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MR 210 "NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR FREE GERMANY"

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MR 210 "NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR FREE GERMANY"

July 29, 1943.

July 29, 1943.

Map Room  
Box 78  
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FOREIGN NATIONALITIES BRANCH OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

July 29, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PLANNING GROUP

Reference: Memorandum of Dr. James Grafton Rogers, July 26, 1943, referring to the National Committee of Freies Deutschland

I

Four possible purposes may be attributed to the decision of the Kremlin to have a National Committee for Free Germany proclaimed from Moscow, namely:

(1) Plain psychological warfare -- simply to impair, that is, the enemy's will to fight;

(2) To push Soviet Russia's dominant influence beyond Eastern Europe (where it is now pretty well conceded) into Central and even Western Europe; or at least to begin a defense against Anglo-Saxon dominance in the Central and Western portions of the Continent;

(3) To prepare the way for a peace, which might be a separate peace;

(4) To put pressure on Great Britain and the United States so that they will (a) be more aware of Russia as a

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
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third partner, and (b) step up military operations for a second front.


Since no possibility is excluded from the practical and courageous political thinking which is characteristic of Moscow, one may suppose that all four of these purposes are present in some degree. It seems likely that the one stated first (plain psychological warfare) is in fact first in the mind of Moscow, especially since the announcement of the Free Germany Committee, so viewed, fits into a pattern which has been transpiring for a long time past; that the second purpose (assertion of the Russian position on the Continent against the complacent self-assertion of the Anglo-Saxons) is also present in some measure; and that the third purpose (preparation for peace maneuvers) is not wholly absent. The fourth purpose suggested seems self-evident and really needs no discussion.

The most positive material of judgment now in hand is the internal evidence offered by the text of the announcement of July 21 and the appended list of names, considered in the light of previous events. There will be summarized (1) some views expressed at the Department of State and by a member of the British Embassy in Washington; (2) some judgments on this basis which it has been possible to elicit from persons thought to be particularly competent for one reason or another to form a judgment; and (3) the judgment of the



FN staff on the problem generally and its bearing on the respective positions of the principal United Nations, the Axis, Germany, and the USSR.

A revealing analysis of the texts of the most recent Manifesto and of the preceding Rhineland Manifesto is given in an addendum to this report, together with some comments on the signers of the Moscow Manifesto.




II

The pattern of Soviet Russian policy toward a future Germany has grown increasingly apparent during the past several months. The principal characteristic has been avoidance of traditional revolutionary Communist doctrine in favor of an appeal to nationalism.

Stalin, in an address on November 6, 1942, discussing the progress of the war and the international relations of the Soviet Union, stated that it was not Russia's aim to destroy Germany or to wipe out German military power. To do so, he emphasized, would be not only impossible, but inadvisable for the future.

A clear example of this type of Soviet propaganda to Germany is found in a broadcast to the German people delivered by Ernst Fischer over Radio Moscow early in December and first published in the United States by the Daily Worker for December 13, 1942. This address closely parallels the Manifesto of July 21, 1943. It appeals to non-Nazi leaders in the German Army, as well as to the rank and file, to bring about the withdrawal of the Army into Germany proper. It calls to all Germans regardless of political partisanship, "from the worker to the nobleman, from the private to the general," to establish a new government, "a truly German, truly national government."



This broadcast by Fischer was not a new direction in Soviet propaganda. As far back as the early months of 1942, Wilhelm Pieck, former Communist member of the Reichstag and a leader of the new National Committee of Freies Deutschland, in a radio broadcast from Kuibyshev formulated the policy of a united German front. Pieck at that time enumerated the parties and classes of the opposition within Germany, from the Left as well as from the Right (including dissident Nazis), who were urged to join a movement upon which the future of Germany depended.

An "underground conference" said to have been held in the Rhineland during December 1942 (see FNB memorandum Number 110 of March 4, 1943) expressed almost as clearly as the new Manifesto from Moscow the Soviet Russian policy of encouraging in Germany an anti-Nazi national front. Although originally reported from Berna, Switzerland, all subsequent notices, including the Peace Manifesto of this conference, emanated from Soviet- or Communist-affiliated agencies and were quickly spread through the Communist press.

The ten-point program of the Rhineland Conference is similar to the recent Manifesto of the National Committee in Moscow even to the point of proclaiming support for certain institutions of a "capitalist" economy. "We Germans from the western regions of Germany...have united regardless of

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religious and political convictions," the Manifesto began. But the appeal was not to regionalism any more than to political sectarianism; it was for a "national democratic government." In the same way the Soviets have at various times addressed radio propaganda to the "Bavarian people."

The Rhineland Conference has not been an isolated phenomenon in Soviet Russian propaganda policy. Similar movements have been reported for other European countries. During January 1943 the formation of a Hungarian Front for National Independence, composed of representatives of the underground ranging in political views from the Right to the Left, was announced under similar circumstances. (See Foreign Nationalities Number B-19 of January 20, 1943.) A ten-point program corresponding in concept to that proposed for Germany by the Rhineland Conference was brought forth and received with enthusiastic ballyhoo by the Communist press.

A less elaborate and less publicized pronouncement of an Austrian underground movement calling for a Freedom Front and unity of all Austrians made its appearance during March 1943. Although many anti-Communist Austrians called this story a falsification, non-monarchist Austrians-in-exile have at various times looked hopefully to the Soviet Union as a potential champion of Austrian independence. The lack of an Austrian policy in Washington and London induced

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a few members of this group as early as the summer of 1941 to approach the then Soviet Ambassador in Washington, Mr. Gumsansky, to discuss recognition of Austrian rights by the USSR. This was followed up in August 1942 by a visit paid to Ambassador Litvinov by Ferdinand Czernin, leader of the American Federation of Austrian Democrats, and Dr. Martin Fuchs. Although no definite answer was received, it may be worth noting that Radio Moscow has been employing a former member of the Austrian Social Democratic Party, Ernst Fischer, as its main Austrian propogandist, whereas propaganda to Germany has been directed largely by former Communist members of the Reichstag.

Dr. Hans Simon, the well known Austrian banker and economist, expressed to FW on May 1 last his fear that Soviet Russia might set up an Austrian Government-in-Exile. Such a seed, he apprehended, would not fall on barren ground if the United States and Great Britain should continue their silence regarding the future status of Austria. The danger was especially notable since the Free Austrian movement in London, reported to be sustained by the Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile, was to some extent subject to communistic influences.

With these more recent developments in mind it may be interesting to recall a conversation which occurred in Berlin at the end of September 1939, between a member of the Foreign

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Nationalities staff (then representing the American Red Cross) and Dr. Fritz Berber, Director of the German Institute for Foreign Policy Research, and a close confidant of von Ribbentrop. Facing even then the possibilities of a stalemate or conceivably a German defeat, Dr. Berber voiced a conviction that either eventuality would bring on the collapse or overthrow of the prevailing system, or its transformation through more radical and extremist action. Large parts of Germany -- and almost certainly the northern, northwestern and central areas, probably down to the Rhineland -- would (he expected) shift to some sort of Soviet system having a special relationship to Soviet Russia. Both German Communists and left-wing National Socialists, as well as some elements of the German Army and of the Nazi Party police, would tend to see their interests along that line, and other supporters would perhaps rally to the movement as a way of saving themselves from enemy domination.


The Moscow Manifesto of July 21 emerges, then, out of a familiar background; it is consistent with Soviet Russia's demonstrated readiness to use German and other nationalisms as an instrument of psychological warfare or tools of Soviet foreign policy.

It is understood that a manifesto identical with the Free Germany Manifesto proclaimed in Moscow July 21 was

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published also in Mexico City at approximately the same time. One hears that this move has been highly disturbing to G-2 and to the Department of State; the two joined in obtaining from the United States Censor a complete ban on the publication of the news in the United States. To the State Department the news seems particularly portentous as an indication of a disposition on the part of Moscow to interfere with Latin American affairs. The Department understands that Ambassador Goumansky has brought with him to Mexico City several agents who are particularly competent for this field.




III

The conviction is general at the Department of State, from the secretary down, that the formation of the "Free Germany" group at Moscow, the appearance of a newspaper under the same name, and the broadcasting of the Free Germany appeal to the German Armies and people, are among the most far-reaching steps yet taken by the Soviet authorities affecting their future relations with the United Nations.

One of the experts on Russia in the Department has pointed out in a confidential intra-departmental memorandum that this newest development needs to be considered in conjunction with the following preceding events or trends:

1. The dissolution of the Comintern.
2. The earlier creation in Moscow of the Union of Polish Patriots.
3. The revival of Pan-Slavism.
4. A similar approach to the Italian problem in an article printed in the London Daily Worker of July 17, wherein it was stated that the Roosevelt-Churchill appeal to the Italian people was not completely satisfactory since it was not "accompanied by more particular action; cooperation is needed in particular with those Italians who have consistently, even long before the war, fought the regime...." Allied leadership, it was asserted, must support and encourage this movement of



liberation.

5. A recent approach by the Soviets to the British Foreign Office to ascertain whether the latter would have any objection to the conclusion of a twenty-year Czechoslovak-Soviet Assistance Pact.

6. The Partisan-Michailovich controversy in Yugoslavia.

7. Indications given by the Soviet Ambassador during May to the exiled Governments in London that his Government disapproved of Greek-Yugoslav federation plans and that this Government should be consulted before any plans were made affecting countries in the Aegean area.

8. The Communist-controlled "Free Germany" movement in the western Hemisphere with headquarters in Mexico City, the activities of which come within the orbit of Soviet Ambassador Oumansky; close connection also with the CTAL (Latin American Trade Union Confederation).

This memorandum being of course the statement of the views not of the Department but only of certain officers proceeds with the observation that a perusal of the "Free Germany" manifesto leads to the following comments:

1. The spirit of the Free Germany proclamation, which could only have been issued with the approval of the Soviet authorities, does not appear to be in complete accord with the Casablanca declaration of unconditional surrender.

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1. The spirit of the Free Germany proclamation, which could only have been issued with the approval of the Soviet authorities, does not appear to be in complete accord with the Casablanca declaration of unconditional surrender.

2. A clear distinction is insisted upon between the masses of the German people and the present rulers. This line has been consistently followed by Moscow since Stalin's statement of November 6, 1942 and his 1943 May Day Order of the Day to the Soviet Armies.

It is to be noted, moreover, that the New York Daily Worker of December 13, 1942 printed the text of a Moscow broadcast headed "There Is a Way Out," which is practically a paraphrase of the "Free Germany" Manifesto as issued from Moscow July 21.

3. The Soviet Government, without consulting with its Allies, is proceeding to lay the basis for a post-war Germany by harboring and giving propaganda facilities to the Free German group.

It has to be concluded, according to the author of this memorandum, that since all who signed the Manifesto are known to have been officials or members of the German Communist Party or close affiliates thereof, and also members of the Comintern, and since all of them have lived in the USSR for at least six years, the appeal is in effect for a Soviet-controlled Government in Germany.


The Manifesto, being made at the time when the Russian armies are closing in on Orel, might be interpreted as a peace offer to the German Army. The word "democratic," it might be

noted, as used in the Manifesto and as probably understood by most Germans has quite a different sense from that which is familiar in the West.

Having dissolved the Comintern, the Soviet authorities might now substitute new organizations which would implement a policy of assuring the establishment of a series of governments in Europe which would be not only friendly to the Soviet Government but also subject to considerable, if not complete, control by it. Thus a limited revolutionary objective would be substituted for the original worldwide plan of the Comintern.

Apart from these possible long-term objectives, an immediate objective is no doubt the fomenting of dissension on the German home front with a view to relieving the military pressure on the Soviet armies. This suggests that the Soviet authorities may have reason to believe that the collapse in Germany is more imminent than is generally believed, and that they feel accordingly that an appeal such as the present might hasten the prospect.

The encouragement offered to the hope for peace, and the suggestion of a return of private property, and the other suggestions contained in the "Free Germany" Manifesto, must be recognized as astute movements in psychological warfare over against the British-American formula of unconditional



surrender.

It would be difficult to take official exception to the program which has been put forward from Moscow since it contains in essence the Four Freedoms.


A British view of the developments in Moscow has been expressed privately and unofficially by Minister Harold Butler of the Embassy in Washington. "Free Germany," Mr. Butler remarked to a European journalist, "is an extremely clever and shrewd propaganda move." Evaluation would have to be delayed, however, until it could be determined to what extent the move was directed against the Anglo-Saxon Powers.

Anything could happen, Mr. Butler felt. The worst would be a new Brest-Litovsk - of course in reverse. The most probable theory, however, was that the move was in the nature of a trial balloon. Soviet Russia had made clear a decision to have a say in Central European affairs. The Anglo-Saxon Powers were thus urged to come out with proposals to be coordinated with the Soviet blueprint.

If the British and American proposals should be found acceptable, Mr. Butler continued, Soviet Russia would be in a position to drop at any moment the "Free Germany" movement to which for the time being the Soviets are giving the support of their press and radio, but which has no legal Soviet standing. The Russians put great stock in legality, as Mr. Butler saw

it, and hence they had not committed themselves in any way while opening several doors leading in different directions.

Mr. Butler commented that the idea had been advanced that the creation of "Free Germany" in Moscow had impressed the Italian mind and had precipitated the replacement of Mussolini by Badoglio. It was interesting that the Soviets had acted during the very week of the anglo-american appeal to Italy. Should Italy capitulate within the next two or three weeks, said Mr. Butler, the strategic and diplomatic position of Great Britain and the United States would be immediately strengthened, and "we will be more advantageously placed to discuss the "Free Germany" matter with the Soviets."




Comment on the formation of the National Committee of Freies Deutschland was obtained from the following: Stefan de Ropp of the Polish Information Center; Albert Grzesinski, Chairman of the Association of Free Germans; Milan Hodza, former Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia; Raoul Aglion, head of the Fighting French Delegation in New York; Reinhold Schairer, liberal educator, former head of the German Student Service; Sava Kosanovich, former Yugoslav Minister of State; Hans Simons, former Prussian Minister of Finance and right-wing conservative; Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, President of the Pan-European Union; Gerhart Seger, editor of the Neue Volkszeitung in New York City; Henry Ehrmann, of the Neu Beginnen group; Greta Beigel, German Social Democrat, former editor of Der Tag, now with OWI; Charles Davila, former Rumanian Minister in Washington; Stoyan Gavrilovich, Chief of the Yugoslav Information Center; Mrs. A. M. Brady of the international Catholic Center of Information Pro Deo; Constantin Fotich, Yugoslav Ambassador in Washington; Jan Ciechanowski, Polish Ambassador in Washington; General Julius Deutsch, Austrian Labor group leader; Arthur J. Goldsmith, prominent American financier interested in European problems.

Among all these persons psychological warfare received general acceptance as at least a partial explanation. It seemed to them the logical culmination of a propaganda pattern which Russia has long directed toward Germany. Evidence was seen of

Russia's confidence in its power of resistance this summer against the Nazis. Fighting more than 200 German divisions, while the Americans and British faced only four or five, Moscow was felt to be in a better psychological-military position than Washington or London to address an appeal to the Germans.

Significance was attached to the fact that the announcement was made so shortly before Mussolini's fall. According to Raoul Aglion, head of the Fighting French Delegation in New York, the resignation of Il Duce was planned when he and Hitler met in Northern Italy; the Russian secret service was certainly aware of what was coming; therefore, the formation of the National Committee of Free Germany was to be interpreted as the Russian idea of the best and strongest propaganda move Russia could make to offset any advantage Hitler thought he might gain by having Italy out of the war. As for the French (and here he emphasized the French in France), Aglion said, there were no "good" and "bad" Germans, and they could not be pleased with the idea of a Free Committee. Since de Gaulle had been considered to be rather close to Moscow, Aglion concluded it might be significant that he failed to mention the Manifesto in his last speech.

That this latest maneuver might signify an intention on the part of Soviet Russia to extend its influence further into Europe and to forestall Anglo-Saxon pre-eminence, was the view expressed by a number of Central European leaders. "Russia, which has never been fully admitted into the sanctum of Anglo-American policy,"



Ambassador Fotich of Yugoslavia said in a private talk, "distrusts that policy and fears Anglo-Saxon domination in the post-war world. In order to secure herself against this domination Russia needs Germany for the balance of power, which she may well play in the same way that Britain played it during the nineteenth century."

Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, advocate of a Pan-European Federation and considered anti-Russian as well as to some extent anti-British, thought the guiding motive of Russian policy was to forestall at all costs the possibility of an Anglo-Saxon domination of the world. To the Russian mind the Anglo-Saxons were the prime danger because they alone could now come in the way of Russia's own ambition to dominate when a generation or so had healed her wounds.

Dr. Milan Hodza, Slovak agrarian leader, former Premier of Czechoslovakia and advocate of Central European federation, expressed deep fear of an enduring Russo-German rapprochement. "Autocracies in Russia and Germany are enrooted in historic development; this fact should not be underrated. Their political influences in Europe -- and in the world -- can be reduced to their natural limits only by consolidating democracy in Central Europe. Stalin's fear has been for a long time that at the conclusion of hostilities Soviet Russia and Germany might be considerably weakened, even exhausted, while the United

States and Great Britain could force the capitalistic and democratic views and claims with comparatively fresh vigor."

That this sudden development of Soviet diplomacy might be preparing the way for a peace with Germany could not, in the view of most, be overlooked. The Germans now had before them two offers of peace: one on the basis of unconditional surrender and the other on a basis of negotiation which had been sent forth from Moscow with the approval of the Kremlin leaders.


The Germans were likely to make their choice soon, Count Coudenhove-Kalergi said. If Allied bombing kept up they might act this autumn. Therefore, the near future might find Germany and Soviet Russia on the threshold of a peace to be negotiated along the lines to which Moscow had given utterance. If the Allies refused participation in such a peace conference, the war would become then, in the Soviet view, an imperialistic war and Soviet Russia would be amply justified in making its own settlement with Germany.

In connection with a statement by Count Coudenhove that the territorial adjustment would follow the frontiers of 1914, it is interesting to note that according to unconfirmed information, the spokesman of the Free German National Committee in Moscow said in a radio speech to Germany that the

Committee had good reason to expect as a special peace term, the pre-1914 frontiers.

Whether the Moscow move might elicit popular response and rally wide support in Germany was questionable, most thought, but not beyond the realm of possibility. The Communist underground was said not to be exceedingly numerous now, but it was the strongest opposition ready to act at a critical moment, such as a Russian invasion of Germany. Only the Churches (both Protestant and Catholic) were more influential, according to one opinion. The democratic political groups would of course cooperate with them rather than with Communism.

An interesting observation was offered by Reinhold Schairer, former head of the German Student Service and now a British citizen. He thought the Moscow move might point to a practical program as well as to psychological warfare. For some time he and individuals he knew had noted indications of a scheme to set up the structure for a system which might be supported by followers of General von Brauchitsch, of Pastor Niemoller, and of Doctor Hjalmar Schacht, the last-named reported to have his own economic and financial planning office in Basle, Switzerland. This scheme, Schairer thought, might represent an effort to



salvage Army, Church, industrial and land-owning interests by political reforms and professed repentance.

As of interest, Schairer noted that the Soviet TASS news agency in New York had gotten in touch with Dr. Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster, a leading German exponent of anti-Prussianism, and a non-Communist, and asked him for a message to the "Free Germany" group in Moscow. Evidently this was aimed at building up the Committee's position from the American side. Dr. Foerster had not answered as yet and, if he decided to do so, he would be likely to emphasize the idea of individual liberty and freedom of religion, representation, speech, and press.

As to the fourth possible purpose of this latest Soviet move, suggested at the outset of this report -- i.e., the application of pressure on Great Britain and the United States for more recognition of Russia and more active participation in the war -- Gerhart Seger, former Social Democratic member of the Reichstag and now editor of the Neue Volkszeitung in New York City, while believing the formation of the Free Germany group to be primarily a piece of Communist psychological strategy, thought also that the Moscow proclamation could be a sign that the Kremlin leaders felt themselves out of the Anglo-American circle. The Western Powers must be induced to consult and collaborate more closely.

Another source remarked that the method of "displeasing the capitalist states" had been a card frequently and successfully played by Soviet diplomacy to provoke bargaining. Moscow was probably displeased by the Roosevelt-Churchill appeal to the Italian people without Russian participation. The Soviets were always sensitive about important Allied moves to which they were not a party and were keen and ready to show their independence and displeasure. The same informant believed that the Soviets did not aim to support a Communist Germany in the future because they were clever enough to see that a Soviet Germany might come to play first violin in world affairs and be a more dangerous rival to Russia than a non-militant, newly democratized Germany.


Criticism was voiced of the policy of the United States toward "free movements." Naturally, the exiled non-Communist Germans who have been clamoring in this country for recognition by Washington are crying, "We told you so." Most members of this group, including Albert Grzesinski, chairman of the Association of Free Germans, while crying "see now!" showed the utmost contempt for this "Communist trick" although they recognized its propaganda value.

Among Central European political figures now in the United States there was much deprecation of a lack of a strong American policy toward a future Europe and an even greater fear that the formation of a Free Germany Committee in Moscow, fol-

lowing closely on the steps of a similar Polish organization, may be the beginning of a whole series of Soviet-supported "free movements."

Milan Hodza and Stefan de Ropp pointed out that there were already a considerable number of "free committees" in Moscow in varying stages of organization. The purpose of these groups might be to serve as a series of trump cards in the Soviet diplomatic deck or they might well be intended to provide "legitimate governments" when the Red Army moved westward into Europe. In addition to the already publicized Union of Polish Patriots and the Free Germany Committee, Hodza asserted that there existed a Bulgarian group connected with the "Druzhbashi," a Sovietophile organization of the agricultural and industrial proletariat. Hodza added that a Czech committee presided over by Professor Nejedly had been in existence in Moscow since 1938 and included some former members of the Czechoslovak Parliament. Stefan de Ropp, whose views would not be without prejudice, asserted that when Benes found out about this group he made an agreement with Great Britain for the occupation of Czechoslovakia by British forces. This became known in Moscow, and Stalin protested strongly in a note to Benes; before this there had been an understanding that Czechoslovakia would be occupied by Russian forces.

In addition to the Czech Committee, Hodza said, there was



a Committee for Slovakia headed by a former deputy named Culen. This included some soldiers from the Slovak Army who deserted from the Germans but who were for the most part very far from being Communists.

It was also believed that a Hungarian Committee was in the making.


Because of the Partisan-Michailovich controversy the news of the formation of the Free Germany National Committee in Moscow was viewed with a great deal of concern among the Yugoslavs. As is well known, the relationship between the Yugoslav Government-in-Exile in London and the Soviet Government has not been a happy one. At the time when these difficulties were at their height, it was rumored that Moscow might organize a group of Yugoslav extreme leftist personalities now living in the USSR.

According to Dr. Stoyan Gavrilovich, head of the Yugoslav Information Center in New York, the formation of the new German Committee only served to bring these fears again to life. The question of the formation by Moscow of a "Free Yugoslav Government" still remained open and might at any moment take a very serious turn. The situation in Yugoslavia itself, where the division between the Michailovich and the Partisan forces seemed to be as acute as ever, made the position of the Yugoslav Government-in-Exile more precarious.

Reactions among the Poles were as might be expected. The

Polish Ambassador in Washington, Jan Ciechanowski, expressed the opinion that Soviet Russia had now replaced the Comintern with a "Slavintern." "They want now all of Germany," he said, "and they will want tomorrow all of Europe." The Polish-American press, with the to-be-expected exception of the Communist papers, has called this move a Russian betrayal -- an attempt on the part of the Soviet Union to set up its own United Nations.

Catholic opinion in this country, it is thought, is most likely to be impressed by the fact that the wording of the Manifesto does not follow a strictly Communist line. The emphasis on religious freedom which the Manifesto contains is especially satisfying to the Catholic point of view. Catholic circles have been quite evidently pleased by the emphasis placed upon the preservation of certain institutions of "capitalist" economy, including private property.



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In the judgment of the staff of FN the Moscow "Free Germany" Manifesto requires to be taken very seriously. It cannot be dismissed as a simple maneuver of psychological warfare; still less as "Communist propaganda." It is not at all a product of Communism, but distinctly the product of a renascent Russian nationalism from which the tincture of Communism has been carefully extracted.

From two independent refugee sources in the United States this Branch hears that the prospective non-Nazi German Government is to be headed by Pastor Niemöller as figurehead and symbol; Field Marshal von Brauchitsch is to command the armed forces; and Dr. Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht is to be business man and general manager. That would be as "bourgeois" as one could ask for.

The move has been long in preparation. It was not precipitated by the Roosevelt-Churchill message to Italy. That became public July 16. Pravda relates that the "Free Germany" Manifesto was drafted by a convention in Moscow July 12 and 13. Preparations had of course started well before that. The Manifesto was simply one more step in a program which began to show itself definitely late in 1942 and which could be proved by a diligent historian to stem naturally from the whole history of German-Russian relations,

including Bismarck's policy of re-insurance and the 1922 Treaty of Rapallo.

Moreover, this latest development from Moscow needs to be looked at not only in the vertical perspective of history but broadly as well -- as a symptom in the general pathology which currently besets the world. What we are experiencing at present is not just a war. An incalculable metamorphosis is under way. Forces have been let loose and issues are at stake which are greater than the war. When the war has been won on the field of battle, the questions may still remain, who won it and what kind of world is going to ensue? If it turns out not to be our kind of world, we are likely to take another try at it.

Yet, in the face of this stupendous uncertainty, we appear not yet to have made up our minds on our ultimate objective. Are we waging just a military campaign or a war a outrance for a way of life? Latest pronouncements suggest that until victory comes in the field we are to think just in terms of a military campaign.

Is it possible that we are unable to bring ourselves to face the profound and vexatious issues of politics (except with the generalities of the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms) or to venture into the field of adroit political action, and so are escaping (as the psychologists

would say) into the technical business of fighting? To focus strictly on fighting yields a great simplification. The vexatious questions can be put aside, for the moment anyhow, by answering that military considerations must govern. If this is what we are in fact doing, we may find ourselves in a great piece of self-delusion.

The Russians are following a different line. They are fighting a "total war," a contest that is political as well as military. They know what they want apparently; they are able to prepare well in advance and be ready for the breaks.

They have their own groups organized not only for Poland and Germany but probably for every country on the Continent of Europe. They have, moreover, active allies in the United States. It is predicted by some American Government officials that, if we venture to pick in any country any group other than that which Moscow has already marked for its own, the signal will be given for a public outcry in the United States, and our political authorities have grown so hypersensitive since the Darlan episode that we might then draw back. It takes political as well as military hardihood to win a total war.

Maybe we can win this war in the total sense by just plugging ahead on the battlefield and relying upon our generally favorable reputation and our "reservoir of good

will" to carry us through; maybe we can get to where we want to go by "plain heroic magnitude of mind" as it were.

Maybe that is the democratic way. Leissser faire certainly has its virtues. But it would seem to be more in the tradition of Yankee prudence to keep before us the old truism that war, rightly understood, is the pursuit of policy. The objective cannot be just victory. Military victory is no more than a step to political ends.

So far as one can judge from halfway around the world, the Russians have made up their minds on what they want beyond victory and how they are going to get it, and apparently they are proceeding according to plan.

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ADDENDUM

Notes on the Texts of the Peace Manifesto of the Rhineland Conference and the Manifesto issued in Moscow July 21, 1943 by the National Committee of Freies Deutschland

The text of the "Peace Manifesto" of the Rhineland Conference was published in English and German in the United States under the title, "The Signs of Awakening." Publisher and distributor was the German American, organ of the Communist-led German American Emergency Conference.

The English text evidently was not written by anyone knowing that language as his native tongue. For illustration:

"...they are trying to hide from us the fact that the German economy and food question are in a state of terrible degradation."

"The lack of labor power in the countryside...."

"Our cattle herd is sharply declining."

An impression that the German is likewise exotic has been confirmed by examination of the text with a German-born expert. A few examples suffice to show the probability of translation from another language into German:

"...der Krieg ist nun schon mehr als drei Jahre im Fortgang...."

"...im Zustand schrecklichen Niedergangs...."

"Der Mangel an Arbeitskraft...." (Arbeitskraft is a word for the working strength in a man, not for general labor power; a proper phrase would have been Mangel an Arbeitern.)

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By SR Date MAY 9 1975

"Unser Viehbestand verringert sich rapid." (This is as bad German as some of the other phrases; the word rapid would never be used, but rather schnell or perhaps geschwind.)

"...dem Mangel an Mannschaften..." (The word Mannschaften would not be used in this military sense, but rather Truppen.)

The only language handled correctly in the pamphlet is Russian, in a phrase on the page facing the inside back cover which shows a reproduction of "original leaflets circulated by the Red Army among German Soldiers" telling Germans how to surrender themselves. The phrase in question -- "Sdajus, Towarisch, ne strelajte" -- is colloquially sound, and is acceptably transliterated from Russian according to the German alphabetical system for Germans to read and pronounce.

In the Manifesto issued in Moscow July 21 several items are noteworthy:

Readers of Lenin, Stalin, and Trotsky will recognize in "the most urgent task of our people" a stock phrase of Communist literature.

The "Weimar regime" is termed "helpless." The authors of the document envisage "a strong democratic power that will have nothing in common" with the Weimar Republic -- which must mean nothing in common with a regime which, whatever its proven weakness, was set up on the Western model of democratic government. Instead, the Manifesto calls for

"a democracy that will be implacable" -- which cannot mean a democracy at all as we in the West understand the term. Democracy as we know it may be ungrateful but not implacable. A mob (not an ordered democracy) may turn implacable; or a single leader. This wording emanates from a mind attuned to a proletarian regime -- a "democracy" based "on the people" -- with a strong, "implacable" leadership.


German history, the Manifesto proclaims, "sets us a great example," and the one singled out is the appeal of "the finest sons of the Germans -- von Stein, Arndt, Clausewitz, York and others...to wage a liberation war." To German ears "liberation war" is like a bugle call. It revisualizes the struggle against Napoleon for German liberation and the "Battle of the Nations" at Leipzig in 1813.

The National Committee of **Freies Deutschland** proclaims itself a group of "workers and writers, soldiers and officers, trade union functionaries and political figures, people with the most different political views and convictions who only a year ago would have considered such unification impossible." A review of the signers of the Manifesto reveals that most of the recognizable names have had close Communist or left-wing National Socialist affiliations. There is not a single Jew among the Germans who signed the Manifesto; there are listed no Austrians and no Germans from the Sudetenland.

Prominent on the list is Wilhelm Pieck, formerly active in the Prussian Diet and a Reichstag deputy from Berlin, 1928-1933. He has been since 1928 a member of the German Communist Party, and for a time was President of the Party's Central Committee. Walter Ulbrich was put out of the German Woodworkers Trade Union for his Communist factional activities. A Reichstag deputy from Potsdam from 1928-1933, Ulbrich has been described as an unscrupulous politician, a leading organizer of early agreements between Communists and National Socialists before the latter moved into power, and a moving spirit among the so-called "Beefsteak Boys" -- "brown outside and red inside."


Other former Communist Party Reichstag deputies listed as members of the Freies Deutschland National Committee are Martha Arendsee, Wilhelm Florin, Erwin Hoernle. The intellectual signatories include such leftist writers as Johannes Becher, Willi Bredel, Friedrich Wolf, and Erich Weinert, President of the Committee.

The military names affixed to the Manifesto, insofar as they can be identified, belong to men of non-Communist background. Major Karl Hetz, an engineer from Koenigsberg and the Committee's First Vice President; Captain Bodo Fleischer, and Captain Ernest Hadermann, referred to by the Daily Worker as economist and university professor respectively, have



been described to FN by German sources as men of the regular staff. They are probably without previous Communist or other significant political connections. Two signatories from the lower ranks of the Army, Heinz Kessler, whom the Daily Worker calls a mechanic, and Mathaus Klein, are, according to FN sources, members of Protestant Church confessional bodies and may be characterized as liberal-progressive reformers. Lieutenant Prince Heinrich von Einsiedel, great grandson of Bismarck, and Lieutenant Berndt von Kugenlegan, free-lance journalist of aristocratic background, are "conservative-liberals" who had been associated with a youth student organization known as the Eoberhaus Gruppe and with adult education movements in which the Bismarck doctrine of German good relations with Russia were stressed as a tradition.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
FOREIGN NATIONALITIES BRANCH



July 27, 1943

S-37

MEMORANDUM for the Director of Strategic Services  
Secretary of State

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CIA 006687  
By SR Date MAY 9 1975

The recent proclamation in Moscow of a National Committee of Free Germany does not mark a new departure for Soviet Russian policy in Europe. Indications that Moscow was preparing, and might in due course press, its own particular political strategy appeared half a year ago in a "Hungarian Front for National Independence" (reported on by this Branch in its Number B-19 of January 20, 1943) and very notably in a so-called Rhineland Conference supposed to have been held during December 1942. This Rhineland Conference was the subject of a report by this Branch, Number 110 of March 4, 1943, wherein it was remarked that evidence was now in hand "to suggest that the USSR has adopted a policy of encouraging in Germany an anti-Nazi 'National Front' with emphasis falling heavily on an appeal to German nationalism."

It is noteworthy now that one of the most astute of the Central European diplomats in Washington expresses himself as coming reluctantly to the view that, with the further unmistakable development of the Soviet program through the formation of the Free Germany Committee, Russia may be advancing toward success, and the United States, on the other hand, failing to succeed with its general European policy. It is Constantin Fotich, Ambassador of Yugoslavia, who has given an intimate "Continental" view of Russian policy in Europe. Speaking "off-the-record" on July 24 with a European journalist whom he has known for some time --

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the subject being the Free Germany Committee in Moscow, with news of Mussolini's collapse still pending -- Mr. Potich expressed himself substantially as follows:

All that is happening is extremely sad. The American position is becoming daily stronger in a military sense and weaker politically. This great country, I am afraid, has already missed "the great boat of the peace."

I find it hard to explain this to my American friends because they are easily vexed. They are so impressed by the growing military strength of the United States that they do not perceive the increasing limitations on their political powers. What is worse, they do not understand that most of these limitations are the consequence of numerous misunderstandings and mistakes.

From the diplomatic point of view the situation is for me very clear. Russia, which has never been fully admitted into the sanctum of Anglo-American policy, distrusts that policy and fears Anglo-Saxon domination in the post-war world. In order to secure herself against this domination Russia needs Germany for the balance of power, which she may well play in the same way that Britain played it during the nineteenth century.

American diplomacy committed a fatal error in respect to France. France was greatly needed by the United States as the logical intermediary between the United States and most of the countries of continental Europe. Britain is a stranger to the Continent, but France enjoys the affection of many continental countries, extending back through centuries. France could have been the intermediary with Yugoslavia and Belgium, Greece and Denmark, even with enemy countries such as Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary.

By antagonizing France the United States is bound to antagonize all of Europe (meaning, the Continent). The tragedy, to the European continental mind, is the fact that Europe's fate is being determined outside of herself. Whatever European solution is worked out in that way will, however, be temporary. Europe will never accept it but will revolt against it.

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understanding of Europe than the United States, sees the situation with perfect clarity and prepares in advance its own leadership for the coming European revolt.

Russia knows that this coming revolt will bear at least as much of a nationalistic as of a social character, or maybe even more. That is the reason why Russia has thrown away the obsolete symbol of the Comintern. Russia seeks now to prepare a new International of European nationalisms. For this it has to use the left-overs of the Comintern, but it is determined to implement its program with nationalistic elements.

It is most significant that in the new "Free Germany" created in Moscow there is not a single German Jew. Soviet diplomacy seeks to assure Germany that Germany, liberated from Hitler, will be given a chance to be German, strong, and independent.

The use of the word Communism is strictly avoided; but if it avoids such terms, Soviet diplomacy still thinks on the same level of strategy, while it modifies its tactics.

Most significant for the moment is that Soviet Russia flatters Germany's national pride, as she flatters also the national pride of France. This is an extremely wise and far-seeing policy.

Some remarks by the Polish Ambassador, Jan Ciechanowski, spoken to the same correspondent on the same day, reflect a less judicial attitude:

It is becoming clear now to every American man and woman (Mr. Ciechanowski said) that the sole and real danger to our civilization is Soviet Russia. Having "dissolved" the Comintern, Soviet Russia has replaced it by the "Slavintern."

They are too greedy, however; the Slav countries which they intend to rule through the All-Slav Congress in Moscow are not enough for their imperialistic appetite. They want now all of Germany and they will want tomorrow all of Europe.

The danger is tremendous; we must save Europe and our Christian civilization.

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The Polish Ambassador added that he was delighted to have had two talks recently with Edgar Ansel Mowrer and to have convinced him of the importance and acuteness of the danger.

*DeWitt C. Poole*

DeWitt C. Poole

cc: Deputy Director, IS  
Director, R & A  
Chief, SI  
Member, Board of Analysts (McKay)  
Director, Psychological Warfare Room  
Member, Planning Board (Wilson)  
Deputy Director, Planning Group for  
Psychological Warfare  
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