MR 300, Sec. 2 — WARFARE (JAPAN)

Jan-Dec, 1944.
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<td>Memorandum</td>
<td>Reports from Tokyo</td>
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<td>11-10-44</td>
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<td>Hall to Donovan</td>
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<td>5-12-44</td>
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FILE LOCATION
MAP ROOM, Box 89, MR 500, Sec. 2 - Warfare (Japan), 1944

RESTRICTION CODES
(A) Closed by Executive Order 11652 governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94
(COM 7TH FLT SHOOTS ACTION ALL INTERESTED CURRENT OPS SWP INFO CINCPAC COMINCH COM 3RD FLT)

NAVAL PRISONERS INTERROGATED THIS AREA STATE NEW CARRIERS UNRYU KATSURAGI AMAGI ALL RECENTLY PUT INTO OPERATION. ALL SIMILAR SHOKAKU CLASS IN SIZE AND BELIEVED BUILT FROM KEEL UP AS CARRIERS. KATSURAGI HAS LARGE ISLAND ABOVE DECK ON PORT SIDE AMIDSHIPS SINGLE ELLIPTICAL RAKED STACK. FLIGHT DECK EXTENDED OVER BOW POINT SLIGHTLY. EVEN WITH HULL AT STERN. UNRYU HAS NO ISLAND. BRIDGE EXTENDS AHWART SHIP DIRECTLY UNDER FORWARD PORTION FLIGHT DECK AND IS GHOST ENCASED. AFTER END OF FLIGHT DECK BENDS DISTINCTLY DOWNWARD AND EXTENDS BEYOND STERN. TWIN FUNNELS ON STARBOARD AMIDSHIPS BENDING DOWNWARD AND NOT VISABLE OVER FLIGHT DECK. ELECTRICAL FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM FOR GUNS ON EACH SIDE. NIL DETAILS ON AMAGI.

*AS RECEIVED
COM 7TH FLEET SENDS TO CTF 71 INFO CINCPAC COMINCH CTF 77

SURVIVOR FROM DESTROYER KUMA, (WHICH HE REPORTS SUNK DAWN 1DEC 3RD BY 7TH FLEET DESTROYERS IN ORMOC BAY AREA) ASSERTS KUMA DEPARTED JAPAN NOV 8TH WITH CL ISUZU AND DESTROYER MAKI ON ANTI SUBMARINE PATROL TO SAIGON. ARRIVED SAIGON APPROXIMATELY FIFTEENTH AND DEPARTED SEVENTEENTH ON ZIG ZAG ROUTE FOR MANILA ARRIVING ABOUT 28TH NOVEMBER. BLUE SUBS ATTACKED THEM ON 27TH OR 28TH. ISUZU SUFFERED ONE TORPEDO HIT NEAR STERN AND RETIRED IMMEDIATELY TOWARDS EMPIRE AT ABOUT 10 KNOTS. REQUEST ANY INFORMATION AVAILABLE BEARING ON ABOVE ATTACK AS DESCRIBED. YOUR 261551 NOV REPORTS HAVE CLAIMED TWO HITS ON NATORI CLASS CRUISER WEST OF MANILA NOV 19TH. APPRECIATE DESCRIPTION ORANGE UNITS ACCOMPANYING THAT CRUISER.
YOUR ATTENTION INVITED JAPANESE USE OF DESRON INCLUDING ISUXU AND MATSU CLASS DESTROYERS (TAKE MOMO UME MAKI SUGI NJUBABIOSW GSI* GIVEN BY PRISONERS IS STILL AFLOAT) CONVOYING ANTI-SUBMARINE GROUP IN ADDITION OTHER FUNCTIONS. FOR DESCRIPTION OF MATSU CLASS DESTROYERS REFER SEVENTH FLEET INTELLIGENCE REPORT NUMBER 67A DATED OCT 16 AND CINCPAC'S WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 20 DATED NOV 24TH. KUMA PRISONER (WHO IS DEEMED FAIRLY RELIABLE) ESTIMATES CONSTRUCTION THIS TYPE OF DESTROYER TAKES ONLY ABOUT 2 AND 1/2 MONTHS.

COPY TO 20G
* AS RECD
JAPANESE NAVAL ATTACHE SAYS ONLY 1 ESTABLISHMENT BELONGING NAVY HAS BEEN SLIGHTLY DAMAGED BY BOMBS. HE THINKS LIGHT BOMBING OF INDUSTRIES MAY BE USEFUL INFLUENCING INDUSTRIALISTS COOPERATE WITH GOVERNMENT. ABOVE FROM SHARK WHO CONCLUDES INDUSTRIALISTS MAY BE EFFECTIVELY OPPOSING DISPERAL INDUSTRIES.
THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington

December 11, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR COL. RICHARD PARK, JR.

Here is copy of a memo given to me on Friday, December 8th, by Dr. H. H. Kung.

I have no way of knowing the value of this information.

Will you see that it gets into the right hands?

R. H. R.

encd.

memo re "Reports from Tokyo"
(1) A military conference held sometime ago in Tokyo had reached the following decisions:—

(a) To enforce compulsory evacuation of leading cities and strengthen the nation-wide air raid precautions.
(b) To strengthen the defense works in Ogasahara Islands, South Sea Islands and the Philippines in anticipation of the American assault.
(c) To dispatch a portion of the fleet now in Ushigaura Bay and North China waters to Formosa in order to meet the American attack.

(2) German Ambassador and the Japanese Premier had agreed:—

(a) That there shall be no separate peace with the enemies.
(b) That urgent steps are to be taken to bring under a unified control of all the leading industries of the naval and air forces and lessen dislocation in the event of large scale air-raids in Japan proper.
(c) That the Japanese navy should adopt a cautious policy and shorten communication lines to avoid scattering of forces.
(d) Mongolia and Manchuria shall be Japan's Asiatic fortresses.
(e) That Japan's attitude towards Russia to be re-examined.
(f) That the Japanese Government will place confidence in German technical experts who arrived in Japan by submarine to help Japan's war production.

(3) In recent months shipping tonnage between Japan and Continental ports had increased many times. Neutral observers believe that the Japanese Government is now shipping important source materials and machineries to Manchuria.

(4) The Japanese Government planned to complete the rail communication line between Mukden and Canton by the end of September, 1944, thereby the freight capacity can be increased from 500,000 to 840,000 tons by the end of this year. This would do away with air and naval convoy and free more than 400,000 tons of shipping space for other use.

The Japanese Government has long been divided on Japan's war strategy. The first school advocates an all out naval against America and at the same time preparation for decisive battle with America and Britain on Chinese continent. The second school advocates the immediate liquidation of the China Incident, and then invites for a negotiated peace. If America and Britain refuse Japan's peace gesture, then a decision can be fought for on the continent. Japan's recent offensive in China seems to indicate that the second school of thought has won.

(5) According to sources close to the Japanese Navy, Japan's plans of constructing large ships are practically at a standstill, due to the acute shortage of steel, motor engines and essential machineries. Nearly all civilian dockyards are now engaged in building wooden boats.
(1) IWAI Ryotaro writing on the lessons from American-Japanese war in the Pacific says that three new factors have changed the nature of war.

(a) The appearance of large air force
(b) Naval strategy has changed to plane strategy causing losses many hundred thousand tons of Japanese ships
(c) American self-evidence in victory is too great an obstacle for Japan to crush.

(2) Japan's naval strategy is to avoid a decisive naval battle with America so long as America's air force enjoys great superiority over Japan's.

(3) The naval war against America has become a war of replenishment. Japan is handicapped in this respect because she loses more than 100,000 tons of shipping every month. The shortage of her shipping tonnage is so great that Japanese submarines are used to transport supplies.

(4) Japanese industrialists are alarmed by the shortage of coal and copper which cannot be brought to Japan due to lack of ships. Consequently many responsible industrial leaders have resigned their directorship.
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL "IVI"
PRIORITY

From: CG, US Army Forces China Theater, Chungking China
To: War Department
Nr: 23732 11 December 1944

HILID 23732 from DePass signed Wedemeyer.

Yesterday Russian Assistant Military Attaché stated he had been informed that rail transportation in Japan would all be closed to commercial traffic and sequestered for period between 15 December and 15 January by military. Comment follows: This coincides with annual call conscripts to colors indicating larger need for manpower than previous years and also gives indication effort expand armed forces.

End.

ACTION: G-2
INFO: CG AAF

CM-IN-11188 (11 Dec 44) 2005Z pa

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
CONSIDER TOP SECREl DUE TO SOURCE.

PERSONAL OBSERVER IN TOKYO COUNTED 926 HOUSES BURNED DOWN AS RESULT OF-9 RAID Nov 29-30. NUMBER OF THIS HOUSES HERE IN NORTHWEST SECTION OF HIROSHIMA DESIGNATED 30% TO THE SOUTH OF KANBA UP TO 5% IN REGION SIRA AND NORTH HAYAMATSU AND ABOUT 75% IN REGION BASHABU. PEOPLE STATED ABOUT 2000 HOUSES BURNED THROUGHOUT CITY. OBSERVER STATES JAPS AA FIRE APPARENTLY CANNOT COPE WITH HIGH ALTITUDE AND NIGHT BOMBING PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE.

NO COUNTER MEASURES COULD BE FOUND AGAINST INCENDIARY BOMBS AND NO MEANS HAS BEEN FOUND TO STRENGTHEN JAPS MORAL RESISTANCE BOTH OF WHICH FACTORS LED TO INCREASED CASUALTIES.

POPULATION WAS EVIDENTLY BEATEN IN SPIRIT BY EFFECT OF RAID AS INSTRUCTED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/44
**TOP Dispatch**

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**ASTERISK (*) PAGRAM ADRESSEE**

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**PAGE 2 OF 2**

**NOR 8977**

**DECEMBER 3 RAID ON AVIATION FACTORIES IN WESTERN SECTION OF CITY RESULTED IN EXTREMELY LARGE FIRES LASTING UNTIL 1800. JAP AVIATION MORE ACTIVE BUT AA WEAK. PEOPLE SAY THAT SEASONED FLYERS WERE BROUGHT FROM KUSU FOR DEFENCE OF TOKYO.**

**DECLASSIFIED**

E. O. 11669, Sec. 2(D) and 2(D) or (D)  
OSS Token, May 4, 1972

By SLR  
Date: **FEB 12, 1974**

**ORIGINAL SEC DISTRIBUTION:**

10(#1)...ACT

**COMINC(#2-9)...OPS(#10)...25O(#11)...**

No. 1 ADMIRAL  
No. 2 FILE  
No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM  
No. 4 SPECIAL

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 70, Navy Regulations.
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

To: War Department.
Nr: 720
720.

9 December 1944.

Among known Jap serious shortages are ship tonnage, food and iron, later critical. Smallest metal appliances and hardware being requisitioned from masses according to 140 rated B 3 reporting conversation with travellers recently in Japan. Source characterizes Japs as nervous and cautious but stubborn and insolent. They will continue fight as do Germans. Their attitude toward Soviet has changed from 1942 impertinence and defiance to present moderation and correctness.

Rayens.

ACTION: G-2
INFO: CG AAF
OPD
COL PARK
LOG

CM-IN-9735 (10 Dec 44) 1354Z mcs

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date: 7/1/94

COPY No. 42
LT COMDR EARLE SENDS TO NAVAL AIDE TO PRESIDENT.

TURKISH SOURCE OF QUESTIONABLE RELIABILITY BUT WHO GAVE ME IN SEPTEMBER 1943 FIRST INFORMATION OF Y-1 BOMBS FOR ENGLAND NOW INFORMS ME WITHIN 30 DAYS AMERICAN EASTERN SEABOARD CITIES WILL BE BOMBED BY STRATOSPHERIC Y-3 BOMBS.

SAME SOURCE SAYS TURKISH CHIEF OF PROTOCOL WAS GIVEN FOLLOWING INFORMATION BY JAPANESE AMBASSADOR HERE. JAPAN WORRIED BY RUSSIAN ATTITUDE AS RUSSIA HAS FAILED TO KEEP SOME OF ITS ENGAGEMENTS WITH JAPAN. JAPAN NEEDS A YEAR TO DECENTRALIZE INDUSTRIES MOVING MANY TO CHINESE MAINLAND THEREFORE HEAVY AMERICAN BOMBARDMENTS COMING BEFORE EXPECTED ARE ALSO SOURCE OF WORRY. JAPAN HAS
P-SECRET DISPATCH

FROM ALUSMA BEYDGLU

RELEASED BY

DATE 6 DECEMBER 1944

TOR CODED

DECODED BY

PARAPHRASED BY

ROUTED BY

FOR ACTION

ADDRESSEES

ASTERISK (*) TELEGRAM ADDRESSEE

PRECEDENCE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

BASEGRAM

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

BASEGRAM

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

PAGE 2 OF 2 051444 NCR 4414

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

ORIGINATOR TELL IN DATE AND TIME GROUP

(USE G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

PRACTICALLY CRUSHED CHINA MILITARILY AND CAN TAKE CHUNGKING WHEN THEY PLEASE. NOW WILL EXERT EVERY EFFORT TO MAKE PEACE WITH CHINA.

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11682, Sec. 3 (c) and 3 (f) or (g)

ODT Instr., May 3, 1976

By SLR Date FEB 14 1974

NCR ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:

NAVYDE(#1, #2).....ACT

TOP-SECRET

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 70, Navy Regulations.

OPNAV 19-70

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/74

051444
JAP NAVAL ATTAC GE STRESSES CRITICAL SITUATION PHILIPPINES AND BELIEVES LOCAL COUNTER-OFFENSIVE HE PREDICTED MY 171322 DELAYED BUT NOT ABANDONED. PESSIMISM CREATED BY STALIN'S STATEMENT ON JAPANESE AGGRESSION IS REDUCED BY INCREASING BRITISH RUSSIAN DISCORD AND CONCERTED COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN EUROPE AND ZOMBIE AGITATION IN CANADA AND US DECISION REDUCE LENDLEASE TO ENGL AND...
From: US Military Attache, Ankara, Turkey
To: War Department
525
C3, US Army Forces in the Middle East,
Cairo, Egypt.
1204

4 December 1944

Mag nbr HILID 525 ANSMR 1204.

Have just received report through OSS that
Japanese Ambassador, Ankara informed high Turkish diplomat
that the Japanese expect to conquer Chinese Army definitely
in the next 15 days.

Luons

ACTION: G-2
INFO: CGMAFAF; OFD; Log

CH-TH-4192 (5 Dec 44) 0035Z old

The making of an exact copy of this message is forbidden

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/44
CONAVGROUP CHINA PASSED TO CHINPOA FOR ACTION AND COMM. FOR INFO AS 204124.

(CONAVGROUP CHINA FROM LEMAY D3904)

FURTHER DETAILS NOW FOLLOW ON SHIPPING SEEN ON PHOTO RECON MISSION 4 NR22, 17 NOVEMBER:

(A) OCHRA--NO SIGNIFICANT SHIPPING.

(B) FUSAI--GOOD COVER SHOWS 280 FOOT NAVAL ESCORT AND LARGE TRANSPORT IN DRYDOCK, 24300 CROSS TONS CARGO SHIPPING. FOLLOWING ARE DETAILS:

1. IN 410 FOOT DRYDOCK IS 280 FOOT NAVAL ESCORT, REPAIRS NOT VISIBLE.

2. IN 525 FOOT DRYDOCK UNDERGOING MAJOR REPAIRS IS 430 FOOT TRANSPORT.

3. IN 430 FOOT BUILDING WAY IS 310 FOOT ENGINES AFT CARGO HULL.

O.
4. 315 FOOT ENGINE| AFT CARGO IN DRYDOCK.

5. OPERATING MERCHANT VESSELS ARE 495 FOOT, 315 FOOT,
3 BY 235 FOOT ENGINE AFT CARGOES, 355 FOOT FTC.

(c) INUKO|A--LARGELY CLOUD COVERED, JUST VISIBLE NEAR
RIVER MOUTH IS 590 FOOT PROBABLY TRANSPORT AND 3 SMALL CARGO
VESSELS.

(d) NAGASAKI--TOTALS OF 41000 GROSS TONS ACT|VE CARGO
SHIPPING, 800 FOOT CARRIER UNDER CONSTRUCTION NOW AFLOAT,
125 FOOT NAVAL ESCORT, 480 FOOT TRANSPORT, LARGE MERCHANT
VESSEL UNDER CONSTRUCTION. FOLLOWING ARE DETAILS:

1. 800 FOOT CARRIER UNDER CONSTRUCTION SHOWS 175 FEET
OF FLIGHT DECK COMPLETED CEMI AT WHARF NORTH OF TATEGAMI
SHIPYARD WITH LARGE FLOATING CRANE ALONGSIDE.

2. ANCHORED NEAR CARRIER IS 250 FOOT NAVAL VESSEL.

3. 480 FOOT TRANSPORT ENTERING DRYDOCK NORTH OF TATEGAMI
SHIPYARD.

4. AT TATEGAMI SHIPYARD, KEELS LAID FOR TWO SMALL VESSELS,
450 FOOT MERCHANT VESSEL ON WAY.

5. 12 BY 240 FOOT ENGINES AFT CARGO VESSELS IN OUTER
HARBOR.

6. 2 BY 225 FOOT ENGINES AFT CARGO IN DRYDOCK.

7. OTHER SHIPPING INNER HARBOR INCLUDES 495 FOOT AND
3 BY 235 FOOT ENGINES AFT CARGOES, 430 FOOT CARGO VESSEL, 2
BY 385 FOOT FTC'S. 
From: CG, U.S. Army Forces, China Theater, Chungking, China.
To: War Department
No: MILID 23714 18 November 1944

Strength totaling about 15,000 is size of Jap northwest drive. No Chih with Kweiyang indicated destination of drives our commentary view.

While moving west to Lohai enemy column from Taipingchau joined column from Shuangchia together marching on Iehan.

Following northwestward movement to Pingyang forces for from Chienchiang split into two columns, one driving to Chincha and other to Lungkuang.

Another column from Haianghsien moved west taking Plulien after joining column from Lulpin.

End

Note: Corrected copy of CM-IN-18239 (19 Nov 44) G-2
ACTION: G-2
INFO: CG AAF OPD Col Park
CM-IN-19586 (20 Nov 44) 1059Z pa

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4 NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
From: US Military Attache, Chungking, China
To: War Department
No: 23710   16 November 1944
MILID 23710 from DePass signed Wedemeyer.

Presently located at Lohai 11 miles west Ishan
two Japanese columns moving west on Kweiyang road with
4,000 troop strength.

From Sino B2 this report C-3 is rated.

End.

ACTION: G-2
INFO: CC AAF
       OFD
       SOL PARK

CM-IN-16490 (17 Nov 44) 1238Z mcs

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
WEEKLY AIRFIELD NOTES
JAPAN AND JAPANESE OCCUPIED TERRITORY

NO. 12
DATE 15 NOV 1944

By Authority of
THE COMMANDING GENERAL
Army Air Forces

Prepared in Office of
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence
Washington D.C.
By Combined Personnel of
U.S. and British Services
For the War Department

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
Summary of Contents:

Appendix 'A'. Japanese Air Development in Northern China

Item (1) Clarification of the airfield position on the SAKASHIMA GROUP of the HANSEI ARCHIPELAGO.

(2) One new field in CHINA

(3) Nothing to report from SOUTHEAST ASIA

(4) In the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC theatre development has taken place in the CELEBES, BORNEO, JAVA, LESSER SUNDA ISLANDS, TIMOR, and in the PHILIPPINES.

(5) No evidence of development in the CENTRAL PACIFIC
JAPANESE AIR DEVELOPMENT IN
SOUTHERN CHINA

Recent events, unfavourable to the Japanese on land, sea and in the air, have inspired them to pay energetic attention to the development of air bases along or near the China coast. This has coincided roughly with their seizure of Foochow, the last major Chinese-held port in free China.

The main centers of air expansion at present appear to be Shanghai and Nanking (the areas of both of which were the targets for B-29's last weekend) with a possibility of development also occurring at Hangchow. These three zones form a rough triangle, and they are spaced not above 150 miles apart. They also form the shortest direct air route from the mainland of Japan. It is probably in this area that a large reserve pool of operational aircraft could best be disposed and accommodated. Other factors which may have given an impetus to developments in this particular zone are:

(i) The apparent need for supplementing the number of bases from which torpedo-carrying aircraft and dive bombers could operate in support of action against Allied fleet offensive movements in this area.

(ii) Anti-submarine and anti-Allied reconnaissance aircraft patrols. For this purpose the Japanese Naval Air Force aircraft based on the China mainland could operate in conjunction with those based on Formosa and on the strategic islands of the Nansen Archipelago.

(iii) The air protection of shipping routes to and from the great coastal and river ports of North East China.

(iv) The area is most favourably situated for the interception of China-based Allied bombers taking a direct route to Japan.

Of these bases, Shanghai, and Hangkow farther inland to the West, are the most important in China. The latter is also located at one of the dominating centers of communication in the North East of the country.

Shanghai: Here there are five airfields or landing grounds and one seaplane station. Of these, three airfields are at present undergoing development. Aerially Shanghai is the best equipped and most heavily fortified coastal area in China. Also, there is good evidence that it is an important ferry-replacement and air transport center.
Appendix 'A' -- (continued)

Nanking: Here there are three important operational fields. Recent photographic cover is not available, but there are indications that work that was being pushed ahead during the summer has now been intensified. This policy has certainly been justified by recent setbacks.

Hangchow: This also has a complex of three fields with one established as fully operational. The actual nature of the development believed to be proceeding here is not known. However, an expansion would be entirely in accordance with present needs.

Improvements to existing airfields are also taking place farther North, notably at Tsingtao, where two airfields and two seaplane stations now exist, and which shows a marked improvement in facilities from those reported in 1943. This area too, could play its part in operations on cover or near the Yellow Sea.
Information on airfield development in Japan and Japanese-occupied territories available to the week ending November 11, 1944 is dealt with under these headings:

(1) Japan, Formosa, and adjacent islands
(2) China, Manchuria, and Korea
(3) Southeast Asia area
(4) Southwest Pacific
(5) Central Pacific

NOTE: The number of the appropriate Air Movements Branch operational airfield map is given in parenthesis under the name of each field.

(1) JAPAN, FORMOSA, etc.

No information is available on new construction, etc. on the mainland of JAPAN but it is established that the following two fields do not exist and they should therefore be removed from airfield lists, operational maps and operational capacity tables.

SHIONOMISAKI
(30N-139E) 33 27N 135 46E

TOKYO
(30N-121E) 32 36N 128 46E There is no airfield or landing ground on this island.

The following change of position is notified:

HOKOTA
(42N-139E) 36 09N 140 31E

Since the publication of Weekly Airfield Notes No. 7, dated October 11, 1944, which gave a statement on the airfield position on the OKINAWA ISLANDS of the MARIAN ARCHIPELAGO, information has become available which makes it possible to establish the existence and position of the following fields in the SAKASHIMA GROUP. It is emphasized that the data on these islands is at present incomplete and changes in status or position of fields at present carried in lists and on airfield maps may be necessary. Immediately the situation becomes clarified, details will be given in this publication.

KORABU
(30N-121E) 24 43N 150 125 20S Two coral surfaced runways NNW/SSW 3800' x 150' approx., NNE/WSW 3800' x 110' approx. 40 or more revetments or hardstandings. The A/D is on high ground, is free of obstructions, and is probably extensible.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 7/1/44
(1) JAPAN, FORMOSA, etc. -- (continued):

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<td>Hirara</td>
<td>24 47N</td>
<td>125 19E</td>
<td>This A/D was previously called MITAKO ISLAND. Three runways as follows:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1) N/S 3800' x 240' approx., coral paved u/c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(ii) E/W 3800' x 240' approx., coral paved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(iii) NE/SW 3800' x 240' approx., coral paved, u/c but 60% complete. Parking apron adjoins N/S runway. 26 or more revetments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohama</td>
<td>24 20N</td>
<td>124 11E</td>
<td>The landing area is approx. 7200' x 5200' with 2 runways NE/SW 5300' x 350'; E/W 5100' x 250' u/c. Dispersal areas being developed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiraho</td>
<td>24 21N</td>
<td>124 14E</td>
<td>Two runways or strips running NE/SW and N/S. Dimensions not yet determined.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sukama</td>
<td>24 44N</td>
<td>125 18E</td>
<td>A cleared strip running NE/SW approx. 4500' x 250' contains a paved runway 3800' x 120'. Dispersal areas u/c on S side of runway, which is free of obstructions and could be extended.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokuno</td>
<td>27 49N</td>
<td>128 54E</td>
<td>A coral-paved runway 3300' x 70' approx. running NNE/WSW inside a cleared area 4200' x 800'. Dispersal areas contain 28 or more revetments.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kikai L.</td>
<td>28 19N</td>
<td>129 55E</td>
<td>Landing area approx. 4500' x 2500' NNE/WSW. Runway on same orientation approx. 4500' of which 500' has been surfaced. Dispersal area with 12 or more revetments (see Weekly Airfield Notes No. 8 dated October 14, 1944).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the fields given above the following details are available on the seaplane station on AMAMIO ISLAND.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Island</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Latitude</th>
<th>Longitude</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Konita</td>
<td>28 09N</td>
<td>129 18E</td>
<td>Alighting area on 0-SHIMA KAIKYO. A taxiway leads from apron 700' x 600' to 6 revetments. Ramp; pier; floating crane.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following Seaplane Alighting Areas should be removed from airfield lists and operational airfield maps. All are in the KURILS ISLANDS and appear on operational map 54N-150E.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/54
(1) JAPAN, FORMOSA, ETC.--(Continued):

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<th>Longitude</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Latitude</th>
<th>Longitude</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HORAI LAKE</td>
<td>49 35'N</td>
<td>154 50'E</td>
<td>NUNAJIRI</td>
<td>50 47'N</td>
<td>156 30'E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KARASU RIVER</td>
<td>50 38'N</td>
<td>156 08'E</td>
<td>OTAMAE BAY</td>
<td>50 11'N</td>
<td>155 37'E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUJIRA BAY</td>
<td>50 17'N</td>
<td>155 21'E</td>
<td>SURIBACHI BAY</td>
<td>50 10'N</td>
<td>155 45'E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINAMI BAY</td>
<td>50 49'N</td>
<td>155 39'E</td>
<td>YAMATO BAY</td>
<td>48 03'N</td>
<td>153 17'E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOTOKO BAY</td>
<td>50 12'N</td>
<td>155 16'E</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) CHINA, MANCHURIA, AND KOREA:

In CHINA the runway at LIUCHOW (24 17'N - 109 16'E) was demolished prior to withdrawal from the area. At TUNGSAN a new field is notified:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Latitude</th>
<th>Longitude</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TUNGSAN NORTHWEST</td>
<td>34 18'N</td>
<td>117 16'E</td>
<td>Earth strip NE/SW 3000' x 150' approx.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Changes in names and corrections to positions of the two older fields are given:

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<th>Longitude</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TUNGSAN EAST</td>
<td>34 17'N</td>
<td>117 18'E</td>
<td>Formerly TUNGSAN (1). Area approx. 4000' x 3700' with 2 strips each, 2450' x 150' running NE/SW and NW/SE respectively. Dispersal area to NE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUNGSAN SOUTHEAST</td>
<td>34 16'N</td>
<td>117 19'E</td>
<td>Dimensions approx. 4500' x 4350' with an E/W runway 5000' x 320' and a N/S strip 3300' x 500'.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In MANCHURIA there is one new field:

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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANSHAN/KENGOHANPATU</td>
<td>41 01'N</td>
<td>122 44'E</td>
<td>At present under construction with 2 runways or strips 5000' x 320' NNE/-SSW, 4500' approx. E/W.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) SOUTHEAST ASIA AREA:

Nothing to report from this area.

(4) SOUTHWEST PACIFIC:

In the CELEBS the following changes have taken place:

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date
### SOUTHWEST PACIFIC -- (continued):

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Runway No. 1</th>
<th>Runway No. 2</th>
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<tr>
<td>BORI-BORI</td>
<td>5 328</td>
<td>4 063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6S-122E)</td>
<td>119 25E</td>
<td>122 22E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIMBUENG</td>
<td>5 196</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6S-122E)</td>
<td>119 26E</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANNA</td>
<td>5 045</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6S-122E)</td>
<td>119 32E</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PALO</td>
<td>1 003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6S-122E)</td>
<td>119 57E</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIMOR</td>
<td>4 453</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6S-122E)</td>
<td>122 30E</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WITICOLA</td>
<td>4 238</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6S-122E)</td>
<td>122 35E</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**BOHLOEDOWANG**

Runway No. 1 5200' NE/SW
Runway No. 2 4400' NW/SSE

**BORI-BORI**

The runway (5000' x 300' E/W) is now surfaced except for 900' in the centre. Additional dispersal u/c.

**LIMBUENG**

There are 3 strips: (i) 6000' x 310' NW/SE not surfaced but serviceable; (ii) 4100' x 310' NW/SE rolled and graded; (iii) 4100' x 310' NE/SW serviceable but not surfaced. Extensive dispersal u/c.

**MANDAI**

Runway No. 1 has been extended 600' at its W end to make 5100' x 200' E/W. Runway No. 2 has been extended at its NW end to make 4500' x 370' NW/SE. Development to dispersal is also occurring.

**PALO**

There is a N/S runway or strip 3450' x 600'. Operational.

**TIMOR**

There are 2 strips; (i) 5000' x 280' ENE/NW with turning circles; (ii) 3800' x 160' NW/SE, turning circle at the NW end. Extensive dispersal u/c.

**WITICOLA**

The coordinates as given in Weekly Airfield Notes No. 5 were incorrect. Extensive dispersal development has taken place.

In **JAVA**, there is evidence of one new field:

**SAPCEI ISLAND**

Two strips, dimensions not yet determined, running N/S and NE/SW.

On the **LESSER SUNDA ISLANDS** the following development has occurred:

**BIMA**

Additional dispersal has been provided.

**WAHALO**

Runway No. 1 now measures 6920' x 330' E/W. Runway No. 2 now measures 3460' x 165' NW/SE and is being extended to the S to give an ultimate run of 4000'. Considerable additional dispersal.

---

**E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4**

DECLASSIFIED

By RT, NARA, Date: 6/12/44

By SLR, Date: FEB 1/374

---

E. O. 11653, Sec. 202 and (D) or (E)

GOD Letter, May 1, 1972
Extensive dispersal. 30 or more
revetments:

Runway No. 1 now measures 5200' x 160'
WNW/ESE. Runways Nos. 2 and 3: No
change. Runway No. 4 now measures
3600' x 150' N/S. There are now 50
or more revetments.

Runway running E/W measures 4750' x
330' surfaced to 160' wide. 30 or
more revetments have been constructed.

On TIMOR limited development has taken place:

GESACE
(68-122E)
10 08S
123 49E
The runway (4500' x 240' NNW/ESE) has
been dazzle-painted. Additional dis-
persal includes 20 or more revetments.

POLOPTI
(68-122E)
10 07S
123 45E
Runway dimensions unchanged. Disper-
sal now comprises 47 or more reveto-
ments.

In BORNEO the two fields known as Samarinda (1) and Samarinda (2) have
been renamed MELAK and ASA respectively. The following details are
available:

ASA
(68-122E)
00 13S
115 44E
4 miles W of Melak A/D. Revised di-
mensions: strip 4325' x 320' NE/SW
inside cleared area 5000' x 2800'.
Graded earth surface of high service-
ability. Dispersal includes 5 re-
vetments. Operational but apparently
inactive during mid-October.

MELAK
(68-122E)
00 11S
115 46E
4 miles E of ASA A/D. Revised dimen-
sions: Strip 4500' x 350' NE/SW in-
side cleared area 5200' x 2800'. Prob-
able barracks, stores buildings, and
administration. Limited dispersal in-
cludes 13 revetments. Connected by road
to landing stage on MAHAKAM RIVER 3/4
mile to 5.

Development has also occurred at MANGAR:

MANGAR
(68-122E)
1 32S
116 58E
There are 2 parallel runways spaced
1500' apart and running NNE/SSW. No. 1
3940' x 340' paved. No. 2 3000' x 110'.
Dispersal loop between runway 2 and sea
shore has 24 small revetments. Prob-
able repair shops, barracks, unidenti-
fied buildings.
(4) SOUTHWEST PACIFIC -- (continued):

In the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS the following changes have occurred:

DIPOLO (6N-131E) Revised dimensions of NNE/SSW strip 5700' x 200'. Limited dispersal to NNE. Apparently inactive.
  8 36N 123 21E

ILIGAN (6N-131E) Revised dimensions of E/W strip 2900' x 150' approx. of which 2400' is graded earth compacted with coral or gravel. Apparently inactive.
  8 15N 124 15E

LEGAASP/SAMBORN (18N-117E) Revised dimensions of NE/SW runway 4800' x 280' of which 2700' x 180' is concrete. Dispersal areas on either side of runway. Underground-fuel and bomb storages.
  13 10N 123 44E

MANILA/NICHOLS (18N-117E) A stretch of Deway Boulevard along the edge of Manila Bay and just NW of Nichols Field may be used as an additional runway. It measures approx.
  14 31N 121 00E 3200' x 75' N/S.

MANILA/NITIISON (18N-117E) Revised dimensions: Runway No. 1 3800' x 260' NW/SE, Runway No. 2 2000' x 260'. Extensive dispersal with 34 or more revetments and practically unlimited hardstanding capacity.
  14 33N 121 01E

The following fields should be deleted from lists, maps, and operational capacity tables:

CAMP OVERTON (6N-131E) No field exists in this area.
  8 13N 124 13E

MANILA/GRAIG PARK SAT. (18N-117E) This is now included in the MANILA/GRAIG PARK complex.
  14 39N 121 06E

New auxiliary seaplane stations or seaplane alighting areas are notified:

CARALTAN (18N-117E) Beaching possible on sand bar at Orig River mouth; NE side of San Fernando Harbour. Operational.
  16 32N 120 19E

MANDARIN BAY (18N-117E) Limited facilities; buildings, etc. not yet identified. Operational.
  12 20N 121 05E

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11612, Sec. 2(b) and 5(d) or (c)
OSD letter, May 8, 1972
By SLR Date FEB 14 1974
(4) SOUTHWEST PACIFIC -- (continued):

PORO (18N-117E) 16 37N 120 17E
Concrete ramp extends across neck of Poró Peninsula. Jetty; fuel dump; various unidentified buildings. Operational.

PUERTA PRINCESA (6N-115E) 9 45N 118 43E
No details but S.A.A. is operational.

At the established seaplane station of Manila/Sangley Point the following additional details are available:

MANILA/SANGLES POINT 14 30N 120 55E
There is a 130' ramp to Canagat Bay. 3 taxiways lead to dispersal points N and E of apron. W/T and barracks area.

(5) CENTRAL PACIFIC:

Nothing to report from this area.

Although these notes bear a SECRET classification, positions and types of airfields or other material herein included may be extracted for use in maps, charts, or lists bearing a lower classification, provided such reproduction of material is in accordance with AR 380-5.
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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12336, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 1/31/74
SHARK reports following from same source 041410. US lost 22 carriers and 10 damaged during October 12 to 31 and both sides about one quarter other surface forces. US unable resume major offensive before January maybe later. Japs will take advantage temporary local initiative and strike before US replacements arrive. Admiral Onishi now command forces Philippines is energetic and daring to point of being gambler. His appointment believed made for daring local counter offensive this area to begin when air force ready about 20 November. Object of offensive is to prolong war even if it falls U.S. new chief naval
STAFF ADMIRAL OIKAWA HAS HAD LITTLE SEA DUTY IS OLD AND WEAK. HIS APPOINTMENT BELIEVED MADE TO PERMIT ENERGETIC SUBORDINATES CONDUCT WAR.
**TOP-SECRET DISPATCH**

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DECLASSIFIED BY Authority of VCS Memo.

109983

NCR 8748

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP. (Use G. C. T.)

**Top Secret**

(PASS TO COMINCH FOR INFO AS RDO HONOLULU 109927.)

THIS IS CHINESE ULTRA.

7 NOVEMBER BETWEEN 0430 - 0700 COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN NAVAL BASE FORMOSA AND FOLLOWING ENEMY VESSELS: BB'S HAKUMA AND MUTSU, CV'S HOKOJO AND AKARI, CA'S SATSUKI ASAKAZE AND TZUSABA.

SPECIAL SERVICE SHIP SHIKISHIMA. UNIDENTIFIED VESSEL NITTSUYU AND SHINONOME. THE AKARI AND SHIKISHIMA DEPARTED BASE AND REACHED 12-00 NORTH 114-00 EAST. ON 8 NOVEMBER AT 0550 - 0600 COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN MAKO MAKO AND FOLLOWING ENEMY VESSELS, CV KOYOU CA MAOKU AND GL TENRIYU. THE MAOKU WILL ARRIVE MAKO MAKO AT 0600. THIS IS 5TH REPORT ON SHIPPING FROM CHINESE INTERCEPT SOURCE PREVIOUSLY USED ON ENEMY AIRFORCE ONLY. WILL BE DAILY. ALL TIMES BELIEVED LOCAL. DO YOU WISH ANY MORE OF THIS CHINESE ULTRA. ADVISE.

No. 1 ADMIRAL.
No. 2 FILE.
No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM.
No. 4 SPECIAL.

DECLASSIFIED E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
**DISPATCH**

**FROM**  ALUSNA MOSCOW
**RELEASED BY**
**DATE**  NOV 15 1944
**TOR CODEOON**  151956
**DECODED BY**  CHEESMAN/HELTON
**PARASUS BY**  MONTGOMERY
**Routed By**  MONTGOMERY

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**INFORMATION**

- **UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.**

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**ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME GROUP**

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**PASSING ALONG AS TOPSECRET DUE SOURCE AND RECOMMEND NO PUBLICITY.**

SOVIET NAVAL REPRESENTATIVE TOKIO REPORTS AT 1323 NOV 1 UNIDENTIFIED PLANE REPORTED OVER TOKIO AT HIGH ALTITUDE LEAVING MILKY BLUE ALERT SOUNDED AT 1325. SOON THEREAFTER ACKACK STARTED AND AIR ALARM SOUNDED. JAP FIGHTERS IN AIR 15 TO 20 MINUTES AFTER ALARM. AT 1445 STAFF OF EASTERN ARMY DISTRICT INFORMED PUBLIC OVER ANNOUNCER SYSTEM THAT SEVERAL PLANES OF LARGE TYPE HAD BROKEN THROUGH DEFENSE RING AT KAYCHAN. AT 1515 SECOND ANNOUNCEMENT THAT PLANES FLEW AWAY CAUSING NO DAMAGE AND ALL CLEAR SOUNDED. AT 1930 STAFF ANNOUNCED A SINGLE 829 HAIR FLOWN OVER AREA. AT 2145 ANOTHER ALERT SOUNDED BUT NO FURTHER INFO THEREAFTER.

**NCB ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:**

18(1).......ACT
COMINCH(270)......

**ACTION F-2**

---

**DECLASSIFIED**

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
From: CG, US Army Forces, China Theater, Chungking, China

To: War Department

No. MILID 23704 10 November 1944

MILID 23704 from DePass signed Wedemeyer. C-3 rated is this SINO G-2 report.

Approximately 250 various sizes enemy Naval vessels and 1500 new type planes recently Philippine arrivals now reported engaged in operations making place in area around the Philippines. To direct operations Admiral Leetake Toyoda Commander Jap United Fleets arrived at Philippine Islands 22 Oct and next day proceeded to Nantao (probably Hainan Island).

End

ACTION: G-2

INFO: CGAAP, OPD/COL.PARK, LOG

CM-IN 12487 (13 Nov 44) 1609Z

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: US Military Attaché, Lisbon, Portugal
To: War Department
No.: 505
7 November 1944

Repeated Madrid 505.

Japs here reported by source B2 to believe that Salazar preparing rupture diplomatic relations with Japan. Publication of names of all Port citizens now on Timor which appeared without apparent reason in press on Nov 4 is advanced as bearing out above. Japs reducing currently their missions here and Madrid sending members to Switzerland. They have been discharging all Germ Nationals lately and source reports Japs consider Germany lost war.

Jap Counsellor of Legation here is said having received communication from Tokyo that defeat of American carriers at Formosa permitted Jap Navy freedom of movement. Further that within two weeks Jap will counter attack Leyte and dislodge American forces. Should this operation prove unsuccessful continues Jap diplomat then Japan lost war and mass suicides in Japan will follow. Even if Japan should go under, states source, overall objective will have been achieved namely elimination of white race from Asia because seeds of hatred against Anglo Saxons have been successfully sown in that area.

Jap source opines that serious fissures are apparent in Anglo US Soviet Alliance which will subsist only as long

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
as Hitler exists. After his down fall, fissures will become unbridgable gulf reacting to Germany's benefit. He claims Russia conducting political anti Hitler war. Jap therefore concludes that Germany's main task now is to prolong war and gain time at any cost.

Solberg

ACTION: G-2
INFO: GDAAP; OPD; Col Park; Log
CM-IN-6734 (7 Nov 44) 21217 ekk

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
IN CONVERSATION WITH SHARK JAP NAVAL ATTACHE GIVES FOLLOWING ESTIMATE. SITUATION IS SERIOUS AND VIEWED WITH APPREHENSION BUT HOPE SEEN IN FOLLOWING. OF 50 AMERICAN CARRIERS IN PACIFIC 11 SUNK AND 5 OTHERS SUNK OR DAMAGED. SEVERAL MONTHS NECESSARY REPLACE THEM. JAPS LOST 2400 PLANES IN WEST PACIFIC AND 800 OTHER THEATRES PAST 2 MONTHS. PRODUCTION 3,000 PER MONTH INCLUDES ALL TYPES BUT COMBAT TYPES EXCEED LOSSES BY SMALL MARGIN. IF JAP FLEET TOO WEAK ENGAGE SUPERIOR FORCES IT WILL WITHDRAW HOME WATERS AND AWAIT AMERICAN APPROACH WHILE AIR FORCES FIGHTS DELAYING ACTION. POLICY TO PLAY FOR TIME AND HOPE FOR FAVORABLE BREAK. AMERICANS HAVE ABOUT 50 ARMY DIVISIONS EUROPE AND LOSING 2 PER MONTH. 1 DIVISION PER
MONTH BEING LOST ASIATIC THEATRE. THIS TOTAL LOSS 36 DIVISIONS.
PER YEAR CAN BE REPLACED BUT DUE SHIPPINGS SITUATION GREAT
AUGMENTATION FORCES NOW ABROAD IMPOSSIBLE. THIS SITUATION
WILL LAST AS LONG AS WAR IN EUROPE. STUBBORN GERMAN RESISTANCE
AND OBVIOUS LACK COORDINATION RUSSIAN AND ALLIED FORCES FAVOR
PROLONGATION THAT WAR. RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA CONTINUE HOPEFUL.
NO INDICATIONS SHE WILL WAR AND SEVERAL SHE WILL NOT. FACT THAT
RUMANIA BULGARIA AND FINLAND ARMISTICE TERMS DO NOT DEMAND WAR
AGAINST JAPAN SHOWS RUSSIAS INTENTIONS AND HER PREDOMINANT IN-
FLUENCE OVER ALLIES. JAPS PREPARED MAKE CONCESSIONS TO RUSSIA
INCLUDING MAICHUCUO IN NECESSARY
NAVAL MESSAGE

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<tr>
<th>ADDRESS</th>
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FROM: COM 7TH FLT
RELEASED BY: 4 NOVEMBER 1944
DATE: 1915
TOR CODE/DOM: MCDougall
PARAPHRASED BY: MCDougall

THE FOLLOWING NOTES ON ENEMY SHIPS AND TACTICS ARE FROM VERBAL REPORTS OF SOME OF OUR OFFICERS PARTICIPATING IN THE ACTIONS. OBSERVATIONS GIVEN OVERALL GRADE OF B2. AT LEAST 2 SHIPS WERE TRACKED RETREATING THRU SURIGAO STRAIT AT SPEED OF 18 TO 20 KNOTS BOTH SHIPS WERE APPARENTLY ON FIRE AFT WITH BRIGHT FLAMES AND SMOKE 20 TO 40 FT HIGH.

COM 7TH FLT SENDS ACTION CINCSEPA COMINCH CINC PAC COM 3RD FLT COM 5TH FLT.

COMMENT THIS LENDS ADDED COLOR TO PREVIOUS RUMORS THAT JAPS USE FLAME AND SMOKE THROWERS TO SIMULATE BATTLE DAMAGE.

A ROWE* TO ASSIST ESCAPE AND ALSO SUGGESTS THAT AIRCRAFT REPORTS OF DAMAGE BASED ON OBSERVATION OF FLAME AND SMOKE SHOULD BE ACCEPTED WITH RESERVATION. THE 1ST HEAVY GUN SALVO NOTES BY THE SAINT LO WAS COMPOSED OF APPARENTLY ANTIRADAR SHELL. THE SHELLS BURST HIGH WITH SALVO WHILE IN

* Rowe

Make original copy. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (g) NAVFRCs.)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
DISPERSION AND WHAT APPEARED TO BE WINDOW APPEARED WHERE THE
SHELLS HAD BURST AND SLOWLY DESCENDED TOWARDS THE WATER.
ENEMY BATTLESHIPS OPENED FIRE AT 33,000 YARDS ALL SALVOS JUST
SHORT. COMMENT SUGGESTS MAXIMUM RANGE. BATTLESHIPS AND CRUISERS
USED DYE LOADED SHELLS SPLASHES COLORED GREEN PINK AND YELLOW.
3 BATTLESHIPS IDENTIFIED BB OF YAMATO CLASS WERE TRACKED FOR
ABOUT 20 MINUTES AT A SPEED OF 27 KNOTS. YAMATO CLASS BATTLE
SHIPS SEEN FAIRLY CLOSE ABOARD HAS A BIG RADAR ANTENNA ATOP THE
FOREMAST STRUCTURE ALMOST EXACTLY SIMILAR TO OUR MARK 8 WITH RODS
STICKING OUT BUT ABOUT HALF AS WIDE. THE ANTENNA HAS A VERY LONG
ATHRWARTSHIP DIMENSION AND APPEARS LIKE A LARGE YARD. 3 DESTROYERS
OF THE ASASHIO CLASS PASSED VERY CLOSE ABOARD SURVIVORS OF THE
USS HOEL ON RAFTS CHANGING COURSE TO THE RIGHT TO AVOID HITTING THE
RAFTS, THEY DID NOT SRAFE OR MOLEST OUR MEN IN ANY WAY. MEMBERS
OF THE CREW WERE NOTED TAKING PHOTOGRAPHS. LEADING DD HAD KIEDG*
HOLE IN HER PORT BOW AND NEAR DESTROYER APPARENTLY WAS PUMPING
AFT WITH HER HANDY BILLY. THE USS HOEL WAS HIT BY 20 TO 30 SHELLS
OF 8 INCH OR LARGER. SHE WITHSTOOD ENEMY CRUISER AND BATTLESHIP
FIRE FOR NEARLY AN HOUR AT RANGES UNDER 10,000 YARDS BEFORE
SINKING. THERE WAS NO EXPLOSION WITHIN OR ON THE SHIP.

COPY TO 20G
* AS RECEIVED.
COM AMPHIB GROUP 8 ORIGIANATES RADIO HONOLULU PASS TO CINCPAC FOR INFO RADIO WASHINGTON PASS INFO TO COMINCH.

DOCUMENTS SALVAGED FROM JAP PLANE SHOT DOWN 3 NOVEMBER LEYTE AREA INCLUDE OPERATION ORDER OF AIR GROUP 653 DATED 18 OCTOBER WHICH ORDERS PLANE UNITS OF AIR GROUPS 653 TO EMBARK IN CV ZUIKAKU AND CVL'S ZUIKO CHITOSE CHIYODA ON 20 OCTOBER. PLANES OF AIR GROUP 931 AND 601 ALSO EMBARKED THESE SHIPS. TOTALS OF PLANES AND AIR GROUPS FOR EACH SHIP AS FOLLOWS: ZUIKAKU 28 FIGHTERS 20 FIGHTER-BOMBERS 8 TENZAN 10 COMETS DOURO 8 FIGHTERS 4 TO 6 FIGHTER-BOMBERS 6 TENZAN, CHITOSE 8 FIGHTERS 6 TO 8 FIGHTER-BOMBERS 6 TENZAN, CHIYODA 16 TO 18 TYPE 97 SHIPBOARD ATTACK PLANES. NO INDICATION LOCATION OF CARRIERS AT ABOVE TIME.
WEBSLV AIRFIELD NOTES: NO. 10

THE FAR EAST

Summary of Contents

Appendix 'A'. Air Development in Japan

(1) Two new fields in Formosa
(2) Nothing to report from China, Manchuria, or Korea
(3) Minor development in Sumatra
(4) Development in the Celebes, Borneo, and the Philippines
(5) No evidence of development in the Central Pacific.

Information to week ending
October 28, 1944.
Appendix 'A'

AIR DEVELOPMENT IN JAPAN

New Airfields Round Fukuoka.

Last week, details of the new construction of airfields and landing grounds in the Fukuoka area on Kyushu were given. It was then stated that in addition to the six new fields of which conclusive evidence had been received development was also taking place to the established airfields in that area.

Possible Reasons.

The continuous series of Japanese military setbacks have been relieved only by their gains during the recent land operations in China and the two latest Allied successes, the landings in the Philippines, and the great victory over the Japanese Navy in the second battle of the Philippine Sea have probably presented the enemy with a further understanding of a fact that must have become apparent long ago. This the inescapable certainty that the centre of gravity of the war in the Pacific is fast moving closer to Japan itself. The possibility that Allied forces might soon be able to penetrate inside their lines of communication and attack the homeland from the West is now facing the Japanese. Air blows of mounting intensity are already being struck from this direction by B-29’s of the Xth Air Force.

Conclusions.

This air development in the Fukuoka area, which is now being rushed, can therefore, serve the following purposes:

(a) That of augmenting the air protection of the highly industrialised island of Kyushu, in which military targets abound, and which contains a large proportion of Japan’s war potential.

(b) It can help to provide an air ‘bolt’ to the gap between the Japanese mainland and the territory of Korea, which lies across a comparatively narrow strait and forms the opposite side of the Southwest entrance to the Sea of Japan. This strait is divided into two channels by the Tsushima Islands.

If these conclusions are correct air development might also be looked for on the Tsushima Islands and on Sado island, the large island which guards the approaches to the strait. About the Tsushima Islands little is known but there is an indication that some years ago there was an airfield or seaplane station or both in existence on the Northwest tip of the more northerly of the two islands. Regarding Sado, there are, according to available information, two known airfields or landing grounds and one possible landing ground, and a probable seaplane station. There is evidence that the flight training of naval aircrew personnel is carried out here and it may also be a stage on an air route into China of undetermined importance. Further development in all these areas, as well as in the southern part of Korea, will be watched for.

- 2 -
NIPPLEY AIRFIELD NOTES NO. 10
THE FAR EAST

Information on airfield development in Japan and Japanese occupied territories available to the week ending October 22, 1944, is dealt with under these headings:

(1) Japan, Formosa, and adjacent islands
(2) China, Manchuria, and Korea
(3) Southeast Asia area
(4) Southwest Pacific
(5) Central Pacific

NOTE: The number of the appropriate Air Movements Branch operational airfield map is given in parenthesis under the name of each field.

1) JAPAN, FORMOSA, etc.

No information of airfield development in Japan proper has been received but in FORMOSA there is satisfactory evidence of two new fields.

ALIAN
(18N-117E)
22 51N
120 20E
There is a N/S graded earth strip 4900' x 600' approx., and dispersal areas with 25 or more revetments.

TSUINA
(18N-117E)
23 35N
120 15E
(town)
A strip of approx. 5200' appears serviceable. Orientation not known. Dispersal areas on either side of strip.

In the RYUKYU ISLANDS there is a new seaplane station.

TSUHAKO
(30N-121E)
26 11N
127 16E
Dimensions of alighting area: Unlimited N/S x 5000' E/W. Slipway; one hangar-type building, 3 workshops, 3 unidentified buildings. The station is operational.

In the KURIILE ISLANDS evidence has been received that the following locations, formerly stated to be auxiliary seaplane stations, possess no installations of a character to justify this status and they should, therefore, be reclassified as seaplane alighting areas.

(42N-139E)-(BURUOTON BAY)
(34N-139E)-(KAKUMABETSU BAY)
(54N-250E)-(MIZASHI BAY)
(MAKAGAWA WAI

Also in the Kurile Islands, the following locations should be removed from lists and airfield maps.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(M) and 8(D) or (E)
By SR By: JEB Date: FE 2 874

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date: 2/1/74
(1) JAPAN, FORMOSA, etc.--(Continued):

ARAIDO I.  50 49N
(54W-150E)  155 39E
An L.G. or E.L.G. has never existed.
BANJARMASIN  47 08N
(42W-139E)  152 15E
The strip has received no attention since July 1943. Considered abandoned.

(2) CHINA, MANCHURIA, and KOREA:

There is nothing to report from these areas.

(3) SOUTHEAST ASIA area:

Information is confined to development to an existing field in SUMATRA.

PANDANG  00 52E
(68-106E)  100 22E
There are now two runways, spaced approx. 150' apart, each 5100' x 180'
NNW/SSE. Dispersal areas to E and SW.

(4) SOUTHEAST PACIFIC:

(a) The CERAMIC.

TAMAMON  00 58N
(6N-131E)  124 13E
A runway or strip running N/S is u/c.
Present dimensions approx. 4800' x 160'.
The above amplifies and corrects information given last week.

MASAMBA  2 34S
(60-122E)  120 19E
The runway has now been extended
from 1950' to 4000'.

(b) BORNEO.

Existence of a new field confirmed:

CHIDITITI  1 16S
(60-122E)  116 54E
(approx)
An ENE/WSW runway 3200' x 135'. Dispersal areas and servicing apron u/c.

(c) The PHILIPPINES.

Two new fields are reported:

BAKAO  10 31N
(6N-115E)  122 51E
An E/W strip 3500' x 200' approx.
Believed not operational.

LA CARLOTA  10 26N
(60-115E)  122 54E
A strip running NE/SW approx. 5000'
x 150'. Some facilities. Operational.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date ___________
(4) SOUTHWEST PACIFIC -- (continued):

Confirmation has been obtained that the following either no longer exist or never have existed, and they should therefore be deleted from airfield lists, operational maps, and operational capacity tables.

(HINUNDAYAN .......... 10 21N, 125 15E
(6N-131E) FABRICA/PARABASO .......... 10 53N, 123 21E
LA CARLOTA .......... 10 25N, 122 53E
(6N-115E) ZAMBOANGA/SAN JOSE ...... 6 55N, 122 03E

Development has occurred at the following established fields:

SURIGAO (6N-131E) 9 45N 125 29E There is now a R/S strip approx. 4500' x 250' of which the N portion is surfaced. Believed not operational.

VALENCIA No. 1 (6N-131E) 7 59N 125 03E There are now four natural-surfaced strips as follows: (i) 6100' x 550' E/W, (ii) 5050' x 650' NN/SS, (iii) 3200' x 550' N/S, (iv) 6650' x 325' ENE/WSW. Dispersal with 40 or more medium and small revetments.

VALENCIA No. 2 (6N-131E) 8 02N 125 05E There are now two strips: (i) 5700' x 480' NE/SW, (ii) 4200' x 170' N/S. Dispersal area u/c.

Status reports on Japanese-held fields in NEW BRITAIN and NEW IRELAND:

Inactive and probably abandoned:

(BORPOP (6S-154E) KERAVAT (now under cultivation)
(HAMATANI (RAPPOF

Maintained as serviceable or partly serviceable:

(KAVIENG (6S-154E) LAKUMAI
(TUBERIA (VUNAKANAU

(5) CENTRAL PACIFIC:

No reports of enemy development.
Although these notes bear a SECRET classification, positions and types of airfields or other material herein included may be extracted for use in maps, charts, or lists bearing a lower classification, provided such reproduction of material is in accordance with AR 380-5.

(6) DISTRIBUTION:

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- 6 -

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/74

FEB 1974
From: US Military Attache, Chungking, China
To: War Department
No: 23688 31 October 1944

MILID 23688 from Depass signed Hearn.
Rated G-3, Chinese G-2 from east and southeast enemy moving on Kwelin.

End

ACTION: G-2
INFO: CG AAF
       OPD
       COL PARK
       LEG
CM-IN-256 (1 Nov 44) 0522Z MOS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: COM 3RD FLEET
RELEASED: 29 OCTOBER 1944
T/O CODEROOM: 11915
DECODED BY: MCCLELLAN
PARAPHRASED BY: KNAPP/BEHRENDT
Hlolp: 075

COM 3RD FLEET SENDS ACTION CINCPAC CINCSOWESPAC COM 7TH FLEET INFO COMINCH CTF 77 ALL TFC'S 3RD FLEET.

THE ONE WELL INFORMED TALKATIVE POW OF 6 SUBUYA SURVIVORS STATES: 1 DRAGGING AND 1 FLOATING DOCK SINGAPORE WILL NOT TAKE YAMATO CLASS, WHILE TRANSPORTING TROOPS JAPAN TO SINGAPORE LAST JANUARY YAMATO HIT BY 2 TORPEDOES BUT MADE 20 KNOTS THEREAFTER. RETURNED EMPIRE FOR DOCKING, BOTH AFTER TURRETS UNO ON REMOVED AND FLIGHT DECK HEIGHT OF FORMER NUMBER 4 TURRETT. SEEMS POSITIVE MORGAN IN SURIGAO FORCE 25TH.

REQUEST 7TH FLEET ADVISE INFORMATION FROM POW OF EARLY STRATEGICAL TACTICAL OR ACTION ANALYSIS VALUE. ALSO THE TIME OF PHOTO OF YAMATO ON 26TH BY 5TH AF NEAR LINAPACAN.

R. O. 11650, Sec. 5(D) and 5(D) or (F)
OSD Letter, May 1, 1972

By SLR

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/94

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver in Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVRECNS.)

Handwritten signature
PASSED BY CINCPOA TO CINCSPapa CTF 77 CONNAU CON 3RD ALL TFC AND TGC 3RD FLT FOR INFO AS 271147.

(CINCPOA SENDS INFO CINCSPapa CTF 77 CONNAU CON 3RD ALL TFC AND TGC 3RD FLT. FOLLOWING IS REENCRYPTION OF CONNAUGROUP CHINA 27/141 ACTION CINCPOA INFO CINCSPapa)

"RECEIVED FROM CHENNAULT AND PASSED TO EDERT FOR INFO PROB. ULTRA EXCLUSIVE INFORMATION HAS REVEALED TO US THAT THE JAP ARE MOVING AIR FORCE UNITS FROM JAPAN PROPER AND MANCHURIA TO PHILIPPINE ISLANDS AND FORMOSA TO REINFORCE SAME. AT PORT ARTHUR AND DAIREN ON OR BEFORE THE 24TH INST JAP AUTHORITIES HAVE ISSUED ORDERS TO HER (CARBLE) TOGETHER OILERS NUMBERING 16 AND IN 3 DAYS BEFORE SAILING TO THE LOOGHOCS (RYUKYU ISLANDS) AND FORMOSA TO COMPLETE LOADING OF SAID VESSELS. THE 1ST THREE SHIPS ARE EXPECTED TO LEAVE PORT TODAY THE 26TH 6 COPIES TO 1944.4 BY 2454
NAVAL MESSAGE

14TH AIR FORCE HAS MADE AN ABNORMAL NUMBER OF MERCHANT CONTACTS DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS NEAR THE SOUTHERN LIMIT OF THEIR BLIND BOMBING AREA. MOST OF THESE ARE NORTHBOUND INDICATING A LARGE WITHDRAWAL OF JAPANESE MERCHANT SHIPPING FROM SOUTHERN AREAS.
We turned each of them
down every single piece when we suggested.

The attack started when about 1200 men moved
c/m and was turned back by an attack.
From the CVR5 they put again of was

130 planes lost for all times

Total

Stots

1125-12/15 E

Dear family

With love

R. J. Dove

30/09
Title: An Analysis of Current Japanese Attitudes Towards the War.

SUMMARY

I. Introduction
1. The Japanese have no hope of defeating the United Nations in the war, but they count on a negotiated "victory."

II. Conclusions
1. Japanese morale is high, but there is a trend of increasing pessimism about the way the war is going. This trend will probably increase.
An Analysis of Japanese Military

(The following discussion is predicated on Russia's not entering the war in the Far East.)

1. The Japanese Military Group has no hope of winning the war in the sense of defeating the United Nations. It expects, however, on a negotiated peace at some time which will have advanced the Greater East Asia Policy of Japan to the extent of complete domination of at least Manchuria and North China (1,6). Top Military Leaders believe that the U.S.A. will grow war weary and therefore be prepared to negotiate a peace (1,3,6,7).

2. The Navy Leaders would probably be glad to negotiate a peace at this moment. They appreciate more than the Army Group the strength of the United Nations (1,3).

3. The "Big Four Families" of Japan would probably welcome a negotiated peace at this moment, but have little chance of making their influence felt against the Army Group. They have always appreciated the great strength of the United Nations more than the Army and Navy Groups (1,3).

4. The urban population is less influenced by government propaganda than the Farmers. Both groups, but especially the city people, grumble about the lack of food, clothing, fuel and transportation. The better educated Japanese are disturbed about the future (1,3,6). There is evidence of increasing pessimism about the way the war is going. A trend in this direction has noticeably increased during the past six months (8,3,4,6). There is an increasing tendency to rely on mystical sources of victory (8,6).

5. If the defeat of Japan will probably have to be pushed to the extent of defeating her Navy and/or landing on one of the four main islands before the Japanese as a whole concede they are beaten (1).

6. In that event, the Army Group might try to carry on the war from Manchuria and China. Some responsible Leaders would probably retreat outside (1).

As feeling develops in Japan that she will lose the war, there will probably be a shuffling of leaders and new Presidents, each of whom will be a little less strongly tied to the Army Group than the last one (1,6).
7. The people of the United States in general probably underestimate the ability of the Japanese to carry on the war under what we would consider tremendous difficulties and privations. In the event of Japan proposing a negotiated peace, the U.S.A. might be fooled by "liberal" leaders coming forward who really represent the old "Axis group." On the other hand, there is equal danger that the U.S.A. might accept leaders who would otherwise cooperate with us and so destroy their effectiveness with their own people (1).
CONFIDENTIAL

Source List


2. Japanese radio broadcasts to the home front.

3. Japanese newspapers and other journals (including government publications) from "Pearl Harbor" to August 1944.


5. Four Hundred Minutes of Captured Soldiers.

6. Approximately 850 Prisoner of War Interrogation Reports.


Appendix to Research
Project No. 807

A Correlation of:
(a) Japanese Broadcasts to the Home Front.
(b) Japanese Journals.
(c) Pa/Ni Interrogation Reports.
Representative Statements in Japanese Journals and Captured Documents:

1. Commander Goro Takase:
   "Race for Air Supremacy", 
   "Kaisei June 1943.

2. Article from <em>Kyodo</em>:
   "...Out cities are full of women who have become completely Americanized both outwardly and inwardly." 
   "A Manifesto to Women", 
   July 1943.

3. Lieutenant - Colonel Giso Otsuka on the General Staff:
   "...If the big towns are raided, I'm afraid that however splendid the country villages are, complete victory in the war may perhaps become difficult. There is the need to strengthen the ideas of the educated classes in the big towns. If America raids Japan's small towns and villages, she will only enhance war-consciousness in them more and more; doesn't the key lie to getting big towns in the same state as the small towns and villages?" 
   "Don't Lose the War on Kure", 
   Kure, August 1943.

4. Yoshi Kanbara, Head of Imperial Petroleum Planning Department:
   "Petroleum — the Burning Question", 
   "Minyo Kyoukai", August 1943.

5. Article from <em>Kansai</em>:
   "...The intellectuals are unwilling to swallow the official propaganda that this is a holy war to protect the Emperor and spread his glory throughout the world." 
   "Ideological Warfare in the Present Decisive War Situation", 
   <em>Kansai</em>, October 1943.

6. Lt. Tezu Tomi of the Naval Headquarters, Bureau of Information:
   "...The importance of air power is very great and if Japan is defeated in the air she will lose the war. Without air superiority Japan will never win the war." 
   "The War in the Air", 
   "Hosen Kyoukai", 
   October 1943.

7. Lt. Colonel Koji Takada, Information Dept., Ministry of War:
   "...The Atlantic Charter and other pronouncements by the American leaders may influence some Japanese who still worship the West. It is natural that a long protracted war should weary the people and cause them to think about peace, but it is the duty of propaganda to suppress this feeling among the people..." 
   From the pamphlet "The Great East Asia War and Ideological Warfare", 
   November 20, 1943.

8. Professor Fukutaro Okai of Keio University:
   "...Tokyo will certainly be bombed to smashies. However, Japan will still carry on with the dispersed population. But will citizens of Tokyo and other large cities be able to take it?" 
   "The Defense of the Realm", 
   "Minyo Kyoukai", November 1943.

9. Vice Admiral Tomyuki Senoo, Director of General Bureau of Marine Transportation:
   "Marine Transportation Holds Decision of War", 
   "Kanse", Jan. 1, 1944.
10. Colonel Kingoro Kashiwagi:
"Produce a Hundred Thousand Planes and a Hundred Million Koku of Rice"; Kenmam Baraba, March 1944.
### Changes in Attitude Toward Victory

Of reports on 800 Japanese prisoners analyzed, 189 army prisoners commented on victory. The chart shows the attitudes of these prisoners arranged according to time of capture.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time periods in which prisoners were captured</th>
<th>Percentage of prisoners who lacked confidence in victory</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Jan-April, 1943</td>
<td>*</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. July-Dec, 1943</td>
<td>*</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Jan-July, 1944</td>
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* A few army prisoners were captured between September and December 1943 but this period is not plotted because of inadequacy of sample.

**NOTE:** 100 per cent equals the total number of prisoners reported as commenting on victory in each of the time periods. Each time period uncharted balance is per cent making comments suggesting confidence in victory.

The total number of prisoners which comprised the sample for each of the three time periods is as follows:

1st period: 41  
2nd period: 26  
3rd period: 58

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DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/44

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DECLASSIFIED
From: CG US Army Forces in China Burma and India Forward Echelon, Chungking, China

To: War Department

Nr: 23679 20 October 1944

MILID 23679 from Depass signed Stilwell.

That Japanese industrialists desire cease war is information received from prominent banker here with B rating. F-5 rating. Nip army refuses to cooperate and if necessary insists on war to death although the industrialists state they have persuaded Navy to support peace offensive.

End

ACTION: G-2
INFO: CG AAF OPD
Col. Park
LOG
CM-IN-19299 (20 Oct 44) 1922Z by SLR

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
There are several interesting factors in connection with Japan's propaganda handling of the Battle of Formosa. First is the striking resemblance to the treatment of the fake Bougainville Victory of November 1943; second, Tokyo's lack of reference to objectives bombed or damaged sustained in Formosa; third, the prompt declarations that American official silence is an indication of American defeat; and fourth, the admissions (in Japanese language material only) that Japan had previously suffered a number of serious defeats and the implicit suggestion that this "victory" has come as a much-needed stimulus to morale on Japan's home front.

Another Bougainville: The need for a smashing victory to bolster morale and spur production after a succession of "disappointments" is as poignantly felt now as it was a year ago (See Weekly Review, Nov. 13, 1943; "Bougainville Bugee"). At that time, the Japanese had had a long series of reverses at Guadalcanal, New Guinea, Munda, Attu and Kiska. The year 1944 has brought even more depressing reports of setbacks at Truk, Salipan and Gunn, and bombings of the homeland, Manchuria and the Philippines.

Although there have been indications that it was subsequently rather widely rumored in Japan that the Bougainville reports (in which even the Emperor was involved) were exaggerated, it may have served as a temporary shot in the arm of sufficient value to risk trying it again. This time, also, the Emperor enters conspiratorially into the picture; Kido congratulated him on his victory and he in turn graciously granted an Imperial Rescript to the officers and men and - significantly - to the "nation." Again the United States forces have been "lured into a trap," far from their homeland, and have not a diameter "equal to and even surpassing that of Pearl Harbor." The possibility that there are even now some sceptics among the Japanese may be indicated by the repeated assurance of the unimpeachable accuracy of Imperial Headquarters communiques, by the repetitions emphasis on the claims that various numbers of ship or planes were "truly destroyed," and by the radio insistence that the estimates are "conservative."

Last year the Bougainville hoax was perpetrated at a time when all the puppet nations had assembled delegations in Tokyo for the Greater East Asia Conference. This year the news of the "annihilation of the American fleet" is released as the Philippines celebrates its first year of "independence" - and while the threat of American retribution is more imminent than ever before. Tokyo very probably reasons that...

Further details of enemy broadcasts on the "naval battle" off Formosa may be seen in the DAILY REPORT, the "A" Wire, and the forthcoming RADIO REPORT ON THE FAR EAST.
if the Philippines can be convinced that the Japanese really took a major part of the American Navy, then the existence of "remnants" of that Navy in nearby waters may cause less nervousness among wavering puppets.

Distracting Attention: In referring to the raids on Formosa, propagandists show a studious avoidance of naming the objectives bombed. Absent even are the phrases "negligible damage sustained" or "no damage at all to military installations" which have become familiar by-products of raids on Kyushu and Manchuria. Attention on all beams is focused on staggering enemy losses with the probable intention of diverting the minds of listeners from damages to Formosa installations. Propagandists emphatically declare that the "Tokyo" defenders were ready, that they "intercepted the enemy" whose object was to "advance on the Chinese mainland and cut the lines to the Philippines."

It was admitted once that the raid on the morning of Oct. 12th would "not have been considered a bad piece of work" from the enemy's point of view if the task force had not sustained subsequent blows from land based planes. By lingering in the vicinity during the 12th and 13th the task force was "cornered by the Imperial forces" and its "fighting strength was reduced by more than half." When it allegedly took to its heels on the morning of the 14th it put up "little anti-aircraft resistance."

It was like a doctor without eyeballs and could only muster "two or three planes to fly about overhead."

OVERSEAS PROPAGANDA

An attempt to make, as usual, to create doubt of American claim in the minds of the American public. Official American "silence" and lack of communiques giving war results is pointed to in this connection, as it was in reporting the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway. The "foolhardy attempt" to neutralize Formosa and the Ryukyu Island bases is deprecated as a wild gamble taken in an attempt to boost President Roosevelt's re-election chances.

Heavy American losses are detailed endlessly, with commentators glibly estimating the complement of officers and men aboard each sunken warship (admitting always that the figures are conservative estimates). Five hundred thousand tons of warships were said to have been destroyed, along with 1000 planes. But ships and planes are less valuable than the 26,000 trained personnel who were killed or not sent to graves because the "desperately fleeing American ships" did not have time to rescue the drowning. A single English transmission on Oct. 15th whittled the first estimate of 1100 to 1500 planes (which were said to have taken part in the first raid on Formosa the day before) down to "three or four hundred."

The explanation was that each plane had made several sorties, so that there had appeared to be more. The tally of 100 planes shot down was maintained, however, with the army assurance that this was at least 50% of the raiders on the first day.
Under the onslaught of Japanese land based planes and surface units, not only the enemy air raid objectives of "reconnoitering hidden air strength at a pivotal point of Japan's inner defense line" and destroying that strength, but also the enemy's naval strategy of destroying the Japanese combined fleet" were said to have "vanished in the air like a bubble." English speaking listeners were reminded that land based planes sank the Repulcan and the Prince of Wales 2½ years ago. In the waters off Formosa the battle with the 26th American task force on Oct. 15 was described by Imperial Headquarters as "a battle of annihilation on the largest scale."

The accuracy of Imperial Headquarters communiqués was said to be assured by the careful examination of staff members and their "usual and characteristic effort to insure the utmost accuracy." If dubious listeners required further proof of serious losses sustained by the carrier based air force, they had only to remember that the commander of the task force had been "compelled to call in the aid of the China based United States Air Force" on the second day of the Taiwan raids. By current Japanese reasoning, the more severe American attack the closer is the day of Japanese victory, and the more coordinated are different American commands the nearer they are all proved to be.

DOMESTIC PROPAGANDA

Tokyo gave everything it had to dramatizing the stream of announcements, perhaps acting on the Hitlerian thesis that a big lie is more forcible than a timid one. Martial music accompanied the communiqués, which were repeated twice on most transmissions; the Emperor graciously granted an Imperial Rescript; a dozen high-ranking political and military figures were generously quoted; congratulatory telegrams poured in to the Emperor, Kido, Yonai, Buiyama and Toyoda, from occupied Asia states and from Axis Europe; and high officials made hurried trips to Yasukuni Shrine to give thanks for the victory. While the people of Japan were "excited with boundless joy," the people of Germany were not less restrained, "dancing with joy" in the streets. And some of the best news of all for the Japanese was that the people of America are "experiencing cold shivers."

Two new and highly revealing notes are being introduced, which were absent in the Bougainville precedent: (1) Japanese propagandists play heavily on the theme that the overwhelming victory proves the working unity of the Army and Navy (a subject which was never discussed in the first year of war, but which has been appearing every now and again since Feb. 1944), and (2) the people of Japan are being given part credit for the victory. After perhaps too many months of receiving only official blame for every Japanese military defeat -- on the grounds that they did not produce the "one more plane" or gun or ship which was needed to throw back the enemy -- the little people are now suddenly called upon to the extent that the Emperor himself includes them in an Imperial Rescript recognizing the importance of their continuing efforts on the production front in making the victory possible.
Weekend Rejoicing: Oct. 19 was a gala day for the often disappointed Japanese people. They had been told for hours to stand by for an Imperial Headquarters announcement which would bring them good news. They learned at 3 o'clock in the afternoon that the box score for Oct. 12 and 13 was 23 warships sunk or heavily damaged off Formosa and the Philippines. Of these, 9 were said to be aircraft carriers. They were preceded at the same time that the war results would soon be further "expanded," and later in the evening the figure soared to 55 vessels including 16 carriers accounted for in the four days Oct. 12 through 15. Even then more and greater reports were "anticipated." (By Oct. 19 the score stood at 57 ships, including 11 carriers sunk, eight heavily damaged.) Officials chose a day which would enhance the beneficial psychological effect of victory. Although many Japanese undoubtedly work on Sundays, the first and the 15th days of the month are traditionally days when Japanese rest. They would have a whole day to listen to the radio and celebrate. On Monday they could start back to work with renewed enthusiasm.

All day Sunday crowds thronged around the stalls selling newspapers or stood in queues waiting to purchase the latest editions. Radio revealed news flash after news flash, feeding the public hunger for good news. People were told that it was an "overwhelming victory, as great as the blow dealt the Uzrful Russian Baltic fleet in the battle of the Japan Sea" 40 years ago. Naval Spokesman Kuribara told the press that it was a victory which "far surpasses Pearl Harbor" or the action off the coast of Malaya.

All the newspapers carried streaming headlines on Monday. The YUMIURI HOCHI seems to have inadvertently let slip some Japanese impatience at the Navy's former reluctance to fight. A headline read "Our Surface Units Finally Sailed Forth in Running Fight for a Decisive Battle in the Pacific." Another ran, "Triumphal Song Rings; Enemy Task Force Dealt Decisive Blow." The MAINICHI chose, "Fleeing Enemy Fleet is Being Pursued and Heavily Attacked." The ASAHI had, "Look at This Great War Result!" and "Desperately Fleeing Enemy Warships Completely Destroyed." Another declared vitrially, "Truly Enemy Task Force Has Been Destroyed."

Two Years Since Guadalcanal: For all the joyous hysteria, symbolic references to past defeats crop into Japanese language material (but are omitted in foreign language transmissions). Now there are outright admissions that at Guadalcanal the fortunes of war turned against Japan. "The enemy, first starting his attacks on Guadalcanal in August of year before last, has pressed the Pacific War to the Mariana Islands and to the Ryukyu Islands and now to the decisive battles of Taiwan." Again on Oct. 14, "two years have gone by since our suicidal withdrawal from Guadalcanal, and it is significant that we are now inflicting crushing blows on a superior enemy task force." When news of the "crushing defeat" was released on Oct. 17th the patient Japanese people who had waited two long years since Guadalcanal were overjoyed. The task force raid came "in the nick of time", and Tokyo officials are quite obviously hoping that it will obliterate at least temporarily the grim memories of "offensive carried out by the enemy at Saipan, Tinian and Guam, then in the Palau Islands, and in the southwestern Pacific on the Northwestern coast of New Guinea, and at Morotai in the Bismarck Islands.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NL-101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/10/44
Enemy Superiority: The more preponderant among the Japanese may well consider the victory miraculous after listening to the howl and gaping admissions of America's tremendous striking power. One broadcast (Oct. 15) implied that the enemy was unprepared, in that "Whenever he plans to start an operation he first assembles a force several times more, may several tons of troops more, then that of his opponent." The first statement was made that "If such a force cannot be assembled, he does not start the operation." Japanese impregnations of the raids during three days, Oct. 12-14, were that the enemy was able to offer as sacrifice approximately 3000 carrier-based planes.

Warning Note: The Japanese people were allowed their weekend of unrelieved rejoicing, and then on Sunday evening ominous signals began to appear. Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura warned:

"It is erroneous to think that we have completely upset the entire enemy strategy and that Japan has suddenly won an advantageous position for offensive-defensive battles. Such a viewpoint must absolutely be warned against. Although the enemy appears to have challenged our naval force to a decisive battle, it is not so. The enemy is planning to reduce the fighting strength of Japan with as little harm as possible to his own warships and personnel."

President Shotaro Kashihara, President of the Board of Directors of the Dai Nippon Industrial Patriotic Service Association, had this to say:

"This announcement coming within no short a time after we had heard of the honorable deaths of all our officers and men on Guam and Tinian truly brought us great-relief... There was not a single one among us who was not delighted the day we heard of the gallant deaths of these men on the two islands... The real fighting is yet to be fought. Enemy America will surely come out again after speedily replenishing his lost air power and increasing it... We are fully aware of the gravity of the present situation... Our efforts are far from being enough.

Spokesman Sadao Igauchi also warned on Oct. 16 that "we may expect the enemy to repeat similar attempts."

Production Spur: As the high pitch of victory claims subsides, it may confidently be predicted that the people's enthusiasm will be channeled into greater sacrifice on the home front. Already on Monday they were told that if the meaning of reinforcements was relaxed the "running battle will terminate." The home front must develop a "bodily crush structure" modeled on the spirit of the "self-less fighting" "pilots." If during the one instant that we breathe a sigh of relief, the hands of the production workers are relaxed, this running battle will stop. "A new slogan was obediently adopted by factory workers: "Onward to the running battle." On Wednesday, the first of a series of morale-raising nationwide rallies was announced for Oct. 20, to be held to give thanks to the astounding achievements of the Japanese Armed Forces in crushing the U. S. task force in the waters off Taiwan and the Philippines."
CHINESE SOURCE RATED TC ADVISES JAP SUICIDE SQUADRON OF 500 FIGHTERS AND BOMBERS PLUS PILOTS CONCENTRATED NORTHERN LUZON TO ATTACK U.S. FLEET. JAP STRENGTH NANNING, NHEILIN, LIUCHOW, 13,000. PROBABLE DRIVE TO NEUTRALIZE AIRFIELD AT NANNING THEN NORTH TO LIUCHOW.
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Hollandia, New Guinea

To: War Department
CG, US Army Forces China, Burma India Forward Echelon, Chungking, China
CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma India Theater Headquarters, New Delhi, India
CG, US Army Forces Pacific Ocean Areas, Ft. Shafter, T.H.
CG, United Kingdom Base Section, London England
Supreme Commander Southeast Asia Command, Kendy, Ceylon

NR: C 19464 13th October 1944

From SWPA to MacArthur to AVMAR, G/G AWMOSCA, C/AMMDEL, COMGENPOA, Military Attaché London, CBI pass to GHQ India, SEAC, (OPIR).

Further study mobilization orders captured Central Pacific suggests new type standard division has been evolved with considerably lower strength than predecessor. Infantry regiments the same except 3 rifle companies to battalion instead of 4. Transport regiment drops horse and motor battalion of three companies each and substitutes regimental organization consisting of two horse and three motor transport companies. Artillery same organization, but batteries of 3 guns for total only 27. Cavalry-one mounted company dropped in new organization. Recce-two motor companies and one tank company as opposed one mounted company, two motor companies, one light armored car company and one truck company. Not prepared to state what divisions reorganized but

CM-IN-13578 (14 Oct 44)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 11/13/44
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

From: General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area,
Hollandia, New Guinea
NR: C 19464, 13th October 1944

bason above evidence and fact some divisions Burma so or-
ganized, consider * * any strengthened divisions extremely
unlikely with probability that 20,000 estimate Table of
Organization will be too high for standard divisions.

End

*Being Serviced

ACTION: G-2
INFO : CG AAP
       CGNW
       OPD
       COL PARK
       LOG

CM-IN-13578 (14 Oct 44) 1714Z mcs

CLASSIFIED

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 1/12/94
HONO INTERCEPT

(LATER REPORTS INDICATE JAP CONCENTRATION ALONG SOUTH
COAST SAMAR PARTICULARLY AROUND BASEY. PAMBULAN SUR*
NOW UNOCCUPIED BUT NAVAL GARRISONS REMAIN AT ASGAD W 7-9
10-00 NORTH 123-40 EAST AND AT SAPAO ON NORTH TIP OF
SIARGAO KSLFDNX.* SAILBOATS FLYING WHITE FLAG BEING USED
TO MOVE TROOPS AND SUPPLIES IN LEYCE GULF AND SAN PEDRO
BAY.

*AS RECEIVED

By STG Date FEB 4 1974

[Handwritten notes and signatures]
From: CG, 14th Air Force, Kunming, China.
To: War Department.
Nr: 242 8 October 1944

Donovan for 154 from Hall OSS nr 242 info Heppner OSS Kandy nr 44.

Annamites and Nips are in controversy over "rush bugs" which latter requested but now refuse to compensate for; claiming transportation trouble, they advocate diminished production. This item is triple B from Region 4.

The junk war risk insurance rate at Tonkin is 240 each 1000.

Three B info also emanates from Zone 4 that former airfield lying south of Hoshan airbase at AMOY has been rebuilt by Nipponese with installation of subterranean hangar to hold five aircraft. The Sapowei base situated south from AMOY is utilized systematically by two co planes. Resting there last night was great number of vessels.

Last item serves as verification of advice obtained previously that day, classified triple B, that convoy of 17 transport vessels came from south at 15000 o'clock; composed of six little, nine medium size and single ship especially big. Anchored there besides above were one little and one big transport ship, single war vessel kind unspecified and seven launches. Given no classification by originator, the below items are assigned triple C here:

CM-IN-8217 (9 Oct 44)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/46
From: CG, 14th Air Force, Kunming, China.

Nr: 242 8 October 1944

Termination last month, four planes and Naval personnel to number of 700 sailed from south China for Shanghai. Likewise since 25 last, not allowed is traffic on Hangchow Kinhwa rail line. At Kinhwa airdrome are two sham planes. Verification of previous information is word that troops of enemy Independent Brigade 8 who were at Shihchishuang are currently at Poochow. To capture Chango, Nips 500 in strength forded river proceeding NE from Poochow. Notwithstanding former reports, there have not been any coastal debarkations from ANOY. 800 injured Nipponese were shipped from south to Putoshan located east of Pinhentai.

Near Anking a dual B notes following water traffic on Yangtze this month: At 1000 o'clock on 4th, big launch up river and four hours later two down. Day previous at 900 o'clock, 11 launches traveled up and at 1200 a little transport going down short while later were two small launches. On 2nd, little transport traveled up at 900 and two big launches one, two hours later and other at 1300.

Seventh Zone yesterday submitted this material on targets in Canton locales. The Shekling span still utilized but unsteady. Formosan power plant functioning in Canton, refer to prep inter report 58, 39; for fuel it employs wood shavings, chaff and sawdust and generates current of 110 volts. Not protect by anti aircraft. A manufactory on SW corner of Shai Pook and Wai on roads produces corno materials, 100 pistols every week and also Ordnance. At fourth house from corner on Wai on road to left of there it crosses Fu
From: CG, 14th Air Force, Kunming, China.

Nr: 242 8 October 1944

Chueng Road, in back of central park, in Army Headquarters in Canton region. Above two B at source.

100 Mip motor vehicles said to have been noted by Sino Army Group on 6th this month at spot about six kilos east from Koyul; this item not classified at source. Our operative advises that at Tsalvu are steel launches, three in number and each capable of holding three trucks.

Tomorrow our liaison goes to new headquarters at Luchai in Zone 4 with Marshall Chang Fu Kei who shortly expects mounting enemy pressure. Enemy seizure of Taoshien, Changning and Pacong is attributed by Hsiehoy to Mip plan to secure powerful places for protection of Kweilin, Hengyang and Sianyuan lines of communications; recommends them as priority targets. Hsiehoy thinks Leiyang, Shaling and Anjen are occupied for similar reasons. The General in charge at Kweilin believes Yang Tong secure for minimum of seven more days; last from our team here.

Sino troop dispositions in that region puts Army 79 on line from Kweilin to Ining; from latter city to Lungsheng are two local regiments. Between Yangjae and Luitang is the 46th. Sino Army Group 27 is deployed from Pinglo to Fuchuan. The enemy said to be leaving Laopaocun which lies about six miles NE Tajungkiang.

ACTION: OSS
INFORMATION: CMAAF
OPD
0-2
Col. Park
Log
CM-IN-8917 (9 Oct 44) 0526Z rb

End

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SPECIAL "IVI" PRIORITY

Reference

From: OG, 14th Air Force, Kunming, China
To: War Department
Nr: 235

3 October 1944

Donovan 088 for 154 from Hall nr 235 info Heppner 089
Kandy nr 39.

Point of origin assigns no rating to this data
concerning Poochow status. Enemy headquarters for activities at
Lienkong, Pantu, Kwantow and Poochow are Chuansu Island
eight miles SE Lienkong. Sites is big foreign constructed
summer place NW from Chuansu City 0.2 miles. 4000 Nips and
an Admiral whose name according to Sino pronunciation is Yuan-
Tien arrived at above place as did Ching-Yi, Air Chief Army
Naval Base and his G-2. Subsequent arrival was Chi Tien
(as pronounced by Chinese) with 5000 men; he is Rear Admiral
of South China Fleet, previously at Hong Kong. Sino puppet
chief Ong Sang Kung of I Army Corps encamped at Chao-ying
vicinity Swatow joined the above with two companies totaling
400 groups. Stallions, ammunition, depth charges and
gasoline were landed at Sains Island which is likewise the
major supply depot for this drive. At nite engaged in
transporting materials to spot directly opposite Lienkong
are launches approximately 100 in number. The direction of
the drives are as follows:

Major enemy forces debarked at Lienkong City and
drove thru Pantu to spot east of Poochow 24 kilo. The
subsiary thrust emanated from Lienkong and via Kwantow to
Kuling. Three regiments battle fully 4000 enemy troops.

CM-IN-4956 (5 Oct 44)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44

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Copy No. 43
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Page 2

From: CC, 14th Air Force, Kunming, China

Sr: 235 3 October 1944

Their Wenochow assault progresses favorably to date any Chinese but have very little ammunition left, and if plane aid fails them, shall be forced to cancel today's operations. BEB of first this month locates four tin cans, one baby flat-top carrying eight aircraft, five coal burning launches and six transport vessels all loaded, steaming among inlets and little bays of Paichuan Islands which lie 67 miles eastward and some what south of Foochoo.

Our liaison groups at Lipo and Kweiilin in some fourth corroborate Nip seizure of Haingan 1 October. Our Lipo men also advise that the 20,000 enemy forces in Haingan fight in radius of three miles from city and on route to rear. Portion of enemy's Division 44, complete division 58 and additional ones are contained in above. From Kwieilin comes word too, that new Sino line will be about eight miles westward from Haingan at Lao Pao Chen; delaying encounters currently rage at Hien Kwan Ko seven kilometers westward from Haingan. Great numbers of additional enemy proceed southering direction. The 2,000 Nips currently at Lungkuan in four mile radius, are being strengthened. Shifting to Luchai NE Liuchow is Chinese Headquarters currently at Pingo. Chinese Gen Yangsen now proceeds with 30,000 men on route south and west from Hinguan to Lanchan Fuchwan and to Pingo. BE advice from fourth region says that Nips do not permit French liaison to go with them, and engage in wide surveys as well as river soundings in these directions: Dam Hao to east, Tien Yen to coast; on coast between China border Tien Yen and Dam Hao. Likewise between Hoanh No and Bien Liev.

On first this month during nite, 3,000 enemy landed

CM-IN-4956 (5 Oct 44)
From: 00, 14th Air Force, Kunming, China

Nr: 235

3 October 1944

at Amoy from three troop ships, two gun vessels and seven coal launches. Haiteng and Changzhou on coast west of Amoy were raided that day at 2300 o'clock by six enemy sea planes. This considered by ally to be preliminary to enemy debarkations at Haitang and at places raided. All above BB from Third Region.

End

ACTION: OSS

INFORMATION: CG AAF
OPD
G-2
Col Park
Log

CM-IN-4956 (5 Oct 44) 2023Z bjm

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
JAP NAVAD ATTACHE SAYS CRITICAL PERIOD FOR JAPAN WILL BE BETWEEN NOW AND APRIL DUE TO SERIOUS LOSSES PLANS AND ESPECIALLY PILOTS AND NECESSITY FOR CONTINUAL EXPENDITURE, BOTH ON SAME SCALE. BEGINNING APRIL INCREASED NUMBERS OF BOTH WILL BECOME AVAILABLE. FOR THIS REASON JAPANESE HAPPY ABOUT RUSSIAN TRANSFER OF ATTENTION AND FORCES FROM EAST FRONT TO BALKANS WITH RESULTING INCREASED GERMAN RESISTANCE TO ANGLO AMERICANS AND PROSPECT OF PROLONGED WAR. ABOVE FROM SHANK WHO SAYS RELIABLE INFORMATION FROM SEVERAL SOURCES CONVINCES HIM RUSSIAN MOVE INTO BALKANS WAS NOT ENCIRCLING MOVE, AGAINST GERMANS BUT TO SECURE DESIRED POSITION IN BALKANS AND THAT THEY WILL NOT PRESS WAR TO CONCLUSION BEFORE THAT POSITION SECURED AND APPROVED BY ALLIES. BULGAR SECRETARY JUST ARRIVED FROM LEGATION MOSCOW REPORTS JAPANESE THERE MORE ACTIVE AND
MORE CONFIDENT OF INFLUENCING STALIN.

16...ACT

COMINCH...CNO...NAV...25 OP...25G....

SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Condition of By-Passed Japanese in Pacific Area from November 1943 to September 1944.

The operations in the Pacific Area from November 1943 to September 1944 have resulted in by-passing an estimated 325,500 Japanese who have now been reduced by minor operations, bombardment, starvation, suicide and other means, to an estimated 218,500. These hostile elements are cut off from their lines of communications by air, sea and land blockade. This blockade has forced the Japanese to subsist off of the country. Their inability to replenish munition, food and medical supplies results in starvation, ill health, low morale and deterioration of fighting units.

The breakdown of the several operations are listed below chronologically by dates:

November 1943

BOUGAINVILLE:

Initial Estimated Japanese Garrison = - - - 40,000
Current Estimated Japanese Garrison = - - - 15,000

Prisoner of War report of mid-July 1944 indicates that the ration is about four ounces per man per day. The troops are discouraged and have low morale. However, evidence indicates that these troops probably can exist on locally grown produce unless driven from gardens. Allied Air, recognizing this, have improvised means for spraying oil on these gardens. The following quotation from a captured diary illustrates conditions in this area: "The bombardment keeps up without change; walking or sleeping I think only of eating; in dreams all kinds of good things float before me but I cannot get them into my mouth."

February 1944

MARSHALL GROUP (including WAKE, OCEAN and MAURU ISLANDS in the GILBERT Group):
Memorandum for The President (Continued)
Subject: Condition of By-Passed Japanese in Pacific Area from November 1943 to September 1944.

Initial Estimated Japanese Garrison = - - - 24,000
Current Estimated Japanese Garrison = - - - 20,000

An occasional submarine has landed rice and other food stuffs which is barely enough to keep them alive. Due to high disease rates and shortage of medicines, these troops have undergone considerable deterioration.

March 1944

NEW BRITAIN - NEW IRELAND:

Initial Estimated Japanese Garrison = - - - 70,000
Current Estimated Japanese Garrison = - - - 47,000

Gardens throughout the Rabaul Area alone cover an estimated 3,000 acres. The estimated present yield would enable a garrison of 40,000 troops to receive 2.8 pounds of vegetables per day. It is believed that approximately one supply submarine, principally loaded with rice, visits this area each week.

April 1944

NEWAK (Northeast New Guinea):

Initial Estimated Japanese Garrison = - - - 64,000
Current Estimated Japanese Garrison = - - - 33,000

Troops have deteriorated materially, lost most of their arms and equipment previously stockpiled and are using staple rations. Half of the troops are sick with the seriously wounded only being hospitalized. Estimated medical supplies on hand are sufficient to the end of September. It is probable that some supplies also have been brought into this area by submarine. The desperate status of these troops probably cause the suicidal attempts to break out of the trap.

May 1944

SARMAI (Northwest New Guinea):

Initial Estimated Japanese Garrison = - - - 8,500
Current Estimated Japanese Garrison = - - - 3,000

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 6(D) or 3(F)
OSD Letter, May 4, 1972
Memorandum for The President (Continued)
Subject: Condition of By-Passed Japanese in Pacific Area from November 1943 to September 1944.

A serious shortage of clothing and equipment is indicated in this area by salvage from the dead. Seriously wounded are being evacuated only upon order and the slightly wounded are being retained in the front lines. To supplement the ration in this area, sago trees are being felled to produce sago flour by native method. Half of the labor troops employed in this project are sick. Therefore, production is nil.

June 1944
ROTA ISLAND (Marianas Group):
Initial Estimated Japanese Garrison - - - 2,000
Current Estimated Japanese Garrison - - - 1,600

Continued air strikes have forced these Japanese to live underground. Food stuffs and medical supplies are short.

July 1944
GERLINGS BAY (Northwest New Guinea):
Initial Estimated Japanese Garrison - - - 20,000
Current Estimated Japanese Garrison - - - 14,000

Natives report troops in this area disorganized and starving; they are breaking into small groups to raid native gardens. This condition has resulted in many suicides, and attempts to use inland trails to the West in an attempt to be picked up on Western New Guinea beaches by small boat or barge for evacuation to Ceram, Halmahera or other localities. The inland trails are reported covered with Japanese and Formosans who are escaping. Probably the larger part of the 8,000 shown as lost in this area have made good their escape. A report of the Nemofoor Operation (23 June 1944 to 31 August 1944) indicates that cannibalism was practiced; prisoners of war report that Formosans have been taken out on patrol, killed, and their flesh returned to bivouac areas to be eaten.

September 1944
CAROLINE GROUP (including YAP and PAlAU):
Initial Estimated Japanese Garrison - - - 98,000
Current Estimated Japanese Garrison - - - 88,000
Memorandum for The President (Continued)
Subject: Condition of By-Passed Japanese
in Pacific Area from November 1943
to September 1944.

The Japanese in this area are believed to be in a near
normal condition because of home gardening, supplemented by food and
medical supplies landed by submarines. Continuous air strikes on
these islands are causing considerable decline in their present
conditions since they are now living almost entirely under ground.
Ground operations are now in progress on Palau.

[Signature]
Chief of Staff.
From: CG US Army Forces China Burma India Forward
    Kohlen, Chungking China

To:     War Department
    CG US Army Forces China Burma India Theater
    Headquarters New Delhi India
    CG US Army Forces Arpacta India
    CG US Army Forces Caining China
    CG 20th Bomber Command Kharagpur India
    CG Army Air Forces India-Burma Sector Calcutta India

No:      CPFX 23400  28 Sep 1944

Bissell WDGBI Cannon Sultan Chemnault Middleton
Cunynus and Duncan Dutton LeMay Stratemeyer CPFX 23400 book
wag nr 136 from G-2 AMI190A

Sino G-2 daily report received from 2nd War Zone
Headquarters that between 22nd and 25th Sept 20,000 Jap
troops crossed to south of Yellow River and now concentrated
Shan Haisin-Tru Shih area. Sino G-2 thinks drive on Lu Shih
(11040-3401) may be contemplated although some indication
these troops moving east towards Pingham railway. No defi-
nite identification of these troops but thought to be pro-
bably elements of 69th and 110th Divisions.

Sino G-2 states three trains daily running south on
Pingham Railway. (Comment: Although reports too indefinite
to determine intent of Jap forces in Yellow River area per-
sistent reports seen to indicate some action in this area
contemplated. Movements of troops being watched closely.
If drive on Lushih materializes drive will probably be ex-
tended to include Sian. See no need for further reinforce-
ment of forces in Homan-Kwangsi area. Trains south on Pิง-

CH-IN-50  (1 Oct 44)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: CG US Army Forces China Burma India Forward
Rear Echelon Chungking China

Mr: OFEX 23400 28 Sep 1944

ham Railway probably carrying supplies.)

Hunan-Kwangsi area: Elements of 37th Division reported by-passing Woohsing on north and have crossed Tsu River to the west of Paoshing. Elements of 116th Division have by-passed Paoshing to the south and also reported having crossed the Tsu River. No movement down the Hengyang Kweilin Railway. Column of 2,000 Japs moving north from Hain Ming (11045-2631) reported vicinity of Wukang (11038-2644). These troops are elements of 40th Division. 1,500 Japs of 13th Division have moved south from Kweiyang and occupied Hwang Tsu Hau on 25th Sep. On same date elements of 3rd Division moving south from Yung Ming (11122-2515) occupied Maoling (11120-3456).

Wenchow area: On 20th Sep Japs made following landings on islands off Chekiang coast. 5,000 on Chou Shan (12210-3010), 5,000 at Ting Hai (11205-3003), 1,000 at Hsiang Shan (12155-2940), 500 on Dachu Island off Wenchow Bay, 100 on island off coast at Loching (11133-2243). Jap troops at Wenchow now being supplied by water.

Canton area: No change in situation reported. Comment: Movement of Japanese which threatened Wai-Taep (11204-2402) and took Wu-Chou (11119-2326) opens communications to Kweilin and/or Liuchow. Kweilin routes are along either Kuei River or forward along highway from Hain-Tu (11134-2401). "Manually propelled river craft in Hunan, appears likely that Kuei River will be used even though un navigable.

CM-IN-50 (1 Oct 44)
From: CG US Army Forces China Burma India Forward
Echoelon Chungking China

Nr: CFEX 23400 28 Sep 1944

to steamore.

Route to Liuchow can go up West River to vicinity of Kuei-Ping from Sunchow or Kuei-Haien (10940-2302) and then move overland to Liuchow (10935-2420) by good roads or by Lui River. Kiu River will take large river junks and barges all the way to Liuchow. Kuei-Haien and Kuei-Ping are connected by routes crossing fairly soft easy terrain with Liuchow. Also it must be overlooked that the West River gives shallow boat river transportation all the way Manning (10820-2245). Manning was occupied earlier in the war and remains unoccupied only on sufferance of Japanese in French Indo China and along coast.

Present force moving on Kwelin must be credited with the intention of advancing on Liuchow (our last large eastern air base for 14th Air Force operations). Forces moving from Canton area up West River and north from Liuchow Peninsula appear to be serving a dual purpose. One - to protect the left flank of the forces advancing on Kwelin by immobilizing the Chinese armies in southeast China. Liuchow Peninsula, Canton, and Hengyang forces to unite vicinity of Kwelin or Liuchow. Two - securing the routes of communication inland from the HongKong-Canton area. Use of this shortened supply line when the Japanese have taken Kwelin and Liuchow will lighten their supply difficulties considerably and ease the strain on a lengthened line of communi-
From: CG US Army Forces China Burma India Forward
         Echelon Chongqing China

Nr: CFBX 23400  26 Sep 1944

With the forces now available to the Japanese in
the Hengyang area, there is no reason to doubt their ability
to take both Kwelien and Liuchow and at present this line
of action is indicated.

End

* Being serviced

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: CGAAP
               QFD
               Col Park
               Log

CM-IN-50 (1 Oct 44)  0132Z  bjm

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/8/94
From: US Military Attache, Chungking, China
To: War Department
No: 23663 28 September 1944

MILID 23663 from Depass signed Stilwell.

Moving south 20,000 Japanese troops left Taiyuan and
allegedly preparing drive on Tungkwan, 200 Japanese tanks
also assembled at Loyang.

Bearing 94th Division designation and with headquarters
Yuncheng, troops are reported southern Shanxi.

Being fortified by Japanese are many islands off
Hingpo and Wenshau.

With Japanese heavy artillery attacking, that Poaching
City may be by passed is Chinese belief although encirclement
continues. To Huangnioushi from Huanyang, from Yunganqin south
to Maling and Lungmukuan, and toward Wukang from Heining
Jap columns moved.

Moved west towards Tenghsien, Jap columns from Wuhou,
columns moved north to Haiangchihhsu and Liuentang from Jungh-
sien.

Carrying C- --- does this Sino G-2 report.

End

**---Being Serviced

ACTION: G-2
INFO: CG AAF

CPD
Log

CM-IN-26795 (29 Sep 44) 04222 pa

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 7/1/64
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

"IVI"
CORRECTED COPY
PRIORITY

From: CG, 14th Air Force, Kunming, China

To: War Department
CG, US Army Forces, China Burma and India, Theater Headquarters, New Delhi, India
OSS, Kandy, Ceylon

Nr: 220 27 September 1944

Donovan OSS for 154 from Hall Nr 220 info Sultan for Coughlin OSS Nr 72 Hoppner OSS Kandy OSS Nr 33.

Subject to challenge is the information emanating from Guerilla Headquarters at Huichow that 18th this month Russian Naval Squadron comprising numerous vessels touched at Woosung in 3rd War Area. In the harbor there was another such Soviet Unit. The leaders of both these squadrons conferred and then met with Nip officials.

The newly arrived ships then sailed for points not determined after taking on supplies. We suggest that above report be taken with caution as it may be Jap inspired.

Seven vessels approximately 1,000 tons each are anchored at Wenchow; at dawn today 4 gunvessels and 5 launches arrived and rest off north shore of Wenchow Bay. Using Samman and Tugs these ships now discharge cargo and troops to entrance to river. Included were 20 motor trucks which now run on highway between Wenchow and Letsing. The Nips apparently strive for full siezure of Wenchow. An attempt shall shortly be made by Chinese military in that region to ejeet Nips. The last from local Ally Headquarters who currently draw battle plans and ask our planes support prior to contemplate assault.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 10/13/94

COPY NO. COL. PAK

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: CG, 14th Air Force, Kunming, China
HR: 220 27 September 1944

They will furnish full details shortly. Jap soldiers quartered in every temple on Futo Shan Island. At the fartherest SE point of Tinghai Island which lies off Pingpo the enemy builds powerful fortifications. Lately 20,000 Nipponese civilians were brought there.

Concealed at Kuan Shab cemetery vicinity Kinbwa Field are several hundred containers of gasoline in a bomb shelter. Triple B reports that road between Mingpo and Hangchow presently employed by military vehicles. Status quo still maintains on Amoy traffic; 5 enemy war vessels remain off Hsia Fu.

This AM 2 coal burning launches rested off entrance to river in vicinity Foochow. Latest train timetable between Hangchow and Shanghai follows:

Trains pull out from both cities at 0600 and 1400 o'clock every day.
At 0600 o'clock on September 23rd a little gun vessel steamed up Yangtze River below Anking and 3 hours later a large war vessel;
Traveling down at 1500 a big ship.

The following day at 1400 another sizeable vessel up, and 2 gunvessels down one at 0800 and other at 1000.
Or 25 upstream a gunvessel at 0900 and at 1500 one launch;
Downstream shortly before a big ship.
From: CG, 14th Air Force, Kunming, China

Mr: 220

27 September 1944

Obtained and corroborated report from 7th region that 10,000 strong enemy forces have debarked at Bias Bay coords 11,440 east 2240 north 23. Am making further investigation.

Northeast of Hongkong from Hoifung comes word that 300 enemy are stationed on Henghai Island with radio equipment, 115 10 east 22 45 north and same number on Taai Sue Island coords 115 30 east 22 40 north.

Upon arrival of Atelite Division 43 both strengthened; fear of American seaborne landings may result in further debarkation occurring. AA and other large equipment were unloaded on Samun Island located west side Bias Bay. On the Namtau-Tungkun coastal road 120 trucks are said to be carrying large numbers of nip troops.

End

FOOTNOTE: Corrected copy of CM-IN-26068 (28 Sep 44) OSS

ACTION: OSS

INFO: CGAAF, OPD, G-2, Col Park, Log

CM-IN-26567 (28 Sep 44) 23072 jb
COM 7TH FLT SENDS ACTION CINCPAC COMINCH.

ADDITIONAL MY 131093 NATORI SURVIVORS INTERROGATION EVALUATION B 1. POW STATES 1 FLOATING DOCK AT MANILA CAN ACCOMMODATE CL. NIL DOCKS DAVAO NOR CEBU. 1 NEW CARRIER AT KOBE 1 NEW CARRIER YOKOSUKA NIL UNITS BUILDING SASEBO. COMMENT SUGGEST AMAGI AND KATSURAGI. POW DESCRIBES MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS AND HAYABUSA BOATS SIMILAR SIZE. HAYABUSAS CARRY DEPTH CHARGES NIL TORPEDOES. 15 TO 16 METERS LENGTH. NEWEST TYPE KALIBOKAN (NUMBERED) SMALLER THAN OLDER TYPE (NAMED). NIL BELIEVED UNDER 80 METERS. NIL OVER 400 TONS. TRANSOM STERN, RAKED BOW. ISLAND GROUP COMPRISING BRIDGE WITH RANGE FINDER, SINGLE PYLON MAST WITH RADAR AND SURMOUNTED BY STICK MAST, SINGLE RAKED STACK. STRAIGHT FORECASTLE DECK BROKEN JUST AFT BRIDGE. BRIDGE SQUARE WITH CORNER POSSIBLY SHAPED. SEARCHLIGHT AND MACHINE GUN.

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
PLATFORM ISLAND AROUND STOCK MAINMAST. MANY 35 MILLIMETER MG.
DEPTH CHARGE RACKS ON Stern. TWIN 12.7 CENTIMETER GUNS FORWARD
AND AFT.

*CORRECTED BY 250240 NCR 8645.

DELCIVERED
TO OP-20G
MAILGRAM

FURTHER TO MY 081037. PRELIMINARY INTERROGATION OF NATORI PRISONERS. NATORI SCHEDULE SINCE END MAY THIS YEAR. MAIZURU TO DAVAO. DAVAO TO PALAU. PALAU TO MANILA VIA NORTHERN TIP LUZON. MANILA TO PALAU VIA SAN BERNARDINO. PALAU TO DAVAO. DAVAO TO MANILA. MANILA TO CEBU. CEBU ENROUTE PALAU WHEN SUNK 18 AUGUST. NATORI EVACUATED 200 PILOTS AND GROUND CREWS FROM PALAU TO DAVAO ON 1 TRIP. 500 WOMEN, NO CHILDREN FROM PALAU TO DAVAO ANOTHER TRIP. POW NEVER WENT ASHORE PALAU BUT UNDERSTAND MOST CIVILIANS HAVE LEFT THERE. ON RUNS TO PALAU ENTERED VIA SOUTHEASTERN CHANNEL PASSING MALAKAL ISLAND INTO THE HARBOR AND DEPART-

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV 19-67 30 JAPAN 131039

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
ED VIA NISHI SUIDO which POW IDENTIFIED AS TOAGEL MLUNGUI.

Natori's radar had extreme range of 50 kilometers for aircraft and 15 to 20 kilometers for surface vessels. POW maintains it was never relied upon. Number 3 transport described as new class with designation naval transport (Yu Sookan).


Bridge square. Radar above bridge. Natori accompanied Hayasui from Empire to Davao in May. Hayasui new ship with designation Tokumukan or Yusookan. About 10,000 tons. Stack far aft. Derrick forward of stack with low house in between.

Catapult in each side amidships and catapult track level with long narrow deck running between the 2 catapults. 1 float plane carried on each catapult for her own protection. Catapults train outboard from deck for launching. Transom stern. Appearance of high forecastle though deck at center line is flush for entire length except for superstructure of bridge and low house forward of stack. NIL radar. 1 70 mm gun on
FORECASTLE AND 1 OF SAME ON AFTER SIDE BRIDGE. BRIDGE
LOCATED 1/4 OF SHIP'S LENGTH AFT OF BOW. EASILY MISTAKEN
FOR TANKER OR IF STACK NOT NOTICED FOR CARRIER. CARRIES
MIXED FREIGHT. SPEED NOT OVER 20 KNOTS AT VERY MAXIMUM.
JUST PRIOR MID AUGUST POW SAW NEW CABLE LAYER ODATE WHEN
IN MANILA LAST TIME. KAIBOOKAN CLASS IS ABOUT 90 METERS
LONG AND HAS SINGLE STACK. RESEMBLES SKETCH IN SEIC BUL-
LETIN NUMBER 3 OPPOSITE PAGE 4. ISE HYUGA CONVERSION AS
FOLLOWS: THE 2 AFTER TURRETS REMOVED BUT THE OTHERS UN-
CHANGED. FLIGHT DECK ADDED RUNNING FROM MAINMAST AT LEVEL
OF MAINMAST. AA PLATFORM TO 3 OR 4 METERS BEYOND STERN-
POST. WIDTH EXTENDS 1 TO 2 METERS OVER EACH SIDE. CATA-
PULT NEAR MAINMAST. THINKS ELEVATOR EXISTS BUT UNCERTAIN
LOCATION. ESTIMATES CAPACITY ABOUT 25 AIRCRAFT. NO PRO-
VISION FOR LANDING ON ISE HYUGA. PLANES EXPECTED TO LAND
ON REGULAR CARRIERS OPERATING IN SAME AREA. ISE HYUGA NOW
KNOWN AS KOKUKUSENKAN. COMMON KNOWLEDGE IN NAVAL CIRCLES
THAT REAL DIMENSIONS OF YAMATO MUSASHI SO SECRET THAT ONLY
NOMINAL FIGURES USED EVEN IN OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS. POW HAD
SEEN THEIR MAIN ARMAMENT LISTED AS 40 CENTIMETERS IN DOCU-
MENT BUT WAS WELL UNDERSTOOD BY SELF AND NAVAL COLLEAGUES
AS ACTUALLY 45 CENTIMETERS OR POSSIBLY MORE. THESE IN 3

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 11/1/94
TRIPLE TURRETS. DISPLACEMENT AT LEAST 5000 TONS. ESTIMATED MAXIMUM SPEED AT 27 OR 28 KNOTS. NEW HEAVY CRUISER IBUKI UNDER CONSTRUCTION AT KURE AND THOUGHT PROBABLY OPERATIVE BY NOW. HOMU CLASS DESTROYERS KNOWN AS GO SOOKUCHIKUKAN AND EMPLOYED PRIMARILY FOR ESCORT DUTY. 1000 TONS. 2 RAKED STACKS SHAPED AND PLACED SIMILAR THOSE ON USS DUNLAP. (COMPARISON IS POW'S). 25 KNOTS. LENGTH 90 METERS APPROXIMATELY. BEAM ABOUT 9 METERS. SINGLE OR TWIN TURRET 12.7 CENTIMETER GUN FORWARD. TWIN 12.7 CENTIMETER AFT. MANY 25 MM MACHINE GUNS. 1 TORPEDO MOUNT BETWEEN STACKS CENTER LINE. UNCERTAIN NUMBER OF TUBES. THINKS TORPEDO TYPE 93. NEW DESTROYERS KIYOSHIRO, AKISHIMO, ASASHIMO, HAYASHIMO ARE ALL SAME CLASS. DISPLACE 1500 TONS. 33 KNOTS. 2 STACKS. 2 QUADRUPLE TORPEDO MOUNTS. CLOSE RESEMBLANCE TO ASASHIMO CLASS. POW SURE TOYODA STILL CINC COMBINED FLEET. POW TERMS CEBU NAVAL BASE. BULK OF ABOVE INFORMATION GLEANED FROM ENSIGN IWA, WHO WAS OFFICER IN CHARGE OF LOOKOUT AND RECOGNITION ABOARD NATORI. TENTATIVE EVALUATION B-1. WILL REPORT FURTHER RESULTS IF OF INTEREST.
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

"IVI"
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: CG, 20th Bomber Command, Kharetpur, India
To: War Department
CG, Army Air Forces, India Burma Sector, Calcutta, India
CG, 14th Air Force, Kunming, China
CG, 10th Air Force, Kanjipoah, Assam
Deputy Command, 20th Air Force, Hickam Field, TH
CG, US Army Forces, Calcutta, India
CG, US Army Forces, Paradhoa, India

Nr. D 9708 9 Sept 1944

Arnold from Lesmy info Stretemeyer, Chennault, Davidson, DEPCOMAF 20, also pass to CG ADVONBOMCOM 21st, Blanchard, Harvey, Kalberer, Faulkner, attention S 2's D 9708.

Preliminary report of damage to Shawa steel works based for most part on one set of K 19 and partially on two sets of K 18 pictures of fair quality taken by 40th Group.

On north bank of coke ovens, no indication of hits though plumes of white smoke coming from entire length of bank; west central bank of coke oven batteries shows rising from it or immediately west of the two north batteries large plume of dark smoke obscuring both these batteries and indicating near misses or possible hits, while from the south two batteries of this bank comes no white smoke; east central bank of coke oven batteries is almost entirely obscured by bomb bursts and at least six small fires are seen immediately to the west of this bank. In the by-products plant a big T shaped building in north part of plant apparently received a direct hit, a small building in south part of plant is giving forth dense black smoke and beginning to burn, and several stacks of plant are smoking abnormally which perhaps

CM-IN-8575 (10 Sep 44)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/74
From: CG, 23rd Bomber Command, Kharagpur, India
Nr. C 9708 9 Sept 1944

Means damage to the plant. Direct hits on two large and one small building are seen on the Calcining Plant. In the warehouse area 1 large and several small ware houses damaged by hits or near misses, while in the workers quarters about 10 and barracks south of the round house are destroyed or damaged. A photo reconnaissance B-29 took off at 082248Z to cover Anaban with weather forecast of 5/10ths cumulus over target at 17000 feet.

End

ACTION: CO AAF

INFORMATION: OPD
C-2
Adm King Log

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec (R) and (C) of (R)
OSD letter, May 1, 1972
By SLR Date FEB 5, 1974

CM-IN-8575 (10 Sep 44) 0613Z bjm
Herman to Hewitt

Subject: Mission No. 8

TELECON Message No. D-423

Extracts from TELECON Conference.

1. The forward area for take-off on Mission No. 8 are 114 B-29s, 27 from 462 groups, and 29 from each of the other 3 groups. Targets in the daylight mission are: primary the Shoya Steel Works at Anshan, secondary, harbor facilities at Dairen, Manchuria, later resort, railroad yards at Sinsiang China. Scheduled take-off times as follows - 40th group 2240Z; 444th 2253Z; 462nd at 2252Z; 468th - 2246Z.

2. According to field order, method of bombing is flights of 4 aircraft at assigned altitude in no case below 23,000 feet true. Minimum bomb loading is 8 - 500 lb ANN 64 GP bombs fused 1/10 second nose and 25/1000 second tail.

3. Just received take-off radio: 106 airborne: 25 from 40th 4970, 29 from the 444th group 27 from 462nd group, and 27 from the 468th group.

4. Included in the 114 aircraft 288, our photo ship, scheduled to take off on D day plus 1.

ACTION: LT COL H E W I T T
INFO: GEN ARNOLD
GEN HANDY
GEN BISSELL
COL PARK
LOG

WD-TT-929 (8 Sep 44) 0907Z mos

UNCLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 8(D) and 8(D) or (C)
OSD letter, May 1, 1972
By SLR Date FEB 5 1974

COPY NO. 19

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
EXTRACT OF TELETYPE CONFERENCE BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND KHARARPUR, 9 SEPTEMBER 1944

Washington Parties
Lt. Col. Hewitt
Captain Spivak

Khararpur Parties
Colonel Herman

SUBJECT: Mission No. 8

Telecon Message No. D-457

Here is all we have on air raid of last night:

1. Duration of raid 1810Z to 1840Z, although enemy planes were in the area for two hours.

2. Three waves were over Heining:

First wave - One bomber dropped 3 to 4 bombs; believed 500 pound.

Second wave - (15 minutes later) - one to three bombers dropped 30 to 40 small bombs or frag clusters.

Third wave - (15 minutes later) - one bomber dropped 3 bombs; believe about three minutes, 500 pound.

Damage:

1. Large hole in west taxi strip 10 to 15 feet in diameter.

2. One small hole in the runway.

3. One large crater just off shoulder of runway near center.

4. Small crater of east taxi strip.

5. Two gunners in AA machine gun put slightly wounded.

6. B-29 tanker No. 254 sustained numerous frag holes will be out of commission for two days.

7. B-29 No. 395 received frag holes but damage superficial.
8. Hydraulic system on C-46 out from near miss.

4. This field with taxistrip is oval in shape with aircraft dispersed around rim of the oval, all three runs placed bombs in center of oval and this accounts for very limited damage to our aircraft. This accuracy may have possibly been aided by two red flares or very stars shot upwards by unknown party immediately prior to first bombing and fire in rice paddy to north of field exactly in line with all three bomb runs.

5. Two waves on KungLai.

First wave - At least two bombers.

Second wave - Did not bomb.

6. Damage:

First wave - One five hundred pound bomb dropped great distance from field. Frags dropped on taxistrip left small 12" to 18" craters - no damage to runway.
ALUSNA LISBON SENDS TO CNO.

6 NON-DIPLOMATIC MEMBERS JAP MISSION REPORTED DEPARTED LISBON NOW IN MADRID EVENTUAL DESTINATION STOCKHOLM. THIS BELIEVED RESULT OF GROWING JAP CONCERN ARISING OUT OF PRESENT SESSION PORTUGUESE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS WHICH SAID TO BE CONSIDERING DECISION ON TIMOR. SOME SOURCES BELIEVES ALAZAR WISHES TO ACCELERATE ACTION ON THIS MATTER NOW. SAME COUNCIL ALSO SAID TO BE CONSIDERING MINISTERIAL CHANGES INCLUDING INTERIOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS COLONIES AND NAVY.

DECLASSED
B. O. 11662, Sec. 2(2) and 8(3) or 8(3)
OSD letter, May 6, 1972

16...ACT

COMINCH...20G...CNO...NAVAIDE...200P....

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/94
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CORRECTED COPY

From: CG, General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area,
Rear Echelon, Brisbane, Australia

To: War Department
CG, US Army Forces in China, Burma and India Forward
Echelon, Chungking, China
CG, US Army Forces in China, Burma and India, Theater
Headquarters, New Delhi, India
CG, US Army Forces in Pacific Ocean Areas,
Ft Shafter TH
Supreme Commander Southeast Asia Command, Kandy, Ceylon
CG, US Army Forces in European Theater of Operations,
Rear Echelon, London, England

No: CX 17066 3 September 1944

To AGWAR CG AMMISCA CG ANNEXEL CG USAFFOA, Military
Attaché London, COFIR, Kandy and CBI. Pm GHQ SWPA and
MacArthur CX 17066. Book message AGWAR, CG AMMISCA CG ANNEXEL
CG USAFFOA, Military Attachés London, COFIR, Kandy and CBI
for latter reason opposed adding new classification division
as B-2.

Agree new type organisation Japanese division attempt
to solve problem island defense, and likely other divisions
may appear this category, as well as further variations in
organisation as circumstances compel. Believe attempts
classification Japanese divisions misleading and will eventu-
ally lead real confusion. Experience so far gives strong
evidence all divisions vary in strength and often in compo-
sition of units. Doubt if so-called A-1 or A divisions now
exist, since majority such units drained for various expedi-
tionary units in mandates; possible replacements received,

CM-IN-3081 (4 Sep 44)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11582, Sec. (S) and (RP) or (O)
OSD letter, May 1, 1972
By SLR Date FEB 5 1974

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: CG, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Rear Echelon, Brisbane, Australia
No: CX 17066 3 September 1944

but no evidence here.

B divisions encountered all of varying strength and composition. Lack contact C type divisions makes comment difficult but evidence available these vary, with some having artillery and others in certain parts China engaged garrison duties not so organized. If F-2 classification accepted, will make five distinct type infantry divisions activated by Japanese; doubt if this is actually the case. Note also that wide variations possible even new type divisions. One with each infantry regiment having organic artillery battalion, T-O 3165: the other with each infantry battalion having organic artillery battery with only three guns to battery, as opposed to four in first example and mortar unit substituted for infantry gun company. T-O latter 3964. Believe new type division still experimental and that Japs will eventually accept one or other regimental organizations as standard for all divisions. Note that 43rd Division had regiments all of one type while other divisions had regimental organization similar that outlined CINCPAC number 9614. Note also differences in artillery components; some have mountain guns others have 75 MM field pieces and 105 howitzers. Suggest as alternative that divisions be simply classified as triangular infantry, brigaded infantry, and armored. Evidence here definitely shows 32nd and 35th Divisions not reorganized according new type. 35th entirely different type closely following original B organization but included certain features of the new type. Have no evidence 55th and 46th Division reorganizations proceeding according to plan.

Corrected copy of CM-IN-2749(4 Sep 44) G-2
ACTION: G-2
INFO: CG AAF; OPD, Col Park, LOG
CM-IN-3081 (4 Sep 44) 0928Z
From: US Military Attache, Lisbon, Portugal
To: War Department
Nr: 426
2 September 1944
For Bissell WDGBI 426.

Subsequent to Rumanian and Bulgarian reversals of position Jap counsellor called on Hungarian charge trying to ascertain if Hungary will follow suit according to B2.

Jap expressed view that war is lost both in Europe and for Japan and held forth that in reality Jap people never wanted to fight Anglo Saxons. He explained that after conclusion of tri partite agreement in 1941 Japs expected to fight Russia but Hitler opposed it claiming that Germs need no help in that quarter.

Incuse stated that 2 schools of thought existed within Jap Gen Staff, 1 advocating swift attack on Russia, the other war with US. He intimated that time has come to engage preliminary peace conversations and expressed preference to contact British rather than US for as he put it there is no conflict of interests between Japan and Britain.

Jap added that Jap Berlin mission did not share his views, were still confident of German final victory and were talking about German 1 year plan of defense now achieving final stages of preparation.

Source reports that Madrid Hungarian charge De Holan instructed his attache Debehlen to contact British and
From: US Military Attache, Lisbon, Portugal

Nr: 426 2 September 1944

Americans but that no positive results were obtained.

Comment. Inoue is said to be very suave and on more friendly terms with certain members of diplomatic Corps here than any other Jap. Those who know him consider Inoue as very astute and realistic not at all fanatic.

Solberg.
From: CG, 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur, India

To: War Department
   CG, 14th Air Force, Kunming, China
   CG, 10th Air Force, Kanjipoah, India
   CG, US Army Forces Pacific Ocean Areas Ft. Shafter, T.H.
   CG, Army Air Forces India Burma Sector, Calcutta, India

No. D 8582 25 August 1944

Arnold from Saunders information Stratemeyer, Chennault, Davidson, COMOEMAAF POA, COADVOMBOMCOM 21st, Nimitz thru COMOEMAAF POA, Richardson thru COMOEMAAF POA D8582.

Photographs of scale approximately 1-15000, On 21 August covering Nagasaki Harbor and the communities of Nagasaki, Inase, and Akumure, show one or two points of possible minor damage although quality of photos and lack of satisfactory comparative prevent definite statement.

Now follows first phase interpretation:

(1) Under construction at Tategami Shipyard a probable battleship about 800 feet, hull apparently complete. Hull of probable naval vessel 470 feet complete. Keel laid for probable naval vessel 430 feet.

(2) 4 submarines 250 feet tied up at Mitsubishi Dockyard.

(3) Tanker 600 feet in graving dock 800 feet.

NLR 101, NARA, Date: 5/2/1944
From: CG, 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur, India

No. D 8582 25 August 1944

(4) Tanker 600 alongside.
(5) Tanker 390 moored.
(6) Graving dock 600.
(7) Probable flak ship 555 feet alongside.
(8) Probable tanker 450 feet alongside.
(9) Probable flak ship 435 feet.
(10) A number of AA batteries are seen.
(11) Considerable new industrial camouflage, particularly dazzle type, is noted.

End.

ACTION: CGAAF

INFO: OPD, G-2, Adm. King, Col. Park, Log

CM-IN- 23385 (25 Aug 44) 1738Z wk

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 8 (F) and 8 (E) or (R)
OMB Order, May 1, 1972
By SLR Date FEB 5, 1974

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: CG, 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur, India
To: War Department
    CG, US Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas
    Ft. Shafter, T. H.
    CG, Army Air Forces, India Burma Sector
    Calcutta, India
    CG, 10th Air Force, Kanjoah, Assam
    CG, 14th Air Force, Kunming, China

No. D 8638  24 August 1944

Arnold from Saunders information Stratemeyer, Chennault, Davidson, COMGENAAF POA, Ogadvonbowcon 21st Nimitz thru COMGENAAF POA, Richardson thru COMGENAAF POA D8638.

Quick reconnaissance mission, 21 August, by aircraft 288 with 2 split K-18 cameras, scale 1 to 15000, quality variable fair to good.

2 split K-22 cameras scale 1 to 9000, quality poor.

Tri-metrogon, scale 1 to 60,000 quality as yet unknown.

Full coverage Omura aircraft plant and Omura Naval Air Station fair to good quality photos.

Full cover Pusan Harbor and north end Makino Shima, quality fair to good.

Full cover Nagasaki Harbor and City, quality fair.
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

From: CG, 20th Bomber Command, Karagpur, India
No. D 8638 24 August 1944

to good.

Full cover Imperial Iron and Steel Works, Yavata, but heavy cloud obscures vital target areas, overcast resulted in very poor quality photographs.

Now follows first phase interpretation on Osura Aircraft Plant:

2 large areas of expansion of plant shown on 21 photorecon squadron photos 31 October 1943 is seen to be virtually complete with no further expansion indicated. Facilities these 2 new areas include 2 very large buildings, 1 large hangar completed, 2 buildings averaging 400x330 feet, 6 buildings averaging 350x150 feet, 21 buildings averaging 350x75 feet, numerous smaller buildings.

Naval Air Station A/F is first class, sodded, rectangular shaped, 5100 feet north-south by 4000 feet east-west. Visible on field and aircraft plant area are at least 113 small single engine aircraft, 7 large 2 engine aircraft, 5 probable Mavis type flying boats. Of interest in construction of 112 revetments not shown on previous cover, 77 of which are dispersed in residential area south of A/F, 19 dispersed in residential area east of A/F, and 16 dispersed in residential and barracks area north of A/F. No heavy guns noted on preliminary examination.

CM-IN-22193 (24 Aug 44)
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Page #3

From: CG, 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur, India
No. D 8638     24 August 1944

First phase at Pusan Harbor follows:

Shipyard on north side Makihoro Shima on newly constructed mole includes 3 shipways, graving dock 540x75 feet, graving dock 420x65 feet, several large and small buildings. New mole near Umba-Ri includes 8 large and several small godowns. Reclaimed area at extreme north end of Harbor contains approximately 8 medium sized godowns and several smaller ones. New pier development approximately 3000 feet north of old piers. 1 pier 1500x500 feet contains 4 godowns and 2 rail lines. Another new pier just north approximately 2000x500 feet in process of reclamation, only shoreward 200-300 feet now reclaimed. Numerous godowns line harbor immediate front. Marshalling yard 15 to 20 tracks wide, 4500 feet long show heavy concentration of rolling stock. Shipping includes 8 cargo vessels, 1 400/450 feet, 1 350/400 feet, 6 300/350 feet aggregating 27000 tons shipping.

Area defended by at least 18 heavy guns.

Nagasaki first phase interpretation will follow soon.

ACTION: CG AAF
INFO : OPD G-2 Adm. King Col. Park Log

CM-IN-22193     (24 Aug 44) 1447Z gko

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(8) and 5(10) or (5)
OSD Letter, May 1, 1972
By SL3
Date: FEB 5 1974

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: CO, 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur, India

To: War Department
   CO, Army Air Forces, India Burma Sector
   Calcutta, India
   CO, 10th Air Force, Kanjipoh, Assam
   CO, US Army Forces Pacific Ocean Areas
   Peurter, T. H.
   CO, 14th Air Force, Kunming, China

No. D 8438     21 August 1944

Arnold from Saunders information Stratemeyer, Chennault, Davidson, COMGENAAF POA, CO ADVONBOMCOM 21st, Wimits thru COMGENAAF POA, Richardson thru COMGENAAF POA D8438.

Provisional damage assessment now follows on Yavata attack based on majority of strike photographs:

Several bursts are seen in the immediate vicinity of the new coke oven batteries including one possible direct hit on the southwest battery near the coal bin (8.7-0.35). It is also possible that a direct hit was scored in the unfinished northwest battery (8.6-0.6) coke oven battery in old plant (9.6-0.6) is seen to be burning for at least one quarter of its length due possibly to one or more direct hits. Dense black smoke emitting from this battery obscures other battery just south. Unidentified small building of coke by-products plant on Eukino Oka (7.8-0.3) also emitting dense cloud of black smoke apparently from direct hit. Thirteen bursts are seen in residential areas to the east of the plant (12.0-D.0) it is thought likely that large fires may be burning to the south of the plant.

CM-IN-19473

(21 Aug 44)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11663, Sec. 2(B) and 2(D) or (E)
OSD Letter, May 4, 1977
By SLR

FEB 5 1974 52
COPY NO. 52
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Page #2

From: CO, 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur, India
No. D 8438 21 August 1944

(8:0-A:0) unnumbered balloons are in position at approximate altitude of 2500 feet. It is possible that some use is being made of a small but ineffective smoke screen originating from cruising minor surface craft. Several flak bursts are seen in strike photos. Grid references are to Yawata Grid Overlay furnished by Major Bower AAF Intelligence, Washington, Analysis Division.

End.

ACTION: OPD

CM-IN-19473 (21 Aug 44) 1850Z gkc

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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET "IVI"

URGENT

From: CG, 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur, India

To: CG, War Department
   CG, Army Air Forces, India, Burma Sector, Calcutta, India
   CG, 14th Air Force, Kunming, China
   CG, 10th Air Force, Kanjipoh, Assam
   CG, US Army Forces Pacific Ocean Areas, Fort Shafter, T. H.

No: D 8404  21 August 1944

Arnold from Saunders info Stratemeyer, Chennault, Davidson, COMGENAAF POA, CQAVONBOMCOM 21st, Himitz thru COMGENAAF POA, Richardson thru COMGENAAF POA D 8404.

Flash report follows:

Yawata was bombed by estimated 55 aircraft, Laoyao by one aircraft, Kaifeng by one aircraft and an unisoloced target of opportunity was bombed by one aircraft.

Observed results at Yawata, good; Laoyao, unobserved; Kaifeng, unobserved; TO, not reported.

Enemy aircraft opposition at Yawata was moderate to strong, at Laoyao and Kaifeng, none. Enemy heavy AA at Yawata was moderate to intense and accurate. No other AA reported. Four of our aircraft were observed lost and six additional aircraft have failed to return. Our crews claim 12 destroyed, 12 probably destroyed and 10 damaged.

ACTION: CG AAF

INFO: OPD, G-2, Adm King, Col Park, Log

CM-IN-19201 (21 Aug 44) 0929Z

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11352, Sec. 2 (f) and 5 (d) or (a)
CIA Notice, May 1, 1972
By SLR  FEB 5 1974

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: CG, 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur, India

To: War Department
CG, 14th Air Force Kunming, China
CG, Army Air Forces, India Burma Sector
Calcutta, India
CG, US Army Forces Pacific Ocean Areas
Pt. Shafter, T. H.

No. D 8440 21 August 1944

Arnold from Saunders information Stratemeyer,
Chennault, Davidson, COMGENAAF POA, CGADVONBOMOON 21st,
Nimitz thru COMGENAAF POA, Richardson thru COMGENAAF POA
D8440.

Preliminary Mission report 7A follows:

40th, 468th, 462nd, 444th are Groups participating.
Aircraft Airborne 75. 61 aircraft bombed Yavata, 1 bombed
Lacoyak, 1 bombed Kaifeng and 2 bombed targets opportunity.

55 releases were visual, 2 by radar and 7 unknown.

Observed results at Yavata were good, other targets
unobserved. Air opposition at Yavata moderate to strong
and at other targets none.

Enemy heavy AA at Yavata moderate to intense and
accurate, at Lacoyak none.

Claims are destroyed 15, probable 13, damaged 12.
From: CG, 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur, India
No. D 8440 21 August 1944

Weather CAVU to 1/10th's, winds about 21 knots from 250 at Yawata; at Laoyao 10/10th's cover, winds 15 knots from 30 degrees. 61 aircraft returned to our bases, 2 landed elsewhere, 3 crashed on or near our bases and 9 are missing.

Casualties are 123 missing.

All bombs dropped were 500 pound GP's; approximately 366 on Yawata and 6 on each of other targets.

Early study of strike photos shows hits on target.

Photo report sent separately.

End.

ACTION: OPD
INFO: CG AAP G-2 Adm. King Col. Park Log

CM-IN-19461 (21 Aug 44) 1906Z gko

DECLASSIFIED E. O. 11652, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 5/2 1974
WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

"IVI"
URGENT

From: CG, 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur, India

To: War Department
   CG, 14th Air Force, Kunming, China
   CG, 10th Air Force, Kajipoh, Assam
   CG, Army Air Forces, India Burma Sector
   CG, U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific Ocean Areas
   P. Shafter, T. H.

No. D363 20 August 1944

Arnold from Saunders info Strateseyer, Chennault,
Davidson, CONGAHAAP FOA, CG ADVANCEDCOM 21st, Hants thru
CONGAHAAP FOA, Richardson thru CONGAHAAP FOA D363.

Superfortresses on the way. Following Airborne:
22 from 40th Group first at 200142Z last at 200219; 18 from
444 Group first at 200152Z last at 200232; seven from 462
Group first at 200152Z last at 200211Z; and 28 from 468
Group first at 200146 the last at 200242Z. The eighth plane
from 462 Group crashed on takeoff closing runway. All
remaining available aircraft of 462 Group are being readied
for possible takeoff at 0900Z today for night bombing attack
on same target if takeoff conditions permit. One early
return from 40th Group just in. Bomb loadings for 444
Group as follows: 15 aircraft are each carrying 65 100 pound
general purpose bombs and nine aircraft carrying eight bombs
apiece.

ACTION: CG AAF

INFO: OPD G-2 Ads. King Col. Park Log

WH-81-18426 (20 Aug 44) 1505Z gko

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11970, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 8/2/94

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COPY NO. 50
From: US Military Observer, New Delhi, India
To: War Department
Nr: CLB 222  18 August 1944

From Graybeal CLB 222 for Bissell signed Sultan.

Military Intelligence Service Source Control number MIL R 12 for reference also recurlet JICA 350.05 dated 15 August subject Japanese Air Defense Systems. Following is supplemental information. JICA Chungking report number 634 dated May 5 and following information supplied by JICA/CBI Chungking branch. Evaluate everything 03.

At Akakage Sumida Park Hamacho Park Shiba Park West Shinagawa Station Yoyogi NF Station Asukayama Koizumi Hibiya Park Ueno Park Kinen Park Hagatacho south of city along Tamagawa north of city along Edagawa and on Tokyo Bay along Araka Canal anti-aircraft emplacement are located.

Near docks on western coast of Tokyo-Wan particularly near Shibaura Yokohama and Tsurumi is a barrage balloon net. Believed not continuous but about 30 kilos apart are balloons. About 2 kilos at most is depth of dispersion. About 700 or 800 meters is height.

In vicinity of Tokyo airfields are said to be located at Omiya Nito Takasuki Murayama Reservoir Kofu Ofuna Yokosuka Kisarazu Choshi Kabumigaure (largest Navy base) Kawashiro (many fighters here) Yokohama Tateyama Utsunomiya Tachikawa (largest Army base) Hiratsuka and Chiba. Chinese communist agent is source.

Civilian air raid precautions seem to be the usual.

CM-IN-17389 (19 Aug 44)
From: US Military Observer, New Delhi, India

Nr: OIB 222 18 August 1944

Air raid drills are frequent in large cities, in Tokyo water storage tanks are located at almost every corner, near Osaka station are barbed wire outside shelters. Instructions are that during first and second alerts production must be maintained, for immediate repair of buildings damaged in raids there is an accumulation of building material at factory sites. One report states Tokyo has no available shelters fireproof solutions are painted on roofs and so on. Chinese medical student who attended school in Tokyo from 1938 to July 1943 and Japanese publications are sources.

Around large and small boats patrolling unknown distance offshore a warning system is built with several small boats between every two large boats. By wireless small boats warn large boats which in turn warn Shireibu (air defense headquarters). Shireibu is located in Aashigawa for north Japan, Osaka for west Japan, in Tokyo for east Japan and Kokura for south Japan, first location doubtful. Civilian and Army lookout posts along Pacific shores by islands in question supplement this system. Near vital areas posts are more heavily concentrated. Said to be located at Tatsuyama near Yokosuka and at Choshi are sound detectors. Chinese communist agent is source.

Two books which are being microfilmed for Washington obtained by O-2 this headquarters from communists at Yenan, one being air defense laws with explanatory notes published by air defense headquarters 30 March 1944 the
From: US Military Observer, New Delhi, India

Ref: CIB 222 18 August 1944

Other air raid proof buildings and air raid shelters published by Home Affairs Ministry on 25 February 44. Microfilm will be forwarded as soon as possible.

When our planes are raiding Japan the Japanese plan to raid our bases by dispatching Jap aircraft from central China bases. Chinese 0-2 agent is source.

End

ACTION: G-2
INFO: CG AAF
OPD
Col. Park

CM-IN-17389 (19 Aug 44) 14392 gko
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

EXTRACT OF TELETYPE CONFERENCE, 1 AUGUST 1944, BETWEEN
GENERAL HANSELL, WASHINGTON, AND GENERAL SAUNDERS, KHAR-
AGPUR

1 August 1944

Gen Saunders:

Provisional damage assessment from interpretation of incomplete returns of strike photographs now follows for attack on Shown Steel Works, Anshan, Manchuria: Great column of dense black smoke estimated to be at least 10,000 feet high is seen to be issuing from by-products plant representing direct hits therein by bombs dropped from 1st attacking elements. Long flames of light colored smoke issuing from many ovens of north and south coke batteries indicate both batteries have almost surely been seriously breached by near misses. In addition southern battery has been hit directly by at least 2 bombs. Also very large well developed mass of flame and black smoke is seen over heart of steel finishing plant. Severe damage is also thought to have been effected on tracks and coal handling facilities for coke ovens.

Other damage observed: At least 2 near-misses on number 4 blast furnace and 1 near-miss on number 2 blast furnace with direct hits on heating stoves of both these furnaces; many bursts are seen in and near ore and coke yard making probable damage to other handling installations; several hits on or near small building related to large machine shop; a number of bursts near gas washing plant; a number of direct hits on chemical and metallurgical laboratory; direct hits on number 1 and number 2 concentrating plants.

Other results noted: Some 16 bursts on southern edge of plant area; approximately 8 additional bursts on or near railroad tracks immediately south of south coke battery; 7 to 8 bursts mark fall bomb fall in group of workmen's or military quarters east of coke batteries.

Now follows provisional damage assessment of strike photographs made by 4 aircraft which attacked Taku area: At least 5 bursts on wharf area with probable blast damage to 2 large Godowns; probable direct hit on 150/200 foot

WD-TT-773 (1 Aug 44)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3.3 and (13) or (15)
By EL 921

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
merchand vessel; at least 10 bursts are seen in business/residential area just northeast of target; 8 to 10 bursts are seen in Yungli alkali plant with damage or destruction of 3 large and several small sheds or buildings; 40 bursts on marshalling yard and siding just east of target. These photos show much new construction approximately tripling wharf and loading facilities. Part photo cover of target area shows approximately 25 collier type vessels 100/200 feet and 1 cargo vessel 250/300 feet.

From 1 set of poor quality strike photographs made over Chenghsien no bursts are seen. Bulk of strike photographs and all negatives not yet received from forward area. Photographs will be quickly sent to Washington as soon as received and printed here. In response to your request an attempt will be made following this transmission to telephoto portion of best available strike prints.

End

ORIGINATOR: Gen Hansell

INFORMATION: CG AAF, OPD, G-2, SGS, Adm King, Col Park, Log

WD-TT-773 (1 Aug 44) 1814Z ekk

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11663, Sec. 2(B) and 6(D) or (F)

FEB 5 1974

COPY No. 43

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
PASSED BY COM 13 TO CNO FOR ACTION AS 300529

2 SURVIVORS OF USSR BELO RUSSIA ARRIVED VLADIVOSTOK LAST OF JUNE FROM JAPAN AND REPORTED THEIR SHIP WAS SUNK BY 3 TORPEDOES FROM AN UNIDENTIFIED SUBMARINE AND SANK WITHIN A FEW MINUTES ON OR ABOUT MARCH 3RD WHILE DRIFTING NEAR ICE FIELD OFF ETOROFU JIMA 25 TO 30 ORIGINAL SURVIVORS ABANDONED SHIP. DTOLCEPSF DUE TO SEVER COLD AND EXPOSURE ALL DIED BUT 2 FIREMEN WHO WALKED AND SWAM ACROSS 3 MILES OF BROKEN ICE FLOES TO SHORE WHERE THEY RECUPERATED SUFFICIENTLY IN AN ABANDONED HUT TO PROCEED ALONG THE SHORE UNTIL THEY WERE PICKED UP BY JAPANESE FISHING BOATS. THE 2 FIREMEN WERE FINALLY TRANSFERRED TO A JAPANESE
SHIP AND MAXENT TO JAPAN THOUGHT TO BE TOKYO WHERE THEY WERE SEVERELY BEATEN AND QUESTIONED AS TO WHAT THEY KNEW AND HAD SEEN. USSR CONSUL HEARD OF THESE MEN AND DEMANDED THEIR RETURN TO VLADIVOSTOK. A RUSSIAN SHIP WAS SENT TO JAPAN TO RETURN THEM.

EVALUATION A1

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 2(B) and 8(D) or 8
On Jan 5, 1972
By SLR
DATE FEB 5 1974

16...ACT

COMINCH...20G...CNO...NAVAIDE...200P...
THE KOISO-YONAI CABINET

Perhaps to the average American, the government of Gen. Hideki Tojo was synonymous with Japan. It was Tojo's government which precipitated the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Tojo regime has been described to the people of the Allied world as the symbol of all that was evil in Japan. Therefore, the natural first reaction to the unexpected downfall of Japan's counterpart to Hitler was a wave of feeling that the beginning of the end for Japan had come.

Undoubtedly, this resignation, an bloc of the longest-lived of Japan's 7 war cabinets (2 years and 9 months) can be taken as the first concrete evidence of Japan's eventual crack-up, but analysis of the present Cabinet's make-up does not give much room for optimism concerning a quick end to the war.

The Koiso Cabinet is not a "surrender Cabinet", Nor, contrary to prevailing belief, is it a "moderate" or a "liberal" Cabinet. It is an over all strong war Cabinet which will plunge Japan deeper into war for the last and hardest struggle. It is a Cabinet which shows a much closer unity between the Army and Navy, between the government and the people, and among the Cabinet members themselves. It is also a Cabinet made up of seasoned men who have been active in Japan's Continental and southward expansion programs. The make-up of this Cabinet, installed by the Emperor on July 22 and headed by two men—Gen. Kuniaki Koiso and Adm. Mitsumasa Yonai—follows:

- Premier: Gen. Kuniaki Koiso
- Deputy Premier: Adm. Mitsumasa Yonai
- War: Field Marshal Gen. Sugiyama
- Navy: Adm. Mitsumasa Yonai
- Munitions: Genjiro Fujimura
- Foreign Affairs: Nanor Shigemitsu
- GSA: Nanor Shigemitsu
- Home Affairs: Shigao Odato
- Finance: Sotaro Ikawa
- Education: Lt. Gen. Harushige Ninomiya
- Welfare: Hisatada Hirose
- Justice: Hiromasa Matsuoka
- Agriculture and Commerce: Toshio Shindo
- Transportation and Communications: Yonetsu Mueda
- State Affairs: Shigao Odato
- State Affairs: Takatora Ogata
- Board of Information: Takatora Ogata
The Ministers

"Senior Statesmen": At a glance, the names of the Cabinet Ministers are those of capable men with past Cabinet experience. Comparatively new names are those of Education Minister Minomiya, Justice Minister Natsuaki and State Minister Ogata. Shigeo Odate, while this is his first appointment as a full-fledged Minister, served as Vice-Home Minister under Minister Kobara in the Abe Cabinet and also under Minister Kodama in the Yonai Cabinet, which followed.

Friends And Classmates: Ishiwata, Koiso, Hirose, Neda, and Yonai were fellow Ministers under the Hiranuma Cabinet, while Kodama, Shinada, Fujimara, Koiso, Ishiwata, and Odate were all active participants in the Yonai Cabinet. This is obviously not mere coincidence. Also, the fact that Koiso, Sugiyyama and Minomiya were all members of the 12th graduating class of the Military Academy cannot be overlooked.

Two Career Men: From the point of view of experience, Justice Minister Natsuaki is a career man, being, until his recent appointment to this post, the Procurator General. Ogata, also, is a career man with 34 years of newspaper experience behind him. The choice of this former editor-in-chief and vice president of the Osaka and Tokyo ASSH newspaper is noteworthy in that hitherto the post of the President of the Board of Information was always held by a diplomatic career man.

Army Man For Education: The experience of the relatively unknown Education Minister Minomiya is questionable. However, here again—inaeuch as the educational system is fully geared to the war effort now—the appointment of a retired Army General close to the Premier and to the War Minister may be of great significance. If some school children were not participating fully in the war effort before, there will doubtless be no more such "coddlings" under Minomiya.

In the course of the Cabinet formation, hopes were expressed in many quarters of Japan that capable, strongwilled and compatible men would be chosen, who would measure up to the people's willingness to fight and sacrifice. All indications are that Koiso and Yonai have fulfilled these demands.

Army-Navy Unity

Admission of Conflict: A Domed political commentator on July 21 revealed that during the past three months the Tojo Cabinet had been exerting its utmost for establishment of a closer unity between the Army and the Navy. This unguarded statement, and Tojo's final desperate attempt to reorganize the top naval and military administrative staffs, support the idea that division between the two fighting forces was the major cause of Tojo's downfall.

Friction between the Army and Navy is nothing new, especially in Japan. In the past, it has caused the collapse of several Cabinets (the Yonai Cabinet of 1940 is a pertinent recent example).
Nature of Friction: The root of this conflict is very complex, but the most outstanding factor known to all, is the basic one of expansion policies. The Army's ambitions in the past lay primarily in the Asiatic Continent while the Navy clamored for a "Southward Expansion Program". The opposing programs are readily understandable. Successful execution of the continental expansion program would involve land forces with only a minor role for the Navy, while the southward expansion policy would involve amphibious operations dependent mainly on the "Invincible Imperial Navy". The Sino-Japanese Incident was part of the Army's continental policy and the S.E.A. War was the bargaining of the Navy's southward expansion program.

Good Beginning: That very real unity existed between the two fighting forces at the outset of the war cannot be denied. The early successes in Japan's amphibious operations in the Southwest Pacific surely prove this. However, the successive failures on the part of the Japanese Navy to stem the growing combined American counter-offensive must have brought increasing deterioration to this unity.

Army's Failures: From the Army's standpoint, it was the inactivity of the Navy to protect, to supply, and to reinforce the far-flung garrisons that caused these setbacks. The Navy failed to meet the American combined forces. In the Navy's explanation to the people, the continuous retreat was camouflaged as a plot to "lie in wait for an opportune change to wipe out the enemy in one bold stroke." The people were led to believe that the beginning of the Saipan invasion was the opportune moment to strike, but the Navy did not carry through. The result was the loss of one of its most important Central Pacific bases, and—perhaps as important to the Japanese people—a piece of land which they considered almost a part of Japan after 30 years of occupation.

The Rule of Yosai: The Emperor's appointment of Adm. Yosai to share his cabinet with Kiso also the honor of organizing a new Cabinet clearly indicates that closer unity between the two forces was being sought. Yosai, a Navy elder, is one of the outstanding naval leaders of Japan. His restoration to active duty by a special act to enable him to accept the Navy portfolio concurrently with that of the deputy premiership, is unprecedented in Japanese history. This irregular procedure is ample evidence of the Navy's resolve to overcome its present unhappy status.

Kiso and Yosai

Old Colleagues: The paths of Kiso and Yosai have crossed at least twice before in their official careers. Although Kiso is now at the helm of the "dual" Cabinet, they were fellow Ministers under the Hiranuma Cabinet in 1939; and in 1940 while Yosai was Premier, Kiso was his Overseas Minister.

Kiso and Yosai from all available reports are men of opposite character and temperament. Yosai is said to be moderate. He was generally known to be "liberal" and "pro-American" before the war (but it is very improbable that he is today).
Koiso's History: Koiso, on the other hand, is said to be a keen administrator, an imperialist of the first order and a man capable of enforcing drastic action. That Koiso is an ardent expansionist is well known. Like all good Army men he was a rabid enthusiast of the Japanese Continental Expansion Policy. He played a prominent part in the conquest of Manchuria and Japan's subsequent recognition of "Manchukuo". To illustrate his interest in Manchuria it is said that in 1932 he resigned the post of Vice-Minister in order to accept the much lower position of Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army.

However, his interest in expansion did not stop with the Continent. He was one of the very few Army men identified with the Navy's agitation for Japanese expansion in the South Seas. Here was an Army man who could understand the Navy's dream. Therefore the appointment of Gen. Koiso in Adm. Yonai's Cabinet as Overseas Minister was a natural and expected action.

During his tenure as Overseas Minister, Koiso made an unofficial inspection trip to the Netherlands East Indies. His statement, made upon his return that the natives of the Dutch colony had been long oppressed and exploited by the local Dutch authorities, created a severe diplomatic repercussion which finally resulted in the Dutch government's refusal to accept him as a special envoy to the East Indies to negotiate a trade treaty.

Chunuking Comment: The TA KUNG FAO points out that Tojo resigned because it is necessary "to infuse new life into the Japanese people and more vigorously prosecute the war." It also indicates that the journal continues, that the friction between the Japanese Army and Navy is now so intense that it is no longer possible for an Army man or a Navy man to lead the government alone. Commenting on Koiso the Chhungking newspaper states that "he is an adventurer. His vocation for years has been the invasion of the Asiatic Continent. He also stands for Japanese adventures in the South Seas. With him as one of the Prime Ministers, Japan will continue to fight." As for Yonai, he is called a "riddle". His historic position is that of a "moderate" but the TA KUNG FAO writes that "he has every chance of being a smoke screen. Besides he plays second fiddle to Koiso in the present set-up." (Chungking in English to America, July 21).

Sugiyma and Umez
More Classmates And Ex-Colleagues: The position of the Army has been greatly strengthened by the return of Field Marshal Gen Sugiyma. He is a classmate of Koiso and a fellow Military Staff College graduate. The choice of Gen. Umezu as Chief of the Military General Staff is expected to bring about closer harmony among the top military men. Umezu, having served Sugiyma as Vice-Minister of War in both the Hayashi and the first Konoe Cabinets, is reportedly very close to his former chief. It was pointed out by Lowel (July 22) that "Field Marshal Sugiyma in military administration, Chief of Staff Gen. Umezu in military operation, and Gen. Koiso in national affairs will serve to strengthen the flexibility and systematic cooperation of the armed forces."
Sugiyama And Yonai

Navy’s Position Not Weakened: On the question of how Yonai will fit into this picture, it can be said that his presence in the Cabinet has not weakened the Navy’s position vis-a-vis the Army. In fact, it appears that the Navy’s position in the Cabinet has been somewhat strengthened. As Deputy Premier Yonai will undoubtedly have some say in the running of the government. His recall to active duty in order to have him cooperate with War Minister Sugiyama in the capacity of Navy Minister is portentous. These two have worked together in the past as respective Minister of Army and Navy through the Hayashi and the first Konoe Cabinets.

National Policies

No Change Expected: Tojo’s policies were aimed at “rigorous prosecution of the war”, and it can be taken for granted that the new Cabinet will follow the same general pattern. “It will be a continuance of Tojo’s Cabinet”, as Domai puts it. But since Tojo’s downfall is attributed in many Japanese quarters to his “inability fully to translate policies into action,” the new Cabinet is expected to take even more vigorous steps in executing and applying Tojo’s national policies. The hold-over of Tojo’s man Inukawa, Shigemitsu and Fujikawa, can be interpreted as the new Cabinet’s intention to follow Tojo’s policies at least in the field of foreign affairs, finance, and production. Since the whole economy of the country is geared to the war and the policies chosen by Tojo, it would probably be disastrous to attempt any far-reaching changes in these fields.

Foreign Affairs

Shigemitsu Honored: The retention of Shigemitsu, the author of the GGA Joint Declaration, as Foreign Minister and concurrent GGA Minister is presented by Tokyo as conclusive evidence that Japan’s foreign policies will remain unchanged under the new government. Tokyo (led Japanese to GGA) said that “the policy of the Imperial Government will become firmer and stronger and the close relationship between Japan and her allied nations will become even tighter. Why? Because the development of the GGA is the eternal mission of the Empire.”

Whether or not Japan will have to abandon her Axis commitments in the coming months, the Government has been farsighted enough to forestall speculation on the subject by retaining the Foreign Minister who stood for close Japan-German friendship and for neutrality with Soviet Russia.

Decline of GGA Ministry: A point which has been somewhat overlooked in the reorganization is the subordinate position to which the GGA Ministry—launched with such immense fanfare in 1943—has evidently fallen. The decline of the Ministry in recent months has been accompanied by a steady decrease in Tokyo’s references to its former Minister, Kusuo Aoki, who departed the Government along with Tojo, without any words of praise or sorrow.

Shigemitsu’s assumption of the GGA post may signal the eventual restoration of full diplomatic powers to the Foreign Office.
It is reported that "complete agreement of views" was reached between Shigenobu and Kunichiro, Vice-Minister of OSA Affairs. Yamamoto is expected to be largely responsible for the execution of Shigenobu's administrative duties as concurrent Minister of OSA Affairs. A policy plan to strengthen the network of communications and transportation covering the whole OSA area is also reported by the same (unrevealed) sources.

Finance And Production

Ishiwara's Record: The reappointment of Sotaro Ishiwara confirms the continuation of the financial policy of the Tojo government. However, his retention is said to be significant also in terms of his having been very active in Asiatic finance. Prior to his assumption of the Finance portfolio on Feb. 21, 1944, he was the Supreme Financial Advisor to the National Government of China. He is largely credited with not only streamlining Japan's finances to meet the exigencies of war but also with taking a leading part in helping Occupied China reform her currency system. Likewise he "persuaded" Burma and the Philippines to establish Central Banks, and Thailand to strengthen its Central Bank. Tokyo expects further consolidation of Japan's financial progress as well as the strengthening of OSA finances with his resumption of the Finance portfolio.

Fukusawa's Record: Fukusawa was Minister of Commerce and Industry in the Yonal Cabinet of 1940. In the Tojo Cabinet he served in the capacity of Minister without Portfolio, conducting a number of Administrative Inspections of war plants. In the latter capacity he is reported to have made a substantial contribution to Japan's war production by his various useful suggestions.

Recently he returned from an inspection tour of North China. The appointment of this veteran industrialist and business man as Minister without Portfolio is a logical step, and under his Japan's production schedule is expected to make "gigantic strides".

Government And The People

IARPS Support: The Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, Japan's only political party, has pledged itself to support the new Cabinet. On receiving the Imperial Command to form a Cabinet, Gen. Kiso paid a visit to Governor Abe of the IARPS to request total cooperation and support in fulfilling his "grave responsibility under the current situation." Total cooperation and support as well as full participation in the Cabinet were promised by Abe (who was then on named Governor General of Korea).

In the new Cabinet, the IARPS is represented by members Toshio Shiga as Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, Tomoaki Naide as Minister of Transportation and Communications and Choji Machida as Minister without Portfolio. It is noteworthy that all of these three men were leaders of the Selyukul and Ninsito parties before the formation of the IARPS. (It may be inserted here that Tokyo has been strangely silent on the role of the IMA in the new Cabinet, except to report that it will probably be "reorganized.")
Three days after Koiso's interview with Gen. Abe, Domel announced (in English to America) the resignation of Abe as the Governor of IRAPS and his subsequent appointment as Governor General of Korea. Abe's successor as Governor of IRAPS has not been named, as yet.

Biographical Notes

Most of the following brief biographies are from the Domel romanji file. They are included in this report for the convenience of far East specialists, and because, taken together, they point up the following primary characterization of the new government staff: long-term political and military leadership; first hand knowledge of and interest in the China continent; and compatibility based on the same school tie and on the experience of having worked together successfully in former Cabinets.

Gen. Gen Sugiyama, Minister of War.

Born in the city of Ogura, he is 65 years of age. He graduated from the Military Academy at the same time as General Koiso, the new Premier; Tate, Commander in Chief of the China Expeditionary Forces; and Iwagawa, former Minister of Justice. After graduation he was stationed in England and France. In 1930, he became a Lieutenant General and Vice-Minister of War. He later served as a Commander of a Division and as Chief of the Military Air Headquarters. In 1934, he became vice-chief of the General Staff and concurrently the Superintendent of the War College. He was appointed concurrently to the positions of Inspector General of Military Education and Supreme War Councillor in 1936; promoted to a Full General the same year; and was appointed War Minister in the Hayashi and the first Konoye Cabinets in 1937. In October, 1940, he became the Chief of the General Staff and served in this capacity for three years and four months until he was succeeded by General Sojo last February. He was promoted to the rank of Field Marshal in June, 1943. With the separation of the War Minister and Chief of General Staff joint-post on July 18, he was returned to his old position as Inspector General of Military Education, and at this time he takes office as War Minister for the third time after a lapse of six years and one month.

Ganjiro Kamiyama, Minister of Munitions.

A native of Nagano Prefecture, he was born in 1856. After graduating from Kieio Gijuku at age 23, he became editor-in-chief of the paper NIPPON SHIMPO. Then he launched into the industrial world. From the Mitsui Bank he climbed the ladder to become the head of the Lumber Department of the Mitsui House Co., and in 1911 he entered the Oji Paper Manufacturing Co. and was instrumental in making the Oji Paper Co. what it is today. In June, 1939, by Imperial nomination, he became a member of the House of Peers, and
upon the formation of the Yosai Cabinet, he became Minister of Commerce and Industry, demonstrating his ability in economic circles. In December, 1941, when the Industrial Equipment Corporation was formed, he became its president. In March, 1942, when the Tojo Cabinet installed the Cabinet Advisory system, he became Tojo's Cabinet Adviser; and in December 17 of the same year, he became State Minister in the Tojo Cabinet. Later, he was made Administrative Inspector by Imperial order. He is next to the oldest member of the new Cabinet.

Yamoru Shigemitsu, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Greater East Asia.

A native of Oita Prefecture, he is 56 years old; graduate of Imperial University Law School; diplomatic experience in China, Germany, Britain, Soviet Russia. He was Ambassador to Great Britain in the trying period after 1936, and to Nanking China in 1941. He served in the Home Ministry under former Foreign Ministers Uchida and Hirota. In the China post he "devoted his entire strength for solidification of political power of the National Government of China to cope with the new situation of Japan-Nanking relations after Japan's declaration of war, and promotion of amicable relations between Japan and Nanking." He was the leading figure in the signing of the pacts which led Nanking to declare war against America and Britain.

Sotaro Ishiwata, Finance Minister.

He was born in Tokyo in 1891. After graduating from Tokyo Imperial University he joined the Finance Ministry and in 1931 was appointed to the staff of the Cabinet Research Bureau. In 1937 he was promoted to the office of Director of the Taxation Bureau and later Vice-Finance Minister. In 1939, he was chosen Finance Minister in the Hiranuma Cabinet and later served as Chief Secretary in the Yosai Cabinet. Until recalled to succeed Kaya as Finance Minister in February of this year, he was Financial Adviser to the Nanking Government and is said to have played a big part in the stabilization of the Chinese currency. He is said to be a good organizer as well as an excellent financier.

Shigeo Odate, Minister of Home Affairs.

He was born in Nara City of Nara Prefecture and is 53 years old. He was appointed Governor of Hokkaido Prefecture in 1932. In 1934, he was called by the "Manchukuo" government to take the position of Director of the Legislation Bureau, and later became Vice-Director of the General Affairs Board. In 1935, he became the Director of the same board, resigning this position at the end of the year.
With the outbreak of the China Incident, he became the adviser to the Special Affairs Bureau of the North China Expeditionary Force, following which he was the adviser to the Provisional Government of Central China together with Michio Yuzama. In September, 1939, he was made Vice-Homie Minister and served under Minister Kikun in the Abe Cabinet and also under Minister Aokiba in the Yonai Cabinet which followed. In February, 1942, he was named Mayor of the Special Municipality of "Shomon" (Singapore). Later he became the first Governor of the newly-formed Tokyo Metropolis, and concurrently the Chairman of the Kantō District Administrative Council. He has been serving in the last two positions up to the present.

Harushige Hinomizu, Minister of Education.

He was born in Okayama Prefecture and is 66 years old. He is well known as one of the outstanding four of the 12th graduating class of the Military Academy along with the new Premier Kato, and Generals Sugiyama and Hata. At the time of the Manchurian Incident, he was Vice-Chief of the General Staff. In 1934, he resigned the command of the 5th Division and left the active service. He served as military attaché to the Japanese Embassy in London. After the close of the First World War, he made a "brilliant and thorough study of international relationships", and the excellence of his report to the central army headquarters is said to be matchless. He was the president of both the Chosen (Korea) and Manchurian Development Companies before their consolidation and was instrumental in the establishment of the Manchurian Development Company in 1940. He exerted a great influence in the carrying out of Manchurian development and emigration policies.

Graji Machida, Minister of State Affairs

He was born in March 1865 in Akita Prefecture. He was graduated from the Imperial University in 1887 and entered the Legislation Bureau. Later he was transferred from the Bank of Japan to the Yamanouchi Bank, becoming its director. He was president of the Hōchō Ginkō, and since his election as a member of the Diet in 1892, he has been sent to the Diet ten times. In the first Wakatsuki Cabinet in 1926, he was the Yamanouchi Cabinet in 1929, and in the second Wakatsuki Cabinet in 1932, he served as Agriculture Minister. In 1934, in the Okada Cabinet he was appointed Commerce Minister, and in addition, concurrently Finance Minister for a while. After retirement from government service he was honored as a Minister without Portfolio. From the first Konoe Cabinet in 1937 to the second Konoe Cabinet he was a member of the Cabinet Advisory Council. In January 1935 he replaced Baron Reihiro Wakatsuki as president of the Minzoku party and
"gave his efforts to political circles as an elder."
Upon establishment of the IRAPS he was made advisor, in
which capacity he has served to the present. He is the
oldest member of the new Cabinet.

Count Hyozo Kodama, Minister of State Affairs.

He was born in 1876 in Yamaguchi Prefecture as the
eldest son of Viscount Genjuro Kodama. In 1906, he suc-
cceeded to the title. He graduated from the Imperial
University in 1900, and has held various posts as Secretary
in the Finance Ministry; Secretary-General of Korea;
Chief Secretary in the Terauchi Cabinet in 1915; President
of the Decorations Bureau; Governor General of Shantung
Territory; Chief Civil Administrator in Korea under Saito
in 1923; Minister of Overseas Affairs in October, 1934 in
the Okada Cabinet; Minister of Communications in the Hayashi
Cabinet in 1937, and Minister of Home Affairs in the Yosai
Cabinet in January, 1940. In March, 1940, he went to Java
as the Supreme Councilor to the Southern Regions Army Civil
Administration. There, "he engaged in reconstruction work
but returned to Japan because of illness." He is a brother-
in-law of Field Marshal Terauchi and is an "amiable and
energetic person." At present, he is one of the most im-
portant members of the Sekkyukan group of the House of Peers.

Takeo Ogata, Minister of State and President of the Information Board.

He was born in Fukusaki Prefecture and is 57 years old.
He was graduated from the Tokyo Higher Commercial School
and the political science and economic school of Waseda
University. In 1911 he went to work on the XEPO ASAI
Shibam and became chief of the editorial bureau in 1925.
After serving as director and editor-in-chief, he became
vice president of the paper, replacing Hiroshi Shinoura,
who entered the Japan Broadcasting Corporation. He has
held this post to the present. Ogata was affiliated with
the IRAPA, was active as a press representative, and has
participated in many national activities. Much is ex-
pected of him as president of the Board of Information at
this critical time.

NOTE: This report is written only two days after the Koiso-Yonai Cabinet
was installed and of caution should be added concerning its
finality. In the forthcoming RADIO REPORT ON THE FAR EAST No. 51,
scheduled for August 4, a section will be devoted to the Tojo and Koiso
Cabinets, based on subsequent Tokyo intercepts—Ed.
This change was followed two days later by the announcement that "the decisive battle of the Pacific" had begun. Hence another reorganization of the Cabinet was necessary to cope with the important phases of both politics and war. The new appointments included Finance Minister Soitaro Ikisawa, Agriculture and Forestry Minister Shinya Uchida, and Transportation and Communications Minister Keito Goto. Tokyo again interpreted the changes as evidence of strength rather than weakness, by praising both the incoming and outgoing Ministers so as not to give the impression that the three men dismissed had failed.

Saipan and the Kyushu Bombing: The finishing touches were put on Tojo's almost 4-year-old regime by the American occupation of Saipan and the 2nd and 3rd bombings of Japan proper. The strain of public and official pressure on Tojo was evidently too great this time. Lacking a scapegoat important enough to assume the blame for these disasters, he resigned and assumed full responsibility for what had happened. While it is not correct to say that this series of military reverses, beginning in the summer of 1942 and ending with Saipan and Kyushu, have been the sole cause for the many cabinet changes it may be safely said that they represent the most important precipitating reasons.

The home front failures and the military failures cannot be separated, since they form a vicious circle. It is Japan's way, to excuse the militarists' bungling, since the government is in the hands of the militarists. And if the people can be convinced that their own deficiencies in production are responsible for military reverses, presumably they will be easier to exploit, and slower to develop anti-war attitudes.

**PERSONALITIES**

**New Appointments**

Admiral Yonai: The appointment of Admiral Yonai by the Emperor to share with Kuniaki Koiso the honor of organizing a new Cabinet leads to considerable speculation. Yonai has never distinguished himself for aggressiveness. He has a reputation of amiability and moderation. During the years immediately before the "Greatest East Asia War" Yonai stood firmly for capitalism as contrasted with the strong fascist tendencies of Japan's "sledgehammer" politicians. During this time when he was Premier (Jan. 16 to July, 1940) he pursued a cautious middle-of-the-road course, seemingly fearful of a slip which would endanger his position. So concerned was he over maintaining peace that a group of assassins, headed by the infamous Colonel Kingoro Hashimoto (who ordered the attack on the U.S.S. *Panay*) plotted to kill the mordant Premier. The plot was discovered, Yonai's life was spared, but nine days later he was replaced by Prince Kongo as head of the state.

Early in his career Yonai developed a healthy respect for British naval tradition, so much so that he was branded as an Anglophile. And it was Yonai who led the Navy's counter-offensive against the Army's proposal to conclude a military alliance with the Romo-Berlin Axis in 1939. During the time the pro-totalitarian drive was fast gathering momentum in Japan (1939) Yonai made a bold statement: "There ought to be a certain limit...to controlled economy."
Control over 'everything,' from production and distribution to consumption, can only lead to national ruin.... Radical Reform can only bring on chaos; it should be gradual improvement. It should be evolution, not revolution." He seems a popular choice for the job of forming an even "stronger" regime than the one which has had more control over the people than any Japanese government since the Restoration.

General Konshi Koiso: It would be difficult to find a man more opposite to Yond in character, temperament, and ability than Gen. Koiso, Governor General of Korea. From Lt. Gen. Sadao Ushijima, a friend and classmate of Koiso, came the following description: "He has a very calm countenance...is a composed quiet-determined man and a person who notices details and one who possesses much foresight." During the time Koiso was in Korea he had the name, "Tiger of Chosen." His administration was rigid in its discipline and under his direction all the conscription laws pertaining to the Koreans have been ends.

He has held such positions as Director of the General Affairs section of Aviation Headquarters of the Army, section Chief of the Staff Office, Director of the Military Affairs Bureau, Vice-Minister War Minister, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army (1935), Commander of the 20th Army Division in 1945. "He was Overseas Minister in the Hirohito Cabinet, April-August, 1939, the same in the Yond Cabinet until its fall in July 1940; and since that time Governor-General in Korea. Koiso is a vigorous man and an ardent imperialist. He believes in the use of the "military fist" in diplomatic relations."

Gen. Yashiro Umezu, newly appointed Chief of the Army General Staff, is well known, said Doori (in English July 19), for the famous Umezu-Yo Ying-chin agreement concluded in June 1939 which resulted in certain important settlements being made in North China without resorting to war. At the time General Umezu was Commander in Chief of the Japanese garrison in China. In 1936 he assumed the post of Vice-Minister of War under General Hisaichi Terauchi, War Minister. Umezu occupied this position until May, 1938, under War Minister Kotaro Hahnura and Gen. Sugiyama. With the outbreak of the China affair General Umezu was transferred to a post in North China and in 1939 he succeeded General Konshi Ueda as Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army and concurrently Ambassador to Manchukuo. In 1940 he was raised to the rank of full general.

Field Marshal Sugiyama, the newly appointed Inspector General of Military Education is the senior member among the high Japanese Army officers on the active list. He served as Supreme War Councillor in 1936 concurrently with his duties as Inspector General of Military Education. He was promoted to full general the same year. In 1937 he became War Minister in the Hayashi Cabinet and again in the Kono Cabinet. In the following year he became the Supreme Commander of the Japanese Forces in North China. The position of Chief of the Army General Staff, which was assumed by Sugiyama in 1939, he filled for three years, directing all operations during the early period of the Sino war. In June 1943, he was appointed to the Board of Field Marshals in recognition of his distinguished military service. He was removed from his concurrent post of Chief of the Army General Staff on February 21 of this year and made a Supreme War Councillor, when General Tojo took over the Military General Staff job.
General Otozo Yamada, the new Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army, served as Supreme Commander of the Japanese Forces in Central China from January, 1939 to October of the same year. Following his return from the front he was made a member of the Supreme War Council, and was sent to the post of Inspector General of Military Training (Education). In 1940 Yamada concurrently was appointed the first Commander in Chief of National Defense of General Headquarters, a position he held for just a year.

Lt. Gen. Michio Sugawara, the newly appointed Inspector General of Army Aviation, has held posts mostly connected with Army Aviation since the outbreak of the war in Asia. He served on the "Southern Regions Front." In May 1942 he was transferred to the post of Director of the Army Aviation Academy. With the creation of the offices of Assistant Inspector General of Army Aviation and Vice Chief of Army Aviation Headquarters in April of this year, he was named to these two posts concurrently (Doomed in English to America July 15).

Navy

Admiral Masaomi Nomura, the Navy Minister who held his position for one day is a native of Kagogami Prefecture, and is a member of the family which served under the Katama-clan of Kyushu. In November 1927 he graduated from the Naval Academy and during the ensuing years he held minor positions until 1939 when he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Commander. Nomura has spent a number of years in Germany. From 1922 to 1924 he held a diplomatic post in the Japanese Embassy in Berlin; from 1929 to 1931 he was again posted in Germany, and during the year 1940 he was sent to Germany on an undisclosed mission. During these years he rose from Lieutenant-Commander to Vice-Admiral. In 1936 he was appointed to serve as Chief of a section of the Naval General Staff, in 1939 he became naval attaché serving in Shanghai, and in 1943 he was made a member of the Supreme War Council and Commander-in-Chief of the Kuro Naval Station. He was promoted to the rank of Full Admiral in March of this year (Doomed to GEA in radio, July 17).
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RECENTLY WHEN GÖEBELS MADE SPEECH SAYING THERE WAS LITTLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ANGLO-SAXON AND GERMAN IDEOLOGIES JAPANESE AMBASSADOR BERLIN ASKED HITLER FOR MEANING OF SPEECH. HITLER ASSURED AMBASSADOR IT DID NOT MEAN COMPROMISE AND THAT GERMANY WOULD FIGHT TO BITTER END. AMBASSADORS REPORT TO TOKYO WAS REPEATED TO AMBASSADOR ANKARA WHO TOLD SHARK. LATTER SAYS IT IS JAPANESE PRACTICE TO REPEAT SUCH INFORMATION BY TELEGRAM TO ALL EMBASSYS.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY REQUIRES ADDITION OF LETTERS "KVI" TO CLASSIFICATION OF REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE.

From: CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma and India, Theater Headquarters, New Delhi, India

To: War Department
CG, 14th Air Force, Kunming
CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma and India
Forward Echelon, Chungking, China
CG, US Army Forces, Chabua, India
CG, US Army Forces in Central Pacific Area, Ft. Shafter, T.H.

NR: CRAX 8202, 14th July 1944

Bissell CRAX 8202 information Ferris, Chennault, Cranston, Dorn, Egan, Merrill, Wolfe, and CONGENCENPAC from Creswell signed Sultah.

Learned from Japanese prisoners captured Kameing late June that 3rd Battalion 18th Mountain Artillery Regiment, last identified as Kameing, destroyed their 6 remaining guns and fought as infantry being subsequently wiped out; also confirmed presence 2nd and 3rd Battalions 146 Regiment this front during May plus Regimental Headquarters. G ***. In Salween in April was 1st Battalion 146 Regiment. Casualty report document of 18th Division for May captured 5th July Mogun region confirms strength and casualty estimates that unit; indicates half 55th Regiment ineffective caused by disease. Bishenpur region at Kha Kumou positive identification 2nd Battalion 151st Regiment 53rd Division made; aside from initial order captured addressed to 151st Regiment less 1st Battalion this is first definite identification 2nd Battalion. Northeast Palel at Maebi Kumou signs hasty Japanese withdrawal.

CM-IN-12024 (15 Jul 44)
From: CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma and India, Theater Headquarters, New Delhi, India

but though that was strategic point for enemy there are no signs general withdrawal Tengmou Pal region. Prisoner identified Ukhrul region include 1st Battalion 124th Regiment, 2nd and 3rd Battalions 60th Regiment, 31st Engineer Regiment and 51st Field Ambulance. Since March British 4th Corps has taken 113 prisoners, 33 Corps has taken 150 for total 263 prisoners. Estimated 60 to 100 Japanese left on Thoubal river north Ukhrul-Imphal road; other regions north of road now clear enemy. Villager report 400 apparently fresh Japanese troops north of Runie from south. These probably troops refitted and moving to assist rearguard fighting and not new troops. Japanese still offering stiff resistance to southeast British push.

*Being Serviced

ACTION: G-2

INFO: CG AAF

LOG

CM-IN-12024 (15 Jul 44) 0620Z mss

End
NAVAL MESSAGE

CINCPAC

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(CINCPAC GIVES ACTION TO PACIFIC FLEET INFO COMINCH, COM 7TH FLEET.)

POW CAPTURED SAIPAN AND APPARENTLY IN POSITION TO KNOW STATES AMAGI KATSURAGI AND SAGAMI REGULARLY LAY DOWN AS BATTLESHIPS BUT NOW IN PROCESS CONVERSION TO CARRIERS. SAGAMI SAID TO HAVE BEEN PLANNED AS SISTERSHIP OF YAMATO. POW STATES BATTLESHIP MUTSU BLEW UP WHILE LOADING NEW TYPE MINES AT HASHIRAJIMA (NEAR KURE) IN MAY 1943. ALSO SAYS BATTLESHIPS ISE AND HYUGA NOW EQUIPPED WITH FLIGHT DECKS AFT OF CENTER TURRET. POW SAYS PLANES CAN TAKE OFF BUT CANNOT LAND ABOARD.

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94

300-06-00
COMAIRNORSOLS SUBMITS FOLLOWING REPORT AND STATEMENT RELATIVE YOUR 061845. (Bombing Log Hospital)

COMAIRNORSOLS RECORDS SHOW HORIZONTAL, DIVE AND FIGHTER BOMBER ATTACKS 23RD AND 24TH MAY ON ACK ACK CONCENTRATIONS OF 9 HEAVIES 16 AUTOMATICS AND MANY MACHINE GUNS ON HIGH RIDGE 600 YARDS NORTHEAST OF RABAUL TOWN. THESE GUNS FORM IMPORTANT PART RABAUL - LAKUNAI AIRDROME - SIMPSON HARBOR ANTI AIRCRAFT DEFENSE SYSTEM. INTENSE FIRE FROM THESE POSITIONS HAS RESULTED SERIOUS DAMAGE OUR PLANES WHEN ATTACKING SUPPLY CONCENTRATIONS SHIPING AND AIRDROME INSTALLATIONS IN AREA. 9 PLANES HOLED ON DAYS SPECIFIED. SOME 1% OF
MANY BUILDINGS IN AREA ON SAME RIDGE MARKED WITH RED CROSS.

1 SUCH BUILDING LOCATED 300 YARDS FROM 3 GUN HEAVY POSITIONS
AND ANOTHER 650 YARDS FROM 2 GUN HEAVY POSITION. 145 TONS
BOMBS DROPPED IN 2 DAYS. AFTER STRIKE PHOTOS SHOW 5 LARGE
SEVERAL SMALL BUILDINGS DESTROYED OR DAMAGED. FURTHER
ATTACKS ON THESE GUNS NECESSARY AND CONTEMPLATED. INEVITABLE
THAT SOME DAMAGE THOUGH POSITIVELY UNINTENTIONAL MUST OCCUR
SO LONG AS ENEMY Chooses LOCATE HOSPITAL AREAS CONTIGUOUS
TO ANTI AIRCRAFT POSITIONS.

* COMINCH DELIVER TO COS ARMY AND COM AAF.
CTF 52 INFO ADEE ENCRYPTS AND SENDS 090824 FOR
NTLF FOR ACTION CINCPAC. COM 5TH FLT AND CTF
56 GET HAND INFO.

TOWING CHIEF PETTY OFFICER TAKES POW LATE SATURDAY 8
JULY NEAR MATANSA SAIPAN CLAIMS UPON INTERROGATION THAT
HE WAS CHIEF YODEN TO VICE ADMIRAL NAGUMO COMMANDER OF
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA WITH HEADQUARTERS AT GARAPAN
SAIPAN. POW STATES THAT HE PERSONALLY WITNESSED THE
SUICIDE OF VICE ADMIRAL NAGUMO AND REAR ADMIRAL YANO AT
1930 JULY 7TH AT THE TEMPOARY HEADQUARTERS INLAND FROM
MATANSA. POW CLAIMS TO HAVE WRITTEN AN ORDER ISSUED BY
NAGUMO ACCORDING TO POW ORDERING THE COUNTERATTACK AGAINST
OUR FORCES THE MORNING OF JULY 7TH AND COMMANDING ALL
CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PERSONNEL REMAINING ON THE NORTH END
OF SAIPAN TO COMMIT SUICIDE ON JULY 7. POW SAYS THAT VICE
ADMIRAL NAGUMO COMMANDER THE ATTACK FORCE WHICH STRUCK

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREG.)

300 Japan

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/44
PEARL HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941 AND WAS IN COMMAND AT THE
BATTLE OF MIDWAY THAT THE ADMIRAL WAS IN CHARGE OF THE SASEDO
NAVAL BASE BEFORE ORDERED TO HIS LAST STATION HERE AS COMMANDER
OF THE CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA AT SAIPAN ON MARCH 8, 1944. P Zero IS
BEING EVACUATED TO THE ROCKY MOUNT FOR FURTHER TRANSPORTATION
TO PEARL HARBOR.

RDO HONO PASSED TO COMINCH FOR ACTION AS 102006.
**JAPANESE AMBASSADOR AND NAVAL ATTACHE HAVE MADE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS TO SHARK: DURING PAST 4 MONTHS ENTIRE ATTENTION HIGH COMMAND HAS BEEN GIVEN TO BUILDING UP NAVAL AVIATION ON ACCOUNT AMERICAN ADVANCE FROM SEA AND JAP PLANE LOSSES. ARMY AVIATION HAS PLAYED LITTLE PART AND HAD FEW LOSSES IN CHINA AND BURMA WHILE WAR WITH RUSSIA NOT ANTICIPATED SOON. AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION HAS REACHED VERY HIGH LEVEL COMPARED WITH PAST 3 YEARS AND HAS SURPASSED EXPECTATIONS. WHILE PRODUCTION DOES NOT APPROACH THAT OF AMERICA IT IS BELIEVED ADEQUATE IN VIEW OF GEOGRAPHICAL ADVANTAGES TO MAKE HONORABLE SHOWING. LARGE TRAINING PROGRAM BEGIN EARLY 1942 BEGAN BEAR FRUIT THIS SPRING AND HIGHLY TRAINED PERSONNEL NOW AVAILABLE FOR DOUBLE OR TRIPLE NUMBER PLANES PRODUCED.

**16...ACT

**COMINCH...2OG...CNO...NAVAIDE...200P...**

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**DECLASSIFIED**

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 7/31/94

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**MAY 17 1974**

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Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Office in person. (See Art. 76 (4) Nav Regs.)
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT HAS LODGED FORMAL PROTEST WITH UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ALLEGING THAT ON 23 AND 24 MAY UNITED STATES BOMBERS AND FIGHTERS IN DAYLIGHT ATTACKS ON RABUAL BOMBED AND STREADED A HOSPITAL AND ANNEXES CAUSING SERIOUS DAMAGE AND CASUALTIES TO OCCUPANTS. PROTEST DOES NOT STATE LOCATION OF HOSPITAL BUT ALLEGES ITS BUILDINGS WERE MARKED WITH LARGE RED CROSSES ON A WHITE GROUND AND THAT WEATHER WAS FAIR AND VISIBILITY GOOD. PLEASE FORWARD DESPATCH REPORT ON ASCERTAINABLE AND PERTINENT FACTS AS A BASIS FOR REPLY TO JAPANESE GOVERNMENT. SIMILAR REQUEST BEING ADDRESSED TO SWPA.

To: War Department

Br. H 9043 5 July 1944

COMHGBPAC sends H 9043 to AGWAR for C-2.

Following estimated Japanese casualties occurred during second quarter this year until 15th June within Solomons Area (Reured RAME 826 January 22nd). Total enemy force stationed within area some time during period approximately 20,000 including about 5,000 Naval with shipboard and flight personnel excluded dead from all causes 3,200, incapacitated through wounds 900, incapacitated through sickness 2,800.

End

ACTION: C-2

INFORMATION: CG AAF

Col Park

Log

CM-IN-3709 (5 Jul 44) 34812 bjm

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11632, Sec. 3(B) and 5(D) or 15
OSD inset, May 1, 1972
By SLR Date FEB 5 1974

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
From: Alusana Chungking
To : CNO
Nr : 040800 MCR 3760 4 July 1944

Alusana sends to CNO.

Sino intelligence rated C 3 states that they now certain Japs intend advance from Hengyang to Kweilin. They hope defend latter with 2 Army corps but evacuation women children non essential civilians ordered prior 5 July. Japs advancing toward Kukong from Canton. No con- firmation of landings in Pakhoi area but this continues to be reported.

End

ACTION: G-2
INFORMATION: CG AAF
OPD
Log
CM-IN-3734 (5 Jul 44) 1348Z lee

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/44

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
AC/AS, Intelligence
Analysis Division
Far East Branch

JAPANESE CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS AS
AFFECTED BY U.S. MARIANAS OPERATIONS AND
COINCIDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES.

This Copy May Be Destroyed

DISTRIBUTION:

CG, AAF
Chief, Air Staff
AC/AS, Intelligence
AC/AS, Plans
Ch/S, Twentieth AF
OPD
JIS
AC/S, O-2
ONI

White House Division

310 Japan
JAPANESE CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS AS
AFFECTED BY U. S. MARINAS OPERATIONS AND
COINCIDENT NAVAL ACTIVITIES.

30 June 1944

1. The Japanese have sustained a serious, but not a critical defeat in the Pacific in the recent Marianas-Philippine naval engagements. In these actions, the enemy has suffered a serious temporary loss of naval capabilities. The 450 enemy carrier-based aircraft used in the carrier engagements, represented approximately four-fifths of his estimated total of about 550. Approximately 350 enemy carrier-based aircraft and their pilots, were destroyed by Allied air action. Thus, approximately 200 carrier-based aircraft and pilots remain to the enemy. It is by no means certain that the enemy has no additional carrier pilot replacements, or that a back log of carrier pilots in various stages of training does not exist. Latest available information suggests a definite enemy shortage in fully trained carrier pilots. In any event, it is estimated that for at least the next two or three months, the enemy's carrier fleet will be critically short of fully trained pilots, and during such period must be withdrawn from tactical employment. Thus, the Japanese Fleet will be unable to engage in major operations outside the range of supporting land-based aircraft. This circumstance, for all purposes, withdraws any immediate future threat by the enemy's fleet, to existing and near-term, proposed Allied Pacific operations. The enemy's fleet, however, will still have a strong defensive capability within supporting range of aircraft land-based on the Homeland, the Palus Islands, the Philippines, and Truk.

2. The enemy's total loss of approximately 725 aircraft in the carrier actions and in defense of land air bases in the Marianas and the Bonins, is serious but far from crippling. The enemy has the capability of absorbing these losses out of current production, and if the condition of such bases permits, can reconstitute their air strength out of current production, or by redispersion. It is estimated that the enemy's total loss for the month of June in all theatres of operations, including non-combat losses, will not be greatly in excess of his estimated monthly production. The excess of losses over production, however, will preclude his building up any back log at a time when it is most important for him to be able to do so.

3. Withdrawal of the threat from the Japanese Navy to our present Pacific operations, leaves the enemy with only an offensive threat by air. Effective and safe bases for the employment of the enemy's air against our operations, however, have been reduced to a low potential by the continuous attack of our land and carrier-based aircraft. Enemy bases north of the Marianas and through the Bonins, southeast through the Palus, and southeast to Truk are the only ones within effective range of the Marianas. These bases have shown themselves to be highly

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 1/30/44
vulnerable, and our continuous attack has thus far prevented the enemy from gathering any concentration of aircraft large enough for an effective attack against us in the Marianas. His capabilities in this regard have been reduced by sporadic attacks principally during hours of darkness, on a scale which can neither delay or prevent the execution of our intentions in the area. While it is true that our lines of communication from forward bases in the Marshalls to the Marianas are greatly extended, the enemy does not have the capability by air to do more than ineffectively harass our necessary sea traffic. The enemy's most effective air attacks would probably come from the Bonin Islands area, which we are presently only able to attack with carrier-based aircraft at infrequent intervals. The enemy's greatest offensive air capability, therefore, exists in the Bonin.

4. The threat of our Marianas operations has probably caused the enemy to reinforce his air bases in the Iwo and Bonin Islands to the maximum of their capacity. It is entirely possible that the enemy has not as yet exhausted the airfield potential of the Iwo Islands. The threat to the Homelands from our Marianas positions when consolidated, has probably stimulated the construction of additional airfields in the Iwo Islands. It is believed that the enemy has already exhausted capabilities of the Bonin Islands for air bases. As to the latter, it is estimated that the enemy may be able to base as many as 175 aircraft. Such disposition would be primarily for local defensive purposes, as well as to attempt to screen penetration by air north through the Bonins into Homshu. Similarly, it is estimated that the Palau Islands will receive air reinforcements for local defensive purposes, and as an outpost protection to the southern Philippines. Air strength at highly vulnerable Truk will probably not be reinforced beyond a total of 75 to 100 aircraft, and it is believed, will probably be allowed to slowly decline.

5. Our occupation of Saipan in the Marianas has breached the enemy's present perimeter defense line extending from Homshu through the Iwo and Bonin Islands, the Marianas and Palaua down to northwest New Guinea—Halmahera. The breaching of this line at the center, will compel the enemy to fall back on his next perimeter line running from Kyushu down the Nansei Shoto to Formosa, the Philippines, and Halmahera—West New Guinea. The Bonins, the balance of the Marianas, and the Palaua are now vulnerable outpost of such new line positions. The Caroline Islands are thus effectively cut off, though a tenuous air corridor from the Philippines to the Palaua and through Solai and Alet still connect them with remaining enemy positions to the west. Supply shipping could utilize this corridor, but would be forced to run the gauntlet of our medium and heavy bombers, based both north and north of it, as well as our submarine forces. Considering the enemy's urgent necessity for conserving his merchant fleet, it seems evident
that supply or reinforcement shipping into the Carolines, will be cut to an irreducible minimum. As soon as our air power is fully operative against it heavy attrition against this minimum will cause it to disappear altogether, in repetition of the previous Solomons, Bismarcks, and New Guinea campaigns. Air reinforcements could be staged through bases in the corridor, but our air attacks will render them so vulnerable as to reduce the flow even below minimum defense requirements.

6. In retiring to the Kyushu-Fomosa-Philippine-Halmahera line, it is estimated that the enemy will immediately reinforce it with air power and ground forces, will accelerate the construction of necessary defensive installations and air bases, and will vitalize the defensive capabilities of the line, by perfecting its logistic requirements. Such effort, will involve a sizeable amount of merchant shipping, which will come within the range of our Air Forces off the China coast, and in the waters bordering the southern portion of the Philippines and Halmahera. The present Japanese advance in China threatens our forward air bases from which air operations against the enemy's China coast shipping has been effectively conducted. Our submarine fleet, however, will continue to cause such increased traffic heavy losses. At the southern end of the line, land-based aircraft of the Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces from recently captured Biak airfields and extensive new ones to be constructed, will not only be in a position to attack shipping coming into the southern portion of the line, but will be able to attack the line itself, in preparation for amphibious operations.

7. The enemy's new defense line will be more difficult for our Central and Southwest Pacific Fleets to operate against, than was the Bonin-Marianas-Palmas perimeter. The line throughout almost its entire length contains important air defenses in depth and breadth. In addition, the major objectives of attack on such line, except for Davao, are mostly located on the western side of the line, compelling our carrier force attacks to fly over the width of the line with its strong air and ground defenses, to reach the important tactical and strategic objectives. These difficulties do not foreclose realization of the offensive intentions of our fleet in the Pacific, especially against the Homeland, but renders fleet and/ or fleet operations much more hazardous and subject to loss than in the past.

8. The consolidation of our positions in the Marianas will extend the perimeter of Seventh Air Force heavy bomber attack northward to include all of the Bonins, and of the Seventh, Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces to include all of the Carolines, Southern Marianas and the Palmas. Such aerial pincers will effectively cut off such areas and soften them up for later attack.
9. The enemy, by shortening his defenses to the line above mentioned, gains the important advantage of shortening his lines of communication. This will increase his available merchant fleet, both by making more ships available, and by reducing the duration of voyages. The latter, in turn, will affect an important saving in fuel. The enemy has virtually lost the western Pacific shipping lanes, and will be compelled to increase his use of the Formosa Strait-South China Sea lane, heretofore made hazardous by our submarines and the Fourteenth Air Force. The latter is in process of losing its advance bases for such anti-shipping operations, and the hazard to the enemy will be decreased at a time when his use of such sea lane will increase.

10. By withdrawal to such defense line, the enemy also gains air and logistic advantages of compressibility. He will have reduced the area in which he must dispose aircraft, and which he must supply. This should result in an increase in air strength at all points along such new defense line, so long as current production is unimpaired.

11. The proximity of our Marianas positions to the Homeland Islands, will probably have immediate repercussions in the latter. It is deemed probable that Homeland air strength will be both increased and redispersed to meet the direction and force of possible attacks; strengthening and alerting of coastal and A4 defenses will probably take place, and civilian defense measures extended. Our successful Marianas offensive appears to have already caused the replacement of the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Combined Fleets. It is probable that additional important military and naval leadership changes may be made. It is deemed probable that the bulk of the Japanese Fleet will be allowed to remain in Philippine-Formosa waters, and that the enemy intends to defend the Homeland against carrier-based air attacks with land-based aircraft, and anti-aircraft defenses.
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: CG, 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur, India
To: War Department
Nr: D 5238 24th June 1944.

To Arnold from Wolfe D 5238.

Now follows summary of damage to Imperial Iron and Steel, Yawata. Roof of power house, located approximately 3,700 feet north west of Aisugg point appears damaged. Smoke coming from only 1 of 8 stacks indicates power house still operation. No other damage noted to target, all major units appear to be in operation. Other industrial damage includes 2 large and 2 small shop buildings destroyed or severely damaged at Kokura Arsenal; several direct hits destroyed central building of Kyushu Chemical Works and destroyed or damaged several nearby buildings; 2 of 3 buildings of a light industrial plant 1 mile north of Kokura Arsenal mostly destroyed. Nonindustrial damage includes widely scattered damage to business/residential areas in cities of Yawata, Tobata and Kokura. Approx 250 acres affected in which over 1,000 business/residential buildings damaged or destroyed. Seven or 8 small areas of probably damage in Chimonoseki City to business/residential buildings totalling about 10 acres. Lack of stereo and previous photo cover precludes definite assessment in all cases at present.

End.

ACTION: GO AAF
INFO: OPD, G-2, Col. Park, LOG
CM-IN-19747 (24 June 44) 12532 mod

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11695, Sec. 5(7) and 5(7) or (8)
By SLR Date FEB 5 1974
COPY NO.
The making of an exact copy of this message is forbidden

42
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Chungking via Navy
Dated June 24, 1944
Rec'd 10:07 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington
1095, June 24, 1 p.m.

Fowler and McGovern for Stone and Rudlin re our
1008, June 9.

One. Chinese G2 now report dismantling of Wuhu
Anchi railroad completed with materials being sent
to Wuhu.

Supplementing earlier report that Japs intend
using materials to construct line from Anking to
Kiukiang. Same source new reports Japs intend build
line along Yangtze from Fukow to Hankow.

Two. Japs are reported by same source to have cut
rail road at Lohva (28-50; 115-50) and to be carrying
rails north to river by train.

Gauss

ACTION: G-2
INFORMATION: CG AAF

DECCLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-73
By H. H. Parks Date: FEB. 6 1974

CM-IN-23215 (28 June 44) 2132Z pa

DECCLASSIFIED
E.O. 12336, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
ACTION CNO MOSCOW FROM AMCON VLAD.

LEARN FROM C-1 SOURCES THAT MEMBERS JAP CONSULATE VLADIVOSTOK FACING BADLY BECAUSE LACK OF FUNDS DURING PAST FEW MONTHS WITH WHICH TO LIQUIDATE MINOR SOVIET OBLIGATIONS FOR FOOD, LIGHT, HEAT, AND WATER. BIMONTHLY COURIERS FROM MANCHURIA FORMERLY BROUGHT MANY NECESSITIES OF LIFE AND FOOD FOR PERSONNEL HERE BUT NOW BRING ONLY MAIL, AS OTHER ITEMS SAID NOT AVAILABLE.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date FEB 6 1974

CONFIDENTIAL
ALUSNA CHUNGKING

CINCPAC
COMSUBPAC
COM 7TH FLT
CTF 71

(Alusna Chungking sends action CINCPAC ComSUBPAC Com 7th FLT CTF 71 info Chno.)

AERIAL RECON TODAY SHOWS 7,000 TONS ENEMY SHIPPING HONKONG HARBOR. RATED A 2.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11850, Sec. 2(D) and 3(D) or 2(D)

By: SIR 

By: NLR 

Date: FEB 6 1974

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVRECS.)

081202 To: JAPAN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/94.
ESTIMATE OF JAP STRATEGY

2 June 1944

Japan's basic strategy is to make Allied penetration into her newly won empire as costly as possible and to prolong the war until her weaknesses will force the Allied Nations to negotiate a peace leaving Japan in possession of much of her empire or in a position to resume re-conquest at a later date. She still has implicit belief in the superiority of the spiritual strength and staying qualities of the Japanese people over that of her enemies. Our rapid advances in the Pacific have thrown her off balance but she is fast recovering. While there may be some doubt as to her ability to retain the outlying islands such as the Marinas and the Palau, she still is confident that her sea, land and air forces are capable of holding firmly the rest of her empire.

Some of the problems confronting the Japanese High Command now are:

1. Steady and rapid increase in U.S. naval and air strength.
2. Allied penetration in the West and Southwest Pacific at a much faster rate than anticipated.
4. Strong threat against Kuriles.
5. Continuing heavy shipping losses due to Submarine, Task Force and China-based air attacks.
6. Failure of Assam campaign to reduce troop traffic and consequent build-up of China-based air including V-14 preparations in India and China.
7. Allied successes in North Burma which might result in heavier movement of supplies into China.
8. Naval threat from Indian Ocean.

Recent Jap movements of air and ground reinforcements to the outer areas, ground forces action in Burma and China, and the concentration of naval and naval air force in S. Philippine waters can be construed to show a designed and related strategic pattern as a reaction to the above problems.
The China Telegram

General Ho Ting-chin’s statements denote a state bordering on panic in Chinese government leadership. This state has been brought about by a number of developments. First is the real threat of Jap military action in Central and possibly South China which the Chinese probably cannot counter with their ineffective military forces. Second is the rapidly worsening financial and economic situations. Third is the fear of a rapprochement between the Soviet Government and the Chinese Communists which would enable the Communists to assume control of North China and Manchuria as the Jap held on these areas weakens. Fourth there is a fear of a Russo-Japanese rapprochement at the expense of China. Fifth is the growing flow of criticism of the Hanhuyin Government in the American, British and Russian press. Sixth is the general deterioration in quality, health and leadership throughout the Chinese army. Seventh is increasing war weariness.

Careful comparison of the factual data presented by General Ho with the information in C-2 shows glaring inconsistencies as shown in appended Tab. A. Special information indicates only a Russo-Jap agreement on the long discussed question as to Sakhalin oil and fishing rights dating from the signing of the Russo-Jap non-aggression pact in 1941. All information indicates that no potential reduction in Jap Hanhuyin garrison has occurred so far. Failure to operate aggressively against the Japs can be charged to Hanhuyin Government forces as well as to the Communists.

We must remember too that CES has presented a bleak situation in China before and has asked for specific remedial action including loans.

Japsm is satisfied that she can restore the Pinh-Han Ky and is now testing Chinese resistance to the Changsha drive. If the Chinese defense proves weak as is probable, Japs are likely to push through the entire Canton-Hankow Ky. They may even try a drive toward KENYIAN and LUCHON, WANGHAI, for a possible junction with forces from French Indo-China. Against poor Chinese resistance these operations can be accomplished with Jap troops available in North and Central China, together with the forces now in South China and French Indo-China.

Conclusions:

1. Chinese apprehension is based on real fear of Jap military action and is accentuated by contributing factors given above.

2. Japs can occupy and reoccupy Canton-Hankow Ky. This would not only be a serious blow to Chinese morale but would also hamper 14th Air Force ability to interdict Jap shipping and other important missions.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 6/1/44
The China Telegram

General comparison of the factual data presented by General Ho with Information available in 0-2 is tabulated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Telegram</th>
<th>0-2 Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Increase of manpower possible by changing consumption ages will permit formation of 25-30 new divisions.</td>
<td>The manpower is available but 0-2 doubts that arms and equipment are ready for mobilization of such large forces at one time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. 500,000 soldiers available from Korea and Formosa.</td>
<td>Again manpower is available but Jap distrust of both races will not permit formation of pure native units. Small percentage speak and read Japanese, a prerequisite to indoctrination. Since 1938, only 19,000 Koreans inducted plus about 30,000 laborers. Estimate only 4500 Formosans in army and navy plus possibly 150,000 laborers mostly in Formosa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. 20 divisions in Manchuria prior to flush part.</td>
<td>0-2 now carries 12 divisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. 6 divisions remain in Manchuria.</td>
<td>This unit is believed to have been formed around the 1st Cav Div at Patow in Suiyuan, N. China.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. 3rd Tank Div moved from Manchuria to Honan.</td>
<td>0-2 identifies only 27 divisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Distribution of Jap forces on exterior lines 43 Div.</td>
<td>0-2 can account for possibly 4 divisions, two of which moved out of China. Miscellaneous detachments may account for 19,000 additional.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Movement of 500,000 troops south over Pain-Pu Ry 1 Mar to 15 May</td>
<td>0-2 agrees but considers these distributed between Ichang and Eulian along Yangtze and from Sinitang to Yuchow along Pingshan and Canton-Hankow Rys.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. 9 divisions in Hankow-Huchang area.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Jap combat air strength totals 8355.</td>
<td>Army and navy combat strength totals about 5400 1 June 44.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FROM ALUSNA CHUNGKING TO CNO.

JAPANESE STRENGTH IN JUHAN AREA NOT REPORTED 11 DIVISIONS PLUS 2 TANK REGIMENTS. CANTON NAM 4 DIVISIONS PLUS 1 TANK REGIMENT. TOTAL STRENGTH CHINA 35 DIVISIONS WHICH FIGURE IS HIGHEST SINCE WAR. PART OF THIS FORCE IS SAID TO BE REPRESENTED BY TRANSFER 9 DIVISIONS FROM MANCHURIA SINCE SIGNING OF RECENT FISHERIES AGREEMENT WITH SOVIET WHICH CHINESE NOW POSITIVE CONTAINS ANNEX PROVIDING FOR SOVIET NON AGGRESSION. CHINESE POINT OUT PRESENCE MECHANIZED DIVISION AND TANK REGIMENT WHICH HITHERTO UNEMPLOYED THIS THEATER AND BELIEVE ATTEMP WILL BE MADE TO CLEAR CANTON HANKON RAILWAY WHICH IN TURN THEY PROBABLY POWERLESS TO
PREVENT ALASKA COMMENT ALTHOUGH FOREGOING PASSED TO ME
BY ASST. DIRECTOR INTELLIGENCE AS ORIGINATING FROM DMI UNDER
DIRECT ORDERS GENERALISINO TO THIS OFFICE AND BRITISH RE-
PRESENTATIVE I HAVE REASONS TO BELIEVE THIS ALREADY GIVEN TO
OTHER SOURCES. THE INCREASE IN JAPANESE STRENGTH IS LIKELY
TOGETHER WITH OPERATIONS TO JOIN FORCES ALONG RAILWAY LINE IN
SOUTH CHINA. HOWEVER GROWING APPREHENSION AND MISTRUST OF
SOVIETS LONG APPARENT HERE. PRESENT DIRECTOR INTELLIGENCE
SPECIALIST IN SOVIET RELATIONS AND BELIEVED TO HAVE BIAS THAT
DIRECTION. PRIVATELY INFORMED SOURCE OF REPORTED SOVIIET
JAPANESE AGREEMENT IS PUPPET OFFICIAL CLAIMING TO HAVE SEEN
COPY OF SAME AND TO HAVE RECENTLY ARRIVED CHUNGKING WHERE HE
REPORTED TO CHIANG. SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION WOULD NORMALLY
BE RATED C-3 BUT OTHER THAN TROOP CONCENTRATIONS AND THEIR
CAPABILITIES THE FOREGOING IS PASSED WITHOUT COMMENT.
REFERENCES BY 471231 AND 471241 MARCH ALSO 471415 FEBRUARY
AND 25/8/14 MAY.

16...ACT.
COM INCH...29G...NAVAIDE...G NO...210P...

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 5-3-74
MAY 17 1974

ALUSNA CHUNGKING 311224 4423
Originator D/T Group NCR Page 2 Of 2 Pages
FOR CNO FROM ALUSNA.

RATED B2.

JAPANESE ARE MOBILIZING THEIR CIVILIANS IN FRENCH INDO CHINA AGED 18 AND OVER. ANAMITE AND CHINESE AUXILIARIES OF THE JAPANESE CONSTABULARY DETACHED TO THEIR VILLAGES HAVE RECEIVED ORDERS TO REJOIN NEAREST CONSTABULARY POST AT NEWS OF ALLIED LANDING IN EUROPE.
FROM ALUSNA TO CNO.

RATED B-2.

JAPANESE TOTAL EFFECTIVES FRENCH-INDO CHINA AS OF 15 MAY
45,750 DIVIDED AS FOLLOWS:

TONKIN 14,000
AMAN 9,750

GOODIN CHINA AND CAMBODIA 22,000.

62 AIRCRAFT VARIOUS TYPES.
FROM SOURCE RATED B-2 FOR CNO FROM ALUSNA:

JAPANESE HAVE DEMANDED OF FRENCH THE DREDGING OF THE HAIPHONG CHANNEL IN VIEW OF THE ARRIVAL OF A CONVOY BRINGING 8,000 MEN. 1 VESSEL WITH CARGO 2,000 TONS RICE DEPARTED SAIGON 18TH FOR SHANGHAI 19TH 3 SHIPS WITH 13,000 TONS RICE LEFT SAME PORT FOR SOUTH.

CHINESE FORCES DEPLOYING ABOUT TUNGKUAN AND ATTEMPTING HOLD LINGPAO ON LUNGHAI RAILWAY.

JAPANESE REPORTED ADVANCING LUSHIH AREA WEST HONAN. REPORTED GENERALISSIMO HAS ISSUED

ORDERS SHENSI BE HELD AT ALL COSTS.
ALUSNA SENDS.

OFFICIAL FRENCH SOURCES DISCLOSE JAP INTENTIONS
TO TOUR AN INDO-CHINA AS FOLLOWS:
ESTABLISHMENT NAVAL DEPOT YARDS FOR CONSTRUCTION
JUNKS AND LIGHTERS, ARMY DEPOT, AND THE AMASSING
LARGE QUANTITIES COAL. LAST TROOP REINFORCEMENTS
25 APRIL BRINGS EFFECTIVES TO 11,100 MEN THIS
AREA. GENERAL NAGANO IN COMMAND. RATED 82.

16...ACT
CINICH...CNO...2@...NAVADIE...2@OP...

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVRECS.)

190323 30JAPAN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94.
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

From: CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma & India
       Forward Echelon, Chungking, China
To: War Department
    CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma & India
       Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India
NA: 17256
     May 12, 1944

To Bissell WDUS CPD Sultan OFUK 17256 and Stillwell.

Now comes information obtained from Japanese Navy
Captain Okino by Admiral Yang, former Sino-O-S. Subject
Battleships: Prevar strength 9. 3 have been sunk (Hiyo,
Nikko, Kongo or 1 of Kongo class). Two new ones (Yamato
and Musashi) have been built. This makes present strength
8 battleships. Subject cruisers: Only 2 heavy cruisers
and 37 or 28 light cruisers left. Subject destroyers:
Prevar strength approximately 160. Present strength 60.
Subject aircraft carriers: 6 have been sunk. No new carriers
are being constructed. Merchant vessels being converted
to convoy escort carriers. More than 20 have been converted.
This program due to Japanese decision to fight defensive
warfare with land based aircraft. Convert merchantmen
suitable for towing escort duty only. Subject merchant
shipping: Prevar tonnage 6200,000 tons. Losses approximately
4,000,000. New construction 1,500,000 (Based on building
capacity of 750,000 tons annually) Present tonnage 3,730,000
tons. This does not include tonnage sailed at start of war.
Subject building program: Japan is not building any more
 cruisers or destroyers. Construction concentrated on 2 types
of ships which are especially adapted for home defense. Type
1: Kai Bo Kan. 8,000 tons, heavy fire power both offensive
and defensive antiaircraft, high speed but limited cruising
range. Several have been constructed during 1943. Type 2:
Sue Sen Lei. Especially adapted for anti submarine warfare.
Weight 100 - 200 tons. Speed 40 knots. Over 100 have been
built during 1943. Subject air strength: Navy air strength:
Prevar strength 3,000 planes of which 1,000 were first line.
Monthly production 500, Month. (This capable of increase to
1,000) Average loss 400 planes per month. Present total 6,000
planes of which 2,000 are first line. Army air strength:

CM-IN-9250 (13 May 44)

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
Prewar strength 1,000 planes. Production 600 planes per month. Losses 350 planes per month. Present strength 3,500 planes. Army Air Corps organization: At present there are 11 Air Divisions. Normal strength is 400 planes per division. However, due to losses, some divisions are not full strength. Most China area units have only 300 planes per division. Subject general: Okino states there is strong tendency for Navy to lay blame for Japanese reverses on Army. Evidence of much discord between Army and Navy. He does not think Japanese Navy capable of major offensive action because of losses. Older Navy officers pessimistic over outcome of war but young officers still optimistic. Okino was Tokum Kikan of Hankow District prior to capture in January 1944. All above information dated prior to that time. Will forward contents of interrogation when received here.

No sig.

ACTION: O-2
INFO: CG AAF
OPD
Adm. King
Col. Park
Log

CM-IN-9250 (13 May 44) 0219Z vhm
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

From: CO, U.S. Army Forces, China, Burma & India
       Forward Echelon, Chungking, China.

To: War Department.
    CO, Rear Echelon Southwest Pacific Area Gen Hq.
       Brisbane Australia.
    CO, U.S. Army Forces Central Pacific Area
       Fort Shafter, T.H.
    CO, U.S. Army Forces, China, Burma & India
       Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India.
    CO, U.S. Army Forces in South Pacific Area
       Noumea, New Caledonia.

WR: CPBX 17257       12 May 1944.

To Bissell WDGBI info CINCSWA, ANMDEL, CO, CENTFAC,
MECAL, RANE CPBX 17257 signed Stilwell, reued WAX 33820
dated 9th May.

Sino G-2 states that captured document indicates
Japanese government issued edict last fall lowering age for
induction into Army from 20 to 18. Same order increased
upper age limit from 40 to 44. On basis this document
Chinese feel it is logical that age for pre-induction train-
ing has been lowered from 17 to 15. Induction of lower age
group to start with January class as estimated they will
not appear in combat zones before this summer.

Conclusions Sino G-2 based on study this document
follows: This lowering and raising of age limits will
make available for military service an extra 2,500,000
men. This will allow the formation of 25 new divisions.
Have permission to photograph document and will forward
same as soon as obtained.

ACTION: G-2
INFO: CGAEP, OPD, Col. Park.
CM-IN-9482 (13 May 44) 10552 eij

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/44.
From: U.S. Military Attaché Chungking, China
To: War Department
No: 23493
Our 23493

9th May 1944

Oral advice from Chinese G 2 that Jap Navy Captain, former Naval Attaché Hanking personal friend Chiang Kai Shek and Howing Chin now war prisoner plane recently shot down. Complete copy interrogation promised me soon. Important points subject confirmation of written report: Main part Jap Navy concentrated home waters Japan, intend right US Navy in seas between Japan and Bonin Is, no effort replace carrier losses; reliance heavy battleships and land based aircraft of which 6,000 being reserved this purpose. Jap Navy will not fight defend Philippines. Sino G 2 rates this very high. Will forward full report when received.

Depass

ACTION: 0-2
INFO: CGAAF
OPD
Adm. King
Col. Park
Log

MAY 1 7 1974

DECLASSIFIED
RED Letter, 5-3-72

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
(CINCPAC SENDS)

CAPTURED DOCUMENT INDICATES JAP SHOOPERS ARE USING AIR BORNE DIRECTION FINDER EQUIPMENT TO
LEAD AIRCRAFT ATTACK GROUPS TO OUR TASK FORCES.
JAP SHOOPER DIRECTED TO TRANSMIT WHILE FLYING
AT LOW ALTITUDE AND WHEN TASK FORCE AND ATTACK
GROUPS ARE ON THE SAME BEARING FROM

THE SHOOPER. SKETCH INDICATES SHOOPER MAY TRANSMIT
WHEN OUR TASK FORCE AND ATTACK GROUP ARE ON

OPPOSITE BEARINGS FROM SHOOPER BUT THIS LESS
DESIRABLE. DOCUMENT LISTS 4 AIR BORNE DIRECTION

FINDER SETS ALL OF WHICH OPERATE ON FREQUENCY
OF 165 TO 1200 KILOCALCIES. SHOOPER CAN HOME

PLACES FOR DISTANCES FROM 200 TO 130 MILES
DEPENDING ON POWER USED WHICH CAN BE FROM

5 TO 154 KILOCALCIES. SAME METHOD USED TO EFFECT
REZEVOS BETWEEN 2 SHOOPERS ONE OF WHICH

RELIEVING OTHER ON STATION. NO UNUSUAL EQUIPMENT

SECRET
OR METHODS APPEAR INVOLVED.
NAVL MESSAGE

FROM ALUSNA CHUNGKING
RELEASED BY
DATE 4 MAY 1944
TOR CODEROOM 1236/4
DECODED BY SCHMICK
PARAPHRASED BY BROWN, L.
ROUTED BY PIPP

ADDRESS: CHNO
PRIORITY: DEFERRED
PRECEDENCE: 7

ALUSNA SENDS TO CHNO.

SOURCE RATED B 3 REPORTS SEVERAL HUNDRED JAP TROOPS HAVE LANDED ON YUSHAN ISLAND 26-57 NORTH 132-00 EAST. CERTAIN AMOUNT SHIPPING ACTIVITY THERE RECENTLY, BY SERIAL 218-44.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(2D) and 6(G) or (F)
GD Act May 4, 1972
By SLR Date FEB 6 1974

16...ACT

COMINCH...2CG...CHNO...28OP...NAVAIDE...

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/8/96
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Research and Analysis Branch

R and A No. 2131

SELECTED REFERENCES TO AGRICULTURAL AND
MARINE PRODUCTION IN JAPAN

Listing references in readily available English sources
to data on agricultural and marine production in Japan.

4 May 1944

When this study outlives its usefulness to you,
please return it to:

Office of Strategic Services
Director, Research and Analysis Branch
25th and E Streets, N.W.,
Washington, D. C. (25)

Copy No. 16

(42292) 3-20-40

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32 as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
SELECTED REFERENCES TO AGRICULTURAL AND MARINE PRODUCTION IN JAPAN

Agricultural Production


Page 181: data on principal farm crops (in yen) for 1926, 1931, and 1936. (Based on Norinsho Tokocho, 1936.)

Table 26, page 174: data for the years 1924-1937 inclusive, on the area (in cho) under cereals including rice, barley and wheat.

Table 29, page 176-177: data for 1920-1937 on the production of vegetables (in kan).

Table 40, page 187: data for 1920-1939 on crop area (in cho), number of producing families, production, imports, exports, and total supply.


Table 21, parts 2, 3, and 6, pages 105, 106, 107: data on production of barley, soy beans, potatoes and tea, for 1928-1937. (Based on Norinsho Tokocho, 1938). (See also Annuals of Department of Finance for previous years).

The Far East Year Book, 1941.

Table 5, page 286: area (in cho) under cultivation for the years 1926-1939 inclusive, for the following crops: rice, barley, rye, wheat, oats, tea, vegetables and mulberries.

Table 6, page 286: value (in yen) of the same crops for 1926-1939.

Foreign Affairs Association, The Japan Year Book, 1941-42.

Page 424: data on soy beans, potatoes, vegetables and tea for 1938.

Field, Frederick V., Economic Handbook of the Pacific Area, Doubleday Doran, 1934.


Table LX, page 108: data for 1926-1931 inclusive, on production of beans and potatoes.

Table LXV, page 109: data for 1927-1932 inclusive, on tea production.
Foreign Economic Administration, Special Areas Branch, Far East Enemy Division, Japan’s War Economy, 1943-44, No. E P 60,1 (Confidential).

Table, page 187: data on consumption of food produced in Japan Proper in 1943 giving total production figure.

Information provided on pages 186 and 188 regarding production of wheat, barley, soy beans and potatoes.

Shiroshi Nasu, Aspects of Japanese Agriculture, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941.

Table 86 (A) and (B), page 97: data on the value of farm products (in yen) 1930-34 (average) and 1937.

Table 87 (A) and (B), page 98: data on the production of rice, barley, wheat, vegetables, tea, mulberry by area (in cho), by value (in yen) and by per ton (in yen) for 1930-34 (average) and 1937.

Table 90, page 102: data on the production of such food crops as beans, sweet potatoes, and Irish potatoes by area (in cho), by value (in yen), and per ton value (in yen) for 1934.

Table 99, page 109: data on per ton production of barley and wheat 1930-34 (in koku).


Table 4, Agricultural Production in Japan, page 18-23: data for each year 1929 through 1939 on area (in cho), on crops (in koku), on yield per cho (in koku), and on value (in yen) for the following: barley, naked barley, wheat, soy beans, sweet and Irish potatoes, as well as other agricultural products. Data for the same years on area (in cho) and value (in yen) for vegetables; on area (in cho), on crop (in kan) on value (in yen), and on number of families occupied for tea; on area (in cho) on quantity of cocoons (in kan) on value of cocoons (in yen) and on number of families occupied for mulberries.

(Based on Norinsho Tokeiyo, 1939).

Shogaku Ronkan (Elementary Almanac), 1941, pages 220-221, CID No. 61166 (Restricted).

Data on area of production and amount of production provided for the following:
- Wheat (1939)
- Barley (1941)
- Soy Beans (1939)
- Irish Potatoes (1939)
- Vegetables (no date)
- Sweet Potatoes (1938)
Royal Institute of International Affairs, World Production of Raw Materials, June 1941.

Pages 56, 57 and 69: data on production of barley, tea and wheat for 1937-1940.

Rice

Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit.

Page 63: data on rice production for 1937, 1938, 1939 and 1940.

Schumpeter et al., op. cit.

Table 21, page 151: data on total cultivated area, area under rice, and yield for 1920-1939 inclusive.

Table 22, page 151: data on Japanese rice supply and consumption for the years 1918-1938, inclusive.

Japan Department of Finance, op. cit.

Table 21 (1), page 106: data on the production of rice for the years 1926-1937 inclusive. (Based on Norinsho Tokkinyo 1938). (See also annuals for previous years.)

The Far East Year Book, 1941.

Tables 8 and 9, page 287: data on the area under rice (in cho) and the production of rice (in koku) for the years 1929-1939 inclusive. (Table 9 also covers the years 1926-1929).

Table II, page 289: data on the demand and supply of rice for the years 1928-1940, inclusive.

Foreign Affairs Association, op. cit.

Pages 421 and 422: data on the supply and demand of rice for the years 1930-1939, inclusive.

Page 423: data on the area planted (in cho) and the rice crop (in koku) for 1930-1939.

Foreign Economic Administration, Special Areas Branch, Far East Enemy Division, op. cit.

Pages 183 and 184: data on rice production, stockpiles, rationing and prices.

Shiroshi Nasu, op. cit.

Table 97, page 108: data on per tan production of rice according to prefecture 1951-1953 (in koku).

Table 167, page 161: data on the demand and supply of rice in Japan (in koku) for the years 1922-1934, inclusive.
A. J. Gradjdanzev, op. cit.

Page 81: data on Japan's rice supply for the years 1929-1939, inclusive.

Table 4, pages 18-19: data on rice for years 1929-1939, includes:

- Total area (in cho)
- Total crop (in koku)
- Total value (in yen)
- Yield per tan (in koku)

(Based on Norinsho Tokoikyo, 1939)

Elementary Almanac, op. cit. (Restricted)

Data provided on area for rice cultivation, total rice production, and supply and demand of rice in 1939.

Silk Production

Foreign Affairs Association, op. cit.

Page 435: data on volume of silk production (in ken) and value (in yen) for the years 1924-1938. Separate data for white silk and yellow silk.

Schumpeter et al., op. cit.

Table 50, page 219: data on mulberry trees -- area (in cho), number of cultivators, and total production for the years 1920-1938.

Japan Department of Finance, op. cit.

Table 21, pages 107 and 108: data on cocoons and silk production 1928-1939. (Based on Norinsho Tokoikyo, 1939). (See also annuals for previous year).

The Far East Year Book, 1941, op. cit.

Table 2, page 302: following data for the years 1932-1939, inclusive, broken down into Spring Crops, Summer, Autumn Crops, and Combined Total crops:

- Number of cocoon raising families
- Egg -- cards hatched
- Output
- Total Value (in yen)

Table 5, page 305: data on raw silk output for the years 1927 and 1932 through 1938.

Shiroshi Nasu, op. cit.

Table 94, page 106: data by prefecture on the per tan value of mulberry products in 1934.
Table 105, page 110: data on area of mulberry farms (in cho), production of cocoons (in kwan), and value of production (in yen) for 1928 and 1930-1938.

Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit.


Stock Breeding

Foreign Affairs Association, op. cit.

Pages 424 and 425: data on the number of horses, cattle, swine, sheep and goats in 1936.

Japan Department of Finance, op. cit.

Table 22, page 108-109: data on the number of cattle, horses, sheep, goats and swine for the years 1927-1936; also number of slaughtered animals. (Based on Norinsho Jiskeiho, 1936). (See also annuals for previous years.)

Far East-Year Book, 1941, op. cit.

Table 33, page 296: data on the number of families raising cattle, horses, swine, goats, and sheep for the years 1926, 1933, 1934, 1935, 1936, 1937, 1938.

Frederick V. Field, op. cit.

Table LV, page 109: data on number of cattle, sheep, goats, and swine 1921-1930 (averages) and data on the number slaughtered.

Shiroki Hanyu, op. cit.

Table, page 45: data concerning farming families keeping cattle, horses and hogs, by number of head.

Table 57, page 66: data on the area of land for grazing (in cho) and the number of cattle, horses, and other domestic animals grazing thereon for the years 1921, 1924, 1927, 1930 and 1933.

Page 46: data on general location of farmers keeping horses.

A. J. Grajdanzev, op. cit.

Table 7, stock breeding, page 28: following data for the years 1929-39, inclusive:

- Number of families having cattle
- Number of cattle
- Number of families keeping pigs
- Pigs
- Sheep
- Goats
- Rabbits
- Horses

(Based on Norinsho Jiskeiho, 1936 and 1939.)
Forestry

Foreign Affairs Association, op. cit.

Table, page 457: data for the years 1930, 1932, 1936 on the area of forests, bamboo groves, and wild lands in Japan Proper.

Tables, page 464: data on lumber supply and demand for the years 1934-1939, inclusive.

Schumpeter et al., op. cit.

Table 44, page 199: data on timber production and imports (in koku) for the years 1916-1939.

Table 45, page 200: data on wood and bamboo production for the years 1918-1937.

Far East Year Book 1941, op. cit.

Table 1, page 308: data on the quantity (in cubic meters) and the value (in yen) of forestry output in the Japanese empire in 1938.

Table 2, page 309: data on the area (in cho) for the years 1918, 1921, 1924, 1927, 1930, 1933, and 1936 under needle-leafed trees, broad-leafed trees, mixed trees, bamboo, miscellaneous trees and without trees.

Table 3, page 308: data for the years 1932-1938, inclusive, on forestry output in quantity (in koku) and in value (in yen).

Shiroshi Nasu, op. cit.

Table 50, page 58: data on the extent of forests (in cho) in 1933, by kinds of trees.

Table 52, page 61: data on the area felled (in cho) production (in koku) and value (in yen) of forests in 1934.


Table 54, page 69: data on timber production (in koku) in 1934, by prefecture and region.

Table 55, page 69: data on forests felled and newly planted areas for the years 1926-34, inclusive.

Fisheries

Foreign Affairs Association, op. cit.

Pages 444 and 445: data on the quantity (in kan) and value (in yen) of various catches in 1933-1938, inclusive.
Schumpeter et al, op. cit.

Table 34, pages 161 and 162: data on the quantity (in kwan) of fish caught for the years 1920-1936.

Japan Department of Finance, op. cit.

Table 23, pages 108, 109, 110: data on the value of fish caught (in yen) for the years 1927-1936 and the value of the manufactured products for the same period. (Based on Norinsha Tokkeinyo, 1938). (See also annuals for previous years.)

Far East Year Book, 1941, op. cit.

Table 2(a) and (b), pages 311 and 312: data on the value of manufactured products for the years 1934-1939, inclusive, by fishing areas.

Table 4, page 313: data on the number of people engaged in fishing for the years 1933-1939, inclusive.

Foreign Economic Administration, Special Areas Branch, Far East Enemy Division, op. cit.

Page 186: estimates of total fish catch for 1943.

"A Brief Survey of the Fishing and Marine Industry of Japan", Board of Economic Warfare, 10 July 1943, OIB 81345 (Restricted) (Translated from a Russian manuscript submitted by N.N. Lury, 8 July 1942.)

Information on the territory covered by the industry, marine products and the location of the fisheries, economic significance of the industry and the fishing industry in relation to the present war.
**Naval Message**

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<th>NAVY DEPARTMENT</th>
<th>NAVAL MESSAGE</th>
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**ORIGINATOR**: FILL IN DATE AND TIME:

**DATE**: 28445
**TIME**: N.R. 2764

On outgoing dispatches please leave about one inch clear space before beginning text.

**ALUSNA SENS TO CHO.**

FOREIGN SOURCE RATED B-2, REPORTS MINISTER OF WAR ACCOMPANIED BY DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF ARRIVED SHAN 29TH. TRAINING LATER FOR LOYANG TO ASSUME PERSONAL CHARGE OF OPERATIONS IN AREA. CHINESE SITUATION REPORTED SOMEWHAT IMPROVED, SUGGESTING PLAN TO ATTEMPT STEAM JAP INVASION.

16...ACT

CHO...CHUNGKING...230...NANWAI...260P...

**Declassified**

E. O. 11505, Sec. 2(A) and 6(D) or (D) CSN Inter., May 1, 1972

By SIIC Date FEB 6 1972

**SECRET**

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVRECS.)

**OIP-SAV-SIR-15**
ALUSNA SENDS FROM SOURCE RATED A2 TO CNO.

TOTAL EFFECTIVES JAPANESE FORCES INDO CHINA UNDER DATE 15 APRIL 52,220.
SANITIZED DOCUMENT

NAVY DEPARTMENT

NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM
ALASKA MOSCOW

RELEASED BY

DATE
25 APRIL 1944

TOR CODEROOM
251448

DECODED BY
NERZ

PARAPHRASED BY
MOORHEAD THOMPSON

ROUTED BY
PIPP

ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE
CNO

PRIORITY ROUTINE DEFERRED

INFORMATION

DURING CONVERSATION WITH [REDACTED] ASKED IF ANY SOVIET ARMY OR NAVY OBSERVERS PERMITTED BY JAPS TO VISIT PACIFIC COMBAT AREAS. REPLIED NEGATIVE DEFINITELY AND THAT RED PERSONNEL IN JAPAN PRACTICALLY KEPT IN CONCENTRATION CAMP.

ASKED IF GERMAN OBSERVERS ALLOWED VISIT REPLIED TO BEST HIS KNOWLEDGE THEY WERE EARLY IN WAR BUT NOT LATELY AND FURTHER THAT JAPS NOW SENDING ALL BUT VERY FEW GERMANS OUT OF COUNTRY.

16...ACT

CONFIDENTIAL
CNO...CNO200...NAVAIDE...200P....

DECLASSIFIED E. O. 12336, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4 NLR 101 By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94
THIS MESSAGE DR-31 (TURKISH)
SAME SOURCE MY SECRET SERIAL 203 SAYS JAPS VERY BACKWARD
IN RADIO TECHNIQUE AND SHORT OF ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT FOR
DETECTING SENDING SETS. GENERAL RESTRICTIONS WITH
FREQUENT POLICE INSPECTION AND SEVERE PENALTIES FOR
POSSESSING RADIO EQUIPMENT ARE LARGELY RESULT OF THIS.
HE THINKS EMISSIONS FROM HIGH SPEED TRANSMITTER WOULD
NOT BE RECOGNIZED AS SUCH BY JAP OPERATORS WHO WOULD
PROBABLY THINK IT WAS STATIC. THIS SUGGESTS POSSIBILITY
USING SUCH A TRANSMITTER IN A FOREIGN EMBASSY.

REF MY 241719.

(Attached)

16...ACT.

COMINCH...NAVAIDE...

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/94.
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

From: American Military Attaché, Chungking, China

To: War Department
   CG, US Army Forces near echelon GHQ Southwest Pacific Area
   CG, US Army Forces Central Pacific Area
   Port Shafter, T. H.
   CG, US Army Forces in South Pacific Area
   Noumea, New Caledonia
   CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma & India
   Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India
   CG, 14th Air Force, Kunming, China

No: 23467  13th April 1944

To MILID, CINCWSPA, CG CENTPAC, MBCAL, USFOR,
COPFR, Ammdel, AMKFK, COGHK CPBK 16065 book mag nr
23467 from AMILAT Chungking.

Japan proper credited with 6 Divisions. 7th, 42nd, 46th, 47th, and 53rd. 42nd, 43rd 46th and 47th Divisions confirmed captured documents as new divisions formed around September and October 1943. 7th Division never moved from Japan proper. 53rd Division formerly stationed Manchuria. Comment above tends to show Japanese Troops Kiukiang moved to home defenses. 2000 Japanese Troops Kiukiang moved to Wuhan (Hupeh) 2 divisions already stationed there. Comment preparing for attack against Changsha. 10,000 troops arrived Hankow by Pidghaf railroad between 24th and 27th March. Japanese divisions totalling 50,000 (code numbers 616 and 126 of Kwantung Army) recently arrived Wuhan. 70 Sampan requisitioned by puppets arrived Chenglingchi (north of Tuihohow, Hunan) from Hankow 28th March large quantity military supplies. Comment as previously reported 116th Division stationed Anking moved westward to Wuhan and Cienling Areas; 3rd Division at Sinyang moved south to Wuhan and 13th Division in Kingsmen-Shasi Area moved eastwards. Above claims 2 new divisions in Wuhan area Japanese may be planning new action this area.

CM-IN-11543 (16 Apr 44)

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date, 4/13/94
French Indo-China authorities completed drafting 50,000 able bodied adults in Northern French Indo-China requested by Japanese to draft 15,000 more. Approximately 50 Japanese troop trains with 20 to 30,000 troops (Infantry and Cavalry) passed through Hsuchow by Tsinpu railroad from north between 8 and 18 March. Part believed at Hankow others destination not known. Japanese Army Telegraph Communications weave between Tokyo and Rangoon, Taipei, Manila and Hankow. Over 100 urgent telegrams exchanged between Rangoon and Tokyo on March 29th. 28th Japanese Army Headquarters reported at Drome in Burma. Over 1000 Japanese paratroops trained at Lashio. Japanese Formosen Army Headquarters at Taipei, 2nd Army Headquarters at Manila and China Expeditionary Headquarters at Hankow.

Above reported by Chinese G-2 on 2nd April and rated C3. My comment do not credit Japanese Wuhan capability attack Changsha or any other objective.

ACTION: G-2
INFOR: CG AAF
OPD
Col Park
LOG

CM-IN-11543 (16 APR 44) 1120Z mmd
(ALUSNA CHUNGKING SENDS)

CHINESE SOURCES SUBSTANTIATED BY FOREIGN SOURCES INDICATE JAPANESE CONCENTRATIONS OF PERSONNEL MUNITIONS MOTORIZED EQUIPMENT AT HSINSHIANG NORTH OF YELLOW RIVER HONAN WITH GROWING PENABILITY DRIVE SOUTHWARD ALONG PEIPING-HANKOW RAILWAY. RATED B3

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(1) and D(3) or (3)
OSD Letter, May 1, 1973
By SLR  Date  FEB  6  1974

16.....ACT

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date  4/1/1994
Naval Message

From: ALASKA CIRCUIT

Released by: 

Date: 9 Apr 1944

TOR Code room: 7929

Decoded by: REED

Paraphrased by: SCOTT/ROGERS

To: COMMANDER, PACIFIC FORCES OICS FLO T

Address: CH.0 RDG PERTH AUSTRALIA

Telegraphed for: CIR 517

Prior technically译: 

Information: Deferred

Originator fill in date and time:

On outgoing dispatches please leave about one inch clear space before beginning test:

(ALASKA CIRCUIT SAYS)

RECOL RDG 7TH SHOWS 5 CARGO 15 FEET 2 FLOATING CRANES BAILI BAY. 26,000 TONS SHIPMENT PLUS 5 LARGE MOTOR VESSELS SALIN BAY.

Contact: CH.0 FLO T

T 040306 Sec Japan

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/7 1964
ALUSNA CHUNGKING SENDS TO CNO.

RATED B2 AS OF MARCH 26 JAPANESE EFFECTIVES FRENCH INDO CHINA AS FOLLOW$: TONKIN 1,380 ANNAM 1,200 CAMBODIA 150 COCHIN CHINA 2,740 TOTAL 4,440

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11612, Sec. 2(D) and 8(D) or (R)
By SLR Date FEB 6, 1974

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 12/1/74

ALUSNA CHUNGKING • 14 APRIL 1944 • CNO 44

TOR CODEROOM 1640

DECODED BY LYNN

PARAPHRASED BY BAKER

ROUTED BY WIDMA
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM
CTF 57

RELEASED BY
3 APRIL 1944

TOR CODEROOM
2255

decoded by
BLUNT

PARAPHRASED BY
FISHER

ROUTED BY

NCR 695

ADDRESSSEES
CINCPOA
CONCENPAC

PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

PRIORITIES

FOR ACTION
INTERCEPT

(ACTION CINCPOA FROM CTF 57 INFO CONCENPAC.)

AILUK RECONNAISSANCE COMPLETED RONCELAPE (R.W. of Kompulan) AND MEJIT TODAY 2ND.

MY 261151 MARCH REPORT OF JAPANESE FIRING UNDER WHITE FLAG AT ESCON NOW FOUND TO BE FALSE.

1 COPY 27-6.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
By RT, NARA, Date 4/8/44
OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SECRET

Page 1

DECLASSIFIED

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SECRET

Page 2
Memo for Joint Intelligence Staff
Ensay Air Activity for the Week Ending 14 March 1944

Allied operations in the Admiralties continued unimpeded by enemy air attacks.

Although the enemy continued to refrain from offensive air activity on New Guinea, he made one attempt to defend his airfields at Wewak. On the 11th, a force of escorted Allied bombers attacking the Wewak airfields was heavily intercepted by the enemy and 26 enemy fighters were claimed destroyed in the ensuing combat. The following day, however, a similar Allied mission encountered no interception, suggesting that the enemy is unwilling to incur sustained losses in the defense of his forward bases and intends to conserve his striking force for employment against the next forward Allied move.

A recently captured Japanese captain who was attached to the maintenance organization of a medium bomber group based at Rabaul since September 1943, stated that his group had lost from 30 to 40 planes in operations during that period. Replacements were flown from the empire within two or three days. Some of these aircraft were produced as late as October or late November, suggesting that they had come almost directly from the production line.

**ASIATIC THEATER**

A successful blow was struck against the Japanese Air Force in central Burma during the past week. Strafing and fighter-bomber attacks against airfields in the Siboto and Haho areas resulted in the destruction of 36 enemy aircraft on the ground and ten in the air. This is the
Memo for Joint Intelligence Staff
Enemy Air Activity for the Week Ending 14 March 1944

first occasion in many months on which our forces have been successful
in finding concentrations of Japanese aircraft on the ground in this
area. This concentration of aircraft may well have reflected some
enemy offensive intentions. If so, such intentions were successfully
frustrated, as no significant offensive operations were reported during
the week.

There was an increase during the week in enemy defensive activity
over the Yangtse River Valley. Allied fighter and medium bomber
attacks against shipping in this area encountered consistent intercep-
tion which may reflect the effectiveness of the attacks of the Fourteenth
Air Force against the enemy's main artery of supply on the Yangtse
River.

The enemy again made several light night attacks against our
airfields in the Kweilin area but there are as yet no indications of
a sustained or consistent effort to neutralize these bases.

W. M. BURGESS
Colonel, GSC
Operational Deputy
Office of AC/AS, Intelligence
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: Rear Echelon GHQ SWPA
To: WAR
Mr: C-2626, 09 March 1944

To Chief of Staff from GHQ SWPA for MacArthur c/o C 2626. Attention WDUB.

German seaman, Alfred Herbert Rotter, recently escaped from the Japanese, states as follows: Japs have taken over following ships with German personnel against their wishes: Roegbach, Anatomi, Nexfjord, Oresund and Haviland. Jap attitude towards German personnel strained to breaking point. American POWs stowing Jap ships; while in transit they are locked up in holds to prevent escape if torpedoed.

No Sig

ACTION: 0-2
INFORMATION: OPD Log

Sunk in Enemy area Dec 27, 1943

Sunk in South Atlantic Jan 3, 1944.

CM-IN-5922 (9 Mar 44) 0908Z

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

COPY No. 32

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
ORANGE NO. 6

THE KAWASAKI COMPANY KOBE CONVERTED PASSENGER SHIP ABOUT 8,874 TONS TO CARRIER DURING YEAR ENDING SEPT 41.

SIMILAR SHIP CONVERTED DURING FOLLOWING YEAR. NEW CARRIER BEGAN SEPT 42 NEARING COMPLETION. 2 ADJACENT YARDS BUILDING SMALL WAR VESSELS OF TYPE PRESS REPORTS BEING BUILT IN QUANTITY SINGAPORE AND SOUTHERN ISLANDS. 1 NEW UNCOMPLETED STEEL CARGO SHIP TIED UP MANY MONTHS KOBE MAY INDICATE SHORTAGE MACHINERY, SHIPPING SHORTAGE OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED AS REASON FOOD CANNOT BE BROUGHT FROM HOKKAIDO AND COAL FROM KOREA FOR LACK OTHER MATERIALS. FERRY BOAT WITH 638 PASSENGERS SHIBISONOKI TO FUSOS ANNOUNCED SUNK BY SUB LATE OCTOBER.

16...ACT

E. O. 11665, Sec. 26D and 56D or (3)
OSD letter, May 4, 1973

SECRET

By GLIT Date FEB 6 1974

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
MY 04933 DETAILED REPORT SAME SOURCE STATES KATORIAT AT SASEBO. ISUZU AT TAMU. CHOGEI AT KUME. YURA AT YOKOSUKA. SUZUYA AT KAWASAKI KOBE. TYPE UNKNOWN NEW SHIP SATON AT MITSUBISHI KOBE. ALL ARRIVED BETWEEN 21-31 JAN. RECONDITIONING ALL EXCEPT LAST 2 DUE END MARCH THEY MID APRIL. 33 I TYPE 88 6 RO TYPE AT KURE SASEBO MAIZURY YOKOSUKA KAWASAKI TAMU MITSUBISHI BETWEEN 18 JAN AND 6 FEB FOR INCREASED SPEED DUE COMPLETION END MARCH OR MID APRIL. 19 NI TYPE MIDGET SUBMARINES TO BE COVERED WITH RUBBER COATING DUE FOR COMPLETION BY 1 APRIL. COMMENT ALL IN REFERENCE DESPATCH. 7 GERMAN EXPERTS SAID ASSISTING IN DIRECTING THIS WORK.

NOTE: NCR IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THIS DISPATCH IS COMPLETE. THERE ARE NO DEFINITE INDICATIONS OF ADDITIONAL PARTS.
ORANGE NUMBER 4.

PEOPLE READ PAPERS BELIEVE WHAT IS PRINTED AND DO NOT DISCUSS POLITICS. LATELY ALL CLASSES EXPRESSING DESIRE FOR EARLY PEACE BUT IMPLY JAP VICTORY. PRESS GENERALLY REPORTS ONLY BIG VICTORIES BUT LOSS OF ATU was REPORTED IN FAVORABLE LIGHT SURROUNDED WITH MYSTERY AND MAGIC WHICH SATISFIED PEOPLE. THEY DID NOT DISCUSS IT. NO SOLDIERS FROM ATU WERE SEEN. IN GENERAL CIVILIANS DO NOT KNOW WHAT IS HAPPENING AT FRONT AND VICE VERSA. 1 WOUNDED SOLDIER AFTER TELLING ABOUT BOMBING AND SHELLING HE HAD BEEN THROUGH ON PACIFIC ISLAND EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT AT CHANGES AT HOME, REFERRING TO CLOTHES PEOPLE WERE WEARING AND GENERAL RUNDOWN CONDITION OF BUSES AND TAXIS HE SAID "I DID NOT THINK JAPAN WAS LIKE THIS". IN SPITE OF PROPAGANDA JAPS ARE DEPRESSED AND

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11235, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/1945
NOT OPTIMISTIC. THEY KEEP SAYING THEY WILL WIN BUT DO NOT BELIEVE IT. MORE PEOPLE VISIT SHRINE TO HONOR DEAD MILITARY FUNERALS HELD FOR ALL MEN REPORTED KILLED OR MISSING PLAY AN IMPORTANT PART IN JAPANESE LIFE. THERE ARE MANY. IN JAPAN ONE GETS IMPRESSION JAPAN STRONGER THAN GERMANY. MANY EXPECTED GERMAN DEFEAT THIS SPRING FROM TURKEY GERMANY APPEARS THE STRONGER. WHEN INDEPENDENCE PHILIPPINES AND OTHER OCCUPIED COUNTRIES WAS ANNOUNCED KOREA DEMANDED HER ALSO AND IN SUMMER 1943 STARTED REVOLT WHOSE SERIOUSNESS NOT KNOWN BUT JAPS SEEM WORRIED AND KOREANS NOW HAVE MORE FREEDOM AND FOOD THAN JAPANESE AT HOME. THE FEW WHO CAN VISIT KOREA NOW FIND IT PARADISE
METROPOLE NUMBER 3 ORANGE WHICH IS SECRET.

FEW THOUSAND GERMANS IN JAPAN. THEY RIDICULOUSLY COMMUNICATE ANNOUNCING VICTORIES. ADMIT WAR LOST AND DO NOT EXPECT RETURN HOME. PRESS PUBLISHING MORE AND MORE RUSSIAN NEWS AND IS REALISTIC IN ANNOUNCING GERMAN DEFEATS.

GERMANS THINK JAPAN MAY BE ABLE TO CONTINUE WAR LONG TIME.

GERMANS TRAVEL FAIRLY FREELY BUT ALWAYS FOLLOWED AND 3 WERE IMPRISONED FOR SPYING 1942.

ALL FOREIGNERS REMOVED YOKOHAMA TO CONCENTRATION CAMP AND PLANS SAME FOR TOKYO KOBE. NO MOTOR TRANSPORT EXCEPT FEW OLD TAXIS AND BUSES BURNING CHARCOAL. ALL WILL BE WORN OUT IN 1 YEAR. RAILROAD EQUIPMENT GOOD CONDITION. TRAINS FEWER WITH REDUCED SPEED BUT MORE CARS. 2 DAILY TRAINS KOBE TOKYO. 1 PASSENGER SHIP BETWEEN KOBE SHANGHAI TAKES 15 DAYS.

SECRET
NO INFORMATION AND PLANE COMMUNICATION WITH GERMANY BUT RUMORS OF SUBMARINES IN THAT SERVICE.
GERMAN AMBASSADOR REPORTED LEFT IN SUB IN OCTOBER.

16....ACT
CNO....COMINCH....210....NAVAID....210P....

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 2(D) and 5(D) or (F)
OSS letter, May 1, 1974
By SLR Date FEB 6 1974

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREDS.)
NAV-NCB-45

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
(ALUSNA CHUNGKING SENDS.)

MINISTER WAR CONFIDENTIALLY INFORMS THAT REPORT FROM RELIABLE AGENT STATES SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE RECENTLY CONFERRED WITH HIGH JAPANESE OFFICIAL IN MANCHURIA. THIS FOLLOWED BY MEETING JAP REPRESENTATIVE AND LEADING MANCHURIAN OFFICIAL. HIS MINIMUM INTERPRETATION WAS AGENDA CONCERNED WITHDRAWAL SOVIET BORDER GARRISONS IN ORDER RELEASE JAPANESE TROOPS AND PLANES. GENERAL HQ ESTIMATES 1500 JAP PLANES MANCHURIA. AGENT HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO OBTAIN FURTHER DETAILS WHICH WILL BE GIVEN US. RATED C3.
ALUSNA CHUNGKING SENDS.

RATED A-2.

FRENCH AUTHORITIES HAVE AGREED TO ESTABLISHMENT JAPANESE GARRISONS AT JINH QUINHON ALTHOUGH NOT YET OCCUPIED. REINFORCEMENTS ALSO AGREED TO AT THANHhoa.

DECLASSIFIED

R. O. 11010, Sec. 23D and 21D or (ID)
GSS letter, May 4, 1942

16...ACT

CONFIDENTIAL...2G...

SECRET

Make—original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76.4 NAV REGS.)

060930 360 Japan

DECCLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94
RAFFLE NUMBER 3 ORANGE WHICH IS SECRET.

CLOTHING HAS BEEN MADE OF FABRIC BUT PLAN NOW PUT ALL CIVILIANS IN STANDARD TYPE UNIFORM MADE OF FIBRE AND TWENTY PERCENT COTTON. WOMEN TO WEAR TROUSERS MADE FROM OLD CLOTHES. ANNUAL RATION ABOUT 1 COMPLETE OUTFIT BUT ARTICLES NOT AVAILABLE. NO LEATHER SINCE 2 YEARS. MOST CHILDREN BAREFOOT. DIFFICULT FOR EUROPEANS FIND CLOTHES BLACK MARKET. NO INFORMATION OIL SUPPLY OR RESERVE. NO EVIDENCE OF SHIPMENTS ARRIVING EXCEPT MANY NEW TANKS NEAR MOJI. SHIP CARRYING 100% ENGINEERS AND SCIENTISTS TO OIL FIELDS IN INDIES WAS SUNK WITH ALL ON BOARD. FEW REMAINING TAXIS AND BUSES USE CHARCOAL OR WOOD. NO DIESEL OPERATING. COAL FROM MANCHUKUIN FOR INDUSTRY IS ADE-
QUATE. ESTIMATED RESERVE FOR 1 MONTH ON HAND KOSIOSAKA.
NONE FOR PRIVATE USE. SOME RUBBER REACHES KOB\ WHERE
TIRES AND OTHER MILITARY EQUIPMENT OF INFERIOR QUALITY
ARE MADE. NO RUBBER FOR PRIVATE USE KOKO.

E. O. 11652, Sec. 2010 and 507 or (2)
ORD 460, May 4, 1972

By SLR Date: FEB 6 1974
ORANGE NUMBER 2

FOOD SHORTAGE GREATEST PROBLEM JAPANESE PEOPLE. GOVERNMENT REPORTS NO SHORTAGE BUT CONDITION GROWS WORSE AND NO VISIBLE SIGN OF RESERVE. IMPORTS DROPPED DUE LOW GOVERNMENT PRICES AND RESULTING LOW PRODUCTION MANCHUKUO. ALL MONEY IS SPENT FOR FOOD SINCE NOTHING ELSE TO BUY. GERMANS AND JEWS ONLY PEOPLE WITH MONEY FOR CLOTHES AND ENTERTAINMENT. EVERYTHING RATIONED INCLUDING ITEMS WHICH DON'T EXIST. BLACK MARKET ACTIVE AND WIDESPREAD.

FAMILIES BOTH JAP AND FOREIGN SEND SCOUTS AT 4 AM DAILY TO SEARCH PLACES WHERE FOOD REPORTED. JAP DISCIPLINE BREAKS DOWN HERE. RICE INADEQUATE AND INFERIOR. DEEP SEA FISHING INDUSTRY DESTROYED BY SHORTAGE FUEL AND CREWS. LOCAL FISH SCARCE AND INFERIOR. MEAT PRACTICALLY UNKNOWN TO JAPS. FOREIGNERS ALLOWED 1 1/2 POUNDS PER MONTH. NEWSPAPER ARTICLES RECOMMEND RATS, NO FOOD TO RAISE CHICKENS. BREAD FOR FOREIGNERS MADE OF SWEET POTATOES AND LITTLE FLOUR FREQUENTLY INEDIBLE. SUGAR EGGS AND BUTTER RARE. TEA PLENTIFUL. CHIEF ITEM OF DIET IS LARGE RADISH.

SOLDIERS SAILORS LOOK WELL FEED. 16...ACT COUSINS...CHI...NAVAL...

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/194
**NAVAL MESSAGE**

**FROM:** ALUSNA CHUNGKING  
**RELEASED BY:**  
**DATE:** 4 MARCH 1944  
**TOR CODEROOM:** 1259  
**DECODED BY:** BECKMAN  
**PARAPHRASED BY:** SMITH  
**ROUTED BY:** WIDMAN

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<th>DATE</th>
<th>TIME</th>
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ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT.

FROM ALUSNA CHUNGKING.

FROM GENERAL ISSEYMO'S ADVISER JAPANESE AFFAIRS passed as CO. 17 BATTLESHIPS AND HEAVY CRUISERS plus 54 LIGHTER CRAFT RECALLED TO 6 BASES FOR ALTERATIONS DUE TO BE COMPLETED BY 1 MAY. HE BELIEVES GUN ALTERATIONS (PROBABLY INCREASED AA) BUT MENTIONS TO PAINT VESSELS WITH RUBBER BASE/OFFSET RADAR. COMMENT SOURCE SOMETIMES APPEARS TO HAVE GOOD INFORMATION FOREGOING PASSED FOR POSSIBLE CHECKING OTHER SOURCES SHIPS REFERRED TO ABOVE ARE JAPANESE.

---

E. O. 11658, Sec. 8ID and 8ID or CDE  
OOD letter, May 6, 1972

By ELR  
FEB 6 1974

COMINCH-20G...CHO...20P...NAVAVE...  

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

040330 320 Japan

DECLASSIFIED  
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
CELANO ORANGE NUMBER 1.

JAP CIVILIAN POPULATION SUFFERING FROM UNDER NOURISHMENT INHUMAN LIVING CONDITIONS AND RESULTING DISEASES WHICH GROW WORSE CONSTANTLY.

ADULTS AND CHILDREN LOOK WEAK AND UNDERNOURISHED. LOW BLOOD PRESSURE, SKIN DISEASES OF VARIOUS TYPES AND SCURVY ARE GENERAL. PUBLIC BATHS DIRTY. MALARIA BROUGHT BY RETURNING SOLDIERS IS SERIOUS. 59% DIED FROM TYPHUS IN 1941 AREA DURING SPRING 1942 BUT EPIDEMIC BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL. DYSENTERY INCREASED BUT SEVERITY NOT KNOWN.

INSpite of above they consider tuberculosis most important health problem. Hospitals badly overcrowded and dirty. Illustrated by patient sent home immediately after haemorroid operation travelled by train then walked 1 mile.

SECRET
Doctors and dentists inadequate and inefficient.
Patients wait in line several hours.
Many hotels converted hospitals for wounded soldiers who are kept segregated from civilians.

16...ACT
CONVANCED...20...3NO...NAVATDE...20DP...

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVRECS.)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/45
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM ALUSNA CHUNGKING

RELEASED BY

DATE 23 FEBRUARY 1944

TOR CODEROOM 1658

DECODED BY MONROE

PARAPHRASED BY RODGERS/REBER

ROUTED BY WILLIAMS

ADDRESS

CNO

PRECEDENCE

1

INFORMATION FOR ACTION

PRIORITY ROUTINE DEFERRED

CONCEALMENT

PRIORITY ROUTINE DEFERRED

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

ON OUTGOING DISTANCES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING Text

( ALUSNA CHUNGKING SENDS )

AS OF FEBRUARY 23 SOURCE RATED A 2. JAP TROOPS TONKIN 9,000 ANAM, 21,000 COchin CHINA 259,000 CAMBODIA 1,400 TOTAL

38,000. AVIATION AT SAIGON 127 FIGHTERS 124 BOMBERS 35 TRANSPORTS. AT TOURAN 127 FIGHTERS 124 BOMBERS 35 TRANSPORTS. AT TOURAN PROBABLY 15 UNDETERMINED TYPE. AT RIALAM 2 SQUADRONS FIGHTERS

16 ACT

ADD COMINCH 250 PER 16

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 8(B) and 5(D) or (E)

OCD letter, May 3, 1972

By SLR Date FEB 6 1974

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAV REGS.)

DECLASSIFIED E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44

23 0730 3 to Japan
SEVERAL JAPS HAVE RECENTLY ARRIVED VLADIVOSTOCK FROM KAMCHATKA EVIDENTLY CONNECTED TO RENEWAL JAP FISHING AGREEMENT. TOTAL NR NOW 12 INCLUDING CONSULAR STAFF. ONLY 1 OF THEM OBTAINING INFO AMERICAN ACTIVITIES.
### JAP ORDER OF BATTLE, 9 FEBRUARY 1944

**South Pacific, Southwest Pacific, and Central Pacific Areas**

#### New Guinea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Troops</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saidor Area</td>
<td>1,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramu to Madang</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madang</td>
<td>11,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabia</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wewak</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manus I.</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>37,000</td>
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#### New Britain

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<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Troops</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E of Borgod Bay</td>
<td>4,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arawe</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talasea-C. Hoskins</td>
<td>3,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gazmata</td>
<td>3,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uberi</td>
<td>800</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jacquinot Bay</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wide Bay</td>
<td>300</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rabaul</td>
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#### New Ireland

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<tr>
<td>Namatanai</td>
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#### Bougainville

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<td>Esp. Aug. Bay</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kahili-Choiseul Bay</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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**DECLASSIFIED**

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/44
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<tr>
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<td>1,700</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jaluit</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nauru</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ocean</td>
<td>600</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenwich</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Central Pacific Totals**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
By January 28, 1944,

Local Director Office War Information has report from German intelligence source that Japanese agents in Balkans are sending military information to Russians.

16...ACT

COMINCH...26G...CNO...NAVACE...24OP.....

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
JAPANESE ORDER OF BATTLE

(Source: Cable (M-IN #2086), dated 31 January, 1944, giving strength of aircraft as of 30 January, 1944.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>FIGHTERS</th>
<th>BOMBERS</th>
<th>COMPARISON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern Burma</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>(+ 40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Thailand</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern French Indo-China</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hainan</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton-Hongkong</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formosa</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nanking</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hankow</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai-Hangchow</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>575</strong></td>
<td><strong>520</strong></td>
<td><strong>(+105)</strong>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Are such tables used as basis for posting?

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94
From: Lisbon
To: MILID
No.: 1114 27 January 1944

For Strong.

Jan 15 began Budapest periodical convention Jap MAS stationed Europe. Investigation of Jap activities Lisbon and especially agitation of Jap legation Consul Taro Inoue who for obscure reasons was extremely eager to expound Jap point of view to Polish and Hungarian special representatives here crystallize into following evaluation of Jap situation re European war conduct. Repeated Madrid.

Japs have heretofore politically and operationally considered European war anchored to Italo Germ Axis as distinct and separate from their own which in main still is aero naval operation with bulk of their ground forces mazed in Manchuria.

Since Italys defection as Axis partner and Red successes Japs began take increased notice of European military events culminating today in vital concern affecting own survival.

To face Allied assault Japan needs two years economic consolidation to which continuation European hostilities prerequisite, also at end of period she feels Allies will become war weary.

Her thesis is built upon mistrust among Allies and her first shock was received when Teheran conference took place where unconditional surrender was omitted signifying Russia seeks political as well as military solution of Germ question and wanting Rus restraint.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date _/12/44_
From: Lisbon
To: MILID
No. 1114 27 January 1944

Japs stress importance of Polish Soviet situation from global angle and assert this presents first practical test of Teheran. If problem settled amicably and constructively confidence among Allies will be established and Japs will have to seek different orientation.

In Jap estimation Russ reasonableness and restraint coupled with Allies faith in Moscow present indispensable conditions to establishment of second front in Europe. They reason that without underlying faith in Red integrity Allies will not risk invasion as sudden separate Red Germ compromise would be catastrophic to allied armies. By same token invasion would not be undertaken they argue if its successful outcome would only serve Russ ends in Europe.

Predicted on confidence among Allies and emboldened by Russ restraint Germany is faced by spectre of capitulation and entire burden of war would be shifted to Far East before Japs are ready. Cessation of hostilities in Europe imperil Jap position not excluding joint Allied attack on Japan.

Reasonable to conclude Japs will strain every effort to further aggravate Polish issue which they consider primordial and pivotal and to prevent establishment of second front in Europe under conditions favorable to Allies. They will continue to sow discord and undermine confidence. In this respect local police source says Japs originated Pravda incident and among their number here are Red agents. Should these machinations fail they are faced by crucial decision to attack Russia.

CM-IN-18718 (28 Jan 44) RECLASSIFIED
M. O. 1164-2, Sec. 4(D) and 4(D) or 39
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By SLR Data FEB 6 1974 39

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Lisbon
To: MILID
No. 1114 27 January 1944

In presenting above I am not unmindful of following imponderables:

A. How long and how intensively can Russ continue their offensive effort?

B. How long can Germ defensive potential last?

C. How effective is bombardment over Germany's war potential?

D. Allied capacity to take punishment in the field and human price they are willing to pay for victory.

Solborg

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: CPD
OGMAF
White House
LOG

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3 (b) and 6 (d) or (9
OSD Issuer, May 3, 1972
By SLR Date FEB 6 1974

CM-IN-18718 (26 Jan 44) 15506 03

SECRET
COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
Large part Jap troops southern Shanxi reported will transfer during January reinforce defenses North Pacific, troops southern Shantung and along Tainpu Lunghai being moved toward Haichow, about 10,000 Jap troops reported arrived Canton 29 December western Yunnan about 2000 troops Kiao-tou, 700 Hweipo and Wuchiaowan, road recently completed by Japs from Mangshih to Pingka via Siandel one to 3 meters wide capable moving artillery. Indo China Thailand Burma; Enzky Hung Ban Indo China opening new airfields, about 20,000 Jap troops along railroad Bangkok Panpang, confirmed captured documents headquarters 18 Division moved Myitkyina to Sswingban, 2 KM north Maingkyan, Highway 9 feet wide completed Tanya Bum south of Tare to Lockin and Xamning. Sadaki Nakamichi Deputy Chief Staff North China Command, Lt Gen Issaku Hishihara Commanding Cavalry Group Pactow, Yoshitaka Akiyama Commanding Seventh Ind Mixed Brig Shantung all returned Japan. Captured documents confirm Kasahvi Hanayo Chief Staff First Army Shanxi Commander 55 Division Burma relieved by Daningri (query). All above from Sino 0-2 rated 03 comment: no indications so far movement troops Shanxi to north Pacific.

ACTION: O-2
INFORMATION: OPD

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/44
(FROM ALUSNA CHUNGKING. ACTION CNO, CINCPAC, COMSOWESPACFOR, COMTASKFOR 71)

B3

13 Nov JAP NAVAL PERSONNEL ARRIVED HONGKONG DEC. 20
FROM SHANGHAI. C3 REPORT WHICH SUBSEQUENTLY APPEARS
CONFIRMED STATES FIVE TRANSPORTS BROUGHT 10,000
TROOPS FROM FORMOSA TO HONGKONG 8 DEC. THESE
PROBABLY ROUTINE RELIEFS BUT MAY POSSIBLY BE USED
TO STRENGTHEN CONTROL CANTON-KWALOON RR AND EXTEND
AREA NOW OCCUPIED THAT VICINITY. NO REPORTS OF
TROOP DEPARTURES FROM HONGKONG. INCREASED PATROL
BOAT ACTIVITY HONGKONG WATERS.

16...ACT

by SLR

Date FEB 6 1974

SECRET
From: Ankara
To: Secretary of State, Washington
Dated: 5 January 1944
Number: 22

A ranking official in the Turkish Embassy in Tokyo has just arrived in Ankara after a trip lasting 59 days. He makes the following comments about the situation in Japan.

The Japs have such a fanatical hatred of white people that even the Germans in Tokyo, along with other diplomats, are under a severe strain. Although they may move about freely in the city, secret agents always shadow them, and permission three days in advance is necessary if they want to leave Tokyo. Our informant quoted General Ota as saying that when the real air attacks on Japan start, even the Germans will be included in the massacre of all white men.

Diplomats in Tokyo have no entertainment or social life of any kind, and even the Germans neither extend nor accept any invitations. The Japanese Government supplies the diplomatic corps with food and other necessaries at reasonable prices. On the open market there is practically nothing to be bought. Outside news reaches the Turkish Embassy by radio broadcasts from our west coast.

The Japanese officials our informant dealt with seemed completely confident of Japanese victory, although what their actual beliefs are he could not tell. These Jap officials insisted that they can match us in everything except productive capacity, the factor which they say has delayed their victory.

The military completely control Japan, and no one dares to speak frankly. A short time before the informant left Tokyo, a nobleman in the House of Peers, who in secret session had criticized the Government, was sent a dagger the evening he made his speech, and he killed himself three days afterward.

The informant says American war prisoners on the streets from time to time. They were under guard and seemed clean and moderately healthy. Blockade runners reach Japan from Germany fairly often, with their arrivals demonstrated by the appearance on the streets of German sailors.
From: An
To Secretary of State, Washington
Dated: 5 January 1944
Number: 22

In Tokyo there is a general feeling that at the time of Pearl Harbor Prince Konoye was the leader of a powerful opposition group, which included conservative diplomats and ministers, and which planned to get rid of the military regime and overthrow the Government if the Pearl Harbor attack failed. When it was an almost complete success, their hands were tied.

The same night that word of Italy's surrender reached Tokyo, the members of the Italian Embassy were arrested. They were all put in a concentration camp, after suffering great indignities. When Brazil's Ambassador was leaving Tokyo for Farina, where he is now confined in the Brazilian Legation, he protested about being obliged to carry his own luggage when there were many coolies on hand. He was told that in Asia there is no longer any such thing for Europeans as a coolie system.

Steinhardt.

ACTION: G-2
INFORMATION: G6P
OG AAP
S6S
LOG

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter 1-11-72
By H. H. Parke Date FEB 12 1972

CH-IN-6252 (10 Jan 44) 14032 mca