MR 300, Sec. 1 FRANCE — WARFARE
May 1942 thru May 1944

Map Room
Box 83
Folder 3
From: US Military Attache, Madrid, Spain
To: War Department
Nr: 12505

1 June 1944


Being organised in France important new group named "Comite National Descorps Khouldeh Public" composed of former elected officials affiliated with centre parties politically opposed to Vichy and Algiers and desiring to reconstitute democratic government by popular vote and cultivate closer ties with England. Sponsoring movement are leaders radical socialist parties like Laurent-Kynae, Amogot, Devinat, Dusse, big industrialists like Wendel, Schneider and Creuset. Resistance army composed 45,000 trained men 600 officers 1500 non-coms under command General Revers with insufficient armament from armistice army hold themselves at disposal of committee and Allied GHQ and are ready to conduct guerilla operations on large scale. Committee desires send delegation to London immediately if invited. Request cable instructions and comments if any.

End

ACTION: G-2
INFO: Col Park
GM-IR-1423 (2 Jun 44) 1749Z

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 6(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 8, 1972
By DBS Date APR 17 1973

3 as France

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94

COPY NO. 28
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: AIR CINC RAF
RELEASED BY: 21 MARCH 1944
DATE: 212150
TOR CODE: KIRKBRIDE/MONROE
DECODED BY: ELY
PARAPHRASED BY: """
ROUTES: DERHER/NCR 1541

AIR CINC RAF ORIGINATES. ACTION AIRMINISTRY WHITEHALL RAF DEL WASHINGTON, FREEDOM, CINCOED, COMNAVAF, HOURS MAAF, HOURS MAAF ALGERS.

COMNAVAF REESEPHYS AIR CINC RAF’S 282449 FOR INFO TO COMINC COMOROCCAN SEAFRON AND CONFIRMING 15.

REF NC THIS MESSAGE JCS 426 MARCH 20, 1944.

PERSONAL ACAS(P) FROM SLEESSOR.

(1) I HAVE JUST BEEN INFORMED THAT THE FRENCH NAVAL AIR FORCE HAVE BEEN PROMISED 15 FDY’S AND 36 A24’S OUT OF US NAVY STOCKS. THE IDEA IS THAT THESE ARE TO FORM 3 SQUADRONS WHICH ULTIMATELY SHOULD RELIEVE US NAVAL SQUADRONS NOW OPERATING IN THE MOROCCAN SEA FRONTIER.

(2) ON THE FIRST JANUARY 1944 THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER IN CHIEF WAS TOLD BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF (FAN 288) THAT "IN ORDER THAT MATTERS

OF 4 PAGES

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (F) of 1900-06-28 Sec. 2(b) or 2(d) or (B). GSD letter, May 8, 1972.

DECLASSIFIED
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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/4/73
PERTAINING TO SUPPLY AND REAHRNEMENT OF FRENCH
GROUND AIR AND NAVAL FORCES MAY BE COORDINATED BY
APPROPRIATE AGENCIES IT IS DESIRED THAT SUCH
MATTERS CONTINUE TO BE PRESENTED FOR CONSIDER-
ATION OF COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH A
RECOMMENDATION OF ALLIED COMMANDER IN CHIEF
MEDITERRANEAN."

(3) ON THE 14TH JANUARY I WAS INFORMED BY GENERAL ARNOLD
THAT THE FRENCH NAVAL "491" IN WASHINGTON HAD
SUBMITTED A REQUISITION FOR LARGE NUMBERS OF
AIRCRAFT OF DIFFERENT TYPES. WE WERE ASKED FOR
INFORMATION IN THIS MATTER.

(4) ON 24TH JANUARY I REPLIED TO THE EFFECT THAT NO
PLAN HAD BEEN SUBMITTED BY THE FRENCH FOR THE
REARRANGEMENT OF FRENCH NAVAL SQUADRONS AND I
STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT IN CONSIDERATION SHOULD
BE GIVEN TO THE REARRANGEMENT OF ANY FRENCH NAVAL AIR
FORCES AT THE EXPENSE OF ALLIED AIR FORCES. I
WENT ON TO SAY THAT DETAILED STUDY INDICATED THAT
THE PERSONNEL WAS NOT AVAILABLE EITHER FOR THE
ORIGINAL IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW NAVAL AIR SQUADRONS
OR FOR

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94

DBS Date APR 17 1973
(5) The next thing we heard was in a signal from bad Washington to the Admiralty repeated cinched us that the US Chiefs of Staff proposed to transfer 15 PBY's and 36 SPD A-24 aircraft to the French Navy to form squadrons to be assigned to the Moroccan Sea Frontier as relief for US Navy squadrons operating in that area. I did not see this signal but Group Captain Rock de Becquer immediately on his return from UK pointed out that WAAF had never been consulted on this subject and the Joint Air Commission should be consulted before any comment was made by Cinched. I am informed that Cinched did not comment.

(6) However it would appear from an effusive letter of thanks from General Giraud to General Wilson that an offer has already been made to the French authorities without any consultation with Supreme Allied Commander in Chief on the lines laid down.
BY CCS THEMSELVES AND QUOTED IN PARA 2 ABOVE.

(7) IT IS PRESUMABLY TOO LATE TO DO ANYTHING ABOUT THIS NOW. I WILL EFORT TO ENSURE THAT IN FUTURE AIR COMMITMENTS OF THIS SORT ARE NOT UNDERTAKEN WITHOUT CONSULTATION WITH THE AIR COMMANDER - IN - CHIEF BUT I MUST POINT OUT THAT THE RESULT OF THIS IS LIKELY TO BE THAT THE FRENCH NAVAL SQUADRONS ALREADY IN EXISTENCE OF WHICH THE FORMATION HAS BEEN PROPERLY APPROVED BY THE SUNDERLAND AND WELLINGTON SQUADRONS IN THE BRITISH TARGET PROGRAMME MAY FALL SHORT OF CREWS.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11662, Sec. 3(f) and 6(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 8, 1972
By DBS Date APR 17 1973

* RECEIVED AS 211234.

4 OF 4 PAGES

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/44
WAR DEPARTMENT
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OUTGOING MESSAGE

Date: DEC 23 1944
Signature: RAP

Combined Chiefs of Staff
71469
March 17, 1944

COMMANDING GENERAL
USAF IN NORTH AFRICAN THEATER
ALGIERS, ALGERIA
Number 2499

COMMANDING GENERAL
USAF IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER
LONDON, ENGLAND
Number R-975

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
LONDON, ENGLAND
Number 328

For Wilson Freedom Algiers, FAN 350, from the Combined
Chiefs of Staff.

1. Concurring with Admiralty, the Combined Chiefs of
Staff approve operating French cruisers Tourville,
Duquesne, and Suffren as long as possible without repair
except from local resources HAF 637 refers.

2. Shipments of repair materials from the United States
for these vessels being continued. If it becomes apparent
that materials earmarked for these ships are being unduly
immobilized in the theater because French are unable to
undertake repairs, such materials are hereby made avail-
able to you for theater use. Ships are to be laid up
when no longer operational and crews used elsewhere.

3. Use foregoing to influence French to take hold of
their share of the task. Press them to repair at Dakar
as soon as possible 1 cruiser selected by you. No workmen
should be moved by the French from Casablanca or ports in
the Mediterranean for employment on this repair work at
Dakar without your concurrence.

ORIGINATOR: CQS (Col McFarland)
INFORMATION: QPD, Gen Bissell, Gen Arnold, Adm King,
Col Mathewson, LOG

CH-OUT-7345 (17 Mar 44) 2304Z ear

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

Date- DEC 23 1971

Signature- RHP

Combined Chiefs of Staff
March 10, 1944
Number 1943
CG FREEDOM, ALGIERS
CG HYDEA, LONDON
CG SHAEP, LONDON

For Wilson FREEDOM Algiers, PAN 343, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have this date approved the following agreement for the employment of French Forces. It is furnished herewith for your signature and presentation to the French Committee of National Liberation.

AGREEMENT

I. It is recognized that the necessity for combining the use of American and British Forces and of French Forces operating with the same strategic purpose implies a single Allied Command over the whole of those Forces. Nevertheless since the forces of each nation are in the service of their respective countries, the Interallied Command must be in a position to take into account the point of view of each nation in regard to employment of forces of that nation.

II. The French Committee of National Liberation agrees that the Interallied body responsible for drawing up and execution of strategic plans including plans for use of whole of French Forces earmarked for Interallied use shall be the organization known as the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Washington to whom the French Committee of National Liberation shall delegate its powers in this respect. The French Committee of National Liberation are entitled to appoint in Washington a representative to make known its views on this subject to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

CM-OUT-9344 (10 Mar 44)

300 France

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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26-5359410 18405
Chiefs of Staff. Similarly the French Committee of National Liberation agrees that military command in each theater of operations including use of French Forces assigned for operation in that theater shall be exercised by a Commander in Chief designated by Combined Chiefs of Staff. The French Military Command shall be represented by a Liaison officer at Hq of the Commander in Chief.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff will keep the French Military Command informed of their general plans involving the use of French Forces.

Should the French Military Command consider that plans determining the use of French Forces are not in conformity with its responsibilities towards French Committee of National Liberation the French Military Command may refer the matter to French Committee of National Liberation but in such a manner that execution of intended operation is not delayed or jeopardized. The French Committee of National Liberation may then, if it deems fit, take up the matter with the appropriate authority.

III. The Allied Command shall make every effort in its use of French Forces to maintain the present composition of both larger and smaller units. The supply of equipment to French Forces will continue under existing arrangement, subject to such modifications as the Combined Chiefs of Staff may make from time to time. The French Forces to be placed at disposal of Combined Chiefs of Staff is a matter for agreement between Combined Chiefs of Staff and French Committee of National Liberation, it being understood that the forces placed at the disposal of the Combined Chiefs of Staff will include all French Forces which have been reserved and reequipped by the United States or Great Britain. The Commander of French Forces operating under an Allied Commander in Chief shall have the right and shall be given necessary facilities for reporting his situation and requirements direct to the Schelion of French Military
 Command immediately superior to him. The question of the communications to be used by the French Commander shall form the subject of a separate agreement. The authority appointed by French Committee of National Liberation shall be given every facility for inspecting French Forces in various theaters of operations.

IV. The French Forces shall be exclusively under the authority of the French Commander in all matters pertaining to discipline, the organization of troops and of various services, the assignment of personnel and supplies, uniform, postal censorship, etc., within framework of policy laid down by Allied Commander in Chief.

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
  GEN BISSELL
  GEN ARNOLD
  ADM KING
  LOG

CM-OUT-4344 (10 Mar 44) 23272 lcm

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
French Army Rearmament Program is the subject. Reference
urred NAF 597 and your letter subject as above dated February 4
1944. The program for French rearmament as submitted in the
2 above given references is approved in so far as availability
of equipment will permit. Present studies indicate that
there may be some shortages for this program in signal equip-
ment, trucks and artillery which will be communicated as soon
as they are known. A detailed outline of the French Ground
Force Rearmament Plan as approved herewith by the Combined
Chiefs of Staff is being forwarded to you by courier. Equip-
ment will be shipped in accordance with theater priority.
You will be kept informed as to approximate date of shipment
and of suggested substitution of any item not available.

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JCS 29-71
Date- DEC 23 1971

SIGNATURE- RAP

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11 February 1944

The White House Map Room
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Colonel Chester Hammond

Gentlemen:

I am transmitting herewith one copy of R & A No. 1697, "Survey of French Underground Movements", prepared in the Research and Analysis Branch of this office and classified as secret.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

William D. Langer
Director, Branch of Research & Analysis

Enclosure

Declassified
per State Dept letter of 1-11-72

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
SURVEY OF FRENCH UNDERGROUND MOVEMENTS

Description

The strength of the French underground; the degree of unification achieved; the various constituent groups; the military effectiveness.

28 January 1944

"This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 USC 31 and 32, as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law."

Declassified per
State Dept 1-11-72
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1. The French underground enjoys the support of the vast majority of Frenchmen. It has been unified through the establishment of the National Council of Resistance. Since 1942 the underground has recognized the leadership of de Gaulle. The Consultative Assembly provides the underground with a vehicle for expression independent of the French Committee for National Liberation.

2. The underground is agreed on certain policies:
   (a) that the French Committee should function as the provisional government of France;
   (b) that quiescent elements in France should be purged;
   (c) that a Consultative Assembly should function beside the provisional government. The underground, while anxious for Anglo-American friendship, is critical of Allied policy with regard to French affairs.

3. The resistance movement is composed of organizations of three types (a) pure resistance groups; (b) Trade Union groups; (c) political parties. The most important pure resistance groups are: Combat, Libération, Franc-Tireur, Front National, Ceux de la Résistance, Ceux de la Libération, Organisation Civile et Militaire. Trade Union resistance centers round the illegally reconstituted national organizations, the Confédération Générale du Travail and the Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens. Of the old parties, only the Communist, Socialist, and, to a lesser degree, the Radical Socialist parties have succeeded in establishing an extensive underground network. Catholics and Protestants collaborate in anti-German propaganda based on Christian principles.
4. The various underground groups have a very considerable military potential, coordinated into one Armeo Secrète, which is divided into (a) the Armeo Secrète proper, to take the field at the time of Allied invasion; and (b) Action Immédiate, for specific sabotage and guerrilla actions. Both types lack adequate supplies of military equipment.
SURVEY OF FRENCH UNDERGROUND MOVEMENTS

I. THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT AS A WHOLE

A. Introduction

A French underground resistance movement has existed since the second half of 1940. By the end of 1940 there were perhaps as many as eighty separate groups, with little or no liaison between them, and with a wide range of divergent political attitudes. The liaison problem was complicated by the division of France into three different zones, the Unoccupied Zone, the Occupied Zone, and the Forbidden Zone in the North East, communications between zones being severely restricted. The political divergences were an inevitable legacy from the last days of the Third Republic, carried further in the inevitable process of examining the causes of defeat. The growth of the Resistance movement is primarily the result of the measure of unification achieved on both the organizational and ideological levels.

B. Organizational Unification

Towards the end of 1941, as a result of contacts made inside France, out of the confusion of small groups there began to appear a restricted number of major organizations, Combat, Libération, Franc-Tireur in the Unoccupied Zone, and Libération and the Front National in the Occupied Zone. The next phase of unification, a gradual process spread over the whole of 1942, was the establishment of the Fighting French in London as the liaison center for resistance in metropolitan France, and the recognition of de Gaulle as the leader of resistance. By the end of 1942

1. Castellano in France Libre, 16 August 1943.
the resistance movement as a whole, with some minor exceptions, had taken this step. The reasons for this development are various. De Gaulle could offer liaison facilities as well as financial and other material support to organizations which needed them badly. De Gaulle's organization constituted a channel for military liaison with the Western Democracies, whose future invasion of France was the event for which the underground was preparing. De Gaulle provided a symbol of resistance which united groups of divergent tendency.

After the establishment of Fighting France in London as a center of unification, the next step was the achievement of further unification inside France. By the spring of 1943 the three main South Zone organizations had been united into the Nouveaux Unis de Résistance (NUR), agreeing to merge their paramilitary organizations and their youth sections, while keeping their propaganda organs independent. A directing committee of four was set up, one representative from each organization and one representative of de Gaulle. In the North Zone a similar coordinating committee was set up by the principal organizations.

In May 1943, the final step was taken of setting up a National Council of Resistance inside France, formally composed of one delegate from each of eight resistance organizations (three from the South Zone, five from the North Zone), two clandestine Trade Unions and six political parties. This National Council of Resistance is the only body coordinating the action and policies of resistance as a whole.

1. CID #37126, April 1943.
It is said to have ten to fifteen departments dealing with different aspects of resistance: (1) day-to-day action against the Germans; (2) coordination with Allied invasion; (3) the Inquis; and (4) post-war problems. When the Consultative Assembly was set up, it was the National Council of Resistance which designated the delegates of metropolitan Resistance from among the representatives of the constituent organizations. The National Council only met irregularly (it has met about four times); complete coordination of resistance is a practical impossibility.  

Since the establishment of the National Council of Resistance, and according to its general directive, unification has been pushed at the regional and local levels. "Departmental Committees of Resistance," uniting all groups, and, on a local scale, "Committees of Fighting France" are being set up. These groups will direct whatever action the underground takes at the time of invasion. 

A further indication of the trend towards unity is the formation of a united youth movement (see below, II, F). 

The official contact between the French underground and the French Committee for National Liberation is through the Commissariat of the Interior, a post which has been held by representatives of the underground (André Philip and Emmanuel d'Astier de la Vigerie). Other contacts are available.

1. France in Christian Science Monitor, 26 October 1943, d'Astier in France-Amérique, 5 December 1943. It is not clear how far the scheme for representation was realized, compare OBS #16731, 18 May 1943. The formation of the Council is foreshadowed in Libération, 30 March 1943, and recognized in Combat #63, 25 September 1943.  
2. CID #48868, 23 October 1943; Action #1, October 1943; Libération, Lyon ed., #6, September 1943.
through channels built up by the Bureau Central de Renseignements de l'Armée (BCRA) and by Colonel Passey on behalf of the Fighting French military organization. The French underground has at its disposal machinery for making its wishes known to a government in exile which other European undergrounds do not have. Apart from statements issued by the National Council of Resistance which, in view of the presence of representatives of resistance who could discern these statements, should be taken at their face value, it has its delegates to the Consultative Assembly at Algiers. It is certain that the nominations of the delegates representing metropolitan resistance, which constitute the controlling bloc in the Consultative Assembly, were not controlled by de Gaulle or the French Committee for National Liberation. The Resistance delegates came to Algiers with instructions to the effect that the immediate tasks of the Consultative Assembly were: (1) the subordination of the military to the civil authority; (2) the designation of one head of the government within the French Committee of National Liberation; (3) the purge of both military and political cadres. The dissatisfaction of the delegates with the progress of the purge and on the vital issue of ending the underground, has in fact strained relations between the underground and the French Committee.  

1. Passey has been accused of using violent methods, of urging de Gaulle to set up a personal dictatorship, and of using various pressures to obtain adherence to de Gaulle: CID #60439 and #60238. It is not credible that threats and violence account for the underground's general adherence to de Gaulle. It is not clear that the civilian resistance movement uses the channels of the Gendarmerie Service de Renseignements (SR) and Sécurité Militaire (SM) which Gaullists distrust as not being secure. CID #59316, 10 January 1944.  

2. CID #50666, October 1944; OSS Algiers, 20 December 1943. Censorship (London) Ref. 10/D/4038/240846/45. For the underground press attitude to Consultative Assembly, see La Vegetation du Nord #61, October 1943.
Their independence is further shown by the tendency for the Consultative Assembly to acquire more than a purely consultative role, in accordance with the wishes of the majority, who believe that this would, amongst other things, help to allay Anglo-American doubts as to the democratic character of the Gaullist movement.

With regard to the resistance movements, recognition of de Gaulle's leadership, it has been stated so often as scarcely to merit repetition that the Gaullisme of resistance as a whole does not imply partisan support for policies or ambitions which de Gaulle may entertain.

C. The Constituent Organizations of the National Council of Resistance

1. Resistance Movements

a. South Zone

   Combat

   Libération

   Franc-Tireur

   Mouvements Unis de Résistance (MUR)

b. North Zone

   Libération

   Front National

   Coeur de la Libération

   Coeur de la Résistance

   Organisation Civile et Militaire (OCM)

2. Trade Unions

   Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT)

   Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens (CFTC)

3. Political Parties

   Communist Party

   Socialist Party

   Radical Party

   Démocrates Populaires
D. The Policies and Attitudes of the Underground

1. Introduction. Reference has already been made to the divergences in political attitude which originally separated different groups in the underground. Although these divergences have not disappeared, at the present juncture they are divergences within the framework of unity. The basic fact at present is the ideological unity of the underground. This has come about in two ways: (a) the political experience gained in resistance, together with the political discussion carried on in the underground press, has brought about a definite measure of genuine agreement on basic principles; (b) the deeply felt need for French unity has created a willingness to reach a compromise on all immediate issues. It is therefore legitimate to speak of the policy of the French underground.

The policies and attitudes common to the French underground as a whole will be considered under the following headings: (1) Attitude to the Allies; (2) Policy with regard to the provisional government of France; and (3) post-war aims.

2. Attitude to the Allies. The basic inspiration of French resistance is French nationalism. With regard to Great Britain and the USA the attitude of the underground is complex. It began with a definite conception that its ideological affinity is with the western democracies; it is aware that the western democracies will be its liberators. At the same time the underground has been critical of Anglo-American policy with regard to French affairs on several points:
a. With reference to North African affairs, the under-
ground did not like the continuance in office of Vichy men,
and the by-passing of the political leadership of de Gaulle
and the French National Committee in favor of Giraud, after
resistance had rallied to the banner of de Gaulle.1

b. The underground does not understand why the French
committee for National Liberation has not been given full
recognition as the provisional government of France, or why
American recognition of the Vichy government has not been
formally cancelled.2

c. The underground cannot see any justification for
the failure to supply them with arms.

Those criticisms have generated a definite suspicion
of Allied intentions. The resistance groups suspect the pos-
sibility of a deal with Vichy at their expense; they suspect
the Allies of interference in the domestic affairs of France
(as they see it) to the extent of blocking the realization
of certain points in their own program which they consider
essential -- for example the "purge" and the subordination
of the military to the civilian authority; they suspect the
Allies of planning to use an NO administration in France, to

1. Cf. The statement to the British and American governments
signed by Combat, Franc-Tireur, Libération, Mouvement
Ouvrier Français, Comité d’Action Socialiste, Radical Party,
Popular-Democratic Party, and Republican Federation in
Liberation (South Zone), 16 November 1942; Populaire,
November 1942; Voix du Nord, February 1943; Combat, Novem-
ber and December 1942; January, February, June, September,
October 1943; Libération (South Zone), 16 May 1943; Libé-
ratlon (South Zone), 2 December 1943; Resistance, 4 Febru-
ary and 26 June 1943; Franc-Tireur, November 1942 and
February 1943; Populaire, December-January 1943, March
1943; Populaire, September 1943 ("message to President
Roosevelt"); Communist position in La Vie Ouvrière and
L’Humanité, January 1943, and OSS source A 17928, 26
November 1943.

2. PID 5, Supplement on French Clandestine Press, July-September
1943, and October 1942; PID 352, 14 July 1943; Grenier in
Les Documents, 1 February 1943; Les Cahiers Franpais,
16 June 1943.
an extent not justified by purely military considerations; they suspect that the failure to arm them was predicated on opposition to their internal program, which, they insist, is not one of social revolution but of a purge of anti-national elements. These suspicions are unfortunate but characteristic expressions of the sensitive nationalism of resistance. Allied rebuffs to de Gaulle, and de Gaulle's intransigence, have been a major factor in crystallizing Gau- list sentiment in resistance and among the French as a whole. ¹

Grave as these suspicions are, they should not be construed as tantamount to alienation from the USA and Great Britain. The language used in the "Letters to the American people" and "Letters to President Roosevelt" that have appeared in clandestine press is consistently that of a friendly nation appealing to another friendly nation. The underground believes that "lack of time information" or even "fifty column influences" have perverted the natural unity that should prevail between France and the US.² They are prepared to concede that mistakes have been made on their part. One of them writes "we have probably made mistakes since June 1940; the Allies have theirs responsibilities. All that is past. Americanophobia and Anglophobia are contrary to the interest of all."³

As regards the USSR, there is very great admiration for Russian military achievements, but no particular inclination to find in the successes of Russian arms an argument for the adoption of the Russian social system. The form of recognition granted the FOLL by the USSR was no doubt more

¹. ODS source A #17332, 30 December 1943; CID #37126, April 1943; CID #4117, 20 June 1943; CID #54704, 20 January 1944.
². ODS, Daily Intelligence Report, 10 October 1943.
³. Contant, 17 October 1943.
satisfactory to the underground than the form of Anglo-American recognition; however, no overt comparisons can be found in the underground press. It should also be remembered that the USSR has enjoyed the advantage of non-involvement in all the strains on good relations imposed by military operations in the territory of an ally.

3. Policy with Regard to Provisional Government of France. While a detailed program has not been settled, certain broad principles can be stated as expressing the point of view of the underground as a whole.

a. Resistance wants the French Committee for National Liberation recognized as the provisional government of France, and hence the supreme civil authority in metropolitan France after liberation and after the period of military government prescribed by military necessities. A change in the personnel of the Committee is envisaged.1

b. A national assembly should assist the provisional government, but this cannot be the National Assembly composed of the old Senate and Chamber, nor can it be constituted by recourse to the Revenue law (which arranges for the election of a provisional assembly by the departmental (conseils généraux), because the Senate, Chamber, and conseils généraux include discredited elements.2

c. A Consultative Assembly should function as the support of the provisional government, and as the guarantor of democracy. The Consultative Assembly should be constituted by representatives of both the resistance movements and

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2. CID #43559C, 14 July 1943; PID Supplement on French Clandestine Press, July-September 1943; Resistance, 17 July 1943; France-Tirage, March 1943.
political parties, and perhaps some other groups.1

d. Local administrations should be based on an amalgam between (a) such of the existing or previously existing administrations as are not compromised by collaborationism; and (b) representatives of resistance.

e. The tasks of the provisional government, apart from economic reconstruction, should include (1) restoration of democratic liberties, and cancellation of the Vichy system; (2) a purge of compromised elements from administrative cadres, the punishment of traitors, and the confiscation of the property of businessmen who have collaborated with the Germans.2 A distinction is drawn between notorious and conspicuous collaborationists, whom the underground wants condemned to death by the speediest possible judicial procedure, and the general run of collaborationists whom they want immediately arrested and tried. Elements which they regard as compromised, but not guilty of any zeal in the persecution of the underground, they want removed from their functions. (3) The provisional government should make preparations for a new Constitution, and for the holding of a new election after the return of the prisoners from Germany.

4. Post-War Aims

a. In the political sphere, there is agreement on the principle of parliamentary democracy. A minority current in resistance, which has a critical attitude towards parliamentary democracy, seems now to be working for a strengthening of the executive branch within a democratic frame,

1. CID #429530, 14 July 1943.
2. Voix du Nord, October 1943; Franco-Tirur, 15 July 1943.
   L'Express, September 1943; a purge of the press, according to Citation in France-America, 5 December 1943; CID #34600, 10 May 1943; Resistance, 23 January 1943; Franco-
   Tirur, September 1942.
rather than for any substitute for parliamentary democracy.  

b. In the field of social and economic legislation, 
resistance as a whole is leftist in complexion. The conserva-
tive wing of the clandestine press admits the principle of 
state-control of key industries and financial institutions; 
the radical wing urges state-ownership; all distinguish an 
economic sector which should be free from a sector which should 
be controlled. The principle of state responsibility for 
individual welfare is generally accepted.  

E. The Relations between the Underground and the Rest of 
the Population

On a conservative estimate, 90 percent of the French 
population are anti-German. Estimates of the number in con-
tact with resistance groups have little scientific value; 
General De Lattre de Tassigny estimates them at just under 
one million. Other estimates have been as high as eight 
million. A calculation based on information on one town 
gives the figure of 575,000 men capable of military action 
organized in resistance groups. 

Beyond the circle of actual members of resistance 
groups is the circle of those contacted by the clandestine 
press. Algeria claims that the clandestine press circulates 
1,200,000 copies a month. Perhaps as many as four to 
eight readers for each copy seems a reasonable hypothesis; 
at the same time deduction should be made for copies con-
fiscated. Perhaps four million readers a month is a 

1. CID #422936, 14 July 1943; CID #39194.
2. Cf. Maurici in Combat (Alger) #87-8, 5, 12 December 1943; 
   CID #81336; Waldeck-Rousseau in France (London) 3 and 
   8 January 1943; Censorship London, Ref. LOI/IPD/220846/43; 
   CID #39194; Franc-Tireur, March 1943; Populaire, 16 June 
   1942, 7 November 1942; Défense de la France, 3 February, 
   20 March, and 20 October 1943.
3. OSS source A, #17720, 29 December 1943.
conservative estimate; some allowance should also be made on the assumption that the same readers do not absorb the circulation every month. This figure should be compared with the present population of France (38 million). The conclusion appears to be that although the distinction between the vanguard of active resistance and the anti-German but inactive majority is real, the vanguard is not isolated from the majority.

As regards the relation between social stratification and resistance, the following generalizations seem permissible, it being understood that these generalizations are statements of support for the resistance movement, rather than actual membership in resistance groups.

1. The backbone of resistance as a mass movement are the workers with a trade union background.

2. The petit bourgeois (small shopkeepers etc.) are with resistance, primarily because of Republican traditions, but also because of the pauperization from which they have suffered as a result of both German and Vichy economic policy.

3. The lower ranks of the civil service, especially the teachers, are with resistance, as are a majority of the liberal professions, though there are conspicuous exceptions.

4. The peasants, though they have received favored treatment from Vichy, are discontented, but did not play an active role in resistance until the program of deporting labor for Germany hit them along with the rest of the population. At present they may be said to be anti-Vicky, and, while entertaining anxieties about disorder and distrust of the Communist element, they will certainly not oppose the resistance

1. CID #39014.
2. Rudart in France (London) 20 October 1943.
movement and probably will go along with it. 1

5. The lower ranks of the clergy are with resistance, and have rendered it notable services. The upper hierarchy, though condemning individual measures such as the anti-Jewish legislation, has not for the most part abandoned the theory of the legitimacy of the Vichy government (see V).

6. Women, as such, have shown no hesitation with regard to resistance; their record has been remarkable.

7. The majority of the Army officers, and even larger majority of the naval officers, have not come to terms with the resistance movement, primarily because of its leftist connections. A minority has worked with resistance, and because of their qualifications have occupied a higher proportion of the positions of leadership than corresponds to their numbers in resistance.

8. Only a minority of the higher civil servants, and representatives of finance and industry have committed themselves to support of resistance. Attention is here the dominant trend. Those who have worked with resistance have been in a position to render unique services.

General support of the resistance movement is not incompatible with a critical attitude towards this or that policy of resistance or of the French Committee for National Liberation. 2

Finally it should be noted that in certain explosive situations, which will be repeated in a magnified form at the time of liberation, resistance has shown itself capable

2. OSS #24920, 16 November 1943; OSS source A #16689, 8 December 1943; OSS source A #16379, 4 December 1943.
of mobilizing virtually the entire population of a locality. In some of the remoter rural areas the resistance movement has been able to operate continuously, virtually in the open, between periodic visitations of the "corps mobiles."
II. THE "PURE RESISTANCE" GROUPS

A. Les Mouvements Unis de Résistance (MUR)¹

1. Combat

   a. The Growth of Combat: Combat is the largest of the South Zone organizations united in the Mouvements Unis de Résistance, and the least homogeneous. The organization, now identified by the name of its paper, was originally known as Libération Française, which first published a paper called Combat in December 1941. Libération Française was formed by an amalgamation of two other groups, Libération Nationale and Liberté, both of which were founded towards the end of 1940. The character of the two groups whose amalgamation produced Libération Française is symbolized by the personalities of the two men who were the moving spirits in them, and who are now in Algiers as members of the French Committee for National Liberation: Henri Frenay and François de Menthon. Henri Frenay was an officer of the French Army who resigned his commission immediately after the Armistice, and soon afterwards was engaged in organizing Libération Nationale.² Libération Nationale³ was an organization of Army officers, particularly members of the General Staff and the Deuxième Bureau of whom General de la Laurencie was perhaps the highest. They supported (October 1940) the internal program of Pétain's

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² OSS Biographical Records, #1605.
³ Libération Nationale published in 1941. Les Petites Allees, Verité, and a paper called Résistance (not to be confused with the paper of Ceux de Résistance, founded in 1942). See also CID 18927, 4 June 1942.
National Revolution, but insisted that the National Revolution must come after National Liberation; hence they opposed collaboration. Reflecting both the tendency to blame the British for the disaster of 1940, and Pétain's "France alone" mystique, they refused to accept orders or aid from England, while recognizing that they were working for a British victory. Their program was to mobilize anti-German sentiment, while waiting for the day when the Army would again take the field against the Germans. With regard to Pétain, they felt he was surrounded by bad advisers, and that their movement expressed the views which Pétain would express if he were free. In this feeling they were encouraged in their contacts with certain high Vichy officials, including Puechou. From the start they were strongly anti-Communist, and continued to be so after the outbreak of war between Germany and the USSR.¹

The moving spirit behind Liberté, the other group which went to form Libération Française, was François de Monthon.² De Monthon comes from an aristocratic family, is a lawyer by training, and is very strongly Catholic, (from 1925-1928 he was president of the Association Catholique de la Jeunesse Française). The clandestine paper, Liberté, which was started in January 1941 and reached primarily a Catholic and rural audience, came out strongly for all the democratic libertés. The group behind Liberté consisted largely of democratic Catholics, including advanced anti-fascists; the leaders were against Pétain and the National Revolution.

The amalgamation of Libération Nationale and Liberté

¹. Cf. Vérités, #11 and 12, 15 and 25 September 1941; CID #1627, 4 June 1942; Resistance #7, 15 August 1941.
². OSS Biographical Records, Special Study #19, 29 December 1943.
into Libération Française in the fall of 1941 was the product of a general movement toward unification of the various political trends in resistance, apart from the Communists. This trend continued after the formation of Libération Française. In the fall of '41 there were negotiations between the Libération Française groups on the one hand, and Trade Union groups (CGT and Christian) and Socialist party groups on the other. These working class elements were at the same time receiving overtures from Libération, Combat's nearest competitor today for preeminence among the Mouvements Unis de Résistance. In the fall of 1941 it was clear to the leaders of Libération Française (as to the leaders of Libération) that a mass movement of resistance would have to be based primarily on the working class element in the population. An agreement was reached whereby the Socialist party permitted its militants to join Libération Française.¹ It was estimated in 1943 that one-third of the members of Combat were Socialists or ex-Socialists. If this agreement seems surprising, two factors should be remembered: (1) the Socialist party reconstituted itself as a party, not as a movement of military or paramilitary resistance, a function which was to be performed by "pure resistance" movements, such as Libération Française, (2) at this period the editorial policy of Combat shifted to the left. In the first half of 1942 Combat moved into opposition to Petain and the National Revolution,² publicly disavowing Général de la Laurencie³ and came out in support of the "Republican

1. CID #21009, 7 July 1942.
2. Combat; January-July 1942; CID #18927, 4 June 1942.
Traditions of 1789, rejecting the Vichy theorem (in relation to the Reno trial) that the 3rd Republic was responsible for the defeat. This shift in editorial policy was due to the necessity of taking into account the political sentiments of the mass of new adherents to the movement: liberal Catholics of the Liberté group, Socialists, Trade Unionists, and middle-class elements. Furthermore is it not likely that the group in Libération Française which had originally supported Petain's National Revolution, shared the progressive general disillusionment with that system, and, through the novel experience of resistance, came to a new appreciation of the principles of equality, liberty, and fraternity?

In the second half of 1942 the following developments in Combat are observable: (1) the movement recognized de Gaulle as the leader of French resistance. This began in March, when the paper hailed the US government's recognition of the French Committee as the de facto authority in New Caledonia, and was strongly affirmed in the August issue, under the heading "all with de Gaulle." The December issue carried the Combat emblem, a "C" on a Cross of Lorraine. (2) A trend towards unification with the other large Unoccupied Zone movements, Libération, and Franc-Tireur, set in. The first half of 1942 had been marked by some rivalry between Combat and Libération: in August 1942 the journals of both movements carried an identical statement that the two movements have common aims, and that both recognize de Gaulle as the leader and symbol of resistance.

In 1943 the main developments of an organizational character were the participation of Combat in the formation of the Mouvements Unis de Résistance, the National Council...
of Resistance, and the Consultative Assembly in Algiers, which are considered in I,B.

b. The Organization and Activities of Combat. In 1941 the predecessors of Combat, Libération Nationale and Libération, covered both zones, and published papers in both zones; in 1942 Combat (or, as it was then called, Libération Française) confined its propaganda to the South Zone, while claiming to have paramilitary groups in such widely scattered North Zone areas as Compiegne, Léon-Spernay, Reims, Cotentin-Calvados, Nantes-St. Nazaire, Vendée, Lorraine. In 1943 Combat was regarded as a South Zone organization, and its paper primarily obtains a South Zone circulation. Particular areas where it appeared to be strong in 1943 are Lyons, Languedoc, Haute-Savoie and Pyrénées-Orientales; the fragmentary nature of the evidence on this point makes it entirely possible that there are other areas where it is equally strong. The activities of Combat may be classified under three heads:

1. Propaganda Activity. The paper Combat is one of the best-edited, best-printed, and most influential clandestine journals. Previously appearing every two weeks, in October 1943 it announced itself as a weekly; it is reported that about 60,000 copies are printed. There are also regional supplements appearing monthly for Lyon (20,000 copies) and Languedoc (10,000 copies). In addition leaflets are put in editions of 100-120,000, in which any of the campaigns listed under ii may be developed.

ii. Political and Organizational Campaigns. The ramifications of resistant activity may be illustrated by
a consideration of the various activities involved in the campaign against the deportation of workers to Germany. Combat asks farmers and employers to send word by the chain if they can assure the livelihood of some who refuse to go to Germany; Combat appeals to employers, government officials, and police to sabotage the round-up of workers for Germany; the workers themselves are urged to organize "Patriotic Committees of Labor Action" and to strike and resist the deportation; popular demonstrations are to be organized; leadership and financial support has to be provided for those who have escaped to the Haquis; a "social service" has to be organized for the benefit of imprisoned militants and their families.

iii. Military Activities. At the beginning of the year Combat had a restricted number of groupes francaes, actively engaged in industrial sabotage, destruction of specific targets, and attacks upon isolated German soldiers or Frenchmen in the pay of the Germans. In addition they had a larger number of secretly organized militia, prepared to rise up in coordination with an Allied invasion. These military formations are now united with those of the Liberation and Franco-Tileur, in the mouvements Unis de Resistance (MUR). The MUR has in addition undertaken to provide the youth in the Haquis with the leadership and organization. Prior to the unification in the MUR, Combat had the largest paramilitary group (estimated at 25,000 in the South Zone in October 1942).

b. The Ideological Trends in Combat. Combat is the least homogeneous of any of the resistance groups; it reflects

1. Actions reported in Combat, 1 September 1943.
all the diverse trends of thought to be found in resistance as a whole. Through 1942 a distinctive emphasis on the Catholic point of view was observable in the national paper, indicating the continued presence of the old Liberté group; the Catholic influence on the regional paper Combat de Langue continued to be strong. The army element probably continues to be predominantly in control of the military formations. In 1943 the national paper and the Lyons edition featured Trade Union resistance regularly, but by no means exclusively. With regard to Communist resistance, some changes in attitude took place; whereas in 1941 Libération Nationale had been strongly anti-Communist, in 1942 Combat accepted Communist resistance "in the fraternity of arms, with some reservations, however," expressing admiration for the resistance of French Communists and the Russians, but saying that Communism is "still a menace in the form of an authoritarian regime." In 1943 Combat implicitly but not explicitly endorses the readmittance of the Communists into the illegally reconstituted CGT, and the cooperation of Communists with other Trade Union resistant elements on a local scale. De Menthon has spoken in favor of Communist participation in the National Committee. With regard to the future political regime, apart from explicit repudiation of any dictatorship "military, economic,

1. Particularly in Combat, December 1941, and August 1942.
2. CID #37126.
3. CID #39194.
6. France, 16 November 1943.
or foreign," and a reassertion of the Republican ideal, the diverse trends in Combat do not seem to have reached agreement on a specific program, and the paper can do no more than call for a "4th Republic, rejuvenated from top to bottom, based on liberty and social justice." It is probable that the mutual distrust between certain parliametary, party elements and certain "pure resistance" elements includes some elements in Combat. In North African sections of Combat, opposing "wings" have appeared: the same may happen in France. The extreme mutability of resistance thought, especially on the eve of and during the decisive period of liberation, defies prediction.

2. Libération

a. The Ideology of Libération. Libération, if both its North and South Zones sections are reckoned, is larger than Combat; within the South Zone it is not as strong as Combat. Though recruited from diverse elements, it is more homogeneous than Combat, and more to the Left. Its original leadership included Trade Union, Socialist Party and Radical Party leaders, and some without previous affiliations. Those which are now known to the world include Emmanuel d'Astier de la Vigerie, journalist belonging to a family with Rightist traditions; André Philip, Christian Socialist professor and deputy; Pierre Vienot, former Socialist Minister; and Dumesnil de Grammont, chief of the Scottish Rite Masons in France.

Libération in 1941 was critical and suspicious of the Army element in Libération Nationale (forerunner of Combat),

2.TypeID #77126, April 1943.
3. JID #81343.
and this mutual distrust carried over into 1942, causing the leaders of Combat and Llibération to issue a statement in August 1942 on the identity of aims of the two organizations and their common acceptance of the leadership of de Gaulle.

The ideological trend in Llibération may be distinguished from that of Combat by the following features, provided it is remembered that the general trend of development in resistance thought has been for originally divergent elements to converge.

i. From the beginning the paper of the movement was heavily Republican and anti-Pétain.1

ii. Llibération has closer relations with the parliamentary party groups than does Combat. The North Zone paper has explicitly come out against the idea of perpetuating the resistance movement after the war as a political movement, emphasizing the necessary role of diverse political parties.2 Combat has not taken a contrary view, but does not seem to have committed itself to a crystallized opinion on the subject.

iii. Llibération reflects the ideology of international liberalism (the Atlantic Charter, international organization) whereas Combat is more nationalist in tone.3

iv. While both Combat and Llibération give equal support to Trade Union resistance, Llibération is stronger in its emphasis on post-war social and economic reform to be achieved through the Trade Unions and the reconstituted parties.

Llibération was the first of the major resistance groups to recognize de Gaulle as the leader of French

1 Cf. Llibération #2, August 1941.
2 midi-Éclair #3, January 1942; Llibération, North Zone 1941-2, 4, 11, 18 September 1942; CID #48117.
3 Llibération, North Zone, 20 February 1943; CID #48117.
resistance, in the first half of 1942.\footnote{1}

b. The Organization and Activity of Libération.

Libération is divided into a North Zone and a South Zone section. The two sections are coordinated, and follow the same policy, but are independent. They each publish their own edition of the paper of the movement, Libération; they each send their own delegates to the National Council of Resistance and to the Consultative Assembly in Algiers.

In the South Zone, Libération possesses an elaborate organization. At the top there are (1) a General Delegate (a sort of president), (2) a Political Committee, and (3) an Executive Committee comprising the General Delegate and the heads of the three central branches -- propaganda, political action, and paramilitary action. The movement is divided into seven regions, centering around Marseilles, Chambéry, Lyon, Montluçon, Limoges, Orange, and Toulouse. Each region is divided into districts (usually corresponding to departments) and each district into sectors. All of these units have leaders or chiefs.

The propaganda branch publishes a great many tracts -- half a dozen per month, in editions of 100,000 copies, it is claimed. It also puts out a paper, Libération; the South Zone edition appears every two weeks, with 70,000 copies, and the North Zone edition every week, 15,000 copies. Local editions of Libération in the South Zone appear also in a Lyon, Toulouse, and Basse-Alpes regions.

The movement also publishes a paper for students, Libre France, and has just started a literary review, Les Cahiers.

\footnote{1: CID \#391154, 9 July 1943; CID \#21009, 7 July 1942; CID Pouvois \#14732A, 11 November 1943; CID \#19307 - 3; CID \#19010, 21 July 1942.}
The political action branch organizes sabotage in the establishments where the members are employed. Small cells are organized in a great many factories and government offices. Sabotage work is believed to be particularly effective in the regions of Grenoble, St. Etienne, Lyon, Montluçon. The same organization is used to effect strikes and demonstrations. In this work the Libération groups are now integrated with those of the other Mouvements Unis.

The paramilitary branch is also now integrated with that of the other Mouvements Unis de Résistance. Before the unification, the paramilitary formation of Libération was not as large as that of Combat: it was estimated at 15,000 men in the south zone in October 1942. Its organization is cellular, with about six men to a cell, and five cells forming a unit. In addition to this militia, Libération has a much more restricted number organized in groupes francs, for the destruction of military or industrial targets or of German agents. Their activity has been reported from the regions of Lyons, Bourg, St. Etienne, Toulouse, Marseille, Montluçon, Chambery.

3. Franco-Tireur. The Franco-Tireur movement (not to be confused with the Frances-Tireurs et Partisana, see VI,B) is considerably less powerful than either of the other two movements with which it has united to form the Mouvements Unis de Résistance. It has a miscellaneous following: it includes some Trade Union and Socialist

1. D'Astier de la Vigerie in France-Amérique, 5 December 1943.
2. Libération #18, 15 September 1942; CID #21009, 7 July 1942; CID #37126, April 1943.
elements, but is primarily recruited from individuals who had not previously belonged to a mass organization, middle-class democrats and republicans, peasants, Catholics, Jews. Its closest ideological affiliation is with the old Radical Socialist Party. It has contacts with parliamentarians of the Herriot type. It should be remembered that the old Radical Socialist Party was not a mass organization, but consisted only of electoral committees; hence the organization of a mass resistance movement, without the advantage of the connections and experience provided by Trade Unionism, on the part of the amorphous following of the Radical Socialist Party, represents a very significant achievement.1

The ideology of the Franc-Tireur movement is in the tradition of French radical-socialist thought: Liberty, World Democracy, anti-Fascism, the Social Republic, are its slogans. It is against totalitarianism of the Right or the Left. It came out strongly in support of the defenders of the Riom trial, and has consistently denounced Pétain. It is also marked by the traditional radical-socialist hostility to the financial oligarchy of the Trusts.2 Franc-Tireur recognized de Gaulle's leadership in March 1942, emphasizing the idea that de Gaulle is necessary at the head of a provisional government to maintain order in the period of transition, at the same time stating openly that they would be against him if "contrary to what he has always said, he envisaged a dictatorship."3 In 1943 Franc-Tireur does not seem to have regarded it as necessary to repeat these reservations, though there is no doubt that its members have not departed

1. CID #37126, April 1943.
3. Ibid., March 1942, June 1942, etc.
from their principles. Their delegate to the Consultative Assembly in Algiers, known as Jean-Jacques, has shown an independent attitude.\(^1\)

**Franco-Tireur** is primarily a propaganda organization. It has published, since January 1942, a monthly paper of the same name, now having a circulation of 30-50,000. The Franco-Tireur group also has published *Le père Duchesne* since April 1942, a periodical for literary-minded people, in a style of vitriolic vituperation, appealing to humanitarian liberalism which it bases on the traditions of the French Revolution, Montaigne, Rabelais, Hugo.\(^2\)

In the field of action, Franco-Tireur endorses the same type of program as the other *Mouvements Unis de Résistance* (sabotage, strikes, demonstration, formation of a secret militia). In view of its social composition, it probably makes a special contribution to administrative sabotage, information gathering, and the provision of refuge and aid in peasant and bourgeois circles to fugitives from the Gestapo or from labor deportation.\(^3\)

B. **Front National**\(^4\)

The *Front National de lutte pour l'indépendance de la France* was launched in May 1941. It was launched under Communist auspices, and it is Communist-controlled, in the sense that its organization is dependent on the cooperation of the Communist organization. Grenier has stated that

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\(^1\) OSS #26471, 24 December 1943: compare also his emphasis on Consultative Assembly’s role, *Combat* (Algiers) #90, 26 December 1943.
\(^2\) CID #21009, 7 July 1942: Père Duchesne 1/1, April 1942.
\(^3\) Franco-Tireur, September 1942, March 1943.
\(^4\) General Source: French Basic Handbook, revised 1944 edition M.S., Part III, Chapter, XVI A.
the *Front National* was constituted as a result of the efforts of the Communist Party to coordinate the resistance of those who did not accept the Communist social program, but were for liberation. ¹ Though the composition of its leadership is unknown, it may safely be assumed to include Communists. At the same time, the *Front National* undoubtedly contains numerous non-Communists probably even in the leadership. In its multiform literature no specifically Communist propaganda can be found, though it follows the Communist tactics of extreme activist resistance. According to the Vichy police, members of the *Front National*, when arrested, are surprised to hear they belong to a Communist organization.

The failure of the Communist attempt to unite all resistance in the *Front National* will be treated separately (see on the Communist Party, IV,C). It remains to consider the actual organization of the *Front National*.

The *Front National* is organized in three different dimensions:

1. The *France-Tireurs et Partisans*, are the paramilitary organization of the *Front National* on a national scale. (See VI,B).

2. There are also local and regional organizations. Such regional organizations are known to exist in Lyon, Nice, Oise, Picardy, Brittany.²

3. There are also organizations on a professional basis, publishing propaganda journals such as *Le Palais*.

¹ Les Documents, 1 February 1943.
² Cf. the clandestine papers *Le Front Patriotique de Lyon*; *'63*, paper of the *Front Patriotique de la Jeunesse Legion nicoise*; *Patriote de l'Oise*, *Picardie Libre*.
Libre for Lawyers (Le Front National des Juristes), Les Lettres Françaises for writers, L'Universitaire Libre for university circles, L'Art Française for artists: others are said to exist for doctors and architects.

The Front National is relatively weak in the South Zone, being overshadowed by the Mouvements Unis de Résistance. It is recognized as one of the five leading organizations in the North Zone: if volume of propaganda is a fair index, it is the strongest single North Zone organization.

C. Ceux de la Résistance

Ceux de la Résistance is the name of one of the five North Zone organizations who are represented in the National Council of Resistance and in the Consultative Assembly. It is connected with the paper Résistance, which was started in November 1942, and is published every two weeks in Paris. From the start the paper has recognized de Gaulle as the leader of French Resistance.

The policies of this paper offer a considerable contrast to those of the group Combat, Libération, Franc-Tireur. From the start, it has shown great interest, even preoccupation, in post-liberation and post-war problems. Its slogan, to express the ideal for the future France, is the National Community. In this future France, political parties will exist, but not in the fashion characteristic of the 3rd Republic: there should be fewer parties, and party strife must not again be allowed to endanger the National Community. Résistance regards all the old parties as discredited. The future France will also be a regime of

1. Its existence in the South Zone is attested for Lyon and Nice: see above; cf. also OSS Source A #18483A, 8 January 1944.
2. This paper has no connection with the mimeographed paper of the same name published in the winter of 1940-1, nor with Résistance, organ of Libération Nationale in August-September 1941: see cit #14809, 17 May 1943.
social justice, apparently conceived somewhat on the pattern of the corporative Socialism of some types of Catholic theory. With regard to the post-liberation period of provisional government, Resistance urges "a certain authoritarianism" is necessary, which "is not a military dictatorship," to prevent civil war. The paper has also shown a tendency to look to a provisional government, headed by de Gaulle, and supported and controlled by the resistance movements, to lay the basis of the new France before the reestablishment of parliamentary democracy, which is postponed till normal times. Resistance has not been entirely consistent on this point; in July it advocated a speedy summoning of a National Assembly.¹

It is clear that Resistance reflects a point of view which has also influenced Pétain's internal program (though there is no evidence that Resistance group were ever supporters of Vichy, it should be remembered that the paper only started publication in November 1942). The composition of the Resistance group is inadequately known: it is reasonable to suppose it is predominantly supported by Catholic bourgeoisie, professional and intellectual circles, including some Christian Trade Union elements and university youth.

Another clandestine paper which expresses related, but not identical views to those of Resistance is Défense de la France, which while Catholic in tone, and calling for an "authoritarian democracy" is distinguished from Resistance by the conservation of its economic and social doctrine, being unique in the clandestine press in having advocated an

¹ Resistance #4-8, December 1942-February 1943, and 15 July 1943; CID #34809, 37126, 37127; O3S Source A; #1529, 26 November 1943; compare also article of J.-J. Mayoux, delegate of Corps de la Résistance to the Consultative Assembly in Combat (Algiers) #90, 26 December 1943.
alliance between de Gaulle and the powers of high finance. 1

It is not clear how much resistance activity the group "Ceux de la Résistance" carry on apart from the distribution of their paper, nor how large the group is. In the summer of 1943 a regional edition was started for the Bordeaux area. An active sabotage group by that name exists in Lyon. 2 The theoretical preoccupation of the paper, contrasting with the general preoccupation of the clandestine press with sabotage, the fight against deportation, etc., suggests that they are less active. Its significance perhaps consists in the indication it provides of the variety of political currents in the underground movement, and the richness of the political debates that are conducted in it.

D. Ceux de la Libération

This is the name of one of the five North Zone organizations sending delegates to the National Council of Resistance and to the Consultative Assembly in Algiers. Nothing is known about Ceux de la Libération.

E. Organisation Civile et Militaire

This is one of the eight resistance groups participating in the National Council of Resistance. It represents the nucleus of resistance centering round ex-officers of the French Army, with their contacts in business, professional, and government circles. The Deuxième Bureau has assumed the direction of its clandestine activity.

1. Défense de la France, #27, 30, 40, 5 February, 30 March, and 70 October 1943; CID #23117, 20 June 1943; France (London) 7 December 1943. Similar tendency also in the clandestine paper Libérer et Fédérer.
2. Défense de la France, 8 July 1943.
After the Armistice certain groups in the Army began preparing for the day when the Army would again take the field against the Germans. Illegal activity primarily took the form of concealing secret stores of arms, keeping in touch with demobilized soldiers, and political scheming to secure an anti-German administration in Vichy when the right moment came. The climax of these preparations was General Delattre de Tassigny's resistance to the total occupation of France in November 1942 (though OCM as such probably did not exist then). After the disbandment of the Armistice Army, the activities of nuclei of resistance in the Army became more restricted. To counteract the effect of demobilization, efforts were made to expand the Corps civile de l'Armée, to provide jobs for demobilized officers and men. A good many were placed in supervisory positions in the Chemtiers de Jeunesse and other Vichy youth organizations. The OCM tries to keep such of these elements as are resistant in contact.1 It also looks after such piles of military equipment as have not been confiscated by the Germans, and keeps names and addresses of demobilized soldiers. They are hampered by the fact that the Gestapo keeps former officers under surveillance; arrests have been made, and it is reported that the occupation authorities plan to round up all former officers and men of the French Army at the time of invasion.2

In addition, the civil or political branch of OCM keeps contacts with sympathetic business professional and government circles. Some of these contacts are with elements

1. OSS #29002 Casablanca, 5 November 1943, OSS Source A #17119, 17 December 1943.
2. OSS Source 0, #6100, 7 December 1943.
very close to the Vichy Administration; it is said that some of the members of OCM are members of the Comité d'Etudes Technique et Syndical (CETS) formed by Pucheu, Bichelonne, and Barnaud. This branch puts out a paper, Les Cahiers de l'Organisation Civile et Militaire.

The Army resistance differs in political outlook from the mass of the resistance movement as a whole. They are rightist, even fascist or monarchist in tendency; inclined to avoid political judgment of Vichy on the ground that the enemy is Germany; at the beginning of 1943 they favored Giraud rather than de Gaulle.

In spite of the listing of OCM as a member of the National Council of Resistance in May 1943, relations between OCM and the rest of resistance continued to be distant, until the very end of 1943. In December 1943 complete unification was finally effected.

The contribution of OCM to active resistance has been limited, partly by the conspicuousness of its members, partly by the fact that it has no mass following, and partly by the professional soldiers' scepticism towards military unorthodoxy. Probably its most valuable contribution has been in the way of providing the Maquis fugitives with leadership: the unification with the mass resistance groups may provide an opportunity for supplying their military formations with trained officers.

1. CID #38199, 9 July 1943; France (London) 7 December 1943.
2. OSS Source A#17139, 17 December 1943; CID #38199, 9 July 1943; OSS Source A#16435, 6 December 1943; OSS #25124, 19 November 1943.
3. This must be accepted as a fact in view of the receipt of three separate reports to the same effect: CID #52921, 24 December 1943; OSS Source A, #17139, 17 December 1943; OSS Source A #18969C, 15 January 1943. D'Action de la Vigeio clained a unification of the directing services in Algiers, in the debate on resistance of the Consultative Assembly, France (London), 12 January 1943. For previous aloofness of OCM compare OSS #16731, 15 May 1943.
F. Forces Unies de la Jeunesse

A further indication of the strong trend to unity is the existence, since the beginning of 1943, of a united youth movement, the Forces Unies de la Jeunesse (FUJ), which is an autonomous body constituted by the youth sections of various resistance movements. These constituent youth groups are:

- Jeunes des Mouvements Unis des Résistance (MUR);
- Front Patriotique des Jeunes (youth section of the Front National);
- Jeunes de la Résistance (youth section of Coeur de la Résistance);
- Jeunes de l'Organisation Civile et Militaire (OCM);
- Jeunes Chrétiens de la Résistance, comprising resistant groups in the Jeunesse Currivide Catholique (JOC);
- Jeunes Étudiants Catholiques (JEC);
- Association Catholique de la Jeunesse Française (ACJF); and
- Boy Scouts. The united youth movement has its paper, Forces Unies de la Jeunesse, which is published by the Toulouse regional committee of the FUJ. According to a recent report, elements of the youth elite associated with the now disbanded École nationale des Cadres at Uriage, have joined the FUJ: these are probably to be identified as the Jeunes de l'OCM.

1. Forces Unies de la Jeunesse, June and September 1943; Revue de l'Organe du front patriotique des Jeunes, #22, July 1943; OIH #39194; Combat, Lyon ed., January 1943. OSS Source A #7139, 17 December 1943.
III. UNDERGROUND LABOR UNIONS

A. The Labor Legislation of the Vichy Government

Though Vichy has not declared Trade Unions illegal, it has enacted a series of restrictive laws: (1) it has abolished all organizations grouping members of different professions on a national plane, i.e. (in addition to employers unions) the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) and Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétains (CFTC); (2) all syndical organizations were placed under the control of Comités d'organisation, corporate bodies appointed by the government, almost exclusively from representatives of big business interests; (3) the government was given the power to dissolve any professional organization by decree; (4) the government withdrew the right of collective Bargaining and the right to strike.

In addition to these measures designed to render existing Trade Union organizations impotent, Vichy has also embarked on an ambitious program of social reorganization on corporate lines, embodied in the Labor Charter. Though the program has been only partially implemented, it has served to aggravate the hostility of Trade Unionists, particularly towards the clauses which call for a single compulsory union in each field (this outraged the Christian Trade Unionists, always jealous of their independence), and which set up mixed Comités Sociales, composed of employers, technicians, and workers as the real authorities on all questions relating to the profession.

It is clear that Vichy labor legislation served to aggravate the hostility of the majority of Trade Unionists.

towards a regime whose personnel, political policy, and international policy was objectionable to them from the start.

1. The Demoralization of the Trade Union Movement.

In spite of these antagonisms between the Vichy government and the Trade Unions aggravated by the disparity between frozen wages and a steeply rising cost of living, and in spite of the strength of the pre-war labor movement, the Trade Unions as such have not been the major factor in resistance as might have been expected, though Trade Unionists in various organizations have been the backbone of resistance. This is due to the disunity that has reigned in the French Trade Union movement: the long-standing separation into CGT and CFTC; the duality in the CGT existing since the expulsion of the Communists in 1939; the divisions within the CGT since June 1940 as to tactics to be pursued; the adherence of some CGT and CFTC leaders to Vichy.

B. The Forms of Resistant Trade Union Activity

The existing confusion in Trade Unionism has resulted in a complexity in the forms of resistant Trade Union activity.

1. Vichy's attempt to dissolve the central Trade Union organizations merely led to their illegal reconstitution. Militant leaders of the CGT and CFTC responded to the dissolution by drawing up in November 1940 a joint manifesto

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1. In 1936 the CGT claimed 5,000,000 members, and the CFTC, 500,000. In February 1940, after the expulsion of the Communists, and after mobilization, the CGT claimed 1,200,000; the membership of the CFTC had also declined.
insisting that syndicalism must be voluntary and free from government interference. 1

2. Where a national, departmental or local union was controlled by a collaborationist, an illegal dual organization was set up as for example in the case of the Metal Workers Union, the Miners Union of Northern France, the Paris Union des syndicats, the departmental union Haute-Vienne, the Teachers Union, the federation of government employees. 2

3. In some cases it was possible to get rid of the collaborationist leadership. Thus Dumoulin has been expelled from his post as secretary-general of the departmental union of the Nord, Vigne from the secretary-generalship of the Federation of Miners, etc.

4. In some cases the existant leadership was secretly resistant, or was converted to that policy by pressure from illegally organized committees within the organization. 3

In implementing the policy of trying to win the officially approved organizations over to resistance, militant Trade Union leaders have had to combat the deep suspicion in which the official organizations are held by the workers. The workers have in fact been leaving the Trade Unions en masse. For example, the departmental union of the Nord had 100,000 members in 1935, and 3,000 in June 1942; the Miners of the Pas-de-Calais had 105,000 members in September 1939 and 11,000 in October 1942. On the other hand, a significant rise in membership is

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1. CID #34811, 20 May 1943.
generally registered when an official union turns from collaboration to resistance. The continued appeal of a genuine, free Trade Unionism cannot be doubted.

C. The Organization of the Trade Union Underground

The coordination of resistant Trade Union activity under the conditions outlined above was very difficult, and has not been completely achieved. There are various groups, each now crystallized round a clandestine Trade Union paper, each reflecting the direction of a different group of resistant Trade Union leaders, and often with different financial backing.

1. Mouvement Ouvrier Français (MOF). This was set up in May 1942, on the initiative of Labor and Socialist leaders in Libération and Combat, such as André Philip and Léon Morandat. It brought together CGT and CFTC resistance. Originally reserved in attitudes to de Gaulle, in 1943 it has shown no reservations in its recognition of de Gaulle. It was always a South Zone organization, and played an important role in organizing resistance to the deportation of labor to Germany in the fall and winter of 1942. It has not succeeded in becoming the main center of resistant Trade Unionism, and its paper, started in June 1943, has been followed by others reflecting different tendencies.

2. Les Informations Sociales, which describes itself as a "News Bulletin for Trade Union Militants and the future..."
social cadres of liberated France." This was started in the summer of 1943, and seems to reflect the post-war social program of André Philip.¹

3. La Résistance Ouvrière. It started publication in August 1943. It describes itself as the "bond between French workers and CGT representatives around de Gaulle," and its purpose to "serve the CGT without compromising its unity or its independence." It reflects the views of Georges Puisson and Albert Buigui, who since 1943 have been delegates of the CGT in London and Algiers.²

4. Action. It started publication in October 1943. It calls itself the "social organ of Fighting France" and probably represents the more radical wing of the reconstituted CGT Bureau, typified by Gazier, the delegate of CGT resistance to the Consultative Assembly in Algiers.

5. La Vie Ouvrière. This is the Communist Trade Union paper, and has been in continuous publication since 1940.

6. In addition, the organs of "pure resistance" movements, Libération, Combat, and La Voix du Nord which include Trade Unionists in their leadership, have given reports and some direction to Trade Union resistance.³

D. Present Trends

In this confusion of diverse trends the following trends emerge.

1. The clandestine Bureau of the CGT is increasingly asserting its authority over its previous following. The collaborationist Trade Union leaders have admitted its

¹. CID #48057.
². See La Résistance Ouvrière, 21 August 1943.

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influence over the official ex-CGT unions. It sends delegates to the National Council of Resistance and the Consultative Assembly in Algiers. In 1943 it replaced the MOP as the leading center of Trade Union resistance. The clandestine Bureau of the CGT was reorganized in the first half of 1943 so as to cancel the effect of the 1939 expulsion of the Communists. The Bureau now consists of eight members, three of which represent the reinstated Communist element. The clandestine CGT seems to have taken the bit between the teeth, and while not disavowing its previous representatives with the Fighting French, Buisson and Guigui, regards itself as more adequately represented by its delegate to the Consultative Assembly, Gazette. The admission of the Communists to the CGT Bureau draws attention to the undoubted fact of a growth in their influence on labor resistance as a whole.

2. Relations between the CGT and the CFTC are reported to continue to be good, as has been declared in public statements by Buisson (CGT) and Poinsbeuf (CFTC).

3. In 1943 there was an increase in liaison, and local liaison groups, linking the various organizations concerned with labor resistance, including the Mouvement Unia de Résistance, the Mouvement Ouvrier Français, and Communists. These liaison groups have been known variously as Committees of Labor Resistance, Committees of Syndical Unity and Action, and Committees of Patriotic Labor Action. These were organized for the purpose of organizing active resistance

1. OSS Source A, #16182, 1 December 1943.
2. CID #45459, July 1943.
3. CID #28591, 12 February 1943; CID #48057; OSS Algiers 13 January 1944.
4. OSS Source A #14732A, 11 November 1943; CID #39014, June 1943.

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(against the deportations and for sabotage) and of stimulating the legal Trade Unions to adopt a resistant attitude. They will presumably organize whatever general action is planned for workers at the time of invasion.  

The Trade Union resistance has as a whole recognized de Gaulle's leadership since 1942, while at the same time remaining jealous of their independence.  

Reservations exist in some Trade Union circles as to de Gaulle's post-war role and towards the Rightist elements in de Gaulle's entourage.

Post-liberation planning has occupied a certain place in Trade Union resistance thought in 1943. A CGT program for the period of provisional government has been outlined. It shows the same insistence as does resistance as a whole on sanctions against collaborationists, and in the field of labor legislation demands a return to the 1939 status quo, the confiscation of property of collaborators, and the maintenance of the Comités d'Organisation with a "democratic personnel nominated by the unions."  

1. CID #45807, July 1943; CID #48117, July 1943; Action, organisation sociale de la France Combattante, No. 1, 1 October 1943.  
2. CID #28591, 12 February 1943; CID #34311, 20 May 1943.  
3. On délégations du personnel, the Bureau split, five favoring a return to the 1939 basis, and three for a return to the 1936 basis.  
4. A 3-5 minority favored the suppression of the Comités d'Organisation.
IV. UNDERGROUND POLITICAL PARTIES

. Rightist and Moderate Parties

Apart from the Socialists and Communists, four other political parties are recognized as participating in the National Council of Resistance: one rightist party, the Fédération Républicaine (or Union Républicaine Démocratique), two center parties, the Alliance Démocratique and the Démocrates Populaires (progressive Catholics), and one left party, the Radical Socialists.

So far as is known, of these parties only the Radical Socialists have established any network of clandestine nuclei; in the case of the Radical Socialist Party not very much has been accomplished, though their relations with the resistance group, Franc-Tireur, are close. For the rest their activity seems to have been limited to clandestine meetings of parliamentary groups, which have not produced any overt action welcomed by Resistance as a whole since Herriot and Johnnancy protected the closing of the Bureau of the Chamber and the Senate. ¹ The seating of representatives of these political parties in the National Council of Resistance and in the Consultative Assembly is not based on their contribution to resistance, but on a recognition of the role of political parties in any free government.

2. The Socialist Party

1. The Socialist Party and Resistance. The French Socialist Party was demoralized by the events culminating in the fall of France and the establishment of the Vichy régime. In the 1930's Léon Blum's international policy was ¹. O33 interview with Fernand-Laurent, 11 March 1943; CID #31236, April 1943; CID #21006, 7 July 1942; Rupert in France (London) 12 October 1943; CID #228498.

opposed by various dissident factions within the Socialist party: the Neosocialistes led by Marcel Déat and Adrien Marquet, the Gauche Révolutionnaire (Trotskyst) led by Marcel Pivert, and the extreme pacifists led by Paul Faure. When these groups committed themselves to support of Vichy and collaborationists, an unbridgeable gulf opened in Socialist ranks. Of 190 Socialist deputies and senators, 26 voted against the grant of full powers to Pétain in July 1940, 60 voted for, (the rest abstaining or being absent).¹

A large but undetermined number of the 250,000 members of the pre-war Socialist Party rejected collaborationism. They form a considerable fraction of the membership of resistance organizations, especially those grouped in the Mouvement Unis de Résistance, and also are active in Trade Union resistance.

In addition, a clandestine organization of the Socialist Party itself has taken place. This began early in 1941, under the leadership of André Philip in the South Zone, André Le Troquier in the North Zone, and Juste Evrard in the Nord and Pas-de-Calais. Clandestine papers were published in various regions. The movement, however, remained weak until 1942. Léon Blum's brilliant defense at the Riom trial did much to restore the party's prestige and morale.

The Socialist Party remains quite small in relation to its previous strength. In September 1943 it claimed 60,000 militant adherents, and in December 60,000.² The present organization is regarded by the Socialists themselves as only a "reconstitution of andres."

¹. CIO 40384, 19 May 1943.
². La Populaire, September 1943; Fronten in France, 26 December 1943.
To that end, the party has conducted a purge, on both a national and a local scale. All parliamentarians who voted for full powers to Pétain have been excluded, though those who immediately realized their error can be provisionally reinstated by the national Executive Committee after active service to the movement. The same applies to members of General Councils who voted for resolutions in support of Pétain. In the Pas-de-Calais more than one-fourth of the old leaders have been excluded. On the other hand, reports indicate that a number of the Socialist parliamentarians who abstained or were absent from the vote on full powers to Pétain have been reinstated, and that in the Prohibited Zone (Nord and Pas-de-Calais) a number of Socialist holders of municipal offices have both continued in office and are in touch with the Socialist Party.¹

Another factor which limits the present importance of the Socialist Party is the restricted nature of its activity. It is not itself a resistance group in the military sense, and has no subsidiary paramilitary organization. (There are, however, independent military groups under Socialist leadership.) It does whole-heartedly support the active resistance movement. It contributes political guidance; for example it campaigned for the unification of resistance which was realized in May 1943; it has opposed the tendency of some resistant circles to favor a one-party system after the war;² it has taken a stand on various political issues, such as de Gaulle's role, the Darlan and Giraud administration in North Africa, etc. It also makes effective contribution, from a

1. CTD #4869; CTD #57136, April 1943; L’Eanoir, September 1943.
Socialist point of view, to the propaganda campaign against Vichy policies and collaborationism. At the same time, it regards the rebuilding of the Socialist Party itself as its primary objective.

There can be no doubt that the Socialist Party has potentialities for very considerable expansion in numbers and influence after liberation. The work of reconstituting the Party has been definitely successful; a parliamentary framework should attract to it many who, in a framework of underground resistance, are attracted to the Communists. The degree to which its influence can be expected to be larger than its membership is shown by the fact that in 1936, with 250,000 members, it polled 1,887,000 votes (the largest of any party).

2. Organization of the Socialist Party. In 1942 the Party was organized under the direction of separate Comité d'Action Socialiste for the South Zone, the North Zone, and the Prohibited Zone. The South Zone Comité consisted of four members: two socialists elected to public office, and two militants. Under it were thirteen regional prefects; under them were departmental prefects (covering all départements except three); under them, chefs de centres d'études et de propagande; under them, the militants. A similar organization obtained in the other zones. In the middle of 1943, the North and South Zone organizations were linked, by placing each organization under a Comité Directoire, subordinate to a national Comité Exécutif.2

The Socialist party is strong in the Departments of

1. CID #34332, 19 May 1943.
2. CID #37126, April 1943; CID #21009, 7 July 1942.
Nord and Pas-de-Calais; in the former Occupied Zone it is strongest in Gironde, Touraine, and Brittany; in the South Zone it is organized round eleven centers: Marseille, Valence, Lyon, Monluçon, Clermont-Ferrand, Limoges, Périgueux, Agen, Toulouse, Pau, and Montpellier. ¹

The Socialists publish ten clandestine papers, of which the most important is Le Populaire, which first appeared in May 1942 and has a present circulation of 25,000 copies. Their clandestine propaganda work has received financial support from sympathetic organizations outside France (including the USA).²

3. Policy of the Socialist Party. The Socialist Party has accepted de Gaulle’s leadership since June 1942. The official organ of the party, Le Populaire, has always made clear that its recognition of de Gaulle was based on an acceptance of his pledge to restore democratic liberties and the Republic. It is known, however, that there are varying degrees of confidence in de Gaulle in Socialist circles. Le Populaire has made the same representations with regard to American policy towards de Gaulle, Darlan, Giraud, as has the underground press in general.³

The post-war policy of the Socialist Party is orientated (a) towards the restoration of parliamentary democracy; (b) within this framework, the Socialists will work for a coalition similar to the Popular Front, in which they will be the essential bridge between the Communists and the “organizations of advanced bourgeois democracy”;
(c) this coalition will work for a "Socialist Democracy";
(d) the social program includes nationalization of industrial monopolies, public utilities, banks and insurance companies; inclusion of workers and technicians in the management of big and medium-sized business; distribution of wealth, etc.; (e) in the international sphere they have appealed for a Federation of Peoples, based on cooperation between the USA, Great Britain, France, and the USSR.

It deserves to be noted that there are divergent currents of thought among Socialists. The clandestine Socialist press has implicitly admitted that the militants have not always accepted the decisions of the central authority. Militants who are active in resistance organizations are liable to a conflict of loyalties; there are reports that Socialists find themselves opposed to the "imprudent activities" of the Mouvement Unie de Resistance (in which there are a great many Socialists). Differences in attitude toward de Gaulle have been noted. It is reported that the North Zone organization has had a more independent attitude toward de Gaulle; this is attributed to the alleged fact that the South Zone organization is more financially dependent on the French Committee. This is, however, no ground for questioning the sincerity of those Socialists, like Philip and Le Troquer, who have been consistently "Gaullistes."

There is also a Socialist splinter-group which is urging a Socialist revolution as the only means of liberating France, and which is in opposition to both Gaullism and

1. André Philip in Echo d'Alger, 19 December 1943; Le Populaire, November and March 1943.
2. L'Espoir, July 1943.
3. Ibid., August 1943.
4. CID #49690.
It is evident that the leaders of the Socialist Party follow a policy of restricting present collaboration with the Communists to the degree regarded as necessary for the cause of national liberation, and while contemplating a post-war alliance with the Communists and others, along the lines of the Front Populaire, continue to distrust Communist methods and ambitions.

C. The Communist Party

1. The Communist Party Line since June 1940. The French Communist Party, having abandoned the policy of collective security after the Russo-German pact of 1939, adopted a position of opposition to the war, and its defeatist campaign brought down upon it the government decree of 26 September 1939 which declared the party illegal.

After the armistice the Communist propaganda line became more complicated: on the one hand it attacked Petain and collaborationist labor leaders as traitors; on the other hand it continued to regard the war as an "imperialist war"; "We do not want Frenchmen to be soldiers for England, with de Gaulle, or soldiers for Germany, with Laval and Doriot." The result was that while the Vichy authorities pursued the Communists with vigor, the Germans were tolerant of their activities in the Occupied Zone for a while, allowing, for example, the continuance of Communist mayors in office. Relations with the Germans began to be troubled in October.
1940, when 300 Communists (including Grunier) were arrested in Paris. The party does not seem ever to have linked its cause with that of the Germans; it conducted, for example, a campaign against anti-Semitic measures.

An anti-German orientation of the Communist line developed, as it was developing in Russian diplomacy also, before the outbreak of Russo-German hostilities. In May 1941 an appeal was launched, under Communist auspices, for the formation of a **Front National de lutte pour l'Indépendance de la France**. Whether this represented a submission of the party line to the overwhelming anti-German sentiment of the French people, or a shrewd guess on the direction which international developments were taking, cannot be ascertained, since in the next month the outbreak of the Russo-German war put an end to the contradictory position in which the Communists found themselves.

Since June 1941, the French section of the Communist International has thrown all its energy into organizing and stimulating French resistance. The party's propaganda has been violently nationalistic in reference, and Jacobin in tone. While the doctrines of Marxian socialism continue to be given in inner party circles, and the infallibility of Marxian science is emphasized in approach to intellectuals, Communist mass-propaganda is directed almost exclusively to stimulating the struggle for national liberation, and to give directives as to the methods to be pursued in the struggle.

This turn in Communist propaganda, and the establishment of connection between Communists, other resistance movements, and the French National Committee, created a situation

1. Particularly in **Les Cahiers du Bolchevisme**.
which made the dissolution of the Comintern apparently acceptable to old-time Marxists, and no doubt welcome to the following attracted by the purely nationalist line. 1

Occasional references to Socialism and the definitive suppression of the trusts as a post-war goal are made. The news presentation is of course markedly pro-Russian, and pro-Russian propaganda is conducted by the regular publication of Ruissle Aujourd'hui. A special anti-Anglo-American orientation, such as some observers have reported, is not detectable in overt Communist propaganda; their expressions on American policy toward France are not essentially different from the non-Communist underground press. 2 In the recent discussion of the provisional government of France the Communist public statements are studiously republican and democratic in tone, while indicating insistence on a reversion to the social legislation of 1936, and echoing the underground's general attitude of intrusiveness on the "purge" of political and economic administration. 3 Specifically socialist agitation is being held in reserve.

2. Communist Organization and Activity. The framework of the Communist Party's structure is composed of: (1) a directing body acting outside of Metropolitan France; (2) an executive committee inside France of which the headquarters are believed to be in Paris; (3) directorates for the North and South Zones, which issue current instructions; (4) regional and departmental directorates transmitting

1. Compare the manifesto "The French Communist Party approves the dissolution of the Communist International."
2. Samples, OSS source A 15829, 25 November 1943. On the other hand, they demanded the 2nd Front more vigorously than the others.
3. Waldenck-Rochet in France, 3 and 8 January 1944.
and executing the orders of the zonal directorates; (6) sections, directed by committees of three, one for political direction and the struggle against the police, one for propaganda, one for organization of Communist groups; (6) the quartier, forming a liaison between the section and the Party cells; (7) finally, the Party cells which generally consist of not more than three members, and which are into being wherever three members have made contact, either locally or in the place of their work. Although the Party has lost a few of its national leaders since 1930 through defections and German executions, it would appear that the Communists have preserved the organization and pre-war leadership more than any other party.\(^1\)

The pre-war membership of the Communist Party was about 300,000. Until the beginning of 1943 new recruits were taken in only with extreme caution and hesitation.\(^2\) In 1943, however, owing apparently to the decimation of Communist rank and file by executions, arrests, and deportations, a policy of active recruiting was launched\(^3\) according to a method whereby groups of three are to be formed by individual initiative, which will only be contacted by the regional organization after the group has proved itself by action. No information is available on the numerical strength of the Party: the above-mentioned factors make it reasonable to assume that it is below the 1939 figure of 300,000, though the Party members would be only a small minority of the Communist sympathizers. The main centers of Communist activity at the present time are Paris, Lyon, Toulouse, St. Etienne, 

2. *Gez source A*, #179154, 30 December 1943.

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Harcelo, Clermont-Ferrand. They are relatively weaker in the South Zone.\(^1\) The efficiency of the Communist underground is universally admitted; it disposes of ample funds, presumably including subsidies from abroad.\(^2\) At the same time it should be remembered that Communists produce more sound and fury per member than any other group, and hence can easily appear more numerous than they actually are.

Apart from the activities which Communists carry on in other organizations (primarily the *Front National*, see II, B, and the *Francais-Tirailleurs et Partisans*, see VI, B) the Communist Party as such carries on a vigorous life of its own:

a. **Propaganda.** The party issues numerous leaflets, as well as the following papers: *L'Humanité*, the official organ of the party, once a month in four regional editions of 70,000 each; *La Voix Ouvrière*, the official paper for trade unionists, with about 70,000 circulation; *L'Avant-Garde*, the paper for the Communist youth organization; *La Terre*, for peasants; *Russe Aujourd'hui*.

b. **Intelligence and Liaison.**

c. Infiltration into the public services of the Vichy Administration, and such organizations as the *Légion des Combattants*, for purposes of administrative sabotage and undermining of collaborationist morale; also of the Vichy-sanctioned Trade Unions, to stimulate resistance.

3. **Communist Tactics in Resistance.** The Communists have, since June 1941, been the extremist advocates of a policy of immediate action on all possible fronts, strikes, sabotage, guerrilla activity, demonstrations, etc., and have consistently striven to develop minor incidents into major

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1. C\(10002\), 7 July 1942; C\(37217\), April 1943.
2. C\(49599\); C\(37217\), April 1943.
incidents (for example, a strike in one factory into a general strike in the locality). The polar opposite of this tactic is the one advocated by some military elements in resistance, which emphasizes rather the preparation of a secret army which would take the field only on the day of Allied invasion. In between there are various shades of opinion. In 1943 the necessity of immediately resisting the deportation of French labor to Germany, brought the two schools of thought closer together. At present the Communist orders for action to be taken by Party members at the time of Allied invasion are modelled on those issued by the National Council of Resistance to which the Communist Party belongs.\footnote{Waldock-Rochot in France, 21 December 1943; CID #39261, 21 July 1943; L'Humanité, 15 April 1943.}

4. The Communists, Other Resistance Groups, and Fighting France. With the adoption of the nationalist line in June 1941, the Communists also decided to work for the unification of all French resistance. Until 1943, however, they insisted that this unification should take place under the aegis of the Communist-controlled \textit{Front National}. This goal was never achieved. \textit{Front National} is now recognized as only one of five main resistant organizations in the North Zone. The Communists in 1940 apparently accepted this position, since they accepted the unification of French resistance under the National Council of Resistance, in which \textit{Front National} is one of eight resistance groups sending delegates, and the Communist Party is one of six political parties sending delegates. Furthermore, a recent manifesto of the \textit{Front National} calls for the formation of committees of Fighting France (i.e. including the various resistant organizations) in every locality, and not as previously committees of the \textit{Front National}.\footnote{Waldock-Rochot in France, 21 December 1943; CID #39261, 21 July 1943; L'Humanité, 15 April 1943.}
National.

Attacks on Gaulliste in the Communist propaganda ceased soon after the adoption of the line of total resistance. Agreement between the French National Committee and the Communist Party was not reached till November 1942, and Grenier arrived in London in January 1943. Since then the Communists have maintained official links first with London, then with Algiers, and the Communist clandestine press has given full support to the National Committee and demanded its full recognition by the Allies. Recently the Communists demanded that the Committee declare itself the provisional government of France. At the same time the Communists belong to the radical wing of the Consultative Assembly, which is critical of the National Committee on such issues as the purge and the arming of the underground. The failure of the Communists and de Gaulle to reach agreement on Communist participation in the National Committee is significant, as are some expressions in Communist statements on a provisional government, which are designed to suggest dictatorial aspirations on the part of de Gaulle.

5. Communist Intentions at the Time of Allied Invasion.

The question must first be clarified, by distinguishing a national insurrection against the Germans and the Vichy government, from a specifically communist revolution to install a dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e., the Party. The former is the declared program of the communists, as of the resistance movement as a whole. As to the question

1. Compare the Manifesto "The French Communist Party approves the dissolution of the Communist International."
2. ORI #36647.
3. Hardy in France, 27 November 1943; Waldeck-Rochet in France, 2 and 3 January 1944.
whether the communists plan to develop the national insurrection into a social revolution, the evidence is as follows:

a. A number of observers inside France credit them with this intention. On the other hand, the attitude of these observers is often such as to suggest that in their eyes a national insurrection against the Vichy government would be the same thing as a social revolution. Hence it is not clear that their views really credit the communists with intentions essentially different from those of the resistance movement as a whole.

b. The communist propaganda line, analyzed above, has been up to the present such that it is true to say that communist rank and file has up to now not been indoctrinated to regard Allied invasion as an opportunity for a specific communist uprising. On the other hand, the French communists up to 1941 and since have shown the same ability to change the line as is shown by the Communist Parties of other countries.

c. The Communist Party, has by its universally recognized patriotic activity since June 1941, won the respect of anti-communist Frenchmen, and the adherence of many, particularly in the Front National and its military formation, the France-Tireuse et Partigane, whose support of the communists is not more than the support of what they consider to be the most effective resistance group. It is to be questioned whether the communist leaders would risk losing this support, or whether these supporters would follow them, in an insurrection which had goals clearly distinct from those of

1. OSS source #17941 and #17921, 30 December 1943; OSS source #13868, 30 December 1943.
2. OSS source #17941, 30 December 1943.
resistance as a whole.

d. If the Resistance movement as a whole is persuaded that essential points which it expects a provisional government to satisfy are in danger of not being satisfied, a discontent is likely to be generated which may make possible an oppositional movement including the communists and at least sections of the Resistance movement. The communist leader, Grenier, has stated that "any attempt to rehabilitate Vichy would deal a fatal blow to the statesmen or governments which attempted it." 1

e. The record shows that the leaders of the Communist Party will adopt no policy which is contrary to the interests of the USSR. The question will therefore be decided within the broader framework of relations between the USSR, Great Britain, and the USA.

It is considered certain that the Communist Party would command considerably greater support at a free election now than at any former period. 2 This is due to;

a. The admiration of all classes of Frenchmen for the courage, discipline, and skill shown by the communists in resistance, the number of their "martyrs of resistance" (30,000 out of a total of 60,000 executions, according to a non-communist source), 3 and patriotism, rather than social revolution which has inspired their martyrs.

b. The misery and discontent prevalent in France, the pauperization of the lower middle classes, and the disparity

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1. [No specific source mentioned]
2. [No specific source mentioned]
3. [No specific source mentioned]

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/1944
between wages and cost of living.

c. The admiration of the French public for the achievements of the Red Army.

Though the French grand bourgeoisie, military, and haute-fonctionnaire classes remain anti-communist, though the peasants, at present discontented, are likely to resume their conservative role, though the leaders of all political parties and many labor leaders continue to be distrustful of the communists, the mobilizing of an anti-communist bloc is not regarded as an immediate possibility.

The resistance movement as a whole is committed to collaboration with the communists, though there is an undercurrent of friction, varying in degree in different localities and with different movements.
V. CATHOLIC RESISTANCE

According to French Catholic sources, the dominant fact as regards French Catholicism has been the fact that in contrast with the opportunism of the hierarchy, there has been a participation of numerous Catholics in resistance.¹ The resistance group which has most Catholics in it is Combat, though other clandestine papers (Résistance, Défense de la France, La Voix du Nord) show Catholic influence. The lower clergy have done outstanding service to the cause of resistance. In addition to this Catholic participation in resistance groups, Catholic resisters as such have put out several clandestine papers. Cooperating since July 1942 with the Protestant resister group which used to publish La Peule, they publish Les Courriers du Témoignage Chrétien (originally Les Courriers du Témoignage Catholique) and Les Cahiers du Témoignage Chrétien. Les Cahiers are extended expositions (about 50 pages) of resistant Catholic doctrines. Originally these Catholic papers confined themselves to criticism of German policy. Since 1943 they have advocated active resistance. They have not recognized de Gaulle directly, but they encourage Catholic youth to join the Forces Unies du Jeuness, to which explicitly Gaullist youth groups (and even communist youth groups) are affiliated. The general tendency of Catholic resistant thought is democratic in politics and leftist in social policy, and opposed to communism.²

¹ CID # 2135F
² Cahiers du Témoignage Chrétien, May, July 1943; CID # 19019; Les Documents, 15 July 1942; CID # 42980C, July 1943.
VI. THE SECRET ARMY

A. The Secret Army as a Whole

One of the results of the establishment of the National Council of Resistance in May 1943 was the setting up of machinery for the coordination of all the military groups in the underground. At that time a scheme for a unified command was set up, under a commander in chief who would work in liaison with the Allied command, and under a single leadership in each region and locality. What degree of coordination has actually been achieved is problematical, as is the degree of disorganization consequent upon such arrests of leaders of the Secret Army as have taken place or will take place in the future.\(^1\) It does, however, seem that the broad lines of strategy are laid down by the National Council of Resistance and accepted by individual groups in a form adapted to their own situation.

The Secret Army at the end of October 1943 was composed of forces of two types: (1) the Secret Army, or Armée Secrète (AS), consisting of 180,000 men, holding themselves in reserve for the Allied invasion; (2) Action Immédiate (AI), consisting of 70,000 men, already engaged in operations against the Germans. Action Immédiate is composed of 32,000 for sabotage activities and 38,000 for guerrilla operations including 16,000 in the Maquis (see VI, C). Direction is in the hands of twelve regional commands who control both AS and AI. Action Immédiate, in relation to Allied invasion, has two functions: (1) the destruction of strategic objectives; (2) the protection of strategic points from destruction by the enemy. The AS, if adequately armed and supported, has the following possibilities: (1) cutting communications between France and Italy at the Alps;

\(^1\) An almost total liquidation of Secret Army leaders is reported in OSS source A #17720, 29 December 1943.
(2) isolating Marseille from Toulouse; (3) isolating Bordeaux from Loire; (4) holding strong points from which raids could be made, such as Vercors, Jura, Donon, Argonne.¹

As to equipment, in October 1943, of the 70,000 men in AI, 15,000 were adequately equipped. The proportion of the AS group adequately armed is much lower.²

It is altogether probable that at the time of liberation the underground forces will be increased very considerably over the number of those already organized.

The Secret Army, as is shown by its spokesmen in Algiers, is disappointed in the amount of military supplies which the Allies have given, and in the degree of liaison with the Allied command established. In particular, the mobilization of the AS group for the type of operations outlined above is rendered extremely difficult without close liaison with the Allied command.³

The AI groups, which function each in their own locality, is perhaps in a more independent position. It is altogether probable that at least the AI group will attempt to seize control of strategic points (communications, administration, etc.) even if no greater measure of liaison between the Allied command and the underground forces is established. The underground workers, in particular transportation, communications, and public utilities, are in a position to make a real contribution to the Allied military effort.

B. French-Tireurs et Partisans (FTP)⁴

The French-Tireurs et Partisans have been the paramilitary

1. OSS Berne, 27 October 1943.
2. OSS Berne, 27 October 1943. German seizures of hidden arms are going on all the time -- see for example CID #61366, November 1943.
3. A detailed analysis of the process of AS mobilization, with recommendations as to liaison with the Allied command, as given in OSS source A #17120, 29 December 1943.
resistance group most active in guerrilla operations, and are largely under communist direction. As in the case of the Front National, of which the FTP are the military arm, the communists have aimed at including non-communists, and the FTP therefore refrain from party politics. The Communist Party is aiming at incorporating 20% of its members in the FTP (the figure was raised from 10% to 20% in the spring of 1943), a fact which may indicate anxiety to keep the FTP in the Party's control.

The FTP have been the organization most active in such guerrilla activities as dynamiting, train-wrecking, attacks on isolated German detachments. This is the opinion of competent analysts; it also follows from the fact that their communiques are much more extensive in claims than those of any other organizations: indeed tributes to the FTP are found in the papers of other organizations. The claim made in the Consultative Assembly by the communist, Granier, that numerous actions credited to "patriots" in press releases were the work of the FTP, was not denied by the other resistance delegates. The claims made in the communiques of the FTP (published in their organ, France d'Aberd) are impossible to check. A summary of the communiques issued from 1 April -- 1 September 1943 by the FTP North Zone report 273 attacks on railroads, 357 locomotives put out of use, 18 attacks on enemy detachments, attacks on food and industrial products destined for Germany, 980 German officers and men killed, including Generals Schauburg and Ritter. Independent sources show that constant attacks of this sort are being maintained, without indicating the organization responsible in each case. The prominence of the FTP in active guerrilla operations does not mean that they are the principal component of the 'Secret'.

2. *Journal Officiel de la République Française*, 8 January 1944.
Army' of the underground as a whole, which they are not. It only means that they have concentrated on this type of operation, whereas other groups have in the past tended to keep more in reserve for the day of invasion and 'national insurrection.' There is no reliable information on the strength of the FTP. It is believed that the force is composed of 30,000 men taking part in present activities, and could mobilize a much larger number at the time of invasion, though it is almost certain that there would not be enough arms for a large proportion of them. FTP detachments have been reported in Normandy, Picardy, Nord, Ile-de-France, Saone et Loire, Loiret, Nièvre, Yonne, Corrèze, and the Centre.1

The FTP is for the most part organized so that the members live a normal life and only come together to carry out a specific task. If the FTP have been thus active, and if, as seems likely, they have received little in the way of supplies of arms from abroad, it appears probable that they must have long practiced techniques of securing arms from the enemy. The organization is directed by a Comité Militaire National, which gives orders to regional committees throughout the country; the latter have under them military instructors who are sometimes ex-officers and NCO's. The FTP have been taught to regard themselves as de facto soldiers, and as such entitled after liberation to all the rights and compensations of ex-servicemen.2

The FTP has made a considerable effort to organize the Résistants in the Maquis. In this field it has had competition from both the Mouvement Unis de Résistance and separate military resistance groups. In this field it seems as if the FTP were

1. CIB # 46785, September 1943; La Franc-Tireur Normand et Picard; France d'Abord, 15 March 1943 and May 1942; La Franc-Tireur, organe des FTP du Centre.
less successful than the other groups.

The FTP publishes its paper on a national scale, France d'Abord "organ of information, liaison, and battle of the FTP," as well as regional papers.

Some general coordination in planning between the FTP and other paramilitary groups was achieved in 1943 on a national scale through the National Council of Resistance, and on a regional scale through liaison committees. Nevertheless divisive jealousies have persisted: in some regions liaison has been broken off;¹ the spokesmen of the FTP in Algiers want more publicity for their own group, and charge that it has been discriminated against in the matter of supplies of arms.²

C. The Maquis

The Maquis are groups of young men who have taken flight into the mountainous regions of France to avoid deportation to Germany, or assignment to work in German-controlled enterprises in France. A spontaneous movement for this purpose developed at the end of 1942 and continued through the first nine months of 1943. The resistance movements have applied themselves to organize the Maquis into units capable of taking military action against the Germans. The task was a very considerable one, for which they had not made prior preparations. On the whole they succeeded, although there have remained some autonomous or undisciplined groups.³ Even greater was the problem of supplying the Maquis with food and clothing, not to speak of arms. In some cases arrangements were worked out with the local peasantry whereby the Maquis got paid for working as agricultural laborers; the underground embarked on a campaign to raise funds for the Maquis; raids were made on the supplies of such institutions as

¹. In Correspondence, on orders of Grenier, CID # 45785, September 1943.
². Journal officiel de la République française, 6 January 1944.
³. OSS source B # 22356, 31 December 1943.
the Chantiers de Jeunesse and the Secours National.\(^1\)

However, recourse to "requisitions" on the local peasantry in certain areas could hardly be avoided;\(^2\) while Vichy denunciations of the banditry of the Maquis cannot be taken at their face value, and while Maquis spokesmen say that receipts are given for articles requisitioned, to be honored by a liberated France, the whole situation made the morale of the Maquis and good relations with the local peasantry difficult to maintain. In addition, on the whole the Maquis lived in a state of armed truce rather than active hostilities with the Vichy authorities and the Germans; this tended to evaporate enthusiasm.\(^3\) The Maquis also lived in expectation of an invasion of France "before the leaves of autumn"; when this failed to materialize, they lent an ear to the appeals of Vichy to return after the Laval-Sauckel agreement of October ostensibly had ended the deportation program. A great many then began drifting back into the cities as winter set in, relying on fake identification papers.\(^4\)

These factors have all led to a decrease in the importance of Maquis resistance. The one thing that could have maintained their full strength, large supplies of food and clothing by Allied parachute, was not forthcoming; in spite of all, however, a considerable nucleus still exists in the Maquis.

Numbers in the Maquis. In the fall of 1943 estimates of the number organized in guerrilla groups in the Maquis varied from 15-100,000, the most likely figure being 25,000.

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1. OSS, R & A London, 31 August 1943.
2. OSS Source, A #15747, 24 November 1943.
3. OSS #34962, 16 November 1943.
4. OSS #34464, 2 November 1943.
The center of gravity was in the Alpine region of Savoie and Haute-Savoie; other groups were reported in Dauphiné, the Massif Central (especially Corrèze), the Pyrenees, and Brittany. Today 15,000 would probably be a liberal estimate.1

Organization of the Maquis. The Maquis have been given organization and leadership by three main groups (1) the Mouvement Unie de Résistance; (2) military men, either independent or belonging to the OCM, particularly ex-officers of the Chasseur Alpine in the Savoy; (3) the France-Tirailleurs et Partisans. On the whole army leadership is predominant.2

An attempt has been made to organize a unified command of the Maquis on a departmental and regional basis, and to coordinate the command of the Maquis with that of the Secret Army as a whole. Liaison has, however, up to now been imperfect, the communist-controlled FTP showing particular aloofness.3

The armament at the disposal of Maquis groups is, so far as is known, on the same level as that of the Secret Army as a whole (see above).

1. CID #48669, 3 November 1943; CID #61366, November 1943; OSS Source A #17934, 30 December 1943 (estimates 10,000 still in Savoy); OSS #25134, 19 November 1943 (80,000); OSS Source B #2641, 6 December 1943 (25,000 in August); OSS Berne, 27 October 1943 (15,000).
2. OSS Source A #21541, 5 December 1943.
3. OSS #29002 Casablanca, 5 November 1943; #5509, #5504, #5601; CID #60761, 6 December 1943.
From: Madrid
To: MILID
No: 38, 27 Jan 1944


Retired French General Brulé, friend of Sir John Dill and General Vanier present Canadian Minister to Algiers informs us that there is no coordination among various resistance groups within France and that as result their present activities must be considered ineffective in larger sense. He suggests that nonpolitical non-French Allied Representative meeting in France with heads of various resistance groups could draw up plans for concerted action at present time meanwhile, furnishing important military info. In view of present political atmosphere in Algiers, this suggestion may not be acceptable to Gen. de Gaulle but believe it merits consideration by British and American Theatre Commanders. Inquire still in France but ask be contacted through this office. Request his name be protected in conversations with French.

ACTION: G-2
INFORMATION: OPD
White House
Log

CM-IN-18515 (28 Jan 44) 0720Z vhf

Hothenthal

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD Letter, May 8, 1972
By DBS  Data APR 17 1973

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: Algiers
To: War
No. W-7849, 17 December 1943

This is [NAP 551]. Added AGWAR for CCS, USAFINN
information USFOR FOR British CCS signed Eisenhower
site FRUIT.

With reference our NAP 530 dated 27th November.
Request you expedite answer.

NAP 530 is CM-IN-17031 (28 Nov 43) CCS
ACTION: CCS (CAPT ROYAL USN)
INFORMATION: OPD
GEN STRONG
GEN ARNOLD
ADM KING

CM-IN-10864 (17 Dec 43) 1649E wos

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12335, Sec. 3(b) and 6(D) or 6(E)
OSD letter, May 6, 1972
By DBS Date 6/73

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COPY No. 19

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12335, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/74
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Algiers
To: War

No. W-7676/14346 15 December 1943

To AOWAR for CCS and USFOR for BOS NAF 549 cite SPLIA and NAJRC signed Eisenhower.

Recommend approval of French Navy request for salvage equipment approved by Commodore Sullivan, USN, in letter UR Chef DU Service Central Des Constructions Et Armes Navales, number A-14 serial 184 of 18th November, copies of which forwarded to Navy Department, Bureau of Ships and French Naval Mission in Washington. Equipment should be shipped to Algiers under tonnage allocation of 3000 tons per convoy for French Navy.

No Sig.

ACTION: CCS (Capt Royal USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Strong
Gen Arnold
Adm King
Adm Horne

CM-IN-10023 (16 Dec 43) 10302 jb
FROM: Algiers
To: War
No: W-7589/1365. NAF 546 14 December 1943.

[NAF 546]action AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff information USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff cite PROCT, PHOIS, SPLL A And NAJRC signed Eisenhower.

Incidental to the French rearmament program and the equipment of French Divisions, it is recommended that French Zone of Interior or Communications Zone establishments such as High Command Headquarters, Replacement and Unit Training Centers, Base Ports, Depots, Shops and Hospitals, be supplied with maintenance materials. To a degree, these French facilities are now available and can operate provided they are supplied with materials which fall generally into classes II and IV, and specifically as Follows:

- Ordnance supplies in SNLX and H and parts common.
- Quartermaster-clothing maintenance, supplies for repair of clothing and equipment, cleaning and preserving supplies, stationery and office supplies and other expendable supplies.
- Signal Corps-expendable and consumable supplies as listed in appendix A, Signal Corps General catalogue 8-15-42, and wire and electrical supplies for base installations and training centers.

Medical Corps-drugs, hospital and laboratory maintenance supplies.

Chemical Warfare Service-expendable supplies. Engineer-pipings, fittings, building repair material, wire and strapping. In addition-miscellaneous hand tools for all services. Requirements for maintenance herein requested are exclusive of maintenance requirements of the troops in French Expeditionary Corps of about 300,000.

The supplies indicated above are largely non-military and it is intended to obtain as much as possible thru NAEB. Upon advice that recommendations contained herein have been approved, requisitions will be forwarded. For purpose of including in
Army supply program the supplies necessary for operation of these French territorial installations, computations of requirements should be based on requirements of United States units listed in three columns as follows:

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CM-IN-8996 (14 Dec 43)
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<td>Quartermaster Service Battalion</td>
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<td>Headquarters Base Group.</td>
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<td>Chemical Warfare Supply.</td>
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<td>CM-IN-8996 (14 Dec 43)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Type Unit</td>
<td>USA T/0-2</td>
<td>Number of Units</td>
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<td>---------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance Company,</td>
<td>3-47</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decontamination Company,</td>
<td>3-217</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depot Company,</td>
<td>3-67</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composite Company,</td>
<td>3-277</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processing Company (Impregnation)</td>
<td>3-77</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transportation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment Fort Battalion TC</td>
<td>55-116</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Port Company TC,</td>
<td>55-117</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quartermaster Truck Regiment,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quartermaster Service Battalion (Labor Unit),</td>
<td>10-65</td>
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<td>Headquarters and Headquarters Company Fort M</td>
<td>10-260-1</td>
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<td>Quartermaster Car Company,</td>
<td>10-87</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regulating Company TC,</td>
<td>Tentative</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Staging Area Company TC,</td>
<td>55-147</td>
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<td>Engineers,</td>
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<tr>
<td>General Service Regiment,</td>
<td>5-21</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Battalion (Separate),</td>
<td>5-35</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Depot Company,</td>
<td>5-47</td>
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CM-IN-3996 (14 Dec 43)
**WAR DEPARTMENT\nCLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER\nINCOMING MESSAGE\n**

**From:** Algcr

**To:** WAR

**No.:** W-7589/13853

**14 December 1943**

<table>
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<tr>
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<td>Dump Truck Company</td>
<td>5-88</td>
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<td>Maintenance Company</td>
<td>5-157</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ports Supply Company</td>
<td>5-247</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Searchlight Repair Detachment</td>
<td>5-587</td>
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<tr>
<td>Water Supply Company (Separate)</td>
<td>5-67</td>
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<tr>
<td>Camouflage Company</td>
<td>5-297</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Petroleum Distribution Company</td>
<td>5-327</td>
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<tr>
<td>Map Depot Detachment</td>
<td>--</td>
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<tr>
<td>Utility Detachment</td>
<td>5-283</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire Fighting Detachment</td>
<td>5-337</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical: General Hospital-1,000 beds</td>
<td>8-550</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Station Hospital-500 beds</td>
<td>8-560</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Supply Depot</td>
<td>8-661</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ambulance Battalion</td>
<td>8-315</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Hospital Train</td>
<td>8-520</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Replacement Depots, Training Centers and Schools: Headquarters and Headquarters Company Replacement Battalion</td>
<td>20-42</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Replacement Battalion</td>
<td>20-45</td>
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CM-IN-8996 (14 Dec 43)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

COPY No. 19
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: All Arms
To: WAR
No. W-7589/13853 14 December 1943.

French personnel required to operate these installations is 93,000 approximately.

No Sig.

* Omission Being Serviced.

ACTION: CC/S
INFORMATION: OPD
Serving Strong
General Arnold
Admiral King
Admiral Horne

JCS-29-71
Date - DEC 23 1971
Signature - RAP

CN-IN-8956 (14 Dec 43) 21162 med

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/97
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers
To: War

No. W-7569 14th December 1943.

To AGWAR cite SPLA and NAJRC signed Eisenhower.

Recommendations on following 2 subjects (Reference your 1464 of 2 November and your 3383 of 25 November) will be sent at an early date to AGWAR for CDS:

(1) Additional corps, army and base units to be added to present French rearmament program and

(2) New project for maintenance of French territorial forces required for support of expeditionary forces.

Approval of recommendations will involve provisions in 1944 armor supply program.

No Sig.

3383 is CM-OUT-9625 (25 Nov 43) OPD
1464 is CM-OUT-232 (1 Nov 43) OPD

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: CC/3 (Captain Royal USN)
General Somervell
General Maxwell

CM-IN-9095 (15 Dec 43) 00262 med

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 2(b) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 8, 1972
By DBS Date APR 17, 1973

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COPY No. 11
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

Combined Chiefs of Staff
December 1, 1943
Number 3919

CQ FREEDOM ALGIERS
CQ US FOR LONDON ENGLAND
FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF
Number R 6418
Number 1156

For Eisenhower Freedom Agliers, PAN 302, from the Combined
Chiefs of Staff.

Question raised your NAP 530 under consideration.
Attention to PAN 272 invited.

ORIGINATOR: CCS (CAPT ROYAL USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
GEN STRONG
GEN ARNOLD
ADM KNOX
ADM HORNE
SOS
LOG

CM-OUT-338 (1 Dec 43) 20262 mlc

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/44

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NL R 101

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: Algiers
To: War

No. W-6283/6360, NAF 530, 27th November 1943

NAF 530 added AGWAR for CCS, and to USAFIMRE, information
USFOR for British CCS signed Eisenhower cite FOOT.

French Naval rearrangement decisions CCS 358 designate
COMINCH as executive agent of CCS in French Naval matters.
To simplify communications and expedite action recommend
Commander in Chief Mediterranean as Naval Commander this
theater act as executive agent for me in matters which
are purely of Naval concern, be authorized to communicate
direct with COMINCH on such matters with information
copies to me.

No Sig

ACTION: CC/S (CAPT. ROYAL, USN)
INFORMATION: OPD

GEN. STRONG
GEN. ARNOLD
ADM. KING
ADM. HORNE
LOG

CM-IN-17031 (28 Nov 43) 0042Z cong

DECLASSIFIED
JCS 29-71

Date: DEC 23 1971
Signature: RFP

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COPY No.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/94
QUESTION NAVAL REPRESENTATION WITH FRENCH COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION YOUR 261814 NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION.

13 ORIG.
AMBASSADOR WILSON, REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE FRENCH COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION, HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IN ALGIERS. AS PRESENT POLICY PROVIDES FOR OPERATION MAJOR PORTION FRENCH FLEET IN MEDITERRANEAN, AMBASSADOR RECOMMENDS AND I CONCUR THAT NAVAL ATTACHE SHOULD BE ATTACHED TO HIS STAFF WITH ADDITIONAL DUTY ON COMMAND. LT COMDR S A D HUNTER USNR HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN ORDERED TO THIS COMMAND FOR ULTIMATE ASSIGNMENT TO CIVIL AFFAIRS FOR DUTY CONNECTION FRENCH NAVAL MATTERS. THIS OFFICER IS WELL VERSED IN FOREIGN RELATIONS BUT HAS NO NAVAL BACKGROUND. I RECOMMEND ASSIGNMENT OF A SENIOR NAVAL OFFICER EITHER ACTIVE OR RETIRED TO THIS DUTY.

DECLASSIFIED E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4 NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 1/18/94
CAPTAIN DALLAS DUPRE OR AUGUSTUS GRAY WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE.
FRENCH AIR SQUADRON WITHDRAWN FROM FRONT. 9 SURVIVORS OF ORIGINAL 30 PILOTS NOW MOSCOW. BEING SENT TULA AREA TO TRAIN NEW VOLUNTEERS TO COME FROM AFRICA AND WILL BE EXPANDED TO AIR REGIMENT. ARE TO BE EQUIPPED WITH YAK 11'S. SAY SHOT DOWN 90 GERMANS. ARE WELL PLEASED WITH RED TREATMENT BUT DO NOT GIVE IMPRESSION OF BEING PRO COMMUNIST

16...ACT

COMINCH...
From: Algiers
To: WAR

No: W-5435/2056, 17th Nov 1943

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower cite PHAEB. This is NAP518 reference (2).

No embarrassment or difficulties in delaying change in character of NAEB for period required to define state and ODEA functions. It is desired that State Department not be pressed on this matter. From military standpoint it is anticipated a liaison attachment to NAEM after change will be substantially same as present Military Department of NAEB. Changeover is therefore easy of accomplishment at one time. From civilian standpoint without awaiting NAEB change progress is currently being made in turning over many of NAEB operating functions particularly in Land Lease procurement to Comite Francais which is strengthening its staff here and in Washington. French are anxious that this should proceed to the end that our economic representation here be in nature of civilian supply mission such as NAEM. Accordingly it may be that after establishment of U.S. diplomatic mission here French may press for more speedy action.

Attention is invited to CM-OUT-13352 (29 Oct 43) 00/3

ACTION: CC/G (CAPT. ROYAL USN)
INFORMATION: OFD
GEN. STRONG
GEN. ARNOLD
ADM. KING
GEN. HILLDRING
LOG

CM-IN-10621 (17 Nov 43) 22312 cng

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ALUSNA MOSCON</td>
<td>72144</td>
<td>WILLIAMS, F.W.</td>
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<td>WILLIAMS, F.W./RN</td>
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<td>SCRUGGS</td>
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</table>

SEVERAL MEMBERS FRENCH AIR SQUADRON LEAVING FOR AFRICA, REMAINING APPR. 2 AT FROST, Rotating 2 OR 3 RESTING AT MOSCOW. COLONEL SCHWEITZER WHO BITTERLY DENOUNCED AMERICANS WHILE AT KUBISHEV EARLY 1949 RECENTLY LEFT USSR PROBABLY PERMANENTLY. GENERAL PETIT TOO SENIOR, BITTER OVER CONDITIONS AND HIS PERSONAL TREATMENT NORTH AFRICA ENROUTE LEBEN. CAPT HURLES SLIPPED ODessa JEN AND PROBABLY COMMUNIST ALSO GONE. ALL ABOVE PLUS AVIATORS ANTI ANGLO AMERICAN. SOME OF LATTER REMARKING BETTER RETURN TO GERMAN HELD NORTH AFRICA THAN ONE IN HANDS ANGLO AMERICANS. PRACTICALLY NO SOCIAL OR OFFICIAL CONTACT BETWEEN FRENCH AND ANGLO-AMERICANS HERE DUE THEIR UNCOMPROMISING ATTITUDE.

16...ACT

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/14

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11950, Sec. 8(D) and 8(D) or (B)
OUSD letter, May 8, 1972

APR 17 1973

060657 304 France
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Madrid
To: Milid
No. 238, June 2, 1943.

Reported end April confirmed May 20th that 50 camouflaged tank cars with fuel for sub base at Bordeaux are on siding south main Ry line at Cknavay 8 KM from La Mothe direction Bordeaux. Repeated London. Sub base Bordeaux uncompleted but now being used by both Wop and Germ subs.

Hoheenthal

Action: G-2
Information: OPD
CG AAF

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 5(D) or (E)
GSD letter, May 10, 1972
By DBS

CM-IN-1482 (3 Jun 43) 0458Z vc

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

COPY No. 26

305 frames
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<td>FROM</td>
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<tr>
<td>RELEASED BY</td>
<td>7 MAY 1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOR CODEROOM</td>
<td>GREENE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DECODED BY</td>
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<tr>
<td>PARAPHRASED BY</td>
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<tr>
<td>INDICATE BY ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>HATCH</td>
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<td>NOR 1321</td>
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UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

TEXT

RELIABLY REPORTED ME THAT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
GERMANS AND LAVALL HAVE REACHED POINT WHERE FORMER
CONSIDER REPLACING LATTER BY ONE MONSIEUR WECHEIN.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 8, 1972
By DBS
Date APR 17 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVBEGS.)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/44
WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Bern  
To: Secretary of State, Washington  
Number 2817, May 7, 1943

The local press in Nice, France carried the following statements which were issued by the headquarters of the Italian Army of occupation. The Swiss Consulate at Nice reported these as of April 19.

"In case of attack from the sea the population of coastal cities is informed that it will not be permitted to leave residences to retire toward interior. Therefore all without important reasons requiring residence coastal area are advised immediately to consider departure other departments."

Harrison

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: OPD  
CG AAF

DECORATED  
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/44
From: Bernes
To: MILID

In Reply Cite: 557, April 6, 1943

Defense of channel coast Trouville to Courseulles: 20 Artillery Batteries emplaced coastal section between Courseulles and Ladives River mined coastal section between Ladives and Latouques River forbidden zone except towns of Houlgate, Deauville and Trouville. (Map Carte Michel in 541 over 200,000 Road Franceville-Cabourg and road) (For ETO USA) Entrance Luc and Ladelivrance mined.

Legge

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: OPD
CG AAF

CM-IN-3801 (7 Apr 43) 0750Z flw
Following from Free, signed Legge. (This is section 4 of the message of which, sections 1, 2, and 3 were transmitted in Legation's telegrams No's. 1229, 1267, and 1272 of February 23, 24 and 25 respectively.)

1. Following with regard to opinion in "unoccupied" France. Sources: various, all of the middle and upper classes. VN.

Four-fifths of the total population are against Germany; three-fourths of the rich, (particularly the industrialists), making up 5% of the total population are pro-German and strongly collaborationist; the remainder of the people are "Vichy Vasy". It is generally hoped by the workers that Russia will be victorious.

There is much greater sympathy for the United States than for England, and only the pro-German elements harbor resentment toward the United States over North Africa. Most think and hope that the Allies will win; they hope that the war will be over in 1943; and anticipate that Europe will be invaded. If this should happen the Allies would probably receive active help from less than half the population of the "unoccupied" zone, because of too great fear and inertia. (Comment: Evidently there is a great difference between "unoccupied" and "occupied" zones. The people believe that the North African population is better off than before, and consider that if the Americans land, France will be supplied with food.

The people have a fairly good knowledge of war developments obtained by listening to British and United States broadcasts. People listen considerable to American broadcasts because there is less jamming of American broadcasts than British and the people prefer American ideas,
and dislike the British broadcasts in the French language because they are too tendentious (de Gaulist) and because too many of the participants are Jewish.

The Army dislikes de Gaulle because he is too ambitious, and there is very little de Gaullism among the workers but a great deal of Communist activity. The group in "unoccupied" France who favor de Gaulle is small, and consists mostly of lawyers, students, doctors and professors.

The greater number of people feel that the Vichy Government "sold out" to Germany, yet they respect and forgive Marshal Pétain, there being many who would still follow his leadership. Laval is disliked. However, only among the better educated is there resistance. Sabotage very limited.

People not depressed although excited and nervous; very great degree of lethargy.

The poor are almost at the point of starvation, not being able to find even vegetables. Among the old, there have been some instances of actual starvation. Instructions given Lyon prefecture to do nothing for the old, but to let them die. (Comment: It is reported that the above policy is being carried out in Germany; old people find it impossible to get medical care). Many deaths among infants between 1 and 3 months old.

2. Following regarding Hungary. Information in telegram No. 298 dated January 14 from Legation confirmed by several sources. Hungarian Nazis only element of population who expect a German victory, most of the people hope Germany loses because they fear domination by Germany; everyone anxious for peace; position of Regent Horthy strong; Communism feared by upper groups who hope that England and the United States will afford protection against the U.S.S.R.
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
CCWD
INCOMING MESSAGE
Feb 25, 1943
0004Z

From: Madrid
To: MILID Wash DC
No: 81
February 24, 1943

Following reports received today from Non British sources: 1 Germ SS trooper with word Paris on sleeve seen in Irun Feb 22, evaluation A 1. Large amount unidentified material has arrived Biarritz, evaluation E 1. Since Feb 18 53 engined Germ Planes have flown over Irun daily coming from direction Avarre, evaluation B. Germes suspended Feb 20th civil rail traffic from Bayonne south in order give priority to MIL freight, evaluation B 2. Fifteen Germ planes at Biarritz Airport, evaluation B 3. Six Germ dive tax Biarritz area, evaluation C 5. Following are rumors from Spanish border: 300 Germ planes Biarritz Airport. Common talk Germ soldiers set date that Spain will be invaded next 2 months.

Rohenthal to Strong estimate situation based on this and previously reported into: Germes have made some concentration troops and supplies Bayonne region. Insufficient info yet to accurately determine size and capability possible mission some to strengthen defenses Atlantic Coast immediately North Spanish border which have been weak 2 reorganization units returned from Eastern front 3 new offensive in Germ war of nerves against Spain and Allied Nations.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 2(D) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 8, 1973
Dusenbury By DBS Date: APR 11 1973

Action: G-2
Information: EA

M. L. S. JOURNAL No 138 FEB 25 1943
COPY No. 26

300 France

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/1944

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SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: Madrid
To: MILID

No. 75, February 23, 1943

In addition to our number 70, 2 agents of British secret service on February 21 reported large number German troops in area south of Dax, but details lacking. We sent 2 officers at once to border to get information. Today Cerza reports French sailors personally saw on Feb 18th concentration of fresh German troops on Croy, Czeck and SS between Dax and Hendaye. He counted at railroad station Labenne North Bayonne 5 trains each with 30 cars carrying 165 Howitzers, 187 tanks, 350 light tanks and armored cars. He heard that 300 combat planes had arrived at the aviation fields. And also that an important motor convoy had arrived at Bayonne. High ranking friendly Spanish General told us today that German concentration was hurriedly made over week ago by Germans who expected Allied landing Bordeaux-Frontier coast. Every effort now being made to check reports and obtain further information. Will keep you informed all details obtained. Dusenbury and Hohenthal to General Strong your no. 206 answered.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11565, Sec. 3(F) and 5(D) or 32
OSD letter, May 8, 1972

Footnote: No. 70 is CM-IN-10824 (21 Feb 43) G-2

Action: Information:

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/44

COPY No. 26

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SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: London
To: MILID

No. 4275, February 17, 1943

It is reported by Czechoslovakian intelligence that German Army Command in France camouflages moves of German higher units by leaving in France dispensable staffs of units already moved. Staffs left behind sometimes remain until arrival or formation of another higher unit.

26th and 27th Panzer Divisions (signed Solbert) under formation in France joined into 27th Panzer Div and moved Eastern front. 26th Panzer Div now only has depot formation in France.

No Sig

Action: G-2

Information: OPD
            CG AAF

CM-IN-8753 (17 Feb 43) 1944 Z

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 8, 1972

By DBS Date APR 17 1973

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
From: Tanger
To: MILID

No. 469, February 15, 1943

Major Morejon Spanish Aide to General Uriarte, Military Commander of and High Commissioner's Deputy in Tangier recently returned from months vacation in northeastern Spain states that no visible or audible concentration of German Forces nor terrestrial activities at present French side border, frontier remains closed except for passage of railway traffic. French still control customs and police administration on Meditrranean end and Central section of frontier as opposed to Atlantic side where Germans in complete charge all border activities without exceptions, French being entirely excluded from all operations in this territory. German Army Headquarters for Eastern Franco-Spanish border region located at Perpignan.

Edwards

ACTION: G-2 E-A
INFORMATION: OPD CG AAP

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 5-3-78
MAY 15 1974

CM-IN-8026 (16 Feb 43) 1023Z ems

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 or Sec. 3.3
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/44
From: Ankara
To: Milid

No. 359, January 16, 1943

Diplomatic sources left Salonika December 15. 8 2 states only 1 German battalion and few tanks there centers of radio communications with islands no rail movements erection fortifications continue. French travelers arrived Turkey December 14th from France state 8 2 Officer disband army continues draw be able all desire go North Africa one out of 1,000 agree serve new Laval Army.

Jadwin
(FROM GALLAN)

DECISIONS TAKEN HITLER LAVAL RE STRENGTHENING AXIS
EFFECTIVENESS FRANCE TO DECLARE WAR ON RUSSIA ENGLAND NOT AMERICA. FRANCE TO PUT DISPOSAL AXIS NECESSARY CONSEQUENCES MANPOWER WHICH WILL BE TRANSFERRED GERMANY AND EASTERN ITALY FOR TRAINING AND ARMING WITH VIEW RELIEVING GERMEN UNITS IN REAR AND PARTLY IN NEICH.
IN EXCHANGE LARGE NUMBER FRENCH PRISONERS TO BE RELEASED TO RETURN FRANCE AND ITALIANS TO GIVE UP CLAIMS NICE, CORSICA. 02 FRENCH SOURCE. DESPITE LAVAL'S PLENARY POWERS GERMENs AWAITING CONFIRMATION PEITAN.

16. ACTION
COMINCH...1/11...24C...CNAV...DEC 24 UP FAA EJL.
From: Bern
To: Milid

No. 420, January 6th, 1943

Source 202 W lack of material for German Armies in France becoming more apparent. From original document 157th Reserve Division Felber Group issued to its unit no further requisitions for machine guns mine throwers anti tank guns or spare parts of any kind will be accepted the requirements of Africa’s Corps and Army in Russia’s absorb all production. For this reason formation of new combat divisions proceeding slowly. German High Command estimated their losses would be 500,000 during the period November 1942 through February 1943 actual losses to December 23d believed to have reached that figure. Including encircled troops Stalingrad Sector 30 German Divisions totally out of action 10 partially.

France’s 157th Reserve Division moved to Rosancon area December 21st. Following German Divisions have left France since December 15th: Three Infantry Divisions as follows 304th 321st and unidentified from Brittany. Three Panzer Divisions as follows 7th, SS Panzer Corps, remaining elements of 10th.

Boundaries of Italians zone of occupations north Colony on Geneva Road west: Rhone.

This exception: zones between Lyon Geneva Road Belgium lines Tain-L’Hermitage-Chambery is reserved by Germans for mass maneuver of several Divisions with C P at Bourg for eventual action.

Fortifications under construction areas

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/44

This copy may not be reproduced.
From: Bern  
To: Milid  
No. 420, January 6th, 1943

Scotts Germans still considering suppression of line of demarcation and creation of an interior free zone and demilitarized coastal zones the latter forbidden to the French order of battle; The AO of that 1 stationed at Toulouse for several weeks has return to Bordeaux leaving administrative staff at Toulouse 158th Reserve Division (General Meeckal) Avignon 148th Reserve Division Toulouses 157th Reserve Divisions Bourg part at Besancouen 326th Division Perpignan 327th Division Beziers 335th Division Marseilles 328th Division Lunel (not sure) 165th Res Div Beune-Vesoul.

One Motorized or Armored Division reported detraining at region Pontoise element only were reserved.

From document of Felber Group 66th Army Corps is mentioned in region Clermont Ferrand. We have previously reported that Felber Group includes 64th Arm Corps have you any other check? Repeated to ETO USA.

Legge

* Service on request.

Action Copy: G-2 E A

Info. Copies: OFD CG AAF Log

CM-IN-2906 (1-7-43) 1205Z ems

8. I. S. JOURNAL NO. 10 3 JAN 1943

COPY No. 29

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/44
From: Helsinki  
Dated: December 30, 1942, 10 a.m.  
No.: 1289  
Rec'd: December 30, 1942, 9:43 a.m.  

Information has been received concerning observations made at Lille the week after the city was bombed by flying fortresses. The observer, who is a prominent businessman in Finland, said that he had been told that 125 people were killed in the air raid. In spite of the fact that the raid was carried out by Americans, he said that the people of the city are still almost completely favorable to the United States. In Brussels and in Lille, he said, he had to communicate with the people in English since they would not speak German. Our informant said that before the air raid took place, many of the large factories which were previously located at Lille had been moved to Luxemburg. He, himself, did not see much evidence of damage.

Our informant said further that Belgian conditions were somewhat improved over last year, this improvement being for the most part due to a better potato crop. Anyone who has enough money, he said, can buy almost anything through the black market which is flourishing in Brussels. As an example he said that he had to pay the equivalent of 10,000 Finish marks when he gave a luncheon for 6 people at a leading restaurant.

MC CLINTOCK

ACTION: G-2  
INFO. COPIES: OPD  
CG AAF  

CH-IN-13240 (12/31/42) 12222 bjm

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/44
From: Madrid
To: Milid
No 385 December 22, 1942

On fairly good authority it is understood that 2 coastal zones each about 30 miles wide have been closed to commercial navigation since December 16th. One zone includes Marseilles the other Toulon. In view of recent bombardments of Italian ports it is possible that reinforcements for Tunisia are being sent from the above French ports.

Stephens

ACTION COPY: G-2EA
INFO. COPIES: OPD CGAHP

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 8(D) or (R)
OSD letter, May 8, 1972
By DBS Date: APR 17 1973

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date: 4/1/1994

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
FROM: Madrid  
TO: Milid  
No. 364 December 21, 1942  

For General Strong: Demarkation line Germ Italian occupying forces everything west line: Lyon Valence Avignon Aix dash on dash provence Toulon Hyeres inclusive to Germs supplementing my estimate Dec seventeenth cable No three five seven Italian Troops identified as follows:  
Armored Div Centauro at Menton, second Cav Div at Cannes, Mtn Div Lupidteesana at Torets, Inf Divs; Tora near Hyeres, Piave at Barmes and Legnano at Nice. Source of above info French Officer comdg that sector at time of occupation who since escaped into Spain. Info as of Dec seventh. Repeated London. According to letter from Lavagne Chief Petains Cabinet Germs have seized all French Diplomatic codes insist on control of Diplomatic pouches. Recommend caution. Signed Ehenthal.

Stephens  

Footnote: No. 357 is CM-IN-8255 (12-19-42) G-2  
Action Copy: G-2  
Info. Copies: OPD  
               General Deane (CC/S)  
               LOG  

CM-IN-9564 (12-22-42) 1347 Z mns
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

December 18, 1942

SD4 Confidential
RECD FROM BERN DEC 17 11A
FROM STATE FOR OPHAV

NO. 5936
17th Marseilles Havas OFI despatch states sea fishing prohibited until further notice between Cape Couronna and Port La Ciotat likewise all embarkation circulation water sold port and in Domain of Marseilles Port equally forbidden inform Navy.

HARRISON
TOD 812P

NCR 2999

NAVY DISTRIBUTION:
16.....ACTION
10/11...F37...38...39...28...COMINCR...13.....
FILE
F-3...ACTION
16...16-F....16-C....F-8....F-4...B-5...16-J.....W

ACTION COPY: G-2 e/A
INFO COPIES: OPD, CG AAF

CM-IN-7852 (12-18-42) 1702Z eob

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/44

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Madrid
To: Madrid
No. 357, December 17th, 1942

For General Strong and reliable direct contact with France. Dec. seventh, At that time Germs had one Mountain and two Infantry Divisions between Pan and Perigone and one Infantry Division at Toulouse. Other German troop dispositions not known. Ger German Headquarters at Toulouse and Avignon also mixed Italian German Headquarters at Avignon. Following locations Italian Headquarters Fourth Army at Contes Fifteenth Corps at Grasse Thirty Second Corps at Brignoles First Corps at Orange. Italian troop dispositions one Tank Div at Mentone, one Horse Cav Div at Cannes one Mountain and two Infantry Divisions between Marseilles and Toulon one Infantry Div at Nice. Confirming previous information German occupation forces consisted twelve div including three Panzer. One of latter with markings Y three believed to be Tenth Panzer Div was transferred to Italy via Riviera on Nov twenty fourth. How French Army now being organized will be under direct German control if not control. French population quiet. In my opinion German dispositions in Southern France on Dec seventh were purely defensive. However any appearance of Panzer or Motorized Troops south of the Gironde River should be viewed as a possible preparation for operations on Spanish Peninsula. Unable to accurately judge situation in France today due to break in contact. Germans exercise strict control French Spanish Border. Situation Spain except for reported movement five hundred Spanish Troops Algiers to Ceuta Dec third no important changes noted. Ger propaganda assisted

CM-IN-8255 (12/19/42)
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Page 2

From: Madrid To: Milid
No. 357, December 17th, 1942

by Falange with some red counter propaganda has
caused considerable tension. No reason to be-
lieve that Spanish policy of non participation
in war has changed. However rapid changes in
Spanish attitude should not surprise in case im-
portant Allied reverses. Believe removal of
Jordana or large increase of Spanish Morocco
forces would be danger signals. Munoz Grande
Comdr Blue Div reported arriving in Madrid. He
and Vague are potential trouble makers. Ger
newspapers to Dec sixth emphasise Germany's
strong position for defense and counter attack.
Italian situation reported unchanged. My opinion,
that we will gain politically on Peninsula by
successful action in Tunisia. Repeated London
and Lisbon. Signed Hohenthal.

Stephens

ACTION COPY: G-2

INFO. COPIES: OPD
GEN. DEANE (CC/S)
LOG

CM-IN-8255 (12/19/43) 12242 cen

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11612, Sec. 2(E) and 8(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 8, 1972
By DBS Date APR 17 1973

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date
PARAPHRASE

No. 5901

Dated: Dec 15, 1942, 4 p.m.

From: Bern

Rec'd: Dec 15, 1942, 4:52 p.m.

I and my British colleague have received a copy of a communication dated November 14th which is addressed to Pétain by von Ribbentrop. The communication was sent to us by Commandant Weygand who is at Grasse France at present. The document brought forward the reasons for the arrest of General Weygand and among these were numerous conversations between Robert Murphy and Weygand. In transmitting the document, the Commandant indicated that he was following the instructions of the General. These instructions were given him by his father prior to the latter's not entirely unexpected arrest. Commandant Weygand also indicated that the text of the document may be used by the Government of the United States in any way it saw fit but that he did not wish to be disclosed as the source of this information.

A translation of the communication referred to above is attached.

HARRISON

5 PFD:MCW:SS

CM-IN-7685 (12/18/42)
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE
Page 2 December 15, 1942

Secretary of State, Washington

5901, December 15, (Section 2)

"The Marshal obviously forgets that we have just had an experience with General Giraud which proves how little confidence we can have in the word of conspiring personalities such as General Giraud, General Weygand etc. even if given to Marshal Petain as head of the Government. Even if given under the guarantee of the Marshal the value of which we appreciate it would not in our estimation prevent persons such as General Weygand from deceiving the Marshal and by going over to our enemies place French policy in an extremely critical situation.

HARRISON

Secretary of State, Washington

5901, December 15, 4 p.m. (Section 3)

Consequently we are compelled to have positive guarantees that the case of General Giraud shall not be repeated. As concerns General Weygand we have already let it be known that we are exactly informed that the latter as Commander in Chief in North Africa allowed himself to be enticed into conversations with Embassy Counselor Murphy. This implies treason against his own government aimed unquestionably at assisting our adversaries. We know from an absolutely and completely authentic source that on July 17 General Weygand had a conversation alone with Mr. Murphy. Mr Murphy at that time transmitted to General Weygand a message from President Roosevelt the contents of which General Weygand said he examined with great satisfaction. He affirmed on that occasion that he

CM-IN-7685 (12/18/42)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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COPY No. 27
would not say a word about it to his government. Furthermore at the same meeting he expressed how much he realized the necessity of a total defeat of Germany; he also let it be understood that he was ready to do all in his power to contribute to that result.

In another conversation with Mr Murphy whom the General had had brought to him by an aide-de-camp enjoying his special confidence General Weygand informed Mr. Murphy that the French Government was acting under the control of Germany and that as a matter of fact the Marshall possessed none of the qualities required to govern France. Therefore, he felt himself justified in taking over at the opportune time the Marshall's place and assuming the responsibilities.

We are also compelled to recall in what shameful manner the government of Mr Winston Churchill treats persons whom it considers capable of harming its policies. The British did not even hesitate to deport Prince Paul of Yugoslavia President Stoyad Inovitch and the Shah of Persia and they treated and still treat them in the most outrageous fashion. Secretary Cordell Hull declared recently as is known that the Consulates in North Africa had been useful auxiliaries in furnishing information that is they were in fact used for espionage purposes. Although this state of affairs was perfectly well known to the competent authorities the latter did not make any attempt to prevent intrigues such as those of Mr Murphy and as a result they violated the spirit of the Armistice Convention.

Under those circumstances and also by reason of the experiences we have had and which we have again with the commanders in chief and with the governors of North Africa who only made believe that they were following the Marshal and the orders from Vichy and who effectively betrayed the Marshal there remains for us no other alternative than to lay hold of the person of General Weygand so that he cannot pursue any further intrigues against us.

CM-IN-7685 (12/18/42)
A state of honorable confinement is provided for General Weygand, Germany taking into consideration his rank in every respect and in view of all the explained and known facts this measure must be considered as extraordinarily humane (signed) von Ribbentrop.

(End of Message)

HARRISON

WSB

ACTION COPY: G-2
INFO. COPIES: OPD
CGA AF
SGS
GEN DEANE (CCS)

CM-IN-7685 (12/18/42) 0854Z mov
A report has been received from a source that is considered reliable that the frontier zone in France has been completely occupied by the Germans to a depth of 40 kilometers. They have disarmed the military authorities and civil authorities of France and have taken over administration in the region. There are said to be no Germans in regions beyond this zone.

Our informant said that motorized troops in large columns were observed passing on highway between Foix and Belan, night of November 28th, in the direction of Port Vendres. We do not know the final destination of these troops.

FROST

S FED:MCW:SS

Action Copy: G-2-CH

Info. Copies: OPD

CM-OUT-5497 (12-13-42) 1109 Z

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/44
From: Lisboa
To: MILID Wash DC
No 368 December 8, 1942

From very reliable source GERM INF and motorized in France concentrated at Nimes and air force round Aixen Province troops are also seen at Daxmont Demarsan and Carcassonne. Much light artille seen entrained between Granville and Stomer in direction span border personal baggage belonging air force shipped from Bevigny in vicinity St Dizier to Genoa. Recent occupation shows artilllry and air under normal ratio to other troops. Among numerous French escapes arriving in Spain are Nazi agents.

Solborg

ACTION COPY: G-2
INFO COPIES: OPD

CM-IN-3765 (12/9/42) 1443Z mer

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

DLA

PLAIN

Bern

Dated:

December 5, 1942

Rec'd 6:30 p.m.

SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

5680 5th
Marseilles reports occupying troops and civil
authorities taking active measures anticipation possible
Allied raids several sections strategic importance
turned over to German troops population evacuated nearby health
resorts are specialists inspecting cellars and abris
with immediate construction new public shelters foreseen
valuable museum pieces public records transferred places
of safety public encountering difficulty adjusting occupation
forces curfew regulations.

HARRISON

WVC

ACTION COPY: G-2

INFO COPIES: OPD, CG AAF

CM-IN-2394 (12-6-42) 1154E eob
A member of the staff of the Embassy obtained all of the items contained in this report directly from sources which he believes to be excellent. He also reports that everything is quiet at Confranc which he also visited. He received much more cordial treatment from the Spanish Military than when visiting in that area previously.

The occupation forces in Southwest France have been considerably reduced according to the British Vice Consul at San Sebastian. This has taken place during the last few weeks as a result of the eastward movement of the forces. A great deal of fortification work which was going forward has been discontinued.

Another source in San Sebastian confirms the above in regard to the reduction of German forces in southwestern France and adds that the troops which have remained behind are concentrated at central points.

No evidence of invasion preparations was noted by an excellent French source who returned from Paris through Toulouse, Toulouse, Rouen and Rouen. He stated that no invasion talk was heard during his trip south nor during his 2 days in Paris. He noted several heavy guns on a railroad siding at Toulouse. Very few German troops were seen moving in any direction.

That the Germans intend to invade Spain is not believed by the Commanding General at San Sebastian. He states that the Foreign Minister told him that any invaders will be resisted and that Spain intends to remain neutral. It is the belief of this officer that the French border is
quiet. He has received reports that there has been a change in the local commanders at St. Jean de Luz and Hendaye and that some troops have been sent to eastern France.

No reports of increased German activity in southwestern France have been received by the Commanding General at Bilbao according to direct information from the latter.

HAYES

Action Copy: G-2 EA

Info. Copies: OPD
CG AAF
LOG

CM-IN-2395 (12/6/42) 115.62 mew
No. 322, December 1, 1942.

Bobsenthal to General Strong summary of coordinated information to date: German troops occupying France have considerable motorized units and normal air support but no heavy artillery or tanks unverified report from reliable source claims total of 8 divisions. Some of these troops reported sent from Brittany and Normandy routed Portiers dash tours dash Bordeaux dash Toulouse. Replacements to these areas said to be routed via Paris area and to include units from Russia. German troop concentrations at Peu and Toulouse considered normal for occupation and not aimed at Spain 1500 German custom official reported assigned to new Spanish frontier but only small detachments of troops on border. Have no report from Lyon Marseille area one French submarine from Toulon interned Barcelona another put in Valencia in damaged condition but later left for Allied port. French people reported bitter and confused but no outbreak. Estimated less than 1,000 French refugees filtered across Spanish border this month. Reliable observer who was in Rome November 3rd to November 23rd reports large increase German troops there 70 percent in woolen uniforms mostly young men and large proportion of these from Luftwaffe. Other 30 percent first class troops in worn tropical uniforms mostly motorized and apparently recently returned from Africa. Personal baggage Luftwaffe personnel entering Italy reported routed to Genoa. French Naval Attaché here reports 6 German armored divisions have moved into Italy as unable to verify.

CH-IN-940
Several direct sources report Italian people have given up war as lost and in some areas are badly demoralized as result air attacks. Attitude of Germans in Italy is determined and many cases of friction with Italians reported.

Situation in Spain is calm and un-changed German propaganda here ties up Anglo-American efforts with Red Spain is partially successful.

Spanish military opinion that Germans would meet little organized but considerable guerilla resistance if they invade Spain. Also that 20 to 30 German divisions required to control Spain after invasion.

My estimate of situation: Germany will make maximum effort to hold bridgeheads in Africa. There are no indications that she is preparing to enter Spain at this time but that capability should not be discarded.

Spains attitude toward us has improved with our recent successes our North African operations. If Axis are forced out of Tunisia and Lybia Spain will cooperate more completely with Allied nations and Italy may crack. End Schentala message I concur in the above report. Moroccon army unchanged strength about 130,000. 1 class only 1941 called to date less than 50,000 increase great shortage of uniforms especially shoes. With present increase in strength of army estimated 550,000 more classes might be called later date Spanish troops in Gibraltara area no change no double track railroad Badillia to Sanroque and Huelva see cable Military Attache Lisbon November 28th repeat to London and Lisbon.

Dussenbury

Reference is CM-IN-12304 (11/29/42) G-2
Action Copy: G-2


CM-IN-940 (12/3/42) COPY NO. 46
Swiss circles report Haute Savoie occupied by both Italian and German troops with Italians in Southern Section and Germans occupying entire Swiss frontier region (Lake Geneva shore) thus controlling all land and air communications between Switzerland and France. Bavarian and Austrian mountain troops mostly boys 17 to 20 with sprinkling older experienced soldiers compose German occupation troops. Other than to have French police arrest numerous persons suspect of communist activities no apparent interference internal matters. Air raid precautions immediately intensified and strictly enforced with antiaircraft batteries and searchlights reportedly installed on Saleve and at other points near Geneva apparently to attack Royal Air Force raids on North Italy. Motor cars and stores benzine requisitioned as well as other transport material.

HARRISON

Action Copy: G-2 E.

Info. Copies: OPD
CG AAF.

CM-IN-7240 (11/17/42) 08222Z law
Secretary of State,  
Washington  
1735, November 14, noon.  

Barcelona's 99, November 13, 5 p.m., 1st sentence, 2nd paragraph.  

Frost obviously means 100 German troops and 6 tanks arrived at Cerbers. Repeated to Barcelona.  

Hayes  

99 is CM-IN-6533 (11/15/42) G-2

Action Copy: G-2 - EE

Info. Copies: OPD
CG AAF

CM-IN-6534 (11/15/42) 1319Z ce

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
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Secret of State, Washington

99, November 13, 8 p.m.

Reference Consulate General's telegram dated November 13, 1 p.m.

The following further information has been obtained from informant:

100 German troops and 6 tanks arrived at Port Bou at 5:30 p.m. November 13. 300 more men in trucks carried at midnight when they immediately took over Post Office, telegraph and telephone services. At the same time surveillance of Cerbere international railroad station undertaken.

5 or 6 German soldiers proceeded to Port Bou where they interviewed Spanish station master while others proceeded by road to frontier limits and spoke to Spanish Police authorities stationed there.

It is said that majority of 400 troops has been distributed at points on shore line between Cerbere and Port Vendres.

Travelers were entering and leaving France under surveillance of German troops, but without their direct intervention (other reliable source, however reports that Swiss courier prevented from entering Spain by German authorities on night of November 12).

Informant interviewed 3 Irish priests who arrived at Port Bou from Vichy on November 12 who reported that no one had ever asked to see their documentation between Vichy and Cerbres although they saw German troops at all stations en route.

CM-IN-6533
Informant also spoke to railroad resident in Narbonne who told him that Germans were received coldly and with dislike stating further that Spain would be fortunate if occupied by American troops instead of German.

In conversation with police at Port Bou informant learned that police were considerably agitated during 2 or 3 days for fear of personal injury from villagers who are described by police as all Reds. Police panic has subsided since arrival of Germans at Franco-Spanish frontier. Repeated to Embassy.

Front

Action Copy: G-2
Info. Copies: OPD
CG AAF

CM-IN-6533 (11/15/42) 1318Z ce
From Bern
To: Milid

No. 370, November 11th, 1942.

From several sources: German Troops crossed line of Demarcation at 4 AM Wednesday. Marching down Rhone Valley our estimate this 64th Reserve Army Corps. Occupation Corsica reported planned.

Legge

Action Copy: G-2 ~ E7
Info. Copies: OPD
CG AAF
Log

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11655, Sec. 5(B) and 5(D) or 6
OSD letter, May 6, 1972
By DBS Date APR 17 1973

CM-IN-4708 (11-11-42) 1529Z

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
SD 9
FROM STATE FOR OPNAV
FOLLOWING RCVD FROM VICHY 11-9-42 842 AM
DATED 11-9-42 NOON NO 1656
FROM NAVAL ATTACHE FOR OPNAV ASSISTANT NAVAL ATTACHE
IS RETURNING TO VICHY HE ADVISES NOTHING HAS BEEN JEOPARDIZED.
(SIGNED) TUCK

16...ACTION
10/11...COMINCH...20G...NAVAID...200P...20P...2G...2K...FILE
From: London
To: G-2

No 3603 October 17th, 1942

Eastern desk foreign office and war ministry state request one nine six three fighting French Forces Syria and Lebanon under command British Ninth Army all times, French retaining police and security functions in French occupying areas. Upon declaration state of siege by G O C Ninth Army, British assume full command including police and security functions.

French headquarters London state British not keeping agreement which provides unified command under officer of nation having greater number troops in Syria. French say they have many more troops but British still maintain control, and that French supreme command in Syria matter of national pride.

Hughes

Note: Number 1963 is CH-60T-2773 (10-9-42) G-2.

Action Copy: G-2.

Info. Copies: OPD.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 2(D) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 8, 1972

By DBS Date APR 17 1973

CH-11-07347 (10-17-42) 1957E ems

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/64
From: Vichy
To: Milid
No. 81, September 27, 1942

French Army Staff preparing plans for possible operations on continent in cooperation with Anglo American forces. Willing to cooperate in Africa but feel any action near future would produce disastrous results such as complete occupation France preventing organized action in Metropole. Planning send mission to England and possibly Washington for discussions with military authorities: realization depends on attitude of Laval.

Tuck

Action Copy: G-2 WE
Info. Copies: OPD
Log

CM-IN-12184 (9-28-42) 0617Z
URDIS 211924 Statement approved by CominCh 262944.
August was attached to Letter of Admiral Auboyneau of August 4 submitted as enclosure with my secret letter 0634 of August 12. Substance was indicated in URDIS 08922 August. French will release following text 1915 GCT September 23:

"The Naval Authorities of the USA and of Fighting France have reached agreement on plans for the cooperation of the Naval Aviation Service of Fighting France with the American Navy.

"In accordance with this agreement a detachment of the Fighting French Naval Aviation will complete its training in American Naval Aviation Schools and Bases in order later constitute a French unit which with planes to be furnished by the United States would operate in cooperation with United Nations Naval (see page 2)
AVIATION FORCES.

"THIS INTIMATE COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE AMERICAN AND FIGHTING FRENCH NAVAL AVIATION SERVICES IS A NEW MANIFESTATION OF THE UNCHANGING BOND OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND TRADITIONAL FRANCE AND OF THEIR RESOLVE TO UNITE CLOSELY THEIR EFFORTS IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST COMMON ENEMIES".

COMINCH PASSED TO OPNAV FOR OP-13

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/74
No change French order of battle see our report two mix three five three W. No infantry regiments motorized one battery per battalion artillery motorized. One company division train equipped with trucks capable transporting one infantry battalion. Estimated French Army has five thousand trucks hidden not known to Germans. This in reply your number seventy four one squadron per divisional cavalry regiment equipped with light armored cars no tanks on hand, one hundred being built as tractors. Eight artillery regiments of three battalions of three batteries equipped with seventy five MM guns, total for Army two hundred eighty eight guns no guns larger caliber. No antitank guns, no antiaircraft guns in division.

FOOTNOTE: 74 is CM-OUT-1550 (9-4-42) G-2.
ACTION: G-2 WE.
INFO. COPIES: OPD, CGAAT

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11682, Sec. 8(D) and 8(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 8, 1972
By DBS Date APR 17 1973
From Vichy
To Milid
No 76 Sept 7, 1942

Presumably under German pressure Laval recently relieved second bureau of its services decoutes or wire tapping functions which are now under civilian control otherwise second bureau unchanged. This reply to your number seventy five mail report follows.

Tuck

Action Copy: G-2
Info. Copies: OPD CG AAF

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
ORD letter, May 8, 1973

By DBS Date APR 17 1973

CM-1E-3354 (9-9-42) 0205Z

M.I. 8 JOURNAL No. 178 SEP 8-1942

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/8/44
Laval’s meeting with "high German officials" accompanied by the French officials named in our 1272 dated August 30, 1 p.m., at Nevers on August 27 was for the purpose of discussing the questions of defending French West Africa and merchant tonnage according to the individual referred to in 1259 of August 27, 2 p.m.

Our informant confirms the above point and tells us most confidentially that the Germans in return for permitting the French to strengthen Dakar with guns and munitions are insisting on the right to send to Dakar "a German military observer or a commission of some kind which will satisfy themselves concerning the measure the French are taking". He added that the Germans at this meeting offered to arrive at a Franco-German defense agreement to cover the defense of French North and West Africa. Although Laval greeted this proposal with favor, Admiral Auphan who was present held to the view that such a pact would expose France to the risk of inviting action against Africa by the Anglo-Saxons, and Auphan is said to have threatened his resignation in event such an agreement were made. As a result, reports this person, Laval has put an idea of such a joint defensive pact aside for the time being but our informant is convinced that Laval has consented to the sending to Dakar of some kind of German observer or control Commission.

The next question taken up at the meeting was that of merchant tonnage. On this point the Germans demanded that a total of 200,000 tons be turned over by the French. This quantity would be made up of such ships of countries at war with Germany as might be interned in French ports (Dutch, Danish, Yugoslav, et cetera). The rest of the total to consist of French shipping, tankers in particular. According to our source there are only some 70,000 tons of belligerent shipping interned in French ports so that the French would be required to turn over a hundred and thirty thousand tons of their own to meet the demand. On this question Admiral Auphan also took a strong stand against turning over French tonnage. Our contact believes that Laval will consent to the delivery of the 70,000 tons of shipping belonging to countries at war with Germany but he also believes that if the Germans...
do not press too hard, at least for the time being, French vessels will not be turned over to the Germans.

Reference our 1272 he confirms that Marshal Pétain refused to accept Boisson's resignation and requested him to continue at Dakar; Boisson having submitted his resignation to Pétain through a general.

Tuck

Footnote: No. 1272 is CM-IN-11884 (8-31-42) G-2
WDCMC unable to identify 1259.

Action Copy: G-2 WE
Info. Copies: OPD, CG AAF, Log

CM-IN-0174 (9-1-42) 11472

M.I.S. Journal No. 62 Sep 1 1942

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
From: Bern
To: Milid
No. 289 August 15, 1942

Message X 12, original source agents of France evaluation A report as of July 30 following identifications parachute regiments: 6 Fallschirm jager regiments part of the 7th air division Lieutenant General Peters (Northern France); 1st regiment Major General Brauer; 2nd Commander unknown regiment was at Stendal-Borstelen April; 3d Colonel Heydrich regiment was at Grossoorn Pomerania May 15th; 4th Major General Meindel location unknown; 5th Lieutenant Colonel Rock companies 11 13 14 Coutances, 1st Battalion Coutainville, 2d Battalion Coutances; 6th regiment which was Camp Bergen may 15th paragraph X 12 B pilots especially of fighters Stuttgart airdrome Alerted for take off to West.

No Sig

ACTION COPY: G-2
INFO COPIES: OPD, A-2, CG AAF
CM-IN- 5799 (8/16/42) 0915Z

DECLASSIFIED
30JUL1972
M.I.8. JOURNAL NO. 22 AUG 1942
COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Vichy
To: Milid

No. 67, August 11, 1942.

Supplementing our numbers sixtytwo and sixty three following Ersatz Divisions in Alsace Lorraine one four eight Metz one eight two Nancy one five eight Strasbourg one six five Epinal. Reliable source reports elements these units have been sent to Coastal Regions.

Thompson

62 (CM-IN-2228 8/7/42) G-2
63 (CM-IN-2229 8/7/42) G-2
From: Berne
To: Milid

No. 265, July 24, 1942

X 12 about 10000 trucks delivered by French from North African stock to Axis Libya. Bapaume Saint Quentin new German armored units no details. Along entire shore Dunkirk to Boulogne concrete blockhouses being constructed about 10 kilometers inland.

Legge
INCOMING MESSAGE

July 17, 1942

PARAPHRASE

Telegram no. 1043

From: Vichy

Dated: July 17, 6 pm

Rec'd: July 17, 6:14 pm

Following for MIS

In official circles the impression prevails that a personnel shortage is being experienced by German air units located in France.

An official source tells us that the 110th Division has been identified in France and that according to the latest estimates there are in France and Belgium 33 divisions.

Following from an excellent source: Preparations to leave are being made by paratroops in the vicinity of Caen. On a general line of Chalons Sur Marne - St. Dizier - Chaumont - Langres - Vesoux there are fortifications. In the vicinity of Letouquet, Calais and Stomer a considerable number of concrete pillboxes and machine gun nests have been prepared; having special emphasis on defense against paratroops and aircraft defense has been organized to a 30 kilometer depth.

TUCK

ACTION COPY: G-2

INFO. COPY: OPD A-2 CG AAF TAG LOG FILE

CM-IN-6178 (7/18/42) 1025Z

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/44
From: Madrid
To: Milid
No. 235 July 14, 1942

Important French contact previously quoted advises some decline quality German occupation troops saying coast defenses very strong but no organized in depth also transportation system in chaotic state with only 95 thousand freight cars in France against pre-war 475 thousand. Believe now psychological moment open second front predict wholesale sabotage will follow successful landing. Urge more heavy important rail communication centers.

Dusenbury

ACTION COPY: G-2 - W.E.
INFO. COPY: OPD A-2 CG AAF TAG LOG FILE

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 8, 1972
By DBS Date APR 17 1973
CM-IN-4909 (7/14/42) 2210Z

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94

229 JUL 14 42
29

COPY No.
From: London
To: Willid
No. 2962, July 9, 1942.

British have information believed good that Commander German Troops in France recently informed all troops that France must be completely self-reliant for supply and equipment. Also must rely on present forces in view of early attempt to establish Second Front in France.

Present German forces in France twenty-two Infantry and three Armored Divisions in addition strong Coastal Defence Personnel. Of the Infantry Divisions majority are low category having two Infantry Regiments. Two of them, fifteenth and one hundred sixth are rated high category but have just arrived from Russia where suffered badly. They replaced two Infantry Divisions sent Russia. The three Armored Divisions are rated high and originally were Russia but brought France some time for rest and refitting. There is also a tank training center in France with considerable armament and personnel. Also in France Cherbourg Area small number German parachute troops.

McClure

DECLASSED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 8(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 8, 1973
By DBS Date: APR 17, 1973

ACTION: G-2
INFO. COPY: OPD, A-2, CGAAF, TAG, LOG, FILE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date: 4/13/15
**M.I.S. MESSAGE**

*Original Source*: Vichy 6-25

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0925 6/23 0430 6/23

**SECRET - PARAPHRASE**

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**THERE ARE NO NEW INDICATIONS TO REPORT.**

**American Charge of d'affaires at Interim**

**Distribution:**
- Journal
- Col. Bruton
- Col. Bette
- Situation Summary
- Young Room
- Mrs.
- V
- A

**EVAL. SECT. COMMENT:**

**Disseminated from Evaluation Section:**
- LT. BAIRD

**OFFICER IN CHARGE**
- CAPT. DUNGEY

**Briefed or Paraphrased**

**JOUR SUMM W.R. A-2**

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**JOURNAL NO.** 66 OF 6/25, 1942

**DECLASSIFIED**

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/42
INCOMING MESSAGE

Telegram no. 889
From: Vichy

Dated: June 18, 1942
6 p.m.
Rec'd: June 18, 1942
4:00 p.m.

FOR MIS.

According to an excellent source, the French have received authorization from the Germans to construct 100 tanks in the unoccupied zones. It is estimated that 18 months will be required for this construction. Preparations are being made for the shipment of small arms and munitions to Dakar, according to same source.

The "Division Tricolore" is to be organized for the defense of French territory, with German approval. This division is to be sent to the eastern front, believes this same reliable contact.

TUCK
American Charge d'Affaires

S: WLS: DFB: SS.

ACTION: G-2 WE

INFO COPIES: OPD, 'A-2, CG AAF, TAG, FILE, LOG

CM-IN-5852 (6/18/42) 11:29 PM
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Fort Lamy
To: MILID

No. 22 June 14, 1942

French Senegalese BN passed through Ft Lamy yesterday destination Garua Cameroons.

Miller
From: Madrid
To: MILID

No. 201, June 11, 1943

Good French contact from Paris say total occupation troops France probably well under 400,000 mostly coastal areas. Important concentrations Bordeaux but practically nothing southward. Heard average age German fighting force now 34.

Durnebury
From: Madrid  
To: MILID  

No. 198 June 8, 1942  

Additional defense construction work reported Southwest France but indications further reduction in actual occupation troops.  

Dusenbury  

Action Copy: G-2 WE  

Info. Copies: OPD  
A-2  
CG AAF  
TAG  
Log  
File  

DECLASSIFIED  
E. O. 11652, Sec. 8(2) and 8(2) or (3)  
ORD letter, May 8, 1972  
By DBS Date APR 17, 1973  

CM-IN-2462 (6/8/42) PM 8:02  

JUN 8 1942  

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