

MR 203(14), Sec. 1 -- COLONEL MATHENSON STUDIES

1944

Change title? to
"Map Room Memoranda for President"?

Map Room
Box 74

20 April 1944

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL PARK.

By W. J. Stewart Date JAN 4 1974

Following items have been extracted from various reports re Allied and Enemy Air. Some might interest you.

1. U.S. Plane production for 1-14 April is running behind that for the corresponding period of March. Total was 3,944 - a decrease of 433. Of the total 3,064 were combat types, this category showing a decrease of 232. Production of B-27s for the period was 31, an increase of 8.
2. British production of combat planes for March was 2,152. This was 125 units, or 6%, above the forecast for that month.
3. Japanese Air Force. Wastage of planes during March is estimated at 1,085 or 85 in excess of estimated March production of 1,000 planes.
4. German Air Force. February production estimated at 1,225 of which bombers were 360, fighters 800, and others 65. Preliminary indications for March are for a production of about 800 planes - 225 bombers, 450 fighters and 125 others. Input from repairs is estimated at 325 and input from salvage at 300. Total input was, therefore, about 1425, against a gross wastage of 1,800, leaving a deficit of 375 for the month. ----- The tendency to concentrate single-engine fighters in Northwest Germany at the expense of other parts of the front continues.
5. Miscellaneous items:
 - a. On April 10th, P-38's were used for the first time for high altitude precision bombing of German-held airdromes. With the aid of a bombardier operated bombsight in the lead plane of the group, two airdromes were attacked from 18,000 feet. Results were excellent at one field.
 - b. Axis air opposition to operations of the 15th AF during week ending 18 April was relatively weak and unaggressive, and was confined to target area. Weather may have had something to do with this. Against 8th AF operations enemy fighter reaction was varied. Some spots aggressive, at others weak.
 - c. German air effort in Italy during the same week was concentrated entirely on the anchorage at Anzio where 22 to 40 enemy aircraft either attacked or mined the approaches daily.
 - d. In the period 9-15 April the Japanese Air Force offensive effort in the South and Southwest Pacific was virtually nil. --- Sightings shows his strength on New Guinea (air) to be at the lowest point in several months. It is entirely possible that the enemy, temporarily at least, is having difficulty with his replacements. ----- In view of the extensive land

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operations conducted by the Japanese in western Burma and eastern India since early March, it is of particular interest to note that very little air support has been rendered their ground troops except for daily recon flights.

g. The 15th Air Force employed P-51 fighters as long range escorts for the first time in this theatre on 16 April.

f. Report on an AAF Board Project, carried out in conjunction with the Ground Forces and Navy at Fort Pierce, Florida, indicates that aerial bombardment with 100-pound demolition bombs with instantaneous fuzing from medium altitude is effective in clearing a path for assault troops through beach defenses consisting of barbed wire and mine fields. Air attack is found to be less effective against other types of static beach defenses.

g. The attention of the Soviet Purchasing Commission has been called to 700,000 lbs. of aircraft spares awaiting shipment at Portland, Oregon for more than 60 days, as of 31 March 1944, and immediate action has been requested.

h. The Joint Meteorological Committee has approved a high altitude weather project to construct a series of normal monthly weather maps for heights up to 60,000 feet over most of the Northern Hemisphere. From these maps the normal wind directions and speeds can be ascertained.

i. Report received from Pratt & Whitney representative that theatre operations have begun using P-47D15 airplanes as dive bombers. Airplane carries two 1000-pound bombs plus one 75 gallon belly tank for radius of action of 275 miles. Estimated 175 miles radius with three 1000-pound bombs. Pilots who have flown the airplanes in the configuration state that "this is best dive bomber built to date".

HENRY W. PUTNAM
Captain, AC

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1. Statistical Airmarks.

British production of 2,152 combat airplanes in March 1944, showed a 14% increase over February, a short month, and was 125 units or 6% above the forecast for March. The largest increases over the forecast were in Heavy Bombers, 521 produced against 486 scheduled; and in Twin-Engine and Single-Engine Fighters, 1,082 against 985. (Lancasters produced exceeded forecast by 22 and Mosquito Fighters by 72).

2. Movement of Heavy Bombardment Replacement Crews to European and Mediterranean Theaters - SECRET

As of 13 April 1944, the status of heavy bombardment replacement crews moving to the European and Mediterranean Theaters was as indicated below:

Type Crews	<u>European Theater</u>		Arrived since 1 April	Total
	Bal. Estim. to Depart US before 1 May	En Route		
B-17	192	105	342	639
B-24	119	62	18	199
Total	311	167	360	838

<u>Mediterranean Theater</u>				
B-17	29	22	9	60
B-24	73	71	98	242
Total	102	93	107	302

3. Comparison of Aircraft Allocations with Factory Deliveries During First Quarter of 1944 - SECRET

Following is a comparison of aircraft allocations with factory deliveries for the first quarter of 1944:

Type A/C	<u>AAF</u>			<u>Giveaways</u>			<u>Total</u>		
	<u>Alloc.</u>	<u>Deliv.</u>	<u>% + or -</u>	<u>Alloc.</u>	<u>Deliv.</u>	<u>% + or -</u>	<u>Alloc.</u>	<u>Deliv.</u>	<u>% + or -</u>
Heavy Bombers (B-17, B-24)	3225	3664	+13%	307	400	+30%	3532	4064	+15%
Medium & Light (B-25, B-26, A-20, A-26)	1344	1509	+12%	688	812	+18%	2032	2321	+14%
Fighters & Night Fighters (P-38, P-39/63, P-40, P-47, P-51, P-61)	4039	4125	+2%	1498	1705	+14%	5537	5830	+5%
Transports (UC-45, C-46 C-47, C-54)	954	1042	+9%	429	500	+17%	1383	1542	+11%

Note: Figures based on ADQ 302. (RMSOD) dated 31 March 1944.

4. Liaison Aircraft Improvements --SECRET

A cable from General Stratemeyer stated that liaison aircraft to be shipped CBI should have shorter landing and take-off characteristics, a radio compass, an artificial horizon, a better radio, two bomb shackles (for supply dropping), and should accommodate one or two litter patients. Colonel Allison added that the most immediate requirements was accommodations for one litter and increased take-off and all around performance; these requirements, he believed, could be accomplished by modifying the L-5 to carry one litter and by installing a controllable pitch propeller. He also stated other requirements which were desirable but in a lower priority.

In reply, the theater has been informed that the single litter modification would be incorporated in all production L-5's by July 1944, that controllable pitch prop was in experimental stage and would be expedited and that all other requested changes were under consideration. NMD has been requested to expedite litter and prop modifications for the L-5 and to investigate the feasibility of other proposed modifications.

5. High Altitude Weather Project - ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Joint Meteorological Committee has approved a high altitude weather project to construct a series of normal monthly weather maps for heights up to 60,000 feet over most of the Northern Hemisphere. From these maps the normal wind directions and speeds can be ascertained.

6. Use of 1000 Pound Bombs on P-47's.

Report received from Pratt & Whitney representative the theatre operations have begun using P-47D15 airplanes as dive bombers. Airplane carries two 1000 lb. bombs plus one 75 gal. belly tank for radius of action of 275 miles. Estimated 175 miles radius with three 1000 lb. bombs. Pilots who have flown the airplanes in the configuration state that "this is best dive bomber built to date".

7. Quick Change Power Plant Project for R-3350-BB Engines in B-29's.

Directed initiation of quick change power plant project for R-3350-BB engines in B-29 aircraft. This is a speculative project against the possibility of future need of higher power engines in the B-29 than the present R-3350-BA.

8. Development of Propaganda Leaflet Bomb

Requested Chief of Ordnance to develop a propaganda leaflet bomb and procure a minimum of 4,000 per month for the remainder of the calendar year. Requested that this project be expedited so that delivery of subject bombs to United States Strategic Air Force in Europe can be initiated at the earliest possible date. These bombs are for use in the proposed psychological warfare by USSAFE, and will be employed to drop leaflets over predetermined areas occupied by the enemy. At the present time, several make-shift devices are being investigated in the U.K., but as yet none of the methods tried have given satisfactory results.

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9. Shipment of Aircraft to South Pacific and CBI

Since there are indications of a shortage of shipping space for processed aircraft to the subject theatres, tentative arrangements have been made to divert a portion of the aircraft for CBI from Los Angeles to New York for shipment from the latter port on British Tankers. These British Tankers are being set up for ultimate operation between the Persian Gulf and CBI. If the situation with respect to the aircraft destined for South Pacific becomes serious, it may become necessary to establish processing facilities in the Canal Zone.

10. Additional Fuel Provisions for B-29's

Directed that B-29 airplanes, prior to incorporation of additional wing center section fuel, be delivered with two bomb bay tanks in front bay. Kits consisting of two bomb bay tanks and supporting straps for rear bomb bay installation, will be provided for possible future installation for all interim airplanes with the exception of those modified for 6 tank installation or assigned to training.

11. Use of Water Injection for Fuel Saving

Tests have been made with B-46 and B-29 airplanes for the purpose of determining the practicability of use of water injection for cruising and possible saving of fuel. Tests with B-46 indicate that optimum specific fuel consumption can be obtained without use of water injection for cruise purposes. Tests with B-29 indicate that water injection for cruise can be used to advantage. Tests with B-29 scheduled to start on 1 May. Development of a water injection system (from exhaust gases) is being considered in view of water jet pump, as proposed.

12. United States Government Policy on Installation of Aircraft

12.1. Policy

The members of the United States Government Commission have been asked to report on the use of aircraft bases within an airport in Port of Spain, Trinidad, for more than 25 years, and to report on the use of the same for more than 25 years, and to report on the use of the same for more than 25 years.

12.2. Policy of United States Government

It is the policy of the United States Government to provide for the use of aircraft bases within an airport in Port of Spain, Trinidad, for more than 25 years, and to report on the use of the same for more than 25 years, and to report on the use of the same for more than 25 years.

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1. Destruction of Beach Defense by Air Attack

Report on an AAF Board Project, carried out in conjunction with the Ground Forces and Navy at Fort Pierce, Florida, indicates that aerial bombardment with 100-pound demolition bombs with instantaneous fuzing from medium altitude is effective in clearing a path for assault troops through beach defenses consisting of barbed wire and mine fields. Air attack is found to be less effective against other types of static beach defenses.

This report is being forwarded to G-3, Army Ground Forces, and Army Service Forces. It is being recommended that G-3 forward pertinent parts of this report to overseas theater commanders.

2. Test to Determine Mutual Interference Between H2X Equipment on Aircraft in Close Formation

The AAF Board has been directed to conduct tests to determine the density of H2X aircraft which can be employed in a formation before mutual interference becomes so pronounced that the equipment is not usable.

3. Use of Water Injection for Cruising Purposes

Tests have been made with C-46 and C-87 airplanes for the purpose of determining the practicability of use of water injection for cruising and possible saving of fuel. Tests with C-46 indicate that minimum specific fuel consumption can be obtained without use of water injection for cruise purposes. Tests with C-87 indicate that water injection for cruise can be used to advantage. Tests with C-54 scheduled to start on 1 May. Development work on the B-29 on a water recovery system (from exhaust gases) weighing 300 lbs. to recover 50 lbs. of water per hour, is progressing.

4. Soviet Purchasing Commission Advised of Accumulation of Aircraft Spares

The attention of the Soviet Purchasing Commission has been called to 700,000 lbs. of aircraft spares awaiting shipment at Portland, Oregon for more than 60 days, as of 31 March 1944, and immediate action has been requested.

5. Delivery of P-47's to Brazilians in MTO

In accordance with Lend-Lease instructions, arranged for delivery of 68 P-47 aircraft to Mediterranean Theatre of Operations for use by First Brazilian Fighter Squadron (Overseas Force) to operate with the Coastal Air Force. Delivery schedule on these aircraft is 10 in April; 10 in May; 18 in June and 5 per month throughout the remainder of 1944.

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By W. J. Stewart Date JAN 4 1974
REVIEW OF CURRENT OPERATIONS IN BURMA

Plans for current Allied operations in Burma called for the capture of Akyab on the western coast by the British XV Corps, the seizure of the Schwebo-Monywa airfields in central Burma by the British IV Corps and the development of the Ledo Road through the Hukawng Valley in northern Burma by Chinese-American forces.

The campaign opened slowly in December 1943, following the end of the last year's monsoon. The British 5th and 7th Indian Divisions initiated the drive down the Arakan coast to Akyab with the capture of Maungdaw, an important port for seaborne supplies. Stubborn opposition was offered along the line of the Maungdaw-Buthidaung road by the Japanese 55th Division reinforced with elements of the 33rd Division. Forty miles to the east, the 81st West African Division began a parallel drive south from Paletwa down the valley of the Kaladan River.

In northern Burma, the Ledo Road had been cleared for truck traffic over the Patkai Range to Shingbwiyang at the head of the Hukawng Valley. From this base, the American-trained 22nd and 38th Chinese Divisions advanced against Taro and Maingwan. This attack was strongly opposed by elements of the Japanese 18th Division, a veteran of the Singapore campaign, and initial progress was slow.

Principal action in February developed in the Maungdaw-Buthidaung sector of the Arakan front. Early in the month a Japanese regiment infiltrated to the rear of the British positions, pushed columns to the west and south and isolated the British 5th and 7th Divisions. Instead of retreating in confusion, the British established a strong central point capable of being supplied by air, and from which successful ground action against Jap positions could be projected. Admiral Mountbatten's request to the Chiefs of Staff for a diversion of 27 C-46 aircraft from Hump operations to supply the isolated forces was approved. British reinforcements arrived by forced march from rear areas and succeeded in isolating and destroying many of the infiltrating Jap

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elements. By 25 February the communications of both British Divisions were restored. Fifteen hundred Japs were killed in the action.

During this period of heavy fighting in the Arakan, the 81st West African Division moved down the Kaladan Valley against sporadic opposition to a point 30 miles east of Buthidaung. However, early in March a Japanese infiltration to the north forced the British to withdraw west of the Kaladan and north of Kyauktaw. This Division has become partially dependent upon supply by air and has not made subsequent progress.

After the restoration of communications on the Arakan front, the British resumed the offensive and to date have cleared the Maungdaw-Buthidaung road except for the tunnel section through the Mayu Range. British troops have occupied St. Martin's Island, 13 miles south of Maungdaw and conducted successful commando operations on the adjacent mainland. In the past week, further Japanese infiltration northwest of Buthidaung has been detected and attacked.

During March, the center of action has shifted from the Arakan sector to northern and central Burma.

On March 4-5, the Hukawng Valley drive attained its first major objective with the capture of Maingkwan. The 5307 American Ranger Regiment, composed of volunteers experienced in Jungle fighting, made a rapid flanking movement and seized Walabum on the road to the rear of the Jap position at Maingkwan. The Japanese were trapped between the Americans and the Chinese 22nd Division attacking from the north and over 2,000 Japs were killed. Allied losses were light. The Chinese 38th Division cleared the western portion of the valley, captured Taro on the upper Chindwin River, and advanced south to join the forces from Maingkwan. The strong Jap position at Shaduzup at the southern end of the Hukawng Valley has been taken. The Rangers again executed a flanking movement through the hills and isolated the enemy.

On the right flank of the forces in the Hukawng Valley, a regiment of Gurkha and

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Kashin levies (native troops) captured Sumprabum on 20 March and have pushed to within 40 miles of Myitkyina, principal Jap air and supply base in northern Burma.

Between 5 and 10 March the largest airborne force yet carried by the Allies was landed 160 miles behind the enemy lines near Katha in north central Burma. In this period, 8,000 men and 660 mules, comprising Wingate's 77th and 111th Long Range Penetration Brigades, were flown into two landing strips which were cleared rapidly by American airborne engineers. Total casualties were 120. Transport plane sorties alone totalled 575. Allied air operations in support of this movement caught an unusual concentration of Japanese aircraft on fields in central Burma, destroying 63 and damaging 18 planes. The LRP brigades have since moved west and cut the Mogaung-Mandalay railway. A third LRP Brigade, the 16th, has reached the Indaw-Katha area, having crossed the Chindwin south of Taro and marched south on jungle trails. Approximately 12,000 Allied troops and 1,200 mules are now operating against Jap communications in this area. This force is being supplied entirely by air.

During the past seven months, the Japanese have more than doubled their forces in Burma. With eight combat divisions in the area, the Japs were believed to have distinct offensive capabilities.

On 12 March elements of the Japanese 33rd Division blocked the Imphal-Tiddim road north of Tiddim, headquarters of the British 17th Division. During the following week, units of the 15th and 31st Japanese Divisions crossed the Chindwin on a broad front and advanced into the hills west and northwest of Imphal. Previous to this, activity on this front had been limited to patrol action with the British taking the offensive. Admiral Mountbatten interpreted these movements as a three-divisional assault aimed at seizure of the Imphal plain with its food produce and two all-weather airfields. Request was made to the Chiefs of Staff for additional aircraft to bring the experienced 5th and 7th Divisions from the Arakan front as reinforcements and to supply units isolated in the Imphal area. The Admiral was urged to obtain these air-

craft from British sources, rather than from Hump operations.

The Japanese 33rd Division with tank support, is engaged in the area south and southeast Imphal. Elements have retarded the withdrawal towards Imphal of the British 17th Division and have infiltrated to points within 25 miles of Imphal. One regiment of the Jap 15th Division has pushed patrols northwest of Tamu to within 25 miles of Imphal. Two regiments of the Jap 31st Division are in the Urrul-Kohima area northwest of Imphal. Two additional regiments from these divisions are believed available for offensive action against northeast India. The basis of the Japanese tactics has been to infiltrate small groups to cut the supply lines of larger British forces. It is not yet clear whether the main Jap effort will be directed towards Dinapur and the railway from Calcutta which supplies our Assam airfields.

In this series of Allied offensives and Jap counter-offensives, the dominant role of cargo and transport aircraft is apparent. The speed of the Ledo advance, the successful movement and supply of the LRP groups, and the supply of units isolated by infiltration -- all are dependent upon air cargo facilities.

Throughout the operations the Allied Strategic and Tactical Air Forces based in India have maintained effective bombing of the thinly extended enemy communications in Burma, acted in direct support of ground action, attacked airfields and protected air cargo routes. Jap air action has been sporadic and has not involved large numbers of planes.

A message from the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to the British Chiefs of Staff, dated 24 March states:

"It is conclusive to us that the greatest accomplishment that can be achieved by Admiral Mountbatten is to secure Myitkyina with the object of providing an immediate increase of the air transport capacity to China. We urge again therefore that the necessary directive be issued to Admiral Mountbatten to undertake the most vigorous action to capture Upper Burma during the remainder of the dry season, through-

out the monsoon, and next fall, in order to increase the capacity of the air transport line to China and expedite the laying of a pipeline to that country".

In the past week, British have concluded that the Japanese offensive has become a serious threat to their position at Imphal and to the railway from Calcutta to Ledo. A message from the British Chiefs of Staff to General Wilson, dated 29 March states:

"Supreme Commander South East Asia has made an urgent request for reinforcements in transport aircraft to enable him to assist in supplying our forces which are operating behind the Japanese lines. Situation is serious since present Japanese advance towards Imphal might if successful cut the supply route to Assam airfields from which the air route to China begins and on which the troops defending this route depend. On the other hand if we are successful we might achieve a considerable victory over the Japanese.

"Immediate need is for reinforcements of 100 C-47 transports. We have discussed with United States Chiefs of Staff all possible sources of supply and have reached the conclusion that the aircraft can be provided with least effect on important operations if they come from the Mediterranean. United States Chiefs of Staff have proposed and we agree that one United States Group of Troop Carrier Command (64 (U.E.) and one R.A.F. Dakota Squadron (25 U.E.) should be transferred immediately to Southeast Asia."

General Stilwell has advised General Marshall that Chiang Kai Shek will not commit the Y Force -- the Chinese forces in the Yunnan Province on the northeast border of Burma. The Generalissimo is providing however, one more division which will be flown into Burma. A second division may be released for a diversional attack on Myitkyina.

2 April 1944.

Forwarded

Richard Park, Jr.
RICHARD PARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.

Boyce P. Price
BOYCE P. PRICE,
Captain, C. E.

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JAN 4 1974

1 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL BROWN:

The following is a brief of the attached Soviet analysis:

The present Soviet advance southwestward is so powerful that the Germans appear unable or unwilling to hold the river lines. This advance may be slowed by spring thaws south of the Pripet Marshes. If for any reason the present drive is stalled, a Soviet attack either toward Warsaw or Riga seems likely. Although the German withdrawal has been comparatively orderly, it is probably not part of a carefully considered strategic plan aimed at a counter-offensive should the Soviet lines become over extended.

The Germans will attempt to hold the Soviets as far east of the Carpathians as they can, and will probably counterattack very heavily east of Lwow to hold that vital communication center. Should Lwow fall, the Germans will probably defend either (1) Carpathians -- Prut River line, (2) Carpathians -- Siret River line, (3) Carpathians -- Lower Danube River line.

Critical manpower shortages might lead the Germans to effect a voluntary withdrawal to a line based on either (1) Riga -- Grodno -- 1941 boundary, or (2) 1941 boundary -- Carpathian mountains -- lower Danube. Although either of these positions effect a substantial shortening of the line (500-700 miles), a proportionate economy of manpower cannot be realized because many German units have been badly cut up and because the Soviets could not only reduce their average frontage per division but also economize in defensive areas and concentrate larger forces for attack in selected areas. Nevertheless, withdrawal to the Carpathians, which lend themselves to defensive operations, would result in a material saving of manpower for the Germans.

The Russian military capabilities are dependent on essential lend-lease supplies, without which Germany could probably still defeat Russia. They will remain essentially unchanged until the event of a cross-channel operation. If that operation is successful the Soviets will continue their pressure and it is unlikely that any considerable number of German troops could be withdrawn from the Eastern Front. If that operation is unsuccessful, or if there is no Second Front, the Germans could move substantial forces to the Eastern Front and it would seem likely the Soviets would be forced to take up the defensive somewhere along the 1941 boundary line. The Soviets will probably not attempt to go beyond the 1941 boundary except in the case of a successful cross-channel invasion and/or the collapse of Germany.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date JAN 4 1974

Richard Park, Jr.

RICHARD PARK
Colonel, General Staff

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1. General.

a. The Soviet advance south of the Pripet Marshes during the past month has been rapid and impressive. Soviet forces have crossed the Bug and the Dnestr, have traversed Bessarabia, and are facing Old Rumania along the northern Prut. The present southwestward advance is so powerful that the Germans appear unable or unwilling to hold the river lines that normally would present greatest barriers.

b. The progress of the drive toward the southwest presents several questions involving the general strategy of the United Nations, Soviet ambitions in Europe, repercussions in the Balkans, as well as possible military reaction on the part of the Germans.

2. Estimate of the Situation -- Immediate Present.

a. It is unlikely that the German withdrawal has been part of a carefully considered strategic plan involving a major counter-offensive should Russian lines become overextended. In general, withdrawal has been comparatively orderly. German counterattacks continue, particularly in the Tarnopol area east of Lwow, the latter being the center of railway lines to the south and southeast. German resistance in the Odessa-Nikolaev region has been stubborn.

b. The possibility exists that the present rate of the Soviet advance may be materially slowed down south of the Pripet Marshes largely because of approaching spring thaws.

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c. If the present drive is stalled, it is probable that the Russians will attack either toward Warsaw, as a diversionary effort, or toward Riga from the Pripet Marshes to cut off forces in the Baltic Countries.

3. German Military Lines of Action.

a. Assuming a vigorous continuance of the present Soviet offensive south of the Pripet marshes the Germans will probably defend either (see map)

- (1) Carpathians -- Pruth River Line
- (2) Carpathians -- Siret River Line
- (3) Carpathians -- Lower Danube River Line
- (4) and/or launch a counterattack in the Lwow - Tarnopol area.

b. Manpower in Germany is sufficient for minimum military needs only. The Germans have 194 divisions on the Eastern Front (total strength 3,600,000) opposed to 450 Soviet divisions estimated to number 4,700,000. The Germans are overextended as a result of winter operations and all available reserves are now in the West. Length of time at beginning of drive was about 1970 miles (ten miles to a division). Present line is 1700 miles.

c. Considerable economy of forces can be effected by a voluntary German withdrawal to:

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(1) Riga -- Grodno - 1941 boundary:

Approximate length - 1000

On the present basis of one division for 10 miles this would indicate a possible saving of 97 divisions. This cannot be accepted because many German divisions have been so badly cut up by the Soviet during the withdrawal that they are no longer available as fighting units and therefore cannot be considered as a saving. The shortening of lines for the Germans would represent an equivalent shortening for the Soviets and a concurrent capability of reducing materially the average frontage per division. Shortening lines would mean that the Soviet would be able to economize in defensive areas and concentrate larger forces for offensive action in selected areas. Should the Germans withdraw to the Carpathians, they can effect a material saving in divisions as the mountain area lends itself to defensive operations.

(2) 1941 boundary line -- Carpathian Mountains --

Lower Danube:

Approximate length - 1200


The holding of this line on the basis of present density would indicate a saving of about 79 divisions. No such saving would be possible for the reasons indicated in paragraph (1) above.

4. Logistical Considerations.

a. Lines of Communications. Adequate rail lines exist to areas north of Pripet with no important bottlenecks or defiles. The picture is entirely different in the Pruth--Dneister areas east of

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the Carpathians. With Lwow in Soviet possession supply to these areas would be almost entirely dependent on lines from Western Europe running through Budapest and to a lesser extent, Belgrade. Concentrated bombing of these cities would seriously cripple the Nazi military supply requirements.

b. Rivers. The Danube River and its tributaries, as soon as free of ice, will be available to augment present transportation facilities in the Balkans. The riverhead for navigation is indicated by the anchor symbols on the attached map.

c. Oil. Germany's augmented synthetic oil production has reached the point that it could enable her to fight a defensive war on greatly shortened lines for a considerable time. Oil supply in Rumania, Hungary and Poland, however, supply 70.3% of the total annual Axis crude oil supply or 40% of the total annual Axis oil production. Germany must, however, have oil to mount offensives and must use whatever divisions are required to defend the Rumanian oil and insure the Hungarian oil. She must make an effort to protect the 200,000 tons of oil she now receives from Estonia.

d. Effect of Lend-Lease on Soviet Capabilities. An important factor enabling the Soviets to seize the offensive and retain it is Lend-Lease. Lend-Lease food and transport particularly have been vital factors in Soviet success. Combat aircraft, upon which the Soviet Air Forces relied so greatly, have been furnished in relatively great numbers (11,300 combat planes received). Should there be a full stoppage of Lend-Lease it is extremely doubtful whether Russia could


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retain efficiently her all-out offensive capabilities. Even defensively the supply of Lend-Lease food and transport would play an extremely vital role. It amounts to about a million tons a year. If Russia were deprived of it, Germany could probably still defeat the U.S.S.R. Lend-Lease is our trump card in dealing with U.S.S.R. and its control is possibly the most effective means we have to keep the Soviets on the offensive in connection with the second front.

5. Second Front.

a. Russian military capabilities will remain essentially unchanged until the following develop:

- (1) A successful Second Front, or
- (2) An unsuccessful or no Second Front.

b. In the case of a successful cross-Channel operation, it is unlikely that any considerable number of German troops can be withdrawn from the Eastern Front if the Soviets will continue their pressure. Assuming continuance of the present Soviet offensive, intensified Allied bombing of important rail and industrial centers in the Balkans, and consequent Balkan internal difficulties, it is possible that Germany may be forced to withdraw within a much more constricted defensive area or reduce forces currently in France or Germany.

c. In case of an unsuccessful or no Second Front, the Germans could move substantial military forces to the Eastern Front. Under these circumstances it is likely that the Soviet Army would be forced to take up the defensive somewhere along the 1941 boundary line against the offensive action the Germans could be expected to initiate. The

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German offensive could be launched north of the marshes where the rail net is superb for the support of operations. Should the U.S.S.R. advance to the Carpathians the German attack could be launched to the South East where its effect would be to stabilize the Balkans, secure the Danube corridor and rob the Russians of the gains that have cost them so highly. Such an attack would have the advantage of paralleling the river lines thus minimizing these barriers.

6. Conclusions.

a. The Soviets will not attempt to go beyond the 1941 boundary except in the case of a successful cross-Channel operation and/or a German collapse. In the former case they will continue their offensive. In the latter case they will move rapidly into Germany.

b. The Germans will hold the Russians as far east of the Carpathians as they can. They will counterattack very heavily east of Lwow to hold that vital communication center. If they fail to hold Lwow they will withdraw to defensive lines indicated in paragraph 3 above.

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JAN 4 1974

To: Colonel Parks.


Question: What kind of command does Gen. Eisenhower have over the British Bomber Command and the U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe?

Answer:

At the present time, Gen Eisenhower exercises no command over either. Both the U.S. Air Forces in Europe and the British Bomber Command operate directly under the CCS carrying out directives prepared by the CCS. Air Marshal Portal is the executive agent for the CCS. Arrangements have been made to pass direction of the Strategic Air Forces, both British and American, to General Eisenhower. This direction is to pass when Gen Eisenhower and Air Marshal Portal have agreed upon a plan for air operations to assist OVERLORD. This direction will consist of operational control over both Air Forces by General Eisenhower and will be exercised through Air Chief Marshal Tedder who is Deputy to General Eisenhower.

General Eisenhower and Air Marshall Portal have agreed upon a plan but the plan has not been approved by the British Chiefs of Staff, hence the passage of control to General Eisenhower has not yet taken effect.

Bremer



**THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**

1 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL BROWN:

Subject: Estimated Situation on the Soviet-German Front as of 1 June 1944.

In compliance with your instructions, the following is an estimate of the situation on the Eastern Front, to include the probable location of the front line as of 1 June 1944.

It is suggested that due to the dearth of information on the Red Army, any prediction must be nothing better than an "educated guess."

It is generally agreed that Soviet manpower is such that the Red Army is able to maintain a superiority of numbers, and with a peak war production, is able to replace battle wastages, particularly in artillery and tanks. Lend-Lease fills out the other two vital factors—planes and food.

Therefore, a definite strategy is opened to the Soviets which they have relentlessly maintained. This strategy involves pressure along the entire front, and when a soft spot in the German lines appears, it is developed to the limit. Meanwhile, pressure is not relaxed on the remainder of the front, thereby pinning down lateral movement of German reinforcements.

To date no major Soviet drive has been launched without simultaneous pressure all along the rest of the front. Further, it is believed that during April the ground from the Pripet marches north will

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By W. J. Stewart Date JAN 4 1974

SECRET

greatly restrict large scale pressure. Therefore, in spite of the fact that the southern sectors of the front may permit large scale operations, the accompanying pressure in the north will be absent, thus preventing the Red Army temporarily from continuing its overall strategy.

The actual period of thaw may only be about four weeks duration but men and materiel are not moved up to the front until the ground is hard, and this movement requires time. The latter part of May then will permit the Soviets to resume their strategy.


Therefore, I estimate the front on 1 June will be substantially the same as at present except for that portion from the vicinity of Cernauti to the Black Sea, where it may be along the Carpathians to approximately the mouth of the Danube or to some point on the coast more to the north.

Richard Park

RICHARD PARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.

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By W. J. Stewart Date JAN 4 1974

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SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

15 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

A recently captured Japanese captain who was attached to the maintenance organization of a medium bomber group based at Rabaul since September 1943, stated that his group had lost from 30 to 40 planes in operations during that period. Replacements were flown from the empire within two or three days. Some of these aircraft were produced as late as October or late November, suggesting that they had come almost directly from the production line.

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.

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By W. J. Stewart Date JAN 4 1974

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

14 March 1944


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:


In summing up recent air-borne operations in Burma, General Stratemeier has reported additionally as follows:

On the night of 5 March, the First Air Commando Force carrying Wingate's men landed 160 miles behind the lines in Burma. Glider-borne engineers did superb job on strip 5,000 x 300 feet in one day. Next morning light planes evacuated 30 casualties.

On afternoon and night of 9 March our bombers and fighters destroyed on the ground 20% of Jap Air Force in Burma. Looking forward now to extreme concentration of effort for direct air support of Wingate's Forces. We now have a fighter base complete with anti-aircraft and radar warning protection, from which we will operate against Japanese from the heart of their own territory.

Respectfully,


L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.



203(14)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

7 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: B-29 Project

1. The XX Bomber Command and the first of its two Very Heavy Bombardment Wings (the 58th) will move to the theatre this month. This initial force will be made up of four (4) groups, with four (4) squadrons each, equipped with 150 B-29's. Maintenance and service units required are moving by water. Personnel for the tactical units will fly over in B-29's and in aircraft of the Air Transport Command. The B-29's will begin to move approximately 10 March, leaving in increments of nine or ten aircraft a day (weather permitting) until all 150 have departed.
2. Training of the 58th Wing began in October and has been conducted at Kansas bases under the Second Air Force. Much of this training has been accomplished on B-17's while awaiting production of the B-29. To date, 178 standard B-29's have been delivered to the Army Air Forces (exclusive of 14 test and experimental models.) The 150 aircraft for the special project require certain modifications to make them fully ready for combat, which modifications are now being made and will be completed by 15 March. These aircraft will be equipped with the latest central gun control apparatus, radar countermeasure equipment, and blind bombing radar equipment. Bases are being constructed to receive these aircraft in the theatre and necessary supplies, including fuel, fuel storage facilities, lubricants, bombs, and ammunition are being assembled in the theatre. The Commanding General of the XX Bomber Command, Brigadier General K. B. Wolfe, has been in the theatre since the middle of January with the Advance Echelon of his Headquarters and is participating in the preparation.
3. The second wing for the XX Bomber Command (the 73rd Very Heavy Bombardment Wing) has begun its training under the Second Air Force and is scheduled to go to the theatre this fall.

L. Mathewson
L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.

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By W. J. Stewart Date JAN 4 1974

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Regraded Unclassified

21 February 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Recent reports of starvation overtaking Japanese troops in New Guinea and New Britain are further borne out by the following interesting extracts from an Intelligence Summary from the Southwest Pacific:

* * * * *

Extracts from diary of ^{Jap} officer of 80th Infantry at Sattelberg: "4 Nov: We've been without rations for a month. Although we appreciate the fact that to endure privations and shortages of food is a part of war, our present privations cannot be expressed in words. We have eaten bananas, stems and roots, plantain trees, bamboo shoots, grass, and flowering ferns, in fact, everything up to leaves of trees that could be eaten. Whether we like it or not, we are experiencing this and thinking only that it is a splendid training for us."


* * * * *

A POW captured at Kelanca (16 miles SE of Sio) on 14 Jan 44 expressed hatred toward superior officers because of ill-treatment. Says that during retreat a wounded Sgt Major was buried alive because of mistreatment of subordinates. Claimed to have seen most of his companions commit suicide during withdrawal due to inability to stand starvation.

* * * * *

5 Feb: POW states: Due to shortages in supplies and rations, evacuees were living on the hope of getting west of Saidor. Officers gave stragglers and sick, hand grenades with which to commit suicide and left them behind.

* * * * *


L. H. MATHEWSON
Colonel, U. S. Army

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By W. J. Stewart Date JAN 4 1974

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

17 February 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Statistical analysis of Japanese shipping losses.

1. In two years of war, United States and Allied Forces have destroyed a total of 783 ships, comprising 204 commissioned naval vessels and 579 merchantmen of 1,000 or more gross tons. These totals are current estimates of the Division of Naval Intelligence, and they are based upon continuous revision and reevaluation of all information received from Pearl Harbor up to February 7, 1944.

JAPANESE SHIPPING SUNK BY DIFFERENT AGENTS

Type of vessel	By Subs	By Planes	By Surface Vessels	By Other Agents	Total
Battleships.....	--	--	1	1*	2
Aircraft Carriers...	--	5	--	1**	6
Heavy Cruisers.....	1	2	1	--	4
Light Cruisers.....	1	1	2	--	4
Destroyers.....	15	17	22	8	62
Submarines.....	11	2	20	13***	46
Subtotals.....	28	27	46	23	124
Merchantmen (1000 or more gross tons)...	413	105	7	54	579
GRAND TOTAL.....	441	132	53	77	703
Percentage.....	62.7%	18.8%	7.5%	11.0%	100.0%

* 1 Battleship sunk by aircraft and surface vessels.

** 1 Aircraft Carrier sunk by aircraft and submarine.

*** 1 Submarine sunk by mine, 4 by aircraft and surface vessels,
8 by unrevealed units.

2. The following statistics reflect that the three principal weapons employed against the enemy's shipping -- torpedoes, bombs and gunfire -- it is the torpedo which has caused the greatest devastation, whether launched from submarines, surface vessels or aircraft. Bombs have damaged an incalculable number of the enemy's vessels, but they have sunk them, as a rule, only when employed with the low altitude tactics

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which are now coming into full development. Gunfire has struck the body blows against the enemy's capital ships.

<u>Type of vessel</u>	<u>Torpedoes</u>	<u>Bombs</u>	<u>Gunfire</u>	<u>Varied Combinations</u>	<u>Other Weapons</u>	<u>Total</u>
Battleships.....	--	--	1	1	--	2
Aircraft Carriers....	--	1	--	5	--	6
Heavy Cruisers.....	1	1	1	1	--	4
Light Cruisers.....	1	1	--	2	--	4
Destroyers.....	21	13	10	13	5	62
Subtotals.....	23	16	12	22	5	78
Merchantmen.....	418	94	15	21	31	579
GRAND TOTAL.....	441	110	27	43	36	657

Very respectfully,

C.W.
Chester Wood,
Captain, U.S.N.

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By W. J. Stewart Date JAN 4 1974


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

17 February 1944

SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

German efforts to throw Allied forces in the Anzio beachhead off balance have been handicapped to date by a lack of sufficient heavy artillery and antiaircraft guns.

Correction of these deficiencies by recent heavy night movements of artillery along roads leading south toward Rome points to a likely resumption of the German attack within the near future.


L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.

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By W. J. Stewart Date JAN 4 1974

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

15 February 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following extracts from a cable recently received from General Eaker are of possible interest. His comments were based on a recent tour of inspection of the Mediterranean area and conversations with Generals Cannon, Clark, Alexander and Devers and staff:

"1. Everyone is engaged in critical examination of tactics, organization and weapons to see whether any change is needed. If it is, it will be made promptly and Washington will be advised so that action can be taken in other theaters, too. At present there seems to be no serious limitation, which is not inherent in Air Forces, and no known change in equipment will permit fighters to operate with a 60-mile gale blowing across their field nor can bombers fly in freezing rain with heavy icing levels at 200.

"2. Present organization has come from successful operations of the same type of organization over a long time. Air Forces are sufficient in number. There is a good logistic system and there are no shortages of critical items. The supply of critical items with units communication and fuel, is good for thirty days and in depots there is a minimum of 45 days' supply. Leadership is able and experienced and communications are good. Airfields are inferior by U.K. or U.S. standards, but in good weather they are operational and satisfactory with care. Generally, there are enough landing strips, and they are well laid out and sufficiently big to support operations.

"3. A recommendation is made against drawing conclusions without complete information on local conditions and facts.

"4. The air and ground leaders agree on air employment and air support problems, and there is close cooperation and harmony.

"5. Equipment, accessories, bombers and planes generally are adequate under prevailing conditions.

"6. The Air Forces are flying any mission which has any prospect of success and will continue to do so. Generals Cannon and Clark spent


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By W. J. Stewart Date JAN 4 1974

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the day in the beachhead Wednesday and later both have been interviewed and their confidence and statements are reassuring. General Clark feels that he is getting support and full cooperation from the air and has no complaint."


L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.

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By W. J. Stewart Date JAN 4 1974

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

29 January 1944

██████████
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL BROWN:

SUBJECT: Allied and Enemy strength in Italy.

1. It is estimated that total Allied strength in Italy at the present time is 600,000.


2. This figure includes:

- 5 U. S. Divisions
- 5 British Divisions
- 1 New Zealand Division
- 2 Canadian Divisions
- 2 Indian Divisions
- 2 French Divisions
- 1 Polish Division

Total 18 Divisions

3. Enemy strength in central Italy is estimated at 350,000 including 15 divisions. Additional enemy strength in northern Italy which may be brought to bear against our forces is estimated at 60,000 and includes 2 plus divisions.

4. The above figures do not include air.


L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.

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DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. JAN 4 1974
By W. J. Stewart Date

203 (14)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

28 January 1944


MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL BROWN:

The following has been furnished to me by the Joint Planners reference control of the strategic air forces in Europe and the Mediterranean.

A directive has been issued by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to General Spaatz, who commands the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, extracts of which are as follows:

"2. The U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe will come directly under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander at a date to be announced later by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.


"5. Should a strategical or tactical emergency arise requiring such action, theater commanders may, at their discretion utilize the strategic air forces, which are based within their respective theaters, for purposes other than their primary mission, informing the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Commanding General, U.S.S.A.F.E. of the action taken."

The directive under which General Wilson is now operating in the Mediterranean contains provisions substantially the same as those in Para 5 above.

You will notice that the above applies to U.S. Strategic Air Forces alone, and in no way covers the use which may be made of the Royal Air Force Bombing Command. I am told that the British to date have objected to subordinating this force to the Supreme Allied Commander, but that there is a disposition on their part to yield to our viewpoint for the purpose of OVERLORD. 11?


L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.

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 By W. J. Stewart Date JAN 4 1974

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This is from the Enclosure to CCS 400/2
entitled

CONTROL OF STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN NORTHWEST EUROPE AND IN
THE MEDITERRANEAN

The Enclosure is a draft of a directive to be issued by the U.S.
Chiefs of Staff.

2. The U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe will come directly
under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander at a date to be
announced later by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

5. Should a strategical or tactical emergency arise requiring
such action, theater commanders may, at their discretion utilize the
strategic air forces, which are based within their respective theaters,
for purposes other than their primary mission, informing the Combined
Chiefs of Staff and the Commanding General, U.S.S.A.F.E. of the action
taken.

Note: The directive to General Wilson contained in CCS 387/3 contains
a statement approximately the same as that in paragraph 5 above.

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J.C.S. Regrading Memo 522-71
By RAP Date JAN 4 1974

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WAR DEPARTMENT
 WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
 OPERATIONS DIVISION
 WASHINGTON

26 January 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL BROWN:

The following has been prepared by Captain Kniffin and reviewed by me in an attempt to anticipate the result of operations now directed toward the capture of Rome.

It is estimated that the build-up of the Allied forces on the beachhead south of Rome and the enemy force to oppose it will be approximately as follows:

	<u>German</u>	<u>Allied</u>
D - Day	-	1 Div plus
D + 2	-	2 Divs (equiv)
D + 3	Equiv of 3 Div	2 1/3 Divs plus
D + 4	" " 3 1/3 Divs	"
D + 5	" " 3 2/3 Divs	3 Divs
D + 6	" " 4 Divs	"

In MEDCOS 14 General Wilson estimated that enemy strength by dark 25th would be equivalent of a little more than 3 divisions. At the same time Allied strength was 2 1/3 divisions plus special troops.

Assuming as an outside estimate that the enemy succeeds in building up his Rome force at the rate of 1/3 division per day, drawing largely from the Cassino front, and assuming that total Allied build-up for the foreseeable future will not exceed 4 divisions plus, then by D + 6 or 28 January he should have sufficient strength seriously to oppose the expansion of our bridgehead. The improvisation of a workable organization from his available bits and pieces and the time required to assemble adequate supplies will operate further to postpone any major counter-attack against our forces until a later date. Meanwhile, delaying us as he can, he may be expected to concentrate the bulk of his troops in the Velletri-Valmontone area and bide his time.

If the enemy adopts the line of action suggested above, D + 7 may find his forces distributed approximately as follows:



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 E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (G)
 OSD letter, May 3, 1972
 By RHP, NARS Date JAN 4 1974

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Rome area 4 divisions plus
 Cassino area 4 divisions
 Enroute NW 1 division

This may result in so weakening his Cassino force that he may find it necessary to pull back to a previously prepared position running generally northeast from Terracina. This he could do leisurely and it is believed successfully behind skillful use of mines and demolitions, with an eye, meanwhile, to the full development of the situation south of Rome.

By D + 6, our landing forces should have succeeded in cutting the Appian way near Cisterna, but further progress will be slow and stoutly contested. An attempt to penetrate the gap between the mountains would be extremely costly and of doubtful success. I can therefore at this point see no other immediate result on this front but a stalemate induced by enemy forces in possession of dominating terrain and fighting desperately to protect the one remaining road leading northwest to Rome. Constant and heavy bombardment of this artery by our air forces will make it increasingly difficult for the enemy to supply his Southern forces. This, combined with steady pressure along the ground from the southeast and south, will eventually force the enemy to retire to a general line possibly running from the mouth of the Tiber on the south, through Velletri-Valmontone-Avezzano, and along the Pescara River on the north.

The enemy's line, while forced to yield, will not be broken, and the capture of Rome will have to be postponed to a later date.

L. Mathewson
 L. MATHEWSON,
 Colonel, General Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (R)
 OSD letter, May 3, 1972
 By RHP, NARS Date JAN 4 1974

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON


26 January 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL BROWN:

As a partial answer to the question which you raised this morning, the following is submitted:

Despite unfavorable flying conditions on the 24th, over 500 defensive sorties were flown by Allied fighters over the Anzio area. Participating throughout the 24th in these operations were: 129 Spitfires and 165 P-40's or a total of 294 fighters. 40 enemy aircraft were encountered over the area for an equal loss of 3 airplanes to both sides. Light casualties suffered by both sides indicate that defensive fighters found it difficult to close with the enemy due to poor visibility. The Germans meanwhile, using radar, could carry out their anti-shipping bombing missions despite the weather. 20 enemy aircraft have been reported destroyed to date by fighters of the Tactical and Coastal Air Forces in the immediate area where the landings have been made.

I have also been informed that heavy bombers of the Strategic Air Forces were given a primary mission throughout the week ending 24th January of cooperating with mediums and lights of the Tactical Air Forces in operations which were designed to pave the way for and support the landings. Weather preventing such employment of heavy bombers on the 24th, they were dispatched to Sofia. Lacking further details, it would seem that the 142 fighters which escorted the abortive Sofia mission might have been more profitably employed over the Anzio area on the same day.


L. MATHEWSON
Colonel, U. S. Army



[REDACTED]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

31 December 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL BROWN:

Subject: Estimated Situation on the Russo-German Front as of March, 1944.

1. In compliance with your instructions, the following is an estimate of the situation on the Eastern Front, to include probable location of the front line as of March, 1944.

2. As will be appreciated, a proper analysis of this subject must be based largely on a determination of the lines of action which are open to each of the opposing forces and of the course of action which each is most apt to pursue. Unfortunately, the answers to the above questions are based upon so many imponderables, that any conclusion reached at the present time can be considered not much better than an "educated guess". However, I have endeavored to weigh the factors involved, based on the meager information available, and the following is presented for what it may be worth.

3. Capabilities.

a. The Soviets appear to have a preponderance of strength over the Germans of about three to one along the entire front. From this standpoint, they appear to be in a position to launch large scale winter operations at any time, at any point, and with reasonable chance of success. If and when they choose to commit their strategic reserves, it is likely that they may effect at least an initial break-through of serious proportions. Their ability to fully exploit such a break-through

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By W. J. Stewart Date JAN 4 1974

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on a sustained basis and carry it through to a decisive conclusion remains a matter of speculation, due largely to the supply and communications problems involved.

b. If the past is any criterion, the German Army appears capable of continuing an organized defense as long as operations against them remain on approximately the same scale as at present. To date, they have been able to hold in critical areas, and even launch limited counter-offensives in order to prevent the encirclement of sizeable units. While it is true the German Armies have been forced to give ground, their withdrawals have, for the most part, been made in good order and without serious loss of manpower and equipment. If, on the other hand, the Russians should make an all-out effort to break the line at any given point, it is doubtful if the Germans could hold. The remarkable recuperative powers of German units in the face of disaster must continue to be a vital factor in determining the scope of their defeat under any given set of conditions.

4. Intentions.

a. It is doubtful if the Russians have any intention of committing their forces to an all-out effort within the next three months. Gain in territory does not appear to be a predominant factor in their winter plans, since each important advance to the West is necessarily attended by new and serious problems from a supply and communications standpoint. Rather, it would seem to their best interests, for the present, to keep up sufficient pressure to retain the initiative in critical areas and to contain the maximum enemy forces and wear them

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down by attrition. Thus the ground work would be prepared for what, we may reasonably hope, will be a major commitment of strategic reserves on the Eastern Front in coordination with Anglo-American invasion on the West.


b. German efforts, meanwhile, may well be calculated to preserve the integrity of their defense and to conserve manpower even at the cost of terrain.

5. Conclusions.

a. From the above, it may be concluded that no material change will occur in the situation on the Eastern front during the next three months.

b. Winter operations may be expected to force a German withdrawal by March to the following general line (north to south): Lake Peipus - Polotsk - Slavne - Bobruisk - Mory - Olevisk - Zhitomir - Vinnitsa - southeast along the Bug River to Nikolayev. (See attached map). Withdrawal from the Crimea is also included in the above.

c. Since the center of gravity of the Russian Armies is now massed in the Gomel - Kiev area, a German withdrawal in the south to the Bug River is considered more likely than a withdrawal to the Lake Peipus - Polotsk line in the north.


L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.

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JAN 4 1974