

MR 300 ITALY (1) Sec. 1 - Warfare

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MR 300 ITALY (1) Sec. 1 - Warfare

June ~~May~~, 1942, thru August, 1943

Map Room
Box 90

June
(~~May~~, 1942, thru August, 1943)

Box 90

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

JDJD C 20
Filed 31/1135B
AB

INCOMING MESSAGE

31 August 1943
1453Z

EYES ONLY

P R I O R I T Y

FOR HULL AND MARSHALL EYES ONLY

From: Algiers
To: WAR

W 8750, 31 August, 1943

General Z in his conversations (From Murphy and Eisenhower for Hull and Marshall eyes only) with us has mentioned the following political points in regard to the Italian situation. The Italian governments position not only started by being weak at home but it was faced with a desperate military and political situation abroad. One of its difficulties is that it is dominated by used men, the King, Badoglio, etc, who have for many years submitted at least in part to the domination of the Fascists. It is too much now to expect spectacular initiative on their part. General Z made the analogy with Marshal Petain. Although in his opinion the authority of the government was not seriously questioned in Italy now by the Italians even those of the extreme left and it had been able completely to set aside Fascism nevertheless the slowness with which these measures had proceeded has meant that the Germans have had sufficient time to make dispositions to take over and that they may very well do so before the Italian Government completed arrangements with the Allies. He emphasized that no one could tell how long the Germans would leave the Italian Government any freedom of action whatsoever. It might be a question of days or even hours before complete German control would be assumed through the use of military forces if necessary. This might take the form of a Quisling Government under some former well known Fascist

CM-IN-23592 (31 Aug 43)

[Printed in Papers of Dwight Eisenhower, War Years, II, 1371-1373]

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

[Printed in Papers of Dwight Eisenhower, War Years, II, 1371-1373]

P R I O R I T Y
FOR HULL AND MARSHALL EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

From: Algiers
To: WAR

Nr: W 8750, 31 August, 1943

such as Farinacci who is now in Germany or of the appointment of a German Gauleiter. Whereas the bulk of all Italian elements are convinced that Fascism is a dead letter in Italy their primary concern today aside from the fundamental desire to rid the country of German military forces is the fear that the German General Staff may decide to throw Germany into the arms of the Soviet Union since there was no doubt in the minds of most intelligent Germans that they could not win the war. General Z said that in Rome there had been a number of indications that conversations had taken place between the Russians and the Germans prior to the Orel offensive. In Italian opinion the German General Staff and party leaders calculate that rapprochement with the Soviet Union may offer the guarantee of preserving Germany intact as a nation even though it may be welded into a Soviet bloc. The Germans are confident that their industrial population would eventually achieve a dominant situation in such a Tuto - Slav combination. The appointment of Himmler as Minister of the Interior controlling 3,000,000 SS the Italians regard as the first step in this direction. On the other hand they have nothing to hope for the Anglo-American nations but disintegration and ruin. Italy according to General Z is badgered by this fear that once in the camp of the Americans and British it would later be faced with a Russo - German combination at its front door with Britain and America far away. He points out that one of Germany's difficult problems lies in working out a procedure whereby the power may be transferred if the German General Staff for example should effect the elimination of Reich Chancellor Hitler. That is a much more difficult process than is the case in Italy where the Royal House provides a medium by which legally the transmission of power can be effected in the traditional manner. In Germany a violent break undoubtedly would be required. General Z gave an interesting account of Mussolini's downfall which had followed a meeting of

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P R I O R I T Y

FOR HULL AND MARSHALL EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

From: Algiers
To: WAR

Nr: W 8750, 31 August, 1943

Fascist Grand Council the vote of which had been 17 to 7 against him. His only supporters being such extreme Fascists as Farinacci and Scorza. After the meeting Mussolini was summoned to the Royal Palace where the King brushed aside Mussolini's pretensions to continue on a modified basis and flatly informed him that his resignation had been accepted. On leaving the Palace Mussolini was ushered into an automobile in the guard of Carabinieri and was first taken to Lipar. His present whereabouts are not definitely known to the General but he is thought to be in the North Tyrrhenian Sea. It should not be forgotten in the opinion of General Z that the House of Savoy has acted as a stabilizing influence in Italy for the past 6 centuries. He believes this peg on which a transition regime may be attached is essential if chaos in Italy is to be avoided. The present Italian regime is managing to keep comparative order and tranquility in the country which according to the General should work to the benefit of the Allies. The disposition of Italian forces in the Rome area is stated by the Italians to the Germans as designed for the purpose of protecting the area against an Allied landing but actually it is intended to defend the city and the airfields against the Germans. According to General Z many airfields in Italy are still controlled by Italian forces who after an arrangement will receive and aid the Allies. In his opinion every top Italian officer is opposed to the Germans and ready under an appropriate arrangement to join with the Allies. General Z declared that he was not informed of the nature of the last conversation between Mussolini and

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P R I O R I T Y

FOR HULL AND MARSHALL EYES ONLY

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From: Algiers
To: War

Nr: W 8750, 31 August, 1943

Hitler said that the recent meeting between the Italian General Staff and Field Marshals Rommel and Jodl was limited to technical army matters. Virgilio Gayds General Z informed me has been interned outside of Rome. I took the liberty to suggest to General Z who agreed that he would appreciate the internment of Pound the traitor American who has been broadcasting from Rome during these past months and that he be held for delivery to us at the earliest possible moment.

No Sig.

ACTION: CCS (GEN DEANE)

INFORMATION: OPD
GEN STRONG
C OF S

[Printed in Papers of Dwight Eisenhower, War Years, II, 1371-1373]

[Printed in Papers of Dwight Eisenhower, War Years, II, 1371-1373]

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EDCC
31 August
1442Z

EYES ONLY

[Printed in Papers of Dwight Eisenhower, War Years, II, 1373-1374]

URGENT

For Marshall's and Hull's Eyes Only

From: Algiers
To: WAR

No: W 8751 31 August 1943

In further conversation with General Z late today (from Murphy and Eisenhower for Marshall and Hull eyes only) he reemphasized that in Italy today we are dealing with used men laboring under the handicap of 20 years of Fascism and the embarrassment of past actions. Yet the only man he said who now could possibly replace Badoglio who is generally regarded as an honest patriot would be General Ambrosio. The latter he declared does not enjoy the prestige which Badoglio unquestionably possesses, which is essential for the transition period incident to the advent of the Allies if chaos and confusion embarrassing to the Allies are to be avoided and effective cooperation with the Allies by the Italian army is to be extended.

Should the Germans learn of our present conversations in General Z's opinion their plans are perfected to seize all top Italian authorities and possibly the Pope and establish their Quisling in Italy. General Z and his friends who he said for months have given much study and thought to these eventualities have considered the means necessary to effect the escape from German control of the Government and King. The latter while well disposed are conservative and rather helpless in their expectance that the Allies will deliver them. Initiative must come from the more energetic younger army officers working with the Allies.

General Z discussed at length the possibility of effecting their escape by Italian Naval vessel out of Spezzia with air coverage provided by the Allies to Sardinia. There he said the four Italian Divisions could easily overcome the one German Division present, especially if the Allies could provide a little support. This of

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EYES ONLY

From: USFOR London
To: WAR

No: W 8751 31 August 1943

course would only be necessary if an Allied landing on the mainland did not ~~provide~~ in cooperation with the Italian army which General Z assumes will work with us the necessary protection for the present government. Naturally if the mainland operations are not adequate for these purposes the advantages of the acquisition of Sardinia (which almost automatically would entail that of Corsica) are considerable.

The long conversations with General Z demonstrate that the Italian General Staff have pondered over every possible "combinations" leading out of the morass in which Italy flounders.

No Sig.

ACTION: Gen Deane (CC/S)

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Strong
C of S

[Printed in Papers of Dwight Eisenhower, War Years, II, 1373-1374]

CM-IN-23541

(31 Aug 43)

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SECURITY CONTROL
30 August 1943

EYES ONLY
URGENT
SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers
To: War

Number W 8685/8030, NAF 344 30 August 1943

Military information which follows received from General Z. To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower cite FHGBI. This is NAF 344. Information dated up to 24th August. Preceding Para 1.

Para 2. German Order of Battle in Italy.

A. Following Divisions in Genoa - Livorno area. 305th Infantry, 94th Infantry, 76th Infantry, 65th Infantry with 44th Infantry moving down from north. Comment. 65th Infantry Division may be error for 71st as General Z first gave number as 61st. Previous report from General C gave 55th (probably 65th) in Ravenna Area. Seems probable however that both 71st and 65th Divisions are in Italy though exact location unknown. All were good divisions partly motorized but not all up to strength.

B. 1 SS Division (probably Adolph Hitler) and 21st Panzer Division in Reggio Nell Emilia Area. SS Division Reich was moving into same area from Germany. Divisions were up to strength. Comment. 21st Panzer Division may be a mistake for 24th Panzer Division but General Z was emphatic that number was 21.

C. 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division and 2nd Fliieger Division respectively north and south of Rome. Former had attached troops which made it equivalent of 1 and 1/2 divisions and had some 50 to 60 tanks. 2nd Fliieger Division had been reinforced by some tanks and heavy artillery. These divisions constituted the German threat to Rome and were not believed to have any coastal defense roles. Divisions were hinged onto 5th Italian Army but in reality were Kesselrings body guard and would act under his orders.

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SECURITY CONTROL

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From: Algiers Page 2
To: War
Number W 8685/8030, NAF 344 30 August 1943

D. 15th Panzer Grenadier, Hermann Goering and 16th Panzer Divisions were located in area Gaeta - Naples - Salerno. 26th Panzer Division was in Castrovillari - Catanzaro area and 29th Panzer Grenadier Division in toe. One Flieger Division was practically non existent. 16th and 26th Panzer Divisions were excellent divisions and must be presumed up to strength. On 24th August the 3 Divisions in Sicily were equivalent in strength to 1 good division. 15th Panzer Grenadier and Hermann Goering Division had very few tanks. All 3 divisions were being reported with troops which were moving south through Rome. This traffic however seemed to be greater than that needed to bring divisions up to strength. Comment. One Flieger Division is believed to be stronger than thought by General Z and we estimate it to be equivalent of 5 to 6 battalions.

E. General Z stated of 16 divisions at present in Italy 12 were up to strength and although some divisions lacked various types of equipment the force as a whole was up to strength.

Para 3. German strategy.

A. Germany's first task is directed towards building up her forces in the north and making the line Genoa - Rimini firm. When General Z left on 25th August Germans were considering, move forward to line of river Arno. As their forces became stronger they would then move further south to the line Grosseto - Amiata - Perugia - Ancona. This provided a strong line with the high ground on either side of Lake Trasimeno. It was even possible they would push forward to a line Gaeta - Isernio - Vasta on which some fortifications were already being prepared. These moves were dependent on Allies. If we showed strength Germans would remain in north and withdraw slowly their forces in south. If Allies revealed weakness Germans would fight in south.

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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SECURITY CONTROL

EYES ONLY SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers
To: War

Page 3

Number W 8685/8030, NAF 344

30 August 1943

B. All lines were naturally strong where communications northwards could be easily blocked and where hilly terrain necessitated the employment of specially trained Infantry.

C. Germany had disposed her forces in locks in areas where landings were likely to take place ie Genoa - Spexia, Gaeta - Naples - Salerno and Calabria.

D. Finally Germany would do everything in her power to keep the Allies as far from her vitals as possible. Eyes only.

Para 4. Command of forces.

A. In theory German troops were under General Roatta as Chief of Italian Army Staff but in practice the OBS intervened whenever they saw fit and Germans carried on as they desired.

B. Rommel commands German troops in the north and those in south are under 10th Army. Italians refused to allow their 4th and 8th Armies to be under command of Rommel. Germans have asked that Rommel should take over German and Italian Sectors as he advances.

Para 5. Italian formations. General Z was not very forthcoming concerning Italian Order of Battle. He said a 2nd Infantry Division is to be moved into heel of Italy. He was uncertain regarding the movements of 4th Army from France but thought that 2 or 3 divisions might remain in France. Italian dispositions were especially strong on the French and Yugoslav borders and at Rome. One division was being moved to Spexia and possibly a 2nd might go there. Between Spexia and Rome forces were very weak.

Para 6. Italian policy regarding Rome. Rome would be defended at all costs if Germans tried to take

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SECURITY CONTROL

EYES ONLY SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers
To: War
Number W 8685/8030, NAF 344

Page 4

30 August 1943

control. For this purpose 5 to 6 Italian Division were disposed round Rome. No orders to this effect had gone out in writing but soldiers understood that was required of them ever since fall of Mussolini.

Para 7. German - Russian Armistice. General Z dwelt at some length on this and is convinced that Hitler rather than surrender would throw himself onto Russian mercy. Z is convinced that German strategic moves are made with view to gaining time for a Russian reproachment so that Germany can turn her attention to west.

Para 8. Use of gas. Italians are nervous that Germany will use gas against them. As General Z pointed out Hitler had once said gas was meant for traitors. He therefore urged that in event of Italian surrender we should inform Germany that use of gas against the Italians would result in the United Nations using it against Germany. Comment. The possible use of gas by Germany is no doubt being held over the Italians as a threat.

Para 9. Evacuation from Sicily. Some 40,000 German and 75,000 Italian troops were evacuated from Sicily.

Para 10. General. General Z was not so impressive as General C. He appeared genuine however and as Chief of Staff to Roetta had evidently given thought to the many problems confronting Italy. He could be described as mediocre Staff Officer with a sound but solid outlook on strategy. He gave following views which are of interest.

B. He had considered 5 aspects of the present situation, 1 if Germany took initiative and 4 if Allies did. These were:

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EYES ONLY SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers
To: War
Number W 8685/8030, NAF 344

Page 5

30 August 1943

1. German case. This considered most urgent as they might attack Italy at any moment under conditions which would oblige Italy to resist. This was no case for Allies to pull Italian chestnuts out of fire but in order to avoid return of Fascism or Communism there must be coordinated plan with Allies.

2. First Allied case. Attack on Germany through Italy. This considered (rather naturally) most unfavourable action, requiring some 15 to 20 divisions. There must however be coordinated plan giving Italy specific roles.

3. Second Allied case. If Allied landing was to be in Balkans Italy must be given special role.

4. Third Allied case. In event of attack on Sardinia or Corsica essential that Italians on Islands should not be asked to assist but instructed to offer minimum resistance to Allied. Italian assistance to Allied would merely lead to Germany taking over Italy.

5. Fourth Allied case. Attack by Allies elsewhere outside the barrier of the Alps might mean the withdrawal of some German divisions from Italy. Although this case would result in Italy fighting Germany unaided and this she was prepared to do.

C. Z made no objections whatever to our actual terms, military, political, or economic. He considered that strong objection would be taken by Badoglio to the phrasing used in part of the complete surrender terms (longer document). The wording of the preamble of this document he described as "Brutal". He considered that a great effort would have to be made by the younger generals who believed in cooperation with the Allies to overcome the objections of Badoglio and the King to the distasteful words "Unconditional Surrender" and repeated often that everything the Allies wish could be obtained

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SECURITY CONTROL

EYES ONLY SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers Page 6
To: War
Number W 8685/8030, NAF 344 30 August 1943

without imposing this unnecessary indignity which might result in the present Government, which was sincere and honest, refusing the terms. He stated that the present Government was brought into being by men who, from the beginning, had deplored an unnatural alliance and were determined that the brand of Germany should not be imposed on the Italy of the future even if this meant fighting Germany alone and he urged us to reconsider what he termed "Unnecessarily brutal phrasing". Four final terms remarking that the Military Victory should be far more important to us than a political victory.

Para 11. Corsica and Sardinia. Details were given concerning composition of German and Italian troops which do not differ to information already in our possession.

Para 12. Finally General Z stated that in the event of Allied attack on Italy without diversions elsewhere Germans would send further 10 to 12 divisions into Italy.

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ACTION: GEN DEANE
INFORMATION: OPD
GEN STRONG
GEN ARNOLD
ADM KING
C OF S

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22 Aug 43

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SECURITY CONTROL

U R G E N T

SECURITY CONTROL

From: ALOIERS
To : BOSCO

No. 7965/4395

22 Aug 43

This is NAF 336. Reference NAF 335 our W7938 to AGWAR and 4255 to Troopers USFOR pass to Troopers repeated Combined Chiefs of Staff (KKAD) dated 21 August.

Following additional points were mentioned at conference. Germans would require 8 to 9 divisions for defense of Finoce-Ravenna line. Up to date no preparations for demolition of ports in Italy made. It will normally be task of Italians to carry out this task.

General(?)
Comments on military aspects of conference. The General spoke of Italy as an occupied country and was highly alarmed at the degree of control which the Germans had obtained. It may be that he exaggerated this control to some extent in order to win support for his proposals. Although he admitted weaknesses in the German Air Force he nevertheless was fearful of the amount of damage it might do should it be turned against Italy and the Italians.

AGWAR personal for Marshall from Eisenhower USFOR pass to Troopers, KKAD personal for IMI from Strong repeated Combined Chiefs of Staff (KKAD) signed Eisenhower cite FHGBI G-2 Freedom.

In spite of arguments to contrary he appeared convinced that the German threat to use gas was real and that such a danger existed. He was clearly impressed with the strength of the German Army and the number of reserves available to it and thought that the war would last for some time yet mentioning to support his view that the Germans had not used their reserves in the recent Russian operations.

He clearly hated the Germans who he said had behaved

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**SECURITY
CONTROL**
Page 2

From: ALGIERS
To : BOSCO

abominably to the Italian troops in Russia. Although the Germans maintained only liaison officers at Italian War Office Kesselring visited Ambrosio 3 or 4 times a week and on each occasion there was a row. On the other hand he stated that Secret Services and Gestapo of both countries worked closely together. There still are many pro-Germans among Italian officers including Roatta but the General thought that Badoglio was perfectly capable of directing the views of these officers as policy dictated.

Although a good deal of accurate detail was produced at conference it seems doubtful whether the Germans have taken the Italians fully into their confidence. Consequently such matters as extent of German reserves may possibly be exaggerated.

No Sig

ACTION : CC/S

INFORMATION: White House
Adm Leahy
Adm King
Adm Cooke
Adm Willson
Gen Marshall
Gen Handy
Gen Arnold
Gen Kuter
Gen Fairchild
Gen Wedemeyer
Col Connor

Note: NAF 335 is BOSCO-IN-199 to 203, inclusive, (21 Aug 43)
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BOSCO-IN-215

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INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY
CONTROL
CWD
August 1943

U R G E N T

S E C U R I T Y C O N T R O L

From: Algiers
To: War
 Quebec
No. W-7938/4256
No #

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(A) and 5(D) or (1)
OSD letter, May 1, 1974
By DBS Date MAY 21 1973

21 August 1943.

German order of battle as at 12 August given at conference as follows. Neur 5650 dated 21 August. Part 1. German Division in Italy. 305 Infantry 44 Infantry. 76 Infantry. 94 Infantry. 55 Infantry (possibly mistake for 65). 3 Panzer Grenadier. 29 Panzer Grenadier (Part only). 90 Panzer Grenadier (Sardinia). 16 Panzer. 26 Panzer. 24 Panzer (entering Italy by Brenner Route). 2 SS Divisions. 1 SS Brigade (Corsica may be part of 1 of the SS Divisions in Italy). 2 Parachute Division. Preceding para 1. AGWAR personnel for Marshall from Eisenhower repeated Combined Chiefs of Staff (KKAD) repeated Troopers personnel for DMI Strong from G2 Freedom signed Eisenhower cite FRGBI. This is NAF 335.

2. Following divisions not up to strength.
305. 76. 94. 55 and 2 SS Divisions.

3. GHQ German Army at Frascati.

4. Germans had defended areas at following places which were primarily bases for Corsica. Sardinia. Sicily. But were in fact excuse by Germans for holding garrisons in Italy. Each Garrison 3000 to 5000 strong. Leghorn. Naples. Orbetello. Salerno. Grosseto. In addition some 7000 to 8000 SS or equivalent troops in various disguise in Rome.

5. Germans intended to make Genoa-Ravenna main
(CM-IN-18157 22 Aug 43)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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INCOMING MESSAGE

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

From: Algiers
To: WAR
Quebec
21 August 1943

No. W-7938/4256
No #

(Page 2)

defense line. If this penetrated line of River Po would be defended.

6. Germans had complete control of Rome and a part SS troops immediately available there were 3 Panzer Grenadier Divisions and 2 Para Divisions to assist SS troops if necessity arose. Part 2 follows.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

(CM-IN-16157 22 Aug 43)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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URGENT

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 1(b) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 4, 1972

By DBS Date MAY 21 1973
PAGE 3.

From: Algiers
To: WAR - W 7938/4256
Quebec - No #

21st August 1943

SECURITY CONTROL

This part two of cable on German order of battle as at 12th August given at conference.

Para 7. Locations of divisions given as follows:

305th Infantry, 76th Infantry, 94th Infantry all in area Genoa. (Comment. Probably commanded by an Infantry Corps. One or more these divisions may move Livorno area)

Two SS Divisions under SS Corps (Ex Russia) in area Reggio Nell Emilia.

55th Division (Comment. Possibly 65th) Ravenna area.

44th Division area Brenner Pass.

3 Panzer Grenadier Division North of Rome (Comment. Probably Viterbo area).

AGWAR personal for Marshall from Eisenhower repeated Combined Chiefs of Staff (KKAD) repeated Troopers personal for DMI from Strong from G-2 Freedom USFOR pass to Troopers signed Eisenhower cite FHGBI.

Para 8. Comment by G-2 on order of battle and locations as given. In addition to above following divisions evacuated from Sicily. Remainder 29 Panzer Grenadier Division (believed now 2/3 complete but lacking MT). Hermann Goering Division considered equivalent one weak RCT and likely be withdrawn to Naples or Apulia area to reform. Fifteen Panzer Grenadier Division considered equal

(CM-IN-16157 22 Aug 43)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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INCOMING MESSAGE

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

URGENT

From: Algiers
To : War - W 7938/4256
Quebec - No #

Page 4

21st August 1943

1 weak RCT and possibly withdrawn to reform North of Naples Area. One Para Division equivalent 2 to 3 Battalions. Possibly reforming with elements of Division which did not cross to Sicily either in Naples-Salerno area or Calabria. At Conference stated probably only 1/2 to 1 Division evacuated with very little equipment. Believe this underestimate and prefer figures above. Thus when Divisions Ex Sicily reformed there will be equivalent of 17 German Divisions in Italy. Estimate all Divisions entering Italy will be complete though possibly some under strength by last week September. To follow is 3rd part.

No Sig.

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OSD letter, May 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

(CM IN-16157 22 Aug 43)

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JDJD C104
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jr

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL
Aug 21 1943

URGENT

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OSD Instruction 1572
By DBS
Date MAY 21 1973

SECURITY CONTROL

From: AFHQ North Africa
To : War W 7938/4256
Quebec No #

Page 5.

21 August 1943

This is 3rd part of cable on German order of battle as at 12 August given at conference.

9. General statements made as follows:

A. Estimated Germany would require some 15 Divisions for occupation of Italy if Italian Troops cooperated. Possible more would be brought in. These likely be chiefly withdrawn from France. No permanent fortifications as yet on Genoa-Ravenna Line.

B. Best tactics for Allies would be to land in Leghorn area between Grosseto and Spezia. German lines of communication into Italy particularly via Brenner extremely vulnerable and should be attacked by Allies.

C. Germans intended defend Sardinia and Corsica. Italian Forces to be withdrawn from Corisca but not Sardinia.

D. 2 Italian Divisions recently sent North Italy to offset occupation of Brenner area by Germans. Had been no actual fighting as result of this but firm attitude of Italians had caused Germans to hesitate in number of their actions. (AGWAR personal for Marshall from Eisenhower repeated Combined Chiefs of Staff (KKAD) repeated Troopers personal for DMI USFOR pass to Troopers. From Strong from G2 Freedom signed Eisenhower cite FHGBI).

E. Strength of German Military Personnel in Italy

(CM-IN-16157 22 Aug 43)

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SECURITY CONTROL

From: AFHQ North Africa
To: War W 7938/4256
Quebec No #
21 August, 1943

page 6

SECURITY CONTROL

estimated at 400,000.

F. Genoa-Ravenna Line would be extremely difficult to penetrate owing hilly nature of country and narrow roads

G. Conference on 14 August held at Bologna at which General Roatta, Field Marshall Rommel and General Jodl present. Plans for defence of Italy discussed. These included return of Italian troops from France, Slovenia and North Croatia. Final result discussions not known.

H. Italian Army short of gasoline and entirely dependent on Germany for this. Italy would require supplies of wheat and coal if Germany ceases to provide. Italian Army short of many types of weapons especially anti tank guns, anti tank ammunition and boots.

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OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date

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INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

URGENT

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers
To: WAR W7938/4256
Quebec No Number

Page 7.

21 August 1943

Part four of cable on German order of battle as at 12th August given at conference.

Para 9. continues. I. Italian Fleet had only sufficient fuel oil for one main fleet action. Mussolini was responsible for stopping Italian Fleet putting to sea on several occasions in order to have it to counter any attack on Italian Peninsula. Germans informed Italians that submarine warfare was to be put on completely new basis which they thought would have considerable success. No details disclosed. AGWAR personal for Marshall from Eisenhower repeated Combined Chiefs of Staff (KKAD) repeated Troopers personal for DMI USFOR pass to Troopers. From Strong from G-2 Freedom signed Eisenhower cite FHGBI.

J. Italian Air Force very short of material but fighter element considered good. All Italian airfields except a few small ones in hands of Germans.

K. German policy towards Russia was to hold back reserves and adopt defensive policy in hope Russians would wear themselves out. Germans considered this might happen by spring 1944. German Divisions totalled 260 of which 50 to 60 in reserve. Up to December 1942 estimated German permanent casualties killed or wounded three million. Russian divisions numbered 320. Ribbentrop reckoned on Allied, especially American, War weariness increasing.

L. Ribbentrop has threatened that if Italy turned against Germany gas would be used against the country and most terrible vengeance would be exacted on Italian people as an example to remainder of Satellites. Italian

(CM-IN-16157

22 Aug 43

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~~SECURITY
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From: Algiers
To: WAR W7938/4256
Quebec No Number
21 August 1943

people had no gas masks or protection against gas. Italian Army almost in same position. Hungary might follow Italian example but Roumania and Bulgaria less likely.

M. Allies could not look for collapse in German morale owing to Gestapo. Number of Generals desirous of getting rid of Hitler but this unlikely at present owing considerable loyalty towards him.

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(CM-IN-16157 22 Aug 43)

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By DBS Date MAY 21 1973

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JDJD B62
Filed 21/2207B
jr

SECURITY CONTROL
21 AUG 1943
2148

**URGENT
SECURITY CONTROL**

From: AFBQ North Africa
To : War W7938/4256
Quebec No #

Page 9.

21 August 1943

This is part 5 of German order of battle as of 12 August.

10. Conference is head of the Italian planning staff performing the same functions for Italy as General Warlimont for Germany. Who he maintains is the man who is really responsible for German plans and considerably more able than Jodl. (AGWAR personal for Marshall from Eisenhower repeated Combined Chiefs of Staff (KKAD) repeated Troopers personal for DMI USFOR pass to Troopers from Strong from G2Freedom signed Eisenhower cite FRGBI). Conference declared he was 1 of the 3 officials who engineered fall of Mussolini as latter showed no intention to make stand against German infiltration and demands. The King was told of the plot and Signor Grandi was asked to arrange that the Fascist Grand Council meet and vote against Mussolini, the bait to Grandi being that he would replace Mussolini. Grandi did his share but there was never any real intention that he would get the provisional reward and so he still remains out in the cold. End message.

No Sig.

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NOTE: 5650 is CM-OUT-8601 (21 Aug 43) G-2. E.O. 11652, Sec. 5(E) and 5(D) or (B)

ACTION: CC/S

By DBS

OSD letter, May 5, 1972

Date MAY 21 1973

INFORMATION: OPD, General Strong, Admiral King, General Arnold, Log.

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	ALUSNA BEYOGLU	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEES	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY		CNO	RRRRRR
DATE	1 AUGUST 1943		DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM	2116		
DECODED BY	SCHULTZ	INFORMATION	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY	ELY		ROUTINE
ROUTED BY	J. ALLEN		DEFERRED

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NCR 6373

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(FROM LOCAL AGENT)

IT IS CERTAIN GUARIGLIA HAS GONE ITALY TO MAKE PEACE. HE DOES NOT WANT TO SURRENDER BUT READY NEGOTIATE. HE IS OLD FRIEND OF GUDOGGIO WHO ALWAYS OPPOSED MUSSOLINI'S POLICY OF DISPERSING TROOPS TO AFRICA GREECE AND RUSSIA. TROOPS BEING WITHDRAWN FROM BALKANS AND PROBABLY NOT MORE THAN 15 DIVISIONS REMAINING. TROOPS PROBABLY WILL BE WITHDRAWN FROM CRETE BUT NOT FROM DODECANESE UNTIL ITALY SURRENDERS.

16...ACT

COMINCH...13...NAVAIDE...200P.....

FILE.

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 1, 1973

By DBS Date MAY 21 1973

ACTION

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RC 15
Filed 26/2030Z
jm

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER ^{CCWD} 26 July 1943

INCOMING MESSAGE

WAZ

From: Madrid.
To : Milid Washington DC.

No : 295. 26 July 1943.

Usual Italian officer source states at recent Hitler Mussolini conference latter described Italian Internal Political and Mil situation asking former for aid. Repeated Freedom and London. Reply was Germany could not render additional Mil assistance and proposed gradual withdrawing from Italy. Italian Embassy Madrid not yet informed as to program of Badoglio but informant thinks that after assuring order he will ask for peace conditions.

Stephens.

Action: G-2

Information: OPD
Gen. Deane (CC/S)
LOG

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OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

CM-IN-19163 (27 Jul 43) 0512Z vc

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WAR DEPARTMENT
 "State Department Message Center
 of V.D."
INCOMING MESSAGE

May 27, 1943

PARAPHRASE

Telegram no. 730

Dated: May 26, 9 p.m.

From: Tangier

Rec'd: May 26, 8:19 p.m.

Following information has been furnished Algiers and Madrid.

On May 25 the Spanish Minister was told by Badoglio that his father, the Marshal, had in fact not accepted command of the Italian forces nor did he accept any active assignment in the Italian army. It was thus implied that Marshal Badoglio desired to continue his stand of reserve and independence toward Mussolini. It was pointed out that the Marshal would limit his cooperation to continuing as ex-officio staff member of the Italian Council of National Defense.

CHILDS

ACTION: G-2

**INFORMATION: OPD
CG AAF**

CM-IN-17870 (28 May 43) 0724Z cen

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MAY 28 1943
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M. I. B. JOURNAL NO. 94 MAY 28 1943

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G2 Dist.	Action	Info
MC		✓
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SIT		✓
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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

"State Dept. paraphrase for the information
of W.D."

May 27, 1943

PARAPHRASE

Telegram no. 1676

Dated: May 26, 6 p.m.

From: Stockholm

Rec'd: May 26, 7:40 p.m.

OSS has been furnished the following information which is considered to be from an entirely reliable source.

Badoglio has assumed supreme command of all operations south T from E; this includes Sicily as well as other islands. Graziani serves under him. High German officers are to be removed from this area; Badoglio's condition for acceptance being that his general staff be all Italian.

Cavallero, formerly Chief of Staff, has command of coastal defenses which include the Tyrrhenian Sea, Sardinia and the coast from Rome northward to Genoa and Mentone.

The Inspector General for North Italy is De Bono. This area also includes occupied French territory. Orders have gone out for the civilian population to evacuate Civitanecchia and Laspertzia. For Sicily, Laspertzia and Sardinia military passport control is in effect.

JOHNSON

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: OPD
CG AAF

CM-IN-17871 (28 May 43) 0725Z cen

M. I. 8. JOURNAL NO. 95 MAY 28 1943

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G2 Dist.	Authentic	Index
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DISS		✓
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30 Italy

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

November 28, 1942

PARAPHRASE

Telegram No. 5469

Dated: Nov. 27, 4 p.m.

From: Bern

Rec'd: Nov. 27, 9 p.m.

The information contained in this telegram was furnished by a former contact of the source referred to in my telegram of April 11, number 1463 and in previous telegrams.

35 members of the German Air Force are in Milan and convalescent hospitals at Bordighera, Allassio and San Remo contain German soldiers. 10 days ago there were about 500 of these soldiers in these hospitals. However, there are no German forces station in Northern Italy.

The air raids on Italian cities have had the result of lowering morale a great deal. During his last visit at Genoa the King of Italy was bombarded by cries of "bread and peace". All over Italy hurried efforts are being made to set up machinery for the evacuation of civilians from areas which are bombarded. Also attempts are being made to improve anti-aircraft defenses.

In the area between Naples and Sapri about 175 kilometers to the South anti-Fascist sentiment is very strong and morale is very low. Italian efforts to resist invasion in this area would probably be sabotaged as much as possible by the people who themselves would not try to oppose such an invasion. In the area of Brindisi, Taranto, Bari and Lecco a strong resistance would probably be made by the people if an invasion were attempted. In this area the people support the Fascists very strongly.

German sailors have recently been sent to the ports of Spezia, Santa Margherita and Liguria. The numbers of

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320
Italy

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

(Page 2)

Nov. 28, 1942

No. 5489

these sailors and their nature has not been reported.

In important cities in the North of Italy such as Milan, Cremona, Genoa, Novara, Parma, Bologna, Turin and Voghera the strength of the Italian secret police (OVRA) has been doubled.

Between November 16 and November 19, 1 German Division arrived in Calabria, 1 in Catania and 3 in Syracuse. They have not yet been assigned to definite barracks.

HARRISON

S:ASB:IMR:SS

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Info. Copies: OPD
CG AAF

CM-IN-11964 (11/28/42) 1041Z 1aw

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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
ALUSMA CHARGE NAVY DEPT NAVAL ATTACHE VICHY		OPNAV	PRIORITY ROUTINE ROUTINE DEFERRED
RELEASED BY	DATE	FOR ACTION	DEFERRED
5 JUNE 1942			
TOR CODER ROOM	1314/5	FOR INFORMATION	DEFERRED
KEELEY			
DECODED BY	HEINE	RECLASSIFIED E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) OSD letter, May 1, 1972 By DBS Date MAY 21 1973	PRIORITY ROUTINE DEFERRED
PARAPHRASED BY			

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GERMAN 042345 NCR9989

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TEXT

BY WELL INFORMED AND MOST RELIABLE SOURCE AM INFORMED OF THE FOLLOWING.

AT MAY SALZBURG MEETING, MUSSOLINI PRESSED FOR FRENCH TERRITORIES NAMELY NICE, CORSICA, AND TUNISA. HITLER IS

REPORTED AS EITHER NOT REPLYING OR GIVING AN EVASIVE ANSWER. MUSSOLINI, ASSUMING HITLER TACITLY AGREED, INTENSIFIED PRESS

CAMPAIGN FOR RETURN THESE PLACES TO ITALY AND SENT MAIN BODY ITALIAN FLEET TO CORBICAN WATERS. ON LEARNING THIS, FRENCH

IMMEDIATELY ALERTED AND PLACED NAVY IN STAND BY CONDITION. FRENCH EXPECTED ITALIAN ATTACK ON 25 MAY. ABOUT THIS TIME,

ITALIANS, BECOMING SUSPICIOUS OF WHAT THEY CONSIDERED AN OMINOUS POLITICAL SILENCE ON THE PART OF THE FRENCH AND

GERMANS CEASED ALL ACTIVITIES AND ORDERED FLEET BACK TO TARANTA. FRENCH NOW CONSIDER DANGER PAST FOR TIME BEING. BY ORDER OF

LAVAL, FRENCH PRESS, UNOCCUPIED FRANCE, WERE FORBIDDEN, UNTIL THIS MORNING, TO PUBLISH CIANO'S RECENT SPEECH IN WHICH HE


STATED FRENCH ITALIAN RELATIONS WERE AS HARMONIOUS AS FRENCH-GERMAN RELATIONS

MY SOURCE INSISTED UTMOST SECRECY BE MAINTAINED AS ONLY SIX VICHY FRENCHMEN KNEW FLEET HAD BEEN ALERTED AND BECAUSE THEY CONSIDERED ITALIANS WERE NOT YET AWARE OF THIS FACT.

DISTRIBUTION

16... ACTION

COMINCH... 290... M



042345 NCR9989

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27129

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