MR 300 SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA — Sec. A-1 — WARFARE

May 1942 thru December 1943
CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER CCWD
INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORIT Y

From: Melbourne
To: Milid
No. 29 December 19, 1942

The Prime Minister Hester Curtin for some weeks has been working to secure the support of the Australian Labor Party to his proposal to permit the use of the militia in "such other territory in the Southwest Pacific area as the Governor General proclaims as being territory associated with the defense of Australia."

The following are extracts from his later remarks "The Government asked for and was given the help of other countries in defending Australia. At present the American and Dutch forces are here fighting with us and for us and for themselves. Chinese laborers are here working for us. These are our indissoluble Allies. The enemy is fighting desperately to hold New Guinea and at present strongly holds Rabaul. These places are within the jurisdiction of the commonwealth. There are islands close to Australia which the enemy holds and from which he launches attacks against us. These include the Netherland East Indies, Timor, the Solomons and others. These places are integral to our defense but politically are outside of the jurisdiction of the commonwealth. I put it as plainly as I can that

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11662, Sec. 3(5) and 5(3) or 3
OSD letter, May 1, 1972

CH-IN-8472 (12-19-42) 2319Z as By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

COPY No.

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/74
the policy of the Australian Labor Party in respect to New Guinea and Rabaul should apply to all the Islands in this theatre of war. Limiting it to some of them negates common sense. All of them have the same military significance in Japan's attacks upon us. Australian Labor Party in Victoria and Queensland rejected the proposal but with endorsement of Western Australia December 18th necessary approval of four states has been secured and most likely the proposal will receive the support of the General Australian Labor Conference in early January and should be approved by the Commonwealth Parliament in late January. The question was brought to floor of Parliament on December 11th and except for some very clever political juggling would have wrecked the Curtin Government. Parliament has now adjourned until about January 27th. The proposal does not relieve one service. Australian Imperial Forces would remain available for use anywhere. Latest War Department statistics show Commonwealth Military Forces reduced to 230,000 and transfer to Australian Imperial Forces averaging 5000 per week.

Baldwin

ACTION COPIES: G-2
INFO. COPIES: OPD, CG AAF, LOG

CM-1N-6472 (12-19-42) 2310Z as

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11662, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) or 7(B)
OSD letter, May 1, 1972
By SLR
Date: May 1, 1973

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date, 4/13/44

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NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM CONSPAC
RELEASED BY
DATE NOVEMBER 28, 1942
FOR ACTION
INFORMATION
DECLINED BY
PARAPHRASE BY

GEN MACARTHUR
CINCPAC COMINCH

Prioritize Routine Deferred
Prioritize Routine Deferred

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

280108

unless otherwise indicated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

ORIGINAL FILL IN DATE AND TIME

TEXT

YOUR 270055 AND 271136. OUR COMMON OBJECTIVE IS RABaul. UNTIL JAP AIR IN NEW BRITAIN AND NORTHERN SOLOMONS HAS BEEN REIGNED, RISK OF VALUABLE NAVAL UNITS IN MIDDLE AND WESTERN REACHES OF SOLOMON SEA CAN ONLY BE JUSTIFIED BY MAJOR REPEAT MAJOR ENEMY SEA- SIDE MOVEMENT AGAINST SOUTH COAST NEW GUINEA OR AUSTRALIA ITSELF. SEABOAR SUPPLY OF BASES WE TAKE ON NORTHEAST COAST OF NEW GUINEA NOT FEASIBLE UNTIL WE CONTROL SOLOMON SEA IN OTHER WORDS RABaul. PUSUANT FORGOING AND WITH HISTORY PAST MONTHS IN VIEW, CONSIDER RABaul ASSAULT CAMPAIGN MUST BE AMPHIBIOUS ALONG THE SOLOMONS WITH NEW GUINEA LAND POSITION BASICALLY A SUPPORTING ONE ONLY. I AM CURRENTLY REINFORCING CACTUS POSIT AND EXPEDITING MEANS OF OPERATING HEAVY AIR FROM THERE. IT IS MY BELIEF THAT THE SOUND PROCEDURE AT THIS TIME IS TO MAINTAIN AS STRONG A LAND AND AIR PRESSURE AGAINST THE JAPANESE SHIPPING, AN ATTITUDE WHICH IF CONTINUED AT THE PRESENT RATE HE CAN NOT LONG SUSTAIN. I BELIEVE THAT MY GREATEST CONTRIBUTION TO OUR COMMON EFFORT WOULD BE TO STRENGTHEN MY POSITION AND RESUME THE ADVANCE UP THE SOLOMONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, WHILE CONTINUING TO MAINTAIN A NAVAL FORCE IN BEING ON THE FLANK OF ANY POSSIBLE JAPANESE LARGE SCALE ADVANCE AGAINST AUSTRALIA OR SOUTHERN NEW GUINEA COAST.

BEGIN

E. O. 11682, Sec. 3(D) and 8(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

RECEIVED

1941-45 SECNAV

SEALED

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (d) NAVREGS.)

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

19-0020-1 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
FROM: COMSOWESPAQ (VHCH) 240435 NOR5511 25 NOV 42 DL 903#KOS.
ACTION: OINOPAC...NSS...XXX...

COMSOWESPAQ SENDS TO COMINCH OINOPAC COMSOPAC BUPERS X

THIS NAVAL BOARD 12497/23 X THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE PURPORTING TO
BE FROM LEON DASH A SURVIVOR FROM USS VINCENT WAS BROADCAST

FROM BATAVIA RADIO AT 2434L/22 AND SINGAPORE RADIO AT 0234L/23
BEGIN COLON DEAR MOM AND DAD BY THE KINDNESS OF THE JAPANESE

I AM ABLE TO SEND YOU GREETINGS X I AND ALL OTHERS FROM VINCENT
ARE SAFE AND SOUND X XEN WE ARE ALL PHYSICALLY AND MENTALLY FIT X

NATURALLY WE MISS SOME OF THE PLEASURES WE HAVE BEEN ACCUSTOMED
TO BUT WE HAVE NO COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE JAPANESE WHO HAVE BEEN
MORE THAN KIND TO US

MARK ANY REPLY RESTRICTED.

DISTRIBUTION:

BUPERS........ACTION
COMINCH...SHOW 19...FILE.

RESTRICED

For information about this dispatch call Branch 3004 (Room 2639)
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

URGENT

From: Brisbane
To: War
No. C-802 October 25, 1942

For further information or changes Order of Battle. Amongst documents captured are several copies pamphlet entitled "A Guide For Warriors In The South Seas" dated November fifteenth and according to POWS issued on November twenty second nineteen hundred fortyone signed by Toritaro Morii Commander South Seas Force. Other documents establish this unit as taking part Guam Operation. Indicated that one hundred forty fourth Infantry Regiment at Guam December twenty seventh, Rabaul January twenty fifth and Salamaua March eighth. Hence not with Fifty Fifth Division in Burma. Captured letter from Osaka states two hundred American prisoners quartered at Ikeda Nachi Municipal Grounds working as stevedores. Letter also states "First and Second National Reserves will be drafted during current year and they are now in the midst of calling out the Army (to Agwar from CINC SWPA Signed MacArthur) Roll".

no sig

Action Copy: 0-2
Info. Copies: OEP
CG AAF

CM-IN-10612 (10-25-42) 05112

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 5/21/73

COPY No. 27
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following message from MacArthur, reflecting his views as to a Japanese attack in his sector, is quoted for your information:

"In case the enemy launches a sea, air and land attack at New Guinea, what assistance may I expect from the Pacific Fleet? The Naval forces at my disposal are minor in strength, practically half were lost or seriously damaged in the Solomons operations, and my air and ground troops are entirely inadequate to meet a balanced attack from the enemy comprising large sea elements."

"In my C-367, August 28 (attached) I suggested that the Naval force under Admiral Hichamley include in its mission the covering of the southeastern tip of New Guinea but this was disapproved both by him and by Admiral Nimitz.

"It is absolutely essential that I be informed as to what the Navy contemplates in case of a sea-borne attack on New Guinea so that I can plan accordingly.

"I regard the potential situation with the gravest concern."

Admiral King and I will prepare a reply in answer to his question as to Naval plans.

Chief of Staff.
SECRET

**DISTRICTION OF GROUND FORCES OF THE JAPANESE ARMY IN THE SOUTHERN PACIFIC AREA**

**September 17, 1942**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Solomon Islands</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buka Island</td>
<td>1000 (variable)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gohama Island</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kista</td>
<td>200-500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruin-Tonolei</td>
<td>1000 or more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faisi-Shortland Isls.</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gizo Island</td>
<td>1000 or more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guadalcanal</td>
<td>6000-8000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Isabel Island</td>
<td>Small patrols, no estimate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Probably recently reinforced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaita Island</td>
<td>Small patrols. No estimate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloridge Bay</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Ritter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Astralaba</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ala Cove</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Soloa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russell Islands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Niueaik Area</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rabaul and vicinity</td>
<td>35,000 or more, tanks, horse cavalry, A/A and harbor defense artillery. Two divisions plus one infantry brigade at present. It is anticipated that further reinforcements are enroute. It is believed that considerable units are now on movement from this area to the southern part of the Solomons.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Gazema | Small force. No estimate. |
| Fondo | Small force. No estimate. |
| Usanuma | Small force. No estimate. |
| New Ireland - Kavieng | 500 |
| Namatanai | Small patrol. No estimate. |
| Cape George | Small patrol. No estimate. |
| Slabori Island, Rader Group, Manus Island (Lorengau), Admiralty Group | Small patrol. No estimate. |
| Etang Island |  |

---

500 S. Unit, far Aera

**DECLASSIFIED**

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/11/76
### SECRET

**Date**
- New Guinea
- Janokwa
- Pak Pak
- Habire
- Sarai
- Sorong
- Hollandia
- Momis
  - 200 + some labor troops. Airdrome under construction.

**British New Guinea**
- Vanimo
- Lae
- Salamaua
- Buna-Efogi
- Goodenough Island
  - Small force. No estimate.
- Milne Bay
  - 2000-5000 (variable)

**Marshall Islands**
- 25,000
- 2000-5000
  - Small force. No estimate.

**Gilbert Islands**
- Makin Island
- Tarawa
- Aspalaua
- Kusa
- Nauru Island
  - Small force. No estimate.

**Tinian Area**
- Easamp and vicinity
- Dili and vicinity
- Alor Island
- Wetar Island
- Batu Island
- Tana Island
- Banda Island
- Baruk Island
- Kila Island
- Tamakier Island
- Aru Islands
- Asbon
  - 70 Special Navy landing party men.
  - 2000-4000

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E. O. 11842, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date
SECRET

Borneo
1 Division
25,000

Java
2 Divisions, 5th and 57th
50,000

Sumatra
1 Division 38th
25,000

Malay Area
2 Divisions, Guards, 1 Tank Regiment
52,500 men
150 tanks

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 200(D) and 50(D) or 5(U)
OSD letter, May 1, 1973
By SLR
Date: MAY 2 1 1973

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94
From: Brisbane Australia
To: War
No. C 502, September 16th, 1942

Part one of message C 502 previously undecipherable.

To fully man four transport Squadrons RAAF will have to take flying crews from Australian Civil Transport Lines which have some excess flying personnel (Arnold from Kenney) we are now trying to hire these excess pilots and ten Dutch crews in order to operate USAAF Transports on twenty-four schedule and release our crews for bombardment. Your nr one six seven seven thirteenth. Ten more transports would satisfy existing needs RAAF and fully take care morale factor. Strongly recommend no change in present plans for six USAAF Transport Squadrons. This absolute

FOOTNOTE: Original is CM-IN-7298 (9-17-42) OPD.
ACTION: OPD
INFO. COPIES: G-2, CGAAF, LOG

CM-IN-11383 (9-26-42) 1318Z

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11615, Sec. 2(D) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 1, 1972
By SLR Date

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COPY No. 30
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE
CCWD
Sept 17
0513

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 2(D) and 8(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 4. 1973

From: Brisbane Australia
To: War
No. C 502, Sept 16, 1942

Part one undecipherable. Minimum for present needs which will have to be increased as we move further into New Guinea. In total absence road and rail communications in theatre of operations, small amount of shipping available, absence of docks and loading and unloading facilities and necessity of conveyng against enemy naval activity air transport only efficient means of supply. A ferry trip with two four four troops for New Guinea was made yesterday and this type work plus evacuation sick and wounded certain to increase. Forty one transports now in service in USAAF. This comprises ten different types. About fifteen of these on last leg with non standard engines and accessories and no spares. These will be gradually cannalized and should not be included in seventy eight transports set up for this theatre. Recommend (1) USAAF transport service be brought up to seventy eight plane strength early as practicable (2) ten transports be allotted to RAAF (3) that following para five and two RAAF transport strength be brought up to three squadrons only and as additional transports become available they be assigned to USAAF.

MACARTHUR

Action Copy: OPD
Info. Copies: G-2, CG AAF, LOG
CM-IN-7298 (9/17/42) 1954Z ce

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
August 28, 1942.

From: CINC SWPA
To: Chief of Staff
No. C-367, August 28, 1942

There are indications that the enemy is preparing an attack against New Guinea, the possibility of which was contained in my radio Q-147 August 2nd. Evidence is accumulating that under cover of the Solomons Islands operations he contemplates a stroke here. My position is exposed due to the absence of all SWPA Naval forces which are operating under the South Pacific area. In consequence, the enemy completely controls the sea approaches to New Guinea and when adverse weather hampers our air activity he is able to move transports directly into Milne Bay.

If strong infiltration continues or if a major movement eventuates my situation will immediately become critical unless I am afforded Naval support. I have been moving into New Guinea as rapidly as possible the maximum number of troops that I can transport and supply with the extremely limited shipping resources available to me. In order to secure my position I suggest that Ghormley be given the added mission of covering the Milne Bay area.

MacArthur
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

136 WY
Filed 0725/10
ACM

CSWD
Aug. 10, 1942.
12:19 Z

PRIORITY

From: Eq. USASOS SWPA
To: Milid

No. Victor 5972, August 8th, 1942.

Australian conscripts (militia) forces have not rpt not been made available for duty (for Ullo reference your one nine eight twenty sixth to CINC SWPA for M A) outside of Australia. However Eastern New Guinea and Bismarck Archipelago are to be considered Australian territory. Question of use of Australian militia conscripts outside Australia is politically dangerous to party in power and publicly sidestepped by its leaders. Certain leaders of all parties however have privately indicated that they would support the sending of conscripts outside Australia if and when it becomes urgent and necessary in this general area such as the Dutch East Indies. Information on organization of Australian forces will be cabled as soon as possible.

Stewart

Note: Radio 198 (CM-OUT-7384, 7/25/42) G-2.

Action Copy: G-2 BE

Info. Copies: OPD, A-2, CG AAF

CM-IN-3524 (8/10/42) 1355 Z

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 2 (E) and 8 (D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 2, 1973
By SLR Date

M. 18, JOURNAL NO. 73 AUG 10 1942

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
From: Cinc Swpa
To: AGWAR Washington DC
No. C-211, August 6th, 1942

General information from organization referred to your one eight eight twentyfifth July. Source future information will be stated as "AIB". Following conditions Rabaul middle May fairly reliably reported. British Europeans were all interned or prisoners of War and confined from Australian Military Hutsments: Food short: No Medical attention not brutally treated but conditions bad and compelled to work: Chinese allowed limited trading subject curfew and confined certain areas: Natives allowed to go in and out: At first enemy molested: native women but had later established own brothels. By middle July in country outside town Jap treatment of natives imprisonment of labor lack of goods much as tobacco cloth razor blades and absence justice had led natives appreciate former Australian control and dislike Japs. Reported enemy told natives War practically over and Germans would return. On other hand believe religious and economic activities German Missions stopped.

MacArthur

188 is CM-OUT- 7293 (7/25/42) G-2

ACTION COPY: G-2J.².
INFO COPIES: OPD

M. L. S. JOURNAL NO. 148 AUG 6 1942

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May, 21 1973

CM-IN- 2157 (8/6/42) 2229Z

By SRL Date

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: CINC SWPA
To: Agwar
No. C 205, August 5, 1942

Joint psychological warfare referred to in your three hundred thirtieth is apparently counterpart of plan for joint political warfare proposed recently by British government to Australian government which plan latter proposes to implement under Joint Department External Affairs in cooperation with London and Washington. Plan embraces Interalia extensive propaganda and counter propaganda included creation of conflicting interest between Axis powers, agitation of revolt in occupied territories, jealousy between Japanese services and exploitation of Social, religious political and ethological differences, Economic Warfare and sabotage enemy fiscal system. Since large part such activity will be affected by social and political policies of several Allied Civil Authorities and will involve understandings between Allied governments relative to post war settlements, I am convinced that (one) Civil branches of Allied governments are deeply involved (2) that this plan must be coordinated and guided in Washington or London (already possibility potential friction indicated here between Dutch and Australians regarding future post-war Nei resulting in Dutch sensitiveness relative propaganda directed to Nei), and (3) Military Intelligence, Espionage and Sabotage and Guerilla activities incident to Military operations, must be kept separate for reasons of security and effectiveness.

Allied Intelligence Bureau described our Cast one twenty one July seventeenth will operate this headquarters for military purposes, avoiding entanglement with political

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 2(D) and 5(D) or (D)
OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By SLR

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: CINC SWPA
To: Agwar
No. C 205, August 5, 1942

It is prepared to handle subversive and Guerilla operations incidental to military plans and in addition, limited covert propaganda strictly incidental to military operations. Facilities required for such missions are available or being manufactured here, any additional will be requested if and when needed. Essential Naval cooperation in use of submarines for landing parties in enemy occupied territory has been arranged satisfactorily hitherto. Dutch have offered one submarine for such use.

Believe this headquarters should cooperate with Australian section political or psychological warfare only to extent of maintaining liaison, supplying necessary military information and in providing facilities for dissemination of written propagandas and other material and personnel when required. Believe inexpedient to send here personnel for direct participation in psychological warfare.

MACARTHUR

FOOTNOTE: No. 330 in CM-OAT-8791 (7/30/42) OPD No.
C121 in CM-IN-6047 (7/17/42) G-2
ACTION COPY: OPD
INFO. COPY: G-2 A-2 CG AAF LOG
CM-IN-1882 (8/6/42) 0741Z

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 8(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May. MAP 21 1973
By SLR Date

M. I. S. JOURNAL NO. 25 AUG 1942
SECRET COPY No.

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INCOMING MESSAGE

From: USASOS Melbourne
To: Milid
No. M 4 July 27, 1942

Department of civil aviation (part one) is preparing information on Australian airports and radio facilities in accordance with details requested by letter from H R Adams. This office should be able to forward to AFDD in about one week reference your thirty twentieth. Part Two U S seal for this office previously reported lost has been found in a safe part three the Australian High court has declared valid the four bills bearing upon uniform federal income tax throughout Australia and doing away with all income tax collections by the states. This is perhaps the greatest forward step in abolishing state rights in many years and affirms the supremacy of the Commonwealth government in its wide authority and defense powers. The commonwealth government will return certain income tax collections to the several states. Taxes start with incomes as low as one hundred fifty eight pounds per year. At four thousand pounds the tax is approximately sixty two percent and for all income above four thousand pounds the tax is ninety percent.

Baldwin

Action Copy: G-2 BE
Info. Copies: OPD A-2 CG AAF SOS TAG FILE
CM-IN-10157 (7/29/42) 1921Z

DECORLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) OGD letter, May 5, 1972

By SLR Date MAY 29 1973

M I S JOURNAL NO. 127 JUL 29 1942

COPY No. 27

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4 NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94
EFFECTIVE 1800K JULY 20 HEADQUARTERS COMSOWESTPAC FOR
SHIFTS FROM MELBOURNE TO BRISBANE AUSTRALIA.
ADDRESS COMSOWESTPAC BRISBANE ANY USNAVCOM RPT USNAVCOM
BRISBANE. NEW HEADQUARTERS CONNECTED BY TELEPRINT
TO RADIO CANBERRA (BELCONNEN AND HARIAN) TO DOBBIN
IN SYDNEY AND TO ACNB IN MELBOURNE.
ALUSNA, NAVPUR AND ISSUING OFFICE REMAIN MELBOURNE
SERVED BY BELCONNEN.
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: GHQ SWPA
To: Chief of Staff

#C-136, July 19, 1942

Statement by Air Marshal Williams was (For General Marshall only) based upon project submitted to Washington by Australian joint Chiefs of Staff and approved and arranged in priorities in my radio four one April twenty fourth replying your four one zero Seventeenth. Australian project was based upon requirements for defense of their extensive coast. It is understood here that planes to implement this program were to be derived from British allocations although manufactured in the United States. Controlling factor in Australian ability to effectuate this program is development of ground personnel. Program is proceeding according to plan and by the end of this year a strength of approximately forty-five squadrons can be attained. Upon completion of the program as submitted, Australia expects to be able to maintain seventy one squadrons here, the remaining two being in the Middle East. The Australians have not repeat not several hundred experienced pilots without planes. Existing pilots are completely absorbed in squadrons now operating with wiralways and other types which they expect to convert for use on new models after necessary transition training. I strongly urge the continued development of the RAAF in accordance with the plan as submitted, but it is imperatively essential that this should not repeat not be done at the expense of the American Air Force for this area. This force as I have repeatedly stated is insufficient at present and is pitibly inadequate to support the eventual offensive based upon Australia. While Australian land and air forces will unquestionably participate in this offensive, particularly in its early phases, it is evident that the force that will drive through to culmination will be preponderantly American, and it is essential that the American Air Force be developed with this end in view. Any propo-
sition that contemplates the cessation of the development of United States Air units or of their withdrawal from this area would be destructive. Withdrawal of American units of any sort would have incalculable repercussions not only in Australia but also in China. Its effect in the Far East would be catastrophic for it may be accepted as a fact that the cessation of American effort in the Pacific and the consequent continued and increasing ascendancy of Japan will be followed by the collapse of China and an immediate attack by Japan upon Russia in Siberia. Such a sequence of events might determine completely the outcome of the war.

My recommendations with reference to the new flying personnel were forwarded in my C one three three Nineteenth.

MacArthur

AG 441 is CM-IN-6810 (4/25/42) OPD
410 is CM-OUT-4886 (7/17/42) CG AAF Air Force situation
C-133 is CM-IN-6617 (7/19/42) CG AAF Recommends formation
of Dutch Tactical Units

Action Copy: OPD
Info. Copies: G-2
A-2
CG AAF
TAG
LOG
FILE

CM-IN-6747 (7/19/42) 22:5Z

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. (b)(2) and 8(d) or (b)
OIB letter, May 3, 1973
By SLR Date May 3, 1973
217 JUL 1942
COPY No.
We have established replying your three nine nine fourteen on a very sound basis an interallied secret service organization prepared to cover a wide range from purely combat items to strategic economic information. This service is organized as an interallied unit in which Australian Dutch British and American Military Personnel participate under an Australian controller Rpt controller subject to direction and supervision of General Headquarters. It is financed by proportional interallied contributions. Expert personnel on Netherlands East Indies affairs is available. Since penetration is into enemy controlled territory A civil director is not competent. However the special qualifications of Vandenbosch are noted if and when an opportunity for his efficient employment presents itself.

MacArthur

FOOTNOTE: No. 399 is CM-OUT-3913 (7-14-42) G-2. Plan for obtaining enemy info.

ACTION: G-2 — 75. 6.

INFO. COPIES: OPD, A-2, CGAAN, TAG, FILE

CM-In-6047 (7-17-42) 2306Z

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/7/44
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

PRIORITY

From: OBQ SWPA
To: Chief of S War Dept
     Washington DC

No. C 117 July 16, 1942

General headquarters southwest Pacific area will move from Melbourne to Brisbane effective ten hundred Zed July twentieth. Naval and Air Commanders will be in same building and Land headquarters adjacent. Radio circuits with Honolulu and San Francisco already established from Brisbane. Request that all radio and cable communications for all United States Army Echelons be addressed CINC SWPA in order to effect proper distribution in most expeditious manner.

MacArthur.

Action Copy: OPD

Info. Copies: G-2
A-2
CG AAF
SOS
TAG
Log
File

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 6(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 1, 1972
By SLR Date: MAY 24 1973

CH-IN-5468 (7/16/42) 1329 Z

COPY No. 27

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
From: GHQ SWPA
To: Chief of Staff
No. C110, July 15, 1942

The necessary repositioning of air force tactical elements from one combat zone into another and the development of heretofore unoccupied areas in the theater of war has consistently dissipated our AGE force supply and maintenance facilities and personnel. This has resulted in training tactical organizations not yet supplied with airplanes of trained personnel and the replacement control depot of bases for airbase complements in newly appointed combat areas. Continuing the study of this situation has led us to believe that the present ratio of maintenance organizations to tactical units involved in this theater is not correct. Study has shown the necessity for at least six air depot groups in Australia to adequately provide for vital airplane repair and erection facilities. With the three authorized thus far it will be necessary to furnish three other air depot groups. When these are present in this theater it will release the air base groups to assume their normal function of servicing tactical groups. Due to wide dispersion of tactical organizations and to the poor communications in the northern and western portions of Australia it is considered that one air base group complete with air base SQ per tactical group will give the minimum number of servicing facilities and personnel to accomplish our mission. We now have a total of eight
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER page 2

INCOMING MESSAGE

From:
To:

No. C 110, July 15, 1942

Tactical groups less two squadrons of medium bombardment and one transport group. SBP Air Base Groups we have on hand less air base squadrons engaged principally in air depot work with only a limited application to normal functions. A total of nine air base groups properly equipped with air base squadrons are necessary to provide service and airfields complements for eight tactical groups and one transport group. Lagg of air depot groups and air base groups in the numbers given results in trying to allocate station complements from combat units to a large number of airstrips and dispersal strips. Repeated attempts to reorganize this led to the tactical structure laid down in tables of organization. Since most of our operations are amphibious in character for offensive operation to be completely successful it will be necessary to have both tactical and maintenance organizations completely mobile. This can be accomplished if the ratio of maintenance organizations and tactical organizations be as set out above. It is recommended therefore that this area be supplied with three complete additional air depot groups six air base squadrons for the six air base groups now on hand and three complete additional air base groups to include air base squadrons.

MacArthur

Action Copy: OPD
Info. Copies: G-2
A-2
CG AAF
TAG
LOG
File

CM-IN-5228 (7/15/42)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: CINC SWPA MNB
To: AGWAR WH DC

No. Cast-68, July 11th, 1942

Can more definite information (for Marshall than indicated in your three fifty one July seventh be given as to the probable dates of supply of landing boats. Australian resources of personnel demand that Naval crews be not withdrawn from other pursuits prior to necessity therefor. Your radio does not rpt not furnish a sufficiently firm basis to advise Australian Government as to when to start training of their crews. Is it possible to ship immediately enough of the boats to institute training at an earlier date... It is estimated that sixty five assault type landing boats, twenty four rubber landing boats with outboard motors and six tank lighters will be sufficient to institute training.

Australian authorities advise that they can man this minimum number of boats by September first. Surveys indicate that few improvised landing boats can be obtained locally. Local resources for manufacture are meager.

MacArthur

Footnote: 351 (CM-OUT-1772 7-7-42) OPD Landing boats and operating personnel.

Action Copy: OPD

Info. Copies: G-2, A-2, CG AAF, SOS, TAG, LOG, File

CM-IN-3720 (7-11-42) 1004 Z

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(c) and 5(d) or (b)
OSD letter, May 1, 1972
By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
PRIORITY

From: CINC SWPA
To: AGWAR
No. C 71 July 10, 1942

This radio consists of four parts. Part one: The great distances encountered, the lack of communications and the poor port facilities in operation areas produce a very serious logistic problem in Australia. These conditions together with a rapidly diminishing labor pool which is practically devoid of skilled mechanics, is seriously affecting American effectiveness. I have had these problems studied and am convinced that greater logistic support in the form of American service of supply troops must be provided for this theatre at the earliest practicable date. This logistic support is required irrespective of whether our mission is offensive or defensive.

There is available in Australia at the present time the necessary basic elements for a limited objective offensive effort: That is, three divisions namely, the seventh Australian, thirty second and forty first USA, and the American air force. The US divisions are being organized into a corps under American command. The Australian division may be assigned thereto. To effect this organization it will be necessary to furnish certain auxiliary corps and army units adapted for combat in a theatre devoid of roads, railroads and other communication means. This corps no matter what its role may be, will require these additional means.

In addition to providing specialized corps troops CDA it will be necessary to revise somewhat the equipment of the
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: CINC SWPA
To: AGWAR
No. C-71 July 10, 1943

individual divisions to adopt them for special conditions which vary widely in this area. The equipment problem is now under study and our requirements in this respect will be submitted at an early date.

Part two of the radiogram, which follows, indicates service of supply troops immediately required irrespective of the mission of the Southwest Pacific area. Part three lists additional troops required to form a corps and additional SOS troops required for its line of communications support which will permit of the organization of a task force suitable constituted for limited objective offensive operations in this area. Four priorities of shipment are stated. Similar priority in parts two and three should be given equal weight and shipped concurrently. End of part one part two: Additional service of supply units required: First priority dash engr dash one rpt engr dash one regt rpt regt gen serv white, one Dep Co, four HQ Com rpt Com zone sec, one Mobile shop Co white, three dump trk co white, one half E Q rpt EQ com zone, one engr bn avv rpt avn white. Ord rpt ord dash one Am rpt am bn white less four co, two dep rpt dep co. QM rpt QM dash one trk regt less two bn white, one light maint bn less two co, one serv bn white, three dep rpt dep co sap white, two dep rpt dep co motor transport, one mobile shoe and textile rep co, one Hv rpt Hv maint bn less one co, one port labor bn white, one salv dep EQ. Sig rpt Sig dash two base sec com det, two com EQ avn rpt EQ avn support. Ac rpt ac dash one transport GP rpt GP with planes.

Second priority dash engr rpt engr dash one regt gen serv white, one dump trk co white. Ord rpt Ord dash one maint and sup bn. QM rpt QM dash one trk co white, one light maint co, one dep co sup white, one port labor bn white. C M rpt cml mash one impregnating co.

Third priority dash engr rpt engr dash one dump trk co white. QM rpt QM dash one trk bn white, one mobile refrigeration co less heavy refreg equipage further details will be submitted later, one GRAVEN registration co. Cws rpt cws dash one impregnating co.

Fourth priority dash engr rpt engr dash one dump trk
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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

FROM: CINC SFC
TO: Agwar
No. C-71 July 10, 1942

co white. Med rpt med dash one regt (Army Pyle), qm rpt qm
dash one regt, one refrigeration co less heavy refriger equipage
further details will be submitted later, one sterilization
and bath bn white, one Idry co white, one car co less trans-
portation. Cws rpt cws dash one impregnating co, one bn mtx
rpt mtx less one co.

Engineer units imperative to exploit local resources
of material, to supervise local labor pools and to work on
widely separated construction projects throughout Australia
and in New Guinea. These projects must be complete prior to
rainy season. Additional medical regiment required since the
medical regiment here is widely dispersed to serve two base
sections and adjacent islands. Additional truck units re-
quired to provide essential transportation for
personnel and supplies in and about base sections and depo-
since the two truck regiments now here are fully employed in
maintaining lateral communications between base sections one and
two. The air force transport group is required for the aerial
transportation of personnel and supplies, for evacuation and for
providing transportation for three air borne anti aircraft units not
here and parachute battalions requested in part three. Depot
units requested are essential for receiving, warehousing and
issuing supplies at main ports and depot. End of part two.

Part three: Additional units required to organize task force for
limited objective offensive from Australia: First priority
dash one Hq and Hq co corps, one Hq and Hq co air support
cond. Engr rpt engr dash one Hq corps three Bq CX rpt CX
sec cmt one combat regt corps, one Hq GHQ AP rpt AP. Inf
rpt Inf dash one parachute bn. Fa rpt Fa dash three bn
seventy five MM pack how less animals which will be supplied
locally dash all now should be same model and provided with
towing equipment per pages forty five and six snl rpt snl
dash cast twenty six Feb forty one. Ord rpt Ord dash two med
maint co. AC rpt AC dash one transport gp rpt gp (flying boat) with
planes.

Second priority dash engr rpt engr dash one dep rpt
dep co, one bn avn rpt avn white, one Hq co Af rpt Af. Inf
rpt Inf dash one para bn. Ca rpt Ca dash one AA regt plus
one auto weapons bn, Fa rpt Fa dash one Hq and Hq btry, one

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/44

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

No. C-71 July 10, 1942

To: AGWAR

td rpt td bn light preferably self propelled. Ord rpt Ord dash one dep co, one am rpt am bn less four co. Qm rpt Qm dash one trk bn white less one co, one light maint co. Cws rpt cws dash two prov cal rpt cal co incl co bq decon rpt decon plat unpack plat and comb maint and dep plat.

Third priority dash engr rpt engr dash one combat regt corps, one heavy ponton bn less ponton equipage, transporta-
tion, portable cranes, tractors and crane trucks of the two
engr bridge cos rpt cos only; in their place there should
be shipped seventy four two wheel trailers, seventy two
dash two and half rpt two and one half ton cargo trks,
eight half ton pickup body trks, two three quarters ton
cargo trailers, and four one quarter ton four Xray four
George prep trks. Inf rpt Inf dash one parachute bn.
Fa rpt Fa dash one bn one hundred fifty five MM gun
tractor drawn. Ord rpt Ord dash one AN rpt AN co. QM
rpt QM dash one gm sup co white, one serv bn white,
one dep rpt dep co sup white, one graves registration
co one dep rpt dep at rpt at co, one Salv collecting co
white, two Trk Co Avn rpt Avn. Cws rpt Cws dash one Prov
Cal rpt Cal co Incl Co Hq decon rpt decon plat unpack
Plat and comb maint and Dep Plat.

Fourth priority dash engr rpt engr dash two gen
serv regt white, one mobile ship co, two dump trk co
white, one bn avn rpt avn white. Ord rpt Ord dash three
medium maint co. C: one dep co, three am rpt am co.
Qm rpt Qm dash one trk bn white less one co, one light
maint co, one serv bn white, one mobile refrigeration co
less heavy refrigeration equipage further details will
be submitted later, one hv rpt hv maint co. Deem it
highly advisable to complete assembling, reequipping,
training and acclimatizing of such a force at earliest
possible moment. Projected force is balance, suitable
for any probable limited objective offensive and
adaptable for operations with marine forces. Urge early
positive action on implementation of this force. End
of part three part four: Above troop requirements practiced
on units personnel.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 2(d) and (6) or (5)
OSD letter, May 1, 1973

By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

COPY No. 27
and equipment listed below which have been approved by
indicated radio for shipment, but on which shipping
orders not yet received, as being available to this
command. Shipment these approved units should be expedited
as much as possible: two SIG CO DEP AVN RPT DEP AVN
and one air DEP GP RPT DEP GP, NR RPT NR two one six
three dash June sixty. Five MP BNS, NR one five four
three dash thirty April and NR RPT NR two six three dash
six June. Two ORD COS AVN RPT COS AVN, NR PRT NR two
eight one dash twenty fifth June, one MED SUP DEP and four
field HOSP, NR RPT NR two two six zero dash fifteen June
dash separate radio on Med personnel and equipment follows:
three Sig BNS, one SIG CO OPN RPT OPN, one SIG CO AVN, two
AW RPT AW SIG RPTG COS RPT RPTG COS, one AW RPT AW SIG BN,
and one SIG CONST RPT CONST BN, NR RPT NR two one four one
zero dash twenty first April. Also one hundred twenty
radio technicians, NR RPT NR one nine zero two dash twenty
fifth May. Forty Kw RPT Kw fixed RAD STA DET and air
force fillers, NR RPT NR two three zero two dash seventeenth
June. Paragraph. Request early radio reply your decision
this requisition, also advice on War Department Code
designation shipment numbers assigned for directed
movement of units listed in parts two, three and four.

MACARTHUR

Action Copy: G-2
Info. Copies: G-2
A-2
CO AAF
SOS
TAG
LOG
File

CM-IN-3702 (7-11-42) 0637 Z

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/1944
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTION</th>
<th>TEXT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F-00</td>
<td>SAY TO GENERAL MACARTHUR THAT I REGRET TO HAVE GIVEN ANY OCCASION FOR HIS MISUNDERSTANDING OF MY INTENTIONS IN SENDING TO YOU DESPATCHES INFORMATIVE OF CONTEMPLATED OPERATIONS ESPECIALLY THAT ONE WHICH INADVERTENTLY OMITTED SPECIFIC DIRECTION AFTERWARDS CORRECTED TO YOU TO SHOW THEM TO HIM.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 2(B) and 5(D) or (B)
OSD letter, May 1, 1973
By SLR Date May 1, 1973
Dear Captain McCrea,

At the direction of Dr. Evatt, I enclose herewith
the text of an extract from a speech made recently by the Australian
Prime Minister, Mr. Curtin, in which he refers to Dr. Evatt’s
mission to the United States and England. It will be noted that
Mr. Curtin expresses his gratitude to President Roosevelt for
the assistance and help extended to the representative of the
Australian Government.

Dr. Evatt would be grateful if the enclosed text could
be brought to the notice of the President.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Captain J. L. McCrea,
Naval Aide to the President,
White House,
Washington, D.C.
Tel. No. 699

To

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

AUSTRALIAN LEGATION, WASHINGTON

Received in Clear

d. June 6th, 1942 (17.40 hours)

r. " " (10.30 ")

For Evatt from Hodgson.

Your E.S. 54. Following is full text of passage referred to.

The Minister for External Affairs has completed his work in London and returned to Washington. Dr. Evatt has achieved important results in the special mission entrusted to him. There are some who earlier in this year had sought to do a disservice to the unity of the allied cause and the solidarity of the Empire by distorting my plain and frank statements of the emphasis which the Australian Government placed on the importance of the Pacific theatre in the grand strategy of the whole war, the forces required for the security of Australia as a base and the forces required for offensive action in this theatre against Japan.

The correctness of my own original statements was confirmed soon after I made them by the following events:

(1) The directive issued to the Supreme Commander by the United Nations fully provided in principle for my contentions.

(2) The division of the globe into areas for greater facility in the higher direction of the war placed Australia and the Southwest Pacific area under the operational responsibility of the United States. At the same time Mr. Churchill also gave me assurances that he did not consider this arrangement as in any way absolving the United Kingdom Government from their determination and duty to come to...
our aid to the best of their ability.

Probably the greatest service Dr. Evatt has rendered was the winning of sympathetic understanding of our viewpoint in Washington and London. He has now had the opportunity of discussing our position with the President and his advisers in Washington and with Mr. Churchill and other Ministers and the Chiefs of Staff in London where he has also been able to explain the Pacific outlook to the people and the press of Britain.

As I have indicated there never was any real cause for doubt or misunderstanding but I am happy to say that any trace of either has completely disappeared. In conformity with Mr. Churchill's earlier assurances Dr. Evatt has also received promises of material aid, which I am unable to elaborate at present but they are a practical gesture of great significance to the Australian people.

Mr. Churchill has expressed to me his pleasure of having had the opportunity for personal discussion with the Minister for External Affairs and we for our part are most appreciative of the facilities afforded to our Minister while in London to enable him to carry out his mission. I would like to take this opportunity of recording publicly the deep appreciation of the Government and myself for the aid and assistance which the British Government and especially Mr. Churchill himself have afforded to the Minister for External Affairs and to the Commonwealth of Australia whose representative he is.

I would also express my gratitude to President Roosevelt for the assistance and help that he has extended to the representative of the Australian Government. I have received a most cordial message of goodwill which I have suitably acknowledged. It is a matter for great satisfaction that the President among his onerous responsibilities is able to preside at meetings of the Pacific War Council.

While in Washington Dr. Evatt will have an opportunity for discussion and consultation with Sir Owen Dixon who will represent Australia on the Pacific War Council there. With Dr. Evatt's departure from London it has been decided to appoint Mr. Bruce as the accredited representative of the Commonwealth Government on the United Kingdom War Cabinet and the Pacific War Council in London.
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

PRIORITY

From: GHQ SWPA
To: AGWAR
By SLR
Date MAY 26, 1942

No. AG 812, May 26, 1942.

For Marshall smuggling crude rubber from Dutch East Indies under consideration here but definite plans for project have not been made. Dutch authorities believe rubber can be brought out from Sumatra if good prices are paid but doubt possibility of getting any from Java or Malaya. Contacts are being attempted. Will advise of development. RE your 1(#1)8 May 21st. Major L. W. Elliott associated with development of petroleum products in Dutch East Indies for past 15 years. His character is excellent. Now assigned Headquarters DMAFIA where his broad experience in production and distribution of petroleum products can be utilized to full advantage. If further information desired regarding Elliott suggest contact John A. Brown President Socony Vacuum 26 Broadway New York or Walter C. Teagle Standard Oil Rockefeller Center New York.

MacArthur.

(*) #1 came RE your one aero eight. Service will be made on request.

Note: No. 108 (CM-OUT-4358, 5/21/42) Smuggling crude rubber from NEI. OPD.

Action Copy: OPD
Info. Copies: G-2
A-2
CG AAF
TAG
File

CM-IN-7263 (5/26/42) AM 7:45

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached hereto is a radiogram received from General MacArthur on May 23, and a reply prepared by Admiral King which is concurred in by me.

Our radio number 109 to which General MacArthur refers was one in which he was told of the necessity for delaying the arrival of certain air units destined for Australia because of the necessity of holding them in Hawaii until the present situation clears up.

(Signed) Acting Chief of Staff

5/25/42

President has seen

MAY 21 1973

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11612, Sec. 8(D) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD Letter, May 3, 1972
By SLR Date

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date
From Australia
To Chief of Staff
No 199 May 23, 1942

Sincerely appreciate your radio 109 22nd. The fatal weakness in our position is and has been since the beginning of the War lack of sea power in the Pacific. Every disaster in that Theatre is due fundamentally to the fact and these disasters will continue and increase until a force is concentrated sufficient to challenge the Japanese Navy. It is no longer a question of priorities of fronts or of maintaining the flow of supplies to critical areas. The enemy is concentrating his full power in the Pacific for a definite decision which cannot be avoided. By great good fortune we have become possessed of his plans in sufficient detail to enable us to concentrate to meet him. The Atlantic and the Indian Oceans should temporarily be stripped in order to concentrate a sufficient force for this special occasion to overwhelm him. There is still time for such a concentration on our part which can promptly be returned to present missions as soon as the stroke has been accomplished. If this is not done much more than the fate of Australia will be jeopardized. The United States itself will face a series of such disasters and a crisis of such proportions as she has never faced in the long years of her existence.

MacArthur


Action Copy: OPD

Info. Copies: SGS File

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1973
By SLR Date May 8, 1973

CM-IN-5409 (5/23/42) AM 10:29

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
From: General Marshall
To: General MacArthur

THE SERIOUS SITUATION SET FORTH IN YOUR ONE NINE NINE TWENTY-THIRD CONFIRMS VIEWS OF US JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF STOP STEPS TO MEET THIS SITUATION ARE ALREADY RECEIVING DEEP CONSIDERATION HERE STOP FROM MARSHALL TO MACARTHUR STOP DESIRE TO REEMPHASIZE EXTREME URGENCY THAT INFORMATION CONVEYED IN MY ONE ZERO NINE TWENTY-SECOND SHOULD NOT BE PASSED BEYOND YOURSELF AND

May 24, 1942.
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: GHQ SWPA
To: AGWAR

No AG 796 May 24th, 1942

If military priorities (for Somervell) in the use of ships are promptly enforceable and the ships are not removed from local waters I concur in your chartering of ships for Australian coastwise use, including the military forces, through the British Ministry of War Transport (re your 1691 air mail letter not repeat not received). Within the week it has been necessary to partially unload 1 of the outbound ships under exclusive United States Army control order to provide prompt transportation in accordance with War Department Operation orders to move troop units to certain islands in the Pacific to the east of Australia. Days and hours were of vital importance and there was insufficient time to present the case to the Allied Consultative Council or the Australian Shipping Control Board. There is no way of telling far in advance when such emergency military needs will arise and therefore my priorities must be promptly enforceable. My concern for the retention of tonnage in Australian waters arises from the interlocking of economic and military uses of available tonnage at the present time. Frankly the recent combination of the local agency of the British Ministry of War Transport and the chairmanship of the allied Consultative Council in 1 person makes it appear that

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 4, 1972

By SLR

DATE
MAY 21, 1973

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

No AG 796 May 24th, 1942 From: GHQ SWPA To: AGWAR Page 2

London will be in a position to remove ships from these waters as necessity may appear to London to dictate. Since the strategic direction of the military effort in this area is America's concern I have felt it was important to have the charter party of ships here in the hands of the United States Army or United States War Shipping Administration. If the information is readily available as to the location of vessels in Australian waters, if the allocated tonnage is kept here and not removed and if my priorities can be promptly enforced, the objections are overcome and I am prepared to accept the position of the War Shipping Administration.

MacArthur

Action Copy: SOS
Info. Copies: OPD G-2 A-2 CGAAF TAG FILE

CM-IN-6704 (5/24/42) 4:08 am

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 1, 1972
By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: GHQ SWPA
To: AGWAR

No. 784, May 21, 1942.

Tires and rubber products being procured locally now only in special cases. For Marshall. Reurad 1631 May 5. Estimate 5(#1) tons rubber stock required to meet total demand for US Army Operations in Australia to December (#2) 1943 repeat 43, if all products procured locally. Contracts now being made with local concerns for future procurement of tires to meet US needs. Estimate based on approximately 18,000 vehicles here now, 700 airplanes plus Signal and Medical Corps requirements and incidentals. This also assumes 6 months tire life with no recapping or retreading. Any planning for additional vehicles and planes would increase estimated demand proportionately. Stock of raw rubber in Australia as of May 1 approximately 13,000 tons.

MacArthur.

(#1) came five thousand spx hundred
(#2) came December thirteenth nineteen fortythree

Service will be made on request.

FOOTNOTE: Radio 1631 (CM-OUT-1040 5/5/42) OPD. Asks for estimate of demands to be made on Australian rubber stocks.

ACTION COPY: OPD

INFO COPY: G-2, A-3, CGAAP, TAG, FILE

CR-IN-5800 (5/31/43) RM 1:53

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E.O. 11652 Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

MAY 21 1942

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E.O. 12356 Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
PRIORITY

From: Melbourne
To: Chief of Staff
No. 190, May 19, 1942

In view of present disposition of our own and enemy Naval Forces and of estimated probable enemy course of action suggest for consideration the possibility of bringing the forces of the Eastern Fleet to bear upon the situation. They could be utilized in complete concert of action either by operating from this area as a base or by creating diversion in Eastern Area of Indian Ocean.

Macarthur

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(X) and 3(D) or (X)
OSD letter, May 1, 1972
By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

Action Copy: OPD
Info. Copies: G-2, A-2, CG AAF, SGS, TAG, File

CM-IN-5112 (5/19/42) 1:26 AM

COPY No.
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

CSWD
May 18, 1942
10:18 A.M.

PRIORITY

From: GHQ SWPA
To: AGWAR

No. AG 770, May 18, 1942.

For General Marshall your 985 proposed a method of filing requisitions with London and Washington, in which I concurred in my 102 and which you indicate is subject to reconsideration in you 69, in that all requisitions may be filed in Washington instead of being split between London and Washington. From information received informally from Chiefs of Staffs of Australian Services it is believed that the change suggested in your 69 will be disadvantageous to and not desired by the Australian Navy and Army, whereas it is acceptable to the Air Force. The Australian Army and Navy both obtain considerable quantities of British types of equipment and supplies. It would serve no useful purpose to have the large volume of requisitions for such equipment and supplies submitted to Washington prior to forwarding to London. Relative priorities which I shall assign to such requisitions in relation to requisitions submitted directly to Washington will indicate the position that such requests should take in relation to my direct requisitions, if and when they are extracted to Washington from London for supply. I have requested the formal opinion of the Australian Government by letter to the Prime Minister and will supplement this radio as soon as I receive his reply. My assignment of priorities to requisitions referred to in my 102 is in progress and the explanation upon which War Department Agencies may interpret my assignment for purposes of supply and shipment will follow by airmail at an early date. The application of my priorities together with my statement as to whether or not commodities which are requested from time to time by the Australian

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E. O. 11662, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 1, 1972
By SLR Date MAY 2-1 1973

COPY No. 26

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
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Government are essential to the military effort, constitute my method of allocation of war materials in this area, for which I am held responsible by the terms of paragraph 3 of my mission. You have previously confirmed such allocation in your 1486.

MaxArthur.

Note: Radio 985 is prior to 4-1-42 and therefore no copy in WDMC. Radio 102 (CM-IN-2365 4/9/42) concur in proposed system of requisition. Radio 69 (CM-OUT-2756 5/14/42) Decision pending regarding requisitions. Radio 1486 (CM-OUT-5062 4/25/42). Paragraph 5 of your directive authorizes you broad allocation of war materials to forces under your command.
SECRET
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INCOMING MESSAGE

URGENT

From: GHQ SWPA
To: Chief of Staff

No. 179, May 10, 1942

Absolutely no information has been released from my headquarters with reference to action taking place in the northeastern sector of this area except the official communes replying your 49 9th. By no stretch of possible imagination do they contain anything of value to the enemy nor anything not fully known by him. The release of such information by this Headquarters is specifically provided for in the general directive approved by all the nations concerned. The forces engaged in the present action involve all my naval force which includes the major portion of the Australian Navy, a large part of my air force involving many Australian components, and my ground forces which are the actual objective of the hostile movement and which are almost exclusively Australian. This is an action in Australian waters involving Australian forces and the very fate of the Australian people and continent and it is manifestly absurd that some technicality of administrative process should attempt to force them to await the pleasure of the United States Navy Department for news of action. The Australians are the most immediate ones concerned and the publicity to their Parliament and people is given without delay by the Prime Minister himself. As I have stated before, it is impossible under the conditions that exist to have a unilateral control of publicity exercised over this country and these forces by an American echelon thousands of miles away. The Australian Government does not and will not recognize such a situation in which their sovereign rights in this particular are controlled elsewhere. Such an attempt could only lead to friction and resentment which would be completely destructive to a combined military effort. There is nothing that I can do that I have not already done in this respect. If I do not issue communes involving this area such control as I have of the situation will entirely disappear. The Australians

[Handwritten note: "Hold to show President"]

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
will resume their own publicity and their views on censorship differ so materially from the standard desired that the information that will flow out will be infinitely more liberal than at present. My communiques and all information from this Headquarters are given only in the broadest generalities. They emanate personally from me and so far as secrecy is concerned cannot be objectionable. Nothing is released unless the occurrences are in the area and involve forces belonging to the area. Under these circumstances I feel that it is absolutely essential that communiques such as those put forth be issued as circumstances demand.

MacArthur

ACTION: OPD
INFO. COPIES: G-2, SGS, TAG, BPR, FILE

Footnote: Reference to Radio 49 is in error. This message refers to Radio 48 (CM-OUT-1764 5-9-42) (MAC JOURNAL 5/9/42) OPD. Premature release of publicity in recent South Pacific Action.

CM-IN-2672 (5-10-42) AM 8:16

M.I.S. JOURNAL NO

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 1, 1972
By SLR

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94