MR 300 ALASKA — Sec. A-I, — WARFARE

May 1942 thru December 1943

Box 29
(PART 2 AND FINAL COMORPAC AUGUST 28 SUMMARY FOR SAME ADDRESSES AS BY 291/21.)

INFORMATION ON Kiska CONTINUES.

BADLY WRECKED ENEMY PLANES ON AND BEHIND BEACH AND IN HANGARS ESTIMATED TO EXCEED TOTAL OF 50. PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION PIECES AND NAME PLATES SHOW FOLLOWING TYPES: FIGHTERS, TYPE 1 AND 2 NAKAJI A_FLOAT, ZERO CARRIER TYPE, RECONNAISSANCE TYPES. MATAGABE TWIN FLOAT, SATO IROK WORKS 95 FLOAT, AICHI 2/FLOAT (BELIEVED TWIN), HIROSHI ZERO FLOAT, 1 MITSUBISHI FLOAT OBSERVATION BIPLANE WITH FOLDING WINGS. 1 BADLY WRECKED TYPE 97 KAWAIIEHI 4 ENGINE SEAPLANE.

1 TANK FOUND PARTIALLY BURIED VICINITY MAIN.
CAMP. MAIN POWER HOUSE IS STEAM PLANT. MANY AUXILIARY DIESEL PLANTS. COMMUNICATION AND LIGHTING WIRING EXPENSIVE. MOST BUILDING RETEVEMENTS 30 FT HIGH. QUANTITIES WINTER CLOTHING MEDICAL SUPPLIES EQUIPMENT BARBED WIRE AND BULLET PROOF VESTS. WATER SYSTEM WITH FIRE ENGINES AND EQUIPMENT. EXTENSIVE CAVES AND UNDERGROUND WORKS. DUMMY HEAD AND SHOULDER SILHOUETTES IN HILLS GERTRUDE COVE AREA. LARGER GUN BATTERIES HAD COINCIDENCE RANGE FINDERS. 3 INCH NAVAL GUNS BEHIND SUB BASE (NUMBER NOT REPORTED). 2 LARGE SEARCH LIGHTS NORTH HEAD. HOKKAIDO NEWSPAPERS MAGAZINES LATEST DATE JUNE 17. KISKA NEWSPAPER LAST DATE FOUND JULY 26.

SECRET
**NAVAL MESSAGE**

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**RELEASED BY**

**DATE** 22 AUGUST 1943

**TOR CODEROOM** 4-316

**DECODED BY** WINBORN/WINBORN

**PARAPHRASED BY** COMNORPAC COINCPAC

**ROUTED BY**

---

**ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME**

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THIS FROM CINCPAC. ACTION COMNORPAC INFO COMSOPAC COINCPAC.

EXTREMELY VALUABLE DOCUMENTS PARTICULARLY RELATING TO CODES, CIPHERS, AND COMMUNICATIONS PROBABLY ABOARD SUB YOUR 208658 MAKE ALL PRACTICABLE EFFORTS TOWARD EARLY RECOVERY.

---

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

D 04-29856-13

290539 For Alaska
NAVAL MESSAGE
NAVY DEPARTMENT

FROM
COMORPAC

RELEASED BY

AUGUST 28, 1943

TOR CODEROOM
6731/6655

DECODED BY
BENNETT/BENNETT

PARAPHRASED BY

ROUTED BY

ADDRESS
CINCPAC
COMINCH

ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSES

PRECEDENCE
PRIORITY

DESPAIR
DEFERRED

DESPAIR
DESPAIR

DESPAIR
DEFERRED

CINCPAC SENDS TO CINCPAC FOR ACTION
COMINCH FOR INFO)

LARGE JAP SUBMARINE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED DAM-
AGED AND AGROUND ON TWIN ROCKS KISSA HAS BEEN LOCAT-
ED BY SURVEY PARTY IN UTE (CAPTAIN CARTER IN CHARGE)
SUB IS NOW COMPLETELY SUBMERGED, LISTED 45 DEGREES,
WITH BOW IN 7 FATHOMS AND stern IN 15 FATHOMS. PRE-
LIMINARY REPORT STATES DIVER TRAVERSED SUPERSTRUCT-
URE FROM CONNING TOWER TO BOW, THAT CONNING TOWER
AND HULL JUST ABAFT TOWER ARE DAMAGED AND BOW COM-
PLETLY GONE. PRELIMINARY SURVEY INDICATES SALVAGE
WILL REQUIRE LARGE SCALE OPERATION. INTEND INVE-
STIGATE FURTHER WITH MORE EXPERIENCED DIVERS AND AD-
EQUATE EQUIPMENT.

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OYNSA-NCR-15

DRAFTED APR 16, 1973

OFCN (NAV) 11659, Sec. 3(E) and 4(D) or 3(B)60
OFCN letter, May 6, 1973

DS

RECEIVED

APR 16, 1973
**NAVAL MESSAGE**

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**COUICH CINCPAC** SENTS TO COMM BuPAC CTF 97 AND CTF 96 WHO HANDS COMM BuPAC VDC.

SUMMARY AUGUST 25TH.

5 AS KINGFISHERS ON FLOATS BASING ON CASCO AT KISKA.

2 KINGFISHERS ON WHEELS LANDED ON KISKA RUNWAY AUGUST 25TH AND TOOK OFF AGAIN. RUNWAY REPORTED SLIGHTLY OVER 3,000 FEET, ROCK AND GRAVEL, CAN BE USED IN EMERGENCIES BUT WOULD NOT TAKE HEAVY PLANES IN PRESENT SOFT CONDITION.

TODAY'S SEARCHES AVERAGED 250 MILES NORTHWEST ATU AND SOUTH ATSKU AND 325 MILES WEST AND SOUTHWEST ATU AND SOUTH AMCHITKA 295 SOUTH ATU AND SOUTHWEST AMCHITKA.

-CLEAR WEATHER SOUTH OF CHUIN. WEST OF ATU LOW VISIBILITY INCLUDING FOG.

**DECLASSIFIED**

E. O. 11683, Sec. (K) and 8(D) or (B)

OSD letter, May 9, 1972

By DBS  APR 16 1973

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 74 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-15

U. S. Government Printing Office  1943-06-01 0-20

278900 3rd Alaska
US Grant relays following for CTC 16.8 who originates. Action CinCPac, ComSOPAC, ComNorPac.

6-2 Periodic Report Number 1 from 1715W 21 August to 1715W 22 August.

1. Preliminary Interpretation Early documents hampered by lack of material. Japs apparently careful to destroy all evidence. However Dispatch bared Kiska harbor indicates submarines used for evacuation as total 31 subs there 22 July. Captured Diary also says warning order sent 8th July actual evacuation major forces 29 July.

2. Of 3 pages evacuation order recovered list destination only as Point X. Portion of retrieved diary indicates subs of Item Class entered Kiska
HARBOR ON AVERAGE 1 EVERY 4 DAYS FROM 1ST MAY TO LAST JULY BRINGING CARGO MANY WELL STOCKED SUPPLY DUMPS THROUGHOUT THE ISLAND TESTIFY TO EFFICACY THIS MEANS TRANSPORTATION.

2. ISLAND DEFENSE PLAN SIMILAR TO ATTU WHERE CONS EMPLACED TO FIRE DOWN VALLEY HOWEVER RISKS MUCH BETTER IN ARTILLERY PLACEMENT EXAMPLE ROSE HILL WHERE 37 MM INFANTRY CANNON EMPLACED BEHIND CONCRETE. USUAL WEAK BATTLES PRACTICE SITTING WEAPONS WITH LIMITED FIELD OF FIRE FOLLOWED. NUMEROUS GALLERIES SOME RESEMBLING ANCIENT CATACOMBS HETED OUT OF SOFT SANDSTONE USED AS SUPPLY STORAGE AND SHELTER.

3. DIARIES INDICATE PROLONGED NAVAL AND AIR BOMBARDMENT WAS BREAKING ENEMY MORALE PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE HERE DELAYED ACTION BOMBS.

4. ENEMY ABILITIES CONSIST ATTACK BY AIR OR SEA FORCES.
INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: NAVY
To: BOSCO
No. 6

Following from NORPAC Area.

Part A. With complete tactical surprise again achieved, landings beaches purple Red Green in northern sector began on schedule at 0620, preceded by special service troops at 0110. Times W. All assault waves less Canadians ashore by 8 hours. Total northern troops landed by 9 hours 3100. 0845 Special service troops reported occupying ranges north terrain with no enemy contact.

Situation in south not reported except 10 to 12 tons Jap small arms ammunition captured Lawson Hill, believed to be enemy reserve sector. Gunfire support stations conducted largely on radar due heavy fog. Moderate surf on landing beaches.

Air activity. AS patrols sent Oom Adak. Some searches off from Attu base southern sectors on basis contact reported by S-35 yesterday. Attu Shemya Anchitska fog bound to midday.

Part B from NORPAC Area. In north sector patrol of 12-l operated down (*) creed and to (*) report Jap tents down and many blankets strewn in area with indications area having been abandoned 10 days to 2 weaks. In north sector elements 104-1 now on Ranger Hill. Recent evacuation this locality indicated.

Canadian BKG 13-14 landed beach 14 Green about 1100. Unloading troops and cargo slowly owing to availability of only beach Green while work goes in improving beaches Red and Purple.

Force Artillery Headquarters Battery now established R 1649 at 1103. Estimate troops landed in north 4,100 in south 9,000. At 0900 several anti-personnel and anti-material mines discovered on Green beach. 1 T-15 was lost.

BOSCO-IN-100

COPY No. 7

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: NAVY
To: B[500]

no personnel. Weather same as last report. Low visibility proving handicap to operation ashore and afloat. Beach restrictions and congestion southern beaches impeding unloading a percentage completion 0900 today.


Part C from NORPAC Area. Summary number 6. As of 1600 14 August 15 patrols of tactical groups 17th and 27th in Gertrude Cove, area report it unoccupied. Strong combat patrol will move in tonight. Patrol from 16-3 reinforced now on mission to ascertain if enemy occupies middle pass.

Unloading beaches 9 Blue 9 Yellow and 10 Scarlet being limited to necessary supplies for 3 days pending decision probable use of more accessible beaches. All Canadian assault forces now ashore with 14-16 on Sunny Hill. VONOR Sector has moved to beach. Estimate 7,000 troops ashore in north sector. In north air reports our patrols have reached Morgan and Maple hills. Little Ki'ia installations ordered bombed. Weather has cleared over island north or middle pass. End of Part C.

Part D from NORPAC Area. Report as of 1600, times billian, south sector: 15-1 patrols operating down Lake Creek to Ethel Cove report Jep tents down and many blankets strewn in area with indications abandoned 10 days to 2 weeks ago; patrols from 17th and 27th report Gertrude Cove area unoccupied; strong combat patrol moves in tonight. 17-2 19-3 patrol now investigating middle pass.

Northern sector: Elements 104-1 on Ranger Hill report "recent" evacuation this locality indicated; all Canadian assault forces ashore with 13th-16th on Rusty Hill; air reports our patrols have reached Morgan and Cape Hills; anti-personnel and ant-material mines_been found; unloading troops and cargo slow due restricted beaches and congestion; unloading beaches Blue, Yellow

D0SC0-IN-100 (17 Aug 43)
and Scarlet being limited to 3 days supplies pending decision to shift to better beaches. Estimated troops landed: Northern sector: 7,000; Southern sector: 9,000. During afternoon weather cleared over Kiska north of Middle Pass.

Attu searches averaged 350 miles to south 300 to southwest. One Amchitka plane went 200 to southwestward, mostly radar. Anti-sub planes over transport areas during day. One Liberator reconnoitered Kiska. Southern part Agattu scouted by air with negative results.

(*) garbled.

ACTION: Adm King

INFORMATION: White House Gen Handy Gen Wedemeyer
Adm Leahy Gen Deane Col Ritchie
Adm Cooke Gen Arnold Col Betts
Adm Wilson Gen Kuter Col Roberts
Gen Marshall Gen Fairchild

DECLASSIFIED

M. O. 11662, Sec. 2(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OMB letter, May 3, 1973

By DBS Date APR 18 1973

BOSCO-IN-100 (19 Aug 43) 1406Z jo

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SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE
17 Aug 43

FROM: WAR (Relay of 3431 from WDC)
TO: BOSCO
No. 81 August 17, 1943

Having been preceded by 600 troops of our first service regiment which landed unopposed at Quisling Cove before daylight on 15 August, the first and second assault waves have advanced to the line Larry-Larry-Lulu Hills where a front of 4,500 yards has been established and flanks have been secured. Lark and Link Hills were also occupied. All southern sector troops have been landed and at 180000C August an estimated 7,300 were ashore on the southwest portion of Kiska. Our patrols were reported near Lore Hill and were progressing to the southwest towards the Knob-Kidney Hills area and also were advancing southward toward the Gertrude Cove-Vega Bay area to develop enemy positions there.

It appeared that a few enemy riflemen were forced to vacate Lard Hill, and hot coffee and hand grenades were found in trenches on Link Hills; otherwise no signs of the enemy were reported.

Prior to the actual landings, feints were made with barges which approached to within 300 yards of Vega Bay beaches between Tom Thumb Cove and Gertrude Cove. No enemy personnel were observed and no fire from shore guns was received. Initial landings were aided by favorable sea conditions.

Visibilities were from 3 to 5 miles with 500 to 1,000 feet ceilings over beaches and transport areas. Low fog prevailed over other portions of the island.

At an unreported time a scout plane found CO conditions at Kiska and did not observe any friendly or hostile troops.

BOSCO-IN-95 (17 Aug 43) dmk

COPY No.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

FROM: WAR (Relay of 3431 from WDC) E.O. 11652, Sec. 5(E) and 5(D) or (E)

TO: BOSCO

No. 81 August 17, 1943

During the night of 14-15 August a FBY, opposed by no AA fire, made a bombing run over Gertrude Cove and during the same night, a destroyer bombarded Rose Hill installations with 24 only 5 inch rounds.

Air missions flown on 14 August observed trenches and buildings described as shacks on Sniper Hill while photos taken on 13 August indicated that considerable damage had been inflicted on buildings in the main camp area.

Photographs taken during the raid on Paramushiru on 11 August, showed the Kashiwabara airfield probably completed (156 degrees 09 mins E-50 degrees 51 mins N). Also at Kashiwabara the following activity was shown: 250 boats less than 120 feet in length with a majority of them 40 to 60 feet; 3 large auxiliary ships and 2 probable seaplane tenders or carriers; 2 dredging or harbor maintenance craft; and 7 four-engine Kawanishi seaplanes with 6 arftol in and 1 on the stern of a probable tender. Although the Paramushiru Strait was partially obscured by overcast, 2 large auxiliary vessels are shown north of Kashiwabara and 1 probable cruiser is in Kataoka Bay.

At Aradjo Island (155 degrees 40 mins E-50 degrees 50 mins N) the following surface craft were noted: 11 small boats beached on the south shore of the island; 1 cargo ship beached at a point approximately 3,300 yards down shore from the cannery; 27 purse seiners under 120 feet in length moored in the gap near cannery and 6 beached 50 foot boats.

Weckerling

ACTION: Gen Handy

Information: White House - Adm Willson - CO/S - Gen Arnold
Adm Leahy - Gen Marshall - CO/S - Gen Butler
Adm King - Gen Fairchild - Gen Wedemeyer
Adm Cooke - Gen Betts

BOSCO-IN-95 (17 Aug 43) 0619Z dmK

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COPY No. 2
NAVAL MESSAGE

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PAGE ONE OF TWO

MAILGRAM

 ESTABLISHMENT OF NAF ATTU HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED 
 BY VCSO AND THE STATION PLACED IN COMMISSION.
 PLACE OPERATIONS AT PRESENT AT THAT PLACE
 CONSIST OF 1/2 SQUADRON KINGFISHERS AND 2/2
 SQUADRON PBY 5A'S. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT NEEDS
 OF CINCPAC 4 WILL REQUIRE THE OPERATION FROM
 THIS PLACE AS SOON AS FACILITIES CAN BE PREPARED
 OF 1 SQUADRON KINGFISHERS AND 2 SQUADRON PBY'S.
 BASED ON THE FOREGOING IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE
 FOLLOWING EQUIPMENT BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR THE USE
 OF THE NAF: 6 TRACTORS, 4 GAS AND OIL TRUCKS, 4
 FIRE AND CRASH TRUCKS, 1 CRASH BOAT, 6 JEeps,

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Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (c) NAVVRS)

NAVAL SUPPLEMENT

142347

200-0504-1

142347  Alakeh

200-0504-1
2 RUNWAY LIGHTING SYSTEMS EACH FOR 5000 FOOT RUNWAY, 12 HEATERS FOR WARMING AIRCRAFT ENGINES, 4 SNOW PLOWS AND ROTARY SWEEPERS, 1 FLOOD LIGHTING UNIT, AIR EQUIPMENT FOR CLASS C ACTIVITY.

IF AND WHEN EQUIPMENT IS SHIPPED IT IS REQUESTED THAT NOTIFICATION INCLUDING THE DATE OF SHIPMENT AND METHOD OF SHIPMENT BE FURNISHED COMA/ASEC AND CO NAF ATTU IN ORDER THAT THE MATERIAL MAY BE FOLLOWED AND DELAYS ENROUTE AVOIDED.

BUAER...ACT

46...32AER...204...COMINCH...19/11...19...19C

...23M...21S...20S2...21...23E...BUPERS...BUORD

...BUNED...BUSAHA...12...11G...31...BUDOCKS...20P3

01...HAWAIAE...DLV...FILE

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CONINRPAC SENS JUNE MONTHLY SUMMARY TO CONINCH CINCPAC COM TASK FORCES 51, 87 AND 96 WHO HANDS CONGEN WDS.  

PART 1 20230 NCR 7037  PART 4 20232 NCR 7037  

PART 2 20243 NCR 7026  PART 5 20251 NCR 7057  

AIR OPERATIONS DURING JUNE KISKA HIT WITH 260 TONS BOMBS AND NUMEROUS STRAFING MISSIONS. 13 PLANES LOST.  

MAINTAINING 2 TO 3 DESTROYERS ON STATION. POSITIVE DESTRUCTION OF 2 ENEMY SUBMARINES AND POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO OR DESTRUCTION OF 2 OTHERS RESULTED. ON 9 JUNE PC 487 DESTROYED ANOTHER ENEMY SUB OFF SHERMAN. INFORMATION NOW AVAILABLE SHOWS DURING JUNE CORPAC FOR SUBS OPERATING IN NORTHERN KURILES SANK 4 SAPIDS, MADE 2 HITS IN 18,000 TON AP, AND ATTACKED 2 ENEMY AK'S WITH UNOBSERVED
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<td>RESULTS</td>
<td>It was reported that the fuel and facilities at Attu are adequate for the impending operations.</td>
<td>Norpac FOR SUBS now obtaining fuel and provisions at Attu enroute to and from patrol stations.</td>
<td>Attu operations. Final mopping up completed except for stragglers. Few scattered Japs killed during month.</td>
<td>TOTAL KNOWN ENEMY DEAD 4644, PRISONERS 94, 1 OF WHOM LATER DIED OF BATTLE WOUNDS. US ARMY TROOPS ATTO</td>
<td>14-9-44, NAVY INCLUDING AIR PERSONNEL AND SEABEES 1884. ALEXAI POINT FIGHTER STRIP WITH TAXINAYS AND HARD STANDINGS IN USE AND BEING EXTENDED INTO MEDIUM BOMBER STRIP AFTER WHICH CROSS STRIP CONSTRUCTION BEGINS. 6 WARHAWKS</td>
<td>BASING ALEXAI. 6 CATALINAS 5 KINGFISHERS Basing on. Tender at Attu. 4 MTB'S BASING MASSACRE BAY. NUMBER 1 ARMY SHIPS DOCK COMPLETED AND IN USE. 2 SHIPS UNLOADING SIMULTANEOUSLY THEREON. NUMBER 2 ARMY DOCK</td>
<td>CONSTRUCTION BEGUN. NAVY DOCK WILL BE CONSTRUCTED SOON. MOTOR TORPEDO BOAT BASE PONTOON DOCK COMPLETED AND READY FOR INSTALLATION. CONSTRUCTION HARBOR FACILITIES MASSACRE BAY CONTINUES, NET INSTALLATION 69 PERCENT</td>
<td>COMPLETE ROADS AND OTHER ATTU SHORE FACILITIES BEING LAID OUT.</td>
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**DECIDED**

E. O. 11665, Sec. 5(B) and 6(D) or (B)

OSD letter, May 8, 1972

By DBS Date: **APR 16 1973**

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**PAGE 3 OF 5**

**NAVY DEPARTMENT**

**FROM**

**RECEIVED BY**

**DATE**

**TOR CODE ROOM**

**DECODED BY**

**PARAPHRASED**

**ROUTED BY**

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**ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME**

**DESTINATION FILL IN DATE AND TIME**

**GT**

**IN OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT 1-INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT**

**ACTION**

| P-0  | P-01 | P-02 | P-01S | P-015 | P-012S | P-02 | P-07 | P-11 | P-21 | P-32 | P-44 | P-50 | P-51 | P-52 | P-53 | P-54 | P-55 | P-56 | P-57 | T0-00 | V000 |
|------|------|------|-------|-------|--------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|

**SHEMYA, FIGHTER STRIP COMPLETED. MEDIUM BOMBER STRIP 85 PERCENT COMPLETED. CONSTRUCTION HARBOR INSTALLATIONS AT NORTHWEST END OF ISLAND AND OTHER FACILITIES CONTINUES INCLUDING BARGE DOCK 23 PERCENT COMPLETED.**

**1 MOORING BUOY INSTALLED. LST'S AND LCT'S USING SPECIAL RAMP FOR UNLOADING. FIGHTERS FOR SHEMYA AND ADDITIONAL FIGHTERS FOR ATTU NOW AT AMCHITKA WAITING SUITABLE WEATHER. ARMY TROOPS ON SHEMYA 7500. NAVAL PERSONNEL INCLUDING SEABEES 112. HYDROGRAPHER(SURVEY VESSEL) HAS CONDUCTED SURVEYS MASSACRE BAY AND SHEMYA AREA AND HAS SURVEYED CABLE ROUTE SHEMYA TO ATTU. EXPECT START LAYING ARMY CABLE IN JULY. HYDROGRAPHER CONTINUING SURVEY WORK IN SHEMYA-ATTU AREA. RECONNAISSANCE OF ALAID FOUND ABANDONED HUT PREVIOUSLY OCCUPIED SMALL NUMBER JAPS BUT NOT RECENTLY. AGATTU RECONNAISSANCE COMPLETED. NO JAPS BUT CABINS IN MIDDLE COVE HAD BEEN OCCUPIED BY SMALL PARTY. ONLY GOOD LANDING BEACH IN MIDDLE COVE. ONLY 2 POSSIBLE AIRFIELD SITES FOUND, 1 OF POSSIBLE 500 FOOT LENGTH ON EAST SIDE.
CAPE SABAK, OTHER OF MAXIMUM 2000 FOOT LENGTH VICINITY MIDDLE COVE. AIRFIELD CONSTRUCTION COULD REQUIRE SUCH HEAVY EQUIPMENT AND ACCESS ROADS AND AT LEAST 180 DAYS TO COMPLETE. CONSTRUCTION NOT CONSIDERED DESIRABLE AT THIS TIME. OGLINCA NO CHANGE. ARCHITKA, CONSTRUCTION ON MEDIUM BOMBER CROSS STRIP 34 PERCENT COMPLETED. IMPROVEMENT HARBOR INSTALLATIONS ROADS AND HOUSING FACILITIES CONTINUES.

4 TO 6 HTBS BASHING ARCHITKA AND PATROLLING TO WESTWARD. GREAT SITKIN ISLAND. SHIPS DOCK SAND BAY TILL BE 80 PERCENT COMPLETE JULY 6TH AT WHICH TIME SMALL SHIP CAN GO ALONGSIDE DOCK. BY 6 JULY EXPECT TO HAVE COMPLETED 2 10,000 BARREL CAPACITY TANKS AND 16 INCH PIPE LINE. COMPLETION HEATING AND PUMPING PLANT DEPENDS ON ARRIVAL OF EQUIPMENT. MAGAZINE STORAGE WAREHOUSES AND NET INSTALLATIONS WILL BE COMPLETED IN JULY. TOTAL PERSONNEL GREAT SITKIN ALL NAVY INCLUDING SEABEES 1919. ADAK ANTI TORPEDO NET KULUK RAY ANCHORAGE AREA COMPLETED.

ADAK NAVY TOWN INCLUDING HOSPITAL NOW EXPANDING AROUND SOUTHERN HILL SLEEPERS COVE. MOTOR TORPEDO BOAT BASE

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 78 (4) NAVregs.)
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IN FINGER BAY

DECLASIFIED

E. O. 11852, Sec. 3(a) and 5(b) or (c)

OSD letter, May 8, 1972

By DBS Date APR 18 1973

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREC.)
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: COMORPAC (INDEFINITE CALL)
RELEASED BY: 
DATE: 11 JUNE 1943
TOR CODE: 1521/1435
DECODED BY: RINDS/SCHMONEEES
PARAPHRASED BY: 
ROUTED BY: 

ADDRESSEES:
COMINCH
CINCPAC
CTF'S 51, 97, 96
GENERAL GEWITT
NORPACFOR

PRECEDENCE:
PRIORITY 
ROUTINE 
DEFERRED

ACTION:
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1090

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

COMORPAC JUNE 16TH SUMMARY (THREE PARTS).
PART 2: 110932
PART 3: 110941

PART TWO
AT 0855W/16 PC 487 45 MILES NORTHEAST SHEYMA MADE SOUND THEN RADAR CONTACT WITH JAP SUB ON PORT BOW. HEADED FOR HIM AND SIGHTED 2 PERISCOPE S 4 FEET OUT OF WATER RANGE 250 YARDS. DROPPED 5 DEPTH CHARGE PATTERN SHALLOW AND MEDIUM. SUB SURFACED AS A RESULT DEPTH CHARGING. PC THEN RAMMED NIPPER AT 19 KNOTS DIRECTLY AMIDSHIPS WITH CONNING TOWER AWASH AND WENT COMPLETELY OVER SUB. TURNED AND RAMMED AGAIN AT HIGH SPEED WITH SUB NEARLY SURFACED AGAIN PASSING OVER. ATTACKED WITH 3-INCH AND 25MM OBSERVING 5 3-INCH HITS NUMEROUS 25MM. SUB SANK STERN

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

P. 1 OF 3.
FIRST ABOUT 83%. NO WRECKAGE NOR SURVIVORS RECOVERED. PERISCOPE SCRAPED SIDE OF HULL BREAKING STANCHION ON DECK. PC FLOODED FORWARD, PORT PROPELLOR BADLY DAMAGED AND SHAFT BENT BUT PROCEEDED MASSACRE BAY UNDER OWN POWER.

PART THREE

SIX ACCENTUATE WARHAWKS LANDED ALEXAI POINT ATTU FIGHTER STRIP TODAY AND WILL OPERATE THEREFROM HERE-AFTER. FOG AND DRIZZLE GROUNDED AFFECTATION AND ACCENTUATE PLANES MOST OF DAY. WEATHER CLEARED AT AFFECTATION AND KISKA HARBOR OPENED DURING AFTERNOON ALLOWING 4 ATTACKS COMPRISING 8 MITCHELLS 6 LIBERATORS 8 LIGHTNINGS 12 WARHAWKS. 30 5 TONS BOMBS ON LITTLE KISKA NORTH AND SOUTH HEADS GERTRUDE COVE RUNWAY AND

OPNAV-NCR-45

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM
RELEASED BY
DATE
TOR CODE ROOM
DECODED BY
PARAPHRASED BY
ROUTED BY

NAVY DEPARTMENT

EXTENSION NUMBER
ADDRESSEES
ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEES
PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

ACTION

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P-40
1G-00
YCN0

Barges with hits seen runway Little Kiska North Head and many on gun batteries Gertrude Cove Area. Barges in harbor were bombed and strafed from low altitude by fighters. Little Kiska also strafed. AA varied from light to very heavy. Three jackboot search planes went 350 miles southwest thereof. Accentuate searches to southward averaged 1½ miles.

New Subject: S 41 reported following: Observed Kaku-Wabetsu Wan and valley to west from 2 miles distance. No military installations observed. Believe no bases west coast Paramushilu. For past 2 days S 41 has been patrolling area 30½ miles southwest Attu in which there have been large number D/F fixes.

P. 3 of 3.
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: WDC (Weckerling)
To: War Department, G-2, MIS
Number 3-C, May 31, 1943

Report received at this HQ at 312200Z May from G-2 ADC indicated that at an unstated hour, believed by this HQ to be today, hostile organized resistance on Attu had ceased classify secret our number 2785 at 312200Z May with our forces in process of occupying permanent positions.

ACTION: G-2
INFORMATION: OPD
CG AAF

CM-IN-20257 (31 May 43) 2335Z ems

M.I.S. JOURNAL No. 3 JUN 1943 25
COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL BROWN.

Referring to telephone request made by Lieutenant Commander Moott this morning -

On 16 May, 1943, CTF 51 reported to NOFASCORP that "CTF 16.2 has complete Naval Base establishment standing by in VEGA, SPICA, and other base draft ready to go as soon as HOLTZ BAY is ready."

There is no information in the operation orders covering the ATTU operation to reveal the composition of the base establishment mentioned.

It is not intended to use the harbors of ATTU for basing our submarines.

The naval base establishment referred to in above despatch is to secure the harbor for the purpose of supplying material and personnel.

One despatch indicated that one of the subordinate commanders thought MASSACRE BAY should be permanently employed.

Some of the details requested, such as nets, gates, etc., are in plans which have not been received by Cominch.

E. SMITH,
Captain, U. S. Navy.
PART ONE OF COMTASKFORCE 51 190130 TO COMTASKFORCE 16 FOR ACTION AND INFO TO CINCPAC.

BRIEF SUMMARY LANDCRAB. RENDEZVOUS POINT YELLOW AND APPROACH TO JACKBOOT MADE IN SPITE DENSE FOG. THIS COMBINED WITH COLLISION SIGARD MCDONOUGH DELAYED DEPARTURE ABOUT 2 HOURS. WITH SOUTO ALREADY LANDED BY SUB SCARLET BEACH DECISION MADE TO EXECUTE LANDINGS MAIN FORCE UPON ARRIVAL TRANSPORT AREAS DESPITE VISIBILITY ABOUT 200 YARDS. KANE UNABLE INITIALLY LOCATE BEACH SCARLET. GUIDED BY FLAGSHIP RADAR SHE WAS ABLE TO LAND RECONNAISSANCE TROUP AT 1125. HOW HOUR MOVED SUCCESSIVELY FROM 0945 TO 1045 THEN DELAYED ON RECOMMENDATION COMLANFOR MASSACRE BAY WHERE VISIBILITY WORST AND MANY SMALL BOATS HAD DIFFICULTY FINDING TRANSPORTS. MEANTIME SMALL BOAT GROUP FROM BESEL WAS LED ON BY DESTROYER RADAR TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBILITIES RED BEACH REPORTED LANDING FEASIBLE AND LANDED ABOUT 1316.
**MESSAGE**

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*ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEES*

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**196942**

**NOR 9973**

**HOUR FOR RED BEACH THEN DESIGNATED 1450 AND HOW HOURS FOR MASSACRE AT 1530. PART 2 FOLLOWS.**

**DECLASSIFIED**

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(C) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 8, 1972

By DBS

Date APR 16 1973

**PASSED TO COMINCH FOR INFO AS RDO HONOLULU'S 192551**

3 COPIES TO 23 G.

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVFREGS.)

OPNAV-SCH-13

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1973-059-016-4

P 2 OF 2.
**MESSAGE**

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**TEXT**

**PART 2** OF CTF 51 190132 CTF 16 FOR ACTION CINCPAC FOR INFO. PART 3 FOLLOWS.

SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT OF ASSAULT UNITS CONDUCTED ENTIRELY BY RADAR DD's AND HEAVILY SUPPORTED BY RADAR CONTROLLED NAVAL GUNFIRE IN HOLTZ BAY AREA ACHIEVED COMPLETE TACTICAL SURPRISE. ALL LANDINGS MADE AT PROPER BEACHES. BY 1600 ALL BELL TROOPS LANDED BEACH RED. BY 1745 APPROXIMATELY 15% TROOPS LANDED BEACHES YELLOW AND BLUE. BY 2316 COMMAND POST ESTABLISHED YELLOW BEACH AND BY 2400 ALL TROOPS CALLED FOR BY PLAN LANDED MASSACRE BAY AREA. INITIAL PROGRESS TROOPS ASHORE SATISFACTORY. BY 1750 FORWARD ELEMENTS MASSACRE BAY AREA REPORTED 2 1/4 YARDS INLAND NO OPPOSITION. BY 1700 ADVANCE OF 5 3/4 YARDS HAD BEEN MADE FROM BEACH RED.

(PAGE ONE OF TWO)
AS RESISTANCE DEVELOPED COUNTER BATTERY FIRE AND CLOSE SUPPORT FIRE FROM BATTLESHIPS AND DESTROYER WAS DELIVERED ON CALL FROM TROOPS.

*RADIO HONOLULU PASSED TO COMINCH FOR INFO AS 20039*

3 COPIES 29G....

**Delayed**

E. O. 11652, Sec. 7(B) and 8(D) or (E)

OSD letter, 1-9-72

By LBS Date APR 16 1973
ACTION

(CONTASKFORCE 51. ACTION TO CONTASKFORCE 16. INFO TO CINCPAC.)

PART III OF 196130.

OVER 35 SUCH MISSIONS EACH MISSION DELIVERING FIRE
UPON 1 TO 3 TARGETS CLOSE IN HAVE BEEN EXECUTED TO
DATE. SHIPS ENTERING UNCHARTED WATERS TO ACCOMPLISH,
BY J PLUS 4 DAYS 14 INCH HC AMMUNITION BATTLESHIPS
EXHAUSTED. ON ONE MISSION PENNSYLVANIA LAY OFF
ENTRANCE HOLTZ BAY FOR 2 HOURS AND ONE HALF FIRING
ALMOST CONTINUOUSLY IN COORDINATED EFFORT WITH
TROOPS TO CAPTURE WEST ARM HOLTZ BAY. SHORTLY AFTER
WITHDRAWING PENNSYLVANIA ATTACKED BY SUBMARINE WHICH
HAS LATER SUNK BY EDAGERU. CLOSE SUPPORT FIRE HAS
BEEN CONTINUED. BECAUSE OF POOR VISIBILITY AND
OBSCURE LOCATION OF TARGETS ALMOST ENTIRE DEPENDENCE
FOR CONTROL OF FIRE PLACED ON SHORE FIRE CONTROL
PARTIES. TRAINING THESE PARTIES AND SPECIALY SELECTED SHIPS HAS PAID DIVIDENDS. CONTINUED FOUL WEATHER PRACTICALLY ELIMINATED ARMY AIR FROM EFFECTIVE SUPPORT OF OPERATION. CARRIER OPERATIONS INCLUDED 9 URGENT MISSIONS IN EXTREMELY HAZARDOUS WEATHER UPON REQUEST TROOPS FOR AIR SUPPORT.

PART IV FOLLOWS SOON.

DECLASSED

E.O. 11665, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) or 6
OSD letter, May 8, 1972

By DBS Date, APR 16 1973

3 COPIES TO 24G

* PASSED TO NSS AS 192247 FROM NPM
**MESSAGE**

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**FROM**

COMTASKFORC 51

**RELEASED BY**

INDEFINITE CALL

**DATE**

20 MAY 1943

**TOR CODEROOM**

1347/1424

**DECODED BY**

BLUM/SCRUGGS

**COMPANY**

CINCPAC

**PRIORITY**

ROUTINE

**DEFERRED**

COMITASKFORC 51

**OPERATIONAL AND COMBAT CASUALTIES 5 PILOTS KILLED OR MISSING 7 PLANES LOST. CONSIDER THEIR CONTRIBUTION UNDER EXISTING CONDITIONS OUTSTANDING. AT 20:30 DOG PLUS 4 DAY APA. UNLOADED FOLLOWING PERCENTAGES. HEYWOOD 18%, ZEILIN 9%, HARRIS 72% AND BELL 7%. SHELLING BEACH RED ATTACK BY ENEMY SUBMARINES AND ARRIVAL REINFORCEMENTS IN GRANT AND CHIRIKOF DEMANDING USE OF APA BOATS TO LAND TROOPS ON DOG PLUS 3 AND DOG PLUS 4 DAYS SLOWED UNLOADING APA'S. GRANT ARRIVED MASSACRE BAY ABOUT TWELVE HOURS ON DOG PLUS 3 DAY AND ALL TROOPS ASHORE BY EARLY EVENING. CHIRIKOF ARRIVED OFF BEACH RED ABOUT 1700 DOG PLUS 3 DAY AND ALL TROOPS ASHORE**

(PART 4 OF COMTASKFORCE 51 19013 TO COMTASKFORCE 16 FOR ACTION AND CINCPAC FOR INFO)

**PARAPHRASED BY**

OSD letter, May 8, 1972

**UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.**

**ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME**

**GCT**

**TEXT**

**ACTION**

| P00 | P01 | P015 | P0010 | P05 | P07 | P11 | P2 | P3 | P30 | P31 | P32 | P33 | P34 | P35 | P37 | 10-00 | VONO |

*PART 4 OF COMTASKFORCE 51 19013*

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Act. 74 (c) NAVFECs.)
BY 1920 DOG PLUS 4 DAY. THESE TROOPS PARTICIPATED IN ASSAULT ON WEST ARC HOLTZ BAY AT 1600. AT 2000 DOG PLUS 5 DAY DESPITE INTERRUPTION DESCRIBED ALL APA'S THIS FORCE WERE UNLOADED AND READY TO DEPART. PART 5 FINAL FOLLOWS.

*PASSED BY RADIO HONOLULU AS 200841 TO COMINCH FOR INFO 3 COPIES 20G...
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM

ADV CP HQ ADC ADAK ALAS.

RECEIVED BY

MIS WD WASHN DC.

RELEASED BY

18 MAY 1943

CODED BY

TO

1451

DECODED BY

BECKMAN

FOR ACTION

PRIORITY

INFORMATION

ROUTINE

OPERATION

PRIORITY

ADDRESS

ROUTINE

PRECEDENCE

DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

PAGE 1 OF 5

NO 80 - MAY 18 1943

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR ENTER DATE AND TIME

TEXT

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION FROM ATTU. SOURCE CAPTURED DOCUMENTS, MAPS, DIARIES, LETTERS, PERSONAL RECONNAISSANCE, EVALUATION AS VERY GOOD. SIGNED VERBICK G-2 ADC. THE ALASKA AREA KNOWN AS NORTHERN DEFENSIVE SECTOR. KISKA KNOWN AS 1ST SECTOR UNIT AND ATTU AS 2ND SECTOR UNIT. DISTRICT COMMANDER IS LIEUT GENERAL KIICHIRO HIGUCHI. NORTHERN DEFENSE COMMANDER IS MAJOR GENERAL TAIICHIRO HUNEKI, ATTU COMMANDER COLONEL YASUYO YAMASKI. CHICHAGOF HARBOR COMMANDER MAJOR TOKUJI MATANAGE.

ENEMY STRENGTH: REINFORCED REGIMENT, 1ST BN 4 COMPANIES 2ND BN 8 COMPANIES ALSO 1 UNIT OF LESS THAN BN SIZE.

EACH COMPANY IS INFANTRY WITH ARTILLERY AND MACHINE GUNS ATTACHED. KNOWN NUMBER OF WEAPONS AS: 98 LIGHT MGs, 24 GRENADE THROWERS, 9 HEAVY MGs, 24 HEAVY ARTILLERY PIECES, 8 MEDIUM ARTILLERY PIECES. UNIT DESIGNATIONS:
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**TEXT**

303 Independent Infantry BN, 9th Company of 27th Infantry Regiment of 7th Division which left Japan October 21 and arrived Attu October 29. This unit saw service North China and Manchuria 1937 and was in Paramushiro 1942. Part of the 302 Independent Infantry BN was lost in the sinking of the Kotohira Maru which was sunk off Attu. There were only 18 survivors.

Other forces follow: 37 Force (Butai) of 14th Division, 33 Field Antiaircraft Unit, 28th Force (Inomata Unit) 38 Force. Watanabe Force consists of Hayashi Unit, Nakamura Unit, Meyata Unit, Nahan Unit. Major Watanabe also commands 303 Independent Infantry BN. Names of many junior officers omitted herein will be mailed. 303 BN attached to Independent 5th Infantry Regiment. No prisoners have been captured. Enemy plan of defense follows:

---

*k. o. 11655, sec. 3(d) and 5(d) or (k)*

OSS letter, May 9, 1943.

By DBS Date 29/4/1943

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS).
### NAVAL MESSAGE

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Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

PAGE 3 OF 5 NO 80 MAY 1943

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

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"1 BN WITH SUPPORTING ARTILLERY TO DEFEND REAR AGAINST ENEMY WHO ARE KNOWN TO BE PLANNING A LANDING IN MASSACRE BAY. BY ORDERS OF HEADQUARTERS, RESERVES WILL WEAKEN THE DEFENSIVE POSITIONS OF SARANA BAY SECTOR AND SHIFT THEIR MAIN STRENGTH TO MASSACRE BAY SECTOR. THE RESERVES OF CHICAGO AREA CONSIST OF 1/2 PLATOON OF MACHINE GUNS 1 RIFLE PLATOON."

OTHER EXTRACTS OF ENEMY DEFENSE ORDER FOLLOW:

CHICAGO HBR ABOUT 1 BN WITH SUPPORTING ARTILLERY. SARANA BAY 1 MACHINE GUN COMPANY PLUS COMBINED INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY COMPANY WILL OCCUPY POSITIONS ON NORTHWEST HEIGHTS OF SARANA BAY TO CHECK ENEMY LANDING IN SARANA BAY.

MASSACRE BAY 1 RIFLE COMPANY, 2 MACHINE GUN Platoons, 2 MORTAR Platoons WILL OCCUPY POSITIONS ON EASTERN HEIGHTS OF MOUNTAINS TO HOLD POSITIONS AGAINST ENEMY HEADED FROM
MASSACRE BAY. FUTURE ARRIVAL OF 2 TRANSPORTS EXPECTED MAY 21 INDICATES REINFORCEMENTS WERE EXPECTED. GENERAL PLAN OF DEFENSE: TO DEFEND ALL BAY AREAS FROM ONE CONTINUOUS LINE OF HIGH GROUND TO THE REAR OF EACH BEACH. NO BEACH DEFENSE WAS PLANNED END OF ENEMY ORDER.

ARRIVAL OF TRANSPORTS KIMIKANA MARU ON JANUARY 30, SAKITO MARU ON JANUARY 30, AKAGAWA MARU ARRIVED FEB 2. AKAGANE MARU ARRIVED FEB 3 AND BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN SUNK FEB 21, YAMAYURI MARU ON FEB 12. MONTREAL MARU WAS SUNK OFF KISKA BUT NO DATE GIVEN. 2 TRANSPORTS ATTEMPTED TO OCCUPY SEMICHIS BUT RETURNED TO PARAMUSHIRO NOVEMBER 27 BECAUSE OF THREAT OF US WARSHIP AND SUBMARINE. FOLLOW JAPANESE NAMES MASSACRE BAY 18 ASAHI WAN, SARPNA BAY 18 CAGAI OKA WAN, CHICHAGOF HARBOR 18 ATSUTA WAN, HOLTZ BAY 18 HOKKAI WAN, OTHER NAMES UNCHANGED.
NAVAL MESSAGE

| ACTION | P-00 | P-01 | P-015 | P-0015 | P-05 | P-07 | P-1 | P-11 | F-5 | F-7 | P-3 | F-30 | F-31 | F-32 | F-33 | F-34 | F-35 | F-37 | G-00 | VONO |
|--------|------|------|-------|--------|------|------|-----|------|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|

IDENTIFIED BY SAILING TIME FROM PARAMUSHIRO TO ATTU 2 DAYS. QUANTITIES OF DOCUMENTS, ORDNANCE INCLUDING NEW TYPE HAND GRENADE, AND SUPPLIES WERE TAKEN. REPORTS FOLLOW.

ENEMY RIFLE FIRE INACCURATE AT ANY BUT EXTREMELY SHORT RANGE. SMALL GROUPS CONTINUE TO USE INFILTRATION COUNTERATTACK METHODS. SNIPER HARRASSING FIRE IS GENERAL.

ENEMY FIELD FORTIFICATIONS EXTENSIVE AND CAMOUFLAGE GOOD. ONE DOCUMENT REFERS TO PILL BOXES IN HOLTZ BAY. ENEMY UNIFORMS ARE STANDARD. ENEMY PLENTIFULLY SUPPLIED WITH AMMUNITION, RATIONS, PERSONAL ARTICLES, ENEMY TROOPS IN MOUNTAINS MAKE EXTENSIVE USE OF SHORT SKIES. DIARIES CAPTURED INDICATE AIR BOMBING HAS BEEN EFFECTIVE AND EXPRESS A CANCER TO THESE AIRPLANES." STATE OF ENEMY MORAL UNKNOWN BUT LITTLE TENDENCY TO SURRENDER NOTED.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. (EB) and (S) on (8)
OSD letter, May 6,1972

FED 18/04/82.

FILED 18/04/82.

By DBS

Date: APR 16 19
MAJOR GENERAL EUGENE N. LAMBERT

Born Pensacola 1891
Enlisted Regular Army August 20, 1910
Private, Coast Artillery
Private and sergeant, 17th Infantry
Commissioned 2d Lt Regular Army November 26, 1916
Promoted to lst Lt same date
Captain June 4, 1917
Major November 15, 1927
Lt Col April 1, 1938

Temp Col June 26, 1941
" Brig Gen March 12, 1942
" Maj Gen March 13, 1943

Assignments:

Dec 1, 1940 Executive Officer, Infantry school, Fort Benning, Ga.

March 15, 1941 Hq 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Washington

At present: Alaska Defense Command, in command army troops on Amchitka
Admiral Rockwell (Commanding Naval Task Force for Attu Operation) May 15, 1943
To Admiral Kincaid (Commanding North Pacific Force)

Summary Brown's estimate of May 14th: (A) Jap tactics with machine guns and snipers plus difficult going in passes, causes casualties out of proportion to casualties we can inflict and will require troops in excess of those now available. Jap positions among heights of Holts hard to locate and almost impossible to shoot out with artillery.

(B) Massacre Bay is immediate supply base and must be protected.

(C) If we take Holts and troops are not able to proceed from Massacre, will hold passes awaiting reinforcements. More troops required to rest and relieve present troops.

(D) Present tactical situation, 3 Battalions committed Massacre, 1 of these holding Chicago Base and 2 in offensive action Massacre-Holts Bays. Two additional battalions plus provisional battalion committed in North to take Holts.

(E) If Northern Force unable to clear Holts Area, Southern Force will not be able to proceed itself without strong reinforcement and even then slowly.

(F) In event Holts is not cleared, three courses available: Northern Force hold and supply it through Red Beach; withdraw to Massacre; reinforce by water from Massacre.

(G) Massacre Bay can be held with forces now available.

(H) Recommend that Hoe and Branch be sent Massacre at once. That 4th Infantry be sent at once. That Navy prevent enemy reinforcement.

My views follow: Appears reduction of Attu will be slow. Survey of Massacre Bay will soon be completed and Bay offers good prospects for base. Recommend accede Brown's request to send reinforcements Massacre immediately and also send tugs, barges, LCT's for local use in supply and mobility of troops. Continue maximum possible air support. Recommend no further naval bombardment. Also recommend establishing small local Naval Patrol Force Attu and sea planes base Massacre.

New Subject: Consider landing phase of amphibious operations will be completed upon withdrawal of APA's and that Penma and Nassau should withdraw at same time.
From Admiral Rockwell to Admiral Kincaid - May 16, 1943

Completed conference. Brown statement was as follows: All present forces committed. Does not have sufficient strength to take Attu. Doubts if Collin (undecipherable) can capture Holts with present forces and believes his position insecure without reinforcements which Brown can not supply from local forces. Requests early conference if possible with you and DeWitt. Believes enemy strength greater than original estimate and possible 13 Infantry Companies plus special troops total number unknown. Enemy casualties unknown. Attributes difficulty to terrain and numerous concealed enemy machine gun positions. Requests immediate reinforcement by 4th Inf plus artillery available and remainder 32nd Inf.

In view of urgency expressed by Brown have ordered Bell to remain unloading off Red Beach. Hope to complete tomorrow when she will be directed to recover boats proceed Adak purpose load such troops as you may direct. Chirakof requires probably 5 day unload and have directed her Massacre to complete.

Supplies can then be ferried Red Beach by PLAN or small boats. Suggest LCT’s and barges be sent Attu assist unloading. Harris and Zellin completed unloading now fueling DD’s and will join Beal return Adak. Heywood remain Massacre for emergency evacuation Red Beach.

Request your approval my proposed ship movements as submitting suggested distribution Naval Forces this area by later dispatch.

SECRET

From Admiral Kinkaid (Commanding North Pacific)  
To Admiral Rockwell (Naval Task Force Commander for Attu Operation)  

May 16, 1943

Deliver this immediately to Admiral Rockwell personally. This dispatch is for Admiral Rockwell's eyes only, all others stop here.

Your message received by Buckner from Brown requesting large shipment heavy engineer road building equipment indicate that Brown has stopped fighting and intends to consolidate his present position in Massacre Bay for an indefinite period. Evidently he does not intend to move his front line or to use his vastly superior numbers vigorously and aggressively until provided with a road net. This procedure would jeopardize the entire Attu operation. Brown's mission is based on necessity for speedy capture of Holtz Bay so as to secure base for prompt movement to x x x x (undecipherable) and construction of airfield thereon. Tactical employment of troops is Brown's responsibility. If reinforcement by water from Massacre to Red Beach is desirable it should be decided upon at once while landing force facilities are fully available. The view that the reduction of Attu will be slow is not acceptable. If in your opinion Brown lacks stamina and aggressive spirit necessary for driving attack home at once I intend that he be relieved from command and be replaced by Landrum who has been made available. Dewitt and Buckner concur. Desire your recommendation immediately. Branch and Hoe (transports) will be sent when escorts available.

From General Marshall to General Dewitt (For his eyes only)  
May 16, 1943

Difficult to understand at this distance lack of aggressiveness on part Ground Force Commander Attu Operations. If relief of any Army commander appears advisable, take immediate action accordingly. It is desired that you remain in the area until situation clarifies.

DECEALED  
E. O. 1164, Sec. 7.(B) and 8.(D) or (E)  
OSD Date May 8, 1972  
By DBS  
Date APR 16 1973
From Kinoaid (at Adak) to King

May 16, 1943

Refrences which have been double headed to King and Nimitz present the unsatisfactory tactical situation on Attu. I regret the necessity but feel compelled to have Commander Landing Force superceded. Accordingly General Landrum will proceed by plane to Attu May 16 to relieve General Brown.

From General Marshall to General DeWitt (For his eyes only)

May 16, 1943

Would it not be advisable for Buckner to go forward and see for himself what is the trouble with the ground troops, if any.
SECRET

Memo for Allen Brown:

The situation on 16th shapes up as follows:

On the 16th Jan Brown estimated that Jap tactics with snipers and machine gun fire hard going in the near-by area. Casualties were running, casualties but of proportion to casualties we can expect and that this additional troops would be required portably in the Holt Bay area where Jap positions in the heights were hard to find and almost impossible to bomb and machine guns.

General Brown went on to state that if Colonel Collins force would not take the Holt Bay area he he would not reinforce him from Massacre Bay another reason for reinforcements.

Because of the above views of General Brown and his apparent intention not to move his front line forward aggressively but rather to consolidate his position and build a road to his advancing, Admiral Pinkerad told Admiral Rockwell that in his opinion the whole operation was jeopardized.

This Admiral's major premise was...
SECRET

That the view that the reduction of Attu would be a slow one was not acceptable.

Kinkaid then told Rockwell that in his opinion Brown lacked stamina and aggressive spirit necessary to launch the attack at once. He (Kinkaid) intended to relieve him with Landrum who had been made available. The Generals Driett and Buchner concurred.

After a conference with Brown in which the latter's views seemed very pessimistic and in which he said with his present forces he was unable to take Attu without reinforcements, Admiral Rockwell reported the unfavorable situation to Kinkaid who then relieved Brown with Landrum. A thumbnail sketch of Gen. Landrum is enclosed.

Brown now estimates approximately 2000 infantry troops on island plus unknown number receding troops. He attributes the difficulty to terrain and numerous concealed machine gun positions.

Our Casualties to date: 4 officers, 100 men killed, 748 missing, 3 officers, 168 men wounded. Very best,
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: COMNOPAC
RELEASED BY:
DATE: 15 MAY 1943
TOR CODE: 345/341
DECODED BY: DUMMY/DUMMY

NAVAL DEPARTM.

CTF 51

PRECEDENCE
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PRIORITY ROUTINE

INFORMATION

FOR ACTION

NAVA L MCUACC MAY 06 EPA

COINOPAC BEIIDI FOR ACTION CTF 51,

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

ACTION

INTERCEPT

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 5(D) or (R)
OSD letter, May 8, 1972
By DBS Date APR 16 1973

CONNOR PAC SENDS FOR ACTION CTF 51.

YOUR 142352—DO NOT BOX

AM IN ENTIRE ACCORD WITH YOUR VIEWS REGARDING NOT PUTTING MORE TROOPS INTO MASSACRE UNTIL CONGESTED CONDITIONS RELIEVED. THERE ARE NO ESCORTS HERE FOR BRINGING ADDITIONAL REINFORCEMENTS. WE MUST BE READY TO MEET STRONG ENEMY NAVAL FORCE PROBABLY ASSEMBLING IN NORTH PACIFIC. WEATHER WILL GET WORSE BEFORE IT IMPROVES SO THE TIME DURING WHICH WE CAN EXPECT TO BE FREE OF ENEMY EFFORTS TO SAVE ATTU IS RAPIDLY WANNING. IMPRESS UPON BROWN THE NECESSITY FOR PROMPT ACTION AND CALL UPON HIM FOR AN ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION JUSTIFYING HIS NEEDS FOR MORE COMBAT TROOPS AND AN EXPLANATION OF HIS PRESENT SITUATION.

NCR 6427

NCR—15

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS)
CONSIDERABLE QUANTITY ENEMY DOCUMENTS HAVE BEEN CAPTURED AND TRANSLATED, ALSO OFFICIAL RECORDS. ONE OF THE MAI V UNITS ON ISLAND 18 HOKOBU 5213/ A UNIT OF NORTHERN EXPEDITIONARY CORPS. EVIDENCE THIS UNIT CANNOT HAVE LEFT JAPAN BEFORE 24 DECEMBER 1942 WHEN IT WAS AT HAKODATE. FORCE IS RECRUITED FROM NORTHERN PROVINCES, CHIEFLY IWA TE AND AOMORI. OFFICERS INCLUDE COLONEL YOSUYO YAMAZAI CO OF THE 962 NIP FORCE. MAJOR TAKUJI WATANABE CO OF THE 303 BATTALION. FIRST LIEUTENANT TOSHI O YASHI CO THE 1ST COMPANY, 303 BATTALION. UNITS ARE ATTACHED TO INDEPENDENT 5TH INFANTRY REGIMENT. NO PRISONERS CAPTURED. INFORMATION INDICATES THAT CERTAIN UNITS HAVE SERVED IN BURMA. THIS IS NOT CONFIRMED BY DOCUMENTS.

*(TO COMINCH & CINCPAC AS NERK 149590)

*TO COMINCH & CINCPAC 3 COPIES TO 2G-G

140280 NCR 5909

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION

(CTF 51 ORIGINATES. NCI PASS TO CTF 16)
INTERCEPT

ITS COMTASKFOR 51 AGAIN. NC1 GIVE TO CTF 16 FOR ACTION.

LANDINGS PROGRESSING ON BEACHES RED YELLOW AND BLUE IN DENSE FOG.
BOMBARDED CHICAGOHOF BY RADAR CONTROL. TROOPS FRONT LINES NOW
ABOUT 3000 YARDS INLAND FROM BEACHES RED AND YELLOW.

SEALEO

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
**NAVAL MESSAGE**

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**TEXT**

COMNORPACFOR SENDS. RECEIVED FROM OTF 51.

HOW HOUR IS 1540W. PLAN TO BE USED IS EASY.

PASSED TO COMINCH FOR INFO A8 111651.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(I) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 8, 1972
By DBS Date APR 18 1973

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Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1972—09313—1
NAVAL MESSAGE

Navy Department

From: COMNORPACFOR

Released by: ____________

Date: 9 MAY 43

TOR Code Room: 0939/0633

Decoded by: CAMPBELL/CAMPBELL

Indicate by asterisk addresses for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

NCR 2466-5

Unless otherwise indicated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

Originator fill in date and time

Text

(COMNORPACFOR SENDS, RDD STATIONS PASS TO CINC PAC FOR ACTION INFO COMINCH CMTASK FORCE 97 AND 96 WHO PASSES TO COMGEN WDC.)

MO8

LANDCRAB DOG DAY POSTPONED UNTIL 11 MAY DUE FORECAST CONTINUED BAD WEATHER.

Declassified

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(d) and 5(d) or (F)
OSD letter, May 8, 1973

By DBS

APR 16 1973

SEALED

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVRECS.)

NCR 18 090700 300 Alaska

Secret
SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 31, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADmiral BROWN:

A thorough and complete search was made by air covering all of the Aleutians and the surrounding ocean. No new shipping or unusual enemy action was sighted.

The indications mentioned this morning that a new convoy is enroute to the Aleutians, and that the old convoy is still at sea, were based on association of addresses in Japanese radio traffic.

Very respectfully,

W. A. Bush Jr.,
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.,
By direction.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

Date APR 16 1973
Naval message

Draft: COMMORPACFOR

To: CINCPAC

From: COMMORPACFOR

Released by: 29 March 1943

Date: 29 March 1943

TOR Code room: RINDS/RINDS

Decoded by: RINDS/RINDS

Paraphrased by: DBS

Priority: DEFERRED

Routine: DEFERRED

Information: DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Secs. 3(3) and 5(A) or (E)
OSD letter, May 8, 1972

Date: APR 16 1973

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

290345

NCR 3959-8

Page 2 of 5

Unless otherwise indicated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

Text:

PART ONE 290328 NCR 3957-8

PART TWO 240376 NCR 3951-8

PART THREE 259345 NCR 3959-8

(Commorpacfor originates. Action CINCPAC. Info COMINT. ADEES PASS)

Preliminary report action west of Jack Boot March 26. All times William.

Radar contact by Coghlan Richmond 1730 bearing 34° true approximately 17 miles from Richmond. Task group then on scouting line 35°/17° scouting distance 6 miles course 320°. By plot enemy initial course 38° speed 13.

Enemy apparently contacted our force and headed north but he later resumed easterly course and formed his heavies in van light forces center akts in rear.

Our leading ships conformed to enemy changes until concentration completed about 1830. Courses changed

Sealed

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVRECS.)
NAVAL MESSAGE

DRAFTER: CONNOR PACFOR
DATE
TO
FROM
RELEASED BY
TOR CODE ROOM
DECODED BY
PARAPHRASED BY
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 8(D) or (R)

ADDRESS: PRORITI
PRIORITI
PRIORITY
PRIORITY

PRECEDENCF: ROUTINE
ROUTINE
ROUTINE
ROUTINE

DATE: APR 16, 1973

Text:

TO NORTHWARD AND NORTHWESTWARD TO CUT UNDER ENEMY STERN IN UNSUCCESSFUL ENDEAVOR TO ATTACK AK's. ENGAGEMENT OPENED AT ABOUT 22,000 YARDS ON OPPOSITE COURSES. SHORTLY THEREAFTER JAPS LAUNCHED PLANES AND REVERSED SIMULTANEOUSLY. BY 0950 1 ENEMY CA APPEARED HEAVILY HIT AND OUR TASK GROUP CHANGED TO NORTHEASTERLY COURSES TO CIRCLE ENEMY. AFTER BRIEF LULL ENEMY HEAVIES REOPENED FIRE CLOSING RAPIDLY. OWN COURSES THROUGH NORTHWEST TO WES'TERLY WITH SALT LAKE CITY HAVING TEMPORARY OPERATIONAL STEERING CASUALTY AND THEN BEING HIT ABOUT 1015.

CONDERSON 14 ORDERED TO SCREEN SALT LAKE CITY WITH SMOKE AND DID SO EFFECTIVELY. 11% WITH SALT LAKE HAVING SUSTAINED FURTHER DAMAGE AND ENEMY STILL ON NORTHWESTERLY COURSES OWN COURSES CHANGED TO SOUTHERLY. 1152 SALT LAKE CITY

SEALEO
SPEED 0 AND DESTROYERS ORDERED TO TORpedo ATTACK TO COVER. 1243 BAILEY (CONDESRON 14 FLAG) LAUNCHED 5 FISH 1 Probable Hit ENEMY CA. ENEMY APPARENTLY TURNED AWAY AND AT 1218 MONMORRIS HEADED EAST WITH ENEMY ASTRERN. SALT LAKE UP TO 19 KNOTS HAVING CEASED FIRE 1248. 1215 ENGAGEMENT BROKEN OFF AND WHEN LAST SEEN AT 1245 ENEMY HEADING WEST RANGE ABOUT 15 MILES. ENEMY DD'S DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN ACTION.

ESTIMATED DAMAGE TO ENEMY: 1 CA HEAVILY HIT BY SALT LAKE 8 INCH PROBABLE TORPEDO HIT, SMOKING HEAVILY AND LOSS OF MAJOR PORTION MAIN BATTERY. 6 INCH HITS FROM RICHMOND ON 1 CL. NUMEROUS 5 INCH HITS BY DESTROYERS ON BOTH ENEMY HEAVIES AND 1 LIGHT.

OWN BATTLE DAMAGE: SALT LAKE; 6 OR 7 HITS 8-INCH 2 BELOW WATERLINE; FLOODING; SHAFT ALLEYS 3 AND 4 AA.
SALT LAKE CITY, O.C. 11665, (302) and 6(2) or (B)
O.S.D. letter, May 9, 1972

From: COMNORPACFOR

Date: APR 1, 1973

To: CODEDROOM

Decoded By: 

PARAPHRASED BY: 

Indicate by asterisk addressee for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

29/345

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ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME — --- DATE --- TIME --- OCT

TEXT

SWITCHBOARD ROOM AFTER 5 INCH HANDLING ROOM AND STORAGE; 4 BOW COMPARTMENTS ANCHOR GEAR SECTION; AFTER ENGINE ROOM PARTIALLY FLOODED, SINCE PUMPED DOWN.

BAILEY: 2 8-INCH HITS (1 BELOW WATER LINE, 1 IN ISSUING ROOM AND GALLEY) NUMEROUS FRAGMENTS; FORWARD ENGINE ROOM FLOODED.

COGHAN: NUMEROUS FRAGMENTS WITH DIRECTOR OUT OF COMMISSION 56 COAXIFL CABLE Ruptured Minor Hull Damage.

CASUALTIES: KILLED. SALT LAKE; 3 OFFICER, 1 MAN. BAILEY: 1 OFFICER, 3 N.C. INJURED. SALT LAKE; 2 SERIOUSLY, 1 SLIGHTLY. BAILEY: 5 SERIOUSLY, 1 OF WHOM HAS DIED. COGHAN: 1 SERIOUSLY, 3 SLIGHTLY.

REPAIRS TO SALT LAKE CITY, BAILEY, WILL REQUIRE NAVY YARD AVAILABILITY. ALSO MONAGHAN WITH REDUCTION GEAR

REPAIRS TO SALT LAKE CITY, BAILEY, WILL REQUIRE NAVY YARD AVAILABILITY. ALSO MONAGHAN WITH REDUCTION GEAR

CASUALTY PROBABLY NEEDS YARD AVAILABILITY. BELIEVE

SEALED

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
NAVAL MESSAGE

From: CONORPACFOR
Released By: 
Date: 
TOR CodeRoom: 
Decoded By: 
PARAPHRASED BY: 

FOR ACTION
INFORMATION

PRECEDENCE
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INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

290345

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ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME
DATE
TIME
GCT

TEXT

TENDER CAN EFFECT REPAIRS COGHLAN. MORE ON THIS LATER.

DECLASSIFIED

O. 11652, Sec. 9(E) and 8(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 8, 1972
By DBS Date APR 16 1973

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3 F-C OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

SEALED

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following despatch was sent by CINCPACFLT at 260030:

"Extensive western searches were made today (the 27th), by Catalinas and T-26 attack groups. There were no enemy contacts. All indications point to the cruiser-heru force having turned back to Horseshoe or that they are awaiting foul weather before attempting to go to Juku. Yevporia (in Salt Lake City) arriving at Mak tonight.

"Based upon the above indications his gallant task group stopped a greatly superior force in an attempt to reinforce enemy positions in the Aleutians."

From the South Pacific Admiral Nimitz agrees with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Iwo-Jima invasion should be put off until Hoodlark Island air base is commissioned and that it should go forward simultaneously with MacArthur operations against Iwo and the Iwo Peninsula.

Very respectfully,

W. C. McCauley

[Signature]

T. G. 1943

Vice Chief, U.S.N.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT:

The SALT LAKE CITY (heavy cruiser) received four hits, two below the water line, and her speed was reduced to twenty-two knots. Her main battery is unimpaired.

One of the enemy heavy cruisers was hit repeatedly and when last seen had only one turret firing.

The SALT LAKE CITY and one destroyer have retired toward Adak, and the rest of our force continues patrol off Wales Bay, Attu.

Air strikes have been sent out to intercept the enemy.

Very respectfully,

W. C. Mott,
Lt. Comdr., U.S.N.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By APR 16 1973

300 Alaska
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: COMNORPACFOR (HECK)
RELEASED BY:
DATE: 27 MARCH 1943
TOR CODEROOM: 1152/1117
DECODED BY: RINDS/RINDS

NAVAL MESSAGE

PRECEDENCE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

FOR ACTION
PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

FROM: CINCPAC
COMINCH
CTF 51
COMNORWESTSEAFRON
COMWESTSEAFRON
GENERAL DEWITT

INFORMATION
INFORMATION
INFORMATION

PARAPHRASED BY:

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

PART ONE 27/8/05 NCR 26/6
PART TWO 27/8/10 NCR 26/7

TEXT

(SUMMARY MARCH 26TH FROM COMNORPACFOR, DELIVER CINCPAC
COMINCH CTF 51 COMNORWESTSEAFRON COMWESTSEAFRON WHO
DELIVERS DEWITT)

RELTEF
K. O. 11682, Sec. (82) and (62) or (6)
OSD letter, May 8, 1972
By DBS Data APR 1.6.1973

ALL TIMES WILLIAM.
CRUISER GROUP SALT LAKE CITY RICHMOND BAILEY COGHAN
DALE MONOCHAM AT 0833 MADE CONTACT WITH 2 ATAGOS OR
NACHIS 2 KUMAS 4 UNIDENTIFIED DD'S 2 LARGE AK'S OR
AP'S LAT 53-00 LONG 168-40 E. ABOUT 8930 AFTER CON-
CENTRATING, MCMAHON ENGAGED INITIALLY AT EXTREME RANGES
COURSES GENERALLY NORTHWEST. FORCE COMMANDER SUGGESTED
RETIRING ACTION TO ALLOW OPPORTUNITY OFFSETTING ENEMY
SUPERIOR STRENGTH WITH AIR. SEARCHING CATALINAS FORMED

SEALLED

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVSECGR.)

NCR 18
270810 30 ALASKA
SCOUTING LINE. S-23 ENROUTE BASE DIVERTED TO HOLTZ BAY CHICHAGOF AREA. CRUISER GROUP COURSES FROM NORTHWEST TO SOUTH TO EAST. SURFACE ENGAGEMENT BROKEN OFF ABOUT 122°. OUR FORCES THEN HEADING TO EASTWARD. ENEMY LAST REPORTED 2½ OR MORE MILES TO WESTWARD. NO FURTHER CONTACT BETWEEN SURFACE FORCES.

1 ENEMY HEAVY CRUISER HIT BY AUX FIRE AND PROBABLY TORPEDO. WAS FIRING ONLY 1 TURRET WHEN ENGAGEMENT BROKEN OFF. PROBABLY HITS ON 1 ENEMY LIGHT AND OTHER HEAVY CRUISER.

SALT LAKE CITY RECEIVED AT LEAST 6 HITS, 2 BELOW WATER LINE. MAX SPEED 22. GYROS OUT, EMERGENCY STEERING IN USE AND FLOODING AFTER ENGINE ROOM BEING CONTROLLED WITH DIFFICULTY.

BAILEY DAMAGED, DETAILS UNKNOWN. COCHRAN DIRECTOR AND
RADAR OUT, SEVERAL INJURED. MONOCHAN CASUALTYS TO REDUCTION GEAR BEARING LIMITS SPEED TO 25 KNOTS. 8 LIGHTNINGS, 3 MITCHELLS LEFT FORMULA 1329 HAVING BEEN DELAYED DUE INSTALLATION BOMB BAY TANKS BOMBERS. VENTRILIOQUIST PLANES DELAYED DUE BEING ALREADY LOADED WITH MISCELLANEOUS BOMBS FOR BOODLE: 13 LIBERATORS, 6 MITCHELLS OFF FROM VENTRILIOQUIST 1336. 145% CATALINA REPORTED 2 TRANSPORTS COURSE 27°, SPEED 14%, NO POSITION. 155% POSITION THIS PLANE LAT 52-45 166-55 E. 150% ANOTHER CATALINA PICKED UP 1 AK LAT 53-44 166-48 E NO COURSE OR SPEED GIVEN. ALL MITCHELLS AND LIGHTNINGS LANDED FORMULA 1935 TO 1935. ALL LIBERATORS LANDED VENTRILIOQUIST 24%. BOMBERS DID NOT CONTACT ENEMY. FEATHER PLANE SCOUTED ATTU AGATU SEMICHIK KISKA. NO
CONTACTS OR NEW ACTIVITY. WEATHER MIDDLE CHAIN FLIZZARDS VENTRiloquist TO WESTWARD FREQUENT SNOW SQUALLS.
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE
WDC NR 1 BCD 4 MAR 44 CIRCULZ MARCH 44
CHIEF OF STAFF G-2
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON D C

Estimate of enemy strength on Kiska unchanged from that contained in intelligence memorandum number 1 this section dated 25 November 1942 which estimated that there were 9385 enemy troops on the enemy occupied island consisting of approximately 4000 infantry, 2100 manning the batteries of medium to heavy AA or dual purpose guns, 500 manning the automatic AA weapons, 642 Engineers, and other troops including barge company, Naval unit operating the submarine base and air personnel. In reply our number 2256 at 232240 E March. (Classified Secret) This is in reply to Nr 2-C dated 22 March received here 23 March. On Kiska Island there are evidences of augmentation of enemy personnel particularly that of personnel manning heavy anti-aircraft or dual purpose guns but these changes are relatively unimportant and it is recommended by this section that the figure arrived at be considered the enemy strength for planning purposes. On Attu Island there is an estimated strength of from 510 to 880 enemy troops consisting principally of personnel of anti-aircraft batteries in addition to a small cargo handling company. This estimate is contained in our intelligence memorandum number 3 dated 20 March 1943, copies of which have been sent you by air mail. There is believed no troops on Agattu Island and the Semichi Group.

Weckerling

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: OPD
            CG AAF
            ADM. KING

CM-IN-12591 (24 Mar 43) 0158Z cen

DECLASSIFIED
E.G. 11652 Sec. 3(b) and 5(D) or (E)
By DBS Date APR 16 1973

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

M.I. B. JOURNAL NO. 48 MAR 81 1944
COPY No. 25
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3-14-43

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Soon after the occupation of Amchitka, aerial reconnaissance showed that the small island of Oriluna nearby was topographically well suited for the rapid construction of a small emergency fighter landing strip.

Accordingly, work was started and it was hoped construction would be finished in time to give protection to Amchitka while the field there was being built. However, first estimates proved too pessimistic and the Oriluna project is just now nearing completion. It is now planned to base any planes there but in view of the open and short type of weather in the Aleutians, the field there should make a valuable emergency strip.

This island lies 140 miles from Kiska, 88 from Adak and 75 from Amchitka. Relative position is shown on the attached sketch.

Very respectfully,

H. C. Mott

C. C. Nott

Lt. Cdr. W.S.W.

[Signature]
SECRE'r

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 2, 1943.

Sincerely yours for Admiral Brown:

The February summary for the Aleutians lists the destruction of ten Jap planes with no U.S. losses in combat. One enemy ammunition ship was blown up by cruiser gunfire, and Chichagoff Harbor on the Island of Attu was bombed.

A 3,600 foot fighter strip at Amchitka now accommodates sixteen P-40’s and two Catalinas. By March 15th, it will be able to handle twenty-five P-40’s, four B-25’s, and eight Catalinas.

The ARTHUR MIDDLETON will be reflected in three weeks if all goes well.

On Amchitka we now have slightly over five thousand men, Army and Navy, including part of a Sea-Bee battalion. Work on a heavy bomber strip will start on March 16th, with May 15th as the estimated completion date. A small emergency landing strip is being rapidly completed on Orilugu Island (halfway between Amchitka and Adak).

Very respectfully,

W. C. Mott

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By
Date APR 16 1973
Transmitting information from special 21 February message from G-2 ADC. Report from Taskforce 8.6 states that Chichagof and Holtz Bays were bombarded and 190331 Z. No enemy shipping was sighted in either area and results of bombardment were not observed. Spotting planes from Taskforce encountered antiaircraft fire during foregoing action but the enemy did not respond with Coast Artillery fire. Our number 2027 at 213050 Z February classified secret. At 200952 Z an enemy vessel which appeared to be an ammunition ship was attacked, set afire and destroyed by CA Indianapolis. It is believed that this encounter took place northwest of Attu although the message did not give location.

Weckerling

ACTION: OPD
INFORMATION: G-2
CGA AF
LOG
CM-IN-11072 (21 Feb 43) 2220Z new

M. I. S. JOURNAL NO. 222 FEB 21 1943
COPY No.
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM COMNORPACFOR (RIO KODIAK)

RELEASED BY

DATE 19 FEBRUARY 1943

TOR CODEWORD 1339/2591

DECODED BY WHISNANT/WHISNANT

ADDRESSED STATIONS/PASS TO COMINCH, COMNOWESTSEAFRON, CINCPAC AND COMWESTSEAFRON WHO PASS TO GEN DEWITT. COMNORPACFOR SENDS WORKSHEET FOR FEBRUARY 18th.

WEATHER TO WEST OF LONGVIEW GENERALLY POOR WITH SNOW SQUALLS LOW VISIBILITY. NO UNNAK SEARCHES. LONGVIEW SEARCHES GENERALLY 60 PERCENT. AT 0817W 8-28 OPERATING OFF ATTU REPORTED STRONG POSSIBILITY 3 ENEMY SHIPS HOLTZ BAY. REPORT NOT FURTHER AMPLIFIED. ON ASSUMPTION MARUS HAD EVACUATED, CRUISER GROUPS WERE DIRECTED CONCENTRATE AND PROCEED HOLTZ BAY. UPON ARRIVAL THERE AT 1430W TASK GROUP FOUND NO SHIPS BUT BOMBARDED TARGET AREAS HOLTZ BAY AND CHICAGO HARBOR. SPOTTING PLANES USED WHICH RECEIVED SOME AA FIRE. RESULTS BOMBARDEMENT NOT APPARENT. CRUISER GROUP WAS TRAILED BY ENEMY PLANE COMMENCING ABOUT 1230W.

PAGE 1 OF 2.
CRUISER GROUP NOW RETIRING TO NORTHEAST WILL RESUME STATION WESTWARD ATTU TO INTERCEPT ENEMY SHIPPING. ARMY WEATHER PLANE UPON REACHING ATTU REPORTED OWN SURFACE UNITS AS ENEMY. CORRECTED LATER. ANTI SUB PATROL OVER FORMULA DURING DAYLIGHT. 4 ADDITIONAL P-408 ARRIVED FORMULA TODAY. LATTER PLACE REPORTED AIR ATTACK AT 1955W. NO DETAILS YET AVAILABLE.

3 COPIES TO 20-G.
DAILY ACTIVITY BULLETIN FROM COWNORPACFOR FOR TUESDAY FEBRUARY 16TH. RDO STATIONS PASS TO COMINCH CINCPAC COMNOWESTSEAFRON AND COMNOWESTSEAFRON WHO PASSES TO COMGEN WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND.

ALL AIR SEARCHES FROM UDNAK CANCELLED BAD WEATHER.

WESTERN SECTOR SEARCHES FROM LONGVIEW TOOK OFF JUST PRIOR DAYLIGHT RETURNED LATE AFTERNOON COVERAGE 95 PER CENT. CONTACTS NEGATIVE. SOUTHERN SECTORS FROM LONGVIEW OFF ABOUT SAME TIME RETURNED EARLY AFTERNOON COVERAGE 90 PERCENT. CONTACTS ALSO NEGATIVE. ANTI SUBMARINE PATROL OVER FORMULA DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS. WEATHER PLANE OFF EARLY MORNING SIGHTED 2 ENEMY PLANES JUST WEST OF KISKA MID MORNING KEPT CLEAR OF KISKA HARBOR DUE PLANES IN AIR SAW NO ENEMY ACTIVITY AGATCU, ATTU AND
NAVAL MESSAGE

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**TEXT**

SEMICHIK ABOUT NOON TIME. FIGHTER PATROL OF LIGHT-nings MAINTAINED OVER FORMULA DURING DAYLIGHT. NO CONTACTS. 5 HEAVIES, 6 MEDIUMS, AND 6 FIGHTERS ARRIVED NORTH KISKA EARLY AFTERNOON BUT FOUND HARBOR AREA CLOSED IN BY WEATHER MOVING IN FROM WEST. NO ATTACKS. COMMENCED LIMITED OPERATIONS FROM FIGHTER FIELD FORMULA AS REPORTED BY 170755. TRANSPORT ESCORTED 7 FIGHTERS TO FORMULA, LANDED ON FIGHTER STRIP, AND RETURNED LONGVIEW. TOTAL 8 P-45'S NOW AT FORMULA.

 Three copies delivered to 21-G.

M. O. 11665, Sec. 5(b) and 5(d) or (E)
ORD letter, May 8, 1973
By DBS Date APR 16 1973

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
### Naval Message

**Naval Message**

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**Information**

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**Unless otherwise indicated, this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.**

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**Text**

FROM COMMORPACFOR. CONTACT FORGE 8 SENDS. RADIO STATIONS PASS TO CINCPAC, COMINCH, COMMORWESTSEAFRON AND COMWESTSEAFRON WHO PASS TO COMGEN WDC.

3,000 FEET FIGHTER STRIP FORMULA WITHOUT MAT NOW USEABLE. AT 2142Z FIRST FIGHTER (P-40) LANDED AND 7 MORE ENROUTE. LAYING OF MAT WILL PROCEED WITH FIELD IN USE. ESTIMATED COMPLETION 23H AT WHICH TIME FULL SQUADRON OF 24 P-40S WILL BE ASSIGNED. PLAN MAINTAIN DAILY """"DEEK"""" P-38 COVERAGE FROM LONGVIEW USING FORMULA P-40S FOR MORNING AND EVENING PATROL ONLY UNTIL FIELD FULLY READY.

Field now in use and 8 P-40s stationed there.

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (c) NAVRECS.)

By DBS APR 18 1937
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

WDCC
January 20, 1943
1225Z

PRIORITY

From: Adv Cp Hq ADC Ft Greely Ala
To: Military Intelligence Service

No. 200240Z January 20, 1943

Approximate line of occupation our troops formula: Constantine-Hill 351-Spout Markarius Bay-.2 1/2 miles north west of Constantine-Constantine. Number 3 ADC outpost and force outposts in position. Daily patrol to north west by provisional combat intelligence platoon. Rations ashore 23 days. Ammunition ashore sufficient. Weapons and materiel ashore well dispersed. Still loaded on Middleton one half battery 37 MM AA, not in danger. Remainder of weapons in position ashore. To Mil Int Serv Washn DC and G-2 WDC and FA. Favorable outlook by General Jones. Believes problems due absence of floating equipment can be solved. Excellent troop morale. Covering force landed on Worden 1800Z D day. Three boats rubber lost in heavy seas no casualties. Blinker message to Middleton 1730Z stated landing would be unopposed. 1800Z Worden grounded. Radio message forwarded. Scouts on Worden went ashore in dories ascertained suitable landing beaches. Middleton at anchor 2030Z. First troops ashore 2100Z completed beach head occupation 4 and 1/2 hours later. Manner of operation superior. No boats grounded on beach. Increasing storms of first night grounded Middleton. Following day and night most of landing barges beached and damaged due storm which lasted 3 days. No Orange contact or Orange day air reconnaissance at Formula to 180900Z despite good weather to westward and adverse to eastward on 16 January. All tractors operating ashore under hard usage. Heating equipment and tentage ashore enough to eliminate severe discomfort, Man power now unloading Middleton. Heavy equipment being unloaded from barges at shore. Landing boats being repaired. Salvage Middleton doubtful though no immediate danger. All positions now occupied easily reached by tractors. Have Middleton to beach telephone communication also satis-

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

COPY No.
factory connections to all units. Force command post located inland but General Jones at emergency CP on beach. This paraphrase of radio report Col Verbeck after return to Longview from Formula 19 Jan via Vega.

Castner

Action Copy: OPD
Info. Copies: G-2
CG AAF
LOG

DECLARED
R.O. 11602, Sec. 2(D) and 3(D) (CR)
ORD letter, May 8, 1972
By DBS

CM-IN-9126 (20 Jan 43) 1951 Z mvw

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: HQ ADC Ft Richardson Ais
To: MIS
No. 1097 October 3, 1942

Navy supplies information that Longview was bombed without damage by one plane type unknown at fifteen hundred GMT two October. Our occupation Longview now definitely known to Japs.

Casht

Action Copy: G-2

Air Branch

Info. Copies: OPD
CG AAF
LOG

RECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 8(D) or (E)
ORD letter, May 8, 1972
By DBS

CM-IN-1158 (10/3/42) 1530Z

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
FROM CINCPAC (NPM)
RELEASED BY
DATE SEPT. 13, 1942
TOR CODE ROOM 2742/0659
DECODED BY GARRETTSON/SMITH
PARAPHRASED BY

NAVAL MESSAGE

CTF 8 (NHB) PRIORITY ROUTINE DEFERRED

TO COMINCH (NSB) COMMSEAFRON (NPS) COMNORSEAFRON (NPC) PRIORITY ROUTINE DEFERRED

GEN. DENITT

APPROPRIATE ARMY COMMANDS

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

LT COPELAND

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION 130015
UNCT ELSEWHER ENDIED THIS DESPATCH WILL NOT BE DISTRIBUTED FURTHER UNLESS SPECIFIED.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

TEXT

FROM CINCPAC. ACTION COMTASKFOR 8. INFO COMINCH, COMMSEAFRON, COMNORSEAFRON. PASS THIS DESPATCH TO APPROPRIATE ARMY COMMANDERS FOR INFO. GRESNLADE PASS TO DENITT.

CONDUCT OF FIREPLACE OPERATION TO DATE, PARTICULARLY THE SPEEDY PREPARATION OF LANDING STRIP MONTHS AHEAD OF ESTIMATED DATE, IS HIGHLY CREDITABLE. PLEASE PASS MY CONGRATULATIONS TO THOSE RESPONSIBLE.

DENITT

K. O. 11668, Sec. 5(a) and 5(d) or (b)
OSD Letter, May 8, 1973

DISTRIBUTION

RECP: COS ARMY FOR PASS INC TO APPROPRIATE ARMY COMMANDERS.

(FOR INFO.

(NO FURTHER DISTRIBUTION BY NCR)

130015

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (b) NAVRECS.)
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: Piers of San Francisco
To: Chief of Staff

No 453 Sept 12, 1942

A report of which the following is a paraphrase is transmitted for your information "progress report from Comtaskfor eight relative to Fireplace is that one cargo vessel three transports and fifteen barges have been unloaded and that two more cargo vessels will be unloaded in approx two days. This action will complete phase one and task one. On or about twelve Sept a fourth transport is leaving Kodiak for Fireplace and a second convey of barges left Chernofski on tenth Sept. One transport of a ship convey scheduled to leave Chernofski on seventeenth Sept for Fireplace is destined for Atka. A flying field nine thousand feet long and averaging five hundred feet wide with a surface of hard sand has been constructed by the Army by draining Sweeper Creek. Col Harechson piloting B 18 first land ten Sept on above field and reports it best in Alaska. P 38's being despatched to Fireplace today eleven Sept to base and operate from Fireplace. Indications are that this movement is not known to enemy. Navy has furnished above information to Cominch CINCPAC joint Chiefs of Staff northwest sea frontier and CG ADC.

ACTION: OPD
INFO. COPIES: G-2, CGA AF, SOS-TAG, LOG

CH-IN-5161 (9-13-42) 0116Z

COPY No. 29
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<td>FOLLOWING JOINT COMMENT BY COMALSEC AND CONAS ON FOSTER KODIAK REPORT: RECOMMEND FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION</td>
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<td>F-01</td>
<td>(A) AUTHORIZE RELOCATION OF SUBBASE TO SOUTH SIDE WOMENS BAY ADJACENT APPROVED LOCATION FLOATING DRYDOCK FACILITIES. SUBBASE BUILDINGS THUS FAR COMPLETED ARE NEEDED FOR ESSENTIAL ADDITIONS TO AIR STATION WHICH MUST OTHERWISE BE BUILT ELSEWHERE AS NYMANS PENINSULA IS SATURATED. IF APPROVED IN PRINCIPLE PLAN WILL BE SUBMITTED FOR ORDERLY TRANSFER OF SUBBASE FACILITIES TO NEW LOCATION.</td>
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<td>(B) BUPERS APPROVE OFFICER AND ENLISTED COMPLEMENT RECOMMENDED IN COMALSEC SERIAL 349 DATED 25 JULY AND FURNISH PERSONNEL TO FILL IT OVER PERIOD OF 3 TO 4 MONTHS. PRESENT COMPLEMENT WAS BASED ON STATION AS ORIGINALLY PLANNED AT MOST OF ABOUT $10,000,000 WHILE COST OF</td>
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CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
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INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

120137 NCR 2545 (PAGE 2 OF 2)

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

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<table>
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<tr>
<th>TEXT ACTION</th>
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<tr>
<td>INSTALLATION NOW BUILT OR IN HAND IS ABOUT 70,000 INCLUD-</td>
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<td>EN MANY ADDED FACILITIES REQUIRED OF AN OPERATING BASE.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(C) PROVIDE AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE PC BOATS TO</td>
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<td>AUGMENT PRESENT TOTALLY INADEQUATE ESCORT FORCE WHICH</td>
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<td>HAS SUFFICED ONLY BECAUSE OF NO REAL SUBMARINE OFFENSIVE.</td>
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<td>(D) KEEP IN TRAINING HERE 1 SQUADRON OF WILDCATS</td>
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<td>AND KINGFISHERS INSTEAD OF TRAINING AT ALAMEDA OR SEATTLE</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEE PARAGRAPH 21 FOSTER REPORT.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(E) COM 13 072357* STATES THE CASE RELATIVE ALTERN-</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATE LOCATION FOR KODIAK. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BEGINNING</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEVELOPMENT OF COLD BAY CONTAINED IN COMALSEC SERIAL</td>
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<td>C545 DATED AUGUST 5 EARLY ACTION ON WHICH IS URGED.</td>
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<td>E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 8(D) or (R)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSD letter, May 8, 1972</td>
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<tr>
<td>By DBS Date APR 16 1973</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* REF. SECRET.

ACT: 30...

BUAER...QDMINCH...12...BUDOCKS...FILE...CNO...OPDO...
CONCUR IN THE MAIN WITH FOSTER REPORT ON SITKA.

RECOMMEND FOLLOWING FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION.

(A) PROVIDE NOW GROUP OF FIGHTERS OF SERVICE OR OBSOLETE TYPE. ESSENTIAL FOR TEST OF ARRESTING PLATFORM TRAINING
OF ARRESTING CREWS AND FAMILIARIZATION OF PILOTS WITH GEAR
AND LOCAL FLYING CONDITIONS.

(B) APPROVE PROPOSED OFFICER AND ENLISTED COMPLEMENTS
NOW IN MAIL. FILL COMPLEMENT AS PRACTICABLE OVER PERIOD
OF ABOUT 4 MONTHS. ADDITIONAL OFFICERS NEEDED NOW INCLUDE
2 NAVAL AVIATORS 2 LIEUTENANTS OR JUNIOR LIEUTENANTS AS
ORDNANCE AND TORPEDO OFFICERS 1 RESERVE OFFICER D-VS
1 CHAPLAIN AND 1 JUNIOR SUPPLY OFFICER.

(C) INCREASE DEFENSES BY OBTAINING 40MM BATTERY OF 4 GUNS
PLS 4 20MM IN SUPPORT.

(D) DEFER ERECTION HANGAR NUMBER 3 BECAUSE OF LIMITED
SPACE AND PRESENT PROVISIONS PROBABLY ADEQUATE.

(E) NO INCREASE BELIEVED NECESSARY IN SECTION BASE FACILITIES
NOW CONTEMPLATED.

(F) CONSIDER FURTHER DEVELOPMENT SITKA SHOULD BE IN ACCORD-
CONTINUED
PAGE 2 OF 82300 NCR527

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

TEXT

ACTION

- ANCE DEMONSTRATED NEED AND SHOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH MORE URGENT NEEDS AT LEST DEVELOPED STATIONS TO WESTWARD.

LETTER Follows

REASSIGNED

K. O. 11662, Sec. 3(6) and 5(D) or (8)
QSD letter, May 8, 1972
By DBS Date APR 16 1973

DISTRIBUTION

30.....ACTION

COMINCH..18/11...12....30.....BUDOCKS...BUPE...S...OPDO.....

FILE: 280P.....

FILE: 280P.....

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NVREGS.)
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

URGENT - XXX A

From: Hq WDC & 4th Army
To: Chief of Staff

No. XXX A 630 June 14, 1942

Enemy has occupied Kiska in force and rapidly consolidating his position. Apparently building temporary landing field and can easily establish landing field on Amchitka Island if not repeat not strongly opposed. Importance of effect on defense of Alaska as result of enemy occupation of Kiska can not repeat not be discounted and unquestionably is prelude to offensive to eastward at early date with objective reduction and occupation of Umnak and Dutch Harbor. Umnak is key to defense of Alaska. If lost Dutch Harbor falls giving enemy air and sea bases for further attacks to eastward with objective reduction and occupation air fields Forts Randall and Morrow. If this is permitted to occur threat on Kodiak becomes reality. Enemy action all offensive and comparable to advance southward from mandated islands by gradual build up of air bases in direction of attack. Our reinforcements now being prepared for movement to Glenn, Randall and Morrow will go far toward defense these important localities but this purely passive. Offensive counter measures essential if this progressive occupation now rapidly developing is to be eliminated. These counter measures should be inaugurated immediately and require joint action naval ground and air forces, additional long range bombers and carrier based aircraft to neutralize enemy air action. Joint expeditionary force should be organized for recapture Kiska and Attu. Have directed General Buckner to initiate construction dispersion fields Umnak as rapidly as possible with means at his disposal and assign General Ladd Command Fort Glenn. Request importance of movement of transports carrying reinforcements to stations in Alaska and their immediate turn around be impressed on Navy. Transports now in Alaskan waters that sailed Seattle June 2nd have not repeat not arrived stations being held at Kodiak and to eastward. This immobilization of shipping at Kodiak and to east thereof clearly illustrates result of enemy occupation of Kiska. Reinforcements recently authorized will begin leaving this week from both San Francisco and Seattle. Again urgently request assignment 2 squadrons B-24s and 2 squadrons B-17s to 11th Air Force. Due to attrition combat, landing and take off accidents heavy bombers now available 11th Air Force reduced to 10 to be reinforced by 6 B-24s on way this is not repeat not sufficient. Air reinforcements Alaska take too long
to reach Richardson from States due to normally unfavorable weather conditions. Can not repeat not emphasize too strongly that this type ship must be used for bombing Kiska position. Can obtain no information as to action Navy task force 8. Recommend state of Army opposed invasion be declared.

De Witt
CG WDC & 4th Army

Action Copy: OPD
Info. Copies: G-2
A-2
CG AAF
Log
File

K.O. 11653, Sec. 5(D) and 6(D) or (H)
OSD letter, May 2, 1972
By DBS
Date APR 1 6 1973

CH-1N-4434 (6/14/42) PM 5:03

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Commander, Northwest Sea Frontier.
To: Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Bombing at Dutch Harbor; Report on.
Enclosure: (A) Copy of report of Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station, Dutch Harbor, on above subject.

1. There is transmitted herewith, in advance of its submission through routine channels, the report of the Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station, Dutch Harbor, on the bombing of that station on June third and fourth.

2. No enclosures accompany this advance copy.

C. S. FREEMAN

cc: Cominco
July 6, 1942

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander, Alaskan Sector.
Subject: Bombing at Dutch Harbor - report on O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Enclosure: (A) Print showing hits. (B) Photographs.

On 3 June in accordance with the daily routine, the Naval Air Station went to "general quarters" at 0430. At 0545 (zone plus ten time), battle stations being fully manned, a flight of about fifteen wheel-type fighting planes appeared without previous warning. Guns were laid awaiting definite identification; enemy character was made positive as the planes commenced to machine-gun installations near the Air Station. Anti-aircraft fire of great intensity was opened; the planes made but one flight over the Station, from south, disappearing to northward, and did no damage except that resulting from strafing a PBY airplane taxiing in the harbor. This plane, preparing to take-off for Kodiak, had one crew member killed; an enlisted passenger was wounded, jumped overboard and drowned.

About 0550, a flight of four bombers was sighted on a course of about 30° true. Sixteen bombs were released at 0555; fourteen dropped in the congested area of Fort Mears, killing about twenty-five men and seriously wounding, approximately the same number. The other two bombs dropped in the water. Three warehouses, two barrack buildings and three quonset huts were totally destroyed by the bomb hits and the resulting fire. Three barracks, two officer's quarters, one officer's mess building, one cold storage, and one temporary cold storage building were damaged.

A second flight of three bombers then appeared over Mount Ballyhoo. Flying southerly, then circling around to the left to about course 55°, they dropped a stick of six bombs which over-shot Fort Mears and struck in the soft ground to the north, killing one Army man in a trench but doing no material damage.

A third flight of three bombers on a southwesterly course dropped six bombs near the Naval Radio Transmitter Station. One bomb landed in hard ground, severed a transmitting antenna, shattered all the windows and doors, and puck-marked the brick front of the radio station apartment house. Another bomb made a direct hit on a quonset hut, completely demolishing it. Another buried a Siemens-Durkee Puget Sound employee in a trench, and killed him. The other three bombs exploded in the soft ground.

The fourth and last flight of planes on this day were bombers which approached on an easterly course and over-shot the wooden oil tanks. One bomb struck hard ground near a Navy fire-watchers pill-box and killed one enlisted man outside and severely wounded one man inside. Another struck on the edge of a road, demolishing an Army truck and killing the driver.
Subject: Bombing at Dutch Harbor - report on.

third struck in soft ground near a trench and killed one Marine private. The other three bombs exploded harmlessly in soft ground.

6. After the attack, all planes disappeared to the northward. They were again sighted about 0600 to the West of the Station, flying South. They were seen by the WY POINT eyes, flying northeast over Beaver Inlet and then southwest to sea over Udaqak Strait. At 0850, a Catalina reported being attacked by enemy planes south of Cape Alak. The assumption is that the carrier was southwest of Unalaska Island. The attack was made from the north and all planes retired to the north. They circled to the south and passed to the west of Dutch Harbor, flew down Captain's Bay, and crossed over the mountain passes to Beaver Inlet, travelled down Beaver Inlet and thence out to sea over Udaqak Strait. There they turned southwest and followed the coast of Unalaska Island at least as far as Cape Alak.

7. The morning of June 3 was clear over Dutch Harbor, following three days of unusually bad weather. It is believed that the enemy followed the atmospheric disturbance as it moved westward, taking concealment in its westward edge. We attacked Dutch Harbor during the first clear weather after the storm, probably knowing that air assistance from the east could not get through. The ceiling was about 10,000 feet. Bombing approaches were tracked at an average altitude of 9000 feet.

8. The first stick of sixteen bombs, dropped on Fort Wears, was spaced in range pattern 1500 feet with a deflection spread of 250 feet. The three six-bomb patterns measured 510' x 125', 500 x 200', and 350' x 240'.

9. Anti-aircraft fire was intense. At least one bomber appeared to have been hit and several of the fighters are believed to have been hit. Some hits were definitely made as indicated by the recovery of shattered parts of aircraft structures. However, no planes were brought down, at least none has been found in the vicinity.

10. Enemy targets appear to have been Fort Wears, the Radio Station, and the wooden oil tanks. The last two targets have been here for years, and the enemy has had opportunity to know their positions. Fort Wears is a congested area of white frame buildings, and is the most conspicuous target on Amaknak Island or vicinity.

11. At 1110, Fort Glenn (at Otter Point on Unuck Island) reported two enemy cruiser-type planes engaged, one shot down and one escaped. This may have been the first intimation to the enemy of the existence of Fort Glenn and the airfield there. At 1200, a Catalina reported that enemy fighters over Fort Glenn had been driven off by Army fighters. This attack may have been directed at Dutch Harbor but then diverted to Fort Glenn when Fort Glenn
July 6, 1942

From: The Commanding Officer
To: The Commander, Alaskan Sector.

Subject: Bombing at Dutch Harbor - report on.

was discovered by the enemy.

12. The enemy was not sighted again on June 3. The good weather was succeeded by another small low, and fog, rain and overcast skies were prevalent in the general area.

13. The U.S. Army Transport PRESIDENT FILMORE, U.S.S. S-27, U.S.S. KING, U.S.S. TALBOT, U.S.S. GILLES, U.S.C.G. ONANDO and the U.S.A.T. MORELEN were in the harbor but got underway and stood out to sea with no damage done. All but the MORELEN and the S-27 adding to the volume of anti-aircraft fire. The PRESIDENT FILMORE's fire was notable. In addition to her own armament she had mounted on deck a battery of 77mm guns consigned to Cold Bay, which gave her twenty-two anti-aircraft guns, all of which were served with such rapidity that the FILMORE appeared to be (and was reported) on fire.

14. The morning of June 4, 1942, was rainy and overcast. Catalinas were in contact with the enemy under conditions of low ceiling and reduced visibility most of the morning. Contact was lost when the tracking Catalina had an engine shot out of action by anti-aircraft fire. The weather improved during the day as the enemy approached the Southwest end of Unalak Island; by 1800, the time of the enemy attack on June 4, the weather was clear with scattered clouds at about 3000 feet.

15. At 1737, Fisherman's Point Army observation post reported a Catalina shot down in flames near Egg Island and at 1740 it sighted three flights of bombers headed for Dutch Harbor. At 1745, Priest's Rock and Elder Point (Army observation posts) reported sighting a large number of planes. At 1752, Mount Ballyhoo observation post reported enemy aircraft circling Mount Ballyhoo and warned to watch for three flights of bombers. At 1753 seven fighters and eleven bombers were seen flying south close to the west slope of Mount Ballyhoo. All continued south until lost from sight. The seven fighters, now joined by three more fighters, made a fast low-flying strafing attack from the south. At 1800, fire was opened with anti-aircraft guns. The fighters continued on over the station, firing their machine guns, and disappeared to the northward.

16. The eleven bombers delivered a dive bombing attack through the openings in the overcast. The dives were shallow, estimated as between thirty and forty degrees; bombs were released at altitudes between 1000 to 1500 feet. Each plane appeared to carry but one large bomb. Hits were scored as follows:

(1) Indian Affairs Hospital at Unalaska - hit and one wing demolished.
From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander, Alaskan Sector.

Subject: Bombing at Dutch Harbor - report on.

(2) Four new steel (6666 - barrel), fuel oil tanks commissioned on May 31, 1942, and filled by the U.S.S. BMAZOS on June 1, were hit and totally destroyed with their contents of 22,000 barrels of fuel oil. The adjacent steel diesel oil tank (15,102 barrel capacity) was punctured and its contents destroyed by fire. The wisdom of having installed these tanks in bunkers was proved when the resulting fire was contained in two bunkers and all other tanks and their contents in the tank farm were saved.

(3) The Northwestern barracks ship for Siemens-Drake Puget Sound and which supplied steam and electrical power to the Air Station, was hit forward on the port side and set on fire. Fire was spread to the adjacent issue warehouse by an unfavorable wind; this warehouse and its contents were destroyed. The Northwestern burned for three days. The third day her boilers were found undamaged, were lit off and are now supplying steam to the station.

(4) An Army 37mm gun emplacement on the Air Station was hit, demolishing the gun and burying the crew. Two members of the crew were killed and two men were seriously injured. The other crew members were dug out; their injuries were slight.

(5) The Naval Air Station pier was struck near the sea side of the southeast corner shearing off piles and splintering the deck. This damage has now been repaired. The bomb that made this hit was the only dud noted. Two bombs dropped into the water near the pier.

(6) The incomplete hangar was struck in the center of the roof by one bomb. The bomb pierced the roof and detonated before reaching the floor. A hole fifty feet in diameter was blown in the roof. Debris showered the Catalina damaged in the previous raid, tore the fabric of the tail and wings, and pierced the hull in several places.

(7) Three bombs exploded harmlessly in soft earth.

17. At 1821, three level bombers approached from the Northeast and dropped five bombs into the harbor between the sand spit and the Naval Air Station dock. These planes were flying high over the broken clouds and smoke from the tank farm fire. They turned to the West over the harbor and disappeared over Mount Rallyhoo. One bomb was dropped on the South summit of Mount Rallyho.

18. At 1825, five bombers flying high approached from the northwest and delivered a horizontal attack on the magazine area on the south slope of Mount Rallyhoo. Ten bombs were dropped along the magazine road with a range pattern of 1500 feet. The first nine exploded harmlessly; the tenth bomb struck near a Navy 20mm gun emplacement and killed the battery officer and three of the gun's crew.
July 6, 1942

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander, Alaskan Sector.

Subject: Bombing at Dutch Harbor — report on.

19. At 1915, planes were sighted behind Mount Halsey. At 1926, planes were reported over Hog Island. At 1945, three planes were reported by Eider Point Army observation post. At 1950, twenty-one planes headed south and were sighted west of the Station by Mount Halsey. At 1955, planes were sighted to the northwest of Mount Halsey; these disappeared in the South at 2010.

20. It is believed that the heavy anti-aircraft fire and the cloud conditions prevented the horizontal bombers from making successful attacks.

(a) Of the sixteen bombs observed to have been dropped by horizontal bombers, only one was effective, the one which killed an officer and three men of a Navy 20mm gun crew. (The gun is now in service.)

(b) Of the eleven bombs dropped by the dive bombers, five were effective, viz., those hitting the Unalaska Hospital, the fuel oil tanks, the Northwestern and the Army 37mm gun, the hangar, and the Naval Air Station Dock (One dud). Three caused no damage and two more fell into the water. Only the hits on the Army 37mm caused personnel losses. The only serious material damage was to the fuel oil tanks and to the Northwestern, including the losses caused by the fires set to the contents of the diesel tank and to the warehouse previously mentioned.

21. The low loss of life to Navy and Contractor's personnel is attributed to the fact that they were dispersed under cover, and to the heavy anti-aircraft fire that caused the quick retirement of the fighters. Special credit is due to the Executive Officer, Lieutenant Commander T. C. Thomas, USN, for the thorough and effective manner in which he prepared for all emergencies and for organizing the personnel to resist attack. No officer or man of the Navy or Marine Corps was observed by the Commanding Officer to flinch in the performance of duty; all hands conducted themselves like veterans. The untried and inexperienced gun crews stuck to their posts under a hail of bullets and never ceased fire as long as an enemy was in range. It is to be regretted that their energetic fire did not produce more tangible trophies.

22. Five civilian nurses employed by the Contractor coolly and efficiently manned stations in exposed areas during attacks, gave aid to wounded civilians, soldiers, sailors, and marines and assisted the surgeons in performing operations. They are Miss Mary Kain, Mrs. Margaret Jaklan, Miss Fern Tellison, Miss Veronica Janastch and Miss E. Lucille De Well. They are considered to be worthy of commendation for their helpful and brave conduct under extraordinary conditions.

23. Summary:

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From: The Commanding Officer  
To: The Commander, Alaskan Sector  

Subject: Bombing at Dutch Harbor - report on.  

SUMMARY (Continued)  

13 Horizontal Bombers  
11 Dive Bombers  
28  

The type of aircraft used by the enemy have been variously identified. All were wheel-type, single-engined monoplanes; it is believed that all had retractable landing gear.  

Bomb dropped  

FIRST RAID  
SECOND RAID  

16 200(?) lb bombs  
27 500(?) lb bombs  

18 500(?) lb bombs  
TOTAL: 16-200 lb and 45-500(?) lb bombs.  

Personnel Casualties:  

NAVY  
6 Navy Dead  
1 Marine Corps Dead  
1 Siamese Drake Puget Sound Dead  
TOTAL 10  

ARMY  
33 Dead  
TOTAL 33  

Material Casualties:  
The only serious material casualties were the loss of four 6666 barrel fuel oil tanks, 22,000 barrels fuel oil, 625,000 gallons diesel oil, the burning of the Northwestern upperworks and interior, and the burning of the issue warehouse. Efficient fire fighting, supervised by Major P. P. Groves, U.S.M.C. and Fire Chief, Harold Joe Davis prevented the spreading of fire from the warehouse to the wooden oil tanks.

W. N. UPDGRAFF  
DECLASSIFIED  
K. O. 11853, Sec. 8(a) and 6(b) or (R)  
OSD letter, May 8, 1973  

By DBS  
Date: APR 16 1973
FROM WDC TO
MISS 6-Z WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON D C
21 JULY 1045 0144 GMT
TWO JAPANESE AIRCRAFT CARRIERS PARTICIPATED IN ACTION 3 AND 4 JUNE VICINITY DUTCH HARBOR ACCORDING TO DOCUMENTS FOUND ON BODY OF PILOT FIGHTER PLANES DISCOVERED CRASHED ON AKUTAN RECENTLY THESE VESSELS WERE NITJUJO AND HAYATAKA WHICH CONFIRMS OUR PREVIOUS REPORT CONTAINED IN SPECIAL NUMBER 464 JUNE 16.

WICKERLING
G-2 WDC AND FOURTH ARMY
SENT AT 1145 GMT
LT COMBS ICD
SCXXX SECRET
END FLS ACK
R NR 3-C WDGS 0145 GCT EMM END.

See J-No. 150, June 16.
See Wickerling's #4-C, June 16.
Rec'd in M.I.S., 1020 PM, July 20-42.
SECRET

DUTCH HARBOR ACTION

1. At 1545 Z 3 June, (0445 X 3 June), Dutch Harbor was attacked by 15 light bombers type 97. Attack at 10,000 feet lasted 20 minutes.

   Damage incurred:
   Two barracks and two warehouses were set afire.
   Flames have been extinguished. Five other barracks were damaged.

2. At 2145 Z 3 June, (1045 X 3 June), 2 ORANGE PLANES made a reconnaissance flight, one plane (catapult type) was shot down at Umnak Pass.

3. Later 3 June, Orange Photographic Plane was sighted.

4. Subsequent report:
   NAS Kodiak 041145, Part 2

   Add our losses:
   One Catalina strafed at Dutch Harbor and 4 others down in vicinity of which one may have been due to combat - total five planes.

   Enemy Losses:
   One cruiser plane shot down off Otter Point, Umnak (Par. 2 above) and one in serial combat - total 2 planes.

5. An enemy force consisting of:
   1 -- CV
   2 -- CA
   2 -- DD

   has been reported several times southwest of Dutch Harbor. At 2105 Z 4, this force was reported 215° distance 165 miles from Dutch Harbor on course north, speed 15.

   B-17s with bombs, B-26s with torpedoes and Catalinas with torpedoes are enroute to attack.
6. At 0355 Z 5th. Dutch Harbor under air attack by 11 bombers and 7 fighters. SS NORTHWESTERN and warehouses lost.

7. B26 divebombed CV in position bearing 210 distance 120 from Unalak at 050052. 1 large CV with 5 VF on deck, 1 small CV, no planes, 2 CA, 3 DD, course 330 Speed 25.
COMINCH PHONE

FROM: KODIAK

PART 2. OUT OF FUEL. FOUR AMPHIBIANS CALLED INTO UMNAK TO LOAD TORPEDOES FOR ATTACK. SIX B-17'S, ONE LB-30 DEPARTED KODIAK AT 1952 FOR COLD BAY ENROUTE TO ATTACK WITH BOMBS. DEPARTED COLD BAY FOR TARGET 050035. NO SUBSEQUENT REPORT FROM THEM. MESSAGE FROM CT UNIT 8.1.1 INDICATED SIX UMNAK B-26'S REPORT UMNAK TO ATTACK BUT RETURNED WHEN CONTACT LOST. CASCO REPORTED AT 042350 FIVE B-26'S DEPARTED COLD BAY FOR UMNAK TO REFUEL. ELMENDORF B-26'S FAILED TO REACH COLD BAY ACCOUNT WEATHER AND RETURNED. NO APPARENT ACTION BY ANY B-26'S SINCE. AT 050105 CT UNIT 8.1.1 REQUESTED ME TO OBTAIN IMMEDIATE ORDERS FOR ARMY AT UMNACK WHO HAD REQUESTED EXPLICIT ORDER FOR ARMY AND NAVY SEPARATELY.
WASHINGTON

AT 050209 FORWARDED CTG 8.3 ORDERED TO UMNAK FOR BOMBARDMENT TO ATTACK CARRIER IMMEDIATELY.

AT 050224 FORWARDED CONFIRMATION FROM 8.3 OF CT UNIT 8.1.1 ORDERS TO UMNAK FOR B-26'S TO TAKE OFF ATTACK WITH TORPEDO WHEN FOUR NAVY PLANES PLUS ONE B-17 THEN ABOUT TO.

END

PART 2.

Received at 7:10 - 6/17/3
FROM: NAS KODIAK

PART 3. DEPART UMNACK HAD REGAINED CONTACT SC UNIT 812 REPORTS AT 050254, COMPLETED SEARCH SECTOR 2 DISTANCE 450 MILES NEGATIVE RESULTS. THREE CATALINAS DEPARTING 050200 TO SEARCH SECTOR LIMITING BEARINGS 150 TO 225 DISTANCE 200 MILES. B 17 MAKING NIGHT SEARCH KODIAK SECTOR 225 TO 216 DISTANCE 700 MILES. BECAUSE NUMBERS CATALINAS AND CREWS AVAILABLE UNDETERMINED CANNOT SPECIFY ADDITIONAL SEARCHERS AT THIS TIME BUT WILL Endeavor TO REGAIN AND MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH ENEMY UNTIL ATTACKS COMPLETED IF IT TAKES ALL NIGHT. PILOTS AND CREWS IN ALMOST CONTANT FLIGHT AND ACTION PAST 48 HOURS IN MOST DIFFICULT WEATHER. COMMUNICATIONS DIFFICULT AS PATRON PORTABLES ONLY RELIABLE COMMUNICATIONS WITH FORT GLENN AND FORT RANDALL. REINFORCE-
WASHINGTON

MIGHTS ENROUTE OF CATALINAS FROM SEATTLE TO KODIAK - THREE KINGFISHERS SITKA TO KODIAK.
ELEVEN WILDCATS AT COHOVA FOR KODIAK. LT. COMMANDER PAUL EOLEY USN DESERVES HIGH PRAISE
FOR TODAY'S CATALINAS OPERATIONS. AT 050355 DUTCH AND GILLIS REPORT PLANE ATTACK ON STATION
GARBLE D REPORTS NOW COMING IN INDICATED REGAIN CONTACT AND POSSIBLE ATTACK. END PART THREE.
COMINCH ZONE

FROM: KODIAK

PART 1. RESUME OF SITUATION 05420, ALL TIME ZED. NIL INDICATIONS OF ENEMY NORTH OF ALEUTIANS TODAY. ENEMY FORCE ONE CV, 2 DD DEFINITELY LOCATED BY CATALINA LATITUDE 50-07 LONGITUDE 171-14 WEST. COURSE 150 AT 041725. TWO TORPEDO LOADED AMPHIBIANS IN AIR NEAR DUTCH HARBOR. STARTED IMMEDIATELY TO ATTACK. CONTACT APPARENTLY LOST ABOUT 1840. TORPEDO AMPHIBIANS FORMED SCOUTING LINES AND 17 V-3 REGAINED CONTACT AT 2005. REPORTED ONE CV THREE CA TWO DD, POSITION BEARING 215 DISTANCE 165 FROM OUTER POINT. FEW PLANES ON DECK COURSE NORTH SPEED 15. REPORTED ENEMY CHANGE COURSE TO 200 SPEED 20 AT 2125. LOW FUEL AND ENGINE FAILURE MADE TORPEDO ATTACK INCOMPLETE. AT 2318 CONTACT LOST AS RELIEVING PLANE NOT ARRIVED. END PART 1.
WASHINGTON

COMINCH PHONE

FROM: NWSF

DUTCH HARBOR UNDER REPEATED SEVERE AIR
ATTACKS BEGINNING SHORTLY BEFORE 1900.
COMMUNICATIONS STILL INTACT.

RECEIVED AT 700 5 JUNE
COMINCH PHONE
FROM: KODIAK

RESUME OF AIR OPERATIONS 3 JUNE. ALL TIME ZONE ZED. DUTCH HARBOR ATTACKED ONE TIME FROM BERING SEA AT 031555 BY FOUR TYPE 97 KOGEKIKI TORPEDO BOMBERS AND 14 FIGHTERS. ATTACKS CEASED AT 031615. ENEMY RETIRED TO NORTH. APPEAR PRINCIPALLY PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE. NIL DAMAGE REPORTED TO AIR STATION INSTALLATIONS. ONE CATALINA STRAFFED ON WATER. MINOR FIRES IN FORT MEARS BARRACKS AREA. ABOUT 2100 THREE BOMBS OBSERVED DROPPED THROUGH OVERCASE, STRIKING WATER 15 MILES.
END.

RECEIVED AT 640 5 JUNE
WASHINGTON

COMINCH PHONE

FROM: DUTCH HARBOR

DUTCH HARBOR ATTACKED BY ELEVEN BOMBERS AND SEVEN FIGHTERS AT 1808 WILLIAM. SS NORTHWESTERN AND WAREHOUSES LOST. DETAILS WILL FOLLOW.

RECEIVED AT 6:40 5 JUNE
INDEFINITE CALL TO INDEFINITE CALL

REPORT FROM COLD BAY 50405
B 26 PILOT RETURNED DIVE BOMBER CARRIER
BELIEVED SKASIXA* AT 050052 GAVE POSITION
BEARING 210 DISTANCE 120 MILES FROM UMNAX
(GARBLE = COM *** HOUR) 1 LARGE CV WITH
FIVE FIGHTERS ON DECK, ONE SMALL CV NO
PLANES, TWO CA, THREE DD COURSE 330
SPEED 25 REPORTED POSITION CHECKED WITH
LAST KNOWN MOVEMENTS X

RECEIVED AT 0640 - 5 JUNE
WASHINGTON

COMING PHONE

FROM: NAS KODIAK
TO: (NEARBY ACTIVITIES)
INFORM COMMANDER ARMY B 17e 36th SQUADRON
REMAIN COLD BAY OR UMNAX PREPARED FOR
EARLY MISSION (FOUR GROUPS MISSING)
AGAINST ENEMY FLEET UNITS AS DEVELOPED
CARRIERS X

SGD.

BUTLER

RECEIVED AT 0147 - 5JUNE
WASHINGTON

COMINCH PHONE

INTERCEPT FROM DUTCH HARBOR:

ATTACK SECURE HAS BEEN SOUNDED (REST OF MESSAGE UNINTELLIGIBLE BUT APPARENTLY MEANS SECURE FOR SECOND ATTACK)

RECEIVED AT 0136-05 JUNE
WASHINGTON

COMINCH PHONE

AT 0025-05 June COMINCH DUTY OFFICER CALLED TO REPORT THAT INDICATIONS WERE THAT DUTCH HARBOR WAS BEING ATTACKED AGAIN X

(TIME OF ATTACK NOT GIVEN)
WASHINGTON

COMINCH PHONE

FROM: DUTCH HARBOR
TO: COMALSEC

040745

ABOUT 10 TORPEDO BOMBER PLANES ESCORTED
BY ABOUT 15 FIGHTERS ATTACKED DUTCH HARBOR
AT 0655 WILLIAM X PLANES APPEARED WITHOUT
WARNING BUT STATION WAS AT DAILY DAWN
BATTLE STATIONS AND HEAVY AA FIRE WAS
OPENED IMMEDIATELY X FIGHTERS DELIVERED
STRAFFING ATTACK ON CATALINA MAIL PLANE
TAKING OFF FOR KODIAK WHICH WAS IMMEDIATELY
BEACHED ON SAND SPIT X TWO MEMBERS OF
CREW WERE KILLED AND ONE INJURED X HEAVY
BOMB ATTACK WAS DELIVERED FROM 9000 FT.
ALTITUDE X TARGETS WERE OLD WOODEN OIL
TANKS, RADIO STATION AND FT. MEARS X
TANKS AND RADIO STATION WERE NEARLY MISSED,
LATTER BEING DAMAGED AND TRANSMITTING
ANTENNA BEING TEMPORARILY OUT OF
COMMISSION AFTER FIRST CONTACT REPORT
HAD ALREADY BEEN SENT. SEVERAL BARRACKS
AND WAREHOUSES AT FT. MEARS HIT AND
BURNED X PRESIDENT FILMORE, OORLEN,
KING, TALBOT, GILLIS, S-27 AND
ONANDAGA WERE IN HARBOR AND UNDAMAGED X
ALL SHIPS LEFT THE HARBOR DURING OR
JUST AFTER ATTACK AT 0715 X PLANES
RETIRED TO NORTHWARD X KNOWN CASUALTIES:
NAVY 3 DEAD, 1 SERIOUSLY WOUNDED
MARINES 1 DEAD (GARELE)
ARMY 18 DEAD, 25 SERIOUSLY WOUNDED
AT 1035 SEVERAL UNIDENTIFIED PLANES
WERE SIGHTED BUT NO ATTACK WAS MADE.
FACILITIES TO SERVE FLEET SURFACE SUB
OR AIR UNITS READY TO SAME CAPACITY AS
WASHINGTON

BEFORE X LIMITED VISABILITY INDICATES
NO RECURRENCE FURTHER ATTACKS PRIOR
DAWN TOMORROW X

RECEIVED AT 0010 -05 JUNE
0457 NPC V NPR ATTACK SECURE HAS BEEN SOUNDED BUT ---
(REST OF TRANSMISSION UNREADABLE HERE)
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

URGENT

From: HQ ADC Ft. Richardson Ams
To: Military Intelligence Svc

No. 032037-99, June 3, 1942

Air attack now coming in to Dutch Harbor.

Buckner

SECRET

K. C. 11455, Secs. 3(D) and 8(D) or (N)

OSD letter, May 5, 1973

By DBS

Action Copy: OPD
Info. Copies: G-2
A-2
CG AAF
SSS
TAG
LOG, File

CH-IN-0857 (6/3/42) 5:49 PM

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

COPY No. 28

248
**M.I.S. MESSAGE**

(SECRET)

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**SECRET**

| CONFIDENTIAL |

**SECRET**

| Strike out all but one |

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Hostile carrier contacted by 11th Air Force at latitude 55 degrees, 11 minutes North and longitude 167 degrees 10 minutes West. Details later nothing further known by Alaska Defense Second Dutch Harbor attack thirty minutes ago.

**SECRET**

| Strike out all but one |

**SECRET**

| Strike out all but one |

---

**Distribution:**

- Journal
- GFD
- Col. Bratton
- Gen. Kroemer
- Summary
- Situation
- Col. Bette
- Var Room
- ORI
- Air
- A-3
- TR
- US Ground Forces
- White House

**EVAL. SECT. COMMENT:**

---

**Disseminated from Evaluation Section:**

By Lt. Rigby

**OFFICER IN CHARGE:**

Lt. Barclay

**Briefed or Paraphrased:**

---

**JOURNAL NO. 263 OF 6/3, 1942**

**COPY NO. 14**
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

URGENT

From: HQ ADC Ft Richardson Als
To: Military Intelligence Svc

No. 032205-100, June 3rd, 1942

Third aerial attack on Dutch Harbor at 2139 GMT.

Decker CG ADC

INFO

E.O. 11652, Sec. 2(D) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 8, 1973

Action Copy: OPD

By DBS Date APR 16 1973

Info. Copies: G-3
A-3
CG AAF
NCG
TAG
LOG
FILE

CH-IN-0873 (6/3/43) 7:07 PM

S.I.S. JOURNAL 265

JUN 3 1942

COPY No. 28

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

URGENT

From: Eq ADC Ft. Richardson Alaska
To: Military Intelligence Svc

No. 032000, June 3, 1942.

Jap attack on Dutch Harbor 1545 GCT by 15 light bombers type 97 few casualties barracks and warehouses on fire. G-2 estimate: Planes launched from carrier thought to be in eastern edge high pressure area extending north and south between longitude 170 and 175 west probably 300 miles south of Seguan Island reason: 1 weather most unfavorable for carrier operation both east and west of above area 2 reports June 2nd indicated carrier not more than 400 miles south repeat south Adak Island.

Castner G-2 ADC

By DBS

Action Copy: OPD

Info. Copies: G-2
A-2
CG AAF
SGS
TAG
LOG
File

CH-IN-0874 (6/3/42) 7:12 P.M.

264

JUN 3 1947

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
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M.I.S. MESSAGE

(Strike out all but one)

ORIGINAL SOURCE

FOURTH ARMY

VIA TVX MESSAGE NO. 6-9

LOCAL FILING TIME AT SOURCE

Time Date Time Date Time Date

2236 8/3 1936 8/3

RECEIVED IN EVAL. SECT. 1. G. - (Room 2643)

2236 8/3 1936 8/3

SECRET - CONFIDENTIAL - INTRUSTED PERSON

(Strike out all but one)

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In addition to first attack reported at 8:16 A.M. Anchorage Alaska time there were two others one at 11:18 A.M. and third at 12:39 P.M. Both Anchorage local time. The results of the second and third attacks are unknown as well as other details apparently third attack still in progress. The Air Corps Alaska reported shooting down one hostile seaplane single engine with pentecosts near Usmak at 20155 GMT no losses our forces reported. Other details later.

WEATHER

Distributions:
Journal
Gen. Strong
Col. Shreeve
A-2
Col. Raitt
Gen. Kneer
Summary
Situation
Col. Betts
Var Room
C.M.I.
Air
P.M.
G.S. Ground Forces
White House

DECLASSIFIED:
E.O. 11652, Sec. 7(E) and 8(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 8, 1972
By DBS Date APR 1 6 1973

EVAL. SECT. COMMENT:

Disseminated from Evaluation Section: LT. Dugay

OFFICER IN CHARGE LT. BARCLAY

Briefed or Paraphrased

JOUR SUMM W.R. A-2

280 of 1942

COPY NO. 15
Alaska estimates hostile planes taking part in Dutch Harbor attack launched from carrier located probably three hundred miles south of Sagan Island out of high pressure area between 172 degrees west. Belief based on two reasons one reports 2 June indicated hostile carrier located south of Adak Island about 100 miles two east and west above area very unfavorable for carrier operation.

Weeks

G-2 and FOURTH ARMY

CONSIDERATION repeating the third line

Island out of high pressure area between 172 degrees and 175 degrees west.

Belief based.

Distribution: Journal G-2 Col. Burton Col. Kroemer Summary Situation Col. Betts War Room

OFFICER IN CHARGE

Lt. Darby

JOURNAL NO. 273 OF 6/3, 1942

COPIE NO. 11
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

URGENT

From Ft Richardson Alaska
To Military Intelligence Service

No 060030-104 June 4, 1942

North of Unalaska Army bomber cites G-2 reports sighting Jap carrier exact location unknown.

Buckner CG ADC

RECEIVED
2 O 11625 Sec 3(D) and 5(D) or (R)
ORD letter, May 5, 1972

By DBS Date APR 16, 1973

Action Copy: GPO
Info. Copies: G-2
A-2
CG AAF
SGS
TAG
Log
File

CH-IN-0911 (6/3/42) 10:34 PM

COPY No.

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**M.I.S. MESSAGE**

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**MESSAGE NO.** 4-3  
**G.M.T.**  
**E.W.T.**

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**EXACT COPY** -  
**SECRET** -

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Message just received from Alaska Defense Command states Army bomber reports sighting enemy carrier North of Unalaska. Exact location not known.

**VIGNERING**

**Distribution:**
- Journal
- C.P.D.
- Col. Baltin
- Gen. Krasner

**Summary**

**Situation** -
- Col. Bates
- Var Room
- G.M.I.
- Air
- A-3
- F.M.
- G-3 Ground Forces
- White House

**EVAL. SECT. COMMENT:**

**Disseminated from Evaluation Section:**

**OFFICER IN CHARGE:**

**Briefed or Paraphrased:**

By Lt. Higby  
Lt. Baron

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**JOURNAL NO.** 304  
**OF**  
**DATE**  
**COPY NO.** 14
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: HQ WDC and 4th Army
To: Operations Division

No 544 June 3rd, 1942.

3 hostile air attacks on Dutch Harbor Alaska 3 June 1942 at 543 AM, 1116 AM, and 1239 PM all Anchorage time. First attack 18 light Japanese bombers appeared 545 AM type B7 attacked from 10000 feet. 2 Barracks and warehouse set afire. Few casualties. No repeat no information extent damage and casualties number of hostile planes or type second and third attacks. One Jap single engine seaplane (Ponton type) type C) shot down near Umsak at 3033 GMT. Reported contact by 11th AF with enemy CV near Fox Island, 110 miles SW of Dutch Harbor.

Dewitt

SECRET
E.O. 11652, Secs. 9(D) and 8(D) or (B)
OSD letter, May 8, 1973
By: DSS Date: APR 16 1973

ACTION: OPD
INFO. COPIES: G-2, A-2, CG AAF, TAG, SGS, FILE

CM-IN-0958 (6-4-42) AM 2:27

RECEIVED JUN 4 1942

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
ALERT ORDERED IN SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA FROM 0330 TO 0430 ON JUNE 4 JUNE AS RESULT OF DERAX CONTACT WITH TARGET INITIALLY THOUGHT TO BE FLIGHT OF UNIDENTIFIED PLANES 60 MILES WEST OF GOLDEN GATE BUT WHICH FADED OUT AFTER A FEW MINUTES.

EVAL. SECT. COMMENT:

Disseminated from Evaluation Section: "

OFFICER IN CHARGE

Capt. Hughey

Briefed or Paraphrased

By 14. Bird

JOURNAL NO. 36 OF 6/4, 1942

COPY NO. 14
M.I.S. MESSAGE

(Strike out all but one)

ORIGINAL SOURCE VDC

VIA MESSAGE NO. 9 G.W.T. E.W.T.

LOCAL FILING TIME AT SOURCE Time Date Time Date

RECEIVED IN EVAL. SECT. I. G. - (Room 2643) 0725 6/4 0825 6/4

EXACT COPY - CONFIDENTIAL -

ALASKA DEFENSE COMMAND GIVES FOLLOWING SUMMARY: DATES: ACTION: COLON: ATTACK ON POST KEARS CONDUCTED BY FIFTEEN LIGNE BOMBERS OF HISEY SEVEN TYPE WHICH ATTACKED FOR TWENTY MINUTES AT FIFTEEN FORTY FIVE GMT FLYING AT TEN THOUSAND ALTITUDE STOP ABOUT THIRTY FIVE WERE INJURED AND TWENTY KILLED PERIOD TWO BARRACKS TWO WAREHOUSES ONE CLOTHING AND ONE MISCELLANEOUS SET AFIRE AND ANOTHER FIVE BARRACKS DAMAGED BUT PLANES NOW EXTINGUISHED PERIOD PLANES STRUCK FROM OTHER LAND IN GROUPS OF THREE COMMA ONE FLIGHT FROM SOUTHEAST AND FOUR FROM NORTHWEST STOP BOMBS WERE THROWN FIFTY TO FIVE HUNDRED POUNDS PERIOD ALTHOUGH THERE ARE FIVE RADARS HAVING TWENTY FIVE MILE RANGE THEY DID NOT REPORT APPROACH STOP NAVY RADIO NOW OPERATING AFTER BEING OUT OF ORDER TEMPORARILY STOP AT UMEAK PASS WE SHOT DOWN ONE CATAapult SINGLE ENGINE SEAPLANE WITH PONTOONS AND ONE GOT AWAY PERIOD STILL SEARCHING FOR ENEMY CARRIERS PERIOD THERE WAS ONLY ONE ATTACK ON KEARS AND MORE ELSEWHERE

EVAL. SECT. COMMENT:

Disseminated from Evaluation Section: By Lt. Baird

OFFICER IN CHARGE Briefed or Paraphrased

JOUR SUMM W.R. A-2

JOURNAL NO. 37 OF 6/4, 1942

COPY NO. 14
JUNEAU ALS 127 P JUNE 3 1942
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT PRESIDENT
THE WHITE HOUSE WASHN DC

AS YOU DOUBTLESS HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY MILITARY AND NAVAL JAPANESE PLANES ATTACKED DUTCHHARBOR THIS MORNING FROM CARRIERS AND ATTACK IS CONTINUING STOP ARMED FORCES FULLY PREPARED AND EVIDENTLY RENDERING FINE ACCOUNT OF THEMSELVES STOP CIVILIAN MORALE ALSO OF THE HIGHEST STOP I AM KEEPING IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH MILITARY AND NAVAL COMMANDS

ERNEST GRUENING GOVERNOR OF ALASKA

504PM

[Signature]

Received 2020
Sent to President at
Direction of Capt. McCrea.
This M.I.S. message estimates that hostile carriers which may have been located South or Southeast of Unalaska during last forty eight hours have capability of movement toward Pacific Coast releasing planes and attacking Seattle Area any time after midnight three four June and San Francisco and Los Angeles any time after midnight four five June. This belief partially furthered by radio direction finder bearing fixed at latitude 49 degrees 30 minutes North and longitude 161 degrees West at 2040 GMT obtained on frequency 8085 KGS and band on three west coast P.O. stations and one Honolulu station. All subordinate commands and Navy have been notified and alerted.

WECKERLING

Distribution:
Journal
C.P.D.
Col. Bratton
Gen. Kroner
Summary
Situation
Col. Betts
War Room
C.F.I.
Air
A-2
F.E.
G-3 Ground Forces
White House

**DECLASSIFIED**
E.O. 11652, Sec. 20(b) and 8(d) or (E)
OSD letter, May 8, 1972
By DBS
Date APR 16 1973

OFFICER IN CHARGE
Lt. Bursley

Briefed or Paraphrased

EVAL. SECT. COMMENT:

*Disseminated from Evaluation Section:*

**JOUR** | **SUMM** | **W.R.** | **A-2**
---|---|---|---

**JOURNAL NO. 293 OF 5/3 1949**

**COPY NO. 5**
Alaska Defense Command reported at 0128 GMT (6:28 PM PWT) that reports of second and third attacks of Dutch Harbor were unfounded and apparently reported by Dutch Harbor to Anchorage in confusion resulting from hostile radio deception efforts. Report of enemy seaplane downed correct as reported. No detailed information damaged and casualties available other than as previously reported. No repeat no contact was made with carrier as reported.

WECKERLING

Distribution:
Journal
C.P.R.
Col. Bratton
Gen. Kroner
Summary
Situation
Col. Betts
War Room
Air
A-2
P.B.
A-2 Ground Forces
White House

EVAL. SECT. COMMENT:

Disseminated from Evaluation Section:

Officer in Charge

Briefed or Paraphrased

By Lt. Rigby

Lt. Barsley

JOUR SUMM W.R. A-2

JOURNAL NO. 297 OF 6/3, 1942

COPIE NO. 5
M. I. S. MESSAGE  

(Special number 551 at 1800 GMT 4 June. Information Alaska Defense Report 4 June from Intelligence Scouts Dutch Harbor relating attack 3 June paraphrased; initial attack made by one plane from east repulsed by anti-aircraft fire. Planes departed same direction. Three or four minutes after first flight group of three low-wing monoplane, single-engine retractable landing gear planes in the formation approached at 10,000 feet altitude speed estimated less than 200 mph. These planes in straight north-northwest (NW) direction dropped incendiary and heavy bombs. Barra Gok immediately caught fire. Five minutes later, third flight of four planes of same type same altitude in diamond formation flying north. These planes dropped incendiary bombs in uninhabited area near post. Five minutes afterward, fourth flight of four planes of same type at 10,000 feet altitude diamond formation approached flying north attacked navy base. One heavy bomb fell vicinity of navy base. Fifth flight of four planes approached from south at 4,000 feet altitude. Anti-aircraft fire forced this flight off while one mile away. Incendiaries dropped during raid estimated from observation while in flight to be 1 foot 2 inches long and 4 inches diameter.

WECKERLING  

EVAL. SECT. COMMENT:

3-2 WDC and Fourth Army

Summary:  

Disseminated from Evaluation Section:  

By Capt. H. B. Smith  

Officer in Charge: Maj. H. H. Mclle  

Briefed or Paraphrased

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Bratton, Betta, Sherrill  

Journal No. 134 of 6/4, 1942  

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INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY:

\[\text{31840} \quad \text{CCR 3224}\]

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

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<tr>
<th>ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>GCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

TEXT

DUTCH HARBOR ATTACKED BY JAP AIRCRAFT 1550/Z

[BRASIL]

E. O. 11652, Sec. 5(b) and 5(d) or (e)
OSD letter, May 8, 1972
By DBS \[\text{Data APR 16 1973}\]

031840

\[\text{310 Alaska}\]

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVRECS.)
FROM COM ALASKAN SECTOR
ACTION: COM TASKFOR 8 PACIFIC

ENEMY AIRCRAFT ATTACKING DUTCHHARBOR

1827APMXJUNE13545

COMINCH ACTION
00A 00R 10 16 19 20 20G 20K
37 38 OPDO HYDRO CG CWO(3)
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM
NAG-DUTCH HARBOR-ALASKA

RELEASED BY

DATE
9 JUNE 1942

TOR CODEROOM
2335/2224

DECODED BY
NEWHOUSE/NEWHOUSE

PARAPHRASED BY

ADDRESSEES
COMNOWESTSEAFRON

COM ALASKAN SECTOR

CONINCH

GON 13

PRECEDENCE
PRIORITY
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPOSITION IS IN PRIORITY WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

TEXT

PASSED BY COM 13 TO CONINCH FOR INFO

PROBABLY REFERS REQUEST FOR AIRCRAFT WEATHER FROM WESTERN STATIONS NECESSARY FOR GENERAL BUCKNER COMMANDER FISHER FLIGHT TO ATTU YOUR 26224 CODES HELD ONLY BY KISKA STILL CIVILIAN MANNED ARE ATTU AND ATKA WEATHER PREVENTED RECENT SURVEY SHIPS FROM LANDING NAVY PERSONNEL ATTU AND CODES KANAGA AS PLANNED

DO NOT HAVE REFERENCE

DECLARED
K. O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 8(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 6, 1972
By DBS Date APR 6 1973

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: Ft Richardson ALS
To: CG Army Air Forces

#242005, May 24, 1942

For immediate action attention Gen Arnold. Information received from Cinpac indicates Amphibious attack about June 1 on Aleutians and Alaska for purposes of securing advanced bases. Air force at my disposal inadequate to repel such expedition. Request information for planning purposes of any prospective air reinforcements in view of this situation. Can use effectively 2 heavy bomb groups and 1 pursuit group in addition to units here; more in extreme emergency.

Approximately 48 planes

Butler Com AF 11

Action Copy: OPD
Info. Copies: G-2
A-2
CGAAF
TAG
File

3 Heavy Bombers
15 Med. Bombers
47 P-40's

REPLACED:
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 6(D) = (c)
OIB letter, May 8, 1942

CM-IN-6868 (5-24-42) PH 7:00

U.S.S. JOURNAL

2/15
MAY 24, 1942

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: HQ WDC & 4th Army Pct
To: Chief of Staff War Dept Wash DC

No. 464, May 22nd, 1942

In view of existing situation it is recommended and requested that immediately WD PRO direct all reference to Alaska in any publication be prohibited.

Dewitt

Action Copy: OPD

Info. Copies: G-2
A-2
CG AAF
SUS
TAG
BPR
File

CM-IN-6305 (5/23/42) 12:36 AM

SECRET
COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM CINCPAC (NPM)

RELEASED BY

DATE 23 MAY 1942

TOR CODENOE 4397

DECODED BY WHISNANT/NEWHOUSE

PARAPHRASED BY

FOR ACTION COMTASKGROUP 2.1

INFORMATION COMDESPAC

INFORMATION COMINCH (NSS)

INDICATIONS ARE THAT JAPANESE INTEND ATTACK ALASKA ABOUT ONE JUNE X CANCEL UNCOMPLETED PORTION MY OPLAN 24-42 X PROCEED TO KODIAK VIA DUTCH HARBOR FUELLING TO CAPACITY LATTER PLACE X ASSUME TASK UNIT DESIGNATION B.1.1 X COMTASKFOR 8 RAD THEOBALD IN REID ARRIVES KODIAK 27 MAY AND MAY TRANSFER TO YOU ON YOUR ARRIVAL X FROM DUTCH HARBOR ADVISE HIM WHEN TO EXPECT YOU X SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS ACCORD MY OPLAN 28-42 WHICH WILL BE DELIVERED TO YOU BY CTF EIGHT X MAINTAIN RADIO SILENCE X PAC 70 GOVERNS COMMUNICATIONS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 5(D) and 5(E) or 5(B)

OSD letter, May 8, 1972

By DBS Date APR 16, 1973

Make, original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
DAILY SUMMARY
WAR DEPARTMENT OPERATIONAL
DECISIONS AND ACTIONS
RESPECTING HOSTILITIES WITH AXIS
No 71
7:00 AM February 18 to 7:00 AM February 19

ABRIDGED FORM FOR
THE WHITE HOUSE

Classified
K.C. 16453, Sec. 3(2) and 4(2) or (R)
OSD letter, May 5, 1972
By DBS  Date: APR 1.C. 1972
MR. 200 ALASKA (6") - Maps and Plans of ATTU Occupation (LANDCRAW), May 11, 1942.
Additional Developments to April 23, 1943.

1. **Airstrip.**
   a. Estimated completion date is June 15-30 (G-2 ADC).
   b. Photos taken April 17 show 75 handcars on airstrip.

2. **Tents.**
   a. One conical tent was observed at Massacre Bay April 19.

3. **Gibson Island (South of Chicago Harbor)**
   a. Two large rectangular huts approximately the size of quonset huts were observed on the NW end of Gibson Island.
   b. At least one light AA battery and an OP are known to be located on Gibson Island.

4. **Radar.**—No radar was believed operative on Attu according to an estimate on April 18.

5. **Aviation.**—On April 20 a Zerko type float plane was seen in Chicago Harbor.

6. **Shipping.** (Period from April 9 to April 23)
   a. On April 9, 15 and 17 one or more barges were seen in Chicago Harbor.
   b. On April 10 two vessels were reported in the vicinity of杂志湾.
LEGEND

- 75mm - 105mm AA or Dual Purpose Gun
- O.P.

PREPARED BY A.G.O. S. G-2
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND
AND FOURTH ARMY
PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

STREAM COURSE UNCERTAIN

TEMNAC BAY

POSITION OF GUNS UNCERTAIN

Scale in Yards
LEGEND

- 75mm - 105mm AA or Dual Purpose Gun
- Possible 75mm - 105mm AA or Dual Purpose Gun
- Light AA or Machine Gun
- Bridge
- Trail
- Road
- Trench
- # Tent and/or Building Area

DETAIL SKETCH "A"

Scale in Yards

PREPARED BY AG of S, G-2
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

TERMINUS UNKNOWN

WEST ARM

HOLTZ BAY

EAST ARM

POSITIONS UNDER CONSTRUCTION
5 APRIL, 1943

CHICHAGOF HARBOR BEACH
500 YARDS

SARANA BAY BEACH
6000 YARDS

MASSACRE BAY BEACH
6000 YARDS

STREAM COURSES
NOT EXACT
15 April 1943

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

400 Defense Command and Fourth Army
San Francisco, California

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2

15 April 1943

* * * * *
* * * * *
* * * *
* * *

By DBS
Date APR 16 1943

NEW ISLAND AS KNOWN 15 APRIL 1943.

* * * * *
* * * *
* * *
* *

Eastern Defense Command and Fourth Army
1. INTRODUCTION

a. Enemy activity on ATU ISLAND has recently increased and although frequent storms and unfavorable flying conditions prevent daily observation of the occupied portions of the island, it is evident the enemy is rapidly expanding and strengthening his position. New weapons have been installed, new areas occupied and new buildings erected within the last few weeks. Further increases of troops or material, or both, may be indicated by the recent presence of enemy surface craft at ATU and in adjacent waters. Enemy seaplanes, seldom seen at ATU, have increased their activity in that vicinity, and have been sighted on at least three separate occasions. The fact that enemy planes have avoided combat suggests they are in the area for reconnaissance purposes possibly in connection with surface craft which may be attempting to avoid our surface or air craft to discharge cargo at ATU.

b. The most important new development on ATU ISLAND is a landing strip under construction at the EAST ARM of HOLTZ BAY. Development of this project was started some time prior to 10 March 1943, the date on which photos revealing initial stages of construction were taken. Since that date, progress has been rapid, indicating the enemy has attached sufficient importance to the project to provide the necessary labor, material, and equipment to insure early completion. According to O-2, Alaska Defense Command, photos of 5 April revealed the landing strip to be 25 per cent complete at that time. The strip, which will be of sufficient length for the operation of bombers will strengthen the entire enemy position in the Aleutians, not only by affording him better protection against possible sea and air attacks by our forces, but also by providing a comparatively secure base from which to operate long range bomber, fighter and reconnaissance planes for the neutralization or destruction of U.S. forward bases. Other and more suitable landing strip sites exist on ATU, and may be developed later, or may be in the process of development at the present time. The establishment of a bomber strip on ATU may be only the first phase in the development of a strong offensive base from which, behind the protection of Kiska, the enemy may attempt to drive American forces from the ALEUTIAN-HERING SEA area.

2. ENEMY INSTALLATIONS, DEFENSIVE ORGANIZATION AND ARTILLERY

It is emphasized that although our knowledge of enemy installations and activity on ATU ISLAND is based on the latest reports and photographs available, the situation on ATU is very fluid and fast moving, and by the time any particular installation is identified and known to us, it may have been moved by the enemy. This may be especially true in the area of, and adjacent to the new landing strip area at HOLTZ BAY, judged by the manner in which the enemy on KISKA ISLAND has shifted many weapons for the apparent purpose of providing more and better artillery protection for his new landing strip on that island. Furthermore, if enemy shipping recently sighted in the vicinity of ATU has landed reinforcements, new occupied areas and new installations may soon be discovered. The following installations have been reported or are revealed in the latest available photographs of ATU ISLAND.

a. Holtz Bay

Enemy activity as currently known is centered chiefly in the EAST ARM of HOLTZ BAY, where a landing strip approximately 575 feet in width and 3500 feet in length is under construction. Over 500 fox holes have been photographed adjacent to this project, which may be an indication of the number of troops engaged in the construction. Frame and "barbara" type buildings have been constructed and some tents erected near the floor of the valley which extends generally to the southwest from the beach, and weapons have been installed over a wide area covering a number of
possible approaches to HOLTZ BAY. Installations at the WEST ARM of
HOLTZ BAY have also been recently changed, principally by the construc-
tion of frame and "barbara" type buildings to replace tents formerly
observed there, although some tents still remain. Weapons at and near
HOLTZ BAY are shown on Detail Sketch A, attached hereto, and consist of
the following:

17 Medium or Heavy AA or Dual Purpose Guns
#6 Probable Medium or Heavy AA or Dual Purpose Guns
15 Light AA or Machine Guns

#Gun positions reported being prepared on 5 April are probably
completed.

b. Chicagof Harbor

No important change has been reported in the CHICAGOF area. A few new
light gun positions have been located but whether they have been recently
installed or were the same in place and not decided upon. All
late photographic coverage of this area has been so obscured by clouds
that very little of the camp area is revealed. The presence of many
barges in the water, and well used trails along the beach area indicate
cargo or troops may have recently been unloaded at CHICAGOF HARBOR.
The construction of what was estimated to be 2 docks was reported by
filers over the bay on 27 March 1943, but the exact location was not
given. "Weapons at CHICAGOF HARBOR are shown on Detail Sketch B, and
consist of the following:

4. Heavy AA or Dual Purpose Guns
11 Light AA or Machine Guns
6 Possible Light AA or Machine Guns

b. Ternac Bay

Little information is available regarding enemy installation at TERNAC
BAY. The first indication of enemy occupation of that area was on 3 April
1943, when our planes received antiaircraft through an overcast which
prevented location of the weapons. A message from O-2, Alaska Defense
Command, on 5 April 1943, gave the location of an outpost, and reported
a gun position nearby, but did not state the number and estimated caliber
of the weapons. Lacking definite information to the contrary, these
weapons are considered as a battery of medium to heavy AA or dual
purpose guns, since the enemy has usually installed at least a battery of
guns of that caliber for the protection of an area as large as TERNAC
Bay. Installations at TERNAC BAY are shown on Detail Sketch C, and con-
sist of the following:

4. Medium to Heavy AA or Dual Purpose Guns,

4. Areas Occupied or Probably Occupied but No Details Available

(1) Steller Cove

On 27 March 1943, a flight of our bombers observed a barge in STELLER
COVE, and on 1 April 1943, observed 2 unidentified dumps on the
beach. That this area is occupied appears certain, but the approxi-
mate time of the garrison and the time of occupation is unknown.
The fact that only one barge was observed indicates only a small
outpost, there, however, this cove, as revealed by vectorographed
photos of ATTU, offers routes of approach, from the rear, to several
of the important bays of the island, and for that reason may be
more strongly garrisoned than the presence of one barge would indic-
ate. Furthermore, STELLER COVE is near a large potential landing
field site on the northwestern coast of the island to which access
could be gained by construction of a short but difficult road. No
installations of any type have been reported at STELLER COVE.

- 2 -
(2) Cape Khlobninof

A pile of lumber was observed at CAPE KHELENIKOF on 27 March 1943, and on 5 April an observation post was reported there, but the exact location was not stated. The presence of defensive weapons and possibly other installations is suspected but not determined.

2. Areas Formerly Occupied, Not Known to be Currently Occupied

(1) The unnamed bay between NORTHEAST BLUFF and STELLER COVE was revealed in recent photographs to have been occupied and later abandoned, probably in 1942. Revelations for at least 2 heavy gun batteries, numerous smaller weapons, and several tents were revealed and one barge, apparently damaged and abandoned, was noted on the beach. Although the barge might be considered as indicating the present existence of an outpost in the vicinity, no trails leading away from the beach could be discovered, and no other signs of current occupancy were revealed by a thorough examination of the photographs.

(2) Sarana Bay

Photos recently received indicated that the enemy camp at SARANA BAY was abandoned in 1942. These photos revealed that the camp was apparently much larger than previously believed, but other than evidence which suggests that several hundred men probably garrisoned the camp, little is known of enemy activity or installations in that area. Current enemy occupation of SARANA BAY is not indicated by recent reports or photos although 2 artillery weapons,emplaced on the SARANA-CHICAGO ridge approximately 6600 yards from the beach at SARANA BAY and cover the corridor leading inland from MASSACRE BAY, SARANA BAY and at least part of the CHICAGO HARBOR corridor. Six tents and several hundred yards of trenches are also reported in the same area, but even approximate locations are unknown. The 2 artillery weapons are shown on Detail Sketch A.

(3) Alexei Point

This low, "TH"-shaped point of land approximately midway between SOUTH PRONG of CHIRIKOF POINT and the northern beach at MASSACRE BAY was occupied, and abandoned in 1942, as revealed by photographs recently received. The size of the garrison could not be determined, but several former gun positions, probably for dual purpose weapons, and numerous fox holes could be identified. No recent reports indicate current occupancy of ALEXEI POINT.

(4) Massacre Bay

Recently received photos indicated that the enemy occupied and abandoned this area in 1942. Several former gun positions (including 2 which appear to have been intended for coastal defense guns), revetments for numerous smaller weapons, tent revetments, and excavations remaining after the removal of temporary or "barebosh" type buildings, indicate that several hundred troops may have occupied MASSACRE BAY during 1942. Recent reports or photographs do not indicate current occupancy of the area. However, as in the case of SARANA Bay, the 2 artillery weapons, shown on Detail Chart A, cover the beach area of MASSACRE BAY. It is also possible that guns probably located at TEMMACK BAY, cover part or all of the MASSACRE BAY beach areas, although such is not known to be the case.

4. Other Areas

(1) Etienne Bay

On 27 March 1943, a fighter pilot observed what he thought to be
2 ships in ETIENNE BAY. No further sighting was reported in that vicinity, and no photographic coverage of the area has been received.

Aside from the possible sighting of 2 ships, there is nothing to indicate enemy shore installations in the vicinity of ETIENNE BAY.

(2) Novisdiskov Bay

Our weather plane on 1 April 1943, while in the vicinity of NEVISDISKOV BAY, was followed by an unidentified enemy seaplane which avoided combat. There were no reports indicating enemy occupation, however, poor weather has hindered aerial reconnaissance and the possibility of enemy forces in the vicinity of NEVISDISKOV BAY should not be overlooked.

5. Miscellaneous

On unknown dates in 1942 the enemy occupied and abandoned several areas of ATTU ISLAND, without interference or even detection by our forces, and although we now have air bases several hundred of miles closer to ATTU than formerly and can more easily observe that island, the possibility still exists that enemy forces, taking advantage of long and frequent periods of cloudiness, may again seize and defend formerly occupied areas without our knowledge. Should the enemy choose to reoccupy part or all of his previously organized positions, much of the labor to construct revetments, foxholes, and excavations would already be accomplished, permitting him to defend himself from prepared positions in a very short period of time.

3. SUMMARY

5. Personnel

In the enumeration of enemy installations above and in the attached sketches, no reference has been made to the numbers of tents and buildings in the known occupied areas of ATTU. This omission was intentional and due to the fact that not all of the most recent photographs of ATTU are yet available to this Headquarters. However, based on the latest photographs then available, G-2 of Alaska Defense Command stated on 5 April 1943, that a total of 58 tents and 39 buildings, with an aggregate floor space of 62,978 square feet had been disclosed by examination of aerial photographs. Allowing for reasonable deductions for storage space, G-2 Alaska Defense Command estimated that tents and buildings observed could shelter 1711 men, under Japanese standards. Compared with photos seen by this Headquarters, and reports previously received from Alaska, the foregoing enumeration of buildings and tents is consistent, and the estimate of enemy personnel which could be sheltered is reasonable. In arriving at the probable enemy strength on ATTU, using as a basis a possible task force composition, by branch, Alaska G-2 estimated 1649 troops on ATTU. An estimate by this Headquarters on 6 April 1943 prepared independently and prior to receipt of the estimate prepared by Alaska, is shown below:

Headquarters and Miscellaneous Personnel
(army estimate)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Unit</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 to 5 Heavy AA or Dual purpose Gun Batteries</td>
<td>600 - 750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 medium AA or Dual purpose Gun Battery</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 AA Battery, caliber unknown</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Light AA guns (army estimate)</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Machine Guns (personnel not counted, probably components of larger batteries)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Cargo Handling Company</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Engineer Construction (or Labor) Company</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Infantry Company *</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1505 - 1655</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* It is safe to assume that both the Cargo Handling and Engineer
construction personnel are armed as Infantry. Therefore the ground troops, with fixed MGs are approximately equivalent to an Infantry Battalion.

Information received subsequent to the date of this estimate is not sufficient to warrant any major revision, but in view of the larger number of light AA or machine guns now identified, several of which may not be component parts of larger batteries, a small increase in probable enemy strength is indicated. An arbitrary estimate of 100 men is considered the maximum which could be added in view of additional light AA guns on the island.

b. Weapons

The following weapons have been reported or identified from aerial photos:

- 25 Heavy or Medium AA or Dual purpose Guns
- 6 Probable Heavy or Medium AA or Dual Purpose Guns
- 26 Light AA or Machine Guns
- 6 Possible Light AA or Machine Guns

4. CONCLUSIONS

a. The enemy has reoccupied ATTU ISLAND in considerable force, and is prepared to defend it against all attacks.

b. Construction of the landing strip, now under construction, will enable the enemy to use ATTU ISLAND as an air base for both defensive and offensive action, thereby strengthening his entire Aleutian position.

c. In view of the potential defensive and offensive value of ATTU ISLAND to the enemy, he may be expected to defend it with all the powers at his command, should an effort be made to dislodge him.

[Signature]

John W. Wiederling
Colonel, G.S.C.
A.C. of S., C-2

[Classified]

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 8(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 8, 1972
By DBS Date APR 1 0 3232

[Classified]

CONIDENTIAL

[Handwritten note]

-5-
DATA

Task Force - Admiral Rockwell, Commanding

NAVAL COMPONENTS
3 Battleships (Pennsylvania, Nevada, Idaho)
3 Modern Heavy Cruisers (Louisville, San Francisco, Wichita)
1 Modern Light Cruiser (Sante Fe)
3 Old Light Cruisers (Detroit, Richmond, Raleigh)
1h Destroyers
5 Submarines

ARMY COMPONENTS (approximately 15,000)
Assault Force (Combat loaded on 6 personnel transports)
3 Bn. Combat Teams 17th US Infantry
1 Bn. Combat Team 32nd US Infantry 7th Inf. Div.
Reinforcing Group (Afloat in readiness at Adak)
32nd US Infantry (less 1 Bn. Combat Team) reinf.

PLAN IN BRIEF

100 selected men from 7th Div. land from submarine the night preceding D-day to seize and hold dominating ground on western shore of Holtz Bay. One Bn. Combat Team, 17th Inf., lands at dawn on D-day on northwest extremity of Holtz Bay under covering fire of the battleship "Pennsylvania" and proceeds around the Bay to the high ground at "X", overrunning enemy resistance. Two Bn. Combat Teams, 17th Inf., land at Sarana Bay under covering naval fire and proceed overland to "X". One Bn. Combat Team, 32nd Inf., held afloat in Sarana Bay. 11th Air Force covers both landings.

Enemy strength: Estimated at approximately 1,600.

D-day: May 8, 1943. (Sunrise, Task Force Time, is approximately 1200, Washington, D. C. time.)

Enemy dispositions: (See Map).
MASTER PLAN FOR LANDGRAB

I. GENERAL.

1. 3 Phases.
   I. Occupation of ATTU.
   II. Occupation of SHEMYA.
   III. Reinforcing of garrisons for the above and building of airfield on SHEMYA.

2. Target date, 7 May.

3. Assault force to load in SAN FRANCISCO about April 24, proceeding direct to staging area at Ft. Randall for refueling; thence to ATTU.

   Composition: 17th Inf. Reinf. and 1 Bn. 32nd Inf. Reinf., on 6 AP's escorted by 4 DD's.

4. Reinforcement: 32nd Inf. Reinf. (less 1 Bn) embarked at SAN FRANCISCO about April 19 enroute via coastal route to Dutch Harbor, thence to ADAX, remaining there afloat until assault is completed and escorts are available to convey it to ATTU, if required.

5. Occupation force for SHEMYA: 4th Inf. Composite and 18th Engrs. combat. Now at ADAX. Will be shipped to ATTU after capture of same and thence transported to SHEMYA using 4 LST's and 6 LCT 5's.

II. DISPOSITIONS DURING ASSAULT.

1. Task Force 16 -- CA, 2 CL's, 6 DD's, will cover the operation from a position generally west of ATTU.

2. Task Force 51--2-3 BB, 1 converted carrier (?), 6 destroyers, will escort the landing force, cover it with bombardment while landing and continue support until occupation is complete.
3. 11th Air Force will support by dominating hostile air in the Aleutians, assisting in the bombardment of hostile installations on ATTU and operating against hostile surface forces.

III. DETAILS OF ASSAULT.

1. One hundred men of the 7th Division reconnaissance detachment to be landed by night from a submarine by rubber boats to seize and hold high ground at A. They have had special training for this.

Under cover of these forces one battalion combat team 17th Infantry to land at dawn at B, proceed around the Bay and over-run Japanese forces at the head of HOLTZ BAY.

One battleship to enter HOLTZ BAY after it has been cleared of mines and cover the landing by shelling hostile installations.

2. Two battalion combat teams 17th Infantry to land at C in SARANA BAY and seize and occupy the high ground at X, after which a junction is to be effected between the two landing forces and the Japanese installations at CHICHAGOF HARBOR are to be over-run.

At least one of the two remaining battleships is to cover the landing at SARANA BAY by gunfire.

One battalion combat team 32d Infantry to be held afloat in SARANA BAY for reinforcement of this effort if necessary.

3. XI Air Force to cover both landings.
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: CINCPAC (RDO HONOLULU)

DATE: MARCH 25, 1943

FOR ACTION: COMING

CG, WDC

TEXT

PART TWO OF 24214/7 HICOM. ADM. KING AND CG, WDC ONLY FROM CINCPAC.

ARMY FORCES, ASSAULT RESERVE AND INITIAL OCCUPATION TROOPS: ASSAULT ON ATTU 7TH DIVISION COMBAT TEAM CONSISTING:

- 17th Inf.
- 1 Bn FA
- 1 Bn Combat Engrs for shore parties
- 1 Btry AA Automatic Weapons
- 3 Detachments 75th Special Signal Co.
- 1 Co. 7th Div. organic combat Engrs
- 1 Medical Collecting Co. 7th Div.
- Det Hq. 7th Div. Med. Bn
- Det 7th Div. QM Bn
- Det 7th Div organic Signal Co.

INITIAL OCCUPATION SELECTED SITE IN NEAR ISLAND:

- 18th Combat Engrs from Adak
- 4th Inf composite Regt from Adak.

FLOATING RESERVE:

- 1 Regimental Combat Team consisting of:
  - 32nd Inf with reinforcements similar to those for 17th Inf indicated above.

GARRISONS FOR ATTU AND SELECTED SITE IN NEAR ISLAND TO BE DESIGNATED BY COMGEN WDC AND TO INCLUDE 17th INFANTRY COMBAT TEAM:

- 32nd Inf Combat Team
- 78 CA AA
- 2nd Bn 501st CA AA

TARGET DATE MAY 7, 1943.

REVERSION OF COMMAND. COMMAND OCCUPIED AREA WILL REVERT TO ARMY WHEN SENIOR ARMY OFFICER NEAR ISLANDS INFORMS CTF 16 ARMY IS READY TO TAKE OVER.

EVALUATION

SECURITY
From official sources reporting activities to 9 AM 16 May G.C.T.

Intensive anti-sub patrol by US planes.

Jap machine guns and snipers causing heavy casualties.

Jap force may total 13 Inf Companies plus special troops

Initial supply base that must be protected.

ATTU ISLAND

SCALE OF MILES

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
2 S-type submarines have taken up position near the eastern exit of La Perouse Straits for the purpose of observing movement of Japanese reinforcements.

Destroyers SICARD and MACDONOUGH collided in fog returning to ADAK, were directed to take up antisubmarine patrol there, hence presumably not seriously damaged.
All action as of May 11

- Enemy discovered and reported assault 1510 Aleutian time. Chicagof bombarded by radar control.

- Successful landings at Beaches Yellow and Blue. Troops reported 3,000 yards inland from Beach Yellow.

- At least 6 boats landed at Beach Red. Landing progressing favorably. Troops 3,000 yards inland.

- Naval bombardment limited by fog; Chicagof Harbor bombarded by radar control.

- Troops from submarines and destroyer Lane (estimated at about 200 men) successfully landed at 510 Aleutian time on Beach Scarlet. No evidence of hostile resistance.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED