the two emissaries have brought proposals for negotiation.

2. Early in April the emissaries talked with the OSS representative in Bern, conveying the suggestion of a deal between this German opposition group and the Western Allies. The group expressed their willingness and preparation to attempt ousting Hitler and the Nazis. They stated their belief that the time in which successful action could be carried out was rapidly shortening. They said they were the only group able to profit by personal approach to Hitler and other Nazi chiefs, and

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By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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the only one controlling enough arms and enough influence in the Wehrmacht to accomplish the purpose of Nazi overthrow. The group stated that the German generals now commanding in the West -- particularly Rundstedt and Falkenhausen -- would be ready to cease resistance and aid Allied landings, once the Nazis had been ousted. They thought that similar arrangements might be worked out for the reception of Allied airborne forces at strategic points in Germany. While ready to attempt a coup, the group did not guarantee success.

3. The condition on which the group expressed willingness to act was that they would deal directly with the Western Allies alone after overthrowing the Nazi regime. As precedent for excluding the USSR from all negotiations they cited the recent example of Finland, which they said dealt solely with Moscow. This condition the group based on the conservative character of their membership and supporters. However, the group declared their willingness to cooperate with any leftist elements except the Communists; in February they had described Leusehner as an acceptable type of head for an interim government, assuming that neither the military nor the Communists would dominate during the transition period. The group feared political and ideological sway over

Central Europe by Bolshevism, with a mere exchange of Nazi totalitarianism for a totalitarianism of the radical left accompanied by the submergence of democracy and Christian culture. They stated that if capitulation were to be made primarily to the Soviet Union, it would have to be carried out by another group in Germany.

4. The OSS representative expressed to the emissaries his conviction that the United States and Great Britain would not act regarding Germany without the concert of Russia. In commenting on the opposition group's proposal, he expressed skepticism of their capability since Beck and Goerdler have been so prominently mentioned as potential leaders that the Gestapo must be aware of the situation and is only waiting to crack down until plans have gone farther or because the Gestapo may wish to keep an anchor to westward.

5. In May 1944, approximately one month after the April visit of the emissaries to the OSS representative, they received an oral message by courier from the opposition group. Now mentioned as members were also Halder, Zeitzler, Heusinger (chief of operations for Zeitzler), Olbrecht (chief of the German Army Administration), Falkenhausen, and Rundstedt. The group was reported ready to help Allied units get into Germany if the Allies agreed that the



Wehrmacht should continue to hold the Eastern Front. They proposed in detail: (1) three Allied airborne divisions should land in the Berlin region with the assistance of the local Army commanders, (2) major amphibious landings should be undertaken at or near Bremen and Hamburg, (3) landings in France should follow, although Rommel cannot be counted on for cooperation, (4) reliable German units in the area of Munich would isolate Hitler and other high Nazis in Ober Salzburg. The opposition group is reported to feel that Germany has lost the war and that the only chance of avoiding Communism in Germany is to facilitate occupation of as large a section of Europe as possible by American and British forces before collapse on the Eastern Front.

6. The emissaries, who had remained in Switzerland, replied to the courier that discussion of the plan would be unavailing because of the proviso concerning the USSR. Later the group dispatched to them a telegram advising no further action "for the time being". The emissaries think nevertheless that the subject is still open. They have characterized the group's proviso as unrealistic, and regard as the core of the proposal only the plan that American and British forces should become entrenched in Germany before the Russians; they urged that it was en-

tiely a military matter if some of the German generals wish to assist the Allied invasion and try to take over the Nazi regime. The OSS representative reiterated to the emissaries that Great Britain and the United States would adhere to their Russian commitments. In answer to the objection that point (1) of the group's plan (paragraph 5, above, on page 3) might be regarded by the Allies as a trap, they stated that since they were not military men they could only say that sufficient opportunity for requisite precautions would be presented in the form of direct prior contact with German military authorities. The emissaries said that Zeitzler had been won over by Heusinger and Olbrecht; they added that he was preoccupied in respect of military matters with the Eastern Front, that he would cooperate in any plan to bring about a systematic liquidation of that front in order to escape the blame for a military disaster there -- which he greatly fears.

7. One of the opposition group's emissaries acknowledged his lack of confidence in the political courage of the German generals, on the basis of past experience, and said the Allies might do well to ignore their propositions if there were assurance of early victory and a speedy Allied occupation of Germany. The OSS representative at Bern is convinced of the sincerity of this intermediary, as the result of investigation and of

experience with him. The representative is of the opinion that there are some German generals who wish to liquidate their responsibility in the war by collaborating in the construction of an Anglo-American bulwark against the pressure of the USSR in Europe, and he is convinced that the two emissaries are in contact with such a group. Doubtful that the group would have the determination to act effectively at the appropriate time and sensitive to the problem of Soviet relations in the effectuation of any plan in which the group might participate, he believes that the group's activities may nevertheless be useful to undermine the morale of the top echelon in the Wehrmacht.



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WASHINGTON, D. C.


11 May 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Reports Received in OSS, No. 121

Submitted herewith are some additional items received from our secret sources abroad.

Unless otherwise indicated, the items of information transmitted are reports just as received from agents, and have not been evaluated as to degree of reliability other than as stated.

  
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

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By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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may take the place of the present one in Central Europe. The constructive policy in dealing with this very dangerous development.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

29 April 1944

The German labor leaders suggest the following moderate policy for order reconstruction as a means of attracting the German laboring elements:

GERMANY: Suggestions of German Labor Leaders

for Allied Psychological Warfare.

(a) Should make an encouraging statement which could be transmitted in confidence to leaders of Socialism within the Reich.

A source believed to be in contact with the leaders of the German Socialist labor underground has described to the OSS representative in Bern the views held in these circles. Because he believes these views to be representative of those labor leaders who oppose the present Nazi regime and who are basically agreeable to taking sides with us, the OSS representative hopes that they will be accorded due consideration, even if some of them seem naive. Such naivete can be accounted for by the fact that for many years the Germans have been isolated from honest news and have had, instead, vicious propaganda as a result of which even some basic truths have been distorted.

The following are said to be the views of these Socialist labor leaders:

While the two movements are entirely separate, both the Communists and the Socialists maintain underground organizations in labor circles within the Reich, with skeleton organizations in the bigger urban communities. For the following reasons the former organization commands a broader influence, is more active and is better organized:

(1) The ideology of the Communists finds a fertile field because Germans by the millions have lost all their material possessions.

(2) A central committee of the Communists exists in the Reich to coordinate and direct their activities within the country and to maintain contact with the Free Germany Committee in Moscow, from which government support is received. Soviet war prisoners and workers by the millions facilitate this contact with Russia through a Moscow-directed secret organization. The fewness of their German guards is a great aid to them.

(3) The Soviet Union maintains a steady flow into the Reich of constructive ideas and programs to provide for the rehabilitation of the Reich after the war. Such plans are being disseminated widely among the German masses through effective whispering campaigns organized by the Communists.

In contrast to the activities mentioned above there is complete ignorance as to the ultimate objectives and the practical ideas of the Allied powers for the future of Central Europe. The leaders of Socialism within the Reich may with emphasis that this uncertainty must be clarified as soon as possible in order to counteract the growing influence of Communism. This tendency toward the ultra-radical has grown stupendously and its momentum is gaining rapidly. If it is not stopped the leaders of German labor are afraid that even if the Allies achieve military victory, the peace will be quickly lost and a new dictatorship

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may take the place of the present one in Central Europe. The adoption of a constructive policy in dealing with the masses of Central Europe is urged as a means of dealing with this very dangerous development.

The German labor leaders suggest the following moderate policy for orderly reconstruction as a means of attracting the German laboring elements:

- (a) Some responsible person in the U. S. should make an encouraging statement which could be transmitted in confidence to leaders of Socialism within the Reich.
- (b) Some basic statement with regard to Germany's future self-government as well as some intimation of the extent to which the independent operation of the Germans' own administration will be permitted by the Allies. It is recommended that self-government by local communities and regions be particularly stressed.

It is suggested that the Allies issue a series of encouraging statements to the German laboring classes, stressing the prospects for their collaboration in the reconstruction of Germany. These statements should also extend a welcome to the Socialists to join in the future government of Germany.

There should be a statement that it is not the intention of the Allies to do as the Nazis have done; i.e., to set up in the Reich a puppet regime composed of German quislings who will govern the Germans and represent the interests of the Allies. Such an idea is obvious to us, but the fact that these German opposition leaders request assurance on the point is a good example of the bewilderment in the German mind instilled by long-continued Nazi propaganda.

Air raids, these labor leaders believe, should be focused as nearly as possible upon industrial and military objectives, for the bombing of big urban centers is rapidly making all of Central Europe entirely proletarian.

Some statements should be made to the effect that the labor element in Germany will be encouraged and allowed to organize its own labor movement along its own lines with no interference from anti-labor capitalist elements among the Allies.

There should be an active exchange of ideas set up between the progressive forces in the Allied nations and the Socialist movement in Germany in order to counteract the close contact that prevails between the Russians and German Communists.

Bombarding Germany with leaflets was ineffective during 1939 when German arms were victorious, but now the people are open to such propaganda--if the material used is in accord with the constantly shifting trend in the psychology of the German masses. Bombs and leaflets should not be dropped simultaneously, and leaflets should be dropped in such large numbers as to make their quick removal by the Gestapo impossible. To exploit the changing psychology of the German people these leaflets should be compiled with the assistance of the resistance movement in the Reich.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 21 April)



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

**SECRET**

10 May 1944

GREECE: British Allegedly Furnish Misleading  
Information on Internal Conditions

Although the Greek people in general are pro-American and hope that the U. S. will send them effective help, the OSS representative in Cairo says that his source feels that Allied missions in Greece, especially the British, are not giving the outside world a true picture on internal conditions. The British missions, the informant says, are misleading their own services by passing on the opinions of minority groups and not giving the true facts on which the Allied policy makers could base their action. Source asserts that the British are not following a realistic policy in Greece and that they have done the Allied cause a grave if not irreparable injury.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Cairo, 7 May; rated B-2)

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By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_

CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 5 1975

Regraded Unclassified

**SECRET**

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

11 May 1944

RUMANIA: Military Situation

The following information concerning Rumania comes from Budapest as of 28 April and is rated A-2:

The internal situation is tense, with hatred being engendered by Allied bombings. The transfer of evacuees has interfered with the new mobilization and the movement of troops. The supply of arms is very low, and the replacements from Germany are being delivered extremely slowly.

There are 15 Rumanian divisions at the front, most of them northeast of Jassy. Their supplies are uncertain since they are shipped through Hungary. German divisions are coming from the west. Five German divisions in poor condition have been distributed along the Dniester River, where there are only field fortifications. In the opinion of a competent observer, the defense line as now constituted may not be able to withstand an attack, but the observer believes that the Seret-Danube line is strong, for the fortifications there are permanent ones.

Although the evacuation of the Crimea is still under way, it is hampered by the Soviet fleet. Five Rumanian divisions are staying there.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Stockholm, 7 May)

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By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_

CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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W

FINLAND: Reported German Plans to Occupy Finland  
and the Aland Islands

A Finnish official in Sweden, who is in a position to be well informed, believes that the Germans are planning to occupy Finland and thinks they have so informed Marshal Mannerheim. Two German occupying divisions may go to Helsinki, one to Hango, and a fourth to the Aland Islands.

Source believes the Aland Islands will play an important part in coming events. He says that half a dozen fortifications there now have heavy guns, and that the islands have already been reinforced by two German battalions and by one of Finnish infantry.

Reports indicate that the Germans have made strong though unpublicized counterattacks on the Russian bridgehead at Narva, and that the Russians have made heavy attacks at Pskov.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Stockholm, 3 April)

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By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_

CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 5 1975

203(N)



14 Apr 11 1944

SWITZERLAND and PORTUGAL: Reaction to Secretary  
Hull's Speech

The OSS representative in Bern says that Secretary Hull's speech has done much to clear the air.

However, he points out, it should be realized that speeches of this nature are never reproduced in their entirety, and in Switzerland much of Hull's statement was blanketed by the frank warning to neutrals, which was headlined and commented on almost to the exclusion of the balance of the speech. Also, the timing of the speech was not quite fortunate, since during the Easter period newspapers appear irregularly in Continental countries, and, when they are published, there is a plethora of news and a shortage of space.

The OSS representative comments that, if we wish to use neutral countries and the neutral press as sounding boards through which statements of policy can reach enemy countries, it is well to omit from the statements anything of primary importance to the particular neutral, since the neutral press will jump upon that item to the exclusion of matters of even greater concern to the world at large.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 13 April)

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By Authority of,

CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 5 1975

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

12 April 1944

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GREECE: Tsouderos' Cabinet Carries On;  
British Put Some Greek Units Under Siege.

On 8 April, Roussos and Venizelos declined to accept the responsibility for the establishment of a new government, stating that the situation was completely out of hand and protesting against the British for their continued arrests of Greek nationals at Alexandria and Cairo. (A-2)

At a meeting of Premier Tsouderos' Cabinet, it was decided unanimously that the old Tsouderos regime should act until the emergency among the armed forces is terminated, at which time it will be possible to establish a new government. (A-1) The King of Greece will arrive in Cairo soon. (B-2)

The British military authorities are still arresting arbitrarily. They have taken control of the Greek War Ministry, the Cairo garrison headquarters, and the Ministry of the Marine in Alexandria. An outbreak in the First Brigade was responsible for the death of two men, the wounding of two more, and one suicide. British forces insisted that the brigade should surrender its weapons. When it would not do so, the British brought up tanks. Thereupon the brigade brought their anti-tank guns into position and the British tanks retreated. The brigade is now under siege and its supplies have been cut off. Similarly, several Greek naval vessels are under siege, as they also refused to surrender their weapons. (B-2)

In Alexandria, a general strike is in effect on Greek merchant vessels; this strike was in response to the arrest of the leader of the Greek seamen's union. Crew members from 15 ships are taking part in the strike and one Greek naval ship declined to leave on a mission. (B-2)

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(OSS Official Dispatch, Cairo, 10 April)

CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

5 May 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: PW Possibilities in Announcement of Reported  
Plan for Joint Allied Occupation of Germany

Transmitted herewith for your information  
is copy of a dispatch from the Bern office of this  
agency, suggesting the psychological warfare possi-  
bilities latent in the announcement of the reported  
plan for joint Allied occupation of Germany.

  
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

Attachment

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CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

5 May 1944

GERMANY: PW Possibilities in Announcement of Reported  
Plan for Joint Allied Occupation of Germany

The Swiss press has given considerable publicity to the reported Allied plans for the occupation of Germany-- indicating that America would occupy the southern sector, England the Rhineland and Western Germany, and Russia the east up to the Oder, with a joint occupation of the center. The OSS representative in Bern thinks that if such a plan has been worked out, it might be very effective to make this public.

Not only would such an announcement further evidence the concrete character of the collaboration between the three principal Allies, but it might also have important internal repercussions within Germany itself. The majority of Germans now realize that Germany will not win the war. They are waging a fight of desperation because they see no alternative. If the people of Bavaria and the neighboring states realize that they would have an American occupation and if, in Western Germany and the Rhineland, they realize that the English would come, many of these people would have a strong incentive to hasten the arrival of such occupation. Quite a considerable number of people would immediately begin to prepare their contacts and their alibis. Our relations with this part of Germany would tend to build up immediately and the same would be true with respect to the British as regards the parts of Germany to be occupied by them. The non-communist section of the population in these areas would take new courage. They would feel that they were protected against the threat of Bolshevism which is being used by Goebbels to lash them into continued resistance and they would tend to disbelieve the Nazi propaganda that Bolshevism is the only alternative if they should lose the war. (It is important to remember that few things have done more to consolidate Hitler's position with the German people than the continued propaganda that a defeat means bolshevizing all of Germany.)

With respect to the eastern parts of Germany, if it were advertised that they were to be occupied by Russian troops, something approaching a panic would set in among the non-communist bourgeois elements who would make every possible effort to move themselves and their portable property to the west and south, thus further tending to disrupt the German transportation system.

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By **SR** Date **MAY 5 1975**

A further result of the announcement of such plans for the occupation of Germany would be a strengthening of the already existing tendencies toward decentralization and an increase in the growing conflict between the Prussians on the one hand and of the South Germans and the Rhinelanders on the other. It would thus serve to break down Germany's unity, standing as she is with her back to the wall.

Such a program would also have an interesting influence on Swiss public opinion. If they heard that a protective cordon of American occupation would be thrown around their northern frontier, the Swiss would be relieved of some of their present apprehension arising out of a fear of bolshevization of Europe. Their cooperation for the post war period also might be activated within the framework of their neutrality. Switzerland is the only largely German-speaking country of Europe which has not been engulfed by the Nazis and which has maintained those principals of freedom and democracy which must be inculcated in the new Germany if it is to become a peaceful state in Europe. In the post war work in Germany the aid of Switzerland and her Swiss citizens can be of great assistance.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 1 May)

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.


**SECRET**

29 April 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Suggestions of German Labor Leaders  
for Allied Psychological Warfare.

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy  
of a dispatch from the Bern office of this agency, setting  
out the suggestions of certain German labor leaders for Al-  
lied psychological warfare.

  
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

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CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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WASHINGTON, D. C.


26 April 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Reports Received in OSS, No. 120

Submitted herewith are some additional items received from our secret sources abroad.

Unless otherwise indicated, the items of information transmitted are reports just as received from agents, and have not been evaluated as to degree of reliability other than as stated.

  
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

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By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_

CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

25 April 1944

EGYPT: New Cabinet to be Formed?

According to an Egyptian-Arab newspaperman, a new cabinet will soon be formed. This will amount substantially to a Palace-Wafd coalition, but without any representation of the recently formed United Opposition Front, of which the leader is Makram. As a result of the crisis of 12-21 April (during which King Farouk is reliably reported to have demanded from British Ambassador Lord Killearn the withdrawal of British support of Nahas), Nahas will temporarily continue to enjoy British support at the cost of dropping four anti-Palace ministers of his present cabinet.

It is reported from Cairo that King Farouk has been looking for American support, and seems to be getting it. His latest favorite adviser is reported to be James Landis.

[OSS analysts remark that if Nahas should be displaced, the most important result would probably be the passing of the leadership of the Arab unity movement into the hands of Nuri Pasha, Premier of Iraq.]

(OSS Official Dispatch, Cairo, 22 April; rated B-2)

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CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

24 April 1944

FRANCE: Increasing Number of Successful Strikes

Within the past three months French workers have displayed powerful inclinations to strike on issues involving food and pay. A number of strikes took place last month in the area around Marseilles. One strike involved 1,500 naval construction workers, who held out for two days and secured a 30 percent increase in pay. With the unions gaining in strength, other movements in the vicinity of Toulouse and Lyon have been on the whole effective. (B-0)

The invasion of France will be the opening gun in a powerful move by the working classes. At the start, this movement will be characterized by spontaneous action, but it will be important to guide its course with directives from the Confederation Generale du Travail. (B-3)

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 20 April)

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By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_

CIA 006687

By SK Date MAY 5 1975

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

25 April 1944

GERMANY: No Press Comment on Stoppage of Chrome  
Imports from Turkey

The OSS representative in Bern says that according to Berlin reports received by the Swiss press, nothing had been published in Germany up to 24 April on the subject of the cessation of chrome exports by Turkey. There is every reason to believe, he says, that this measure came as a surprise to the Germans, and that it is a serious blow to German diplomacy in Turkey.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 24 April)

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Date MAY 5 1975

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.


21 April 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Reports Received in OSS

Submitted herewith are some additional items received from our secret sources abroad.

Unless otherwise indicated, the items of information transmitted are reports just as received from agents, and have not been evaluated as to degree of reliability other than as stated.

  
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

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CIA 006687  
By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

21 April 1944

NORTHERN ITALY: Conditions in Italian Industries

A neutral business man, intimately acquainted with Italian industry, has just arrived in Switzerland, and states that:

Italian industry in the north, judged by large factories such as the Fiat, is working at about 50 percent capacity. This is due to the lack of raw materials, the unwillingness of the workers to work for Germany, and to the attempts of the Germans to introduce their own technicians, who do not know Italian conditions. Also, production was disorganized because of confused and ever-changing German commands.

The German organization in the north, too, is not functioning very efficiently, mostly because of a lack of coordination between the Wehrmacht, the Todt-Speer organization, and the Gestapo. The real master of ceremonies in northern Italy now is Himmler's representative, Wolff, who is even more powerful than the Nazi diplomatic representative, Hahn. The lack of coordination was exemplified when the Gestapo recently arrested a prominent Italian industrialist; within two hours this man was released on the orders of the Wehrmacht, and an hour later he was re-arrested under orders from Wolff.

After the strikes of last March, the German authorities called upon the Italian management in certain factories where strikes had occurred to designate a substantial number of hostages, several hundred in the case of one large factory. These men, drawn presumably from the ranks of those who had participated in the strikes, were then to be deported to Poland as a punishment. Many of the factory managers refused to comply with this request, and the Germans did nothing about it.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 20 April)

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CIA 006687

By JR Date MAY 5 1975

203(14)



**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**  
**WASHINGTON, D. C.**

21 April 1944

GERMANY: Increase in Number of Germans Favoring  
Separate Peace with Russia.

There has been a considerable increase in the number of those Germans who favor a separate peace with Russia, the OSS representative in Bern has learned from a reliable informant. The military, however, and particularly those who have returned from the Eastern Front, consider that the chances of such a peace are extremely reduced, if not nonexistent, because Germany has been too clumsy in her relations with Russia. There have been too many German brutalities against the civilian population, and Germany disclosed too early her aim to transform Russia into a vast German colony.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 20 April)

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By Authority of

CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 5 1975

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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20 April 1944

GERMANY: Officers Reported to be Less Optimistic  
About Ability to Repel Invasion.

The OSS representative in Bern reports information, from a reasonably good source, that German officers on the Western Front who, some months ago, were optimistic about the chances of repelling an invasion, are now quoted as stating that the Allies have followed the proper tactics in waiting. These officers are reportedly expressing the opinion that the chances of a successful Allied invasion are now about fifty-fifty, whereas a few weeks ago they felt they were about 70 percent in favor of the Germans.

They say that the reserves held back for the second front have deteriorated somewhat, due to having been quartered in France for some time, and also because certain of the better combat divisions have been removed and replaced by divisions recuperating from the Eastern front.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 18 April)

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CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 5 1975

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

20 April 1944

20 April 1944

ITALY: Attitude of Northern Branch of Action Party

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Reports Received in OSS  
Members of the local Action Party, according to reports received, approve of any Party participation in the Government unless specifically authorized by the Party's Executive Junta. Even so, the arrangement should be put beyond the power of the Lieutenant General to annul before the end of hostilities.  
Transmitted herewith are some additional items received from our secret sources abroad.

Unless otherwise indicated, the items of information transmitted are reports just as received from agents, and have not been evaluated as to degree of reliability other than as stated.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Algiers, 16 April, rated S-2)

T. D. Palmer  
T. D. Palmer, Colonel, Inf.  
Acting Deputy Director, OSS  
Intelligence Service

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Date MAY 5 1975



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

20 April 1944

ITALY: Attitude of Northern Branch of Action Party

Members of the local Action Party, according to sources in Northern Italy, disapprove of any Party participation in the Government unless specifically authorized by the Party's Executive Junta. Even so, the arrangement should be put beyond the power of the Lieutenant General to annul before the end of hostilities and the setting up of a new Italian Government.

These Northern members ask that the Party decline to collaborate if reactionaries or fascists are admitted to the Government or if it is not founded on a democratic basis. They reiterate their desire to cooperate wholeheartedly in the war for freedom.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Algiers, 18 April, rated B-2)

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SR

Date

MAY 5 1975

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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20 April 1944

FRANCE: Report on the French Militia

The OSS representative in Bern reports that it is difficult to estimate the exact strength of Darnand's milice, as information from various sources differs widely.

It seems, however, that the shock troops of the milice do not greatly exceed 5000. There is also a reserve of some 20,000, only partially armed and organized, although budgetary provision contemplated a force of 55,000. It had been originally planned that the milice would operate only in the south, but Darnand has now made arrangements to operate in the north as well.

In addition to the stationary units allocated to various departments, the milice has mobile units available anywhere for special missions. The milice is entirely subordinate to the German Wehrmacht, works in closest collaboration with it, and is fully dependent upon it for arms.

Darnand, in addition to being chief of the milice, is reported to be also Chief of the Waffen-SS Francois, which is directly under the order of the Wehrmacht, and wears SS uniforms.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 18 April)

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CIA 006687

By SR

Date MAY 5 1975

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

**SECRET**

20 April 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Impossibility of a real revolution in  
Germany, as distinguished from a putsch.

Transmitted herewith for your information  
is copy of a dispatch from the Bern office of this  
agency, quoting from an article on the above subject  
appearing currently in the Swiss periodical SIE UND  
ER.

In 1918 opposition to the Kaiser and his  
ministers, while not of political revolution nor  
was legal and permissible. A real revolution  
had not yet occurred. In France or 1917 in Russia,  
the like can be improvised.  
possible in Germany today.  
might take place in the party. Hitler is considered  
capable of bringing this about, or perhaps there might  
be a coup by the front troops. But that would not con-  
stitute a real revolution, which requires thorough pre-  
paration. A doctrine must be phrased and spread, and  
this may require decades. Revolutionary forces must be  
assembled, organized, and armed.

Enclosure

*T. D. Palmer*  
T. D. Palmer, Colonel, Inf.  
Acting Deputy Director, OSS  
Intelligence Service

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CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

**SECRET**

20 April 1944

GERMANY: A Real Revolution, as Distinguished from a  
Mere Putsch, Regarded as Impossible

Although in the occupied countries countless patriots resist the invader and are considered heroes, says an article entitled "Is Revolution Possible in the Reich?" which appears currently in the Swiss periodical Sie und Er, in Germany a revolutionary appears to his family, to his friends, and to his countrymen not as a hero but as a traitor. He is working against a regime which came to power in a legal way, and therefore he can expect only distrust and opposition. Germans are naturally a disciplined people, believing in authority and not often thinking for themselves. These psychological characteristics hamper the organization of any underground movement. In substantiation of this, it should be recalled that incredibly little has been heard of any illegal resistance in Germany.

In 1918 opposition to the Kaiser and his ministers, unlike any sort of political opposition now, was legal and permissible. Yet even then no real revolutionary upheaval occurred, nothing comparable to 1789 in France or 1917 in Russia. Rebellions, coups d'etat and the like can be improvised at any time, and are perfectly possible in Germany today. It is possible a division might take place in the party. Himmler is considered capable of bringing this about, or perhaps there might occur a mutiny among the front troops, a coup by the generals, or a student uprising. But that would not constitute a real revolution, which requires thorough preparation. A doctrine must be phrased and spread, and this may require decades. Revolutionary forces must be assembled, organized, and armed.

Revolutions never have much chance to succeed unless the rulers are weak, and Hitler is no weakling like Louis XVI or Nicholas II. Hitler and the Gestapo

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are thoroughly familiar with the psychology of revolution processes. The bombings, moreover, have played into the hands of the Gestapo, inasmuch as the people are deprived of food, clothing, and homes, so that their very existence is dependent on the mercy of the Party and the organs of government which control the necessities of life. This applies especially to the cities, and cities are proverbially the mothers of revolution.

Even the elementary technical means of launching a revolutionary doctrine are lacking, and there are no leaders in sight. The German refugees have no doctrine, nor has the Free German Committee in Moscow. This Committee is open to all--Communists, Socialists, liberals, and nationalists--and its leader, General Seydlitz, does not represent any revolutionary doctrine. The Committee can only be useful as a propaganda agency, but it is devoid of revolutionary stimulus, which is presumably just what Stalin and the Allies want. They have no interest in having the German people free themselves, because after a revolution the Germans would feel themselves the advance-guard of democracies and would continue to play the leading role even under a new flag. They want to beat the Germans on the battlefield, under circumstances making it impossible for the Germans ever to claim that they were defeated by a stab in the back.

A rebellion, a putsch, or a mutiny is possible as in 1918, but the Gestapo is prepared to meet it. The German people will not be drawn into any revolutionary acts of consequence, for there is no doctrine, there are no able independent leaders in the Reich, no refugees with home contacts, no positive revolutionary ideas, and not even the will for revolution.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 18 April)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

**SECRET**

18 April 1944

18 April 1944

ITALY: Mussolini Realizes the Germans Have Deceived Him

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Reports Received in OSS

Transmitted herewith are some additional items received from our secret sources abroad.

Unless otherwise indicated, the items of information transmitted are reports just as received from agents, and have not been evaluated as to degree of reliability other than as stated.

Mussolini apparently also feels that the Germans are coveting Italian territory in the Alps and on the Adriatic coast. He had not planned to be a quivering but he himself placed in that position, and in a...  
T. D. Palmer, Colonel, Inf.  
Acting Deputy Director, OSS  
Intelligence Service

Enclosures

(OSS Official Dispatch, Fern, 17 April)

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By SR MAY 5 1975

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

18 April 1944

ITALY: Mussolini Realizes the Germans have Deceived Him

Reports from Italy indicate that the relations between the Nazi administration in Italy and Mussolini are becoming more and more tense, says the OSS representative in Bern.

According to the latest (but unconfirmed) reports, Mussolini is seriously ill, and it is not known whether the meeting between Hitler and Mussolini to straighten out these difficulties ever took place. Mussolini is said to feel that the Germans are going far beyond what was required by military necessity, and are assuming too much power in the general administrative and economic field. He did not like the way that German officials and soldiers bought up everything they could find, and shipped it to Germany. He was also displeased with the German attitude toward the creation of an Italian army and their failure to arm and equip more troops of the Neo-Fascist government. Obviously the Germans do not want to irritate Mussolini by telling him that they do not trust the Italians with their airplanes and arms.

Mussolini apparently also feels that the Germans are coveting Italian territory in the Alps and on the Adriatic coast. He had not planned to be a quisling, but finds himself placed in that position, and in addition is sick, powerless, and abandoned. Undoubtedly, adds the OSS representative, the Germans would be glad if Providence should remove him from the scene for ever.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 17 April)

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Date

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

18 April 1944

GERMANY: Rivalry Between Ribbentrop and the SS

GERMANY: Concentration Camp for Prominent Hostages

The appointment of Weesenmeyer as a special envoy to Hungary is generally interpreted as a setback for Ribbentrop. Long associated with the SS, Weesenmeyer was involved in the Jewish persecutions in Poland, and later acted as a Hungarian specialist in the Reichskanzlerei. His appointment, says the OSS representative in Bern, is a further step toward bringing German diplomacy under the Nazi Party organization, rather than under the Foreign Office. Hermann Neubacher, the special envoy to the Balkans, is a man of the same general type.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 17 April)

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By SR Date MAY 5 1975

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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18 April 1944

GERMANY: Concentration Camp for Prominent Hostages?

According to a German report, says the OSS representative in Bern, Hitler has given orders to establish a special concentration camp in Southern Germany, where prominent business men, bankers, and politicians from occupied territories are to be confined, especially those who have had close relations with Britain and the U. S. It is believed that Hitler will hold these men as hostages for his own safety.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 17 April)

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By SR Date MAY 5 1975



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

18 April 1944

GERMANY: Berchtesgaden the New Capital of Germany?

Several reliable sources indicate that the administrative and diplomatic machinery of Germany is becoming increasingly concentrated in the vicinity of Berchtesgaden, and it is said that hundreds of high officials and their staffs are in this area. Salzburg has been chosen by high Foreign Office officials at their GHQ.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 17 April)

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By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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
15 April 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Reports Received in OSS, No. 119

Submitted herewith are some additional items received from our secret sources abroad.

Unless otherwise indicated, the items of information transmitted are reports just as received from agents, and have not been evaluated as to degree of reliability other than as stated.

  
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

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By SR Date \_\_\_\_\_

MAY 5 1975

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WASHINGTON, D. C.

**SECRET**

14 April 1944

ITALY: Germans Seizing Italian Workers by Force.

According to the OSS representative in Bern, the Germans, through sudden brutal raids in public places, are seizing Italians wanted for the Todt Organization and for other services.

They have also ordered a mobilization of Italian workers to be carried out by the Servizio del Lavoro Italiano. These methods, not being completely successful, have been supplemented by ordering large Italian firms to submit complete lists of their workers. In actual practice the Germans take only 20 percent or less of these specialized workers, but at first it was reported that they would take 40 percent. Up to 20 March more than 10,000 had been taken from Milan, and a large group left on 30 March. The Germans concentrate on anti-Fascist workers in order to get them out of the way. Pirelli, for example, was ordered to furnish a list of his anti-Fascist workers.

When strikes occur, the Germans pick up the strikers and ship them off in closed box-cars, but in many cases the railway employees assist these men to escape en route.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 13 April)

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By SR Date MAY 5 1975



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15 April 1944

RUMANIA: Military Information

According to information transmitted from Istanbul under date of 5 April, the Rumanians were fighting unassisted against the Red Army south of Czernowitz. No Rumanian soldiers had at that time gone over to Tito or to the Soviets.

The informant, who left Bucharest on 5 April, also was said to have stated that the bombing attack on that city on 4 April severely disabled the power plant, and that the electricity and water supply was interrupted for a number of days. The population was greatly outraged by the "wanton destruction" and the great number of civilians killed and injured.

This same source reported that Antonescu is getting more and more backing from the followers of Maniu and Bratianu. The Nazis, in fact, think that they can count on him, and have removed the threat of using the Iron Guard, previously the means of compelling cooperation.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Istanbul, 12 April, rated B-3)

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By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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
14 April 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Reports Received in OSS, No. 118

Submitted herewith are some additional items received from our secret sources abroad.

Unless otherwise indicated, the items of information transmitted are reports just as received from agents, and have not been evaluated as to degree of reliability other than as stated.

  
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

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By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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Axis Estimate: Anglo-American Invasion Strength

On 31 March the Hungarian Military Attaché in Stockholm, who is a solid Nazi, granted an interview to an officer on the Staff of the Finnish Military Attaché there. He speculated on the attitude and actions of the Seventh U.S. Army, and wondered whether or not plans for an invasion into the Balkans are being prepared. He believed that that army lacked sufficient spirit and referred to its low rate of advance. He said there were now in Britain 35 American and 50 British divisions. This number he believed too few to start an invasion. However, more American divisions were arriving, and by the summer the British and Americans together could have 100 divisions, which would be enough to start a large-scale invasion.

This estimate, comments the OSS representative in Stockholm, possibly represents the settled German opinion as to the forces in that area.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Stockholm, 3 April)

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By **SR** Date **MAY 5 1975**



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
14 April 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Reports Received in OSS, No. 117

Submitted herewith are some additional items received from our secret sources abroad.

Unless otherwise indicated, the items of information transmitted are reports just as received from agents, and have not been evaluated as to degree of reliability other than as stated.



John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

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By **SR** Date **MAY 5 1975**

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BULGARIA: Authoritative Opinion on the Bulgarian Situation

According to information received from a reliable source, there is danger of a Nazi coup in Bulgaria similar to that in Hungary.

Source doubts the Nazis would demand that the Bulgarian army attack Russia, but would insist rather on Bulgar assistance in repelling a possible Anglo-Saxon landing in the Balkans. He believes that Bulgaria will tend to gravitate toward Russia as a result of the realistic policy vis-à-vis Bulgaria, which he thinks the Soviet is now pursuing.

Our informant is hopeful that the Americans and the British can work out some policy toward Bulgaria--perhaps jointly with the USSR--which will not only strengthen opposition to the Nazis but will also preserve Anglo-American influence within Bulgaria.

He believes it to be extremely important to strengthen the domestic opposition to the present regime at once, because the Regents and the Cabinet, fearing the Sobranje, dismissed it on 21 March, only five days after it had been convened.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 7 April)

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WASHINGTON, D. C.

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GERMANY: "Pressure Groups" of Bombed-Outs May  
Bear Watching

In certain areas of Germany, the bombed-out populations are trying to work together with a view to making a common front and getting all possible assistance from the authorities. In Germany, where anything like a political organization is impossible, this embryonic "pressure group", however feeble, may have interesting consequences.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 12 April)

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By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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FRANCE: Germans to Liquidate Vichy Government?;  
Pre-Invasion Arrests

A well-informed neutral, just arrived from Vichy, says that the Germans are now anxious to get rid of Marshal Pétain, liquidate the Vichy regime, and move the government to Paris. The informant insisted that Pétain was still a source of embarrassment to the Germans, who do not know what to do with him. They have, however, decided to arrest him in case of invasion, but they fear the reaction if this were done before that time.

Laval may not last many weeks more. The Germans will probably replace him by one of the Déat-Darnand Henriot group, probably by Déat. The informant confirms the fact that Pétain refused to sign the appointment of these men, and refused to preside at any Cabinet meetings with them present. Even Laval resisted the Déat appointment (Minister Secretary of State for Labor and National Solidarity) for some months before finally yielding.

According to Germans at Vichy, they believe it will take from 15 to 20 divisions to hold down the French population, over and above the forces necessary to repel an invasion. The Germans have reportedly arrested 300,000 Frenchmen and have executed a large number of them. The Chantiers de Jeunesse have been almost completely dissipated, particularly some 9,000 leaders of the Chantiers, who formed a very dangerous element for the Germans.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 12 April)

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Date MAY 5 1975

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ITALY: Portrait of Ercoli

A former Communist who worked closely with Ercoli in Italy, Moscow and France in the late twenties, has given the OSS representative in Bern this general picture of him:

Ercoli, whose real name is Palmiro Togliatti, is a man of letters, a Ph.D., and an expert journalist. He left Italy for Moscow in 1926 (at the time that the Fascists took strong measures against the Italian Communist party), and became the representative of the Italian Communist party in the Comintern and a member of the so-called Bukharin group. He was one of the rare foreigners in the Comintern who had ideas, and he quickly became a leader. When Bukharin was liquidated, Ercoli almost suffered the same fate; but he outlived this crisis by giving in completely, and retired to Paris, where he remained for several years. He represented the viewpoint that as Russia alone had a Communist government, it was necessary for the Communists of other countries to accept Moscow's leadership rather than to attempt to build up independent national Communist parties. He therefore always took his orders from Moscow, and became the faithful servant of Stalin.

He is a man of great political skill, speaks many languages fluently, and is a true disciple of Machiavelli. He is severe in his habits, and might be taken for a cleric; he knows Vatican policy extremely well. The informant considers that Ercoli is by far the cleverest of the men who have appeared on the political scene in southern Italy, and believes that he can be counted upon to play the Russian game, or at least an Italian game oriented completely to Moscow. This, however, he will disguise behind an attitude of seeming moderation and great suppleness.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 12 April)

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WASHINGTON, D. C.

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14 April 1944

14 April 1944

Polish-Russian Relations, according to a Polish Diplomat.

In mid-March an OSS representative had a detailed conversation with a Polish official.  
TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Views of a Polish Diplomat Concerning Polish-Russian Relations.

This official believes that the Polish Government is unable to make concessions to the Soviets. He guarantees that this would solve the difficulties. They suspect that if they yielded to Soviet demands, they would have played out their role of making the deal palatable to Western opinion and then would be dropped in favor of openly pro-Soviet groups. Further, Stalin is out to control the Polish situation. The existence of a truly independent Poland is not possible. The Soviets may be able to control the Polish situation, but rather a Popular Frontist minority will be in power. The Polish people have been conditioned by the occupation to believe that the Communists are the only ones who can save them.

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of a Special Memorandum, prepared by the Research and Analysis Branch of this agency, in which are set forth the views of a Polish diplomat concerning Polish-Russian relations.

Source believes that, generally, the people in Poland support the Government in London; that the Polish Government estimates the proportion of pro-Government groups to pro-Soviet groups as 50 to 1. However, years of German occupation have created an immense sympathy among most of the people, and, moreover, what the Communists lack in numbers they make up in organization, in boldness of action, in greater possibilities of being supplied from Russia. The Communists are also aided by the advance of the Russian armies, and by the fact that in Eastern Poland they are a majority and where external aid is available. The Russian furtherance of the Communist activity of the pro-Government Underground.

Enclosure. It practically all pre-war Polish Communist leaders are now either dead or inactive, with the exception of a few in the Polish Patriotic Front (none of them too important). Wanda Wasilewska is not a serious candidate for Polish leadership. The Soviets seem to be grooming Andrzej (Andreas) Witom, the half-brother of the peasant leader Wladyslaw Witom, three-time Premier of Poland. Andrzej has nothing except the value of his name (purchased once before by the Communists during an election campaign).

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
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**SECRET**

14 April 1944

Polish-Russian Relations, According to a Polish Diplomat.

In mid-March an OSS representative had a detailed conversation with an official of the Polish Foreign Ministry.

This official believes that no compromise is possible between the Soviets and the present Polish Government. The latter is unable to make concessions primarily because they have no guarantee that this would solve the difficulties. They suspect that if they yielded to Soviet demands, they would have played out their role of making the deal palatable to Western opinion and then would be dropped in favor of openly pro-Soviet groups. Further, Stalin is out to control the whole of Poland and cannot tolerate the existence of a truly independent Polish Government. Also, the Soviets may set up a puppet regime, not necessarily Communist, but rather a Popular Front type of government with a strong Communist minority pulling the wires. They may also win the sympathies of many Poles by seemingly magnanimous cultural concessions, as the people have been starved for cultural entertainment and decent literature since the occupation.

Source believes that, generally, the people in Poland support the Government in London; that the Polish Government estimates the proportion of pro-Government groups to pro-Soviet groups as 50 to 1. However, years of German occupation have created an immense apathy among most of the people, and, moreover, what the Communists lack in numbers they make up in organization, in boldness of action, in greater possibilities of being supplied from Russia. The Communists are also aided by the advance of the Russian armies, and by the fact that in Eastern Poland, where the Poles were always a minority and where extermination actions by the Germans and Russians further decreased their numbers, there is very little organized activity of the pro-Government Underground.

Source agreed that practically all pre-war Polish Communist leaders are now either dead or inactive, with the exception of a few in the Union of Polish Patriots (none of them too important). Wanda Wasilewska is not a serious candidate for Polish leadership. The Soviets seem to be grooming Andrzej (Andreas) Witos, the half-brother of the peasant leader Wincenty Witos, three-time Premier of Poland. Andrzej has nothing to offer except the value of his name (purchased once before by the Pilsudski regime during an election campaign).

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By **SR** Date **MAY 5 1975**

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When asked why the Polish Government made no serious attempt to get some Ukrainian spokesman to come out for Polish-Ukrainian collaboration within the pre-war frontiers, our informant explained that the Polish Government was looking frantically for a Ukrainian spokesman, but unfortunately the Ukrainian (Galician) leaders were either wiped out or deported by the Russians or else they had collaborated with the Germans.

Speaking of certain views expressed by Army men--the strongest pressure group in exile--source admitted that some utterances by Polish officers are very "undiplomatic" and none too helpful. He pointed out that the proportion of Poles from Eastern Poland is unusually great among the Poles in exile. They constitute about one-third of the civilian exiles and almost two-thirds among soldiers (the possibilities of escape having been greater in Eastern Poland, while the West was quickly overrun by the Germans). Naturally these people from border territories with acute nationality problems, who are now directly threatened with losing their homes by Soviet annexation, are inclined to make rather intemperate statements.

Another factor influencing the views of the Army men is their relative inactivity--which is always detrimental to morale. Also, some views presented as those of the Army, actually come from a group of officers ousted for one reason or another from active service. There are hundreds of these dissatisfied officers, particularly in the Near East. They bask in the sun on quite comfortable retirement pay and spend their time complaining and talking politics. Their utterances should not be taken as the expression of official views. As for General Sosnkowski, so often described by Russian propaganda as a focal source of anti-Soviet sentiments, source said he was actually busy touring the military camps in an attempt to mitigate the views of the Army hot-heads.

It was stated further that there had been at least six waves of German conciliation moves, none of them successful, although Nazi propaganda had had some effect on the desperate Poles. The grip of the Gestapo seems to have loosened recently, he said, and emissaries of the Polish Government find it much easier to move across Germany than before. A recent arrival from Poland simply took a train from Warsaw to Paris, where he contacted the French Underground and with their help reached London over the shortest route, almost exactly the normal pre-war route.

(Special Memorandum, R&A Branch, Central European Section, 16 March)

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
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12 April 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Willingness of German Opposition Group  
to Attempt Overthrow of Nazis.

Transmitted herewith for your information  
is copy of a dispatch from the Bern office of this  
agency, giving important details concerning the will-  
ingness of a German Opposition group to attempt the  
overthrow of the Nazis.

  
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

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By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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12 April 1944

GERMANY: Opposition Group Claims Willingness to Attempt Overthrow of the Nazis, Provided They can Deal Solely with the US and UK.

The OSS representative in Bern has been approached by two emissaries from an opposition group in Germany who claim that they are now ready to attempt the ousting of Hitler and the Nazis, provided that negotiations can then be carried on solely with the US and with Britain, and to the complete exclusion of the USSR. They point out, however, that if the capitulation is to be made primarily to Russia, the negotiations would then be carried on by an entirely different opposition group. They are eager to know if we are interested in pursuing this subject, and point out that the time in which successful action could be carried out by any such group is quickly drawing to a close.

To these overtures the OSS representative said little beyond expressing his strong belief that we would never act without the previous knowledge of the USSR. He feels, moreover, that since the leaders of the group have been widely acclaimed as potential heads of such a movement, we are bound to take it for granted that the Gestapo is aware of the situation and is letting matters hang fire, either because they plan not to crack down till the situation has matured further, or because they wish to have an anchor to the West.

A summary of the declaration made by this opposition group follows:

Germany's position is fast coming to a head and the end of hostilities in Europe can definitely be seen. The opposition group, led by a prominent German General, now out of power, and by a prominent German civilian, are now willing to attempt a coup. They claim theirs to be the only group with personal access to Hitler and other Nazi chiefs, with enough arms at hand to accomplish their ends, and with enough power in the army to make a

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coup feasible. They point out, for example, that the Wehrmacht generals now commanding in the west, particularly Rundstedt and Falkenhausen, would be ready to help Allied troops land, once the Nazis had been ousted; and that, similarly, arrangements might be worked out for the reception of Allied parachute forces in strategic spots in Germany. (Even so, they make it clear that although they are willing to attempt a coup, they can not guarantee its success.)

As precedent for negotiating solely with Britain and the US, the group cites the recent Finnish peace negotiations, in which the Finns dealt with Moscow alone, despite their being at war with both Britain and the Soviet. They base the request on the fact that the people who are planning this coup are rather conservative minded, although willing to cooperate with any available elements of the Left, barring the Communists. Their chief aim, they say, is to save Central Europe from coming under the sway of the USSR, since, if this happened, both democracy and Christian culture would vanish there. The group declares with great emphasis that we must not dismiss lightly the perils of a new totalitarianism of the radical Left, particularly in the light of the millions now living in Central Europe who have become completely proletarian.

The OSS representative in Bern comments that the above message brings up the old predicament of capitulating to the East or to the West: the Germans can never perceive the third alternative of capitulating to both at the same moment.

(OSS Official Dispatches, Bern, 6 and 7 April)

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By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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WASHINGTON, D. C.

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12 April 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Reports Received in OSS, No. 116

Submitted herewith are some additional items received from our secret sources abroad.

Unless otherwise indicated, the items of information transmitted are reports just as received from agents, and have not been evaluated as to degree of reliability other than as stated.

  
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
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7 April 1944

FRANCE: Decline in Morale of French Prisoners  
HUNGARY: Resistance; Pogroms; Food Confiscations.

The OSS representative in Bern reports the following comments of a neutral traveller who has just arrived from Hungary:

While in Budapest during the first days of the occupation, the informant spoke German in ordering his meals at a restaurant; the waiter refused to serve him until he explained that he was not German, but a neutral. The Hungarians are showing their passive resistance in a great many ways, particularly by being slow and inefficient.

A hunt for Jews is on, too. The informant called a business friend who is a Jew, and the latter's wife, sobbing, said that her husband had gone away and begged the informant not to try to see her. The informant is of the opinion that Germany is putting all her energy into making this the most efficient pogrom of them all, and is looting Hungary of all food stuffs she can get her hands on.

The informant saw very few German troops in Budapest, but the Gestapo was everywhere.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 5 April)

However, the OSS representative remarks that, because of their contact with and hatred of the Germans and the fact that they are kept hard at work, the French prisoners of war in Germany may have retained a more robust view than their seemingly more fortunate brothers in Switzerland.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
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7 April 1944

FRANCE: Decline in Morale of French Prisoners  
of War Interned in Switzerland.

From a person who has contact with the French prisoners of war who have escaped to Switzerland from Germany, the OSS representative in Bern has learned that the following is the cross-section of their opinion:

The great majority of them arrived in Switzerland with pronounced De Gaullist sentiments, but at the same time they did not know much about the movement. In their eyes, the word Gaullism was synonymous with resistance, and General de Gaulle personified military honor and the best traditions of what France was before the collapse. Almost all these interned prisoners are openly hostile to any return to the old methods and the old personalities of the Third Republic.

Accordingly, it was with some stupefaction that on reaching Switzerland they learned that the men of Algiers have been largely recruited from the old crowd; and that, on the political and social plane, there is no revolutionary reform apparent.

The delay in action by the Anglo-Saxons has had its effect on these internees. Last year 70 percent of them, it is reported, indicated they were ready to take up arms immediately in case of an Allied landing. Today the percentage is probably reduced by half--the long delay has reduced their morale and their willingness to fight.

However, the OSS representative remarks that, because of their contact with and hatred of the Germans and the fact that they are kept hard at work, the French prisoners of war in Germany may have retained a more robust view than their seemingly more fortunate brothers in Switzerland.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 5 April)

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11 April 1944


FOR: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Reports Received in OSS

Submitted herewith is information regarding recent developments in Rumania which has come to us from reliable sources.

It is submitted as a matter of interest and as it may relate to other information already in your possession.

TAB 1 is the summary of various individual cables; TAB 2 contains the cables, paraphrased and chronologically arranged.

  
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

11 April 1944

The following summary of recent developments in the negotiations for a Rumanian separate peace is based on reliable reports from Middle East sources:

Marshal Ion Antonescu had decided, before 21 March, that the Rumanian Army would not attempt to make a stand on the Dnestr River; resistance would be offered, if at all, only by the Wehrmacht. Shortly thereafter, in a message sent via Criztescu, the Marshal asked for a statement of Allied reaction to the recent turn of events in Hungary and a statement of Allied assistance that could be guaranteed Rumania if that country attempted to withdraw from the Axis. At the same time both Ion and Mihai Antonescu were contemplating a visit to Hitler. General Wilson and others strongly warned against such a trip, since the Antonescus' absence from Rumania could provide the opportunity for a German occupation of the country; Ion and Mihai were urged to take no action without first consulting the Allies. On 2 March the two apparently postponed their trip to see the Reichsfuehrer, but by 24 March (probably on the receipt of a summons from Berchtesgaden) the Antonescus had left for Germany.

Meanwhile Iuliu Maniu, collaborating with the Antonescu regime and having the Rumanian King's consent, remained in fairly continuous communication with the Allies. He had early requested a statement of the extent of assistance the Allies were prepared to offer Rumania in resisting the Germans. On 22 March he repeated this request, emphasizing the royal blessing for his communication and the danger to the Allies that the Wehrmacht would consolidate its position in the southeast unless action were taken; Maniu specifically suggested aid from Allied air forces and airborne troops. On learning (24 March) that the Antonescus had departed for Germany, Maniu expressed his determination to overthrow the Marshal if the official emissaries should come away in agreement with Hitler; once again in this message Maniu inquired about Allied assistance. Two days later (26 March) he stated that Ion and Mihai had returned to Rumania. Maniu expressed his belief that a German occupation of the country had been staved off by the Government; but said he did not know what decisions had been reached by it. Again, on 28 March, Maniu sent a message stating that the Marshal had not informed him of the Government's plans. In this communication Maniu expressed his opinion that both the Rumanian public and Army favored an immediate armistice. Maniu also stated that he and Dinu Bratianu had deposited with the Swiss Legation in Bucuresti a letter for the Allied Governments stating that they would request an armistice as soon as they attained power in Rumania.

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Date MAY 5 1975

On 27 March it was reported from Rumania that the Iron Guard had been trying for two days to unseat the Government, but had at length been thwarted by the Marshal's increased security measures. The Rumanian capital was said to be swarming with recently-arrived and heavily-armed Germans, and anti-German feeling among the city's population was alleged to be strong. Great popular fear of Allied bombardment and the influx of large numbers of refugees from Bessarabia and Moldavia were reported.

On 28 March Maniu had stated that he had received all Allied messages, including the one for Ion, which had already been forwarded. However, on 30 March it was reported that Ion would like to have as quickly as possible the telegrams regarding Allied offers to Rumania; Ion had stated that he was in receipt of a message from General Wilson but did not have two subsequent communications via Cretianu. Ion then said that he would answer directly. On 1 April it was reported (on the basis of a message from Maniu) that Ion was "in principle" converted to the Allied cause, but asked for a repetition via Cretianu or otherwise of the Allied conditions which had been transmitted to him through Maniu.

On 1 April Stefanescu (Rumanian engineer known to the British) and another associate of Maniu's sent a message (arriving 3 April) stating that strain between Maniu and Ion Antonescu stood in the way of Rumanian disengagement from the Axis. These associates expressed their view that cooperation was necessary between the country (represented by Maniu) and the governmental machinery (in Ion's hands). They urged the Allies strongly to recommend to Maniu and Ion Antonescu that they bury their differences. In support of this appeal, Stefanescu on 2 April wired that his advice from Hungary led him to believe that the Army and Opposition there were waiting on Rumanian action for an attack on the occupying Nazis. Continuing this same line, Stefanescu on 3 April wired that Mihai had urged a statement to Ion of minimum armistice conditions the USSR would accept from Rumania. Stefanescu said that some changes of military command and in the Rumanian General Staff were being effected to facilitate a Rumanian volte-face. Stefanescu expressed his opinion that Russia should not demand military occupation of the country, in order to maintain solidarity of the Army and nation. He suggested a Russian operation against Hungary with passage through Rumania, the Rumanian Army reoccupying Transylvania. Stefanescu concluded by asking that he and Stirbey and Ion be apprised of the Soviet conditions.

On 5 April Stirbey met the Soviet Ambassador. In reply to a question about conditions, he stated that armistice was impossible while German and Rumanian forces continued to fight side by side in Rumania. He said the Allies had presented their demands on 30 March, including two by the USSR: (1) surrender of the Rumanian Army to the USSR, which would then put it under command of Marshal Ion, and (2) appointment by Rumania of a capable person (or one of the imprisoned Rumanian generals held by the Russians) to act as liaison between the two high commands to decide on military measures against the Germans. The Ambassador stated that no answer to these conditions, or even an acknowledgment,



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had been received in the ensuing week, and that such was necessary for a resumption of negotiations. Stirbey, in reporting this meeting to Mihai, urged that an answer be given since delay weakened the Rumanian position, prolonged the threat of Allied air attack on Rumanian cities, and was failing to take advantage of a favorable military situation in which Allied authorities believed the Germans could spare no additional forces from the West.



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By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_

CIA 006687

11 April 1944

By SR Date MAY 5 1975

The following are paraphrases of the messages from which the summary in TAB 1 was prepared:

Message #1 relates meeting of Prince Barbu Stirbey with Allied representatives.

Message #2 recommends that Hungarian controversy be avoided in Rumanian negotiations.

Message #3 recommends strongly that Mihai and Ion Antonescu give up the idea of visiting Hitler, since their absence from Rumania might serve as an opportunity for the Germans to occupy the country. Message also says that Mihai and Ion should take no action without prior discussion with the Allies.

Message #4 from Maniu requests a statement of the extent of assistance the Allies are ready to offer Rumania in resisting the Germans.

Message #5 reports receipt of the first message from Stirbey (presumably sent to Bucuresti) and Ion Antonescu's decision not to attempt a stand at the Dneestr River.

Message #6 reports that Mihai and Ion have received instructions (presumably from Germany) to visit Hitler.

Message #7 (dated 23 March) reported that Mihai and Ion have put off their visit to Hitler.

Message #8 from General Wilson to Maniu warns against having Mihai and Ion visit Hitler.

Message #9 from Ion through Criztescu asks for a statement of Allied reaction to the latest developments in Hungary and a statement of assistance that can be guaranteed to Rumania. Criztescu adds that he does not think the Germans control Hungary. However, he states that the danger of a Hungarian attack on Rumania is past.

Message #10, dated 22 March, from Maniu (message emanating from Budapest) reached Ankara on 24 March. Maniu states that he communicates with the permission of the Rumanian King. He points to the danger of a German occupation to consolidate the Wehrmacht position in the southeast, and demands to know what assistance the Allies can give Rumania (Maniu suggests aid from air forces and airborne troops).

Message #11 (dated 24 March) to Stirbey from Maniu states that Mihai and Ion had left to visit Hitler. Maniu states that the Antonescus will continue the war against the Allies if they are in agreement with Hitler. Maniu in that event is determined to overthrow Ion; he asks to know what Allied assistance he can then expect.

Message #12 from Maniu, sent on 26 March and received the next day, states that Mihai and Ion "are now here". Maniu does not know what decisions have been reached, but believes the Government has staved off German occupation.

Message #13, sent from Rumania on 27 March, describes conditions in Rumania. It states that the Iron Guard has been trying for two days to unseat the Government, but has been thwarted by Ion's increased security measures. Bucuresti is swarming with recently-arrived heavily-armed Germans. Anti-German feeling in the city is strong. There is great fear of Allied bombardment. Streams of fugitives are pouring in from Bessarabia and Moldavia.

Maniu on 28 March sent a message (#14), received 29 March, in which he states that he has received all messages, including the one intended to be forwarded to Ion, which has been so forwarded. Ion has not told Maniu his plans. Public opinion and the Army favor an immediate armistice. Maniu and Dinu Bratianu have deposited with the Swiss Legation in Bucuresti a letter for the Allied Governments stating that they would request an armistice as soon as they achieved power in Rumania.

Reginald on 28 March states (message #15, received next day) that large numbers of Germans are in Bucharest. As of 28 March traffic has been stopped on the railroad to Chernovitsy and Yassy. Two heavy railroad accidents have occurred.

It was reported on 30 March that Ion would like to have as quickly as possible the telegrams regarding Allied offers; he has received General Wilson's communication, but did not receive two others via Cretianu. Ion will answer directly.

It was reported on 1 April (presumably on the basis of a message from Maniu) that Ion was in principle converted to the Allied cause; he asks for a repetition via Cretianu or otherwise of the Allied conditions made known to Ion through Maniu (presumably).

Message #16, dated 1 April and received two days later from Stefanescu and another of Maniu's associates, stated that strain between Maniu and Ion stood in the way of Rumanian disengagement from the Axis. The associates think necessary a cooperation between the country (represented by Maniu) and the Government (in Ion's hands), and urge that the Allies strongly recommend to Maniu and Ion that they join forces to extricate Rumania from the German side of the war.



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Stefanescu on 2 April messages (#17) that reports from Hungary persuade him the Army and opposition there are waiting for Rumanian action to attack the occupying Nazis themselves. Stefanescu asks for an immediate answer to the associates' appeal.

On 3 April Stefanescu sent a message (#18) stating that Mihai has urged a statement to Ion in general terms what minimum armistice conditions the USSR would accept from Rumania. Stefanescu states that some changes of military command and in the Rumanian General Staff are being made to facilitate a Rumanian volte-face. Maniu concurs. Stefanescu expresses the opinion that Russia should not demand military occupation of the country, in order to maintain the solidarity of the Army and nation. Stefanescu suggests a Russian operation against the Hungarians with passage through Rumania, the Rumanian Army reoccupying Transylvania. Stefanescu asks that he and Stirbey and Ion be apprised of the conditions.

On 5 April Stirbey sent the following message to Mihai at Ankara, for relay to Maniu: The Soviet Ambassador and Stirbey met on 5 April, when Stirbey asked concerning Russian conditions. The Ambassador replied that armistice was impossible while German forces, interspersed with Rumanian troops, continue to fight in Rumania. He stated that the Allies had already presented their terms on 30 March in a wire from HMG; at that time Russia submitted two demands: (1) surrender of the Rumanian Army to the USSR, which would then put it at Ion's disposal, and (2) appointment by Rumania of a capable person (or one of the imprisoned generals held by the USSR) to form liaison between the Rumanian and Russian high commands in order to decide on military measures against the Germans. The Ambassador stated that no answer or even acknowledgement had been received after the lapse of a week, and that a definite and immediate answer was required before negotiations could again be started. Stirbey states to Mihai that it is the belief of the Allied military authorities that the Nazis cannot spare any forces from the west to establish a defensive front in the southeast, because of lack of reserves; if Rumania deserted Germany, the German position could be greatly worsened. Stirbey says that some conclusion must be reached as further delay weakens the Rumanian negotiating position and leaves Rumanian cities open to continued Allied air attack.



*Please show to Admiral Leahy*

**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

**SECRET**

5 April 1944

Germany: Eyewitness Account of the Situation in Berlin.

The following eyewitness report, which is rated A-2, is by a reliable informant who recently spent a day in Berlin:

With the exception of the Schlesischer Bahnhof, which is still unscathed, all the major railroad stations in Berlin have been completely demolished. All the rail traffic seemed to be running on a punctual schedule, however, and the informant's train was on time at every stop. Where there are no stations, rail tickets must be procured from the police and only emergency cases and special pass holders are permitted to buy tickets. The appearance of the rolling stock was clean and in good shape. Only about 25 percent of the subway system is in use; the remainder has been converted into giant shelters and a tremendous machine repair shop. In most of the city, the street cars are running.

Both Charlottenburg and Templehof are entirely demolished, without a single building left standing. Half of the buildings on Unter den Linden are destroyed. The Legation Quarter, the Tiergarten, the Luftfahr Ministry and Gestapo Headquarters are all completely demolished. Not a wall is standing at the airport, which is a shambles. The Moabit Criminal Courts are demolished. Informant claims he drove in a cab through central and west Berlin for a distance of six miles without observing a single house standing. For the most part, the population of Berlin is living underground. They have evacuated all of the small children. The older children and the women are working 16 hours a day. All food is rationed, although on a generous basis. Every item of clothing is also rationed.

The essential business of Berlin functions doggedly, although some of the Ministries, the Luftfahr included, have moved to Vienna. Tremendous "slave" labor forces, for the most part Russians and Poles, are in evidence everywhere doing safety demolition and clean-up work. These men are forced to stay out in the open during raids, since there are not enough shelters available for everyone in Berlin.

Source reports that a relatively accurate and gloomy picture of the war situation is being given to the general populace. This results in a fabulous fear of the Russians and in despair of victory, but also in a drugged reaction as though from morphine, and there is no sign of collapse. Everyone is convinced that the only way out is to fight to the end and there is a glimmer of hope that England and America may turn against Russia once they see that the Soviet is about to assume complete control.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Baghdad, 2 April)

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**CIA 006687**

By *SR* Date *MAY* 5 1975

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C. (25)

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8 April 1944


The White House Map Room  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Colonel Richard Parks, Jr.

Gentlemen:

I am transmitting herewith one copy of R & A No.  
1258, "Routes Across the Indochinese Peninsula", prepared in  
the Research and Analysis Branch of this office and classified  
~~as confidential~~.

Sincerely yours,



William L. Langer  
Director, Branch of  
Research & Analysis

Enclosure

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State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By RHP Date 2-10-72

*Filed in Bookcase*

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
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

4 April 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Resignation of Greek Prime  
Minister Tsouderos

Transmitted herewith for your information  
is a copy of a dispatch from the Cairo office of this  
agency, giving important details on the resignation  
of Greek Prime Minister Tsouderos.

  
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

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CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 5 1975

203(12)



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

4 April 1944

Greece: Greek Troops in Cairo Revolt;  
Tsouderos Wires King his Resignation

The following information was received on 3 April from Vasilliades, and from Minister of the Marine Sophokles Venizelos. The former came to Cairo recently from Greece as a representative of General Gonatas and Themistokles Souphoulis, former leaders of the Liberal (Venizelist) Party:

Revolt has occurred in the Greek garrison in Cairo and the officers arrested 1 April on the Council of Ministers' orders have been released. Due to this and like disturbances among Greek refugees and troops elsewhere in the Middle East, Vasilliades and the Minister of War [probably Karapanayiotis] and Venizelos have demanded that Tsouderos resign as Prime Minister on the grounds that such action would help prevent the dissolution of Greek forces. In reply Tsouderos has wired the King in London submitting his resignation and suggesting that Venizelos be appointed to succeed him. There have been indications that Venizelos is willing to take the post.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Cairo, 3 April; rated A-2)

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By Authority of

CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 5 1975

203(12)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~SECRET~~


5 April 1944

TO:\* Colonel Richard Park, Jr.  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Reports Received in OSS, No. 115

Submitted herewith are some additional items received from our secret sources abroad.

Unless otherwise indicated, the items of information transmitted are reports just as received from agents, and have not been evaluated as to degree of reliability other than as stated.

  
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

Enclosures.

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CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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CIA 006687

5 April 1944

By SR Date MAY 5 1975Germany: Reaction to Allied Psychological Warfare.

On the basis of numerous reports and extended consultation, the OSS representative in Bern transmits the German reactions to three major Allied propaganda lines:

1. The trend toward a German defeat is inescapable. The Germans are certainly aware of this inescapable trend. Their hopes at present consist solely in: (a) diminution of Russian interest upon attaining the 1941 boundaries, or else friction between the USSR and the western Allies; (b) frustration of attempts to land in the Balkans or in France, added to war fatigue on the part of the western countries, the forthcoming elections in the US, and the degree to which the US views the war against Japan as its primary concern; (c) a miracle of some sort, such as a secret weapon, although this hope is fading; (d) an era of chaotic confusion throughout Europe, from which Germany would emerge in as good shape as any other country.

2. Unconditional surrender does not mean total disaster. The majority of Germans suspect that the Allies wish to ruin the economic as well as the military strength of Germany; "unconditional surrender" therefore signifies to most of them total catastrophe for the country and for the individual German. We ourselves have done nothing to offer them a more hopeful meaning for this expression; we have never, for example, indicated that it refers only to military and party leaders. The Germans' pessimistic interpretation of "unconditional surrender" is also supported by the widespread feeling that the Atlantic Charter has been discarded or at least does not hold good for Germany, and by Churchill's mention of compensation to Poland by giving her German territory. In the face of Goebbels' propaganda system, it would be difficult to "sell" the German people on a new and more optimistic interpretation of "unconditional surrender"; however, granting the issuance of authoritative and harmonizing proclamations from Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, it probably could be achieved in time. Thus far, back-handed encouragement from the Free German Committee in Moscow has been the only source of hope for the Germans, and many Germans regard this Committee as a trap.

3. Overthrow of the Nazis by a minority group. Unless Hitler and certain other Nazi leaders were murdered and the Army takes over, most Germans believe that no minority faction

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could now seize authority over the existing ruler. Moreover, no effective opposition group, military or civilian, exists which favors the western powers. Most anti-Nazis who desire western orientation see no justification for risking their lives to promote any plans for Germany thus far submitted by the western powers. Other anti-Nazi elements in the Reich prefer to have the authority and responsibility maintained by the Nazi and military cliques until the ultimate debacle, so that the whole blame for the war and for Germany's downfall will rest for all time on the shoulders of Hitler and the military. The German Socialists, especially, do not intend to assume control as they did the last time and thus have to answer for the armistice and peace terms. The Catholics' point of view is much the same. The Communists possess no known leader. Of course, a new group probably would be created in case we chose to offer any indication that such a group could deal with us; until the capitulation, however, the strength of this group would be insignificant.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 31 March)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

5 April 1944

Hungary: Background of the Occupation.

The OSS representative in Bern transmits the following background story of the Hungarian occupation:

After Horthy had written concerning the withdrawal of the Hungarian troops in Russia, Hitler asked the Regent to come and see him. Hitler started off with a long speech attacking Hungary's unsatisfactory attitude, and stated that he knew of Hungary's secret negotiations with the Allies. He also attacked Horthy on the Jewish question. He then advised Horthy of his decision to occupy Hungary, and asked him to sign a document to the effect that Hitler and the Regent had decided that such occupation was necessary for the prosecution of the war. Horthy refused, saying it was against his oath to the constitution. Hitler said he would occupy Hungary anyway. Horthy replied that he would order the Hungarian army to resist, and when Hitler replied that he would crush all resistance, Horthy said that in that event he would resign. Hitler replied that he then would not guarantee his or his family's safety. The Regent, however, continued to resist. The Germans delayed the train which was to take back the Regent to Budapest, so that it arrived only Sunday at 11 o'clock.

The Germans began the occupation at 2 o'clock on Sunday morning. At 2:30 Premier Kallay was informed. Since the German Minister had gone to Hitler's headquarters, Kallay talked to the German Military Attache. The latter telephoned to the German GHQ, returned and said it was true -- Budapest was to be occupied by 5 o'clock that morning -- with the consent of the Regent. There was some resistance, but the Vice Chief of the General Staff ordered it stopped after Hitler had given the word that all was being done with the consent of the Regent. The Chief of the General Staff was at Hitler's headquarters. When the Regent arrived in Budapest at 11 o'clock on Sunday morning, the occupation had been carried through. He called a Crown Council (one presided over by the Regent). The Kallay cabinet resigned. The Regent's idea

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then was to put in a non-political government, choosing the oldest permanent official in each department. The Germans insisted on a Parliamentary government, and proposed Imredy. Imredy refused. Then the new German Minister, Weessenmayer, informed the Regent that Hitler insisted upon Sztojay. The Regent said that he would accept him but only as head of a non-political government. The Germans then gave an ultimatum, and on Wednesday at 6 o'clock the Regent finally accepted Sztojay and the new government.

The OSS representative in Bern, who has a list of those who have been arrested, comments that the Germans have arrested all those close to the Regent. Apparently the purpose is to eliminate everybody he trusts, so that Horthy now is completely isolated.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 3 April)



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
1 April 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Reports Received in OSS, No. 114

Submitted herewith are some additional items received from our secret sources abroad.

Unless otherwise indicated, the items of information transmitted are reports just as received from agents, and have not been evaluated as to degree of reliability other than as stated.



John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

Enclosures.

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CIA 006687  
By SR Date MAY 5 1975

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 April 1944

Hungary: PW Opportunity in the Non-Magyar  
Complexion of the New Regime.

The GAZETTE DE LAUSANNE on 27 March emphasized the non-Magyar character of the new Hungarian Government, pointing out that in 1929 the Prime Minister dropped his real name of Dimitru Stoyanovich for Döme Sztojay; that the Chief of Staff of the Army is really named Knause; that the Minister of Finance has the German name of Schneller; that the Minister of Commerce, Kunder, comes from the German minority, and that in all probability the Minister of Agriculture, Bela Yurczek, is either a Serb or Slovak. The OSS representative suggests that Allied broadcasts to Hungary might well emphasize the "Made in Germany" composition of the new quisling government.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern; 29 March)

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by SR Date MAY 5 1975

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WASHINGTON, D. C.

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30 March 1944

USSR: Manpower Losses.

Major General Korneef, one of the two leaders of the Soviet Mission to Tito's headquarters, has stated, in reply to a direct question from an American observer, that to date the Soviet losses in prisoners, dead, and wounded, amount to between 8 and 10 millions, leaving available for military service an estimated 10 to 12 millions.

[The OSS estimate of permanent casualties (battle and non-battle) to this spring is 7.6 million, of which 1.2 million are non-battle casualties; OSS analysts also estimate that within the pre-1939 borders of the USSR there are still about 15 million males of military age who have not yet been called up.]

(OSS Official Dispatch, Cairo, 26 March)

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CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 5 1975



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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29 March 1944

Palestine: Raids on Police Headquarters.

During the attack on police headquarters in Jerusalem on 23-24 March, the explosions uprooted a tree in the yard and blew out the lower front of the headquarters, which is one of the most solid buildings thereabout. Plate glass was shattered for a block on both sides of Jaffa Road, and, as a precaution against more live bombs, the road was shut off. In Haifa, the CID building was blown up and a number of English policemen were injured. Four bags of high explosives were discovered in the headquarters of the Jaffa police, which was evacuated. The building was destroyed by subsequent explosions. The south wall of one house, constructed of modern ferro-concrete, was completely blown out. In various parts of Tel-Aviv, gangster-fashion attacks were made on the police, one of whom was killed and two injured. The Mayor and municipal functionaries have indicated their horror at these attacks, which they believe were carried out by the Stern gang.

The OSS representative in Jerusalem comments that it is not known whether Irgun Zva'i Le'umi (National Military Organization) took part in these raids, which were carried out in the commando manner by the Stern gang.

(OSS Official Dispatces, Cairo, Jerusalem, 26 March; both rated A-2)

[OSS analysts in Washington are inclined to believe that Irgun, which has a membership of from two to three thousand, is carrying out these bombings. The political clearheadedness employed in fixing upon the targets to be destroyed and the technical skill in organizing the bombings seems to surpass the somewhat haphazard methods of the Stern gang.]

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By SK Date MAY 5 1975

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
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30 March 1944

TO: Colonel L. Mathewson  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Reports Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information  
is a copy of a dispatch from the Cairo office of this  
agency giving important details on the political and  
military situation in Yugoslavia.

  
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

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By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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CIA 006687

30 March, 1944

By SR Date MAY 5 1975

Yugoslavia: Tito's Situation and Plans;  
Soviet Intentions.

The following report is from an OSS observer who has recently spent three weeks in different sectors of Bosnia and held many lengthy discussions with Marshal Tito, members of the National Committee of Liberation, staff officers and various other officers of the Partisans, civilians, soldiers, and others:

Earlier accounts by the Partisans of their military situation and operations, and those of the Germans, have been found to be exaggerated and incomplete to a degree calling for their re-evaluation on the basis of more recent information. In addition, subsequent reports will have to undergo closer scrutiny by Anglo-American and Russian officers on the spot.

Tito says he is planning a change in tactics which would involve setting up a fixed line of defense and establishing a General Headquarters in the rear, to remain permanently in the same spot. It seems impossible that such a plan can be carried out, yet there is no hint of this in the way Tito talks about it.

Tito's General Headquarters is continuously buzzing with plans for establishing beachheads to which sea-borne materiel could be delivered and which would guard the supply lines into the interior; but so far nothing feasible has been proposed.

Tito claims that even after the Germans evacuate Yugoslavia his troops will maintain the offensive and carry on the war across the borders of Hungary and Austria. An Army doctor from New Zealand who has spent the last ten months on a comprehensive tour of Yugoslavia, says, however, that the health of both civilians and armed forces has suffered so severely as to make any practical resistance next winter doubtful. The OSS observer himself found the country severely torn by strife, sick, utterly weary, and lacking in everything--transportation, communications, clothing, food, etc.. Seed for the sowing of crops this spring is needed more than anything else and right away.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Cairo, 30 March)



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A Soviet mission of 22, led by Major Generals Korneef and Gorshakov, has now moved into the Partisan General Headquarters. In unofficial authority, popular affection, and prestige, the Soviets seem to come first with the members of the GHQ. According to Korneef, this Soviet group, which he says forms a direct connecting link between Tito and Stalin, will remain assigned to Tito's GHQ for the rest of the war and is at present adding more specialists to its staff. He also declared that he intended to keep no information from the US and English missions and expected the same attitude on our part. Korneef said his country had not the remotest intention of bringing about a junction between the Partisan and Soviet armies across Bulgaria, Rumania, or any other intervening nation. The brunt of helping the Partisans, he thought, should be borne by the US and Britain; however, the Soviets intend to help all they can by means of aircraft landings and parachutings, which will be carried out by DC-3's from Russia. Last week, the Soviets effected the first of these.

There is much diplomatic activity going on between Tito and the British mission. The observer discovered that the British are almost certainly attempting now to obtain post-war economic concessions from Tito. It is quite clear that Randolph Churchill is doing practically nothing in the country, however. The whole show is run by Brigadier MacLean, who exercises complete monopoly. Its outlook, its activities, and, with minor exceptions, its members, have all been British. Tito is seriously opposing the British efforts to get him to acknowledge King Peter. He declares that there is nothing personal in his rejection of Peter, but that neither the Yugoslav population nor the National Committee of Liberation has any desire to see Peter regain his throne, no matter what compromises he may make.

The Partisan leader claims that, once the Nazis have evacuated the country, the solidly entrenched position of the Partisans as the universally popular choice for the government will remain evident: figures of from 80 percent to 98 percent in Belgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubljana are mentioned by officers in Tito's entourage. He says that as soon as the war ends he wants to hold plebiscites which will discover the people's wishes on every significant question. At this very moment, says Tito, most of the Serbs are in favor of the Partisans. He claims he is maintaining contact with Partisan elements in Greece, Bulgaria, and Albania, and that there is a possibility, which he favors, of a powerful democratic federation with a central federated government, resulting from a union of these nations, and perhaps even Rumania, with Yugoslavia.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Cairo, 26 March)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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
29 March 1944

TO: Colonel L. Mathewson  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Reports Received in OSS, No. 113

Submitted herewith are some additional items received from our secret sources abroad.

Unless otherwise indicated, the items of information transmitted are reports just as received from agents, and have not been evaluated as to degree of reliability other than as stated.

  
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

Enclosures.

203(12)

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CIA 006687  
By SR Date MAY 5 1975

113

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

**SECRET**

29 March 1944

Yugoslavia: Tito Desires Transfer of Croats and Slovenes from the Italian Army.

In a formal note, dated 24 March, to be forwarded to the US and UK via Brigadier MacLean, Chief of the Allied Military Mission, Tito declares that there are about 40,000 Italian citizens of Croat and Slovene origin serving in the Italian army. (Most of these troops are in Sardinia.) A number of these are alleged to have stated a desire to join Tito's Army of National Liberation, and they further suggest, the note declares, that an Allied military mission (including representatives of the Partisans) be set up to carry out the transfer of these troops to Yugoslavia.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Cairo, 26 March)

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By SR Date MAY 5 1975



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28 March 1944

Iraq: Reaction to Wagner Resolution.

The OSS representative in Baghdad reports that on 27 March the controversy over the Wagner resolution reached its peak with a furious attack on the US in the Majles. The Opposition leader, Salmon Sheikh Daoud, said that the US should establish a Jewish State in America if it was so fond of Jews. Nuri made only a feeble response. As a result of all this, public opinion is now persuaded that protests from the Middle East forced General Marshall's actions, indicating the fear of the Arab world which exists in America. A very trustworthy source states that US prestige has never before been so low.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Baghdad, 27 March; rated A-2)

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By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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27 March 1944

Hungary: Situation Still Confused;  
Possibility of a Free Hungary Movement.

According to telegrams sent by Swiss correspondents in Berlin, says the OSS representative in Bern, the German public is being left in almost complete ignorance of events in Hungary, and no fresh details are available in Bern. The whereabouts of Horthy, Kallay, and other leading members of the late government are unknown.

The Hungarians have always been particularly careful to preserve the immunity from arrest of members of their Parliament. No matter what they do, Parliament members can only be arrested after a special Parliamentary Committee waives the right to immunity. The fact that reports received so far indicate that several members of both houses of Parliament have been arrested attests to the fact that these arrests were made by Germans.

Among the personalities mentioned in connection with the possible organization of a Free Hungarian movement, the name of Pelenyi, former Hungarian Minister in Washington, is favorably discussed in important Hungarian circles in Bern. Among Hungarians in England only Karolyi is well known, and his designation to head such a movement would be unfavorably received in many quarters, including those whose cooperation would be essential to the successful building up of opposition in Hungary.

[John Pelenyi began his diplomatic career in 1908 as consular attache at Pittsburgh and was subsequently consul at Chicago and Cleveland. From 1920 to 1930 he was counsellor of legation at Washington, during which time (in 1923) he married Sue Wade Harman of Cleveland. From 1930 to 1933 he was head of the Hungarian Delegation at the League of Nations, and from 1933 to 1940 he was minister at Washington. He resigned on 22 November 1940, because of Hungary's swing to the Axis, and since 1941 has been professor of political science at Dartmouth College.]

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 25 March)

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25 March 1944

CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 5 1975

Yugoslavia: Effort to Form Compromise Government.

The following information has been received from a reliable source, rated B-3:

1. An effort has been initiated to construct the basis for a new Yugoslav government, to represent the potential middle element between Tito and Purich. To this end there are daily conversations in which the following persons participate: Frants Smoj (former Minister of State, leader in the Slovene People's Party, Clerical, and anti-Communist); Benjamin Vilder (Director of the Yugoslav Information Service at London, former Yugoslav Minister to Czechoslovakia, and Independent Democrat); Srdjan Budislavljevich (Minister of Social Welfare and National Health, Independent Democrat); Milan Grol (Minister of Transportation, Democrat); Bogulyub Jettich, Slobodan Jovanovich, and Captain Kern (a Slovene, formerly in the Cabinet in London, dismissed last year). The first three are Serbs from Croatia or Bosnia, the second three are Serbs from Serbia. No Croats have been asked to participate in the discussions to date, on the theory that agreement must first be reached among the Serbian factions.

2. The group's program is approximately as follows: (a) maintenance of friendly terms with the USSR; (b) Mihailovich to be ultimately replaced as War Minister by a civilian, possibly by Grol; (c) ultimate establishment of friendship with the Partisans; (d) complete support of a Federal Yugoslavia, to which Bosnia would be added as a fourth unit, independent of both Zagreb and Belgrade.

3. This group has not yet contacted either the King or the British Foreign Office, although it plans to very soon. The group fears that the British will insist upon more radical concessions to Tito, and is not ready to accept Tito's appointees into the new government. They feel that because cabinet members accompanied the King to London, there will be significant changes in the immediate future. Purich, Ivo Chichin-Shain (a Croat, appointed Minister of Finance 16 October 1943, Yugoslav National Party), and Vladeta Milichevich (Minister of the Interior, a Serb, accompanied King Peter to the United States in 1942), are among the members who went with him. Serbs in London no longer resent the King's marriage.

(OSS Official Dispatch, London, 23 March)



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23 March 1944


PWEL: Factors in Propaganda Cabinet Reshuffle

TO: Colonel L. Mathewson  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Reports Received in OSS, No. 113

Submitted herewith are some additional items received from our secret sources abroad.

Unless otherwise indicated, the items of information transmitted are reports just as received from agents, and have not been evaluated as to degree of reliability other than as stated.

  
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.

Deputy Director, OSS -- Intelligence Service

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3/23/44

23 March 1944

FCNL: Factors in Prospective Cabinet Reshuffle

The current political crisis between Interior Commissioner Emmanuel d'Astier de la Vigerie and the BCRA (Bureau Central de Renseignements de l'Armee, an intelligence bureau of Gaullist tendencies, which has its own underground contacts) is concerned with preparations for the transfer of the FCNL to France and with the struggle for control over the resistance movements. The 17 ministries now in existence will, according to all indications, be greatly reduced by the prospective reshuffling, and an effective war cabinet will emerge capable of making quick decisions at the time of landings in France. De Gaulle has rejected the resignations of D'Astier and Mendès-France (Commissioner of Finance). There is some doubt as to the position of War Commissioner Le Troquer. Catroux, now Commissioner without Portfolio, is being suggested as Ambassador to London. However, certain groups in the Consultative Assembly have been pressing the FCNL to purge both Catroux, on account of his alleged favoritism toward the Moslems, and Massigli, who is accused of being too lenient toward Vichy.

(OSS Official Dispatch, 17 March, Algiers, rated A-3)

Worthy, for all his faults, says the OSS representative, is not a man to be frightened by threats, and press reports of his firm stand during his interview with Hitler may be true. On the other hand, the reports that Imbrey would head a quisling government appear doubtful. While Imbrey undoubtedly has been pro-German, he is a man of some ability, and would hardly risk his chances of rehabilitating himself by acting as a tool of the German invading forces.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 21

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23 March 1944

Hungary: Reactions to German Invasion

On 21 March, the OSS representative in Bern was informed by a good source, though without confirmation, that Horthy was back in Budapest and that there had been a number of arrests in the capital, including members of the Royal Italian Legation.

It is doubtful, comments the OSS representative, that the invasion took the Hungarians completely by surprise, as the threat of German occupation had been hanging over them for some time, and they realized that in attempting to withdraw their troops from Russia and in refusing certain facilities to the Germans they were playing a dangerous game. Unfortunately, this crisis may find the Hungarian Army badly divided. The pro-Nazi element of the army has considerable influence and its position has been strengthened by recent developments, which persuaded the population that a Russian victory would mean reduction of Hungary to her Trianon frontiers or worse. However, if the press reports that Horthy is being detained by the Germans are true, this will strengthen the anti-Nazi element of the army. And if reports that two Rumanian Divisions are with the German invading forces are confirmed, this would strongly, perhaps decisively, influence the Hungarian Army to resist.

Horthy, for all his faults, says the OSS representative, is not a man to be frightened by threats, and press reports of his firm stand during his interview with Hitler may be true. On the other hand, the reports that Imredy would head a quisling government appear doubtful. While Imredy undoubtedly has been pro-German, he is a man of some ability, and would hardly risk his chances of rehabilitating himself by acting as a tool of the German invading forces.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 21 March)

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23 March 1944

Rumania: Panicky Situation Controlled by German Army

From Rumania a prevailing atmosphere of panic is reported. However, says the OSS representative in Bern, the German military situation in Rumania has been greatly strengthened in recent months in order to secure what is now the only remaining line of retreat for the remnant of Mannstein's army. German reserves have been accumulated in Rumania and German military personnel has infiltrated into all important Rumanian military and administration posts. Many Rumanian companies have German captains, often with German officers under them, and Rumanian officers have little to say. The Germans also control all telephone and telegraph communications and the country is practically in German military hands.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 21 March)

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By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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
22 March 1944

TO: Colonel L. Mathewson  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Reports Received in OSS, No. 112

Submitted herewith are some additional items received from our secret sources abroad.

Unless otherwise indicated, the items of information transmitted are reports just as received from agents, and have not been evaluated as to degree of reliability other than as stated.

  
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

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20 March 1944

Yugoslavia: King Peter's Intentions, Public and Private.

The following statements are attributed to King Peter by a well-informed source:

King Peter has declared to a close friend in London that the British kept him practically a prisoner in Cairo, even though at the time he was forced to deny publicly, press reports to that effect. His sojourn in Cairo was further made difficult and futile, he said, because (1) General Zivkovich has been engaging in plots to depose Peter and place Peter's brother, Prince Tomislav, on the throne (Tomislav is reputedly the bastard son of Zivkovich and Queen Marie); (2) Yugoslav army officers have been going over to Tito; and (3) Cabinet underlings have been issuing inflammatory decrees in favor of Mihailovich, affixing the King's signature to them without his consent. This, remarked the King, has made it hard to work for an understanding with Tito.

For all these reasons, plus the desire to expedite his own marriage and to cause American and British policy to be more sympathetic to Mihailovich, Peter desired to return to London. He claims that Mihailovich's lack of activity has been caused only by American and British instructions urging him to save his strength until the invasion of Europe. Both Peter and the Purich Cabinet support Mihailovich not only as the leader of an anti-Nazi force but also as a guarantee of Peter's eventual return to the throne. The King claimed to have derived the impression from his discussion with Eden that the British are in sympathy with these opinions, but dare take no action based upon them for fear of affronting the USSR.

The King was greatly heartened by a recent message of loyalty and support sent by Slovene groups and relayed by the Vatican. He intimated that he intends to keep Purich as Prime Minister, unless the British order him to do otherwise, and is extremely bitter against Simovich, whom he says he will not accept in a government position.

The Kings of Greece and England have approved Peter's marriage, which will take place within a few days, while Peter's mother, who has opposed the marriage, has been completely silenced.

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Peter intends to stay in England indefinitely, nor have the British given any sign that they are opposed to his doing so.

[OSS analysts, while not denying that the foregoing views probably represent what King Peter would like people to believe, comment that these statements reflect the King's political immaturity. The King, according to this view, mistook Eden's diplomatic politeness for a change in conviction. Moreover, any Slovenes communicating with King Peter, would be almost certainly anti-Tito clericals, especially as their message was relayed by the Vatican. Moreover, it is not correct to say that Peter was a "prisoner" of the British in Cairo, although this statement has often been made by the Nedich press. OSS analysts had never previously heard of the alleged Zivkovich-Queen Marie liaison, and are very skeptical of it.]

(OSS Official Dispatch, London, 18 March)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

21 March 1944

Italy: Views of a Prominent Italian Socialist.

In reply to a memorandum of questions which was submitted to him by the OSS representative in Bern, a well-informed Italian Socialist source has supplied the following information:

1. Present situation in the liberated zone? Owing to the uncertainty and contradictions of Allied policy, southern Italy, which has always been politically moderate, is rapidly becoming more radical. Should the present situation continue, the population will end by joining in part the Communists, in part the neo-Fascists.

2. Present activities and future possibilities of the Socialists? The Socialist Party has made great progress in the last few months, despite the fact that many of its members have been arrested and executed in the German-occupied zone. The official organ of the party, AVANTI!, is regularly printed in five editions--in Rome, Milan, Padua, Bologna, and Turin. The newspaper TERZO FRONTE is published every fortnight in Genoa, and its Milan edition is printed in 20,000 copies. The Socialists have played a big part in the resistance and in the strikes. Some internal political difficulties have been solved. The possibility of merging the Socialist and Communist parties has been eliminated. In the small industrial centers, the Socialists are the strongest anti-Fascist party. Its members have specialized in syndicalist questions and local administration. Together with the Action Party and the Communist Party, the Socialist Party forms a left-wing bloc within the opposition which will be decisive in future events. (A-3)

3. The best solution of urgent problems? The appointment in the liberated zones of consultative commissions for the solution of the most important practical questions is suggested, in which all anti-Fascist parties should be represented. Italians in America should be allowed to send money to their families in the liberated zones. Direct contact between the American Federation of Labor and the free Italian trade unionists should be encouraged; and Italian trade unionist elements whose democratic creed has been proved and who are now in North or South America should be allowed to return to Italy to assist in the reconstruction of the labor movement. Bureaus for assisting the workers in Palermo, Bari, Naples, etc., could be very useful.

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4. Socialist views regarding the permanent solution for the future? Anti-Fascist Italians will claim the right of taking part in the peace conference. Italian reconstruction will demand a radical renovation, based on the forces of labor and intelligence. Electrical plants, mining industries, iron works, chemical and textile industries, heavy machine industries, shipbuilding and banking will have to be nationalized on a basis of control by technicians and workers. This change will be necessary in order to destroy autarchy. The Italian state will have to be strongly decentralized on a regional basis. Large estates will have to be handed over to agricultural cooperatives. A part of Italian labor must be allowed to find work abroad. The most active elements of the various anti-Fascist parties are now asking for European unity.

5. Points of view in which all the opposition groups agree? All the anti-Fascist parties agree that Italy must be led by new forces and that the future Italian state must be democratic. They all agree in demanding abdication of the King, the dismissal of Badoglio, and the cleaning out of Fascists still remaining in governing circles.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 20 March; rated A-2, except for item 2.)



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21 March 1944

Benes Reports on the Russian Attitude toward  
Hungary and Rumania.

The following is a summary of a confidential message which Benes recently sent to a source of unquestioned integrity:

1. Benes reviewed the Rumanian situation with Molotov and Stalin, and informed them that in Hungarian matters Czechoslovakia stands with Yugoslavia and Rumania, and holds that Transylvania should be part of Rumania. He also hoped that Rumania would be able to establish a relationship with Russia which would enable the Czechs to resume amicable relations with Rumania.
2. Molotov said it was essential for Bessarabia and the northern portion of Bukovina to continue within the Soviet Union. He agreed with the Czech viewpoint on other Rumanian issues, however, and declared that Russia is prepared to support Rumania vis-a-vis Hungary and in general to embrace a good neighbor policy toward Rumania.
3. Stalin emphasized the importance of having Transylvania remain Rumanian so as to insure Rumanian democracy. The Russians have also conveyed this attitude toward Transylvania to the British in identical terms, Benes says.
4. Both Stalin and Molotov stressed the need for a more militant Russian opposition, so that Rumania's break with Germany would not come too late.
5. Benes found the Soviet attitude toward Hungary exceedingly unfavorable. He found, however, a general sympathy toward a democratic Rumania (Stalin, for example, evinced a deep interest in Maniu), and an "unswerving intention" to respect its sovereignty. Benes believes that much can be salvaged for Rumania by an early initiation of a proper policy.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 16 March; rated A-2)

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By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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
17 March 1944

TO: Colonel L. Mathewson  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Reports Received in OSS, No. 111.

Submitted herewith are some additional items received from our secret sources abroad.

Unless otherwise indicated, the items of information transmitted are reports just as received from agents, and have not been evaluated as to degree of reliability other than as stated.

  
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS  
Intelligence Service

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CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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14 March 1944

Cairo: Reaction to President's Reported  
Statements Concerning Palestine.

Cairo newspapers have carried surprisingly little comment on the statements with regard to Palestine and the White Paper attributed to President Roosevelt by Rabbis Wise and Silver after their recent interview with him, to the effect that he was pleased that Palestine had opened its gates to Jewish immigration, that the White Paper had never received U. S. approval, and that the U. S. people and their Government deeply sympathize with the concept of a Jewish National Home. There is, however, widespread discussion of the report in Cairo. The public appears either to disbelieve it or to withhold fire pending confirmation of the facts. The Reuters dispatch carrying the report has not been carried by the English papers. One of the native papers comments that it is difficult to reconcile Roosevelt's reported statements with Kirk's assurances to Nahas that the Wagner resolution does not represent official opinion.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Cairo, 12 March)

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By SR Date MAY 5 1975



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15 March 1944

Hungary: Political Sentiments of  
Leading Military Figures.

The following information has been received from a reliable Hungarian source:

Prime Minister Kallay of Hungary has met with some success in placing men on whom he can depend in vital places on the General Staff and in the War Ministry. General Csataj, the Minister of War, is looked upon as trustworthy. It is believed that he would stand by the government instead of obeying the Nazi-controlled military camarilla. General Naday, in command in the Ruthenian Carpathians, and Colonel Kadar, the new chief of G-2, are both said to be loyal.

The Chief of Staff, Colonel-General Szombathelyi, is a doubtful element, but Kallay has not given up hope that he may be persuaded of the inevitability of Nazi defeat, since Szombathelyi is not regarded as a serious Germanophile but rather as a climber and a politician.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 9 March)

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By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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16 March 1944

North Italy: Eyewitness Report of  
Resistance Activities.

A trained observer, who was in northwestern Italy for three months, makes the following first-hand report:

The Resistance groups operate in units of between 150 and 175 men, divided into smaller groups of ten and fifteen men each. These units maintain liaison with a Maquis center which relays supplies and instructions. They have no steady source of food, but are well supplied with rifles and ammunition. Many of the bands in the vicinity of Turin have boasted that they could capture that city within two hours of an Allied landing, since the Nazi troops there numbered only 1000.

In a raid on a Nazi airport near Cuneo, which was guarded by only seven Germans, the Partisans seized three trucks and 10,000 litres of benzine; one guard was killed, the other six taken into custody and later executed. On 11 January a band was attacked by 1000 Nazis, but at the end of 48 hours of battle, the Nazis retreated to Cuneo and the Partisans took refuge in a neighboring church. The group reorganized and it changed its positions frequently.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 15 March, rated B-2)

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By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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17 March 1944

Rumania: Tense Situation Reported.

The OSS representative in Bern reports that telephone calls received from Bucharest on 16 March indicated a very tense situation, and it is expected that events in Rumania may move swiftly. The negotiations of Prince Barbu Stirbey, who recently arrived in Istanbul, have caused a real sensation in Bern, but it is not known how much of this has been disclosed to the public in Rumania. The OSS representative comments that if, as is generally supposed, the negotiations are taking place with the tacit approval of certain members of the Government as well as of the opposition, it creates a very critical situation for the Germans at a moment when the bases for their military operations are close to the Rumanian frontier. We must therefore expect drastic and possibly quick action by the Germans; there are some indications that the present Government will be reshuffled in a form more favorable to the Germans.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 16 March, rated A-2)

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
13 March 1944

To: Colonel L. Mathewson  
White House Map Room

Subject: Reports Received in OSS, No. 110

Submitted herewith are some additional items received from our secret sources abroad.

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John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS  
Intelligence Service

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By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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8 March 1944

Poland: Activities of Polish and Ukrainian Partisans.

The following information is dated as of the end of December, 1943, and comes from a good source:

The Nazis have been embarrassed by Partisan attacks from Red Ukrainians and Polish nationalists in the area from Brest Litovsk to the Galician boundary. On the other hand, these two factions, the Ukrainian and the Polish, often battled each other. The Red Ukrainians are strengthened by the presence of Soviet parachutists, and are commanded by Red Army officers. The inhabitants of the above-mentioned area suffered worse treatment from the Red Partisans than they had from the Nazis. In the region of Lvov there was no activity on the part of the Partisans, but the Ukrainian Partisans farther east knew no restraints. Nevertheless, there was no indication that a possible understanding might be reached between the Nazis and the Poles. In Warsaw, the source noted that the Russians were propagandizing intensively against the Polish Government-in-exile, and the Polish bourgeoisie and officers were most receptive to this campaign.

(OSS Official Dispatch, London, 7 March)

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By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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9 March 1944

Italy: The Milan Strikes.

The OSS representative in Bern has just received a report about the recent strikes in Milan. They began on 2 March in several Milanese factories, involved an estimated 30,000 workers, and were limited to Milan and its environs. In the striking factories the workers reportedly participated almost 100 percent, although not all industries adhered to the strike order. The tram employees in Milan also went out on strike, but apparently the state, municipal and railway employees did not. The first to resume work were the tram employees, who went back to work on 3 March. In protest against this, a group of young men tore up some of the tram rails that night.

According to the informant, these strikes were not concerned with wages, but were principally a protest against the repressive measures of the Neo-Fascists and against the presence of the Germans. The strikers also demanded the liberation of civil and military internees sent to Germany and the cessation of forced enrollment of workers and soldiers destined for Germany.

The informant adds that Italian workers are so afraid of eventual Allied reprisals for the aid they may have rendered the German war machine that, for the majority, fear of being put on the Allied blacklist is greater than the fear of the Fascists and Germans.

The informant points out that reports of the extent of the strike should be taken with some reserve. At about the same time as the strike, measures were taken to limit the consumption of electricity in industrial plants; a number of factories are therefore momentarily idle due to these new restrictions.

An appeal was addressed to the workers by the Fascist prefect on 6 March, calling on them to return to work on the morning of 8 March, failing which they would lose all rights and would be sent to forced labor in Italy or "elsewhere".

In the opinion of one informant, the big industrialists were secretly rather pleased by the strike. They felt it might push the Germans toward liquidating the Neo-Fascist experiment with all its pseudo-socialization measures, such as workers' committees and the like. The industrialists felt they would fare much better under German occupation than under the Fascist government.

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(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 8 March)

CIA 006687  
By SR Date MAY 5 1975



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9 March 1944

The Wehrmacht: Reported Shift of German Troops from Northern to Southern France and Italy.

The following report has been received from the OSS representative in Bern:

According to French railway workers who reached Geneva on 4 March, southern France is boiling with German activity. Civilian freight and passenger traffic in this area has been temporarily suspended during major shifts of troops and material from northern to southern France. This information is in line with general indications of troop movements previously received. Apparently the Germans are either carrying out a major reinforcement of southern France or Italy, or they are making a show of so doing. However, the reports received in Bern indicate that the Germans may believe that there will not be any grave danger on the Channel coast for another sixty days or more, and that they intend to concentrate troops on the Anzio front in an attempt to force an Allied withdrawal there, and thus produce a psychological effect on future landing operations.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 6 March)

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CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 5 1975

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

11 March 1944

Hungary: Attitude Toward Germany.

The OSS representative in Bern submits the following information from a person extremely well informed on Hungarian conditions:

Hungary is still at a loss what to do. Many people, formerly pro-German or who believed in German invincibility, have now changed their minds. In general, the aristocracy, the higher clergy, both Catholic and Protestant, and most of the Socialists are pro-Allied, although there are still some radical Nazis among the left element of the latter group. Pro-Germans still dominate the army, although some important changes have recently been made. Pro-Germans are also found in the rank and file of the bureaucracy, and in the non-Jewish middle classes, many of whom are of German origin, and in the lower ranks of the clergy, except for the Unitarians, who are all anti-German. The Hungarian peasants are mostly anti-German, but there are some half-million Swabians who are completely pro-Nazi.

The position of the Jews in Hungary is anomalous. Naturally they wish to see the Nazis beaten, but they are frightened of a German occupation of Hungary, which would mean their liquidation. Therefore they are trying to persuade Kallay to be cautious, so that the end of the war can be reached without German occupation, even though this might result in Hungary's being treated at the peace negotiations as an impenitent ally of Germany. This same attitude is maintained by some members of the upper strata of society, who, though anti-German, feel they too would be liquidated in the event of a prolonged German occupation.

The present idea of all parties except the Communists is to defend the Carpathians, alone if possible, and even to decline offers of assistance from Germany. However, if the Germans come in unsolicited and even unwanted, it is difficult to say what Hungary would do. Many Hungarians still try to believe that the Anglo-Saxons are so anxious to keep Russia out of the Balkans and the Mediterranean area that they would hastily revise their war policy if the Russians were in the Carpathians.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 9 March)

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By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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11 March 1944

The Vatican: Attitude on the Bombardment  
of Castel Gandolfo.

The village of Castel Gandolfo, according to a trustworthy Vatican source, was crammed with refugees at the time of the bombardment, which injured 1000 persons and killed about 300 more. Source asserts, however, that the village also was packed with Nazi military equipment and soldiers, and that the same bombs which caused the college to blow up destroyed tanks which were parked before the palace. The Vatican, according to this source, takes an objective view of the bombing, though it felt forced to protest against this infringement of its territory.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 9 March, rated B-2)

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By SR Date MAY 5 1975



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11 March 1944

Germany: Practical Morale Effects of Bombings Dubious.

The OSS representative in Bern sees no evidence that the German morale has been greatly affected by recent bombings. This is partly due, he says, to the fact that there is no longer any such thing as morale in Germany as we normally use the term, since there is no possibility of public, or even private, expression of views. There are in Germany millions of tired, discouraged, disillusioned, bewildered, but stubbornly obedient people, who see no alternative other than to continue their struggle.

The bombings have tended to make proletarians of many millions. It has broken down social distinctions, created a sort of comradeship of misery, and to some extent lightened the task of the Gestapo because opposition was feared from those who still had something to save rather than from those who had lost everything. Those who have lost their property by bombing receive a claim against the government, which often is all they have left, and which is of value only if the government survives.

Last summer, when the destruction of Hamburg seemed to have created a real panic, it appeared that a few more Hamburgs might bring about a collapse. Now, however, this feeling of panic has apparently worn off, and it is evident that we must evaluate the air raids primarily from their military and economic effect in destroying centers of production, communications, transportation and administrative machinery, etc., rather than in their effect on morale.

[OSS analysts in Washington have been similarly interpreting the morale situation in Germany, as affected by air raids, for several months. They add, however, that it is too early to appraise the morale effect of American daylight raids. When the military effect of precision bombing, knowledge of which takes some time to spread, becomes known in Germany, it may have considerable effect on morale. OSS analysts here also observe that the underground, which may be stronger than we have believed, is probably growing larger and better organized as a result of the dislocation of controls by air raids, and may become a significant political factor.]

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(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 10 March)

CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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13 March 1944

CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 5 1975Italy: Interview with Prince Humbert.

On 17 February members of the OSS staff in Naples called on Prince Humbert at his Naples villa. While awaiting the audience with the Prince, they talked with General Gambera, his military aide.

General Gambera lost no time in distinguishing between Fascist politics and the political stand of the King. He made it clear that the one time strength of Mussolini and the Fascist Party had made it impossible for the King to express his opposition to the Party's conduct. The General also stated that, despite the remarks of many people, it is not true that the King is unwilling to abdicate. He would be the first to want to go if he could leave his son a strong government.

Prince Humbert himself was quite vague on questions relating to the general European situation and to the problem of post-war organization. He emphasized that his experience was primarily that of a soldier and not of a politician. He was hesitant in expressing himself on possible developments in the local political situation. He indicated no antipathy to the various parties now forming and mentioned that he had pleasant personal relations in the past with several of the leaders. He did, however, allude to the fact that in the early days of Fascism, many non-members of the party, including as pronounced a liberal as Benedetto Croce, had been willing to show a reserved confidence in Fascism as a measure of discipline and order against the threat of internal chaos. He also felt that certain people, especially Count Sforza, had been away from Italy so long that they had tended to lose touch.

When asked whether a more satisfactory solution to the existing political confusion in Italy was necessary for the morale of the soldiers, he answered vigorously in the negative. Political opinion and activity should play no part in the army, whose success must be based upon discipline and obedience.

The Prince stated that the King had given much thought to abdicating in his (Prince Humbert's) favor, but had withdrawn from the idea because the existing political parties, which are involved in the problem, are too numerous, disunited, and lacking in responsibility. He said, however, that the King would reconsider abdication if stronger and more stable parties appeared.

(OSS Report, Naples, 20 February)



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
8 March 1944

TO: Colonel L. Mathewson  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Reports Received in OSS, No. 109

Submitted herewith are some additional items received from our secret sources abroad.

Unless otherwise indicated, the items of information transmitted are reports just as received from agents, and have not been evaluated as to degree of reliability other than as stated.



John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

Enclosures.

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CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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6 March 1944

Germany: Bombings Reported to be  
Affecting Morale Decisively.

The OSS representative in Stockholm reports that intelligence from two independent sources seems to indicate that the air raids are beginning to have a destructive effect on German morale. A Finnish engineer, who has been in Germany for two or three months supervising the erection of Finnish-exported wooden barracks for evacuees, states that a great change took place in the people's spirit during his last month in Germany. According to him, the atmosphere is rapidly becoming ripe for riot. Similarly, a Dutch businessman, who was in Leipzig after the last heavy raid there, is reported to have described morale as low and declining fast.

[OSS analysts point out that while this report runs counter to recent intelligence on this subject, it is possible that the sustained bombings of recent weeks have produced changes in the direction indicated by this report.]

(OSS Official Dispatch, Stockholm, 1 March, rated B-3)

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By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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6 March 1944

Nazi Europe: Propaganda Maneuver for Compromise Peace;  
Anti-Catholic Measures.

The Germans, according to a generally reliable informant, are spreading stories among the population of the occupied countries about how ruthless they will be as soon as the Allied invasion starts: coastal areas will be flooded, towns turned into fortresses, and the entire country laid waste. The purpose of these stories is said to be to make the peoples of the occupied countries bring pressure on their governments-in-exile to persuade the Allies to make peace before the invasion. The argument is that if peace is made now, the Germans will retire quietly to their own territory. If not, they will destroy everything in their retreat, as they are doing in Italy. This propaganda is having some effect, according to source, who states that some people who had hoped for invasion in these occupied countries are now beginning to dread it.

Under the pretext of combating separatism, rigorous measures are being taken against Catholics throughout southern Germany and Austria, according to a report rated A-3. Efforts are being made to remove priests from their parishes; hundreds of searches have been made of the homes of priests, and even of churches; and in Munich numerous Catholic personalities have been arrested on the charge of committing crimes against the unity of the Reich. Further persecution of everything Catholic and of suspected hostile groups is to be expected, says this report.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 3 March)

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By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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7 March 1944

Finland: Imminent German Occupation  
of the Aland Islands?

The OSS representative in Stockholm has learned that the Finnish Military Attache to Sweden has expressed concern over the capability of the Germans of occupying immediately the Aland Islands. The Attache believed the move was imminent, and a necessary one, in order that the Germans might protect their communications in the Gulf of Bothnia. No positive evidence of such German intentions is available, however. The Finnish Military Attache's concern reveals his belief that the Germans expect to remain in Finland.

(Stockholm, 3 March)

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CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 5 1975



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7 March 1944

Italy: Unfortunate Consequences for the United States  
of Announcement concerning the Italian Fleet.

The announcement about turning over one-third of the Italian fleet to Russia has apparently had deep repercussions in Italy, says the OSS representative in Bern, and will undoubtedly render more difficult the task of building up the Italian resistance movement in the north of Italy. Many Italians find this measure difficult to reconcile with our appeals to them to fight against the Germans. Moreover, American relations with the Italians are affected by the fact that this measure was announced solely by President Roosevelt, and thus to the Italians seems to be quite largely an American decision. If it had been announced by the military authorities of the United States, Britain and Russia, as a measure calculated to be the most effective present use of the navy in meeting the common enemy, the onus on the United States would have been less, in the opinion of many Italians.

Anti-Fascist Italians considered the fleet as being the one element which had been kept relatively free of Fascism. The one event to which the pro-Allied Italians could look with any pride was the gesture of the fleet in going over to our side at the armistice. With the fleet they felt that they could render real aid to the Allies in freeing Italy.

The German propaganda line that neither the United States, nor Britain nor Russia are European powers, and have no interest in Europe except to use it to promote their own imperialistic ends, has already been aided, in the view of some observers, by the speech of Marshal Smuts, by Churchill's reference to compensating Poland at Germany's expense, by the Finnish situation, and by the bombing of the Cassino monastery. And now the division of the Italian fleet adds new material to the German claim that the Allies are coming as the destroyers and exploiters of Europe and not, as we claim, as its liberators. The headway which this propaganda is making has military consequences in so far as it lessens European opposition to Nazi domination.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 6 March)

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By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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7 March 1944

Rumania: Reported Discussion of Peace Proposals.

The following information, dated 2 March, is forwarded by the OSS representative in Istanbul, and is rated B-3:

General Ion Manolescu, Cretsianu, Princess Martha Bibescu, and Prince Barbu Stirbey all appeared in Istanbul some weeks ago to discuss peace proposals. Reportedly it was decided that as soon as Finland signs a treaty with Russia, Rumania will make a vigorous approach to the Soviets and will offer to give up Bucovina and Bessarabia in return for the remainder of Transylvania. According to General Manolescu, in order to help in establishing a common frontier between Czechoslovakia and Russia, Rumania is prepared to discuss ceding territory to Russia which the latter has not held previously. Coincident with the signing of a treaty with the Soviet, Rumania intends to launch an attack on Cluj, the capital of Transylvania, by way of pacifying the people of Rumania for the loss of territory. Rumania will seek Allied military support in this undertaking. As soon as an agreement is concluded, Maniu is scheduled to assume control.

[General Manolescu is attached to the staff of the King's palace, and is reported to be in touch with Maniu and Bratianu. Cretsianu, the Ambassador to Turkey, is reputed to be anti-German and was appointed to his present post, it is said, over Antonescu's opposition. He has been a career diplomat since 1918 and was Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs in Tatarescu's last cabinet [1940]. Princess Bibescu, the novelist, may be representing Mihai Antonescu in Istanbul. Prince Stirbey, a Prime Minister of Rumania until Carol's return in 1930, is related by marriage to the Bratianu family, and is believed to support the anti-German opposition.]

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(OSS Official Dispatch, Istanbul, 5 March)

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
4 March 1944

TO: Colonel L. Mathewson,  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Reports Received in OSS, No. 108

Submitted herewith are some additional items received from our sources abroad and in this country.

Unless otherwise indicated, the items of information transmitted are reports just as received from agents, and have not been evaluated as to degree of reliability other than as stated.



John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

Enclosures.

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By SR Date MAY 5 1975



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4. The French Resistance 3 March 1944  
... that you have failed to arm it adequately -- that increasing its already great sacrifices -- because you are afraid of its policy; and that you have been reluctant to arm French forces abroad because you want to have France completely under your control. The following is a summary of a long memorandum which was prepared by an important young leader in the French Resistance at the request of the OSS representative in Bern. Although the author is impulsive and somewhat immature, his point of view is fairly representative of the younger and militant elements of the Resistance:

The following is a summary of a long memorandum which was prepared by an important young leader in the French Resistance at the request of the OSS representative in Bern. Although the author is impulsive and somewhat immature, his point of view is fairly representative of the younger and militant elements of the Resistance:

1. The French Resistance resents the Allied opposition to General de Gaulle and regards their attempt to make General Giraud the French chief as an attack against national sovereignty. It also resents Allied willingness to carry on a long war of attrition while the occupied countries are starving, the apparently purposeless bombing of French cities, and the attempt to limit the French Resistance to sabotage and to providing intelligence, while excluding it from the political arena where the future of Europe is to be decided. (Official Dispatch, Bern, 26 February)

2. The Allies have misjudged the French Resistance because they have listened to reports of emigres who want to restore the old France. The Resistance has broken with this regime, and in particular we do not wish to fight for capitalism. We want to establish civil rights, freedom of speech and all such liberties; but we also want thorough-going reforms in property rights. We recognize that the right of property is at the base of any real social order, but we wish to adapt it to the new needs of human society.

3. Nevertheless the Resistance is not Communist, and has always condemned the Communist Party based on Moscow, whose secretary, Thorez, deserted in the face of the enemy and entered Paris in June with the Germans. Our Communist comrades in the Resistance, who have shared our battle and common sufferings, have renounced such internationalism, and we are sure they will no longer betray us.

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4. The French Resistance feels that you have failed to arm it adequately -- thus increasing its already great sacrifices -- because you are afraid of its policy; and that you have been reluctant to arm French troops abroad because you want to have France completely at your mercy. In order to win French confidence, the first thing to do, undoubtedly, is to give us arms.

5. President Roosevelt, who has great popularity with us, should publicly acknowledge General de Gaulle as the leader of the French nation, and should also clearly deny the German propaganda which tells us day after day that France will not regain her colonies. (Marshal Smuts' famous speech has profoundly disturbed French opinion since it seemed to confirm this German propaganda.)

6. We would also like to see a French officer at the side of General Eisenhower, and to have the members of the National Committee participate in great international conferences. And finally, we would like to be shown that American industrial and commercial enterprise is not making away with the riches of our Empire, as we are being told is the case.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 28 February)



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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3 March 1944

France: Position of the Communist Party  
in the Resistance Movement.

The following is a summary of a report from a representative of the French Resistance, Northern Zone, concerning the relations of the Communists in France to the general resistance movement. The report was prepared by a source not himself a Communist:

The Communist Party does not constitute a separate resistance movement; that is, it has no separate forces or its own independent centers of action. Communists individually, with the assent of their party, have adhered to the principal Resistance movements. Further, the Communist Party has officially given its adherence to the powerful movement known as the Front Nationale (this is the most important unit of the Resistance movement in the north, which is now a part of the United Resistance front). Although in certain circles abroad, the Front Nationale is apparently considered a purely Communist movement, the Communists are only a minority in it, and the directing committee has a majority of persons whose ideas are entirely foreign to Communism and are even strongly opposed to it. It would be impossible for the Communists to take over any one of the Resistance movements and make it a revolutionary party under their control.

The fact that the Communist Party has not attempted to constitute a separate Resistance movement, and that all its efforts have been directed towards bringing into the Resistance movement the largest number of Frenchmen regardless of their former political opinion, shows clearly that the Party's aim at present is in no sense revolution, but solely to fight against the invader. The Communist Party, like the other resistance movements, recognizes the FCNL as the only legitimate government of France, and recognizes General de Gaulle as the leader of the liberation movement. We feel that the Communist Party's policies in the Resistance movement has proved its sincerity. We are certain that the only purpose of the Communist leaders, as well as the rank and file, is to install the FCNL as a provisional government. The only point on which they are absolutely determined is the following: they demand that the provisional government be of short duration, and that its fundamental task be to prepare the election of a constituent assembly. This policy, we feel, is in conformity also with the interests of both France and the Resistance movements. If the Communist Party should attempt a coup de force

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after the liberation, it would only meet a bloody defeat. The character and composition of the French Communist Party has profoundly changed during these years of struggle. The old faces have disappeared and new elements, motivated by patriotism, have joined the Party. For the foregoing reasons, it is entirely wrong to suppose that in arming the French Resistance you are arming a revolution. The French Resistance is a block more solid than ever, and when it asks for arms it is solely to use these arms against the Germans.

The position taken in this memorandum, comments the OSS representative in Bern, may seem surprising, but "so far as I know, the Communists in France have not openly attempted to organize a separate Communist Resistance movement." They have acted, as indicated, through such movements as the Front Nationale.

[OSS analysts in Washington believe it quite likely that the Communist Party in France has become more "French" and less "international" as a result of the war.]

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 1 March)

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5. Sabotage has caused many 3 March 1944 French railway workers and civilians, and the attitude of the workers has been affected by the senselessness of the sabotage as well as by the acts of anarchy that sometimes accompany it.

France: Lack of Intelligent Central Planning in Railroad Sabotage.

It threatens to halt traffic which is vital to French economy, but for lack of an intelligent over-all plan designed by specialists, has little effect on Nazi military. The OSS representative in Bern has received the following memorandum, dated 10 February, from a source whose loyalty and integrity is beyond doubt and who is very well fitted to comment on the kind of railroad sabotage which the French Resistance movement is currently bringing off: (S, rated A-2)

1. Nazi transportation is virtually unaffected by the Resistance organizations' sabotage of the French railways. For the most part the activity affects French transport only, because Nazi economic and military transport is given priority over the French. Therefore the traffic stoppage resulting from attacks upon locomotives injures only the French.

2. There is no strategic plan governing the halting of traffic. The Ussel-Treignat line, for example, which has been subject to the record number of attacks, has no military value. It is not often that the center of communication is completely cut, or that various lines to the same place are cut at the same time. For example, the Paris-Lyons line is often cut between Lyons and Dijon, but parallel lines which pass by Amberieu and Paray-le-Monial remain intact. During the concentration of troops for the clearance of Haute-Savoie, early in February, nothing was done to the Culoz-Bellegarde-Annemasse line, although the Culoz-Aix-Annecy line was cut. The inference is that a strategic plan is non-existent. Local resistance groups apparently merely act on their own initiative, and without central coordinating direction.

3. The Nazis were quite perturbed at the increase in railroad sabotage last September but the effects of the surprise have now been lost. The Nazis have grown used to a certain sabotage frequency of approximately 100 cases weekly.

4. Nazi counter-measures instituted to avoid sabotage now include forcing French civilians to undertake guard, and guarding strategic points themselves. In addition, the Nazis are sending German railroad men into France. Over 2000 arrived in the first group, and ultimately 20,000 such German workmen are expected to take over the French railroads. DECLASSIFIED

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By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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5. Sabotage has caused many accidents to French railway workers and civilians, and the attitude of the workers has been affected by the aimlessness of the sabotage as well as by the acts of anarchy that sometimes accompany it.

6. In conclusion: Sabotage against the French railways has not yielded results commensurate with the efforts of the saboteurs. It threatens to halt traffic which is vital to French economy, but for lack of an intelligent over-all plan designed by specialists, has little effect on Nazi military traffic.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 1 March, rated A-2)



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FOREIGN NATIONALITY GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES  
MEMORANDUM TO THE DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
FROM THE FOREIGN NATIONALITIES BRANCH

Number 8-163

2 March 1944

## AMERICAN OPINION ON THE POLISH-RUSSIAN ISSUE

An unpublished Gallup poll of American opinion on the Russo-Polish dispute suggests that a majority of Americans are not interested; of those who expressed an opinion, sympathizers with Poland held a slight edge.

THE American Institute of Public Opinion has completed a survey of general American opinion on the Polish-Russian issue. The Institute does not intend to circulate the results of the survey to its subscribing newspapers. Through the courtesy of Dr. George Gallup, the Director of the Institute, the results have come into the possession of this Branch along with permission to make any desired use of them.

The questionnaire was sent out 19 January 1944, and the survey was made in accordance with the Institute's usual procedures. The results came off the tabulating machines last week.

Those interviewed were asked: "Have you read or heard anything about the argument between Russia and Poland over the Russia-Poland border?" If the answer was "No," the interview was terminated. If the answer was "Yes," the interviewer then asked: "In this argument are your sympathies with the Poles or with the Russians?"

Of all those interviewed 35 per cent answered that they had not heard about the dispute. Of the men asked, 27 per cent answered negatively, and of the women, 43 per cent. The breakdown of negative answers by economic classes was: Upper, 11 per cent; Middle, 24 per

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cent; Lower, 47 per cent. Thirty-seven per cent of the Democrats and 31 per cent of the Republicans answered this first question negatively.

The following table sets forth the answers percentually:

	Polish Sympa- thizers	Russian Sympa- thizers	No Opinion	Haven't heard
National	26%	17%	22%	35%
Men	26	24	23	27
Women	26	11	20	43
Upper	30	36	23	11
Middle	32	20	24	24
Lower	21	11	21	47
Democratic	22	20	21	37
Republican	31	14	24	31

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

2 March 1944

Germany: Representative German View of the Situation.

The following is a summary of a memorandum giving a German view of the war situation. The OSS representative in Bern believes that it gives a fair view of the opinion of many German circles today, and OSS authorities in Washington agree that the opinions outlined are held by a substantial segment of the German upper class:

1. German military circles believe that Russian losses have been heavier than the German and that the Russians do not have sufficient driving power to exploit their tactical successes. Moreover, the Russians do not know how to take advantage of these successes. In fact, the present situation is rather better than it was a year ago. The German army is still strong and disciplined, and the Nazi leaders have firmly decided to continue to fight to the end.

2. In the west, German military circles recognize that the Anglo-Saxons have a sufficient war potential to defeat the German army, but they lack the necessary experience. The Allies have the chance of winning if they are ready to accept very heavy sacrifices. If not, the war will still be long, and may end by mutual exhaustion. The view is quite prevalent in Germany that public opinion may force the Anglo-Saxons to conclude a compromise peace.

3. Internally, although many Germans are hostile to the regime, this opposition so far has had no practical effect. Moreover, its strength is very changeable, following the course of military events and air bombardments. Such things as even a temporary improvement in the food situation seems to make the opposition lessen as if by magic. One cannot count on an internal revolution in the near future, even though large sums of Russian money have been placed at the disposition of the German workers.

4. The Germans consider that the alliance between the German prisoners in Russia and the German Communists is entirely unnatural, and they believe that Stalin is on the wrong track in counting on these German prisoners; certainly the German Communists will be the first to betray these officers as soon as they have no further need of them.

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By SR Date MAY 5 1975



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5. While differences still exist between the Wehrmacht and the Party, they are not very important, as today the Wehrmacht has too many things to occupy it to busy itself with politics.

6. As to the bombardment, the people's attitude is extraordinary: They are accepting these blows with stoicism and give the impression that they are able to receive many more. The bombardments are not likely to bring about a general breakdown and while they have slowed down industrial production, so long as the Russians are not able to bomb the industrial regions of Upper Silesia, Germany will be able to produce enough war material to supply its armies.

7. The food situation will be difficult in June and July, but Germany will find a way of getting over the crisis. Arrangements have already been made with Rumania, Hungary, and other allies, to meet the deficit resulting from a shortage of potatoes. At the moment the food situation is not alarming.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 29 February)

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CIA 006687

29 February 1944

By SR Date MAY 5 1975

Iraq and the Plans for Arab Union

The following information has been received from the OSS representative in Baghdad:

1. Resentment of Senator Wagner's Resolution -- The resolution which Senator Wagner introduced in Congress recently, favoring the creation of a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine and abrogation of the White Paper, has caused a great commotion among political groups in Iraq. Nuri Pasha, the Iraqi Premier, is quite unexcited about it, but Foreign Ministry officials are absolutely furious, and over Nuri's signature personal wires have been fired at Taft, Wagner and the Iraqi Ministry in Washington, serving notice that passage of the resolution by the US would be regarded by the Arab nations as almost the equivalent of a declaration of war. British interests in Baghdad are also making a good deal of the incident, says the OSS representative, and exploiting it out of all proportion to its significance.

2. Resentment of American Oil Plans in Saudi Arabia -- The present American oil plans in Saudi Arabia, including the building of a pipe line, are apparently regarded as an obstacle to the plans for Arab Union, since they have twice called forth bitter comment from Nuri Pasha's personal advisor, Judge Lloyd. It is his opinion that the old age of Ibn Saud, the lack of strength in his sons, and the friction among them, all mean that without the present advent of American money and oil to enhance Ibn Saud's power and pride, Mecca would have been no potential threat to Nuri's Arab plans.

3. Nahas Pasha to be Nominal Head During Impending Discussions, Says Nuri -- In an off-the-record conversation, Nuri Pasha has said that it is his plan to have Nahas the nominal leader in the Arab Union discussions. Nahas has an ability to speak freely and to be at ease in public which Nuri himself does not possess. However, Nuri hinted that he was confident he would not be replaced as final leader by Nahas, who lacks the intelligence and energy. Believing that he sees in Nahas a future tool of some value, Nuri is attempting to iron out the personal rancor of recent months.

(OSS Official Dispatches, Baghdad, 26 and 27 February, rated A-2)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~RESTRICTED~~

28 February 1944

TO: Colonel L. Mathewson,  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: OSS Reports.

A survey of foreign-language press response to the  
President's January 1944 message was made for  
this Branch by the Overseas News Agency of New York. According  
to the statistics furnished by ONA, the foreign-language press  
gave ample coverage to the message. Editorial comment was  
scattered and. Submitted herewith is a brief memorandum  
prepared by the Foreign Nationalities Branch of this  
agency, indicating the reaction of the foreign-  
language press in this country to the President's  
message to Congress of 11 January 1944. Service act and

The President's entire program included those of the various  
language groups which consistently support the foreign policy  
of the Soviet Union. There was no opposition to a  
civilian draft as inspired by John Magruder, Brig. Gen. or anti-  
Administration forces; they attributed labor opposition to a  
misinterpretation of the act. In addition the papers which  
habitually give blanket approval to the domestic policy of the

Enclosure.

Administration came out for a national service act. Those  
included the New York Il Progresso Italo-Americano, the Polish-  
language dailies Kuryer Polski (Milwaukee), Kuryer Polski  
(Milwaukee), and Przegląd Żołnierski (Chicago), and the Arab-  
language Morast El Charb of New York City.

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25 February 1944

FOREIGN-LANGUAGE PRESS RESPONSE  
TO THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS

A survey of foreign-language press response to the President's message to Congress 11 January 1944 was made for this Branch by the Overseas News Agency of New York. According to the statement prepared by ONA, the foreign-language press gave ample coverage to the message. Editorial comment was scattered and, with certain exceptions, brief. As in the general press, the President's call for national service legislation was a matter of controversy with the line-up for and against it about equal.

Papers vigorously supporting a national service act and the President's entire program included those of the various language groups which consistently support the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. These papers denounced opposition to a civilian draft as inspired by reactionary industrial, or anti-Administration forces; they attributed labor opposition to a misinterpretation of the act. In addition the papers which habitually give blanket approval to the domestic policy of the Administration came out for a national service act. These included the New York Il Progresso Italo-Americano, the Polish-language dailies Nowiny Polskie (Milwaukee), Kuryer Polski (Milwaukee), and Dziennik Zwiazkowy (Chicago), and the Arab-language Meraat Ul Gharb of New York City.

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- 2 -

Lined up sharply against national service legislation, precisely on the ground that it was anti-labor and anti-democratic, were such pro-labor papers as the Finnish-language Industrialisti (Duluth) and the Slovenian-language Prosveta (Chicago). So, too, was the Lithuanian-language Draugas of Chicago. The Progresso, although it gave editorial approval to the President's proposal, published Luigi Antonini's denunciation of it as anti-labor.

In a third category, the Swedish-language Nordstjernan (New York City) in line with its undeviating anti-Administration policy, attacked the proposal while calling for an anti-strike law.

Many papers insisted in general terms on their desire for an all-out war effort of both labor and industry, but refrained from taking any definite position on the President's proposal. In effect, however, they took a stand against it by saying it was belated and pointing out that the strike situation had not thus been bettered in England or Canada, and by predicting that the measure would not be enacted by Congress. If these papers can be counted together with those in frank opposition, the weight of opinion of the foreign-language press goes over to the negative side.

Of interest is the fact that Luigi Criscuolo's semi-monthly Rubicon (prior to Pearl Harbor deemed openly pro-Fascist) warned

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- 3 -

against playing into the hands of the dictatorships with such an act, while the German-language Detroiter Abendpost said bluntly that the measure smelled of the German labor front.

A good many of the papers lauded the President's message as a whole calling it an effective program for the home front. The economic Bill of Rights was hailed in all the papers which present themselves as champions of labor.

(Foreign Nationalities Branch Memorandum)



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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
26 February 1944

TO: Colonel L. Mathewson,  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Reports Received in OSS, No. 107

Submitted herewith are some additional items received from our secret sources abroad.

Unless otherwise indicated, the items of information transmitted are reports just as received from agents, and have not been evaluated as to degree of reliability other than as stated.

  
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

Enclosures.

see final inclosure

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CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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5. "Local autonomy should be provided for, i.e., in Transylvania for the Rumanians, Hungarians and Saxons, and in the Banat 26 February 1944 for the Serbs, Rumanians and Serbs; also for the Ruthenians under Hungary and for the Sudeten Germans under the Czech state."

6. "The member states of the federation would thus  
Central Europe and Balkans:

Conservative Hungarian Opinion  
Concerning Post-War Organization.

Count Bethlen, former Hungarian Premier, who is highly influential among conservative Hungarians, has prepared an extensive memorandum on the above subject. Significant excerpts follow:

1. "There is no such thing as a Czechoslovak people. There are Czechs, and Slovaks, and Ruthenians. The Slovaks and Ruthenians, right to the end of the last war, remained faithful to the old monarchy." obtained control everywhere."
2. "There is no Yugoslav people. There are Serbs, and Croats, and Slovenes. The Serbs and Croats detest one another, and both have suffered atrociously when one of these peoples was in a position to humble the other."
3. "It would be an historical crime to try to resuscitate the old Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia. Both Serbs and Croats should be treated as independent nations, and all the Danube people should be brought together in a federation. Individual rights should be recognized and guaranteed."
4. "A division into three regions is recommended. The first, north of the Carpathians, would consist of Poland and possibly Lithuania, if Lithuania remains independent. The second would group together the Czech, Slovak, Ruthenian, Austrian, Hungarian, Transylvanian-Rumanian, Croat and Slovene peoples. The third would comprise the Balkan peoples, i.e., those who were not included in the former Dual Monarchy."

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5. "Local autonomy should be provided for, i.e., in Transylvania for the Rumanians, Hungarians and Saxons, and in the Banat for the Hungarians, Swabians, Rumanians and Serbs; also for the Ruthenians under Hungary and for the Sudeten Germans under the Czech state."
6. "The member states of the federation would thus be five or six: Austria, the Czech state, the Slovak state, Hungary, and either Croatia and Slovenia as distinct states or Croatia-Slovenia as a single unit. The federation would differ from the old Dual Monarchy in that it would not include Galicia or Ruthenia north of the Carpathians, or Bosnia-Herzegovina or Dalmatia; and its member states would be five or six instead of two."
7. "The difficulties are real, but not as formidable as people imagine who accept the current notion that the old Dual Monarchy broke up of its own accord. What actually happened was that social revolution after the last war paralyzed the forces of order, while extremist elements, supported from abroad, obtained control everywhere."
8. "No doubt the Dual Monarchy failed in that it did not give due recognition to certain nations, i.e., the Czechs and the Slovaks. But it was no remedy to set up on the Dual Monarchy's ruins a Czech power to rule 3,000,000 Germans, 2,600,000 Slovaks, 1,000,000 Magyars, and 500,000 Ruthenians."
9. "The federation would rest on a monarchical basis. It would be impossible to get agreement on a president. No Austrian or Hungarian would vote for Benes, nor would Czechs vote for Austrian or Hungarian candidates."
10. "The federal constitution should be elastic, and excessive centralization avoided. In common there need only be Foreign Affairs, Customs, and Finance. A transitional period might have to be allowed before individual tariffs disappeared. Full guarantees should be given to minorities, with an impartial federal tribunal to which states, collectivities and individuals might apply. Member states' military forces should have uniform equipment, and

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there should be periodical consultation between the staffs. Generally speaking, the federal constitution should resemble that of the British Commonwealth rather than that of the old Dual Monarchy."

11. "In order to insure an outlet to the sea, Croatia and Slovenia must be included in the federation, with guarantees of free access for the other member states. Trieste and Piume should become free ports."
12. "In Austria, if a government comes up after the war born of the elements that fought the Nazis and suffered under them, it will be favorably inclined to federation and a monarchy. In Hungary, the latter may be left to Regent Horthy. Croatia and Slovenia, if really free to make their choice, will offer no great difficulty. Trouble is always to be anticipated from the Czechs and the Transylvanian-Rumanians."

The memorandum also includes an exposition of Hungarian claims to Transylvania, a strong attack on Benes, and miscellaneous anti-Russian sentiments.

OS comment:

[This memorandum agrees entirely with what is known about the plans and ideas of Hungary's "anti-Nazi" conservatives. The attack against Benes and the suggestion of a restoration of the Hapsburgs is characteristic in that respect. It can probably be assumed that this source would have the backing of Regent Horthy for such plans.]

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 19 February)

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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26 February 1944

Italy: Italian Partisans Attacked the  
Germans near the Anzio Beachhead.

The latest issue (14 February) of AVANTI!, the clandestine paper of the Italian Socialist Party, reports that in the days immediately following the Allied landing at Nettuno, Italian partisans attacked the Germans at Albano, Anzio, Palestrina, and Velletri. The partisans, well armed and equipped, held Albano for two days and Velletri for eight hours. Only after bitter and bloody fighting were they overcome by the Germans, who arrived in overwhelming force equipped with tanks.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 24 February)

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By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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WASHINGTON, D. C.

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26 February 1944

Central Europe: Reaction to Churchill's Speech.

The OSS representative in Bern reports that Churchill's speech has aroused the greatest interest there, most attention being given, naturally, to his reference to compensating Poland at the expense of Germany for territories to be ceded to Russia in the East. While people are possibly not surprised at this plan, it was unexpected that Churchill would announce it publicly.

The general impression prevails that the Anglo-Saxons are slowly being forced to abandon their original idea of entering into no commitments until the war is over. The first breach of this policy was the Benes-Russian pact, which, it is generally assumed in Bern, must have had at least the acquiescence of the Western powers. This pact has implicitly affected the settlement to be reached in the Danube Basin. Now comes Churchill's statement, which affects the settlement of the frontiers between Germany and Poland, and which people assume to mean that East Prussia and most of Silesia will be Polish. Hence the conclusion is reached that when the time comes for a European settlement, there will no longer be a clean slate but more likely a series of commitments and alliances which will influence the future map of Europe. The question is frequently raised as to whether the United States is in full accord with the policy of Churchill's speech, or whether possibly England and Russia have gone further than the United States in their concrete plans for the future.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 24 February)

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24 February 1944


TO: Colonel L. Mathewson,  
White House Map Room

FROM: John Magruder, Brig. Gen.

SUBJECT: Reports Received in OSS, No. 106

Submitted herewith are some additional items received from our secret sources abroad.

Unless otherwise indicated, the items of information transmitted are reports just as received from agents, and have not been evaluated as to degree of reliability other than as stated.

  
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

Enclosures.

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By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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24 February 1944

Hungary: Difficulties of Withdrawing from the Axis.

On 16 February the OSS representative in Bern received the following information from an influential Hungarian:

Despite suggestions from certain quarters that Hungary should undertake to defend the Carpathians unassisted, and should resist German pressure to accept German support (motivated by the belief that this policy provided the only hope of preventing the Soviet from treating Hungary as enemy territory), Foreign Minister Ghyczy has refused to adopt such a policy. Ghyczy, according to this report, states that although Hungary would not resist British or American forces, she distrusts the USSR; and that in spite of preferring to defend the Carpathians single-handed, Hungary is not now in a position to resist Nazi forces dispatched to the Carpathians against the Red Army.

According to the informant, Ullein Reviczky, the Hungarian Minister in Stockholm, has reported to the Hungarian Foreign Office that our Minister in Stockholm had notified him officially that the only course open to Hungary was unconditional surrender. Ghyczy is said to have instructed Reviczky to reply that Hungary was in a position to be of tremendous help by assisting in the maintenance of order in the territory around the Central Danube; and that although Hungary was prepared to accept the Atlantic Charter, if she surrendered now it would mean surrender to the Soviets, to which Hungary would not agree, and that if American and British troops were on the spot the situation would be altogether different.

The source, however, considers Reviczky both unreliable and incompetent, and thinks that he may simply be attempting to exalt himself as an alleged line of contact with the United States Government.

The OSS representative is not sanguine as to the possibilities of a change in the official Hungarian position. However, a separate Finnish peace, he thinks, would have a profound effect on Hungary and there is enough hope involved to warrant the most careful scrutiny of developments.

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(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern)

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24 February 1944

Hungary: Leftists Plan no Action until Peace is Signed;  
Attitude is Characteristic of Leftists in all  
Satellite Countries.

It is reported that Socialist and Peasant Party leaders met recently at Szeged and decided not to take action until after the German defeat. This is symptomatic of the general attitude taken by the leftist elements in the satellite countries. It is partly due to the experience of the German and Austrian Socialists after the last war, when they took over the control of the government and then had to bear the opprobrium for the peace terms. Now the leftist elements plan to lie low and allow those who are responsible for taking their country into war to carry through and assume the responsibility for the peace terms imposed. Only at that point do the left-wing elements plan to step forward and assume political responsibility. The result is to lessen outward opposition to the governments in power at the present time, and possibly also to delay the disintegration of the internal front.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern)

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By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
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24 February 1944

Italy: Decline of the Neo-Fascists.

A resident from a village near Milan, who has just arrived in Bern, says that the Neo-Fascists are fast losing any popularity they ever had. In his village there is not a single Neo-Fascist. In Milan the Neo-Fascists are making desperate attempts to win over the clergy or to frighten it into collaboration, but with practically no success. The Cardinal Archbishop of Milan, Schuster, who at one time flirted with Fascism, has become soured now on Neo-Fascism, and the Catholic clergy among whom Fascist influence has been strong have now completely veered around. However, the Neo-Fascists are still dangerous, and Farinacci's round-ups are very serious. People with anti-Fascist reputations burn their identity papers and lie low, hoping for the Allies' arrival.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern)

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WASHINGTON, D. C.

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serious in view of the loss of much 24 February 1944 aircraft and bearing industries. If this figure really represents a substantial drop in machine-tool capacity, the Germany: Official UN Estimate of Bomb-Damage. plants is likely to be much slower than has heretofore been estimated. It is noteworthy that most of the loss in the aircraft, bearing and machine tool industries, supplied to the Research and Analysis Branch by the official United Nations economic research analysts, states the results of Allied attacks on the Reich from March through December of last year:

Serious damage affecting factory buildings: 140,000,000 sq. ft. (4.5 percent of estimated factories in Greater Germany)

Total serious industrial damage: 190,000,000 sq. ft.

The total industrial loss is more than 9 percent of the potential Nazi production. The most marked losses were sustained in the categories below (figures standing for the potential output affected in each category):

Anti-friction bearings	20 percent
Synthetic rubber	10 percent
Single engine fighters	17 percent
Machine tools	59 percent

The figures cover loss of production as a result of direct damage and burden of replacement and repair. Even so, they are too modest as they do not include losses from administrative disorganization and the interruption of supplies to factories not damaged. Taking this into consideration, 15 percent is probably a closer estimate of the over-all industrial loss.

Total serious non-industrial damage: 590,000,000 sq. ft.

Habitation units demolished or made uninhabitable: 1,400,000 (6 percent of the total units in Greater Germany)

The latter makes it necessary to rehouse more than 4,500,000 people in Germany.

The Europe-Africa Economic Subdivision of Research and Analysis comments on the above as follows:

These estimates of damage are based on calculations of man hours lost in various industries. They indicate that the German economy is likely to become less and less resilient. The loss of machine-tool production may be very

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serious in view of the loss of machine tools in the aircraft and bearing industries. If this figure really represents a substantial drop in machine-tool capacity, the recovery of aircraft plants and bearing plants is likely to be much slower than has heretofore been estimated. It is noteworthy that most of the loss in the aircraft, bearing and rubber industries has been due to daylight bombing but that the loss of machine-tool production is entirely due to the RAF raids on the Ruhr and other centers of machine-tool output.7

(OSS Official Dispatch, London, 21 February)

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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22 February 1944


TO: Colonel L. Mathewson,  
White House Map Room

FROM: John Magruder, Brig. Gen.

SUBJECT: Reports received in OSS, No. 105.

Submitted herewith are some additional items received from our secret sources abroad.

Unless otherwise indicated, the items of information transmitted are reports just as received from agents, and have not been evaluated as to degree of reliability other than as stated.

  
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

Enclosures.

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CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 5 1975

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## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

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CIA 006687

22 February 1944

By SE Date MAY 5 1975Europe: Appeal for Allied Use of PW.

The OSS representative in Bern suggests that the time has come to make a greater use of the weapon of political warfare in the rapidly approaching European crisis, basing his opinion upon the following views of well-informed individuals in Switzerland:

Germany cannot now win even a partial victory. The remnant left of Germany (after her bombardment, her losses in Russia, and social disintegration) cannot reorganize and rule Europe. Hitler's New Order is dead, and his only potentiality now is to keep a grip on the peoples' lives for a few more months by the SS terror. The Nazi machine has lost its ascendancy over the peoples' minds and souls. The most that Hitler can now do is to help create chaos. This fact is recognized by most of the peoples of Europe, and tacitly by the Germans themselves.

The real issue is whether constructive regenerating forces will control the fate of Europe, or whether the forces of anarchy and disintegration will prevail. This depends primarily on the policy adopted by Russia, and secondly upon the vigor, strength, and direction of the policy adopted by the United States and Great Britain. Russia, because of her military victories, and on account of the growing belief in many parts of Europe that the common man will fare better in a Europe under Russian than under Western influence, is beginning to dominate the scene. The principles of the Atlantic Charter seem to be subordinated by the Anglo-Americans to the idea of unconditional surrender, and the latter is being interpreted as meaning the acceptance also of whatever social and economic ideals the Western Powers choose to impose. These ideals have not yet been clearly indicated, and the policy adopted by the Western Powers toward Italy and France shows a disinclination to break with the past, or to cooperate with the growing tide of Leftist sentiment. The people of Europe, although they have moved far to the Left, do not want communism, but they do want a new social order, and there is a growing skepticism over the attitude of the United States and Great Britain in the achievement of this aim.

In Germany the people are becoming more and more reconciled to a Russian solution. All things seem to indicate that Hitler would sacrifice the Eastern front and turn Germany over to Russia, rather than allow the Western Powers to enter the European fortress by force of arms. This policy seems to be creating allies for him, even among people who would usually turn to the West rather than to the East.

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(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

21 February 1944

Italy: Confused Impression of US and UK Policy;  
Pro-Russian Sentiment Growing.

The following comments are included in the memorandum of a prominent and very well-informed Italian to an OSS representative in Switzerland:

"There are in Italy today two Fascist puppet governments: the neo-Fascist one in North Italy, at the orders of the Gestapo; the conservative Fascist one in South Italy, at the disposal of AMG. Anti-Fascism has not yet appeared actively on the scene and is therefore not responsible for the developments up to now. If the Italians are expected to fight efficiently against the Germans, they must have respected leaders and an honored flag. But union is impossible under the present discredited leadership, which is responsible for the Italian debacle.

"Out of the present tragedy, the first real one endured by the whole population since the fall of the Roman Empire, there will probably come some good; we may eventually acquire the dignity of a sound, democratic nation. But for some time to come, we in Italy will have to rely on some stronger power. We hope it will be the Anglo-Saxons, not only for sentimental reasons, but because we believe that their ideals and their mode of life are nearer to ours than the Russian, which, at least up till now, seems dominated by Communist ideology. But the difficulty of understanding Anglo-American policy; the growing, if unfair, feeling that the Atlantic Charter is fading out; the bombing of non-military targets in our towns; the lack of good Allied propaganda; the Russian military successes; the skill with which Stalin plays his cards to appear as the defender of liberty in Europe--these and many other factors are cooling real Italian sympathy for the Anglo-Saxons. Pro-Russian sentiment is growing. It is unfortunate, it is probably unfair, but it is a fact necessary to face. There is not much time to waste."

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern)

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By SR Date MAY 5 1975



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22 February 1944

Germany: Data on Submarines.

A German source who says that he has just escaped to Switzerland after having been imprisoned for voicing defeatist opinions, and who was last employed as an instructor of navigation at a land station, supplies the following information (rated B-3), which he claims to have obtained from his father, a high-ranking German Naval officer:

1. For a time submarines were equipped with rubber skins, but this caused more corrosion of the craft's hull underneath the skin, and made it impossible to apply paint to prevent barnacle formation; therefore the experiment was abandoned.
2. The newest trick submarine device is a small "noise torpedo". This serves as a decoy to confuse beaming apparatus and is fired in desperate situations for the purpose of misleading listening devices.
3. The fastest submarine of which our informant has knowledge has a speed of 17 knots underwater and 24 on the surface.
4. There is a new base for long-range U-boats near Bayonne.
5. The occasional destruction of plants which manufacture small but vital parts has considerably decreased U-boat production now that production is decentralized and carried on in inland factories.
6. The crews of U-boats receive only limited leave so that they will be out of touch with home front nervousness. However, they receive extra rations and other facilities and their morale on the whole is not low.
7. A 5-man U-boat is in process of development at the Krupp works.

(OSS Official Dispatch, 20 February)

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
18 February 1944

To: Colonel L. Mathewson,  
White House Map Room.

Subject: Reports received in OSS, No. 104.

Submitted herewith are some additional items received from our sources abroad and in this country.

Unless otherwise indicated, the items of information transmitted are reports just as received from agents, and have not been evaluated as to degree of reliability other than as stated.

  
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS--  
Intelligence Service

Enclosures.

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By SR Date APR 3 1975

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WASHINGTON, D. C.

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15 February 1944

Germany: Gestapo vs. the Army.

As the Wehrmacht retreats toward the German frontier, Nazi Party circles are reportedly reviewing the danger to themselves of having the German Army on their hands. Until now, the strength of the Gestapo in internal affairs has been due in part to the fact that the Wehrmacht was largely outside the country. It is anticipated by some that the SS may arrange for an incident, such as the discovery of a plot against Hitler, as an excuse to proclaim martial law under SS administration. Such a maneuver, though it could hardly increase the powers of the Gestapo, might put it in a better position to dominate the Army and would be calculated to forestall any future attempt by the Army to institute martial law under its own auspices.

(OSS Official Dispatch, via Radiophone, Bern)

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Date APR 3 1975

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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15 February 1944

SALVEMINI'S LECTURE TOUR

Three recent talks by Professor Gaetano Salvemini of Harvard University, as analyzed in FN Memorandum B-156 of 11 February 1944, serve to indicate the points this leading anti-Fascist will stress in criticism of Anglo-American Italian policy, during an extensive lecture tour on which he has embarked. Judged by the response of his recent audiences, Professor Salvemini's tour may have considerable influence on American and Italo-American opinion respecting Allied policy in Italy.

Focal point of the three lectures was Salvemini's denunciation of Allied policy in Italy since the Italian armistice and insistence on the republican sentiments of the Italian people. Referring sarcastically to "the wise men in Washington and London" and their "love affair" with King Victor Emmanuel, Salvemini approved the first resolution adopted by the six-party congress at Bari 29 January, calling for abdication of the King. In support of his conviction that a government freely chosen by Italians would be anti-monarchical, he cited the fact that in Florence a republic was spontaneously proclaimed the evening of Mussolini's downfall. It was his opinion that while Italy might bow to superior force, it would never cooperate with a "quisling" regime supported by the Anglo-Saxon Powers.

In regard to the policy of the Vatican, Salvemini distinguished between the higher clergy, who he said were working in support of Fascist elements and the monarchy, and the lower clergy, whose contact with the people put them on the side of democracy. He called, as he has in his writings, for the separation of Church and State, remarking that American statesmen have not yet understood that the Pope is powerful in Boston but not in Rome.

Discussing the personalities involved in the Italian picture, Salvemini "hoped" that Count Sforza would not collaborate in Allied plans to establish a regency. He compared the Republican leader Colonel Pacciardi to General de Gaulle. For Benedetto Croce he showed respect, and for the novelist Ignazio Silone a great admiration. Ill health might deny Silone an important role in a democratic Italy, he said, but it was the State Department which refused to allow Pacciardi to return because of his opposition to Badoglio.

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By SR Date APR 3 1975

Regraded Unclassified

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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18 February 1944

Japan: Views of Japanese Military Attachés  
on Military Situation.

According to a report which emanates from a reliable source, a conference was held last month in Budapest of all the Japanese military attachés in Europe who were able to attend. The consensus of their opinion is said to have been that the Allies would not be successful in establishing a foothold on the Continent this year, that the USSR could continue its offensive at the present rate for another twelve months, and that the breaking point for the Nazis might not occur for the same length of time. The Japanese attachés are said to have estimated a total of 26 American divisions in the European-African Theatre, of which 12 are in the Mediterranean area. They are also said to have estimated that the United States could send across four more divisions during each month of 1944.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, rated B-3)

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18 February 1944

Germany: Suggestions for Post-War  
Allied Political Policy.

The following observations are submitted by  
an experienced OSS representative in Switzerland:

In order to avoid political chaos in post-war Germany, which would facilitate the establishment of a Communist state, we should seriously consider supporting, during the first stages of the occupation, such groups as the Catholic Center and the Social Democratic Parties, as these are able and willing to cooperate in establishing a democratic regime. The German people will need sound political guidance in order to develop a democratic government after the collapse. The Nazi destruction of political machinery has been complete; the Center and the Social Democratic Parties are the only ones capable of being speedily re-formed with strength enough to give direction to the political life of the country. Yet such a policy need not mean the exclusion of any other constructive democratic forces which may develop.

It is possible that the bourgeois Center Party and the Social Democrats may discover a basis for joint action. Outstanding refugees, representing the viewpoints of the two parties, have conferred in Switzerland on various occasions, and though confronted with differences on educational problems, they were in essential agreement on the broad political outlook for Germany after the war.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, rated A-3)

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8 February 1944


MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL L. MATHEWSON,  
WHITE HOUSE MAP ROOM.

SUBJECT: Reports received in OSS, No. 102  
(Intelligence on French Resistance)

1. Transmitted herewith are five recent reports relating to various phases of the French resistance movement:

- TAB A -- A message to de Gaulle from metropolitan resistance groups.
- TAB B -- A statement, by the head of the organized Maquis resistance, of the needs of the French underground army.
- TAB C -- A statement of current British plans for increased assistance to the resistance groups.
- TAB D -- A report, by a well-placed French observer, on the political problems facing the resistance groups, and the relations of these groups with General de Gaulle and the Algiers Committee.
- TAB E -- A summary of a report, prepared by one of the most active leaders of the resistance movement, stating its practical problems and needs, both political and operational, particularly in relation to the period of invasion.

2. Unless otherwise indicated, the items of information submitted herewith are reports just as received from agents, and have not been evaluated as to degree of reliability other than as stated.

  
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

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Enclosures.

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8 February 1944

France: Message to De Gaulle from  
Metropolitan Resistance Groups.

The following is a paraphrase of a message sent from Switzerland to General de Gaulle at the end of the year by representatives of the French resistance groups:

The resistance movement in France is almost totally lacking in arms and suffers from a want of financial support. Its position is tragic. Losses amount to about 100 men per week; the Germans kill the wounded and take no prisoners. However, the groups inflict twice as many casualties on the Germans as the Germans do on them, in spite of being short of weapons.

In the southern zone MUR (Mouvement Unie de Résistance) has an effective complement in cadres of about 22,000 men. In the northern zone the complement is about 14,000. Only ten per cent of these men are armed. Half of them are located in camps and the other half are scattered about but can be mobilized in a very short time. The cadres are manned by seasoned soldiers and are strong and the morale remains very high in spite of the seeming indifference of the Allies and of Algiers.

The Maquis needs munitions and arms and money immediately. The Allies and Algiers should realize the value which the Maquis can contribute to Allied military action, thanks to the fact that the guerrillas are dispersed throughout the whole of France.

If aid is not forthcoming, the resistance groups may be reduced to murder and pillage as the result of the feeling that France has been abandoned by Algiers and by the Allies. The Allies and Algiers have incurred a serious responsibility through encouraging uprisings and by propaganda and yet have failed to furnish material assistance.

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4 February 1944

France: Needs of the Underground Army.

The following information has been received from the  
OSS representative in Madrid:

The head of organized Maquis resistance in France is en route to London via Madrid. This person states that under him are 25,000 disciplined men. His organization needs 1000 heavy grenades for tank destruction; 100,000 hand grenades; 10,000 submachine guns, preferably Sten guns, with thousands of rounds per gun; 3000 machine guns, with 1200 rounds for each gun; 15,000 rifles or long-range pistols. In order further to integrate and organize resistance groups in France, it is of the utmost importance that the BBC announce British and American support (with General de Gaulle's complete approval) of the united resistance movement. This would discourage any disintegration of the resistance into small rival sections, each claiming the backing of a different intelligence service or Allied government. He plans to talk with the Prime Minister concerning all of the above.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Madrid, 29 January 1944)

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4 February 1944

France: British Plans for Supplying  
the Maquis Resistance.

Another lift of 32 Stirlings, each with a capacity of 24 containers, plus 60 sorties to be made by unit 38, has been granted by Churchill for February to give assistance to the Maquis, especially in the Southeastern section of France. If these sorties prove successful, additional squadrons of Stirlings may possibly be provided to aid the Maquis in March.

The above British assistance, given at the instigation of the French, has no bearing on the necessity for having another squadron of Liberators to assist the chief plan. About 260 more sorties are needed to deliver the tonnage necessary to complete the endorsed operations in coordination with the chief plan. Consequently 29 more airplanes are required for a three-month period, estimating that each plane carries out three successful sorties a month.

(OSS Official Dispatch, London, 1 February 1944)

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

8 February 1944

France: The Resistance, the Parliamentarians, and Algiers.

The following is a first-hand report by a Frenchman who over a long period has proved to be remarkably accurate:

Although Vichy is dead and there is no French government in France any more, France still has administrative machinery, and certain branches have remained relatively sound. The traditions of these branches and the fact that they are highly specialized has rendered them indifferent to political directives. The police, with the exception of the militia, has not been won over to the Germans, and even among the personnel of the various prefectures, many are still resisting.

In 1943 France started separating herself from extremes and came back toward the center. The French peasant is essentially republican; hence the country has returned to the ideal of restoring the republic. Among the workers the communists exercise a great influence, but have only a limited number of active adherents; no one can say how many workers would join a communism crowned with the prestige of the Soviet victories, or, on the other hand, would remain faithful to the old C.G.T. (Confederation Generale du Travail), which was Socialist, pacifist, and anti-communist, but unfortunately has compromised itself by dealings with Vichy.

Government functionaries and the workers have been the chief victims of the occupation. Among those classes many are openly De Gaullist; some are communist. On the whole they fear and hate the hold which private interests have won over public affairs. Among certain groups of workers, violent reactions are to be feared. As soon as they are freed, they may well aid any revolution which promises to eliminate the "trusts". However, even the revolutionaries remain attached to liberty, and they would hesitate to turn over power even to a proletarian dictatorship. They want a strong state but still a free state. Before the war they were Syndicalists or Socialists, and the decadence of syndicalism and the fall of socialism have left them without political direction.

Industry and commerce have suffered much less than the above-mentioned classes. Vichy favored them, and a certain number were collaborationist. Since November 1942 the collaborationism of commerce and industry has been gradually abandoned. Business is more conservative than the peasants and farmers, and would not be frightened by a dictatorship of the Right.

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The resistance groups in France are not today purely passive instruments of Algiers policy. They really constitute a state within a state. There are rivalries, jealousies, difficulties arising out of collaboration with the communists, and sometimes an excess of terroristic acts has tended to eliminate certain good elements. Nevertheless, these groups constitute the rallying point of the resistance. Unfortunately in their daily struggle with the Gestapo there are cruel losses, and the efforts of Algiers to organize an armed resistance are insufficient.

The communists are undoubtedly powerful, and in the field of resistance and sabotage they are effective. They have suffered heavy losses, but their ranks, decimated by the Gestapo, are always filled up. They are clever, conciliatory, and more tolerant politically and religiously than other political groups. But the strength of communism in France today is really an unknown quantity, and it frightens the mass of the people. If the country were still further devastated, communism might well bring the revolution -- even if Moscow did not play along.

1943 has seen the rebirth in France of the influence of Parliament. Petain's gesture in November only reflected the advice of those around him; but the return to favor covers only those Parliamentarians who have not compromised themselves with Vichy. The ordinary Frenchman, as distinct from Algiers, does not blame the members of Parliament who abdicated in July 1940 in favor of Marshal Petain, but France does not forgive those who served the Vichy government. However, these are only a small minority. It is unfortunate for the unity of the country that Algiers found it necessary to condemn as a whole all those who voted full power to Marshal Petain. The Parliamentarians at Algiers are too little known to be taken as an expression of the popular will. With regard to De Gaulle, the heart of the country is with him in so far as he represents the struggle against the invader, but with regard to him in his capacity as President of the Algiers Committee, his acts are judged with detachment.

Today, in order to save the nation, it is essential to have an agreement between Algiers and the Parliamentarians in France. Such an agreement would greatly benefit Algiers by ending the feeling, which is now current in metropolitan France, that Algiers secretly desires to wipe out the liberties of the French people.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern)



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France: Resistance Groups and Allied Policy

The following is the summary of a report obtained by OSS from a high French official who is one of the most active leaders of the resistance movement and thoroughly informed of its practical problems and needs:

Three and a half years under German and collaborationist rule have given the French resistance movement an exact sense of its limitations. Experience has shown that a centralized mass organization is impossible. Accordingly the Resistance tends to form in autonomous groups, among which contact is maintained by circuitous and indirect methods. Each group relies primarily on the small body of men who really mean business rather than on the mass of inactive sympathizers; it is considered better to count on only a few and to be able to count on them completely.

These circumstances--a small nucleus, limited arms, decentralization of control--have obliged the Resistance to look toward guerrilla warfare, accompanied by sabotage, subversion and terrorism, as its strongest tactic of opposition. Properly coordinated with United Nations military plans, the Resistance Groups can render powerful aid at the moment of invasion.

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The problems created for the Resistance by Allied landings in France are both military and political. Let us consider the military aspects first:

1) The debarkation must be successful. Failure would mean the premature exposure and perhaps final destruction of the Resistance Groups.

2) The chiefs of the Resistance organizations, down to the small local groups, must be warned of the debarkation before it occurs. The Germans have made plans for rounding up all Frenchmen between 18 and 60 at the instant of invasion; the Town Halls of many Departments have already received posters ordering all men to appear with several days' rations. Consequently each local chief will require at least six hours advance notice of a daylight landing, or twelve hours at night, in order to get his men out of town. To save time and minimize the risk of indiscretion, warning should be given directly by broadcasting some sentence agreed on in advance.

It is indispensable to inform all chiefs that they will be warned in advance of invasion. These leaders, conscious of their responsibilities and desperately afraid of premature action, can maintain confidence only with this information. They must be told even if it is decided NOT to warn Resistance Groups. In this case they will remain inactive and thus will avoid useless risks. ~~DECLASSIFIED~~

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3) In the eventuality of a successful and rapidly exploited landing, the small nuclei of Resistance Groups will be able to mobilize an immense number of heretofore inactive supporters. It must be expected that the number of insurgents will be disappointing during the first few hours; they will be considerably higher as soon as it becomes plain that the uprising will be supported by vigorous action. The example of Corsica proves this point.

In central France, with which this report is especially concerned, the groups will take refuge in the mountainous and wooded country. When alerted, the group chief will pass the word on through squad leaders; and the men will go singly to appointed meeting places, where the group chief will distribute arms or conduct his unit to the arms depot. The groups go then to their final stations. For the first few days in the woods the only action will consist of the destruction of roads and communications, carried out by trained demolition squads (groupes francs) and railroad men. The bulk of the men will remain in hiding, completing their training, and observing where they can best support the invasion as it develops.

4) The limited number of men and arms forbids large-scale or long-sustained action. The Resistance Groups are recruited principally from city dwellers whose physical endurance has been greatly weakened by the severe restrictions of food and clothing. It is essential to remember that, though these men are capable of heroic action, they cannot maintain long and continuous physical effort.

On the other hand, they will possess important advantages in their mobility and their knowledge of the mountainous and broken terrain. Main highways and railways are rare in this area; in particular, there is no railway running north and south between the Rhone valley and the line from Clermont-Ferrand to Nîmes. All communications are easily cut, and small German garrisons exist only in isolated cities. Raids, ambushes, attacks on trains and truck convoys, destruction of ammunition and gasoline dumps, destruction of railroads and highways can be carried out unhindered from the permanent station. On the model of Russian guerrilla tactics, it is planned always to bring heavy fire power to bear on an unsuspecting enemy for a few moments, then to break off the engagement and disappear after having caused a maximum of losses in a minimum of time. The basic principle is to avoid pitched battles. Mobility is so essential that nearly a dozen men will be assigned to each automatic gun in order to maneuver it with the greatest possible speed.

When the enemy is forced to withdraw important numbers of troops in order to protect his supply lines and guard his dumps, when demolitions and road blocks and surprise attacks have made his communications precarious and his morale uncertain, the Resistance Groups will have furnished the greatest help, behind the enemy lines, which can be expected of them.

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Whatever precautions are taken, the guerrilla bands cannot long survive if the invasion front does not move rapidly toward them. It is impossible for large bodies of men to hide very long in France from an enemy which seeks systematically to root them out. Consequently the Resistance Groups should refrain from heavy action until the fighting front is no more than 100 kilometres away. It is conceivable, indeed, that those far from the front should not take to the woods until the Germans appear to be taking steps to round them up.

5) The maintenance of Resistance Groups in the brush raises a number of serious problems.

Supply. The stores built up over the past two years will be quickly used up, after which the bands must depend upon local resources and upon Allied aid. Since in many cases the peasants are likely to be hostile and unreliable, it is imperative that air-borne supplies should be planned for at the earliest possible moment.

Arms. The inadequacy of present supplies of arms and ammunition has been stressed. These also must be dropped by parachute as soon as possible after the landing.

Liaison. Contact must be established among the groups and also with the Allied Command. Each band should have at least one sending and receiving set. At present, such equipment is almost non-existent.

Uniforms. A standard uniform would give the guerrillas a feeling of security and a sense of being a part of the French liberating army.

Plans for Action. All these questions resolve to the basic question of establishing a coordinated plan for action. This plan should foresee the zone of action, the arms and ammunition requirements, the means of supply and liaison, the appointed points for parachute reception, the secret landing fields, and so on. It can be applied wisely only in terms of regions or perhaps even locally. Without it, the Resistance Groups will feel themselves abandoned and go into the struggle already persuaded of a high probability of wasted effort and useless sacrifice.

6) There are many unorganized men at present in the maquis, ranging from the best men of the Resistance to common criminals. Means have been developed to recruit the toughest and ablest among them for guerrilla action. So long as these men remain quiet, they are not bothered by the French or German police, but the question of food and supplies is becoming increasingly urgent, especially during the winter months. The Resistance Groups, who have done much to maintain them up to now, have about exhausted their facilities.

7) The Allied Command could initiate no more powerful measure both of military and moral support than sending help in the form of parachute troops. The cooperation of trained soldiers and of patriots

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intimately acquainted with the terrain has accomplished astonishing results in Russia and Yugoslavia. No action could do more to convince the Resistance of the Allied confidence in them.

8) It has so far been impossible to penetrate the Milice (Laval's Police). On the other hand, the Garde Mobile constitutes an important part of the armed force to be counted upon by the Resistance; around Vichy, for example, some instructors of the Resistance groups were actually officers in the Garde Mobile. (It is urgent that this information be regarded as extremely secret. The Germans must not be undeceived about the Garde Mobile until it is too late.) The cooperation of the Garde Mobile is likely to help change the attitude of the Gendarmerie from hesitating neutrality to active aid. The Marshal's Guard, composed largely of those who received the Croix de Guerre in 1939-40, is strongly anti-German but probably will not act until it receives orders from Pétain (which is unlikely).

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The political problems raised by the Allied landings will be perhaps more serious than the military.

The majority of French people has very greatly changed in its political views. This fact is not properly understood outside of France. It must not be expected that gratitude to the liberators will be the dominant and exclusive emotion. Only the superior men will subordinate all to the one aim of driving out the invader. The mass of the people, exasperated by years of privations and slavery, has been dreaming of nothing but individual vengeance. On the day of debarkation, personal rancors will be wiped out in blood under the cover of the struggle against the enemy and the traitors.

This contingency can only be forestalled by careful planning. It will be necessary to install immediately a strong power which will judge all crimes, even political crimes, quickly and pitilessly. This power must strike with the death penalty, if necessary, any man seeking to take justice into his own hands. (This extreme statement might not be agreed to by those in France who have not undergone during 1942-43 the severe discipline of the military Resistance Groups.)

The one legitimate aim is the liberation of France. Within the actual Resistance, internal politics have been progressively eliminated, and their revival must not be allowed to interfere with military operations. On the other hand, the Resistance will not pardon acts which, under any name whatsoever, have contributed to the weakening of France. In particular, it is hard to overstress the implacability of their feeling toward the collaborationists, even toward all men associated with Vichy. For this reason, all those holding office under Vichy, no matter how unimportant, must be immediately interned. This is all the more urgent for those who have a record of resisting the Germans in order that they may be preserved from indiscriminate vengeance.

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But these measures against individual vengeance must be accompanied as compensation by swift and summary punishment of all who symbolize for the people the cause of their suffering. For this purpose, there must be no trial. A list should be prepared, drawn up within France and not by Frenchmen outside the country, and all persons on this list must be immediately executed. Once this has been done, the others who have collaborated must be placed under arrest, though their trials should be delayed until a calmer time. When the trials are held, it must be recognized that only those who have undergone the agony of oppression can properly judge their compatriots. This program of stern official vengeance, on the one hand, stern repression of unorganized vengeance, on the other, will go far toward maintaining civil order.

The administration of liberated regions must, as far as possible, be non-political and in the hands of local groups. The failure to give the Resistance organizations the power which is due them will arouse fears that the traitors will escape; the Resistance will accordingly require the settling of accounts at once, instead of being willing to wait until the country has been completely freed.

A great deal of discretion and self-abnegation will be demanded from those who return from North Africa, for they will be looked on as people who risked little during the years of occupation. On the other hand, the prestige of General de Gaulle appears to have recovered to a considerable degree from the low point to which it fell at the height of the political squabbles in Algiers. This has been due in large measure to the belief that de Gaulle has defended French interests, without compromise or weakness, against Allied attempts to crush them. This attitude has caused the movements unanimously to consider him their leader and spokesman in the present circumstances. Their complete adherence by no means implies, however, a blanket endorsement of every particular move of de Gaulle, and even less of the Committee of National Liberation.

A foreign administration of the AMG type would outrage the already keen French sensitivity on issues of national honor. Events in North Africa and Italy have created a certain mistrust of Allied intentions, as well as a deep fear that the Allies consider France finished as a major power.

If a choice between the English and the Americans had to be made, the Resistance would probably favor the English. They are regarded as closer to Europe; they carried on the war against Germany alone and at the most difficult period. The Americans are held responsible for Allied intervention in French affairs; and American high-altitude raids seem to be carried out without regard for French lives, while the RAF raids, because they are more daring, are more successful in smashing military objectives alone.

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If it were impossible, however, to establish a French administration tolerable to all, an AMG administration might be the best solution, because it would at least unite the French and direct their discontents elsewhere.

To succeed in the struggle for liberation, the Resistance believes the following to be necessary:

- Stop all politics.
- Devote oneself entirely to action.
- Set up a coordinated plan for the Resistance organization and for liaison with the Allies.
- When the time comes, make use of these organizations and uphold them.
- Permit them later to be incorporated in the liberation army.
- Give them finally a France which is united, strong, loved and respected in the image of the France which they have brought about among themselves, under the occupation, and for which they are now risking their lives.

Addendum

ATTACKS ON LOCOMOTIVES: AIR BOMBARDMENTS

Resistance organizations have repeatedly pointed out that it is an error to attack locomotives from the air. The inevitable killing and wounding of train crews deprive the Allied Forces of the most reliable and best organized of all Frenchmen, and the material damage is out of all proportion to the risks. Reports of the National Society of French Railways indicate that locomotives attacked from the air do not remain out of use more than one week. On the other hand, almost all the locomotives that have been attacked by saboteurs, whose activity is less frequently reported, are permanently out of use.

As for air bombardments, they are often carried out without discernment or care, as if they were terror raids on a German city. The French are the first to rejoice when bombs fall on a military objective. But their anger is all the keener when Frenchmen are killed or houses destroyed uselessly, without military necessity to justify these losses. The French are angered above all when the scattering nature of the bombardment results from high altitude flight, which seems to them like a lack of courage. This reproach is addressed almost solely to American aviation.

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WASHINGTON, D. C.

5 February 1944


To: Colonel L. Mathewson,  
White House Map Room

From: John Magruder, Brig. Gen.

Subject: Reports received in Office of  
Strategic Services, No. 101

Submitted herewith are some additional items received  
from our secret sources abroad.

Unless otherwise indicated, the items of information  
submitted herewith are reports just as received from  
agents, and have not been evaluated as to degree of  
reliability other than as stated.



John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

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3 February 1944

French Morocco: Still More Disturbances.

The following information concerning the unexpected resurgence of nationalist disturbances in French Morocco is transmitted by OSS representatives in Algiers, who received it from eyewitness sources:

Constituents of the Moroccan nationalist leader, Hadj Ahmed Balaerej, demonstrated on 29 January requesting that detained nationalist leaders be freed. French officials and the Sultan answered that only German agents were jailed, and that some of them just chanced to be nationalists. 1500 to 2000 people replied by creating a disturbance in the Mechouar (the area around the Sultan's palace). The Sultan dispatched the Black Guard to put an end to the trouble. No casualties resulted. Still another small gathering came back to the French Residency with the identical request, which was refused as before. As a result of the trouble, mobile guards and police closed the native village. Clashes followed when the natives attempted to get out of the village and hold demonstrations, in which two policemen and several Arabs were killed. In Medina a French officer and civilians were stripped and thrashed. Since the morning of 29 January all French garrisons in Morocco have been alerted. Also the towns of Fez, Oujda, and Meknes had demonstrations, but there were no casualties. At the time of this report all was quiet in the south and around Marrakech and in the area administered by Glaoui Pasha. On 29 January the Sultan voiced an appeal to the people to remain calm or he would request the French to enforce order. The demonstrations at Oujda were held in sympathy for the nationalist activities in Tlemcen, authorities believe, but they are sure that German and Spanish agents instigated the disturbance.

(OSS Official Dispatches, Algiers, rated A-1)

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3 February 1944

Italy: Germans Plan to Abandon Rome?

Four signs indicate that the Nazi Command has decided to organize their resistance on the line of La Spezia-Pistoia-Rimini-Dicomano and that there will be an early exodus south of this line:

(1) German civilians were ordered to leave Italy not later than 31 January;

(2) Italian refugees are forbidden to move south of this line;

(3) The Nazis have cancelled orders given to Italian industrial firms south of this position, and all industrial machinery in these factories has been moved to Northern Italy;

(4) No attempt has been made to insure provisions for Rome and the garrison there has not been strengthened.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, rated B-3)

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3 February 1944

Hungary: Attempt to Withdraw Troops from Russia.

The following information, rated most reliable, has been received by the OSS representative in Bern from a high Hungarian official:

Szombathelyi, who is Minister of War in the Hungarian Government, has been sent to the headquarters of Adolf Hitler. The purpose of his visit is to urge that Hungarian soldiers be returned to Hungary from Russia. The argument advanced is that the Hungarians wish to defend the Carpathians themselves. No results have so far been achieved by this demarche; the prospects do not seem very hopeful.

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3 February 1944

Rumania: Maniu Appoints Outside Representative.

The following information has been received by the OSS representative in Bern from a most dependable source:

Maniu has requested a highly placed Rumanian, now in Switzerland, to act as his (Maniu's) representative outside of that country. The Rumanian, who previously served in a diplomatic position in Russia, is considered thoroughly reliable. He is anxious to leave Switzerland, and is making plans to that end. He is a realist with respect to the present situation of his country, and has been of the opinion for some time that Rumania should attempt to deal directly with Russia in spite of the possible risks involved. He believes that the contacts which he himself has made in Russia would be of great assistance in establishing direct connections with that country at the present time.

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4 February 1944

France: Status of Petain, Laval, and Darnand.

Upon Laval's return to Vichy from his conference with Sauckel and Abetz in Paris, it is reported that on 17 January there was a Cabinet meeting, presided over by the Marshal for the first time since 13 November. This goes to show, says the OSS representative in Bern, that Petain has fairly well decided that he will never resign on his own initiative, despite the indignities and pressure to which he is subjected, and the Germans appear to be happy to leave him in his post as a facade.

The extent to which Laval's power has been restricted since the appointment of Darnand is not yet clear, but it looks as though the Germans had now decided to keep him on for a while, and he too has probably decided not to force the issue and is seemingly accepting the personnel changes which the Germans have imposed upon him.

The next serious issue for Vichy France may well depend upon the ability of Darnand to make his militia, which now will operate in the north as well as the south of France, a really effective gang of terrorists. They will require careful selection, because otherwise some decent Frenchmen may infiltrate themselves into the militia; if so, it would only have the same fate as its various predecessor para-military organizations under the Vichy regime. Certainly Darnand and the Germans will try to see to it that each candidate for a place in the militia is sufficiently disreputable and unscrupulous to cooperate effectively with the German Gestapo.

(OSS Official Dispatch, via Radiophone, Bern)

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
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5 February 1944

ARAB UNION: Plans of Nuri Pasha; Policy Toward Jews.

Nuri Pasha's method of working toward an Arab union consists of making moves progressively. The first step was the inception of collaboration between Iraq and Syria, and that was followed up by collaboration with the Trans-Jordan. At the time of the Lebanese crisis, the Trans-Jordan Parliament, too, tried to gain independence for the country. The latest step is Nuri's attempt to weaken Britain's hold on Iraq by revising the treaty with the British. At the conference next spring he hopes to see established a general council of the proposed Union.

With respect to the Jews, Nuri sees that the great need of the Arab world is technicians and a literate working class. This is the first time that Nuri has acknowledged this need, R & A analysts observe. The technicians must be imported from elsewhere, just as Russia imported technicians during the six years prior to 1933. Nuri hopes to use the Jews for this purpose; not only would he built up Arab strength, but he would counter the demands of the Zionists and Jewish Revisionists by offering the Jews far more extensive territory for settlement than is available in Palestine. The Jews would be assured protection and local autonomy, and guaranteed cultural, economic, civil and religious freedom. They would be given what amounts to an industrial and manufacturing monopoly, the center of which is bound to be in Palestine.

Nuri no longer counts on French or British pledges. His goal is security for Arabs from Cairo (or even Tangier) to Basra, following the Atlantic Charter.

OSS analysts comment that this plan has certainly many important features, but one has to bear in mind that Nuri is at present declining in power. If his prestige were ascending, something might really come of it.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Baghdad, rated A-2)

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5 February 1944

Italy: Underground Activity.

A recent arrival in Bern from Rome reports that the state of mind among the working classes in and around Rome toward the Allies is excellent. Continuing acts of sabotage against the Germans are being carried out. Recently a group of students disguised themselves in stolen German uniforms and made their way into the German headquarters in Rome. There they bombed the German officers, killing several of them. Another example of underground activity is the publication in Milan, Genoa, Venice and Rome of editions of ITALIA LIBERA, the anti-Fascist paper founded by the Partito d'Azione.

The Communist party in Genoa is said to have split into Trotzkyites and Stalinists. The Stalinists have urged the Socialists to refuse to cooperate with the Trotzkyites, but under the present situation the Socialists are inclined to cooperate with both groups. The Trotzkyite group is active throughout Piedmont and Liguria, and is publishing the underground newspapers STELLA ROSSA and PROMETEO. The Stalinists' organs are L'UNITA and a well illustrated 24-page magazine called LA NOSTRA LOTTA.

(OSS Official Dispatch, via Radiophone, Bern)

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5 February 1944

France: Labor Draft to be Realized?

Sauckel recently returned to France to renew his demands for French workers to go to Germany. 150,000 workmen are to be supplied in February and a similar number in March. In addition, Sauckel demanded appropriate decrees which would enable the speedy mobilization of all males between the ages of 18 and 60 (cf. the NEW YORK TIMES, 3 February, page 10). Sauckel has also demanded a law permitting a special census of all women from 18 to 25 who are unmarried or childless. Informant says that any demand requiring French women to be sent to Germany would result in the most extreme reaction in French popular feeling.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, rated B-2)

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2 February 1944


To: Col. L. Mathewson,  
White House Map Room

From: John Magruder, Brig. Gen.

Subject: Reports received in Office of  
Strategic Services, No. 100

Submitted herewith are some additional items received  
from our secret sources abroad.

Unless otherwise indicated, the items of information  
submitted herewith are reports just as received from  
agents, and have not been evaluated as to degree of  
reliability other than as stated.

  
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

Enclosures.

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By SR Date APR 3 1975

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
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1 February 1944

The Netherlands: Dutch Political Parties Object to  
even an Interim Post-war Military  
Government.

A report from Holland says that the members of various Dutch political parties have set forth their views for post-war reconstruction in a long document which has just reached Switzerland. A reliable informant who has seen the document says it rejects in the strongest terms the idea of the setting up of any sort of a military government, even of a provisional character, after the war. It also indicates a certain distrust of the Dutch authorities in England, as having lost touch with their countrymen; and some apprehension is expressed about the younger elements in the Army, whose patriotism is not questioned but whom the Dutch at home do not want to see in positions of authority after the war.

(OSS Official Dispatch, via Radiophone, Bern)

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1 February 1944

Mecca: Arab World Shaken by Incident.

An incident of recent occurrence in Mecca bids fair to fan "denominational" antipathies in the Moslem world and, in areas where Shia and Sunnite Moslems live in numbers approximately equal (as in Iraq), may lead to serious trouble.

In the course of going through the ceremonies of the Kaaba (the sacred Black Stone in the holy enclosure at Mecca), a youthful Shia pilgrim of Iran vomited, thus contaminating the holy marble pavement. The Shia Moslems declare that this profanation was involuntary, while the Sunnites, on the other hand, say that this was done on purpose. Whatever the youth's intentions may have been, he was arrested, quickly judged by a court of ulema, pronounced guilty and beheaded by command of Ibn Saud. Ibn Saud has been sent a formal letter of protest from Kerbala via the Persian Government and there are demonstrations in Kerbala and Najaf (places of pilgrimage in Iraq for all Shia Moslems). The Shia clergy are threatening to issue a Fatwa (decree) forbidding any Shia from making a pilgrimage to Mecca while Ibn Saud rules the Hejaz, in the event that suitable retribution is not forthcoming.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Baghdad, rated A-2. The antagonism between the Shia Moslems and Sunni Moslems is very strong, with both sects being represented in Iraq, while in Iran the Shias are in predominance. Ibn Saud, who is a member of the Wahabi (the most puritanical group of all the Sunnites), considers the Shias as being practically infidels. The incident may have far-reaching repercussions, OSS analysts believe, probably showing up first in Iraq.)

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
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1 February 1944

Switzerland:    Potential Embarrassment Caused by  
                    Action of an Italian Enclave.

On 28 January, Campione, the Italian enclave which (with an area of almost exactly one square mile and a population of about 600) borders entirely on Switzerland and the Swiss portion of Lake Lugano, declared itself pro-Badoglio and ejected the neo-Fascist representatives. The situation is very delicate, especially for the Swiss. The Germans and neo-Fascists, it is believed, will urge the Swiss to grant them permission to dispatch a detachment for taking over Campione. However, since only the King's Government is recognized by Switzerland, Badoglio should have the right to dispatch officials to Campione. Campione's Provisional Committee has meanwhile proclaimed itself as coming under the control of a Royal Italian Legation Extraordinary Commissioner. It may be that the Swiss will feel that to avoid embarrassing precedents they will themselves have to assume the administration of Campione temporarily.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, rated A-3)

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2 February 1944

Germany: An Appraisal of Stiffening Morale.

German morale appears to have stiffened surprisingly over the last two or three months. The OSS representative in Bern attributes this to rather subtle causes, among which the following seem to be important:

1. Mass opinion in Germany is less afraid of Russia than formerly. This is partly because the German withdrawal has been carried out with small advertised losses; partly because it is believed that the German war potential will increase relatively to the Russian as the front moves westward; and partly because the recent rift in Anglo-American-Russian relations has revived the hope of a possible arrangement with Russia once Russia has reached its 1939 frontiers. Also certain strata of Germans have become more radical as a result of war weariness and bombing, and look on Russian successes as bringing an earlier end of the war and the complete socialization of Germany.

2. German opinion, other than this radical element, has become somewhat reconciled to fighting a war of survival. Goebbels has a considerable following for his position that the only course is to dig in and gamble on the breakdown of the Allied coalition.

3. Germany survived the fall of Mussolini, the loss of Africa and Sicily, the recapture of Kharkov and the destruction of Hamburg. The period from the end of July to October was the lowest that German morale has touched. But since neither the Anglo-Saxons nor the Russians were strong enough to force through a decision then, the Germans now hope that opportunities lost may not come to us again. In any event, this winter has been so far relatively less disastrous than last.

4. The Germans are now convinced that the Tehran conference was not a complete success, that there is no real understanding between the West and Russia.

5. The bombings have so far failed to break German civilian morale. In general the bombed-out people seem to become fanatical; probably the majority feel that since they have lost everything, they might as well fight on to the bitter end.

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6. Gestapo repressive measures, doubly ruthless during recent months, have made it very difficult for people to grumble, and have thus raised a barrier against waves of depression.

7. The Anglo-Saxons have done little in recent months to undermine German morale by presenting any alternative to a stubborn carry-on of the fight. Not many Germans are ready to risk their lives to bring about an unconditional surrender to the Anglo-Saxons, which they fear may only mean a Russian occupation. Hence there has been little underground activity; such activity as exists is rather Leftist and pro-Russian than pro-Anglo-Saxon.

8. The morale of the fighting forces, particularly of the younger Nazis, appears to be unimpaired. The possible exceptions to this are the troops long quartered in occupied territory. In any event, the home front feels that the fighting morale is largely unimpaired.

These factors help to explain why German morale has somewhat recovered from the tailspin it took last autumn. However, the foundation of German morale is a very shaky one. The equilibrium is unstable. Morale is largely kept in hand by terror and Gestapo methods. When Germany cracks, it will probably come suddenly without much forewarning. It might be fair to say that Germany has impetus without morale. It is a machine rather than an aggregate of normal human beings. When the efficiency of the machine is reduced below a certain point, the crack will come, both on the fighting and on the home front.

(OSS Official Dispatch, via Radiophone, Bern)

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29 January 1944


TO: Col. L. Mathewson,  
White House Map Room

FROM: John Magruder, Brig. Gen.

SUBJECT: Reports received in Office of  
Strategic Services, No. 99

Submitted herewith are some additional items  
received from our secret sources abroad.

Unless otherwise indicated, the items of  
information submitted herewith are reports just as  
received from agents, and have not been evaluated as  
to degree of reliability other than as stated.

  
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS -- Intelligence Service

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By SR Date APR 3 1975

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

YUGOSLAVIA: Political Thinking among Yugoslavs  
In the United States.

1. Ivan Subasich, exiled Ban (Governor) of Croatia, and Sava Kosanovich, Yugoslavian Minister of State in retirement, ascribe Partisan growth in the field of political leadership to the shortcomings of Yugoslav leadership abroad. Ban Subasich, politically middle-of-the-road, is an almost religiously fervent follower of Machek and the Croatian Peasant Party; Kosanovich is liberal-left. Both men are inclined to see the Tito movement as a Yugoslav phenomenon, not primarily a Communist or Soviet Russian creation.

Subasich is disturbed by fears that Tito's movement has perhaps overtaken the Croatian Peasant Party and may replace the party as a democratic political force in Croatia. Even Kosanovich, who is less reserved than Subasich in approval of Tito's Government of National Liberation, does not believe that the Partisans can or should be recognized diplomatically by the Allies, though he and Subasich are convinced that the Purich Government should be removed. Kosanovich, a Serb from Croatia, cannot see how Tito, a Croat, can successfully head a Yugoslav government.

2. Two men who were successively in charge of the now defunct Royal Yugoslav Information Center in New York, Bogdan Radica and Stoyan Gavrilovich, have declined to accept new assignments offered them. Their salaries have been stopped. Yugoslav information work in New York has been taken over by Miloye M. Sokich, who went to school with Mihailovich. Sokich greatly admires and trusts Mihailovich. He regards the Partisans as purely a Communist movement.

3. Stoyan Gavrilovich, a Yugoslav career diplomat who describes himself as pro-British, appears to hold much the same views as Subasich and Kosanovich. He describes the Purich Government as "a stench in the nostrils of honest men", and Ambassador Fotich as "an evil genius who has brought Yugoslavian affairs to their present sad state."

Gavrilovich believes Yugoslav leadership has failed to solve the historic problem facing it: to further domestic change toward democracy in all its forms -- Gavrilovich does

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not call it revolution -- and at the same time preserve the Yugoslav state as a sovereign personality. To this coldly intellectual servant of the Foreign Office, Russia currently appears to offer the practical solution.

Gavrilovich's faith in Russia clearly does not stem from any conviction of good intentions on the part of the government at Moscow. In his opinion Soviet long-term aims include: (1) complete security for Russia's frontiers; (2) a sympathetic political climate in Europe which would bolster that security; and (3) extensive national expansion.

4. The Serbian-American nationalists have their headquarters at Pittsburgh. Led by mistrust of Serbo-Croatian cooperation and by nationalistic fervor to promote the idea of a post-war Greater Serbia, they feel strongly that the British have betrayed Mihailovich.

The problem of the moment in the Balkans can be understood most clearly, they say, in terms of British-Russian rivalry -- with the United States a pawn being "played" by Britain. The Serbs remember their experience under the Turks and consequently consider themselves adept at political maneuvers. According to their Pittsburgh spokesmen, these Serbs will not permit Serbia again to be made "a puppet in power politics". As a last resort they will enter "in despair" the camp of the Soviets. This possibility they describe as their "reserve political line".

(OSS Foreign Nationalities Branch Memorandum, 22 January 1944)

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By SR Date APR 3 1975



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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

German Propaganda For the Troops in the West

Confronted with the fact that the German units fighting in the East have a much higher morale than those engaged in the task of occupying the Low Countries and France, German propaganda has devised new lines for the troops in the West. Submarine warfare and the secret weapon are no longer emphasized; instead, the soldiers in France are now being told that Russia will halt her advance when she reaches the Polish frontier established after the partition in 1939. Then all the Germans will have to do will be to handle the Anglo-Saxons. Viewed from this angle, each advance which the Russians make can be presented as hastening the day when the war will come to an end, not because Germany will be defeated, but because Germany then will no longer have Russia as an antagonist and can then deal with the Western powers practically free of Russian menace.

A second propaganda line is to present Russia as imperialistic but not anti-German or pro-Anglo-Saxon; this is done by emphasizing Russian interests in the Balkans and other non-German areas. Then, with the aid of playing up alleged difficulties between the Anglo-Saxons and the Russians (such as the PRAVDA story and the Polish question), the propagandists hint at the possibility that when Russia gets into the Balkans and back to her 1939 frontier, the attitude of the British will be very different. Then, rather than fight the Germans, the English will be quite glad to work with them to keep Russia within limits. They talk about a German-French-Italian bloc which England may well see fit to join to resist the Russian menace. They talk of a solid group to resist Russia on the one hand and the US on the other. It is hardly surprising, then, that the common soldier of the German occupational forces in France reaches the conclusion that maybe there is some way out if they hang on long enough.

(OSS Official Dispatch via Radiophone, Bern)

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

ITALY: Countess Ciano's Story

The following is a summary of what Countess Ciano is reported to have stated privately since her arrival in Switzerland. The OSS representative in Bern believes it to be accurate:

After Mussolini's fall, the Cianos decided to take refuge in Germany and travelled across Italy incognito. Life in Germany, however, was not agreeable, and they found themselves "in a mousetrap." Later the neo-Fascists through Farinacci demanded Ciano's extradition, and the Germans turned him over. Edda was able to return to Italy after her father's liberation, was taken into the home of Marquis Bucci, and lived with him near Verona. Meanwhile she arranged to send her sons to Switzerland, where they arrived on 12 December.

Edda intervened with her father on behalf of her husband, but Mussolini answered that he could do nothing. He said that his authority was absolutely zero, his state of health did not permit him to do any work, and the affairs of the neo-Fascist government were entirely in the hands of Pavolini and Farinacci. With the latter, too, Edda tried to intervene, but he would not even see her, declaring that Ciano was a criminal and, if the tribunal condemned him, he would have him shot. The Germans, also refused to do anything on Ciano's behalf, stating that it was a domestic Italian affair and was in the hands of the neo-Fascists. When, however, Edda learned from her father, who was then closely guarded by the Germans and the Fascists, that she had to draw her own conclusions about what was going to happen, she prepared for flight. Passing as Bucci's wife, she was not recognized at the frontier.

The following are reportedly Edda's comments about the Italian political situation: Everything is cracking up, she says, and the neo-Fascist party has had no success. Mussolini is convinced that everything is over and that nothing more is to be done. He is a prisoner of the Germans and of the neo-Fascists, and the latter have no love for him. His authority is dead. He is without strength, sad, sick, and eaten by bitterness at finding himself abandoned even by his closest friends. Edda is reported to have said that her only desire

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is to be quiet, to avoid any political activity, and to remain with her children (and Marquis Bucci). She is supposed to be well provided with funds.

(OSS Official Dispatch, via radiophone, Bern)

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
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27 January 1944


TO: Col. L. Mathewson,  
White House Map Room

FROM: John Magruder, Brig. Gen.

SUBJECT: Reports received in Office of  
Strategic Services, No. 98

Submitted herewith are some additional items received from our secret sources abroad.

Unless otherwise indicated, the items of information submitted herewith are reports just as received from agents, and have not been evaluated as to degree of reliability other than as stated.

  
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

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By SR Date APR 3 1975

203(12)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

27 January 1944

France: German Policy; the Status of Pétain.

The following observations are those of a person intimately acquainted with present conditions in France:

French disappointment because the invasion -- which they confidently expected in 1943 -- did not come, has been more directed against the British than the Americans because they feel that the BBC held out unfulfilled hopes and was instrumental in sending their sons needlessly to the "maquis". Russian prestige is of course great among the French.

Among the police probably only the Militia, largely hired brigands, can be counted upon to work with the Gestapo, but those two organizations are sufficient to cause a general reign of terror. For example, Bousquet, the natural son of Maurice Sarraut, although then head of the police, was unable to protect Sarraut from assassination, presumably by the Militia.

The Germans now have three policies in France: (1) that of the Army, whose only interest is in maintaining order; it is content to keep Marshal Pétain; (2) the Himmler policy, which wants to introduce a Gauleiter, probably de Brinon, with Bridoux; and (3) the Ribbentrop-Abetz policy, which wants to keep the Marshal and Laval, but without their having any power. In his famous 13-page letter of 4 December to Pétain, Ribbentrop said that Germany had learned with great indignation of Pétain's idea of reinstating the National Assembly; that this was the very body which had declared war on Germany; Germany would take adequate measures to prevent any such reinstatement. Further, Ribbentrop demanded that the Marshal return immediately to the Montoire policy, and that he appoint collaborationist ministers and dismiss certain functionaries. Finally Ribbentrop demanded a policy of great "social justice". Informant thinks the Germans are playing the radical line, and trying to show up the Marshal as favoring the trusts and as a reactionary. The Marshal replied that he considered his November Decree regarding the National Assembly as valid, and would not change a word of it; that he would consider possible cabinet changes. Informant says that the Marshal's decree is considered of real importance in France, and that its possible value for the future has been overlooked abroad. The French are a very legalistic people. The Marshal's decree provides a way for a legal succession. This one day might help to save France from civil war.

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APR 3 1975

As to the Marshal himself, there are two or three hours a day when he is entirely lucid and competent. He knows his limitations, and with many people makes no effort; hence many misleading stories have spread that he has become feeble-minded. He now has only one obsession: that is the fear of history. He feels that his decree gives him a way out, and he will stick to it. His friends say that he no longer criticizes de Gaulle, talks with affection of Giraud, and with very great feeling of General Georges. He still persists in believing that the Germans will not dare turn him out. There is less hostility in the country toward him than before November, largely due to his decree. People in France now say that he realizes that he made a mistake, and recognizes the necessity of returning to a republican form of government.

The one pervading feeling in France today is against having any sort of fascist or dictatorial government. Their apprehension about the Algiers Committee is that it wants to impose a dictatorial form of government on France. Statements from Algiers about shooting or imprisoning the parliamentarians and rumors that it had suspended the General Council in Corsica [which it did by decree on 4 December], have harmed the Committee in France. General de Gaulle's prestige is far greater than that of the Committee. Distrust of the FCNL has greatly increased due to the reception given in Algiers to Marty and Thorez [evidently an erroneous rumor in France, since Thorez is not known to be in Algiers], who are considered Communist traitors. The French have no objection to Communists, as such, however, and the French Communists are taking a relatively reasonable point of view, emphasizing that they are against anarchy but want to play a part in any new government.

In conclusion, informant suggests that the only way he could see of saving France from a bloody revolution after the victory would be to save de Gaulle from his surroundings so that the moral value which he represents for France may be capitalized; and that he must in some way be brought together with the National Assembly [i.e., of Pétain], which for France represents both legality and freedom from dictatorship.

(OSS Official Dispatch, via Radiophone, Bern)

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27 January 1944

Czechoslovakia: Opinions, and Potential of Resistance.

According to an observer who has recently visited Prague, Benes' stock has gone up greatly since his visit to Moscow and the conclusion of the treaty. It is currently said that Benes had the support of only about 20 percent of the population before that; now, however, he may have the support of about half the country, excluding Slovakia. Communism has taken a new lease of life in Bohemia, and is strongly pro-Benes. Bohemia, however, is almost devoid of leaders who are actually in the country.

[OSS analysts comment that the figures on Benes' following are probably somewhat underrated; they may be anywhere between the 50 percent claimed by the report and the 90 percent which are claimed by the Government-in-exile. It also makes a difference whether one differentiates between those who approve of his international policy and those who are his personal followers, and whether one takes cognizance in the computation of the 20 percent pre-1939 German minority. It is unlikely that the underground is as weak as described above; long before 1914 the Czechs had an extended tradition of underground activity. Furthermore, the Government in London claims to be constantly in contact with the leaders of the underground. These leaders claim that the administration of the country can be taken over by them at a moment's notice, when the time comes.]

(OSS Official Dispatch, via Radiophone, Bern)

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
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26 January 1944


TO: Col. L. Mathewson,  
White House Map Room

FROM: John Magruder, Brig. Gen.

SUBJECT: Reports received in Office of  
Strategic Services, No. 97

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John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

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By SR Date APR 3 1975

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

24 January 1944

France: Preparation for Invasion;  
Decline of Laval.

Public and private reports from France indicate that in preparation for the threatened invasion, the purge of Pétain's entourage is gathering speed, and that the Marshal is increasingly isolated. Vichy, which for many months has been a dead city, has been enlivened by the arrival of members of the militia, who fill the streets and cafés. Laval, who has lost control of the militia and failed in his attempt to dissolve the organization (which the Germans consider a valuable addition to the Gestapo), has had Darnand foisted upon him as its commander. Laval tried to neutralize Darnand by surrounding him with two of his confidence men, Lemoine and Parmentier, but Darnand now has the power and the troops and is escaping from Laval's influence. The Germans are also pressing Laval to take Déat into the government as minister in charge of resistance to terrorism and to any invasion attempt. It is generally thought that Laval may have to relinquish his position to a government consisting of Darnand, Doriot, Déat, and De Brinon, already referred to as the Government of the Four D's.

(OSS Official Dispatch, via Radiophone, Bern)

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By CIA 006687  
SC Date APR 3 1975



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

26 January 1944

France: The Radical Party.

The following report on the French political situation is rated A-2:

Although plans for rebuilding the Radical Party were gravely affected by Maurice Sarraut's death, attempts are being made to keep going. A manifesto, which will be publicized via Geneva, is being prepared by a committee of four, one of whom is Laurent-Eynac. Its main features are: (1) a statement of regret regarding the policy adopted by Algiers toward the Parliamentarians and of hope that this policy will be revised, to allow an agreement to be reached; (2) agreement with the resistance groups and reaffirmation of the policy of resistance; (3) denouncement of the policy of collaboration, and finally (4), a statement in favor of getting rid of any Parliamentarians who have accepted positions in the Vichy Government.

Resistance groups have made every effort to persuade the Radical Socialists not to commit themselves to a policy which would exclude the Communists. The Radical Socialists have contacted the Communists very discreetly, and the latter seem to take a reasonable attitude, declaring that they are interested only in having a hand in the government and do not desire a revolution.

(Maurice Sarraut (b. 1869), who was assassinated on 2 December 1943, was one of the leaders of the Radical Socialist Party and the director of the very influential DEPECHE DE TOULOUSE. Laurent-Eynac, who became a deputy in 1914 and was elected a senator in 1935, served in the air force in World War I and in 1928 was the creator of the Air Ministry in the French Government. At the time of the collapse he was Undersecretary of Air in the Reynaud Cabinet.)

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern)

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By SR Date APR 3 1975

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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26 January 1944

Austria: Manpower Shortage Prevents  
Underground Activity.

Austrian manpower has been sacrificed in this war much more heavily than in World War I; there are few people left in Austria to engage in underground activity. All men are drafted for the army as soon as they become of military age, and even the women are put to work in surroundings where they have little opportunity of starting subversive activities. The only circles left to initiate such movements are composed of elderly, more or less broken, men and women, who have neither the physical nor the moral stamina required for such activity. For these reasons the Moscow Declaration that Austria was expected to cooperate actively in liberating itself seemed unrealistic to the Austrians themselves; they are not in a position to do anything effective at the moment.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern. OSS analysts in Washington concur with the judgment of the OSS representative in Bern that this first-hand report, from a source recently in Vienna, is a little over-drawn but nevertheless substantially true.)

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By SR Date APR 3 1975

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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22 January 1944

TO: Col. L. Mathewson,  
White House Map Room

FROM: Col. J. R. Forgan

SUBJECT: Reports received in Office of  
Strategic Services, No. 96

Submitted herewith are some additional items received from our secret sources abroad.

Unless otherwise indicated, the items of information submitted herewith are reports just as received from agents, and have not been evaluated as to degree of reliability other than as stated.

*J. R. Forgan*  
Colonel J. R. Forgan, G.S.C.  
Acting Deputy Director, OSS--  
Intelligence Service

Enclosures.

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CIA 006687

By SR Date APR 3 1975

203(12)



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

19 January 1944

France: Conditions and Morale in the Vendée.

*Dept. in France  
40 mi S. of Nantes*

An informant, who has recently been in the Vendée, reports that Allied bombardments of large cities in that region, which have seemed useless to the population, have affected public opinion adversely. In 1942 and the early part of 1943 the people had great hopes of the Allies; now they have become more skeptical. However, they still hope for the invasion and are willing to accept the risks it involves. There is admiration for the Russians, but Communists are scarce in this part of France. The bourgeoisie, in spite of their anti-German fears, are apprehensive of bloody internal social troubles with the Communists after the war.

Pétain, says the informant, continues to enjoy high prestige in the Vendée, combined with a little respect and much pity. Laval is universally detested as a traitor. De Gaulle is greatly admired as a symbol of resistance, but the addition to the Algiers Committee of such personalities as Marty and Cot has made a bad impression.\* Giraud also has great prestige and the population seems ignorant of his decreased power. There has been little serious trouble with the occupying troops. The Germans are detested, there is no collaboration with them, but they are not provoked. On their side, they have been correct. There have been no executions and no mass deportations. Despite heavy requisitions of the occupying force, the food situation is still reasonably good.

The OSS representative in Bern comments that this report differs considerably from the more familiar descriptions of opinion in urban France.

(OSS Official Dispatch, via Radiophone, Bern)

- \* OSS has frequently received reports indicating that the French have been misled into supposing that the Communists like Marty have positions on the FCNL. Marty and Cot are actually members of the Consultative Assembly.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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22 January 1944

Germany: Post-war Organization of Labor.

It is estimated in a report by German labor leaders and Socialists in Bern that from 30,000 to 50,000 former trade union functionaries between the ages of 40 and 60 will be available in Germany after the war as a skeleton force to rebuild labor organizations. As to the higher union officials, while many have been disposed of by the Nazis, a few leaders of outstanding political experience and ability will remain. Some of them are elderly, but they command considerable prestige among the masses of former union members. In addition, there are a number of experienced German trade union leaders abroad who might be useful.

German labor leaders in Bern who prepared this report believe that for a short period of transition the Deutsche Arbeitsfront should not be dissolved, as was previously recommended. Immediate dissolution would tend to increase the chaos in Germany, which is expected to be serious in any case. The resulting millions of non-organized workers would constitute a serious threat to political stability. Non-organized labor in Germany in the past has proved particularly susceptible to being led into political adventures. The Nazis, for example, drew considerable support from non-organized labor, but found breaking into the ranks of the labor unions a very difficult matter.

Temporary maintenance of the DAF under new democratic leadership would also provide an organization through which the occupying forces could reach millions of manual workers throughout Germany. As soon as conditions have become somewhat stabilized the present obligatory membership in the DAF should be abolished to permit labor to organize according to its own wishes. Meanwhile, the heads of the DAF should be replaced immediately by experienced former trade union leaders, and the rank and file of minor functionaries should be changed as quickly as feasible. It should be kept in mind, the report concludes, that the millions of former Socialist and Christian trade union members represent perhaps the only compact section of the German population which opposed Nazism and was fundamentally pacifist in its outlook. It represents a most important body on which to rebuild a democratic, peaceful Germany in the post-war period.

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The OSS representative in Bern comments that the Chief difference between this and his earlier report is one of emphasis rather than substance. The earlier report stressed the necessity of abolishing the DAF immediately; the present report, which is from older and more experienced men, recognizes the difficulty of immediate dissolution of the DAF, and believes that temporary retention of the old machinery under new leaders would be preferable.

(OSS Official Dispatch, via Radiophone, Bern)



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

19 January 1944

Austria: Reaction to Moscow Declaration;  
Resistance Weak and Bewildered.

The Moscow Declaration regarding an independent Austria has had no very profound effect within the country. Left-wing Austrians (Communists and radical Socialists) are not sure they would not prefer to be part of a large, left-oriented Germany, while the liberal and Catholic groups, who otherwise would probably wish to be free of Germany, are not very interested in reverting to an Austria within its post-1919 boundaries. As one Austrian put it, "We are not ready to fight and die so that Austria may be a province of either Russia or Czechoslovakia."

An informant who was in Vienna a few weeks ago reports that there is almost complete bewilderment among the people as to what they can do to get out of the trap in which they find themselves. Nostalgia for the good old days under the monarchy, fear of Communism, hope for a speedy end to the war, and a desire to escape the war's consequences are combined with widespread distrust of the Allies' intentions. Even the most determined opponents of the Nazis feel that for more than twenty years Austria was delivered over to Czechoslovakia and the Little Entente, that this drove Austria into the arms of Germany and helped cause the war; they are now discouraged by the apparent lack of any clear indication of Allied post-war policy. There is almost complete ignorance of the world military and political developments; the underground paper, DER FREIE OESTERREICH, is good, but very few copies get circulated. It must also be remembered, says the informant, that the majority of workers and intellectuals have very little resistance (Nervenkraft) left, though the peasants are in somewhat better shape. Finally, the vast reign of terror makes almost impossible any resistance within the country.

(OSS Official Dispatch, via Radiophone, Bern)

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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**SECRET**

18 January 1944

TO: Col. L. Mathewson,  
White House Map Room

FROM: John Magruder, Brig. Gen.

SUBJECT: Reports received in Office of  
Strategic Services, No. 95

Submitted herewith are some additional items received  
from our secret sources abroad.

Unless otherwise indicated, the items of information  
submitted herewith are reports just as received from  
agents, and have not been evaluated as to degree of  
reliability other than as stated.

*John Magruder*  
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

95

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CIA 006687

By SR Date APR 3 1975

203(14)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

**SECRET**

15 January 1944

France: Underground Papers Suspicious of United States Intentions toward Russia and France.

U. S. standing remains low among French clandestine papers, and stories still circulate about U. S. plans to collaborate with the Germans against Russia. In a recent mimeographed bulletin, which is circulated among leaders of the resistance movement, there is a story, which the bulletin says is current in big business circles, about alleged conversations in Lisbon between Americans and Germans. The Germans were supposed to have arranged with the Americans to liquidate the Nazis, and then the Germans and the Americans would plan to make common cause against Russia. The national revolution in France was meanwhile to be kept down with the aid of the Petainists.

(OSS Official Dispatch, via Radiophone, Bern)

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By SR Date APR 3 1975

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
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15 January 1944

Poland: Jan Kwapinski (Polish Deputy Premier)  
on Ukrainian-Polish Relations.

During his recent visit to the U. S. the Polish Deputy Premier, Jan Kwapinski, was interviewed on Ukrainian-Polish relations by Vladimir Levitsky, editor of the Social-Democratic HROMODSKY HOLOS.

To a question about the official Polish position toward future Polish-Ukrainian relations, Kwapinski revealed that Polish Government emissaries are conducting negotiations with Ukrainians in Lwow. He outlined the offer submitted, including three points: (1) a promise of local and provincial autonomy in cultural and economic matters; (2) creation of a Ukrainian university in Lwow; (3) greater concessions in administrative status. Kwapinski asserted that favorable progress was being made in these negotiations. He stated without qualification that the sentiments of Ukrainians in Polish territories were decidedly anti-Soviet and pro-Polish. He recounted personal experiences in Eastern Galicia, where he had been in hiding during eight months of Soviet occupation, and represented the situation as unbearable not only for Poles but also for Ukrainians.

He said that annexation of the Western Ukrainian areas by the Soviets would lead to the annihilation of the Ukrainian nation. This, he suggested, was the intention behind the Kremlin's demand for these territories. They would resettle all Ukrainians in Siberia, he said, and fill the gap with Russians. The Soviet Government, he declared, would compromise on territorial issues if the Poles were willing to hand over the entire Ukrainian population. But if these territories were left intact in the Poland to come, he argued, the Soviets would fear that the Ukrainians could establish "their Piedmont" there.

Kwapinski said that he and other Polish Cabinet members were willing to settle the question by a plebiscite and that during the voting neither the Polish nor the Red Army should be present on the disputed territories. The occupying force should be neutral -- Swedish or Turkish, for example. In conclusion, he suggested that Washington and London should use their influence with the Soviet Union for acceptance of this solution.

(OSS Foreign Nationalities Branch Memorandum, 8 January 1944)

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WASHINGTON, D. C.

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18 January 1944

Zionism in the U. S.: Jewish Commonwealth Issue, etc.

The advocates of an uncompromising program, who came into control of the Zionist movement in the U. S. at the American Jewish Conference last September, are now pressing plans for a wide campaign to range public opinion behind their demand for the establishment of a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine. Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, Chairman of the American Zionist Emergency Council, has come to believe that mere opposition to the British White Paper (which decreed an end to Jewish immigration to Palestine after 31 March 1944) might give the impression that official Zionist organizations would be content if the terms of the White Paper were abrogated. The many non-Zionists and anti-Zionists who had joined Zionist committees simply in order to oppose the White Paper are to be asked to resign if they cannot also go along wholeheartedly on the Commonwealth issue.

The decision to concentrate on this issue, which has not yet been made public and to which large groups of the U. S. Jewish community are vigorously opposed, is apparently connected with rumors that Dr. Chaim Weizmann, head of the World Zionist Organization, has been assured in London that either the White Paper will be withdrawn or that some way will be found to vitiate it before it becomes operative on 31 March. It is reported in American Zionist circles that Weizmann had a satisfactory conversation with Churchill (arranged by Smuts, a consistent and militant friend of Zionism) before Churchill left for Cairo and Tehran.

Nevertheless, a new plan, which the Zionists oppose (and which the British Colonial Office denies), to partition Palestine into a Jewish, an Arab, and a "neutral" zone is believed by American Zionists to be under consideration.

(OSS, Foreign Nationalities Branch Memorandum, 13 Jan.)

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
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

13 January 1944

TO: Col. L. Mathewson, White House Map Room  
FROM: John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
SUBJECT: Reports received in Office of  
Strategic Services, No. 94

Submitted herewith are some additional items received from our secret sources abroad.

Unless otherwise indicated, the items of information submitted herewith are reports just as received from agents, and have not been evaluated as to degree of reliability other than as stated.

  
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

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By SR Date APR 3 1975

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

12 January 1944

Germany: Suggested Policy During the Allied Occupation.

A person who is very familiar with conditions in Germany suggests the importance of choosing an outstanding Allied civilian as the supreme Allied representative there after the country is occupied. He believes complete military occupation essential, but feels that it would have an important psychological effect if the supreme Allied authority were civilian rather than military. Since the German people are used to military domination, the symbolic change might help, he feels, toward re-educating the country.

The same informant also emphasizes the vital importance of choosing, for such administrative posts as are to be filled by Germans, persons who are known never to have compromised with the Nazis. He says that such men exist in every community in Germany, in every government office, and in every factory; and that the local people in Germany know who they are. He suggests that the occupying authorities start by choosing from various parts of the country twenty representative Germans whose reputations are above question. These men would serve as a panel to advise the military authorities, on the basis of local information, as to the persons who could be trusted. Informant says nothing would do more to discredit a military occupation than to have the occupation authorities innocently make use of ex-Nazis who, after the defeat, will flock around in great numbers and protest their innocence. It would be almost impossible for the military authorities to separate the sheep from the goats: only people who have lived in Germany during the last ten years could do this.

Informant thinks the Deutsche Arbeits Front (DAF) should be completely discarded, since in essence it is merely a vast Nazi Party organization to raise money for party purposes at the expense of the workers. He feels that trained labor leaders could be found, some outside of Germany -- in the United States, England, Switzerland, and Sweden, for example -- who might be willing to go to Germany and help reorganize the labor organization, working with old comrades in Germany.

(OSS Official Dispatch, via Radiophone, Bern)

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By SR Date APR 3 1975

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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11 January 1944

Austria: Objectives of Austrian  
Committee in Algiers.

The Secretary General of the three-man Austrian Committee in Algiers, founded at the beginning of November 1943, declares that the Committee is non-political. (Very likely, says the source, it is anti-monarchist.) Its first objective, which the FCNL is currently considering, is to be permitted to represent local Austrians as individuals (but not collectively). Its second and major objective is to organize special military units from the Austrians who are at present serving with various Allied armies. These units would accompany the Allies when they invade Austria, and there assume police and administrative roles. The Committee considers this proposal very unlike the now abandoned Austrian Legion project. The third objective of the new Committee is to free Austrian prisoners of war and place them in those special units. There are approximately 2000 Austrians in North Africa.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Algiers)

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**CIA** 006687

By **SR** Date **APR 3 1975**

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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11 January 1944

Central and Western Europe: Prospects of Russian Dominance.

The following report has been received from the OSS representative in Bern:

The Moscow and Tehran Conferences have strengthened rather than lessened the impression, now widespread in Central and Western Europe, that Russia will be the dominating force in determining the future of Europe. These conferences have dispelled the idea of a possible arrangement between Germany and Russia, thus eliminating Germany's last hope of even a compromise peace. Almost nobody, even Germany, now believes that there is any possible way out for Germany. Some believe that the end may come within a few months and possibly even before an Allied invasion.

Most Europeans now believe that Russia already has laid her plans for the kind of Europe she wants, and that no force now exists which can block her program. Among the factors which have led to this conclusion are the following:

- (1) The agreement with Benes, which starts a system of alliances in Central Europe and which may affect any future settlement in the Danube Basin;
- (2) The connections believed to exist between Tito and Moscow and also between Russia and important circles in Bulgaria, which together, it is said, will go far towards determining the future arrangements in the Balkans;
- (3) The belief that Russia is unwilling to reach an agreement with Finland, even on the basis of the 1941 treaty;
- (4) The belief that Russia has already laid plans for assuring the kind of government it wants in France;
- (5) The apparent intention of Russia to determine alone the size and shape of the future Poland.

These assumptions may not be correct; but they are fairly generally believed in this part of the world, and hence are influencing policy. And this we must take into account.

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Date APR 3 1975



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Furthermore, the US and UK have no direct answering counterpart to Russia's purposeful, dynamic policy in Europe. In general it is believed that we desire a clean slate after the collapse of Germany, on which, following a considerable period of trial during a prolonged armistice, to build a peace; that, in general, we desire non-militaristic and democratic governments in the various European countries, and that we have plans -- information about which unfortunately has not yet reached here in any great detail -- for assuring the food supply and the economic rehabilitation of countries which fit into the framework of a new, peaceful, democratic Europe.

So far, however, the Western powers have not given dynamic, spiritual form to the statements of their objectives as regards Europe, certainly nothing that has moved the great masses as they were moved 25 years ago by President Wilson's idealism. Rather England and America, to the man in the street, seems associated with outwardly reactionary forces, such as the Darlans and Victor Emmanuel and Badoglio. A great social revolution is going on in Europe, as is inevitable after the earthquake it has undergone. The Russians rather than the Western powers have caught the imagination of the peoples who have suffered from this earthquake.

Despite this, Western Europe does not fundamentally desire Russian domination. Its 200-odd millions of people contain only a small percentage of Slavs, and even the terrors of the last four years have not destroyed entirely their traditions or the desire to rebuild them free from Slavic domination. If Communism follows the war in this area, it will probably be of a local national character, and, if there is any alternative, not based on the particular desire to join with Russia.

Nevertheless, the situation described above is leading to a sort of fatalism which is pervading Germany, her satellites, and some of the occupied territories, particularly northern Italy and to some extent France. It also accounts for the fact that even in Rumania and Hungary the opposition to the German alliance has somewhat lessened, rather than increased; and that there is so little organized opposition in Germany herself.

This all may change when Anglo-Saxon forces enter Europe or the Balkans, or if Russia indicates that she will agree to fix a limit to her claims of territorial or political domination.

After the fall of Napoleon, Western Europe had a fear of Russia somewhat comparable to that of today. It proved groundless. In the same way the present-day apprehension of Russia may turn out to be mistaken. Some evidence on which such hopes could be grounded would hasten the end of the war and would give more hope on which to start the work of reconstruction.

(OSS Official Dispatch, via Radiophone, Bern)

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CIA 006687

By SR Date APR 3 1975

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.


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10 January 1944

To: Col. L. Mathewson, White House Map Room  
From: John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Subject: Reports received in Office of  
Strategic Services, No. 93

Submitted herewith are some additional items received from our secret sources abroad.

Unless otherwise indicated, the items of information submitted herewith are reports just as received from agents, and have not been evaluated as to degree of reliability other than as stated.

  
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

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By SR Date APR 3 1975

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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4 January 1944

Iraq: Criticism of the Recent Constitution  
and of Nuri's New Cabinet.

The Turkish Minister to Iraq will protest some time this week a franchise clause in the new Iraq constitution which, he claims, is discriminatory against some 400,000 Turkish-born Iraqi citizens.

Shia Moslem dissatisfaction with the representation which they have received in the recently announced cabinet is mounting. The two cabinet positions which were created in order to safeguard Nuri's control were allotted, one to a Kurd and one to a Sunnite Moslem, despite the fact that the Shia population is in the majority. Moreover, Sadr, the Shia leader, has been displaced as President of the Senate, after serving in that capacity for twenty years.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Baghdad, rated A-2)

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By Authority of \_\_\_\_\_

CIA 006687

By SR Date APR 3 1975

Regraded Unclassified



6 January 1944

Germany: Secret Weapon Losing Propaganda Value;  
Recruitment of Young Boys.

Latest rumors from Germany say that the German secret weapon, apparently the rocket, cannot be used before March. As a means of propaganda the secret weapon is rapidly losing its effectiveness in Germany; it has been talked about too much and given publicity too soon. This, of course, has nothing to do with what its eventual military effectiveness may be.

Boys as young as from 12 to 14 years of age are being trained for flak duty in Germany, according to a German report recently received in Bern.

(OSS Official Dispatch, via Radiophone, Bern)

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By SR Date APR 3 1975

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WASHINGTON, D. C.

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10 January 1944

USSR: Enemy Estimate of Soviet  
Forces in the Far East.

According to a Japanese report dated 10 November (which, because of its unverifiability, must be rated F-0), 50,000 men have been added to Soviet military forces in the Far East. These forces now comprise in all, according to this report, 100,000 men in the NKVD or political security troops; 550,000 in the Army, and 50,000 in the Navy. These forces have from 800 to 1000 tanks and 1300 planes.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Stockholm. OSS analysts comment that these figures are not substantially out of line with estimates previously received.)

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By SR Date APR 3 1975

Regraded Unclassified

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WASHINGTON, D. C.

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10 January 1944

France: Collaborationists starting  
Ostensible Resistance Movements.

Reports have reached Bern of the formation of new so-called resistance committees in France. One, widely publicized, is reported to have repudiated the Algiers Committee but to have pledged support of De Gaulle. Apparently what is taking place is this:

French collaborationists realize that the German collapse is only a matter of time. They hope to confuse the record of their collaboration by an eleventh hour repentance, and are making as much noise about their activities as they dare, without attracting too much attention from the Gestapo. The name of De Monzie has been often mentioned in connection with one of these movements. The fact that public opinion in France is very much divided about the Algiers Committee and certain of its members makes it possible for such movements, which are both anti-Algiers and anti-Laval, to gain some support.

The Germans are probably not particularly disturbed at such developments since anything which prejudices the standing of the organized resistance in France or of the Algiers Committee is helpful to them. Moreover, they do not particularly object to movements which are anti-Vichy or anti-Pétain. With invasion in sight the Germans probably see that they will soon have to take over the administration and abolish the fiction of Vichy, and these last-minute converts are useful in preparing the way.

(OSS Official Dispatch, via Radiophone, Bern)

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10 January 1944

Hungary: Policy of Carpathian Defense.

The Hungarians hope to maintain a passive defense by themselves alone along the Carpathians, in the expectation that the Russians, if unprovoked, will be too busy elsewhere to desire to force so difficult a passage. The Hungarians fear, however, that the Germans will now suggest a joint German-Hungarian Carpathian defense, which would be tantamount to inviting the Russians to invade Hungary.

(OSS Official Dispatch, via Radiophone, Bern)

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APR 3 1975

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

10 January 1944

Italy: Vatican Conflicts with the Axis.

It is reported from Rome, but unconfirmed, that the aviator who bombed Vatican City was Botto, the Undersecretary of State in the Fascist Republican Government.

It is also reported that the Fascist and German police made a house-to-house search on Saturday, 23 December, at the Collegio Lombardo, which is Vatican property, and supposed to be immune. The searchers found on the premises a number of radical refugees, among whom, it is reported, was Robeda, one of the heads of the Communist Party. About 15 people were arrested. The fact that these persons were found here is of no little embarrassment to the Vatican.

The Benedictine monastery of Cava dei Tirreni near Salerno was reportedly looted by the Germans before the Allied advance, its precious library set on fire, and the abbot and a bishop taken to an unknown destination. Intervention in their behalf by the Vatican has so far been of no avail.

(OSS Official Dispatch, via Radiophone, Bern)

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CIA 006687

By SR Date APR 3 1975

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

5 January 1944

To: Col. L. Mathewson, White House Map Room  
From: John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Subject: Reports Received in Office of  
Strategic Services, No. 92

Submitted herewith are some additional items received from our secret sources abroad.

Unless otherwise indicated, the items of information submitted herewith are reports just as received from agents, and have not been evaluated as to degree of reliability other than as stated.

*John Magruder*  
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS - Intelligence Service

Enclosures.

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CIA 006687

By SR APR 3 1975

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Russia: Policy toward Yugoslavia,  
According to Benes.

On January 1 President Benes, in conversation with a prominent Yugoslav exile at Cairo, made the following statements with regard to Russia's policy concerning Yugoslavia. Benes wished the statements to be treated with complete discretion.

1. Yugoslav territory will not be split up nor will an independent Croatia or a Great Serbia be created. Instead, Yugoslavia will be recreated.
2. Russia will not interfere in internal matters, and the Yugoslavs will have to make their own decisions regarding the monarchy. Anything which expresses the will of the Yugoslav people elicits Russian sympathy. Therefore she is sympathetic towards the Partisan movement.
3. According to Benes, Russia is ready to come to an agreement with Yugoslavia. However, under no conditions will she deal with the present Cairo government.
4. The incorporation of the area of the Julian Alps, including Trieste, into Yugoslavia is regarded sympathetically by the Soviet Union. The union of Slovenes, Serbs, and Croats, and internal agreement within Yugoslavia, will, however, constitute the determining factor.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Cairo, rated reliable)

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By SR Date APR 3 1975

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WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Yugoslavia: Desire of some Exiled Army and  
Navy Personnel to follow Tito.

Following a previous report on the interest shown by young Yugoslav officers in the Partisan movement, it is now reported that a group of Yugoslav officers and non-coms in the Middle East has been busy organizing a movement among Yugoslav units, especially among naval personnel at Alexandria and among the aviation units near Suez and Tobruk, to make a public statement of their allegiance to the Partisans and Tito, recognizing them as the only representative elements in Yugoslavia. The group is reputed to total about 200 members already, and the organizers anticipate that the vast majority of the seamen, non coms, and soldiers will promptly ally themselves with the movement. The officers will request that the British send them to Yugoslavia to participate in active combat after they have resigned their commissions and offered themselves to Tito and his units.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Cairo, rated A-3)

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Topic: Economic Crisis with Brief

Yugoslavia: Reported Government-in-exile  
Sentiments about Tito.

In a conversation between Sokolovich, who is Prime Minister Purich's chef de cabinet, and a prominent Yugoslavian exile, the former remarked, according to a reliable report, that the Purich government is in a really desperate situation but will be able to survive the crisis if only the Nazi offensive against the Partisans is successful.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Cairo)

As the Kurdish tribes learn of the text of the Tehran Declaration, reports indicate that they are disappointed and resentful, and regard it as a serious barrier to their hopes for a free Kurdistan.

(OSS Official Dispatches, Baghdad, dated 4-2)

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By SR Date APR 3 1975

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Iraq: Economic Union with Syria?  
Kurds Resent Tehran Declaration.

Premier Nuri will devote most of his time to certain special matters such as Pan Arabism. His first step in this direction is his intention to exchange legations with Syria. As a result of this, a Syrian mission has arrived in Baghdad, led by the Foreign Minister. The comparatively impoverished Syrians are believed eager to accept Nuri's proposals for an economic union with wealthier Iraq, and the project will probably result in the abolition of all passport requirements and border customs. Up to the present, however, the Syrians have not agreed to Nuri's additional plan for political union. From Iraq the Syrian mission will proceed to Saudi Arabia, at Nuri's suggestion, with the intention of sounding out Ibn Saud and to begin winning his favor for the Nuri sponsored scheme of a Greater Syria.

As the Kurdish tribes learn of the text of the Tehran Declaration, reports indicate that they are disappointed and resentful, and regard it as a serious barrier to their hopes for a free Kurdistan.

(OSS Official Dispatches, Baghdad, rated A-2)

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By JR Date APR 3 1975

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Poland: Jan Kwapinski and the Polish Crisis.

During a private talk in New York on December 23, Jan Kwapinski, Deputy Prime Minister of the Polish Government-in-Exile, asserted to a member of the Foreign Nationalities staff a heartfelt conviction (1) that the Americans as well as the Poles can deal with the Russians only on the basis of a "brutal calculation of forces"; and (2) that the recently signed Czechoslovak-Soviet Russian Treaty of mutual assistance does not prepare the way for confederation in Central and Eastern Europe, but only for the subjugation to Russia of States in that area.

(Foreign Nationalities Branch, Special Report, 12/31/43)

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Iraq: Mulla Mustapha Refuses to Give In.

Mulla Mustapha, who is leading the Kurdish revolt against the Iraqi Government, unqualifiedly turned down the last Iraqi offer and declined to carry on any more negotiations. He is said to have become arrogant. Immediately after his refusal the British Ambassador communicated with him, severely admonishing him to yield to Iraqi terms on pain of the British Government's regarding his activity as a threat to the war effort of the United Nations. Mulla answered that he loved the British, but without their assurances he refused "to give in to the Iraqi crooks."

(OSS Official Dispatch, Baghdad, rated A-2)

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Iraq: Nuri's Clever Maneuvering.

By appointing to Cabinet posts three of his bitterest enemies in the Senate (thus removing them from that body) and by appointing nine of his henchmen to new seats (a move authorized by the new constitution), Nuri has safeguarded his position in the Senate. Thereupon, to maintain his position in the Cabinet, Nuri has created two new ministries, so that he and his followers constitute a Cabinet majority. Informed persons believe, however, that in spite of these machinations, the Cabinet will not remain in office more than three months, and that it may not last a fortnight.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Baghdad, rated A-2)

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
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 January 1944

To: Col. L. Mathewson, White House Map Room  
From: John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Subject: Reports Received in Office of  
Strategic Services, No. 91

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John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS - Intelligence Service

Enclosures.

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CIA 006687

By SR Date APR 3 1975

Bulgaria: Negotiations with Nazis on Mobilization.

The following report is transmitted by OSS in Bern and is rated B-3:

About December 5 the Germans demanded that Bulgaria order a general mobilization and incorporate her army in the Nazi Luftwaffe organization. The effective date was to depend upon the degree to which the Turks might make concessions to the Allies. If the Allies, for example, were to make use of Turkey's territory or territorial waters, the arrangements were to take effect at once. The Bulgarians accepted the German demands, but only with conditions which the Nazis found unacceptable. These included the withdrawal of German troops from Bulgaria and the recalling into Bulgarian territory of all Bulgar troops. It would appear that both of these proposed stipulations were urged upon the Bulgars by strong representations from the Turks, and von Papen was therefore ordered, when this information reached Germany, to make energetic counter-representations in Ankara.

Recent reports indicate that Bulgaria will construe as "Bulgarian territory" the Macedonian territory formerly belonging to Greece and now occupied by Bulgaria, and will engage to defend it. The German High Command is similarly reported to have agreed to a Bulgarian withdrawal by next March from territory formerly Yugoslavian.

On December 17 negotiations were still in progress on the subject of air coordination and Bulgarian mobilization. According to the Bulgars, it will be necessary to take these measures only in the event of an Allied threat to use Turkey for an attack on Bulgaria itself. The Bulgars are willing to have their Air Force commanded by the Nazis in case of war, but reject the suggestion of Nazi command of their Army. In consideration of Turkish feelings, the Bulgars do not wish the Nazis to send in fighter-bombers, though they do not mind the recent strengthening of Nazi pursuit squadrons in Bulgaria. The Nazis are energetically building up their air defenses on the airdromes along Bulgaria's coast, because they anticipate at any moment the appearance of Allied planes on Turkish fields, from which they would be able to launch attacks on Constantza, the Crimea, and Odessa.

There is no truth in the report that Bulgarian forces have been dispatched to take over the islands formerly under Nazi occupation. Until the spring of 1942, Bulgar forces were on Samothrace, when they were recalled in compliance with Turkey's wishes. Only Bulgar gendarmerie remains. Since the summer of 1941, Bulgar forces have been on the islands of Sasopula and Thasos only.

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(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern)

CIA 006687  
By SR Date APR 3 1975



Hungary: An Appeal by Michael Karolyi.

Reuters will soon release an appeal from Count Michael Karolyi addressed to the workers and peasants of Hungary. The appeal calls for the establishment and intensification of underground work against Horthy and Hitler, and advocates sabotage, strikes, the overthrow of the Horthy regime, the creation of a Partisan Army, and severance of relations with Hitler. Hungary should enter the struggle on the side of the Allies, and cooperate intimately with the Soviets, the Czechs, and Tito. Karolyi intimates that he may secure the support of the Czechs.

(OSS Official Dispatch, London, rated B-3)

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CIA 006687

By SR Date APR 3 1975

Sweden: Attitude of German Communists in Stockholm

Although they still talk about plans to unite all anti-Nazi Germans into a common front, the German Communists in Sweden openly disavow any interest in the "Free German Committee". Furthermore, it seems evident that the so-called "German Cultural Society" was formed not long ago on their initiative. However, the "Free German Committee" has not been officially abandoned, and Max Hodann, its presiding officer, is now also chairman of the German Cultural Society Board, which is composed of three "Independents", two members of the Social Democrat Party, and two official representatives of the Communist Party. It is possible that responsibility for the actions of the Social Democrat members will be disclaimed by most of the German Social Democrats in Stockholm.

The paramount issue in Communist groups seems to be the development of a plan to attain the fullest possible application of all German effort for the benefit of the economic and physical reconstruction of the Soviet. There is not much concern over such matters as the independence of Germany, but any native of Germany not in favor of maximum utilization of all German human and physical resources for Russian reconstruction is denounced as a "saboteur".

(OSS Official Dispatch, Stockholm, rated B-2)

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By **SR** Date **APR 3 1975**