WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

F-R-I-O-R-I-T-Y

From: CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma & India
       Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India

To: War Department
    Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area
    Brisbane, Australia
    CG, US Army Forces in South Pacific Area
    Noumea, New Caledonia

No: CRAX 3111

10th May 1944

Sultan to Marshall for Asiatic Section OPD info
MacArthur, COMDESOPAC, Ferris, Chennault, Boatner, Lindsey,
Dorn, Cranston, Egan and Timberman CRAX 3111.

On Assam front in Gasper force, 2nd Battalion, 89th
Regiment moved to Moran. Reinforced company formerly
Wanching and Tamla joined 1st Battalion, 89th Regiment at Sepon.
In Kohima area heavy fighting continues and some progress
made by British troops. On 4th Corps front British consolid-
ating positions in Potsangbam, 2 miles south Bishenpur, but
Japanese still hold center of village. Six three Brigade of
17th Division now near Oinam 15-20 miles southwest Imphal.
Minor fighting north of Imphal and near Tengnoupal. Arakan
front generally quiet with some fighting near .551. With-
drawal to Monsoon positions continues and 26th Division HQ
now 3 miles southwest Dawli Bazaar. 71st Brigade moved to
Taung Bazer, and 4th Brigade in Sinwya. Both these Bri-

gades in 26th Division. Slowly advancing down Mogaung valley
Chinese 22nd and 38th Divisions made slight gains on both
sides Mogaung river. Chinese engaged with enemy on East
flank in Aucho and Warang area and on west flank in
Mangoa area. Third Battalion ULAHAD and 88th Regi-

CM-IN-7860

(11 May 44)

Col.

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/94
From: 00, US Army Forces, China, Burma & India  
Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India  

No: CRAX 3111  
10th May 1944

A enemy group surrounded near Ritpong. First Battalion GALAHAD and 150th Regiment moving around Ritpong to Sana, 15 miles West of Naopsup. Second Battalion GALAHAD moving eastwards and now in Hkada Ga, 14 miles west Ritpong.

No Sig

ACTION: OPD
INPO: CGAAF
0-2  
Col. Park  
100

CM-IN-7860  (11 May 44)  0847Z  eIV

DECLASSIFIED  
GED Letter. 8-3-72

42

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
Commanding General  
USAF China, Burma and India  
Forward Eshelon  
Chungking, China

Commanding General  
USAF in Central Pacific Area  
Fort Shafter, T. H.

Commander in Chief  
Southwest Pacific Area  
Brisbane, Australia

Number: WARR 34551

Book Message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Stilwell for action; Stilwell pass to Miles; Richardson pass to Nimitz for information; to MacArthur for information.

At earliest practicable date, information and recommendations are desired concerning ports and harbors on coast of China from Amoy to Shanghai suitable for use of: Supply shipping; US fleet units; movement of ground forces, with equipment and supplies, inland to the extent necessary to insure security of bases for operations in and from China.

Data should include information regarding harbor facilities and transportation facilities. It is desired that services of Miles and his staff be utilized in compiling information on Naval matters.

Representatives of your staff and of Miles' staff should be prepared to proceed to Pearl Harbor and then Washington, if required, subsequent to submission of report.

ORIGINATOR: OPD  
INFORMATION: JCS (Col McFarland), Gen Arnold, Gen Bissell, SGS  
Adm. King, Col. Park, C of S  
CM-OUT-34551  
(10 May 44) 16012 vh

DECLASSECLFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHF, NLR, Date MAY 15 1974

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/94
To: Chiefs of Staff
Info: Joint Staff Mission
From: SACNA
No: SEACOS 156

Following for Chiefs of Staff repeated Joint Staff Mission from Mountbatten.

1. Your Combined Chiefs of Staff 2413 of 6 May. I have now been able to consult Commanders-in-Chief regarding transport aircraft situation in this theater.

2. In order to arrive in the Mediterranean by May 31 the T9 aircraft now on loan to me must be withdrawn from the battle by May 24. The accelerated departure of the (first) combat cargo group from the U.S. will not permit the use of these planes in the Imphal battle before mid-June, a most optimistic date. This will result in denying me this air lift from 24 May to mid-June at least. It is impossible for me to solve the problem by disengaging troops now in action in time to reduce my air supply requirements for this period. At this same time the requirements on the China side will be extremely demanding.

3. Generalissimo has been pressing Chennault for air support of his troops facing Jap thrust on Peixing-Hankow (railway). Support for the Y Force both combat and air supply will likewise increase the demands on Chennault's air force. Similarly diversions from ATO would seriously delay initiating

CH-IN-8995 (12 May 44)
the build-up of air supplies to assist Formosa operation. Feud with these facts I cannot reduce the scale of ground action taking place in S.E.A.C. nor virtually ground the 14th AF at a crucial time. Accordingly we have reached a point in our operations in this area where a readjustment of transport aircraft in the theater of diversion from ATC is neither feasible or sound.

4. Consequently I am forced to ask a reconsideration of my request to retain the 79 aircraft now on loan replacing them in the Mediterranean from planes departing from U.S., starting 22 May. Looking at the situation merely from this end I just cannot reconcile some 150 aircraft flying some 5000 miles in opposite directions during a time which will find my command in a difficult situation.

5. It would be most dangerous to exchange aircrew experiences in operating over the difficult and mountainous terrain of Burma for inexperienced aircrews at a time when the highest level of airmanship, navigation and tactical skill is required to deal with the added factor of the monsoon, the adverse effects of which are already being felt.

6. I realize that the Chiefs of Staff agree that it is unthinkable to surrender the Imphal Plain the disastrous consequences which would ensue to the Ledo Force and 14th Air Force or to withdraw General Stilwell from his hard fought advance.

T.O.O. 101635

ACTION: CC\S

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
GOD
Gen Bissell
Mr. King
Col Parker
C of S

CM-IN-8996

(12 May 44) 18072 amb

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

URGENT

From: CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma & India
Forward Echelon, Chungking, China

To: War Department

No: 23490
Message Serial Number 23490.

9 May, 1944

Heyingchin not leave Chungking. Operations Loyang area in charge Tangany, Sino G 2 depreciates tone communiqué and AP report mentioned your 31977 1 concur. Situation midnight 8th: Two columns moved south from Haunchang, East column to Yencheng where split, one about one thousand going Heiping and other going west to Kilang. West column from Haunchang to Kiangchung where split, one going south to Notsian thence west to Mishan two thousand strong, other column moved north west towards Loyang about five thousand strong crossed Hao River but counterattack forced back south bank. Jap troops identified this campaign are 110 Division, part 63 Division including engineer regiment, parts 59 and 65 Divisions 15th Inf 4th Cavalry Brigade 5th Mountain Artillery Regiment and 12th Tank Regiment all totals about 30,000 troops. In addition elements 3rd Division in three thrusts converged on Kioshan then moved north to Chushian and were driven back to Kioshan. Small part 58 Division moved west from Sinyang as west flank guard. 180 kilometers separate Chengchow and Sinyang forces along railroad. 13 and 34 Divisions assembled Wuhan area. Believe 7 new radio stations previously reported Wuhan area indicates 2 new divisions. From Sino G 2 rated B 3. Comment Chinese do not admit severity fighting state main forces not yet contacted, I do not expect Chinese defend Loyang against strong attack. View small numbers Japs actually fighting my opinion operations training and so recognised by Chinese wait return Japs to garrison area before counter attacking.

ACTION: G-2
INFO : CGAAF, OPD, Col Park, Log
CM-IN-7527 (10 May 44) 21262 mos

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
From: Main 11 Army Group Sea
To: Usual Addresses
No: 307/0PS

SITREP NO. 117

ONE

ARAKAN

Documents captured Pyinhe Kala FM5547 3 May show 55 Div received rfts on 30 April from rft unit located Chengmai QB8273. These rfts drafted from depot of 154 Regt OB54 Div left Japan 6 Jan. Ref Sitrep 115. In 6 OxF Bucks successful attack on Thayegonbaung FM3627 21 enemy killed many wounded. Our cas 7 killed 17 wounded. Enemy shelled and attacked our posms FM4036. 7 May. Attack repulsed and our arty 3 times dispersed enemy forming up for further attacks this area. In recent fighting area Butidaung now reliably estimated enemy suffered minimum 400 cas. This incl 182 known killed reported Sitrep 115. Our provisional cas 34 killed 169 wounded 87 missing. High proportion missing expected return. HQ 51 Bde FM352432. 2 Rajput FM4444 1 Wils FM4544. 8 FP Rif FM4550. 71 Bde area Sinswaya FM 4252. 114 Bde under cond 26 Div.

TWO

KALADAN

Approx 1 enemy coy attacked 1 Gambia posns area FG7332 7 May losing 12 killed many more wounded. 1 Tripura Rif killed 8 of our party 9 enemy in ambush FG9317 6 May.

CM-IN-7281

(10 May 44)

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By Authority of

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
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Number 307/OPS May 9, 1944 Page 2

THIRD. FOUR CORPS

(A) Area Bishenpur. Ref Sitrep 116. Now known elements 9/14 Punjab captured 4 enemy guns not 3. Enemy cas 35 killed. Own 11 killed 6 wounded. 7 May 1/4 GR repulsed enemy attack RK1140. Elements 1 Bapand 3 Bn 215 Regt identified this area. Our Inf with tks 8 May attacked Popsangbam RK1836 making some progress. 7/9 captured RK1936 7 May states HQ 2 Bn 213 Regt in this area. 8 May our posn 2 miles north of Bishenpur attacked. Attack repulsed but number of our 2 prs damaged.

(B) Area Palel-Tamu. 4/2 captured area RK5281 belongs 2 Coy 60 Regt states Coy (STR) reduced to 31. 7 May 3 INA JIFP surrendered state INA Cmd 3 Bn Gandhi Bde killed. Ref Sitrep 116. Enemy attack night 6/7 May on 80 Bde posns RK59120 was supported by med tks. 7 May further enemy attack repulsed. Night 7/8 May enemy again attacked and all attacks repulsed but small feature RK 509123 occupied by enemy. 8 May RAP destroyed 2 enemy tks this area. In OPS 7 May on hills east of Palel our tps killed 64 enemy. Own cas 12 killed 27 wounded.

(C) Area Imphal. 100 to 150 enemy encountered north of PT4853 RK5093. PT4066 RK5287 occupied by our tps. 1 Dogra in contact with enemy area RK5093.

FOUR 33 CORPS

(A) Area Kohima. Escapee reports 30 April 2,000 enemy with 300 mules and 125 BTA possible muleteers located area RB5269, also states HQ 31 Div at RB6364 on 27 April. Enemy evacuated RB474662 and RB489667 but still holding RB486651. Enemy STR at RB5065 believed greatly increased. Considerable enemy still area RB5170. Locals report no enemy Rekrosa RB57 but enemy at PT5129 RB5427 and towards CM-IN-7281 (10 May 44)

DECLASSIFIED
Number 307/OPS  May 9, 1944  Page 3

Chedema RE56. Another report 1,000 enemy between North Chakhabama RE5667 and South Chakhabama RE6164 possibly in res. 100 enemy reported Sathamui RE77. Paybook identifies 9 Coy 124 Regt near RE5167. Locals report Moroma RE47 evacuated by enemy date unknown presumed 8 May. Between 4 May to midday 6 May 750 enemy bodies counted area Kohima. 7 May 1 RS killed 31 enemy and 2 Norfolk 80 enemy area RE494655. 1/1 Punjab RE494656. 1/1 Assam Regt less 2 coy's area RE4967.

(B) 23 Bde. Nothing to report.

FIVE HUKAWO

Elements 114 Regt identified Kitpong MX92127 1/114 Chinese Regt advancing against stiff resistance towards Hlasyi SC4085. Local enemy attacks on our pans area Inkanghtawng SC2789 night 5/6 May repulsed. American Rangers Kitpong.

T.O.O. 091830

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: OS AAF
G-2
Col Park
Log

CM-IN-7281  (10 May 44)  1734Z amb

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

From: CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma & India, Forward Echelon, Chungking, China
To: War Department
CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma, & India
Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India
CG, 14th Air Force, Kunming, China

Nr: CPBX 17175

9 May 44

To Bissell WDGBI, Sultan and Chennault CPBX 17175
sgd Stilwell.

Japanese continue advance in all directions. Yellow river area. No information available regarding positions of column advancing East from Ssu Shui (113 degrees 10 minutes-34 degrees 50 minutes), Mih Si’en (113 degrees 11 minutes-34 degrees 30 minutes) and Yu Hsien (113 degrees 15 minutes-34 degrees 15 minutes).

Main force of western drive (including between 100-200 armoured cars and 50-60 tankettes) proceeding from Chi Hsien (113 degrees 06 minutes-33 degrees 58 minutes) thru Lin Ju Hsien (112 degrees 50 minutes-34 degrees 10 minutes), captured Iyang (112 degrees 25 minutes-34 degrees 20 minutes) on 4th May. Ichuen Hsien (112 degrees 20 minutes-34 degrees 40 minutes) on 5th May and now attacking Loyang (112 degrees 27 minutes-34 degrees 45 minutes) from south with strength of 6-7000.

CM-IN-8129 (11 May 44)

Colonel Park

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/8/1973

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COPY NO.
From: CO, US Army Forces, China, Burma & India
Forward Echelon, Chungking, China

Mr: CPEX 17175 9 May 44

Japanese force estimated at 10,000, previously reported located North Yellow River vicinity of Chian Yang (112 degrees 50 minutes-35 degrees 10 minutes) now reported crossing Yellow River with probably intent of attacking Loyang from North. This not confirmed by Sino G-2.

This column bombed and strafed on 5th and 6th May by elements Sino American Composite Wing with following results reported:

300-400 troops killed,
30-40 trucks, armoured cars and tanks damaged.

Sino first war area headquarters moved from Loyang southwest to Luning (111 degrees 40 minutes-34 degrees 20 minutes).

New subject. Japanese force of 10,000 proceeding from Siangh Cheng (113 degrees 25 minutes-33 degrees 50 minutes) occupied Yeh Hiaen on 6th May. 7-8000 this group attacked Lushan (112 degrees 48 minutes-33 degrees 47 minutes) on 7th May.

CM-IN-8129 (11 May 44)
From: CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma & India
Forward Echelon, Chungking, China

TO: CPEx 17175 9 May 44

Movement south along Pinyehn railroad continues with
1 column, 1-2000 strong, occupying Siwang-Chuang (114
degrees 08 minutes-33 degrees 11 minutes) on 7th May and
another column occupying 1 Feng Chin (113 degrees 50 minutes
-33 degrees 15 minutes) on 7 May.

Aerial recon reports evidence of beginning reconstruc-
tion of railroad between Yellow River bridge and Cheng Haisen
(113 degrees 31 minutes-34 degrees 45 minutes) recon also re-
ports large concentration of railroad cars Sinyang (114 degrees
50 minutes-32 degrees 10 minutes) vicinity.

Sino G-2 situation map shows following Sino Divisions
opposing Japanese advance:

177, new 140, 17, new 35, 34, new 24.

These elements of 9 Army and located in northern
portion of combat area but exact location not known.

Further south are following Divisions:
47, 91, 193, new 42 and 4 Divisions of 78 Army.

All above info except recon info from Sino G-2.

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: CG AAF, OPD, Col Park, Log

CM-IN-8129 (11 May 44) 1640Z bjm

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OSD Letter, 8-3-72

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PRIORITY

CORRECTED COPY

From: CG US Army Forces, China, Burma and India
       Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India

To: War Department
   CINC Southwest Pacific Area, Brisbane, Australia
   CG US Army Forces in South Pacific Area
   Noumea, New Caledonia

No. CRAX 3055, 9 May, 1944.

Sultan to Marshall for Asiatic Section OPD, info
MacArthur, COMOPPAC, Ferris, Chennault, Boarner,
Lindsey, Dorn, Cranston, Egan and Timberman CRAX 3055.

Patrol actions and minor skirmishes only in Mogaung
Valley east of river and on east flank in Nhump area. West
of Mogaung River 22 division made slight progress south west
Inkanyahtawng.

1st Battalion Galahad and 150 Regiment now 4 miles
north Ritpong.

3rd Battalion Galahad and 88 Regiment in contact with
enemy south of Ritpong.

On Assam front heavy fighting continues around Kohima.

British now have 4th, 5th and 6th Brigades of 2nd
Division, 161 Brigade of 5th Division and 33 Brigade of 7th
Division.

Follows is a paraphrase of USAF CBI message.

"Engaged in Kohima battle, on 4th Corps front fighting
reported in Bishenpur area. British occupied Potsangbas

CM-IN-7217 (10 May 44)

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E.O. 11452, Sec. 3(d) and (e) or (ii)
OGD letter, May 5, 1972

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
2 miles south of Bishenpur, and repulsed Jap attack west of Bishenpur. North of Imphal, British advanced against light enemy opposition. 99 Brigade of 7th Division now 8 miles north west of Imphal. Palel area scene of activity as British repulsed Jap attacks at Tengnoupal and made advance east of Palel. On Arakan front fighting 6 miles southeast of Maungdaw and south of Rangoon. British evacuated Sinohpyin, 3 miles north of Buthidaung, and Japs occupied area. 51 Brigade of 25 Division now 3 miles northeast of Maungdaw and 36 and 71 Brigades of 26 Division in Sinzweya 7 miles northwest of Buthidaung village.

No Sig
Lt. Col. George H. Taylor, the Engineers of War Plans, and Mr. Nelson G. Taylor have just recently returned from a survey in C-B-I of the Burma Road and the Ledo Road. The Burma Road from Kunming to the beginning of the destroyed portion near Salween and all of the Ledo Road which can be covered by car. This report covers the road up to the end of April of this year.

They flew via South Africa, went to New Delhi. Went to the Office of General Ferrill (Office of the Construction Engineer) and to the Office of the SEC. They covered the roads by jeep. They got to the end of the road the latter part of February, which is just about two miles from actual fighting. At Columbia 710 (... River) they were about 5 or 6 miles direct line to the Jap lines and then back to New Delhi.

Lt. Col. Taylor's mission was to plan future requirements on the Ledo and Burma Roads.

Mr. Taylor's mission was to seek future bridge requirements on the Burma and Ledo Roads.

The Ledo Road, which is part gravel and part dirt road, is 22' wide, and is now in process of being hard-surfaced. 74 to 118 miles only is a perfect road. 14 to 74 relocations are to be made. From 118 using evacuation road to pontoon bridge (7).

The Ledo Road is part gravel and part dirt road. The part that is gravelled has only a thin coating of gravel and is easily washed out. The gravel has to be hauled from the rivers and it is a long haul.

There is a present no construction going on the roads other than maintenance. It is really more than they can do to maintain the roads during monsoon, because the roads are not too good even before the monsoons begin. The Burma Road and the Ledo Road are both subject to slides. The roads are two-way roads at present; all except for the bridges which can accommodate only one truck at a time. 6 x 6, 2½-ton trucks can be used over these roads and bridges.

The Burma Road is topped with a sort of crushed rock surface. The original part of the road has a crushed rock surface 5'' to 6'' in depth.

The engineers and men working on the road construction have to be a combination of combat troops and construction men - for they are often the targets of Japanese mortars, which makes the work more difficult. The crossing at Salween is a gorge and there is a suspension bridge there. At other places on the Salween, chain bridges and bamboo bridges are used, as well as ferries.

Off the record: There is plenty of crossing of the Salween by the Chinese coolies to do a bit of trading with the Japanese as they have been seen carrying salt and rice...and thus making of themselves big and successful business men. At times it is hard to distinguish between the two as they are so similar.

300 C I D
The original construction of the Ledo Road was done by the 330th Engineers and they have been doing the brunt of the engineer work. Negroes and Whites are the construction men keeping up the maintenance of the roads. There are some American officers and enlisted men who are there as technicians (Engineers from the G-4 Engineer Section) - working on the Burma Road and mostly in an advisory capacity, but not in large numbers. There are no British working on the roads. Chinese coolies are not such good help in this construction work as they can carry only a few rocks at a time in a basket to the side of the road. The question here came up as to whether Japanese propaganda might not have something to do with their inability to work harder. The negroes are sometimes difficult and by choice, commit misdemeanors - or course officers, just to get sent to jail as they consider this getting back to civilization.

Some asked if any comments were made concerning aviation engineers for doing the work and the answer was that aviation engineers, if they have their TR equipment, are very well equipped because of this heavy equipment.

There are, incidentally, only three big heavy pieces of construction equipment here to build a road 426 miles long.

So far as known, there have been no cases of sabotage on either of the roads.

If General Stilwell's drive goes favorably, the road is expected to be completed in April, 1945.

Convoy system of control is used in blocking off the road for construction, and in this way, the traffic is handled effectively.

If the Bengal-Assam railway is out by Japs, it was suggested that construction troops from the Ledo area would be called to fix it.

The further toward the Mogaung Valley, the better the road gets.

Kunming as far as Columbus 710 (between Salween and ...) is in good condition.

There are several regular established supply points along the road. The food is not too good and is local product. C rations and K rations are to be had in small amounts. Water can be had any time by digging and from streams. Gas is all carried by air over the hump.
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

From: CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma & India  
Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India

To: War Department  
Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area  
Brisbane, Australia  
CG, US Army Forces in South Pacific Area  
Houmes, New Caledonia

No: CRAX 2920  
9 May 1944

Sultan to Marshall for Asiatic Section OPD, info MacArthur, CONGENSO FAC, Ferris, Chennault, Boatin, Lindsey, Burn, Cranston, Egan and Timberman CRAX 2920.

Troops of 64th Regiment in contact with enemy 500 yards south Hvelon Hka in Mogaung Valley. East of Inkan-gahtwang units of 113 Regiment are along north bank Tigravak Hka. Chinese patrols on west flank engaged Jap patrols 8 miles northeast Mansum. In Fort Hertz Valley levies ambushed Japs 3 times southeast Tlangap. After engaging enemy Company 3rd Battalion Jalalad and 88th Regiment advanced Nunningbu 3 miles north Bung. Leading elements First Battalion Jalalad and 150th Regiment reached Salawg-Hkaway 6 miles north Bung.

Heavy fighting continues in Kohima area and Second Division generally making gains. Columns of 23rd Brigade continue to move southwards towards Kohima-Jessani trail. Elements of 44th column occupied Chengwai.

On Fourth Corps front British attacked north of Imphal in Manipur area but failed to reach objectives.

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44  

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E.O. 11493, Sec. 5(B) and Sec. 5(D) or (E)  
OSD letter, May 9, 1972  
RIP, NARS Dec. APR 4 1973  
C-O-R-E-C-T-E-D C-O-P-Y
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P-R-I-O-R-I-T-Y
C-O-R-R-E-C-T-E-D C-O-P-Y

From: CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma & India
Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India

Page 2
No: CRAX 2920 9 May 1944

Some patrol actions near Patil and Bishenpur.

48 Brigade less 1 Battalion arrived Wanjing 9 miles north Patil. Elements of 89 Brigade of Seventh Division arrived in Imphal area from Arakan. In Arakan heavy shelling near Buthidaung and British forced to withdraw. British occupied Thayegonbaung, 2 miles southeast Godusara and enemy attacks on point 551 repulsed.

No Sig

Footnote: Corrected copy of CM-IN-5652 (8 May 44) OPD.

ACTION: OPD
INFO: CG AAF
G-2
Col Park
Log

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E.O. 11652, Sec. (E) and 8(D) or (K)
OED Letter, May 9, 1972

CM-IN-6483 (9 May 44) 1556Z met

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/94
From: CO 14th Air Force, Kunming, China  Page 3
No: CAEX 1782  8 May 1944

from Hsiuming to Puchih with several box cars destroyed, 2 tracks destroyed and several Japs killed by strafing.

On May 6th, 8 Jap bombers escorted by 6 Jap Fighters bombed Hsiuming. Radio station, hangars and taxiway damaged.

Add Sorties for 6th May, 66 Fighter, 6 Bomber and 1 Photo. For May 7th, 9 Fighter Sorties.

Routine ferry trips by 308th Group with 11 over and 4 back.

Chinese Air Force reports Jap Forces 20 miles south of Loyang. Chinese Headquarters transferred to Loyang. Considerable motorized Jap equipment moving northwest of Hsiuming. Jap occupied Kischan, north of Sinyang, on May 1st. Photos now received of mission from Szechuan 5th May show north south probable fighter strip being constructed at recently unused old airstrip at east edge Hsiuming. Also runway "Haisan under construction 1650 feet long and 575 feet east west Haisan. Shipping Haisan only 7100 tons due probably continued move up river to Wuhan.

No Sig

CM-IN-6292  (9 May 44)  0838Z  eJv

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: CG US Army Forces China Burma and India Rear Echelon New Delhi, India

To: War Department Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, Brisbane, Australia
CG US Army Forces in South Pacific Area Noumea, New Caledonia

No: CRAX 2983 8 May 1944

Sultan to Marshall for Asiatic Section OPD information MacArthur, COMGENSO PAC, Ferra, Chennault, Boatner, Lincsey, Dorn, Cranston, Egan and Timberman CRAX 2983.

On Moganung Valley front slight local gains made now in vicinity Hitpcon are 3rd Battalion Galahay and 88th Regiment. On Assam front heavy fighting continues around Kohima as 2nd Division pushed to clear Japanese from area. At Tengnoupal in Palei area, 80th Brigade repulsed Jap attack and 48th Brigade advanced eastward and occupied several villages 6 miles northeast Palei. British on Arakan front in move to Monsoon positions evacuated Buthidaung according to plan. Heavy fighting near point 551 as British repulsed enemy attacks. East of Kacapanzin River 81st Division carried out successful operations. 71st Brigade now in Letvedet area. On 4th Corps front considerable patrol activity and fighting in Bishenpur area.

ACTION: OPD
INFO: CG AAF
G-2 Log

CM-IN-6186 (9 May 44) 0318Z mcs

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or 3
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
JAPANESE FORCES ALONG PEIPING HANKOW RAILWAY NOW LESS THAN 60 MILES APART. ELEMENTS OF 2 DIVISIONS MOVING NORTH FROM ABOVE HSIN YANG. PARTS OR ALL OF 3 POSSIBLY 4 DIVISIONS PLUS 1 CAVALRY BRIGADE 1 TANK REGIMENT 1 MECHANIZED REGIMENT MOVING SOUTH FROM YENCHENG. MECHANIZED UNITS HAVE MOVED WEST AND NORTHWEST TO LOYANG. ALUSNA COMMENTS THAT LITTLE EFFECTIVE RESISTANCE APPEARS TO BE DEVELOPING ON PART OF CHINESE.

16...ACT

ALUSNA

CHUNGKING SENDS

RATED B 2.

FROM DIRECTOR INTELLIGENCE: CHUNGKING SENDS

NAVAL MESSAGE

ROM DIRECTOR INTELLIGENCE CHUNGKING

RELEASED BY

DATE 8 MAY 44

TOR CODEROOM 1238/08

DECODED BY KIRKBRIDE

PARAPHRASED BY KULKA/ROGERS

ROUTED BY HUTCHINSON

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

DECLASSIFIED

O2D Lotton 18196

MAY 15 1974

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-45

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

May 8, 1944

From: Main 11 Army Group Sea
To: War Office and usual addressers
No: 286/OPS

SITREP 116

1. Arakan

2 JIFs from (*LMT*) OP surrendered area FM 6346. PW belonging 55 Div 505 Regt captured area FM 5246 states has no knowledge JIF units East of Kalapanz in as area Simohyrin FM 5047. 25 Div assumed responsibility area FM 551 FM 4342. In fighting this area 150 enemy bodies counted. 3 enemy attacks on our positions from North of FM 551 night 6/7 May repulsed. Feature FM 442424 FM 445427 FM 463430 evac according to plan. Enemy attack on area 71 Bde HQ FM 4844 night 5/6 May repulsed with 30 casualties to enemy. Enemy occupied area FM 4948 FM 5048 same night after previous evac by our Tps. HQ 71 Bde 1 R. Garb RIF FM 452473. 5/7 Punjab FM 4546. 1 Lincoln FM 4547. 7 enemy and 225 enemy enemy killed by 81 (WA) Div area FM 5939. 6 May enemy dumps area FM 5839 FM 5346 also destroyed.

2. Kaladan

1 Tripura KIF killed 10 enemy in ambush area PG 7630 6 May.

3. 4 Corps

A. Area Bishenpur. Night 4/5 May. Enemy occupied our PL posn area RK 110404 withdrew 5 May taking some food but leaving enm. Night 5/6 May enemy again active in this area. On 1 of the small actions this area 25 enemy killed. Our cas 7. 6 May elements 9/14 Punjab with Tk 3P engaged enemy RK 2039 capturing 3 guns. PW belonging 4 Coy 214 Regt captured RK 2039—states deserted fortnight ago when his En in area RK CM-IN-6604 (9 May 44)

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SITREP 116
May 8, 1944
Page two

0900. 2 more Fw captured this area identify 1 indep A Tk Bg and a fourth identifies 1 Bn 215 Regt. 2 captured JIFs state large enco enemy at Moirang RK 1824 intended move North from area Ayuron RK 1138 but owing to opposed encounter now intend move Eastwards on Bishenpur. 6 May enemy digging in at RK 0645 and RK 0748.

D. Area Palel-Tamu. 4 May in action area RK 3806 with ind JIFs our Tps inflicted estimated 65 cas and took 8 Fw. Since 1 May cas inflicted on JIFs area Palel Tamu total 150 Fw 54. 6 May large enemy at CONVOY moved NW from Palel Tamu RK 5818. Right 6/7 May by enemy attack on 80 Bde pooms RK 596120 repulsed with many cas to enemy. 7 May. Elements 48 Bde occupied 2 villages area RK 5255 suffering slight cas. 14 FF Rif occupied village RK 4505 against slight opposn.

C. Area Imphal. AI report track Kunchup Khul RK 16 Tamenglong RG 88 clear of enemy 5 and 6 May. BR RK 0272 damaged but easily repairable. Some enemy patrol activity area Khongbhen RK 5282. Unconfirmed local report 1,000 enemy arrived night 1/2 May RK 6796 from NW and proceeded direction UKHRUL. Comment. Number probably exaggerated. Poaoo NK 4979 occupied 7 May without opposn.

D. Total Japanese Fw taken 4 Corps area during present ops now 41.

4. 33 Corps.

A. Kohima. Offensive to clear Kohima continues. 6 May 5 Bde inflicted many cas on enemy digging in area East of RK 516680. 5 Bde firmly established area RK 511682. 4 Rajput relieved 2 DLI in Kohima Gyn. Some enemy continue to hold out area RK 502668. 4 Bde held up by Bunker pooms hold poon astride Ridge at RK 494653. Elements 1/2 Punjub infiltrated into enemy pooms area RK 49665 but were later forced to withdraw to original poon RK 498625. 33 Bde under CM-IN-6604 (9 May 44)

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/94
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SITREP 116  May 8, 1944  Page three

comd 2 Div from 5 May. 1 QUEENS area RE 484656. 4/15 Punjab area RE 4866. 4/1 GR remains area RE 482658.

B. 23 Bde. 56 Coln RE 453813. 88 33 Colns RE 532833. 60 Coln RE 927822.

Time of Origin 081855

ACTION: OPD
INFO: CC/B
      CC AAF
      O-2
      Colonel Park
      Log

CM-IN-6604  (9 May 44)  1855Z  mem

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/30/44
WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

FROM: Main 11 Army Group Sea
TO : War Office

Rptd:
N.Z. Force Hq New Zealand
Military Attaché China
BfD Washington
GHQ Persia & Iraq Force
GHQ East Africa
Hq Brisbane (Pass COIC GHQ)
Hq AAI.

NO : 265/OPS SITREP No. 115

ONE ARAKAN.

5 May 0P saw enemy digging PM 5460. Night 5/6 May 2 small parties enemy encountered PM 5459. No fresh developments area BUTHIDAUNG night 5/6 May and 6 May. 182 enemy known killed this area 5 May. BUTHIDAUNG evacuated night 6/7 May in accordance with plan for withdrawal to monsoon dispositions. 6 Ox Buks occupied THATUYONBAUNG PM 3827 early 6 May.

TWO KALADAN.

One coy enemy moved south from PW 8031 and joined forward elements enemy coln at SATPAUNG PG 7829. One pl enemy forced to withdraw after action area PG 7728 5 May.

THREE 4 CORPS.

(A) Area BISHOOPUR. 5 May 1 coy 33 Engr Regt identified RJ 8850 l 25 FR and 4 vehs destroyed in attack by 20 enmy AC 6 May.

(B) AREA PALEL TAMU. 5 May enemy in hills east of PALEL inactive. Enemy arty silent 2 May shelled our poon RX 593120 on 6 May.

CM-IN-5041 (8 May 44)

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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By Authority of JCS
Date: APR 5/4 1973

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NO: 265/OP3 SITREP No. 115 Page Two May 7, 1944

(C) AREA IMPHAL. Unconfirmed report all enemy from HAOCHEONG RK 0107 moved to RANPOXI RE 3704. Night 5/6 May patrol report approx 1 coy enemy RK 3391. Feature RK 3383 report clear.

FOUR: 33 CORPS

(A) Area KOHIMA. Village RE 504764 confirmed clear of enemy. 4 May enemy in str covering rd at RE 495665. Strong enemy poens RE 505653 RE 508648. Nopping up continued area RE 502668. Situation confused area RE 498659. 16 enemy killed in action 5 May MERMA RE 4973.

(B) 23 BDE. Elements 44 coln occupied CHESWEMA RE 4976 5 May.

FIVE: HUKAWNG

4 May American Rangers in contact area NX 9222.

T.O.O. 071645

ACTION: OPD

INFO: CG/8
CG AAF
G-2
Col. Park
Log

GM-IN-5041 (8 May 44) 2214Z

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
May 6, 1944

To: SACSEA
Rpt: AFRQ Algiers, J.S.M.
From: Chiefs of Staff
Nr: 02-2413

Following is from Combined Chiefs of Staff for Admiral Mountbatten, General Stilwell and General Stratemeyer.

1. Reference SEACOS 145 (not to AFRQ). The most effective solution of the problem raised in the above message, giving consideration to the means available and requirements of critical Mediterranean situation is the following:

   (a) You will return the 79 transport aircraft borrowed from the Mediterranean to arrive in that theater by 31st May.

   (b) The United States Chiefs of Staff are initiating the movement to C.B.I. theater by the 1st Combat Cargo Group less personnel. Departure of the 100 C-47 aircraft of this group under A.T.C. control with flight echelons of one pilot, one co-pilot and one crew chief per aircraft and one dead-reckoning navigator per 4 aircraft previously scheduled for July, will be accelerated with initial movement now anticipated about 22nd May 1944 and total balance to follow within 10 days. Fillers totalling approximately 475 additional personnel will depart by earliest available sea transportation.

CM-IN-5742 (8 May 44)
If emergency requires utilization of transport aircraft in theater following departure of 79 aircraft for Mediterranean and prior to arrival of 1st Combat Cargo Group Aircraft you are authorized to recall any number of the 20 C-46 aircraft (or their equivalent lift in C-47's) which you have just returned to the "Hump" operations.

Should a tactical emergency necessitate the diversion of additional transport aircraft you will apply through normal channels to United States Chiefs of Staff in Washington for authority for such diversion.

This acceleration of departure of 1st Combat Cargo Group strains global air transport resources particularly personnel to the limit. The 2nd Combat Cargo Group remains scheduled for departure in mid-August. The urgency of maintaining "Hump" tonnage at maximum capacity in view of Y-Force activities and projected operations does not need reiteration, and you should draw upon these critical facilities only to that degree which you own immediate emergency necessitates.

ACTION: CCS

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Col Park
Log
CM-IN-5742

T.O.O. 051640Z

SECRET

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
FROM: Main 11 Army Group SRA.

TO: War Office.
    Rptd HQ AAI.
    H.A. Forces HQ New Zealand.
    H.A. China.
    British Army Staff, Washington.
    OHQ Feralia and Iraq Command.
    OHQ East Africa.
    HQ Brisbane (pass COIC GHQ)
    Middle East.

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

NO: 254/OPS 6th May.

SITREP 114.

ONE: ARAKAN.

Ref SITREP 113. Report six hundred enemy area FM 4282
now known to be false 1/8 Gr with arty SP and after
hand to hand fighting captured feature FM 438432 4
May. Many enemy bodies found but our cas 1t enemy
attack on our poa area PT 551 FM 4342 and simultaneous
attacks area FM 4422 early 5 May repulsed. Our poas
FM 4543 heavily engaged by enemy early 5 May but
no attack developed. Enemy commenced ops against
area West of Buthidaung by shelling area FM 4845
4 May. Evening 4 May enemy infiltrated area FM
5043 where str estimated approx three hundred Main
attack by estimated one enemy bn commenced 0400 hrs
5 May when enemy gained footing on feature FM 469442.
One hundred and fifty enemy reported West of Buthidaung
engaged by our tks and fighting still in progress.

CM-IN-5846 (8 May 44)

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44

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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Number 254/015

TWO: KALADAN.
Approx one PL INA attacked 1 GAMBIA police area BALAIKOU PG 8031 evening 3 May. Later withdrew losing nine killed. Total known enemy killed by 7/16 PUNJAB and 1 GAMBIA during recent ops now two hundred and thirty. Our cas twelve killed twenty three wounded.

THREE: 4 CORPS.

(A) Area BIGHENBUR. One hundred and fifty enemy located area RK 1504. Three hundred enemy in jungle RK 1635. Night 4/5 May our attack on village RK 1138 unsuccessful. 5 May enemy attempt to demolish trestle BR at RJ 8250 unsuccessful.

(B) Area PALEL-TAMU. Large cone mules and enemy activity reported area RK 5520. Estimated one enemy coy moved East from RK 2623. 48 bde less 9 border WAKOJINU RK 4737. 1/16 PUNJAB 1 PAKILA concentrating WAKOJINU.

(C) Area IMPHAL. Reported seven hundred enemy moved East through village RK 4493 between 1 and 3 May. Comment. Numbers possible excessive but tendency for units 15 Div move East recently noticeable. 9 JAP attack on Ridge MAPAO RK 3579 RK 3784 held up by strong enemy opposition. 3/18 PUNJAB held up Area RK 3583. Our cas area IMPHAL during 48 hours 4 May 5 May estimated one hundred. BQ 89 Bde 2 KEDS 1 BIKR area SHEMAI RK 2878. 1 DOG 1 area RK 4591. BR 37 Bde 3/10 GR three coys 2 HYBAD RK 5575. 3/3 GR 3/5 RGR 5878.

CM-IN-5846 (8 May 44)
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Number 254/OPS

Page Number 3.

(D) 4 CORPS. Estimate five thousand seven hundred enemy killed in Corps area during present ops.

FOUR: 33 CORPS.

(A) One hundred and fifty enemy reported along tracks west and SE of REKHOMA RE 5180. Indications enemy withdrawing SE to area REKHOMA RE 5374 CHEMENA RE 5769* PHAREEEDZUMI RE 9267 reported reinforced by enemy. Possible large number JABS this area. Three hundred enemy reported repairing poans RE 8082.

(B) KOHIMA. Our offensive continues. 4 May. 2 DLI 1 RWP with tks established area RE 500658. 5 Bde established area RE 511651. 4 Bde captured Ridge RE 492637** and made contact with 1/2 PUNJAB area RE 484654. Night 4/5 May continuous enemy counter attack against 5 Bde poans. Fed poans 1 CAMERONS area RE 5168 overrun.

(C) 23 BDE. Ref 3TRMP 113. Twenty enemy killed ten wounded in action PHAREEEDZUMI night 1/2 May. Enemy killed by 23 Bde in present ops now totals one hundred and forty two. 44 coln RE 4582. 56 coln RE 9102. 88 coln RE 9102. 34 coln RE 9102.

FIVE: HUKAWING

Body recovered MANPIN SC 4078 belongs 1/44 Rgt. Estimated one coy enemy NX 9222. Reported three thousand moved from MITARYMA BD 14 to MOOLANG SC 63 late Apr early May. 1/14 Rgt cleared enemy from area SC 3980. American Rangers area NX 9025.

GM-IN-5846 (4 May 44)

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

COPY NO.
SIX: NORTH BURMA.

Enemy str TIANGZUP NY 2321 estimated one coy.

T.O.O. 061925

* Check reads 5569
** Check reads 492651

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: CC/9 (BJSM)
00 AAF
0-2
Colonel Park
Log

CM-IN-5846 (8 May 44) 1643Z ov

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/8/94
From: Rear SACSEA
To: Chiefs of Staff
Info: J.S.M. Washington
Mr: SEA 128

Following for Chiefs of Staff repeated Marshall from Mountbatten agreed Stilwell.

8th Report on MATERHORN for 2 weeks ending 30th April.


4. Piardoba. Concrete runway 7500 feet ready. 39 temporary steel mat hardstandings. Housing ready for 450 officers and 2900 enlisted men. Tankage is 29 per cent complete. Distribution system 45 per cent complete. Estimated completion date 30th September 44.

5. Dudhkundi. North and South runway 2800 feet ready both ends under construction. Housing ready for 260 officers and 1539 enlisted men. Storage tank facilities 82 per cent completed. Estimated completion date 30th September 44.

CM-IN-5544 (8 May 44)

7. Agra and Karachi. Runway extensions at 75 per cent and 100 per cent completed. Hardstandings are 95 per cent and 90 per cent completed. Estimated completion dates are 1st June 44 and 15th May 44 respectively.

T.O.O. 061545 F.G.

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Col Park
100

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By REP, NLK, Date MAY 15 1974

OM-IN-5544 (8 May 44) 0249Z mmd

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From: CG, U.S. Army Forces, China, Burma, and India
To: War Department
For: CRA 2028
6 May 1944.

Weekly summary for week ending 3 May 1944.

(1) US Air: 27 April. Three P-38's set out to attack railroad in north Thailand, returned because of bad weather. Four P-40's attacked 20 junks on Nanxi River, setting fire to several and killing about 100 Japanese.

28 April. Twenty-six B-24's with an escort of ten P-47's bombed 2 Yellow River bridges 18 miles north Changnan. Both bridges were hit and fires were started at north end of one bridge. Two P-40's strafed enemy troops northeast Yengchow with unknown results. Three B-25's off the east coast Hainan Island damaged a 200 foot freighter. Two steamers 125 foot were also attacked and 1 left sinking. Six B-25's bombed Yengan with unobserved results. Eighteen Fighters strafed barracks near Nanchang also with unobserved results. Two B-24's on a screen sweep sighted no shipping.

CM-IN-4927 (7 May 44)
29 April. Twenty four B-25's with twenty four
fighter escort detailed to bomb a bridge in East China
turned back due to bad weather. Four P-40's strafed
buildings at Nanking with unsaved results. Six
B-25's bombed warehouses and barracks in Shanghai
starting large fires and explosions. Two B-25's fired 3
launches 20 to 50 feet long in the Nanking area. Two
B-25's on sea sweep from Foochow to Wenchow strafed
an 85 foot junk with good results. Two missions to
intercept enemy planes and two missions to attack other
objectives were unsuccessful.

29 April. Eight P-40's dive bomb bridges at
Ding No (50 miles southwest of Nanking) destroying 1
section of 1 and damaging a part of another. Four P-40's
strafed fuel dumping north of Hengri with unsaved
results. One mission to intercept enemy aircraft failed
to make contact. Seven P-40's strafed the San Pe Hac
area on the Burma-Thailand border. Two buildings
and a motor pool were destroyed and several motor
transports were damaged.

1 May. Four P-40's destroyed 2 spans of bridge
at Van Lei Kau (west of Takau Ferry) by dive bombing.
Five P-40's strafed enemy installations near Van Phoa.
Four B-25's returned from sea sweep because of bad
weather. Two P-40's damaged 2 barges 100 feet long
in vicinity of Cat Bai Island. Fifteen P-40's in four
missions attacked the railroad, bridges and other enemy
installations in the Loc Sinh, Dong Dang, Ho Chan, Lang
Son and the Vam Phung areas in northern French Indo-

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China. Three bridges and 20 rolling stock were damaged and several buildings were fired. One B-24 on sea sweep may have sighted no shipping. Two B-29's sank a 150 foot freighter in Amoy harbor. Seven B-29's and eight P-40's damaged runway at Hangyang Airfield. Two P-40's on intercept mission failed to make contact with enemy planes.

2 May. Four B-24's sighted no shipping south of Kinmen Island. Nine P-40's on mission to Hangyang returned because of bad weather. Two P-40's on sea sweep off Gai Bui Island sank three sampans and damaged three more. Two P-40's knocked out 1 span of railway bridge at Sea Lo. Four P-40's attacked the Ta Chia railroad yards. The freight station and 3 rolling stock were destroyed and 4 rolling stock were damaged. Two P-40's damaged a railroad bridge north of Xo.

3 May. Two B-24's on sea sweep off southeast coast of China sank a 350 foot freighter and a 100 foot freighter. Four B-29's covered by eight P-40's bombed Hangyang airfield with 50 percent of bombs in storage areas. Ten P-40's bombed the Yellow River Bridge and scored 11 direct hits. This flight then strafed Japanese communications in the Loyang area, destroying fifteen trucks and 500 or 400 Japanese troops. Seven B-29's bombed the Mihsien area in support of ground troops.
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F-R-I-O-N-X-X

Page 4.

From: O8, U.S. Army Forces, China, Burma and India
 Hao Schol, New Delhi, India.

No: CMA 2958 5 May 1944

and fires were started and fourteen trucks destroyed.
In Kechang and Heilung-Chang areas this flight attacked
ammunition and damaged approximately 100 trucks
and 2 tanks.
(3) Chinese Air: Little activity because of
bad flying weather.
(3) US Ground: No operations for period
covered.
(4) Chinese Ground: Operations by the Japanese
are progressing. A double movement from both
the north and south is being carried out to join
the Japanese forces in the Yellow River area with those in
the Yangze River Area. In the north, the Japanese in
the Yellow River bridgehead have bypassed a Chinese
army holding Walliibei and are making a fleeting movement
with a motorized column via Hechyloch, Chinchen, and
Liaju towards Loyang. Fighting has been reported in Lin-
jia and the Chinese are shunting troops to meet this
Japanese threat to Loyang. Other Japanese column in the
Yellow River bridgehead have moved southward and have
reached Tenchang and Wuyung. The Japanese in the Yangze
Valley are advancing northward from Hunan and Kiang
and Linsen. Two Chinese armies are opposing
this threat. There now remains only about 80 miles of

CM-IN-4927 (7 May 44)

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8th Letter, 5-3-42

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
the Peiying-Hankow Railroad in Chinese hands, between Hankow and Binyang.

(5) Ledo Road progress as of 27 April 44:
Forward survey party—milestone 176, lead building—milestone 176, final grading—miles 168, final muddling—through mile 109.6 except for a four mile stretch between milestones, 91.6 and 96.6.

(6) Four inch pipeline progress report as of 29 April 44: Pipeline clearing—milestone 129.33, pipe string—miles 126.28, pipe coupled—miles 123.34, pipeline in operation—Bigboi to Shingyiwang, pipeline tankage—additional 2000 barrel tank is being installed at Shingyiwang.

(7) Change in British troop dispositions follows:
15th Corps at Dhechampsalung,
30th Division at Bawil Basyar.
7th Division; 89th Brigade is moving from Awan to 4th Corps area, 114th Brigade is 1 mile northwest Teang Basyar.

4th Corps; 23rd Division is 4 miles south Imphal, 1 Brigade at Wangling (9 miles south Palai), 37th Brigade is 18 miles northeast Imphal.
5th Division; 9th Brigade is 18 miles north northeast Imphal.

CM-IN-4927 (7 May 44)
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F-D-I-O-B-I-Y

Page 6.

From: 02, U.S. Army Forces, China, Burma, and India
Near Echelon, New Delhi, India

No: CMA 2838 6 May 1944

33rd Corps:

2nd Division: 4th Brigade is four miles southwest Echelin, 6th Brigade is at Echelin.
5th Division: 161st Brigade is two miles west Echelin.
3rd Division: 23rd Brigade at Echelin.

No Sig.

ACTION: OPD
INFO: CGAAF
0-2
Col. Park

CM-IN-4927 (7 May 44) 0619Z e+jv

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RED LETTER, 6-3-78

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
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INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

FOR GENERAL MARSHALL's EYES ONLY

From: CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma and India
       Forward Echelon, Chungking, China

To: War Department

No.: 1035, 5 May 1944

Eyes alone Marshall from Stilwell CHC 1035.

Enclosed - in following is informational.

X Force will jump off in few days with 4 divisions north flank and 4 columns of 4 battalions each spaced along front down to Kunlong. Delays are being caused by last minute changes in plans, but believe the move is at long last about to begin. Indications are that Generalissimo is pushing it and has demanded success. Jap Force on that entire front now estimated at 4 battalions.

Our try for Myitkyena is under way. First contact today. We should know possibility of getting there in about 10 days.

On this front progress painfully slow. Replacement problem always present due to War Ministry's failure to meet quotas. We are past Inkangabiawag and will keep at it, but man can not now estimate what we can do before monsoon. Am putting in a rev regiment to try and push them along.

CM-IN-3973 (6 May 44)
From: CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma and India
Forward Echelon, Chungking, China

No. CBO 1035, 5 May 1944

Have arranged with Slim about long range penetration groups. They come under my command about May 21st, at which time we hope to organize a push for Mogang. The arrangements are as satisfactory as could be expected.

No Sig

ACTION: General Handy
INPO: General Arnold
General Beisel
G of S

CM-IN-3973 (6 May 44) 0100Z 8Jv
EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED
OD Letter, 6-3-72

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

FROM: Main II Army Group SEA
TO: Usual Addressees
NO: 233/OPS

ONE: ARAKAN. Increased enemy activity North end Feature FM 5542. Patrol investigating enemy reported area FM 4366. Locals report unknown reliability 500 enemy area Kendaru Chaung FM 4282. Comment. Consider presence possible but numbers much exaggerated. Several enemy counter-attacks on our newly-gained points area PT 551 FM 4342 repulsed. To date 37 enemy bodies counted this area. Our casualties light. Enemy suffered 24 casualties in fighting area FM 4439 May 2. Night 3/4 May our troops ambushed enemy party area FM 4442. 16 enemy bodies recovered. Ref. SITREP 112. In our successful counter-attack area PT 121 FM 5048 May 3 55 enemy killed. 4 RH had successful action area Debvugrayun FM 5643 night 1/2 May and morning 3 May killing 15 enemy burning village and destroying ammunitions dump FM 5641.

TWO: KALADAN. Jap FW states 500 mixed Japanese and British astride Kaladan near FQ 7823 also majority Bma area jeep track east of R Kaladan. Also states enemy intend reach Indo-Burma Border by Monsoon. HQ Kaladan Force I Gambie Labava FQ 6633, 7/16 Punjab area FQ 6831.


CM-IN-4431 (6 May 44)

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By Authority of CS

meme, 1-7-73

By ACP, R

APR 4, 1973

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5790 now taken refuge in hills to west. Ops against enemy in areas RK 3588 RK 3985 started 4 May. 3/14 Punjab held up area Feature RK 357827. 3 at captured Feature RK 393863. 1/16 Punjab RK 5878.

FOUR: 33 CORPS. A. Locals report 3 May considerable increase enemy troops Nigwee RE 5399 last two days and that enemy came from village RE 5560. RE 4490 clear of enemy CI report INA STR unspecified in area Mukalat I RE 79. Three INA captured in Lazami RE 69. Identifications. EWR captured RE 5065 ** belongs 1 Bn 124 Rgt. B. Kohima. 2 May several small enemy attacks on 4 Bde Coy poon area RE 477533 repulsed. 19 enemy killed. 4 Bde Hq RE less 2 Coys 2 NorFolks RE 480547. ** Coy 1 RS at each RE 477533 RE 469620. 2 div gen attack area Kohima launched 4 May. First reports indicate progress satisfactory. C. 23 Bde. Elements 34 Coln attacked Phatkkedum RE 9267 night 1/2 May inflicting small loss. 34 coln area RE 9394 RE 9180. 60 coln MZ9821. 88 coln MV0129. 33 coln MZ9104 **** 76 coln RE 6198.


T.O.O. 051820

ACTION: OFD

INFO : CG/S

CG AAF

O-2

Col Park

100

CM-IN-4431 (5 May 44) 1652Z hrt

[Signature]

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COPY NO. 56

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/44
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY
FOR GENERAL MARSHALL'S EYES ONLY

From: CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma and India
Forward echelon, Chungking, China

To: War Department

No: CHC 1035, 5 May 1944

Eyes alone Marshall from Stilwell CHC 1035.
Enclosed in following is informational.

Y Force will jump off in few days with 4 divisions north flank and 4 columns of 4 battalions each spaced along front down to Emlong. Delays are being caused by last minute changes in plans, but believe the move is at long last about to begin. Indications are that Generalissimo is pushing it and has demanded success. Jap Force on that entire front now estimated at 4 battalions.

Our try for Nyikyenas is under way. First contact today. We should know possibility of getting there in about 10 days.

On this front progress painfully slow. Replacement problem always present due to War Ministry's failure to meet quotas. We are past Inkanghaawng and will keep at it, but can not now estimate what we can do before monsoon. Am putting in a raw regiment to try and push them along.

CM-IN-3973 (6 May 44)

EYES ONLY
O.S.D. (Sec. 1483) and U.S. or (3)

RPT: OSD letter, May 3, 1972

EYES ONLY

RHP, NARA Dec. APR 4 1973

SECRET

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E.O. 12335, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/28/44

COPY No. 19
From: CQ, US Army Forces, China, Burma and India
Forward Echelon, Chungking, China
No.  CHC 1035, 5 May 1944

Have arranged with Slim about long range penetration groups. They come under my command about May 21st, at which time we hope to organize a push for Mogaung. The arrangements are as satisfactory as could be expected.

No Sig

ACTION:  General Handy
INFO:  General Arnold
General Bissell
C of S

CM-IN-3973  (6 May 44)  0100Z
ejv
EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED
O&D Letter, 8-3-72

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

P-R-I-O-R-I-T-Y

From: CG, US Army Forces, China Burma & India Rear
Echelon, New Delhi India

To: War Department
CG, US Army Forces in South Pacific Area,
Houma, New Caledonia
Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area,
Brisbane, Australia

NR: CRAX 2789, 5th May 1944

Sultan to Marshall for Asiatic Section OPD, info
MacArthur, COMENSOPAC, Ferris, Chennault, Boettner, Lindsey,
Dorn, Cranston and Timberman CRAX 2789.

On Assam front 2nd Division launched general at-
tack in Kohima and satisfactory progress reported. 23rd
Brigade continues to advance southward and now has 6 columns
in rough line about 25 miles north of Kohima-Jessami Trail.
Patrol of 34th Column attacked Phakekedrumi. 4th Corps Area
generally quiet with some fighting north Imphal and skirmishes
near Highpur and Palel. Small units Lushai Brigade reached
area 28 miles northwest Tiddim. At Areek British troops re-
pulsed enemy attack on newly captured positions at point 551.
Small scale fighting near Gvensara, Htindaw and north Buth-
daung. Some activity east of Kalapanzin Ankin Kaladan Valley.
Coordinated air, artillery, tank and infantry attack smashed
Japanese line at Inkangahtawng in Mogaung Valley. Following
air and artillery preparations tanks followed by infantry of
22nd Division crossed Pangyu Hka and occupied Inkangahtawng.
64th Regiment moved around west flank and out main road south
of the Avelon Hka, 2 miles south Inkangahtawng. Trapped
enemy being mopped up. In this action none of our tanks lost
and Chinese ground casualties light. East of Mogaung river
38 Division had several Japanese groups surrounded. Fighting
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Page 2

From: CG, US Army Forces, China Burma & India Rear
Echelon, New Delhi India

To: War Department
CG, US Army Forces in South Pacific Area,
Noumea, New Caledonia
Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area,
Brisbane Australia

NR: CHAX 2789, 5th May 1944

continues on east flank as 1st Battalion, 112 Regiment at-
tacked Kauri and occupied positions, while 3rd Battalion,
112 Regiment repulsed Japanese attack on Fackun. In Port
Hertz Valley British troops successfully ambushed 70 Japa-

nese south of Tiangwup.

No Sig.

ACTION: OPD

INFO: CDAAFF

O-2
Col. Perk
Log

CM-IN-4085 (6 May 44) 0304Z efv

DECLASSIFIED
5EB Letter, 5-5-78

42

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/94
From: CG US Army Forces China Burma & India Forward Echelon, Chungking, China

To: War Department
CG US Army Forces China Burma & India Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India

Re: CPFX 17005 5 May 1944

To Bissell WDORI info Sultan CPFX 17005 from G 2 sgd Stilwell. Repeated 31 April May 3.

Pattern of present indications point to Japanese intention of opening the Pingshan railroad from Sinyang (11º40' E 06º28' N) to Sinsang. Chinese state no plans for the entire operation have been captured. Chinese also believe Japs intend to open railroad. The reported movement to Sinyang of a 4 pronged drive along the railroad (OURAD CPFX 16277 May 4) coupled with the drive southward from the Yellow River all tends to confirm this intention.

The views expressed in OURAD CPFX 16265 April 17 in which Japanese troop concentrations and capabilities were discussed are still adhered to by this headquarters.

SINO communications headquarters estimate that only 2 months time would be required by the Japs to restore the railroad provided the rails were available. It is also possible that the Japs intend to set up fighter fields in this area for the purpose of opposing any east to west flight by our planes.

ACTION: G-2
INFORMATION: CG AAF, OPR Colonel Park, Log

CM-IN-3883 (5 May 44) 22222

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 4(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3 1973
APP 4 1973

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/44

COPY NO.
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

From: CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma and India Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India
To: War Department
Nr: OARX 2708

G-2 report 3rd May, Bissell OARX 2708 info Ferris, Dorn, Cheynault, Cranston, Egan, Lindsay and Timberman from Creswell signed Sultan.

In Arakan reports of arrival reinforcements continue, consider a battalion 111th Regiment may be in area south of Buthidung. Over 30 members India National Army (JIFS) surrendered south of Pakel Tawu Road, those prisoners stated an INA battalion was in area and that all were hungry and ready to surrender; little change Imphal; artillery fire inflicted estimated 200 casualties on enemy concentration 1 mile northeast Kohima; indications Japan are constructing defense positions north and northeast Kohima, probably to oppose British advances to southeast and south. Nothing to report on north Burma and along Salween River.

No Sig.

ACTION: G-2
INFO: CGAAP
OPD
Col. Park
Log

CM-IN-3005 (4 May 44) 2036Z efv

DECLASSIFIED
RG. 11655, Sec. 3.3 and 3.4 or 33
OSD Letter, May 5, 1972
By RHP, NARA Date APR 4, 1973

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COPY NO.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
TO: Chiefs of Staff
INFO: Joint Staff Mission
FROM: SACEUSA
SEACOS 149

Following for Chiefs of Staff repeated Joint Staff Mission from Mountbatten. Fortnightly report for period April 10 to April 26, 1944.

Section 1 - Comments on the operational situation.

I have nothing to add to contents of SEACOS 144 and SEACOS 147.

Section 2 - Eastern Fleet

The operation against Sabang has been fully reported to the Admiralty and in the press and there is nothing else to report.

Section 3 - Army Group Operations.

1. Arakan-Kaladan.

(a) Enemy. 54 division still not committed. Japanese broadcasts making much of capture of Paletwa. Enemy offensive against our left flank still possible.

(b) Own Troops. Fighting to improve positions south of Maungdaw-Buthidaung road continues against heavy opposition. 81 WA division moved from Kaladan to East Kalapanzin area leaving two battalions operating north of Palett.

2. Chindwin.

(a) Enemy. Enemy has changed plans and redistributed forces. Imphal now his main objective and threat to CM-IN-4348 (6 May 44)

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Assam Railway and Mokokchung decreased. Estimated threat against Kohima 5 battalions, against Imphal 9 battalions from north and 7 from south, against Falel 2 battalions and 1 tank regiment.

(b) Own Troops. Heavy fighting in both Imphal and Kohima areas. Imphal area 20 Div successfully withstood determined enemy attempts to move on Imphal from south and SE. 2 brigades are in depth on Falel-Yamu road covering Falel and 1 brigade astride Tiddim road at Bishenpur where Silchar track also enters plain. North of Imphal 23 Div on right, 5 Div less 1 brigade in centre and 1 brigade 17 Div on left are advancing NE and north and have reached points 23 miles NE and 10 miles north of Imphal. Kohima area 2 Div advanced SE from Dimapur cleared road Dimapur-Kohima to the outskirts of Kohima and relieved original Kohima garrison. Heavy hand to hand fighting in Kohima where enemy held northern, eastern and southern outskirts. 361 Bde has withdrawn to a position astride Dimapur-Kohima road NS 32-38. 93 33 Corps and 33 Brigade established in area Dimapur-Bokajan whilst 23 Bde continues to operate in areas Mokokchung-Wokha.

3. Mogaung Valley:

Own Troops. Chinese forces continue to advance slowly against stiff enemy resistance. On main front forward troops are 12 miles south of Shadurup. On left flank village 9 miles north of Ranaing has been occupied.

4. North Burma:

Own Troops. Successful ambushes carried out by our lancers between 32 and 25 miles north of Myitkyina although enemy still holding out 40 miles north of Myitkyina.

5. 3 Ind Div.

(a) Enemy. Japanese buildup in area estimated at equivalent of 16 battalions but all not in contact
and many are composite units made up of L of C Troops. Forces include however one regiment HQ and at least 2 battalions of 2 Div and bulk of 24 Indep mixed bde from South Burma and 5 battalions from Salween where Japanese dispose now only 4 battalions.

(b) Own Troops. Main activity centered round White City. Where 77 Bde repulsed determined enemy attacks with heavy casualties to enemy. 14 Bde has been blocking railway Wunthi-Indaw and 111 Bde road Pinlebu-Pinbon with 3 detached columns carrying out demolitions at road Shamo-Myitkyina.

Section 4 - Air Command. General

1. High effort maintained during period, particularly 4 Corps area, where 9 of 11 Vengeance and Hurribomber squadrons operated, total sorties flown were RAF 6967, USAAF in B A C 5243, 16 USAF 110. This is the first time total sorties more than 10,000.

2. Of 227 enemy sorties 204 were concentrated over Manipur area in spasmodic series of attacks mainly on airfields. 4 RAF Dakotas are reported missing following one attack.

3. Armament developments included use of 500 lb incendiary clusters. 65 land parachute fragmentation bombs.

4. No. 12 US Group comprising 4 Mitchell B.25 squadrons has joined Strategic Air Force. No. 2 Squadron IAF has begun operating. This is the first IAF G/A Squadron to move into the line. No. 8 Squadron IAF which began operating December 1943, has completed 1,000 sorties.

Strategic Air Force.

5. 382 short tons were dropped by USAF bombers in 365 sorties. Most fruitful result was destruction of 2 spars of Sittang bridge, 2 at Natmauk and one of Sinthe bridge in addition to further damage on other railway bridges and installations. Minelaying operations continued and shipping at Port Blair was attacked, near misses being scored against 3 N/V. 6 RAF heavy bombers concentrated their attacks upon railways dropping CM-IN-4348 (6 May 44)
227 short tons in 156 sorties, the raid on Pegu Junction by 9 Wellingtons was particularly successful. Heavy raids also made against Maymyo, Moulmein and Mandalay.

3rd Tactical Air Force.

7. Most of the 1143 Vengeance sorties and all the 1257 sorties of the 4 Hurribomber squadrons were flown over Manipur front in direct support of ground troops. G/A Beaufighters and Hurricanes destroyed or damaged 8 locomotives, 427 rivercraft and 150 M/T. Only 2 G/A Beaufighter squadrons now operating.

8. One fighter-recco squadron N. Arakan Front and two on 4 Corps front flew 748 sorties.

9. Defensive sorties by R.A.F. fighters number 1353 and by U.S.A.A.F. 648. Although owing to contraction of warning area around Imphal as result of enemy infiltration rate of interception by Spitfires scoring 2-3-10 was unavoidably low, nevertheless there was compensation in successful intrusion by USAF Lightnings (P-38's) over airfields used by enemy for his attacks. Total score by Lightnings in 5 successful raids reached following figures: 15-0-10 on ground and 14-0-6 in air. 2 Lightnings damaged.

10. American fighter bombers with total of 1134 sorties continued attacks on enemy positions, supply dumps and communications in Northern sector - their most spectacular exploit was interception without loss by Air Command Mustangs (P-51) of 12 Oscars, 3-0-3 claimed. Air Command long-range P-51 cut Shwell Bridge each carrying 2 x 100 lb bombs.

Other Activities.


12. G/R sorties numbered 141. Pro aircraft flew 121 sorties

CM-IN-4348 (6 May 44)
and covered for first time Kra Isthmus railway and parts of Indo-
China.

13. Combined Allied claim India-Burma theater for period
32-6-36: Losses through enemy action R.A.F. 12 U.S.A.A.F. 2
aircraft.

Section 5 - Administration.

1. Assam L. of C.

(a) Reference SEACOS 141 of 18th April, Section 5.
Dispatches of POL by all agencies for period 5 to
11 April averaged 1025 tons per day.

(b) Railway emergency scheme was extended on 17 April
to give full military control over section Akhaura
to Fadapur in addition to sections notified in
SEACOS 141.

(c) Dispatches military stores by all agencies 12 to
20 April 37478 tons, including POL, giving daily
average 4164 tons per day against target 4745 tons.

(d) Deliveries 11 to 20 April by Chandranathpur-
Manipur road pipeline 1,025,700 gallons.

2. Reinforcements.

Under present operational conditions, arrangements have
been made to fly in reinforcements for the forward formations
in Assam.

3. Leave ex India

At the meeting at GHQ(I) on April 7 it was decided that,
out of the 175 passages to U.K. per month allotted by the War
Office, there would be 125 passages per month for personnel of
the services. Sub-allotment to the 3 services and to Armies/
Commands has not yet been made.

Section 6 - Review of Planning.

In light of information brought back by Axiom Party,
CM-IN-4348 (6 May 44)
planning is at present being concentrated on future operations for reconquest of Burma and on the study of small amphibious operations to take place in 1944 without outside resources.

T.O.O. 031421FG

Footnote: SEACOS 147 is CM-IN-2162 (3 May 44) CC/S SEACOS 144 is CM-IN-17829 (24 Apr 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFO: CG AAF
OPD
G-2
Col. Park
LOG

CM-IN-4348 (6 May 44) 1412Z hrt
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence

INTERVIEW WITH COLONEL JOHN R. ALLISON, A. G.

You have all heard a great deal about the operations which we have just completed in Burma — the operations which are actually still going on. I don't want to get into details; most of you have been bothered with details of this force since its conception about six months ago in the War Department. I want to go through it as quickly as possible, touch on the highlights, touch on its implications, touch on what might be the future of movement of troops by air. To do that and to give you a good background, it will be necessary for me to start right at first.

I think you are familiar with the way this organization started. General Wingate, fighting in Burma, developed a technique which was merely a new application of an old principle of warfare — an old cavalry action, something like the cavalry action which had taken place during the Civil War. He was a firm believer that well-led, well-managed troops could engage enemy line of communication troops, that a small number of troops could go behind the enemy's line and create great destruction, great havoc, and would create opportunities for the main bodies of the troops to advance. To make it a little clearer here, I will show you the picture in Northern Burma.
Northern Burma is roughly a triangle. The western part of this triangle is the Chindwin River. Here on the Chindwin River the British were facing the Japanese. As you know, now the Japanese have advanced and are now attacking Imphal. When we first arrived there, Tiddim was in our hands, and Tamu. We planned to use Tamu as a take-off airdrome for glider assault. This would relieve us of having to clear these mountains here, which meant going to about 8500 feet, a very, very difficult operation for a C-47. But the Japanese came in and took this airdrome just before we shoved off and so it was impossible to use it.

This is the western side of the triangle.

The eastern side of the triangle is roughly here on the Salween River. The Chinese are holding the Japanese in this very high and very mountainous country. At this time all the Chinese are doing there are holding.

The apex of the triangle goes up to the Himalaya mountains. Across the Apex is the hump route into China. It is a very difficult route to fly for many reasons — weather not all of them — the fact that the hump run is vulnerable to attack by Japanese which keeps our pilots from coming down into this lower area and coming across where the flying is relatively easy. There have been a number of times recently when the Japanese have made fighter sweeps into this territory. On some of the fighter sweeps we know that they have taken off from down here — and that all they do is to fly up into this area, turn around and come back. There are so many planes crossing the hump #1 on a good day that it is impossible for a Japanese flight of eighteen airplanes to take off here, go up there and turn around, and come back without running into five or six transports — unarmed transports —
which, of course, are very easy targets for fighters...

If we had fighter bases down here and radar where we could intercept their movements or if we just had radar in this area, so that we could plot the Japanese movement as they came up to make a raid on the hump line, and transmit that information to airplanes flying across the hump, they could take evasive action and fly north and avoid being intercepted by Japanese. But right now, or up until very recently, we had no bases in this area, we had absolutely no warning, we knew nothing about the movement of Japanese airplanes here, except which came through in very meager intelligence reports and, of course, late, and in no time to do us any good. So, if it was possible for the hump to move down and cross lower down on the apex of the triangle, it would be much, much easier to get supplies into China.

General Stilwell right now is pushing against the Japanese in the upper part of this triangle. I had no opportunity to visit his troops — but I have been told by people who have been there that his men are doing a superb job and that they are pushing the Japanese hard in this area.

This is the main Japanese line of supply. This railroad goes all the way from Rangoon to Myitikina. It's very long and very vulnerable. But the front being out here so far away it has been very safe. Airplanes have been able to go in and break that line of supply — but it is just for a matter of hours. It isn't very difficult to repair a railroad, and the Japanese are very adept at it. You break an a railroad bridge and it seems as though the next day they've got it back up.

In his operations last year, Wingate came into this area and back out again. In doing so he depended upon mobility and surprise, and he did create
a great deal of destruction and havoc in this area. But in leaving the country it was necessary to leave his wounded behind. He just wasn't equipped to take them out — he left people sitting beside the trail with wounds and broken legs; or left them to die. So he asked, in this campaign, some form of aviation be produced with which he could evacuate the troops.

He presented this at the Quebec Conference. He sold the leaders on the feasibility of this type of warfare, the advantages it had, the confusion it would cause behind the Japanese lines.

The U.S. Army Air Forces was directed to form an air unit which would evacuate Wingate's wounded as he walked through Burma. When General Arnold called in Colonel Cochran and myself he said: "I am giving you 200 L-5 and L-1 type aircraft. I want you to go in there and take out General Wingate's wounded." Then, with a twinkle in his eye he said, "I not only want you to do that ... but I want you the U.S.A.A.F. to spearhead General Wingate's operations."

With that in mind we started around the Pentagon to round up the necessary equipment to have an air force spearhead a land operation. We had nothing to go on — we had no experience. I had read in the Reader's Digest who Wingate was and what he had done. Cochran immediately went to London to see him. I stayed here.

When I was in China I had often flown over this area. When you fly over it once, low down, and see the jungle, the mountains and the streams and very few roads, you know that the thing that stops movement here, of course, is that there is no way on the ground to get around. You can walk through,
but it is awful hard and takes a long time. So the obvious answer was to
move them by air. I snooped around in the offices in the Air Force here;
I ordered some gliders and transports and light planes. Having been there,
I knew there was not enough fighter aviation in that theatre, nor bomber
aviation, to take care of the present commitments that the theatre commanders
had been given, and also to give our force the protection we wanted them to
have. So I asked for a squadron of fighters, a squadron of B-25’s. We didn’t
got the B-25’s until we got over to India and were able to send a cable back
and ask for the B-25’s. The theatre said it couldn’t give them to us.
General Arnold immediately wired back there were 12 B-25’s on the way, and
that we were to produce the crews for them. We didn’t have enough crews to
man the airplanes we already had — but we scooted around and got some crews
and started into this operation with one squadron of B-25’s and one squadron
of P-51A’s, one group of gliders (roughly 100 gliders and 75 glider pilots)
and one squadron of troop carrier. The gliders were divided up into three
squadrons.

We planned to have as many as three operations going at the same time.
The strategic plan for operations this year were for the people on the
fronts to hold. General Stilwell was going to advance as far as possible;
General Wingate was going to walk in one long-range penetration of troops
from the west here, cutting the Japanese supply lines behind the Japanese
front here facing the British 4th Corps. They were to go into the center of
Burma and be joined by another long range penetration brigade. Roughly
30 to 40,000 men were to walk down into this area to disrupt the Japanese
communications behind Stilwell, join Wingate here. And a third brigade was
was to walk in across the Salween River here and spearhead a possible Chinese advance in this area, cutting the Japanese communications along the Burma Road. All three brigades were to join in Central Burma, fighting in the heart of the communications, and then pull out before the Monsoon. That was the plan.

In General Wingate’s mind there had never been any idea of pulling his troops out. The first time I saw him I said, “What about the Monsoon?”

“We are going in this time to stay,” he said.

I talked to his troops. Although in the plan it had been set down that the troops were to withdraw, the troops themselves believed they were going in there to stay and I believe they are in there to stay right now.

That was the strategic plan for this season’s operation.

Because of Hump limitations General Stilwell said it would be impossible to transport the three to four hundred thousand men in the brigade across the Hump, have them walk in on this front, and also transport their supplies and equipment across and re-supply them by air. You all know the difficulty of Hump transportation. General Stilwell was right. This was before we arrived in this theatre. Cochran was the advance agent. He had just arrived, and he was called into the meeting. Admiral Mountbatten, Stilwell, Auchenreoch, the chiefs of staff of all the forces in India, and General Shennault in China were represented there. This discussion was going on — General Wingate’s operations had been practically cancelled.

The plan had been changed. He was merely to walk in on this front and cut the communication lines of the Japanese who were fighting the Fourth Corps, and to come in and cut the communications of the Japanese who were facing...
Stilwell. He was terribly disappointed because it just seemed there was no answer.

At that time General Wingate did not know what our unit proposed to do for him — neither did anyone else in the theater. We just came there, someone said, "Here comes an outfit — I wonder what they are for."

Cochrane walked in, and they told him the plan had been changed. He said there was no use to do that, that we brought a unit here to take General Wingate anywhere he wants to go in Burma and put him down.

The first reaction to that was, "Can you do it?"

Well, if you know Cochrane, you know what the answer was. "Of course we can do it."

"How many people can you put down here with your force," General Wingate asked.

We had a small force, only 13 C-47's and 100 gliders. Cochrane and Olsen began to figure. He said, "Well, if you streamline your brigade to between two and three thousand men, we can put them down all right in the Central part of Burma here, just carry in one brigade."

General Wingate said, "Well, can you do that in two weeks time?"

"We can do it in one weeks time and probably do it in less than that."

It wasn't quite that easy but it caught on and sold, and certainly sold with General Wingate and with Nimitz, who were very enthusiastic. At this meeting Admiral Nimitz said, "Boy, you are the first ray of sunshine seen in this theater in a long, long time." Wingate, who is the kind of man who is always one jump ahead of you, certainly quick to see anything that was new and to see what could be done with it, said, "Now are you going to do this?"
"We are going to take gliders over, as many as we can, take in engineer equipment and build an airfield, take in the rest of your men in our DC-3s. The Troop Carrier Command here has about 180 DC-3s. Why can't we get them in on the show?"

From then on the whole thing changed. The plan now was to walk in one brigade in front of Stilwell and fly in three more. That was what we had.

It was quite difficult getting our unit up to the front. These two airbases were operated from — just before Balzan and Holligale, across this range of mountains here, roughly the high point, 7200 feet. The glider problem on the first night's operation is perhaps the most difficult one that ever will be undertaken. It was to get DC-3s up to 8000 feet with two fully loaded gliders on strings. There was about a three-quarter moon, it was hazy, and we had to fly 3 hours and 15 minutes in enemy territory. The pilot and every man knew when we took off that no matter what the outcome was — we were going over here and out there — the DC-3 didn't have enough gasoline to pull back to friendly land. It could get back all right by itself, but with two gliders it could never get back to friendly territory. Of course, people shook their heads and said, "Can't do it."

As a matter of fact, we first went to India. One officer stood up and said, "You can't tow two fully loaded gliders behind a DC-3." We started to tell five to show him it could be done, but we ended up by towing two overloaded gliders; 12-man gliders were carrying as many as 20 men. That is all right. You have a nice landing ground to land on. The landing gear is critical at about 4800 pounds.
Anyway, to make a long story short, we brought gliders across here. In doing so we dropped about ten of them off here in the mountains before we got to enemy land. These ten landed okay. No one was hurt. Dropped of in enemy territory, nine. The crew of seven accounted for. The crew of six got back intact. Out of seven gliders two men got back. The rest of them were taken prisoners, and when I left two gliders were still unaccounted for. We had planned two waves of gliders to take off, one to go in to this field here, which we called Broadway, one to go in to this field, Malcomdy. General Wingate said for strategic reasons he wanted to put down 77th brigade in this area here, and the 11th brigade here. He wanted to put down the main body of these troops here, wanted to put down 2,000 men here in this area as a strategic diversion, so Cochran or myself would get the fighter to go out, look over the area — this is ten we first arrived — and pick out the spots on the ground that looked as though they would make the most plausible landing area, send out photo reconnaissance, and have these areas photographed and from the photos decide which ones on which to construct airstrips. We would show those areas to General Wingate, say, "Here in this area we should put down an airstrip, one here, here, and here, for tactical reasons. Do you suggest that?"

There was one here, one in Broadway, Piccadilly, and one here at Colcharingking. After photographing the first time, about a month before we made a landing we stayed completely, didn't go near them, didn't want the Japanese to get on to our plan. The idea behind the whole thing was surprise. It was just impossible for the Japanese to guard every open glade and forest in this area. There wasn't any cultivated field,
just nothing but jungle. So we stayed away from them.

The afternoon before take-off we sent out photo reconnaissance. The men flew very low over the field and took pictures. Twenty minutes before take-off in gliders the pictures were back and on the table in front of us. Looking at this field here we saw it was completely blocked by trees, logs, and stumps. The Japanese had either just by luck blocked that field or gotten on to our plan. General Vingate stood there and looked at it. He said, 'Well, we can't take a chance. The chances are that they knew something has come, know that we have gliders, but don't have our plan. They knew we have gliders and know this would be a likely spot because the year before a 20-3 landed here in the forest and picked up some of his troops and took them out. This place was photographed and a picture put in Life. The Japanese knowing that probably figured, well, okay. We'll catch them this year. They are going to come down here again.' So it couldn't have been more than three days before our proposed take-off that they blocked this field, because one of the men coming back from a mission over here about three or four days before had passed over the field at low altitude and seen it, and had reported that everything looked all right on the field.

We thought perhaps they figured. Well, the Americans are going to use gliders, coming in somewhere. This is as good a spot as any, so let's block it. Right on the beam. We planned that if this field was blocked we would put the troops down here in this field because there was a possibility that maybe the planes had looked out and the Japanese knew what we were going to do, and perhaps they would be at this point waiting for us with machineguns. The thing to do was to take all the gliders that first
night and put them in here, and just assault the field and take it away from the Japanese that there were there. We figured the Japanese could hardly afford more than a company to guard it. We would have machineguns, the fields carefully mapped, the photographs projected on to bedsheets and very carefully plotted where each glider would go down, what each crew would do when it landed, what the assault crews would do, where they would go, picked out the possible strong points on the field, where the Japanese would have machineguns, if on the ground. We had a certain number of gliders. The first ones to land were detailed to go right for those strong points, hit them, and have the troops get out. Those troops, armed with tommyguns, were to go into the wood as fast as they could. We figured the Japanese in there would be asleep, we would be there before they get out of bed, and kill them. That was the plan. Thank goodness, the Japanese were not there.

The first night we put 80 gliders into this field. The photographs showed an excellent landing ground, and right at first when we were making recon of this area I flew low over this field and looked at it. It looked very good, looked as though you could land a fighter on it right there, something the photographs didn't show. In this area the Japanese logged teak. It takes about seven years to get a teak log up in the wood to Rangoon. It has to season so many years. They pull it down from the mountains by elephants to the stream and float it down the river. This field was a thoroughfare for teak logs. In years past in the wet seasons they skidded teak logs across this open glade in the jungle down to the river. ? The soil is clay soil and it made ruts about 3½ or three or four feet wide and a foot and a half deep. It was just like concrete and perfect glider
troops, there wasn't any way to avoid them.

The first wave of approximately 40 gliders came in here and landed, and of course the first ones got down all right. But as they rolled along this field I saw we had them overloaded, very heavily loaded. They would hit the ground and go on across the field and it looked as though they would never slow up. They didn't slow up until they hit the glider traps. The wheels would come off, go down on skids, and stay there. They were so heavily loaded with ammunition, guns and food that the troops took a long time to move out of the way. We expected resistance here. Other gliders were coming in fast, coming in one right after the other, and you couldn't stop them. Once a glider is out loose you can't stop it. It is coming down, and you just have to get out of the way. The first gliders came in all right. As they came in faster and faster they began to pile up in the rutted area, they would one in and hit the rate, and it was pretty tough. There were wounded in the gliders and other people were trying to get out, never knowing when another glider was going to run into them. You couldn't hear them. It was hazy, the moon was getting low on the horizon. You couldn't hear the gliders coming in. All of a sudden the gliders would touch the ground and you could hear the terrible noises. Then you couldn't start to run. You would be there trying to get the wounded out. You couldn't run until you saw the gliders. We would get 200 yards out in front, see the shape. It is going to the left or to the right or come right down. Then you made up your mind to run. It was terribly harassing.

We had three gliders down without cracking them up. All the rest piled up on the field. Two gliders hit the trees. The casualties in the
two gliders were heavy. We had figured out things very-carefully, had measured the ground, had it all figured, calculated the landing of the gliders, had a system worked out so the pilots wouldn't have to do anything. We had a system of lights. The first gliders were Pathfinders, they would come in, put up a system of marker lights so when the gliders came in there would be no danger. Then when we got on to the field it was all spoiled. That is just an operational hazard, one of those things.

The first wave of gliders came in, approximately 40, and the patrols went out and reported no Japanese. We all considered how to stop the second wave of gliders from coming in. It looked as though we had completely surprised the enemy. Rather than risk any more lives trying to get those gliders down on the field that was already completely full of wrecked gliders we radioed back and told the people back in the rear to stop the remainder of the gliders from coming in.

Looking at it the next morning, it was a desolate scene. There were parts of gliders strewn all over the field. There were 23 dead on the field and many wounded. The British brigadier in command of the brigade was a little bit blue. He said, "We have these wounded here. If the Japanese do attack us I wouldn't be worried at all if I could move. We have to stay and face for the wounded can't move." We immediately radioed and just before noon they landed in the field, wounded unescorted, picked up the wounded, and flew right back into friendly territory. I talked to the airborne engineering, Lt. Brecken, who had gone in with me. I said it looked pretty tough there with all the wreckage on the field, the elephant grass growing all around. It looked as though it would be mighty difficult to build an airstrip. I asked him if he thought we could build an
an airdrome.

"Well, sir, I think so," he said.

"How long will it take you?"

"Will this afternoon be too late?"

He wasn't kidding. At 7:30 that night the first DC-3 landed there.

We had 65 DC-3's and which put out about a thousand men, several hundred mules, lots of ammunition, guns and equipment. Everybody's spirits began to rise and from then on it was just an operation of taking off from India after dark, landing in Burma, putting out our troops, and going back to India. On the second day we had a landing strip there with a big dispersal area a mile long and 500 feet wide, with electric motor, lights, and completely illuminated. We could have taken in over 500 sorties a night without any trouble at all at that airdrome. On the second night, 2000 men were put out at this point. Then the gliders were taken off and brought back to India.

The next day the Japanese found and bombed it. All of our people were gone. 1600 of them walked out here to operate against this line of supply which is a road to Mandalay, Lashio, Lozin and up to Myitkyina. This, incidentally, is the main Japanese line of supply for the 18th Division, which is now facing General Stilwell. Fortunately, we did put down 1,600 men which walked across here, a 100-man patrol here, and organised the hill people here and gave them guns so they could do some work against the Japanese line of supply going into Myitkyina.

The headquarters of the 11th Brigade was down here. They walked across here and out across this river, and they are to set up in this area, right here on the rail line. They are to cut the rail line here and to cut
communications in this area. The rest of the 11th Brigade was put down here at Broadway and marched down through here, through Katha (?) and over to this point to join their headquarters. They are operating in this general area here. The 77th Brigade was the one we originally intended to put down. They are now holding this airdrome with around a thousand men. The airdrome is well defended, has around 20 anti-aircraft guns, four Bofors, the rest .50 caliber machine guns. Intermittently it had a flight of Spitfires there — but unfortunately the Japanese destroyed them one day.

On the eighth day of the invasion the Japanese discovered this field and came over with 20 Zeros. I don't know whether they discovered it or not, when they but they sent a patrol of 20 Zeros up into this area to lay for us. We came across this field we had radar on it, Spitfires and some very good anti-aircraft. They came across and must have gotten the shock of their lives because the radar had then reported and knew exactly where they were; the Spits jumped them and shot down four. The anti-aircraft shot down one before we they could get away. We lost one Spit in this engagement. On another engagement the RAF squadron leaders, having been getting a number of false alerts from our own airplanes which were in this area all the time, decided this was not a real attack and wouldn't take his airplanes off. Of course, he lost them all. Those are things that will happen.

The 77th Brigade has moved from Broadway to Malu (?) here, just above here, and established a road block. I visited them there. They are now entrenched on the railroad with around 5,000 men, just above the town of Malu. I arrived there the day after they occupied the point and they had run about a battalion of Japanese off the top of a small hill and taken it over. They had a hundred Japanese bodies there when I walked up. They lost twenty men
themselves. They are there to stay. Just before I left they were getting ready to build DC-3 strips to land and supply them, rather than drop supplies to them by air. It is very expensive when you fly over and drop supplies to troops. In the first place, you lose 20 percent of your lift and weight, and if you don't have expert pilots the supplies are dropped all over the countryside. In trying to collect them and round them up the enemy gets lots of them. Lots of the friendly troops never get them -- so it is actually better to build airstrips and land and supply the troops in this manner.

We built an airstrip here in the Valley at Manton (†) and put down the 14th Brigade. This was the fourth brigade to go in. They were just putting it down when I left. This is one place where we got the jump on General Wingate. He came in one day and said, "You know this point here on the map. I would like you to put an airstrip here. I want to put in the 14th Brigade."

We had had an idea that he was going to say something like that, so we just beat him to the gum. We smiled and said, "General Wingate, we built an airstrip there last night."

He was very pleasantly surprised. He was terribly pleased with the whole operation -- like a child with a new toy. When he came into the theatre he wasn't very popular with the British Army. He told them they were fighting the war wrong in the area. He stood up and told them -- and he told us right out in open conversation that the Japanese were going to come in and out these supply lines. He knew these people were going to be in a panic and going to have these losses down here. That is exactly what happened. He came out and told the British officers that they weren't fighting the war.
right — and of course that is no way to win friends. We were associated with Wingate as his own little air force and for that reason we weren’t popular. 

There had been a great deal of argument between Wingate and the RAF. Wingate had told the RAF how to run the air force, and they sort of rebelled against it. There was an argument about close support using radio-telephone and smoke. The RAF said it wasn’t practicable, and we came in and, not knowing about this argument, went up to General Wingate and said, "We’ve brought all these fancy radio sets, and we’ve brought this colored smoke and stuff. We have a plan for supporting your troops by the use of smoke and radio."

"That’s exactly what I’ve been telling the RAF they can do," he said. So he went to the RAF and told them, "Now, you all go on and you do your fighting here. I’m going over here in this area and fight the Japanese — and I’ve got a bunch of people going along with me that say they can do everything you say you can’t do." You know the kind of reaction that got ... we weren’t very popular with the RAF. But it all worked out very fine in the end, and when I left there there was an RAF commander up in this area who had completely reversed himself on what he would do for Wingate. When I left things seemed to be pulling together a little bit better on the whole thing.

But we went in under those handicaps ... however we did in this area give support to Wingate on the ground. I’m awfully proud with the way the air and ground forces support the ground forces in action. It was a beautiful piece of work. Wingate’s forces moved in here over the town of Malu to where they overlooked the town. The Japanese were in Malu in some strength; they had mortars and machine guns, and they were firing on our positions up there. The first mission we had we came over, and the British smoked the ravine near the town through which a small stream ran. The Japanese were lobbing shells out of the
Our B-25's came over very low with frag bombs and completely sealed that gully with frags causing a terrible commotion in there. The firing stopped and the British said, "That is wonderful." The radio-telephone work was very good that day.

General Arnold had given us the privilege of picking our fighters, and we had some very good ones. They dive bombed the targets, and they would hit them. Then the British started calling their shots for them. First they would put down smokes. They would put down smokes over a few buildings on this side of the tracks and say, "Will you hit the buildings? There is a machine gun nest over there." The first bomb went right in there. Then they began to say, "A hundred yards north of that point there are some Japanese. Put your bombs in there." The boys would put them right where they were calling them. Of course, they were terribly impressed.

Then, to climax it all -- we had 75 mm. cannon in our B-25's, and the whole action degenerated into this: There was a boy named Thompson on the ground. He would say, "Bombers from Thompson. Do you see that white house in the southern part of the town?"

"Yes, we see it."

"Will you get that for us?"

Then they would fly right up to the front door and let go.

"How do you see the house with the red roof about a block up the street?"

"Yes," the bombers would say.

"Will you get that for us?"

And the bombers would fly up to the front door of that and let go with their 75 mm. It was very, very impressive.
Before we did this we tried to give them the proper slant on air power and the use of air power as close support. We told them we were not tanks, and could not do many things with an airplane, and that in the end they would have to win the battles on the ground. But that there was one thing we could do for them — that we could deny the enemy freedom of movement. We did deny the enemy freedom of movement. We had absolute air superiority in this area. The Japanese, when they would come up, would have to come up from down in here. The Japanese in this area had seven very nice airdromes in this little circle. The reason we didn’t land on them with gliders was that those airdromes were defended with anti-aircraft guns, automatic weapons and machine guns. Whenever we would fly over them in our airplanes we would always get shot at.

To land there in a glider is a dangerous operation, and particularly if the Japanese got wind of your plan. In landing in a glider they could cover you with machine guns as you landed on the narrow strip — they could make it very difficult. So, instead of landing on the airdromes here in the area in which we were going to operate, we landed here, here, and here — put the troops down in safety and then marched in here.

In those operations when I left we had probably run almost 1000 DC-3 sorties, and had not lost a single DC-3. The credit goes to the RAF branch of the Troop Carrier Command and the U.S. Army Air Force branch of the Troop Carrier Command. They did a superb job of flying the troops in here and putting them off and getting back. They went into strange airports, and every bit of the operations was done at night. All glider operations were done at night, and all the transport operations were done at night. The wounded were evacuated.
in the daytime by light aircraft. A man could be wounded here, or there, or anywhere in this battle area in the afternoon and that night he would be in a hospital in India. We based our light planes on this field, this field, and this field. We had around 32 here. They were used to carry mortar ammunition, rifle ammunition to troops here. Wherever the troops would stop, in any area, they would clear a strip of about 600 feet long -- that is big enough for the light airplanes to go in and land and take out the wounded. Whenever they would have wounded they would clear a little opening in the jungle. In this area there are a great many paddy fields -- they would knock down the top of several paddies and the light planes would land there, pick up the wounded, take them back to the air drome and that night a DC-3 would pick them up and take them back to the hospital.

The morale of these troops was very good. They are good fighting people. I had an opportunity to work very closely with them and get to know them. I had absolutely the highest regard for General Wingate. He was a great leader, and he certainly did handle his troops well. He used African troops, Indian Nationals, Gurkas. Gurkas are the little people from up in the hills... fighting is their creed. He used English, also and he picked his leaders very carefully. His idea was that if you led a man well regardless of his color he would make a good fighter. He'd tell his officers, "You've got there a company of big west African negroes. If they are not good fighters, it is because you can't train them and you can't lead them. If you can't do that I will get someone who can." And he did have people who could lead them. They were quite proud of their West Africans. They were awfully good fighters.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 5-3-72

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
When we came into this area, as you know, we had no organization.
We had no paper work and no typewriters as we didn't put anything down.
The British sort of scratched their heads at that, but it was all right.
When we would come to do an operation they would start pinning us down and
as it was to tell them generally what it was. We would say, "Oh, to hell
with it -- let's just do it." But not the British. The British were very
thorough and very efficient. They said, "If anything goes wrong with this
operation, it won't be our fault because we'll be ready." And they were.

They would take these troops and we would give them a glider, and
they would make their troops get in the glider, get out, get in and out,
completely armed. In and out -- stow their equipment. A funny thing happened.
These little Gurkhas were very amusing people. A British officer had a
detachment of Gurkhas. They were going in the glider and out. They had
never seen a glider before -- but they kept this up for awhile until they
couldn't stand it any longer. They are very loyal people and very loyal to the
British. They selected a representative and sent him to the British officer.
He said, "Sir (they must have thought the Americans were trying to pull some-
thing over on the British in this operation) we don't want you to get the
idea that we don't want to go along on this operation, or that we are afraid ...
but we thought we better tell you -- those machines don't have any motors in
them."

But they all went along and landed. The Gurkhas actually aren't good
air soldiers. They got terribly sick, and when they landed we had to pick
some of them up and take them out of the airplanes.
The people that went into this field were all British troops -- picked troops of north country Englishmen -- and they were good and determined troops. They were going in there to take that field and I don't think had any trouble at all. I don't recall a man getting sick.

Altogether in the first operation we carried in around 1300 mules. We had no trouble at all. We did have a mule kick a hole in an airplane. It was only necessary to shoot two mules out of 1300 and that was pretty good. For the most part they took to the air very well.

It was a very, very interesting operation. I am not going to make any predictions about the future of battle in this area. This railroad line here is up and completely out, and there are British troops of a very determined nature sitting across it. When I left, the troops were marching down this road. The other brigade was being landed and marching down to cut this road here. There are the two main lines of supply for the Japanese which are now fighting here at Imphal and in this area.

In this area there are approximately 1500 men, and they are all fighting troops -- not supply troops. They are being supplied by air. The supplies are being dropped to them at night. They are in here, and they are in here to stay. The 111th Brigade is across this railroad here. The 77th Brigade had the railroad completely blocked here. The 18th Brigade is to operate in here in the Imphal area. The 16th Brigade was put in to walk down here and out this road here.

The Japanese are using the Chindwin River. Traffic down along here is pretty heavy. The RAF in this area has mostly Hurricanes for fighters, and their range is very limited. They can get out here, but then their operations are very limited. For our operations we use Mustangs in this area,
because of the great range of this particular airplane. The RAF are operating along here to keep the river completely free of all movement in the daytime, and there is no movement in the daytime. What I believe the Japanese do is to go up about this far in the daytime, and then at night they use small boats and go up here so far and then pull off in the bushes in the daytime. The next night they move a little farther and then pull off into the bushes again. This is a very difficult way to operate.

One thing about the Japanese ... they found out that a man with a rifle and a handful of bullets makes a very formidable weapon. He also knows that we won't over-extend ourselves. We won't go out and fight him unless we can supply ourselves. That is how it has been. He has had freedom of movement because we have found it impossible to supply ourselves and commit ourselves to a big battle in this area. Therefore the Japanese has freedom of action.

But in flying over here in the daytime, the minute you cross the river and start down these roads here you would never see any form of life. The Japanese do not move in the daytime because we have complete air superiority for this area. The Japanese do not bring their airplanes into here -- that is a very difficult way to operate. So their operations are terribly limited all through here. We do have air superiority and they do not move in the daytime.

These roads have been cut. These people are now being supplied by air. When I left they were in the process of moving in two divisions of British troops in here by air to defend Imphal. They will be supplied by air. It is my personal opinion that in this whole engagement it is going to be very
embarrassing to the Japanese. I just don't see how they can win. They have
great difficulty in getting their supplies up there, and now that General
Wingate's troops are across their supply lines it is going to be increasingly
difficult. The British are going to be increasingly supplied in this area by
air, and I can see but one outcome to the battle. I think it's a lucky thing
for us that the Japanese did attack for now they are committed to battle, and
I believe that their losses will be very high.

General Stilwell is pushing very hard against them here. They can't
afford to take troops in this area. If they do, they will lose those key-
points here in northern Burma. I may be a little optimistic about the whole
situation, but to me it looks rather good.

I don't know the exact number of airplanes the Troop Carrier Command
has committed to supply these 15,000 troops in here, but when I left they
were using roughly 20 airplanes, and there were roughly 12,000 troops.

The implications of this operation for the future are that you can
move troops by air -- and particularly in this kind of territory where lines
of communications are difficult, you can move them by air, put them down and
supply them.

If the troops had been available to move into here, we could have
moved in -- and if the airplanes had been available to supply them, we could
have moved in just as many divisions as the British had to move in. There was
absolutely nothing to stop us. We had a great big airstrip there and we were
putting troops down every night. We could put 2000 men down each night on
one airstrip. And if we had wanted to we could have built just as many air-
strips in that area in the dry season as we pleased.
This airdrome was built by ten men in eight hours. It seems fantastic -- for it is a big airdrome. But it can be done. That is one of the reasons we are figuring on putting a lot of airplanes in this area over here to fight the Japanese. People say, "Well, you don't have airdromes for them. How are you going to get you airdromes?" My answer is that this is a pretty good airdrome here that was built by ten men in eight hours. It is difficult, but there are a lot of places where you can do it very easily.

Mr. Stimson: You had a bulldozer, hadn't you?
A: Yes, sir. We carried in on this operation, gliders, bulldozers, tractors, jeeps, trailers, and mules.

Mr. Stimson: That was that first night?
A: Yes, sir. The first night.
We had electric machinery to set up a lighting system so transports could come in and land at night.

One thing that helped our operations was the fact we did have air superiority. And one of the reasons we had complete freedom of the air at that time was the fact we had one squadron of P-38's and almost every day -- every other day anyway -- they were down flying over this area, flying over the city of Mandalay. And if there was a Japanese airplane on the ground down there, they went down and get it. The Japanese couldn't afford to bring their air force up and leave it here. We caught them here about five days later and P-38's destroyed 16 on the ground. Here at Mandalay about two weeks later the Japs made an attack on the Arakan in the morning and came over here to land. Radar picked them up -- P-38's were sent out and caught them landing, destroyed 21 of them on the ground and six of them in the air. That makes it very, very difficult for the Japanese Air Force to operate. We do have long range fighters that go out and get them.
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

May 3, 1944

FROM: Main III Army Group S.E.A.

TO: War Office

Rptd: B1 AAI

Military Attache China
N3 Force E New Zealand
BAD Washington
Middle East
B1 Brisbane (pass COIC HQ)
G1K East Africa
G1K Casablanca

No: 177/073

SITREP 111.

ONE: ARAKAN. P/F captures PM 6546 states one thousand five hundred RPT3 on way to join 55 Div. in one and five hundred RPT3 arrived 18 Mar. Body of 55 IGOR Regt recovered PM 6546. No patrols report few enemy seen area PF 152 PM 4846 (2846) and numbers with enemy area PM 5147 PM 5047. Large number of enemy with mules reported arrived 1 May NAIDAUNG PM 2345 from north. No major change. Considerable patrolling by both sides and minor local enemy attacks on areas PM 4442 PM 4942 night 1/2 May repulsed. Tps of 81 (WA) Div killed twenty eight JAPANESE area 012A PM 6845 29/30 April. Our can six killed four wounded.

TWO: KALADAN. Ungranted report three hundred enemy arrived 27 April KIANGMI PM 8288 and still patrolling NW corner. 271 probably exaggerated. Ref Sitrep 109. 7/16 FURKAB killed minus forty enemy in engagement area PG 8215 29 April. In area PG 7827 1 May 7/15 FURKAB inflicted on enemy who withdrew eastwards to hills.

CM-IN-2899 (4 May 44)

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of JCS
memo 1-17-73

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

No: 177/OPS  
May 3, 1944  
Page 2.

(A). Area BISHENPUR. Two coy enemy reported RK 1127 possibly remnants driven from track BISHENPUR. Small enemy attack night 1/2 May on our PIQUET RK 116405 repulsed. Two hrs destroyed by enemy and two enemy rd blocks between RK 070222 and RK 024415. Total enemy dead counted area BISHENPUR to date exceeds two hundred and fifty.

(B). Area PAELLASAMU. 1 May two small mixed Japanese JIF and BFA parties encountered area RK 4306. Night 1/2 May small enemy raid PAEL RK 4620 and RAKHING RK 4125. RQ 1 Bde 1 SIEFOOROS WANGJING RK 4637.

(C). Area IMPHAL. Abandoned camp possibly HQ 15 Japanese Div discovered near BONGPHEL RK 6389. 1 May two hundred enemy reported RK 6789. Locals report many enemy stragglers and morale low this area. Thirty seven enemy gas inflicted in successful ambushes 30 April area SANGJANG RK 6189. Own gas three. 37 Bde area RK 5878.  2 W YORKS area RK 4161.

FORD: 33 CORPS.

(A). JAPS area KIGOWA RE 5357 VISWEMA RE 5554 reported arrived from area KOHMA about 25 April. Reported STR at SHIKAMA RE 5356 has since decreased. Two hundred Coolies reported constructing camp KIGOWA. One enemy gun sighted each side rd KOHMA IMPHAL vicinity KIGOWA. Locals report 28 April enemy unassigned STR infiltrating from area RE 4693 northwards MODU RE 4106. Large number enemy RE 5669. Night 28/29 April three hundred enemy reported arrived area SEEKMA RE 5474 DIKOMA RE 6175 from KOHMA. Two hundred mules and amu dump reported this area. Unconfirmed report 28 and 29 April enemy previously area KILAMI RE 89 moved south to area CHUZUMI RE 7373. Two to three hundred enemy reported SATSUMI RE 7879. 30 April unconfirmed report enemy at RE 7593 intending move EZ 6506.

CM-IR-2899  (4 May 44)  

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/44
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No: 177/093
Page 3.

May 3, 1944

Identifications. F M captured RE 4569 belongs 3 Coy 1 Bn
128 Regt and states left Bn one or two weeks ago for patrol
with four others who died. Documents identify 3 Bn 58 Regt
at RE 5069. Bodies recovered this area 30 April identify
elements 58 Regt. Ref Sitrep 109. Elements 58 Regt
identified RE 4668 NOT RE 4568 and 2 Bn 58 Regt identified
RE 4966 NOT RE 4938. F M belonging 1 Bn 124 Regt states
his unit in KOHIMA.

(B). KOHIMA. 30 April. Enemy attack on hill RE 4865
by estimated one coy repulsed with by cas to enemy. One
enemy coy RE 507680 withdraw when attacked suffering slight
cas. Enemy attack by estimated one coy SW KOHIMA repulsed
with sixty cas to enemy. 1 May. 4 RAJPUT repelled counter
attacks area RE 483656 inflicting by cas. Elements 5 Bns
infiltrated enemy poons RE 502690 but withdraw on encountering
enemy in STU. Considerable enemy cas. 4 Bde adv de-
layed by adverse weather continues without oppsn. Locations.
HQ 4 Bde RE 477633. 1 RG RE 459620. 2 NORPUL RE 490541.
HQ 5 Bde RE 493698. 7 NGRS R area RE 4970 RE 5069. 1 HQP
KOHIMA. 2 DLZ area RE 4688. 1 R SERS RE 483633. 4 RAJPUT
RE 4759. 4/1 OR RE 482658.

(C) 23. Bde. Ref Sitrep 108. 44 coin attack on
PENOKOHIMA RE 4292 successful. Twenty enemy dead recovered.
Many more in undergrowth. Eighteen own dead recovered.
56 coin forced to withdraw after attack on enemy area RE 4708.
Locations. TAC Bde RE NOKOKOHIMA NZ 94. 44 Coin PERNOKOHIMA.
56 Coin RE 4489. 55 Coin NZ 8001. 60 Coin NW 0120. 34
Coin RE 9394. 88 Coin NZ 9224.

FIVE: North BURMA. Own tps repulsed several attacks by own
enemy coy area NWOPPUP NY 2106 inflicting twenty cas.
Fighting continues.

ACTION: OPD
INFO: CG AAF
G-2
LG
CM-ZN-2899 (4 May 44) 18032

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 1/13/44
From: CG, U.S. Army Forces, China, Burma and India, Rear Echelon New Delhi, India

To: War Department
Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area
Brisbane, Australia
CG, US Army Forces in South Pacific Area
Noumea, New Caledonia

Nr: CRAX 2638 3rd May 1944

Sultan to Marshall for Asiatic Section OPD info MacArthur, COMHQOPAC, Fierce, Chennault, Boomer, Lindsey, Down, Cranston, Egan, and Timberman CRAX 2638

Elements 38th Division advanced to 1 mile north of Wala east of river in Nose-an Valley. West of River 22nd Division also made progress and I battalion is making flanking movement around Jap position. On east flank the 112 Regiment is in contact with enemy along trails in Warong-Mampin-Auche area. Heavy fighting along entire front on Assam front Kohima situation slightly improved. As 3 brigades of 2nd Division and 1 brigade of 5th Division, with supporting troops engage enemy in area. Headquarters of 23rd Brigade has moved to Mokokchung and columns this brigade making steady southward progress from Mokokchung and Wokha areas. On 4th Corps front minor actions near Blahempur, Falel and north of Imphal. 37th Brigade withdrew from Aishan to positions on Ukhrul Road 15 miles northeast Imphal. 1st Brigade moved from Shomchel to Wangjung, 9 miles north Falel, to strengthen British defense this area. In Arakan there was active patrolling and several clashes south of Buthidaung, last of Buthidaung in Kaladan Valley. Headquarters of 6th Division moved to Kawli Bazar.

*Being serviced

ACTION: OPD
INFO: CGAOP, 0-2, Col. Park, Log.

CM-IN-2455 (4 May 44) 05262 jb

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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COPY NO.
From: OQ, US Army Forces, China, Burma and India
Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India

To: War Department

N: CRAX 2622, 3 May 1944.

Weekly 02 report to April 30th Bissell CRAX 2622 info Ferris, Dunn, Timberman, O'neal, Egan and Lindsay from Greenwell signed Sultan.

Developments are nil along the Salween front;

Minor clashes only at widely separated points;

Indications of increase in puppet troops but no information as to strength or combat effectiveness;

Disposition of Japanese forces unknown since detachment of 5 battalions to other areas;

Strong indications 56th Division organised on 3 companies per battalion basis;

Estimated strength remains at 4 Japanese Battalions along entire front with capability of only limited defense at main avenues of approach.

Along Palai Tams road enemy strength estimated between 2 and 3 battalions of 33rd Division and 1 battalion of 15th Division supported by 14th Tank Regiment;

Enemy have captured Yangnoupel but attacks against Sita repulsed;

Attempts to bypass British position this area continuing with probable intention attacking Rylel. Little change in Bishangur Kungpi from where bulk of 33rd Division operating to north and northwest. British drive to northeast from Laphal on Ushral road reach Tams and...

CM-IN-2260 (3 May 44)
From: CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma and India
Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India

Mr: ORAX 2622, 3 May 1944.


Slight indication leading elements 31st Division, previously reported to move to this area from Kohima, may have arrived. Situation in immediate Kohima area confused; strong enemy concentrations reported just south of Kohima and main force to north of village believed in Chiswema-Chinshma-Phakowkima triangle.

Road to Dimapur open but escort required due enemy snipers and raiding parties.

In general the Imphal-Kohima situation has improved the immediate threat toward Assam line of communication has receded and British troops are regaining the offensive in the more active subsectors. Nothing of importance on Arakan Front.

Latest reports indicate some increase in enemy strength east and southeast Butliocumt with possibility of Japanese offensive westward across Kalapansin River north of Buthidaung.

Kaledan Valley opposing troops in contact north of Paletwa.

Little change in north Burma during week. Enemy resistance has increased mainly due to extensive use of artillery.

ACTION: O-2
INFORMATION: CG AAF COL PARK
CM-IN-2260 (3 May 44) 23242 ps
From: CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma & India
Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India

To: War Department
Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, Brisbane, Australia
CG, US Army Forces in South Pacific Area, Noumea, New Caledonia

No. CAAX 2581, 2 May 1944

Sultan to Marshall for Asiatic Section OPD,
information MacArthur, COMGENSOPAC, Ferris, Chennault
Boatner, Lindsey, Dorn, Cranston, Egan, and Timberman
CAAX 2581.

"Both east and west of river in Mogaung Valley
Chinese made local gains. 1st Battalion, 64th Regiment
captured Jap position 2 miles northwest Inkangtawng
and 2nd Battalion, 64th Regiment made flanking movement
2 miles south of this captured position. GALAHAD Force
with 8 light and 150 Chinese Regiments now 36 miles
northeast of Shadurap near Tungajum Bum. On Assam front
troops of 2nd Division in contact with enemy at several
points in Kohima area. On 4th Corps front situation
generally quiet with patrolling and minor clashes near
Fael, Bishenpur and north of Imphal-Ukhrul road. 1st
Brigade troops occupied Shongphel. In Arakan British
troops repulsed several enemy attacks south of Buthi-
daung-Lewedet road. Minor engagements in Kaladan Valley."

ACTION: ODF

INFORMATION: CG AAF
G-2

CM-IN-1260 (2 May 44) 1652

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(b) and 5(c) or (b)
ORD letter, May 3

APR 4 1973

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/44
2 May 1944.

LEAHY:
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL Halsey:

Subject: Summary of Situation in Burma.

ARAKAN FRONT: Fighting is centered in Maungdaw-Buthidaung area approximately 45 miles north of Akyab. The British have three Indian and one West African division against one reinforced Japanese division. Front line is generally south of Maungdaw to Buthidaung north to Taung Bazar. British have three spearheads working in from the coast below Maungdaw towards the Kalapanain River which runs south to Akyab. At present British making very slow progress; Japs are maintaining defensive holding position with sporadic local counterattacks.

CHINDWIN: Fighting centers around Imphal and Kohima areas. British have equivalent of four Indian divisions defending Imphal area against one Jap division which is attacking from south and southwest plus a reinforced Jap division moving in from the north and northeast. British are holding southern sector and are attacking with success in the north. British have a flanking movement in progress to the northeast which will cut off the northern Jap force.

At Kohima 60 miles north of Imphal British have a reinforced division of English troops committed against one Jap division minus a regiment. Japs hold small portion of NE section of the city. British are attempting to drive south along Imphal-Kohima road with intention of pushing Japs back on the heels of those north of Imphal. As planned British are gradually forcing a Jap withdrawal to the south. Small Jap groups which had infiltrated north of Kohima are being liquidated.

MOGAUNG VALLEY: Here four Chinese divisions plus an additional regiment with total estimated strength of 40,000 plus the regiment of Americans (5807 Unit) are driving south along Mogaung Valley toward Mogaung and Myitkyina. Allied troops are opposed by an understrength Jap division plus several battalions recently arrived from the Salween front as reinforcements. Main Chinese force is now located approximately 40 miles northwest Mogaung making very slow advance against small but determined Jap forces. Two Chinese regiments plus the American Rangers have swung to the east (60 Mi. NE Mogaung) to bypass the main Jap force and drive south to Myitkyina.

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/8/44
LONG RANGE PENETRATION GROUPS: The Long Range Penetration Groups are operating in Central Burma around Indaw-Katha. Of these the 77th and 111th Brigades arrived by air in early March and have since operated against the main Japanese line of communication on railroad from Haulin to Nohmyin. In addition one column operated east against the Bhamo-Lashio road to interdict movement from the Salween. The 16th Brigade which walked in from the north and the 14th which recently arrived by air are now located west of Katha with the intention of operating west toward the Jap line of supply to the Chindwin front. Approximately 16,000 British Indian combat troops are now located in the Mawlu-Katha-Wuntho area and their requirements are being supplied by air. They are astride the main railroad north to Myitkyina; they have control of the river traffic on the Irrawaddy; and they are impeding Japanese traffic from the Salween. British estimate a total of nine to ten Jap battalions (which includes the 8th Railway Regiment) are committed in this area.

Richard Park, Jr.
Colonel, GSC

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 6/18/44
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

From: CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma, and India
      Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India
To:  War Department
      Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area,
      Brisbane, Australia,
      CG, US Army Forces in South Pacific Area,
      Noumea, New Caledonia
Nr:  CRAX 2509, 1st May 1944

Marshall, for Asiatic; OPD, info COMGENSFAC MacArthur, Chennault, Ferris, Boatner, Lindsey, Dorn, Cranston, Egan, Timberman from Sultan CRAX 2509.

Local gains only made in Mogang Valley as Chinese meet stiff Jap resistance near Inkan Ahtvang. On east flank 112th Regiment clearing out enemy groups in Manpin-Warong area.

On Assam front, 2nd Division making slight progress in Kohima area and 161st Brigade approximately 1 mile West Kohima.

One battalion 33 Brigade arrived Jotsoma from Bokajan. On 4th Corps front, British troops repulsed enemy attack near Bishenpur, and made minor gains in this area. Northeast and north of Imphal, British carried out active patrolling, and First Brigade made successful raid on Shongphel. On Arakan front, British repulsed several enemy attacks south of Ledvedet Chaung, and south of Buthidaung. Headquarters of 15th Corps has moved to Dhechaupalong, twelve miles southeast of Cox's Bazar.

ACTION: OPD
INFO: COS, CGAAF, G-2, Col Park, Log

CM-IN-547 (1 May 44) 20422 efv

No sig.

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/44
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

To: Prime Minister
Info: Chiefs of Staff J.S.M. Washington
From: SACSEA
Dated: May 1, 1944

1. General. During the week 20-27 April there has again been heavy local fighting with no major changes. The garrison of Kohima has been relieved and the main road opened to them from Dunsapur though interruption is always possible. Between Kohima and Imphal the road is blocked by the enemy. The enemy effort appears to be slackening round Kohima the main thrust being direct against Imphal.

2. Arakan. Our troops are still trying to clear the ground south of the Rommernungadaw to Buthidaung in order to open the road to traffic but fighting here is much more severe than in generally realized and the progress is slow against stubborn opposition in very thick country. 81 (WA) West African Division has left the river Kaladan and is now operating on the left flank of 15 Corps in the foot hills east of the river Kalapanzin. Two battalions have been left to watch the river Koren.

3. Imphal Area. No change in our dispositions. 20 Indian Division is holding out on both the Tiddim and Tamu roads against frequent enemy attacks supported on some occasions by medium artillery concentrations. The opposition here consists of the enemy 33 Division and his 14th Tank Regiment. While we block the Tiddim and Tamu roads the enemy cannot introduce tanks or wheeled artillery into the Imphal Plain from the south. To the north and NE of the Imphal Plain we have made slight progress against the enemy 15th Division which we believe is being reinforced by some four battalions drawn from his 31st Division near Kohima.

CM-IN-2162

300000

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JDS memo, 1-1-74
By HRP, NLR, Date MAY 15 1974

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/74

COPY No. 32
4. Kohima Area. The road from Disapur to Kohima is now open
though interruption by enemy infiltrating parties is still
possible and a brigade of 2 divisions has relieved the original
garrison of Kohima. This was a force hastily organized to
meet the emergency. I have asked Giffard to send my congratu-
lations to this force and its commander Colonel BMV Richurda
for the gallant conduct and stubborn resistance which they
displayed. Enemy pressure has slackened presumably on account
of the withdrawal of the four battalions to reinforce Imphal.

5. North Burma. The Chinese American Forces report that they
are meeting stiff opposition some 17 miles north of Kamsing
and are trying to work round both flanks.

6. 3 Indian Div. (4 long range penetration brigades) in
Upper Burma. Several successful small engagements, ambushes
and destruction of minor enemy dumps. The enemy have con-
tinued their attacks on the White City stronghold Have Mawlu
(Mawlu) without success. 16 Brigade under Ferguson which was
the only Brigade to march in has fought well but is now ex-
austed more by the very long distances marched and climatic
conditions than by fighting. They are to be flown out next
week.

T.O.O. 011455Z

ACTION: 03/2

INFORMATION: GEN ARNOLD

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JSO memo, 1-4-74
By RHF, NLR, Date MAY 15 1974

CH-IN-2162 (3 May 44) 2128Z

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94