Conditions inside Germany, as reported to Belgian official by Swedish Minister to London, Mr. FRITZ, recently returned from visit to Stockholm. Mr. FRITZ in close touch with German industrial leaders, as he is head of S.M.P. Company. German industrialists he encountered in Stockholm hopeless of German victory, but anxious to stress resistance power of Reich. Obvious "feeler" for English consumption on line that industrialists and members of forces would gladly overthrow Nazi regime, if given certain unspecified assurances by allies. Alternative pictured as ultimate choice in Europe. "Modest" accommodation regarding Russian menace. Conviction of Russian diplomatic victories at recent conferences. Negligible communist activity within Germany.

1. A Belgian official has reported in extreme confidence a conversation which he held with Mr. FRITZ, the Swedish Minister to London, who has recently returned from Stockholm. During this conversation the Swedish Minister seems to have expressed himself freely and at length on the European situation and on the present state of affairs within Germany.

2. It must be understood that Mr. FRITZ is not a career diplomat, but a Swedish industrialist with international interests, being the head of the S.M.P. Co., makers of ball bearings, etc., owning factories in "medic, Germany and America. He was especially requested by his government to accept his first and present diplomatic post in 1933. Therefore his point of view cannot be judged apart from his business associations, although the Belgian official spoke of him as a broad minded and liberal man, without any apparent personal bias.
3. During his recent visit to 'toothole', Mr. FRTZ seems to have been in constant touch with Germans who were travelling between Poland and Germany. According to the Belgian official, Mr. FRTZ stated that throughout his stay, Prince von STERNHEIM made repeated efforts to get into personal touch with him, but Mr. FRTZ avoided a meeting, fearing the repercussions it might cause in Holland.

4. As quoted by the Belgian official, Mr. FRTZ claimed that not one of these business men had any hopes whatever of a German victory, although a total German defeat does not seem to have been accepted as inevitable. It was claimed that the morale of the German army was "tireless" and that the civilian population, although tired of war, was none the less well fed and clothed and was standing up to the bombing of their cities. In this connection Mr. FRTZ is said to have remarked that despite the intensity of the Allied air attacks, the total output of German industry as a whole had not yet been seriously affected. To support this opinion, Mr. FRTZ appears to have said that he was speaking from the experience of factories belonging to the I.M.F. Company which had been objectives of Allied bombs.

5. There can be little doubt that these comparatively sanguine opinions, regardless of whether or not they were shared by the Swedish Minister, were given him in reaction to the return of the Polish delegation. A contradictory note was struck in Berlin. The general destruction of Europe's productive powers must lie at the heart of any scheme that was contemplated. It was made clear by the Belgian official, himself an industrialist, that there was no doubt his business associates, the Mr. FRTZ was speaking to him, was not the Swedish "merchant, but as one business man to another. FRTZ seems to have been urged by his German business colleagues to seek in England some sort of a resume for their future under unconditional surrender." It would appear to be tacitly understood that, were certain assurances forthcoming, these German industrialists had it in their power to set up with the British in overrunning the present government. This impression prevailed, despite the fact that during their conversation, Mr. FRTZ said to the Belgian that no German industrialist had any say whatever in the conduct of his affairs. Nevertheless these Germans were evidently saying, "How can we go to our masters if we are totality in the German government?" as regards the future? Give us anything concrete to work with and we can take matters into our own hands. Their alternative would seem to be an indefinite prolongation of the war by an intact Germany to the ultimate ruin of Europe as a whole.

6. In regard to the "Russian menace", Mr. FRTZ was quoted as saying that he had found the situation in Russia, although he himself believed there fears to be groundless. In Mr. FRTZ's view the Russian Government had lost none of its old brand of international communism and he did not seem to believe that his country had anything to fear on that score. FRTZ said, however, that he was convinced that if Moscow and Teheran conferences had been correct diplomatic victories for the Swedes, at which the land and America had concurred, every important point. As to a communist movement within Germany itself, Mr. FRTZ had learned from his German associates that small cells existed in every city. These were composed of German and American Russian and others, but, the Belgian further quoted FRTZ as remarking, "Rutche and the workers could be only a part in such organizations. These cells would a year to be operating on the old communist party line and, because of extremist control, have only a local and limited scope and to be without affiliations in Russia."
7. To sum up, the Swedish Minister's remarks only bear out what has already been reported through various channels, namely that there are elements in Germany, among industrialists and in the Army, who are eager for peace under certain conditions. They appear confident of their ability to rid themselves of the present government and are only restrained from doing so through fear of what might happen to their country and themselves, should internal disorganization throw Germany wide open to the Allied Armies. Their hope seems to lie in persuading the Allies that Germany is able to hold out indefinitely, but that they are able and willing to end the war on any "reasonable" terms.

2. The foregoing is submitted as such or as indication of the sort the Swedish Minister might be inclined to play as a go-between in "peace feelers" as for any other interest it may possess.
24 December 1943

The White House Map Room
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Colonel Chester Hammond

Gentlemen:

I am transmitting herewith the following reports prepared in the Research and Analysis Branch of this office:

R & A No. 1688, "German Morale at the End of 1943", Secret (1 copy)

Sincerely yours,

William L. Langer
Director, Branch of Research & Analysis

Enclosure

300 Germany
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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Research and Analysis Branch

GUAM LOCALS AT THE END OF 1943

R & A No. 1658

Description

This report continues the general analysis of morale in R & A No. 1014 of September 10, 1943.

14 December 1943

Copy No.

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date
Summary

1. The fighting efficiency and the productive power of the German people at home and at the front show no decline.

2. Their morale continues to be bad, though it has improved somewhat under the influence of the stabilization of the fronts in Italy and Austria.

3. Their morale does, moreover, not affect their production and fighting strength because the Nazi controls have not been impaired or broken.

4. These controls have shown considerable flexibility, especially in coping with air warfare. The Nazi Party has materially contributed to the social recuperation in bombed cities.

5. Though the army leadership is still potentially the only part of the ruling group capable of overthrowing the Nazi controls, it is unlikely to be able and willing to do so now, especially under the influence of the Moscow and Tehran conferences; otherwise, no political leadership can be expected from the industrial and middle-class leadership.

6. The terror machinery of Himmler extends to the remaining key positions in the judiciary and administration.

7. There is no large political opposition stemming from labor though potentially it still is the only group which could overthrow the regime. Our lack of a positive Rl policy makes this difficult task still more difficult.
The report Morale in Germany (R & A No. 1214) issued on September 16, 1945 assumed that "morale" in a totalitarian society acquired political significance only to the extent that the pattern of totalitarian control can be impaired or broken. It was found that this pattern of control in Germany had not been impaired or broken.

The following remarks aim at analyzing German morale early in December 1945 in the light of the methods developed in R & A No. 1214.

The following events since September 1945 may have affected German morale:

1. The retreat of the German armies in Russia and the temporary stabilization of the front;
3. The abduction of Mussolini and the stabilization of the Italian front.
4. The Moscow, Cairo and Teheran conferences.
5. The tightening of economic controls by Speer.

1. Morale Intelligence

Morale intelligence is far from illuminating. Neutral sources generally paint an extremely dark picture: grumbling everywhere, demoralization and disorganization as a consequence of air raids, shortages -- of food, money, cigarettes; desertions, political opposition -- especially in Austria. Many of these gloomy reports came from German correspondents of Swiss and Swedish papers and, if read without relation to the social and political
structure of Germany, would lead the observer to believe that Germany’s collapse is imminent.

Reports dealing with political conflicts in Germany belong mostly to the realm of rumors and are, consequently, contradictory and vague. Most of these would have us believe that a “Front” is being organized by the German generals. This junta even has a name, the "Heeroggen movement," but there is no agreement as to its leaders — Himmler, von Bork, Kluge, Falkenhausen, Bormann, Keitel, Bruchhitzsch appear in different roles, sometimes as the leaders of the junta, sometimes as full-blooded Nazis, sometimes as political nonentities.

Other reports purport to show antagonism within the Nazi leadership; Göring figures in almost all of them as being “aloof” from the Party. Ribbentrop is said to have lost power; Bormann and the obvious Hitler appear as the real leaders.

The few available prisoners of war interrogations reveal a very contradictory picture; but the general impression is that morale on the home front is almost certainly lower than that on the fighting fronts, and that the home front is generally war-weary and has lost faith in victory.

Intercepts of correspondence between German civilians and German soldiers reveal a complete lack of interest in political and military developments and an exclusive concentration on personal matters such as the fate of relatives in the war and the little joys and worries of daily life.

If we were to rely on published reports and confidential intelligence, we would indeed be compelled to believe that German morale has almost reached the bottom. If, however, we follow the performance of the German
people in the fields, factories, offices, and on the fighting fronts we can find hardly any deterioration.

This does not mean that the reports on morale are untrue or that our view of the performance in work and battle is incorrect. Most important, it does not mean that the German plant the morale reports that come to us from neutral countries. The two sets of statements are not contradictory, because they deal with two phenomena which, in a totalitarian society, are not necessarily related to each other.

Performance -- as P L A report No. 1826 tried to show -- is basically immune to bad morale as long as the control pattern functions.

2. Air Raids

First among the factors to be reckoned with are air raids. Air raids undoubtedly destroy Nazi controls for a certain time. Theoretically speaking, therefore, air raids could give the war for opposition and the emergence of other forms of social control. But such a theory takes an utterly mechanistic approach to the problem. The controls to which the ordinary citizen is subject are not primarily political but technical, that is, they assure the operation of society. People must live; they must, therefore, be fed, housed, have radical services, transportation, water, gas, electricity. This, in turn, requires administration. Rationing and price control must go on. Administration must go on generally, no matter whether people are Nazis, anti-Nazis, or non-Nazis. The necessities of life compel people to work not only to earn money in order to buy goods, but also to repair damage. Furthermore, in a society based on division of labor, work
can be carried on only in an integrated way.

There is today in Germany but one institution that makes things to -- that is the Nazi Party and its affiliated organizations, especially the NSV, the Nazi Welfare Organization. The more thorough the destruction by air raids, the more dependent the civilian becomes upon control by the Party.

The German control system has shown considerable adaptability to the huge problems created by air warfare. The transfer of individual plants by the Speer Ministry,1 the establishment of Lohnstrafwehr for retailers, the compelling of banks and savings institutions to honor deposits maintained with any credit institution, evacuation and temporary housing, rapid repair services which even enabled the Germans to put parts of the Hamburg harbor back into operation -- to the armament of the Swedish sailors -- all these demonstrate the efficiency of the Nazi organizations and their increasing significance not as organs of oppression but also instruments for maintaining life. There is even a considerable amount of truth in Speer's alleged statement to his co-workers after the destruction of his Ministry during an air raid: "The more files destroyed, the less red tape." Simpler conditions of life and utter disregard for acquired rights (whether plants, shops, factories, houses, or apartments) make administration, indeed, an infinitely simple task.

Few persons possess the political intelligence to think under such circumstances, to reflect that the very institution that now makes life possible on a primitive level is responsible for the primitive character of their existence.

1. Translator is actually ordered by the airmen while the last bolt of the order originates (i.e. the armanent office of the army, the Reichsblatt, etc.) see Völkericher Nachrichten (Nord) Oct. 19, 1943.
The above statements are, of course, concerned only with the so-called "morale" aspects of air warfare and not with its impact upon economic or military capabilities. The re-arcs do not, therefore, apply to target bombing which is a military operation. The morale effects of target bombing are thus much deeper than are those of area bombing. This explains why the Germans, even though candidly admitting and even exaggerating damage to housing, hospitals, museums, etc., never admit destruction of industrial targets.

It need hardly be mentioned that area bombing, of course, achieve its aim of destroying Nazi controls, if its intensity is greatly increased and if no let-up is given the Nazis. But its intermittent character facilitates the recuperation of controls. 1/

3. Military Developments

The general and often-heard statement that morale rises with victories and declines with defeat is by no means always true. Many nations have experienced boosts in morale only when not actually suffering or being threatened with defeat. In the specific German circumstances, however, military defeats cannot but lower morale. There are a number of reasons for the German's position in this respect. First in importance is the Nazi military theory as it was disseminated among the people. The early Blitzkreig accustomed the population to speedy success. The easing coordination of United Nations military activities, the defeat of the U-boats, the inferiority of the Luftwaffe, and finally the Moscow and Tehran agreements

1. This problem of the relative effects of target and area bombing will be amplified in a later report.
have deepened the feeling of military helplessness, in which each military reversal tends to have a much stronger effect than the preceding.

As a further consequence, the character of morale is extremely sensitive to a favorable change in military fortunes, and what was true yesterday need no longer be true today. Seen in this light, the lack of United Nations progress in Italy and the temporary stabilization of the Eastern front have definitely improved morale -- to a much greater degree than those Nazi military successes deserve. Even the loss of Italy will not lower morale greatly, since Italy is considered merely a Verdun. The situation is different with regard to the Eastern front: a further break in the front, compelling withdrawal to, let us say, the Romanian frontier, would almost certainly become the most important single factor in morale while an Allied invasion elsewhere, especially in Western Europe, if it meets with initial success, would seriously undermine morale -- if not disrupt the Nazi controls.

4. Economic Conditions and Morale

a) It is clear that, in spite of the monotony of the diet, food is still adequate and, in some cases, better than during the last period 1918. But there is serious doubt that inadequate food materially contributed to the collapse of Germany in 1918. It probably was not lack of food, but its unequal distribution, especially in the Army and Navy, which brought about the defeat of Germany. There is no doubt, however, that the Nazi

1. See "Patterns of Collapse" in M. Welby
2. OSS R & A No. 189, Oct. 1943.
have learned the lesson of 1919 and are rigidly enforcing their egalitarian restraint, giving special preference to soldiers and heavy workers. This cause for bad morale is, therefore, absent. There are, of course, rumors about preferential treatment, which no doubt are often based on fact. But those cases must not be exaggerated and are almost sure to be taken care of by Himmler wherever they create too much talk.

b) Another general problem is presented by inflation and black market. Economically, inflationary potentialities exist. But the economic controls, together with the egalitarian treatment of all the people, have inflationary tendencies wholly in hand. There is, also, no black market powerful enough to disrupt the controls which have shown remarkable flexibility. Let us take the example of barter trade. It was held -- under the impact of the 1923 inflation -- that barter is inflationary because it manifests the Flucht aus der Mark -- the flight from the Reichsmark, as it was then called -- and thus increases the velocity of circulation of the currency. It is for this reason that Funk originally attacked barter trade. But local Nazi organizations continued to organize barter centers under popular pressure and the government finally gave in. It organized centers, appointed experts for the determination of the exchange value of the bartered goods, and thus incorporated barter into its economic and political system. A movement that at first seemed to threaten disorganization, has actually become another element of the regime's strength.

1. A special report on inflation is under way.
5. **Political Friction**

The Nazi system has never rested upon spontaneous political support. It drew its psychological strength from the utter collapse of the Weimar party system and utilized this collapse by devising a system of mass domination which would preclude the articulation of an opposition.

a) The characteristic of the Nazi "constitution" is its very shapelessness,1* namely the absence of institutions like the Grand Council of Fascism where Mussolini was actually deposed, and like the Monarchy which made it possible to engineer the deposition. No one can put his finger on any specific German institution, except that of the Führer, and say that all political power is concentrated there. It resides everywhere and is carefully divided between and within the Party, the army, industry, and high civil servants; it can be and is constantly being shifted in an utterly informal way without any institutionalized machinery being put in operation. Since there is no such supreme institution except the Führer, control by an opposing faction can come about only by the elimination of the Führer.

b) This is especially true of the armed forces, weakened psychologically by the unconditional surrender formula and the Moscow and Teheran conferences which allow neither the Eastern nor the Western orientation in the high command to assume political leadership. There has been a heavy trend of reliable Nazis into key military positions -- a particularly good example being the appointment of General Guentor Rotten as chief of staff of the GAF. To this must be added the steady influx of Nazi indoctrinated officers taken from the Hitler Youth where they have received thorough pre-military training.

Still, potentially, it is the army leadership where opposition may ultimately crystallize if the fortunes of war decline still further.

a) Industry is now under the leadership of its technicians and engineers who, for this reason, are of course no less capitalistic than the financiers and administrators. For them, the situation would appear quite hopeless. But it is even more hopeless to expect opposition to be organized by them. The Speer organization, the Armament Ministry itself, the Hauptaussehisse and Industrieringe, Labor Supply Engineers, Transport, Power, and Building Deputies, etc., have drawn industry tighter into the system of Nazi economic controls than any previous control system. Moreover, industry is permeated with Nazi business men of the type of Krüger, Voss, Kohrl, Schiebel, Heyler, Zangen, and is divided between non-political and Nazi business men. In addition, German industry, after the death of its two main representatives, Hugo Stinnes and Alfred-Adolf Huthmann, never played a decisive political role in the open. The influence of men like Krupp, Bosch, Duesberg, Schütt, Flick, Kröpfler was clandestine. Lack of courage and of political intelligence made open political activity impossible. Industry will follow where more powerful forces lead--it will almost certainly follow the army leadership to which it is tied by common tradition, family ties, and finance.

d) Slowly and steadily, key positions in the judicial and administrative leadership are being filled by reliable Nazis. This policy of Hitler may not be spectacular, but it is none the less effective and important. These replacements may even be popular because Hitler was careful to select from among the Nazi candidates those who had served in this...
war and have been wounded. 1/ In this way, care is taken to prevent the articulation of opposition among the traditional conservative groups. It must be expected that this policy will be continued.

3) The middle class can safely be eliminated from consideration as a political factor. It has never, since 1812, demonstrated either political wisdom or courage. Its ranks are, besides, split into three groups who benefit from the regime, either as farmers, businessmen, and party officials, and civil servants, and those who have descended into the proletariat, where they either merge with the working class (undoubtedly few), or keep aloof from it hoping a pin for independence which none outside power alone can give them.

4) It is the working classes which is and will continue to be crucial. Our information is certainly scanty. But the absence of adequate intelligence indicates the utter lack of large-scale opposition, which could not be concealed for any length of time. The German worker is a realist! He will oppose if and when the controls are seriously impaired but he is unlikely to contribute anything to the destruction of the controls. The contribution of organised and even revolutionary labor to the collapse in 1918 was small as compared with the abandonment of power by the Monarchy and Ludendorff. Later appeared as a political power in 1918 after the German Army had abandoned resistance but it had done little to undermine that resistance.

1. 1.e. President of the Court of Appeal Munich - Dr. Ernest Issert
   President of the Court of Appeal Cologne - Dr. Erich Lawall
   President of the Court of Appeal Linz - Dr. Pollan
   See also DES # 28527, Dec. 11, 1943 on policy of Himmler in regard to municipal administration.
It is not likely to be different this time, although the picture has changed in two ways. The lack of organisation makess political activity almost impossible. But the mere fact that the Nazi system is responsible for war and misery and that labor by tradition and status is the only group likely to act -- though at a late period -- has probably overcome the political isolation of labor and thus promises for the future a much larger influence.

It is here, however, that lack of a positive labor policy by the allied powers proves to be the greatest single obstacle to the utilization of the oppositional potentialities of labor -- it is unnecessary to repeat statements previously made.

6. Morale of the Troops

The salient fact about morale among the troops is that the German army is offering terrific resistance in the West and in Italy. Has slowed down the combined might of Britain and the United States to about one mile a day. Small detachments are reported to be holding strong points as the main body of the army withdraws. Second class, defensive divisions fight shoulder to shoulder with crack units and acquit themselves admirably. So conclude that the morale of the front line troops is good.

The question remains -- how long will they hold firm? It is assumed that morale will slowly deteriorate as the result of defeats on all fronts, intensified bombing of German cities, and Allied propaganda. It is impossible, however, to trace its decline with any degree of accuracy because of three factors. 1) In addition to the general downward trend,
there are fluctuations which appear to be related to the immediate tactical situation. This point is illustrated in reports which show lower morale on the part of troops taken in Sicily where the Germans were beaten in a running fight than among those taken during the first two weeks in Italy where the front was well defended. 2) The German army contains a large number of reliable agents. It is estimated that there are almost one million "racial Germans" and foreigners in its ranks, many of whom have no interest in the war. To these must be added the political opponents of the Fiihrer and "poor soldiers" who appear in any army. As a result, any agent within enemy lines can find enough of these reliable agents to justify reporting a good deal of data on dispositions, acts of sabotage, and treasonable talk. Hence this type of information must be treated with great caution in estimating changes in the situation. 3) Reports based on P/ interrogations are, perhaps, the most reliable source of information which is available to us. Even these, however, are suspect because a man experiences a drop in morale as the result of being taken prisoner.

The materials which have come to our attention justify the following generalizations:

1) Morale among troops in occupied territories tends to be lower than that of front-line troops.

2) Conditions in Russia place a heavy strain on the German soldier. It is possible that the first real break in morale (mass insubordination) will occur in this area as the result of severe tactical setbacks.
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS BRANCH

R&A No. 1568

THE GERMAN POLITICAL EMIGRATION

3 December 1943

If and when this study outlives its usefulness to you kindly return it to:

Office of Strategic Services
Director, Research and Analysis Branch
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Washington, D.C.

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# The German Political Emigration

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SUMMARY

1. The vast majority of German emigres throughout the world is not political but cultural and racial. The political emigration constitutes scarcely more than one or two percent of the 400,000 German emigres now concentrated principally in Russia, Sweden, Great Britain, Canada, the United States, and South America. These organized German political refugee groups reflect the political environment of the countries in which they are living. The German trade unionists in Sweden are influenced by Swedish neutrality and their proximity to Nazi Germany. German Communists in Russia, whatever their private beliefs, are amenable to the pressure of Russian psychological warfare against Germany. German Socialists in the United States, responsive to American distrust of radical Socialism of any variety, use a democratic rather than Socialist phraseology. Notwithstanding the geographical dispersion and difficulties of wartime communication, German political refugee groups in the various countries are in fairly close touch with one another.

2. The German political emigration has suffered the worst fate of all political refugees, that is to say, it has lost its vital contacts with and influence upon the underground opposition movements inside Germany.

3. Unlike the political refugees from the occupied countries such as Holland and Norway who have achieved a large measure of unity in their struggle for national liberation, unity among German political emigres is quite impossible, and to most groups undesirable. Unity among all anti-Nazi Germans is advocated only by the emigres of the German Communist Party and by conservative Democrats under the influence of the present policy of this party.

4. By accident or design the United States has become the principal place of refuge for emigres of the German political Right. Except for small groups, however, such as the Bavarian separatists, it is neither organized, nor active, nor vocal.

5. The organized German political emigration is for practical purposes equivalent to the parties of the old German Left, the Socialists and Communists. The violent quarrels among the emigres German Socialist groups are scarcely intelligible today except in the light of their competition with one another as underground organizations during the period from 1933 until 1940 when these organizations collapsed. During this period the Socialist Labor Party (SAP), the International Militant Socialists (ISK), and the New Beginnern group attacked the old Social Democratic Party (Sopade) and challenged the ability and authority of its leadership. These quarrels are now largely forgotten among the Socialist groups in London and Stockholm; they survive only in New York.
6. Intellectual leadership among all the principal German Socialist groups still resides in London where most of the organizations have their headquarters. Since 1941 the Union of German Socialist Organizations in Great Britain includes the Social Democratic Party, the SAP, the ISK, and Neu Beginnen. These groups have successfully collaborated in a number of projects for post-war Germany, the most important being their plan for a United Socialist party.

7. The German Fight for Freedom group, not a member of the London Union, has in the past year become one of the most influential groups of German political refugees in Great Britain. This group is an organization of German Socialist Vemitttartists who believe that only the application of force can reconstruck Germany. They do not believe in the possibility of any cooperation or assistance from groups in Germany. They deny the possibility of a German revolution and the existence of any national socialist inside Germany. They insist on a long period of military occupation and contend that the re-education of the German people is not a task for Germans themselves but for the United Nations. Although Socialists, the Fight for Freedom people are anti-revolutionary and anti-Communist. They are being supported by leading officials of the British Labor Party. In its June 1943 conference the British Labor Party has placed its stamp of approval on the program of the Fight for Freedom group. The British Trade Union Congress, however, has not followed its example.

8. In Sweden all German Socialist groups, including the Communists, cooperate in Fritz Tarnov's Arbeiterkreis. Tarnov, a conservative Social Democrat with authoritarian leanings, has latterly capitulated to the more radical program of the SAP under the leadership of August Enders. In Sweden, however, it is the German trade unionists, not the political parties, that play a dominant role in the German political emigration.

9. Only in the United States does the bitter strife between the German Labor Delegation, an organization of prominent former Social Democratic offfceholders, and the Neu Beginnen group continue. This quarrel is less a quarrel over the controversial personality of Paul Hagen than a re- enactment on American soil of the old quarrel between the Social Democratic Party and its dissident Socialist groups dating from the early days of the German underground movement. The German Labor Delegation exercises a considerable influence over the German Socialist emigration in the United States through its control over the editorial policies of the Neu Volkszeitung, while Paul Hagen and Neu Beginnen have attracted many of the most active German Socialist emigres in the United States.

10. Notwithstanding the survival of some of these old quarrels there exists today a substantial unity among the principal German Socialist groups in Sweden, Great Britain, and the United States as one major problem of post-war Germany. Nowhere do German Socialists include in their organizations/Austrian Socialists and nowhere have they any dealings with the Sudeten German Social Democrats. There is no discernible interest in frontier problems. All German Socialist
groups agree on the necessity of a social revolution as the prime condition for the establishment of a peaceful and democratic Germany. The London Union, the German Trade Unionists in Sweden, Paul Hagen’s Neu Beginnen, and even the majority of the German Labor Delegation, demand an immediate socialization of German heavy industry, the banking system, and the break-up of the landed estates of the Junkers. They desire a Germany that will cooperate on friendly terms with both the Western democracies and the Soviet Union and oppose the division of Europe into spheres of interest. A few Socialists among these groups are federalists but a majority of them are centralists.

11. The German Communist Party, as the most numerous, most highly disciplined and best organized party of the German emigration, is the only German emigre party that must be taken seriously. It no longer appears in the open as a German Communist Party but as a group of anti-Fascist Germans who are seeking to bring into a common organization all anti-Nazi in Germany and in the German emigration on an exclusively democratic program. In this it has been most successful in Great Britain, Mexico, and, presumably in Russia. If we are to take German Communists at their word, the KPD has for the moment abandoned its program of Communism and of a single-party dictatorship. Yet it retains its old organization, its old party leaders, and its close association with the Communist Party and the leaders of the Soviet Union, even after the dissolution of the Comintern. At the present moment there exists a kind of truce between the German Communist Party and the various Socialist groups, particularly in Great Britain. Because of their unity program Communists do not openly attack Socialists, and cordial discussions between members of the two parties are taking place. German Socialists are not yet convinced of the complete independence of the KPD from Moscow, and the Communist disruption tactics of the past years have not been forgotten. German Socialist groups of all countries have not concealed their distrust of the Freies Deutschland committees of Mexico City, Moscow, and London, and of the Free German Manifesto of 21 July 1943. They do not like the prominence of the old Communist Party leaders on these committees and above all they do not want a coalition with military personnel which occupies so conspicuous a place in the propaganda of the Free German Committee of Moscow.
I. GEOGRAPHICAL DISPERSION

The vast majority of German refugees throughout the world is not political but racial and cultural. The actual political emigration constitutes scarcely more than one or two percent of the 400,000 German emigres now concentrated principally in Russia, Sweden, Great Britain, the United States and South America. Of the 110,000 German refugees in the United States no more than 400 to 500 are politically organized and active. Notwithstanding this geographical dispersion and the difficulties of communication resulting from it, the organized emigre groups in the countries indicated are in fairly close touch with one another. The emigre groups in London are in regular communication with their corresponding groups in Sweden, New York and South America. Plans for post-war Germany drafted by German trade unionists in Sweden are discussed and criticized in London and New York. Money collected from the Jewish Labor Committee by Social Democrats in New York contributes to the support of the Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Party (Sopade) in London. German Communists in Mexico are kept well informed of the activity of their Communist comrades in Great Britain and Russia and of fellow-traveller organizations in the United States. After nearly four years of warfare the patterns of organization, thought, and activity among German emigres have sufficiently crystallized to permit some kind of analysis.
II. POLITICAL DISUNITY IN THE GERMAN EMIGRATION

To speak of factional quarrels among German political refugees is merely to say that they are emigres. They share these psychological traits, in an intensified form, with the emigres of other countries. Yet, between German political exiles and those of the occupied countries there is a fundamental difference. In the occupied countries at home and among their emigres it is the Left that has borne the brunt of the struggle against Hitler, while the conservative and nationalist Right provided the chief hotbeds of defeatism and quisling intrigues. In the occupied countries the Left is today performing the function which traditionally belonged to the domain of the Right -- the maintenance of the spirit of national unity and keeping alive national consciousness. Yet in Norway, Poland, Holland, and Czechoslovakia and their respective emigrations the struggle is less one for a social revolution than for national liberation. In the emigre groups of these countries ideological divisions which separate the former political parties have become blurred in the face of the common struggle for national unity and liberation. Even the Socialists and Communists have become nationalist in their struggle for political liberation against the enemy. This circumstance is making cooperation with German emigre groups extremely difficult.

For the German political emigration, however, the struggle against Hitler is a political struggle for a total change of system inside Germany. Political principles and party lines are, therefore, for the moment, of greater importance for German refugees than they are for Poles and Dutchmen. For German political refugees a national unity such as the Dutch and Norwegians have achieved is quite impossible. In political groups it is not even desirable. There is little common ground between Dr. Heinrich Brüning who desires a monarchist restoration and the left wing German Socialists who consider a social revolution an essential preliminary to the establishment of a peaceful and democratic Germany, or the Bavarian separatists in the United States who, contending that National Socialism cuts across the divisions of all social classes, seek a solution in the dismemberment of Germany into sovereign states loosely federated with one another. In the opinion of German Socialists of all persuasions a united anti-Nazi front of all emigres would merely provide German Communists with a playground for their infiltration and disruption tactics.

It is, therefore, only the German Communist Party and its fellow-travellers that, in obedience to orders from Moscow, seek a union of all anti-Nazi Germans irrespective of their former political affiliations. On this point the German emigre Communists in Sweden, Great Britain, and Mexico are in complete agreement with Dr. Kurt Rosenfeld's Communist front organization, the German American Emergency Conference. Everywhere German Communists are proclaiming the same doctrine of unity among all political emigres and the suspension of all ideological quarrels among parties until Hitler's collapse has prepared the ground for a revival of German democracy. So long as the German Communists everywhere remain a close and highly disciplined party committed to a dictatorship of the Party and subject to the orders of their leader, Wilhelm Pieck, in Moscow, the difficulties in the way of cooperation between

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between them and the German Socialist groups will remain all but inaudible. In Great Britain and Latin America German Communists have had a very large measure of success in persuading German exiles of other parties to become members of anti-Nazi organizations controlled by them. The Free German League for Culture in Great Britain, the largest organization of anti-Nazi Germans anywhere, is controlled by German Communists.

In all countries German Socialists are still challenging the independence of the German Communist Party from Moscow, more vigorously since the dissolution of the Comintern than before. Everywhere, not even excepting Sweden where Fritz Tarnov has included German Communists in his Arbeitergemeinschaft of 200 German trade unionists, German Socialists deny that Communists have suddenly abandoned their doctrine of dictatorship by the Communist Party in favor of the democratic process. Indeed, the right wing of the German Labor Delegation in New York as represented by Albert Grzesinski, Gerhart Seger and his Neue Volkzeitung, Max Brauer and Rudolf Katz sees in the German Communists enemies more deadly even than National Socialism itself, because the triumph of Communism in Germany means the end of their political existence.
III. THE SOCIALIST UNDERGROUND ORGANIZATIONS, 1933-1939

By accident or design the United States has become the place of refuge for the German Right. Yet these conservative democrats and monarchists consisting for the most part of businessmen, bankers, attorneys, former office-holders and diplomats, are neither organized nor politically active. They meet, if they meet at all, only in the non-political Study Center, established in New York by Dr. Hans Staudinger, for more or less academic discussions. It is a notable fact that none of the former German middle class or conservative parties have survived the emigration. There is, to be sure, the Free German Committee in London, composed of former Democrats and conservative Social Democrats like Karl Hoeltermann, Dr. August Weber, and Dr. Ernst Meyer, which aims at the re-establishment of a German Democratic Party, but it plays no discernible political role. The German Confessional Institute, composed of pastors of the German Confessional Church in London, is more concerned with religion than with politics. The former Center Party also has no organization in the emigration. Dr. Knaas, its former leader, is now in the Vatican and Dr. Heinrich Bruening, whatever his personal plans, persistently refuses affiliation with any emigre political movement. Only Dr. Carl Spreker, next to Dr. Bruening the most prominent former Centrist politician, promises that when Germany is defeated the old Center Party will be on the scene. The German Catholic Club of Great Britain, democratic and anti-Marxist in its views, is the nearest approach to an organization of German Catholics in exile. Unique is the small but growing Bavarian Council in New York, a group of German "separatists" who profess to be non-clerical and democratic and seek the establishment of a federation of German states without Prussia. Led by Dr. Friedrich Proevig, a former Hanoverian, and Rev. von Soden (who has recently died) of the Bavarian People's Party, it includes the Duke Wilhelm of Bavaria who now passes by the name of Mr. Bayern, Annette Kolb, an Alsatian, and Klaus Dohrn, a former Catholic. All of these groups, however, are numerically small and without a press and play no significant role in the international German emigration.

The German political emigration, therefore, is for practical purposes equivalent to the German Left. It is only the political groups and parties of the German Left that are organized, possess a press or retain remnants of their former underground organizations.

Broadly speaking, any group of exiles who are politically active on behalf of a particular program for their home country may be called political emigres. Technically, however, only that part of the German political emigration may be described as the German Opposition abroad which either represents or has had authentic connections with actual opposition groups in Germany. Since the most significant sector of the German political emigration is a product of the various underground movements which developed between 1933 and 1940, the question who represents and who has or has had contacts with political opposition groups inside Germany? -- is a matter of crucial importance. These questions go to the center of the quarrels and resentments that have arisen between the various German Socialist groups since 1933. Without a brief historical account of these quarrels between the various Socialist underground movements, their present behavior must remain largely unintelligible.
The largest mass party among these underground movements, the German Social Democratic Party, established its Executive Committee (Parteivorstand), commonly referred to as the Sopade, in Prague in 1933 to continue its underground operations from there. Since 1920 the political activity of this party had been dominated by the Social Democratic trade unions, its most effective pressure group. Its leaders were almost without exception reformists and opportunists. They were relatively helpless in the face of both the German industrialists and the leaders of the Reichsheer. Confronted with the rising power of Hitler, their prime concern was to keep their party organization intact. Many of its ablest leaders remained at home after the dissolution of the party and withdrew from public life. Those who went into exile were typical of the Social Democratic Old Guard. They were either former ministers or prominent officeholders like Albert Grzesinski, Wilhelm Sollmann, Max Brauer, now in New York, or approved party bureaucrats like Hans Vogel, Erich Ollenhauer, and Wilhelm Sander, now in London, or trade union leaders like Fritz Tarnow, now in Sweden, Hans Gottfureht, now in London, and Siegfried Aufhaeuser, now in New York, or editors of Social Democratic newspapers like Friedrich Stempfer, Gerhart Seger, Toni Sender, now in New York, and many of them were former members of the Reichstag. Two of the ablest of them, Breitscheid and Hilferding were turned over to the Gestapo with 300 others by the Vichy Government on 10 Feb. 1941. A considerable number of these people is now over sixty years old; they fought in the last war and are nationalists, are hostile to left wing Socialists, and uncompromising enemies of the German Communist Party. They represent for the most part the old Majority Socialists, while a large number of the old Independent Socialists (USPD) have deserted to the groups farther to the left.

The Sopade claimed to be the legal representative of the Social Democratic Party in exile, although such a claim could be considered valid only so long as an organized Social Democratic Party in Germany did not exist. It may be considered reasonably certain that no remnants of the former organization of this party still survive in Germany in 1943. Yet in the debates among German Socialist emigres the Sopade has always, until recently, taken the position that the party in Germany has survived all Gestapo efforts to disrupt it. It must be remembered, however, that the Sopade had to fight in two directions, against the Nazi regime and against Communist infiltration into its own ranks. The dissident Socialist groups, however, contended that the old party was dead and buried and could no longer be revived. Managed by veteran party bureaucrats, who had no existence outside of the party, it is perhaps intelligible that in exile the Sopade should exaggerate the importance of its party organization even more than before Hitler's accession to power.

This peculiar legalistic position of the Sopade, to the effect that it alone represented the old Social Democratic Party in Germany, was bound to provoke vigorous opposition from groups less concerned with legality than with the ability and intelligence of leadership in the underground struggle against the Nazi regime. Discontent with the old Social Democratic leadership was widespread, if not general; it eventually caused a larger number of defections from the Sopade than from any other surviving Socialist group. There are today
no more than 160 registered members of the Social Democratic Party in all Great Britain, while the number of emigres who voted as Social Democrats in 1933 is three and four times greater. The number of defections in the United States is greater still. Perhaps these quarrels between the various Socialist groups would have been less acute, had not the Sopade salvaged substantial funds from Germany, which it now claimed the sole right to administer. When the Sopade cut off its funds from a particular Socialist group a war to the knife was inevitable.

From the ranks of the disaffected there emerged new groups who challenged the ability and legitimacy of Sopade leadership and conducted their own underground struggle against Hitler. Among these dissident groups it is only the Neu Beginnen group which has survived in Sweden, Great Britain, and the United States, the other group; the German Revolutionary Socialists, which is reported to have survived in Great Britain, seems to have no other members than S. Retzlaw, its founder. There is no evidence of the survival of the Red Shocktroops in 1943. Besides these, there were other independent Socialist groups which had separated themselves from the Social Democratic Party before Hitler came to power: the Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei (SAP), led by Paul Froehlich and Jakob Walcher, now in the United States, and by August Enderle, now in Sweden; and the Internationale Sozialistischer Kampfbund (ISK) or League of Militant International Socialists, led by Willy Eichler, now in London.

The SAP was formed in the summer of 1931 when a group of left wing Social Democrats and Communists seceded from their respective parties. From the beginning the SAP was anti-militarist and anti-nationalist and placed the emphasis on Marxism as the lifeblood of Socialist statelessness. The party was and is in many ways comparable to the old Independent Socialists (Unabhängige Sozialistische Partei Deutschlands) and many members of this group, like Dr. Kurt Rosenfeld (recently died), now in the United States, joined the SAP. They are sometimes called Trotzkyites by Social Democrats, although Paul Walter in London and Jakob Walcher in the United States emphatically deny this. The SAP played no major role in German national affairs. All the greater was its influence in the local municipal councils and in the State parliaments. The party had its strongest following in Silesia, in Saxony, in the industrial regions about Frankfort-am-Main and in Dusseldorf. There are few intellectuals among them, most of them being trade unionists. Approximately 150 SAP members and leaders went into exile in 1933.

The largest and most active SAP group is now in Sweden, where approximately fifty of them, with August Enderle at their head, have been welcomed into Fritz Tarnov's Arbeitskreis. In London the thirty SAP members, led by Paul Walter, are members of the "Union." The least active SAP group is that in the United States, where there are about twenty members. Here they are neither organized nor active as a group, largely because many of them are here on a visitor's visa. Individually and as a group they support Neu Beginnen.

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The ISK group was founded by Professor Leonard Nelson of Göttingen in the twenties. Dr. Nelson established an international school of political science at the Walkemühle, near the city of Cassel, to propagate his non-Marxian Socialism. Numerically, ISK was never important even in Germany, and there are no more than 100 members in the entire German emigration. Thanks, however, to Nelson's school at the Walkemühle, which was attended by young Socialists from many countries, no German emigre group has better connections with international socialist groups than ISK. The largest unit of ISK, composed of about forty members, is now in Great Britain where it is under the leadership of Willi Eichler. W. Heidorn, formerly active in underground work, is his close collaborator. Another member, Minna Specht, works on German post-war educational problems for the Fabian Society. The London ISK group, also a member of the "Union," is closely associated with the Socialist Vanguard Group in the British Labor Party which publishes the monthly Socialist Commentary. In the United States Miss Eva Levinsky-Pfister and Erna Blenoke are the two best known members of ISK. In Buenos Aires Dr. Hans Lehmann, a member of ISK, is associated with Dr. August Siemsen, the editor of Das Andere Deutschland.

The smallest of these groups is probably the Neu Beginnen group, with approximately 100 original members in the emigration. In London and New York, however, it has a high percentage of fellow-travellers. This group will be discussed more extensively later in this memorandum.

These groups were even better suited to underground operations than the mass party of the Social Democrats. They were very much smaller and had developed a special kind of party leadership. A mass party, operating openly and legally in a democracy, requires able administrators and parliamentarians, orators, and journalists who can influence the masses and mobilize voters. But an illegal or underground political organization has little use for these specific skills. Successful underground activity requires shrewd, bold, disciplined men, men of iron nerves who can keep their heads while under Gestapo observation. The SAP, ISK and Neu Beginnen groups were originally composed of a young, bold and carefully selected elite. They adopted a more rigorous discipline and a stricter rule of secrecy than the Sopade. They were opposed to the mass underground operations of the Social Democrats, the remnants of whose organizations were pretty thoroughly liquidated by 1935. Otto Bauer, the Austrian Socialist leader and a close observer of German underground organizations, offers in his Die illegale Partei a graphic description of the all but complete disruption of the mass underground movement of the Social Democrats. Only after 1936 did the Sopade underground regain some of its former importance. The rival Socialist groups, on the other hand, developed what has been aptly called the cadre party, which, out free from direct contact with the laboring masses, placed emphasis on the training and discipline of a carefully selected elite.

Inevitably, perhaps, the mentality of these groups became sectarian. They were exclusive and contemptuous alike of the reformism of the Social Democratic Party as they were of the German Communists who slavishly obeyed every instruction
from Moscow. The bitter resentments dating from their quarrels
with the Sopade in the early days of the underground move-
ment still survive, in some countries more noticeably than
in others. The Sopade accused them, notably the SAF and Neu
Beginnen, the most vigorous of these groups, of being con-
spiratorial secret societies, of secretly forming cells of
their supporters within the Social Democratic Party, or of
being parties which, like the Communist Party, really aimed
at an undemocratic party dictatorship. Some of these charges
can be substantiated today. These groups on the other hand
charged the Sopade with wasting its funds on an expensive
organisation in Prague, with being reckless and wasteful in
its underground operations, with unreflective opportunistic
leadership; and with responsibility for the destruction of
the Weimar Republic by their political bungling.

Between 1933 and 1939 all these dissident Socialist
groups passed through a series of structural and ideological
changes, many of which merely reflect the changes in the gen-
eral political situation during these dramatic years. Since
the all but complete suppression of the German underground
movement in 1940 and 1941 these quarrels have lost much of
their former meaning. Most of these groups have since aban-
doned their exclusiveness and secrecy, although their criti-
cal attitude toward the old Social Democratic leaders remains
undiminished. If the NeuBeginnen group was committed to the
principle of party dictatorship in 1934 under the leadership of
Leevenheim-Milos, it professes to be even more democratic
in its outlook today under the leadership of Leeventhal-
Sering in London and Frank-Hagen in the United States than
the Social Democratic Party itself. Cut off in 1934 from the
funds of the Social Democratic Party by the Executive Committee,
these groups developed financial resources of their own,
resources which in the end were greater than those of the
Sopade. They won the financial support of Czechoslovak,
Swiss, and British Socialists, of Leon Blum himself, and ob-
tained enormous sums from the United States.
IV. THE UNION OF GERMAN SOCIALIST ORGANIZATIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN

Although still smouldering, the quarrels between these left wing groups, the SAP, TSK, Neu Beginnen and the Sopade are least acute in Great Britain. In Great Britain all of these groups cooperate since March, 1941, on an equal basis with the Sopade in the Union of German Socialist Organizations. Despite the fact that it was imposed upon them by Sir William Gillies, the International Secretary of the British Labor Party, because of his difficulties in having to deal with so many German Socialist groups, the Union has succeeded in winning the active support of all its member units.

The Social Democratic Party, with its 160 registered members, dominates the Union: Hans Vogel, the chairman of its Executive Committee, is also chairman of the Union, although all groups are equally represented on its policy committee. The British Labor Party still adheres to the formal fact that only the Social Democratic Party was a member of the Labor and Socialist International, and that consequently only the Social Democratic Party can be recognized as the official representation of German Labor. The British Labor Party supports the Sopade financially. In the Spring of 1943, however, it withdrew the salary of Erich Ollenhauer, the Secretary of the Youth Section of the party, on the ground that his work was not essential to the war effort. Since then the American Jewish Labor Committee, at the request of the German Labor Delegation in New York, contributes largely to the support of the London Sopade. But for this financial support from the United States the London Sopade could scarcely survive. Even so it maintains neither an office nor a secretarial staff. The meager Sozialistische Mitteilungen, published in mimeographed form once a month, are no substitute for a party press.

These financial difficulties are merely a reflection of the general loss of prestige of the Social Democratic Party in Great Britain. Most of the leaders of the British Labor Party support the rival Fight For Freedom group which is not a member of the Union. Except for John Middleton, Harold Lasik and Walter Schevensel, the Sopade has few cordial friends in Britain. In his annual report on the activities of the Social Democratic Party which Ollenhauer sent to Friedrich Stammer in March, 1943, the former regretfully admits that "we have been unable to overcome this opposition to us."

It must be stated, however, that the same divisions characteristic of German emigré Socialists are to be found also in the British Labor Party.

The conspicuous absence of men of constructive statesmanship and intellectual ability among the Social Democrats in Great Britain has been frequently commented upon. The tragic failure of the German Republic had been in the first instance a failure of the leaders of the Social Democratic Party, the strongest political organization in the country. They had lost initiative in domestic affairs to the Catholic Centre Party and in foreign policy to Gustav Stresemann of the People's Party, and had developed into moderate progressives confined to a narrow range of reforms dealing chiefly with certain time-honored trade union demands. Cast into exile, there was no change of leadership. Otto Wels, the
first chairman of the all-powerful Party Executive in Exile, was a courageous and able manipulator of the party machine. After his death, there was a noticeable decline in the leadership of the party. Hans Vogel, the present chairman, is no doubt an amiable and reasonable gentleman, but scarcely equal to the tremendous problems that face a revolutionary leader in exile. His immediate lieutenants, Erich Ollenhauer, B. F. Heine, and Wilhelm Sander are loyal party men, whom no one has yet regarded as formidable political leaders who might direct an eventual German revolution.

The Social Democratic Party in exile has not recovered from the loss of its ablest intellectuals, Breitscheid and Hilferding in 1941. Otto Braun, the venerable Prime Minister of Prussia, is in Switzerland and, except for occasional communications, out of touch with the London group. Some of the ablest Social Democrats in Great Britain, like Curt Geyer, have deserted, or, like the five members of the original Party Executive, emigrated to the United States. Among those who remain, F. Heine stands out as one of the ablest and most active.

Only about 80 of the 160 registered members of the Social Democratic Party live in London. The rest are scattered over the country wherever the special restrictions for enemy aliens permit them to live. This London group has an organization of its own under the chairmanship of Wilhelm Sander. This organization, however, is distinct from the formally elected Executive Committee of the party, composed of Hans Vogel, Erich Ollenhauer, and B. F. Heine. In the past two years different tendencies within the party have taken a more or less definite shape. One group of a more conservative tendency gathers around Ollenhauer and Sander. There is another group, represented by Victor Schiff, one of the editors of the Vorwärts, and Walter Kolarz, with more pronounced leftist leanings. There is little or nothing that separates the latter from the SAP and Neu Beginnen. All three of the other member groups of the Union -- ISK, SAP, Neu Beginnen -- have a relatively high percentage of fellow travellers among Social Democrats.

In the past year the Union rather than the Social Democratic Party has become the more active organization. The most important function of the Party Executive is to issue once a month a news letter, the Sozialistische Mitteilungen. This news letter, issued in 500 copies, is the only connecting link among the German Social Democrats scattered throughout the world. The lack of financial resources has hitherto not permitted the publication of a regular party organ. Their London leaders have been frequently compelled to resort to the New York Neue Volkszeitung for the publication of their speeches. Ollenhauer's report on the year 1942 mentions a number of mimeographed publications, most of them by F. Heine, which the Party Executive has issued: Judicial Terror in Nazi Germany: Reflections on the Restoration of the Social Democratic Press; Proposal For Food Distribution in Germany After the War; and a reply to the accusations made by the Geyer-Loeb Fight For Freedom Group.

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Among the relations of the London Social Democrats with other national refugee groups, those with the Czechoslovak Government in Exile are most cordial. German Social Democrats have not forgotten the hospitality which for many years the Czechs had given them. It is moreover a fundamental point with them not to recognize any of Hitler's annexations. Consequently, they do not regard the various Sudeten German groups as belonging to the German emigration. As a result, Max Jakob's Sudeten German Social Democratic Party with approximately 900 members is not affiliated with any organization of Reichs-German political emigres. This correct behavior has earned for German Social Democrats the support of the Beneš Government.

Oillenhauer's report desires to convey the impression that the Party Executive's contacts with underground workers in Germany have not been entirely cut off. He refers to facilities which British friends have given them to reopen contacts with illegal workers in neutral countries around Germany. But he complains of the lack of resources and of suitable workers in Great Britain. The London group of Social Democrats is convinced that it is impossible to gain any greater influence over the underground opposition in Germany without an organized press and a news service. The German Labor Delegation in New York is now making strenuous efforts to obtain the necessary funds from the War Chest of the A.P. of L. to establish such a press.

Neu Beginnen has but twelve members in London, but it maintains close connections with the British Socialist Clarity Group, and its guiding spirit, Richard Loewenthal (alias Paul Sering) is one of the ablest German Marxist Socialists in Great Britain and a frequent contributor to the Labor Discussion Notes and The Left News. It also has a relatively high percentage of fellow-travellers in London. Since the members of the official Sopade are unable to provide the rank and file of its members with authoritative leadership, intellectual leadership at least is passing to such men as Loewenthal-Sering. Through his numerous publications, particularly through his recent book Klare Fronten, he is extending his influence beyond the older dissident Socialist groups far into the ranks of the otherwise leaderless Social Democrats. If his radical tendencies still cause some uneasiness among the older Social Democrats, Erwin Karl Schoettle, a former Social Democrat and now secretary of the Neu Beginnen Auslandsburo, has done his utmost to dissipate Social Democratic doubts on the democratic character of the Neu Beginnen program in his recent Neu Beginnen Wie Es War. There is no major or minor quarrel between the Sopade and the Neu Beginnen group in London.

Conspicuous among German Socialists in England is the leader of the I.S.K. group, Willi Eichler, who together with his able collaborator, W. Heidorn, published the periodical Europe Speaks until the spring of 1943. Alarmed by the intellectual isolation of German Socialists, Eichler has cultivated relations with French, British, Polish, and Greek Socialists -- with very modest results. Notwithstanding his close contacts with the French underground movement and with Henri Hauck, his pamphlet Calling All Europe, published

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late in 1942, ends on the pessimistic note: No prospect for a social revolution in Germany or for a real unity of Europe. Eichler's present greatest fear is the possibility that Socialists, misled by the democratic propaganda of the Communists, might yield to the temptation to cooperate with the German Communist Party. Cooperation with the German Communists, he argues, must be fatal to German democratic Socialism of any kind. In the hope of laying this ghost which haunts every German democratic Socialist, he published early in 1943 his Russland und die Komintern, which is a bulky record of the deceptions, the dishonesty and the untrustworthiness of German Communists since the rise of Hitler. Eichler's unrelenting campaign against collaboration with the KPD has had a measure of success in England and in Buenos Aires, where his lieutenant, Dr. Hans Lehmann, prevailed upon Dr. August Siemsen, the editor of Das Andere Deutschland, to break off relations with Paul Merker and the Latin American Committee in Mexico.

We know very little of the present role of Paul Walter and the thirty members of SAP in the London Union. On Russia's entry into the war, they published a leaflet demanding support for Russia and stating that a united front with Communists was desirable but at the moment impracticable. There is no evidence that they have changed their position in this matter. Hans Vogel is particularly proud of having secured the cooperation of the London SAP group.

Closely associated with the London Union is the German Trade Union Center, under its chairman Hans Gottfurfurtch. This Trade Union for all Germans working in Great Britain is affiliated with the I.F.T.U. and the T.U.C. The composition of its Executive Committee (W. Derckov; K. Doberer; Willi Eichler; Anna Beyer, ISK; Herta Goethelf; W. Sander, SPD; E. Schottel, NB; Paul Walter, SAP; C. Wbeckel, SAP) is also indicative of the growing influence of the left wing Socialist groups in the Union. The Trade Union Center is non-partisan. It has recently opened its ranks to all German trade unionists irrespective of their former political-affiliations, including the Communists. When the ban on the Communists was lifted its membership rose from 420 to 650. The Communist claim of a majority in this Trade Union Center is probably exaggerated. According to one report 50 percent of its members belong to the groups of the Union, 25 percent are Communists or fellow travellers, and 25 percent are young people with a considerable number of Communists among them.

This brief review of the member groups of the London Union is sufficient to indicate that a preponderance of influence, if not of numbers, has shifted to the members of the dissident Socialist groups and to left wing Social Democrats. This decided leftist swing of German Socialists in Britain is documented also in the one serious project that has emerged from the common discussions of the member groups of the London Union: the first draft of a plan for a united German Socialist party (Möglichkeiten und Aufgaben Einer Gesezten Sozialistischen Partei in Deutschland, completed early in December 1942).
Whether or not this plan originated in the Sopade is unknown or, perhaps, unimportant. The fact remains that this document, accepted by all the member groups of the Union, bears the unmistakable imprint of the left wing Socialist groups. Writing about this plan to Erich Rinner, Hans Vogel stated, "Events in Russia have brought us German Socialists together." The basis for this agreement was provided less by the Social Democratic Party than by the left wing member groups of the Union, one of the reasons why it caused consternation among the right wing members of the German Labor Delegation in New York. The program of this document is essentially the program of the SAP and Neu-Beginnen. In it the Sopade admits that it is no longer possible or even desirable to revive the old Social Democratic Party in its pre-1913 form. Membership in the new party cannot be determined by membership in the old one. Instead there must be a new party with new leaders, that will absorb all the former left wing dissident groups, including former Communists who have been active in the underground movement. This marks a surrender of the legalist position which the Sopade had taken since 1933.

The program also calls for an immediate social revolution (einen tiefen Eingriff in die alte gesellschaftliche Ordnung). More specifically, it demands the expropriation of the large landowners, heavy industrialists, bankers and finance capitalists, the elimination of both Nazi and reactionary civil servants, the destruction of militarism, in a word a thorough democratization of German economic and political life. The document declares that a new German democracy is impossible without the social revolution which this program postulates.

There exist three other small German emigre Socialist groups in Great Britain which are not members of the Union. The most important of these are the Volkssocialisten, under the leadership of Hans Jaeger, with approximately twenty members. The political doctrine of this group is that Socialism cannot be achieved by basing the movement on labor groups alone. Their program is reminiscent of Otto Strasser's Schwarze Front, and while they lived in Czechoslovakia, these people maintained close relations with Otto Strasser. Some of their members are still admirers of Otto Strasser, although it is not known whether any contacts still exist. It is known, on the other hand, that the Volkssocialisten maintain close contacts with the members of the Union and with the Fight For Freedom group who denounce Otto Strasser as a Fascist. They are favorably disposed to the Union's plan for a united Socialist party.

Definitely unimportant is Kurt Hiller's Freiheitsbund Deutscher Socialisten which has no more than four or five members in Great Britain and one or two in Sweden. Hiller is generally described as a harmless political eccentric with left wing views. He was formerly the leader of the so-called Revolutionary Pacifists in Germany. He has recently issued a declaration which advocates a non-Marxist Socialism. The formation of a Socialist elite, the complete disarmament of Germany after the war, and reparations by the Germans for all crimes committed by the Hitler regime. He is also in favor of the plan for a united Socialist party.
Finally, there is the Bund Deutscher Revolutionäer Sozialisten of S. Rezelaw and Karl Groch. Rezelaw is an old Spartacist who is now on bad terms with his former party friends. Together with the Volkssozialisten and some other people, Rezelaw founded in September, 1945, the Klub der Konstruktivistten. What holds most of these people together is their common opposition to the old Social Democratic Party and its program of a centralized Germany. These people are the only open federalists among the Socialists of the German emigration. They contend that the problem of destroying the roots of German militarism can be solved only by destroying the territorial unity of Prussia and by giving to the new Germany a federal structure. So long as Prussia, with its population of 40 million, remains intact, they argue, Germany's neighbors will not feel secure. They add that German Socialists will not be able to guarantee security to Germany's neighbors, because after ten years of systematic murder of Socialists by the Gestapo, there will be no Socialists left in Germany. They contend that a Germany with a federal structure need not necessarily become reactionary. Rezelaw argues that while the Social Democrats have frequently admitted that centralism has always been the chief source of German imperialism, they lack the courage to come out with a frankly federalist program.
V. THE GERMAN FIGHT FOR FREEDOM GROUP IN LONDON

In no country do German refugees of the Social Democratic Party occupy a more difficult position than in Great Britain, despite the financial support of the British Labor Party. This is in some measure the fault of their London leaders. It is also due to the situation itself. The expectation of a revolution in Germany, exaggerated in the early years of the war, has now vanished in London. With it has vanished also much of the credit which the German emigration enjoyed. While British workers warmed up to German Communists because of their forthright pro-Russianism, German Socialists wrote critical, if not hostile, pamphlets on the subject to Russia. Whenever occasion for public speaking was offered, German Social Democrats dwelt on the "other Germany" which they affected to represent, and emphasized the importance of the underground movement in Germany, although they could produce little compelling evidence of its strength. Their "underground" sources, however, were largely derived from the German press. Attacked both from the Right and the Left, they were on the defensive, and their defensive speeches had the ring of a curious kind of German nationalistic. The news got out that they were hedging on the principle of the unilateral disarmament of Germany. Rightly or wrongly, this lack of a clear position on the issues of the war stirred up suspicion not only among Englishmen but among certain German emigres.

These hesitations produced what at first appeared to be nothing more than another squabble within the German emigration. As time went on, however, this quarrel matured into the most serious accusation from the Social Democratic Party that has yet occurred. The Fight For Freedom group came into existence in the spring of 1942 when six members, among them Curt Geyer, one of the oldest and most prominent, deserted from the Social Democratic Party. The originator and the guiding spirit of the group was Walter Loeb, a former German newspaper publisher. Equipment and funds, they formed a publishing company known as "Fight For Freedom Editorial and Publishing Services, Ltd." This small group of German emigres acquired political importance when Walter Loeb succeeded in enlisting the active support not only of Lord and Lady Van蛩ittart but of such prominent and respected officials of the British Labor Party as Alfred Dobbs, its chairman, James Walker, a former chairman, and Sir William Gillies, the International Secretary of the Labor Party. With such support behind him, Walter Loeb addressed his appeal to the German emigres. In December 1942, he invited a large number of German Socialist emigres to a round table conference at the Savoy Hotel. His appeal failed utterly. Besides the original six members not a single German Socialist emigré has joined the group. Loeb, however, did succeed in obtaining the blessing of a number of prominent continental Socialists, among them Camille Huysmans of Belgium and chairman of the defunct Second International, W. Malinowski of Poland, Jacobus Oldenbroek of Holland, Gustav Winter of Czechoslovakia, Finn Moe of Norway, and others.

In spite of this Socialist and international window dressing the Fight For Freedom is in reality an organization of German Van蛩ittartists. We are not here concerned with the position of Lord Vansittart in British politics. His position on the German problem can be rapidly summarized. He regards
Hitler not as an accident in German history but as its culmination. The "other Germany" is an illusion which never existed save in a small and ineffective minority which has never been able to assert itself in war or peace. The rest, he states in his Lessons of My Life, are stricken with the blight of arrogance, dishonesty, and militarism. These call for the defeat, de-militarization, occupation, and re-education of Germany; beyond that he postulates a prosperous but not powerful Germany. There is no evidence that he ever advocated the dismantlement of Germany. This is also the position of the Fight For Freedom group, although in many of their writings Vanalttartism is as far removed from Lord Vanalttart as Marxism is from Karl Marx.

No doubt, honestly inspired by the fear of some kind of appeasement, the Geyer-Loeb group emphasized the fact that this is less a war against the Axis Powers than a national war against Germany. Germany not Hitler is the real enemy. Aggressive German nationalism and militarism infect not merely the National Socialists but the entire German people, and it is they who must be fought and punished. Presently, however, this criticism turned against the German emigration itself which they charged with aggressive nationalism. Like Lord Vanalttart, they insisted that henceforth there be a definite limit to the attention commanded "by insidious and untrustworthy German exiles." The principal object of their attack was German Social Democracy. They sometimes had recourse to dubious tactics. Obviously inspired by Walter Loeb, the London Sunday Dispatch of 8 February, 1942 published an article under the headlines: "The 'Free German' trick, an exposure of influential emigre groups working in Great Britain to save Germany."

In the most serious of their publications, Gollancz in German Wonderland, Geyer-Loeb accused the German Social Democrats of evasions, subterfuges, and untruthfulness in what concerned Republican Germany between 1920 and 1933. They denounced the obstinate self-justification of the Social Democratic leaders in exile and particularly of Gerhart Seger's Neue Volkzeitung in New York, and exerted their sentimental defense of the German people as a falsification of facts. They accused the Social Democratic leaders in London and New York of aggressive German nationalism, of contempt for the Poles, Greeks, and Yugoslavs, and of placing the national interests of the Reich above considerations of international security and justice. In the spring and summer of 1942 the Fight For Freedom group published a whole series of pamphlets which were designed to prove that the National Socialist regime did not mark a break with the period of the Weimar Republic but was its logical result and continuation. (B. Henne, German Industry on the Warpath; Carl Hess, The Straffish Line; Curt Geyer, Hitler's New, The Kaiser's Old Order; F. K. Bielek, Statistical Truth; B. Henne, The Case of Dr. Brüning.)

Although some of these accusations come with bad grace from two former Social Democrats who shared the responsibility for determining the policy of the party before 1933 and one of them at least, Walter Loeb, has no great record as a fighter against National Socialism, many of their charges hit the mark with a deadly accuracy. When a prominent Social Democrat like Friedrich Stamper, who as editor of the Vorwaars

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was supported by the German generals at the end of the last war, then stubbornly insist in his book the Fourteen Years
that, from 4 August 1914 down until 30 January 1933 the Social
Democratic Party committed not a single major political error,
the charge of untruthfulness cannot easily be avoided. The
same charge also applies to Albert Grzesinski's book on the
period of the Weimar Republic.

The secession and propaganda of the Fight For Freedom
group has stirred up more animosity and personal resentment
in the German emigration of Sweden, London and New York than
any other single event of the past year, for their attack
was directed not only against Social Democrats but also
against the dissident Socialist groups, particularly Neo
Beginnen. To the German Social Democrats this "inverted
chauvinism" with its cry "Down with Ourselves," as they called
it, was incomprehensible. They wrote reply after reply to
the slightly exaggerated Vansittartism of the Geyer-Loeb group,
contending that if every German is a National Socialist, if
indeed it could be proved that there is no "other Germany,"
all hope of a democracy in a future Germany was useless.
Above all they could not forgive Camille Huyssmans, the chair-
man of the Second Socialist and Labor International, for
openly proclaiming his support of the German Fight For
Freedom group.

It was natural that Walter Loeb should attempt to estab-
lish an American branch of his Fight For Freedom group. He
sought the support of William Agar of Freedom House, and
subsequently of Robert Watt, the Secretary of the American
Federation of Labor. Both, however, declined. His only
supporters in the German emigration of the United States are
Emil Ludwig, Dr. Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster, the well known
German pacifist, and T. H. Tetens. Emil Ludwig expounded his
Vansittartist views in a hearing before the Foreign Affairs
Committee of the House of Representatives on 28 March 1943.
Between Emil Ludwig and the Fight For Freedom group in Great
Britain, however, there is a difference. While anti-Prussian-
ism is also anti-Socialism and is the cause of the Geyer-Loeb
group, it is not the core of Ludwig's argument. Dr. F. W. Foerster and T. H.
Tetens are also anti-Prussians, but their attack, Would You
Sign This Letter?, published jointly by them in March 1943,
is not directed against the German political emigration but
against native German Americans and does not concern us here.

The controversy that has arisen over the German Fight
For Freedom Group in London, has administered a shock to the
entire German political emigration. This effect was inten-
sified when the British Labor Party took up the debate on post-
war Germany in its forty-second annual conference in June
1943. The resolution that was finally adopted by a substantial
majority followed the Vansittartist line of the German Fight
For Freedom group, that there is no "other Germany" except
in the sense of an insignificant and powerless minority, and
that a drastic treatment, perhaps even the dismemberment
of Germany, was necessary. The question as to whether this
resolution was adopted under the influence of the German Fight
for Freedom group or of the supporters of Lord Vansittart in
the British Labor Party is immaterial in this connection.
What is important is the fact that the resolution was a rebuke
to the German Social Democratic Party in Britain, which has
been proclaiming the opposite doctrine of the "other Germany." All
the implications of this resolution for German Social

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Democrats are not yet apparent. What is apparent is an accentuation of the strained relations between the British Labor Party and the German Social Democrats, plainly noticeable already before. When a prominent British Socialist in 1943 tells them, "We have nothing in common," much has changed since 1940 when they hopefully set up their headquarters in London.

It should be added, however, that inside the British Labor Party machinery, most probably inside the Executive, discussions have begun on the possibility of altering the resolution of June 1943, in next year's Party Conference. It should also be pointed out that the British Trade Union Congress in its September (1943) meeting refused to adopt a resolution similar to that of the Labor Party.

It is reasonably certain, however, that the German Socialists will not act precipitously. It is not likely that a mere resolution of the British Labor Party will cause the German Socialists to swing to Russia and seek an understanding with the German Communist Party and its leader, Wilhelm Pieck, in Moscow. Nor will the publication of the Free German Manifesto of 21 July 1943 produce so radical a change.
VI. THE GERMAN SOCIALISTS IN SWEDEN

The principal German emigre party groups in Sweden are The Social Democrats under the leadership of Kurt Heinig, the SAP, led by August Enderle, and The German Communist Party. ISK and Neu Beginnen have only two or three original members respectively in Sweden, and they play no important role. In Sweden also some of the old quarrels between these groups continue. But for the past year all these groups cooperate in The Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Deutschen Sozialdemokratischen und Gewerkschaftlichen Emigration. This comprehensive organization was created to facilitate cooperative planning for post-war Germany among all the German Socialist emigres, even the German Communists. Nowhere outside of Sweden have German Communists been welcomed in any organization of German Socialist emigres. This was possible largely because in Sweden it is not the political parties but German trade unionists that play the dominant role. It has also been attributed to another cause. There are good reasons for believing that the contacts between German Socialists in Sweden with opposition groups in Germany, though exceedingly precarious, have not been entirely cut off. There is a widespread impression among German emigres in Sweden that the distinction between old party lines have become unimportant in the underground movements inside Germany.

The outstanding figure in the German emigration in Sweden is Fritz Tarnow, a leading German trade unionist and a prominent member of the old Social Democratic Party. It is now almost forgotten that in 1932 he negotiated with General von Schliecher over a plan to establish a German corporative State, dominated by the army and the trade unions. Tarnow's present Arbeitgemeinschaft 200 German trade unionists includes besides Social Democrats and Communists also the SAP. The fact that the vast majority of German refugees in Sweden are former trade union officials may well have facilitated this comprehensive organization. Besides the Social Democrats, the most active members of this organization are the 50 members of SAP, led by the able August Enderle. It now also publishes a semi-monthly journal. This organization enjoys the moral and financial support of the Swedish trade unions and of the Swedish Social Democratic Party. So close are Tarnow's relations with the Swedes, that he is said to do nothing without their knowledge and consent. It has even been said that his various plans for post-war Germany have the approval of the Swedish Government, a report which it has been impossible to verify.

Like his friend, Dr. Heinrich Bruening to whom he sends his plans for post-war Germany, Fritz Tarnow is a nationalist who is willing to go to extreme lengths to prevent the disruption of the territorial unity of Germany. Reports of drastic peace terms have disturbed him. When Paul Einzig published his article in the Economic Journal a year ago to the effect that to disarm Germany it was not enough to dismantle the armament industry but that the German machine tool industry had to be abolished and that 51 percent of the proprietary rights in German heavy industries should be transferred to the Allies, Tarnow was horrified. If this proposal becomes the basis of the peace, he wrote to Ollenhauer in London, "then I myself could offer no better advice to German workers than to capitulate to Russian Bolshevism and place themselves under the protecting wing of the Soviet Union."

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This appears to be more than a momentary emotional response. When a member of the German Labor Delegation was asked whether that would be his response to Einstig's peace terms he made a similar reply.

Being himself a trade unionist and working together with former trade union officials, Tarnow's planning for post-war Germany is dominated by trade union interests. Ideology and principles are necessary as a driving force, he states, but of what use are they unless you have a machine? Tarnow, therefore, is chiefly concerned with this machine, and he shares with other older Social Democrats an exaggerated opinion of the importance of organization as such, irrespective of its larger purpose. He is above all interested in divorcing completely the trade unions from political parties in the new Germany. Most of his plans for post-war Germany revolve around the problem of transforming the Nazi Arbeiterfront into trade unions. His prime concern are the maintenance of the present unity of the Arbeiterfront and the transfer of its vast property to his projected single national trade union, organized on the basis of one trade union for each industry. This unified national trade union organization, he argues, is designed to prevent a mad scramble of the new political parties for the control of the German trade unions.

Tarnow's plan for the transformation of the Nazi Labor Front has passed through a series of changes. His original plan which was decidedly authoritarian has provoked a volume of criticism from all quarters. In his first version he proposed the retention of the whole basic structure of the present Nazi Labor Front, merely demanding the dismissal of all Nazi officials. It may be a matter of interest to note that it was in this version that he sent the plan to Dr. Heinrich Brüning. It was especially the SAP, as represented by August Enderle and Martin Krebs, which denounced the authoritarian character of this plan. They demanded an im- medi ate, not an eventual, democratization. In its final version all compulsory features have been eliminated from the plan and the proposal for unity has been placed on a voluntary basis.
VII. THE GERMAN LABOR DELEGATION

The situation of the German Socialists in the United States concerns us here only so far as it reflects or influences developments among German emigre Socialists elsewhere. This situation is in many ways unique, because German Socialists in the United States, though more numerous than in other countries, are only partially organized, owing largely to the confusion among German emigres here between emigration and immigration. Many of the ablest former German Socialists such as the members of the New School of Social Research and the Institute of Social Research shun emigre politics of any kind, while others, like Gerhart Seger and Rudolf Katz, though American citizens, devote much of their time to emigre political activities. There are no organizations in the United States comparable to the London "Union" or Tarnow: Arbeitgemeinschaft in Sweden. The Association of Free Germans, presided over by Albert Grzesinski and dominated by Social Democrats, is now practically dormant. Neither the ISK nor the SAP possess independent organizations of their own in the United States; the twenty members of the latter group, with Jakob Waller at their head, are giving their support to the Neu Beginnen group. The German American Emergency Conference, though directed by such emigres as Dr. Kurt Rosenfeld, a former Prussian Minister of Justice, and Felix Boehnheim, a fellow Traveller, is composed chiefly of American citizens and does not concern us here. There are therefore only two groups that fall within the definition of a political organization of German Socialist refugees: the German Labor Delegation and the Neu Beginnen group.

The German Labor Delegation, composed of ten prominent former Social Democratic officeholders, was organized in 1936 to represent the Social Democratic Party in the United States. It was recognized by the A.F. of L. and the C.I.O. and soon acquired a formidable position by obtaining control of the editorial policy of the Neue Volkszeitung, an old German American Socialist weekly, through Gerhart Seger and Rudolf Katz, its editors, who are also members of the German Labor Delegation. Even today no political article is published in the Neue Volkszeitung without the approval of Max Brauer, the present chairman of the Delegation. The Delegation also acts more or less in the capacity of a steering committee for the German Language Branch of the Social Democratic Federation which, besides the main body of American citizens, includes about thirty German Social Democratic refugees.

Until January 1943 the German Labor Delegation was presided over by Albert Grzesinski, the former Prussian Minister of the Interior and Police President of Berlin, a more extreme type of the refugee genius, who is conscious of, and sensitive about, his former political importance. Since January 1943, the German Labor Delegation has two chairmen, Max Brauer, the former mayor of Altona, now counsel for the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ, and Siegfried Aufhaeuser, a leading former German trade unionist and head of the German white collar workers union, and the only former Independent Socialist (USPD) in the Delegation. The other members are: Friedrich Stamper, the old editor of the Vorwärts, who declared that he would refuse to print news about the remnant of Germany when he sought to set up a labor news agency in London in 1936 on the ground that it

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would be treason to Germany; Erich Rinner, the editor of the
former Social Democratic Urne Hefte, and together with Stampfer
the only member of the original Party Executive Committee
of 1933 in the German Labor Delegation; Dr. Hans Staudinger,
former Ministerial Counsellor of the Prussian Ministry of
Commerce, now Dean of the New School for Social Research;
Dr. Alfred Braunthal and Hedwig Wachenheim; Gerhart Seger,
the editor in chief of the Neue Volkszeitung; Dr. Rudolf Katz,
a former attorney and city alderman, a Social Democratic
red-baiter and together with Grezinski one of the most de-
termined enemies of Paul Hagen. Nowhere is there an organi-
ization of more prominent Social Democrats than the German
Labor Delegation. Such men as Grezinski, Stampfer and Brauer
are old members of the party and known throughout Europe.
Siegfried Aufhaeuser is, perhaps, together with Tarnow the
foremost German trade union leader in the entire German
emigration. Gerhart Seger is known as an anti-Fascist
lecturer among the Rotary Clubs of America in almost every
state of the Union. Dr. Erich Rinner, who is inactive since
his employment on the staff of OWI, is one of the more
progressive members of the original Party Executive, and Dr.
Hans Staudinger is widely known as one of the scholarly
economists of the Social Democratic Party. His name also
does not appear on the list of members because of his
position on the staff of the New School of Social Research.
He does not attend all the meetings of the group. On the
other hand, he does not feel that he can afford to separate
from the group.

No other group of émigré Social Democrats has at its
disposal a German language newspaper such as the Neue
Volkszeitung which, so Seger assures us, has a circulation
between 20,000 and 25,000. It is scarcely correct to describe
all the members of the German Labor Delegation as representing
the extreme right wing of the Old Social Democratic Party.
Such a description scarcely applies to Aufhaeuser, Dr.
Staudinger, and Dr. Rinner. The last two, however, rarely
attend the meetings of the group. What is common to them
all, however, is a very genuine fear of the penetration of
Communists or secret Communists into the organization of the
Social Democratic Party. Scarcely less great is their fear
of former Communists who, while they have broken with the
German Communist Party, still adhere to the principle of
dictatorship and resort to the tactics of forming
secret cliques within the Social Democratic Party. In view
of their unhappy experience with such cliques during the
period of the early underground struggle against the Hitler
regime, this fear is intelligible. This fear goes far toward
explaining their resolute opposition to Paul Hagen and the
Neu Beginnen group which constituted such a clique in the
early days of the underground movement.

When the German Labor Delegation was organized in 1938
it was the only organized group of German political refugees
in the United States. The vast majority of the active German
Social Democratic political refugees now living in the
United States, however, arrived in 1940 after the fall of
France when the German underground organizations collapsed.
If the claim of the German Labor Delegation to represent the
Social Democratic Party in the United States was legitimate
and plausible enough in 1938, in 1942 when literally hundreds
of Social Democrats were in the country, this claim was no
longer recognized by all Social Democrats. To escape from
this somewhat ridiculous situation, certain members of this
body proposed opening the ranks of the Delegation to new-
comers. However, a group in the Delegation, composed of
Grzesinski, Brauer, Seger and Katz, refused to accept this
proposal partly because of their Neue Volkszeitung con-
nections, partly because the surrender of an entrenched
position involved loss of influence and leadership to others
whose loyalty to the old Social Democratic leadership they
had good reasons to suspect. It was agreed to advise the
other refugees Social Democrats in the United States to join
the German Language Branch of the Social Democratic Federation.
Only a few responded to this invitation, the great majority
remaining unattached. When the pressure for the extension
of the German Labor Delegation once more became acute in the
autumn of 1941, Grzesinski, Brauer, Seger and Katz, with the
support of others not members of the Delegation, proposed
the creation of an entirely new organization of German
political refugees, the Association of Free Germans, which
was to include all the parties which had supported the Weimar
Republic. Largely because this same group of the German
Labor Delegation, Grzesinski, Brauer, Seger, and Katz, promptly
moved in to control this new organization, the Association of
Free Germans never really came to life. They did, however,
succeed in persuading other Social Democrats, who were not
members of the German Labor Delegation, to become members
of this new organization. Approximately twenty of the twenty
eight members of the Association of Free Germans, are Social
Democrats. Four of the seven members of the Board of Directors
of this organization are also members of the German Labor
Delegation. Apart from issuing its declaration of October 1942,
The Association of Free Germans has been inactive. Some of
its committees have never met.

In the meantime two original members of the German
Labor Delegation, Wilhelm Sollmann, former Minister of the
Interior of the Reich and perhaps the ablest Social Democrat
in the United States, and Professor Alfred Kaehler had resigned.
When, finally, three members of the original Executive Com-
mittee of the Social Democratic Party, Georg Dietrich,
Paul Hertz, and Marie Juchais arrived in the United States,
and either refused or were denied membership in the German
Labor Delegation, the fact the members of this body
represented only themselves and their supporters in the
Association of Free Germans, the Neue Volkszeitung corpora-
tion, and a small group in the German Language Branch of the
Social Democratic Federation but scarcely the Social Democratic Party, became fully apparent.

In the meantime Paul Hagen (Karl Frank) and the Socialists
of the Neu Beginnen group were shrewd enough to exploit this
neglect of the great body of Social Democratic political
refugees on the part of the German Labor Delegation. Anxious
to build up his following, Hagen collected funds to bring
old members of the Neu Beginnen group to the United States
and found employment for them after their arrival. Thanks
to his political and organizing ability, his undeniable
personal charm and apparent sincerity, his great energy and
persistence, he succeeded in enlarging the original nucleus
of the Neu Beginnen group (about 20) which consisted largely
of the members of his former underground organization, by
winning over a considerable number of older Social Democrats

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such as Dr. Hans Hirschfeld and Haass as open supporters or sympathizers. Being something of a political opportunist, he did not inquire too closely into the views of his supporters. His progress was all the greater because he shrewdly did not insist on registered membership. The result was that the group which gathered around him was rather heterogeneous. It has also exposed him to the charge of political opportunism. He had already obtained the active support of Jakob Walcher and the twenty odd former members of the left wing SAP living in the United States. He achieved his greatest success, however, when he won the active support of three of the five members of the original Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Party living in the United States, Georg Dietrich, Paul Hertz and Marie Juchacz. When more than 150 political refugees, including Social Democrats, members of the SAP and ISK, regularly attended the evening sessions of the German Language Group of the American Friends of German Freedom, Paul Hagen, and Neu Beginnen had become a formidable power in the German political emigration of the United States. Not all those who attended his meetings became his open supporters. But in an informal way he had achieved a unity among German emigre Socialists comparable to that of the London "Union."

With such a following behind him Paul Hagen openly challenged the authority of the German Labor Delegation alone to represent German Social Democrats in the United States. Alarmed on their part by this rapid growth of Hagen's influence, Grzesinski, Brauer, Seger, and Katz began to attack the Neu Beginnen movement in all its aspects. This quarrel must be reserved for later discussion. Suffice it to say here that, if Paul Hagen is today, next to ex-chancellor Bruening, the most publicized figure in the German emigration in the United States this is in large measure due to the publicity which the Neue Volkszeitung has given him.

No one was more regretfully conscious of the neglect of the large body of former Social Democrats in the United States by the German Labor Delegation than Max Brauer and Siegfried Aufhaeuser, the two chairmen of that body. In the spring of 1943 they sought a belated remedy for the situation by calling a conference or Landeskonferenz of all those political exiles in the United States who belonged to the Social Democratic Party on 30 January 1933. Thus stated, the project for the conference already fell short of the program of the London "Union," for this meant the exclusion of SAP and ISK. But even to call upon all former Social Democrats to attend the conference appeared to invite disaster in view of the strength of Neu Beginnen. The members of the Delegation, therefore, struck upon the expedient of setting up a special invitation committee to examine credentials. This committee, composed of two members from the German Labor Delegation, two members from the Neue Volkszeitung corporation, and two from the German Language Branch of the Social Democratic Federation and two American citizens, could be safely relied upon to exclude any Social Democrat not approved by the German Labor Delegation.

If a conference, called under such auspices, could be expected to be reasonably safe, the attempt to pack the meeting had become so obvious, that the three members of the Executive Committee of the Party, Georg Dietrich, Paul Hertz,
and Marie Juchacca, supported by seventy-two other members of the Social Democratic Party, addressed a formal letter of protest to the German Labor Delegation, announcing their refusal to attend such a conference. The letter dated 30 June 1943 itself is worth quoting:

"We, the undersigned (Georg Dietrich, Paul Hertz, Marie Juchacca), members of the Parteivorstand elected in Germany in 1939, the only legal Party body of the old Social Democratic movement in Germany, refuse for ourselves and in the name of seventy-two other members of the SPD to participate in the conference to be held on 3 July 1943. It is manifest from the form and content of the invitation that those calling the conference do not intend to hold a real Landeskonferenz in which all former members of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, now living in the United States, have a right to participate, but to call a meeting of well-disposed guests. Therefore, we asked those calling the conference to summon a genuinely democratic meeting instead. We were guided by the hope that such a conference might be the first step towards a "union" such as exists in London and Stockholm. Both in London and Stockholm all Social Democratic groups are united and work together on problems which must be solved after the downfall of Hitler. Those summoning the July conference have declined to take any step leading toward joint action and any cooperation with the groups and persons (meaning, Paul Hagen and Neu Beginnen) who did have and shall have real communication with the underground in Germany."

In this document the members of the German Labor Delegation were charged with undemocratic conduct by a majority of the members of the Social Democratic Party Executive in the United States. While he himself remained discreetly in the background, Paul Hagen allowed the members of the Party Executive to fight his battle for him. That this shrewd political tactician was, nonetheless, the prime mover of this stinging protest, there can be no doubt. Once Paul Hertz, a loyal supporter of Neu Beginnen and a pliable tool in the hands of Paul Hagen, had taken the lead, Georg Dietrich and Marie Juchacca, who had troubles of their own with the German Labor Delegation, needed little persuasion. Nor was it difficult to round up seventy-two former Social Democrats among the supporters of the Neu Beginnen.

The "Landeskonferenz" duly met on 3 July 1943, and was a publicity success, for it was not intended to be mere than that. Speeches were delivered and resolutions passed -- but the situation was left as it was before. Whether the conference succeeded in "creating an impression in Washington" -- so Dr. H. Staudinger ironically described its principal purpose -- must still remain a matter of doubt.

From what has already been said the difference between the German Social Democrats in London and the members of the German Labor Delegation in New York must be apparent. The Delegation recognizes the authority of the Parteivorstand in London and contributes, through the agency of the Jewish Labor Committee, to its financial support. For the rest, those members of the German Labor Delegation, who belong to the extreme right wing of the Social Democratic Old Guard, appear to be at loggerheads with the London group on almost every major issue. In London Vogel and Ollenauer have been

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cooperating effectively with left wing Socialists as represented by SAP and Neu Beginnen. There the old quarrels of the period of their underground struggle have been largely forgotten. In New York the German Labor Delegation has not only refused to collaborate with the SAP but has widened the gap which previously existed between it and the Neu Beginnen group. Hans Vogel and the members of the London Spade admit that the old Social Democratic Party in Germany is irretrievably gone and contend that the most urgent task of the German Socialist emigration is to prepare the foundations for a new united German labor party which will embrace all former Socialist groups, including former Communists. Friedrich Stamper and his colleagues in New York, on the other hand, are preoccupied with the preservation of the old Social Democratic Party as it existed in 1932, without any modification of its program or change in its leadership. Stamper and Grzesinski have denounced Vogel and the London Spade for having abandoned the great Social Democratic tradition by accepting the program of the London Union. They requested their London colleagues to break off their relations with the SAP and Neu Beginnen groups. Impressed by the ubiquitous influence of Neu Beginnen in the United States, they now accuse their London colleagues of having succumbed to its influence also. With the exception of Aufhäuser and Staudinger, the members of the Delegation are alarmed by the recent leftist tendencies of their official London leaders.

It may very well be that Brauer and Aufhäuser, the two new chairmen, may inject new life into the work of the German Labor Delegation which hitherto has wasted its energies in defending itself and attacking others. But the very existence of two coordinate chairmen is indicative of a certain lack of unity between the two factions which has paralyzed the German Labor Delegation for the past two years. While numerous plans and studies on post-war Germany have been produced in London and Sweden, not a single important study or document has yet emerged from the German Labor Delegation.
VIII. NEU BEGINNEN

At first glance the feud between the German Labor Delegation and Neu Beginnen is a purely local quarrel over the controversial personality of Paul Hagen (Dr. Karl Frank) that has no counterpart in London or Sweden. In reality it is the re-enactment on American soil of the old quarrel between the Sapade and its dissident Socialist groups in the early German underground movement of which Otto Bauer, the well known Austrian Socialist, has given the only authentic and neutral description in his Die Illegale Partei, published secretly in Paris in 1939, shortly after the author's death.

The visier and more thoughtful members of the German Labor Delegation, notably Max Brauer, are acutely aware of this and have discontenmented Seger's and Katz's attacks on Paul Hagen's character, attacks denouncing him as dishonest (in the matter of underground reports), as a thief (in the administration of underground funds), or as a criminal (referring to the short prison sentence pronounced against Hagen in his Communist days in the middle twenties when he forcibly detained the Social Democrat Schwers to allow a Communist to speak over the radio in his stead). On Max Brauer's insistence these personal attacks have now been discontinued, at least publicly, as futile and undignified. The struggle continues as one over principles and general political outlook.

In the following discussion it is well to keep in mind that the group which today gathers around the person of Paul Hagen can scarcely any longer be identified with the original Neu Beginnen group. Between 1935 and 1940 this group was essentially an underground organization. In 1943 the overwhelming majority of Hagen's supporters are Social Democrats who never had any connections with Neu Beginnen. While there are no more than twenty people from the Neu Beginnen group now in New York.

No German underground movement between 1933 and 1939 was really effective. But if we are to accept Otto Bauer's testimony, Neu Beginnen, even though small and little known, possessed one of the most efficient underground organizations in Germany before 1939. He is even inclined to regard it as superior to that of the Sapade just as in many ways the Neu Beginnen Die Nachrichten were superior to the Grune Hefte.

Like the Italian Giustizia e Liberta and the Austrian Revolutionary Socialists with whom it was closely allied, Neu Beginnen arose as a dissident group within the Social Democratic Party and did not itself, like the SAP, aspire to be a party. Its early members were shaken by the completeness of the defeat of the Socialist movement and the equally thorough triumph of Fascism. This utter collapse of the Socialist parties was the point of departure of their criticism. They said, we are not merely a continuation of the old Social Democratic Party but represent something new. The old mass party has been utterly defeated and disrupted and its official leaders have been discredited along with their reformism and opportunism both at home and abroad. There must be a new beginning, a Neu Beginnen, with new ideas and principles, a new spirit, new tactics, and above all new leaders. There must be a renovation along more radical Marxist lines and an adaptation of party organization
to the necessities of an underground struggle. The new leaders who emerge from the brutally selective process of the underground struggle against Hitler will be the new leaders of the coming German labor party. Mass underground movements are a failure under Fascism. The new underground party must be a cadre party, composed of small units of elite leaders, highly disciplined and trained in Marxism and in revolutionary technique. Professors of revolution, their opponents derisively called them.

Underground operations must of necessity be conducted by younger men, and it is the height of injustice, when Paul Hagen accuses older well known men such as Otto Weis, Max Brauer, or Friedrich Stumpfer of never having risked their lives in underground activities. On the other hand it is equally unjust when these older Social Democrats of the German Labor Delegation, who did not participate in the underground movement, and have little knowledge of it, denounce Neu Beginnen as a band of conspirators. Indeed, to train themselves in the art of anti-Nazi conspiracy was the central purpose of the schools which Neu Beginnen established everywhere on the frontiers of Germany. Lenin's phrase of "democratic centralism" describes most aptly their party organization; their leaders were anonymous and known only to a few. Their rigid code of personal discipline and secrecy was forced upon them by the nature of their work. No doubt, they were careless at times. But that was true of the Sopade also. On two occasions agents of the Gestapo, one named Schwab and another named Schmann, wormed their way into the office of the Sopade in Prague. The latter, we are told, delivered into the hands of the Gestapo hundreds of photostatic copies of biographies and reports which newly arrived refugees had submitted to the Social Democratic Relief Center in Prague.

Far from regarding them as reckless, Otto Bauer admired the minute prescriptions by which the members of Neu Beginnen subjected their private lives to the needs of anti-Nazi conspiracy. They issued instructions prohibiting the use of alcoholic beverages, on conducting their private correspondence, on the choice and change of places of residence, on the preservation of subversive literature, and particularly on secrecy about the structure and work of the organization. No member knew more about the network and activities of the organization than was necessary for the performance of his partial task. They assumed false names, which many of them still retain. They developed a special party language which no one else could understand. Those who violated the discipline of conspiratorial conduct were quickly eliminated. They were trained much in the manner of a soldier in a modern army. Some of their units were discovered, some of their members are still serving sentences in Nazi prison camps. Dr. Eliasberg, now employed in OWI, mentions a single case of a Nazi spy penetrating their network, and contends that he did not get near the center. Even today, two years after the disruption of their underground organization, no Neu Beginnen member communicates with another member in a different country through the mails.

In the past ten years Neu Beginnen passed through three successive evolutionary stages: the Miles Group, the organization of Neu Beginnen in 1935, and finally its
activities since the collapse of the underground. Today the members of Neu Beginnen protest against being identified with the Milsa Group. It is nonetheless true, that Neu Beginnen emerged from this group. Walter Loewenheim (alias Milsa) organized this discussion group in 1931 in Germany as the disaster was approaching. The Milsa Group was composed largely of members of the former Social Democratic youth organizations, younger members of the Social Democratic Party, young trade unionists, and some members of SAP. There were three former Communists in the group: Walter Loewenheim, Richard Loewenthal (alias Paul Serling now in London) and Paul Hagen (Dr. Karl Frank). Paul Hagen had left the Communist Party in 1929, and he joined this group before he was accepted as a member of the Social Democratic Party in the autumn of 1932 (there are so many witnesses to Hagen's membership in the Social Democratic Party in the United States that the fact no longer appears open to serious doubt). The purpose of the group was to prepare a new theoretical program which was to be as critical of the Party Executive Committee as it was of the Comintern. Beyond that, the intention of the group seems to have been the organization of a left wing within the Social Democratic Party to force a more radical Marxist policy upon its leaders. The discussions of the group were secret, which may account for some of the resentments which later developed. The group had not yet completed its work when Hitler came to power, but there were already a sufficient number of units in the larger cities and industrial districts of Germany to enable it to go underground.

In the meantime Milsa-Loewenheim had written a pamphlet, entitled Neu Beginnen, which was published in Carlsbad in 1934 with funds granted by the official Sopade. The fact that the Sopade released the funds for the publication of this able but radical pamphlet is indicative of the radicalism of the Milsa Group which was quite common even among older Social Democrats in the days immediately after the collapse of the Weimar Republic. According to Paul Hagen, this pamphlet was the expression of Milsa-Loewenheim's personal thought and was written without previous consultation with others.

The argument of the Milsa Neu Beginnen pamphlet runs briefly as follows. Mass proletarian labor parties, because they are controlled by trade union pressure groups, have not and cannot advance beyond democratic and trade unionist objectives. For this reason the central European labor parties of the post-war period were not revolutionary parties. These parties never really challenged the political and economic power of those classes which later exploited the crisis during the period of depression to facilitate the transfer of governmental authority to Fascism. But this did not happen in Russia where no mass labor parties existed before the Soviet Revolution. Quite to the contrary, there were only small units of highly trained Marxists and Socialists who were preparing for a revolutionary struggle against Czarism. These small units, working together, succeeded in the course of the revolution in acquiring an effective leadership over the revolutionary masses. Taking advantage of a spontaneous revolution, they set the goal for this revolution which no longer aimed at merely democratic and trade unionist objectives. They destroyed capitalism, conquered political power, and established a Socialist society. Therefore, so argues Milsa, no spontaneous uprising of the
masses can ever lead to a Socialist revolution. This can be done only by the combination of these highly trained local units into a rigidly centralized and disciplined revolutionary party. While Miles was as critical of the Comintern as were the other Social Democrats, he nonetheless demanded a single-party dictatorship. The most important function of an underground movement in Nazi Germany, he argued, was to train such cadres which, once they were combined into a rigidly centralized party, could take up the struggle with Nazi dictatorship.

We are not concerned here with the validity of the argument contained in the Miles pamphlet. However, it cannot be surprising, if the views expressed in this pamphlet were subsequently attributed to the Neu Beginnen group. In the United States these views have been dogging the footsteps of the members of Neu Beginnen ever since their arrival, So long as there was no official repudiation one can scarcely blame the Labor Delegation for being suspicious. Max Brauer of the Labor Delegation still charges them with retaining the Miles program, notwithstanding the fact that the Neu Beginnen pamphlet, Der Kommende Weltkrieg, written by Loeventhal together with some Austrian Revolutionary Socialists, definitely repudiated the Miles-Loevenheim doctrine of a single-party dictatorship in 1939. In 1940 Erwin Schoettle, the head of the London Auslandsburo of Neu Beginnen, clearly repudiated the same doctrine in his Neu Beginnen, Wie Es Wurde, published in London. Hagen himself repudiated it. The latter states that Miles-Loevenheim had lost influence in this discussion group already in 1934. In June 1935, a secret conference of all the various units of the Miles Group was held in Berlin. On this occasion a majority voted in favor of the democratic process and against the single-party dictatorship views of Miles, who then retired from the group.

This 1935 conference also marks the official organization of the Neu Beginnen group as an independent underground organization. It was decided to establish an Auslandsburo in Prague but within the framework of the Social Democratic Party in exile. The conference despatched a delegate, named Falk, to Brussels in July 1935 to notify the Bureau of the Labor and Socialist International of this decision. At the same time Falk carried with him a statement explaining the principles of the Neu Beginnen group.

Since Neu Beginnen was one of the few organizations which opposed the emigration en masse of its members, there were two governing bodies, the Central Committee in Berlin and the Auslandsburo in Prague. It is not probable that the former survived 1941, but the latter subsequently moved to Paris, where it had the support of Leon Blum, and in 1940 to London, where it still remains.

In view of the disastrous experience of the Sopade with its mass underground movement, Neu Beginnen was and remained an organization of cadres, not all of which were in continuous contact with one another or with the Auslandsburo. Besides the original nucleus of the Miles Group, the composition of which has already been discussed, the following units were either part of or cooperated with the Neu Beginnen underground organization: the remnants of the former Religious Socialists, led by Dr. Paul Tillich, with approximately twenty centers in

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Germany; the Berlin Socialist Youth organization and through its last secretary, Erich Schmidt, now in Boston, Socialist Youth units in all parts of Germany; a surviving group of younger trade unionists of whom Bernard Tauer, now employed in O.N., was the most conspicuous representative; surviving elements of the former Socialist Student organization; several local groups of the Social Democratic Party; and the so-called Ten Point Group, consisting of older functionaries of the Social Democratic Party with affiliations all over Germany. The Central Committee in Berlin was also connected with several other groups of trade unionists, railway men, construction workers, transport workers, and, especially, through the S.A.P., with metal workers.

A mere glance at this list is sufficient to explain the accusation of the Sopade that Neu Beginnen was poaching on its own ground. It will also explain the rooted conviction of Neu Beginnen members to the effect that the old Social Democratic Party in Germany had gone to pieces. It is not at all improbable that they helped along this process of disintegration. Presently, the Sopade made the charge that Neu Beginnen was resorting to the Communist tactics of forming secret cells of its own supporters within the Social Democratic Party. Max Breuer still repeats this accusation. The members of Neu Beginnen most immediately affected by this charge, Erwin Schoettle, Knoerrelling, Eoeglter, W. Klaft, Paul Anderson (all now in England) and Haas (now in the United States) offer the following reply to his charge. They were, like Dr. Hans Hirschfeld, who has now joined Neu Beginnen in New York, frontier organizers of the Sopade in the various countries on the frontiers of Germany. Once they convinced themselves that Neu Beginnen was doing superior underground work, they became members of this new organization. They did not, however, in each case announce this new affiliation to the Sopade, because they, so at least they say, did not consider this office in Prague sufficiently responsible in view of the previous penetration into it of two agents of the Gestapo. Because of the secrecy which still envelopes their past underground activities it is impossible to verify the truth of these statements today.

After a brief period of cooperation, during which Neu Beginnen shared in the funds of the Sopade, the two organizations were at loggerheads along the whole line. It was a contest between two political programs, a competition between an older and a younger generation of Social Democrats, a competition for members and units inside Germany and for supporters among political emigres, a contest between two theories of underground organization. It is, perhaps, natural that the resentments among the older members of the Sopade were more intense. On one occasion Otto Wels, the late chairman of the Executive Committee of the Sopade, is reported to have denounced the entire underground organization of Germany as being Communist. This did not, however, prevent Friedrich Stamper from telling reporters in New York that they had a correspondent in every German factory. Certain less careful members of the German Labor Delegation, but no longer a majority, still apply the designation of crypto-Communists to the Neu Beginnen group. A careful examination of their membership lists, however, indicates that less than 5 percent of Neu Beginnen is composed of former Communists. Nor is it accurate when applied to their
general political outlook. In Great Britain Hans Vogel, Erich Ollenhauer, B. F. Heine and Wilhelm Sander have long since ceased to utter similar charges even in the case of Loewenthal-Sering who might be suspected of Communist leanings. With the exception of four members of the German Labor Delegation, no one in the entire German emigration of New York whose opinion is worth listening to, today suspects Paul Hagen of being anything but a left wing Social Democrat.

Cut off from the official party funds of the Sopade, Neu Beginnen developed its own finances. In this it was remarkably successful, owing chiefly to the tireless energy and shrewd tactics of Paul Hagen. It was not long before a sharp antagonism between the Sopade and Neu Beginnen developed in this matter also. Between 1935 and 1940 the group collected, in addition to membership dues, the following sums: 40,000 German marks from the Sopade before it discontinued its financial support; 5,000 Swiss francs from the Swiss trade unions and the Swiss Social Democratic Party; 90,000 French francs from Leon Blum; 50,000 Czech crowns chiefly from the Sudeten German Social Democratic Party; £500 from England, largely a personal gift from Sir Stafford Cripps; and between $96,000 and $100,000 from the United States.

These figures are merely approximations. The members of the German Labor Delegation, notably Gerhart Seger, have charged Hagen with collecting these sums under false pretenses, and contend that he presented himself frequently as the "leader" of the German underground movement." Hagen, on the other hand contends that he never collected money except for the Neu Beginnen underground group. In the upshot, it appears that the severest criticism that can be directed against Paul Hagen is that he did yield to the temptation of allowing himself to be presented as the leader of the German underground. Whether he was in each case personally responsible for this kind of publicity or whether it must not rather be laid to the door of Reinhold Niebuhr, his principal American sponsor since the death of Charnley Viadeck, is another matter.

Paul Hagen was shrewd enough to place the administration of these mounting sums into the hands of a committee composed of Paul Hertz (as chairman), Boegler and himself. Paul Hertz, assumed his new duties as the treasurer of Neu Beginnen only after full discussion with the Secretariat of the Labor and Socialist International. This body, no more favorably disposed to the Sopade in 1935 than it is in 1943, encouraged Hertz to accept. Hertz, it will be recalled, was also a member of the Executive Committee of the Sopade. He had informed the members of the Committee of his close affiliations with the Neu Beginnen group, and until 1938 no one seems to have voiced any objections. So far as can be ascertained it does not appear probable that Hertz informed the Sopade of his functions as treasurer of Neu Beginnen. His conduct was described as unethical. At all events, when the Sopade moved to Paris in 1939 Otto Wels insisted on Hertz's withdrawal from the Committee. Hertz assures us that it was his opposition to Sopade financing that drove him into cooperation with Neu Beginnen.

He objected to the expensive apparatus of the Sopade in Prague and still contends that Neu Beginnen spent larger sums for underground work in Germany. Neu Beginnen salaries, he states, were smaller by a third, and pure relief funds were held to a minimum. It also appears that Neu Beginnen granted funds of its own to Social Democratic groups in and outside of Germany.
By 1939 the Neu Beginnen Auslandsburo in Paris had contacts through its 'frontier secretaries' with nine groups in Bavaria, five groups in Silesia, three groups in Württemberg, two groups in the Palatinate, two units in Saxony besides its connections with the Central Committee in Berlin, which in turn had connections with the same and other units. The foreign headquarters of the underground organizations of the German miners and of the Rhineland textile workers were also connected with the Auslandsburo of Neu Beginnen. Up to 1939 it regularly despatched couriers to Germany to visit the center in Berlin and sometimes local units. These couriers were either Swiss, Norwegians, British, French, American, or Czech citizens, including Germans. It also arranged for regular visits from Germany to the Auslandsburo or to its frontier schools in France, Belgium and Czechoslovakia.

Anticipating the outbreak of the war, Neu Beginnen set up outposts for war-time contact in Norway, Finland, Switzerland, and Belgium. But contacts across the frontiers broke down completely with the outbreak of the war in 1939. Only a few direct messages from Berlin and Munich reached the outside world in 1940 and 1941. Nothing is known today of the survival of the various units in Germany. Erwin Schoettle was expelled from Switzerland, as were two other members of the Neu Beginnen underground group. The bureau in Oslo was liquidated during the German invasion, and Tauer, who had escaped to Stockholm, was brought to the United States, because it was feared that Sweden, too, could not remain neutral. The Neu Beginnen group in Holland was killed when the Gestapo followed in the wake of the German armies, while those in Belgium managed to escape to Great Britain.

There is no need to dwell here on the developments in the Neu Beginnen group since 1940, as these have been discussed in another connection. However, a few comments on Paul Hagen's position in the German Socialist emigration should be made. There is today no important ideological difference between Paul Hagen and the great body of Social Democratic exiles. In the past five years Hagen has definitely moved to the right, while the London and Stockholm groups have moved just as definitely to the left.

There are some Socialist emigres who have no connections with the German labor Delegation who regard him as a political opportunist. There is much in his conduct since his arrival in the United States that lends color to this view. His effort to adapt his propaganda to the conservative American political psychology is obvious. The difference between the argument of Der Kommende Weltkrieg of 1939, which he did not write but to which he subscribed, and his Um die Vollendung der Demokratischen Revolution, which he wrote in 1943, must be patent to every careful reader. His effort to accumulate mere numbers of supporters is evidence of opportunism. In this matter the conduct of the German Labor Delegation has been more consistent.

When the London Union accepted the program for a new unified German labor party, thus abandoning the moorings of the old Social Democratic Party, it thereby placed its stamp of approval on the Neu Beginnen program. Thus, if Friedrich Stamper complains that his London Friends have fallen under Neu Beginnen influence, he is not so wide of the mark. This also applies to the German Social Democrats in Sweden who have
been cooperating cordially with the SAP group, the closest friends of Neu Beginnen. The composition of the Neu Beginnen group in New York is very much like that of the London Union. It is rather the German Labor Delegation which, because of its opposition to the unity program of the London Union, is in danger of becoming isolated in the German Socialist emigration today. Except for certain members of the German Labor Delegation, Paul Hagen is today much less critical of the Social Democratic leaders who have learned to adapt themselves than he was in 1935. He still hopes that Siegfried Aufhaeuser and Dr. Hans Staadinger, with whom he has neither a personal nor an ideological quarrel, will one day cooperate openly with him. Aufhaeuser has personal objections to Hagen. Dr. Staadinger, however, has informed his colleagues in the German Labor Delegation of his intention to remain on a cordial footing with Hagen. Like the Fight for Freedom group in London, Hagen today directs his principal criticism against the old Majority Socialists (Mehrheitssozialisten), the "Kaiser's Socialists", who represent the nationalist traditions of the last war, who prostrated themselves before the militarists under the Republic and brutally suppressed all left wing elements within the Social Democratic Party. He does not stand alone in the German emigration in regarding Grzesinski, Stumper and Brauer as representing this tradition. But when Hagen today demands a more thoroughgoing democracy within the Party and its Parteiorganisation, or a more generous tolerance of left wing factions within the Party, he is demanding nothing that is not already part of the program of the London Union. His lieutenants in London, Loewenthal-Sering and Schoettle, have been more successful than he has been in the United States.

Because of his former affiliation with the Communist Party Paul Hagen's struggle for leadership in the German Socialist emigration has been beset with enormous difficulties, difficulties which some regard as insuperable. He has far too many personal enemies to stand the slightest chance of ever becoming the unifier of the German political emigration in the United States. For this reason he never permits his identity as a leader of the German underground movement to become obscured. He is a product of this movement, and his activities during his secret journeys into Germany between 1933 and 1939, constitute, in his own mind, the only real basis for his claims to leadership.

In the mind of Paul Hagen the underground movement is inseparably connected with the prime function of a political emigration. The political and propaganda activities of an exile organization have meaning only insofar as they depend upon an intimate connection with the opposition movement inside Germany. For a political emigration to pose as the "German Opposition" in England, Russia, and the United States without a real connection with the opposition movement inside Germany is to Paul Hagen political charlatanry. It is also political suicide, for it signalizes the deflection of a political emigration from its primary tasks. To be completely cut off from the political opposition in Germany is to be condemned to political futility. This is the ghost which never ceases to haunt Hagen. It will also explain his frantic efforts to enlist the support of the British and American Governments for his underground movement. He still contends that before the German emigration, which he generally regards as intellectually sterile and politically unproductive, can do any intelligent planning for a post-war Germany, it must recover its contacts.
with the German underground movement. To recover these lost contacts is and will remain Paul Hagen's strongest political aspiration.

Having thus far failed in this, the next most important function of a political emigration, according to Hagen, is the selection, education, and political training of the most useful elements in this emigration. This, in his mind, is the chief function of the regular fortnightly evening meetings of the German Language Group of the American Friends of German Freedom, sponsored by Reinhold Niebuhr. Between 130 and 200 German emigres of all political persuasions regularly attend these meetings. To these meetings he invites even his enemies of the Neue Volkszeitung and the German Labor Delegation. The function of these meetings is less to draft concrete plans such as Fritz Tarnow's plans for the transformation of the Nazi Labor Front into trade unions and for a provisional government than to provide basic political training and discussion both for himself and his audience.

In the late spring of 1943 he submitted to these mixed audiences the latest formulation of his political program under the title Germany after Hitler, The Completion of the Democratic Revolution (Um die Vollendung der demokratischen Revolution) for criticism and discussion. He is now engaged in re-writing this program on the basis of these discussions.

This document represents in many ways the most realistic analysis of the situation that has yet emerged from the organized sector of the German emigration. Hagen no longer shares the naive optimism of the London Social Democrats to the extent that the United Nations will support the Social Democratic Party as "the only honorable democratic movement in Germany. The total defeat of Germany implies total military occupation and a German revolution, if there is to be a revolution, that will depend on the tolerance or support of Great Britain, the United States, and above all of Soviet Russia. Hagen proceeds on the assumption that Russia as the strongest continental power will support only such a German revolution which would be in the undoubted interest of Russian reconstruction and Russian hegemony. For this reason he is profoundly skeptical of the democratic character of the Free German Manifesto of 21 July 1943. Unreserved confidence could be reposed in such an appeal only if a joint United Nations support guaranteed the genuinely democratic character of such a German revolution. Since the victorious Stalin will scarcely surrender his twenty-five year old opposition to Social Democracy, no democratic and Socialist German revolution can expect any active assistance from Russia. Hagen is thoroughly convinced that if the program of the Free German Manifesto is put into effect, he himself
as a renegade Communist will never be permitted to return to Germany. /1/ No German Social Democrat, he thinks, would survive such a revolution. Even national self-determination would be lost, and Germany would be developed in accordance with Russian interests.

Hagen further contends that Great Britain and the United States cannot be expected to support a genuinely Socialist revolution in Germany. Both Powers are primarily interested in European stability and might be expected to oppose any social revolutionary movement in Germany that could threaten this stability, even though democratization of Germany requires the disruption of finance capitalism and monopoly ownership. Hagen regards a purely western solution of the German problem as no less unfortunate than a purely Russian solution. Such a solution would transform Germany into a bulwark against Bolshevism and would merely strengthen the privileged and reactionary classes in Germany, the heavy industrialists, the higher civil servants, and the large landowners. Hagen expects the United States to observe a benevolent neutrality toward Russia, so long as the war with Japan continues. He thinks it unlikely that the United States will play a decisive role on the European continent; it will rather seek some arrangement that will prevent the expansion of Bolshevism to Germany. Once assured on this point, the United States will meet Russian demands in Northern and Eastern Europe.

Hagen, therefore, sees the most favorable chance for an autonomous German democratic development in a joint military occupation by the United States, Great Britain, and Russia, in which all partners would share an equal responsibility. Provided the Allies do not intend to disrupt Germany territorially, which Hagen like every other German Socialist vigorously opposes, he is generally of the opinion that the greater the unity among the Allies the more favorable will be the opportunity for a democratic German development.

This, of course, is not and cannot be a substitute for the minimum program of a German democratic and Socialist party such as Hagen has in mind. He, like every other German Socialist who stands to the left of Grzesinski, Hoeltermann, and Brauer is convinced that the democratization of Germany

1/ It has recently been reported that in connection with the German Section of the Free World Congress Paul Hagen has advocated the formation in the United States of a Committee of Free Germans. He stated that he wanted no Free German Committee after the Moscow pattern, controlled by Communists but a committee which would be representative of all the sections of the German political emigration, and headed by some person like Thomas Mann. Such a committee would include Catholics like Werner Thornmann, the members of the German Labor Delegation, and even the people from the German American Emergency Conference, which contains some Communists and fellow-travellers. This is, to be sure, no Free German Committee on the Moscow pattern, but it is one which would include some Communists and fellow-travellers. By advocating their inclusion Paul Hagen has departed from the behavior pattern laid down by the London Union. By advocating such a Committee he also betrayed signal lack of political imagination, for he should know that the German Labor Delegation would never endorse a movement of this description. Except for Sweden, no organized German Socialist group anywhere has gone on record as cooperating with German Communists.
is impossible without a social revolution aimed at the heavy industrialists, bankers, large landowners, and high civil servants. So long as the Allies demand Hitler's unconditional surrender but recoil, as Russia does not, from the propaganda of revolution, Hagen thinks there is nothing to be done but to support the Allied war effort. He has convinced himself that, for the moment, the Allies are confident of defeating and occupying Germany without being compelled to have recourse to the incisive changes which constitute the minimum program of the German Socialist emigration and of the German Socialist underground movement.

Up to a certain point, however, Hagen insists on identity in the objectives of the Allied forces of military occupation and of a German revolution. If the United Nations execute their present occupation program thoroughly, they cannot do otherwise than perform some of the tasks of a revolution. All the most important sanctions of an army of occupation must of necessity be directed against the present ruling Nazi classes. If the Nazi criminals are thoroughly swept out of the civil-service, business, and the Wehrmacht, if the Nazi party and its affiliated organizations such as the SA and SS and their monopoly business interests are thoroughly dissolved much of the work will have been done. Moreover, it is probable, he contends, that the occupation forces will seize German heavy industries and other monopoly property by way of temporary or permanent confiscation. However anti-revolutionary the Allied occupation may be, it will restore civil liberties and freedom of political discussion.
IX. GERMAN SOCIALIST GROUPS AND THE PROBLEMS OF POST-WAR GERMANY.

When on 6 December 1942, the London Union took the decisive step to lay the foundation for a new united German Socialist party, it removed the most serious reason for the quarrel between the Sopade and the other Socialist groups. Once the Sopade had abandoned its legalistic position of representing the old Social Democratic Party and admitted that membership in the new party could not be determined by membership in the old one, a substantial basis for unity had been found. Owing to the conciliatory leadership of Enderle and Tarnow the quarrel had never been acute in Sweden. It survived only in New York because of a peculiar and local situation, but here, too, the quarrel will lose its importance once the London decisions filter down to the rank and file of format Social Democrats. So long as intellectual leadership among German Socialists remains in London, it is not likely that the decisions of the Union will be reversed. While the sharp competition for leadership remains, there exists today a substantial unity among all German Socialist groups,

This substantial unity appears to be greater still as soon as their attitude on the major problems of post-war Germany is singled out for special discussion. They profess both democracy and Socialism. All of them, including a majority in the German Labor Delegation, are in agreement on the necessity of a social revolution as a prime condition for the establishment of a peaceful and democratic Germany. They differ at most on the methods by which this is to be done. In one way or another this implies the nationalization of heavy industry, high finance, and the large landed estates, and a thorough coming-out of all reactionary and Nazi civil servants.

"These measures," states the London Union in its resolution of 6 December 1942, "must be taken at once by virtue of the right of revolution." Concrete proposals for the execution of these measures must be prepared in the interim period immediately after the German defeat. The methods finally employed in expropriating and compensating former owners, the nature of future administration and control, cannot, it is argued, be determined by the German emigration but must be decided upon in Germany. Again, all German Socialist groups agree that this social revolution can be only a part of a more comprehensive program for the eventual conversion the Nazi war economy into a non-imperialistic consumption economy (Reparationswirtschaft). Pending the achievement of this ultimate objective, states the program of the London Union, one of the foremost duties of German Socialists is to win over those large sections of the German middle classes which have been ruined by the Nazi war economy in order to make the new Socialist party the leading political force in the new Germany.

Most of these German Socialist groups realize that a social revolution cannot solve all the problems presented by German Fascist nationalism. They do not expect this aggressive German nationalism, which at present cuts across all class lines and has infected, as Tarnow himself emphasizes, even labor, to give up its struggle for power as a political and ideological force. All German Socialist groups, therefore, agree with the pacifist Friedrich Wilhelm Forster on the necessity of a more or less permanent political disfranchisement of the members of the National Socialist Party as a condition for the success of the new German democracy. On the other hand
most Socialist groups are keenly interested in the problem of re-education. Among the numerous German Socialist groups who are now working on German post-war educational problems, Dr. Fritz Karsen, a Social Democrat in New York and Minna Specht in London stand out. The London Union has already completed a plan for the re-organization of the German educational system. In Sweden Tarnow, a group has a committee working on the special problem of the re-education of the German worker. While much of the work of these German Socialist emigres runs along the lines of the two British reports, recently published, the Chatham House Report and the Report of the Joint Commission of the London International Assembly and The Council for Education in World Citizenship, the difference between the proposals of German Socialists and those of the Allies is still very great indeed.

One may well ask what this substantial unity in principle and program among the various German Socialist groups is actually worth. These programs, such as we know them are still extremely vague and there is no assurance that when the debate over concrete measures begins the old differences will not reassert themselves. Broadly speaking, this unity is more effective on the left wing of the Socialist emigration than it is on the right. Experience has shown that in common discussions it is usually the left wing that triumphs. When Tarnow deliberates with the SAP, it is usually the point of view of the latter that prevails. In the same manner older Social Democrats such as Paul Hertz, Georg Dietrich, and Marie Juchacz usually yield to Paul Hagen. We may expect Stumper and Brauer, who are blessed with stronger backbones to continue their efforts to hold the London Gopade to a more conservative course, although there is no unity on this matter in the German Labor Delegation itself. At this moment such an effort is so far likely to succeed, for the program of the London Union was adopted only after six months of careful deliberation. This whole question of future unity is as much a matter of the basic political bent of leading personalities as it is one of ideology and program.

We have an excellent illustration of this in the case of Fritz Tarnow in Sweden. When Tarnow worked alone with his small circle of Social Democratic friends, he produced the monstrous plan for the transformation of the Arbeitsfront into a single national Trade Union Federation with obviously compulsory and authoritarian features. But as soon as he included August Enderle and the SAP in his deliberations, he promptly dropped these authoritarian features of his plan. Working together with Enderle, he completed the draft of an appeal to German Labor which is to be broadcast throughout Germany "on the day after Hitler". Martin Krebs took the precaution to send this appeal in its final draft to Walter Schevenels, the Secretary of the International Federation of Trade Unions, who seems to have given his approval. Attached to this appeal for a single, voluntary, and democratic Trade Union Federation, and also approved by Tarnow, is an immediate program which is almost identical with that of the London Union and of Paul Hagen's Neu Beginnen. This program calls for the immediate socialization of the entire mining industry, transport, the entire banking and loan systems, as well as all the businesses whose owners have been financed by the Nazis or who themselves were active Nazis. Yet, when Tarnow informed Dr. Heinrich Bruein of his plan for the transformation of the Labor Front it was the first conservative draft
with its compulsory features that he transmitted. Again, we know that Tarnow is no less committed to immediate changes in the social and economic structure of Germany than the London Union, the New York Neu Beginnen group or even the German Labor Delegation. Yet, in the plan which Tarnow and his Social Democratic collaborators prepared for a German provisional government, there is no trace of any measure designed to effect a social revolution. In this document all the specifically Socialist objectives have been sacrificed to Tarnow's desire to cooperate with the Allied armies of occupation. This plan Tarnow also dispatched to Dr. Heinrich Brüning after having written in collaboration with Enderle, the Appeal to German Labor. In the face of this conduct on the part of Tarnow, one becomes skeptical of the sincerity of his unity among the German emigres in Sweden. It is impossible to escape the conclusion that Fritz Tarnow, when free to follow his basic conservative bent, will be quite willing to sacrifice the more radical program of German trade unionists in Sweden to his personal ambition to play a larger role in post-war Germany.

This plan for a provisional German civil government (Die Situation nach dem Sturze des Hitlerregimes: Entwurf von Richtlinien zur Staatspolitik) is generally indicative of the conservatism of the older Social Democratic emigres. We may be sure that Enderle and the SAP were not consulted when it was written. For this reason alone it will bear a brief analysis. A military occupation of Germany, so runs the argument of this paper, does not exclude the possibility of a provisional government composed of anti-Nazi Germans. No liberal German political group should refuse cooperation with the occupying Powers, for, whatever the other purposes of a military occupation, the destruction of the National Socialist regime and the restoration of democratic liberties are among them. On the other hand, a provisional government composed of reliable anti-Nazi Germans should be welcome to the occupying Powers, chiefly because National Socialism cannot be uprooted by means of a military occupation alone. A thorough liquidation of National Socialism requires the voluntary cooperation of all anti-Nazi elements among the German people. No group, thinks Tarnow, is more useful for this purpose than the old Social Democratic Party. But middle class democrats and the churches should also be included in such a provisional government.

The thought that dominates Tarnow's entire plan is the impossibility of making any democratic regime, established immediately after Hitler's defeat, to function. For this reason he and his Social Democratic collaborators count on a military occupation of from two to three years. Without democratic institutions, political parties, or an instructed public opinion, no elections for a German national constituent assembly can be successful. Immediate elections can at best produce another Soldiers' and Workmen's council of 1918, which fell an easy prey to irresponsible and undisciplined demagogues and was unable to perform any positive function. Tarnow contends that it will take at least two years for a democratic party system to reconstitute itself and for the press to prepare the German public for general elections.
The dilemma that baffles Tarnow is the necessity of a strong provisional government that will not at the same time awaken the suspicion that it is setting up another dictatorship. The first government after Hitler must operate without a democratic mandate. It must be a very strong government, otherwise the problems of demobilizing the Wehrmacht, of re-employment and the change-over from a war to a peacetime economy cannot be successfully dealt with. This will be all the more difficult since the government will have to begin by eliminating all the leading civil servants in the central government, the states and the local communities. Until the clean-up work among Nazi organizations has been completed, thinks Tarnow, civil rights and liberties ought not to be restored or the institution of protective arrest be dropped. At the same time this provisional government must encourage the development of democratic parties independent of it. He proposes the following principle: democratic movements and their followers are to enjoy the rights of a democratic state, while all movements striving to set up a dictatorship are to be subject to the special laws of an authoritarian state. Tarnow leaves no doubt that among the latter he includes not only National Socialists but Communists. In his search for at least some democratic guarantees for this interim period, Tarnow proposes a Reichsrat or a provisional parliament of 200 persons, nominated by German occupational organizations and appointed by the provisional government. In the composition of this body, which is to have only advisory functions, the various regional interests of Germany are to be adequately considered. Its "mandate" and that of the provisional government is to cease at the moment when a national constituent assembly convenes. In the meantime the provisional government is to exercise full legislative and executive powers, and is to cooperate with the occupying Powers in hunting down Nazi criminals and in eliminating all Nazis from the civil service and the judiciary.

It is obvious that Tarnow envisages a mild form of military occupation, not the total occupation after a total war of which Englishmen and Americans are thinking. While elsewhere Tarnow admits that the destruction of the National Socialist regime is no longer a purely German affair, in this plan he takes the position that it is largely a German problem. While in the Appeal to German Labor, written in collaboration with Enderle, he commits himself to the necessity of an immediate nationalization of heavy industry, the banking system, and the break up of the East-Elbian Junker Estate, there is no indication of such a measure in this plan. It seems clear that this plan, not the Appeal to German Labor, expresses Tarnow's real sentiments. It is the plan of a conservative Social Democrat, designed to appeal to a conservative, like Dr. Brüning, to whom it was sent, and to the conservative elements in the camp of the United Nations.
German Communists are the only group in the German political emigration that must be taken seriously. The German Communist Party is the most numerous, the most active, and effectively organized party within the entire German emigration. No information on the number of German Communist emigres in Russia or Sweden is available. With numbers far in excess of the 350 registered members they constitute the largest organized German emigre party in Great Britain. In the German Trade Union Center of Great Britain, which has approximately 600 members, they are reported to be in the majority. Because they are driven underground in the United States no basis for a numerical estimate is possible. They are to be found in considerable numbers in the German American Emergency Conference and Otto Sattler's German American League for Culture. Excluded from the United States, Mexico has become the center of the largest concentration of German Communists in the Western Hemisphere. Wherever one examines their local units, in Sweden, Great Britain, or Mexico, they exhibit close party cohesion, shrewd and intelligent leadership, and effective party discipline. The remarkable agreement in the political propaganda of the members and leaders of these local units is indicative of their close connections with one another and with the leader of the Central Committee of the German Communist Party in Moscow, Wilhelm Pieck.

A. The German Communist Underground (1933-1941)

The German Communist Party began its underground struggle against the Nazi regime with a great advantage over the Social Democrats. The cynical abuse of democratic institutions, which had contributed to the triumph of Hitler, shook the faith of broad masses of German labor in any kind of democratic regime. The failure of democratic processes in 1933 produced a curious kind of radicalism of defeat among all German anti-Fascists. Even conservative Social Democrats in exile for the moment, sported radical ideas. In Germany proper the conviction that the terror and dictatorship of Hitler could be successfully fought only by the counter-dictatorship of the Communist Party drove considerable numbers of former Social Democrats into the Communist camp. Moreover, the Communists had already perfected the techniques of underground operations and did not first have to acquire them painfully as was the case with the Social Democrat who were accustomed only to legal political activity. Finally, the example of the Russian October Revolution and the active moral and financial support of the Third International gave the suppressed German masses not only a program but hope.

The Communist underground struggle against Hitler was as heroic as it was reckless and costly. No party suffered greater losses at the hands of the Gestapo in the early years of National Socialism. Their local units were destroyed, re-formed, and liquidated again. So many thousands of them had been sent to concentration camps that it became steadily more difficult to replace their secret units.

For a time, it appeared as though the old Socialist-Communist division had lost its significance in Germany after 1933. After the destruction of democracy, there was little sense in speaking of a social and democratic reformism.
By the force of circumstances Socialists had become no less revolutionary than the Communists. Confronted with National Socialism, a fusion between the two German proletarian parties seemed to be at least a theoretical possibility. If, nevertheless, no fusion between the two underground movements was effected, it was because of the differences in their methods and traditions were fundamental. The Socialists were contented with preventing German labor from becoming infected with Nazi propaganda, while the more active Communists were bent on getting the German masses into motion. The Socialists also regarded the Soviet Union as the strongest bulwark of labor, but they were jealous of their independence and retained a critical attitude on developments in Russia. For the Communists, who followed blindly the directions from Moscow, independent criticism of Russia was treason. The Socialists, perplexed by events and their own errors, sought new concepts and perspectives. But the Communists found a solution for every imaginable problem in the instructions that came from Moscow.

The Communists had placed the responsibility for the triumph of Hitler on the Socialists because they defended democracy when they should have appealed to the proletariat to fight for its dictatorship. But now instructions came from Moscow to fight for democracy and democracy only. They had denounced the Socialists for having cooperated with other bourgeois parties, but now, in deference to advice from Moscow, they called for a popular front with the middle classes. They went so far as to invite the cooperation of Catholic clergymen, "honest" Fascists, and even the Nazi labor organizations. These instructions are followed so literally, that even the advocacy of Socialist reformism is now denounced as treason to the cause by Paul Merker in Mexico. It may be surprising in view of these epistles, that there are so many extremely able men among the German Communists in exile. Whatever the explanation, the fact is indisputable.

The German-Russian Pact of August 1939, only accentuated the fierce antagonism between the two parties. Not long after this Pact had been signed, Walter Ulbrich, then head of the Central Committee of the German Communist Party in Moscow, announced that henceforth the principal task of the KPD was to defend the German-Russian Pact, and added that any German anti-Nazi at home or in exile who denounced this Pact was to be "unearthed." "Unearthed" in this connection could mean only denunciation to the foreign police, the Gestapo. It is known that German Communists in Great Britain bent on the Gestapo to the police as agents of the Gestapo honest anti-Nazi Socialists who refused to abide by this irrational party line.

B. German Communists in Great Britain and Mexico Since 1941

This was merely one of their temporary aberrations, for with the German declaration of war against the Soviet Union in June 1941, German Communists became once again the most determined enemies of National Socialist Germany. German Communists everywhere now shared in the rising prestige which the heroic resistance of the Red Army reflected on the Soviet Union. In Great Britain in particular their forthright pro-Russianism gave them a popularity with certain sections of the British trade unions and of the Labor Party which left Social
Democratic emigres enraged and helpless. Wilhelm Koenen, the leader of the German Communists in Britain, and Hans Kahle were usually two or three steps in advance of the other German emigre groups in support of the British war effort. The Social Democrats reluctantly followed their lead, but usually with statements that lacked punch and determination. German Communists like Carl Becker, Hugo Grefe, and Juergen Kuczynski were invited to participate in the meetings of the British trade unions and of the Labor Party. In 1942, Carl Becker was elected to the Executive Committee of the British Miners' Union at its annual conference in Edinburgh. The British Sections of the International Transport Workers Federation and of the Metal Workers International also cooperate cordially with German Communists.

In Great Britain as elsewhere the German Communist Party is today playing a dual role. While remaining a close and highly disciplined group under the effective control of Wilhelm Pieck and the Central Committee of the German Communist Party in Moscow, German Communists are devoting their best energies to a unified anti-Fascist Germans within Germany and in the German political emigration on the basis of a purely democratic program. By creating non-political front organizations, composed largely of non-Communists, they have spread confusion among the other exile parties and extended their influence far into the ranks of the unorganized German emigration which is everywhere in the majority. Because they do not desire to be identified as members of the German Communist Party but merely as anti-Fascist democrats, the Communist leadership of these front organizations is concealed with the most rigid caution. Usually their committees are not composed exclusively of Communists. Often enough, their leaders are authentic Communists without being registered members of the party. This is the case of Dr. Felix Boesheim, the secretary of the German-American Emergency Conference.

These tactics have been most successful of all in Great Britain and Mexico. In Great Britain the Communist Professor Otto Kokeschka and an Executive Committee, all of whom are Communists, control the Free German League of Culture, which, with its 1500 members, is the largest German emigre organization in Great Britain. Likewise it is the Communist Professor A. Meusel who directs the Freie Deutsche Hochschule; the secretary and many of the lecturers of this institution are known to be Communists. This institution is an offshoot of the Free German League of Culture and its official aim is to educate German refugee youth in the spirit of international understanding and prepare them to support the British war effort and help to restore a Free Germany. Again, the Communist J. O. Siebert directs the Foreign Scientists' Section of the Association of Scientific Workers, and its secretary is Margarete Kuczynski, formerly employed by the KPD in Berlin, who is also a member of the Executive Committee of the Free German League of Culture and the wife of Juergen Kuczynski, one of the most prominent German Communists in England; she also is secretary of the War Aid Committee of German Refugee Women. An Executive Committee of thirteen, eight of whom are Communists, directs the Free German Youth which has five hundred members, and which is also an offshoot of the Free German League of Culture. It is interesting to note that latterly German Communists have been boasting of ever growing audiences of non-Communist German refugees in meetings sponsored by the Free German League of Culture.

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In Mexico German Communists have been even more successful in bringing a large number of non-Communist German refugees under Communist leadership on the basis of a purely democratic program. Here the Communists Paul Merker, Ludwig Renn (Baron Veith von Goelsaenau), Erich Jungmann, and Egon Kisch have made the National Committee of Free Germans the central organization for all German Communists in the Western Hemisphere. It, too, has its youth sections, its women organizations, and labor committees, into which all anti-Fascist German refugees have been invited. With the assistance of such able German authors as Anna Seghers, Heinrich Neumann, Alexander Abusch, Andre Simone (Leo Katz), this group publishes the monthly Freie Deutschland, easily the most brilliant magazine published by German emigres anywhere. By way of extending the circle of readers it now publishes a Spanish language weekly and a German language supplement to this, Der Deutsch-Mexikaner. Paul Merker and his friends of the Mexican Committee of Free Germans also control the Latin American Committee of Free Germans which is in a fair way of coordinating the anti-Fascist movements among Germans throughout the countries of Latin America. (The branches in Brazil and Argentina have recently been reported suppressed, but there remain the Alemania Libre of Chile, Uruguay and Ecuador, the Friends of Free Germany in Venezuela, Honduras, Panama, Guatemala, of Cuba, and San Domingo.)

Nowhere outside of Russia is the position of German Communists more favorable than in Mexico. The Merker-Renn Committee of Free Germans enjoys the active support of President Gamach and the open approval of the Mexican State Party. Through their cooperation with the Mexican Minister of the Interior Merker and Renn take an active part in Mexican anti-Fascist counter-espionage, and their recommendations in visa matters for German and Austrian refugees are frequently decisive. Since the condemnation of the mails of this group by the United States Office of Censorship, Mexican diplomatic representatives in some of the countries of Latin America have assisted Paul Merker in his organization work.

On the surface there was now no substantial difference in the programs of the German Socialists and Communists. Both groups advocated revolution and democracy for post-war Germany. Yet, in Great Britain, the United States, and Mexico the implacable feud between them continued. Paul Merker, indubitably the leader of German Communists in the Western Hemisphere, offers us the most instructive illustration of present Communist tactics in dealing with Social Democrats. Individually, he welcomes them in his Latin American Committee of Free Germans, but he persistently refuses to deal with any German Socialist organization on a plane of equality. He denounced his friend and collaborator Dr. Kurt Rosenfeld, the president of the German American Emergency Conference, for having committed the stupidity of sending a letter of congratulation to Dr. August Siemsen who, as leader of Das Andere Deutschland in Buenos Aires, attempted to unite the German anti-Fascist Socialists in South America in support of an openly Socialist program in the Montevideo Conference of 30 January 1943. Paul Merker had previously tried the tactics of infiltration on Das Andere Deutschland. But when his agent, Balder Odgen, a Communist and head of the Coordinating Committee of Democratic Germans in Argentina, failed in his efforts to persuade Dr. Siemsen to accept the leadership of his Mexican (29365)
group, Merker promptly shifted to the tactics of disruption. This same Communist Merker is now endeavoring to undermine the leadership of Karl Schulze and Arthur Gross, two left wing Social Democratic leaders, who organized a large group of German emigres in La Paz and Cochabamba, Bolivia. When his agent, Baender, failed to make sufficient progress, Merker called upon a Spanish Communist in La Paz for assistance.

In the meantime German Socialists like Gerhart Seger continued to denounce German Communists as fifth columnists in his Neue Volkszeitung, and Hans Vogel in London refused to sit at the same conference table with Wilhelm Koenen. Following the lead of Harold Laski in the January 1943, issue of The Left News, the German Social Democratic Party demanded the dissolution of the Comintern. In May 1943, this wish was fulfilled when the Central Committee of the Communist International declared its own dissolution.

C. The Dissolution of the Comintern

We are interested in this event only so far as it concerns the German Communist Party. The immediate and obvious motive for this dissolution was the documentation of the Soviet Union's solidarity with the United Nations. But there were a number of other motives, both remote and immediate, that should be considered in a discussion of the German Communist Party. First among these is Stalin's famous decision that it was possible to develop a Soviet Socialism in Russia without any regard to what happened elsewhere in the world. This decision, it is said, marks the beginning of the end of the Comintern. Henceforth the Communist parties degenerated into mere instruments of the Russian Foreign Office. But at the last Congress of the Communist International in 1935, it was decided that the Executive Committee should "proceed from the concrete situation and the particular conditions in every country, and should make it a rule not to intervene directly in matters pertaining to the organization of Communist parties."

To the charge that the Russians did not act on this new policy, they have good replies ready at hand. Nazi anti-Bolshevik propaganda was already so successful, it is generally argued, that Communist collaboration in popular front parties came too late. To the appeasement of the Western democracies from the Spanish Civil War to Munich in 1938, Russia replied by the Soviet-German Pact of August 1939. In other words, the execution of this new Russian policy with regard to the other Communist parties depended upon a constantly changing political situation and was acted upon only in the spring of 1943 when the momentary situation required some Russian act indicating its solidarity with its new allies.

But by this time the Comintern had already become an encumbrance. In the conquered countries a complete agreement among all the democratic elements of the people to resist Nazi oppression could not be achieved, so long as the Communist element in any particular nation did not make its decisions in accordance with national requirements, but in accordance with orders issued by the Comintern which was assumed to be an instrument of Russian policy. The dissolution of the Comintern was to remove this difficulty.

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More important, perhaps, is the special case of the German Communists which seems to have had an influence on the dissolution of the Comintern. The Russians were the first to learn, what has now become generally apparent, that the strongest support of the Nazi regime is the German fear of Russian Bolshevism and Russian occupation. The German Communists, once the most powerful section of the Third International outside of Russia, were less effective in opposing the Nazi regime in Germany than were the Communists of France, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. It was no satisfactory reply to state that Gestapo control in Germany was more complete; there was a German-national opposition to Bolshevism. If Leninism, despite its kinship with Marxism, could now be described as a native product of Russian revolutionary thought and action, why could there not be a genuine Deutscher Sozialismus -- a term so foully perverted by the Nazis? Freed from the strict orders of the Comintern, the KPD could adjust its program to the special requirements of German national conditions.

The dissolution of the Comintern has not entirely removed the dualism of the German Communist Party. The party remains as an organization without any change in its management and leaders. From a close study of the behavior of Paul Merker in Mexico it is clear that there is no more party-democracy in the German Communist Party today than there was before. Its policy is not determined by criticism and open discussion among its members, but by the dictatorship of the presidium of its Central Committee in Moscow. It retains the sympathy and the active support of the Russian Communist Party and of the Russian Government and is, presumably, subject to Stalin's dictatorship. On the other hand, in its policy, but in its policy alone, it professes democracy, a democracy stripped of the more obvious trappings of Russian Bolshevism.

Although this profession of democracy may be genuine, it is certain that not one of the existing German emigre Socialist organizations trusts them. It must be said, however, that there is a growing disposition among individual Social Democrats in Great Britain to believe that sooner or later they must bargain with the German Communist Party. But the great majority of German Socialists everywhere still cherishes the rooted conviction that German Communists regard them as their deadliest enemies.

D. The Free German Manifesto

It is scarcely probable that this skillful and eloquent Manifesto, signed by war prisoners and German emigres in Moscow and transmitted over the Moscow radio on 21 July 1943, will at once dissipate these doubts.

The origin of this Free German Manifesto can scarcely remain a matter of doubt. Of the thirty-four signers of the Manifesto, twelve are exiled members of the German Communist Party. Of these twelve, five were Reichstag deputies -- Pieck, Florin, Hoernle, Ulbrich, and Martha Arndt -- and four are well-known writers and poets -- Johannes R. Becher, Willi Bredel, Friedrich Wolf, and Erich Weinert, the last named being chairman of the Executive Committee of Freies Deutschland. All of the others are prisoners of war, half of them officers. The Manifesto is a
document of the German Communist Party in Russia which, following the example of the Communist-led National Committee of Freies Deutschland in Mexico, constituted itself as the National Committee of Freies Deutschland in Moscow on 12 July 1943. This identity in the names of the two groups cannot be tossed off as a mere accident. Neither the Freies Deutschland of Mexico nor that of Moscow is composed exclusively of Communists. Both organizations are what, for want of a better term, we have called front organizations of anti-Fascist Germans with Communists in key positions. Both groups publish magazines with the same name, Freies Deutschland, which betray no trace of being Communist Party organs, the one published in Moscow even carrying on its masthead the red, white, and black flag of Imperial Germany. The conclusion is inescapable that Paul Merker and Ludwig Henn in Mexico and Wilhelm Pieck and Walter Ulbrich in Moscow are hewing close to a line previously agreed upon. It has been suggested in very competent quarters that the entire project of the Free German Manifesto originated in Mexico and was transmitted to Moscow by the Russian Ambassador Gumasny in Mexico. It is just as probable, however, that Paul Merker has learned to speak the language of Wilhelm Pieck in Moscow.

If any further proof of the German Communist origin of the Free German Manifesto were needed, it can be found in the propaganda line of the local German Communist units in Great Britain and Mexico. The Mexican and London groups employed the same propaganda device in the Peace Manifesto of the Rhineland Conference, reported by them to have been held in Germany during December 1942. On this occasion all German Communists reported, a group of people from all walks of life, including also members of the opposition of the National Socialist Party, each of them a delegate for a group of anti-Hitler Germans -- Social Democrats, Communists, Trade Unionists, Catholics, and Protestants -- for a new Germany which is almost identical with that of the Free German Manifesto.

The substance and argumentation of the Free German Manifesto are also in remarkable agreement with the statements which German Communists in Great Britain and Mexico have made during the past year. The only novelty about the Manifesto is that it was issued by the Central Committee of the German Communist Party itself. The Manifesto's plea for a "strong democratic power that will have nothing in common with the helpless Weimar regime," is merely a repetition of the centralist position which the German Communist Party for more than a year has taken with reference to post-war Germany. Again, its defense of private property, lawfully acquired, and the "restoration of property to their lawful owners, plundered by Fascist rulers, the confiscation of property of those responsible for the war and war profiteers" is a restatement of the position taken by Freies Deutschland in Mexico from the date of its foundation a year ago. Finally, the commitment of the Manifesto to democracy, freedom of speech, of the press, of religion, of assembly, and to a free economy presents nothing which German Communists have not said before.

The vagueness of the verbiage of the Free German Manifesto has provoked a universal skepticism as to its genuinely democratic character. The terms democracy, freedom of speech, of economy and of assembly, it is argued, are weasel words
that are perfectly compatible with the single-party totalitarian system now prevailing in Russia. It appears that this skepticism is excessive.

A comparison of the text of the Free German Manifesto with Paul Merker's Was Will Aus Deutschland? published in Mexico City in February 1942, may serve to clarify at least some of the doubtful points. As the leading German Communist in the Western Hemisphere, the driving force behind the Freies Deutschland movement in Mexico, a close friend of Lobovsky, and, possibly, an agent of the G.P.U., Paul Merker is in a position to speak with some authority as a German Communist. His booklet is not only in complete agreement with the program of the Manifesto, but presents the fullest exposition of the minimum program of the German Communist Party for post-war Germany yet published. The only difference between the two lies in the prominence of German army officers in the Moscow Committee and in the more conservative and nationalist tone of the Free German Manifesto. A close reading of this pamphlet reveals that whatever it is that Paul Merker is advocating it is not Russian Bolshevism in its present form. Merker speaks freely of private industrial property and private peasant landownership, and implies at least a competitive economy. He does, it is true, demand the dissolution of the great national German cartels, but advocates the creation of price and raw material cartels for smaller middle class industries. When he demands the nationalization of heavy industry, the national banks, and the large landed estates, especially those that lay east of the Elbe river, he asks for nothing beyond what German Socialists are also demanding. This, however, he adds, "is not a Socialist measure, but a simple democratic act to break the power of the most reactionary groups in Germany." To say that the word "democratic" is employed here in a sense more compatible with its usage in Russia than in Western Europe, is mere quibbling. One should also hesitate to charge him with recommending a Russian practice when he advocates the conversion of part of the nationalized landed property of the large estates owners into state farms. State farms have a long and honorable history in Prussia.

When he writes about a national constituent assembly, elected by a secret, direct and equal ballot, about democratic representative bodies and executive organs, Paul Merker is precise and plausible. It is true that his discussion of political parties is a trifle mystifying. His assumption is that the political power of the reactionary and imperialistic elements of German society will be effectively broken by the nationalization of heavy industry, the national banks, the large landed estates, and the elimination of high civil servants. After such a social revolution, he contends, there will be no need for the Deutschnationalen Partei or the Deutsche Volkspartei. It is obvious from Merker's discussion that labor, artisans, peasants, and the middle classes are to constitute the foundation of the new German democracy. He does not openly repudiate the Communist doctrine of a single-party dictatorship, nor does he speak expressly of a multiparty democracy. But neither the Free German Manifesto nor Merker's discussion exclude such a multiple-party democracy. This interpretation seems the more likely in view of the recent statement by Wilhelm Koenen, the leader of German Communists in Great Britain, to the effect that after the war German Communists, not being strong enough to control post-war Germany, will cooperate with other political parties.

(2936)
If, for the moment, we take the statements of the German Communists at their face value, we must assume that since the dissolution of the Comintern the German Communist Party has recovered its complete freedom of action from Moscow with the latter's advice and consent. We must also assume that in effect this party has repudiated its doctrine of a single-party dictatorship and of Russian Bolshevism in its present form. It is true that their old leaders in Moscow have but lately advocated an international Communist revolution, but because of the impracticability of the latter, we are told that they have become democrats and German nationalists who say "Germany must not die." Democracy and nationalism are designed to make their program viable in Germany. It is fair, if perhaps generous, to assume that when they speak of a German democracy they mean a multiple-party democracy, based largely, according to Merker and the Manifesto, upon German labor, artisans, peasants, the middle classes, and the churches. If inveterately distrustful German Socialists criticize the Free German Manifesto as being too conservative and as not going far enough in the direction of a social revolution, German Communists can refer to Paul Merker's program which calls for a nationalization of heavy industry, the banking system, and of the large landed estates of the Prussian Junkers. German Socialists, it will be recalled, demand no more than this.

If these assumptions are necessary on the basis of their official statements, the question -- what then has become of the German Communist Party? -- must be answered. We are left to infer that it has ceased to exist as a Communist party -- at least for the moment. It remains as an organization of cadres composed of the old members of the German Communist Party who are struggling for the realization of the only viable program for democracy -- not Social Democrats together with all the anti-Fascist Germans at home and in the emigration. The structure and organization of the party itself remains unaltered. We have no evidence of any party-democracy among German Communists. There is no relaxation in party discipline. The mechanisms by which the directives of the Central Committee of the KPD in Moscow are promptly registered in the local units of German Communists in Sweden, Great Britain, and Mexico operates too smoothly to permit any inference as to radical changes in the management of the German Communist Party.

For German Socialists in the emigration, who cannot forget Stalin's implacable war on Social Democracy, this is sufficient evidence to cast doubt upon the reality of this change in program. To them the matter of party organization is crucial. For this reason they regard the dissolution of the Comintern and the Free German Manifesto as exceedingly adroit tactical maneuvers, no more. Paul Hagen and the Executive Committee of the American Friends of German Freedom issued a statement on 12 August 1943, to the effect that without the express guarantee by the United Nations, they have no confidence in the genuinely democratic character of the Free German Manifesto. A similar statement is now being prepared by German Socialist groups in Great Britain. But Socialist opinion can scarcely be regarded as decisive.
A discussion of the implications of the Free German Manifesto and of the subsequent propaganda of the Moscow Free German Committee for the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is not part of the purpose of this paper. In any case, since the publication of the Moscow Pact on 2 November 1943, this question is in a fair way of being settled. Having committed itself to political and military cooperation, it is fair to assume that the Soviet Union will not embark on independent action with regard to Germany. Even if no complete agreement between Russia and its Western Allies with regard to Germany yet exists, the mechanism by which such agreement can be reached is being set up.

For a time, indeed, it appeared that since Great Britain and the United States agreed not to recognize any Free German movement, whatever its political complexion, and the Soviet Union has in fact recognized the Moscow Committee of Free Germans, the Soviet Union had a policy of its own in this matter. But it is quite another matter to say that the policy of the Free German Committee is also the policy of the Soviet Union.

Except for its insistence on unconditional surrender and the liberation of Austria, the Moscow Pact is silent on the treatment of defeated Germany. For the rest, Stalin has repeatedly declared that the Hitlerite state and the Nazi army must be destroyed. It should also be remembered that Professor A. Farzin, writing in the Moscow periodical War and the Working Class, includes among the German war criminals not only Nazi leaders in the Party, the State, and the Army, but also the leaders of German finance and industry. What Stalin said on 4 November 1942, about the impossibility of destroying Germany and the foolishness of denying her an organized military force, is now subject to agreement among Allies.

Between such statements as these and the propaganda of the Free German Committee there still remains a wide gap. This propaganda is generally conservative and nationalist, to make it acceptable to German army officers who play so conspicuous a role in the Moscow Free German movement. In this propaganda the new Germany is to have a "strong and genuine German national government" in which the Wehrmacht, purified of course of its Nazi elements, will have a definite place. "We are opposed," states Major Herbert Stoessel in the first issue of the Moscow Freies Deutschland, "to fomenting demoralization in the Wehrmacht. We do not intend to incite soldiers to abandon their arms and retreat in disorder.... We must avert at all costs any repetition of the events of 1918." "This German army," adds Major Stoessel, "must be preserved at any cost and in full," for "the construction of a strong democracy will require the support of a strongly welded army led by officers who realize their responsibilities." This can scarcely be called a statement of Russian policy. The Free German Manifesto does not even contain a fair statement of the immediate objectives of German Communists such as we know them. We know that when a Russian or German Communist speaks of Fascism he includes in this term the imperialist elements of German society. For this reason Paul Merker finds it necessary to insist on the nationalization of heavy industry, the banking system, and of the Junker estates. It is significant that the Free German Manifesto does not mention such measures.
The conclusion seems unavoidable that the statements of the Free German Committee fall largely into the category of psychological warfare so far as both the Soviet Union and the German Communists are concerned. That this propaganda also contains elements of actual policy so far as the German Communists are concerned is plausible enough. In this case the immediate objective of German Communists is neither a Soviet Germany, nor, if we may accept Paul Merker's program as indicative, a Socialist Germany, but a democratic Germany purified of Fascist elements. It is impossible to say whether this is also the policy of the Soviet Union. The most that can be said with certainty is that the Soviet Union is supporting it as psychological warfare.

E. The German Communists and Psychological Warfare

But whatever the significance of the Free German Manifesto, it is effective psychological warfare. Among all the various German party groups in the emigration, it is only the German Communists who are waging effective psychological warfare against the Nazi regime. To German emigres they persistently repeat that the unity of all anti-Fascist Germans which they are seeking in the emigration is to correspond to the unity already achieved, in the German underground opposition where the difference between Socialist and Communists has disappeared. So far as we can see they are employing the same argument inside Germany as regards the German emigration. This propaganda cannot be without effect on the gullible in and outside of Germany.

German Communists have also found the only effective reply to the Nazi-Fascist of the German Flight for Freedom group. They contend that to say that Fascism is an expression of the German character is both to mistake the nature of Fascism and to underestimate its real danger. It is not the character of the German people, German Communists argue, which makes them willing tools of German Fascism, it is rather the character of Fascism which enables it under certain circumstances to turn any people, including the German people, into hordes of barbarians. Once Fascism has come to power in any country, the task of overthrowing it in any country is an extremely difficult one. If it is not to poison an entire people, it must be destroyed as a spiritual and physical force.

The German people, to be sure, are responsible for accepting the Nazi regime and its barbarities. "When we rightly praise the glory of the Soviet people," states Jurgen Kuczynski in the June issue of The Left, "we must also speak of the shame and guilt of the German people." Never, he adds, in the history of mankind has a people borne so heavy a historic guilt. This is the appalling evil which Fascism has brought upon the German people. The SA and SS have deliberately trained all the worst traits in the character of their members, and these have succeeded in corrupting others, or at least, in making them silent partners in crime. Particularly since the beginning of the Russian war German Fascists have succeeded in training an army of thugs or of accomplices through silence. No one can doubt, says Kuczynski, the success of German Fascists in barbarizing the vast majority of German soldiers. This has been done with the premeditated purpose of erecting a wall of hatred.
fear, and shame between the peoples of the occupied countries and the occupying troops and civilian authorities. For such a wall would make fraternization almost impossible, and would, in case of revolt, drive the occupying soldiers to fight to the last, because they could expect no mercy from the peoples of the occupied territories.

Whether or not one accepts this argument as truth, it must be admitted that it is good psychological warfare. This formula, though onesided, has at least the merit of offering a door of escape to deserting Nazis. In their propaganda to Germany both the Russians and German Communists make a great point of these desertions from Nazism. Accordingly, Paul Merker has not hesitated to welcome Bodo Thae, a former member of the Nazi party, into his Mexican Freies Deutschland organization.
Union by Erwin Schoettle and Richard Loewenthal, the
adhesion of Paul Hagen and the New York Neu Beginnen group
may be expected as a matter of course. Indeed, the London
Union is carrying out the very wishes which Hertz, Dietrich,
Juchau, Hans Hirschfeld, and Paul Hagen have been expressing
for more than a year. The only opposition to the London unity
proposals has come from the German Labor Delegation in New
York, or rather from that faction of this body represented by
Stamper, Grzesienski, Brauer, and Katz. By accepting the
unity program of the London Union, Stamper and his colleagues
argued, Hans Vogel and the London Party Executive had betrayed
the trust reposed in them by the Social Democratic Party in
its last Reichskonferent on 26 April 1933. He contended that
this program marked a surrender of the historic traditions of
the Social Democratic Party. He and his colleagues denied
no affiliation with the SAP, Neu Beginnen, and ex-Communists
and they called upon their London colleagues to break off
relations with these groups entirely. He accused Hans Vogel
of being dominated by the Neu Beginnen group, and complained
that in this new Socialist party of ex-Communists honorable
Social Democrats like himself would be fobbed off with a mere
"parents' portion" (Altenstil). In his vigorous defense of
the unity program of the London Union, dated 14 March 1943,
Hans Vogel accused Stamper of forgetting and ignoring all
that had happened in the past ten years. He retorted that
when Social Democrats went into exile in 1933, they undertook
not merely to represent a party organization but to defend
the interests and ideals of the German working classes who,
in their underground struggle against the Nazi regime, showed
little concern for the 1933 membership of the Social Democratic
Party but preferred their present collaborators among whom
there are many former Communists. Vogel added that the Party
Executive felt that it was supremely important to take active
steps toward unity among the principal Socialist groups now
if for no other reason than to prevent another murderous civil
war among them such as the one that occurred after 1918.
Events immediately after Hitler's collapse will have a lasting
importance and any omissions during this period will have
to be paid for bitterly. Vogel gave Stamper to understand
that the London Party Executive did not share the view that
Labor Delegation's bitter feud with the Neu Beginnen group. He
thought that Stamper and some of his colleagues must have
been rather badly rattled to say that the London Union was
controlled by Richard Loewenthal. He added that the Loeb-
Geyer group had made the same charge, but contended that Neu
Beginnen was the least active group in the Union.

Just what the future attitude of the German Labor Delega-
tion toward the unity program of the London Union will be, it
is impossible to say at this moment. Hitherto also the members
of the Delegation have not used the financial dependence of the
London Party Executive upon funds which come from the United
States as a means of bringing political pressure to bear upon
their London comrades. There were no ties attached to the
thousand dollars which the Jewish Labor Committee sent to the
London Social Democrats. At the present moment, the members
of the Delegation are making efforts to obtain a much larger
sum from the War Chest of the American Federation of Labor
to enable the London Sopade to maintain a regular office and
publish a journal.
Agreement among all German Socialist groups on a detailed program for a United Socialist party presents no insuperable difficulties. But such an agreement now depends in large measure on the policy of the United Nations toward post-war Germany. Their fears lest Germany become an exclusive Russian sphere of interest must have been dissipated by the Moscow Pact of 2 November 1943. Ideally, they desire a Germany that will be no less friendly to the Western Democracies than to Soviet Russia. This, however, strikes a growing number of German Socialists in Great Britain, who are most sensitive to the political situation, as a counsel of perfection.

The fact remains that neither Great Britain nor the United States has recognized anti-Nazi Social Democrats in any form, not even as "allied forces," although Socialists here and in Great Britain have sought such recognition for the past two years. German Socialists everywhere have taken no pains to conceal their keen disappointment over this situation. In Great Britain they are more sharply critical of the policy of the American State Department than they are in the United States, where they seek to place themselves in the most conservative light. In Britain also their opposition to Vaneitartists both among themselves and in the British Labor Party is stronger than their aversion to German Communists. Victor Schiff, until 1933 one of the editors of the Social Democratic Vorwärts, recently expressed the opinion that eventually the German Social Democrats would march arm in arm with the USSR against what he called the Darianites of the West. Recent reports indicate that a truce now prevails between the German Communists and Social Democrats in Great Britain. These reports show that friendly discussions between individuals from both camps are becoming more frequent. These reports also indicate that the publication of the Free German Manifesto of Freies Deutschland in Moscow has strengthened the hands of those groups that desire a closer cooperation with the German Communists. To be sure, these groups like neither the "conservative and nationalist" program of the Moscow Free German Committee, nor the prominence in this Committee of German military personnel.

It must be stated, however, that in the latest Free German Committee to be organized in London on 26 September 1943, Social Democrats do not play a conspicuous role. Again, it is the German Communists, Wilhelm Keenen, Prof. Alfred Meusel, Karl Becker, and Hans Flading, who are the driving force behind this movement in Great Britain. The only Social Democrat to appear on the list of supporters is Karl Rawitzky, a former legal adviser of trade unions. So far as is known not a single member of the London Union of German Socialist Organizations participated in the meeting of 26 September unless it be Mr. Geiser, a trade unionist, who protested against the alliance between the Moscow Committee and German army officers. Once more it is the former German Democrats, who have little experience in dealing with German Communists, who are supporting the Free German movement in Great Britain. Frau Adele Schreiber who played a leading part in the meeting was a former Reichstag deputy of the German Democratic Party. Most surprising of all among the participants is the name of the conservative Dr. August Weber, a banker and former chairman of the democratic Deutsche Staatspartei. Dr. Robert R. Kuczynski, who acted as chairman of the meeting is an economist and is now teaching in the London School of Economics. He belonged to no party under the Weimar Republic, but at critical moments
invariably supported the German Communist Party. This conspicuous absence of German Socialists in the Free German movement of Great Britain is significant. It indicates that the decision of Hans Vogel, the Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Party and of the London Union not to deal with the German Communist Party until an agreement with Moscow has been reached is still considered as binding by the members of these German Socialist Groups.
German naval gunner deserted at Trondheim 12 Nov stated 8 subs then at yard all being armed with new standard sub armament of 1 quadruple MG in place of 10.5 gun while 2 20 mm AA guns aboard conning tower. F 3. Small sub sunk 24 July has been raised. Large number laborers on 24 hour shift repairing damage to yard. 8 barrage balloons at NY have a normal non alert anchorage 302 ft.

12...ACT

24...COMM...NAV...DE...BORD...CNC...200P...

CON..FIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/84
NORVEGIAN B3 INFO OF 5 NOV STATES LARGE NUMBER HEAVY AA GUNS BEING MOUNTED AT FREDRIKSTAD POSSIBLY INDICATING PORT IS TO BECOME TROOP TRANSPORTING CENTER.

16...ACT.
COMINCH...CNO...230P...NAVADRE...
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: USFOR London
To: AQWAR Washington DC
No. W-7632 24 November 1943

2 report November 240004Z for WDGBI signed Devers.

Shadowing convoy approximate position 48 degrees north, 18 degrees west day 22 November from Biscarrosse. 1 by 222. 224 had inconclusive combat with same aircraft in southwestern approaches England. 15 long range recon Skagerrak Area, North Sea, Farsnes, west of Eire, west of Brest. HE 117 destroyed by Mosquitos 80 miles north of Shetlands. Enemy effort British Isles home waters night 22/23 November 1 recon north of Shetlands. All forms enemy defensive fighter aircraft on very low scale above period. Air opposition negligible to RAF raid on Berlin. May be attributed to bad weather which prevented enemy fighters from taking off. Day 23 November 2 recon Shetlands, 1 off Brest. 6 enemy defensive sorties northern France. 1 bomber from Trondheim indications of FW 200 activity from Bordeaux. Night 23/24 November 1 recon north of Shetlands. 2 enemy defensive patrols Holland. No subs sighted by UK based aircraft day 23 November. 4 squadrons Spits escorted 24 Beaufighters detailed to attack convoy off Dutch coast. Mission abandoned due weather. Later same Spits escorted 23 Beaufighters in second attack on same convoy off Texel. 4 torpedo carrying Beaufighters attacked 8 to 10,000 ton tanker, 1 hit being observed amidships with possible hit astern. Vessel left with stern low in water with her back possibly broken. 1 minesweeper, 1 armed trawler were set on fire. 2 armed trawlers, 1 minesweeper were seriously damaged. Spits destroyed 2 of 3 attacking enemy aircraft without loss. 4 Beaufighters are missing as result of encountering intense flak. 2 escorted by Typhoons attacked 2400 ton flak ship off Brittany but no strikes seen. AEF dispatched 3 Typhoon bombers, 48 B25’s, 24 A20’s with fighter escort to attack military objectives southwest Cap Gris Nez. Total 89 aircraft attacked dropping 89 tons good results. Considerable fight, heavy flak but no enemy aircraft encountered. All aircraft returned. 9th Air Force dispatched 38 escorted B24’s airfield northern France. Primary target not located, but 19 bombed Ventor Sur Mer Airfield with fair results. 11 aircraft are outstanding.

GEO IN 15455 (25 Nov 43)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 11/30/94

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: 
To: 
No. W-7632 24 November 1943

"Enemy air opposition met. 71 escorted B26's dispatched to Omer/Longuesness Airfield. 62 attacked scoring fair to good results. 2 B26's destroyed by intense flak in target area. 5 others outstanding. No enemy aircraft seen.

Night 23/24 November 382 RAP including 364 Lancasters, 10 Halifaxes, 8 Mosquitoes dispatched Berlin. 10/10th's cloud with tops at 10 to 12,000 feet encountered. 392 bombers attacked dropping 642 tons high explosive. 571 tons incendiary bombs. Markers well concentrated, maintained throughout attack. Crewe report strong glow of fires still burning from previous night. Mosquito over Berlin in 2 hours after attack reported 9 large fires forming a circle approximately 9 miles in diameter with 2 further fires southwest of main concentration. Moderate flak, ineffective searchlights encountered. Enemy fighters fairly active with considerable number of fighters flares seen. 20 Lancasters are missing, 4 others crashed in United Kingdom. 6 Mosquitoes were dispatched against electric generating station at Ennepach, Cologne. 1 attacked primary, 3 bombed the general target area dropping 4 tons in good visibility. Slight to moderate heavy flak met. 1 Mosquito crashed United Kingdom. 1 cone of searchlights observed.

No: 63.

ACTION: ODP
INFORMATION: 0-2
00 AAP
LOG

CM-IN-15455 (25 Nov 43) 1646Z eng

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/94

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BATTERY OF TIRPE SINGLE 42 GUN TURRETS COMPLETED SEPTEMBER AT 67-58 N 15 DEG EAST
C 3 COMMANDS WEST FJORD.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11405, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 2, 1973
By DBS

16...ACT.
C:0\CH: NAVAJ:0...CHC...2. CP....

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: BERNE
RELEASED BY: 
DATE: 15 NOV 1943
TOR CODEROOM: 213C/1A
DECODED BY: 
PARAPHRASED BY: NIEUNGS
ROUTED BY: NIEUNGS

RECEIVED BY THIS FROM ARMY

ESCAPED FLYING PERSONNEL FROM SWITZERLAND AND WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE DUMPING RACED OUT 14 HAVE ADVANCED EVIDENCE OF RADIO CONTROLLED FIGHTER ACTIVITY ABOVE AREA CLAIMED TO BE BASED IN NEPAL AND IN CHINA. ALSO EFFECTIVE IN EXPECTING BATTERY BOMBS AT 2 BEFORE PILOTED FIGHTER ATTACK. RADIO FIGHTER APPARENTLY WELL ARMED. PERSONNEL POSITIVE AS PILOTS RADIO PLANE, POSIBILITY OF TWO AND OR THREE AND THE 214 USED AS CONTROL SHIP SEEN ABOVE AND OUTSIDE FORTRESS FLIGHT. LOCKHEED RADIO FIGHTERS SEEN REPORTED HAVE YELLO Forte, BLUE CAY SILVER AND BLACK COATING. RADIO CONTROLLED PLANES IN NO CASE SEEN RETURNING FIRE. RADIO EQUIPMENT EVIDENTLY WELL ARMED.

CONCEAL...100
16..21E..28G..254..20..P1A..PUARD..OP-13..OP-126..12.. DUAER..31..C03..20P..FILE

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (d) NAVREGS)

OPNAV-NAV-135 33052

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/44

CM IN 5049 300 GERMANY
GERMANS STILL PLAN OFFENSIVE AGAINST RUSSIA IN THE SPRING. THIS FROM LOCAL AGENT WHO BELIEVES GERMANS STILL HAVE 320 DIVISIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN WEAKENED BUT STILL FORMIDABLE FORCE. FAILURE TO OPEN FRONT WESTERN EUROPE HAS CONFUSED GERMANS WHO ARE HOLDING LARGE IMMOBILIZED RESERVES TO MEET ATTACK AND HE ESTIMATES 60 TO 80 DIVISIONS COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE. HIS INFORMATION INDICATES GERMANS WILL MAKE REAL STAND IN ITALY ONLY AT ALPS.
SECOND SECTION.

GERMANS REALIZE WAR LOST BUT STILL STRONG AND FIGHTING FOR COMPROMISE PEACE. THEY TAKING ADVANTAGE OF GENERALLY RECOGNIZED DISCORD BETWEEN RUSSIANS AND ANGLOSAXONS TO PRETEND THROUGH PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN WITHDRAWAL IS IN ACCORD WITH GERMAN RUSSIAN AGREEMENT TO BE ANNOUNCED WHEN NEW LINE IS REACHED AND THAT REPORTS OF FIGHTING ARE ONLY STAGE PLAY. THIS GERMAN PROPAGANDA SUITS RUSSIANS WHO HOPE OUR FEAR OF SUCH AGREEMENT WILL BRING CONCESSIONS AND INCREASED AID.

16...ACT

COWINCH...20G...NANAVIDE...CNO...20OP...
No further reports troop movements across Bulgaria. 2 German divisions 50 miles among which are units from Crimia. After Albania was occupied by Germans the Bulgarians on Albanian frontier withdrew into Serbia. Above from local agent who adds German army morale beginning to crack and breakdown similar Italy not improbable. Also that German circles here persistently predict sensational developments towards October-November. In absence reliable information as to nature these developments they assumed to be propaganda.

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 78 (4) NAVREG.)

231710

By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/44
SECTION 2. GERMAN TROOP TRAINS HAVE BEEN CROSSING BULGARIA FROM ROMANIA OVER FLOVDIV SOFIA ROUTE WITHIN LAST WEEK SPECIFICALLY ON 10TH, 11TH AND 12TH. NOT KNOWN IF ANY REMAIN BULGARIA. DESTINATION PROBABLY SALONIKA AREA VIA NISH. MOVEMENTS SOUTHWARD FROM BELGRADE ALSO RESUMED. BRITISH HERE HAVE SIMILAR REPORTS OF GERMAN MOVEMENTS SOUTHWARD ACROSS DANUBE.

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(R) and 5(D) or (R)
OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS  Date: MAY 21 1973
### NAVAL MESSAGE

**FROM** ALUSHA BEYOGLU  
**RELEASED BY**  
**DATE** 16 SEPT 1943  
**TOR CODEROOM** 1733  
**DECODED BY** TWINING  
**PARAPHRASED BY** CHAPMAN  
**ROUTED BY** KNIGHT  

#### ADDRESSES

- CNO

#### PRIORITY

- RRRRBR
- DEFERRED

#### PRECEDENCE

- ROUTINE
- DEFERRED

#### FOR ACTION

- INFORMATION

**DEPARTMENT** NAVY

**ADDRESS**

**NUMBER** 161538  
**NCR** 5711

### ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

#### DATE

**TIME**

#### ACT

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**DECLASSIFIED**

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(K) and 8(D) or (F)  
OSD letter, May 1, 1972  
Date, MAY 21 1973  
By DBB

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RATED BD2. TURKISH CONSUL GENERAL HAMBURG REPORTED EARLY SEPTEMBER HE HAD MOVED STAFF 24 MILES FROM CITY BECAUSE ALL BUILDINGS NOT DESTROYED WERE UNINHABITABLE AND NO WATER LIGHT GAS TELEPHONES OR PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION

16...ACT

COMINCH...23G...NAVAINDE...13...FILE

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (i) NAVRECS)

16/530, 300 Germany

**DECLASSIFIED**

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/74
IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH INFORMANT, SPANISH MINISTER EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER RUSSIAN FRONT. STATED THAT IF COLLAPSE OF FRONT APPEARS EVIDENT GERMANY PLANS INVITE IMMEDIATE ANGLO AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF REICH WITH FOUR MILLION MEN. INDICATED GERMANY WOULD SACRIFICE TO BRITISH AND AMERICANS IF THEY WILL INSURE EASTERN BOUNDARIES AGAINST RUSSIAN INVASION.

DECLASSIFIED
QSD Letter, E-9-78
MAY 15, 1974

16 ACTION
COMINCH...20G...NAVAIDE...CNO...20P...

FILE.
Danger from air attack on German industry, manufacturing and assembling armaments has been reduced by displacement but since these industries must be connected up as though by an invisible assembly line, the strain on transport has been increased. Production of raw materials for armaments, on the other hand, remains about where it was before.

State ministries experts are kept continually informed of changes and material factors in the production of armament, specifically labor, communications, raw and other materials, by inspections of armaments, by technical and economic staffs and special industrial groups. Also they are kept informed regarding result of air attacks on armament factories and areas.

From the mid-July 1943 reports of economic and other industries interested in munitions and armaments, it was possible to extract the following information.

German armaments industry is distributed in the following districts, assuming 100% capacity:

1. Industrial area of Rhine-Westphalia, including northwest and southwest Germany (Darmstadt, Karlsruhe, Mannheim, Frankfurt-am-Main) (44%).

2. 8% in the Berlin-Brandenburg industrial area, including provinces on the Baltic coast and Warthegau.

3. 28% in the central industrial area (bounded approximately by Chemnitz, Cassel, Hanover, Erfurt, Dresden, 

CM-IN-18072 (24 Aug 43)
Halle, Eisenach, Leipzig, Magdeburg, Dessau, Braunschweig (including Saxony and southern districts).

4. 20% in the great upper Silesian industrial area, including Austria and Sudentenland.

The following damage to mid-July from American-English air attacks on German armament industry is indicated in official information and estimated. Although losses vary individually, total losses in production capacity were 25 to 28% for district one, or a maximum of 15% for all Germany (excluding Hamburg) which percentage is 26% loss of 44% capacity which was estimated for district one. Vital war raw material and processing and finishing industries losses vary locally. As an example, they range up to 30 to 35% at Essen. The losses for raw material industries are less. As an example, only 4 to 6% for coal production. For production of oil from coal, the loss is higher, but for electrical energy at larger plants the loss is again lower.

2.5 to 3% damage for district two. The greatest vulnerability is in the area of production for electric energy, synthetic benzine, i.e. largest power stations, brown coal, locomotive and machine construction all still undamaged (note: as an example, the following large power stations are of decisive importance for production of electricity: (a) Golpa-Zschornowitz in circuit with Lauta and Trattendorf, which have been extended greatly; (b) Bohlen, south of Leipzig, connected with Chemnitz and Hirschfelde, near Zittau, as well as Schleudnitz-Greatkeyna (north of Bohlen).

1 1/4 to 1 1/2%, including works not important to the conduct of the war, in district three.

No air raid damage in district four.

The physical and mental effects of the air offensive on population and workers and the effects on all kinds of transport are not included in the losses in these four districts.

CM-IN-18072 (24 Aug 43)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
As the present time responsible military and other services are giving the greatest attention to needed considerable reinforcement of protection of vital armament industries in districts one and two, especially electrical energy, production of gasoline, coal and smelting, dock yard, plane factory and machine tool branches. All state, party, military and private organizations are being adapted to this end. Workers, tools, materials, transport possibilities, etc., are now the responsibility of employers so that in case of air attack, production can be kept up or resumed at once in their own limited fields of industry. Through armament inspection, Deutsche Arbeits front, local organizations, military services, etc., employers exercise unlimited disciplinary powers.

It is impossible, on the other hand, for the Army to provide at the present time effective reinforcement of still insufficient day and night fighters, flak, etc. The Army could do this only by withdrawing formations from the east front which is impossible before stabilization of the new defense areas.

According to official estimate, effective losses in the first armament producing district, which has for a long time been subjected to air attacks, have still not made the production impossible there. Damaged factories have been patched up and compensations created to date so that this important war industrial area continues to work up to 75% or more of capacity (excluding Hamburg). Should these air attacks continue in same or greater force on these industrial areas for an additional two or three months, they would undoubtedly increase dislocation and damage to such a degree that, combined with secondary effects, this district would become extensively inoperable and finally would become irreparably disintegrated.

The main preoccupation of military and political leaders at the present time is to prevent this. Women and children are compulsorily being removed to districts not subject to air attacks in order to remove the almost unbearable physical and mental burden from that part of
the population most affected. The leaders are taking innumerable other measures for relief of workers.

The same concern is shown by the government concerning the possibility of a series of concentrated air attacks on the "light" Ruhr territory, meaning on the central German industrial area, including Saxony and important southern German places where there are higher vulnerable armament centers, whose weakening or extensive destruction would have the same catastrophic effects on the conduct of war as in "heavy" Ruhr. Protection by the military for this district also cannot be increased as rapidly as required for the reasons already given.

Stabilization of the east front by mid-September, when high military authorities will have formed a gigantic front across Russia and it cut into new defense line, is expected by well informed circles. When this is done, large numbers of men and much material could be released for use in interior Germany for the urgently required improved and more effective defense against air attacks.

The surprising sudden official movement for setting up adequate air defense for greater Berlin as well as the more or less audible invitation to Anglo-Americans to attack the capital are explained on these facts.

Some time ago Berlin adapted itself to these tactics by secretly moving civil and military services responsible for the direction of the war in the homeland to the country. Also moved to the country were higher police security and public order services as well as more recently state and professional authorities in control of transport and armament production. These agencies are distributed in such a manner that revolution could be overcome quickly and confusion in war planning and economic direction is impossible. In order to use existing possibility for accommodation transport and communication, the Berlin office staff of armament companies were transferred to central Germany and Saxony. Offices which were non-essential to direct war effort were sent further toward the Gauamtomkwirren, lower Silesia and Sudetengau.
The Reichs Government opened way out for civil population by the August 1st proclamation of the Propaganda Minister. This proclamation was designed to relieve the most densely populated industrial quarters of north, east and northwest greater Berlin through the evacuation of unrequired women and children, etc., as well as liberating many apartments, buildings, all hospitals and schools for the reception of workers who have been bombed out. White collar employees, wounded also under pressure, supposed danger air raid measures now being put into effect formally carried out by neither private persons nor authorities. The government has done everything to meet intensified sustained Anglo-American heavy air attack on Berlin specially on the most thickly populated industrial section in the northwest areas and also in north and east Berlin, so that the government cannot then be blamed, as was the case in Hamburg, for not having done all in its power. Now everybody is personally responsible and that keeps him fully occupied and diverts him from events now taking place, a calculated secondary effect of this measure.

The necessary time for increasing the protection of vital industries in central, south and west Germany, as well as removing psychological and other burdens from that part of the population which has borne the main brunt of the attacks so far would be provided by air attack on the sea of houses in Berlin. War industry, for instance, electro, technical, locomotive construction and others could be effected by long air attack on Berlin but losses in Berlin would not be decisive, in comparison with points in west and central which are vital to the conduct of the war. Furthermore, since Berlin could easily be replaced by Vienna, the loss of prestige from bombed out capital would be negligible.

It is noteworthy that the ebb and flow into all large industrial cities of bombed out refugees from the north and west creates growing anxiety among population tremendously increased by the ever changing aim of attack on all parts of Germany. Even der Fuehrer's head-

CM-IN-18072 (24 Aug 43)

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/44
quarters at Obersalzberg, where numerous buildings, roads, etc., were recently painted yellow and green as air raid camouflage and defenses were strengthened, was gripped by this anticipatory fear.

A factual report will be made regarding the announcement of destructive reprisal measures of a military decisive nature by "secret weapons."

ACTION: G-2
INFORMATION: OPD CG AAF

CM-IN-18072 (24 Aug 43) 1524Z bjm-21w

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By Date MAY 21 1973

SECRET
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
GERMAN WORKMEN ARE INCLINED COMMUNISM BUT GESTAPO STILL DOMINATES SITUATION. EVERY DAY FEW OF THEM ARE EXECUTED. FOR THE MOMENT A CHANGE OF REGIME IN GERMANY CANNOT BE EXPECTED. MIDDLE CLASS ARE WAITING ALLIED INVASION FOR DELIVERANCE. THEY BELIEVE COMMUNIST GERMAN GOVERNMENT FORMED IN RUSSIA IS GREAT DANGER.

ALTHOUGH RUSSIANS PRETENDED ABDICATE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM THE NATIONAL COMMUNISM ESTABLISHED IN GERMANY WILL EVENTUALLY JOIN RUSSIAN COMMUNISM AND THIS WILL BE CATASTROPHE FOR EUROPE. IN ITALY COMMUNISM GETTING STRONGER. SOME ITALIAN CIRCLES BELIEVE FIRST COUNTRY TO ACCEPT COMMUNISM IN EUROPE WILL BE ITALY.

HUNGARY AND BULGARIA WILL FOLLOW. GERMANS HAVE NO MORE CONFIDENCE IN THEIR ALLY CROATIA. NO CROATIAN UNIT IS CHARGED WITH INDEPENDENT MISSION BUT ARE MIXED IN GERMAN UNITS IN PROPORTION 1 TO 3. ABOVE FROM LOCAL AGENT WHO RATES IT A-1.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/21973

CONFIDENTIAL

••• ACT

46... ACT
COMINCH... 2/C... NAVAVE... FILE
GERMAN MORALE HAS BEEN STRONGLY INFLUENCED BY EVENTS IN ITALY. ABOVE LOCAL AGENT WHO SAYS DEFINITE INDICATIONS GERMANY WILL NOT PUT UP STRONG RESISTANCE IN WEST BUT WILL TRY TO HOLD EASTERN FRONT. FEELING IS STRONG GERMANY WILL NOT BE DESTROYED IF INVADED BY ANGLO SAXONS BUT WILL BE WIPED OUT IF DEFEATED BY RUSSIA.

E. O. 12892, Sec. (F) and 5(D) or (E)
QOD letter, May 4, 1973
By DBS Date MAY 21 1973
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

FROM: HTTP Washington
No: 825 29 July 43

203C2 Par A. 12 German dive now in Italy proper.

Par B. Germans seized railroad Bolzano Verona and lines Verona Padua Mestre (Venice) Trevigoudine and Tirisca to assure communications lines for ra-

Par C. German troops moving from region north of Paris towards SE. Reported destined Italy north of Po.

Par D. Admiral Bard just back from Paris: 1

Movement 1 div from Brittany in direction Paris. 2.

Germans have begun move gasoline and oil stored Lyon area to Germany. 3. Large military depot Paris area being moved north.

Par E. A C of 5 G 2 Swiss Army stated last week to NA mobilized strength Swiss Army upward of 250,000.

INFORMATION: OPD

ACTION: G-2

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/94

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

CRORPE
COPY No. 28

341 German
MEMORANDUM TO LT. COLONEL CHESTER HAMMOND, G.S.C., WHITE HOUSE:

Subject: Brief Estimate of Axis Manpower and Economic Situation.

1. Germany.— a. Manpower.— (1) Armed Forces. The strength of the German armed forces is estimated to be approximately 9,835,000 officers and men. This total includes the army, navy and air force, as follows:

- Army: 7,506,000
- Air Force: 1,952,000
- Navy: 377,000
- Total: 9,835,000

In addition, it is believed that approximately 1,350,000 men are enrolled in such semi-military organizations as Organization Todt and Labor Service units that assist the armed forces in such duties as road construction and motor transportation.

(2) Industrial Manpower. Germany’s industrial manpower estimate is summarized as follows:

- German civilians gainfully employed: 34,350,000
- Foreign civilian workers: 6,000,000
- Prisoners of war: 2,000,000
- Total: 42,350,000

The equivalent figure for 1939 appears to have been approximately 39,000,000.

It is believed that Germany can further draw on the population of some 340,000,000 people in Axis Europe under her control, for additional industrial manpower, thus releasing a considerable number of Germans for service in the armed forces.

b. Economics.— Germany’s overall production of war materials has not been curtailed by air raids to such an extent that equipment...
of the armed forces has suffered to any noticeable degree. The indirect results of bombing, however, have been substantial. Housing, feeding, clothing difficulties, inadequate medical care are serious. Lack of building materials, glass, and labor for repairs is evident. Transportation of evacuees from bombed areas causes some difficulties.

Production of essential war materials can be maintained. High priority is now given to production of fighter aircraft. Submarine production is thus far completely adequate to replace losses and maintain offensive strength. Tanks and guns can be produced in sufficient quantities to replace normal attrition and losses.

In spite of serious shortages on the home front of certain kinds of foods, leather, textiles, fuel, and increasing drain on supplies of copper, tin, tungsten, chrome and rubber, there is no evidence of any deterioration of quality or insufficient quantity of materials for the armed forces. More severe restrictions may be felt on the home front and in occupied or controlled territories before the military potential is affected.

The food level of the civil population is low but adequate. Germany's war effort will not be affected by the economic situation during the next three months.

2. Italy.- a. Manpower.- The total available manpower in Italy of military age (18 to 55) is as follows: 8,782,990. Classes in certain ages are as follows: Ages 15 to 64: 13,692,000.

The manpower of the country is sufficient in view of the low degree of mobilization and small extent of industry.

The present strength of the Italian Army is:

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<td>Depot troops</td>
<td>200,000</td>
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The reason for this relatively low figure, which is less than five percent of Italy's population, is the shortage of military equipment.

b. Economy.- Italian industry is sufficient for all wartime purposes if raw materials are made available. However there are shortages, at present, of industrial raw materials, in iron, coal, steel, rubber and cotton. Food shortages are meat and wheat and fats. There is an adequate supply of potatoes, fresh fruits and vegetables.

The national economy has been slowed recently to some extent by a lowering of morale incident to air bombardments.

Total population 75,000,000
Total male population 37,400,000
Males, 20-39 years of age, inclusive, fit for military service.
Males in Armed Forces 3,075,000
Males of military age required in essential occupation or deferred for other reasons
Remaining potential, 20-39 years of age, inclusive, capable of being mobilised for military service.

Notes: 1/ The following figures are for Japan Proper, which does not include Karafuto (Japanese Sakhalin), Formosa, Korea, Nan-tung Leased Territory or Mandated Islands. Non-Japanese in Korea and Formosa are not included in these estimates since the number from these areas actually serving in Japanese Armed Forces or engaged in occupations in the Japanese homeland is negligible.

2/ By conscription of youths 17-19 years of age, inclusive, an additional 1,400,000 fit for military service could be made available to Japanese Armed Forces. However, some could not be spared from essential occupations without replacements. It is estimated that approximately 100,000 youths of this age group are already serving as volunteers.

3/ There appears to be no substantial lack of manpower for Japanese industry with the notable exception of shortages in technical occupations requiring highly skilled labor.

b. Economics— (1) General— Assuming that Japan does not suffer any major impairment of the productivity of her industrial establishments either by bombing raids or by shipping losses greater than are indicated by present trends it is believed that the war potential will continue to improve. Tightsness in certain essential raw materials is expected to develop but it is believed that through rationalisation and integration of industry, further exploitation of resources close at hand and curtailment of consumer needs, the production of vital equipment and munitions will show general increase.

(2) Shipping— In spite of intensified shipbuilding program, the Japanese shipping position continues to deteriorate. As of
1 June 1943, it is estimated Japan had an operating shortage of about 270,000 G.R.T. This weakness is reflected in Japanese inability to make full use of her acquired resources in southern territories.

(3) Oil.—Japan's oil position appears to be good as long as she can exploit the resources of the East Indies. Tanker shortage is causing some difficulty but this is being overcome by refining in the East Indies and by expansion of her synthetic oil production at home.

(4) Iron and Steel.—1943 production is estimated at 6,700,000 tons of pig iron and 9,000,000 tons of steel ingots. The trend of production continues upward through extension of blast furnaces in North China and expansion of capacities in Manchuria and Japan. Little is known of Japan's ability to increase her rolling mill capacity but it is believed that at least some progress is being made in this direction.

(5) Munitions.—Production is adequate to equip Japan's slowly expanding Army with all necessary arms, ammunition, and equipment despite labor, power, and machine tool shortages, but the rate of expansion is believed to be limited by munitions.

(6) Aircraft. Production, while increasing, is not believed to be sufficient to replace losses, particularly in multi-engined bombers.

(7) Miscellaneous. Shortages are likely to exist or develop in machine tools, electric power, copper, lead, zinc, and the strategic grades of asbestos, mica, and industrial diamonds.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

HAYES A. KROHNER,
Brigadier General,
Chief, Military Intelligence Service.
NAVAL MESSAGE

DRATER: ALUSHA LONDON

RELEASED BY:

DATE: 9 JULY 1943

TO CODED BY: ERENE

DECODED BY:

PARAPHRASED BY:

ROUTED BY: REEAN

ADDRESSES: VICE CNO

PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE

INFORMATION: ROUTINE

TO ACTION:

PRIORITY:

DEFERRED

ARTERISK (**) MAILGRAM ADDRESSES:

PRIORITY:

DEFERRED

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

DATE: 

TIME: 

ACTION: 

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EXPLANATION

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

CONFIDENTIAL

DECORATED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

BY RT, NARA, DATE 4/11/94

GERMANY

06/14/21
BRITISH INTELLIGENCE RATING B-2 REPORTS AXIS TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT MOSTLY GERMAN CONSTANTLY MOVING INTO GREECE THROUGH YUGOSLAVIA. NUMBERS AND UNITS NOT KNOWN BUT ESTIMATED AT 1,000 PER DAY DURING PAST MONTH. MY 181735 LOCAL AGENT REPORTS DURING 7 TO 11 JUNE 34 TRAINS OF 50 CARS EACH LOADED WITH GUNS, TRUCKS AND TROOPS ENTERED BULGARIA VIA DOBRITCHIN RUMANIA. GERMAN TROOPS VERY YOUNG. ONE TRAIN CARRIED RUMANIAN INFANTRY. MOST TRAINS PROCEEDED TOWARDS SOFIA BUT A FEW TURNED SOUTH AT GRONIAOREKHOVITA. AS FAR AS KNOWN ALL
**MESSAGE**

**NAVY DEPARTMENT**

**FROM**

**RELEASED BY**

**DATE**

**TOR CODEROOM**

**DECODED BY**

**PARAPHRASED BY**

**ROUTED BY**

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**PAGE 2 OF 231031 NO. 1390**

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**ACTION**

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**REMAIN BULGARIA.**

**DECLASSIFIED**

E. O. 11665, Sec. 3(b) and 3(d) or (f)

OSD letter, May 1, 1973

By DBS

Date

16...ACT

2PG...NAVATHE...1/11...COM/NCH...2SGP...

FILE

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (6) NAVREG.)

**DECLASSIFIED**

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date
BY 111613. FREIGHT TRAFFIC HAS NOT STOPPED. MOVEMENT OF GERMAN TROOPS AND MATERIAL FROM RUMANIA INTO BULGARIA VIA DOBRITSA AND CHUKN AND GORNOREHNOVITSA BEGINNING JUNE 1ST AS FOLLOWS:

JUNE 1ST TO 3RD - APPROXIMATELY 41 TRAINS EACH OF 45 TO 46 CARS LOADED WITH TANKS, TRUCKS, CUNH AND TROOPS.

JUNE 4TH TO 6TH - 42 TRAINS EACH OF 45 TO 62 CARS LOADED WITH CUNH, TRUCKS AND A FEW TANKS. MOVEMENT HERE CONTINUING AT TIME OF REPORT WHICH WAS JUNE 10TH.

LOCAL AGENT TO SOURCE.

CONFIDENTIAL
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D I RE CTICII,
From Ankara
To: Milid

No. 509, June 5th, 1943.

Civilian shipments stopped June 1 through Munich, Innsbruck and Milan says Polish B 3. Germans built 32 new Telephone lines between Bucharest and Giurgiu. Romanians of German extraction now conscripted into German Army and all exemptions cancelled.

Brown Acting

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: OPD CG AAF

CM-IN-3512 (6 Jun 43) 0735Z ems

M. I. S. JOURNAL NO. 1 0 7 JUN 8 1 9 4 3

CONFIDENTIAL
COPY No. 25

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Helsinki
To: Secretary of State, Washington, DC
Number 727, May 27, 1943

I have learned from an officer who has just returned from the Uhtua front that all Finnish forces have now been withdrawn. There are 3 German divisions including 1 SS division in the Kiestinki sector. The northernmost Finnish positions are now located in the vicinity of Uhtua, which still remains in the hands of the Russians.

According to this officer, in view of the deep hatred which exists between the SS troops and the regular army, it was a mystery how the German army still held together. This hatred also exists between the rank and file of the army and their own officers. However, he stated that the discipline was so strict that in his opinion the eventual break in German morale would not occur first in the army, but rather on the home front. Recently in the far north, he came upon a group of German soldiers who, with the aid of a pocket dictionary were painfully attempting to translate the Finnish newspaper SOSIALI DEMOKRATI, in an effort to obtain reliable news.

According to my informant, it could be expected that deep raids would be made into Finnish and German held territory by Russian patrols this summer. According to him, last summer patrols were successful in penetrating and withdrawing from so far deep as midway between Novaniami and Kuusamo. The inhabitants at Kuusamo actually gave shelter to the Soviet patrols, and because of this the inhabitants have been concentrated into restricted areas for the summer.

McClintock

ACTION: G-2
INFORMATION: OPD

CM-IN-18018 (28 May 43) 1427Z ems

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 1/13/94
INFORMATION FROM GERMANY THAT NOT MORE THAN 7
DIVISIONS CAN BE SPARED FOR DEFENSE OF BALKANS.
5 DIVISIONS OF 1ST AND 2ND LINE TROOPS ALREADY
THERE IN GREECE AND THRACE. AMONG THESE ARE SOME
UNITS OF THE 12th TURKISH PEOPLES RECRUITED FROM
PRISONERS FROM URALS TURKISTAN NORTH CAUCASUS
CRIMEA AND AZERBAIJAN TO WHOM HITLER PROMISED
INDEPENDENCE.

16...ACT

COMINCH...13/11...23G...NAVAIDE...23OP...FILE
The following information comes from a source who has German connections and is believed to be personally reliable.

The advisability of the evacuation of Norway is openly discussed by military circles in Germany. It is pointed out by them that Norway was occupied as a link in the offensive strategy against England. Norway is of no real value to Germany, since this strategy has been unsuccessful. On the contrary Norway ties up larger man forces, which in the event of an invasion of the continent would be badly needed. Should the Allies invade Jutland, which it is generally believed they will do, forces in Norway would be wholly cut off. A transport problem exists, however, in the case of such an evacuation from Norway, as it is assumed that German troops would not be permitted to return through Sweden to Germany. It is said that all plans of this kind are strongly opposed by Nazi party circles.

Several indications exist that the German attitude towards the Polish people is becoming more friendly. This is done as a link in a new policy. For some time Polish workers have been receiving better treatment than hitherto and have had higher rations issued them. Civil propaganda is being made by the Germans, directed against Russia, thus taking advantage of the discovery at Katyn of mass graves. It is said that there are certain Polish circles which are Fascist and are inclined towards collaboration with Germany. It would appear that the German aim is to give Poland some type of self-administration to enable them to enroll Polish people more energetically in the war effort. It is said, among other things, that Germany is planning to set up Polish formations against the USSR.

S: GHM: DFB

ACTION: G-2
INFORMATION: OPD, CG AAF,
CM-IN-12665 (20 May 43) 09412 mjc

The making of an exact copy of this message is forbidden.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/1944
From: Stockholm  
Dated: May 19, 1943

Telegram no. 1601  
Rec'd: May 18, 5:49 p.m.

Following summarizes a Berlin report dated April 21, from Hungarian source.

It is the belief of informed circles that definite political and military decisions for the summer have been reached. Fact that Russia has considerable war potential was demonstrated during past winter. Its war industry continues to be almost unchanged. It is believed that ten million soldiers will be sent to the front by the Russians this summer, but that training and equipment of ten millions will not be completed. Because no surprises are expected on Russo-Jap front this year, it is possible to make this concentration of troops on Russia's west front. It would seem to be in the interest of both parties to have peace there.

It is estimate of Jap information service in Berlin that German Army, with all its reserves, is smaller than Russian Army in proportion of one to two. Sharp drop in number of Axis satellite troops at front will be seen this year; however, it is possible that German armies will stage offensive. The German Army will stop advance where convenient, and build fortified line for winter war, if Russians use last summer's tactics of drawing back in order to lengthen Axis supply lines. Should Russians evade German drive in this manner, then no appreciable change in front will be seen.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By J.R. Date MAY 21 1973

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From Stockholm
No 1001 May 19, 1943

It is expected by Germans that air raids by British will increase in violence, reaching their peak in autumn.

According to Berlin circles, Germany is counting on possibility of attack through Turkey, and is therefore prepared to occupy European Turkey. Whenever it becomes clear that war agreements with Allies have been made by Turkey.

Germans were confused and disappointed by reshaping of Jap Cabinet. No comment on subject was made during April 21 press conference on account of orders from higher up.

Johnson

Action: G-2
Information: OPD
CG AAF

CM-IN-12866 - (20 May 43) 0840Z ce

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By DSS Data MAY 21, 1973

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA Date 4/11/94
From: Stockholm  
Telegram no. 1599  

Dated: May 18, 4 p.m.  
Rec'd: May 18, 8:17 p.m.

This is in continuation of the Budapest report on Hitler meetings. In this connection see my [1537] of May 11 midnight. The following summarizes the demands granted by the Rumanians during Antonescu's last visit to Hitler:

1. Members of "German Folk Group" will enter Waffenste without losing Rumanian nationality.

2. Rumania will try to equip those Rumanian divisions which were smashed in Russia and whose remnants went back to Rumania for reorganization.

3. 5 fresh Rumanian divisions will be equipped at present location in Rumania by Germany.

4. 7 Rumanian divisions now in Russia will be freshly equipped there by Germany.

It is the belief of Hungarians that German attacks on the eastern front are certain, and they expect larger attack in the south plus a secondary attack on Leningrad. In this connection please see my 1534, May 11, 6 p.m. An invasion of Italy by the United States is foreseen by them. Benes' visit to Washington is followed by the Hungarians with misgivings. It is the conviction in Budapest that the earlier plan devised by Benes for Czech Federation with Poland has been expanded to include Russia. So appalled are the Hungarians by this belief that they earnestly suggest the United States investigate this.

Kallay spoke with Ciano's best friend and assistant at the Vatican Embassy, when in Rome. Basic Italo-Hungarian community of interest was discussed by them, and Ciano's friend stated that the need for friendship between Hungary and Italy will survive the loss of war.

The internal situation in Hungary described in my 1537 appears firm. A speech on about May 12 was made by the Minister of Interior Keresztes-Fischer. This was possibly reported from Bern. This speech in summary stated that irresponsible elements who might attempt to disturb public order would be dispatched to work camps. Speech was regarded as remarkable in present crisis by source here. When he last appeared in the Upper House, War Minister Vilmos Nagy, who opposed aid to Germany, received an ovation.
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

PAGE 2.

May 19, 1943

Telegram no. 1590

SECRET

S:GHM:DFB:

Footnote: References not identified in WDCMC

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: OPD

CG AAF

LOG

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By NA, Date MAY 21 1973

CM-IN-12667

(20 May 43)

0952Z mjc

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Bern
To: Secretary of State, Washington

Number 2863, May 10, 1943

April 15, source 906B. All Air France installations in the vicinity of Marseilles have been requisitioned by the German occupational authorities. Equipment and pilots have been placed at the disposal of the Germans. Air France workers have been segregated and most of them sent to Germany. Following table shows delivery of planes destined for the Germans which has been effected by Air France pilots:

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<th>Origin</th>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Type and No of plane</th>
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<td>Toulouse</td>
<td>Dewoitine 520, (25)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nimes (?)</td>
<td>Les Mureaux</td>
<td>Potez 63 (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Bloch 152 (27)</td>
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<td>Nortrop 57.2 (1)</td>
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<td>Farmar 470 (9)</td>
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<td>Bloch 210 (4)</td>
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<td>Simoun (2)</td>
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(CM-IN-7377 12 May 43)

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
The above is from Legge for War Department.

Harrison

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: OPD

CG AAF

CM-IN-7377 (12 May 43) 0600Z ems

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
INCOMING MESSAGE
Dated May 8, 1943
Rec'd 7:53 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1503, May 8, 6 p.m.

Latest reliable figures indicate about 35,000 Danish workers now in Germany and 10,000 in Norway. These totals have changed little in the last year or so, new arrivals being balanced by dissatisfied Danes returning home. Actual turnover has apparently been large, well over 100,000 Danes having some time since occupation accepted employment in (*).

Despite great propaganda efforts by German and Danish Nazis and peculiar circumstances surrounding life Danish workers abroad and their ties with homeland, indications are that actual conversions to National Socialism among their ranks have not been great.

Present favorable employment situation in Denmark tends to prevent workers from having to seek employment abroad and also gives Danish Government good argument to meet anticipated German demands for greater participation Axis all out mobilization. Present outlook, however, remains uncertain, question being how long Reich will be content accord Denmark its present exceptional position involving no enforced labor mobilization.

Complete report following dispatch 1733, May 8.

JOHNSON

(*) Apparent omission

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: OGD

CM-IN-6220 (10 May 43) 10003

300 Germany

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/94

RESTRICTED
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

from: Ankara
To: Milid
No. 466 May 6, 1943

Bomb damage to Munich up to mid-April source with agent in Munich P 2 included: BMW aircraft factory and Krauss Maffei locomotive factory almost wiped out, 2 oil or gas depots burned, tram depot destroyed and 100 trams burned, a military dump destroyed, 20 public buildings 7 hospitals 5 churches including Notre Dame 2 large schools and Polytechnic Institute National Library General Customs House Volkischer Beobachter Newspaper Plant, Schollin Strasse rendered impassable.

Brown

Action: G-2
Information: OPD
CG AAF

MAR 2 7 1974

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
THE GREAT MAJORITY OF GERMANS REALIZE WAR IS LOST BUT THEY ALL BELIEVE THEY WILL BE DESTROYED UNLESS RUSSIAN ARMY IS DEFEATED BEFORE HAVING TO COME TO TERMS WITH ANGLO-SAXONS. THEY BELIEVE THEY CAN DO THAT.

ABOVE FROM LOCAL AGENT.
From: Ankara
To: MILID
No. 463, May 5, 1943

Source B2 states that Hungarian Minister in Berlin gave pessimistic report on last heavy raid over Berlin and described how fire brigades made no attempt to extinguish fires raging 3 days. Damage so widespread that 5 different members Legation Staff living in different parts Berlin were bombed out. 450 dead and others still buried under debris, very large numbers homeless and evacuations continuing. Turkish Counsellor in Berlin reports morale now very low and considerable hostility to regime.

Brown

ACTION: G-2
INFORMATION: OPD
CG AAF

CM-IN-3191 (6 May 43) 0117Z cen

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94
Germany is to furnish the equipment for twenty-three Romanian divisions by virtue of an agreement arrived at during the recent meeting between Hitler and Marshal Antonescu, according to reliable sources. Apparently Antonescu has reached a decision to furnish Romanian troops for the assistance of Germany in offensive operations in Russia. According to preliminary reports this plan is meeting opposition in Romanian military circles.

Report indicate that the March 10 editorial in the London Times and developments in Russian-Polish relations which are taken as indicative of Romanian's possibilities in event of a Russian victory, have weakened civilian opposition to the Government.

Berry

S:WD:M:LEY

Action: G-2

Information: OPD

CH-IN-948 (2 May 43) 1125Z vc
Secretary of State
Washington
2574, 27th.

Political executions.

Brussels Interinf despatch April 24 gives communique
German military administration Belgium stating: numerous
victims caused last few months by 188 attacks on life and
property members Flemish and Walloon renovation movements.
Since beginning 1943 German Security and Army Police arrested
310 terrorists and 522 communist government employees, who when
not shot immediately as expiatory measure are subject trial
military court and may expect death sentence which has already
been pronounced and executed in some cases.

HARRISON
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By Date MAY 21 1973
The following information is attributed by Bari to one and is as of 18 April. I have furnished this information to the Military Attaché.

On March 24 Zeitzler and the General Staff ordered the Twenty-fourth Panzer Division, Major General von Hausenschild, C.O., into Italy. They dissented with Hitler in doing so. This Division arrived in Sicily and based upon insistence by Rommel and his assurances that it will restore balance in to be moved into Tunisia.

Rommel has departed from Tunisia leaving von Armin in command. With the support of Keitel, Himmler and Zeitzler, Rommel is expected to be given command of operations in the Mediterranean theatre. Hitler also now considers that the Italians will shortly be out of the war and will help them only until such time as fortifications have been completed in the Alps, the Danubian and more easterly regions.

The estimated available reserves of untrained men runs about 1,650,000. This figure is after various combings out and includes newest class. General Staff officers consider these men as in no way resembling "elite".

After having been used only once in the Mediterranean submarine tankers were withdrawn due to fear of their being sunk by United Nations air forces. A new array of 90 infantry and 25 Panzer Divisions is now being put together by the Germans. Of the 90 infantry divisions 40 are motorized. This army is to serve as an offensive group in the East in addition to being a strategic reserve of the High Command. Preparations are being made in the Ukraine for its offensive use. As the only way of breaking up the Russian armored drive very large units of heavy artillery are to be affected (turned over?) to the army. Bryphenated Germans in Romania, Croatia, Hungary, etc., are no longer being mobilized by the army; a recent decree of Hitler's reserves them for the SS. From this reserve...
Himler has recently ordered all fit men of the 1908 to 1928 classes to report to the SS. The SS was permitted to commence recruitment in all occupied countries by another decree in early March but up to April 15 only 4,700 men volunteered.

At the moment of this report 4 Panzer Divisions and 8 motorized divisions composed the Waffen SS. These are largely equipped with the latest heavy artillery and tanks.

Planes are on foot by SS leaders to utilize unusually fit Norwegians for a new SS motorized division. These Norwegians are at present being mobilized into Todt organizations together with such other Norwegians as are fit for work. Most likely those in the labor battalions will be put to work behind the Eastern front.

The Third Air Fleet which is in the West with the exception of Norway is under consideration for reinforcement by 4 Kampf Geschwader which have just recently been organized. It is expected that fairly soon all large population centers on the coast or near to it between Brest and German border will be evacuated.

The Germans expect great things from the "mu" boats in defending the continent against a landing attempt by the United Nations. First priority is being given construction of these boats along with submarines.

More men are being mobilized by the Bulgarians. The Bulgarians ordered the Turkish border region to be evacuated by 15 April in the suggestion of the Germans. Orders were given for all Germans living in Bulgaria who were of no military importance to leave the country by 15 April. It is rumored, thus far unverified, that Hitler might deem it well to forestall a United Nations offensive against the Balkans by swarming over Turkey but that officers of the General Staff consider this course as foolish.
CORRECTED COPY

From: Bern
To: Mild

No. 638, April 26, 1943.

Five 06x 8 April 8 concrete submarine shelters being constructed Marseilles believed Germans will construct complete shelter with concrete dome 6 meters thick. C April 18 approx 25 Divisions concentrated Bulgaria north of Balkans. Following troops located: 3 German Inf Divs and 1 Armored Div in region Russe River Rumanian Inf Div and 2 German Divs of special lists region Nikopol 8 Bulgarian Divs region Dragasanovo 4 to 6 Bulgarian Divisions region Tarnovo.

Legge

Footnote: Corrected copy of CM-IN-15694 (26 Apr 43) G-2

ACTION: G-2
INFORMATION: OPD
CG AAF

CM-IN-16932 (28 Apr 43) 1720Z med

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 6/12/44
From Bern
To: Milid

No. 633, April 24th, 1943.

206 from good source German naval units moved south from Trondheim large part AA Norway to German ports especially Cuxhaven and Hamburg where better docks are. Defenses demanded Dornitz he put thru plan build 45 Subs monthly parts made Austria assembled Brella and Galitz many Vedettes being sent from Baltic and North Seas to patrol Italian Coast. Sub losses put at 18 to 20 monthly.

Legge

Note: Corrected copy of CM-IN-14905 (4-25-43) G-2.

Action: G-2

Information: OPD CO AAF

CM-IN-16469 (26 Apr 43) 0229Z law

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Bern
To: Milid
Number 635 April 24, 1943

Source neutral traveller untried Salonika: buildings along sea evacuated important works Gulf Orphano and Chalkidiki Peninsula German Nekoniordas bldg. Division with shield alternate 3 red 4 white vertical stripes men either young or old morale poor bypass Port Rains from Yugoslavia to Southern Greece built. Highway to Athens improved remaining 432 Jews concentrated ghettos. Policy ex-germination continues.

ACTION: G-2
INFORMATION: OPD CG AAF
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 1 1973
By DBS Date MAY 2 1 1973

CM-IN-15014 (25 Apr 43) 0739Z cec

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/44

3 a Germain
From: Chungking
To: MILID

In Reply Cite: 148 April 18, 1943

Japan arranged furnish Germany rubber from Thailand during last half this year, 1/4th that production Germany balance Japan, C zero, Indo China supply Germany 20,000 tons rubber this year. Sino G-2 report.

No Sig

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: OPD CG AAF

CM-IN-11151 (19 Apr 43) 0245Z cen
With reference to press telegrams concerning Baltic states which have been sent recently information has been received from a reliable source to the effect that decrees identical to those which were announced in Lithuania on April 7th, for registration of former army officers and certain classes, were issued in Estonia a day or two preceding the Kaunas conference. This would indicate that the measure was agreed upon in Lithuania prior to the holding of that conference. It would best seem that the registration is not a result of the conference as first appeared, but the reason for the conference, which was held for the purpose of making compulsory registration popular. It is safe to assume that the emphasis made at the conference on forming a national army under their own officers will be ignored and that the policy followed will be that of sending small units which will fight with the German army at places far distant from the North Atlantic borders.

The society Friends of Estonian Legion was used in Estonia by the Germans to popularize registration, but this action was made under false pretenses since according to reliable and confidential information the published appeal had deleted the part which referred to the desire of a national army for the defense of Estonia's frontiers and it was announced that the society committee composed of Estonians who were responsible although not outstanding had signed the appeal although they were not actually signatories.

Information as to whether similar registration decrees were published in Latvia is lacking, however, I understand that a greater proportion of former Latvian officers were used in some form of police or military service than in the other 2 countries. Also greater success was encountered in recruiting in Latvia. Since March 15th your Estonians have fled to Finland in order to avoid joining the armed or labor services operating under the Germans. It is interesting, however

(CN-IN-9348 16 Apr 43)
to note that their first act upon arriving at Helsingfors was to enlist in the army of Finland. While this may seem foolish, as these men risk their lives to avoid having to serve against the Russians under the Germans in order to fight the same enemy under the Finns, it is a demonstration of the typical Baltic attitude towards the Germans at the present time. A member of my staff was visited by one of these Estonians who left Tallinn on March 24th and came to Stockholm. This person has described present German method of conscripting young men. Individual instructions are sent to candidates by mail to report for an interview in connection with enrollment in the legion or labor services. Subsequent to being questioned even those who express no interest in joining the legion are required to strip for a physical examination and if found physically qualified they are handed the legion enrollment form to sign. In many cases their protests are useless and until the form is signed they are not given their clothes back. The first few days this system was very successful, but was later discontinued as there were many who refused to respond to intimidation. They were then escorted to a nearby office where they were pressed to join the auxiliary raoacht service. Should they still refuse they were taken to the next office and were not permitted to leave until they signed up for labor service. It is understood that the majority are joining the latter: one day 300 Tartu men were interviewed and only 12 were enrolled in the legion the rest being taken for labor service, there being no other alternative.

The fact that the labor service is being given two months training, and reports which indicate that the labor service program includes military training, it may be deduced that these men are fundamentally regarded as military reserves and therefore after their arrival in Germany are liable to be sent to the front at any time. It is the desire of the Germans to obtain half a million men from the Baltic states and by the use of the tactics just described which are probably common to all three countries it is likely that they will substantially fill this quota.

ACTION: G-2
INFORMATION: OPD, CG AAF
CM-IN-9348 (16 Apr 43).

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/44

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: ALUSKA STOCKHOLM

RELEASED BY: 20 APRIL 43

TOR ROOM: 1743

DECODER: UC CHESEY/SHUAF

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

J. ALLER 982245
NOR 3707

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

DATE: APRIL 6
TIME: 1 P.M.
ACTION:

F-00
F-01
F-010
F-0015
F-05
F-07
F-1
F-11
F-2
F-3
F-30
F-31
F-32
F-33
F-34
F-35
F-37

TEXT:

ALUSKA EVALUATES HIS INFO AN LECATION TELEGRAM 1942 APRIL 6 TO STATE A2.


CONFIDENTIAL:

STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN

THE RAILS OF BERLIN SHOULD CONTINUE IN AN ATTEMPT TO DESTROY THE GERMAN ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINE.

JOHNSON (MINISTER)

THE HEAVY BOMBING OF BERLIN SHOULD CONTINUE IN ORDER TO TRY TO DESTROY THE WORKINGS OF THE GERMAN ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINE WHICH IS STILL CONCENTRATED IN BERLIN AND WHICH COULD NOT BE RECREATED TO FUNCTION OUTSIDE OF THAT CITY,

ACCORDING TO A PROMINENT DUTCHMAN WHO HAS HAD CONSIDERABLE CONTACTS WITH GERMANS DURING THE WAR.

(See Art. 76 (A) NAVREGS.)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12355, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 6/1/74
NAVAL MESSAGE

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RELEASED BY

DATE

FOR CODEROOM

DECODED BY

PARAPHRASED BY

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

PAGE 1 OF 162245 NCR 3027

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED, THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

ACTION

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NCR DISTRIBUTION

ADDED DISTRIBUTION UNDERLINED

16...ACT

15...COMM...11/11. NAVTE...FILE.

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4 NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/8/44
The following 15 (137) paragraphs show recruits which are in training in certain replacement formations (delayed report from Poe). All of these were mobilized in mid-October unless otherwise stated. Recruits mobilized earlier have nearly completed their training. The numbers which have indicator "A" include the total of 18 plus the previously rejected 19-year olds. The remainder comprise older men, taken from previously exempt jobs, plus a few who had been previously rejected. These are generally between 25 and 35. Volunteers in Flak regiments for home front duty (women) are mostly between 20 and 30 years of age. Their training and garrisoning are similar to that which men receive. Veterans of last war are in Heimat Flak. This unit receives spare time training and is not garrisoned. November 15 to 21 report dates.

I. REGIMENTS

Artillery: 58th Bremen 1,782, including 931 A, also 470 previously mobilized; 5th 1,710, including 818 A; 25th Ludwigsburg near Stuttgart 1,978, including 806 A; 62nd Bonn and vicinity 1,915, including 965 A; 51st 1722, including 620 A; 22nd 1,882, including 936 A, also 540 previously mobilized; 41st 1,981, including 726 A.

Cavalry: 5th Landwehr 2,507, all over 35 years; 193, completely trained, last reported departed for Russia on November 2, 18th 1,524, of which 112 are Germans from Switzerland, 911 A included; 384 last reported departed for Russia.

Infantry: 14th 2,876 (a few Germans from Switzerland), including 1,512 A; 35th 3,681 (517 are Germans from Switzerland; an additional 100 expected soon), including 1,634 A, 882 last reported departed for Russia; 58th 3,208, including 1,974 A, also 738 previously mobilized; 16th 3,327, including 1,885, also 826 mustered earlier; 56th 3,162, including 1,573 A; 77th 3,143, including 1,972 A; 13th 2,951, including
INCOMING MESSAGE

1,283 A, 615 last reported departed for Russia; 59th 3,015, including 1,423 A, also 229 previouslyMustered; 34th 2,984, including 1,573 A, 603 last reported departed for Russia; 119th 3,247 (591 are Germans from Switzerland), including 1,822 A; 473 A were left for Russia; 15th 3,094, including 1,785 A; 37th Hanover 2,924, including 1,778 A, also 307 earlier mustered; 104th Speyer and vicinity 3,853, including 1,630 A (first recruits on hand in 3 months); 77th 2,983, including 1,826 A, also 301 previously mustered; 74th 2,980, including 1,412 A, also 350 earlier mustered.

Panzer: 8th Boeblingen near Stuttgart 2,215 (163 are Germans from Switzerland), including 1,384 A; 7th Vaihingen near Stuttgart 1,952, including 1,033 A.

Flak: 32nd Oldenburg (formerly independent Abteilung, same number) 1,609, including 731 A. This regiment also made up of 658 Heimat Flak, including 94 women; 745 mustered earlier; and 123 women volunteers. 85th 1,273. Also included: 882 Heimat Flak since late summer (317 women); 492 mobilized previously; 427 women volunteers. It is rumored that 18-year-olds heretofore trained in H J units are to be garrisoned soon. 26th 1,429, including 563 A. In addition this regiment is made up of 148 women volunteers; 711 mustered earlier; 403 Heimat Flak (51 women). On November 12 120 others, completely trained, departed for South France. 74th 1,081, including 316 A. Also: 962 Heimat Flak, including 111 women (most since November 14, some since October 5); 115 women; 259 previously mobilized. 371 others, completely trained, departed for South France on November 11.

II. BATTALIONS

Engineer: 5th, 762 including 302 A; 22nd 643 including 319 A and 185 reported earlier; 26th 884 including 309 A and 72 reported earlier; 45th 703 including 281 A; 46th 753 including 342 A and 51 reported earlier.

Signal: 5th 674 including 253 A; 22nd 710 including 264 A and 136 mobilized earlier; 25th 658, of which 73 are Germans who came from Switzerland, including 177 A; 26th 615 including 240 A; 45th 621 including 173 A, 124 reported earlier departed first part of August for active service; 49th Hofriissman 625 including Hanover 604 including 237 A and 152 who were mobilized earlier.

Fahr: 5th 536, 9th 541. No "A" in Fahr.
INCOMING MESSAGE

Reconnaissance: 5th 563 including 398 A; 26th 573 including 405 A.

Artillery Observation: 5th, 527 including 160 A; 9th, 495 including 150 A; 15th, 572 including 184 A; 22nd, 469 including 203 A and 107 reported earlier.

Machine Gun: 1st 638 including 294 A.

Flak Abteilung: 45th, an independent unit, 651 including 208 A. Since first of November 294 Heimat Flak mobilized which includes 74 women. Rumor has it that youths under 18 will be in training with unit soon.

As of 16 November active unit of 26th Flak regiment thought to have been still on the French channel coast.

Troop maneuver grounds as follows in full use since early November by all arms and services. Except when used by Flak recruits and small units of other arms these grounds had been inactive for several months:

(a) Lager--Muenzingen. Canteen proprietors from this place since the summer have been away making their preparations for a long stay.

(b) Munster Lager and Munster--Normin Hanover. In this area better than 9,000 men are in camp daily.

(c) Bergen north of Celle.

(d) Wahn near Cologne. As of November 16 about 8,000 men camped around the ground.

The totals in dead, long missing and unfit for further active service from the start of the war to the respective dated of report are given in the 15 (13?) following paragraphs. These figures were reported to the above-mentioned replacement formations by their corresponding active formations.

I. REGIMENTS

Artillery: 58th 1123; 5th 2016; 25th 1631; 62nd 1078; 51st 1064; 22nd 687; 41st 1749.

CM-IN-6403 (11 Apr 43)
WAR DEPARTMENT
INCOMING MESSAGE
Page 4.
No. 2221
Cavalry: 18th 2370.
Infantry: 14th 4263; 35th 3224; 65th 2952; 16th 2803; 77th 3251; 59th 2488; 34th 3586; 15th 3362; 37th 2358; 57th 3246; 74th 2031; 119th 4163; 56th 3973; 15th 4739.
Panzer: 7th 3559; 8th 4327, believed to be about heaviest loss suffered by any tank regiment.
Flak: 32nd 836; 85th 537; 26th 586; 74th 459.
Landwehr: 5th 403.

II. BATTALIONS
Engineer: 5th 1106; 22nd 800; 26th 703; 45th 914; 46th 927.
Signal: 5th 997; 22nd 331; 25th 916; 26th 605; 45th 403; 49th 513; 51st 386.
Fahr: 5th 283; 9th 198.
Reconnaissance: 5th 680; 26th 359.
Artillery Observation: 5th 391; 9th 187; 15th 339; 22nd 228.
Machine Gun: 1st 793.
Flak: 45th 763.

Figures in following paragraphs to end of message indicate dead only since start of war for various standarten. Figure in parentheses is percent of the peacetime effective not including the reserves mobilized (later ?). Practically all those not mobilized are exempt. Report covers time of November 14 to 20.

SA: 16th 528 (98); 73rd 441 (+); 75th 380 (98); 77th Celle 281 (80); this was 69 prior to October 15; 79th 403 (98); 83rd 340 (81); 114th Konstanz 723 (96), prior to the middle of October this was 94) understood to have been one of the heaviest losses suffered by any SA standarte; 121st, Gauend in Wurttemburg 373 (74, before the middle of October this was 67); 124th 451 (97); 126th 641; 127th Geislingen near Ulm 364

CH-IN-6403 (11 Apr 43)

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN.

DECIMALIZED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date
(85, prior to middle of October this number was 61); 136th 510 (97); 160th 428 (94); 164th 442 (97); 180th 627 (98); 234th 277 (84); 260th 562 (98); 411th 438 (99).

SA sharpshooter: 13th Linder in Hanover 372 (85).

Cavalry (as of November 21): 47th Kassel 211 (78, prior to middle of October this was 99); 48th Marburg Anderlahn 372 (93, prior to middle of October this was 85); 55th Stuttgart 613 (98); 59th 452 (99); 155th 593 (99); 262nd 317 (100).

SS: 12th Hanover 572 (93) nearly all in Waffen-SS large part of which still in France and a few were to move on 20 February. For the SS police in (orders?) Saxony 7 percent. These are especially trained for use against parachute attacks. 35th 731; 88th 632 (94).

NSKK: 47th 421 (96); 55th Stuttgart 726 (66); 62nd 294 (99); 71st 302 (87).

NSKK: 65th 489 (100); 103rd Heilbronn 754 (100); 103rd Oberland Friedrichshafen 875 (100). Last 2 were reported earlier as NSKK in error.
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

April 8, 1943

From Bern
To Secretary of State
Washington

No 2199 April 8, 1943

Berlin correspondents Swiss press report intensification
Allied air attacks Western Europe have provoked official
circles Berlin to sharp polemics and allegation indiscriminate
bombing civilian populations. These statements are reportedly
accompanied by renewed threats reprisals with military sources
quoted as declaring: German Luftwaffe did not engage massive
attacks London until after eight British raids on Berlin and
now as then is biding its time and will hit back in more
terrible manner than before at appropriate time. These same
circles make reference to possible use new Luftwaffe, new
weapons whose existence closely kept military secret to
preserve element surprise.

Harrison

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

Action: G-2
Information: OPD
CG AAF

CM-IN-5140 (9 Apr 43) 12112 ce

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/94
From: Ankara
To: Milid

In Reply Cite 422 Apr 7, 1943

Reported C 3 Bulgarians have been pushing construction on RR Moktchilgrad to Komotipi and from Kustindil to Kumanovo. Construction pill boxes and gun emplacements reported Kavala and Dededagatch coasts. Possibility 2 German divisions to be moved to latter area.

Jadwin

Action: G-2
Information: OPO CG AAF By SLR Date MAR 2-7 1974
CH-IN-5381 (9 Apr 43) 1746Z ce

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/1944
Doenitz insists that the annual production of submarines be increased to 300 for all sizes. The current production is only 8 or 9 each month as a result of bombings. Production is nevertheless expected to go up to a monthly 12 or 14 this spring and to 25 per month by the autumn.

As concerns production centers at Stettin at the moment: It is believed that some yards have been moved to Italy on account of the air raids. As a protection against air raids planes which produce parts are more and more widely dispersed. It is said that extensive use of the Henschel locomotive plant at Cassel is made in producing parts.

Approximately 1800 planes are turned out in Germany each month. They are of all types but with an almost negligible amount of trainers.

Foregoing from reliable source.

HARRISON

Action: G-2
Information: OPD
             CG AAF

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter 1-11-72
By MAY 24 1973

CM-IN-2767 (5 Apr 43) 0904Z  vo
M.I.S. JOURNAL NO 94 APR 5 1943

200 Germany

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/1944
From: USFOR London
To: War

In Reply Cite: 8326 March 31, 1943

Germans are making further drive to obtain Spanish workmen for Germany. HM Embassy have taken up matter with Ministry of Foreign Affairs and have also asked that BBC should resume attacks on such recruitment in their Spanish broadcasts emphasizing conditions in Germany effect of air raids etc. (This message sent to AGWAR as cable number 8326 and to Algiers as cable number 2300 dated March 31).

A new British Military Attache Major Thomson has been appointed to Tangier (this is Foreign Office summary number 56 cite ETOGB to FHINC for Hazeltine signed Andrews). HM Minister Barnes reports that German conscription of French youths and events in Savoy have provoked daily comment in Swiss press and had good anti Vichy effect in French speaking cantons. A representative committee of mostly non Vichy Frenchmen with some Swiss members has been formed for giving "Fraternally aid to French refugees." Committee has received blessing of the Swiss authorities who will permit it to visit camps and look after normal and educational needs. HM Minister and US Minister approve though former fears that this work may possibly be open to Axis surveillance.

ACTION: G-2
INFORMATION: OPD, CG AAF, General Deane (CCS), Admiral King, Log.

CM-IN-334 (1 Apr 43) 13117 ems

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 2(B) and 5(D) or (X)
OSD Letter, Apr 4 1973
By DBS
Date: MAY 21 1973

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CONFIDENTIAL

COPY No. 51
CZECH INTELLIGENCE CONSIDERS AUTHENTIC REPORTS
THAT GERMAN PUBLIC BELIEVES 2ND FRONT WILL NOT BE
OPENED ON ACCOUNT WESTERN POWERS RECOGNIZING RUSSIAN
THREAT TO EUROPE. SAME SOURCE REPORTS GERMAN
GOVERNMENT HAVE HOPES ALLIES WILL SLACKEN AND TO
RUSSIA FOR SAME REASON.
LOCAL AGENT CONFIRMS REPORT REGARDING GERMAN PUBLIC
OPINION ON THIS SUBJECT BUT AGREES IT IS INSPIRED
BY GERMAN GOVERNMENT TO BOLSTER MORALE.

DECLASSIFIED

500 Germany

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12350, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/1974

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVRECS.)
The new German Luftwaffe units mentioned in third paragraph of my telegram no. 1283, February 25 are said to include several field divisions which were organized last November at the beginning of 1942-1943 Soviet winter offensive on the basis of experience with Luftwaffe rifle detachments in 1941-1942 winter campaign. Non-flying personnel of Luftwaffe advance units were asked to volunteer as infantrymen and the air command detailed many men from the ground personnel staff units training fields in Germany, air information services and other non-flying units. The majority of the men organized in the field divisions lacked almost completely infantry training or experience, but were sent immediately into the defensive winter campaign on eastern front. One division composed largely of former chauffeurs, cooks, clerks wireless operators and armormen was engaged in the heavy battles east of Rostov when it gained special recognition. These field divisions are being maintained at the front as infantry and rifleman units but still form an integral part of Luftwaffe. Their formation and use is said to illustrate the manner in which able-bodied soldiers have been detached from noncombatant units to serve at fighting front.
FRENCH REFUGEE REPORTS GERMANS COMMENCING SUBMARINE
     BASE AT ST JEAN D'EUZE. DIKE COMPLETED AND CONTINGENT
     AIR FORCE ARRIVED. ALL STATE CUSTOMS GUARDS SPANISH
     FRENCH FRONTIER BEING STRENGTHENED. STATES MORALLE
     OF GERMAN TROOPS LOW EXCEPT FOR YOUNGER MEN 20 TO 22
     WHO STILL BELIEVE FIRMLY IN AXIS VICTORY.

16...ACT....

COMINCH...10/11....NAVADE....20G....20P....
From: Helsingfors  
To: MILID  

In Reply Cite: 95, March 24, 1943

German Naval officer arriving Helsingfors from Tallinn reports Russian air bombardment evening of 22nd caused heavy damage; German Headquarters and civilian population evacuating. A-1 saw Tallinn flames from Helsingfors Vantage point that night.

Woldike

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: QPD CG AAF

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 1(D) and 2(D) or (N)
OSD letter, May 1, 1973
By DBS Date MAY 21 1973

CM-IN-13159 (25 Mar 43) 0151Z 008

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Cairo        To: AGWAR
In Reply Cite: 25  March 24, 1943

Yugoslav source considered B-2 reports 13 German and 9 other Axis Generals met in Belgrade in early March. Discussion concerned eventual Balkan front creation of GHQ for this front. All German civilians have been ordered out of Serbia Italians having previously been ordered here. Ustaši troops now under Minister of Defense prior to incorporation into Croat Army. Bielo Polje now in Chetnik hands. One German Division with Panzer elements reported arriving at Loznica. For Kroner from Milattache from Brereton British report Germans ordered fifty percent increase in rail capacity Athens-Salonika and Salonika-Gorge ready by April 1st.

No Sig.

ACTION: G-2
INFORMATION: OPD
CG AAF By DBS Date: MAY 21 1973

CH-IN-13006 (24 Mar 43) 2018Z gms

M. I. 8. JOURNAL NO. 247 MAR 24 1943

_COPY NO.

DECLASSIFIED
E. 0. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/94
MY 121745. REPORT OF GERMAN AIR REGIMENT STATIONED
SOFIA IS TRUE. PLANES REPORTED MAY HAVE BEEN
SOME OF ABOUT 50% THAT HAVE CROSSED BULGARIA SOUTH-
BOUND SINCE ALLIES LANDED NORTH AFRICA. ONLY
RECENT ACTIVITY REPORTED FROM BULGARIA IS NEW
GERMAN DEVELOPMENT OF AIR FIELDS AT YAMBOL AND
SLIVEN AND HASKOVA NEAR TURKISH BORDER.

ACTION: 16.....

CONFIDENTIAL
TRAVELERS ARRIVING FROM EUROPE CONSISTENTLY BRING REPORTS OF LOW GERMAN MORALE AND THE OPINION THAT IT WOULD SOON CRACK UNDER CONTINUOUS BOMBING OF LARGE CITIES.
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Brrn
To: Secretary of State
Number 1731, March 17, 1943

Supplementing Legation's 1549, March 7.

Following are further excerpts from press regarding labor mobilization Germany. Up to the present appearances pleasant life maintained Germany but today this is over.

Orders closing firms originally be issued by March 1st and closings undertaken by March 15th but as impossible for administration reasons short postponement necessary. Compilation lists closings difficult as retail trade already 5 times obliged provide labor forces to armaments industry, therefore cannot generally assume retail trade possesses large number excess workers. Mobilization decree doesn't propose destruction small independent firms without regard urgent need utilization labor especially when such persons provide upkeep members families by independent professional activity. Men without professions, example those having independent means and property owners, be especially utilized for war work and many positions opened them Reichspost-Reichsbahn armaments industry involving supervision personnel and control work.

Some maintain armaments industry offers less occupation possibilities than number labor reserves available but they overlooked fact armaments industry until now had far greater demand for laborers than possible satisfy and that can employ laborers in additional factories by appropriate decentralization production. Many firms already recently undertaken establishment branch factories making possible considerable increase production working possibilities therefore fear too great mobilization laborers unwarranted. Decentralization production affords access factories without resettlement or excessive daily travel laborers which especially important part time female workers having responsibility maintain household. War consolidation retail firms advocated especially specialized firms, thereby enabling close some without excessive hardship. Firms handling miscellaneous goods given preference inasmuch enable consumers whose purchasing greatly hindered result closing many firms to cover requirements

(CM-IN-8316 18 Mar 43)

RECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/94

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simultaneously war mobilization requiring prohibition trips commercial travelers except where still necessary. Pre-war number commercial travelers 80,000 whereof over third since mobilized army other services. Remaining generally regarded unimportant war effort therefore subject labor mobilization is unengaged special important tasks armaments industry or utilized distribution vital requirements population.

Principal occupation handicraft industries now repairs while large scale handicraft making important contribution building armaments industries and small medium handicraft industries already subjected closings therefore unexpected mobilize many laborers handicraft industries.

Economic group printing industry authorized undertake closing concentration firms order release laborers wherefor continuing rationalization. 18,000 printing firms and 1500 house printers existing Germany whereof 2/3 employ under 5 persons. Considerable rationalization concentration specialization already undertaken and closing firms now undertaken according similar principles leaving best firms closing remainder amounting several thousand. Women replace German male laborers hotels. Employment orchestras hotels prohibited unless employed cafes annexed. Serving meals rooms, other special services generally prohibited.

Use household maids other occupations armaments industry unintended but reserved primarily households several children.

General labor mobilization decree January 1943 exempting women over 45 years, women with one child under school age, 2 children under 14, unapplies workers subject mobilization agriculture under decree March 1942. Persons subject obligatory agriculture labor service 1942 also obligated 1943. Requirement laborers German agriculture greater than before.

Harrison

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: GPD

CG AAF

CM-IN-8316 (18 Mar 43) 11063 EMS

M.18 JOURNAL NO. 145 MAR 18 1943

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/54

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

Paraphrase

From: Ankara

Dated: March 16, 1943, 10 p.m.

No. 483

Rec'd: March 17, 1943, 12:09 p.m.

A reliable source has just given me information to
the effect that officers of the German General Staff
now stationed in outlying districts of Bulgaria have
recently been given instructions to return to Sofia. This
informant also states that the Germans residing in Bulgaria
have been given secret instructions that they should make
preparations for departure from Bulgaria.

Steinhardt

Action: G-2

Information: OPD

CG AAF

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-73

By MAY 21 1973

CM-IN-9097 (18 Mar 43) 0320 Z msg

M. L. S. JOURNAL NO. 48 MAR 18 1943

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COPY No. 24

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/74
**NAVAL MESSAGE**

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Information: Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

**LT. ROBINSON**

151320  NCR 2940

Unless otherwise indicated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

**ORIGINATOR**  Fill in date and time  **DATE**  **TIME**  **OCT**

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**TEXT**

NEPHEW OF TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER RETURNED RECENTLY FROM COURIER TRIP TO AUSTRIA, GERMANY, FRANCE, SPAIN, AND PORTUGAL. HE ARRIVED IN BERLIN SHORTLY AFTER ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE GERMAN REVERSE AT STALINGRAD AND THE DAY AFTER A BRITISH RAID ON BERLIN. HE SAID MORALE WAS STRIKINGLY LOW AND THAT IT WAS WIDELY FELT AMONG GERMANS HE MET THAT WAR IS LOST. DESPAIR HAD SET IN BUT NO INDICATION THEY WOULD GIVE UP.

ACTION: 16.....

10/11...2G...COMINCH...NAVAIDE...FILE. 2OP...
BRITISH CONSIDER RELIABLE A REPORT THAT GERMAN AIR REGIMENT WITH ME-109 TYPE PLANES RECENTLY ARRIVED BULGARIA FOR DEFENCE SOFIA. ON TANAN PENINSULA TRANSPORT PLANES AND GLIDERS OPERATING FROM CRIMEA ARE BRINGING SUPPLIES AND EVACUATING TROOPS. KIRCH PENINSULA STRONGLY DEFENDED. PERSISTENT REPORTS FROM QUESTIONABLE SOURCES THAT GERMAN ACTIVITY ON AEGEAN ISLANDS IS INCREASING THAT GENERAL BRAUER RECENTLY VISITED RHODES THAT 5,000 GERMAN TROOPS EXPECTED THERE AND THAT PREPARATIONS ARE BEING MADE TO INTENSIFY SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN FROM SALAMIS BASE.

16...ACT

FILE NAVYDE...20P.
From: Madrid
To: Milid

In Reply Cite: 112 March 10 1943

Source: United Press from reliable contacts.
German precautions against 2nd front greatly increased last 10 days. To 1st Army rushing defense Southern European coasts, France, Italy including Sardinia, Sicily, Greece. Bulk labor provided locally. French works Riviera being modernized strengthened. Large number Italian troops moved into Salonika area. Island approaches to Salonika being fortified. Railroad passenger transportation France minimum especially South-west lines.

Dusenbury

ACTION: G-2
INFORMATION: OPD CG AAF

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 8(En and 8(D) or 8(E)
OSD letter, May 6, 1972
By DBS Date: May 21, 1972

CM-IN-5810 (12 Mar 43) 0040Z

M I B JOURNAL No. 19 MAR 12 1943

SECRET

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COPY No. 26
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

March 10, 1943

SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Number 1607

Eye witness bombing raid on Berlin March 1 characterizes damage as very great and states he saw fires burning following day. He reports some damage to Luftwaffe wing of Air Ministry and severe damage to Soviet Embassy. Observer states early report minimized number killed which later grew rapidly and popular feeling is that many more than number officially announced by authorities were victims. Another observer who just arrived today states that effects of raid were impressive and says reports circulate in Berlin that 5000 people were killed. Informants did not give more specific details.

Harrison

Action: G-2
Information: OPD CG AAF

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

CM-IN- 5963 (12 Mar 43) 1033 Z mVS
From: Helsinki

Dated: March 9, 4 p.m.

The Swedish Press Attache has given me the substance of his conversation on March 7 with a woman who was in Berlin at the time of the last RAF bombing. I have repeated this message to London. According to her report, Berliners were panic-stricken. Those people who were within 20 meters of the spot where the bomb hit met instantaneous death. The blast caused their lungs to collapse. This informant described the destruction to the German capital as "terrific", especially to the central part. She also said the population of Berlin expects the RAF to return again very soon. Therefore, it is believed the effect would be tremendous were the British to put on 3 or 4 successive raids.

Action: G-2 AIR

Information: OPD

CG AAF

DECLASSIFIED
May 15, 1974

M. L. R. Journal No. 112 Mar 10, 1943

Copy No. 26

The Making of an Exact Copy of This Message Is Forbidden
From: Cairo
To: MILID

In Reply Cite: AMSME 4 March 9, 1943

Yugoslav and Polish sources in Istanbul report the Romanian army destroyed on Russian front. Building new one for internal purposes (for Kroner from Skymanski from Berston) claim that if Romansians were guaranteed Bukovina from Ions they would secede from Axis. Willing to give up Bessarabia and Dobruja and take a chance on winning Transylvania from Hungary. Same sources report that if Romansians reach Odessa Bulgarians will take on Communism and together with Romansians snuff out Romania. All of Balkans live in dread of approach of Russian army and communism whose agents are increasing their activities there and in Poland.

No Sig.

ACTION: G-2
INFORMATION: OPD
CG AAF
Log

CM-IN-5843 (12 Mar 43) 0249Z

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 2/1/94

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 2/1/94

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Ankara
To: Milid
In Reply Cite: 390, March 6, 1943.

Polish source B 2 states class 1923 Rumania called German High Officers recently made ground reconnaissance Danube Area pro Ally sentiment increasing slogan Opposition Party is to have Rumanian control Army and economics and not to send more troops out of country. Construction fortification continues all possible landing places Aegesan Coast to race ammunition and food supplies to Aegesan Islands increased indicating expected attack and unable to supply during such.

Jedwin

Action: G-2 EA
Information: OPD
CG AAF

RECEIVED
E. O. 11612, Sec. 2(D) and 5(D) or (A)
OED letter, Mar. 1, 1974
By SLR Date MAR 27 1974
CM-IN-3809 (8 Mar 43) 0556 Z mvs

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/94
From Free, signed Legge. (This is section three of the message sections 1 and 2 of which were transmitted in Legation’s telegrams nos. 1229 and 1267 of February 23 and 24, respectively.)

All evidence since the German defeat at Stalingrad confirms sections one and two, which are substantiated fairly well.

It is apparent that the morale of Germans of the upper classes is worse than that of the middle classes, which in turn is worse than that of the lower classes (at least the lower class and lower middle class German workers in the war industries including railroads.) The people, who had believed everything all right on the East Front and so were not prepared for the news of the defeat, were shocked by Stalingrad; however the upper and middle classes were much more greatly shocked than the lower.

It is thought that class differences result from the fact that the educated classes are more aware and more skeptical and are more anti-Nazi in their tendencies, whereas the workers are more susceptible and more open to official propaganda daily through party foremen who disseminate propaganda. Also since one of the reasons male workers of military age are allowed to remain home is their party loyalty, it is natural that they are more receptive than average to official propaganda. There is no weeding out process with regard to the women whom family losses and rationing annoyances affect more greatly; they have recently become more pessimistic and critical and their loyalty is decreasing.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By NARA Date

CONFIDENTIAL
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
During the last war the morale of the German troops was "poisoned" by the declining morale of members of their families, particularly women, at home. After the soldiers returned from leave or received complaining letters their morale was always worse. Because of this and the fact that German women are more vulnerable it is suggested that American propaganda be heavily concentrated on them.

B. It is thought, on the basis of strong evidence, that the two most important aims of our propaganda to Germany are: first stage: to promote feeling of complete defeatism. This spirit which is not yet much advanced because the masses are in comparative ignorance, is gaining momentum mainly because the German propagandists were compelled to partially reveal the truth by the defeats on the Russian front dramatized by Stalingrad. This gives Allied propagandists their opening wedge. It is thought that if Germany continues to suffer military defeats, the situation is set for a quick growth of defeatism, particularly as the pessimism and skepticism of the more informed elements, including the military, begin to reach the lower classes.

The Germans will not give up or crack until they are forced to their knees psychologically, since they recognize only might. This will have to be accomplished mainly by military defeats, but propaganda can assist: (1) by getting the people into a defeatist attitude in advance (accomplished by sowing skepticism and doubt) which will form a basis for interpretation and perhaps even magnifying of the significance of future military setbacks; (2) by familiarizing the public with the real situation, particularly military and its purport on current basis "evidence previously obtained indicates that the public was very badly informed until it became impossible for the German propaganda machine to withhold the news); (3) by eliminating every hope for even a partial German victory or for an "arrangement" founded on the lack of strength or unwillingness of the Allies to continue the war.
The second stage of the propaganda campaign should be to allay the fears of the people as to the consequences which loss of the war would entail in the greater respects, such as fears of mass murder, of being starved, of being made slaves, of being invaded, of being deported (?) by the Russians and peoples of occupied lands. (With regard to starvation, the Germans are still extremely bitter because England did not relax her blockade after the armistice was signed in the last war, thus unnecessarily stunting the children’s growth.) It is thought that if assurances regarding these graver fears could be made so that capitulation might be made more easily palatable, much of the stamina of the Germans would crack. The German propaganda machine finds these fears its most effective weapons and the anxiety of the German people is confirmed by the fact that comparatively nothing is vouchsafed by Allied propaganda concerning these subjects. No alternative but obedience to the regime is at present evident to the people if they are to be spared a horrible fate; it is necessary to furnish them a "way out". The average German, it is thought, desires not much more than assurances of physical security for his family and himself, and a simple livelihood following the war. Latter idea is expressed for the peasants in the following way: Most of them would consider that if they were permitted to keep a field or two or one of their less valuable cows it would be a gift from heaven.

Harrison
CONFIDENTIAL
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

Sec. 3.3

Dated February 25, 1943
Rec'd 7:54 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

Number 1283, February 25, 1943

Confidential sources interested in Germany furnish the following information regarding developments of a military significance there:

1. Anti-aircraft defense of Munich and the surrounding area have been greatly strengthened during the past 6 weeks believed in anticipation of heavy Allied air attacks this spring. This activity is very noticeable and a topic of general conversation in the city. Informants state no reports of comparable activity at other German cities have been received.

2. The appointment of a special inspector for the Panzer forces interpreted as an indication that tanks will be the chief weapon in the German summer offensive and that tank losses sustained through action and abandonment in Russia this winter require the regrouping and reequipping of Panzer units on such a scale that only a ranking officer such as Guderian acting with Hitler's full powers could hope to enforce necessary decisions on military and armament circles.

3. The German Luftwaffe has undergone during the past few months a thorough survey to eliminate physically fit men from ground and other noncombatant duties and to replace them with recovered wounded men otherwise physically unfit and high school youth. This survey has included units operating at the fronts as well as those located in service training civilian and defense fields in Germany and other noncombatant areas. Since the Luftwaffe did not wish to lose control of the released personnel the men were organized into Luftwaffe grenade and artillery units which were sent to the Eastern Front and are now serving alongside of regular army and SS divisions there. These Luftwaffe fighting units have from time to time been mentioned in German communiques of covering fighting in Russia.

4. Infantry General von Unruh was detached from a rear command in occupied Russia to carry out the total mobilization in Germany with direct responsibility to Hitler. He works with

DECLASSIFIED
CM-IN-13641 (26 Feb 43)
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
MAY 21 1973

COPY No. 26

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94

300 Germany. THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
Keitel, Lammers and Bohrmann with a view to mobilizing all available men capable of fighting at the front and every man and woman usable by the war industry. In this aim the General has the power to survey the armed forces to eliminate physically fit men from noncombatant duties and the civilian population to assign workers to necessary armament activities. This survey is specially rigorous in examining the so-called essential positions which heretofore carried exemption from military service.

5. Much pressure is placed on the foreign workmen in Germany, particularly these from the neutral and the occupied countries to enlist in the so-called voluntary formations of the SS for service in Russia. A certain number of recruits are obtained in this manner from workers dissatisfied with working conditions or bored with life in cantonments. This pressure is exercised in such a fashion as to convince potential recruits that military service is more endurable than continued civilian work.
Section two of message from Bern. (Section one of this message was transmitted as Legation's no. 1229.)

1. Source: Swiss mechanic who has been in Germany the last two months during which he set up and repaired machines in sixty factories in all sections of the country. He is lower middle class, not politically minded, but passively pro-United Nations.

VM The factories he visited were among the largest, including ten tank, twenty aircraft, two chemical, the remainder, manufacturing metal goods and tool parts. The morale of the lower middle class and lower class workers in war plants is 3. The workers were less affected by the defeat at Stalingrad than would be anticipated. One worker in three considered it a catastrophe, but the opinion in general of the workers reflected the official propagandists line that the withdrawal on the Russian front was for strategic reasons, and that when the weather improved the Germans will advance. There is in yet any great trend among the workers to blame Der Fuehrer; whatever criticism is voiced is mild.

102. Where two months ago hardly any of the workers were uncertain of victory, now one-fourth to one-third have started to doubt that Germany will win.

Although during the last two months there has been a noticeable increase in the fear of the consequences of losing the war, this fear is not intense among the workers as yet. Most of them believed that the Stalingrad defeat was not decisive and so experienced no special shock or reaction after that defeat. A great number feel that defeat resulting in a Communist regime would entail terror and wholesale murder. They express this feeling by saying that if the Communists won, the Germans would be treated as animals.

22. The workers complain little about work. (Comment: It is probable that this high rating can be partially explained by the fact that workers in the war
INCOMING MESSAGE

Number 1267    Page 2    February 26, 1943

Factories are among the most privileged, and as far as
the male workers are concerned, they are allowed to
remain in Germany for special reasons, loyalty to the
regime being 1 reason.

There was no slave driving. Our informant was
astonished at the slowness with which the workers did
their work and the small amount they produced in
comparison with Swiss.

43. Some of the workers are angry because of
scarcity of goods and the fact that all articles are
rationed; however real opposition lacking; even scolding
ordinarily moderate.

81.° (SO?) There is no talk of peace among the
workers.

164. A worker in 3 is really war-weary; some of
these no longer have faith that Germany will win.
(Comment: Apparently there is a connection between war-
wearyness and defeatism; therefore the importance of
encouraging defeatism as suggested in following).
Wearyness is greater among the women than the men,
because the former are not accustomed to the work, and
due to the increasing burden of work, and more diffi-
culties with rationing. The women are more pessimistic
and also complain of cold sooner than the men. (Comment:
Other plausible sources confirm this).

820. Nothing available to purchase.

840. The workers' nerves in not too bad state.
(Comment: Probably are in better condition than those
of upper and middle classes, since the workers as yet
have less concern about loss of war.)

960. The German workers and the foremen both state
that the foreign workers have been a big disappointment
and complain that the foreign workers are unwilling to
do their share. The Russians, particularly the Ukrainians
women, are the best and most willing of the foreign
workers. The German workers are particularly exasperated
with the Italian workers.

481 in the key message (Telegram No. 203, January 11,
1943, from Legation at Bern) is listed as "blank".

CH-IN-349 (1 Mar 43)

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
Results of bombing: Although source was in war plants constantly during 2 months, he witnessed little disturbance because of bombing, either resulting from loss of time or actual damage, and at no time did he see complete cessation of all work in a plant during an air raid. The following is all the damage that he saw: No damage at Daimler and Bosch in Stuttgart; at Dusseldorf 1/20th of the munitions factories; little damage to tank and metal goods factories and along a harbor at Lubeck; only individual storehouses at Krupp; Cologne, about 15% of factories. Our informant was in Duisberg on December 18 when the big bombing took place and saw little damage there. There has been a small decrease in production but this is caused more by scarcity of skilled workers and the use of foreign workers than by the bombings. Source spent a month in Ruhr and states that there, as elsewhere, there were no evident effects on civilian morale. The German people thought that the bombing seemed to be without plan; and our informant held the same view.

2. Sources: 2 pro-Allied Swiss railroad men who made business trip to Germany. VN

The morale of both administrative personnel and German railway workers. Majority of Germans are working mechanically without enthusiasm. However there is no noticeable unwillingness among the lower railroad workers and the higher personnel show admirable energy. Indications of extreme weariness lacking.

The chief complaint of the employees is that the party men are given the best jobs and promotions. (The situation prevalent).

The Hitler salute is seldom used in Bavaria, which is less pro-Nazi that other areas. There is a strong feeling in Munich against the party.

There is nothing to indicate that the German railroads will be unable to meet the burden of the war, pessimism is lacking among high rail officials.
**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

**Paraphrase**

Telegram No. 1250  
Dated: 2-24-43 8 p.m.

From: Bern  
Rec'd: 2-24-43 10:59 a.m.

Following message from Poe:

Columns below indicate (1) certain replacement formations (2) number of recruits in training therein (3) "A", total of 18 year olds plus formerly rejected 19 year olds (balance are older men usually under 35 years combed from those previously exempt and in addition a few former rejects) and (4) date of mobilization when date was not about mid-October. According to reports, men mobilized in October will be sent to active service in March.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Replacement formation</th>
<th>Number of Recruits</th>
<th>&quot;A&quot;</th>
<th>Date of Muster ing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Artillery:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th</td>
<td>1875</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>Nov. 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Stettin</td>
<td>1921</td>
<td>814</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Above 2,200 at the beginning of 1942 but none three months after mid-July)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th</td>
<td>1826</td>
<td>902</td>
<td>Nov. 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78th</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>Nov. 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56th</td>
<td>1643</td>
<td>721</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Also 309 of 315 reported sooner, 6 removed after shooting exercise accident)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103rd</td>
<td>1772</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>Nov. 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69th</td>
<td>1783</td>
<td>684</td>
<td>Nov. 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71st</td>
<td>3211</td>
<td>2034</td>
<td>Nov. 18</td>
</tr>
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**DECLASSIFIED**

MAY 15 1974

COPY No. 26

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/89
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11th</td>
<td>Leipzig</td>
<td>2933</td>
<td>1567</td>
<td>Nov. 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66th</td>
<td></td>
<td>3105</td>
<td>46 (?)</td>
<td>Nov. 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33rd</td>
<td></td>
<td>2965</td>
<td>1877</td>
<td>Nov. 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panzer:</td>
<td></td>
<td>2512</td>
<td>1683</td>
<td>Nov. 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2107</td>
<td>1322</td>
<td>Nov. 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th</td>
<td></td>
<td>723</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>Nov. 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th</td>
<td>Madgeburg</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>Nov. 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60th</td>
<td></td>
<td>673</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>Nov. 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37th</td>
<td>Panzer</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>Nov. 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Koenigsburg</td>
<td></td>
<td>663</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>Nov. 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Infantry:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th</td>
<td>Meiningen</td>
<td>2318</td>
<td>1659</td>
<td>Nov. 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td></td>
<td>2145</td>
<td>1602</td>
<td>Nov. 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-tank:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th</td>
<td>Borna (?) Leipzig</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>Nov. 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th</td>
<td></td>
<td>693</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>Nov. 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50th</td>
<td></td>
<td>916</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>Nov. 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Motive (?) 372 mobilized earlier, reported being sent on active service shortly)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td></td>
<td>664</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>Nov. 17</td>
</tr>
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Reconnaissance battalions:

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/44

COPY No. 26
ACCORDING TO THE FIRST REPORT FROM BRAUNSCHWEIG, ALL REPLACEMENT FORMATIONS ABOVE MENTIONED IN THIS PROVINCE WERE EMPTY BETWEEN LATE SUMMER AND AROUND MID-OCTOBER, SUBSEQUENTLY FULL. LARGE NUMBER OF TROOPS AND ALL OCTOBER RECRUITS FROM THURINGIA AND OTHER LOCALITIES USING OHDRUF TRAINING FIELD AFTER ROUND END OF OCTOBER UPON COMPLETION OF TWO WEEKS THEORETICAL TRAINING AT BARRACKS. NOVEMBER 16 (?).

NEW SUBJECT FOLLOWS:

HERE BELOW ARE TOTALS OF LONG MISSING, DEAD, AND INCAPACITATED FOR FURTHER ACTIVE SERVICE AS REPORTED BY THEIR ACTIVE FORMATIONS TO THE RESPECTIVE REPLACEMENT FORMATIONS ON THE DATES ABOVE INDICATED:

ARTILLERY:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Artillery</th>
<th>13th</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>29th</th>
<th>78th</th>
<th>58th</th>
<th>103rd</th>
<th>40th</th>
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<td></td>
<td>699</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>1315</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>977</td>
<td>828</td>
<td>889</td>
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INFANTRY:

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<th>Infantry</th>
<th>71st</th>
<th>2882</th>
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<td></td>
<td>5876</td>
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(MW-IN-2467 (5 Mar 43)

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
INCOMING MESSAGE

March 5, 1943

11th 3149
66th 3421
33rd 3264

Panzer:
2nd 3074
1st 2782

Signal:
29th 494
13th 491
60th 480
37th Panzer 661
1st 458

Armored Infantry:
12th 1953
1st 2436

Anti-tank:
24th 538
13th 749
37th 479

Engineer:
50th 702
4th 712

Reconnaissance battalions:
29th Artillery
Observation 171
1st Motorcycle
Riflemen 439

Another new subject:

Following columns show (1) organization; (2) number dead since outbreak of war; (3) per cent of the active peace time effectives mobilized--almost all unmobilized

(CM-IN-2467 (5 Mar 43)
are exempt; (4) date of tabulation (?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SA:</th>
<th>6th Schuetzen of Badische</th>
<th>98</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>235th</td>
<td>461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>232nd</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>437th</td>
<td>429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26th Magdeburg</td>
<td>419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45th</td>
<td>386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>95th</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>217th</td>
<td>623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>47th</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSKK Motorized:</td>
<td>13th Altona in Hamburg</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>74 before, Nov. 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>87 after mid-October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12th</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>137th Magdeburg</td>
<td>281</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>74 before,</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>80 after mid-</td>
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<td></td>
<td>October Nov. 17</td>
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<td></td>
<td>44th</td>
<td>331</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA Naval:</td>
<td>48th</td>
<td>330</td>
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<td></td>
<td>27th</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other SA:</td>
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<td>(CM-IN-2467 (5 Mar 43)</td>
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</table>
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Page 6

6th Sharpshooter 489
137th Cavalry 412

March 5, 1943

Nov. 16
Nov. 17

Harrison

ACTION: G-2 EA

INFORMATION: OPD
CGAAF

CM-IN-2467 (5 Mar 43) 2209Z 25g

DECLASSIFIED
MAY 15 1974

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INCOMING MESSAGE

Telegram no. 1229  Dated: 2/23/43
From: Bern
Rec'd: 2/23/43

Following from Free, signed Legge.

Comparison of very recent reports concerning opinion in
Wurtemberg and Baden, and Berlin contained in this message
with cable no 565 dated January 25 from Legation reveals morale
changes which have occurred as a result of the fact that the
reverses on the East Front have become public knowledge and
the effects of the new propaganda policy of "Back to the Wall"
adopted by the Germans.

1. Source: Swedish journalist who has resided for past
2 years in Germany, most of this time being spent in Berlin.
He is an excellent objective observer, notwithstanding his anti-
Nazi views. Morale of upper classes in Berlin is less than 4;
that of middle classes, 4.

23. The people, notwithstanding their poor morale and
their disgust with the party, are working and fighting desperately;
however, enthusiasm is lacking. The main reason for this is their
fear of the consequences of defeat and their lack of any apparent
alternative.

44.64(?) Discontent last year was diffused; at the present
it is widely and definitely directed against the party.

Upper classes divided between 105 and 106. Middle classes
104. (Comment: Possibility that the war may be lost now appears
more real, undoubtedly this partially accounts for the greater
fear of the consequences of defeat.)

123 outstanding. Invasion by Serbs, French, Russians, Nor-
wegians and Poles is dreaded. National conscience bad.

145. However fear of the consequences of losing the war
bolsters them.

83. Seldom, in part result of fear, in part because Ger-
mans feel that if they impede the war effort they are hurting
themselves. Regardless, the people lately are extremely bold

CM-IN-13640 (26 Feb 43)

E. D. 11460, Sec. 3(B) and 5(D) or (E)
GSD letter, May 1, 1972
By DBS
Date MAY 21 1973

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/17.
INCOMING MESSAGE

in laying blame on the party. Ley's recent speeches in factories have been often interrupted by cat calls. He is considered a bloated "partycrat". Since people made parade "es geht alles vorüber es geht alles vorbei zuerst geht der Hitler dann geht die partei" Goebbels had to ban the song hit.

651. Dismissal of old line conservative generals and appointment of reckless "party general's" resulted in blame for Hitler whose prestige is down.

Berlin source states more air raids desirable, basing his recommendation on the effects of the last 2 air raids.

980. Foreign workers and war prisoners are regarded in friendly light by the Germans; this attitude is passive because of harsh penalties. (Comment: German authorities experiencing great concern over fraternization; they feel that the German people are now incapable of initiating a revolution among themselves, but are afraid that foreign workers may inspire them to it.)

164. Statement by Goering that "arrangement" can be effected with gentlemen is nourishing nebulous hope of middle classes for "arranged" peace. It is rumored repeatedly that "respectable" circles in Germany are in contact with their counterparts in the Allied camp. The policy is first to bring Allies to decision that an "arrangement" is less costly than continued fighting, this to be accomplished by intensely bitter defense of Germany; secondly, to exploit the perils of Communism with greater intensity than ever before to frighten the United States and Britain; and thirdly, to eliminate Hitler.

Thought is not yet being given by people to alternative leadership.

890. Casualties on East front main complaint. Almost every family has suffered losses.

2. Source: German, white collar, middle class, of a profession bringing him in constant contact with large circles of people. He is anti-Nazi. (This is the same source as that furnishing similar report in cable no. 565, of January 25. He has been in Germany ever since.) The morale of the middle classes in the states of Wurttemberg and Baden is between 4 and 5. The change shown after the loss of Stalingrad would be greater except

CM-IN-13640 (26 Feb 43)
that the previous report had been prepared after the propaganda shift's first stages had already been initiated; therefore morale had already started to drop.

In contrast with the earlier report, the emphasis is on intense fear of the consequences of defeat. (Eine ende mit Schrecken). Defeats are being openly discussed, and this results in a fear being more openly admitted. Feel that discussions could be carried on with the Americans and British, but fear "primitive tribes to the east".

A strong realization of guilt is appearing. A simple village woman made the remark that if the Germans had to suffer all the things they had inflicted on others, God help them.

People disapprove the foolish sacrifice of the German army at Stalingrad and are indignant with the Government because of the Russian front. The regard "heroic" propaganda as "empty phrases" and admit the strength of the enemy. The illusions concerning Hitler's infallibility have disappeared. The people say it is because of such a blockhead that thousands have to lose their lives. The population is divided between 104 and 105.

83. In Jena girl students were demanded by gauleiter Sauckel to leave their studies and go to work in the factories. He shouted at them that he would like to see them locked in a barracks with a troop of SS men; that then at least they would fulfill their mission with regard to the population program of Germany. The resultant anger of the girls was so great that Sauckel had to leave the platform.

At a mass meeting of the students at the University of Munich a gauleiter labeled the boys "shirkers" and told the girls that they should go to work in the factories since munitions were of more consequence than art and history. A riot squad arrested many students in the following demonstration.

(The above instances indicate the ways the Nazis are perverting the universities.)
The following message is from Poe: Columns are arranged to indicate certain replacement formations; number of recruits in training; "A" is total number included of 18 year olds plus previous rejects of 19 years (remainder comprises older men usually under 35 years, Flak older, combed from former "exempts" and in addition some previous rejects); and date of muster is shown when date is not around the middle of October.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Replacement Formations</th>
<th>Artillery:</th>
<th>63rd</th>
<th>7th</th>
<th>110th</th>
<th>74th</th>
<th>102nd</th>
<th>98th</th>
<th>100th</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1563</td>
<td>2169</td>
<td>1655</td>
<td>1024</td>
<td>1725</td>
<td>1573</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>824</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>1002</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>817</td>
<td>833</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nov. 17</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nov. 16</td>
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<td>Nov. 16</td>
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<td>Nov. 16</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Replacement Formations</th>
<th>Infantry:</th>
<th>19th (385 from earlier mustering--training almost completed)</th>
<th>3416</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1676</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Nov. 20</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Replacement Formations</th>
<th>63rd</th>
<th>61st</th>
<th>69th (482 from earlier mustering--training almost completed)</th>
<th>3056</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3537</td>
<td>2814</td>
<td></td>
<td>2143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1844</td>
<td>1924</td>
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<td>Nov. 13</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Nov. 10</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Replacement Formations</th>
<th>76th (912 from earlier mustering--understood to be sent soon on active service)</th>
<th>2850</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nov. 13</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Replacement Formations</th>
<th>135th</th>
<th>130th (Krumau and Freistadt in Upper Austria)</th>
<th>134th</th>
<th>133rd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2706</td>
<td></td>
<td>2765</td>
<td>2759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1344</td>
<td></td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>1826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov. 17</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nov. 17</td>
<td>Nov. 17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
War Department
Classified Message Center
Incoming Message

Flak:

57th  572
1112

(Of 803 reported on previously, 624 remain there; balance finished training and departed westward on Nov. 8th. In addition subsequent to mid-November 473 Heimat Flak including 62 women. On November 16th, the training of Heimat Flak was taken over entirely by Flak replacement (Ersatz) units after training on wharf, factory and other business premises on reduced scale under Flak officers proved to be unsatisfactory. Heimat Flak trainees in Strasbourg are not garrisoned and only report in June after work hours each day—men are all over 40 years old, some in fifties, mainly veterans of World War I; Women are volunteers and majority are in their twenties but there are a few older ones.)

66th  1207
(Kiel and vicinity)

105

(492 from previous mustering whose training is nearly completed. Garrison at Kiel is not usable and unit is now in quarters at Preetz and Rastorf with staff headquarters at Preetz. In addition since Autumn of 1942, 343 Heimat Flak including 02 women November 11th.)

5th  1132
573

since mid-Nov.

(Of 782 previously reported, 507 still in training and reported leaving shortly for France or Italy, balance whose training was completed left on night of Nov. 10-11 for south France; 96 women also still there. In addition 302 Heimat Flak 802 31 women November 20)

Other regiments:

9th Reconnaissance 1876 1429
100th Mountain Sharpshooter 2965 1837  Nov. 18
2nd Armored Infantry 2877 1716
5th Marines 1246 965  Nov. 11
CM-IN-2468  (5 Mar 43)

Declassified
March 15, 1974

COPY No. 26

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date

12/3/44
**INCOMING MESSAGE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11th Mounted Infantry</td>
<td>1624</td>
<td>Nov. 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th Air Signal Engineer</td>
<td>1503</td>
<td>Nov. 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81st</td>
<td>846</td>
<td>Nov. 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th</td>
<td>822</td>
<td>Nov. 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>Nov. 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47th</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>Nov. 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th</td>
<td>1034</td>
<td>Nov. 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54th Mountain</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>Nov. 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(empty since late summer 1942)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Signal:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battalion</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>47th</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>Nov. 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Marines</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>Nov. 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(148 previously reported departed for France on Nov. 8th, training not completed)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th Lubeck</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>Nov. 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38th</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>Nov. 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Munich</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>Nov. 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64th Vienna</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>Nov. 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65th</td>
<td>943</td>
<td>Nov. 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81st</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>Nov. 18</td>
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**Artillery Observation:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battalion</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>44th</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>Nov. 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>Nov. 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45th</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>Nov. 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-tank</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>Nov. 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44th Mountain</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>Nov. 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munich</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>Nov. 20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**Other Battalions:**

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<tr>
<th>Battalion</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7th Fahr</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>Nov. 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Reconnaissance</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>Nov. 20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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New subject

Following columns show totals long missing, dead, and incapacitated for further active service as reported by their active formations to above designated replacement formations from the beginning of the War to respective dates:

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<thead>
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<th>Artillery:</th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>63rd</td>
<td>972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th</td>
<td>905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110th</td>
<td>1087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74th</td>
<td>1507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102nd</td>
<td>1068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96th</td>
<td>1194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109th</td>
<td>1198</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Infantry:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19th</td>
<td>4427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th</td>
<td>2401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83rd</td>
<td>3527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61st</td>
<td>4823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th</td>
<td>2603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76th</td>
<td>2951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135th</td>
<td>3292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130th</td>
<td>3412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134th</td>
<td>3036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>133rd</td>
<td>3984</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flak:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>97th</td>
<td>706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66th</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td>603</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other regiments:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9th Reconnaissance</td>
<td>1205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100th Mountain</td>
<td>3683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharpshooter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Armored</td>
<td>2853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Marines</td>
<td>788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mounted Infantry</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th Air Signal</td>
<td>821</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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MAY 15 1974

CM-IN-2468 (5 Mar 43)

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### Incoming Message

**Engineer:**
- 81st: 1002
- 7th: 1367
- 47th: 1083
- 38th: 882
- 54th Mountain: 1437
- 30th: 986

**Signal:**
- 47th: 863
- 1st Marines: 226
- 30th: 479
- 38th: 429
- 7th: 912
- 64th: 391
- 66th: 378
- 65th: 477
- 61st: 493

**Artillery Observation:**
- 44th: 199
- 7th: 318
- 45th: 271

**Anti-tank:**
- 30th: 541
- 44th Mountain: 553
- 7th: 861

**Other Battalions:**
- 7th Fahr: 201
- 7th Reconnaissance: 703

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**Another new subject:**

Following are numbers of dead in various Standarten since beginning of the war; figures in parentheses show per cent of active peace time effective less mobilized reserves (almost all un-mobilized are ex-military):

CM-IN-2468 (5 Mar 43)
### OUTGOING MESSAGE

**WAR DEPARTMENT**  
**CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER**

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SA Cavalry:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Date</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>90th</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>Nov. 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94th</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>Nov. 18</td>
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</table>

**SA:**

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<th>Unit</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31st</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>Nov. 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34th</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>Nov. 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34th</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>Nov. 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>Nov. 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100th</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>Nov. 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>162nd</td>
<td>438 (96)</td>
<td>Nov. 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;R-15-List&quot;</td>
<td>563 (82)</td>
<td>Nov. 20</td>
</tr>
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**SA Sharpshooters:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>557 (09)</td>
<td>Nov. 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>Nov. 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>Nov. 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Nuechdor-Fonian</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>Nov. 19</td>
</tr>
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</table>

(96) mainly manifested 316 of lower middle class and farmers.

**NSK Motorized:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>197th</td>
<td>181 (?)</td>
<td>Nov. 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88th</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>Nov. 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100th</td>
<td>283 (100)</td>
<td>Nov. 17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**SS:** (Message garbled in part referring to SS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Number</th>
<th>Date</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Hulsweber&quot;</td>
<td>892</td>
<td>Nov. 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reenlisting (?)</td>
<td>843</td>
<td>Nov. 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37th and 34th</td>
<td>1902</td>
<td>Nov. 18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Other SA:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Adolf Hitler Bodyguard&quot;</td>
<td>1329</td>
<td>Nov. 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munich</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>Nov. 10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CM-IN-2458 (5 Mar 43)**

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**MAY 15 1974**

**COPY No. 26**

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
"Der Fuehrer" Vienna (Elite formations in combat SS from start of War have been reinforced; at present has 3125 recruits, all volunteers, majority from Hitler Jugend. 900 arrived in October, smaller group earlier, even smaller unit and training in replacement formation under SS not under Army) 4739 dead, long missing and permanently incapacitated up to November 15.

Harrison

Action: G-2 EA
Information: OPD CG AAF

CM-IN-2468 (5 Mar 43) 2211Z vc

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MAY 15 1974

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING MESSAGE
Secretary General Staff
February 20, 1943

GENERAL EISENHOWER
FREEDOM ALGIERS
Number 2626

The following paragraph is quoted from a message from Legge in Bern Switzerland. (For Eisenhower from Marshall.)
The remainder of the long message does not concern your theater:

"Contacts among German Army Officers state that the German General Staff at present greatly estoons General Eisenhower since he did not fall into the dangerous trap which was set for him at Bizerte and Tunis. If he had been tempted to remain 35 kilometers at the time when he had new, long and insecure supply lines, a great number of unreliable French scattered throughout responsible positions in North Africa and inadequate reserves in Morocco, to order General Anderson and his weak army to attack in strength, the result might have been decidedly disastrous for the Allied Nations in northwest Africa. Therefore at this time the German General Staff is worried considering that General Eisenhower employed the intervening time to overcome the early weaknesses and at present is able and does dictate strategy in North Africa. On the other hand the Germans have not given up hope of retaining the Tunisian bridgehead. It is considered by Conservative Staff Officers that the German "investment" in the Tunisian bridgehead is already excessive and they have fears that General Eisenhower may continue his tactics of gradually increasing pressure and thereby force the Germans to increase their investment out of all proportion to the position's value. Eisenhower's ably executed game entirely fooled Hitler and his officers."

ORIGINATOR: SGS
INFORMATION: OPD, GEN. DEANE, GEN. STRONG,
CM-OUT-7363 (20 Feb 43) 2035Z
DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 6(D) or 8
ORD letter, May 1, 1973

COPY No.
NASGAL LONDON

RELEASED BY 19 FEB 49

FOR ACTION

INFORMATION

VOPNAV

PRIORITY

ARRRR

DEERED

Decoded BY: STANFORD

paraphrase BY: ESTERLY

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

KNIGHT 191757

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED, THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR ALFRED M. HAMMOND

Text FROM CALLAN

B 3 NORWEGIAN SOURCE. LAST WEEK DECEMBER, FIRST WEEK JANUARY, MAJORITY GERMAN TRANSPORTS OPERATING NORWEGIAN AREA CARRIED MOSTLY WAR MATERIALS TO NORWAY, VEHICLES, CARTS, HORSES, SMALL GUNS. 2 SHIPS, MOLTKEFELS AND URANDI NOW CARRYING WAR MATERIALS POSSIBLY TROOPS FROM TRONDHEIM NORTHERNS.

ACT: 16...

COMINCH...10/11...2/10...FILES...

NAVATIE...2/10...

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/44
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<th>ACTION</th>
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<tr>
<td>F-00</td>
<td>MY SERIAL 273-42 DECEMBER 15, DUE TO REVERSE</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EASTERN FRONT GERMAN TROOPS STATIONED ROULANTA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-01</td>
<td>ARE GRADUALLY BEING REDUCED. PLOESTI OIL CENTER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>REMAINS MOST VITAL AREA. INFORMATION OF ITS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-012</td>
<td>DEFENSES REMAIN VAGUE BUT REPORTS INDICATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DEFENSE AREA IS DEFINED BY TRIANGLE TARGOV ISTE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-05</td>
<td>PLOESTI AND A POINT ON RAIL ROAD 2½ KILO LETTERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SOUTH OF PLOESTI, DEFENSE MEASURES INCLUDE BATTE-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RIES BALLOONS DUMMY REFINERIES AND PURSUIT PLANES.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-11</td>
<td>THIS IS ONLY PLACE IN ROULANTA WHERE PURSUIT PLANES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-9</td>
<td>STATIONED. ONLY OTHER PLACE WHERE BALLOONS ARE USED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-3</td>
<td>IS ON BRIDGE AT CERNOVO. B-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-30</td>
<td>E.O. 11644, SEC. 3.3 or SEC. 3.4</td>
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<td>F-31</td>
<td>OSD letter, May 4, 1972</td>
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<td>F-32</td>
<td>By DBS</td>
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<td>F-35</td>
<td>Date: MAY 21 1973</td>
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<td>16...ACT</td>
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CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only, Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVRECS.)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date: 4/1/1944
Helsinki

18 February 17, 2 p.m.

Telegram no. 288

2,000,000 established death claims have been paid by German life insurance companies to German soldiers' families, according to a reliable source. It is understood that Swedish military sources figure total German casualties at between 4 and 6,000,000.

Through reliable channel, we hear that Swedish Military Attaché in Berlin was advised by German General Staff that the most serious feature of the German defeat in the Caucasus was the loss of large quantities of gasoline stored there.

McClintock

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: OPD

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By [Signature] Date MAY 21, 1973

CM-IN-9064 (18 Feb 43) 1017Z ems
Throughout Germany there is much grumbling with regard to the war, however, no despair. Notwithstanding vicious antagonism to the Nazis, the will of the people to carry on the fight generally reinforced. The Nazis are very thorough in their intimidation. Since it is impossible for the people to initiate anything against the uniformed Nazi police, and also since people lack any great incentive since they are uncertain as to their probable fate should the regime be destroyed, the conditions are not ripe for revolution within near future. Factory workers are, however, considering whether it might not be possible to use factory AAAM in possible putach. It would be possible for factory employees to rush the factory police successfully and to gain possession of plants and AAAM; however, SS police with tanks and light artillery would then destroy them. Ten to fifty armed factory guards are stationed in every plant employing from 2000 to 3000 people. The overseers in the factories are German, while many of the workers are German women foreigners comprising most of the remainder. In many cities, the armed police now includes foreigners.

There is an ever increasing feeling against capitalism. This is not, however, in the sense of Marxist Communism. The German feeling in its positive expression is rather a seeking of a new ideology, a sort of German Communism. Among those people who in their bitterness believe that at present no revolutionary effort is necessary since sooner or later there will be a general collapse of existing order, Mihilism is having a similar growth.

The people of Germany have a good general conception as to the course of the battle on the east front as there are posted in shop windows maps on which are pinned battle lines of a fair degree of accuracy.

A portion of the German populace of relative unimportance but worthy of note is deriving consolation from the idea that after the Soviet Union has reconquered a considerable portion of its territory, it will be ready for peace talk. It is possible that this idea is officially inspired and reinforced by Nazi rumors that many Russians do not favor collaboration with the British and Americans. The general belief is that the war will last an indefinitely period. In order, first, to cause dissension in the United Nations alliance, and secondly with results, (CM-IN-10250 20 Feb 43)
there had been frequent circulation of rumors, of official inspiration, of peace with England.

It is said that there is such a great scarcity of doctors at the east front that the situation is dangerous.

Cases are positively known where the families of deserters to the Russians have been exterminated as a measure of vengeance.

If a traveler has proper connections, there is as yet no definite bar to taxi travel in Germany. The main cause of the withdrawal at the end of 1942 of a substantial number of taxis from service was to release drivers for the army supply service in the occupied eastern areas.

Many girls who up to now have led sheltered lives within their families are being mobilized for labor. Arduous attempts are being made by Nazi propagandists to convince the parents of these girls that they will not be made to work in the same groups or even in the same plants where there are girls of uncertain morals, and that any factory man who might make advances to them is threatened with the death penalty.

(Note by Legation) This is the first report of Lee's which has throughout a strong indication that a large number of Germans, both those in the armed forces, and civilians, have started to give serious consideration to alternatives to the existing regime and conditions in the country. The German mind, in spite of the fatalism of the soldier and the apathy of the civilian, appears to be reawakening and to be increasingly less receptive to ideas originating abroad. This transformation is the result undoubtedly of fatigue but it is likely even more definitely that the east front reverses and the fact that there is no evident prospect of victory are main causes. The search for alternatives can be expected to show increase as more defeats occur on the various war fronts and as suffering at home increases.

ACTION: G-2
INFORMATION: OPD
CG AAF
CM-IN-10250 (20 Feb 43) 0343E

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By RT, NARA, Date MAY 21 1973

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INCOMING MESSAGE
PARAPHRASE

Telegram no. 1033
From: Bern

Dated: 2-15-43 9 a.m.
Rec'd: 2-15-43 6:42 p.m.

Following message is from Lee as of the first part of
February:

Contacts among German Army officers state that the German
general staff at present greatly esteems General Eisenhower
since he did not fall into the dangerous trap which was set
for him at Bizerte and Tunis. If he had been tempted to
remain 30 kilometers at the time when he had new, long and
insecure supply lines, a great number of unreliable French
scattered throughout responsible positions in North Africa and
inadequate reserves in Morocco, to order General Anderson and
his weak army to attack in strength, the result might have been
decidedly disastrous for the Allied Nations in Northwest Africa.
Therefore at this time the German general staff is worried
considering that General Eisenhower employed the intervening
time to overcome the early weaknesses and at present is able
and does dictate strategy in North Africa. On the other hand
the Germans have not given up hope of retaining the Tunisian
bridgehead. It is considered by conservative staff officers
that the German "investment" in the Tunisian Bridgehead is
already excessive and they have fears that General Eisenhower
may continue his tactics of gradually increasing pressure and
thereby force the Germans to increase their investment out of all
proportion to the position's value. Eisenhower's ably executed
game entirely fooled Hitler and his officers.

With regard to the East front, trustworthy German military
sources state "Maximum strain but nowhere collapse". Included
in prior general strategy calculations is the possible abandon-
ment of all points east and south of the Orel, Kursk, Donetz and
Kertsch line. Nevertheless the Germans entirely underestimated
the Soviet man and material potential for the winter of 1942-1943;
they considered a Russian break through the Donetsk line and
west to Kursk impossible. The latter has turned out to be
a serious development and obviously not within German plans.
German strategy has had to be replanned and it consists at
present of "selling land to gain time" meaning that they want
to retain their battle strength at all costs in order to be
able to inflict heavy losses on enemy forces at every point.

CM-IN-9908 (19 Feb 43)
It is claimed by German officers that such strategy was not possible during the autumn of 1942 on account of the fear that the German people would be unable to support the blow. Its final positive reaction after the first shock of the Stalingrad defeat, however, proved that a good deal could be stood and the Nazis themselves were surprised at the recovery of morale. Owing to the fact that the Red Army attacked several months before the retraining of recruits called up for service last autumn could be finished, German officers think that the Russians were informed by someone as to the time when the German replacement organizations were depleted of trained recruits in 1942.

Hitler is generally blamed for the Stalingrad defeat and in the army there is a noticeable hard feeling against him. The undercurrent of criticism against Hitler and his entourage is more voluminous, distinct and maintained than at any former time. A certain amount of blame is placed on the troops of Germany's Allies who are thought to have given in sooner than the German troops did. With some success among his officers, according to reports, Hitler himself elected to try to blame the Japanese. In a contrite manner he made the admission that he was fooled by the Japanese who left him holding the bag at Stalingrad and the threshold of the Nile after the Japanese had promised him to strike hard in order to connect up with the German forces in the Middle East; the Japanese had then even failed to strike a heavy blow at any point.

Army personnel on furlough was recalled to the eastern front when the Orel-Kursk-Donetz line was broken. 800,000 to 800,000 recruits who were called up about the middle of October are still undergoing training. According to rumors they will be sent without complete training to active service in the near future. Those recruits who were called up last autumn and were undergoing training in northwest Germany joined fighting units in December. Since the middle of October, there have been no noteworthy inductions, but new mustering are expected in the near future possibly about March 15.

It is believed in German military circles that the Turks will not take an active part in hostilities or make concessions to the Allied Nations unless there is a collapse of the German east front. German military circles are not very anxious about the Balkans in as much as they believe that the Allies would have much difficulty in transporting and landing large forces in the Balkans even if Tunisia should be conquered.
the United Nations. Spain and Portugal are still regarded by
the German general staff as the weak spot in the western European
army and they are attempting by all possible means to estimate
what food stocks and motor fuel in Portugal and west Spain
might be used by the invading Anglo-Saxons. Because they fear
the reaction of the Spanish people to a possible large scale
German defeat on the east front in the future, the German
general staff is giving serious but postponed consideration
to the idea of a preventive war in order to secure the Iberian
Peninsula. A portion but not believed to be a decisive
part of the German forces in France were moved east through
Karlsruhe and more northerly passages. Therefore the German
troops in southern France are as yet considerable but no
reliable figures are available at this time. From the first
part of November to around the middle of January a stream of
over-age personnel of the services flowed westward towards
southern France; families of many railroad employees joined
them at their new posts as far as Toulouse and Limoges. It is
positive that the troops at present in southern France are
needed on the Russian front.

The situation has by degrees improved for the Allied
Nations since November 1942 in the opinion of German
replacement formation officers. These also say that chances
of victory for the United Nations are not yet 50-50, but they
will reach that point if the Axis armies are pushed out of
Tunisia or should the Russians destroy further large parts of
the German armies at the cost of less than three or four Russians
to one German.
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM
ALUSNA LONDON

RELEASED BY

DATE
14 FEB 43

TOR CODE: 2126

DECODED BY

BLGOM

FOR ACTION

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DELI CATED

INFORMATION

K. O. 11662, Sec. 3(D) and 4(D) or (D)

OSD Letter, May 1, 1973

By DBS

MAY 21, 1973

DE LI CATED

J. ALLEN

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILE IN DATE AND TIME

ACTION

TEXT

P-00

ZEEBRUGGE HOLE HAS 78 HOLES 6½ CENTIMETERS IN DIAMETER 2 METERS DEEP SPACED 1½ OR 2½ METERS APART

AND SET 4 METERS IN FROM THE EDGE OF THE HOLE BETWEEN CRANE TRACKS PLUS 2½ SIMILAR HOLES IN THE NEW LANDWARD PORTION OF THE HOLE. ANOTHER REPORT ALSO GRADED B2 SAYS THAT 18 MINES PLACED IN GROUPS OF FIVE ARE LOCATED 5½ METERS SOUTH OF 1917 COMMEMORATION PLATE AND 1½ MORE 5½ METERS FURTHER ALONG ALSO THAT MINES HOLES ARE BEING DUG AT 5½ METER INTERVALS ALONG THE LANDING STAGE OF HOLE EACH HOLE WITH SQUARE CONCRETE LID BUT CHARGES YET TO BE INSTALLED ACCORDING TO JANUARY REPORT ALL CRANES ON HOLE FITTED WITH SMALL HOSE HOLDING EXPLOSIVE CHARGE 4 REPORTS VARIOUSLY GRADED SAY ALL

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVRECS)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 

3/12/94
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INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

PAGE TWO OF 131621 NCR 9249

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME | DATE | TIME | OCT

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<td>ACTION</td>
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<tr>
<td>QUAYS SLUICES AND DYKES AT DUNKIRK AND NIEUPORT MINED TO FLOOD AREA AT BRUGES PITS BEING DUG ALONG ENTIRE PERIMETER OF NUMBER 1 AND 2 DOCKS. HOLES ARE 2 METERS DEEP SPACED AT 15 TO 20 METER INTERVALS. REPORT GRADED B2.</td>
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REMARKS
E. O. 11652, Sec. 2(D) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 1, 1972
By DBS Date MAY 21 1973

ACTION...16
1½/11...FILE. ADD 8M INCH...

ADD BUORD.....OP30.....

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Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art 76 (4) NAVRECS.)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
From: Bern  
To: MILID  

Number: 465, February 14, 1943  

Those countries now held by comparatively small force.  

German Army of Caucasus lost.  

Hitler has shown himself incapable of commanding army.  

Russia doubled her important war factories before war began building duplicate plants in or East of Urals. This accounts for continuity in her efforts in war production. When a plant became unusable its workmen were transported rapidly to duplicate plants often by air. Each man responsible for carrying his own tools.  

Greater Russian offensives expected before this campaign is over.  

German Army does not yet know where they will be able to hold. Their losses have been enormous.  

Consensus of reports coming from Germany shows that people at home are in high nervous state about future. Morale lowering and internal political and economical conditions growing rapidly worse.
From: Bern
To: MILID

INCOMING MESSAGE

# 465, February 14, 1943

It is believed Allied Tunisian offensive will be timed with Allied invasions of continent and perhaps with some phase Russian campaign in order to divide German efforts still further and prevent concentration Luftwaffe in any 1 theater of operations.

Germany has definitely lost the war. They know it.

The Germans have been inciting German Swiss to espionage activities. Directing agency is German Legation Berne. German Consulate Zurich also been used for this purpose. Several guilty Swiss executed.

Legge

ACTION: G-2/C-A

INFORMATION: OPD LOG

CM-IN-7607 (15 Feb 43) 1403Z cen
From: Berne
To: Milid

No. 462, February 13th, 1943

Six one four and 615 report from sources believed independent that Hitler has given up command of armed forces will be succeeded by Von Manstein no other sources here informed.

Legge

ACTION: G-2 F-A
INFORMATION: OPD CG AAF

CM-IN-7135 (14 Feb 43) 1045Z cms

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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-- 110 10

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM

FROM: Bern
NO.: 974

DATED: February 11, 1943, 10 p.m.
REC'D: February 11, 1943, 6:45 p.m.

FOLLOWING MESSAGE FOR WAR DEPARTMENT IS FROM LEGGE,
MILITARY ATTACHE.

Further reference to this Legation's telegram 960,
evaluated A, from 902.

(a) List probably now commands the 12th army in the
Baskans.

I am not sure who commands the 13th army in Holland.

Because office Ober Quartier Meister is in Rome, it
is believed formation of Witzleben army is in Italy.

(b) In the summer of 1942, the former 11th army
Manstein was formed: there was one separate army in the
Rostov region and it was disbanded last autumn.

In the region of Pskov, one separate army under
orders of Von Manstein is made up as follows: two divi-
sions coming from Germany; one army corps of 11th army;
one mountain division transported by water to Reval.

(c) Due to the demands of the Volchov, Schlusselburg
and Veliki-Luki fronts, the strength of the second separate
army has been reduced.

(d) The balance of this army has left for the
Smolensk area as last strategic reserve of O.K.H.

(e) That army is no longer under the command of
Manstein but 5 sector Kharkov-Rostov is still under his
command.

Kleist and not List is in command of the remainder of the army
group of the Caucasus.

CH-IN-7214 (14 Feb 43) SECRET

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44

30. Germany
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
Number 974
INCOMING MESSAGE
Page 2.

(f) At the end of January, Busch was promoted to a field marshal and his 16th army was made independent of army group Nord under Kuechler's command.

(g) The northern group (this includes Busch) all north of Novomokol Niki includes: armored divisions: 8th, 12th, possibly 19th also.

Light division and motorized division: 18th, 19th, possibly 25th also.

Mountain divisions: 3 and 5.

Infantry divisions: 22nd, 24th, 28th, 30th, 61st, 65th, 96th, 117th, 121st, 123rd, 132nd, 170th, 196th.
(From Norway) 207th, 223rd, 227th, 267th, 290th.

(h) There is a continuing trend to make armies on the eastern front independent which trend was caused by Prussian penetrations in December and consequent front's disruption.

(i) Ordered Jodl back into the OKW but he is very passive it is reported.

(j) Transports: 15 divisions have been transported from Germany, Belgium, Norway, Holland and France to the east since the end of December.

(k) Soldiers packages are limited to 100 grams since December third.

(l) German losses in the war up to January 30th, 1943 total 1,900,000 dead; 1,000,000 permanently incapacitated.

This information has been repeated to London for Etoua.

Harrison

ACTION: G-2 E-A
INFORMATION: OPD
CG AAF
CH-IN-7214 (14 Feb 43) 1716Z

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/44
From: Ankara
To: Milid
No. 375 Feb 10, 1943

Source 3rd from last sentence my 373 gives reliability A 2 further states 5 Romania divisions at home refused furnish further 11 divisions for which Germans promised equipment for fear riots Morilew practically every family has lost relatives. Antonescu acknowledges future Allied victory feels must support Germans to uphold his military honor. Change regime expected public desires popular Naniu regime.

Jadwin

Footnote: No. 373 is CM-IN-3531 (2-7-43) G-2
Action: G-2 EA
Information: OPD CG AAF

CM-IN-5487 (11 Feb 43) 0646 Z

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94
From: London Embassy
To: MILID

No. 4242, February 10, 1943

All recent Belgian reports indicate empty trains travelling from Germany thru Belgium to France. From Jan 1st to 14th 180 trains transported artillery infantry and material painted white from France to Germany (signed Solbert) 200 more trains travelling from Brittany and Normandy to Germany carrying large quantities artillery.

No Sig

Action: G-2 EA
Information: OPD
            CG AAF

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/74
REPORTS THAT GERMANS ARE MAKING EXTENSIVE DEFENSIVE PREPARATIONS IN YUGOSLAVIA ARE VERIFIED BY LOCAL AGENT WHO SAYS PRINCIPAL CONCENTRATIONS OF TROOPS ARE IN THE AREA BETWEEN NISI AND SKOPLJE SO LOCATED THAT THEY CAN BE QUICKLY DISPATCHED IN THE REQUIRED DIRECTION EITHER TO THE ADRIATIC WHERE COASTAL DEFENSES ARE BEING STRENGTHENED OR TO THE SOUTHERN GREEK MAINLAND OR TO THE SALONIKA KAVALLA AREAS IN NORTHERN GREECE A DEFENSIVE LINE IS BEING ESTABLISHED RUNNING FROM KAVALLA AND SALONIKA ALONG THE ALIAKHON RIVER THROUGH VERIA TO SOUTHERN ALBANIA AND DOWN THROUGH EPIRUS TO PREVEZA. EQUIPMENT IS AT PRESENT BEING SENT UP FROM THE ATHENS PIRAEUS AREA TO THE SALONIKA REGION. WITH THE LAST WEEK OR 1½ DAYS THE RAILROAD SOUTH OF LAMIA WAS DAMAGED AS THE RESULT OF AN ACCIDENT PROBABLY CAUSED BY SABOTAGE SO THAT
TRAFFIC IS AGAIN TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED OVER THE SALONIKA ATHENS LINE. NO RECENT CHANGES IN GERMAN DISPOSITIONS IN GREECE OR IN THE ISLANDS HAVE BEEN REPORTED.

ACT: 16......
24G...COHINC...CNO...NAVAIDE...29OP...FILE

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only! Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVEGRK.)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12396, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/84

OSD letter, May 1, 1973

By DBS
Date: May 21, 1973
NAVAl MESSAGE

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**INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.**

**UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS Dispatch WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.**

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**(FOR ONI.)**

**BOGOTA RADIO IN TWO BROADCASTS YESTERDAY STATED HITLER KILLED BY GROUP OF HIS GENERALS. MUCH DISCUSSION HERE OF THIS RUMOR.**

**CLASSIFIED**

E. O. 11452, Sec. 3(B) and 5(B) or (S)
OSD letter, May 1, 1972.

By DBS Date MAY 21 1973

16...ACTION
1/14/11...2/4...COMINCH...NAVATE...2/8OP...FILE

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/44.
INCOMING MESSAGE

No. 4187, February 3, 1943

January round up Polish Intelligence: for several days from 18th troop movements continued from Germany thru Lwow direction Tarnopol Cryptonym Fahne and Fahnschafft also great number horses and feed. From 11th troops Cryptonym Aspigel direction Brody. From 19th troops Cryptonym Brenner and Eule direction East from Lwow. One hundred locomotives transferred Rumania from Stanislavow mid Jan. Between mid and end Jan following aircraft engines and parts Sicily via Brenner: 125 tons from Munich to Bogoredo 82 tons for JU 88 and 52 Munich to Palermo Catania, 118 tons engines for ME 108 from Stuttgart to Bologna and 61 tons same for FW 190 from Neu-Ulm to Torino.

North Italy area defended by German AA with symbol white letter H in red oval in blue Rombold standing on point. In Milan 250 AA guns and 10,000 personnel (signs Holbert) Genoa 60 AA batteries. Peschiers reported biggest war material depot.

Estimated 30,000 Italian troops on French side Spanish border.

Location German Air Force Fliegerkorps Gross-Borna Westfalenhof, 16th LW Feld Division Zippno

CM-IN-1592

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
FILE: London (No. 4187), February 3, 1943

Fliegerkorps Grossborn Linde, 17th LW Feld Division
Zippino all Ausstellung stab 1 and 3, 18th LW Feld
Division Ost Prussen.

No Sig

Action: G-2 EA
Information: OPD
CG AAF

CM-IN-1592 (4 Feb 43) 0239Z ce

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11850, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (F)
OSD letter, May 4, 1972
By DBS Date: MAY 21 1973

M.I.8. JOURNAL NO. 36 FEB 1943
COPY NO. 26

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: San Jose CR
To: Milid

No. 262 Feb 2 1943

Making reference London Associated Press reports that Hitler will offer peace through Allies, Spanish Foreign Minister Jordans cabled Spanish Legations here to deny Spain intimations to propose peace movement but reserve such rights when opportune moments arrive and only by Spain's own initiative. Same message to Milid, Pomis and Audior. Evaluation A I.

Andino.

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: OPD
CG AAF
GEN. DEANE (CC/S)
LOG

CM-IN-1263 (3 Feb 43) 10222 cen

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 2(B) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May
By DBS

DE Classifed.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
INCOMING MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM

From: Ankara  Dated: January 31, 1943, 2 p.m.
No.: 201  Rec'd: February 1, 1943, 12:29 a.m.

At the time of the Hungarian War Minister's recent visit to Hitler's headquarters, the former agreed to dispatch 3 additional Hungarian divisions to the Eastern Front, according to a reliable source of mine. Apparently the Rumanian Army's greater contribution proportionately made so far appears to have been the basis on which the Hungarian was 'encouraged' to agree to this point.

Steinhardt

ACTION: G-2 C-a
INFORMATION: OPD
 CG AAF

CH-IN-604 (2 Feb 43) 0646Z  bjm

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By  Date  MAY 21 1973

M & A JOURNAL NO. 53  FEB 1943
SECRET

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
From: Madrid
To: Milid

No. 40, January 29, 1943.

Hear from excellent source that Spanish Embassy Berlin reports German public very disheartened believing victory no longer possible. Repeated London.

Stephens

ACTION: G-2 EA
INFORMATION: OPD
CG AAF

CM-IN-14044 (30 Jan 43) 0727 Z vd

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/94

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
French source having Germ contacts just arrived from Paris who previously has given excellent gen info but whose figures not always exact states many Germ occupation troops have recently been sent Italy Russia. Estimates remaining Germ combat troops France about 350,000. States occupation particularly thin in Ror and south east coast. Reports considerable friction between Gestapo SS1 and military civilians other hand. Reports Germ endeavors conscript 400,000 French workmen by March partly by reason German labor shortage partly as hostages in event Allies landing. Believes in approaching crisis Germ would use gas but for fear immediate Russian retaliation.

Yugoslav source reports five Germ div replaced Italians in Croatia during past two months and Germ Balkan Hq transferred Belgrade to Zagreb.

Good Spainish Military source believes Axis will try hold Tunisia until Todt organization can organize defenses southern France Sicily Balkans. Reports heavy German traffic through Italy to Sicily but few Germ troops on Peninsula.

According Swedish MA Madrid recent fairly sure information total only 4 Infantry Divisions and 1 SS First Army refer our 27 repeated to London.

From: Madrid
To: Milid
No 38 January 27, 1943
Axis forces in Russia suffering severely from weather. Germans claim to be organizing reserve of 16% divisions. This from local agent who believes they can not equip such a force even if they find the men. He also believes their offensive power is reduced approximately 50% by fuel shortage.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 1, 1973
By DBS  Date  MAY 21 1973
From: Madrid  
To: MILID  
No. 32, January 26, 1943.

Bremen to Gen Strong. Germa press to Jan 22 increase in Anti Communist propaganda; admission that the Germ forces in Russia are fighting in bitter defense and have had to yield at points; appeal to individuals and groups to make another maximum effort to this total war now become life and death struggle German nation. Definite indication that Finns are showing critical attitude towards Germa. Information that Poles from all areas now being mobilised in Germ armed forces. Heavy military traffic reported moving Germany to Italy. Large numbers German sailors and aviators in Italy. No appreciable change in Spanish situation or attitude. Every colleague and every important Spanish with whom we are in contact expresses opinion that Germany will not come into Spain. This feeling probably responsible for indifference in preparing proper defense. However Germ capability invasion Spain should not be discarded as yet.

Action: G-2  
Information: GFD  
CG AAF  
LOG  
CM-IN-12600 (27 Jan 43) 1234 % 

COPy No. 26
From: Bern
To: MILID

Number: 447, January 26, 1943

302 from trusted source. A. Germans have decided to transfer to interior Germany all machine tools for aviation in former unoccupied zone. This has begun at Toulouse and Lyon.

Legge

ACTION: G-2
INFORMATION: OPD CG AAF

CM-IN-12341 (27 Jan 43) 0049Z cen

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4 NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
From: Bern
To: Milid

No. 442, January 24th, 1943.

Six one five from eyewitness to recent raids Berlin states first night 3 blocks Zahringer Strasse destroyed Deutscher Halle near radio tower damaged 3 blocks Wommen Strasse burned by incendiary 2nd night flak prevented British planes reaching center city slight damage in suburbs stated anti-aircraft fire 2 towers Tiergarten particularly effective.

Legge

Action: G-2 E A
Information: OPD CG AAF

CM-IN-11302 (25 Jan 43) 0448Z ce
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Beria
To: KILID

No. 433, January 16, 1943

708 A from excellent source shortages Germany based chiefly Darmstadt area: suitings now of wood fiber. Average supply of masses with clothes insufficient yearly allotment of textile coupons 120 suits require 100 overcoats 90. Suits almost unobtainable since reserved for bombing victims. Only certificates belonging to that class guarantees suit purchases.

Photographic apparatus unobtainable open market lively trade black market, prices fifty percent above normal. Film photographic paper must be ordered through Stammgeschacht (customer’s card has to be presented) which forwards orders to factory through government agencies. Delivery after two or three months ratio one to seven to ordered quantities paper bags very scarce now made of paper thinner and thinner.

Soap only product obtainable so-called standard soap foams well but attacks skin.

Coupons needed. People coming from foreign countries get coupons only after permit for settling obtained.

Typewriter paper same procedure as for photographic apparatus. Details lacking regarding allotment paper to newspapers and periodicals. Use leather or substitute for binding books strictly forbidden. Just matter form since leather or substitute can not be bought.

Rubber coats completely lacking. In markets so-called gum minuten similar to cellophane sticks

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/44
when most comparatively easy to get price 23 to 35 Reich Marks and 25 textile coupons.

Black out paper easily obtainable. This wood used partly for black out but not cloth material since coupons needed.

Potato allotment 138 kilograms per person annually. Unobtainable Spring 1942, now supply sufficient.

Coal civilian supply adequate this winter. Wood only in nominal amounts.

Shoes. Coupons do not exist. Instead procurement orders of four categories:

A. Normal shoes entirely leather only for high officials higher army officers Gestapo.

B. Shoes of leather substitute privileged middle classes.

C. Summer shoes with wooden soles and leather substitute.

D. Shoes of wood and linen or linen substitute easiest to get.

Darmstadt area evacuates from bombed areas housed in private residences where so called part apartments organized*, no barracks built.

Camouflage of buildings. Use protective painting roofs or blankets with protective colors. Important streets by wire netting on which blankets corresponding to adjoining roofs or landscape. No wood used but much used for building dummy work.

Purchases aspirin pyrimidine and so forth without prescription prohibited doctors may write these only in emergency. Quinine and derivative hardly obtainable without prescription iodine also only on prescription.
Living conditions. Through influx of evacuees and refugees from bombed areas, crowded into apartments causes large scale damage lighting, water supply, stoves, toilet, ceiling, floors. Lack of repair material, skilled labor, makes repairs difficult in many cases impossible. In consequence, light, water supply cut off.

Rail transport totally cut off for civilian needs. Civilian transport, regulated by Government Bureau, by auto or river transport.

Legge

"Word garbled, presumed to be 'organized.'"

ACTION COPY: 6-3 EA
INFO. COPIES: OBD COA AF

CH-DM-7799 (1/17/43) 18051 new

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
From: Berne
To: Milid
No. 432 January 16, 1943

Between January 5th and January 8th 48 coal trains have crossed Switzerland destination La Spezia Maritima. This appears to indicate activity near future of coal burning vessels seized by Axis in French ports.

Legge

Action Copy: G-2
Info. Copies: OPD CG AAF

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 7(B) and 8(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 21 1973
By DBS

CM-IN-7594 (1-17-43) 03462

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

January 16, 1943
Rec'd 7:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,
372, 10th

German press January 9 states 17,000 Estonian volunteers now serving eastern front or perform security tasks in rear
area are, further 30,000 are militia engaged maintenance
security occupied Estonia and numerous volunteers now
registering for service in Reich's labor service and the SS
Legion Natland.

Harrison

NRN

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION COPY: G-3 EA
INFO. COPIES: CPD
CG AAF

CM-IX-7736 (1/17/43) 11402 cen

M.I.S. JOURNAL NO. 154 JAN 17 1943

RESTRICTED

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

COPY No.
**NAVAL MESSAGE**

**FROM**  ALUSNA, LONDON

**RELEASED BY**  

**DATE**  15 JAN 1943

**TO CODE ROOM**  1835

**DECIMAL BY**  TRANPSSH

**PARAPHRASED BY**  GILBERT

**RECIPIENT**  151513

**PRIVATE**  NCR 5199

---

**FROM CALLAN - B-2 POLISH SOURCE**

**GERMANS TRANSFERRING AA UNITS FROM ROMANIA, YUGOSLAVIA TO ITALY AND ORGANIZING AA COASTAL DEFENSE.**

21 AA BATTERIES FORMERLY TURIN, GENOA TRENTO-TUNI AREA TRANSFERRED TO ARRIVE 15 DEC PONTELLERIA.

16...ACT

CONINCH...11/11...24G....

FULL NAVYIDE...240P...

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**CONFIDENTIAL**
NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRATER

EXTENSION NUMBER

ADDRESSES

PRECEDENCE

FROM

ALUSNA, LONDON

VOPNAV

RELEASED BY

15 JAN 1943

PRIORITY

NOTE TIME

DEFERRED

TO CODEROOM

1853

OCCURRENCE

DECIDED BY

TRAMPOSH

OCCURRENCE

PARAPHRASED BY

GILBERT

OCCURRENCE

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

GERMAN 151612 NOR 5221

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

DATE

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OCT

TEXT

FROM CALLAN - POLISH SOURCE B-2.

ACTION

P-00

ON 4, 5, 6, DECEMBER APPROX 450 BOMBERS, 100 FIGHTERS, 100 TRANSPORTS PASSED THROUGH AERODROME AT SOKILUP NEAR LINDON DIRECTION HUNGARY. UP TO 1 DEC 810 GERMAN PLANES INCLUDING 40 BOMBERS ARRIVED ITALY WITH 450 ADDITIONAL EXPECTED. SECOND LUFTFLotte OPERATING WEIDE HERT BEHAD BEEN REINFORCED BY UNITS THIRD AND FOURTH LUFTFLotte FROM FRANCE, HOLLAND, EASTERN FRONT. MAJORITY TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT NORWAY TRANSFERRED SICILY. NUMEROUS DAY NIGHT FIGHTER UNITS TRANSFERRED TO SOUTHEAST FRANCE AND TO ITALY. 12TH AIR FORCE CORPS NIGHT FIGHTER UNITS CAME FROM EASTERN GERMANY. DURING NOV, DEC CONTACT STATES CONFIRMED GERMANY SHIPPED ITALY FOLLOWING AERO ENGINES, APPROX 270 FOR JU-52; 430 FOR JU-88; 230 FOR FW-190 AND 2,750 TONS AVIATION GAS.
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INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

PAGE TWO OF TWO 161512 NCR 5221
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

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DISTRIBUTION:

16...ACT
COMINCH...11/11..21G...414...
FILE:NAVAY...250P...

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/5/44

CONFIDENTIAL

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/5/44
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: CALLAN (LONDON)

RELEASED BY:

DATE: 14 JANUARY 1943

FOR CODEROOM: 2325

DECODED BY: 2325

PARAPHRASED BY: BRINKLEY

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

LT HATCH 131658 MCR 3694

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

TEXT

(FROM CALLAN)

TANK FUEL GERMANY TO ITALY MOVING REGULARLY BUT NOT EXCEEDING 11 OR 12 CARS DAILY. 22 TANK CARS GASOLINE TOTAL 393 TONS ORIGINATING HAMBURG ARRIVED VENICE 12 DECEMBER. BETWEEN 26 DECEMBER 249 RAILROAD CARS SPARE PARTS FOR TANKS, MOTOR VEHICLES, AIRCRAFT SENT FROM GERMANY TO ITALY DESTINED PALERMO, SYRACUSE, CATANIA, FOCCIA, TARANTO, REGIO IN CALABRIA.

16...ACT

COMINCH...1/11...230...MADELE...230P...

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

E. O. 11855, Sec. 3(b) and 5(b) or (c)

OSD letter, May 1973

By DBS Date MAY 21 1973

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12355, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/1974

131658 Germany

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drafters.

**MAIN SUBJECTS DICLER CIANO CONFERENCE.** POLITICAL. MILITARY SITUATION COMPELS GERMANY CARRY OUT NOT ONLY INTENSIVE DEFENSE EASTERN AND AFRICAN FRONTS BUT ALSO CREATE EVER VARYING DISPOSITIONS THREATENED EUROPEAN SECTORS INCLUDING SOUTHERN ITALY, SO. FRANCE, FRANCO SPANISH FRONTIERS, BALKANS WITH PREPARATIONS AGAINST TURKEY. HITLER FORCED HIS VIEW OF MAINTENANCE FRONTS, STRONG SAFEGUARDS DIRECTION SPAIN AND PASSING TO OFFENSIVE SOON AS POSSIBLE AGAINST TURKEY WITH MAIN AIM CAPTURE DARDANELLES ON ASSUMPTION SPAIN MIGHT ALLOW PASSAGE ALLIED TROOPS UNDER-AMERICAN PRESSURE AND TURKEY WILL UNAVOIDABLY BECOME AXIS ADVERSARY. AXIS GENERAL STAFFS OPPOSED HITLER MAINTAINING VAST DEFENDED FRONTS AS DESTRUCTION EFFECTIVES BY DEFENSIVE...

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVY REGS.)

13726 Germany

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12355, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/44
NAVAL MESSAGE  

DRAFTER: ALUSHA LONDON  
RELEASED BY:  
DATE:  
TOR CODEROOM:  
DECODED BY:  
PRIORITY: PRIORITY  
ROUTINE: ROUTINE  
DEFERRED: DEFERRED  

PARAPHRASED BY:  

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.  

131786 NCR 8059 PAGE 2 OF 2  

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.  

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TEXT ACTION:  
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1200  

WARFARE WILL CREATE SERIOUS DANGER GERMANY SHOULD  
RUSSIAN FRONT BREAK DOWN RESULTING LACK SUFFICIENT  
FORCES TO DEFEND GERMEN FRONTIERS.  
KEITEL SUGGESTED SOLUTION IMPASSE BY SHORTENING LINE TO  
east. THIS LED TO SERIOUS CONFLICT HITLER KEITEL.  
FOLLOWING DECISIONS TAKEN TO INCREASE EFFECTIVES:  
CALLING UP CLASS OF 26 CONSIDERED; JEWS 5% GERM  
BLOOD TO BE CALLED UP; GENERAL MOBILIZATION ALL MANNPOWER  
RESERVES NOT GO FOR DRAFTED; INCREASE SATELLITE FRONT  
effectives especially ITALY AND HUNGARY; LIMITATION OF  
effectives troops of occupation. B 2 POLISH SOURCE.  

ACTION: 16...  
COPY...1...1/11...2,G....NAVAL...COPY...FILE  

E. O. 11502, Sec. 2070 and 4173 or 70  
Confident. May 1, 1972  
By SLR  
Date: MAR 27 1974  

CONFIDENTIAL  

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person.  
(See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: CALLAN (ALUNA, LONDON)

RELEASED BY:

DATE: 14 January 1943

TOR CODENUM: 2325

DECODED BY: PINKUSJOHN

PARAPHRASED BY: GRINLEY

VICE ONAV

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

LT HILL

1317/2 NOR 3693

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

TEXT

(FROM CALLAN)

B2 POLISH SOURCE, REPORTED ADMIRAL ANTI-MUNITION GERMANY NAVY RAIDER HAS RETIRED AND REPLACED BY ADMIRAL FRICKLE, FORMERLY CHIEF OF STAFF NAVAL OPERATIONS IN GERMANY HIGH COMMAND. ABOVE NOT CONFIRMED BY BRITISH OR OTHER SOURCES.

16...ACT

1/11...ONHIGH...2JC...GAVAITE...24DP...

REMARKS

E.O. 11236, Sec. 202, and 6253 or 63
OGD Issued, May 1972

By SLR

Date:

MAR 27 1974

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 78 (1) NAV REGS.)
From: Ankara
To: Milid
No. 355, January 12, 1943

Said to be reported Italian Press reliable C 3 new appointment Germany Chief of Army General Staff General Kurbiseizler, Chief of Air Corps General Staff General Jeschomex, Chief of Navy, General Staff Admiral Frick. Turkish Source C 3 states meeting of Rommel Goring Keselring in Rome November 29th nominated Rommel Commander in Chief of Libya, Tunis, Italy with headquarters at Sicily. Washington cables frequently received here without number.

Jadwin

Action Copy: G-2 EA
Info. Copies: OPD

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11292, Sec. 1(D) and 2(D) or (F)
CDD letter, May 3, 1972
by SLN

CM-IN-8766 (1-13-43) 0628 Z

M.L.S. JOURNAL NO. 73 JAN 13 1943
COPY NO. 28

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/94

ACCOUNTS
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Ankara
To: MILID
No. 354 Jan 11, 1943

Informed by neutral Military Attache reliability B 2 extreme rubber shortage Germany also gasoline situation serious monthly airplane output 1500 tank output of approximately 1200. Stated personnel 1/3 each Italian Division in Greece withdrawn to Italy to form new division; Ten Greek classes called to construct defenses Mount Olympus dash Preveza under German supervision. Stated he was informed by Axis Military Attache that four American Divisions were expected Syria in near future; in past month numerous Germans have moved their families from Turkey to Germany.

Action Copy: G-2
Info. Copies: OPD CG AAF

DECLASSIFIED:
E. O. 11652, Sec. 2(M) and 2(D) or 2(E)
OSD letter, May 4, 1972
By DBS Date: MAY 21, 1973

CM-IN-5566 (1-12-43) 2228Z ems

CONFIDENTIAL
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DECLASSIFIED:
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

PARAPHRASE

Telegram no. 226  Dated: 1/11/43 7 p.m.
From:  Bern  Rec'd: 1/11/43 9:17 p.m.

For War Department from Military Attache signed Legge.

From source 202:

There has been an advance of 3 weeks in the dates of induction into service of German recruits and reservists called for January and February.

From source 212 Marcel:

10th Panzer Division is in Tunisia.

German losses: total 500,000 killed and totally incapacitated in this Winter's Soviet campaign up to December 23. This was reported before and is now confirmed.

Source 212 furnishes fragmentary information (first letter designates paragraph, second letter evaluation).

A (W) A Keil resident at present at Davos says that since November 15, possession of gas masks has been compulsory at Keil. They are easily obtainable and the regulation is strictly enforced.

B (W) Under control of German Armistice Commission, the Chedde powder factory located on right bank of River Arve 10 kilometers west of Chamonix and 3 kilometers northwest of LeFayet (?) produces considerable quantities of cheddite and other explosives. There are Italian sentries. A nearby powerstation, which is readily identified from the air, furnishes Chamonix Valley electric current.

C (W) Daily a few large trucks carrying explosives depart from Chedde factory for Modane and southern France. D (W) Forts Depland, Lavour and Dussappet are near Modane. There are about 3500 Italian troops.

E (W) Nitroglycerine for the Chedde factory is furnished by the Argentieres-les-Basses works on River Durance.

CM-IN-5969 (1-13-43)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date: 4/30/44
F (X) A 38 year old soldier deserted November 13 and escaped via Smolensk, Vilna, Koenigsberg, Berlin, and Leipzig arriving in Switzerland on December 28. After being drafted in 1942 he was sent from Leipzig to Soviet front on September 18, arriving Rahev on September 30. He was assigned to the 11th Infantry, 14th Division. He states troops are unprepared for winter campaign. Their morale is low due to cold, shortage of food and heavy losses. He reported a new heavy machine gun with maximum rate 900 rounds per minute and effective rate of 600 per minute.

G (Y) The above deserter told about a magnetic Panzer hand grenade which was tested in February 1942 and perfected in August. It is not thrown but placed and is capable of burning through tank armor. Three-fourths of kilogram in weight and it is size of usual hand grenade. Additional information is being sought.

H (Y) By using cut-off passing 1 1/2 kilometers west of Verona station, Brenner traffic for Bologna by-passes Verona station.

J (Y) 3rd Auto Centro transferred from Milan to Guissano and 5th Alpine from Milan to Inverig.

K (Prim) Because of lack of uniforms many Italian recruits recently drafted were returned home. 150 cases of this kind reported at Como.

L (Y) In October, the 82nd and 91st Infantry Regiments received orders for the Soviet front. However, their orders were cancelled and both regiments are in Tunisia at present. Evaluation is requested of this paragraph.

HARRISON
URGENT

From: Bern
To: MILID

No. 426 Jan 9, 1943

Following from 206 X as of January 1st:

A. German troops Italy alerted officers remain permanently on duty.

B. Number of convoys have left Italy for Salonica and Crete where Joint Axis staff constituting new expedi

C. 20 troop transports including one 15000 and one 20000 tons left Brindisi January 4th at 18 hours destination Crete. Estimated 25000 Axis troops now in Crete.

D. 6 Italian transports due to sail from Trieste January 5th and 8 Italian transports from Cattaro January 6th destination Crete.

E. Following material observed being: 200 tanks, 21 batteries of artillery, 5 batteries antiaircraft artillery, 50 Infantry cannon.

F. 4 transports, one of 6000 tons, due to leave Naples near future destination Saloniki. Among effective 2 Marine Battalions type San Marco.

G. 2 German motorized Divisions have probably arrived Salonika by road.

H. German units in part from occupation troops Croatia Serbia.

CM-IN-4147 (1-10-43)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11615, Sec. 3(b) and 2(b) or (5)
Confidential, May 1, 1972
By NLR Date: MAR 27, 1974

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date: 4/3/44

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COPY No.
To: MILID
No. 426 Jan 9, 1943

I. No confirmation yet possible because of importance above mentioned request early evaluation.

J. Hereafter my cables in short lettered paragraphs for easy references.

Legge.

Action Copy: G-3 E-a
Info. Copies: OPD CG AAF

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11052, Sec. B(1) and B(2) or (3)
NO DOD letter, May 6, 1974

CM-IN-4147 (1-10-43) 0401 2 mvs

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
Following is concluding section of Bern's telegram no. 168 of January 9:

From Source 209:

The German Consulate at Basel is calling more men to the colors. There have been included in the draft Australian born residents in Switzerland for 20 years. As previously, many will refuse.

From Source 212 (with reserve):

General Hestitz has been dismissed. Fricke, who was formerly in charge of European submarine bases, is now commanding all German marines. General Geschonek replaced Hilch.

No merchandise was accepted at any Berlin station between 15 and 19.

On December 18, the Alpina Jaeger regiment (average age 18) departed from Salzburg for southern France. Soldiers on furlough in Baden from east front were recalled on December 16th by telegram.

According to an official of the Todt organization, the main net of German Autobahn is 90% completed. 350,000 road laborers will be released after January for work on east front. There are 1,200,000 men, including prisoners of war, occupied in road construction in Germany.
Page 2

On December 23 at Brest, there were 20 submarines permanently in Lannion Basin. There are concrete shelters for ten.

A defense line is under construction beginning at the railway station, thence northwest along ramparts facing the park at Avenue Clemenceau; then passing through Place de France to Place Faubras, thence due north along part facing Avenue Foch and continuing throughout Rue Moulin a Poudre. Machine guns, AA, anti-tank guns, and barbed wire.

On December 8, 1 fighter squadron arrived Baden - Baden airfield.

The 19th Panzer Division Hanover and the 102nd Infantry Division from Silesia lost 70% of their effectives on the east front between December 1st and 10th.

According to agent at Frankfort, Germans will start using a new light machine gun on January 8. After 300 rounds 12 kilos (?) barrels to be changed.

Harrison

Ref. 168 is CM-IN-4320 (1/10/43) G-2

Action Copy: G-2 C

Info. Copies: GPD
CG AAF

CM-IN-4985 (1/11/43) 1854Z cc

MAR
E. O. 11A2, Sec. 20C and 20D or 20E
OCD letter, May 1, 1972
By SLR

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 1/3/85

CONTOFIDENTIAL
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

COPY No. 26
From: Ankara
To: Milid
No. 349 January 8, 1943

Interview by Brown source our 342 reliability B 2 partially contradicts previous report. Forwarding via pouch today German pilot training program from September 1940 to December 1942 and comments about conditions. Every available transport plane Flying School not taken to supply troops but 14 out of 49 taken from his school. Pilots not trained at fronts due gasoline shortage. Gasoline shortage at his school had improved by September 1942. Can ask him any specific question you desire.

Jadwin

342 WDCMC unable to identify.

ACTION COPY: G-3
INFO. COPIES: OPD CO A.GF

CM-IN-3783 (1/9/43) 1018Z cen

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/8/94
Secretary of State,  
Washington,  

42 4th (Section 1)  

REICHARBEITSLATT December 5th contains new instructions German air authorities specifying extensive measures for permanent protection existing and planned new factories against bomb splinters, falling wreckage and incendiary bombs. Measures assertedly based past experience air raids which revealed splinter effect explosive bombs caused most damage. Basic principles in measures are use of protective walls, restriction number and height windows, gates, other openings, subdivision extensive or important industrial areas into walled splinter protection compartments, use nonsplintering roofing above important equipment and establishment internal shelters for emergency personnel, observers and fire guards.  

Harrison  

WNR  

Berna  
Dated January 4, 1943  
Rec'd 5:34 p.m.  

Secretary of State,  
Washington  

42, January 4, (Section 2)  

These instructions reveal the extensive activity carried on during the past months more adequately to protect German industrial installations against air raid damage. The deflection of much labor and construction material for such purposes is not the least important achievement of the air raids during the past year on industrial centers of the Axis.  

(WEND OF MESSAGE)  

Harrison  

WNC  

ACTION COPY: G-24  
INFO, COPIES: OPD  
CM-IN-1941 (1/18/43) 11402 cen  

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44  

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COPY NO.
**NAVAL MESSAGE**

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**TEXT**

(From Callan)

**OFFICIAL BELGIAN SOURCE, REPORTED FROM LANGERBRUGGE AND VELDERM. BOMBS BEING DROPPED TOO LOW ALTITUDE LANDING FLAT NOT EXPLODING. B2 45 TANK CARS UNLOADED BETWEEN 7 AND 29 DEC VELDERM AIRDROME, FIRST GERMAN FIGHTERS STATIONED AT GOSSELIES.**

**ACTION**

16

13/11...250...NAVAL...COMINCH...FILE. 250P

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (1) NAVREGS.)

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94