

MR 300 Sec. 12 -- CHINA BURMA INDIA -- WARFARE

MR 300 Sec. 12 -- CHINA BURMA INDIA -- WARFARE  
MAY, 1944

CONTINUED

MAY, 1944

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~  
P-R-I-O-R-I-T-Y

~~SECRET~~  
From: CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma & India  
Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India

To: War Department  
Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area  
Brisbane, Australia  
CG, US Army Forces in South Pacific Area  
Noumea, New Caledonia

No: CRAX 3111 10th May 1944

Sultan to Marshall for Asiatic Section OPD info  
MacArthur, COMSOPAC, Ferris, Chennault, Boatner, Lindsey,  
Dorn, Cranston, Egan and Timberman CRAX 3111.

27 [ ] 17

On Assam front in Gasper force, 2nd Battalion, 89th Regiment moved to Moran. Reinforced company formerly Wak-ching and Tamlu joined 1st Battalion, 89th Regiment at Sepon. In Kohima area heavy fighting continues and some progress made by British troops. On 4th Corps front British consolidating positions in Potsangbam, 2 miles south Bishenpur, but Japanese still hold center of village. Six three Brigade of 17th Division now near Oinsam 12 miles southwest Imphal. Minor fighting north of Imphal and near Tengnoupal. Arakan front generally quiet with some fighting near 551. Withdrawal to Monsoon positions continues and 26th Division HQ now 3 miles southwest Bawli Bazer. 71st Brigade moved to Taung Bazer, and 4th Brigade in Sinzweys. Both these Brigades in 26th Division. Slowly advancing down Mogaung valley Chinese 22nd and 38th Divisions made slight gains on both sides Mogaung river. Chinese engaged with enemy on East flank in Auche and Warong areas and on west flank in Mansum area. Third Battalion GALAHAD and 88th Regi-

CM-IN-7860 (11 May 44)

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(F) of (R)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

300 CB2  
RHP, DATES DATE APR 4 1973

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Col. Park  
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P-R-I-O-R-I-T-Y

From: CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma & India  
Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India

No: CRAX 3111 10th May 1944

ment have enemy group surrounded near Ritpong. First Battalion GALAHAD and 150th Regiment moving around Ritpong to Sana, 15 miles West of Naopzup. Second Battalion GALAHAD moving eastwards and now in Hkade Ga, 14 miles west Ritpong.

No Sig

ACTION: OPD

INFO : CGAAP  
G-2  
Col. Park  
LOG

CM-IN-7860 (11 May 44) 0847z ejv

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GSD Letter, 5-3-72

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

Operations Division, WDGS Executive  
Office 2904

May 10, 1944

Commanding General  
USAF China, Burma and India  
Forward Eabelon  
Chungking, China

Commanding General  
USAF in Central Pacific Area  
Fort Shafter, T. H.

Commander in Chief  
Southwest Pacific Area  
Brisbane, Australia

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 15 1974

Number: WAFX 34551

Book Message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Stilwell for action; Stilwell pass to Miles; Richardson pass to Nimitz for information; to MacArthur for information.

At earliest practicable date, information and recommendations are desired concerning ports and harbors on coast of China from Amoy to Shanghai suitable for use of: Supply shipping; US fleet units; movement of ground forces, with equipment and supplies, inland to the extent necessary to insure security of bases for operations in and from China.

Data should include information regarding harbor facilities and transportation facilities. It is desired that services of Miles and his staff be utilized in compiling information on Naval matters.

Representatives of your staff and of Miles' staff should be prepared to proceed to Pearl Harbor and then Washington, if required, subsequent to submission of report.

ORIGINATOR : OPD  
INFORMATION: JC/S (Col McFarland), Gen Arnold, Gen Bissell, SGS  
Adm. King, Col. Park, C of S  
CM-OUT-34551 (10 May 44) 1601Z vh

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By Authority of JCS

May 10, 1944

memo, 8-12-71

By RMP Date APR 4 1973

To : Chiefs of Staff  
Info: Joint Staff Mission  
From: SACSEA  
No : SEACOS 156

See attached

Following for Chiefs of Staff repeated Joint Staff Mission from Mountbatten.

1. Your Combined Chiefs of Staff 2413 of 6 May. I have now been able to consult Commanders-in-Chief regarding transport aircraft situation in this theater.

2. In order to arrive in the Mediterranean by May 31 the 79 aircraft now on loan to me must be withdrawn from the battle by May 24. The accelerated departure of the (?first) combat cargo group from the U.S. will not permit the use of these planes in the Imphal battle before mid-June, a most optimistic date. This will result in denying me this air lift from 24 May to mid-June at least. It is impossible for me to solve the problem by disengaging troops now in action in time to reduce my air supply requirements for this period. At this same time the requirements on the China side will be extremely demanding.

3. Generalissimo has been pressing Chennault for air support of his troops facing Jap thrust on Penking-Hankow (?railway). Support for the Y Force both combat and air supply will likewise increase the demands on Chennault's air force. Similarly diversions from ATC would seriously delay initiating

CN-IN-8996

(12 May 44)

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*Col Park*  
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~~TOP SECRET~~

Number SEACOS 156

May 10, 1944

Page 2

the build-up of air supplies to assist Formosa operation. Faced with these facts I can neither reduce the scale of ground action taking place in S.E.A.C. nor virtually ground the 14th AF at a crucial time. Accordingly we have reached a point in our operations in this area where a readjustment of transport aircraft in the theater of diversion from ATC is neither feasible or sound.

4. Consequently I am forced to ask a reconsideration of my request to retain the 79 aircraft now on loan replacing them in the Mediterranean from planes departing from U.S. starting 22 May. Looking at the situation merely from this end I just cannot reconcile some 150 aircraft flying some 5000 miles in opposite directions during a time which will find my command in a difficult situation.

5. It would be most dangerous to exchange aircrews experienced in operating over the difficult and mountainous terrain of Burma for inexperienced aircrews at a time when the highest level of airmanship navigation and tactical skill is required to deal with the added factor of the monsoon, the adverse effects of which are already being felt.

6. I realize that the Chiefs of Staff agree that it is unthinkable to surrender the Imphal Plain with the disastrous consequences which would ensue to the Ledo Force and 14th Air Force or to withdraw General Stilwell from his hard fought advance.

T.O.O. 101635

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold  
OPD  
Gen Bissell  
Adm King  
Col Park  
C of S

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CM-IN-8996

(12 May 44) 1807Z amb

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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URGENT

From: CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma & India  
Forward Echelon, Chungking, China

To: War Department

No. 23490

9 May, 1944

Message Serial Number 23490.

*Report on fighting in Hanchow*

Hayingohin not leave Chungking. Operations Loyang area in charge Tanganpv, Sino G 2 depreciates tone communique and AP report mentioned your 31977 I concur. Situation midnight 8th: Two columns moved south from Hsuehang, East column to Yencheng where split, one about one thousand going Hsiping and other going west to Kilang. West column from Hsuehang to Hiangcheng where split, one going south to Natsien thence west to Mishan two thousand strong, other column moved north west towards Loyang about five thousand strong crossed Hsu River but counterattack forced back south bank. Jap troops identified this campaign are 110 Division, part 63<sup>rd</sup> Division including engineer regiment, parts 59 and 65 Divisions 15th Inf 4th Cavalry Brigade 5th Mountain Artillery Regiment and 12th Tank Regiment all totals about 30,000 troops. In addition elements 3rd Division in three thrusts converged on Kioshan then moved north to Chumtien and were driven back to Kioshan. Small part 58 Division moved west from Sinyang as west flank guard. 180 kilometers separate Chengchow and Sinyang forces along railroad. 13 and 34 Divisions assembled Wuhan area. Believe 7 new radio stations previously reported Wuhan area indicates 2 new divisions. From Sino G 2 rated B 3. Comment Chinese do not admit severity fighting state main forces not yet contacted, I do not expect Chinese defend Loyang against strong attack. View small numbers Japs actually fighting my opinion operations training and so recognized by Chinese who wait return Japs to garrison area before counter attacking.

Depass

ACTION: G-2  
INFO : CG AAF, OPD, Col Park, Log  
CM-IN-7527 (10 May 44) 2126Z mca

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OSD letter, May 8, 1972  
By RHP, NARS Date APR 4 1973

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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May 9, 1944

From: Main 11 Army Group Sca  
To : Usual Addresses  
No : 307/OPS

SITREP NO. 117

ONE      ARAKAN

Documents captured Pyinshe Kala PM5547 3 May show 55 Div received rfts on 30 April from rft unit located Chengmai QD8275. These rfts drafted from depot of 154 Regt OB54 Div left Japan 6 Jan. Ref Sitrep 115. In 6 Oxf Bucks successful attack on Thayegonbaung PM3827 21 enemy killed many wounded. Our cas 7 killed 17 wounded. Enemy shelled and attacked our posns PM4036. 7 May. Attack repulsed and our arty 3 times dispersed enemy forming up for further attacks this area. In recent fighting area Buthidaung now reliably estimated enemy suffered minimum 400 cas. This incl 182 known killed reported Sitrep 115. Own provisional cas 34 killed 169 wounded 87 missing. High proportion missing expected return. HQ 51 Bde PM352432. 2 Rajput PM4444 1 Wilts PM4544. 8 FF Rif PM4550. 71 Bde area Sinzweya PM 4252. 114 Bde under comd 26 Div.

TWO      KALADAN

Approx 1 enemy coy attacked 1 Gambia posns area PG7332 7 May losing 12 killed many more wounded. 1 Tripura Rif killed 8 of our party 9 enemy in ambush PG6917 6 May.

CM-IN-7281

(10 May 44)

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By Authority of JCS

MEMO, 1-17-73

By RHP

Date APR 4 1973

*Col Park*

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Number 307/OPS

May 9, 1944

Page 2

THREE. FOUR CORPS

*Handwritten: [scribble]*

(A) Area Bishenpur. Ref Sitrep 116. Now known elements 9/14 Punjab captured 4 enemy guns not 3. Enemy cas 35 killed. Own 11 killed 6 wounded. 7 May 1/4 GR repulsed enemy attack RK1140. ✓ Elements 1 Bapand 3 Bn 215 Regt identified this area. ✓ Our Inf with tks 8 May attacked Popsangbam RK1836 making some progress. ✓ PW captured RK1938 7 May states HQ 2 Bn 213 Regt in this area. ✓ 8 May our posn 2 miles north of Bishenpur attacked. Attack repulsed but number of our 2 prs damaged.

*Handwritten: [scribble]*

(B) Area Palel-Tamu. PW captured area RK5324 belongs 2 Coy 60 Regt states Coy (STR) reduced to 31. ✓ 7 May 3 INA JIP3 surrendered state INA Comd 3 Bn Gandhi Bde killed. Ref Sitrep 116. ✓ Enemy attack night 6/7 May on 80 Bde posns RK598120 was supported by med tks. ✓ 7 May further enemy attack repulsed. Night 7/8 May enemy again attacked and all attacks repulsed but small feature RK 509123 occupied by enemy. 8 May RAF destroyed 2 enemy tks this area. In OPS 7 May on hills east of Palel our tps killed 64 enemy. Own cas 12 killed 27 wounded.

(C) Area Imphal. 100 to 150 enemy encountered north of PT4853 RE5093. ✓ PT4066 RK5287 occupied by our tps. 1 Dogra in contact with enemy area RK5093. ✓

FOUR 33 CORPS

*Handwritten: [scribble]*

(A) Area Kohima. Escapes reports 30 April 2,000 enemy with 300 mules and 125 BTA possible muleteers located area RE5268. ✓ Also states HQ 31 Div at RE6364 on 27 April. Enemy evacuated RE474662 and RE489667 but still holding RE486651. ✓ Enemy STR at RE5065 believed greatly increased. Considerable number enemy still area RE5170. Locals report no enemy Rekrone RE57 but enemy at PT5129 RE5427 and towards

CM-IN-7281

(10 May 44)

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Number 307/OPS

May 9, 1944

Page 3

Chedema RE56. Another report 1,000 enemy between North Chakhabama RE6067 and South Chakhabama RE6164 possibly in res. 100 enemy reported Sathazumi RE77. Paybook identifies 9 Coy 124 Regt near RE5167. Locals report Merema RE47 evacuated by enemy date unknown presumed 8 May. Between 4 May to midday 6 May 750 enemy bodies counted area Kohima. 7 May 1 RS killed 31 enemy and 2 Norfolk 80 enemy area RE494655. 1/1 Punjab RE494656. 1/1 Assam Regt less 2 coys area RE4867.

(B) 23 Bde. Nothing to report.

FIVE HUKAWNG

Elements 114 Regt identified Ritpong NX9212. 1/114 Chinese Regt advancing against stiff resistance towards Hlagyl SC4085. Local enemy attacks on our posns area Inkanghtawng SC2789 night 5/6 May repulsed. American Rangers Ritpong.

T.O.O. 091830

NK - 250 M 1500  
96 VE 15122

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: CG AAF  
G-2  
Col Park  
Log

CM-IN-7281

(10 May 44) 1734Z amb

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
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From: CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma & India,  
Forward Echelon, Chungking, China

To : War Department  
CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma, & India  
Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India  
CG, 14th Air Force, Kunming, China

Nr : CFBX 17175 9 May 44

To Bissell WDGBI, Sultan and Chennault CFBX 17175  
sgd Stilwell.

Japanese continue advance in all directions Yellow river area. No information available regarding positions of column advancing East from Ssu Shui ( 113 degrees 10 minutes-34 degrees 50 minutes), Mih Sien ( 113 degrees 11 minutes-34 degrees 30 minutes) and Yu Hsien ( 113 degrees 15 minutes-34 degrees 15 minutes ).

Main force of western drive ( Including between 100-200 armoured cars and 50-60 tankettes) proceeding from Chi Hsien ( 113 degrees 08 minutes-33 degrees 58 minutes) thru Liu Ju Hsien ( 112 degrees 50 minutes-34 degrees 10 minutes), captured Iyang ( 112 degrees 25 minutes-34 degrees 10 minutes) on 4th May. Ichuen Hsien ( 112 degrees 20 minutes -34 degrees 40 minutes ) on 5th May and now attacking Loyang ( 112 degrees 27 minutes-34 degrees 45 minutes) from south with strength of 6-7000.

CM-IN-8129 (11 May 44)

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972  
RHP, NARS Date APR 4 1973

*Colonel  
Park*

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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MVB DEPARTMENT

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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Page 2

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From: CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma & India  
Forward Echelon, Chungking, China

Nr : CFBX 17175 9 May 44

Japanese force estimated at 10,000, previously reported located North Yellow River vicinity of Chin Yang ( 112 degrees 50 minutes-35 degrees 10 minutes) now reported crossing Yellow River with probably intent of attacking Loyang from North. This not confirmed by Sino G-2.

This column bombed and strafed on 5th and 6th May by elements Sino American Composite Wing with following results reported:

- 300-400 troops killed,
- 30-40 trucks, armoured cars and tanks damaged.

Sino first war area headquarters moved from Loyang southwest to Lonig ( 111 degrees 40 minutes-34 degrees 20 minutes).

New subject. Japanese force of 10,000 proceeding from Siang Cheng ( 113 degrees 25 minutes-33 degrees 50 minutes ) occupied Yeh Hsien on 6th May. 7-8000 this group attacked Lushan ( 112 degrees 48 minutes-33 degrees 47 minutes) on 7th May.

CM-IN-8129 (11 May 44)

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OSD Letter, 5-3-72

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Page 3

~~SECRET~~

From: CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma & India  
Forward Echelon, Chungking, China

NR : CFBX 17175 9 May 44

Movement south along Pinghan railroad continues with 1 column, 1-2000 strong, occupying Siwang-Chuang ( 114 degrees 08 minutes-33 degrees 11 minutes ) on 7th May and another column occupying I Feng Chin ( 113 degrees 50 minutes -33 degrees 15 minutes ) on 7 May.

Aerial recon reports evidence of beginning reconstruction of railroad between Yellow River bridge and Cheng Hsien ( 113 degrees 31 minutes-34 degrees 45 minutes ) recon also reports large concentration of railroad cars Sinyang ( 114 degrees 00-minutes-32 degrees 10 minutes ) vicinity.

Sino G-2 situation map shows following Sino Divisions opposing Japanese advance:

177, new 140, 17, new 35, 34, new 24.

These elements of 9 Army and located in northern portion of combat area but exact location not known.

Further south are following Divisions:

47, 91, 193, new 42 and 4 Divisions of 78 Army.

All above info except recon info from Sino G-2.

ACTION: G-2

No sig.

INFORMATION: CG AAF, OPD, Col Park, Log

CM-IN-8129 (11 May 44) 1640Z bjm

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OSD Letter, 6-3-78

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P R I O R I T Y

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CORRECTED COPY

From: CG US Army Forces, China, Burma and India  
Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India

To: War Department  
CINC Southwest Pacific Area, Brisbane, Australia  
CG US Army Forces in South Pacific Area  
Noumea, New Caledonia

No. CRAX 3055, 9 May, 1944.

Sultan to Marshall for Asiatic Section OFD, info  
MacArthur, COMGENSOPAC, Ferris, Chennault, Boatner,  
Lindsey, Dorn, Cranston, Egan and Timberman CRAX 3055.

Patrol actions and minor skirmishes only in Mogaung  
Valley east of river and on east flank in Nhpum area. West  
of Mogaung River 22 division made slight progress south west  
Inkangahtawng.

1st Battalion Galahad and 150 Regiment now 4 miles  
north Ritpong.

3rd Battalion Galahad and 88 Regiment in contact with  
enemy south of Ritpong.

On Assam front heavy fighting continues around Kohima.

British now have 4th, 5th and 6th Brigades of 2nd  
Division, 161 Brigade of 5th Division and 33 Brigade of 7th  
Division.

Follows is a paraphrase of USAF CBI message.

"Engaged in Kohima battle. on 4th Corps front fighting  
reported in Bishenpur area. British occupied Potsangbam

CM-IN-7217 (10 May 44)

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OSD letter, May 2, 1972

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From: CG US Army Forces, China, Burma and India  
Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India  
No. CRAX 3055, 9 May, 1944.

2 miles south Bishenpur and repulsed Jap attack west Bishenpur. North of Imphal British advanced against light enemy opposition. 89 Brigade of 7th Division now 8 miles northwest Imphal. Palel area scene of activity as British repulsed Jap attacks at Tengnoupal and made advance east of Palel. On Arakan front fighting 6 miles southeast Maungdaw and south Maungdaw-Buthidaung road. British evacuated Sinohbyin, 3 miles north Buthidaung, and Japs occupied area. 51 Brigade of 25 Division now 3 miles northeast Maungdaw and 36 and 71 Brigades of 26 Division in Sinxveya 7 miles northwest Buthidaung village."

No Sig

Corrected copy of CM-IN-7020 (10 May 44) OPD

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: CG AAF  
G-2  
COL HARR  
LOG

CM-IN-7217 (10 May 44)

1528Z

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972  
By RHP, NARS Date APR 4 1973

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

CONFERENCE IN ROOM 2B726  
May 9, 1944 at 2 O'clock

Lt. Col. George H. Taylor, the Engineers of War Plans, and Mr. Nelson G. Tayman have just recently returned from a survey in C-B-I of the Burma Road and the Ledo Road. The Burma Road from Kunming to the beginning of the destroyed portion near Salween and all of the Ledo Road which can be covered by car. This report covers the road up to the end of April of this year.

They flew via South Africa; went to New Delhi. Went to the Office of General Ferrill (Office of the Construction Engineer) and to the Office of the SEAC. They covered the roads by jeep. They got to the end of the road the latter part of February, which is just about two miles from actual fighting. At Columbia 710 (... River) they were about 5 or 6 miles direct line to the Jap lines and then back to New Delhi.

Lt. Col. Taylor's mission was to plan future requirements on the Ledo and Burma Roads.

Mr. Tayman's mission was to seek future bridge requirements on the Burma and Ledo Roads.

The Ledo Road, which is part gravel and part dirt road, is 22' wide, and is now in process of being hard-surfaced. 74 to 118 miles only is a perfect road. 14 to 74 relocations are to be made. From 118 using evacuation road to pontoon bridge (?).

The Ledo Road is part gravel and part dirt road. The part that is gravelled has only a thin coating of gravel and is easily washed out. The gravel has to be hauled from the rivers and it is a long haul.

There is a present no construction going on the roads other than maintenance. It is really more than they can do to maintain the roads during monsoon, because the roads are not too good even before the monsoons begin. The Burma Road and the Ledo Road are both subject to slides. The roads are two-way roads at present; all except for the bridges which can accommodate only one truck at a time. 6 x 6, 2½-ton trucks can be used over these roads and bridges.

The Burma Road is topped with a sort of crushed rock surface. The original part of the road has a crushed rock surface 5" to 8" in depth.

The engineers and men working on the road construction have to be a combination of combat troops and construction men - for they are often the targets of Japanese mortars, which makes the work more difficult. The crossing at Salween is a gorge and there is a suspension bridge there. At other places on the Salween, chain bridges and bamboo bridges are used, as well as ferries.

Off the record: There is plenty of crossing of the Salween by the Chinese coolies to do a bit of trading with the Japanese as they have been seen carrying salt and rice...and thus making of themselves big and successful business men. At times it is hard to distinguish between the two as they are so similar.

300 C B 2

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~~APR 4 1975~~

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

The original construction of the Ledge Road was done by the 330th Engineers and they have been doing the brunt of the engineer work. Negroes and Whites are the construction men keeping up the maintenance of the roads. There are some American officers and enlisted men who are there as technicians (Engineers from the G-4 Engineer Section) - working on the Burma Road and mostly in an advisory capacity, but not in large numbers. There are no British working on the roads. Chinese coolies are not such good help in this construction work as they can carry only a few rocks at a time in a basket to the side of the road. The question here came up as to whether Japanese propaganda might not have something to do with their inability to work harder. The negroes are sometimes difficult and by choice, commit misdemeanors - or worse officers, just to get sent to jail as they consider this getting back to civilization.

Some asked if any comments were made concerning aviation engineers for doing the work and the answer was that aviation engineers, if they have their TE equipment, are very well equipped because of this heavy equipment.

There are, incidentally, only three big heavy pieces of construction equipment here to build a road 425 miles long.

So far as known, there have been no cases of sabotage on either of the roads.

If General Stilwell's drive goes favorably, the road is expected to be completed in April, 1945.

Convoy system of control is used in blocking off the road for construction, and in this way, the traffic is handled effectively.

If the Bengal-Assam railway is cut by Japs, it was suggested that construction troops from the Ledge area would be called to fix it.

The further toward the Mogaung Valley, the better the road gets.

Kunming as far as Columbia 710 (between Salween and ...) is in good condition.

There are several regular established supply points along the road. The food is not too good and is local product. C rations and K rations are to be had in small amounts. Water can be had any time by digging and from streams. Gas is all carried by air over the hump.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (B)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

APR 4 1973

~~SECRET~~  
P-R-I-O-R-I-T-Y

By RHP, NARS Date

C-O-R-R-E-C-T-E-D C-O-P-Y

From: CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma & India  
Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India

To : War Department  
Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area  
Brisbane, Australia  
CG, US Army Forces in South Pacific Area  
Noumea, New Caledonia

No : CRAX 2920 9 May 1944

Sultan to Marshall for Asiatic Section OPD, info  
MacArthur, COMGENSOPAC, Ferris, Chennault, Boatner, Lind-  
sey, Dorn, Cranston, Egan and Timberman CRAX 2920.

Troops of 64 Regiment in contact with enemy 500  
yards south Hvelon Hka in Mogaung Valley. East of Inkan-  
gahawng units of 113 Regiment are along north bank Tigran  
Hka. Chinese patrols on west flank engaged Jap patrols 8  
miles northeast Mansum. In Fort Hertz Valley levies am-  
bushed Japs 3 times southeast Tiangrup. After engaging  
enemy Company 3rd Battalion Galahad and 88th Regiment ad-  
vanced Nuungbum 4 miles north Ritpong. Leading elements  
First Battalion Galahad and 150 Regiment reached Salawng-  
Hkayang 6 miles north Ritpong.

Heavy fighting continues in Kohima area and Second  
Division generally making gains. Columns of 23rd Brigade  
continue to move southwards towards Kohima-Jessami trail.  
Elements of 4th column occupied Cheswema.

On Fourth Corps front British attacked north of  
Ixphal in Mapao area but failed to reach objectives.

CM-IN-6483 (9 May 44)

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OSD Letter, 5-3-72

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APR 4 1973

By RHP, NARS Date

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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P-R-I-O-R-I-T-Y

C-O-R-R-E-C-T-E-D C-O-P-Y

From: CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma & India  
Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India

Page 2

No : CRAX 2920 9 May 1944

Some patrol actions near Palel and Bishenpur.

48 Brigade less 1 Battalion arrived Wanjing 9 miles north Palel. Elements of 89 Brigade of Seventh Division arrived in Imphal area from Arakan. In Arakan heavy fighting near Butnidsung and BRITISH forced to withdraw. British occupied Thayegonbaung, 2 miles southeast Godusara and enemy attacks on point 551 repulsed.

No Sig

Footnote: Corrected copy of CM-IN-5652 (8 May 44) OPD.

ACTION: OPD

INFO : CG AAF  
G-2  
Col Park  
Log

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OSD letter, May 8, 1972  
By RHP, NARA Date APR 4 1973

CM-IN-6483 (9 May 44) 1556Z met

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OSD Letter, 5-3-72

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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O-P-E-R-A-T-I-O-N-A-L P-R-I-O-R-I-T-Y

From: CG 14th Air Force, Haining, China Page 3

No: CAXX 1782 8 May 1944

From Sianning to Fuchi with several box cars destroyed,  
2 trucks destroyed and several Japs killed by strafing.

On May 6th, 8 Jap bombers escorted by 6 Jap Fighters  
bombed Hanyang. Radio station, hangar and taxiway damaged.

Add Sorties for 6th May, 66 Fighter, 6 Bomber and 1  
Photo. For May 7th, 9 Fighter Sorties.

Routine ferry trips by 308th Group with 11 over and  
4 back.

Chinese Air Force reports Jap Forces 20 miles south  
of Loyang. Chinese Headquarters transferred to Louing.  
Considerable motorized Jap equipment moving northwest of  
Hsiangchang. Jap occupied Kiochun, north of Sinyuan, on  
May 1st. Photos now received of mission from Suichuan 5th  
May show north south probable Fighter strip being constructed  
at recently unused old airdrome at east edge Hanchang. Also  
runway \*Ensin under construction 1650 feet \*\*\* and 575 feet  
east west Kiukiang. Shipping Kiukiang only 7100 tons due  
probably continued move up river to Wuhan.

No Sig

\*\*\*\*\* Being Serviced.

ACTION: OPD  
INFO : CGAAF, G-2, Col. Park, LOG

CM-IN-6292 (9 May 44) 0838Z ejv

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OSD letter, May 8, 1972  
By RHP, NARS Date APR 4 1973

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JCYO Nr B35  
081134Z  
Maciej

WDCMC  
9 May  
0212Z

~~SECRET~~

P-R-I-O-R-I-T-Y

Post  
From: CG US Army Forces China Burma and India Rear Echelon  
New Delhi, India

To: War Department  
Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area,  
Brisbane, Australia  
CG US Army Forces in South Pacific Area Noumea,  
New Caledonia

No: CRAX 2983 8 May 1944

Sultan to Marshall for Asiatic Section OPD information  
MacArthur, COMGENSOPAC, Ferris, Chennault, Boatner, Linosey,  
Dorn, Cranston, Egan and Timberman CRAX 2983.

On Moganung Valley front slight local gains made now  
in vicinity Ritpong are 3rd Battalion Galahay and 68th  
Regiment. On Assam front heavy fighting continues around  
Kohima as 2nd Division pushes to clear Japanese from area.  
At Tengnoupal in Palel area, 80th Brigade repulsed Jap attack  
and 48th Brigade advanced eastward and occupied several villages  
6 miles northeast Palel. British on Arakan front in move to  
Monsoon positions evacuated Buthidaung according to plan. Heavy  
fighting near point 551 as British repulsed enemy attacks. East  
of Kacapanxin River 81st Division carried out successful opera-  
tions. 71st Brigade now in Letvedet area. On 4th Corps front  
considerable patrol activity and fighting in Bishenpur area.

ACTION: OPD

No Sig

INFO : CG AAF  
G-2  
Log

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CM-IN-6186 (9 May 44) 0318Z mcs

OSD letter, May 8, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date APR 4 1973

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPAF

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>DIRECTOR INTELLIGENCE</b> <b>CHUNGKING</b>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		<b>CNO</b>	PRIORITY
DATE <b>8 MAY 44</b>			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM <b>1238/08</b>			<b>RRRR</b> DEFERRED
DECODED BY <b>KIRKBRIDE</b>			PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY <b>KULKA/ROGERS</b>			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY <b>HUTCHINSON</b>			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND IS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
<b>080916</b>		<b>NCR 7506</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(FROM DIRECTOR INTELLIGENCE  
CHUNGKING SENDS)  
RATED B 2.


ALUSNA

JAPANESE FORCES ALONG PEIPING HANKOW RAILWAY NOW  
LESS THAN 60 MILES APART. ELEMENTS OF 2 DIVISIONS  
MOVING NORTH FROM ABOVE HSINYANG. PARTS OR ALL OF  
3 POSSIBLY 4 DIVISIONS PLUS 1 CAVALRY BRIGADE 1 TANK  
REGIMENT 1 MECHANIZED REGIMENT MOVING SOUTH FROM  
YENCHENG. MECHANIZED UNITS HAVE MOVED WEST AND NORTH-  
WEST TO LOYANG. ALUSNA COMMENTS THAT LITTLE EFFECTIVE  
RESISTANCE APPEARS TO BE DEVELOPING ON PART OF  
CHINESE.

DECLASSIFIED  
OSD Letter, 8/2/94  
MAY 15 1974

16...ACT

COMINCH...20G...20OP...NAVAIDE...CNO...



ACTION	
F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-07	26
F-1	27
F-2	28
F-20	29
F-3	30
F-30	31
F-31	32
F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
FX01	37
FX30	38
FX37	39
FX40	40
IG-00	41
VCNO	42
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Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-15

080916

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

May 8, 1944

From: Main 11 Army Group Sca  
To: War Office and usual addressees  
No: 286/OPS  
SITREP 116

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of

JCS  
memo 1-17-73  
By RHP Date APR 4 1973

1. Arakan

2 JIFs from (\*LNF\*) Gp surrendered area PM 6346. PW belonging 55 Div 505 Regt captured area PM 5246 states has no knowledge JIF units East of Kalapanzin also that 14 Tk Bn estimated str 200 is operating in Inf role with a Bn of 112 Regt West of Kalapanzin in gen area Sinohbyin PM 5047. 25 Div assumed responsibility area PT 551 PM 4342. In recent fighting this area 150 enemy bodies counted. 3 enemy attacks on our posns North of PT 551 night 6/7 May repulsed. Feature PM 442424 PM 445427 PM 463430 evac according to plan. Enemy attack on area 71 Bde Hq PM 4844 night 5/6 May replused with 30 cas to enemy. Enemy occupied area PM 4948 PM 5048 same night after previous evac by our Tps. Hq 71 Bde 1 R. Garh Rif PM 452473. 5/1 Punjab PM 4546. 1 Lincoln PM 4647.7 enemy and 225 enemy mules killed by 81 (WA) Div area PM 5939. 6 May enemy dumps area PM 5839 PM 5346 also destroyed.

2. Kaladan.

1 Tripura KIF killed 10 enemy in AMBUSH area PG 7630 6 May.

3. 4 Corps.

A. Area Biehenpur. Night 4/5 May. Enemy occupied our PL posn area RK 110404 withdrew 5 May taking some food but leaving amm. Night 5/6 May enemy again active this area. On 1 of the small actions this area 25 enemy killed. Our cas 7. 6 May elements 9/14 Punjab with Tk SP engaged enemy area RK 2039 capturing 3 guns. PW belonging 4 Coy 214 Regt captured RK-2039 states deserted fortnight ago when his Bn in area RK CM-IN-6604 (9 May 44)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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SITREP 116

May 8, 1944

Page two

0900. 2 more PW captured this area identify 1 indep A Tk Regt and a fourth identifies 1 Bn 215 Regt. 2 captured JIFs state large conc enemy at Molrang RK 1824 intended move North from area Ayuron RK 1138 but owing to oppoan encountered now intend move Eastwards on Bishenpur. 6 May enemy digging in at RK 0645 and RK 0748.

E. Area Palel-Tamu. 4 May in action area RK 3806 with ind JIFs our Tps inflicted estimated 65 cas and took 8 PW. Since 1 May cas inflicted on JIFs area Palel Tamu total 150 PW 54. 6 May large enemy at CONVOY moved NW Frosaphalbung RK 5818. Night 6/7 May by enemy attack on 80 Bde posns RK 598120 repulsed with many cas to enemy. 7 May. Elements 48 Bde occupied 2 villages area RK 5225 suffering slight cas. 14 PP Rif occupied village RK 4505 against slight oppoan.

C. Area Imphal. AI report track Kanchup Khul RK 16 Tamenglong RJ 88 clear of enemy 5 and 6 May. BR RK 0272 damaged but easily repairable. Some enemy patrol activity area Khongban RK 5282. Unconfirmed local report 1,000 enemy arrived night 1/2 May RK 6796 from NW and proceeded direction UKHRUL. Comment. Number probably exaggerated. Feature RE 4979 occupied 7 May without oppoan.

D. Total Japanese PW taken 4 Corps area during present ops now 41.

4. 33 Corps.

A. Kohima. Offensive to clear Kohima continues. 6 May 5 Bde inflicted many cas on enemy digging in area East of RE 515680. 5 Bde firmly established area RE 511682. 4 Rajput relieved 2 DLI in Kohima Grn. Some enemy continue to hold out area RE 502668. 4 Bde held up by Bunker posns hold posn astride Ridge at RE 494653. Elements 1/1 Punjab infiltrated into enemy posns area RE 4965 but were later forced to withdraw to original posn RE 488625. 33 Bde under

CM-IN-6604 (9 May 44)

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SITREP 116

May 8, 1944

Page three

comd 2 Div from 6 May. 1 QUEENS area RE 484656. 4/15 Punjab  
area RE 4866. 4/1 GR remains area RE 482658.

B. 23 Bde. 56 Coln RE 453813. 88 33 Colns RE  
532838. 60 Coln RE 927822.

Time of Origin 081855

ACTION: OPD

INFO : CC/S  
CG AAF  
G-2  
Colonel Park  
Log

CM-IN-6604 (9 May 44) 1855Z mem

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

May 7, 1944

FROM: Main 11 Army Group Sea

TO : War Office

Rptd: Middle East

N.Z. Force Hq New Zealand

Military Attache China

BAD Washington

GHQ Persia & Iraq Force

GHQ East Africa

Hq Brisbane (Pass COIC GHQ)

Hq AAI.

NO : 265/OPS

SITREP No. 115

ONE ARAKAN.

5 May OP saw enemy digging FM 5460. Night 5/6 May 2 small parties enemy encountered FM 5459. No fresh developments area BUTHIDAUNG night 5/6 May and 6 May. 182 enemy known killed this area 5 May. BUTHIDAUNG evacuated night 6/7 May in accordance with plan for withdrawal to monsoon dispositions. 6 Oxf Bucks occupied THAYEGONBAUNG FM 3827 early 6 May.

TWO KALADAN.

One coy enemy moved south from PW 8031 and joined forward elements enemy coln at SATPAUNG PG 7829. One pl enemy forced to withdraw after action area PG 7728 5 May.

THREE 4 CORPS.

(A) Area BISHEGPUR. 5 May 1 coy 33 Engr Regt identified RJ 8850 1 25 PR and 4 vehs destroyed in attack by 20 enemy AC 6 May.

(B) AREA PALEL TAMU. 5 May enemy in hills east of PALEL inactive. Enemy arty silent 2 May shelled our posn RK 598120 on 6 May.

CM-IN-5041 (8 May 44)

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By Authority of

JCS

memo, 1-17-73

By RAF

Date APR 5 4 1973

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NO: 265/OPS SITREP No. 115 Page Two May 7, 1944

(C) AREA IMPHAL. Unconfirmed report all enemy from HAOCHONG RK0770 moved to KANGPOKPI RE 3704. Night 5/6 May patrol report approx 1 coy enemy RK 3391. Feature RK 3383 report clear.

FOUR: 33 CORPS

(A) Area KOHLIMA. Village RE 504764 confirmed clear of enemy. 4 May enemy in str covering rd at RE 495655. Strong enemy posns RE 505653 RE 508648. Mopping up continued area RE 502668. Situation confused area RE 498659. 16 enemy killed in action 5 May MEREMA RE 4973.

(B) 23 BDE. Elements 44 coln occupied CHESWEMA RE 4876 5 May.

FIVE: HUKAWNG.

4 May American Rangers in contact area NX 9222.

T.O.O. 071645

ACTION: OPD

INFO : CC/S  
CG AAF  
G-2  
Col. Park  
Log

CM-IN-6041 (8 May 44) 2214Z vhm

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

~~TOP SECRET~~

May 6, 1944

To : SACSEA  
Rpt : AFHQ Algiers, J.S.M.  
From: Chiefs of Staff  
Nr : OZ 2413

Following is from Combined Chiefs of Staff for Admiral Mountbatten, General Stilwell and General Stratemeyer.

1. Reference SEACOS 145 (not to AFHQ). The most effective solution of the problem raised in the above message, giving consideration to the means available and requirements of critical Mediterranean situation is the following:

- (a) You will return the 79 transport aircraft borrowed from the Mediterranean to arrive in that theater by 31st May.
- (b) The United States Chiefs of Staff are initiating the movement to C.B.I. Theater of the 1st Combat Cargo Group less personnel. Departure of the 100 C-47 aircraft of this group under A.T.C. control with flight echelons of one pilot, one co-pilot and one crew chief per aircraft and one dead-reckoning navigator per 4 aircraft previously scheduled for July, will be accelerated with initial movement now anticipated about 22nd May 1944 and total balance to follow within 10 days. Fillers totalling approximately 475 additional personnel will depart by earliest available sea transportation.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of JCS

memo 8-12-71

By RHP Date APR 4 1973

CM-IN-5742

(8 May 44)

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*Colonel Park*

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

~~SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

Number OZ 2413

May 6, 1944

Page 2

- (c) If emergency requires utilization of transport aircraft in theater following departure of 79 aircraft for Mediterranean and prior to arrival of 1st Combat Cargo Group Aircraft you are authorized to recall any number of the 20 C-46 aircraft (or their equivalent lift in C-47's) which you have just returned to the "Hump" operations.
- (d) Should a tactical emergency necessitate the diversion of additional transport aircraft you will apply through normal channels to United States Chiefs of Staff in Washington for authority for such diversion.

2. This acceleration of departure of 1st Combat Cargo Group strains global air transport resources particularly personnel to the limit. The 2nd Combat Cargo Group remains scheduled for departure in mid-August. The urgency of maintaining "Hump" tonnage at maximum capacity in view of Y Force activities and projected operations does not need reiteration, and you should draw upon these critical facilities only to that degree which you own immediate emergency necessitates.

T.O.O. 051640Z

SEACOS 145 is CM-IN-22242 (30 Apr 44) CCS

ACTION: CCS

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold  
OPD  
Gen Bissell  
Adm King  
Col Park  
Log

CM-IN-5742

(8 May 44)

1333Z amb

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
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FROM: Main 11 Army Group SEA.

TO: War Office.  
Rptd HQ AAI.  
N.Z. Forces HQ New Zealand.  
M.A. China.  
British Army Staff, Washington.  
GHQ Persia and Iraq Command.  
GHQ East Africa.  
HQ Brisbane (pass COIC GHQ)  
Middle East.

NO: 254/OPS 6th May.

SITREP 114.

ONE: ARAKAN.

Ref SITREP 113. Report six hundred enemy area PM 4282 now known to be false 1/8 Gr with arty SP and after hand to hand fighting captured feature PM 438432 4 May. Many enemy bodies found but our cas lt enemy attack on our posn area PT 551 PM 4342 and simultaneous attacks area PM 4422 early 5 May repulsed. Our posns PM 4543 heavily engaged by enemy early 5 May but no attack developed. Enemy commenced ops against area West of Buthidaung by shelling area PM 4845 4 May. Evening 4 May enemy infiltrated area PM 5043 where str estimated approx three hundred Main attack by estimated one enemy bn commenced 0400 hrs 5 May when enemy gained footing on feature PM 469442. One hundred and fifty enemy reported West of Buthidaung engaged by our tks and fighting still in progress.

CM-IN-5846 (8 May 44)

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Colonel Park  
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Number 254/OPS

Page Number 2.

TWO: KALADAN.

Approx one PL INA attacked 1 GAMBIA posns area BALAING PG 8031 evening 3 May. Later withdrew losing nine killed. Total known enemy killed by 7/16 PUNJAB and 1 GAMBIA during recent ops now two hundred and thirty. Our cas twelve killed twenty three wounded.

THREE: 4 CORPS.

- (A) Area BISHENPUR. One hundred and fifty enemy located area RK 1504. Three hundred enemy in jungle RK 1632. Night 4/5 May our attack on village RK 1138 unsuccessful. 5 May enemy attempt to demolish trestle BR at RJ 8850 unsuccessful.
- (B) Area PALEL-TAMU. Large conc mules and enemy activity reported area RK 5520. Estimated one enemy coy moved East from RK 2623. 48 bde less 9 border WANGJING RK 4737. 1/16 PUNJAB 1 PATIQLA concentrating WANGJING.
- (C) Area IMPHAL. Reported seven hundred enemy moved East through village RK 4493 between 1 and 3 May. Comment. Numbers possible excessive but tendency for units 15 Div move East recently noticeable. 9 JAP attack on Ridge MAPAO RK 3579 RK 3784 held up by strong enemy opposn. 3/14 PUNJAB held up Area RK 3583. Our cas area IMPHAL during 48 hours 4 May 5 May estimated one hundred. HQ 89 Bde 2 KOSB 1 SIKB area SENGMAI RK 2878. 1 DOGI area RK 4591. HQ 37 Bde 3/10 GR three coys 2 HYBAD RK 5575. 3/3 GR 3/5 RGR 5878.

CM-IN-5846

(8 May 44)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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Number 254/OPS

Page Number 3.

(D) 4 CORPS. Estimate five thousand seven hundred enemy killed in Corps area during present ops.

FOUR: 33 CORPS.

(A) One hundred and fifty enemy reported along tracks West and SE of NERHEMA RE 5180. Indications enemy withdrawing SE to area REKROMA RE 5374 CHEDEMA RE 5769\* PHAKEKEDZUMI RE 9267 reported reinforced by enemy. Possible large number JAPS this area. Three hundred enemy reported repairing poans RE 8082.

(B) KOHIMA. Our offensive continues. 4 May. 2 DLI 1 RWP with tks established area RE 500658. 5 Bde established area RE 511681. 4 Bde captured Ridge RE 492637\*\* and made contact with 1/1 PUNJAB area RE 484654. Night 4/5 May continuous enemy counter attack against 5 Bde poans. Fwd poans 1 CAMERONS area RE 5168 overrun.

(C) 23 BDE. Ref SITREP 113. Twenty enemy killed ten wounded in action PHAKEKEDZUMI night 1/2 May. Enemy killed by 23 Bde in present ops now totals one hundred and forty two. 44 coln RE 4582. 56 coln due join 44 coln 4 May. 60 coln RE 9495. 88 Coln MZ 9102. 34 coln RE 9184.

FIVE: HUKAWNG.

Body recovered MANPIN SC 4078 belongs 146 Regt. Estimated one ooy enemy NX 9222. Reported three thousand moved from MITKYINA SD 14 to MOGAUNG SC 63 late Apr early May. 1/114 Regt cleared enemy from area SC 3980. American Rangers area NX 9025.

CM-IN-5846

(8 May 44)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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Number 254/078

Page Number 4.

SIX: NORTH BURMA.

Enemy str TIANZUP NY 2321 estimated one coy.

T.O.O. 061925

\* Check reads 5569

\*\* Check reads 492651

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: CC/S (BJBM)  
CG AAF  
0-2  
Colonel Park  
Log

CM-IN-5846

(8 May 44)

1643Z

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# INCOMING MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

May 6, 1944

From: Rear SACSEA  
To : Chiefs of Staff  
Info: J.S.M. Washington  
Mr : SEA 128

DECLASSIFIED  
JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 15 1974

Following for Chiefs of Staff repeated Marshall  
from Mountbatten agreed Stilwell.

8th Report on MATTERHORN for 2 weeks ending 30th  
April.

1. Kharagpur. Operational runway ready. 8200 feet concrete taxi strips ready. Housing ready for 931 officers and 6397 enlisted men. Storage tank facilities completed. Distribution system 90 per cent complete. Estimated date of completion 30th September 44.
  2. Chakulia. Operational runway ready. 3700 feet concrete taxi strips ready. 42 hardstandings steel plank ready. Housing ready for 686 officers and 4764 enlisted men. Storage tank facilities 83 per cent complete. Distribution system 80 per cent complete. Estimated date of completion 30th September 44.
  3. Kalaikunda. Concrete runway 6000 feet ready. Housing ready for 500 officers and 2000 enlisted men. Estimated date of completion 30th September 44.
  4. Piardoba. Concrete runway 7500 feet ready. 39 temporary steel mat hardstandings. Housing ready for 450 officers and 2900 enlisted men. Tankage is 29 per cent complete. Distribution system 45 per cent complete. Estimated completion date 30th September 44.
  5. Dudhkundi. North and South runway 2800 feet ready both ends under construction. Housing ready for 260 officers and 1539 enlisted men. Storage tank facilities 82 per cent complete. Estimated completion date 30th September 44.
- CM-IN-5544 ( 8 May 44)

*Col. Park*

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Nr: SEA 128

May 6, 1944

Page 2.

6. Charra. East and west runway 6000 feet ready. North and south runway 4804 feet ready. 38 temporary hardstandings ready. Taxi strip reinforced steel mat 2900 feet ready. Housing ready for 260 officers and 200 enlisted men. All work beyond that planned for R.A.F. H.B. airfield including Pol has been stopped.

7. Agra and Karachi. Runway extensions at 75 per cent and 100 per cent completed. Hardstandings are 95 per cent and 90 per cent completed. Estimated completion dates are 1st June 44 and 15th May 44 respectively.

T.O.O. 061545 F.G.

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold  
OPD  
Gen Bissell  
Adm King  
Col Park  
LOG

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 15 1974

CM-IN-5544 (8 May 44) 0249Z mmd

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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P-R-I-O-R-I-T-Y

From: CG, U.S. Army Forces, China, Burma, and India  
Near Echelon, New Delhi, India.

To: War Department

For: CRA 2838

6 May 1944.

Sultan to Marshall for Asiatic Section OPD  
CRA 2838.

Weekly summary for week ending 3 May 1944.

(1) US Air: 27 April. Three P-38's set out to attack railroad in north Thailand, returned because of bad weather. Four P-40's attacked 20 junks on Yangtze River, setting fire to several and killing about 100 Japanese.

28 April. Twenty six B-24's with an escort of ten P-51's bombed 2 Yellow River bridges 18 miles north Chongshien. Both bridges were hit and fires were started at north end of one bridge. Two P-40's strafed enemy troops northeast Fengshang with unknown results. Three B-25's off the east coast Hainan Island damaged a 200 foot freighter. Two steamers 125 feet were also attacked and 1 left sinking. Six B-25's bombed Yangsin with unobserved results. Eighteen Fighters strafed barracks near Namohang also with unobserved results. Two B-24's on a seasweep sighted no shipping.

CM-IN-4927 (7 May 44)

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972  
BHP, NARS Date APR 4 1973

*Colonel Park*  
42

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P-R-I-O-R-I-T-Y

Page 2.

From: CG, U.S. Army Forces, China, Burma, and India  
Near Koholm, New Delhi, India

No: OMA 2858

6 May 1944

29 April. Twenty four B-24's with twenty four fighter escort detailed to bomb a bridge in East China turned back due to bad weather. Four P-40's strafed buildings at Hongping with unobserved results. Six B-25's bombed warehouses and barracks in Shayang starting large fires and explosions. Two B-25's fired 3 launches 20 to 50 feet long in the Kiating area. Two B-25's on sea sweep from Foochow to Wanshow strafed an 85 foot Junk with good results. Two missions to intercept enemy planes and two missions to attack other objectives were unsuccessful.

30 April. Eight P-40's dive bombed bridges at Ding Ho (20 miles southwest of Langso) destroying 1 section of 1 and damaging a part of another. Four P-40's strafed fuel dumps north of Koenwi with unobserved results. One mission to intercept enemy aircraft failed to make contact. Seven P-40's strafed the Wan Pa Hsa area on the Burma-Thailand border. Two buildings and a motor pool were destroyed and several motor transports were damaged.

1 May. Four P-40's destroyed 1 span of bridge at Wan Lai Kaw (west of Takaw Ferry) by dive bombing. Five P-40's strafed enemy installations near Wan Pohsa. Four B-24's returned from sea sweep because of bad weather. Two P-40's damaged 2 barges 100 feet long in vicinity of Cat Bai Island. Fifteen P-40's in four missions attacked the railroad, bridges and other enemy installations in the Loc Binh, Dong Dang, Ma Chan, Lang Son and Pho Want Thuong areas in northern French Indo-

CM-IN-4927 (7 May 44)

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Page 3.

From CG, U.S. Army Forces China, Burma, and India  
Near Echelon, New Delhi, India.

Re: OMA 2858 6 May 1944.

China. Three bridges and 20 rolling stock were damaged and several buildings were fired. One B-24 on sea sweep near Hangchow sighted no shipping. Two B-25's sank a 150 foot freighter in Amoy harbor. Seven B-25's and eight P-40's damaged runway at Tangyang Airfield. Two P-40's on intercept mission failed to make contact with enemy planes.

2 May. Four B-25's sighted no shipping south of Hainan Island. Nine P-40's on mission to Tangchung returned because of bad weather. Two P-40's on sea sweep off Cat Bai Island sank three sampans and damaged three more. Two P-40's knocked out 1 span of railway bridge at Bas Le. Four P-40's attacked the Ho Chua railroad yards. The freight station and 3 rolling stock were destroyed and 4 rolling stock were damaged. Two P-40's damaged a railroad bridge north of Kip.

3 May. Two B-24's on sea sweep off southeast coast of China sank a 350 foot freighter and a 100 foot freighter. Four B-25's covered by eight P-40's bombed Tangyang airfield with 50 percent of bombs in storage areas. Ten P-40's bombed the Yellow River Bridge and scored 11 direct hits. This flight then strafed Japanese communications in the Loyang area, destroying fifteen trucks and 300 or 400 Japanese troops. Seven B-25's bombed the Nihshien area in support of ground troops.

CM-IN-4927 (7 May 44)

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Page 4.

From: CG, U.S. Army Forces, China, Burma and India  
Near Echelon, New Delhi, India.

No: OBA 2858

6 May 1944

and fires were started and fourteen trucks destroyed. In Hanchang and Hsiang-Cheng areas this flight attacked communications and damaged approximately 100 trucks and 2 tanks.

(2) Chinese Air: Little activity because of bad flying weather.

(3) US Ground: No operations for period covered.

(4) Chinese Ground: Operations by the Japanese to open the Peking-Hankow railway through Shantung and Sinyang are progressing. A double movement from both the north and south is being carried out to join the Japanese forces in the Yellow River area with those in the Yangtze River Area. In the north, the Japanese in the Yellow River bridgehead have bypassed a Chinese army holding Hanchang and are making a flanking movement with a motorized column via Hsuehloheng, Chishien, and Linju towards Loyang. Fighting has been reported in Linju and the Chinese are shifting troops to meet this Japanese threat to Loyang. Other Japanese column in the Yellow River bridgehead have moved southward and have reached Yenchang and Wuyang. The Japanese in the Yangtze Valley are advancing northward from Hankow and Sinyang towards Sinsien. Two Chinese armies are opposing this thrust. There now remains only about 80 miles of

CM-IN-4927 (7 May 44)

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Page 5.

From: CG, U.S. Army Forces, China, Burma, and India  
Near Echelon, New Delhi, India

No: CRA 2858 6 May 1944.

the Peking-Hankow Railroad in Chinese hands, between  
Yupohang and Bingyang.

(5) Lado Road progress as of 27 April 44;  
Forward survey party-milestone 176, lead bulldozer-  
miles 176, final grading-miles 148, final unrolling-  
through mile 109.6 except for a four mile stretch  
between milestones, 91.6 and 96.6.

(6) Four inch pipeline progress report as of  
29 April 44: Pipeline clearing-milestone 132.28, pipe  
strung-miles 126.28, pipe coupled-miles 125.88, pipe-  
line in operation-Digboi to Shingwiyang, pipeline  
tankage-conditional 2000 barrel tank is being instal-  
led at Shingwiyang.

(7) Change in British troop dispositions follows:

15th Corps at Dheochapalang.

36th Division at Bewli Basar.

7th Division: 89th Brigade is moving from  
Arahan to 4th Corps area, 114th Brigade is 1 mile north-  
east Fung Basar.

4th Corps: 23rd Division is 4 miles  
south Imphal: 1 Brigade at Wangjing ( 9 miles north  
Palal), 57th Brigade is 16 miles northeast Imphal.

5th Division: 9th Brigade is 12 miles north  
northeast Imphal.

CM-IN-4927 (7 May 44)

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Page 6.

From: CG, U.S. Army Forces, China, Burma, and India  
Near Echelon, New Delhi, India

No: CGA 2058 6 May 1944.

33rd Corps:

2nd Division: 4th Brigade is four miles  
southwest Kohima, 6th Brigade is at Kohima.  
5th Division: 161st Brigade is two miles  
west Kohima.  
3rd Division: 23rd Brigade at Mokokchung.

No Sig.

ACTION: OFD

INFO : CGAAF  
G-2  
Col. Park

CM-IN-4927 (7 May 44) 06192 ejv

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GSD Letter, 6-3-78

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*How President*  
*WS*

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~~SECRET~~

P R I O R I T Y

FOR GENERAL MARSHALL'S EYES ONLY

From: CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma and India  
Forward Echelon, Chungking, China

To: War Department

No. CHC 1035, 5 May 1944

Eyes alone Marshall from Stilwell CHC 1035.

Enclosed in following is informational.

Jap Force will jump off <sup>30 Miles South of Kunlong</sup> in few days with 4 divisions north flank and 4 columns of 4 battalions each spaced along front down to Kunlong. Delays are being caused by last minute changes in plans, but believe the move is at long last about to begin. Indications are that Generalissimo is pushing it and has demanded success. Jap Force on that entire front now estimated at 4 battalions.

Our try for Myitkyena is under way. First contact today. We should know possibility of getting there in about 10 days.

On this front progress painfully slow. Replacement problem always present due to War Ministry's failure to meet quotas. We are past Inkangshawang and will keep at it, but man can not now estimate what we can do before monsoon. Am putting in a raw regiment to try and push them along.

CM-IN-3973 (6 May 44)

~~EYES ONLY~~

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OSD letter, May 8, 1972  
By RHP, NARS Date APP 4 1973

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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-2-

From: CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma and India  
Forward Echelon, Chungking, China

No. CHC 1035, 5 May 1944

Have arranged with Slim about long range penetra-  
tion groups. They come under my command about May 21st,  
at which time we hope to organize a push for Mogaung.  
The arrangements are as satisfactory as could be expected.

No Sig

ACTION: General Handy

INFO : General Arnold  
General Bissell  
C of S

CM-IN-3973

(6 May 44) 0100Z

ejv

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~~SECRET~~

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OSD Letter, 5-3-72

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE <sup>May 3, 1944</sup>

FROM: Main 11 Army Group SEA

TO : Usual Addressees

NO : 233/OPS

ONE: ARAKAN. Increased enemy activity North end Feature PM 5542. Patrol investigating enemy reported area PM 4366. Locals report unknown reliability 600 enemy area Kandarua Chaung PM 4282. Comment. Consider presence possible but numbers much exaggerated. Several enemy counter-attacks on our newly-gained posns area PT 551 PM 4342 repulsed. To date 37 enemy bodies counted this area. Our cas believed light. Enemy suffered 24 cas in fighting area PM 4439 May 2. Night 3/4 May our tps ambushed enemy party area PM 4442. 16 enemy bodies recovered. Ref. SITREP 112. In our successful counter-attack area PT 121 PM 5048 May 3 55 enemy killed. 4 NR had successful action area Dabrugyaung PM 5643 night 1/2 May and morning 3 May killing 15 enemy burning village and destroying amm dump PM 5641.

TWO: KALADAN. Jap PW states 500 mixed Japanese and BTA astride Kaladan near PG 7823 also majority Ina area jeep track east of R Kaladan. Also states enemy intend reach Indo-Burma Border by Monsoon. HQ Kaladan Force 1 Gambia Labawa PG 6633. 7/16 Punjab area PG 6831.

THREE: 4 Corps. A. Reliable indication adv Hq 15 Army at Indaingyi RU 6175 since 22 Apr and Hq northern L of C at Leu SF 4322 since 25 Apr under comd 15 Army. B. Area Bishenpur. Ops against enemy posns areas RK 120406 and RK 110404 continued 4 May. C. Area Palel-Tamu. Locals report villages north of RK 5818 and west to RK 5226 occupied by enemy. Documents captured RK 5619 identify 12 Coy. 213 Regt. 2 May our patrol inflicted small cas on enemy MF convoy moving westward from Leitan RK 6515 to Phalbung RK 5818. Night 1/3 May enemy loaded AT convoy moving east intercepted NW of RK 5818. Night 3/4 May small enemy raid Palel Keep. D. Area Imphal. V force report no enemy activity east of R Yeirok RK 1075 in past week. 2/3 May Kanglatongbi RK 2984 clear except for small IMG post. 9 CID 67 Rest identified 4 May RK 3986. Locals report enemy from village RK

CM-IN-4431

(6 May 44)

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By Authority of FCS

memo, 1-17-73

By RHP Date APR 4 1973

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*Col Park*  
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NO: 233/OPS

Page 2

5790 now taken refuge in hills to west. Ops against enemy in areas RK 3583 RK 3986 started 4 May. 3/14 Punjab held up area Feature RK 357827. 3 at captured Feature RK 392863. 1/16 Punjab RK 5878.

FOUR: 33 CORPS. A. Locals report 3 May considerable increase enemy conc Kigwema RE 5399\* last two days and that enemy came from village RE 5560. RE 4490 clear of enemy CI report INA STR unspecified in area Mukalmt I RE 79. Three INA captured in Lazami RE 69. Identifications. PW captured RE 5065 \*\* belongs 1 Bn 124 Rgt. B. Kohima. 2 May several small enemy attacks on 4 Bde Coy posn area RE 477633 repulsed. 19 enemy killed. 4 Bde Hq1 RS less 2 Coys 2 Norfols RE 480647.\*\* Coy 1 RS at each RE 477633 RE 469620. 2 div gen attack area Kohima launched 4 May. First reports indicate progress satisfactory. C. 23 Bde. Elements 34 Coln attacked Phtkedzumi RE 9267 night 1/2 May inflicting small cas. 34 coln area RE 9394 RE 9180. 60 coln MZ9821. 88 coln NV0122. 33 coln MZ8104 \*\*\*\* 76 coln RE 6198.

FIVE: HYNWNG. 1/64 Regt captured enemy posn SC 2388 killing 15 enemy. 1/112 Regt reached SC5086. 2/112 Regt area SC 4882. 3/112 Regt moving on Paokum SC 4277. 114 Chinese Regt attacking area SC 3887. 3/113 Regt attacking area SC 3089.

T.O.O. 051820

ACTION: OPD

INFO : CC/S  
CG AAF  
C-2  
Col Park  
LOG

CM-IN-4431

(6 May 44)

1652Z

hrt

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P R I O R I T Y

FOR GENERAL MARSHALL'S EYES ONLY

From: CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma and India  
Forward Echelon, Chungking, China

To: War Department

No. CHC 1035, 5 May 1944

Eyes alone Marshall from Stilwell CHC 1035.

Enclosed in following is informational.

Y Force will jump off in few days with 4 divisions north flank and 4 columns of 4 battalions each spaced along front down to Kunlong. Delays are being caused by last minute changes in plans, but believe the move is at long last about to begin. Indications are that Generalissimo is pushing it and has demanded success. Jap Force on that entire front now estimated at 4 battalions.

Our try for Myitkyena is under way. First contact today. We should know possibility of getting there in about 10 days.

On this front progress painfully slow. Replacement problem always present due to War Ministry's failure to meet quotas. We are past Inkanghtawng and will keep at it, but men can not now estimate what we can do before monsoon. Am putting in a new regiment to try and push them along.

CM-IN-3973 (6 May 44)

ERASSED

EYES ONLY E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (B)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date APR 4 1973

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EYES ONLY  
~~SECRET~~  
INCOMING MESSAGE

-2-

From: CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma and India  
Forward Echelon, Chungking, China

No. CHC 1035, 5 May 1944

Have arranged with Slim about long range penetra-  
tion groups. They come under my command about May 21st,  
at which time we hope to organize a push for Mogaung.  
The arrangements are as satisfactory as could be expected.

No Sig

ACTION: General Handy

INFO : General Arnold  
General Bissell  
C of S

CM-IN-3973

(6 May 44) 0100Z

ejv

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972  
By RHP, NARS Date APR 4 1973

*Pact*

From: CG, US Army Forces, China Burma & India Rear  
Eohelon, New Delhi India

To: War Department  
CG, US Army Forces in South Pacific Area,  
Noumea, New Caledonia  
Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area,  
Brisbane, Australia

NR: CRAX 2789, 5th May 1944

Sultan to Marshall for Asiatic Section OPD, info  
MacArthur, COMSOPAC, Ferris, Chennault, Boatner, Lindsey,  
Dorn, Cranston and Timberman CRAX 2789.

On Assam front 2nd Division launched general at-  
tack in Kohima and satisfactory progress reported. 23rd  
Brigade continues to advance southward and now has 6 columns  
in rough line about 25 miles north of Kohima-Jessami Trail.  
Patrol of 34th Column attacked Phakekedxumi. 4th Corps Area  
generally quiet with some fighting north Imphal and skirmishes  
near Bishenpur and Palel. Small units Lushai Brigade reached  
area 28 miles northwest Tiddim. At Arakan British troops re-  
pulsed enemy attack on newly captured positions at point 551.  
Small scale fighting near Godusara, Htindaw and north Buthi-  
daung. Some activity east of Kalapanzin Annkin Kaladan Valley.  
Coordinated air, artillery, tank and infantry attack smashed  
Japanese line at Inkangahtawng in Mogaung Valley. Following  
air and artillery preparations tanks followed by infantry of  
22nd Division crossed Pangyu Hka and occupied Inkangahtawng.  
64th Regiment moved around west flank and cut main road south  
of the Hvelon HKA, 2 miles south Inkangahtawng. Trapped  
enemy being mopped up. In this action none of our tanks lost  
and Chinese ground casualties light. East of Mogaung river  
38 Division had several Japanese groups surrounded. Fighting

*in east Myanmar*

OM-IN-4085

(6 May 44)

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OSD Letter, 5-3-72

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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P-R-I-O-R-I-T-Y

Page 2

From: CG, US Army Forces, China Burma & India Rear  
Echelon, New Delhi India  
To: War Department  
CG, US Army Forces in South Pacific Area,  
Noumea, New Caledonia  
Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area,  
Brisbane Australia  
NR: CRAX 2789, 5th May 1944

continues on east flank as 1st Battalion, 112 Regiment at-  
tacked Kauri and occupied positions, while 3rd Battalion,  
112 Regiment repulsed Japanese attack on Paokun. In Fort  
Hertz Valley British troops successfully ambushed 70 Japa-  
nese south Tiangwup.

No Sig.

ACTION: OPD

INFO : CGAAF  
G-2  
Col. Park  
Log

CM-IN-4085 (6 May 44) 0304Z ejv

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P-R-I-O-R-I-T-Y

From: CG US Army Forces China Burma & India Forward  
Echelon, Chungking, China

To: War Department  
CG US Army Forces China Burma & India Rear  
Echelon, New Delhi, India

Re: CFBX 17005 5 May 1944

To Bissell WDGBI info Sultan CFBX 17005 from G 2  
sgd Stilwell. Reurad 31449 May 3.

Pattern of present indications point to Japanese intention of opening the Pinghan railroad from Sinyang (114 DEG 08 MIN -32 DEG 09 MIN) to Sinsiang. Chinese state no plans for the entire operation have been captured. Chinese also believe Japs intend to open railroad. The reported movement north from Sinyang of a 4 pronged drive along the railroad (OURAD CFBX 16177 May 4) coupled with the drive southward from the Yellow River all tends to confirm this intention.

The views expressed in OURAD CFBX 16265 April 17 in which Japanese troop concentrations and capabilities were discussed are still adhered to by this headquarters.

SINO communications headquarters estimate that only 2 months time would be required by the Japs to restore the railroad provided the rails were available. It is also possible that the Japs intend to set up fighter fields in this area for the purpose of opposing any east to west flight by our planes.

No Sig

ACTION: G-2  
INFORMATION: CG AAP, OPR, Colonel Park, Log

CM-IN-3883 (5 May 44) 2222Z ov

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OSD letter, May 8, 1972  
APR 4 1973  
By RHP, NARS Date

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From: CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma and India Rear  
Echelon, New Delhi, India

To: War Department

Mr: CRAX 2708 4th May, 1944

G-2 report 3rd May, Bissell CRAX 2708 info Ferris,  
Dorn, Chennault, Cranston, Egan, Lindsay and Timberman from  
Creswell signed Sultan.

In Arakan reports of arrival reinforcements continue,  
consider a battalion 11th Regiment may be in area south of  
Buthidung. Over 30 members India National Army (JIFA) sur-  
rendered south of Palel Tamu Road, these prisoners stated an  
INA battalion was in area and that all were hungry and ready  
to surrender; little change Imphal; artillery fire inflicted  
estimated 200 casualties on enemy concentration 1 mile north-  
east Kohima; indications Japanese are constructing defense  
positions north and northeast Kohima, probably to oppose Brit-  
ish advances to southeast and south. Nothing to report on  
north Burma and along Salween River.

No Sig.

ACTION: G-2  
INFO : CGAAF  
OPD  
Col. Park ✓  
Log

CM-IN-3005 (4 May 44) 2036Z e jv

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) of (C)  
OSD letter, May 3, 1972  
By RHP, NARS Date APR 4 1973

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
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May 3, 1944

TO : Chiefs of Staff  
INFO: Joint Staff Mission  
FROM: SACSEA  
SEACOS 149

DECLASSIFIED  
By Authority of JCS  
memo, 8-12-71  
By RMP Date APR 4 1973

Following for Chiefs of Staff repeated Joint Staff Mission from Mountbatten. Fortnightly report for period April 10 to April 26, 1944.

Section 1 - Comments on the operational situation.

I have nothing to add to contents of SEACOS 144 and SEACOS 147.

Section 2 - Eastern Fleet

The operation against Sabang has been fully reported to the Admiralty and in the press and there is nothing else to report.

Section 3 - Army Group Operations.

1. Arakan-Kaladan.

- (a) Enemy. 54 division still not committed. Japanese broadcasts making much of capture of Paletwa. Enemy offensive against our left flank still possible.
- (b) Own Troops. Fighting to improve positions south of Maungdaw-Buthidaung road continues against heavy opposition. 81 WA division moved from Kaladan to East Kalapanzin area leaving two battalions operating north of Palett.

2. Chindwin.

- (a) Enemy. Enemy has changed plans and redistributed forces, Imphal now his main objective and threat to

CM-IN-4348

(6 May 44)

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SEACOS 149

Page 2

Assam Railway and Mokokchung decreased. Estimated threat against Kohima 5 battalions, against Imphal 9 battalions from north and 7 from south, against Palel 2 battalions and 1 tank regiment.

- (b) Own Troops. Heavy fighting in both Imphal and Kohima areas. Imphal area 20 Div successfully withstood determined enemy attempts to move on Imphal from south and SE. 2 brigades are in depth on Palel-Tamu road covering Palel and 1 brigade astride Tiddim road at Bishenpur where Silchar track also enters plain. North of Imphal 23 Div on right, 5 Div less 1 brigade in centre and 1 brigade 17 Div on left are advancing NE and north and have reached points 23 miles NE and 10 miles north of Imphal. Kohima area 2 Div advanced SE from Dimapur cleared road Dimapur-Kohima to the outskirts of Kohima and relieved original Kohima garrison. Heavy hand to hand fighting in Kohima where enemy held northern, eastern and southern outskirts. 161 Bde has withdrawn to a position astride Dimapur-Kohima road MS 32-38. HQ 33 Corps and 33 Brigade established in area Dimapur-Bokajan whilst 23 Bde continues to operate in areas Mokokchujga Wokha.

3. Mogaung Valley.

Own Troops. Chinese forces continue to advance slowly against stiff enemy resistance. On main front forward troops are 12 miles south of Shaduzup. On left flank village 9 miles north of Kanaing has been occupied.

4. North Burma.

Own Troops. Successful ambushes carried out by our levies between 32 and 25 miles north of Myitkyina although enemy still holding out 40 miles north of Myitkyina.

5. 3 Ind Div.

(a) Enemy. Japanese buildup in area estimated at equivalent of 16 battalions but all not in contact

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(6 May 44)

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and many are composite units made up of L of C Troops. Forces include however one regiment HQ and at least 2 battalions of 2 Div and bulk of 24 Indep mixed bde from South Burma and 5 battalions from Salween where Japanese dispose now only 4 battalions.

(b) Own Troops. Main activity centered round White City where 77 Bde repulsed determined enemy attacks with heavy casualties to enemy. 14 Bde has been blocking railway Wunthi-Indaw and 111 Bde road Pinlebu-Pinbon with 3 detached columns carrying out demolitions at road Bhamo-Myitkyina.

Section 4 - Air Command. General

1. High effort maintained during period, particularly 4 Corps area, where 9 of 11 Vengeance and Hurribomber squadrons operated, total sorties flown were RAF 6967, USAAF in E A C 5243, 14 USAAF 110. This is the first time total sorties more than 10,000.
2. Of 227 enemy sorties 204 were concentrated over Manipur area in spasmodic series of attacks mainly on airfields. 4 RAF Dakotas are reported missing following one attack.
3. Armament developments included use of 500 lb incendiary clusters. MC land parachute fragmentation bombs.
4. No. 12 US Group comprising 4 Mitchell B.25 squadrons has joined Strategic Air Force. No. 4 Squadron IAF has begun operating. This is the first IAF G/A Squadron to move into the line. No. 8 Squadron IAF which began operating December 1943, has completed 1,000 sorties.

Strategic Air Force.

5. 382 short tons were dropped by USAAF bombers in 365 sorties. Most fruitful result was destruction of 2 spars of Sittang bridge, 2 at Natmauk and one of Sinthe bridge in addition to further damage on other railway bridges and installations. Minelaying operations continued and shipping at Port Blair was attacked, near misses being scored against 3 M/V. 6 RAF heavy bombers concentrated their attacks upon railways dropping

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(6 May 44)

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BRACOS 149

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227 short tons in 156 sorties, the raid on Pegu junction by 9 Wellingtons was particularly successful. Heavy raids also made against Maymyo, Moulmein and Mandalay.

3rd Tactical Air Force.

7. Most of the 1143 Vengeance sorties and all the 1257 sorties of the 4 Hurribomber squadrons were flown over Manipur front in direct support of ground troops. G/A Beaufighters and Hurricanes destroyed or damaged 8 locomotives, 20 rolling stock, 427 rivercraft and 150 M/T. Only 2 G/A Beaufighter squadrons now operating.

8. One fighter-reece squadron N. Arakan Front and two on 4 Corps front flew 748 sorties.

9. Defensive sorties by R.A.F. fighters number 1353 and by U.S.A.A.F. 648. Although owing to contraction of warning area around Imphal as result of enemy infiltration rate of interception by Spitfires scoring 2-3-10 was unavoidably low, nevertheless there was compensation in successful intrusion by USAAF Lightnings (P-38's) over airfields used by enemy for his attacks. Total score by Lightnings in 5 successful raids reached following figures: 15-0-10 on ground and 14-0-6 in air. 2 Lightnings damaged.

10. American fighter bombers with total of 1134 sorties continued attacks on enemy positions, supply dumps and communications in Northern sector - their most spectacular exploit was interception without loss by Air Command Mustangs (P-51) of 12 Oscars, 3-0-3 claimed. Air Command long-range P-51 cut Shweli Bridge each carrying 2 x 100 lb bombs.

Other Activities.

11. Recently reinforced ex M.A.A.F. by 5 U.S.A.A.F. and 1 R.A.F. squadron Troop Carrier Command with record total of 4032 sorties dropped or landed 10773 short tons, transported 15549 troops and evacuated 1996 casualties. Total TCC strength now 9 U.S.A.A.F. and 5 R.A.F. squadrons.

12. G/R sorties numbered 141. Pro aircraft flew 121 sorties

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(6 May 44)

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and covered for first time Kra Isthmus railway and parts of Indo-China.

13. Combined Allied claim India-Burma theater for period 32-6-36: Losses through enemy action R.A.F. 12 U.S.A.A.F. 2 aircraft.

Section 5 - Administration.

1. Assam L. of C.

- (a) Reference SEACOS 141 of 18th April, Section 5. Dispatches of POL by all agencies for period 5 to 11 April averaged 1025 tons per day.
- (b) Railway emergency scheme was extended on 17 April to give full military control over section Akhaura to Padapur in addition to sections notified in SEACOS 141.
- (c) Dispatches military stores by all agencies 12 to 20 April 37478 tons, including POL, giving daily average 4164 tons per day against target 4745 tons.
- (d) Deliveries 11 to 20 April by Chandranathpur-Manipur road pipeline 1,025,700 gallons.

2. Reinforcements.

Under present operational conditions, arrangements have been made to fly in reinforcements for the forward formations in Assam. ✓

3. Leave ex India

At the meeting at GHQ(I) on April 7 it was decided that, out of the 175 passages to U.K. per month allotted by the War Office, there would be 125 passages per month for personnel of the services. Sub-allotment to the 3 services and to Armies/Commands has not yet been made.

Section 6 - Review of Planning.

In light of information brought back by Axiom Party,  
CM-IN-4348 (6 May 44)

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SEACOS 149

Page 6

planning is at present being concentrated on future operations for reconquest of Burma and on the study of small amphibious operations to take place in 1944 without outside resources.

T.O.O. 031421FG

Footnote: SEACOS 147 is CM-IN-2162 (3 May 44) CC/S SEACOS 144 is CM-IN-17829 (24 Apr 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : CG AAF  
OPD  
G-2  
Col. Park  
LOG

CM-IN-4348

(6 May 44)

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ROUGH DRAFT ONLY

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Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence

INTERVIEW WITH COLONEL JOHN R. ALLISON, A. C.

oOoOo

You have all heard a great deal about the operations which we have just completed in Burma — the operations which are actually still going on. I don't want to get into details; most of you have been bothered with de tails of this force since its conception about six months ago in the War Department. I want to go through it as quickly as possible, touch on the highlights, touch on its implications, touch on what might be the future of movement of troops by air. To do that and to give you a good background, it will be necessary for me to start right at first.

I think you are familiar with the way this organization started. General Wingate, fighting in Burma, developed a technique which was merely a new application of an old principle of warfare — an old cavalry action, something like the cavalry action which had taken place during the Civil War. He was a firm believer that well-led, well-manned troops could engage enemy line of communication troops, that a small number of troops could go behind the enemy's line and create great destruction, great havoc, and would create opportunities for the main bodies of the troops to advance. To make it a little clearer here, I will show you the picture in Northern Burma.

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OSD letter, May 8, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date APR 4 1973

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Northern Burma is roughly a triangle. The western part of this triangle is the Chindwin River. Here on the Chindwin River the British were facing the Japanese. As you know, now the Japanese have advanced and are now attacking Laphal. When we first arrived there, Tiddim was in our hands, and Tamu. We planned to use Tamu as a take-off airdrome for glider assault. This would relieve us of having to clear these mountains here, which meant going to about 8500 feet, a very, very difficult operation for a C-47. But the Japanese came in and took this airdrome just before we shoved off and so it was impossible to use it.

This is the western side of the triangle.

The eastern side of the triangle is roughly here on the Salween River. The Chinese are holding the Japanese in this very high and very mountainous country. At this time all the Chinese are doing there are holding.

The apex of the triangle goes up to the Himalaya mountains. Across the Apex is the hump route into China. It is a very difficult route to fly for many reasons -- weather not all of them -- the fact that the hump run is vulnerable to attack by Japanese which keeps our pilots from coming down into this lower area and coming across where the flying is relatively easy. There have been a number of times recently when the Japanese have made fighter sweeps into this territory. On some of the fighter sweeps we know that they have taken off from down here -- and that all they do is to fly up into this area, turn around and come back. There are so many planes crossing the hump ~~in~~ on a good day that it is impossible for a Japanese flight of eighteen airplanes to take off here, go up there and turn around, and come back without running into five or six transports -- unarmed transports --

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OSD Letter, 6-8-78

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which, of course, are very easy targets for fighters..

If we had fighter bases down here and radar where we could intercept their movements or if we just had radar in this area, so that we could plot the Japanese movement as they came up to make a raid on the hump line, and transmit that information to airplanes flying across the hump, they could take evasive action and fly north and avoid being intercepted by Japanese. But right now, or up until very recently, we had no bases in this area, we had absolutely no warning, we knew nothing about the movement of Japanese airplanes here, except which came through in very meager intelligence reports and, of course, late, and in no time to do us any good. So, if it was possible for the hump to move down and cross lower down on the apex of the triangle, it would be much, much easier to get supplies into China.

General Stilwell right now is pushing against the Japanese in the upper part of this triangle. I had no opportunity to visit his troops -- but I have been told by people who have been there that his men are doing a superb job and that they are pushing the Japanese hard in this area.

This is the main Japanese line of supply. This railroad goes all the way from Rangoon to Myitkyina. It's very long and very vulnerable. But the front being out here so far away it has been very safe. Airplanes have been able to go in and break that line of supply -- but it is just for a matter of hours. It isn't very difficult to repair a railroad, and the Japanese are very adept at it. You break ~~an~~ a railroad bridge and it seems as though the next day they've got it back up.

In his operations last year, Wingate came into this area and back out again. In doing so he depended upon mobility and surprise, and he did create

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a great deal of destruction and havoc in this area. But in leaving the country it was necessary to leave his wounded behind. He just wasn't equipped to take them out -- he left people sitting beside the trail with wounds and broken legs; or left them to die. So he asked, in this campaign, some form of aviation be produced with which he could evacuate the troops. He presented this at the Quebec Conference. He sold the leaders on the feasibility of this type of warfare, the advantages it had, the confusion it would cause behind the Japanese lines.

The U.S. Army Air Forces was directed to form an air unit which would evacuate Wingate's wounded as he walked through Burma. When General Arnold called in Colonel Cochran and myself he said: "I am giving you 200 L-5 and L-1 type aircraft. I want you to go in there and take out General Wingate's wounded." Then, with a twinkle in his eye he said, "I not only want you to do that ... but I want ~~you~~ the U.S.A.A.F. to spearhead General Wingate's operations."

With that in mind we started around the Pentagon to round up the necessary equipment to have an air force spearhead a land operation. We had nothing to go on -- we had no experience. I had read in the Reader's Digest who Wingate was and what he had done. Cochran immediately went to London to see him. I stayed here.

When I was in China I had often flown over this area. When you fly over it once, low down, and see the jungle, the mountains and the streams and very few roads, you know that the thing that stops movement here, of course, is that there is no way on the ground to get around.. You can walk through,

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OSD Letter, 5-8-78

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but it is awful hard and takes a long time. So the obvious answer was to move them by air. I snooped around in the offices in the Air Force here; I ordered some gliders and transports and light planes. Having been there, I knew there was not enough fighter aviation in that theatre, nor bomber aviation, to take care of the present commitments that the theatre commanders had been given, and also to give our force the protection we wanted them to have. So I asked for a squadron of fighters, a squadron of B-25's. We didn't get the B-25's until we got over to India and were able to send a cable back and ask for the B-25's. The theatre said it couldn't give them to us. General Arnold immediately wired back there were 12 B-25's on the way, and that we were to produce the crews for them. We didn't have enough crews to man the airplanes we already had -- but we scouted around and got some crews and started into this operation with one squadron of B-25's and one squadron of P-51's, one group of gliders (roughly 100 gliders and 75 glider pilots) and one squadron of troop carrier. The gliders were divided up into three squadrons.

We planned to have as many as three operations going at the same time. The strategical plan for operations this year were for the people on the fronts to hold. General Stilwell was going to advance as far as possible; General Wingate was going to walk in one long-range penetration of troops from the west here, cutting the Japanese supply lines behind the Japanese front here facing the British 4th Corps. They were to go into the center of Burma and be joined by another long range penetration brigade. Roughly 30 to 40,000 men were to walk down into this area to disrupt the Japanese communications behind Stilwell, join Wingate here. And a third brigade was

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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was to walk in across the Salween River here and spearhead a possible Chinese advance in this area, cutting the Japanese communications along the Burma Road. All three brigades were to join in Central Burma, fighting in the heart of the communications, and then pull out before the Monsoon. That was the plan.

In General Wingate's mind there had never been any idea of pulling his troops out. The first time I saw him I said, "What about the Monsoon?"

"We are going in this time to stay," he said.

I talked to his troops. Although in the plan it had been set down that the troops were to withdraw, the troops themselves believed they were going in there to stay and I believe they are in there to stay right now.

That was the strategic plan for this season's operation.

Because of Hump limitations General Stilwell said it would be impossible to transport the three to four hundred thousand men in the brigade across the Hump, have them walk in on this front, and also transport their supplies and equipment across and re-supply them by air. You all know the difficulty of Hump transportation. General Stilwell was right. This was before we arrived in this theatre. Cochran was the advance agent. He had just arrived, and he was called into the meeting. Admiral Mountbatten, Stilwell, Auchinleck, the chiefs of staff of all the forces in India, and General Shennault in China were represented there. This ~~was~~ discussion was going on -- General Wingate's operations had been practically cancelled. The plan had been changed. He was merely to walk in on this front and cut the communication lines of the Japanese who were fighting the Fourth Corps, and to come in and cut the communications of the Japanese who were facing

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Stilwell. He was terribly disappointed because it just seemed there was no answer.

At that time General Wingate did not know what our unit proposed to do for him -- neither did anyone else in the theatre. We just came there, someone said, "Here comes an outfit -- I wonder what they are for."

Cochrane walked in, and they told him the plan had been changed. He said there was no use to do that, that we brought a unit here to take General Wingate anywhere he wants to go in Burma and put him down.

The first reaction to that was, "Can you do it?"

Well, if you know Cochran, you know what the answer was. "Of course we can do it."

"How many people can you put down here with your force," General Wingate asked.

We had a small force, only 13 C-47's and 100 gliders. Cochran and Olsen began to figure. He said, "Well, if you streamline your brigade to between two and three thousand men, we can put them down all right in the Central part of Burma here, just carry in one brigade."

General Wingate said, "Well, can you do that in two weeks time?"

"We can do it in one weeks time and probably do it in less than that."

It wasn't quite that easy but it caught on and sold, and certainly sold with General Wingate and with Mountbatten, who were very enthused. At this meeting Admiral Mountbatten said, "Boy, you are the first ray of sunshine seen in this theater in a long, long time." Wingate, who is the kind of man who is always one jump ahead of you, certainly quick to see anything that was new and to see what could be done with it, said, "How are you going to do this?"

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OSD Letter, 5-8-78

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"We are going to take gliders over, as many as we can, take in engineer equipment and build an airfield, take in the rest of your men in our DC-3's. The Troop Carrier Command here has about 180 DC-3s. Why can't we get them in on the show?"

From then on the whole thing changed. The plan now was to walk in one brigade in front of Stilwell and fly in three more. That was what we had.

It was quite difficult getting our unit up to the front. These two airdromes were operated from -- just before Halcandy and Holligate, across this range of mountains here, roughly the high point, 7200 feet. The glider problem on the first night's operation is perhaps the most difficult one that ever will be undertaken. It was to get DC-3s up to 8500 feet with two fully loaded gliders on strings. There was about a three-quarter moon, it was hazy, and we had to fly 3 hours and 15 minutes in enemy territory. The pilot and every man knew when we took off that no matter what the outcome was -- we were going over here and out loose -- the DC-3 didn't have enough gasoline to pull back to friendly land. It could get back all right by itself, but with two gliders it could never get back to friendly territory. Of course, people shook their heads and said, "Can't do it."

As a matter of fact, we first went to India. One officer stood up and said, "You can't tow two fully loaded gliders behind a DC-3." We started to <sup>TOW</sup> tow five to show him it could be done, but we ended up by towing two overloaded gliders; 13-men gliders were carrying as many as 20 men. That is all right. You have a nice landing ground to land on. The landing gear is critical at about 4500 pounds.

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Anyway, to make a long story short, we brought gliders across here. In doing so we dropped about ten of them off here in the mountains before we got to enemy land. These ten landed okay. No one was hurt. Dropped of in enemy territory, mine. The crews of seven accounted for. The crews of six got back intact. Out of seven gliders two men got back. The rest of them were taken prisoners, and when I left two gliders were still unaccounted for. We had planned two waves of gliders to take off, one to go in to this field here, which we called Broadway, one to go in to this field, Halcandy. General Wingate said for strategic reasons he wanted to put down <sup>th</sup> 77<sup>th</sup> brigades in this area here, and the 111th brigade here. He wanted to put down the main body of those troops here, wanted to put down 2,000 men here in this area as a strategic diversion, so Cochran or myself would get the fighter to go out, look over the area -- this is when we first arrived -- and pick out the spots on the ground that looked as though they would make the most plausible landing area, send out photo reconnaissance, and have these areas photographed and from the photos decide which ones on which to construct airfields. We would show these areas to General Wingate, say, "Here in this area we should put down an airfield, one here, here, and here, for tactical reasons. Do you suggest that?"

There was one here, one in Broadway, Picadilly, and one here at Calcharinking. After photographing the first time, about a month before we made a landing we stayed completely, didn't go near them, didn't want the Japanese to get on to our <sup>plan</sup> ~~plan~~. The idea behind the whole thing was surprise. It was just impossible for the Japanese to guard every open glade and forest in this area. There wasn't any cultivated field,

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Just nothing but jungle. So we stayed away from them.

The afternoon before take-off we sent out photo reconnaissance. The <sup>airplane</sup> ~~man~~-men flew very low over the field and took pictures. Twenty minutes before take-off in gliders the pictures were back and on the table in front of us. Looking at this field here we saw it was completely blocked by trees, logs, and stumps. The Japanese had either just by luck blocked that field or gotten on to our plan. General Wingate stood there and looked at it. He said, "Well, we can't take a chance. The chances are that they know something has come, know that we have gliders, but don't have our plan. They know we have gliders and know this would be a likely spot because the year before a DC-3 landed here in the forest and picked up some of his troops and took them out. This place was photographed and a picture put in Life. The Japanese knowing that probably figured, well, okay. We'll catch them this year. They are going to come down here again." So it couldn't have been more than three days before our proposed take-off that they blocked this field, because one of the men coming back from a mission over here about three or four days before had passed over the field at low altitude and seen it, and had reported that everything looked all right on the field.

We thought perhaps they figured, Well, the Americans are going to use gliders, coming in somewhere. This is as good a spot as any, so let's block it. <sup>They were</sup> <sup>Two full men open</sup> Right on the beam. We planned that if this field was blocked we would put the troops down here in this field because there was a possibility that maybe the plans had leaked out and the Japanese know what we were going to do, and perhaps they would be at this point waiting for us with machineguns. The thing to do was to take all the gliders that first

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night and put them in here, and just assault the field and take it away from the Japanese that ~~they~~ were there. We figured the Japanese could hardly afford more than a company to guard it, ~~they~~ would have machineguns, the fields carefully mapped, the photographs projected on to bedsheets and very carefully plotted where each glider would go down, what each crew would do when it landed, what the assault crews would do, where they would go, picked out the possible strong points on the field, where the Japanese would have machineguns, if on the ~~ground~~ <sup>field</sup>. We had a certain number of gliders. The first ones to land were detailed to go right for those strong points, hit there, and have the troops get out. Those troops, armed with tommyguns, were to go into the wood as fast as they could. We figured the Japanese in there would be asleep, we would be there before they got out of bed, and kill them. That was the plan. Thank goodness, the Japanese were not there.

The first night we <sup>went to</sup> put 80 gliders into this field. The photographs showed an excellent landing ground, and right at first when we were making recon of this area I flew low over this field and looked at it. It looked very good, looked as though you could land a fighter on it right there, something the photographs didn't show. In this area the Japanese logged teak. It takes about seven years to get a teak log <sup>from</sup> up in the wood to Rangoon. It has to season so many years. They pull it down from the mountains by elephants to the stream and float it down the river. This field was a thoroughfare for teak logs. In years past in the wet seasons they skidded teak logs across this open glade in the jungle down to the river. The soil is clay soil and it made ruts about 2<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> or three or four feet wide and a foot and a half deep. It was just like concrete and perfect glider

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traps, there wasn't any way to avoid them.

The first wave of approximately 40 gliders came in here and landed, and of course the first ones got down all right. But as they rolled along this field I saw we had them overloaded, very heavily loaded. They would hit the ground and go on across the field and it looked as though they would never slow up. They didn't slow up until they hit the glider traps. The wheels would come off, go down on <sup>their</sup> skids, and stay there. They were so heavily loaded with ammunition, guns and food that the troops took a long time to move <sup>them</sup> out of the way. We expected resistance here. ~~Some~~ <sup>The</sup> gliders were coming in fast, coming in one right after the other, and you couldn't stop them. Once a glider is out loose you can't stop it. It is coming down, and you just have to get out of the way. The first gliders come in <sup>none</sup> all right. As they came in faster and faster they began to pile up in the rutted area, they would come in and hit the rate, and it was pretty tough. There were wounded in the gliders and other people were trying to get <sup>them</sup> out, never knowing when another glider was going to run into them. You couldn't hear them. It was hazy, the moon was getting low on the horizon. You couldn't hear the gliders coming in. All of a sudden the gliders would touch the ground and you could hear the terrible rumbles. Even then you couldn't start to run. You would be there trying to get the wounded out. You couldn't run until you saw the gliders. We would get 200 yards out in front, see the shape. It is going to the left or to the right or come right down. Then you made up your mind to run. It was terribly harassing.

We had three gliders down without cranking them up. All the rest piled up on the field. Two gliders hit the trees. The casualties in the

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two gliders were heavy. We had figured out things very-carefully, had measured the ground, had it all figured, calculated the sending of the gliders, had a system worked out so the pilots wouldn't have to do anything. We had a system of lights. The first gliders were Pathfinders, they would come in, put up a system of lights so when the gliders came in there would be no danger. Then when we got on to the field it was all spoiled. That is just an operational hazard, one of those things.

The first wave of gliders came in, approximately 40, and the patrols went out and reported no Japanese. We all considered how to stop the second wave of gliders from coming in. It looked as though we had completely surprised the enemy. Rather than risk any more lives trying to get these gliders down on the field that was already completely full of wrecked gliders we radioed back and told the people back in the rear to stop the remainder of the gliders from coming in.

Looking at it the next morning, it was a desolate scene. There were parts of gliders strewn all over the field. There were 23 dead on the field and many wounded. The British brigadier in command of the brigade was a little bit blue. He said, "We have these wounded here. If the Japanese do attack us I wouldn't be worried at all if I could move. We have to stay and <sup>Guard</sup> care for the wounded, can't move." We immediately radioed and just before noon they landed in the field, ~~xxxxxxx~~ unescorted, picked up the wounded, and flew right on back into friendly territory. I talked to the airborne engineering, Lt. Bracken, who had gone in with us. I said it looked pretty tough there with all the wreckage on the field, the elephant grass growing all around. It looked as though it would be mighty difficult to build an airbase. I asked him if he thought we could build an

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an airdrome.

"Well, sir, I think so," he said.

"How long will it take you?"

"Will this afternoon be too late?"

He wasn't kidding. At 7:20 that night the first DC-3 landed there. We had 65 DC-3's land which put out about a thousand men, several hundred mules, lots of ammunition, guns and equipment. Everybody's spirits began to rise and from then on it was just an operation of taking off from India after dark, landing in Burma, putting out our troops, and going back to India. On the second day we had a landing strip there with a big dispersal area a mile long and 300 feet wide, with electric motor, lights, and completely illuminated. We could have taken in over 200 sorties a night without any trouble at all at that airdrome. On the second night, 2000 men were put out at this point. Then the gliders were taken off and brought back to India.

The next day the Japanese found and bombed it. All of our people were gone. 1600 of them walked out here to operate against this line of supply which is a road to Mandalay, Lashio, Loimwing and up to Myitkyina. This, incidentally, is the main Japanese line of supply for the 18th Division, which is now facing General Stilwell. Fortunately, we did put down 1,500 men which walked across here, a 100-man patrol here, and organized the hill people here and gave them guns so they could do some work against the Japanese line of supply going into Myitkyina.

The headquarters of the 11th Brigade was down here. They walked across here and out across this river, and they are to set up in this area, right here on the rail line. They are to cut the rail line here and to cut

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communications in this area. The rest of the 11th Brigade was put down here at Broadway and marched down through here, through Katha (?) and over to this point to join their headquarters. They are operating in this general area here. The 77th Brigade was the one we originally intended to put down. They are now holding this airdrome with around a thousand men. The airdrome is well defended, has around 20 anti-aircraft guns, four Bofors, the rest .50 calibre machine guns. Intermittently it had a flight of Spitfires there -- but unfortunately the Japanese destroyed them one day.

On the eighth day of the invasion the Japanese discovered this field and came over with 20 Zeros. I don't know whether they discovered it or not, but they sent a patrol of 20 Zeros up into this area to lay for us. <sup>When they</sup> ~~we~~ came across this field we had radar on it, Spitfires and some very good anti-aircraft. They came across and must have gotten the shock of their lives because the radar had them reported and knew exactly where they were; the Spits jumped them and shot down four. The anti-aircraft shot down one before ~~we~~ they could get away. We lost one Spit in this engagement. On another engagement the RAF squadron leaders, having been getting a number of false alerts from our own airplanes which were in this area all the time, decided this was not a real attack and wouldn't take his airplanes off. Of course, he lost them all. Those are things that will happen.

The 77th Brigade has moved from Broadway to Malu (?) here, just above here, and established a road block. I visited them there. They are now entrenched on the railroad with around 3,000 men, just above the town of Malu. I arrived there the day after they occupied the point and they had run about a battalion of Japanese off the top of a small hill and taken it over. They had a hundred Japanese bodies there when I walked up. They lost twenty men

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themselves. They are there to stay. Just before I left they were getting ready to build DC-3 strips to land and supply them, rather than drop supplies to them by air. It is very expensive when you fly over and drop supplies to troops. In the first place, you lose 20 percent of your lift and weight, and if you don't have expert pilots the supplies are dropped all over the countryside. In trying to collect them and round them up the enemy gets lots of them. Lots of the friendly troops never get them -- so it is actually better to build airstrips and land and supply the troops in this manner.

We built an airdrome here in the Valley at Manton (?) and put down the 14th Brigade. This was the fourth brigade to go in. They were just putting it down when I left. This is one place where we got the jump on General ~~W~~ Wingate. He came in one day and said, "You know this point here on the map. I would like for you to put an airdrome here. I want to put in the 14th Brigade."

We had had an idea that he was going to say something like that, so we just beat him to the gun. We smiled and said, "General Wingate, we built an airdrome there last night."

He was very pleasantly surprised. He was terribly pleased with the whole operation -- like a child with a new toy. When he came into the theatre he wasn't very popular with the British Army. ~~He~~ He told them they were fighting the war wrong in the area. He stood up and told them -- and he told us right out in open conversation that the Japanese were going to come in and cut these supply lines. He knew these people were going to be in a panic and going to have these losses down here. That is exactly what happened. He came out and told the British officers that they weren't fighting the war

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right -- and of course that is no way to win friends. We were associated with Wingate as his own little air force and for that reason we weren't popular.

There had been a great deal of argument between Wingate and the RAF. Wingate had told the RAF how to run the air force, and they sort of rebelled against it. There was an argument about close support using radio-telephone and smoke. The RAF said it wasn't practicable, and we <sup>came</sup> in and, not knowing about this argument, went up to General Wingate and said, "We've brought all these fancy radio sets, and we've brought this colored smoke and stuff. We have a plan for supporting your troops by the use of smoke and radio."

"That's exactly what I've been telling the RAF they can do," he said.

So he went to the RAF and told them, "Now, you all go on and you do your fighting here. I'm going over here in this area and fight the Japanese -- and I've got a bunch of people going along with me that say they can do everything you say you can't do." You know the kind of reaction that got ... we weren't very popular with the RAF. But it all worked out very fine in the end, and when I left there there was an RAF commander up in this area who had completely reversed himself on what he would do for Wingate. When I left things seemed to be pulling together a little bit better on the whole thing.

But we went in under those handicaps ... however we did in this area give support to Wingate on the ground. I'm awfully proud with the way the air forces support<sup>ed</sup> the ground forces in action. It was a beautiful piece of work. Wingate's forces moved in here over the town of Malu to where they overlooked the town. The Japanese were in Malu in some strength; they had mortars and machine guns, and they were firing on our positions up there. The first mission we had we came over, and the British smoked the ravine near the town through which a small stream ran. The Japanese were lobbing shells out of the

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ravine. Our B-25's came over very low with frag bombs and completely seated that gully with frags causing a terrible commotion in there. The firing stopped and the British said, "That is wonderful." The radio-telephone work was very good that day.

General Arnold had given us the privilege of picking our fighters, and we had some very good ones. They dive bombed the targets, and they would hit them. Then the British started calling their shots for them. First they would put down smoke. They would put down smoke over a few buildings on this side of the tracks and say, "Will you hit the buildings? There is a machine gun nest over there." The first bombs went right in there. Then they began to say, "A hundred yards north of that point there are some Japanese. Put your bombs in there." The boys would put them right where they were calling them. Of course, they were terribly impressed.

Then, to climax it all -- we had 75 mm. cannon in our B-25's, and the whole action degenerated into this: There was a boy named Thompson on the ground. He would say, "Bombers from Thompson. Do you see that white house in the southern part of the town?"

"Yes, we see it."

"Will you get that for us?"

Then they would fly right up to the front door and let go.

"How do you see the house with the red roof about a block up the street?"

"Yes," the bombers would say.

"Will you get that for us?"

And the bombers would fly up to the front door of that and let go with their 75 mm. It was very, very impressive.

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Before we did this we tried to give them the proper slant on air power and the use of air power as close support. We told them we were not tanks, and could not do many things with an airplane, and that in the end they would have to win the battles on the ground. But that there was one thing we could do for them -- that we could deny the enemy freedom of movement. We did deny the enemy freedom of movement. We had absolute air superiority in this area. The Japanese, when they would come up, would have to come up from down in here. The Japanese in this area had seven very nice airdromes in this little circle. The reason we didn't land on them with gliders was that those airdromes were defended with anti-aircraft guns, automatic weapons and machine guns. Whenever we would fly over them in our airplanes we would always get shot at.

To land there in a glider is a dangerous operation, and particularly if the Japanese got wind of your plan. In landing in a glider they could cover you with machine guns as you landed on the narrow strip -- they could make it very difficult. So, instead of landing on the airdromes here in the area in which we were going to operate, we landed here, here, and here -- put the troops down in safety and then marched in here.

In those operations when I left we had probably run almost 1000 DC-3 sorties, and had not lost a single DC-3. The credit goes to the RAF branch of the Troop Carrier Command and the U.S. Army Air Force branch of the Troop Carrier Command. They did a superb job of flying the troops in here and putting them off and getting back. They went into strange airports, and every bit of the operations was done at night. All glider operations were done at night, and all the transport operations were done at night. The wounded were evacuated

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in the daytime by light aircraft. A man could be wounded here, or here, or anywhere in this battle area in the afternoon and that night he would be in a hospital in India. We based our light planes on this field, this field, and this field. We had around 32 here. They were used to carry mortar ammunition, rifle ammunition to troops here. Wherever the troops would stop, in any area, they would clear a strip of about 600 feet long -- that is big enough for the light airplanes to go in and land and take out the wounded. Whenever they would have wounded they would clear a little opening in the jungle. In this area there are a great many paddy fields -- they would knock down the top of several paddies and the light planes would land there, pick up the wounded, take them back to the airdrome and that night a DC-3 would pick them up and take them back to the hospital.

The morale of these troops was very good. They are good fighting people. I had an opportunity to work very closely with them and get to know them. I had absolutely the highest regard for General Wingate. He was a great leader, and he certainly did handle his troops well. He used African troops, Indian Nationals, Gurkas. Gurkas are the little people from up in the hills... fighting is their creed. He used English, also and he picked his leaders very carefully. His idea was that if you led a man well regardless of his color he would make a good fighter. He'd tell his officers, "You've got there a company of big west African negroes. If they are not good fighters, it is because you can't train them and you can't lead them. If you can't do that I will get someone who can." And he did have people who could lead them. They were quite proud of their West Africans. They were awfully good fighters.

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When we came into this area, as you know, we had no organization. We had no paper work and no typewriters as we didn't put anything down. The British sort of scratched their heads at that, but it was all right. When we would come to do an operation they would start pinning us down and ask us to tell them generally what it was. We would say, "Oh, to hell with it -- let's just do it." But not the British. The British were very thorough and very efficient. They said, "If anything goes wrong with this operation, it won't be our fault because we'll be ready." And they were.

They would take these troops and we would give them a glider, and they would make their troops get in the glider, get out, get in and out, completely armed. In and out -- stow their equipment. A funny thing happened. These little Gurkas were very amusing people. A British officer had a detachment of Gurkas. They were going in ~~in~~ the glider and out. They had never seen a glider before -- but they kept this up for awhile until they couldn't stand it any longer. They are very loyal people and very loyal to the British. They selected a representative and sent him to the British officer. He said, "Sir (they must have thought the Americans were trying to pull something over on the British in this operation) we don't want you to get the idea that we don't want to go along on this operation, or that we are afraid ... but we thought we better tell you -- those machines don't have any motors in them."

But they all went along and landed. The Gurkas actually aren't good air soldiers. They got terribly sick, and when they landed we had to pick some of them up and take them out of the airplanes.

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The people that went into this field were all British troops -- picked troops of north country Englishmen -- and they were good and determined troops. They were going in there to take that field and I don't think had any trouble at all. I don't recall a man getting sick.

Altogether in the first operation we carried in around 1300 mules. We had no trouble at all. We did have a mule kick a hole in an airplane. It was only necessary to shoot two mules out of 1300 and that was pretty good. For the most part they took to the air very well.

It was a very, very interesting operation. I am not going to make any predictions about the future of battle in this area. This railroad line here is up and completely out, and there are British troops of a very determined nature sitting across it. When I left, the troops were marching down this road. The other brigade was being landed and marching down to cut this road here. These are the two main lines of supply for the Japanese which are now fighting here at Imphal and in this area.

In this area there are approximately 1500 men, and they are all fighting troops -- not supply troops. They are being supplied by air. The supplies are being dropped to them at night. They are in here, and they are in here to stay. The 111th Brigade is across this railroad here. The 77th Brigade had the railroad completely blocked here. The 18th Brigade is to operate in here in the Indore area. The 14th Brigade was put in to walk down here and out this road here.

The Japanese are using the Chindwin River. Traffic down along here is pretty heavy. The RAF in this area has mostly Hurricanes for fighters, and their range is very limited. They can get out here, but then their operations are very limited. For our operations we use Mustangs in this area,

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because of the great range of this particular airplane.. The RAF are operating along here to keep the river completely free of all movement in the daytime, and there is no movement in the daytime. What I believe the Japanese do is to go up about this far in the daytime, and then at night they use small boats and go up here so far and then pull off in the bushes in the daytime. The next night they move a little farther and then pull off into the bushes again. This is a very difficult way to operate.

One thing about the Japanese ... they found out that a man with a rifle and a handful of bullets makes a very formidable weapon. He also knows that we won't over-extend ourselves. We won't go out and fight him unless we can supply ourselves. That is how it has been. He has had freedom of movement because we have found it impossible to supply ourselves and commit ourselves to a big battle in this area. Therefore the Japanese has freedom of action.

But in flying over here in the daytime, the minute you cross the river and start down these roads here you would never see any form of life. The Japanese do not move in the daytime because we have complete air superiority for this area. The Japanese do not bring their airplanes into here -- that is a very difficult way to operate. So their operations are terribly limited all through here. We do have air superiority and they do not move in the daytime.

These roads have been cut. These people are now being supplied by air. When I left they were in the process of moving in two divisions of British troops in here by air to defend Imphal. They will be supplied by air. It is my personal opinion that in this whole engagement it is going to be very

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embarrassing to the Japanese. I just don't see how they can win. They have great difficulty in getting their supplies up there, and now that General Wingate's troops are across their supply lines it is going to be increasingly difficult. The British are going to be increasingly supplied in this area by air, and I can see but one outcome to the battle. I think it's a lucky thing for us that the Japanese did attack for now they are committed to battle, and I believe that their losses will be very high.

General Stilwell is pushing very hard against them here. They can't afford to take troops in this area. If they do, they will lose those key-points here in northern Burma. I may be a little optimistic about the whole situation, but to me it looks rather good.

I don't know the exact number of airplanes the Troop Carrier Command has committed to supply these 15,000 troops in here, but when I left they were using roughly 20 airplanes, and there were roughly 12,000 troops.

The implications of this operation for the future are that you can move troops by air -- and particularly in this kind of territory where lines of communications are difficult, you can move them by air, put them down and supply them.

If the troops had been available to move into here, we could have moved in -- and if the airplanes had been available to supply them, we could have moved in just as many divisions as the British had to move in. There was absolutely nothing to stop us. We had a great big airdrome there and we were putting troops down every night. We could put 2000 men down each night on one airdrome. And if we had wanted to we could have built just as many airdromes in that area in the dry season as we pleased.

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date APR 4 1973

This airdrome was built by ten men in eight hours. It seems fantastic -- for it is a big airdrome. But it can be done. That is one of the reasons we are figuring on putting a lot of airplanes in this area over here to fight the Japanese. People say, "Well, you don't have airdromes for them. How are you going to get you airdromes?" My answer is that this is a pretty good airdrome here that was built by ten men in eight hours. It is difficult, but there are a lot of places where you can do it very easily.

Mr. Stimson: You had a bulldozer, hadn't you?

A: Yes, sir. We garried in on this operation, gliders, bulldozers, tractors, jeeps, trailers, and mules.

Mr. Stimson: That was that first night?

A: Yes, sir. The first night.

We had electric machinery to set up a lighting system so transports could come in and land at night.

One thing that helped our operations was the fact we did have air superiority. And one of the reasons we had complete freedom of the air at that time was the fact we had one squadrons of P-51's and almost every day -- every other day anyway -- they were down flying over this area, flying over the city of Mandalay. And if there was a Japanese airplane on the ground down there, they went down and got it. The Japanese couldn't afford to bring their air force up and leave it here. We caught them here about five days later and P-38's destroyed 16 on the ground. Here at Mandalay about two weeks later the Japs made an attack on the Arakan in the morning and came over here to land. Radar picked them up -- P-38's were sent out and caught them landing, destroyed 21 of them on the ground and six of them in the air. That makes it very, very difficult for the Japanese Air Force to operate. We do have long range fighters that go out and get them.

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OSD Letter, 5-8-72

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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Post

~~SECRET~~

May 3, 1944

FROM : Main 11 Army Group SEA  
To : War Office  
Rptd: HQ AAI  
Military Attache China  
NZ Force HQ New Zealand  
EAD Washington  
Middle East  
HQ Brisbane (pass COIC HQ)  
GHQ East Africa  
GHQ Paiforce

No : 177/OPS

SITREP 111.

ONE: ARAKAN. PW captures PM 6546 states one thousand five hundred RPTS on way to join 55 Div incl five hundred RPTS arrived 18 Mar. Body of offr of 55 ENGR Regt recovered PM 6846. 1 May patrols report few enemy seen area PT 162 PM 4846 (2846?) and bunkers with enemy area PM 5147 PM 5047. Large number of enemy with mules reported arrived 1 May PALIDAUING PM 2345 from north. NO major change. Considerable patrolling by both sides and minor local enemy attacks on areas PM 4442 PM 4942 night 1/2 May repulsed. Tpa of 81 (WA) Div killed twenty eight JAPANESE area DIPA PM 6845 29/30 April. Our csa six killed four wounded.

TWO: KALADAN. Ungraded report three hundred enemy arrived 27 April KHAMEI PM 8288 and still patrolling NW comment. STR probably exaggerated. Ref Sitrep 109. 7/16 PUNJAB killed minimum forty enemy in engagement area PG 8215 29 April. In area PG 7827 1 May 7/16 PUNJAB inflicted cas on enemy who withdrew eastwards to hills.

CM-IN-2899 (4 May 44)

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By Authority of

JCS  
memo, 1-17-73  
Date

By RRP

APR 4 1973

Col. Park  
47

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No: 177/OPS

May 3, 1944

Page 2.

THREE: FOUR CORPS.

(A). Area BISHENPUR. Two coys enemy reported RK 1127 possibly remnants driven from track SILCHAR BISHENPUR. Small enemy attack night 1/2 May on our PICQUET RK 110405 repulsed. Two bns destroyed by enemy and two enemy rd blocks between RK 070422 and RK 024415. Total enemy dead counted area BISHENPUR to date exceeds two hundred and fifty.

(B). Area PALELATAMU. 1 May two small mixed Japanese JIF and BFA parties encountered area RK 4306. Night 1/2 May small enemy raids PALEL RK 4620 and KAKCHING RK 4125. HQ 1 Bde 1 SEAFORTHS WANGJING RK 4637.

(C). Area IMPHAL. Deserted camp possibly HQ 15 Japanese Div discovered near SHONGPHEL RK 6389. 1 May two hundred enemy reported RK 6789. Locals report many enemy stragglers and morale low this gen area. Thirty seven enemy cas inflicted in successful ambushes 30 April area SANQJANG RK 8189. Own cas three. 37 Bde area RK 5878. 2 W YORKS area RK 4181.

FOUR: 33 CORPS.

(A). JAPS area KIGWEMA RE 5359 VISWEMA RE 5554 reported arrived from area KOHPMA about 25 April. Reported STR at SHAKHAMA RE 5356 has since decreased. Two hundred Coolies reported constructing camp KIGWEMA. One enemy gun sited each side rd KOHIMA IMPHAL vicinity KIGWEMA. Locals report 28 April enemy unspecified STR infiltrating from area RE 4693 northwards MOGDG NZ 4106. Large number enemy RE 5069. Night 28/29 April three hundred enemy reported arrived area REKROMA RE 5474 DIHOMA RE 6175 from KOHIMA. Two hundred mules and amu dump reported this area. Unconfirmed report 28 and 29 April enemy previously area KILAMI RE 89 moved south to area CHOZUMI RE 7373. Two to three hundred enemy reported SATHAZUMI RE 7879. 30 April unconfirmed report enemy at RE 7593 intending move BZ 6506.

CN-IN-2899 (4 May 44)

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No: 177/OPS

May 3, 1944

Page 3.

Identifications. PW captured RE 4569 belongs 3 Coy 1 Bn 135 Regt and states left Bn one or two weeks ago for patrol with four others who died. Documents identify 3 Bn 58 Regt at RE 5069. Bodies recovered this area 30 April identify elements 58 Regt. Ref Sitrep 109. Elements 58 Regt identified RE 4968 NOT RE 4948 and 2 Bn 58 Regt identified RE 4966 NOT RE 4938. PW belonging 1 Bn 124 Regt states his unit in KOHIMA.

(B). KOHIMA. 30 April. Enemy attack on hill RE 4865 by estimated one coy repulsed with hy cas to enemy. One enemy coy RE 507680 withdrew when attacked suffering slight cas. Enemy attack by estimated one coy SW KOHIMA repulsed with sixty cas to enemy. 1 May. 4 RAJPUT repelled counter attacks area RE 483656 inflicting by cas. Elements 5 Bde infiltrated enemy posns RE 502690 but withdrew on encountering enemy in STR. Considerable enemy cas. 4 Bde adv delayed by adverse weather continues without opposn. Locations. HQ 4 Bde RE 477633. 1 RS RE 469620. 2 NORFOLKS RE 490641. HQ 5 Bde RE 493698. 7 WORC R area RE 4970 RE 5069. 1 RWF KOHIMA. 2 DLI area RE 4688. 1 R BERKS RE 489663. 4 RAJPUT RE 4769. 4/1 GR RE 482658.

(C) 23. Bde. Ref Sitrep 108. 44 coln attack on PHEKERKRIMA RE 4292 successful. Twenty enemy dead recovered. Many more in undergrowth. Eighteen own dead recovered. 56 coln forced to withdraw after attack on enemy area RE 4108. Locations. TAC Bde HQ MOKOKCHUNG NZ 94. 44 Coln PHEKERKRIMA. 56 Coln RE 4489. 55 Coln NZ 8801. 60 Coln NV 0120. 34 Coln RE 9394. 88 Coln NZ 9234.

FIVE: North BURMA. Own tps repulsed several attacks by one enemy coy area NSOPZUP NY 2106 inflicting twenty cas. Fighting continues.

T.O.O. 031910

ACTION: OPD  
INFO : CG AAF  
G-2  
LOG

CM-IN-2899 (4 May 44) 1803Z mmd

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P-R-I-O-R-I-T-Y

*Copy*  
From: CG, U.S. Army Forces, China, Burma and India,  
Rear Echelon New Delhi, India

To: War Department  
Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area  
Brisbane, Australia  
CG, US Army Forces in South Pacific Area  
Noumea, New Caledonia

Nr: CRAX 2638 3rd May 1944

Sultan to Marshall for Asiatic Section OPD info  
MacArthur, COMSOPAC, Ferris, Chennault, Boatner,  
Lindsey, Dorn, Cranston, Egan, and Timberman CRAX 2638

*new*  
Elements 38th Division advanced to 1 mile north  
of Wala east of river in Mogaung Valley. West of River  
22nd Division also made progress and 1 battalion is  
making flanking movement around Jap position. On east  
flank the 112 Regiment is in contact with enemy along trails  
in Warong-Manpin-Auchs area. Heavy fighting along entire  
front on Assam front Kohima situation slightly improved,  
as 3 brigades of 2nd Division and 1 brigade of 5th Division,  
with supporting troops engage enemy in area. Headquarters  
of 23rd Brigade has moved to Mokokohung and columns this  
brigade making steady southward progress from Mokokohung  
and Wokha areas. On 4th Corps front minor actions near  
Bishenpur, Palel and north of Imphal. 37th Brigade with-  
drawn from Aishan to positions on Ukhrul Road 18 miles  
northeast Imphal. 1st Brigade moved from Shongshel to  
Wangjing, 9 miles north Palel, to strengthen British  
defense this area. In Arakan there was active patrolling  
and several clashes south of Buthidaung, last of Buthidaung  
in Kaladan Valley. Headquarters of 6 Division moved to  
Bawli Bazar.

\*Being serviced

No Sig

ACTION: OPD

INFO : CGAAF, G-2, Col. Park, LOG

CM-IN-2455 (4 May 44) 0526Z jb

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972  
By RHP, NARS Date APR 4 1973

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972

~~SECRET~~ RHP, NARS Date APR 4 1973

*Post*

From: CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma and India  
Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India

To: War Department

Re: CRAX 2622, 3 May 1944.

Weekly G2 report to April 30th Bissell CRAX 2622  
info Ferris, Dorn, Timberman, Chennault, Cranston, Egan  
and Lindsay from Oreswell signed Sultan.

Developments are nil along the Salween front;

Minor clashes only at widely separated points;

Indications of increase in puppet troops but no  
information as to strength or combat effectiveness;

Disposition of Japanese forces unknown since  
detachment of 5 battalions to other areas;

Strong indications 56th Division organized on 3  
companies per battalion basis;

Estimated strength remains at 4 Japanese Battalions  
along entire front with capability of only limited  
defense at main avenues of approach.

Along Palel Tamu road enemy strength estimated  
between 2 and 3 battalions of 33rd Division and 1 battalion  
of 15th Division supported by 14th Tank Regiment;

Enemy have captured Tengnoupal but attacks against  
Sita repulsed;

Attempts to bypass British position this area  
continuing with probable intention attacking Rylel. Little  
change in Bishepur Kungpi from where bulk of 33rd  
Division operating to north and northwest. British drive  
to northeast from Imphal on Ukhrul road reach Tamu and in

CM-IN-2260

(3 May 44)

300 C B D

*Col Park*  
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OSD letter, May 8, 1972  
By RHP, NARS Date APR 4 1973

Page 2

From: CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma and India  
Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India

Mr: ORAX 2622, 3 May 1944.

licted considerable casualties on enemy enroute. North  
of Imphal Japanese reoccupied Kanglatongbi;

Slight indication leading elements 31st Division,  
previously reported to move to this area from Kohima, may  
have arrived. Situation in immediate Kohima area con-  
fused; strong enemy concentrations reported just south of  
Kohima and main force to north of village believed in  
Cheswema-Chechema-Phakerkina triangle;

Road to Dimapur open but escort required due enemy  
snipers and raiding parties;

In general the Imphal-Kohima situation has improved  
the immediate threat toward Assam line of communication  
has receded and British troops are regaining the offensive  
in the more active subsectors. Nothing of importance on  
Araikan front;

Latest reports indicate some increase in enemy  
strength east and southeast Butlicoumi with possibility  
of Japanese offensive westward across Kalapanzin River  
north of Buthidaung;

Kaladan Valley opposing troops in contact north of  
Paletwa.

Little change in north Burma during the week, enemy  
resistance has increased mainly due to extensive use of  
artillery.

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: CG AAF

OPD

COL WARK

LOG

No Sig

CM-IN-2260 (3 May 44)

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P R I O R I T Y

From: CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma & India  
Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India

To: War Department  
Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific  
Area, Brisbane, Australia  
CG, US Army Forces in South Pacific  
Area, Noumea, New Caledonia

No. CAAX 2581, 2 May 1944

Sultan to Marshall for Asiatic Section OPD,  
information MacArthur, COMGENSOPAC, Ferris, Chennault  
Boatner, Lindsey, Dorn, Cranston, Egan, and Timberman  
CAAX 2581.

"Both east and west of river in Mogaung Valley  
Chinese made local gains. 1st Battalion, 64th Regiment  
captured Jap position 2 miles northwest Inkangahtawng  
and 2nd Battalion, 64th Regiment made flanking movement  
2 miles south of this captured position. GALAHAD Force  
with 8 light and 150 Chinese Regiments now 36 miles  
northeast of Shaduzup near Tingjawn Bum. On Assam front  
troops of 2nd Division in contact with enemy at several  
points in Kohima area. On 4th Corps front situation  
generally quiet with patrolling and minor clashes near  
Palel, Bishenpur and north of Imphal-Ukhrul road. 1st  
Brigade troops occupied Shongphel. In Arakan British  
troops repulsed several enemy attacks south of Buthi-  
daung-Letvedet road. Minor engagements in Kaladan Valley."

ACTION: OPD

No Sig.

INFORMATION: CG AAF  
G-2  
Col Park  
LOG

CM-IN-1260 (2 May 44)

18512

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OSD letter, May 3, 1978  
By RHP, NARS Date APR 4 1973  
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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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*WAT*

2 May 1944.

LEAHY :

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL BROWN:

Subject: Summary of Situation in Burma.

**ARAKAN FRONT:** Fighting is centered in Maungdaw-Buthidaung area approximately 45 miles north of Akyab. The British have three Indian and one West African division against one reinforced Japanese division. Front line is generally south of Maungdaw to Buthidaung north to Taung Basar. British have three spearheads working in from the coast below Maungdaw towards the Kalapansin River which runs south to Akyab. At present British making very slow progress; Japs are maintaining defensive holding position with sporadic local counterattacks.

**CHINDWIN:** Fighting centers around Imphal and Kohima areas. British have equivalent of four Indian divisions defending Imphal area against one Jap division which is attacking from south and southwest plus a reinforced Jap division moving in from the north and northeast. British are holding southern sector and are attacking with success in the north. British have a flanking movement in progress to the northeast which will cut off the northern Jap force.

At Kohima 80 miles north of Imphal British have a reinforced division of English troops committed against one Jap division minus a regiment. Japs hold small portion of NE section of the city. British are attempting to drive south along Imphal-Kohima road with intention of pushing Japs back on the heels of those north of Imphal. As planned British are gradually forcing a Jap withdrawal to the south. Small Jap groups which had infiltrated north of Kohima are being liquidated.

**MOGAUNG VALLEY:** Here four Chinese divisions plus an additional regiment with total estimated strength of 40,000 plus the regiment of Americans (5307 Unit) are driving south along Mogaung Valley toward Mogaung and Myitkyina. Allied troops are opposed by an understrength Jap division plus several battalions recently arrived from the Salween front as reinforcements. Main Chinese force is now located approximately 40 miles northwest Mogaung making very slow advance against small but determined Jap forces. Two Chinese regiments plus the American Rangers have swung to the east (60 Mi. NE Mogaung) to bypass the main Jap force and drive south to Myitkyina.

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OSD letter, May 8, 1972  
By RHP, NARS Date APR 4 1973

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LONG RANGE PENETRATION GROUPS: The Long Range Penetration Groups are operating in Central Burma around Indaw-Katha. Of these the 77th and 111th Brigades arrived by air in early March and have since operated against the main Japanese line of communication on railroad from Kaulin to Mohywin. In addition one column operated east against the Bhamo-Lashio road to interdict movement from the Salween. The 16th Brigade which walked in from the north and the 14th which recently arrived by air are now located west of Katha with the intention of operating west toward the Jap line of supply to the Chindwin front. Approximately 16,000 British Indian combat troops are now located in the Mawlu-Katha-Wuntho area and their requirements are being supplied by air. They are astride the main railroad north to Myitkyina; they have control of the river traffic on the Irrawaddy; and they are impeding Japanese traffic from the Salween. British estimate a total of nine to ten Jap battalions (which includes the 5th Railway Regiment) are committed in this area.

*Richard Park, Jr.*

RICHARD PARK, JR.  
Colonel, GSC

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972  
By RHP, NARS Date APR 4 1973

- 2 -

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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P R I O R I T Y

*Post*

From: CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma, and India  
Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India

To: War Department  
Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area,  
Brisbane, Australia,  
CG, US Army Forces in South Pacific Area,  
Noumea, New Caledonia

Nr: CRAX 2509, 1st May 1944

Marshall, for Asiatic; OPD, info COMGENSOPAC Mac-  
Arthur, Chennault, Ferris, Boatner, Lindsey, Dorn, Crans-  
ton, Egan, Timberman from Sultan CRAX 2509.

[Local gains only made in Mogaung Valley as Chinese  
meet stiff Jap resistance near Inkan Ahtwang. On east flank  
112th Regiment clearing out enemy groups in Manpin-Warong  
area. *(SE shadow up)*

On Assam front, 2nd Division making slight progress  
in Kohima area, and 161st Brigade approximately 1 mile West  
Kohima.

One battalion 33 Brigade arrived Jotsoma from Boka-  
jan. On 4th Corps front, British troops repulsed enemy  
attack near Bishenpur, and made minor gains in this area.  
Northeast and north of Imphal, British carried out active  
patrolling, and First Brigade made successful raid on Shong-  
phel. On Arakan front, British repulsed several enemy at-  
tacks south of Ledvedet Chaung, and south of Buthidaung.  
Headquarters of 15th Corps has moved to Dhechaupalong, twelve  
miles southeast of Coxs Bazarr.

ACTION: OPD *(SE IMPHAL)* No sig.  
INFO: CCS, CGAAF, G-2, Col Park, Log

CM-IN-547 (1 May 44) 2042Z ejv

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OSD letter, May 8, 1972  
By RHP, MAJIS D.C. *APP. NO. 4 1973*

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By RT, NARA, Date *4/13/94*

*General Info  
Mr. Barman*

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

To: Prime Minister  
Info: Chiefs of Staff J.S.M. Washington  
From: SACSEA  
Dated: May 1, 1944

✓ SEACOS 147 ✓

1. General. During the week 20-27 April there has again been heavy local fighting with no major changes. The garrison of Kohima has been relieved and the main road opened to them from Dumpsapur though interruption is always possible. Between Kohima and Imphal the road is blocked by the enemy. The enemy effort appears to be slackening round Kohima the main thrust being direct against Imphal.

2. Arakan. Our troops are still trying to clear the ground south of the Romennrungdaw to Buthidaung in order to open the road to traffic but fighting here is much more severe than is generally realized and the progress is slow against stubborn opposition in very thick country. 81 (WA) West African Division has left the river Kaladan and is now operating on the left flank of 15 Corps in the foot hills east of the river Kalapanzin. Two battalions have been left to watch the river Korden.

3. Imphal Area. No change in our dispositions. 20 Indian Division is holding out on both the Tiddim and Tamu roads against frequent enemy attacks supported on some occasions by medium artillery concentrations. The opposition here consists of the enemy 33 Division and his 14th Tank Regiment. While we block the Tiddim and Tamu roads the enemy cannot introduce tanks or wheeled artillery into the Imphal Plain from the south. To the north and NE of the Imphal Plain we have made slight progress against the enemy 15th Division which we believe is being reinforced by some four battalions drawn from his 31st Division near Kohima.

CM-IN-2162

(3 May 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 15 1974

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*Col Park*

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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[REDACTED]

4. Kohima Area. The road from Dimapur to Kohima is now open though interruption by enemy infiltrating parties is still possible and a brigade of 2 divisions has relieved the original garrison of Kohima. This was a force hastily organized to meet the emergency. I have asked Giffard to send my congratulations to this force and its commander Colonel HMV Richards for the gallant conduct and stubborn resistance which they displayed. Enemy pressure has slackened presumably on account of the withdrawal of the four battalions to reinforce Imphal.

5. North Burma. The Chinese American Forces report that they are meeting stiff opposition some 17 miles north of Kamaing and are trying to work round both flanks.

6. 3 Indian Div. (4 long range penetration brigades) in Upper Burma. Several successful small engagements, ambushes and destruction of minor enemy dumps. The enemy have continued their attacks on the White City stronghold Nave Mawlu (Mawlu) without success. 16 Brigade under Ferguson which was the only Brigade to march in has fought well but is now exhausted more by the very long distances marched and climatic conditions than by fighting. They are to be flown out next week.

T.O.O. 011455Z

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: GEN ARNOLD  
OPD  
CMI BISSELL  
SME [REDACTED]  
COL PARK  
LOD

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 15 1974

CN-IN-2162

(3 May 44)

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