OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

8 November 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of a dispatch received from the Bern office of this agency, reporting the fact that certain German industrial and Wehrmacht leaders desire early cessation of hostilities.

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

DEClassified
By Authority of
CIA

By SR Date MAY 6 1975

203(12)
GERMANY: Certain Industrial and Wehrmacht Leaders Desire Early Cessation of Hostilities.

The following information, from a source close to the SS, has been transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern, and is supplementary to information furnished in earlier reports entitled "The German Coup d'Etat":

In order to prevent the total destruction of German industrial plants by Allied bombings and to avoid the devastation which would result from fighting on German soil, leading German industrialists and certain Wehrmacht leaders want to end the war quickly. These army and industrial groups feel, however, that they lack power sufficient to overthrow the Hitler-Himmler regime. They therefore consider it necessary to obtain the collaboration of certain of the less compromised but yet influential SS leaders, and have started secret negotiations along this line.

Source, himself, is close to SS Obergruppenführer Karl Kauffmann, Gauleiter of Hamburg, whom he describes as one of the abler and less compromised Gauleiters. Source also reports that Field Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch has indicated a willingness to serve on the Eastern Front provided Colonel-General Franz Halder serves as his chief of staff.

Halder previously had been reported to have been arrested as a member of the conspiratorial group behind the 20 July putsch. Von Brauchitsch has previously been reported as awaiting a command on the Eastern Front.

Source declares that Hjalmar Schacht recently was released from prison but, since he was on the conspiratorial group's list as Minister of Economics, his dossier is under Hitler's personal scrutiny for complicity in the putsch. Source also states that Carl Friederich Goerdler was not executed but apparently is being kept alive on Himmler's orders to be used in an emergency for liaison with the Anglo-Americans.
OSS WASHINGTON COMMENT: Several other reports have recently suggested that neither Schacht nor Goerdler were executed and that Schacht had been released from detention. There may be some reason to believe that the Nazis are grooming them as "anti-Nazis" for use in attempted negotiations with the Allies or in connection with the Nazi underground.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 7 November)
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

7 November 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information is a copy of a dispatch received from the OSS representative in Bucharest, setting forth the decision of the Soviets to treat Hungary as an enemy nation in the same category with Germany, because of continued Hungarian resistance.

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of
CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 6 1975

Regraded Unclassified
HUNGARY: Soviets Treat Hungary as Enemy Nation in Category with Germany.

The OSS representative in Bucharest has transmitted the following intelligence, dated 3 November:

Colonel Kalinen, a high-ranking staff officer of the Second Ukrainian Army, and several other well-informed Soviet officers, state that because of the stubborn and uncompromising Hungarian resistance, the Soviets will deal much more severely with Hungary than with Rumania. Colonel Kalinen points out that the Rumanians assisted the Soviets against the Germans, whereas the Hungarians are contesting every inch of territory and continue today to aid the German war effort. Hence Hungary is to be treated as an enemy nation in the same category with Germany. If Budapest is defended, Kalinen says, the city will be destroyed as was Debreczen after the Hungarians refused the Soviet ultimatum demanding surrender. Kalinen expressed a hope that the British and Americans will not intervene for sympathetic treatment of the Hungarians.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Caserta, 5 November)
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

7 November 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information is a report on Soviet pressure on King Michael in the formation of the new Rumanian Cabinet, and interference by the Soviets in local administration of Rumanian affairs. The intelligence in this report was obtained from a series of cables from the Caserta office of this agency, the latest of which is dated 6 November.

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of
CIA 006687
By SR Date MAY 6 1975

203(12)
HUMANIA: Soviet Pressure on King Michael in Formation of New Cabinet: Interference in Local Administration.

The following information has been received from the OSS representative in Bucharest:

According to a source whom the OSS representative rates B-2, General Vinogradov sent a note to the Rumanian Government on 2 November, in the name of the Allied Armistice Control Commission, criticizing the Rumanian Government for willful failure to carry out the armistice conditions satisfactorily.

Reports received independently from Ionitu (confidential secretary to King Michael), Dinu Bratianu (Liberal Party leader and Minister of War Production in the new Rumanian cabinet), and Max Aunan (well-known Rumanian industrialist), state that on the afternoon of 2 November General Vinogradov, chairman of the Russian Control Commission, called upon King Michael for a lengthy conversation, in the course of which Vinogradov suggested that the new Rumanian cabinet should be political in form rather than a cabinet of technocrats.

As announced on 4 November, the new cabinet, while including several non-political figures, is predominantly political in character. The British political representative in Bucharest, Lerougetel, is inclined to discount alarmist Rumanian reports that Vinogradov pressed for formation of a government along the lines demanded by the Rumanian Communist Party. He suggests that Vinogradov's purpose was to urge formation of a government at the earliest opportunity. Lerougetel, however, is displeased by the Soviet failure to give the British any prior notice or opportunity to discuss this action which, he feels, amounted to political intervention.

According to Georgesau, Undersecretary of the Ministry of National Economy in the cabinet just dissolved, Vinogradov revisited King Michael on 3 November and again pressed for early formation of a government, stating that he wished General Rascanu (reputed to be a Communist) as Minister of War and Constantin Visianu (a career diplomat and supporter of Peasant Party leader Maniu) as Foreign Minister. The following morning Premier Sanatescu proclaimed the resignation of the government and announced a tentative list of new ministers, including himself as Premier; the Communist-supported

SECRET

By Authority of

CIA 006687

DECLASSIFIED

By: [Signature] Date: May 6, 1975

Regraded Unclassified
candidate, Petre Groza, as Vice Premier; Rascănu as Minister of War; and Viscianu as Foreign Minister. The only change in the list as officially announced on the evening of 4 November was the dropping of Rascănu, against whom the King as well as Maniu and Bratianu [Liberal Party leader] are said to have raised violent objections. Starcea, the Marshal of the Palace, is said to have resigned in protest against Sanătescu's action in announcing the new cabinet without the King's approval. Ionitiu believes the acceptance of the new cabinet list to have been due to "lack of natural backbone and unreasoning fear of the Russians."

Aldea, Minister of Interior in the Rumanian cabinet just dissolved, is reliably reported to have collected statistics showing that the Soviets have placed well over 1000 officials in all the principal Rumanian cities, allegedly for the purpose of administering the armistice terms. These officials, who are present in addition to personnel of the Soviet Armistice Control Commission, are reported to be intruding into purely local political matters everywhere.

A Rumanian Government decree published on 4 November by order of the Soviet Control Commission, has again fixed the rate of exchange at 100 lei per ruble. According to Ion Cristu, of the Rumanian Foreign Ministry, this measure will cost the Rumanian Government at least 50 billion lei. The day the decree was published, the local exchange value of the American dollar rose 50 percent, and it is reported still rising rapidly. The situation is aggravated by the fact that the Bulgarian currency has been pegged at 15 leva per ruble, with the result that Russian rubles from Bulgaria are already flooding into Rumania.

(OSS Official Dispatches, Caserta)
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

2 November 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of a dispatch recently received from the Casseltoffice of this agency, concerning the seizing by the Soviets of American- and British-owned refinery equipment in Rumania.

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Director of Naval Intelligence

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of

CIA 006687
By SR Date May 6, 1975

SECRET
RUMANIA: Soviets Seizing American and British Owned Refinery Equipment.

The following intelligence, dated 1 November, has been transmitted by the OSS representative in Bucharest, together with an urgent request by Melbourne that Berry be notified for the information of the State Department. Sources of the information are Air Vice Marshal Stevenson; Georgescu, Undersecretary in the Rumanian Ministry of National Economy; Alexander Ionescu*, General Administrator of the Romana Americana Refinery; Major Grunder of the Petrol Section, AFHQ; and others.

On 28 October, Russian officers are reported to have begun loading large quantities of refinery equipment and accessories at the Romana Americana and Astra Romana plants for shipment to the USSR. According to Ionescu, over 220 tons of equipment were loaded on 28 October and a larger load the following day. Air Vice Marshal Stevenson states that so far equipment has been taken only from companies owned by British and Americans. Certain types of equipment being removed are said to be irreplaceable under present conditions, and as a result Rumanian oil production of petroleum products is expected to decrease within six weeks.

Stevenson proposed to General Vinogradov, head of the Soviet Section of the Allied Armistice Control Commission, that a joint Committee of Soviet, American and British experts determine what equipment is in excess of Rumanian needs and can be made available to the USSR. Although Vinogradov agreed in principle, the loading and shipping continue. Stevenson delayed informing London until convinced that his protests to Vinogradov were ineffective, but he has now advised British authorities that Soviet action has been taken indiscriminately and in a manner to wreck Rumanian production and refinement of petroleum. He has urgently recommended immediate intervention in Moscow for a stoppage of the loading and shipping and the return of trains already left. There is some evidence to support Stevenson's speculation that Vinogradov may be acting on false or misleading information intentionally furnished to him by Soviet experts.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Caserta, 1 November)

* This name was received in garbled form and is not further identifiable on the bases of available information.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of

CIA 006687
MAY 6 1975

Regraded Unclassified
TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of a dispatch received from the Caserta office of this agency, stating that Count Sforza has been approached as to his availability for the Italian Premiership.

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of
CIA 006687
By SR Date MAY 6 1975
ITALY: Sforza Approached for Premiership.

The OSS representative in Rome has forwarded the following intelligence, dated 27 October:

Count Sforza states that in his opinion a crisis is to be expected in the Italian Government. He asserts that he has been approached by leaders of the Action, Socialist, and Communist Parties as to his availability for the Premiership. Sforza admitted that it would be difficult for him to withdraw from his appointment to Washington. It is possible that he may go to the United States only temporarily.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Caserta, 27 October)
1 November 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
   White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Reports Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information are two reports recently received from the Caserta office of this agency, concerning the present situation in Rumania. The first of these reports deals with chaotic conditions now prevailing in the province of Moldavia; the second sets forth details of the current Rumanian Cabinet crisis.

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosures.

cc: Department of State.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of
CIA 006687
By SR Date MAY 6 1975

Regraded Unclassified
RUMANIA: Chaotic Conditions in Moldavia.

The following information, dated 24 October, has been transmitted by the OSS representative in Bucharest. The source of this report, rated B-2 for reportorial accuracy, is George Bratianu (nephew of Cabinet Minister Dinu Bratianu), who is known as Germanophile and anti-Soviet. Bratianu claims to have taken his intelligence from a report submitted to him by General Manoliu, representative of the Rumanian Army in Moldavia.

The province of Moldavia, according to Bratianu, is in a state of complete disorganization, due to poor communications with Bucharest and the fact that regular Rumanian officials removed by Antonescu before the Soviet occupation have been unable to return to office. The civilian population is said to be desperate as a result of inadequate food, medicine, fuel, and clothing; famine and disease are feared with the approach of winter. The situation is said to be worse in the Jassy area of northern Moldavia, where typhus is spreading. (Similar reports to the above have reached the OSS representative from several informants, including Georgescu, Stareca, and Foreign Minister Buzesti.)

According to Bratianu, the Rumanian Government wishes to reinstate certain administrative officials in Moldavia, but fears they will be prevented from entering the province or assuming office. Soviet officers are said to have established a bureau to pass on all travel to and from northern Moldavia. Meanwhile the Communist press, according to General Manoliu, is denouncing the regular Rumanian officials as traitors for deserting Moldavia and leaving the people to their fate. Communists in Moldavia have reportedly also spread word that large landholders are keeping seed wheat from the farmers, though the seed wheat is actually held by the Soviets. Manoliu is anxious for Anglo-American authorities to investigate agriculture, food, and public health conditions in the Jassy area in the hope that such a visit may make planting possible while there is yet time. This, he feels, might remove the population's excessive fear of the Soviets.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Caserta, 25 October)

[Redacted]
RUMANIA: Cabinet Crisis.

The following information has been forwarded by the OSS representative in Bucharest:

The current Romanian cabinet crisis has been severely aggravated by two recent measures of the Soviet Armistice Control Commission. On 15 October the Soviet Commission banned publication of Romania's largest newspaper, Universul, and forbade a political rally scheduled for the same day by the National Peasant Party. Although tension in Bucharest has now somewhat subsided, it is expected that the cabinet will fall soon.

The reason for the suppression of Universul is not clear, although the grounds advanced were that some three weeks previously the paper had printed an obituary of Antonescu's son. The editor of Universul is also suspected of having been too friendly with Antonescu. The Romanians nevertheless fear that the Soviet action was taken to increase the power of the local Communist press. In banning the Peasant Party rally, the Soviet Commission claimed that it was to have been attended by Fascist groups, who at a demonstration of the Liberal and National Peasant Parties on 13 October had insulted the Red Army and praised the Iron Guard leader, Horia Sima. The OSS representative comments that these Soviet allegations were identical with reports appearing in the local Communist press, but that OSS eyewitnesses of the 13 October meeting report no pro-Fascist remarks to have been heard.

These Soviet measures, according to Foreign Minister Buzesti, convinced a majority of the Romanian cabinet that the USSR had definitely decided to intervene in Romanian internal affairs. The Soviet note on political demonstrations was interpreted as a move to force the resignations of Maniu and Bratianu and to destroy the position of their respective political organizations (the National Peasant and Liberal Parties), thus leaving the field open to the Communists. A well-informed non-Romanian observer asserted that the fate of Romania would be settled in a matter of days. Foreign Minister Buzesti stated that he saw little possibility of forming a government acceptable to the Soviets and capable of maintaining Romanian independence.

On 16 October Prime Minister Sanatescu submitted his resignation, which, however, was refused by the King. At a cabinet meeting on the morning of 17 October, Maniu and Bratianu also threatened to resign, but finally agreed to wait until Buzesti could talk with
General Vinogradov, head of the Soviet Commission. In his interview of Vinogradov on the same afternoon, Buzesti presented eyewitness testimony on the events of the previous Liberal-Peasant Party meeting, together with a strong official protest against the ban on Universal and the projected Peasant Party rally.

Vinogradov, whom Buzesti described as most reasonable and even mildly apologetic in manner, replied that the paper would be allowed to resume publication on 19 October. He categorically denied any imputation of Fascist tendencies to Maniu or his party. He promised an early and probably favorable reply on the matter of further political rallies, and requested only guarantees from the Romanian government that pro-Fascist or anti-Russian meetings should not be permitted. In the opinion of a source close to King Michael, Vinogradov had acted on false information deliberately fed to him by local Communists and by Lavrisev, his political advisor. As a result of Vinogradov's remarks, the situation in Bucharest appears temporarily eased, although the crisis continues and a new government is expected to be formed momentarily.

On 23 October, Constantin Visoianu informed the OSS representative that the Romanian Communists continue to urge him and Ion Cristu to accept posts in a new cabinet. Visoianu and Cristu, associates of Maniu, are former diplomats now holding subordinate positions in the Foreign Ministry. Visoianu informed the Communists that he would accept no post in a government which does not include Maniu and Bratianu and that he believes that a political government (as opposed to a non-political government of techniciens) will prove unworkable. Nevertheless Visoianu is willing to accept office in a political cabinet and states that the Communists also appear more willing to compromise than before. Visoianu believes that a decision may be reached by 28 or 29 October, but that the ensuing government will fall after a few weeks because the ministers will work at cross purposes.

Possible further indication of the development of Soviet-Romanian relations may be contained in the report of a high Romanian court official that Marshal Malinovski has finally invited King Michael to visit the front on 27 October. The invitation follows a series of unsuccessful efforts by the King to meet Malinovski, including repeated invitations for the Soviet commander to visit the palace for conversations. Previously the King had received only polite apologies and excuses.

(OSS Official Dispatches, Caserta)
The White House Map Room
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Colonel Richard Parks, Jr.

Gentlemen:

I am transmitting herewith one copy of R & A No. 2327, "Native Craft in Southeast Asia Waters" Parts I and II, prepared in the Research and Analysis Branch of this office and classified as restricted.

Sincerely yours,

William L. Lange
Chief, Research and Analysis Branch

Enclosures (2)
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

24 October 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information is a copy of a dispatch received from the Bern office of this agency, concerning the report that an SS General is in contact with an anti-Nazi Wehrmacht group in Germany.

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of

CIA 006687
By SR Date MAY 6 1975
GERMANY: SS General Reported in Contact with Anti-Nazi Wehrmacht Group.

The OSS representative in Bern has transmitted the following information from an agent of the conspiratorial group behind the attempted coup of 20 July. This is supplementary to earlier reports entitled "The German Coup d'Etat".

General Keppler of the SS, strongly opposed to the Nazi atrocity program, has established contact with anti-Nazi elements in the Wehrmacht.

(This presumably is George Keppler, 50, SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General in the Waffen SS.)

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern)
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

23 October 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
   White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information is a copy of a dispatch received from General Deane, head of the American Military Mission in Moscow. This document concerns the treatment of American war prisoners in Hungary.

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State
    Joint Chiefs of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of
CIA 006687
By SR Date MAY 6, 1975

203(12)
The following information, concerning the treatment of American war prisoners in Hungary, was obtained from Lieutenant Albert Poupet of the 30th French Artillery Regiment, and has been forwarded by General Deane, head of the American Military Mission in Moscow. Lt. Poupet was himself a prisoner in Germany. He escaped to Hungary on 20 October 1943, and during his internment in that country was well treated.

Lt. Poupet saw American prisoners of war, most of them aviators, passing through Budapest en route to the temporary camps at Komaron and Balatonboglar, from which they were sent to a permanent camp on Count Zichy's estate in southern Hungary. He heard from eye-witnesses that American fliers parachuting into Hungary were killed by peasants with pitchforks or beaten to death. Aviators were tortured by the Hungarian Gestapo in Budapest, who seemed especially interested in discovering the flight orders given these aviators. If the prisoner was deemed an interesting subject he was sent to Budapest for Gestapo questioning; otherwise he was sent directly to a prisoner of war camp. Those interrogated who were able to withstand the tortures were not always killed. The Germans did not take part in the torturing.

Lt. Poupet believes that Colonel A. Hallier, the Vichy French Military Attache in Budapest, knows the results of all Allied bombardments, and has supplied the Allied forces with a substantial amount of the extensive intelligence data he possesses. Lt. Poupet recommends that Sous-officier Kreiger, at the French Embassy in Budapest, be approached for first-hand information regarding the treatment of American prisoners. Kreiger is a personal friend of the interpreter who took part in all the Gestapo interrogations.

(U.S. Military Mission Dispatch, Moscow, 19 October)
The White House Map Room  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Colonel Richard Parks

Gentlemen:

I am transmitting herewith one copy of each of the following reports prepared in the Research and Analysis Branch of this office:

R & A No. 2009, "Political Orientation of the European Resistance: The Underground" (Copy No. 1)

R & A No. 1661, "The Role of Communism in the Balkans" (Copy No. 1)

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

William L. Langer  
Chief, Research and Analysis Branch

Enclosures (2)
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

16 October 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of a dispatch received from the Caserta office of this agency, concerning a critical deadlock in the present Romanian Government.

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of
CIA 006687
By __ Date __

Regraded Unclassified
RUMANIA: Critical Rumanian Government Deadlock.

The OSS representative in Caserta has transmitted the following information, dated 8 October:

Prince Stirbey frequently mentioned as the next Rumanian Premier states that the Communists are attempting to build up their strength in the Rumanian Government by obtaining cabinet representation for completely fictional political parties. According to Stirbey, the Rumanian Communists' insistence on radical reforms is responsible for the present government stalemate. Stirbey says that chaos can result from this deadlock, which may be exactly what the Communists wish.

Rumanian Foreign Minister Buzesti asserts that the Communist cabinet minister, Patrascanu, has surreptitiously held up laws already passed for the arrest of war criminals, while the Communist press attacks the government for inactivity. For fear of Communist criticism, the government, according to Buzesti, hesitates to oust as a group those whom he calls undesirable ministers, but plans to replace them with competent administrators one by one. Buzesti says that the Rumanian Communists claim to have full Russian support, but Stirbey and other members of the government doubt that the Soviet Government actually directs the Rumanian Communists.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Caserta, 13 October)
14 October 1944

The White House Map Room
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Colonel Richard Parks, Jr.

Gentlemen:

I am transmitting herewith one copy of R & A No. 2057, "Handbook of the Major German Cartels, 1930 - 1944" prepared in the Research and Analysis Branch of this office and classified as restricted.

Sincerely yours,

William L. Langer
Chief, Research and Analysis Branch

Enclosure

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By RH [Date Feb 10 1972]
TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of a dispatch received from the Caserta office of this agency, reporting the conditions which Prince Barbu Stirbey has outlined for his acceptance of the Rumanian Prime Ministry.

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of

CIA
006687

By 5R Date 6/5 1974

Regarded Unclassified
RUMANIA: Stirbey Outlines Conditions for his Acceptance of Prime Ministry.

The following statements were made by Prince Barbu Stirbey to the OSS representative in Bucharest on 3 October:

Stirbey asserted that no official approach has yet been made to him regarding the possibility of his assuming the Prime Ministry. He asserted that he did not seek the position and that he would accept only under the following conditions:

1. That the leaders of all the Rumanian political parties request him to assume control and offer convincing assurances that they will give him their full support.

2. That the parties agree to refrain from attacking one another during a period of six months. (According to Stirbey, it would take six months to achieve conditions under which normal democratic elections could take place.

3. That he be enabled freely to choose his ministers as well as the principal officials of government departments, with the understanding that his appointees may include, in addition to representatives of the various political parties, good administrators without political background.

4. That the trials of persons accused of war crimes be conducted in legal and orderly fashion.

Stirbey said that the Red Army has not molested his country estates, and that the Soviets have otherwise indicated respect for his person and property.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Caserta, 7 October)
TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of a dispatch received from the Stockholm office of this agency, concerning a reported plan to send Norwegian troops from Sweden to northern Finland to join the Finnish forces in their attacks on the Germans.

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State
Joint Chiefs of Staff
NORWAY: Plan to Send Troops to North Finland.

The OSS representative in Stockholm transmits the following information from a reliable source:

Norwegian authorities have sent a secret emissary to Marshal Mannerheim to propose that two Norwegian battalions be sent from Sweden to northern Finland to join the Finnish forces in their attacks on the Germans. These battalions would be formed from men at the "police training" camps in Sweden. Mannerheim has not yet replied to the suggestion, probably because he first must consult Colonel-General Andrei Zhadanov, head of the Allied Control Commission in Finland.

This proposal indicates the Norwegians' desire to have Norwegian troops take part in the first move onto Norwegian soil, which they believe will come from northern Finland, and to avoid exclusive Soviet entry into north Norway. Finland has not as yet declared war on Germany, therefore it is not certain that she would pursue retreating German forces across her frontier. If the Finns should accept the proposal, the plan would have to be revealed to the Swedish Government in order to enable the Norwegian troops to leave Sweden.

The OSS representative comments that the Germans, when they know of this plan, may infer that there is little likelihood of an operation against Norway from the British Isles.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Stockholm, 7 October)
TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of a dispatch received from the Cairo office of this agency, concerning Soviet demands for extensive oil concessions in northern Iran.

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS  
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DECLASSIFIED  
By Authority of:  
CIA 006687  
By: SR  
Date: MAY 6, 1975

SECRET
IRAN: Soviet Oil Concessions.

The OSS representative in Cairo has transmitted the following information:

In order to avoid compliance with Soviet demands for extensive oil concessions in northern Iran, the Iranian Government was reported ready, on 10 October, to submit to the British, American, and Soviet embassies a statement that all negotiations regarding oil concessions are suspended until after a general European armistice has been concluded. According to reports, the Soviet request [for five years' exclusive oil exploration rights in an area of 200,000 square miles] was accompanied by threats, and Premier Sa'ed announced only recently that he planned to submit to Soviet pressure. The Iranian Government fears an unfavorable Soviet reaction to the suspension of negotiations.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Cairo, 10 October)
TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of a dispatch received from the Bern office of this agency, concerning the rumor in Germany of a new conspiracy against Hitler.

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State.
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
GERMANY: New Conspiracy against Hitler is Rumored.

The following report, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern, is from an untried source:

Source claims to have received from a messenger the details of a new plan to overthrow Hitler. The opposition group is composed of prominent right-wing SS personnel, some members of the General Staff including General Heinz Guderian, some commanders of the national police, the home armies and the Luftwaffe, and some front-line leaders including Field Marshal Walter Model. The plan calls for the elimination of Hitler, Goebbels, Himmler, Goering, and other important Nazi Party leaders. If this coup proves successful, the group plans to continue the war temporarily but at the same time to institute negotiations regarding unconditional surrender terms. The procedure envisaged would be similar to that followed by Badoglio after the ouster of Mussolini.

Source cites as an important new feature of this scheme the cooperation between Army and SS elements in a plan to overthrow Hitler. He has been informed that Himmler is aware of dissatisfaction with Hitler among the SS and concerned by it. Source also has heard that Hitler and Himmler have attempted to negotiate with the Soviets and were unsuccessful, but they still feel they may succeed.

The OSS representative comments that Field Marshal Model and General Guderian have been rumored as the most likely leaders of a putsch against Hitler if one were attempted prior to the collapse, but cautions that this report, coming from an untested source, must be treated with reserve.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern)
The White House Map Room
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Attention: Colonel Richard Parks, Jr.

Gentlemen:

I am transmitting herewith one copy of R & A No. 2273, "Basic Data on Jubaland", prepared in the Research and Analysis Branch of this office and classified as restricted.

Sincerely yours,

William L. Langer
Chief, Research and Analysis Branch

Enclosure
(Copy No. 2/4)
4 October 1944

The White House Map Room
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Col. Richard Parks, Jr.

Dear Sir:

I am transmitting herewith one copy of R & A No. 22/6, "Crisis in the Mexican Sinarquista Movement," prepared in the Research and Analysis Branch of this office and classified as Confidential.

Sincerely yours,

William L. Langer
Chief, Research and Analysis Branch

Enclosure (1)
(Copy No. 12)
TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information is a copy of a dispatch received from the Bern Office of this agency, concerning "Austrian Leader Desires to Aid Allies".

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure

Copy to: Dept. of State
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Aast. Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence
Aast. Chief of Staff, G-2
Director of Naval Intelligence

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of
CIA 00687
By SR Date MAY 6 1975

Regraded Unclassified
AUSTRIAN LEADER DESIRES TO AID ALLIES

The OSS representative in Bern has transmitted the following report from a reliable source who has recently arrived in Switzerland with a message from Edmund Glaise von Horstenau, the prominent Austrian who since the spring of 1941 has served in Zagreb as liaison officer for the German Army with the Croatian Government and currently holds the rank of Lieutenant General:

On about 10 September Glaise-Horstenau was called to Hitler's headquarters. While there, because of his long-standing disagreements with Siegfried Rasche, German Minister to Croatia, he was removed from his Zagreb liaison post. He intends, however, to return shortly to Zagreb where he has considerable influence with the Croats and the Austrian officers who are stationed in Croatia with Croatian and German units.

Glaise-Horstenau says he wishes to work with the Allies for the liberation of Austria. German forces have almost completely evacuated the Croatian coast, he asserts, and are under orders to withdraw from Trieste and Monfalcone (15 miles north-west on the bay of Trieste) should the Allies land there. He therefore believes that Allied landings would encounter slight opposition in this area. He also reports that none of the German military formations in Croatia except two divisions of "police troops" will oppose Anglo-American forces.

After his meeting with Hitler, Glaise-Horstenau went to Belgrade and conferred with Von Wechs and Loehr, commanders of the Balkans. The latter, an Austrian, concurs with Glaise-Horstenau's viewpoint. Glaise-Horstenau also says that among his friends in Zagreb who are willing to cooperate, Baron Fott, his assistant chief of staff, and Major Metzger, his Austrian personnel aide, are particularly reliable.

The OSS representative in Bern believes that Glaise-Horstenau's group wishes to open to the Western Allies the route to Vienna via Zagreb in the hope of avoiding Soviet occupation of the Austrian capital.

OSS Washington Comment: Lieutenant General Edmund Glaise von Horstenau is an Austrian officer, diplomat and politician, whose career has been marked by a decided flair for opportunism.
While the Austrian monarchy lasted, he was a monarchist. During the Republican era he posed as a democrat. Under the Dollfuß-Schuschnigg regime he maintained contacts with the Nazis and the illegal Austrian Nazi underground, while posing as a moderate German national. He entered the Schuschnigg as Minister of the Interior shortly after the Hitler-Schuschnigg conversations of July, 1936. He came out openly as a Nazi when the Anschluss was effected and joined the Seyss-Inquart cabinet in 1938.

Immediately after the installation of the Pavelich regime in Croatia in the spring of 1941, he moved to Zagreb, apparently as German plenipotentiary, and reportedly devoted himself to extracting the maximum manpower and military reserves from the Croat population. Supported by the Austrians who acclaimed Pavelich's Austria as the realization of their dreams, he succeeded in making a Nazi colonial army out of the Croatian Domobran. He was in actual command of the German troops north of the Sava and Kupa Rivers during the fourth and fifth offensives against the Partisans, and has been actively seeking to unite all potential quiescing elements against the Allies and the Partisans. The friction between himself and Minister Kasche is well-known. He is a close friend of the former Austro-Hungarian Army officers living in Yugoslavia but who had not served in the Yugoslav Army either because of hostility to the Yugoslav state or national sympathies for Germany or Hungary.

(Office Official Dispatches).
TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information is a copy of a dispatch received from the Lisbon office of this agency, concerning Salazar's Reluctance to Break With Japan.

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure

COPY To: Department of State
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2
Director Naval Intelligence

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of
CIA 006687
By JR Date MAY 6 1975

Regraded Unclassified
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

28 September 1944

SALAZAR IS RELUCTANT TO BREAK WITH JAPAN

The OSS representative in Lisbon transmits the following report from a reliable and well placed source concerning Salazar's negotiations with Morito Morishima, Japanese Minister to Portugal. Morishima, formerly Consul General in New York, was repatriated on the first Grisholm exchange and has held his present post since November, 1942.

On 8 September Salazar and Morishima had another meeting about Timor in which Salazar told the Japanese Minister that the problem must be straightened out quickly because of increasing United States pressure. Salazar said that he was very reluctant to sever relations with Japan but added that developments in the Pacific war might at some future date compel him to do so. He stressed particularly that Portuguese sovereignty and Portuguese administration of Timor must be restored.

Morishima replied that military considerations must come first, but insisted that his Government intends to do everything possible to relieve the situation, and would consent to withdraw some of its troops from the island. Morishima said he hoped Salazar would recognize the necessity of continuing the occupation for the present.

The Japanese Minister gained the impression from this interview that Salazar is very reluctant to sever relations, but if Salazar finds there is no way to avoid such a step, he will inform him in advance of the impending move. Morishima made a special trip to Madrid to inform the Japanese mission in Spain of the substance of this talk with Salazar.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Lisbon, 23 September)

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of

CIA 006687

By Date MAY 6 1975

Regraded Unclassified
TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information is a copy of a dispatch received from the Bern office of this agency, concerning The German coup d'etat.

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS  
Intelligence Service

Enclosure - 1

DECLASSIFIED  
By Authority of  
CIA  
006687

By SR  
Date MAY 6 1975

203(12)
THE GERMAN COUP D'ETAT (Continued)

The following, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern on 15 and 18 September is a sequel to reports dated 22 July, 23 July, 8 August, 17 August and 28 August, concerning the German conspiratorial group which on 20 July attempted a coup d'état against Hitler.

A former German diplomat who was in close contact with the conspiratorial group and was a friend of Field Marshal Fedor von Bock has recently arrived in Switzerland from Germany and has supplied the following information:

The conspiratorial group advised General Guderian that the coup was planned, and he agreed to it by implication. He is anti-Hitler.

The attack on Hitler on 20 July occurred at the Headquarters in East Prussia. Other reliable German sources have given the same location.

Marshal Fedor von Bock, recently removed as commander of Army Group South on the Eastern Front, is dead.

Johannes Popitz, until his recent arrest Prussian State Minister and Minister of Finance, has been executed.

Marshal von Rundstedt, commander of the German forces in Western Europe until replaced recently by von Kluge, did not sit on the "Court of Honor" which expelled certain officers from the Army for alleged complicity in the 20 July plot, and was placed under arrest.

Marshal von Brauchitsch had nothing to do with the loyalty declaration to the Fuehrer issued under his name on 19 August.

An estimated 20,000 persons have so far been arrested as a result of the putsch, of which some 4,000 were connected with the conspiratorial movement and 2,600 have been executed. Many of the Mecklenburg, Pomeranian and East Prussian aristocracy have been imprisoned and a large percentage executed.

The source himself believes that the German Army will capitulate to the Western Allies soon after they have breached the western defenses, but will continue to fight the Soviets.
The following is from a variety of reliable sources:

Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, former president of the Reichsbank, whose arrest has previously been reported, Count von Bismarck of Potsdam, the former Ambassador to the USSR Count von Schulenberg, and Freiherr Tilo von Wilmowsky, closely related to members of the Krupp family, on 7 September were tried by the same court which sentenced Dr. Karl Goerdler.

General Franz Halder has been arrested, as have a large number of former representatives of the Bavarian Parliament who were affiliated with the Socialist and liberal Catholic parties. Arrests among Bavarian Socialists and Catholics have been numerous.

Otto Gessler, Reichswehr Minister in the Weimar Republic from 1920-28, also arrested after the attempted putsch is reportedly soon to be put to death.

A reliable Bavarian source urges that Allied propaganda be aimed to create dissension among SS troops by pointing out that only those SS members who are guilty of war crimes will be made to pay the penalty, the innocent need not fear they will suffer reprisals.

(OSS Official Dispatches)
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

23 September 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information is a copy of a dispatch received from the OSS representatives in Bucharest, concerning Rumanian Reactions to Soviet Occupation.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure
RUMANIAN REACTIONS TO SOVIET OCCUPATION

The following reports from the OSS representatives in Bucharest, transmitted by the representative in Caserta, are sequels to our memorandum dated 21 September.

By 16 September conditions in Rumania were growing more normal and, though all acts must have prior Russian approval, the Rumanian High Command was gradually taking over the controls.

Arrests of war criminals, pro-Germans, and collaborationists have begun. A report of 18 September states that those already arrested include several former Cabinet ministers and two ex-Premiers. King Michael has signed a law providing for purging public departments. It was discussed with Marshal Malinovski and apparently received his approval. The Rumanian Government hopes the stern provisions of this law will impress the Soviets.

On 18 September two OSS representatives interviewed Rumanian Foreign Minister Grigore Buzesti and Admiral Ioan Georgescu, undersecretary in the Ministry of National Economy. These officials stated:

The Rumanian Government now intends to carry out the armistice terms in a cooperative manner, even though it holds that the conditions were not properly discussed with the representatives of the Rumanian people and that some of the demands are beyond Rumania's capacity to fulfill. The Rumanian Government has been encouraged by talks which Rumanian representatives have had with Marshal Malinovski and has proof that the USSR does not intend to sovietize the country. About 85-90 per cent of the peasants are opposed to communism, though industrial workers include a fair sprinkling of Communists. A Soviet colonel said shortly after his arrival in Rumania several months ago, "there are few Rumanian Communists and many opportunists."

(OSS Official Dispatch)
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

23 September 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

A heretofore untold story was during recent weeks is
believed to have had frequent contacts with German
officers Transmitted herewith for your information
is a copy of a dispatch received from the London office
of this agency, concerning German Preparations for Defeat.
Supplies of fuel, weapons and ammunition have already
been cut.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure
German Preparations for Defeat

The OSS representative in London has transmitted the following information:

A heretofore untied source who during recent weeks is believed to have had frequent contacts with German officers reports that Germany cannot attempt the all-out defense of any fixed line, not even the Rhine. Instead, German defense will be fluid. After being driven back into Germany, substantial forces will go underground for the purpose of conducting guerrilla warfare. Large supplies of food, weapons and ammunition are already concealed.

The same source states that Sweden is preparing to give sanctuary to leading German Junkers, generals and aristocrats. Perhaps Hitler, Himmler, and Goebbels will not be received, but Goering may be included in those given sanctuary.

(OSS Official Dispatch, London, September 21)
TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS

Transmitted herewith for your information is a copy of a dispatch received from the Caserta office of this agency, concerning Soviet Occupation Policies in Rumania.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of
CIA 006687
By SR Date MAY 6, 1975

2O5(12)
21 September 1944

SOVIET OCCUPATION POLICIES IN RUMANIA

The OSS representative in Caserta has transmitted the following information on Soviet operations in Bucharest based on the reports of several officers, including American officers.

The Soviets on 11 September in disregard of Swedish custody entered the former German Legation in the Rumanian capital, after breaking the seals on the doors, and completely ransacked the premises. They explained their action on the grounds that they were looking for furnishings stolen from the Soviet Legation by the Germans. American personnel in Bucharest has received a great number of complaints from the International and Rumanian Red Cross that the Soviets are confiscating ambulances, equipment, supplies and medicine. Contrary to the orders of the Soviet Command in Bucharest, Soviet officers of a field medical unit on 11 September reportedly demanded the surrender of certain Rumanian Red Cross ambulances. The following day the Soviets were said to have seized these ambulances and to have declared that they would take all medical supplies and equipment from the Red Cross warehouse. The Rumanian Government is understood to have lodged a strong protest.

Rumanian industrialists and Government officials are reliably reported to feel that their country has been "abandoned" by the United States and Great Britain, who they claim have broken their promises. Members of the Rumanian armistice commission, since their return from Moscow, are saying that the Soviets dominated the negotiations while the Americans and British remained in the background and were not disposed to discuss the terms until after they had conferred with the Soviets.

A Rumanian industrialist, described as highly reliable and a long-time pro-ally, claims that the Soviet policy apparently is aimed at undermining the King and present Government. The Soviets, the industrialist alleges, have ignored the King and his Government, with the result that the Government has found it increasingly difficult to function and may fall, even though it is willing to cooperate against Germany and Hungary. The Soviet Commanding General is said to have ignored for two days the representatives sent to him by the King.

By Authority of CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 6 1975
The Rumanian people seem to feel that their Government led them into the false belief that the Soviets would not occupy Rumania. The confiscation of radios by the Soviets is considered neither to be a temporary nor a security measure as the poor quality radios reportedly are being destroyed and the good ones are being sent to the USSR.

On 13 September Maniu asked an old American friend why Britain had "let down" the Rumanians and said that he had expected more consideration and more generous terms.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Caserta, 17 September)
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C. (25)

20 September 1944

The White House Map Room
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Attention: Colonel Richard Parks, Jr.

Gentlemen:

I am transmitting herewith one copy of R & A No. 1088.5,
"Losses in the German Armed Forces through June 1944," prepared in
the Research and Analysis Branch of this office and classified as
Confidential.

Sincerely yours,

William L. Langer
Chief, Research and
Analysis Branch

Enclosures (1)
(Copy No. 51)
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C. (25)

19 September 1944

The White House Map Room
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Colonel Richard Parks, Jr.

Gentlemen:

I am transmitting herewith one copy of each of the following reports prepared in the Research and Analysis Branch of this office:

R & A No. 2484, "List of Administrative Subdivisions and Principal Populated Places in Southeastern Siberia" (Copy No. 37)

R & A No. 1767, "Central Industrial Region of Germany" (Copy No. 38)

Sincerely yours,

William L. Langer
Chief, Research and Analysis Branch

Enclosures (2)

Regraded Unclassified
16 September 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.,
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Comité National des Corps
Elus de la République.

Transmitted herewith for your information
is a report, prepared by OSS Washington, dealing with
the Comité National des Corps Elus de la République,
a resistance group in Metropolitan France. This re-
port combines information previously received on the
Comité National (see reports of 2 June, 20 July, 22
July, and 8 August 1944), and describes its background,
objectives, and relationship to the over-all French
political scene.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State
Joint Chiefs of Staff
COMITE NATIONAL DES CORPS ELUS DE LA REPUBLIQUE

I. Origin of the Comite National.

In May 1944 a new organization of French parliamentarians (fully elected members of the French Senate and Chamber), calling itself the Comite National des Corps Elus de la Republique, made contact with the Allies. The movement sprang from the larger group of parliamentarians, who had divided into several distinct camps on the basis of their activities between 1940 and 1943.

Aside from the Communists and the small number of members who have been in exile since 1940, the parliamentarians fall into five groups. The first, reported to number about 200, comprises the men who accepted official positions in the Vichy regime and are in varying degrees identified with the policy of collaboration. A second group, of undetermined size, contains the men who did not hold governmental jobs under Vichy, but who otherwise compromised themselves as collaborators. The largest group is composed of those who avoided all activities committing them to Vichy, but did not participate in resistance. A fourth group engaged in active resistance, and some of its members left France in 1943 or 1944 to work with the FCNL. A fifth group of parliamentarians maintained contact with one another and with members of the non-parliamentary French elite, preparing plans for a return to a republican regime after Allied victory, participating in the active resistance, and maintaining a reserved attitude toward the FCNL.

In 1943 the prospects of an early Allied victory stimulated all the parliamentarians to increased activity. Uncompromised parliamentarians moved toward more active resistance and the FCNL, while those actively identified with Vichy engaged in the maneuvers designed to revive the National Assembly as part of a regime with which, they thought, the Allies might deal. Most important, in February 1944 a group was reported to have organized itself under the name of "the 80", allegedly representing the views of the 80 members of the National Assembly who voted against the 10 July 1940 grant of full powers to Petain. Although generally approving of the FCNL, "the 80" voiced opposition to the idea of a general, De Gaulle, wielding supreme political power. Moreover, "the 80" felt that the FCNL...
had never given it adequate recognition for opposing Petain. These parliamentarians maintained that they alone represented republican legality and properly should assume local authority at the time of liberation in order to uphold the Republic against Vichy and, if necessary, against Communism.

"The 80" may be assumed to have included some parliamentarians who had remained completely inactive as well as some who had been active in resistance but disapproved of anti-parliamentarian and Communist tendencies in the Resistance and the FONL. It drew heavily upon the reconstituted Socialist Party, which has repeatedly endorsed the principle of excluding all parliamentarians who did not vote against Petain.

The Comite National, emerging toward the end of 1943, followed the lead of "the 80" in affirming the illegality of the Vichy regime and stressing the view that the legal continuity of the Third Republic was represented only in the parliamentarians who had not been compromised with Vichy. But the Comite National sought to establish a broader base than that of "the 80" by defining as compromised elements only parliamentarians who accepted positions under Vichy, rather than all those who voted for Petain in July 1940. This definition coincided with the announced policy of the Radical Socialists, the political party from which the Comite National seems to have drawn most of its followers.

II. Composition and Connections of the Comite National.

The Comite National claims to have enlisted 300 officials, including municipal and departmental council members. Although it includes some Socialists, some Democrats Populaires, and some Rightists, the Comite National's membership and leaders are predominantly Radical Socialist. Its Socialist adherents are probably those who were excluded from the reconstituted Socialist Party because of having voted for Petain.

In terms of their activities between 1940 and 1943, the majority of Comite National members in all probability are parliamentarians who have been totally inactive for or against Vichy, and those who were in opposition but not entirely in accord with the FONL. One of its leaders held a directorship in a Ministry under the first Petain Cabinet. Some members may have been active in the organized resistance but became alienated by anti-parliamentarian or Communist tendencies in it.
Representing itself to the Allies as possessing a powerful resistance force in France, the Comité National declared in May 1944 that the resistance organization built around elements of the dissolved Armistice Army, the Organisation de Résistance de l'Armée (ORA), had placed itself at the disposal of the Comité National.

The ORA, organized by the Deuxième Bureau of the Armistice Army, claims to have 45,000 men. Reports indicate that this force, recruited largely from the middle class, has been indoctrinated with ideas of the extreme Right. At the beginning of 1943, the ORA kept itself aloof from the Gaullist Resistance Groups and was even reported to be in contact with some Vichy circles. However, toward the end of 1943 a liaison between the ORA and the Gaullist Secret Army was reported.

The Comité National claimed the complete support of French big business interests. M. de Wendel, of the Comité des Forges, was specifically mentioned. This claim is confirmed by reports that Comité des Forges members, including de Wendel, were trying to penetrate anti-collaborationist groups by offers of financial and material support.

The Comité National has stated that it considers the Vichy regime to be without authority because it has exceeded the powers granted to Pétain by the National Assembly’s decision of 10 July 1940. Unlike most FCMF juridical theorists, the Comité National does not regard that decision itself unconstitutional. No indication has been given that public officials would be considered culpable for fulfilling their obligations to Vichy prior to the Comité National’s 7 May 1944 declaration of principles, reliving officials of their allegiance to Vichy. There is no evidence of an actual connection between Vichy and the Comité National but it is known that the Vichy Ministry of the Interior—and therefore the Gestapo—knew of the existence of the Comité National.

One member of the Comité National is also a member of the Conseil National de Résistance, a directorial council composed of delegates of the Resistance movements, the trade unions, and the political parties. This member is presumably admitted to the Conseil as a representative of his political party, not as a spokesman for the Comité National as such. It is certain that the Comité National, not organized until 1944, could not seriously claim to represent the bulk of the Resistance.
The relations between the Conseil National de Résistance and the Comité National have consisted principally of a dispute over the degree to which the former parliamentary elite will be restored to positions of power. The Conseil has expressed its opposition to the participation in Government of deputies who voted for Pétain in July 1940. This conflicts with the position of the Comité National, and the actual distribution of power by the Conseil has been on the whole unsatisfactory to the Comité National.

III. The Comité National's Quest for Political Power.

On the basis of its claim to constitutional legitimacy, its ORA backing, and its appeal to all parliamentarians not actually in office under Vichy, the Comité National originally hoped to gain Allied recognition of its exclusive right to assume governmental authority in post-liberation France. As the FTP became an increasingly significant military force, and FCNL relations with the Allies improved, the Comité National's political assets declined until in August 1944 the group's last request of the Allies was merely for direct contact with De Gaulle, whom the Comité National has finally had to accept as a political as well as military leader. By working within the framework of the Gaullist government, the Comité National apparently hopes at least to insure the restoration of former parliamentarians to power.

In its original approach to the Allies in May 1944, the Comité National proposed itself as the head of a French civil administration under the Allied High Command. Moreover, it declared on 7 May that the only lawful authority in France was that based on the Constitution, and that no administrative function could legally be carried on without the consent of constitutionally elected officials. It maintained flatly that "Algiers was illegal", and that the Comité National was the sole expression of the sovereign national will, but promised full cooperation with De Gaulle as military leader and symbol of Resistance sentiment.

In June, in a further approach to the Allies, the Comité National modified its position, and stated that it would be willing for De Gaulle to set up a temporary government, "subject to constitutional safeguards". It continued to regard De Gaulle as chief of the army and itself as constitutional representative until elections could be held. Its platform included the maintenance of a democratic constitutional framework of government, resistance to arbitrary government either left or right, and avoidance of civil war.
It still sought to be consulted on plans for administration of liberated territory, asserting that it could guarantee the cooperation of good administrators.

The Comité National at this time expressed alarm over Communist control in Resistance circles. It claimed that it could muster genuine resistance forces, and that the Algiers committee was inadequate to organize a union of French forces. It expressed a desire for an effective, independent liaison with London and the Allied High Command.

However, the Comité National's hope for establishing direct political connection with the Allies suffered a severe blow when, in June, General Revers, head of the ORA, failed to secure a direct liaison between the ORA and the Allied High Command. Revers conveyed his request early in the month, expressing mistrust of the Gaullist Intelligence Services under Colonel Passy and General Koenig, and further asserted that the Conseil National de Resistance was Communist-controlled. Later, it was reported from London that General Eisenhower had rejected ORA overtures, and had agreed to deal exclusively through General Koenig. General Koenig knew of the ORA-Comité National relationship, and in August was reported to have placed Revers in a less responsible position in the FFI. At any rate, the ORA is now fighting as an integral part of the FFI. The failure of the ORA to achieve recognition as an essential, independent Resistance force eliminated the Comité National's strongest bargaining point.

Finally, in August, having failed to establish direct contact with the Allies, the Comité National disavowed any intention of seeking foreign support for itself, and merely asked that the Allies facilitate the establishment of a liaison with De Gaulle personally—as opposed to FCNL agents inside France whom it distrusted. It no longer had any expectation of taking over the government, but held to the fundamental premise that at the moment of liberation Municipal and General Councils elected before the war should be restored to office and should wield authority prior to new elections. The Comité National and the FCNL essentially agreed on this position as well as on the necessity for purging the Councils. However, the FCNL believed that compromised elements should be dismissed and replacements made by the Commissioner for the Interior, acting on the advice of the Prefect and the Departmental Committee of Liberation. The Comité National, on the other hand, originally had envisaged itself as the national authority which would supervise the purge. By August it had modified its position, but declared that the Councils themselves in cooperation with the FCNL should eliminate compromised members and should choose their successors by democratic procedure.
Actually, despite their early demands for over-all authority, the Comité National as early as April 1944 had begun negotiations with the Gaullist movement inside France for positions on the Departmental Committees of Resistance and in the post-liberation administration of France. Since the liberation of France, nothing has been heard of this organization. Certain of its members, however, have emerged in positions of some importance in post-liberation French politics. The new members of the Provisional Government, announced by De Gaulle on 9 September, included Georges Bidault, reportedly chairman of the Comité National, and it is predicted in Paris that other parliamentarians will soon be appointed.
TO:         Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
         White House Map Room
SUBJECT:   Report Received in OSS.

              Transmitted herewith for your information
              is copy of a dispatch received from the Stockholm
              office of this agency, concerning political orienta-
              tion and military plans of the present Hungarian
              Government.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc:    Department of State
       Joint Chiefs of Staff
       Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
       Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence
       Director of Naval Intelligence

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of

CIA 006687
by SR Date MAY 6 1975
HUNGARY: Political Orientation and Military Plans of the Present Government.

The OSS representative in Stockholm has transmitted the information that the strongly pro-Nazi Military Attache at the Hungarian (puppet) Legation in Stockholm, who returned from an official visit to Hungary on 1 September, commented pessimistically on the Hungarian political situation, as follows:

The Army General Staff, still strongly oriented towards Germany, is dissatisfied with the appointment of Lakatos as Premier, especially because he is considered too pro-British and not amenable to control by the military.

The real power is now in the hands of Horthy (the Regent), Lakatos, and Boncezos (Minister of Interior). Horthy is allegedly ashamed of earlier anti-Jewish measures. Though he is still violently anti-Communist, Horthy would support Lakatos in the event of his adopting an anti-Nazi policy.

The Germans will try to stand at the Transylvanian Carpathians, and the Hungarians will try to defend the Sava district as well as the part of Yugoslavia now occupied by Hungarian troops.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Stockholm, 3 September)
TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of a dispatch received from the Algiers office of this agency, concerning reported German withdrawals from Yugoslavia, and continued Partisan-Chetnik conflict.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence
Director of Naval Intelligence

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of CIA 006687
JSR Date May 6, 1975
YUGOSLAVIA: Reported German Withdrawals; Continued Partisan-Chetnik Conflict.

The OSS representative in Algiers has transmitted the following information, which is rated B-3:

A courier from Belgrade, whom Mihailovich considers trustworthy, reports that the evacuation of all German families and non-essential personnel from Serbian centers is in progress, and that rolling stock is being concentrated for the evacuation of German forces in Greece. Mihailovich said he is unable to block this move, due to the Partisan offensive, in which all available Nationalist (Chetnik) troops in Serbia are now engaged. Nationalist mobilization in this area is expected to culminate in the first week of September. An Austrian major now with the Nationalists is working to arrange for the surrender to the Nationalists of German depots after German withdrawal.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Algiers, 2 September)

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of
CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 6 1975
SECRET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

1 September 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
    White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS

Transmitted herewith for your information is a copy of a report, the content of which was obtained from two dispatches received from the Istanbul office of this agency. This document concerns the expulsion of German troops and Gestapo from Bulgaria, and rumored Bulgarian Cabinet appointments.

[Signature]

Oliver Jackson Banks, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure:

cc: Joint Chiefs of Staff
    Department of State (Fletcher Warren)
    Director of Naval Intelligence
    Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
    Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of
CIA 006687

By SK Date: MAY 6 1975

Regarded Unclassified
1 September 1944

BULGARIA: Expulsion of German Troops and Gestapo; Rumored Cabinet Appointments.

The following intelligence, dated 29 August, has been transmitted by the OSS representative in Istanbul:

According to Bulgarian officials in Istanbul, German troops entering Bulgaria from Rumania are being disarmed. A specific deadline has been set for the withdrawal of all Germans now in Bulgaria, including the Gestapo. Troops will be allowed to take with them only small arms and rifles, and all are under surveillance. Reliable Bulgarian units have been stationed around all German camps; 600,000 Bulgarian troops have been mobilized.

Refugees who left Bulgaria on 28 August have reported rumors that Professor Petko Stainov, prominent pro-Allied member of the Democratic Party, would be the new Foreign Minister, and Stoicho Moshanov the new Premier. In view of Moshanov's consistent pro-British attitude, he may be the British choice. Bulgarian officials in Istanbul, however, believe that Moshanov has little prestige in Bulgaria, partly because of his reputed implication in questionable financial deals concerning Jewish affairs.

(OSS Official Dispatches, Istanbul, 31 August)
1 September 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information is a copy of a dispatch received from the London office of this agency, concerning the report that Polish Premier Sikorski was due to confer with Prime Minister Churchill on 30 August with reference to immediate aid for Warsaw.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of

CIA 006687
By SR Date May 6, 1975
31 August 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
    White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of a dispatch received from the Cairo office of this agency, concerning the report that Admiral Alexandris has been chosen as the prospective Governor of the Dodecanese.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Joint Chiefs of Staff
    Department of State
30 August 1944

GREECE: Greek Governor for Dodecanese.

The OSS representative in Cairo has transmitted the following information:

The Greek Government-in-Exile has received a recommendation from the British Embassy to Greece to appoint a Governor for the Dodecanese. Admiral Alexandris, Commander in Chief of the Greek Fleet at the time of the recent mutiny, removed from his post on 19 April because of his reluctance to use force against the mutineers, is said to have been chosen as the prospective Governor. This appointment is being kept a strict secret in order that the Turks can be presented with a fait accompli when the Allies occupy the Dodecanese.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Cairo, 29 August)
28 August 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS

Transmitted herewith for your information is a copy of a dispatch received from the Bern office of this agency concerning the German coup d'état.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS Intelligence Service

Enclosure

cc: Joint Chiefs of Staff
Department of State

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of
CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 6, 1975

Regraded Unclassified
The following, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern, is a sequel to reports dated 22 and 25 July, and 8 and 17 August, concerning the German conspiratorial group which on 20 July attempted a coup d'etat against Hitler:

A courier recently in contact with this group reports that the movement is still going on, although naturally slowed down by executions and arrests. The Gestapo apparently have discovered a comprehensive list of individuals scheduled for top posts in the new regime which was to have been headed by Beck and Goerdler. The courier also confirms the arrest of one of the group's two emissaries referred to in previous reports. The emissary is believed in imminent danger of being liquidated, but will probably be held for Goerdler's trial.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern)
26 August 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS

Transmitted herewith for your information is a copy of a dispatch received from the Bern office of this agency concerning the Nazi plan to execute all foreign workers in the Reich.

John S. Davenport, III
Special Assistant to the Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure

cc: Department of State
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of
CIA 006687
By SR Date MAY 6 1975

Regraded Unclassified
26 August 1944

GERMANY: Nazi Plan to Execute All Foreign Workers in the Reich

The report set forth below has been transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern with the following comment: There is nothing impossible about the Nazi plan as described in this report. The information is forwarded, however, with reserve. It is believed here that the source is dependable enough to justify forwarding his report, and there is no apparent reason for questioning his good faith. Yet before this evidence is accepted fully, it would be wise to have further proof of his sincerity.

Toward the end of May or the beginning of June 1944, a conference was held at Hitler’s headquarters at Berchtesgaden. It was attended by Hitler, Himmler, Kaltenbrunner and Generals Guderian, Fromm, Zeitzler and Keitel, among others. The decision was reached at this meeting to make arrangements for the extermination of alien workers, in the event that the Russian, British and American troops made any further gains. The workers were classified in five groups at the suggestion of Kaltenbrunner and Himmler. The first group, classed as "very dangerous" and comprising 2,000,000 men, was to be exterminated before the others. It appears that their execution was to begin at once. In order to give a semblance of legality to this massacre, it was agreed that the 2,000,000 who were to be liquidated first should be moved from one work camp to another and that, on the way, they should be shot down by SS troops on the pretext that they had attempted to revolt or escape.

The report stated that a number of the Wehrmacht generals, among them Rundstedt, Zeitzler, Fromm, Wittlenben and Beck* as well as General Otto, a close friend of source, had refused to consent to this mass murder. Source suggests it was for this reason that some of them later took part in the attempt against the Fuehrer, which is said to have been foreshadowed in the report.

General Stieff and his friends requested source to establish contact with the Allies in order to warn them of the coming executions and to urge them to drop

*Received "Bock"; presumed to be General Ludwig Beck, see notes.
Leaflets telling the German people of the plan. The report suggested further that an appeal be made by prominent political leaders and men of letters, such as Brüning, Wirth, Thomas Mann and Professor Dessauer, who had taken refuge outside Germany. General von Modeus was also mentioned as one of the army chiefs who might be persuaded to lead his troops against the Nazi government. The writers of this report, however, had no love for the Russians and did not wish to negotiate with them.

The source of the foregoing report is a French journalist with Catholic affiliations, who has been associated with underground activities in France. He states that, since 1941, he has received only brief, occasional communications from his friends in the German High Command. On 11 July, however, he received by secret courier the above report and appeal from Major General Hellmuth Stieff, who was later executed.

Source communicated to Alfred Kober of the National Zeitung of Basel the information on Nazi plans to execute foreign workers which was published by that newspaper and was quoted by an OWI report of 2 August 1944.

**Received "von Moltke"**
Kaltenbrunner, Dr. Ernst - Chief of the Security Services, including the Sicherheits Polizei and the Sicherheits Dienst.

Guderian, Generaloberst Heinz - Made Chief of Staff of the Army High Command after the plot of 20 July, replacing Zeitzler.

Frum, Generaloberst Fritz - Former Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Training Army; replaced since 20 July.

Zeitzler, Generaloberst Kurt - Former Chief of Staff of the Army High Command; was replaced by Guderian after 20 July 1944.

Hitler's deputy in the Fuehrer's capacity as Chief of Army and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

Rundstedt, Generalfeldmarschall Karl Gerd von - In command of the German troops in Western Europe until replaced by von Kluge. Served on the "Court of Honor" which tried those suspected of being implicated in the 20 July plot.

Witzleben, Generalfeldmarschall Erwin von - Retired in 1940. Found guilty of treason in the 20 July plot, and hanged.

Beck, General Ludwig - Retired. Said to have committed suicide after the 20 July plot.

Otto, Lieutenant General Paul - Retired May 1945. This may also be Generalmajor Otto, whose command is unknown.

Major General Hellmuth Stieff was among the generals whose hanging was announced by the Nazis in connection with the plot against Hitler's life.

Model, Generaloberst Walter - in command of the Ninth Army.

Brueening, Dr. Heinrich - Reichskanzler in 1930-32, Catholic Party.

Birch, Joseph - Reichskanzler and Minister between 1940 and 1942, Catholic Party.

Dessauer, Friedrich - Professor of physics at the University of Freiburg, member of the Catholic Center Party. Member of the Reichstag from 1924 to 1933, arrested by the Nazis in 1933.
25 August 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS

Transmitted herewith for your information is a copy of a dispatch received from the London office of this agency, to the effect that Mikolajczyk's government gives the impression that it is playing for time.

[Signature]

John S. Davenport, III
Special Assistant to the Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure

cc: Department of State
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of

CIR 006687
By SR Date MAY 6 1975

Regraded Unclassified
25 August 1944

POLAND: Nikolajczyk Government Gives Impression of Playing For Time

The OSS representative in London has transmitted the following report which supplements the information in the OSS memorandum of 19 August dealing with Nikolajczyk's trip to Moscow:

The impression in London is that the Polish Government-in-exile is "stalling, playing for a break and hoping that swift advances in France may introduce new elements into the situation," following Cabinet approval of a counter-proposal to the Polish Committee in Moscow.

Nikolajczyk's chef de cabinet advised that all members of the Cabinet except the Socialists approved the proposal, the main points of which were substantially as previously reported. The Socialists are afraid to return to a Soviet-occupied Warsaw. However, in Romer's opinion they will give their approval for the sake of unity.

The proposal, said OSS London, was worded diplomatically in the matter of the eastern frontier question, reasserting Poland's sovereign interests in its centers of culture and its sources of raw material. A concession was made to the Soviets in the promise to eliminate from the new government all reactionary elements with pre-September 1939 connections. US and British support is being sought.

Romer quotes Premier Stanislaw Nikolajczyk as predicting the proposal has "only a ten percent chance" for success.
The following, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern, is a sequel to reports dated 25 July and 8 August, concerning the German conspiratorial group which on 20 July attempted a coup d'état against Hitler. One of the group's two emissaries referred to in previous reports left for Germany shortly before 20 July and took part in the final deliberations preceding the attempted putsch. From his place of hiding, he has forwarded the following report via courier to the OSS representative:

A serious break occurred among the conspirators at the eleventh hour. A number of the Generals, as well as Colonel von Stauffenberg, advanced the idea that peace should be concluded with the Soviets, while Goerdler and Beck and the emissary clung to their original view that an arrangement should be worked out with the Western Allies to the exclusion of the Soviets.

/OSS BERN COMMENT: These Generals must have undergone a recent change of attitude, as the OSS representative had not been informed of any such change of position on their part prior to the coup.

Both Rommel and von Kluge were aware of the conspiracy. Rommel insisted that he would only collaborate with the conspirators provided Hitler, Goebbels and Himmler were liquidated. Shortly before the coup was attempted, von Kluge said that he would be able to hold out on the Western Front for about three weeks, while Rommel maintained that it would not be possible to do so for as long as that. Rommel is at present seriously ill in Germany.

The emissary believes that von Kluge holds the key to the situation and thinks that von Kluge would be ready to cooperate with the Western Allies in order to facilitate a more rapid occupation of Germany, if a suitable officer among the Anglo-American war prisoners were sent him as intermediary.

The emissary reports that the following additional persons have been killed since the putsch attempt: Major General Hans Oster (a member of the conspiratorial group and former top-ranking Abwehr leader) and all of von Stauffenberg's children, his wife, brother, and brother's wife. The following, he reports, are kept shackled in prison: Hjalmar Schacht, former president of the Reichsbank; Constantin von Neurath, president of the Cabinet
Council, former Foreign Minister and former Protector of Bohemia and Moravia; Johannes Popitz, until recently Prussian State Minister and Minister of Finance, offices which he has held since 1933; and Wolf Graf von Helldorf, police president of Berlin.

OSS BERN COMMENT: The OSS representative comments that while he is not able positively to confirm the fate or the names of these persons, he believes the information to be trustworthy in view of the source's previous record for reliability.

The messenger who brought the report from the emissary also brought reports that the Army is deeply outraged and shocked by the events which have occurred since 20 July, and says that it is only necessary now for the Allies to strike hard and the entire German structure will collapse.

Among the further consequences of the events of 20 July, the OSS representative reports that top Abwehr control has been effected. A decisive step in this direction was the recent arrest of Colonel Hansen, acting director of the Abwehr under Kaltenbrunner. During the first week in August, Engelbrechten, Abwehr operative in Geneva, was reportedly recalled by the Nazis at the insistence of Swiss officials who claimed he was involved in Gestapo activities. Commander Weisner, German Consul General and Abwehr head in Bern, returned to Bern early in August after a brief visit in Berlin, and indicated his willingness now to work under the Gestapo and Schellenberg, head of one of the Security Service departments. As a part of the Abwehr purge, the Nazis have also recalled Count Ferdinand Auersperg, an Austrian with the rank of Colonel, who nominally held the post of assistant air attache in the Bern Legation but actually was an Abwehr man.

The killing of Werner Haeften and York von Wartenberg shortly after the coup attempt may well indicate that the Gestapo has obtained information regarding opposition elements within the German Labor Party, the German Church movement and Church administration. Von Wartenberg, the OSS representative reports, served as liaison between the leaders of the conspiratorial group and the principal civilian adherents of the group including labor leaders. Von Haeften, whose brother Hans Gustav is in the Foreign Office, is believed to have established good contacts with the Church movement.

(OSS Official Dispatches, Bern, 10 and 11 August)
17 August 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of a dispatch received from the Algiers office of this agency, reporting that the imminent crisis in the Bonomi Government in Italy may result in several replacements.

Olive Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
ITALY: Crisis in Bonomi Government.

It has been reliably reported that the imminent crisis in the Bonomi Government may result in several replacements. Benedetto Croce (who recently resigned from the Government) is apparently maneuvering behind the scenes to effect these changes, which include the replacement of Premier Bonomi by Orlando (the Prime Minister from 1917-19). It is also possible that Rodino, or another member of the Christian Democratic Party who supports the monarchy, may replace de Gasperi (Minister without Portfolio). Possible changes relating to the military include the replacement of Casati (the Liberal Party Minister of War) by General Odone (Adjutant of the General Staff for Territorial Defense in 1942). Finally, Badoglio may assume the position now held by General Mares (Chief of Staff of the armed forces). There is organized opposition to the last change, however, and wall signs have been clandestinely posted in protest.

OSS WASHINGTON COMMENT: Although one of the strongest political pressures in recent months has been for a progressive liberalization of the Italian Government, such changes as indicated above would result in a cabinet of more conservative character.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Algiers, 15 August)
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

17 August 1944

TO:  Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
     White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of a dispatch received from the Cairo office of this agency, concerning a reported British ultimatum to the EAM in Greece.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State.
    Joint Chiefs of Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of

CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 0 1975

Secret

203(12)
GREECE: British Ultimatum to the EAM.

The following information, dated 15 August, has been transmitted by the OSS representative in Cairo:

From the remarks of a ranking British staff officer just prior to his departure for Greece, the OSS representative in Cairo learns that EAM-ELAS headquarters is being offered a final opportunity to join the Papandreou government, with the alternative of losing its place at the peace conference. EAM-ELAS is to be warned that before refusing and throwing the country into civil war it should consider the power of the Allies.

Asked whether this action was an equivalent of the projected denunciation of EAM-ELAS, the officer replied: "Not altogether, but we're showing our hand." The OSS representative concludes that the officer's trip has probably been timed (1) to counterbalance the recently arrived Soviet mission at EAM-ELAS headquarters, and (2) to express the British viewpoint prior to a German withdrawal, at which time its force and effect would be lost.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Cairo, 15 August)
16 August 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
    White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS

Transmitted herewith for your information is a copy of a dispatch received from the Algiers office of this agency, concerning the report that Alexandre Parodi is to be the new FCNL Commissioner for Occupied Territories in France.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of

CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 6 1975

Regarded Unclassified
FRANCE: Parodi Reported to be the New PCNL Commissioner for Occupied Territories.

The OSS representative in Algiers has received a report from trustworthy sources that Alexandre Parodi is the person who was selected by the Algiers "Provisional" Government on 12 August as Commissioner for Occupied Territories. Up to the present Parodi has served in German-occupied France as General de Gaulle's representative. He is said to be an experienced French civil servant who at one time was a member of the Conseil de la Resistance. He is believed to be a staunch republican with Socialist leanings. Apparently his name is familiar to only a small number of people, even in the highest administrative circles in Algiers.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Algiers, 13 August)
TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of two dispatches received from the Istanbul office of this agency, concerning Turkish reaction to the break with Germany.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State.
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
TURKEY: Reaction to the Break with Germany.

The following intelligence, dated 11 August, has been transmitted and rated by the OSS representative in Istanbul:

Turkish Government circles are reported seriously concerned over the popular reaction to the break with Germany. Widespread public resentment and fear that the country's peace has been sacrificed to Allied pressure is said to have been stimulated by the official government statement and by newspaper comments, which ascribed the break to obligations imposed on Turkey by her alliance with the British. Nightly blackouts, curfew laws, and other emergency defense measures soon to be enacted have caused unrest in Istanbul. This has been increased by anti-aircraft action against unidentified planes, although these were later identified as Allied craft. Newspapers report 500 residents evacuating Istanbul each day and moving into the interior of the country. As yet, however, no panic has been reported among the population.

According to witnesses who were in Ankara on 1 August, the session of the parliamentary group of the People's Party which preceded the break was the most turbulent which has been held for years. 29 out of the first 33 members who spoke are said to have opposed the move. (B-3) In an effort to calm their fears, Saracoglu emphasized that Bulgaria would not be a party to any German reprisals, that Turkish officials felt there was little chance of a Nazi attack, and that the Allies would compensate Turkey for economic losses. (C-3) Foreigners in Ankara appear to ascribe the confidence of Turkish officials to a specific agreement with Von Papen that Germany would take no military action against Turkey unless Turkey cooperated in an attack on the Reich. The Turkish Government is said to have assured Von Papen that Turkey felt no enmity toward Germany and would not resort to arms unless forced to do so by the Reich itself. Von Papen, in turn, instructed Saracoglu to hold Turkey back from further action while he attempted to dissuade Germany from retaliating for the break. (C-3)

Of the 3000 Germans resident in Turkey, approximately 200 have already left the country. Diplomats and those who have affirmed their sympathy for the Reich have been treated fairly, but despite newspaper comments to the contrary, Jewish and anti-Nazi Germans are finding it difficult to obtain permission to remain. One explanation of this (B-3) is that Von Papen notified the Turks that the German attitude would be conditioned in part by the treatment accorded to Germans. According to another report (B-3), Nazi authorities have requested the deportation of some of their opponents.

(OSS Official Dispatches, Istanbul, 11 August)
TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information is a copy of two dispatches recently received from the Lisbon office of this agency, concerning the report that a German economic agent is seeking Allied contacts in Lisbon.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State.
   Joint Chiefs of Staff.
GERMAN ECONOMIC AGENT SEEKS ALLIED CONTACTS IN LISBON.

The following report has been received by the OSS representative in Lisbon through a thoroughly reliable source:

Heinz Carl Weber, in charge of all German mineral purchasing operations in Lisbon as representative of the Reichs Wirtschaft Ministerium, says he has received a message from German General Headquarters to find out how the United States would react to the following proposal: Germany would surrender unconditionally to the Western Allies and meet any industrial or territorial demands, provided the latter act at once to occupy the Reich and keep out the Soviet.

Weber claims that German intelligence has obtained evidence showing that the Japanese and the Soviets have agreed to split up Asia into respective spheres of influence. He believes that if the recent attempt to assassinate Hitler had succeeded, it would have resulted in a German collapse and a victory for the German Communists.

The OSS representative comments that such a proposal obviously is in line with German attempts to drive a wedge between the Anglo-Americans and the Soviets, but suggests that the report may merit attention in view of the channels employed and the apparent sincerity of the source.

 OSS WASHINGTON COMMENT: While little biographical data is available on Weber, it is known that he has been active in German economic operations in foreign countries for a number of years, either in affiliation with the Deutsche Bank or in mineral purchasing operations. He is believed to be the head of one or more German companies or trading concerns in the Iberian peninsula and has spent 17 years in Brazil. He is sometimes known as Dr. Weber.

(OSS Official Dispatches, Lisbon, 7 and 8 August)
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C. (25)

10 August 1944

The White House Map Room
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Attention: Lt. Col. Richard Parks, Jr.

Gentlemen:

I am transmitting herewith one copy of each of the following reports prepared in the Research and Analysis Branch of this Office:

R & A No. 2139, "General Zeligowski, A Polish Advocate of Pan-Slavism" (Copy No. 44)

R & A No. 2142, "Navigable Rivers of the Philippine Islands" (Copy No. 26)

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

William L. Langer
Chief, Research and Analysis Branch

Enclosures (2)

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-78
By: DOD Date: FEB 10 1972

Regarded Unclassified
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C. (26)

10 August 1944

The White House Map Room
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Attention: Lt. Col. Richard Parks, Jr.

Gentlemen:

I am transmitting herewith one copy of R & A No.
2081.3, "Italian Political Documents: Part III", prepared
in the Research and Analysis Branch of this office and
classified as restricted.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

William L. Langer
Chief, Research and Analysis Branch

Enclosure
(Copy No. 47)

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By [Signature] Date: FEB 1.0.1972
9 August 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
   White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of two dispatches recently received from the Bern office of this agency. This report, which is a sequel to reports on the same subject dated 2 June, 20 July, and 22 July 1944, is a further summary of the views of the Comite National des Corps Elus de la Republique, a Resistance group in Metropolitan France.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State.
    Joint Chiefs of Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of
CIA 006687

By SR Date May 6, 1975
The following report (sequel to reports dated 2 June, 20 July, and 22 July 1944) is a further summary of the views of the Comité National (Comité National des Corps Elus de la République, a middle-of-the-road group of officials elected before the war, largely composed of members of the Radical Socialist Party) with respect to French administration during and following the current period of liberation. It was submitted to OSS Bern by their representative, Dr. Mazet, who has been Secretary General of the Radical Socialist Party since 1936:

The emissary states that varying anti-Nazi and anti-Vichy viewpoints are represented in the Comité National; its members unite in supporting democratic methods in contrast to despotic rule. All Communists, and such Socialists as have become collaborationists, are ineligible for membership in the Comité. On the other hand, Socialists who support the Resistance and the Comité National keep up a contact either directly or through their respective representatives on the National Council of Resistance (the higher council of Gaullist Resistance groups). The executive committee of the Comité National claims to represent not merely members of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, but also the local municipal and departmental elected councils. These latter bodies have in general retained the confidence of the people.

The best chance for the French populace to make its will felt in the phase now opening lies in suitable recognition, at the moment of liberation, of Municipal and General Councils elected before the war—that is, in so far as they are made up of men not compromised. Under the direction of the forces of occupation and in cooperation with the FCNL, the councils themselves could eliminate compromised members and select successors by democratic procedure.

The Comité National makes much of its sympathy with the US policy of refusing to recognize any regime not chosen by the people of France. They believe, nevertheless, that if all previously elected officials are dropped and others arbitrarily chosen—the procedure which they say is predicted by General de Gaulle's delegates in France—it will be impossible for the French people to give free expression to their will, since men so appointed would have control over the election results. Much water must pass under the bridge...
before any elections are held; but in the interim the nation's business must be attended to. If the old elected officials are kept out of office while these affairs are handled exclusively by appointed officials, there is cause to fear the replacement of the representative, democratic features of the national government by something more arbitrary. This will prevent the people from making their will really effective when elections are finally held.

The Comité National's representative feels certain that the excessive criticism of the Third Republic by the Communists has as its aim the destruction of all potential opponents. As proof, he brings forward a letter signed by 27 Communists sent to Marshal Petain at the time of the Riom trials, commending the Marshal for taking harsh measures against officials of the Third Republic and offering to act as witnesses against them. He emphasizes, however, that it is not a question of the virtues or vices of the Third Republic, but of a serious menace to the future of democracy in France—a menace which will be realized if the Municipal and General Councils are prevented from functioning during the crucial time between the liberation and the holding of new elections.

The Comité National's representative is in intimate touch with M. Parodi, General de Gaulle's delegate in the occupied areas of France, and the National Council of Resistance, which includes a representative of the Comité National. He has discussed frankly these matters with them, and is still convinced that the Communists exert a dominant influence in the National Council of Resistance. He believes, furthermore, that even Parodi has been maneuvered into a position from which he is unable to pass on full information to General de Gaulle. The General, in all likelihood, has no idea of the degree to which popular representation has been superseded by the Communists, whose orders come from an unidentified source. The French nation is not communistically inclined, as the Communists well know. Their game is therefore to seize the controls at the very start; and they are greatly heartened by their success with the National Council of Resistance.

The executive committee of the Comité National is anxious to bring about a meeting between two of their men and General de Gaulle, in whom they see a leader. The purpose of the meeting will be to talk over the questions confronting France. The committee is not seeking the support of any foreign nation; it merely wants material facilities for the journey contemplated by their two representatives. Parodi has not been able to arrange this for them, and they want to know whether OSS could help them if their emissaries get to Madrid. Although the committee recognizes the democratic views and the patriotism of Louis Marin, they consider him to be too old and some-
what too conservative to give proper expression to their views. Moreover, they are not in contact with him at the moment.

The specific questions discussed by the OSS representative in Bern and Dr. Mazet, the Comite National emissary, were:

1. Whatever procedure is followed in Brittany may well be taken as an indication of future general policy. Ex-Senator Le Gorgeu, once Mayor of Brest, has been doing underground work in the vicinity of Rennes. Generals Giraud and de Gaulle, acting jointly, appointed him Trustee of the Republic for all Brittany. The whole region is solidly behind him. It is reported that the Mayors of Dinan and St. Malo are now in Paris, and they could be of help to the Comite National if they could be secured. The Mayor of St. Malo, Gasnier-Duparc, is a Senator, formerly the Marine Minister, and evidently accepted as Mayor by the National Council of Resistance. Geistdoerfer, the Mayor of Dinan, is of Alsatian origin, and was put out of office by Vichy and then established, by the National Council of Resistance, as the authorized Mayor. He has had experience in administration, and was formerly Deputy from Cotes-du-Nord. Should such leaders be ignored by the De Gaulle committee or the National Council of Resistance, the restoration of order in Brittany would receive a set-back and the rest of the country would regard it as an ominous precedent. Feeling has been aroused in France by Aligiers' reported appointment of Jean Cassou and Dunoyer de Segonzac for a district in the southwest of France. The former is a decadent author communistically inclined; the latter was a fervent backer of Petain's National Revolution.

2. It is the firm conviction of the executive committee of the Comite National that the attempt to place the real responsibility for the downfall of France on the democracy of the Third Republic is really an attack on democracy in general. The real responsibility, they feel should fall squarely on Fascists and Fascist sympathizers in the French Army, and on members of the Croix de Feu and Cagoulards, who had Communist assistance.

3. The national Council of Resistance is beginning to show more willingness to compromise with chosen representatives who declined to work with Vichy; but the Communists, who are set on eliminating the representatives of the people, are thwarting every attempt at conciliation made by the Council. Should Blum and Daladier escape the clutches of the Nazis and the milice, the Communists would gladly dispose of them.
4. General de Revers, De Gaulle's military representative in France, was obliged to contend with two representatives of the National Council of Resistance during his command in Southwest France. These men, Fouché and Saller, by name, revealed that they were far more interested in laying the foundations for a French revolution than they were in fighting the Germans. General Koenig sent De Revers word to explain his connection with the Comité National's executive committee. Later, De Revers was recalled to Paris and given a minor advisory post, his position in Southwest France being taken over by Rollé, who, according to De Revers, is a Communist.

5. At the approximate time of the Allied invasion of Normandy, the Germans arrested General Gildas, Paris commander of the French Forces of the Interior, a first-rate man, together with Pecherie, his advisor, and their staff. The Comité National representative feels there is strong reason to suspect that the Communists gave them away. The arrest of these men gave basis for the incorrect report that De Revers himself had been taken into custody.

(OSS Official Dispatches, Bern)
8 August 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
    White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information is a copy of a dispatch recently received from the Bern office of this agency, concerning the posting by the Nazis of a reward for the capture of Arthur Nebe.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State.
    Joint Chiefs of Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of

CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 6 1975
7 August 1944

NAZIS POST REWARD FOR CAPTURE OF ARTHUR NEBE

A report reaching the OSS representative in Bern states that the Nazis have posted a reward for Arthur Nebe, following a like report on Goerdler*. This is taken to indicate that the net is being pulled tighter around the opposition group responsible for the coup d'etat of 20 July 1944.

Nebe is an old Gestapo officer. He has been considered a clever but rather routine official to whom the methods of the Gestapo have sometimes been shocking. It is reported that, for the past ten years, he has maintained contact with one of the Germans who served as emissary for the German opposition group mentioned in the OSS reports of 22 and 25 July 1944 on "The German Coup d'Etat". This accusation that Nebe was involved in the Hitler plot is interpreted as proof that some elements of the Gestapo had a hand in the scheme.

OSS Washington comment: A report of early July 1944 stated that a group associated with Wolff Graf von Halldorf, Chief of Police in Berlin, had joined the opposition group described in previous OSS reports (see reports of 18 and 22 July 1944). Halldorf's group was described as being composed of a number of anti-Hitler elements working separately from the Gestapo. The implication contained in this description, namely that elements in the Gestapo might be involved in the plot against Hitler, seems to be born out by the present report.

*On 1 August 1944, a broadcast by Goebbels named Dr. Karl Goerdler, former Mayor of Leipzig, as having had a hand in the plot to assassinate Hitler, and announced an award of 1,000,000 RM for information leading to his arrest.
5 August 1944

The White House Map Room
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Attention: Col. Richard Parks, Jr.

Gentlemen:

I am transmitting herewith one copy of R & A No. 1261, "Shimushu-To", prepared in the Research and Analysis Branch of this office and classified as secret.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

William F. Langer
Chief, Research and Analysis Branch

Enclosure
(Copy No. 132)

[Redacted]
5 August 1944

The White House Map Room
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Attention: Col. Richard Parks, Jr.

Gentlemen:

I am transmitting herewith one copy of R & A No. 1632, "Captured Chetnik Documents", prepared in the Research and Analysis Branch of this office and classified as secret.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

William E. Luther
Chief, Research and Analysis Branch

Enclosure
(Copy No. 46)

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By [Signature] Date: FEB 10 1972

[Redacted]
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

4 August 1944

TO:      Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
         White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of a dispatch recently received from OSS Istanbul, recording the report that Bulgaria will not permit the Germans to use Bulgarian air bases for an offensive against Turkey, and the belief that Bulgaria may come over to the Allied side.

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of
CIA 006687
By SR Date May 6, 1975

Regraded Unclassified
4 August 1944

Bulgaria Forbids German Use of Her Air Bases Against Turkey; Moving Toward Allies

(B-2) According to reports received by OSS Istanbul on 3 August, Balabanov, Bulgarian envoy to Turkey, officially notified the Turkish Government on 29 July that the Government of Premier Bagryanov would not permit the Germans to use Bulgarian air bases for an offensive against Turkey. Moreover, Balabanov has notified the Bulgarian Consul in Istanbul that Bulgaria will not sever relations with Turkey.

(B-3) The Turkish authorities believe that Bulgaria, under pressure from the USSR, is attempting to draw away from Germany and come over to the Allied side. This thesis, OSS Istanbul comments, has been reported by various other sources and is further indicated by the Soviet inspection of the Bulgarian ports of Burgas and Varna after the Germans had evacuated them in mid-July.

(B-2) Moreover, negotiations are proceeding for the establishment of more Soviet consulates in Bulgaria.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Istanbul, 3 August)
TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of two dispatches received from the Bern office of this agency. This report concerns the account of a prominent Hungarian on internal conditions in Hungary, and his ambitious plans for Hungary's future.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State.
3 August 1944

HUNGARY: Prominent Hungarian's Account of Internal Conditions; Makes Ambitious Plans for Hungary's Future.

The following is a resume of a report, transmitted by OSS Bern, from a most prominent Hungarian who occupied a very responsible position before the Nazis invaded Hungary:

Internal Conditions: Weensenmeyer, the German Minister, and the Gestapo are in control of the country. The Gestapo supports Laszlo Baky (Secretary of State in the Ministry of Interior) and Endre (in charge of Jewish affairs in the Ministry of Interior); Weensenmeyer is supporting Imredy (present Minister for Economic Affairs). The Gestapo seems to have the upper hand. Source complains that everything is now lost that he has struggled to save in Hungary.

No reliance can be placed on the workers and peasants. Nine-tenths of the working populations now support the Nazis, particularly in those areas where US aviators have been machine-gunning the population, dropping toys loaded with explosives and carrying on poisoning. The source is evidently susceptible to standard German propaganda. One-half of the upper classes is in jail, while the remainder is intimidated.

The occupation of Hungary by the Germans has bettered the country's international position instead of making it worse. Although the Nazis found the Hungarians receptive to their ideology because of the people's fear of Communism, the Jewish question, the Treaty of Trianon, and the foolish propaganda by the British, still Hungary is the only satellite country which opposed Germany. It was only by force of arms that the occupation was effected; Rumania did not do so much.

Eighty percent of the army is still dependable, but only two or three weak divisions are presently in Hungary; the best units are on the Soviet front.

Admiral Horthy: Although Baky engineered the unsuccessful attempt at the Regent's life, he is still a free man. The prospects for the immediate future are (1) military dictatorship in case that the Admiral survives, or (2) the assumption of the Regency by Imredy. If these alternative...
tives do not occur, then (3) the existing state of anarchy will lead to Germany's establishing a Protectorate. The Regent is still struggling ahead, but he is without support and is thinking of resigning. In case that Admiral Horthy were able to get out of Hungary, source wishes to know whether recognition would be extended to him. Source asks about the possibility of establishing a government in Portugal, Sweden, Turkey, or some other neutral country. It is necessary that cooperation not be extended to any government other than the legitimate one of the period before 19 March. Source himself cannot get out of Hungary now.

Concerning the future, source suggests that foreign soldiers should not be used to create order in the country, should the Nazis evacuate Hungary without a struggle. In the event that Hungary should become a scene of fighting, even then only soldiers should enter the country, not political agencies. Admiral Horthy should be allowed to remain in the country.

Source states that the only possible post-war program for Hungary is an orthodox liberal nationalism, together with an energetic policy of social reform. Károlyi or Benes are wholly unacceptable to Hungary. As far as Archduke Otto is concerned, however, the situation is different. Otto is the rightful heir, and if the restoration of the monarchy seems to be feasible, it would be well to start activity for it now. Otto will not receive any US backing till after the Presidential election, hence the campaign must not be premature.

An effort should be made to preserve the present Hungarian territory, putting off a final settlement for the future. No one can predict such ultimate settlement. There may be an Austrian-Czech federation. Source envisages that Hungary may become a monarchy whose different nationalities will be given autonomy. Transylvania may be given the status of a canton, and the same might be done with Croatia. One could dispose completely of the Hungarian problem by shifting some one million persons.

The OSS representative in Bern observes that the original communication indicated that the source was desperate and worried when he composed it. OSS analysts in Washington caution that a great deal of the information seems to represent special pleading rather than reliable observation, and that the recommendations for the future appear rather unrealistic.

(OSS Official Dispatches, Bern, undated)
24 July 1944

The White House Map Room
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Attention: Col. Richard Parks, Jr.

Gentlemen:

I am transmitting herewith one copy of R & A No. 2232, "Manpower Shortage and the German Collapse in 1918", prepared in the Research and Analysis Branch of this office and classified as confidential.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

William L. Langer
Chief, Research and Analysis Branch

Enclosure
(Copy No. 8)
TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
    White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of a dispatch received from the London office of this agency, concerning the possible declaration of war on Japan by Portugal.

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State
    Joint Chiefs of Staff
24 July 1944

PORTUGAL to Declare War on Japan?

A reliable source learned on 9 July, OSS London reports, that the Portuguese Undersecretary of War privately stated that his country was planning to declare war on Japan. OSS London has also heard that, in India, one Portuguese division is being equipped and trained for operations in the Far Eastern Theatre.

OSS WASHINGTON COMMENT: It has been reported that prominent Portuguese officials have expressed their anticipation of an early break of relations between Portugal and Japan.

(OSS Official Dispatch, London, 20 July)
TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Reports received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of a dispatch received from the Bern office of this agency, concerning the preparation by Germany, in France, of a more elaborate weapon than the present robot bomb.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of
CIA 006687
By Date MAY 6 1975

Regarded Unclassified
FRANCE: Germans Have Prepared Weapons More Elaborate Than V-1.

OSS Bern forwards the following information (rated B-3), which was received from Rhine Bargemen:

The same construction group which built the runways for the secret weapon at Roubaix and St. Quentin went on to construct similar installations near Bethune-Le-Chateau, Douai, Tournai, Thielt, Roussel, Aare, Ghent, and later also at Breda. The massive-ness of these installations, the bargemen say, indicates a weapon much more elaborate than the present robot bomb. No outsider is permitted to come in the vicinity of these installations, and even construction materials were unloaded at some distance.

Damage done to canal locks prevented the arrival in Rouen from Paris of barges loaded with lime, which were to be sunk in the Seine to block the entrance.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 21 July)
TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: The German Coup d'etat.

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of a report, based on dispatches received from the Bern office of this agency, concerning the German coup d'etat. This report forms a sequel to reports on the same subject, dated 12 April, 16 May and 18 July, which have been forwarded to you.

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State
Joint Chiefs of Staff
TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of a dispatch received from the Algiers office of this agency. This report contains a U. S. correspondent's account of the reaction of Tito and the Partisans to the negotiations with the Subasich Government.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State
   Joint Chiefs of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of
CIA 006687
By SR Date MAY 6 1975

203(12)
The following is an account of a lengthy interview which Stojan Pribichevich, US correspondent with Tito's forces, had with the Marshal on 14 July, and of his impressions of the Partisan reaction to the agreement with Subasich:

Talking of the inclusion of Vukosavljevich and Marusich in the new Subasich Government, Tito stated frankly that it was British propaganda that described these two men as his personal representatives in the Government. They are in the Government merely to see that the Tito-Subasich agreement is carried out exactly according to its terms, and are neither Tito's nor the National Committee's representatives. Pribichevich believes that their inclusion in the Government is an experiment to see whether it will be possible eventually to merge the Royal Government and the National Committee.

Tito stated that the British attempts to associate him closely with the Royal Government of Yugoslavia at such an early time annoyed him very much. In fact, Tito told Pribichevich this was a plot, organized by certain elements in Britain, to disgrace him by associating his name with the emigre Government. Mihailovich, he said, had received similar treatment.

At the time of the interview with Tito, the first reports on the Partisan reaction to the Tito-Subasich agreement were beginning to come in. The rank and file of the Croatian, Serbian and Slovenian Partisans expressed their misgivings, but refrained from directly criticizing the National Committee. Pribichevich states that one does not realize abroad that the common Partisans' attitude toward the emigres is much more radical than that of the National Committee. Tito was forced to the agreement with Subasich, Pribichevich declares, by international circumstances rather than by the domestic situation, and he thereby stood to lose among the Partisans rather than to gain.

A year ago the Partisan masses might have accepted the agreement with more willingness, but they have since become embittered against the Government-in-Exile because of several...
happenings. For example, they greatly resent the fact that, at the height of the German offensive last winter, the Government-in-Exile branded Tito as a "war criminal" and the National Liberation movement as a "movement of terrorist violence". The Partisans realize that the authority of the Government-in-Exile stems largely from its recognition by the Allies, since it has no support among the Partisans at home. When Pribichevich visited Bosnia, he found that some of the older peasants would welcome a reconciliation between King Peter and Tito, but even among these men Tito would get the vote if they had to make a choice.

Pribichevich is convinced that it was Tito's strong personal prestige that made his followers agree to the Subasich pact. However, to keep this popular support, the National Committee has to do much explaining. The strongest objections to the agreement were raised by the Croatian Peasant Party, the Serbian Independent Democrats, and the Slovenian Liberals. On the other hand, the Communist Party, the best disciplined and most realistic one in the entire movement, has accepted the agreement. Other sources suggest that the USSR has been enthusiastic about the agreement, viewing it as a victory for British policy. It is therefore questionable whether Tito and the Communist Party in Yugoslavia are more favorable to the agreement than the more conservative followers of Tito.

The Partisan leaders believe that they cannot overestimate the importance of making a success of the agreement with the Subasich Government. They are convinced that failure now would result in such pressure from the Partisan rank and file that the Committee would be prevented from any further negotiations with the Government-in-Exile.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Algiers, 15 July)
TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS

Transmitted herewith for your information is a copy of a dispatch received from the Bern office of this agency, reporting the plans of former Premier Edouard Herriot and the Comite National des Corps Elus de la Republique, a resistance group in Metropolitan France.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of
CIA 006687
By SJR Date May 6, 1975

Regarded Unclassified
FRANCE: Plans of Herriot and Comité National des Corps Élus de la République

088 Bern reported on 15 July that Andre Enfiere (alias Lamballe), who claims to be a friend of former Premier Edouard Herriot, had submitted a message containing the following information, with the request that it be forwarded to Louis Marin [anti-Vichy Rightist leader, recently escaped from France and now a supporter of De Gaulle].

Believed authentic: Enfiere arrived in Switzerland secretly to carry out a project for Herriot and his friends. At the time of Enfiere's departure, Herriot was in good mental and physical health, and Enfiere did not believe the oft-repeated rumor that Herriot has since died. However, in the event of Herriot's death, Enfiere claimed it was even more important that he meet with Marin. He had two letters of credence, one written at Herriot's request by Herriot's brother-in-law, M. Rebatel, the other from Herriot himself, stating: "I have confidence, Enfiere, that you will act according to my best interests." Enfiere, wishing to go first to London and then to Algiers, asked Marin to make secret arrangements for him to travel by plane from France. He stated that his friend Georges Bidault [leading French journalist with liberal Catholic political affiliations during the Third Republic], chairman of the Comité National des Corps Élus de la République [a recently formed parliamentary opposition group in Metropolitan France advocating a return to the institutions of the Third Republic, and composed of several hundred former parliamentarians, the majority of whom are believed to be Radical Socialists], very much wanted him to make the trip. Enfiere reiterated that regardless of whether Herriot is alive or dead, he (Enfiere) had the backing of Herriot's supporters for the institution of a democratic and parliamentary republic. According to Enfiere, this still constitutes a powerful force among the French people, and the Herriot group desired to inform Republic supporters of their opinions regarding the formation of a government, control of the press, and election procedures. Enfiere's message ended with the statement that Herriot believes Marin to be one of the people working for the restoration of a democratic republic.

Declasified
By Authority of
CIA 006687
By SR [Redacted] MAY 6 1975

Regraded Unclassified
Rated A-2: Source indicated verbally that he was a supporter of General de Gaulle, inasmuch as it was necessary to recognize him as the person who upheld the honor of France. However, he stated that he and his associates want to make certain that General de Gaulle really plans to submit himself to the decision of the nation. Consequently, they desire to have genuine republicans surrounding De Gaulle.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 15 July)
19 July 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of a dispatch received from the Lisbon office of this agency, reporting predictions of certain Portuguese officials concerning a possible break of diplomatic relations between Portugal and Japan.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lie Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of
CIA 006687
By SECRE Date MAY 6 1975

20314
18 July 1944

PORTUGAL: Portuguese Officials Predict an Early Break with Japan

OSS Lisbon was informed on 14 July, by the Portuguese Minister of Justice, that a break of diplomatic relations between Portugal and Japan was expected within a week, caused by the Japanese treatment of Timor. Our Embassy discounts the likelihood of such severance of relations, but several Portuguese officials, including the Director of the Diário de Notícias and the former Portuguese Ambassador to Italy, have confirmed this report. Both the Minister of Justice and the former Ambassador occupy posts in the Portuguese Foreign Office.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Lisbon, 14 July; rated B-3)
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

18 July 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Nazi Opposition Group in
Germany Reports Progress

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of
two dispatches received from the Bern office of this agency.
These dispatches form a sequel to a report dated 16 May 1944
(forwarded to you on 17 May) concerning an opposition group
in Germany, including some high military figures, which favors
peace.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Joint Chiefs of Staff
Department of State

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of

CIA 006687

Date MAY 6 1975

Regarded Unclassified
GERMANY: Nazi Opposition Group Reports Progress

The following, transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern, is a sequel to a report dated 16 May concerning an opposition group in Germany, including some high military figures, which favors peace:

The objectives of this group have received new stimulus from the Soviet gains, the Soviet threat of invading German soil, and the Allied landings in Normandy. The group is receiving cooperation from another group composed of a number of anti-Hitler elements which are described as working independently of the Gestapo. The former group believes that the next few weeks represent the final opportunity to initiate steps to prove the desire of the German people to overthrow Hitler and his organization and to set up a "respectable government". It is the wish of the group that as much of Germany as possible be kept from falling into Soviet hands. The group's proposed plan of action would call for an ordered retreat from the west and the transfer of the best divisions to the defense of the eastern front.

The group also has been encouraged by their alleged acquisition of Colonel-General Fritz Fromm because he has charge of reserves in the Berlin area.

WASHINGTON COMMENT: General Fromm, Chief of the Home Command, is in charge of army equipment and commander of replacement training for the army.

According to the group, the OKW has shifted its headquarters from East Prussia to a locality near Berlin. The group views this transfer as favorable to its purposes, for General Frederick Olbricht, Chief of the General Army Office, under General Fromm, and Colonel-General Kurt Zeitzler, Chief of Staff, as well as other generals supposedly in the opposition, are now accessible in the vicinity of Berlin.

(OSS Official Dispatches, Bern, 13 and 15 July)
17 July 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
    White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of a dispatch received from the Cairo office of this Agency, concerning resignations of pan-Serbs in the Yugoslav Government-in-Exile following the announcement of the new Subasich Cabinet.

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State
    Joint Chiefs of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of
CIA 006687
By SC Date May 6, 1975

Regarded Unclassified
15 July 1944

YUGOSLAVIA: Announcement of Subasich Cabinet
Precipitates Resignations

The following intelligence dated 14 July
from a Yugoslav official in Cairo was transmitted by
the OSS representative there:

The announcement of the new Subasich
cabinet has been followed by a number of resignations
of pan-Serbs in the Yugoslav Government-in-Exile.
Among these are the Secretary Dujcinovich; Deputy
Minister Saponich; Colonel Putnik, chief of staff of
Yugoslav forces outside Yugoslavia; Colonel Kosta
Simich; Colonel Mladin Zhujovich, former political
advisor to Mihailovich and former delegate from Mi-
hailovich to the Chetnik Father Djuich. The resig-
nations are reported to have taken place after receipt
of the Potich-Knezevich wire from Washington dated
10 July.

There is growing evidence that a pan-Serb
combination for future resistance is being formed by
Potich, Purich, Knezevich, and Denich. Their reasoning
and propaganda follow the current Medich contention
that the King is virtually a prisoner and that Subasich,
being a Croat, does not represent the Serbs.
11 July 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of a report from the Bern office of this agency, concerning a document dated 22 June purporting to have come from Marshal Petain himself.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosures.

cc: Joint Chiefs of Staff
Department of State

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of
CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 6 1975

Regraded Unclassified
11 July 1944

FRANCE: Pétain Asserts His Authority Vis-a-vis Allied Plans for Civil Administration of France.

OSS Bern has received a communication, dated 22 June, which purports to come from Marshal Pétain himself, and which the OSS representative believes to be authentic.

The document declares that the people of France are willing to undergo without protest the suffering and destruction which will precede their liberation. They also recognize that the Allies will have to take certain strong measures in the interest of military expediency.

The document states that the French people see no need for the Allies to replace the legitimate civil administration of France. Civil war—and even Communism—might result if the Allies should try to force the country to accept a US-British administration or one appointed by them. Even if circumstances prevent his exercise of full control, Pétain is still the sole legitimate symbol of French sovereignty by virtue of the regular mandate of authority bestowed upon him by the National Assembly.

In view of this, the Allies are exhorted to keep in office all regularly appointed officials except those whose attitudes have inflamed the public. However, whenever the Allies appoint substitutes, the document adds, the appointees will be only temporary deputies until Marshal Pétain, as head of the State, ratifies their appointment.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 8 July)
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D.C. (25)

8 July 1944

The White House Map Room
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Attention: Colonel Richard Parks, Jr.

Gentlemen:

I am transmitting herewith one copy of each of the following reports prepared in the Research and Analysis Branch of this office:

R & A No. 2072, "Japanese Administration of Malaya" (Copy No. 3)

R & A No. 2127, "Finland's Capacity to Pay the Russian Reparations Demand" (Copy No. 2)

R & A No. 2304, "Significance of Argentine War Minister Peron's Speech" (Copy No. 3)

Sincerely yours,

William L. Langer
Chief, Research and Analysis Branch

Enclosures (3)
8 July 1944

The White House Map Room
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Attention: Colonel Richard Parks, Jr.

Gentlemen:

I am transmitting herewith one copy of each of the
following reports prepared in the Research and Analysis Branch
of this office:

R & A No. 1762, "The Government of the New \textit{Philippines}" (Copy No. 2)

R & A No. 1878, "Indigenous African Political \textit{Systems; An Appraisal of Native Aptitudes}" (Copy No. 1)

R & A No. 2356, "A Statistical Analysis of Soviet \textit{Atrocity Charges}" (Copy No. 6)

R & A No. 2304, "Significance of Argentine War \textit{F360 C.A. (Argentina)}
Minister Peron's Speech" (Copy No. 36)

Sincerely yours,

William L. Langer
Chief, Research and Analysis Branch

Enclosures (4)

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 11-11-72

By Date FEB 10 1972
1 July 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS

Transmitted herewith for your information is a copy of a dispatch received from the Istanbul office of this agency, concerning Charles A. Davilla, Maniu's representative in the United States.

Enclosure

cc: State Department
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Declassified
By Authority of
CIA 006687
By SR Date MAY 6 1975

Regarded Unclassified
The following information (rated B-3) has been received from Istanbul:

Charles A. Davila is reported to have been authorized by Maniu to handle the latter's affairs in the United States. Informant is of the opinion that, since the personal standing of Davila among Romanians is low, he was chosen by Maniu simply because both men share an antipathy for King Carol.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Istanbul, 28 June)
28 June 1944

The White House Map Room
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Attention: Colonel Richard Parks, Jr.

Gentlemen:

I am transmitting herewith one copy of each of the following reports prepared in the Research and Analysis Branch of this office:

R & A No. 2095, "Native Nationalism in Spanish North Africa", Secret (Copy No. 48)

R & A No. 2184, "Comparative Data on Population, National Debt and Expenditures, Foreign Trade, National Income and Merchant Marine for All Countries", Restricted (Copy No. 57)

R & A No. 2137, "Industrial Facilities in Malaya", Secret (Copy No. 29)

R & A No. 2131, "Selected References to Agricultural and Marine Production in Japan", Restricted (Copy No. 10)

Sincerely yours,

William L. Langer
Chief, Research and Analysis Branch

Enclosures (4)

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By Date FEB 10 1972

Regarded Unclassified
28 June 1944

The White House Map Room
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Attention: Colonel Richard Parks, Jr.

Gentlemen:

I am transmitting herewith one copy of R & A No.
1899, "Russian War Damage and Possible Reparation Claims,
Part II. Supplement", prepared in the Research and Analysis
Branch of this office and classified as secret.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

William L. Langer
Chief, Research and Analysis Branch

Enclosure
(Copy No. 37)

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By, [Signature] Date, [Date] 1972

Regraded Unclassified
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

24 June 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS

Transmitted herewith for your information is a copy of a dispatch received from the Stockholm office of this agency, concerning the presence of the German battleship Admiral Hipper at Abo.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure

cc: Joint Chiefs of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of
CIA 006687
By SR Date MAY 6 1975

Regraded Unclassified
GERMANY: Battleship Admiral Hipper Reported in Abo

A reliable source (B-2) informs the OSS representative in Stockholm that early on the morning of the 20th, the Nazi battleship Admiral Hipper arrived in Abo. Three Nazi destroyers of the sub-chaser class formed her escort. The channels are too shallow and too narrow to permit the Hipper to enter Abo harbor. It is believed that the Hipper will remain in the archipelago because she will be less exposed to Soviet air attacks than she would be in Hanko.

Some qualified Finns are making the assumption that the Hipper was brought north so that if the Russian Navy attempts to escape from the Gulf of Finland, she could be there for action. A report that the Hipper and her escorts are carrying only their customary complement gives credibility to this thesis.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Stockholm, 21 June)
24 June 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

A report dated 14 June reaching London states that German use of gas is imminent, and that German munitions depots are receiving twenty-five percent of their supplies in the form of gas shells. Further reports transmitted herewith for your information is copy of a dispatch received from the London office of this agency, setting forth reported German plans for the use of gas.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure

cc: Joint Chiefs of Staff.
23 June 1944

GERMANY: Reported Plans for the Use of Gas.

A report dated 16 June, reaching London from an untried source (rated F-5), states that German use of gas is imminent, and that German munitions depots are receiving twenty-five percent of their supplies in the form of gas shells. Another report, dated mid-May, states that a cargo of gas-filled land mines arrived at Skagen, Denmark. Meanwhile an undated French report, received in London on 18 June, states that German officers of different branches of the service had left for Paris to get final instructions in the use of gas, which was said to be imminent.

(GSS Official Dispatch, London, 21 June)
22 June 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of a dispatch received from the Bern office of this agency, concerning the policy of the Comite National des Corps Elus de la Republique toward Lemaigre-Dubreuil, Rigaud, and Fabry. Former reports on the plans and aims of the Comite, to which this enclosure is supplementary, were forwarded to you on 20 May and 7 June 1944.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Admiral William D. Leahy

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of
CIA 006687
By SR Date MAY 6 1975

203(12)
22 June 1944


The following information, received in Bern on 7 June 1944, is a sequel to the report on the Comité National in France dated 2 June 1944, and was furnished by the same source:

1. The Comité National is opposed to any association with Jacques Lemaigre-Dubreuil (1) or Jean Rigaud (2). The Comité has not had relations with either of the latter, and does not intend to establish such relations.

2. Source states that Fabry (3) went to Madrid recently, with the sanction of the Nazis. Fabry asserts that he talked with Middleton, Stevens, and Ambassador Hayes. It is said that he was asked to go on to Washington, but that he refused this offer. When he returned to France, Fabry made known his opposition to de Gaulle and the fact that he was in favor of Pétain. He intimated that he had attempted to establish contact with the United States in the name of Marshal Pétain.

BERN COMMENT: There is a possibility that the references to the above-mentioned conferences and to the Washington invitation are an error.

3. An associate of the Comité National, who knew in advance of Fabry's journey, had warned him that the Comité would not treat with him nor any Parliamentarians who supported Pétain.

4. It is the opinion of the Comité National that certain Parliamentarians who have lost caste because of their support of the Vichy policy will now make an attempt to regain favor by establishing relations with the Comité. The Comité further believes that these Parliamentarians will attempt to put it in an unfavorable light in other countries.

WASHINGt0N COMMENT: This claim would appear to be an attempt by the Comité to explain possible adverse publicity in terms of black-mail by the more heavily committed collaborationists of the Fabry group.

The incidents involving Fabry and Lemaigre-Dubreuil indicate that the situation is serious. The Comité National refuses to admit...
any and all individuals who have yielded to Vichy dictates or taken part in Vichy activities.

OSS BERN commented, on 2 June 1944: "Among the members of the Comité National are Parliamentarians who later rejected collaboration, although they had previously voted for Pétain."

5. Fabry is a member of a group of Parliamentarians who have used a study bureau on the Avenue Victor Emmanuel III as cover to join together various journalistic and literary elements of the Parliamentary function. Boucher, a former cagoulier who was at one time Deputy from the Vosges Department, is President of the group. Benoist-Mechin (4) and Montigny (5) are included among its associates. Members of the group, although it is not probable that they have organized about 40 Parliamentarians. In any case, the Nazis direct Fabry's group and employ it in attaining their political objectives.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 15 June)

(1) Lemaigre-Dubreuil was reported on 31 May 1944 to have escaped from Algiers, where he had been under police surveillance. He had been suspected of contacts with Vichy elements who desired to create a non-de Gaulleist regime in France, and with the Count of Paris. It was believed that Lemaigre-Dubreuil went from Algiers to Madrid.

(2) Rigaud has been associated with Lemaigre-Dubreuil and was reported to have escaped with him.

(3) Fabry was Minister of War in the Darlan Cabinet of 1934 and in the Leval Cabinet of 1935.

(4) Benoist-Mechin was affiliated with the Worms Bank group, and was former Secretary of State under Pétain.

(5) Montigny: Deputy from Sarthe Department.
TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS

Transmitted herewith for your information is a copy of a dispatch received from the Bern office of this agency, concerning the industrial situation in Germany.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure
GERMANY: Industrial Situation

The following information on the industrial situation in Germany has been received from the OSS representative at Bern:

The German industrialists are practically without any power. The distribution of raw materials and of partly manufactured goods is controlled by organs of the government, who determine the type of production of each plant. The finished product is sent to a destination determined by the government and according to an itinerary which they have fixed. Payment is effected by the government according to fixed tariffs. Industrialists have no longer any room for initiative except in the internal organization of their factories, and even here their liberty of action is greatly curtailed, because the position vis-a-vis the workman is entirely different from what it was in the past. Here again it is the Party which is all-powerful. The Nazi delegate for labor questions is a hundred times more important than the director of the factory itself. If the manager wishes to increase the salary of an old workman, the Party official will prevent it, unless the workman is entirely approved from the Party standpoint. If it is a question of increasing the salary of Ukrainian women workers, who may have performed exemplary work, the Party opposes it as a matter of principle. German women workers who are close to the Party receive from RM150 to RM250 an hour, whereas the Russian women workers receive 16 pfennigs. It is an arbitrary regime of favoritism that rules. The best places in the offices are reserved for the daughters of the Party chiefs, and if particular workers do not please them, these girls complain to their parents and the workers leave for the front or for the workers' camps.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 19 June)

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of
CIA 006687
By SK Date MAY 6 1975

Regraded Unclassified
TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report received in OSS

Transmitted herewith for your information is a copy of a dispatch received from the Bern office of this agency relative to the attitude of the Croatian Peasant Party toward the Army of Liberation.

Enclosure

cc: Joint Chiefs of Staff
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

22 June 1944

YUGOSLAVIA: Attitude of the Croatian Peasant Party
Toward the Army of Liberation

The following report has reached the OSS representative in Bern
from allegedly responsible Croat quarters:

The people of Croatia adhere firmly to the Croatian Peasant Party.
The old organizations of the Party have been reconstituted and
extend into the villages. A clandestine paper called JUSTICE is
being circulated. Recently the leaders of the Party have de-
lineated their situation and their policy as follows:

The Croatian people unanimously desire to protect their independence.
They are profoundly democratic and want to decide their own future.
They do not oppose an eventual union with other peoples or other
states, but they wish to decide the conditions of such a union.

With regard to their relations to the Army of Liberation and Mar-
shal Tito, the Party leaders note that most of the combatant Croats
enrolled in Tito's forces are affiliated with the Croatian Peasant
Party. In conformity with the instructions of the Party leaders,
the Croatian people support the Partisan movement and collaborate
with it in military activity against the invader. There is less
sympathy, however, with the political direction of the Army of
Liberation, which is dominated by Jewish and Serbian intellec-
tuals of Communist leanings. This Communist group is attacking
the Croatian Peasant Party, as it sees in the latter an obstacle
to the realization of its prospects. It also attacks the US and
UK, while praising Soviet Russia. Moreover, the shock brigades
of the Army of Liberation, largely composed of Slovene and Serb
Communists, have caused a great deal of needless destruction in
Croat territory and have maintained throughout a hostility to the
Croatian Peasant Party and Machek.

Hence the Croatian Peasant Party emphasizes that the political ten-
dencies of such elements of the Liberation movement do not corres-
pond to the political principles of the Party, which are based on
democracy in the internal sphere and on cooperation with Britain
and the US in the foreign sphere.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern 20 June)
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

22 June 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS

Transmitted herewith for your information is a copy of a dispatch received from the
Istanbul office of this agency, concerning anticipated trouble from the EAM in Evros.

Olive Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure

cc: Joint Chiefs of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of

CIA 006687
By SE Date MAY 5 1975

SECRET

Regarded Unclassified
GREECE: Trouble Anticipated From EAM in Evros

A Greek source who is hostile to EAM has given the OSS representative in Istanbul the following report:

Grave trouble is imminent in Evros. It is generally believed there that the Nazis will soon withdraw their troops, and the EAM guerrillas are determined not to lose their chance to seize power. They will oppose any effort on the part of the Greek army to seize control of Evros and for this reason are preparing to call to arms every adherent who can bear weapons. Rumors are being spread by EAM guerrillas that they have recently received vast quantities of arms, but the source believes that these claims are vastly exaggerated. Nevertheless, and in order to keep the population in check, EAM has already given weapons to a limited group in every town. Source predicts that every village will fly the Communist flag, just as Orestias did, and says that hundreds of the people are seeking refuge in Turkey.

A second Greek source essentially confirms the above report. He states that trouble is anticipated in Evros in the near future, that EAM is determined to wipe out the nationalists once the Nazis depart, and that the anti-EAM population in Evros is terrified.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Istanbul, 17 June)
The TO: represents Colonel Richard Park, Jr. and states the following background information in the White House Map Room with regard to the present situation in Finland:

Word SUBJECT: Report received in OSS. Staff conferences during the last week of May, that the Russians would initiate their drive on the Karelian Isthmus. In this he disagreed with his staff, who forecast a Russian drive from Petsamo.

Transmitted herewith for your information is a copy of a dispatch received from the Stockholm office of this agency. This report, concerning the present situation in Finland, will serve as background material for the information sent you earlier today.

To a futile attempt to blockade the Aland Islands, the Bolsheviks have responded with attacks upon the Aland Islands. Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS Intelligence Service.

Unconditional surrender is facilitated by the military occupation of all of Finland. It may be insisted upon by the Russians.

Enclosure.

Joint Chiefs of Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of
CIA 006887

By SR Data MAY 5 1975

203(13)
FINLAND: Background on Present Situation.

The OSS representative in Stockholm transmits the following background information (rated B-2) with regard to the present situation in Finland:

Marshal Mannerheim predicted at General Staff conferences during the last week of May, that the Russians would initiate their drive on the Karelian Isthmus. In this he disagreed with his staff, who forecast a Russian drive from Pskov.

Only 2500 men, at the most, survived in one Finnish Division which withstood the worst of the initial attack at Terijoki. The light anti-panzer guns of the Finns could not compete with heavy Russian armor. The Nazis have turned over 100 fighter planes with pilots to the Finns, but these are insignificant in opposition to the Russian Air Force. Ever since the period of peace negotiations in February the Nazis, who were prompted by political expediency, had withheld both shipments of food and delivery of substantial amounts of arms and ammunition to the Finns. Grain ships from Finland returned empty from Germany, and no grain deliveries from Nazi ports were allowed prior to 12 June. At present they are being made.

In a futile attempt to stop the advance of the Russians, Finnish reinforcements are being rushed to the Isthmus from the Aland Islands.

Unconditional surrender to facilitate the military occupation of all of Finland may be insisted upon by the Russians, and they will probably obtain it.

(Official OSS Dispatch, Stockholm, 19 June)
22 June 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
    White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of a dispatch received from the Stockholm office of this agency, concerning Finland's preparation for the requesting of peace terms, and the reshuffling of the Finnish Cabinet.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State
    Joint Chiefs of Staff

DECLASSEIFIED
By Authority of

CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 5 1975

Regarded Unclassified
FINLAND Prepares to Ask Peace Terms and Reshuffle its Cabinet.

The following information, rated B-2, was transmitted by the OSS representative in Stockholm:

The Finnish Minister to Sweden (Gripenberg) left for Helsinki on 15 June following a sudden call from Finland. He returned to Stockholm on 19 June with authority to request peace terms from the USSR. He was under instructions, however, to delay making the request until a new cabinet was formed in Finland which would assume authority for the request. The new cabinet was to be formed by 5:00 P.M. on 19 June, but at that time Gripenberg received a call saying there would be a delay but informing him that the cabinet would have the following composition:

**Premier:** Dr. Hendrik Ramsay (Allied-inclined foreign minister under the present cabinet, who has frequently been reported as favoring peace).

**Minister of the Interior:** Hillila (Social Democrat, Governor of Lapland).

**Foreign Minister:** P. J. Rynnininen (former charge d'affaires at Moscow, former secretary-general of the Foreign Office, previously reported a participant in peace negotiations).

**Minister of Defense:** Major General K. R. Walden (conservative, pro-Nazi and anti-Soviet Defense Minister for the past four years; Mannerheim's right-hand man who took part in peace negotiations with the USSR in 1920 and 1940).

**Minister of Agriculture:** William Kalliokoski (chairman (anti-Fascist) of the Agrarian Party, Agriculture Minister in a number of cabinets, including the present one).

**Minister of Finance:** Vaino Kotilainen (pro-British, former Minister of Commerce and Industry, and former Minister of Supply).

**Minister for Social Affairs:** Aleski Altonen (secretary of the Social Democratic Party, successor to Fagerholm in the same post in a previous cabinet).
Minister of Supply: Johannes Kaarle Ellila (holds the same post in the present cabinet).

Minister of Justice: Ernst Baron von Born (pro-peace, chairman of the Swedish People's Party, and former Minister of the Interior.

It is possible that the list may be subject to a few minor changes at the last minute.

On the afternoon of 19 June, Grippenberg approached Swedish Foreign Minister Boheman, the probable choice as intermediary in the peace negotiations, who promised Finland 40,000 tons of bread-grain if Finland makes peace. This tonnage would make up for the loss of German supplies which would presumably be cut off.

Swedish authorities have advised the Finns that they should hope for nothing short of unconditional surrender.

Officers on the Swedish General Staff are anxious lest Sweden may be affected by the changing situation. A number of officers in Stockholm postponed a proposed visit to the Bofors factory on 19 June in order to be available should anything happen.

( OSS Official Dispatch, Stockholm, 19 June)
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

22 June 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS

Transmitted herewith for your information is a copy of a dispatch received from the Lisbon office of this agency concerning Nazi military preparation at Marseille.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure

cc: White House Map Room
Department of State

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of

CIA 0 0 6 6 8 7
By __ Date __

Regarded Unclassified
21 June 1944

FRANCE: Nazi Military Preparation at Marseille

The following information comes from Marseille and is dated 10 June:

Nazi soldiers in Marseille are practicing landing manoeuvres every day. For this purpose they are using landing barges which carry 200 soldiers and 3 tanks. About 20 such landing barges have been observed.

Seven thousand men are engaged in constructing defenses on the islands at the entrance to the harbor of Marseille. Every quay possesses separate fortifications; mines have been placed in the spaces between the quays.

A considerable portion of the stevedores who used to be in Marseille have been dispatched to Germany, and only a small number of them are still left in the city.

Nazi leaders in Marseille are spreading the rumor that within three months peace will be made between the US, USSR, Britain, and Germany.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Lisbon, 16 June)
TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr. 
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of a dispatch received from the Bern office of this agency, concerning operations of the French Resistance forces.

Enclosure.

cc: Joint Chiefs of Staff
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

21 June 1944

FRANCE: Operations of the Resistance Forces.

The following information comes from an individual who left France on 14 June. Because the source is new, the report is rated "F-3."

No attempt is made to differentiate between the various types of French armed resistance units operating in the areas cited. The term "resistance forces" is used loosely to cover all groups.

Eastern France: Armed resistance forces in the Jura area northeast of Lyon, have a good hold on the open country. They are grouped around the railroad center of Bourg ( Ain Department), 20 miles northeast of Lyon, and control many of the roads and rail lines leading from the city. The Nazis still control Bourg itself, but are not taking vigorous action against the resistance forces; the milice is terrorizing the population, and has arrested most of the civil officials.

In Chalon-sur-Saone, electric power center for the Creusot works, sabotage is proceeding and causing the Germans the greatest concern. The area around the railroad junction of Amboise, 10 miles southeast of Bourg, is also held by resistance forces, which on 13 June sabotaged the rail line to Mende, between Amboise and Le Grand Colos.

In the Alpine region the Nazis are established in force at Aix-les-Bains and have been attacking resistance units at nearby Le Bizard. The resistance forces, armed with heavy machine guns, hold Bellevard. The situation in the areas around Grenoble and Chamoney is confused. Engagements between resistance units and the Germans are taking place in the outlying districts of both cities, particularly south of Grenoble. The Nazis, contrary to other reports, hold Fort du Cluse.

The Lyon area is quiet, and the Nazis are trying not to arouse the population. Fearing a "coup de main" by resistance forces, the Germans have placed a military guard at the Prefecture, and have made preparations in the event the city is besieged.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of

CIA 006687

By SR Date 006687

MAY 5 1975

Regraded Unclassified
On the whole the Nazis appear to be less concerned with the resistance northeast of Lyon than they are with the situation in central France. There the resistance forces are well organized and control the departments of Corrèze and Lot et Garonne, west and southwest of Lyon. In Corrèze the resistance forces hold the rail junction of Brive and the departmental capital of Tulle. A recent Nazi attack here was repulsed. The situation at Limousin and at Clermont-Ferrand and Lyon is uncertain. Fighting is under way in the Limoges area. A considerable portion of the 1st French regiment created by Petain has gone over to the resistance forces in this central region. The Germans are determined at all costs to pare down resistance strength there. Rail traffic along the Lyon-Macon-Chalons-Dijon line in both directions is critically challenged by resistance forces between Dijon and Macon. At present, however, railroad supply to German forces in the south is possible via the line running through Clermont-Ferrand and St. Germain des Posses.

- OSS COMMENT: The 1st regiment is composed of men handpicked for their activity on behalf of the collaborationist cause -- fighting in Russia, espionage and counter-espionage activity. It is considered doubtful that they could have gone over to the resistance.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 17 June)
21 June 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report received in OSS

Transmitted herewith for your information is a copy of a dispatch received from the Baghdad office of this agency, concerning the near revolt of the Kurds and measures for suppressing such a revolt.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure

cc: Joint Chiefs of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of
CIA 006687
By SP Date MAY 5 1975

203(12)
IRAQ: Kurds Near Revolt; Measures of Suppression

The OSS representative in Baghdad reports that during the government crisis the palace was besieged with telegrams from all the Kurdish factions asking for the reinstatement of their Minister Majid. The Regent, having selected the new cabinet, has received a stern notice from the city of Hit stating that he personally will be held responsible for the cabinet's survival and for its actions. When the Kurds found their remonstrances were of no avail, they sent a final telegram reiterating all the promises made by Nuri to the Kurds in May, and requesting a prompt statement as to whether the government intends to implement the terms strictly. Majid, protesting loyalty to the Baghdad government, explained that if the Kurds are refused their demands, they will begin a campaign of civil non-cooperation, followed by passive disobedience. If this fails they will sabotage works and communications, and then break out in armed revolt.

Meanwhile, the Regent held council with ailing Prime Minister Pachichi, who is confined to bed. It was decided to entrust the task of pacifying the Kurds to Arshad, former mayor of Baghdad, now in the Cabinet. Majid informed the Regent that further talk would do no good. It was at length decided to send Pachichi north over the weekend in the hope that this gesture and some more talk would hold things over until the Regent gets back.

Tahsin Ali, the Defense Minister, believes that the only procedure to follow is to have the Iraqi Army occupy Kurdistan in a rapid surprise summer campaign, so as to disarm all the Kurdish tribes. If the Kurds have no assistance from the British or Russians, they will be crushed within a few months, because the army is better trained and reinforced.

It is reported that Majid is scheduled for arrest, and that Mulla Mustapha, the Kurdish leader, is about to be hanged or exiled.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Baghdad, 17 June, rated A-2)
14 June 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
    White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS

Transmitted herewith for your information is a copy of a dispatch received from the London office of this agency, concerning war conditions in Normandy.

Enclosure

cc: Department of State
    Joint Chiefs of Staff
    Admiral Leahy

By Authority of

DECLASSIFIED
CIA 006687
By SR May 5 1975
FRANCE: Notes on Normandy

The following information comes from an entirely reliable source who spent 24 hours in a British-occupied sector of the Normandy front. He interviewed many local Frenchmen, including the Mayor of a recently captured town, and spoke with a dozen natives who had just come through the German lines.

According to source, there is overwhelming evidence that the Germans were caught completely by surprise. Preparations for defense were incomplete, and bare evidence of having been started, on any large scale, during the past 90 days. Some mine fields, for instance, still were marked with the warning "Achtung!"

It is generally believed by both French and Germans that this landing is only the first of a series, and that the next one will be at Pas de Calais.

Source received information from all sides regarding the Germans' severe gasoline shortage, which has tied up mechanized units in many sectors.

There was evidence that the German Army had experienced a great deal of trouble with the local labor supply, and were forced to employ children 9 and 10 years old in building glider obstructions.

While there has been no forced or voluntary evacuation of civilians from this particular area, the noise of continuous firing has "put the French in a bad state mentally". Otherwise the local population appears well clothed and fed. There is no food shortage apparent in the restaurants, although prices are very high, especially under the new rate of exchange. Source states that the wine cellar of the Lion d'Or hotel is excellent.

No men of military age were seen except for several groups of foreigners, Poles and Czechs, who had just arrived, stating that they had been employed by the Germans as forced labor behind the lines and had taken advantage of the confusion to escape. Many young children and infants were in evidence, suggesting mixed German-French parentage, but source reports that the conduct of the German soldiers in general was considered extremely correct.

DeGaulle is regarded as a symbol of French resistance, but does not seem to arouse much enthusiasm as an individual or as a political leader. Petain is not hated by the majority of persons with whom source spoke; he is regarded merely as a poor, tired, old man. A picture of him in the Marquis office had been replaced by one of Marshal Foch.

(Original Dispatch, London, 13 June)
13 June 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
   White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of a dispatch received from the Algiers office of this agency, setting forth the views of a prominent Algerian Frenchman concerning American prestige in France.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State
    Joint Chiefs of Staff
FRANCE: Algerian French Views on American Prestige in France

On the day of the Allied landings in France, a prominent and responsible informant in Algiers remarked, "One of the gravest errors Americans could commit is to promise food and medical supplies to the civil population unless the promise is to be fulfilled."

The informant, Professor Jean Alazard, said: "The four mistakes that have most hurt American prestige among the civil population of Algiers are: (1) Darlan, (2) Giraud, (3) failure to provide promised essential medical supplies, and (4) failure to supply promised food. Repetition of any of these mistakes in France will be very damaging to Franco-American relations." Before the American landing in Africa all medical supplies came from France. Now surgical operations are performed without anaesthetics or proper antiseptics, he asserted.

Prof. Alazard is a professor at the University of Algiers, Curator of the Museum of Beaux Arts, editor of the two most influential magazines in Algeria, and one of the organizers of France-America. He is politically conservative and very pro-American.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Algiers, 7 June)
TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of a dispatch received from the Baghdad office of this agency, stating that there has recently been a marked shift in public opinion in Iraq, and that the trend is away from the US and toward the USSR.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State
Joint Chiefs of Staff
IRAQ: Anti-American Sentiment Grows

After talking with hundreds of Iraqis of all classes, the OSS representative in Baghdad reports that there has recently been a marked shift in public opinion in every section of the population except the Jews. The trend is away from the US and toward the USSR. He contrasts the estimated probable sentiments of the Iraq people in March and today as follows:

March: pro-US, 90%; pro-Soviet, 80%; anti-British, 95%
Today: pro-US, 40%; pro-Soviet, 90%; anti-British, 95%

The OSS representative ascribes this sharp change principally to the repercussions from Zionism and oil negotiations and to the loss of hope in any aggressive US foreign policy. He believes that if the seriousness of the situation is not recognized, some such occurrence as that of May 1941 may be repeated (Referring to the Hashid Ali rebellion against the British).

Since 6 June the Arabic press in Baghdad has been printing a flood of articles which charge that "Iraq is becoming simply a cartel of Empire politics" and sharply denounce the HESC and the USGCC. Iraqi censorship has done nothing to halt these articles to date.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Baghdad, 11 June, rated A-3)
TO:  Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
     White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS

There is submitted herewith a report from the Bern office of this agency, giving information about the disruption of German communications in France.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure

CC: Joint Chiefs of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of
CIA 006687
By SR in Date MAY 5 1975

103(14)}
FRANCE: Disruption of German Communications.

The following information received by OSS Bern is rated A-2:

1. Communications in northern France are nearing the point of utter paralysis, and the Paris area has suffered extensive injury. It would be worth while to destroy the Grande Ceinture at several places. There has been no important effect on communications in the Loire area and toward the west. The lines between Marseille and Paris have been hurt, but so far traffic has not been halted.

2. Communications with Germany via the Cologne-Geumont-Paris route have been made uncertain by the air raids. The lines south of Ardennes, however, have not yet suffered seriously; in order to really tie them up, it would be necessary to cripple Sarrebruck and Metz (Sablons).

3. Communication by way of Strasbourg has not been seriously disrupted to date. It would be advisable to continue the methodical raiding of the line from Dunkirk to Basel. Raids on Epinal would not be as effective as at Charlesville-Mons.

4. To combat the risk of a general strike, the Nazis have dispatched from 7,000 to 11,000 of their own chemists to France. These workers are old, somewhat demoralized, and apparently anxious to avoid danger. It is recommended that, when they are sent into the northwest area, the locomotives should be machine-gunned.

5. Meanwhile a significant reduction in the numbers of TGO's indicates that the Nazis are already moving troops mainly by highway. These road movements are being disguised in every possible manner, including the setting up of "ghost" divisions with false headquarters and false insignia.
GERMANY: Railway Repairs Delayed by Shortage of Material

Until recently the air attacks on German railroads seemed to have had a disappointingly small practical effect on both transportation and production. Now, however, the OSS representative in Bern has been reliably informed that, while the Germans have made extremely effective arrangements for repairing railway damage, the resulting delay in railway repairs has set up a vicious circle, and the urgently needed repair supplies tend more and more not to reach the required point at the time and in the amount required. For the first time, the report adds, there is now evidence of a real shortage in heavy equipment in the army. However, it is not yet possible to see whether this shortage is due to an actual production shortage or to the growing disorganization of transportation.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 3 June)
7 June 1944

The White House Map Room
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Colonel Richard Parks, Jr.

Gentlemen:

I am transmitting herewith Copy No. 6 of R & A No. 1088.3, "Losses in the German Armed Forces through March 1944", prepared in the Research and Analysis Branch of this office and classified as confidential.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

William L. Langer
Chief, Research and Analysis Branch

Enclosure
TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of several dispatches received from the Bern office of this agency. This report concerns plans and political aims of the Comite National des Corps Elus de la Republique, a resistance group in Metropolitan France, and is supplementary to a former report on the same subject, which was forwarded to you on 20 May 1944.

For convenience and clarity this report is submitted in the following five sections:

Tab B - Source's Analysis and Views.
Tab C - Comments by General Revers.
Tab D - Comments, OSS Bern.
Tab E - Comments, OSS Washington.

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State.
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Admiral Leahy.

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of
CIA 006687
By SR Date MAY 5 1975

Regarded Unclassified

The following information comes from a reliable source in Bern, evaluated as "A", with considerable army, political, and business (railroad) experience under the Third Republic. This report, dated 2 June 1944, is submitted as a sequel to the report on the same subject dated 15 May 1944. Attention is called to the comments appended from OSS officers in Bern and Washington.

1. The Comite National is headed by fourteen deputies and senators. It is supported by about three hundred parliamentarians and is in close touch with the Conseils Generaux and Municipaux in considerable areas of France. While the group includes some Socialists and some rightists, it is chiefly drawn from the Radical Socialist Party. It requests that Louis Marin be considered its representative and that he be consulted.

OSS Comment: Louis Marin, the former rightist parliamentarian and minister of state, is now in London, where he has asserted that all anti-collaborationist Frenchmen are Gaullists.

2. The Comite National has adopted as its platform the maintenance in France of a democratic constitutional framework, the expulsion of the Nazis, resistance to arbitrary government whether from the left or the right, and an active campaign to avoid the danger of civil war.

3. The Comite National acknowledges de Gaulle as chief of the Army and stands ready to put all its influence in his hands to liberate France. However, the Comite National thinks of itself as the constitutional representative of France until elections can be held. It would be willing to have de Gaulle set up a temporary government, subject to constitutional safeguards, for the purpose of holding elections, in the event that he reaches France as the Army head.

4. The Comite National criticizes the Algiers Committee severely, especially the pretensions of such men as Emmanuel d' Astier de la Vigerie, Andre le Troquer, and others who claim...
to speak for metropolitan France. They resent the tendency allegedly evidenced by the Algiers Committee to choose adventurers for prefects' posts, and think that military operations would be hindered by their presence in France. They are also critical of a certain M. Parodi, a civil representative of the FCNL in France, who, they say, lacks experience. Nevertheless, they have made contact with Parodi and are trying to establish some basis for common action.

5. The Comité National is alarmed over the extent of the control acquired by Communists in resistance circles, fearing that the Communists would eventually dominate if any attempt was made to set up an authoritarian regime. The Comité is afraid that, regardless of its enthusiasm, Resistance "is not serious-minded and discourages solid persons".

6. The Comité National is working closely with General Revers, the Gaullist representative whose job is to organize the regular army forces and collect matériel. It is also working with Revers' assistant, Colonel Dugarreau, in the Paris area, and with Colonel Navarre, who is chief of Revers' Deuxième Bureau.

7. The Comité National and its affiliates believe that, since they represent a majority of the known anti-collaborationist elected representatives, they can muster genuine resistance and can guarantee the cooperation of trained, responsible and devoted administrators. They accordingly ask to be consulted with respect to plans for the administration of liberated areas. The Comité adds that it has close affiliations, not only in Radical Socialist districts, but with leading persons in the regions south to La Rochelle, Brittany and La Vendee. These persons do not trust Algiers but are anti-collaborationist. The Committee is also in close touch with Pierre de Chambrun, who wields great personal influence in his department in spite of his years.

8. The Comité National seeks to establish effective liaison with London in order to advance military cooperation with de Gaulle and to give the invading armies the full support of all groups. In addition, they look to us for help in re-establishing democracy and constitutional government in France.

9. The Comité National is ready to dispatch a responsible representative to any place deemed suitable by the Allied High Command. It affirms that it is not opposed to de Gaulle. It is aware of the delicacy of our position with respect to the FCNL and does not wish to make our task more difficult. It believes, however, that, if only the Algiers Committee tries to organize metropolitan France, the union of French forces cannot be placed solidly behind the invasion effort.
The following is a general analysis of the French situation as submitted on 3 June 1944 by the source of the subject report. It, of course, reflects the general point of view espoused by the advocates of the Comite National.

A growing number of people in France are returning to the tried ways of democracy. They observe the disasters which the extremists, both radical and reactionary, have brought upon France. These people will consent to any compromise which may be required to place the two powerful forces in the political life of France in balance with each other. These two powerful forces are tradition and revolution. France will be able to realize her complete existence once more only if she effects a balance between these two forces.

Marshal Petain is simply a puppet in the hands of the Nazis and Pierre Laval has lost all importance. The one time that Petain received acclaim on his recent journey to Rouen was when he showed himself at the side of an Archbishop who is known to be supporting the liberation groups.

Laval's adherents are being pushed into the background. It is believed that Lemoine will be succeeded by Darnand. The police chiefs are now exclusively members of the Militia.

In the larger towns, there are still some remnants of the old groups of collaborationists who have been reinforced by adherents of Jacques Doriot, Cagoulers, and former members of the Croix de Feu. However, their numbers have lessened and their sole plan for the future is to utilize the confusion for their own safety.

There are speculators and opportunists in the Resistance organizations who are exploited by Algiers and who exploit Algiers in turn. There are numerous idealistic patriots in the resistance groups, as well, but the other types are more noticeable to the public and some of them are compared, to their detriment, with the Communists because of their waste of funds which shocks the economical French people. The Communists always have funds to provide for their activities, but they live on a reasonable scale. It is to be regretted, however, that the goal of the Communists is the dictatorship of the working class and civil strife—not the freedom of their country.
The Communists create the impression that the number of their adherents in France is much greater than it really is. It is definitely less than it was in 1936, although it is greater than in June 1941. In spite of the fact that the Communists allege that their strength among the railroad workers is 50% or more, the most competent data which can be obtained reveals that it does not amount to more than 7 or 8%. They have a well-developed machine, are thoroughly disciplined and ready for any eventuality.

Among those of moderate view, it is not likely that more than one in ten still supports the Vichy Government. A number of them have transferred their support to the FCNL. However, the overwhelming majority are still withholding their allegiance. They are sympathetic to the Resistance movement as the instrument of France’s liberation, but they feel that until a regime worthy of their loyalty is established they can be of greater service by trying to keep order whenever possible. They perform their duty despite great hardships and many dangers. Violence for its own sake does not appeal to them. There is a tendency to return to the old political parties as they were at the time when powerful democratic principles still evoked an enthusiastic response.

The regular Army is led by officers whom De Gaulle selected, and it is making reports to the FCNL. The majority of the elements which were scattered in 1940 are being drawn back into the Army. There is a universal wish to return to a state of order, discipline and responsibility.

The moment for extremists is over. It has taken the moderates a long time to recuperate from their reverses in 1940. But they have by now recovered. It would augur well for the unity of Algiers and metropolitan France if there were a good understanding between the chosen representatives of France and the regular Army under De Gaulle’s leadership. However, this unity has not yet been effected. De Gaulle is a symbol. In him each man sees only what he wishes to see. The moderates consider him to be the supreme leader of French forces. Some people consider him a general of the Popular Front, while to others he is simply another Bonaparte. General de Gaulle is aware of this fact and he will undoubtedly act accordingly. The moderates are, first of all, Frenchmen. Any alliance which moves in a direction opposite to France’s democratic heritage will receive no support of any kind from them.
Source was asked by General Revers to submit, for transmission to General Headquarters in London, the following comments:

1. Due to the fact that General Revers is unaccompanied by a representative either from the War Office or from General Eisenhower, and that his contact with London is inadequate, his capacity for organizing military forces of metropolitan French troops is being hindered. It is absolutely essential that liaison of this nature be set up.

2. The Communists receive too great a share of the arms which the Allies supply via parachute.

3. General Revers is centering his attention on efforts to organize forces in a general region based on the Massif Central, extending south to the Mediterranean and west to the Atlantic. Headquarters will be in the neighborhood of Albi.

4. General Revers complains that insufficient cooperation is being accorded him by Colonel Passy’s London office, and that he has cause to suspect that the Allies do not receive in their original state the reports transmitted by him through Passy. OSS Comment: Source stressed the fact that he has complete confidence in General Revers, who is said to enjoy the full support of General de Gaulle.

There follows a summary of the memorandum recently sent to De Gaulle by General Revers, concerning the peril attendant upon the infiltration into the Resistance Movement of Communist elements:

"The Communist Party is trying to obtain a leading position in the Resistance Movement, keeping its eye on the chaotic period which will ensue upon France's liberation. The Communist Party realizes that it represents only a small French minority, but it is well-manned, organized, and disciplined, and possesses effective tools for action. The Communists have attracted Frenchmen from all classes, either by means of their organization of the Front National or by an appeal to patriotism. As a result, 25% of the Front National is Communist at the present time. This condition also exists with respect to the Francs-Tireurs-Partisans,
which is the fighting force of the Front National. Nevertheless, the Front National is always represented in the Resistance Movement by disciplined Communists. These are the facts:
There are twenty-one members in the Conseil National de Resistance, but only five members are included in its active bureau. Villon, who is a dyed-in-the-wool Communist, is its guiding influence. Villon is the representative of the Front National as well as of the CGT (Confederation Generale du Travail). Actually, the CNR is Villon. In addition he is a member of the Military Committee of Action made up of three members. This situation arises in every phase of resistance. We observe that the FTP demanded the posts of Head of the General Staff and of Military Chief in the Rennes, Paris and Lille areas. The Communists have a working majority in almost all of the local groups. The war against Germany is only of secondary importance to them since they are looking ahead to mass activity, preparing general strikes, and the like. The Communist Party is counting on the fact that the bourgeois elements will have undergone graver suffering than they, which will allow the Communists to seize power during the period after the Nazis leave and before the Allies and the French come in."
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

7 June 1944

COMMENTS BY OSS BERN

1. OSS Bern has held to the opinion right along that Gaullism represents the outstanding aggressive element in France at the present time and that, if we are faced with a choice between supporting Gaullism and other groups at the beginning of a military operation, we will have to support the Gaullists. This fact is fully appreciated by the Comite National and they are evidently desirous of bridging the gap between the Gaullists and the middle-road, Parliamentary, church, middle-class group. The Comite National maintains that many of their members are Parliamentarians who voted against awarding full powers to Petain, and that others among their members are Parliamentarians who later rejected collaboration, although they had previously voted for Petain.

2. OSS Bern agrees that the Algiers Committee per se does not have the complete support of the French people and that it is considerably less strong than De Gaulle, but believes that it would be unwise to allow the idea to arise that we are cool towards De Gaulle, or at odds with him.

3. Because of their 1940 abdication, and the loss of standing of a number of members, the constitutional argument of the Parliamentarians—that of still holding the legal right to represent France—does not impress OSS Bern, which believes, however, that a considerable number of these non-collaborationist Parliamentarians wield a great deal of authority locally and that if the gap between the moderates and the Gaullists could possibly be bridged, the solidarity and effectiveness of French assistance would be greatly increased. If, on the other hand, we are ever forced to choose between the Gaullists and the Parliamentarians, OSS Bern feels that we will have to support the Gaullists. The moderates could naturally use as their spokesmen and leaders those men who voted against full powers. This would in no way be prevented by the vigorous part the Comite National has had in the movement.

4. In the opinion of OSS Bern, there is some foundation of truth in the criticism of the Resistance Movement, although it is exaggerated. The estimate of the Communist and extreme left-wing resistance factions is probably correct, although it is doubted that they represent the degree of danger which is feared by the moderates.

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by SR Date MAY 5 1975

Regraded Unclassified
5. In all relations between OSS Bern and source no commitments or encouragement were offered. Source's most intimate friend at Algiers is Henri Queuille, although Paul Giaccobi, Louis Jacquinot, and Pierre Mendes-France of the Algiers Committee, are moderates who have the confidence of his friends.
SECRET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

7 June 1944

COMMENT BY OSS WASHINGTON

1. There is no significant independent evidence of the power or extent of the Comite National organization. In view of this fact, it must be assumed that the claims advanced by the Comite National as to its present actual influence may well be overdrawn. In particular, the claim that the Comite National can "muster genuine resistance" seems doubtful, in view of the repeated expressions in these Comite National documents against the active resistance because it "is not serious-minded and discourages solid persons", or because it tends away from "a state of order, discipline and responsibility".

2. The Comite National would appear to be primarily a group of Third Republic politicians, predominantly Radical Socialist, who understand that their political future requires that they support De Gaulle but hope to keep the Resistance leaders and the FCNL out of power. They see in the non-recognition of the FCNL a prospect of gaining the Allied support which, they believe, might activate their organization, thus far lacking any wide support. This group has as its spokesmen Parliamentarians and other officials who opposed the grant of full power to Petain; but, as it admits, it includes many who collaborated for longer and shorter periods, and could thus become an obvious haven for Vichyites.

3. The fact that the Comite National seems anxious to exploit the name of De Gaulle in every way short of entering into political commitments to him -- in particular, that it is drawing a distinction between De Gaulle and the FCNL which De Gaulle himself could clearly not accept -- indicates the continued personal strength of De Gaulle in France, as well as the power of the organizations which acknowledge his leadership.

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CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 5 1975

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified
TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Reports Received in OSS

Submitted herewith are some additional items received from our secret sources abroad.

Unless otherwise indicated, the items of information transmitted are reports just as received from agents, and have not been evaluated as to degree of reliability other than as stated.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.  
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS  
Intelligence Service

Enclosures.

Copies to: Department of State  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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By Authority of  
SIA 006687  
By SR Date MAY 5 1975

203(1H)
GERMANY: Naval Personnel in South Germany

German Naval personnel has been arriving in the South of Germany in numbers and is being imprisoned there, according to a report received by the OSS representative in Bern. The report states that these men were seized by the Gestapo because their attitude was disrupting fleet discipline. After a short stay in South Germany, they are sent to the Eastern Front and put in special "punishment" battalions. The difficulties in the fleet have been ascribed to (1) the heavy submarine losses, and (2) the lack of activity among other types of naval units.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 6 June)
GERMANY: Nazi Propaganda Still Tries to Split the Allies by Threats of a Separate Peace with Russia.

Baron von Rheinhaben, former German diplomat, longtime representative at the League of Nations, and more recently a visitor in Lisbon, is now in Switzerland, where he is discreetly propounding German propaganda. He advances numerous and explicit reasons why Germany can no longer win the war. Her only hope, he says, lies in a separate peace with Russia. For that reason, Germany is now ready to accept almost any sacrifices to attain this result. The OSS representative in Bern comments that the apparent purpose of such propaganda is to frighten the Western powers into the belief that a separate Russo-German agreement is imminent.

Similarly, the disbursing officer for the Nazi Consulate in Tangier is reported to have declared that Germany should look for a separate peace with the USSR, if she is to save herself.

(OSS Official Dispatches: Bern, 3 June; Tangier, 1 June)
TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of a dispatch received from the Bern office of this agency, containing a report on the new Cabinet in Bulgaria.

[Signature]

Oliver Jackson, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.
BULGARIA: The New Cabinet

According to information reaching the OSS representative in Bern, the new Bulgarian Cabinet (cf. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 2 June, p. 6) is possibly somewhat better than might have been expected, as it is not 100 percent quisling, although probably Germanophile enough to satisfy the Germans for the moment. The Prime Minister, Bagrianov, was the former aide-de-camp to the King. He was in the Cabinet of Kiosseivanov, the present Bulgarian Minister in Bern, with whom he had a violent controversy. While generally Germanophile, in the past he has on certain occasions indicated some Russian sympathies.

Stanishev, the Minister of the Interior, is a surgeon, and a fanatical Macedonian. Since the war he has become militantly pro-German, and is by far the strongest man in the new Cabinet. However, there is reason to believe that he does not particularly like the Nazi brand of Germanism. General Roussev, the Minister of War, is a hold-over from the last Cabinet, and a colorless person. Kostov, the Minister of Agriculture, is a strong personality and has been long in Russia. He is thought to have Communist tendencies. Savov, the Minister of Finance, was president of the Sofia Chamber of Commerce, and is a Germanophile business man. All in all, the OSS representative's informant believes that this Cabinet has a good German façade, but possibly a back door opening toward Russia.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 2 June)
3 June 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Additional Information on the Attack on Tito's Headquarters.

Transmitted herewith is a copy of two dispatches received from the Algiers office of this agency, containing additional information on the German attack on Tito's headquarters.

[Signature]
Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS Intelligence Service

Enclosure

CC: Department of State
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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By Authority of
CIA 006687
SD 58 Date MAY 5 1975

203(12)
YUGOSLAVIA: Additional Information on the Attack on Tito's Headquarters.

Messages received in Algiers on 29 and 30 May state that three enemy columns, each column consisting of 2,000 troops, were reported to be converging on Tito's current headquarters at Potoči (about 26 miles northwest of Sarajevo). These movements were apparently timed to coincide with the originally reported attack by glider-borne infantry and paratroops. There were also simultaneous landings of airborne troops at Petrovac and Vrtoše. The Partisans claim to have rounded up all of the original paratroopers at Drvar before enemy air action forced them to evacuate the town.

At the time of the most recent report the enemy controlled all the important roads in the Bosnia region. The three columns were said to be leaving the roads and preparing to attack from the regions of Vrbljani, Prekaja and Ključ. Source reports that the situation is grave, even though Allied aviators are effectively strafing and bombing the supply lines to the rear of the advancing columns. Tito is reported to have lost all radio facilities and a great amount of supplies.

Other German drives reported under way on 29 May included: a column moving westward toward Petrovac; a column pushing south from Bihać reinforced by units from Kula Vakif; and an advance north fromLivno to Glamoč. Glamoč airfield has been taken and the town's fall appears imminent.

(OSS Official Dispatches, Algiers, 29 and 30 May)
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

3 June 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of a dispatch received from the Madrid Office of this agency, reporting arrests of local government officials in France.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Joint Chiefs of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of
CIA 006687
By Date MAY 5 1975

Regraded Unclassified
FRANCE: Arrests of Local Government Officials.

Many reports from France indicate that in preparation for D-Day the Nazis are arresting numerous French officials. The regional prefects of Bouches du Rhone, Pyrenees-Orientales, Aveyron, Calvados, Aisne and Cote d'Or are said to have been arrested on 14 May. It is reliably stated, as of 15 May, that the regional prefects of Var, Vaucluse, Gard, Marseille, Nice, Montpellier and Lyon have been arrested; a report from the same source, as of 18 May, states that the prefects of Lille, Bordeaux and Toulouse are under arrest.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Madrid, 30 May)
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

2 June 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: A High German Officer's Estimate of the Soldiers' Morale

Transmitted herewith for your information is a copy of a dispatch from the Bern office of this agency, giving a high German Officer's Estimate of the soldiers' morale.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS Intelligence Service

Enclosure
2 June 1944

GERMANY: A High German Officer's Estimate of the Soldiers' Morale

The following statement is attributed to a high German officer:

There is an ever-growing feeling of separation between the German army and the population at home. The government, despite all its propaganda efforts, has not succeeded in bridging this gap. The individual soldier has endured so much suffering, only to see everything collapse, that he now tends to believe in nothing. He does not believe in victory, he does not believe in the Greater Germany. An immense wave of skepticism has engulfed him, and this is causing serious concern to the High Command.

One indication which has particularly alarmed the High Command is the fact that an increasing number of soldiers refuse to take their leave and return home. An inquiry which was discreetly made by the orders of the High Command to ascertain the causes of this strange and disquieting fact has tended to indicate that there is not one reason, but a whole series of reasons. Some do not wish to return home because there is no home and they consider that it would be too tragic to pass their leave in some hastily-constructed barracks or with strangers. Others explain that it would cause them too much suffering to see their wives working all the day long in the factories, worn out morally and physically. Others explain that the abnormal life which one leads in Germany, the efforts there to profit by the periods between bombardments to steal a little pleasure, fills them with disgust and they do not wish to share it.

According to the officer who made this report, it is this state of mind which explains the fact that in many cases the German soldier fights with desperate abandon, refusing to surrender in situations where there is no way out, preferring to die at his post. However, according to the same officer, it is a very dangerous phenomenon because the courage of despair is a precarious state of mind, and can be followed at a given moment by a complete and total collapse.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 30 May)
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

2 June 1944

TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS

Transmitted herewith for your information
is copy of a dispatch from the Bern office of this
agency, reporting on impending changes in the German
Legation staff at Bern.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.
GERMANY: Impending Changes in the German Legation Staff at Bern.

The OSS representative in Bern reports that steps are being taken to give the German Legation there a more definitely Nazi-SS character. According to reports, the PressAttaché is to be replaced shortly by a certain Prince von Urach. Prince von Urach was formerly correspondent of the VÖELKISCHER BEOBACHTER in Tokyo, and was then employed in the Foreign Office as a companion for important personalities visiting Germany. At one time he was attached to Mussolini. He is an SS man and in the Intelligence Service, and it is said that he is being sent here to try to prevent any recurrence in Switzerland of anything in the nature of the Wernehren incident in Turkey. Meanwhile on various pretexts an effort will be made to get back to Germany certain German officials and German journalists in the various German offices in Switzerland who are not considered safe by the Gestapo.

It is also reported that Prince von Urach, who has specialized in Far Eastern questions, will be entrusted with carrying on the task of following political and other developments in the United States, and will take over the task of Herr von Strempel, formerly in the German Embassy in Washington, who has not satisfied the German authorities in his reporting of American developments. The Prince is described as a decadent member of the German nobility who has completely sold himself to the Gestapo.

(OSS Official Dispatch, Bern, 1 June)
TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS

Under date of 17 May 1944, there was forwarded to you copy of a document prepared by this agency and entitled "Overtures by German Generals and Civilian Opposition for a Separate Armistice". This information, you will recall, was obtained from a series of cables from our representative in Bern, the most recent of which was dated 13 May 1944.

We now enclose a memorandum based on information which we have received from the OSS representative in the Iberian Peninsula. It concerns a Madrid group whose conduct is reminiscent of the Bern incident, and it is possible that the two groups are either identical or closely affiliated.

Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.

cc: Department of State
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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CIA 006687

By SR Date MAY 5 1975

203(IV)
The OSS representative in the Iberian Peninsula, writing from Madrid on 12 May 1944, advises that he has been approached by a certain German who is presumably acting for a group said to be composed of remnants of the German Socialists and Catholic Center Parties, with a goodly smattering of intellectuals. This German presented to our representative a letter which he had written to Dr. Heinrich Brüning, former Chancellor of Germany, now resident in the United States. At the same time, the author of the letter stated that he was planning to leave for Germany about the middle of May and to return one week later, accompanied by a high German military personage. The letter was reported to be interested in "spilling the works" because of his conviction that, if anything is to be saved from the wreck, Hitler must be promptly defeated. The usual fears of Russia's advancing armies make this German and his group highly anxious to contribute to Germany's defeat by invasion from the West and to reach an understanding with the Western Democracies.

The letter to Brüning, referred to above, describes the situation within Germany, and is summarized as follows:

1. Germany faces a prospect of total destruction unless Hitler is removed and the nation cleansed through her own efforts.

2. The Opposition (presumably the group represented by the author of the letter) has consolidated itself to the point of forming a civilian shadow government, with the support of the principal Opposition forces in the Army, which contain many of Brüning's friends and acquaintances.

3. They all count upon Brüning's advice and support, and hope that he will come to Madrid and be associated with this group.
A copy of the letter in question has been submitted to Mr. Breckenridge Long, Assistant Secretary of State, with whom OSS has previously discussed Dr. Brüning. In accordance with Mr. Long's judgment and our own, the Brüning letter will not be delivered.

Further information has been requested of our representative in Madrid as to personalities involved and their connections. He has been instructed to continue his contact in a cautious manner and make no commitments whatsoever.