MR 300 RUSSIA (1) Sec. 2 - Warfare

Nov. '42 thru July '43
COMDR ON STAFF REAR ADM FISHER SAYS REQUEST MADE BY REDS IN LONDON AND BY-PASSING ROYAL NAVY FOR DETAILED INFO BRIT TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS SHIPS EQUIPMENT APPEARS IDENTICAL THAT COVERED MOSCOW 14/03 MARCH.
ROYAL AIR FORCE AND OTHER BRITS MUCH EXERCISED OVER RECENT AND UNEXPLAINED RED REFUSAL GRANT ENTRY LONDON MOSCOW STRATOPLANE NOW FLYING VIA CAIRO. SITTING IN CAIRO 2 WEEKS AWAITING PERMISSION. 3 PLANES AVAILABLE FOR SERVICE. LAST WINTER WHEN FLYING DIRECT LONDON MAJORITY WESTBOUND PASSENGERS RED AVIATORS AND OFFICIALS. REDS NOW HINT REASON REFUSAL ENTRY DUE BRITISH REFUSAL LAST WINTER CARRY WOMEN AND CHILDREN. RECENT ARRIVAL UNITED STATES NAVY PLANES MOSCOW FOR USE AMBASSADOR LEAVES BRITISH FLABBERGASTED AND SURE WE WILL NOT BE ABLE FREELY USE IT. 

16.....ACT

CONINCH.....40.....FILE ADD 13....10/1.....NAVAT

CONFIDENTIAL
FRANKEL REPORTS ALPINE JAEGER CORPS COMMANDED BY LT GENERAL SCHORNER HEADQUARTERS AT PAIKINA OPERATING ON MURMANSK FRONT. DISPOSITION

(A) 6TH DIVISION ALPINE TROOPS COMPOSED OF 141 AND 143 JAEGER PLUS 119 ARTILLERY REGIMENT AND 6 SEPARATE BATTALIONS.

(B) 2ND DIVISION ALPINE COMPOSED OF 136 AND 197 JAEGER 111 ARTILLERY REGIMENTS PLUS 5 SEPARATE BATTALIONS.

(C) 338 REGIMENT OF 214 INFANTRY DIVISION 193 REGIMENT PLUS 2 BATTALIONS OF 68 INFANTRY DIVISION 139 REGIMENT OF 3RD ALPINE JAEGER DIVISION PLUS 3 SEPARATE BATTALIONS.

(D) 3 SEPARATE ARTILLERY BATTERIES. RAILROAD NOW

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
OPERATING BETWEEN PETSAMO AND KIRKENES FOR TRANSPORT NICKEL ORE SOURCE FOR ABOVE INFO RELIABLE. THIS INFO GIVEN MILITARY ATTACHE HERE WHO WILL CORRELATE WITH HIS SOURCES AND COMMUNICATE WITH HIS.

16.. ACT
13... COMinch... CNO... 20G... NAVAIDE... 20P...
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**TO: ALUSNA, MOSCOW**

**FROM: VIC CNO**

**DATE: 16 JULY, 1943**

**TOR CODEROOM: 161726 161840**

**DECODED BY: BRUCE**

**PARAPHRASED BY: KNIGHT**

**ROUTED BY:**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

JOURNEY APPROVED YOUR 191222. ENDEAVOR SECURE INFORMATION AIRFIELDS PARTICULARLY KOMSOMOLSK AREA MEANS OF SUPPLYING THEM, TONNAGE WATER RAIL AND ROAD SYSTEMS CAN HANDLE. AMOUNT 100 OCTANE FUEL PRODUCED LOCALLY AND AMOUNT ABOVE GROUND. STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION FOR EASTERN AIR, TOTAL AND OPERATIONAL. AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION IN FAR EAST. DEGREE OF COMPLETION ROAD AND RAILROAD KOMSOMOLSK TO NIKOLAEV AND KOMSOMOLSK TO SOFYET GAVAN. MEANS OF TRANSPORT AND CAPACITY OVER DUE FOR FROM NIKOLAEV TO RAILHEAD. DEPTH OF WATER AT RAIL BAR AND MINIMUM TO RAILHEAD. PILOT AND DETAILS.

**SECRET**

X. O. 11049, Ech 820 and 820 or (8)

OSI letter, May 1, 1978

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVPROB.)

OPNAV-NR-26

U.S. NAVY DEPARTMENT

May 1, 1978

DECLASSIFIED

Spec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NR 101

By RT, NARA, Date

161716

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**Page 1 of 4** 152/15  NCR 7643

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**INFO BUMED**

**JULY 1 TO 3 LANG VISITED FRONT VICINITY VIASYM IN COMPANY SPECIAL RED CROSS REPRESENTATIVE**

**SULZBERGER AND LOCAL RED CROSS REPRESENTATIVES TOURED LARGE FIELD SORTING AND EVACUATION HOSPITAL AND 2 SMALLER SPECIALIZED FIELD HOSPITALS. REPORTS MINSK HIGHWAY 4 LANE CONCRETE AND ASPHALT AS FAR AS ABOUT 100 KILOMETERS OUT FROM MOSCOW. REMAINING 140 KILOMETERS TO VIASYMA EXTREMELY POOR. EVERY BRIDGE DESTROYED. TEMPORARY REPLACEMENTS FUNCTIONING AND LABOR BATTALIONS PUSHING CONSTRUCTION PERMANENT REPLACEMENTS. ALL ALONG ROAD ARTI TANK DEFENSE LINES SPACED 6 TO 20 MILE INTERVALS AT STRATEGIC POINTS. TRAFFIC CHECK POINTS MANNED BY WOMEN SOLDIERS SPACED 10 TO 20 MILE INTERVALS. 20 UNAVALANCHEABLE GERMAN TANKS SEEN ALONG THIS SECTION. SOME

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVYDRS.)

OPNAV-SEC-16

12-29-43

DECLASSIFIED
I.O. 12336, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
ILR 101

By RT, NARA Date: 4/1/66
VILLAGES COMPLETELY DESTROYED. NO LARGE SCALE PLANTING OF CROPS. CITY VIASMA FORMERLY 60000.

POPULATION COMPLETE RUINS. NO BUILDING UNTouched. RETURNED CIVILIANS EXISTING IN EVERY CONCEIVABLE TYPE OF MAKESHIFT HOVEL. FOOD SITUATION SEVERE BUT NOT CRITICAL. MAIN RAILROAD FULLY REPAIRED AND FUNCTIONING. VICINITY VIASMA IS HUGE HOSPITALIZATION CENTER. FLOW OF WOUNDED IS THROUGH ADVANCE MEDICAL SANITARY BATTALIONS TO FIELD SORTING AND EVACUATING HOSPITAL OF SECTOR THENCE TO FIELD SPECIALIST HOSPITALS OR TO MOSCOW HOSPITALS OR TO HOSPITALS IN DEEP REAR. FIELD HOSPITALS VISITED WERE IN TENTS OR DUGOUTS CLEVERLY HIDDEN IN FOREST AREAS. EQUIPMENT AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES SCANTY.

SMALL AMOUNTS AMERICAN MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND MUCH CLEVER IMPROVISATION SEEN. GREATEST PATIENT LOAD OF FIELD SORTING AND EVACUATING HOSPITAL DURING HEAVY SPRING FIGHTING WAS FOUR THOUSAND. STATED MAXIMUM CAPACITY ALMOST UNLIMITED OWING ABILITY EXPAND HOSPITAL UNDER TENTAGE AND TO SHIFT CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. See Art. 76 (c) NAVY-R8, 1917.

OPNAV-NCR-10

By DBS Date: MAY 21, 1973

DECLASSIFIED
O.G. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
JLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date: 4-18-66
QUICKLY MEDICAL PERSONNEL, ALL MEDICAL PERSONNEL IN SECTOR SET UP IN 1 LARGE POOL CENTRALLY ADMINISTERED. THESE SHIFTS AS NEEDS OF INDIVIDUAL HOSPITALS DEMAND. HOSPITALS SEEN CONTAINED 1/3 PRESENT CAPACITY. DESPITE OBVIOUS SHORTAGE OF MODERN MEDICAL EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES IMPRESSION CREATED THAT CARE OF WOUNDED WELL ORGANIZED AND FUNCTIONING EFFICIENTLY. LANG CONSIDERS MOST IMPORTANT MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE INFO TO BE:

1. CENTRAL SORTING AN EVACUATION HOSPITAL FOR EACH SECTOR FRONT.
2. SETTING UP OF LARGE FRONT LINE HOSPITALIZATION AREAS.
3. LOCATING SPECIALIZED FIELD HOSPITALS CLOSE PROXIMITY FRONT AND TO CENTRAL SORTING HOSPITAL.
4. POOLING ALL MEDICAL PERSONNEL TO SHIFT AND MEET PATIENT LOAD DEMANDS INDIVIDUAL HOSPITALS.
5. WIDESPREAD ANY WORKABLE IMPROVISATION REPLACING LACK OF MODERN MEDICAL EQUIPMENT.
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UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE

**ACTION**

16 ACTION

BURIED 10/11.COM! NAVAIDE 13 FILE

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11852, Sec. 3(R) and Sec. 3(D) or (N)
OSD letter, May 4, 1973
By DBS Date MAY 21 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (i) NAVREGS)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94
REDs HAVE TOLD ME I MAY GO TO KOMSOMOLSK ON AMUR TO INSPECT SHIPBUILDING FACILITIES THERE. ALSO HAVE HOPEs THEY WILL ALLOW ME VISIT VLADIVOSTOK AT SAME TIME WITH EXPECTATION VISITS SHIPS AND PORT AND OPEN ASSOCIATION WITH RED NAVY THERE. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT DUE TO BAD FLYING WEATHER IN URALS SUCH TRIP MAY NECESSITATE SOME RAIL TRAVEL AND AT MOST REQUIRE UP TO A MONTH AWAY FROM MOSCOW. REQUEST DEPARTMENT'S PERMISSION MAKE THIS TRIP.

16...ACT

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/94
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RETURNED FROM VISIT BAKU ACCOMPANIED BY TOLLEY. TOTAL 6 DAYS 2 DAYS OF WHICH TRAVELLING VIA NAVY DOUGLAS.

PRIMARY PURPOSE INSPECT NAVAL SCHOOL, REAR ADM RAMASWIVI DIRECTOR NAVAL EDUCATION BY A PURE COINCIDENCE

ACCOMPANIED FROM MOSCOW AND REMAINED BAKU. FACILITIES EFFICIENCY CLEANLINESS AND GENERAL SET UP OF SCHOOL OF A HIGH ORDER AND REFLECT GREAT CREDIT ON SOVIET NAVY FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF PLACE OF SUCH PROPORTIONS IN 2 YEARS UNDER WAR CONDITIONS. 600 MIDSHIPMEN OF WHICH LARGE MAJORITY NOW ON PRACTICE CRUISES SEVERAL MONTHS

DURATION ABOARD COMBATANT SHIPS OF ALL TYPES. INSPECTED 160 TON SUBMARINE 10 YEARS OLD AND 33 YEAR OLD GUNBOAT.

RED ADJUTANTIAN, CASPIAN SUBS USED FOR TRAINING CREWS TO VISIT OTHER AREAS. ALL QUESTIONS FREELY ANSWERED.

AND GIVEN RUN OF BOTH VESSELS. SENIOR OFFICERS OF SHIPS AND SHORE ESTABLISHMENTS GIVE IMPRESSION OF INTELLIGENCE.

EFFICIENCY AND ABILITY IN NO RESPECTS INFERIOR TO OUR OWN. LESS OPPORTUNITY OBSERVE AND CONVERSE WITH JUNIOR
OFFICERS BUT THEY APPEAR VERY SOUND TYPES FROM STAND-
POINT BOTH INTELLIGENCE AND ABILITY. SEAMEN EXCELLENT.

PHYSICAL SPECIMENS, DISCIPLINE IN ALL RANKS AND RATES
CONSIDERABLE LESS FREE AND INFORMAL THAN AMERICAN AND
NO SUGGESTION WHATSOEVER OF ANY FRATERNIZATION OR SOCIAL
CONTACT BETWEEN OFFICERS AND MEN. ALL THE TRAPPINGS
OF AN ORDINARY USN WARDROOM AND A PERFECTLY USUAL LOOK-
ING MESS DECK WITH FOLDING BUNKS AND COMFORTABLE SIM-
PLICITY FOR THE MEN. GENERAL SNAPSHOT AND ACCURACY
INCOMPARABLY BETTER THAN WE ARE ACCUSTOMED TO FINDING
AMONG CIVIL OFFICIALS AND THE GENERAL RUN OF THE SOVIET
POPULATION. ALL MANIFESTED THE DESIRE WE CRITICIZE
FREELY AND COMPARE EVERYTHING WE SAW WITH AMERICAN
COUNTERPART WITH OBVIOUS WISH INFORMATION AND NOT
FISHING FOR COMPLIMENTS. 4 YEAR INSTRUCTION MIDSHIPMEN
INCLUDES ABOUT 4 MONTHS ANNUAL SEA DUTY. GREAT EMPHASIS
ON NAVIGATION AND LEAST ON ENGINEERING WITH CULTURAL
SUBJECTS MUCH LESS THAN ANnapolis EXCEPT THOSE GIVING
DIRECT BACKGROUND FOR NAVAL SUBJECTS. ADM RAMDHYVILI

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVY MANUAL, May 1, 1973
OPNAV-NCR-16
D. L. NAVY DEPARTMENT NAVAL OFFICE 524-1912-4
By DBB Date MAY 21 1973

DECLAS"IFIED
L. O. 12306, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
ILR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/8/1964
IN MELLOD HOO D FOLLOWING DINNER PARTY HAD BEEN CHATTING WITH ME THROUGH RED NAVY INTERPRETER REQUESTED TOLLEY INTERPRET SAID MOST CONFIDENTIALLY THAT KUXNETSO HAD DIRECTED WE BE SHOWN PRACTICALLY EVERYTHING BUT NOT ALL.

SAID HE HIMSELF PREFERRED FULL EXCHANGE INFO AND FURTHERMORE WOULD FOR EXAMPLE LIKE TO SEE AMERICAN OFFICER BLACK SEA AREA AND ON RED SHIPS AS WAS ARRANGEMENT WITH BRITISH.

I SAID WE FULLY IN ACCORD AND HAD MADE EVERY EFFORT.

EFFECT SUCH EXCHANGE AND WHAT IN HIS OPINION WAS REASON FOR OUR LACK SUCCESS. HIS REPLY 1 WORD "RECIPIROCITY".

MATERIAL FOR USE PRACTICAL INSTRUCTION MIDSHIPMEN AMPLE AND EXCELLENT WITH EXCEPTION ENGINEERING WHICH THEY CONSIDER SUBJECT FOR SPECIALIZATION AFTER GRADUATION AS GENERAL LINE OFFICER. NAVIGATION MATERIAL AND METHODS.

PRACTICAL INSTRUCTION SURPAS OURS BY CONSIDERABLE NARROW. OPTICAL AND ORNAMENTS MATERIAL OF ALL TYPES WITH MANY INTERESTING INNOVATIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS WHICH SHORT INSPECTION IN PASSING GAVE ONLY SUGGESTION OF POSSIBLE WORTH AND EFFECTIVENESS IN CONVERSATION ABOUT POSSIBLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) FOR SECURITY.)

OCTAV-N-5362-16

DECLASSIFIED

L O 12266, Sec. 3.3 OR Sec. 3.4

By RT, HARA, Date 4/18/64

O.D. 1115 Sec. 3.8 and K11 (or 69)

O.D. Letter, May 21, 1973
ILITIEB AND USN RADAR SUPERINTENDENT SAID THAT ON RECENT PREVIOUS CITY ITWDSG NAVAL BRIGADE ASHORE BLACK SEA AREA RADAR OF CRUISER MOLOTOW AT PRTI DETECTED APPROACH LARGE FORMATION GERMAN BOMBERS 20 MINUTES PRIOR THEIR ARRIVAL AT ASTRAKHAN GIVEN ELABORATE LUNCH BY LOCAL NAVAL COMMANDANT AND ATTENDED BY GOVERNOR OR OBLAST. HERE AS EVERYWHERE ON TRIP EVERY EFFORT MADE ON PART SOVIETS TO BE AS HOSPITALITY AND FRIENDLY AS POSSIBLE. PORTRAITS PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT IN DINING ROOMS BOTH ASTRAKHAN AND AT NAVAL SCHOOL FOR FIRST TIME I HAVE SEEN IN USSR. TOASTS AND GENERAL ENTHUSIASM RUN TO QUACK DEFEAT OF GERMANS AND NO MENTION WHATEVER OF SECOND FRONT. JAP DISLIKED CORDIALLY BUT NO SUGGESTION ANY ENTHUSIASM ABOUT A SOVIET JAP WAR EXCEPT AMONG THOSE OF OLDER PERSONNEL WHO FOUGHT IN 1944. NO PARTICULAR INTEREST IN CHINA. ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. LONG AND FRANK DISCUSSION WITH CHIEF CASPIAN HYDROGRAPHER AT BAKU. MUCH INTERESTING INFO ABOUT PLANS MAINTAIN LEVEL THIS SEA. IMPORTANT FOR REASON MAINTAINING FREE NAVIGATION VOLGA AS WELL AS

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art 74 (c) NAVPERS

OPNAV-CHB-45

DECLASSIFIED
L.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/66

By DBB, Date 5/21/73
Caspian. Fall of water level due lessened flow Volga which now augmented by drain into new canal system.

Through Moscow increased industrial use water and by irrigation. Also large losses through evaporation in Kara Gulf. This could easily be blocked off but not desired in view fast mixture water this area with inflow water from Caspian produces tremendous quantity glauers salts which used for making industrial soda.

Comparatively easy open canal via Mainich. Following would result: below 200 meters no life exists black sea due certain poisonous gases suspended. Azov Sea fresh water tremendously valuable fishing. Influx black water would wipe out Azov fishing industry and in time same in Caspian. Diversion of Don water would be inefficient, says Iranian Caspian ports practically inoperative due no docking facilities and shallowness approaches which necessitate lightering. Great number 22 wheeled American trucks in Baku which run there.

Under own power and now used apparently commercial purposes as well as military. Food and wine appear.

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person.

(See Art. 76 (4) of EIR(E) Sec. 1(II) and 4(II) or (II)

OBD letter, May 1, 1977.

By DBS Date: May 21, 1973.

RECLASSIFIED

C. O. 12366, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

MIL 101

By RT. NARA. Date: 4/1/64.
ADEQUATE IF NOT PLENTIFUL BAKU AND ASTRAKHAN AREA AND ONLY PROBLEM 1 OF TRANSPORT TO OTHER LESS BOUNTIFUL REGIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (a), or (b) or (c)).

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/74

DATE

E. O. 11652, Sec. 5(G) and 8(D) or (E)

ORD, May 1, 1975

By DBS

Date 5/21/73
Pashkoff considered reliable observer Vladimirov. Moscow courier trip says condition improves. Passenger traffic handling improved since Nov 1942 but food situation slightly worse. Railroad maintenance and operation almost exclusively women. Amur tunnel apparently completed but not used.

Conversations with Russians en route indicate Jap manchurian concentrations reduced and probability Jap attack small. That USA lendlease goods paid for in Kalima Valley sold via Vladivostok.

That Reds determined hold Baltic states and Bessarabia. That USSR will attack Japan after Hitler's comment on splendid performance Bostons Lockheeds and Jeeps. Usual red admiration.
AMERICAN EFFICIENCY AND PLENTY BUT DISLIKE AND
DISTRACT CAPITALISM THROUGH YEARS PROPAGANDA.
CONVERSATIONS WITH ESTONIANS INDICATES COUNTRY
BOLSHEVISED TO SAME EXTENT USSR PROPER WITH
LIQUIDATION OR DEPORTATION ALL OTHERS THAN
PROLETARIAT. 2 ESTONIAN DIVISIONS 7TH AND 249TH
MANY PERSONNEL OF WHICH WENT OVER TO GERMANS
IN VELIKIE LUKI BATTLE LAST YEAR. ESTONIANS
DEPORTED TO USSR LIVING UNDER MISERABLE
CONDITIONS.

16....ACT
COMINCH....
NAVAVEDE....// FILE.
DESPITE RECENT RECRUDESCENCE ON PART MANY CHINESE OFFICIALS OF RUMORS REGARDING IMMINENCE OF JAP ATTACK ON SIBERIA UNABLE TO DETERMINE SUFFICIENT GROUNDS FOR SUCH BELIEF PRESENT TIME. LOCAL SOVIET CIVIL AND MILITARY UNCONCERNED NEITHER DOES HEAD CHINESE INTELLIGENCE BELIEVE SUCH ATTACK LIKELY NOW.
PART 1 260810 NCR 3513
PART 2 260510 NCR 3512
FOR CNO AND MOSCOW.

REF MY 06110 MAY. INTERPRETER QUESTIONED ON 24 JUNE
ALONG SIMILAR LINES BUT QUESTIONING CONDUCTED BY DIFFERENT
GROUP. PRIMARY PURPOSE THIS OCCASION WAS TO HAVE HER
INTERVIEWED BY CHIEF WHO WAS UNFORTUNATELY DETAINED
ANOTHER MEETING SCHEDULED FOR 1 JULY WHEN CHIEF WILL BE
PRESENT TO CONDUCT. NEW QUESTIONS CONCERNED KNOWLEDGE
CONTENTS OF INCOMING AND OUTGOING MAIL POUCHES. IF LAST
COURIER TO MOSCOW CARRIED CONFIDENTIAL OR SECRET MATTER.
THIS COURIER WAS FORMER RESIDENT OF POLAND, WHETHER RECENT
ORDERS DETACHING VICE CONSUL TO USA WERE RESULT OF
HIS MIS-CONDUCT WITH SOVIET GIRL AND INFO CONCERNING HIS
REplacement.
VICE CONSULS GIRL FRIEND RECENTLY ARRESTED FOR ASSOCIATIONS WITH HIM AND SENTENCED TO INDEFINITE LABOR PERIOD ON COLLECTIVE FARM. VICE CONSUL DETAINED GIRL IN HIS APARTMENT FOR TWO DAYS CAUSING HER TO MISS TRAIN WAS GIVEN DEADLINE 24 HOURS AND MADE RESPONSIBLE BY SOVIET DIPLOMATIC AGENT TO SEE THAT SHE WAS ABOARD NEXT TRAIN AFTER VICE CONSUL CONFESSED HIS ACTION TO DIP AGENT. Undoubtedly vice consuls' conduct has not helped delicate situation existing here between all foreigners and Soviets. Questioning was conducted at usual rendezvous. Treatment was polite but firm. No notes were taken and interpreter not asked to sign anything. Trend of questions leads belief that interpreter will be asked to make regular written reports to NKVD after they inform him of exact info desired.
**SECRET**

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (a) NAVREGS.)

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**TO CODE ROOM**

**DECODED BY**

**PARAPHRASED**

**ROUTED BY**

**PAGE 3 OF 3**

**269610**

**NCR 3513**

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**WILL ADVISE RESULTS NEXT INTERVIEW PC. HAGALLAG.**

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16...ACT

CUT INCH 260...13...CNC...NAVYIDE...FILE

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RECLASSIFIED

L. O. 12366, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/1966
DISCREETLY CONGRATULATED CONVOY OFFICER WHO IS INTENSLEY BUT NOT OPENLY ANTI-JAPAN, FORMER SUBMARINE COMMANDER FOR RED NAVY'S SINKING OF JAP SHIP. YOUR 111196. HE QUICKLY DENIED VERACITY OF REPORT AND INDICATED HE HAD HEARD IT BEFORE STATING IT WAS BELIEVED BY SOVIETS TO BE SOME AMERICAN JOURNALIST'S DREAM. SINCERELY BELIEVE TRUTH OF THIS REPRESENTATIVE STATEMENT AS ALL SOVIET OFFICIALS HERE DOING EVERYTHING IN THEIR POWER AND FIGURATIVELY LICKING JAP REPRESENTATIVE BOOTS TO PRESERVE SUPERFICIAL FRIENDSHIP WHICH IS DISTINCTLY NOT RUSSIAN CHARACTERISTIC. FURTHER BELIEVE NO RETALIATORY ACTION WILL EVER BE TAKEN FOR SINKINGS OR SEIZURES UNTIL U.S.S.R. FULLY RESOLVED AND PREPARED IN THIS THEATER TO WAGE OFFENSIVE WAR AGAINST JAPAN. AT PRESENT THIS AREA ONLY PREPARED FOR STRATEGIC DEFENSE AND EVERY EFFORT BEING
MADE TO MAINTAIN ALWAYS A SPEED UP HUGE UNINTERRUPTED FLOW OF SUPPLIES FROM USA TO VLADIVOSTOK.

16...ACT

COMMON...16/11...20/3...NAVAID...FILE.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(5) and 6(D) or (E)
ORD letter, May 1972
By DBS
May 21 1972

CONFIDENTIAL
Names and function of the eight departments of the Soviet Secret

Internal Police - (N.K.V.D.) formerly known as the O.G.P.U.
Serial: 16 - 48  Date: 30 June, 1963.

Subject: USSR. Intelligence Organization

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The Soviet secret police, whose counterpart in the United States is the F.B.I., is organized as follows:

NARODNY COMMISSARIAT VNUTRENNIKH DEL "NKVD" (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs)

1. - E.K.O.

ECONOMICHIK OTDEL or Economic Department. This department deals with preventing individual accumulation of gold, foreign currency, jewelry etc. as well as with individuals who have appropriated large sums of money for "economic sabotage" such as speculation, for political purposes or for undermining price levels.

2. - S.F.O.

SIEKRETNO POLITICHESKI OTDEL or Secret political Department. This department deals with secret party organizations, members of different political groups, new political party organizations and sabotours.

3. - O.C. or K.R.O.

SPECIALNI OTDEL or KOMITET RAZVEDIVATELSKI OTDEL, Special or Counter Espionage Department. This department handles all affairs of foreigners admitted or seeking admission to the Soviet Union. This, of course, includes personal of all foreign embassies, legations and consulates. In addition it has charge of dealing with all personnel both Soviet and foreign employed on ships touching Soviet ports. It also deals with Soviet citizens who associate with foreigners officially as well as unofficially.

4. - F.O.

FINANSOVY OTDEL or Financial Department. This department is more or less self explanatory as it merely handles all the internal and external financial affairs of the NKVD.

5. - U.S.C.

UKRAINSKI STATISTICHESKI OTDEL or Files and Records Department. This department keeps the records and files of all foreigners in the Soviet Union, lists of enemy suspects, lists of suspicious characters watched by any of the other departments or other Soviet organizations.

6. - S.F.G.

SPETS PERNCHENCHESKI OTDEL or Special Resettlement Department. This department handles exile, resettlement of people transferred from one part of the Soviet Union to another and people transferred from occupied countries to territories within the Soviet Union.
Subject: USSR. Intelligence Organization

7. - O.S.U.A.G.

GOSUDARSTVENNOE UPRAVLENIYE LAGERNYAT or State Department or Directory of Concentration Camps. This is the administrative department of all the concentration camps in the Soviet Union including concentration camps for prisoners of war, political prisoners and criminals.

8. - F.O.

FOREIGN LEGAL OFFICE or Censoring Department. This department handles the censoring of special correspondence and suspects. It is not to be confused with the "General Censoring Department" introduced at the outbreak of war. This department operates in peacetime as well as war time and has representatives in every Central Post and Telegraph Office.

The above eight departments are the principal ones of the NKVD and are further subdivided into smaller specific branches. The officers and personnel attached to this organization do not have any special military training and although their uniform and insignia are similar to the Red Army, they do not correspond in rank and rating.

The NKVD troops in the Soviet Union are not under the control nor are they a part of the above organization. These troops come under the direction and administration of the Red Army similar to the "Military Police" of the United States Army.
VICE ADMIRAL STEFANOV INFORMS US SOVIETS NOW DESIRE EXCHANGE INFORMATION PLANS DESCRIPTIVE DATA AND SAMPLES MINES. I ASKED IF EXCHANGE THIS INFORMATION INCLUDED VISIT OUR EXPERTS AS PROPOSED SOME TIME AGO AND WAS INFORMED THEY DID NOT CONTEMPLATE OUR SENDING MISSION AT THIS TIME. WAS AT SAME TIME TOLD I COULD VISIT NAVAL ACADEMY FORMERLY AT LENINGRAD WHICH IS NOW FUNCTIONING AT BAKU, ALSO I COULD GO TO NORTH SEA FLEET TO PRESENT MEDALS WHICH ARE BEING AWARDED PERSONNEL THAT AREA. MY REQUEST VISIT BLACK SEA IS THEREBY BYPASSED. IN CONNECTION
BLACK SEA ACTIVITIES SEE SULZBERGER ARTICLE NEW YORK TIMES 12TH WHICH WAS WRITTEN AT MY INSTIGATION TO SEE IF CENSORS WOULD PASS. MY OPINION IS NO HEAVY UNITS ARE NON OPERATIVE BLACK SEA. WAS TOLD I COULD VISIT SHIPBUILDING ACTIVITIES MOLOTOVSK OR KOMSOMOLSK. STATED I WOULD GO TO KOMSOMOLSK BUT EXPECTED TO BE PROVIDED AIR TRANSPORTATION. PROMISE WAS MADE IN EX TO NORTHERN SEA ROUTE WOULD BE FORTHCOMING IN FEW DAYS. ALSO INFORMED SOVIETS NOW HAVE LARGE SCALE CHART PARAMUSHIRO WHICH THEY WILL GIVE ONE TO ME. PLAN MAKE 3 OR 4 DAY TRIP TO BAKU AS SOON AS PLANE IS AVAILABLE. NEXT GO ARCHANGEL AND MURMANSK TO PRESENT MEDALS AS SOON AS AMBASSADOR HAS MADE FIRST PRESENTATIONS.
PERSONNEL MOSCOW AREA THEN MAKE TRIP KOMSONOLSK. TOLLEY WILL ACCOMPANY ME EACH TRIP. AFTER TALK WITH STEPHANOY, KUZNETSOV ASKED ME TO SEE ME. HE WANTED TO TAKE A BOW FOR WHAT THEY WERE GRANTING AND ASKED IF ANSWERS AND CONCESSIONS CLEARED UP EVERYTHING IN MY MIND. STATED HE WAS ANXIOUS TO BE PLEASED AND GET WHAT I WANT. I TOLD HIM I WAS OF COURSE QUITE PLEASED BUT CERTAINLY HAD MANY MORE THINGS IN MIND THEY COULD DO IN THE WAY OF COOPERATION. HE MENTIONED 2 EX-U.S. SHIPS WHICH JAPS NOW HAVE IN CUSTODY AND FACT THAT STEPHANOY HAD TOLD ME OF THIS. I TOLD HIM HE HAD KNOWN OF THIS FOR MORE THAN A MONTH AND THAT THIS INFO HAD NOT COME FROM HIM. ALSO THAT COMINCH DIRECTING A WAR IN THE PACIFIC COULD AND

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CONFIDENTIAL
WOULD EXPECT IMMEDIATE INFORMATION FROM THE RED
NAVY ON SUCH SUBJECTS, THAT OUR NAVY HAD NO REASON
TO BE PLEASED AT SUCH INFO COMING AT THIS LATE DATE.
FURTHERMORE, I STATED WE COULD HARDLY AFFORD TO BUILD
SHIPS, FILL THEM WITH SUPPLIES AND TURN THEM OVER TO
THE SOVIETS FOR EVENTUAL USE BY THE JAPS. OTHER THAN
THE ABOVE IT APPEARS THE GENERAL SITUATION AS RE-
GARDS U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS ARE IMPROVING.

16....ACT
C0 WINCH...10/11...20G...30...13...NAVAIDE...FILE

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
**NAVAL MESSAGE**

**FROM**: VICE CNO

**RELEASED BY**: TRAIN

**DATE**: 16 JUNE 1943

**TOR CODEROOM**: 1044

**DECODED BY**: BLACK

**PARAPHRASED BY**: REEGAN

**ROUTED TO**:

**ADDRESS**: ALUSNA MOSCOW

**ATTN**: MATERIAL YOUR 051415*ALREADY BEING RECEIVED.

**REF**: REGARDS TO SHANGHAI ENGLISH LANGUAGE NEWS BROADCASTS, IS UNITED STATES RECEIVING IT. IF NOT DO WE WANT SUMMARIES.

16...ORIG

COMINCH...10/11...20G...NAVALSE...FILE.

**DECLASSIFIED**

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 1, 1973

By DBS

Date: MAY 21, 1973

**CONFIDENTIAL**
At 0120 local time 5th Gorki bombed. American mechanic just returned Moscow was working in tank repair depot near Gorki auto factory which believed making motors, says factory was hit and burned all night. Believed total wreck. Was building about 1 block square. Russians say about 25 planes but none seen from ground due to German flares. Were over area about 2 hours. Considerable anti-aircraft and searchlights but apparently ineffective as bombers took their time over target, think case bombs many duds in one case by actual count 2 out of 9 although possibly may have been long delay type.
16...ACTION.

10/11...COMINCH...2PG...NAVATDE...FILE.
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: ALUSNA VLADIVOSTOK

DATE: 7 JUNE 1943

TOR CODEWORD: 2951

DECODER: HAMILTON

PARAPHRASER: KIRKBRIDE

ROUTED BY:

FOR ACTION:

ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEES

ADDRESS:

CNO

ALUSNA MOSCOW

INFORMATION:

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDIcATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRIORITY.

278415
NOR 1762

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

DATE

TIME

GCT

ACTION

(CACTION CNO MOSCOW)

BECAUSE OF POOR FOOD CONDITIONS IN CITY WHICH SOVIETS ACKNOWLEDGED HE REQUESTED PERMISSION FROM RED NAVY TO GO TO COLLECTIVE FARM 25 KILOMETERS FROM TOWN WHERE LIMIT ABLE. FARM LOCATED ON ROAD LEADING TO KBARBAROVSK NOT IN MILITARY AREA NOR DOES ROAD PASS THRU RESTRICTED ZONE. SOVIETS HAVE IGNORED REQUEST AND MY MOVEMENTS STILL RESTRICTED TO CITY LIMITS.

16.......ACT

COM INCH...16/11...2%G...NAVAIDE...FILE

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 20(b) and 8(D) or (B)

OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By L.S

Date, MAY 21, 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 70 (A) NAVRECIS.)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
CONFIDENTIAL
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Lisbon
To: MILID
No. 812, June 7, 1943
Germ press persists in report of formation of Russian volunteer anti-Red Army over half million under Gen Vlassow captured in 42 at head of 2nd Army. In Kolmes East Galicia creation of SS Volunteer Div composed of Ukrainians was celebrated.

Solborg

ACTION: G-2
INFORMATION: OPD
CG AAF

CM-IN-4548 (8 June 43) 0109Z mcs

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/8/44

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
THIS OFFICE WITHOUT PREVIOUS INFORMATION YOUR 34282. PENDENSON OF STATE DEPARTMENT STATES OFFICIAL SOVIET PERMISSION TO FOLLOW A PRESCRIBED ROUTE INTO RUSSIA MUST BE OBTAINED BEFORE VISAS CAN BE SUPPLIED TO CIRC OF PLANE. ESTIMATED PLANE COMPLETED APPROXIMATELY JUNE 15. ADVISE WHETHER OFFICIAL PERMISSION WAS GIVEN TO 1) RUSSIA AND THAT ROUTE OFFICIALLY APPROVED. YOU ARE ARRIVED WASHINGTON JUNE 9 AND SENT PACKAGES TO LA MESA FROM SPOKANE. HE HAS DELIVERED LETTERS AND SEEN HENDERSON.

16....ORIG

49...COMMON...BUAER...13...26...12/11...

CONFIDENTIAL

CIVED...FILE

SECRET

R. O. 11688, Sec. 12(8) and 6(2) or (8) OED letter, May 3, 1978

By D.B. Date May 21, 1973

RECLASSIFIED

I. O. 12366, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

By RT, NARA, Date May 18, 1964

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (6) NAVREGS.)

SECRET
ROULLARD HEARS SHANGHAI ENGLISH LANGUAGE NEWS BROADCASTS. IS THIS RECEIVED IN UNITED STATES AND IF NOT DO YOU DESIRE PERIODIC DESPATCH SUMMARIES. LAST 3 DAYS SHANGHAI SAYS ADM STANLEY RESIGNED AS AMBASSADOR. MIDNIGHT 4TH HAD TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH ROULLARD AT VLADIVOSTOK. FIRST TIME THIS ATTEMPT MADE. SERVICE GOOD AND CONVERSATION EASILY INTELLIGIBLE BEING SUPERIOR TO EITHER KUTIBYSHEV OR ARCHANGEL MOSCOW DEVICE. CALL REQUESTED AT 2100 FOR MIDNIGHT CAME THROUGH AT 0236. FIRST AIR ALARM THIS YEAR 2300 TO 2330. NO PLANES HEARD. SUPER RELIABLE SAYS THEY WENT TOWARD GORKI. (ADM STANLEY'S SEAL)
THROUGH COOPERATION DOCTOR ARTHUR T. CHAVE PERSONAL PHYSICIAN DAVIES LANG ACCORDED INTERVIEW WITH BURDENKO CHIEF SURGEON, RED ARMY AND OTHER LEADING SOVIET MEDICAL AUTHORITIES AND VISITED THE FOLLOWING SOVIET MEDICAL ACTIVITIES. BOOKIN HOSPITAL LARGEST HOSPITAL IN MOSCOW CAPACITY 2240 BEDS NOW OCCUPIED ENTIRELY BY WOUNDED. FIRST MOSCOW MEDICAL INSTITUTE CONCEDED BY SOVIETS TO BE THEIR LARGEST MEDICAL SCHOOL, AN ARMY EVACUATION HOSPITAL AND A HOSPITAL TRAIN. INTELLIGENCE REPORTS FOLLOW. REPORTS HOSPITAL TRAIN MOST PERFECT STAGE SETTING. TRAIN WAS SHIFTED ALONGSIDE PLATFORM IN LARGE MOSCOW STATION. ALL PEOPLE KEPT HERDING ONE ENDF STATION WAITING ROOM, DURING THIS INSPECTION PLATFORMS ALL DESERTED AND SCRUPULOUSLY CLEANED OF EVEN MATCHES AND CIGARETTE BUTTS.
NO PATIENTS ABOARD. 17 CARS INCLUDING REFRIGRATOR STORAGE KITCHEN SURGICAL LABORATORY AND STAFF CAR SPOTLESSLY CLEAN. DETAILS CAREFULLY ARRANGED EVEN TO HOLLYWOOD EFFECT OF SELECTING GOOD LOOKING NURSES.

16...ACT

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 of NAVREGS.)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94
NAVAL MESSAGE
FROM
RELEASED BY
DATE
TOR CODEROOM
DECODED BY
PARAPHRASED BY
ROUTED BY

EXTENSION NUMBER
ADDRESSEES
PRIORITY
FOR ACTION
INFORMATION
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PRECEDENCE
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NAVY DEPARTMENT

ALASTRA MOSCOW
1 JUNE 42
2129
SCHNICK
SHCAF
SOBEL

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH PREFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME
ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ACTION

11345
MCR 8197

COMMANDER FRENCH S.A.F. MOSCOW SAYS FRENCH AIR SQUADRON 86 FAR HAS DROPPED 14 ENEMY PLANES. SOVIETS NEWSREELING EVERY ANGLE NO DOUBT WITH VIEW HIDE INTERNATIONAL PUBLICITY WHICH BELIEVED 100% REASON FOR INCINERATION AND EMPLOYMENT THIS SQUADRON.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREG.)

REL1SS

DECLASSIFIED
L.O. 1236, Sec 3.3 or Sec 3.4
ILR 101
By RT, NARA, Date

1/30/43
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM

ALUSHA MOSCOW

RELEASED BY

JUNE 1, 1943

DATE

C12295

TOR CODEROOM

SCHMIDT

DECODED BY

PARAPHRASED BY

MC CATHY

Routed By

LT HILL

MAIN ADDRESS

ONINO

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

ON SEND MESSAGE TO:

F-9

F-01

F-02

F-05

F-07

F-11

F-2

F-34

F-30

F-31

F-32

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ID-00

VNNO

STATISTICS OF SOVIET JOURNALIST WITH MILITARY CONTACTS TRANSMITTED VIA RELIABLE PERSON INDICATES REDS USING A WOODEN ATTACK PLANE SPEED OVER 500 MILES PER HOUR WITH AVERAGE LIFE ABOUT 3 SORTIES. SATISFACTORY NUMBER TANKS AND PLANES NOW BEING FURRISHEED BY OWN FACTORIES BUT SHORTAGE PILOTS AND TANK DRIVERS.

16...ACT

CONINCH...19/11...236...41...BUAER...NAVSTEDE...FILE

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 74 (4) NAVREGS.)

DECLASSIFIED 22 Oct 1972, Sec. 3.4 or Sec. 3.4

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/72

DECUASSIFIED 7.0.13285, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

ILR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/72
VICE ADMIRALS TRIBOLOTSKY CINC BALTIC AND YUMASHEV 1 8 CINC PACIFIC PROMOTED ADMIRAL TODAY. NEWSPAPER RED
FLEET REPORTS CAPT THIRD RANK LEV SHUSKIN COMING SUB
NORTHERN FLEET JUST SANK 4 ENEMY TRANSPORTS. HE COMMANDED
S-55 RECENTLY TRANSFERRED VIA PANAMA. PROBABLY STILL IN
SAME BOAT. RELIABLE FOLLOWING HAVE BEEN AMONG SUBS
OPERATING NORTHERN FLEET I-3 K-21 SCHA-432 AND 421
M-171 TO 174 INCLUSIVE M-176 AT BLACK SEA SCHA 235

16...ACT

COMING...10/11...20G...

NAVAILABLE...230P...FILE

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (1) NAYREGS.)
(FOR CNO; MOSCOW.)

FAIRLY RELIABLE CONVERSATION SOVIET SHIP BUILDER FROM SOVGAIV REVEALS CONCENTRATION RED NAVY THERE WITH HARBOR FACILITIES BEING RAPIDLY IMPROVED BUT NO RAIL LINE OR MOTOR ROAD LEADING FROM PORT AND NO PLANS FOR BUILDING EITHER. ALL EX U.S. LIBERTY SHIPS FORCED TO ANCHOR LAPER USE FOR JAP EXAMINATION SINCE INCREASING SUSPICION THEY ARE OPERATED BY U.S.A. GOOD SURFACE MOTOR ROAD TO NAHODKA NOW OPEN FOR MILITARY USE VIA ARTEM.

16...ACT

COMINCH...16/11...28G...F376...NAVAIDE...FILE

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3.3 or 3.4 NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (A) NAVREGS.)
**NAVY DEPARTMENT**

**NAVAL MESSAGE**

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**ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME**

**DATE**

**TIME**

**ACTION**

- F-0: AMBASSADOR INFORMED ME LEND LEASE IS NEGOTIATING
- F-01: BLANKET CONTRACT TO PLACE ALL U.S. TECHNIANS DIRECTLY AND SOLELY UNDER LEND LEASE REPRESENTATIVE MOSCON. THIS MOVE OR PART OF LEND LEASE OBVIOUSLY SPRINGS FROM THEIR OPPOSITION TO CONTRACTS UNDER WHICH NAVAL TECHNICIANS OPERATE. LEND LEASE REPRESENTATIVE HERE DOES NOT PER USEFUL INFORMATION.
- F-02: ARMY TECHNICIANS PICK UP IT SAME WORK BEING FORWARDED OUR ARMY AND THEY AND ARMY OFFICERS ATTACHED LEND LEASE ARE PROHIBITED DISCUSS MATTERS WITH MILITARY ATTACHÉ OR ASSISTANTS. SUCH CONTRACTS CONTAMINATED WOULD RESULT IN THOSE TECHNICIANS WORKING ON PURELY NAVAL PROJECTS BEING PROHIBITED FROM EVEN DISCUSSING THEIR PROBLEMS AND EXPERIENCES.

(PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES)

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (A) NAVREPS.)

DECLASSIFIED

L. O. 12386, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

U.S. EPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

BY RT, NARA, DATE 4/2/66

280929

IG 5754
CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

DECLASSIFIED
L.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
ILR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/66
NAVY HERE ADVISES THAT TELEGRAPHIC ORDERS HAVE BEEN ISSUED CINC PACIFIC FLEET TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR YOU TO VISIT WARSHIPS. INFORM ME WHEN YOU RECEIVE FIRST INVITATION.

ACTION: VLADIVOSTOK INFO ONO

26 MAY 43

251449

HOR 3976

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (c) NAVRECIS.)

251449

May 21 1973
FOLLOWING INFORMATION AND OPINIONS FROM LOCAL AGENT. GERMANS HAD PLANNED A SUMMER OFFENSIVE IN RUSSIA WHILE HOLDING IN TUNISIA, NOW GERMANS SAY RUSSIAN INTERNAL SITUATION SO BAD THAT PROLONGATION OF WAR WILL RESULT IN RUSSIAN COLLAPSE. TRUTH IS THAT GERMANS FEEL THEY CANNOT CONDUCT LARGE SCALE OFFENSIVE NOW THAT TUNISIA IS GONE AND THEIR CLAIM THAT PROLONGATION OF DEADLOCK ON EASTERN FRONT WILL DEFEAT RUSSIA IS PRETEXT FOR INACTION. HOWEVER THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT RUSSIA ALSO IS WEAKER. THE LARGE PERCENTAGE OF BRITISH AMERICAN MATERIAL EMPLOYED AT THE FRONT SINCE BEGINNING THIS YEAR INDICATES RUSSIAN INDUSTRY SERIOUSLY WEAKENED. RECENT FRIENDLY ATTITUDE ADOPTED BY STALIN AND RUSSIAN PRESS TOWARDS ALLIES LOOKS LIKE APPEASEMENT. RUSSIAN PRESS SHOWS THAT INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE NOT MOVING AT TOP SPEED. ADMISSION OF THIS BELIEVED TO INDICATE A SERIOUS SITUATION.

16...ACTION.

10/11...20G...COWINCH...NAVAI...

CONFIDENTIAL

300 Russian

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
IN ANSWERING A REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO VISIT ANY SOVIET SHIPBUILDING FACILITIES NAVY LIASON OFFICER INFORMED ME ALL SOVIET SHIPBUILDING FACILITIES WERE IN NAZI HANDS OR SO DAMAGED AS TO BE INOPERATIVE. PERHAPS SOVIET PURCHASING COMMISSION IS NOT AWARE OF THIS, AND I SUGGEST THEY BE SO INFORMED WHEN THEY PRESENT REQUESTS FOR MATERIAL FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION.

16...ACT
COMINCH.... ...13....20G....NAVAIDE....FILE
CNO.......

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(2) and 8(2) or (3)
by DDEx, May 1, 1973

2045 19
NOR 397

MAKE ORIGINAL ONLY. DELIVER TO CODE ROOM WATCH OFFICER IN PERSON. (SEE ART. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
ADD TO MOSCOW'S 111111°. FAIRBANKS?

SOVIET COLONEL MACHIN AT FAIRBANKS HOST UNCOOPERATIVE
NOTED EVEN BY SPERANSKI. NO RADIO BEACON AT WELKEL.

GAS AND OIL DRUMS ON FIELD. REDS THERE SAY A-2°
GOOD NIGHT FIGHTERS BUT TAKE FIRE EASILY. DO NOT
LIKE TRICYCLE LAND GEAR. ABOUT 15 A-2°'S IN VARIOUS
STATES OF CRACKUP LYING AROUND EDGE OF FIELD APPARENTLY
WAITING REPAIR. SEINCHAN HARD PACKED GRAVEL RUNWAY.

OIL AND GAS ON EDGE OF FIELD IN DRUMS. YAKUTSK DIRT
FIELD 8 MILES FROM TOWN. ABOUT 12 DC-3 TRANSPORTS,
LARGE RADIO STATION WEATHER FORECASTING CENTER REPAIR
FACILITIES. NATIVES THIS AREA NOT BEING USED FOR TROOPS
AND MORE OR LESS LEFT ALONE. KIRENSK LARGE DIRT FIELD

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
WITH TELEPHONE LINES BORDERING ONE SIDE. MAJORITY METEOROLOGISTS ALONG ROUTE WERE WOMEN. FORECASTS ACCURATE. KRASNOYARSK LARGE AIRDROM 8 MILES FROM CITY OVER DIRT ROAD. CONCRETE RUNWAY NOT USED. ABOUT 24 AIRACOBRA'S SEEN ON FIELD. AVIATION SCHOOL BUT LITTLE FLYING SEEN EXCEPT FLIGHT OF 2ND LANDING AT SUNRISE. ALSO NAVAL SCHOOL (5 GROUPS MISSING HERE-HAVE BEEN SERVICED) PROBABLY REHABILITATION CENTER. LARGE NUMBER ELDERLY Beggars. IN CONVERSATION MESS KRASNOYARSK INDICATED BELIEF FIVE OR SIX THOUSAND GERMAN TANKS CONCENTRATED OREL SECTOR EXPECTATION SPRING DRIVE BY GERMANS. FIRST BLACKOUTS AT 0100. VAST MAJORITY RAILWAY WORKERS WOMEN. MUCH CULTI-

VATION ALONG RAILWAY MOSTLY BY HAND. TRAINELOADS OF

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer In person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREG.)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/94
WOMEN GOING EAST SAID TO BE AGRICULTURAL WORKERS
PLenty EGGS MILK ALONG ROUTE UNTIL VICINITY MOSCOW.
OF THREE MEMBERS SOVIET COMMISSION SPERANSKI AND
LVOVICH BROADMINDED AND APPRECIATIVE. PAGAYA SOVIET
FANATIC WITH TOUCHY GEORGIAN DISPOSITION.

*REPORTING ARRIVAL OF LT CHASE AND ADVISING WOULD
FURNISH DETAILS LATER.

16...ACTION.

CONFIDENTIAL
Chronological report of the travel of the Soviet hydro-geological mission, leaving Seattle, Washington, April 27, and arriving in Moscow, U.S.S.R., May 10, 1943. I have included personal observation, conversation, and all official activities I came in contact with enroute.

1. The mission left Seattle in a Pan American plane at 0930. Excellent weather was encountered and after an uneventful trip with a stop for refueling at Juneau the plane landed at Ladd Field, Fairbanks at 1620. Ranking American and Soviet Army Officers and Commander Thomas, U.S.N., Weather Liaison Officer, greeted the party. It was learned that all the material shipped from Dayton, Ohio and the original shipment from Washington had already arrived. A later shipment of about four cases was still enroute. Captain Speranski decided not to wait for them, but to have Colonel Machin of the Soviet Transport Service forward them to him. Arrangements were made for the party to leave with the equipment on two DC-3 transports on April 99, 1943. It was also agreed to meet the following morning to discuss improvements in weather exchange service.

2. During this and subsequent discussions Colonel Machin of the U.S.S.R. maintained an uncooperative attitude. The Alaska-Siberia transport route now has the Bering Strait as the dividing line between the commands of Colonel Masurak and Colonel Machin with headquarters in Yakutsk and Fairbanks respectively. Colonel Machin’s suspicious attitude and habit of asking for information or services without any intention of giving anything in return was carried Captain Speranski, who told me that it was a bad situation and that something should be done about it. Captain Speranski may have even spoken to Colonel Machin about it for the following day the Colonel seemed more amenable.

3. The morning of the 28th the members of the mission asked me where they could get provisions for the trip through Siberia. I took them to the Commissary where they bought about $40 worth of canned goods and groceries. Taking my cue from them I also purchased about $10 worth, a very fortunate investment for me.

4. The weather conference came next. Commander Thomas prepared a memorandum of this, a copy of which is appended. During the conference

Distribution: By Originator

Harry E. H.<br>Deputy Director<br>Intelligence Divn.<br>U.S. Navy Department
Colonel Machin seemed more amenable, perhaps influenced by Captain Spersnaski's example. Captain Spersnaski still was not satisfied with the suspicious atmosphere. He also would like to see more fraternizing between the Soviet and American officers, he told me.

5. In the afternoon Lieutenant Colonel Pagana and Maj. Lovitch continued supervising the loading of the planes and later went shopping. Captain Spersnaski, Commander Thomas, Lieut. Colonals Anderson and Maj. Gleason of the Army Signal Corps, and a Soviet radio officer went to the University of Alaska to see the incoherence station in operation there. Captain Spersnaski showed only a tourist's curiosity, he merely fulfilled promises to Dr. Pushkov of the Soviet Institute of Terrestrial Magnetism and to Dr. Fleming of the Carnegie Institute to visit the plant. When no plan or blue prints of the equipment were available he asked no further questions. At this time a package containing certain plans, booklets and photographs promised to Captain Spersnaski and mailed to Alaska by Dr. Fleming, was given to Captain Spersnaski.

6. The President of the University and Drs. Brashall and Setors explained the equipment to all of us. The Soviet radio expert did not seem so very expert. For example, he did not seem to know that very high frequency waves will reach a point where they are not reflected back by the ionosphere layer but will penetrate and be absorbed. He also kept asking what was the practical use of all this equipment. When told it aided somewhat in forecasting magnetic storms but was still primarily a research and data collecting project his attitude was summed up in "Well, what good is it?"

7. April 29 at 0930 the two planes took off for Nome, Captain Spersnaski and I in one; Lt. Col. Pagana, Maj. Lovitch and a Soviet diplomatic courier, Salykov, with eight large suitcases of mail, in the other. These planes had no seats; being completely stripped. Three and one-half tons of meteorological equipment plus considerable personal baggage were divided between the two planes. We were all equipped with flying suits.

8. At Nome we learned that Welkel was fogged in and that Markovo was thawing and the field a quagmire. No other fields seemed available so the planes remained at Nome overnight. Shopping, movies and badminton occupied the day. The relations between the Soviet and American officers at Nome were very friendly and informal.

9. April 30th Welkel reported good weather and the planes left Nome at 0930 and landed at Welkel without incident May lst. Welkel is situated on the edge of a bay showing open water. There was a layer of packed snow on the field which accommodated the heavily loaded D-3 transports without much extra space. There is no radio beacon; the officers stationed there hope to have one within a month or so when a more powerful radio station is expected to be operating. On the field there were about 15 to 20 A-20 planes in varying stages of crank up. They seem to have been accumulating there during the winter, awaiting warm weather and parts for repairs. I was told that the field was built up since last fall. There are about 15 and banked houses on the field. Gasoline and oil are stored in drums along the field.

10. During a plentiful lunch, with vodka and cigarettes also plentiful, the customs officer came in, stamped our passports and told us that he had received orders to pass the cargo and passengers through without question. This relieved Captain Spersnaski, who had carefully concealed various purchases, including a fur neck piece for his wife. My coming did not seem to surprise anyone although Captain Spersnaski told me that I was the first American officer to enter the U.S.S.R. through this port.
11. While at Walkal eight A-20 planes flew over the field going west. The Russian officers told me that the A-20's made excellent night fighters. Their only criticism was that the planes took fire easily. The tricycle landing gear bothered the pilots somewhat, too. This explains, perhaps, the bashed up planes on the field.

12. From Walkal to Seimachan we flew over clouds at about 13 - 14,000 feet, the temperature dropping to -20° C, and the heaters not working. The mountainous ground, when visible, was completely snow covered and showed no signs of human life. The field at Seimachan was larger than at Walkal, our planes using less than two thirds of the snow packed runway. A strip, of about 200 feet wide, was cleared of snow but was not used. This strip was hard packed dirt and gravel, already dry and dusty. Gasoline and oil were kept in drums along one side of the field. There is a small village just south of the field. Nine A-20 planes landed while we were getting fuel; some handling the planes very well; some rather shakily. I was asked to admire those who did well, the comment being made that Soviet pilots do not always abuse the engineering masterpieces of America.

13. From Seimachan to Yakutsk the planes continued to fly at over 12,000 feet, once going up to 16,000, temperature -30° C. Snow became scarcer enroute, disappearing entirely around Yakutsk although the Lena river was still ice covered. The airfield is large, dirt covered, situated about 8 miles from the town. About a dozen DC-3 transports were on the field, which as a large radio station, weather forecasting center and repair facilities.

14. We stayed in the only hotel in town, five of us in one room. A common washroom, with no mirrors or warm water and an outdoor, unclean, seatless privy were the only facilities provided. The beds were clean but cockroaches frequently and boldly creased along the walls. Captain Spiranski and Maj. Lowrich were somewhat apologetic and felt better when I told them that if Nickie could stay there so could we. Lt. Col. Pagan, who had been the most critical of any American short-comings, accepted all the inconveniences without a word.

15. A public restaurant in a nearby backyard served meals at about 10 rubles. Liquor was available and there were several choices of meat. The only vegetables were potatoes and cabbage. Yakuts as well as Russians ate here, but sat at different tables. Yakuts look very much like Japanese; but I was told no, they are related to the Turks. Russians seem to outnumber them in the town. I observed little mixing of the two, although the Yakuts are as well dressed as the Russians. Few Yakuts in uniform were to be seen and I was told that tribes such as these were not disturbed much by the war nor were any sent to the front. There was no visible evidence of intermarriage.

16. The members of the mission devoted May 2, to business in Yakutsk, leaving me alone during the day. There were no restrictions of movement in the town, and the natives assumed that I was a Russian. In a museum of Yakut culture, history and natural history I saw several posters some of which illustrated the United Nations effort. The best was one showing the Red Army, English Navy and American Industry crushing the Axis. These few were the only United Nations posters I have seen in the U.S.S.R. to date.

17. Yakutsk is a boom town, with dirt streets, much mud and very few brick buildings, some of which have cracked foundations. The Natives take great pride in the fact that the nearest railroad is about 3,000 miles away. The town is supplied during the summer by ships plying the Lena River. Some wheat is grown, reindeer are raised, there are forests nearby, gold and a low grade coal are mined. Gold, fur and the airplane and steamship terminals seem to be the reason for the boom.

18. In many places, including the restaurant, I saw signs advertising...
de-locating houses and others exhorting the people not to drink unboiled water because of danger of typhoid.

19. When the Mission returned from their business Captain Speranski told me that he had made arrangements to send the promised Siberian Chart to Commander Thomas. He added that he was pleased with the work of his hydro-meteorological service along this route, considering their handicap. There is a crying need for more observation stations; at present 300 km. gaps are frequent along this route. Communications, all by radio, are also very unsatisfactory. The Captain promised to attempt an improvement as soon as possible.

20. Approximately the same percentage of reception of United States broadcasts of weather are received in Yakutsk and Khabarovsk as we reported receiving of Soviet broadcasts, said Captain Speranski. At this point Lt. Col. Pagava said, "Yes, the Americans keep complaining of poor reception from us. Now we find that they are no better than we are." Speranski told him that he was all wrong. The Americans had never blamed the Russians, they had accepted it as a communication problem and had merely given these percentages to aid in improving the service. Pagava flared up and if Speranski had not remained calm, they may have come to blows. Lt. Col. Pagava ranks Captain Speranski; Speranski is Chief of the Mission. I would call the result a draw. Later Speranski told me that he would be glad to return to Moscow where he acknowledges only one superior, General Fedorov.

21. Pagava was least appreciative of the cooperation the Mission got in the United States. Speranski and Lovitch frequently and sincerely expressed to Russians we met enroute, their appreciation for official help and also for the cordiality of the average American toward them. There is a tendency to avoid praise, however, if much praise reacts unfavorably on the Soviets by way of contest. Pagava seldom chimed in on these comments.

22. In the evening we went to a very amateurish bedroom farce ridiculing Germany, and did not stay for the end.

23. Loudspeakers were set up at busy corners blaring May day Speeches alternating Russian and Yakutian languages. The pitch was so high and static so plentiful that both were equally unintelligible. I did not observe a single person listening.

24. We were informed that our planes would not go beyond Krasnoyarsk since gasoline was scarce at Swedlovsk. Col. Mazurk was also afraid to let his planes and pilots get outside of his jurisdiction for fear that they might be held up indefinitely.

25. Leaving Yakutsk at 0730 May 3 we flew above clouds with only occasional patches of tree covered ground visible, and temperatures still very low. We stopped for lunch and fuel at Kirensk, which has a large dirt airfield with telephone poles and wires rather close to one side. Our pilot, who had 12 years experiences, habitually descended short of the fields and he would have to open up the motors to reach the runways. Not once did he make a smooth landing.

26. A large lunch and we took off for Krasnoyarsk, flying above some squalls and landed in Krasnoyarsk's airfield at sundown. The pilot always seemed to have good weather information given him, for the most part, by women meteorologists.

27. The airstrome at Krasnoyarsk is very large, with hangars, a concrete runway which we did not use, many American fighter planes, and old Soviet trainers and transports. There is an aviation school at the field with barracks accommodating "Man/' Cadets. I would estimate 1,500. The buildings were substantial two story brick structures, built by Admiral Kolchak during the
revolution. We all lived in the barracks which were very plain but comparatively clean. Officer's food was plentiful, and vodka norms (100 grams) were available.

28. Although this was an aviation school I saw planes up only once; about 20 planes landing at sunrise after making a flight during the night. The pilots handled the planes rather well and are about to be sent to the front.

29. Krasnoyarsk also has a naval school, seemingly the one in Leningrad being transported there.

30. It was arranged to have a small freight car turned over to the Mission for its equipment. This was loaded on May 4, two sleeping bags and bread issued, and Iakov and Irovitch were to ride in the car to Moscow to make sure that the cargo would not go astray. Arrangements were made to hook the car up to a troop train going West.

31. Krasnoyarsk is a large city about 8 miles from the airfield and connected with it by a dirt road. Its main streets are paved with cobblestones. None of its traffic lights are working. Many crippled soldiers are in the town which seems to be a rehabilitation center. Although it is an industrial town, I could find out little about this phase. The Yenisei River is an important part of the transportation system and its ice was already beginning to break up.

32. During meals in conversation I heard that the Germans were concentrating many tanks, 5 to 6 thousand, in the neighborhood of Orel where a drive is expected this spring. I also heard that the newest and best Soviet fighter plane is about as good as our airacobra. This is interesting in view of the fact that in answer to a point blank question about the quality of our equipment the answer is usually, "Oh, it's alright."

33. In Krasnoyarsk on May 4 I saw approximately 1,000 people dressed in their best and carrying bouquets and wreaths to a cemetery about two miles from the town. Some of the most pathetic beggars I have ever seen lined the way. The procession looked very Medieval to me. In answer to my question I was told it was some sort of a religious holiday.

34. The Commanding Officer of the School and the Commandant of the railroad station sent an officer about 500 kms. eastward to buy two reservations for May 5th for Captain Spersanski and me on the sleeper from Krasnoyarsk to Moscow. We had a compartment for two, the train, although old, was kept clean. The restaurant car was not very good according to Captan Spersanski; so we lived for five days on the groceries and canned goods I had purchased. The Captain's was saved for his family.

35. Until close to Moscow there was only one track. Many delays and long stops at every station, including the very smallest, made us twelve hours late. There were no blackouts until we reached Bül. As we neared Moscow many burned and bullet riddled cars and coaches could be seen. Wood burning locomotives also became more frequent. Women workers on the railroads outnumber the men about 10 to 1. The bridges all have soldiers guarding them with dugouts built nearby. Many trains with United States equipment, tanks, planes, trucks, were seen enroute. The trains going east had cars loaded with wounded soldiers and others with women; often in freight cars. I was told the women were going to work in the fields. Plowing was far advanced, but I saw only two tractors at this work along the entire route. There was very much hand plowing of very large gardens; all done by women or children. Until close to Moscow every stop brought forth a flock of vendors of eggs and milk, with very varying prices.

- 5 -
36. We arrived in Moscow at 2200 on May 10. None of the telegrams

the Captain had sent indicating the time of our arrival had come through. How-

ever, Mrs. Speranski and a Captain in the hydrometeorological service met us.

The telephone number of the American Embassy is not given out, so Captain

Speranski arranged to get a Soviet automobile which drove me to the Embassy.

37. During the trip, Captain Speranski, who had discussed with me

the evils of tipping indulged in this "evil" in a very lordly manner. He al-

so, in discussing Jews, told me they were in disfavor in the Soviet Union.

Two stories illustrate this very well: The Jews are credited with being good

guerrilla warriors for they have already conquered Tashkent (about 2,000 miles

from the Front). Also when an order came out limiting the institutions of

higher learning to workers and sons of workers, the Jews flocked to factories

for jobs. A store manager is more likely to be a Jew than otherwise according
to the Captain. In discussing farming Captain Speranski told me that perhaps

liquidating the Kulaks, a decision which was reached over tremendous opposition

within the party, may not have been the right thing to do.

38. Mrs. Speranski, a very charming lady, works for Captain Speranski

in the hydrometeorological service.

39. Just before arriving in Moscow Captain Speranski told me that

although our daily contacts had been so close and cordial it would not do to

be seen often together in Moscow unless we had business to do. At my look of

surprise he said, "You know, this is Russia." He looked embarrassed during

this and added that an occasional theatre party would not be misunderstood by

"them" - (the K.V.O.).

* * * * *
MEMORANDUM:

The following points were discussed at a conference with Captain Sparanski, of the Soviet Meteorological Mission, at Fairbanks on April 28th. Colonel Harold Smith, Regional Control Officer, 11th Weather Region, Comdr. T. O. Thomas, U.S.N., Weather Liaison Officer, Colonel Machin of the Russian Military Mission and several other officers were present.

1. What time is represented in the date-time group of the Khabarovsky (KRF) weather broadcasts. It cannot be Greenwich time as it is received here about four and a half hours before the time indicated on message. We desire Greenwich time to be used, this to be the time of observation.

2. Khabarovsky (KRF) does not start its broadcast exactly on time. Sometimes the broadcasts are a few minutes early, sometimes as much as fifteen minutes late.

3. Khabarovsky (KRF) breaks its sending tape about once every four or five messages. Sometimes the operator does not send the groups near the break by hand but merely feeds the tape into the machine again, which results in a group or two being missed. This makes decoding almost impossible.

4. We desire that the Soviets send a competent meteorologist to Fairbanks to act as weather liaison officer, similar to assignment of Comdr. Thomas who is here representing the Army and Navy in the dealings with the Soviets. There is no officer with the Russian Mission at Fairbanks familiar with the Soviet meteorological organization, nor with the communications which are associated with the dissemination of weather information. Their meteorologist should be thoroughly familiar with the meteorological organization of Siberia, especially along the ferry route. He should be given authority to approve new codes and make decisions in the field without reference to Moscow.

5. Comdr. Thomas requests a good map of Siberia. Some errors exist on the American meteorological plotting charts and he is trying to verify the locations of some of the Soviet weather stations.

6. Americans wish to discontinue the use of the Cipher B on the Khabarovsky-San Francisco exchange, and to substitute a simple cipher like Sigdor. Cipher B is too complicated, takes too long to encipher a message. If part of a message is missed due to interference it is very difficult in Cipher B to break the rest of the message. This is the case in Fairbanks where radio reception is not very good. But more than forty percent of the KRF broadcasts are completely broken due to the difficulty in using Cipher B. Every station which Comdr. Thomas had visited had made a strong plea to use a simple cipher in lieu of Cipher B. This is especially true at the smaller forecasting stations where personnel are limited in numbers. It was pointed out that the greater security given by Cipher B was compromised due to Sigdor and SLAC also being in use. Since Cipher B was made up by the Soviets for use on this exchange, it is proposed that they initiate the change in type of cipher to the simpler form. It was pointed out that Sigdor could be used temporarily until another (and larger) cipher book could be printed.

7. A copy of the Soviet version of Alaco-airmeteo was shown to Captain Sparanski and Colonel Machin. They liked the code, except that clouds should be over 15,000 feet instead of 10,000 feet before the weather reported as "clear". Captain Sparanski will obtain approval from Moscow to put the code into effect, replacing SLAC code. Comdr. Thomas will obtain approval from Washington. The use of plus and minus corrections to the alimeter setting was discussed and it was pointed out that Washington did not feel that this method gave enough security. The Soviets, however, want the correction in its present form and do not desire a change.

Ladd Field,
Fairbanks, Alaska
April 28, 1943.
8. Comdr. Thomas informed Captain Speranski that we had not been able to find out the location of the flying fields in the Waledal area which could be used by the planes as alternate fields in case Waledal was closed out. It was pointed out that our forecasters are briefing the Soviet pilots before their flights but one handicap was the lack of knowledge as to where the alternate fields were located. We are not interested in the location of all their fields, we simply want to know what will be used by the airplanes flying from Nome in case they cannot make Waledal. General Machin replied that this information must be obtained from higher authority as he was not authorized to give it. Captain Speranski was asked to have Moscow authorize this information, since it is necessary to safeguard the planes and pilots on the ferry route.

9. A discussion was held on the present supplementary exchanges of weather. These are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fairbanks</th>
<th>Yakutak</th>
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<tr>
<td>Nome</td>
<td>Waledal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anchorage</td>
<td>Anadyr</td>
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These exchanges duplicate one another since for the most part they send the same stations. This duplication of circuits is most undesirable. There should be only one circuit to exchange hourly weather. For our part, it could be sent by Nome or Fairbanks. The Soviets should be able to disseminate the information within their own territory after receipt at Waledal or Yakutak. No one present at the conference was able to say whether or not there were adequate radio facilities in Siberia to accomplish this. Captain Speranski will investigate.

10. Question was raised if the Soviets had gotten the three radio transmitters installed which we sent them for Waledal, Barkovia, and Semenchik; it was learned that none were operating as yet, that two were received with parts missing or defective. These transmitters were Wilcox, eight channel HF and one channel HF, with quick change of frequency permitted by a dial.

11. Soviet officers reported that they had no complaints about the meteorological services given at Ladd Field. They did say that they were not satisfied by the quality of forecasts given by Nome. Colonel Smith replied that Nome was limited now in experienced personnel, that this station was being expanded in the very near future and that the quality of forecasts should improve.

12. Soviets were asked if Waledal was a main forecasting station. A negative reply was received, that forecasting was done at Yakutak and Semenchik. We suggested to the Red officers that Waledal be built up as a forecasting station like we are doing for Nome so that planes going in either direction will be able to get the latest weather forecast before crossing the Bering Sea.

13. Captain Speranski was informed that we were getting very few pilot balloon sounds and very few radio meteorograph soundings. Comdr. Thomas pointed out that the U.S.S.R. had agreed on September 29, 1942 to send the following reports:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Pilot-Balloons</th>
<th>Radio-Meteorograph Reports</th>
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<tr>
<td>238 Yakutak</td>
<td>238 Yakutak</td>
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<td>236 Chinakan</td>
<td>269 Chabarovsk</td>
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<tr>
<td>383 Semenchik</td>
<td>298 Vladivostok</td>
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<td>246 Markovo</td>
<td>292 Petropavlovsk</td>
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<td>279 Anadyr</td>
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<td>278 Wilen</td>
<td>896 Bohtatixi</td>
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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date
MEMORANDUM (Continued).

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<tr>
<th>Pilot-Balloons</th>
<th>Radio-Meteorograph Reports</th>
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<td>Nya, Shachtät</td>
<td>Ostrov-Kotelnik</td>
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<td>Verchojanck</td>
<td>Ostrov-Chetyrykhatoldovyi</td>
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<td>Jigunak</td>
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<td>Kresty-Kolymski</td>
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However, at the present time we only get one or two reports a day, and these from Vladivostok or Khabarovsk at a rule. We would like to have reports from all the stations originally agreed upon, and especially the eastern part of Siberia where we need the information for the ferry route. Reports from the Kamchatka Peninsula are greatly desired. Captain Speranski will investigate the reason for non-receipt, said he believed it might be a matter of lack of material at these stations.

14. Captain Speranski asked what stations did we want for use in the hourly exchanges. Our reply after investigation is that we want hourly weather, 24 hours a day from the following stations:

- Buhta Providenia 246 Markovo
- Maliv Krestka 278 Velten
- Welkal 350 Nya Van Karen
- Andoyr 280 Niaikan
- Nya Navarin 883 Seimchan
- Ust Beloi

(Other stations may be substituted if necessary for communication reasons)

We will make this from Yakutsk to Fairbanks unless Soviets require it otherwise. Soviets to advise us by dispatch when above program can be put into effect. We will send a similar number of stations to be selected by us unless the Soviets desire to designate the ones they want. Hourly weather twenty-four a day is desired because days are very long now and planes will be flying all the time.

15. Colonel Smith inquired about the possibility of having an exchange of three hourly weather between Petrozavodsk and one of our stations in the Aleutians. The Kamchatka stations are especially important ones for us and at present we get them very poorly through the Khabarovsk broadcast. Due to communication difficulties, most of the stations on the Kamchatka Peninsula do not make the RFP broadcast. We need these stations plus the Bering Island one. Captain Speranski replied that he had no authority to act on this proposal, that it would have to be taken up by Washington and Moscow.

16. Captain Speranski asked about the Khabarovsk broadcast. He said that at Washington and San Francisco they were satisfied with it now. Comdr. Thomas replied that it was better now, and more stations were being sent but that it still was far short of the forty-five stations that should be in each broadcast. A recent check showed that the broadcasts averaged between twenty-five and thirty stations. On being asked for particulars, he produced a check list of recent reports and showed that the following stations were particularly below average in the number of reports made:

197, 225, 230, 231, 246, 280, 283, 269, 936

All of above stations were primary stations for inclusion in the RFP broadcasts. Of the substitute stations, 940 one in exceptionally well, as often as the regular stations.
From: MA London
To: MILID

No. 4804, May 18, 1943

Presence 2 railways into Leningrad open to Russians, 1 across Neva, other on piles across South edge Lake Ladoga accepted by War Office (sgd Peabody).

No movement, major German units to Mediterranean so War Office believes Russia Germany's principal concern. Expects German offensive probably Kurak area by 1st June. Italian Army will fight unless opposed by overwhelming forces.

No Sig

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: CPD

CG AAF

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 2(B) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 1, 1973

By DBS
MAY 21, 1973

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

COPY No. 26

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/84
<table>
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<th>NAVAL MESSAGE</th>
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<td>PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY</td>
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<td>DATE: 13 MAY 1943</td>
<td>FOR ACTION: RRRR</td>
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<td>INFORMATION: ROUTINE</td>
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**REEGAN**

122150

NCR 7865

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

DATE: [ ]

TIME: [ ]

GCT: [ ]

**TEXT ACTION**

F-00

F-01

F-015

F-0015

F-05

F-07

F-11

F-2

F-3

F-30

F-31

F-32

F-33

F-34

F-35

F-37

10-00

VETO

FOR ROULLARD:

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SUCH AS CONTAINED URD 18 181818 DESIRED BY DISPATCH.

16...ORIG

COWINCH...290...13...290P...CHO...NAVADE...

FILE.

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
**NAVAL MESSAGE**

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<td>ROUTINE</td>
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**TO CODEROOM**

| 2150/11 |

**DECODED BY**

| KOHOUTEK |

**PARAPHRASED BY**

| KOHOUTEK |

**INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.**

**SHALL**

| 112101 |

**NCR**

| 7535 |

**UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.**

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**TEXT**

REQUEST BY DISPATCH DETAILED ESTIMATE PORT CAPACITY MURMANSK SINCE RECENT BOMBINGS. IF PRACTICABLE SUGGEST PERSONAL INSPECTION AND REPORT POLYARNOE AND OTHER NAVAL ACTIVITIES NORTH RUSSIAN AREA ALSO RAILROAD TRIP TO KHABAROVO.

16... ORIG.

**NAVAIDE...FILE.**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch office in person. (See Art. 26 (4) NAVFLEET.)

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/44
ALTHOUGH NO SHIPS ALONGSIDE, FREQUENT AIR RAIDS CONTINUE CONSISTING MOSTLY OF INCENDIARY AND ANTI-PERSONNEL BOMBS. REPORTS FROM VARIOUS RELIABLE SOURCES INDICATE THAT SEVERAL THOUSAND DOCKWORKERS ARE TRANSFERRING TO VLADIVOSTOK AREA. SECOND GROUP OF 16 VESSELS SAILED YESTERDAY FOR ARCHANGEL AREA LEAVING NITAMP, PLOREI, PUTNAM ONLY AMERICAN SHIP IN HARBOR.

16....ACTION
COMINCH....10/11....2ØG....F37....
FILE:NAVAIDE.2ØDP
USING COMBINED RESOURCES BRITISH AND AMERICAN SURVIVORS STORES PLUS SHIP CHANDLER SUPPLIES ALL VESSELS HAVE ON LEAVING MURMANSK AREA FOOD AND CIGARETTES FOR PERIOD 2 MONTHS ANTICIPATE THAT ARCHANGEL CAN FURNISH ENOUGH FOR SIMILAR PERIOD IF LENGTH OF STAY REQUIRES. IT IS URGENT THAT WHEN CONVOYS ARE RESUMED THE SURVIVORS STORES BE REPLENISHED WITH FIRST CONVOY.

16......ACT
10/11......NAVALDE......F37........FILE

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
**NAVAL MESSAGE**

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**FROM**

FRANKEL NURMANSK

**RELEASED BY**

11 MAY 43

**DATE**

1525

**TOR CODED**

GREENE/STEWART

**DECODED BY**

TUCKER

**PARAPHRASED**

MAY 4!

**ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME**

REEGAN 091012 NCR 3766

ON THE OTHER-WISE INDICATED IN THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

**TEXT**

ALTHOUGH NO SHIPS ALONGSIDE, FREQUENT AIR RAIDS CONTINUE CONSISTING MOSTLY OF INCENDIARY AND ANTI-PERSONNEL BOMBS. REPORTS FROM VARIOUS RELIABLE SOURCES INDICATE THAT SEVERAL THOUSAND DOCKWORKERS ARE TRANSFERRING TO VLADIVOSTOK AREA. SECOND GROUP OF 10 VESSELS SAILED YESTERDAY FOR ARCHANGEL AREA LEAVING NAVEPADE, chief, putnam only American ship in harbor.

16...ACTION

COMINCH...16/11...28G......F37...

FILE: NAVAIDE, 29DP

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(B), and 8(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 1, 1972
By DBS Date: MAY 21, 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
By RT, NARA, Date
SOVIETS CONSTRUCTING HUGE NEW LANDING FIELD OPPOSITE SKREBTSOV ISLAND ON RIGHT. ANKOFAMUR BAY 43-13 N LAT 131-55 E LONG. WHEN COMPLETED WILL HAVE SINGLE RECTANGULAR BRICK RUNWAY 5000 FEET BY 500 FEET RUNNING NORTHEAST AND SOUTHWEST PREVAILING WINDS BLOW SAME DIRECTION. HANGARS AND FUEL TANKS WILL BE UNDERGROUND. FIELD IS 15.4 KILOMETERS FROM CENTER OF VLAD LYING BETWEEN RAILROAD AND ASPHALT COVERED MOTOR ROAD WITHIN EASY ACCESS TO BOTH. MOST PROMINENT OBJECT IN VICINITY IS SMALL ROCKY SKREBTsov ISLAND. RADIO STATION FOR FIELD COMPLETED AND LOCATED ON HILL INBOARD OF FIELD NEXT TO MOTOR ROAD EQUIPPED WITH DIRECTIONAL TYPE ANTENNA AND INDEPENDENT POWER SUPPLY.
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16...CATION

COMINCH...$0/11...20G......

NAVAIDE...20D...FILE.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/94
YESTERDAY TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER MADE FOLLOWING STATEMENT TO BELGIAN MINISTER: GERMAN GENERAL MOBILIZATION HAS PRODUCED THREE MILLION ADDITIONAL MEN FOR ARMY. RUSSIAN MEN AND RESOURCES ARE NOT INEXHAUSTIBLE AND RUSSIA IS FEELING SERIOUSLY THE STRAIN OF WAR. AT STALINGRAD AND SOME OTHER PLACES RUSSIANS HAVE LOST 10 MEN FOR EACH ONE LOST BY GERMANS. ALLIED VICTORY NOT EXPECTED BEFORE 1944.
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM AMCON VLADIVOSTOK
RELEASED BY
DATE 8 MAY 1943
TOR CODEROOM 1545
DECODED BY STAMBAUGH/NICHOLS/FISHER
PARAPHRASED BY WHITTINGTON

CNO ALUSNA MOSCOW
INFORMATION FOR ACTION
PRIORITY ROUTINE DEFERRED

FROM NAVIGATION

FOR ACTION CNO AND MOSCOW.

PART 1 - 881010, NCR 1838
PART 2 - 881212, NCR 1996

REF MY 13230 APRIL. INTERPRETER WAS AGAIN QUESTIONED FOR 3 HOURS ON 5 MAY BY NKVD ON FOLLOWING: REACTION ON VISIT TO PORT AREA BY LENDE LEASE REPRESENTATIVE MAJOR OLSON, USA, AND ASTALUSNA MADE 4 MAY. WAS FORCED TO SIGN STATEMENT STATING OLSON HAD REQUESTED VISIT THROUGH SOVIET DIPLOMATIC AGENT, THAT HE THOUGHT PORT EXCELLENT CONDITION, AND THAT MORE SHIPS COULD BE ACCOMMODATED. REPORT IF ANY MADE TO CONGEN ON PORT VISIT AND REASON CONGEN DECLINED INVITATION VISIT PORT ON THIS OCCASION. REASONS FOR OLSON'S DESIRE RETURN MOSCOW VIA TASHKENT (PERMISSION WAS REFUSED) AND HIS RELATIVE STATUS WITH SUPPLY MISSION. REACTION OF AMERICAN PERSONNEL TO

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/8/94
SOVIET BREACH IN POLISH RELATIONS. KNOWLEDGE OF ASTALUSNA'S BUSINESS CONCERNING SHIP MOVEMENTS AND ROUTES, WAS AGAIN ASKED ABOUT ACCESS TO CORRESPONDENCE OR ANY PERSONAL NOTES KEPT BY ASTALUSNA. DISAPPEARANCE OF GIRL MENTIONED IN MY 24/53 APRIL AND REACTION OF AMERICAN PERSONNEL. OLSON'S AND MY REACTION TO CONSTANT SHADOWING BY PLAIN CLOTHES MEN. QUESTIONING REVEALED NKVD WANT AS MUCH INFO AS POSSIBLE ON AMERICAN REACTION TO CURRENT EVENTS AND PERSONAL HABITS AND THAT THEY ARE NOT GETTING ALL THE INFO DESIRED FROM SERVANTS AND SOVIET PERSONNEL IN CONSULATE. THEY ARE EXTREMELY AFRAID OF OFFENDING INTERPRETER AND OFFERED HER BRIBES OF CLOTHES, FOOD, AND LIVING QUARTERS. ANSWERS GIVEN WERE NON-COMPROMISING AND BRIBES REFUSED. LINE OF QUESTIONING ANTICIPATED BEFORE INTERVIEW AND INTERPRETER...
INSTRUCTED IN REPLIES. SHE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE CALLED UP AGAIN FROM TIME TO TIME. PLEASE ADVISE IF SIMILAR DISPATCH OR WRITTEN REPORTS DESIRED THIS CONNECTION.

16......ACTION

COMINCH.....2200.....23.....2000.....

CNO.....NAVAIDE.....FILE

SECRET

NCR-15

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (e) NAVREGS.)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/44
The Assistant Naval attaché during a tour of duty at Archangel, USSR from July 1942 to February 1943 had the opportunity of meeting and working with a great many Soviet naval officers as well as Soviet civilians. In addition to this, he was allowed access to practically all semi-military areas, all port areas and aboard any merchant ship or ice-breaker in port. It is interesting to note that the reverse is the case in Vladivostok. Of course, the assistant naval attaché in Vladivostok operates under quite different circumstances, yet the official and unofficial Soviet attitude is entirely different.

Comparison of the following points between Archangel and Vladivostok:

1. Attitude of Soviet Navy toward Americans.
2. Attitude of Soviet Civilians toward Americans.
3. Living conditions.
   (a) Food
   (b) Clothing
   (c) Housing
   (d) Prices
4. Internal Affairs (NAV)

Director of Naval Intelligence and Allen Moscow.
Subject: USSR. Living Conditions. 6 May, 1945.

1. Attitude of Soviet Navy toward Americans.

Soviet Naval Liaison Officers in Vladivostok are polite yet cold and unfriendly. They refuse to discuss...even the weather...and are anxious to hear what the business at hand is so that they can break off the meeting, and relay the information to their superiors before they have time to forget it. They purposely avoid speaking on common professional subjects and apparently want to see as little of the assistant naval attaché as possible.

All business is conducted in a hotel room supposedly occupied by the Liaison officer's secretary, but who only occupies the room ten minutes before an interview is scheduled and leaves at the beginning of the meeting. All routine business (Merchant Ship Movements) is conducted by note, these notes being received and delivered by the secretaries of each officer in the same hotel room; meetings being scheduled by telephone beforehand.

This attitude is in great contrast to the Liaison officer's of the White Sea Flotilla. There, the officers would conduct their business in their offices at the Fleet Headquarters or in the Assistant Naval Attaché's office...or anywhere else that it was convenient. They were very friendly, would discuss anything, apparently liked Americans and were sincere and truthful. The Command-in-Chief of the White Sea Flotilla, Vice Admiral Stepanov always had time for an interview with the Americans and did all of the other senior officers on the staff. It seems that it would be of little effort and only a polite gesture for at least the Soviet Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet to acknowledge by note, if he could not spare the time for a personal meeting, the presence of an American Naval Officer in Vladivostok regardless of his junior rank or status.

2. Attitude of Soviet Civilians toward Americans.

Soviet civilians, officials or otherwise, live; it seems, in mortal fear of an American who greets them in public. Any contact with Soviet civilians must always be official and this official contact is coldly polite. They avoid saying anything unnecessary and prolong their conversation only in order to conclude the necessary business.

In Archangel the Assistant Naval Attaché's office was a constant reception room for Soviets, from the Mayor of the city down to the lowest Seaman second in the Red Navy. All were most cordial and never failed to stay for a friendly cigarette a cup of coffee or long enough to discuss the current phase of the war. These same civilians were greatly flattered when Americans returned their visits, whether they visited on business or merely social.

3. Living Conditions.

(a) Food is much more plentiful in Vladivostok than in any other locality of the Soviet Union thus far visited by the Assistant Naval Attaches. Fish is plentiful and cheap which was not the case in the North. Meat and dairy products are scarce yet obtainable.
at the closed shop for the Consular Corps. This was not the case in Archangel where all Soviet food purchased was from INTURIST and dairy products did not exist. There is a plentiful supply of both black and white bread for the Soviet citizens as well as for foreigners. In the Northern parts a little white bread was available only to the foreigners for a time, however, this supply was exhausted and black bread only was obtainable after November of 1942. A great deal of American food is available to the Soviets in Vladivostok. However, the majority of it consists of luxury foods such as dry oysters, fancy canned shrimp, oysters, clams and a poor grade of sugar. This particular food is not adaptable to the Russian diet, and therefore not popular. It is available only to the people in the city and is generally traded in the "Gypsy" market to the peasants for potatoes, eggs and Vodka. In Archangel no foreign food products were issued to civilians, but a few foreign foods were served to the privileged classes who were permitted to eat at the INTURIST dining rooms.

The people in general in this area look healthy, well fed and complain much less about their poor fare than one hears in other parts of Russia.

(b) Clothing. A great amount of American clothing is issued to the Vladivostok population, especially cheap shoes (men's and women's). However, a great deal of expensive serviceable clothing is also in evidence. This is especially true with the female population as the wives and sweethearts of the merchant seallors going to the U.S. undoubtedly received gifts of shoes, stockings, dresses, coats and hats. In addition, all the wives of officials are well dressed in American clothes. Of course, the best dressed males are the merchant sailors, next come the officials and lastly the ordinary worker. Most of the sailors are dressed in latest American fashions...and with usual loud taste while the officials are more conservative.

The assistant Naval attaché visited Vladivostok in 1937 and believes that as a whole, the population is better dressed now than at that time.

This condition is again greatly contrasted in other parts of the Soviet Union. Even in Moskow the people appear much shabbier, and in the North, no foreign clothes were issued nor did any great amount appear in the streets worn by sailor's wives or sweethearts.

(c) Housing in Vladivostok seems to be just as much of a problem as it is in other Soviet cities. Quarters are limited, poorly kept up, poorly lighted, cold in winter, always dirty and shabby.

(d) Prices are about the same as they are in most other Soviet cities. Official prices for food and articles are naturally the same throughout the country, but prices in the market will vary somewhat depending upon supply and demand. A great deal of speculation takes place with bread and vodka. Little money is ever seen and seldom asked for. Tobacco is greatest in demand with Mahorka weed, the nearest substitute, following it very closely.
CONFIDENTIAL

Serial 10-42

Subject: USSR—Living Conditions. 8 May, 1943.

4. Internal Affairs (NKVD) are of much more importance in Vladivostok than they were in Archangel and Murmansk. In Archangel the house and office occupied by the Assistant Naval Attaché was guarded 24 hours a day by the usual militia. But the NKVD never followed or interfered in any way with the movements of Soviets or Americans entering the Attaché's office. In Vladivostok, the American Consulate is also guarded by the militia at the gate, but in addition the NKVD have a special house directly across from the Consulate where at least six plain clothedmen are on duty with two motor cars, 24 hours a day. Every American and sometimes Soviet employee leaving the Consulate are shadowed by one or more of these NKVD men. If any one member of the Consul General's staff leaves by motor car, the American car is trailed by the NKVD car with as many as four men. Every strange Soviet entering the Consulate is stopped by the militia and forced to give his name and state his business and after leaving he is followed by one of the plain clothedmen. Undoubtedly they are subsequently "picked up" and questioned.

The Soviet explanation for this is that Americans are watched so closely for protection since the Japanese Consulate is also present in the city and "some unpleasant incident" might occur. The Soviets undoubtedly tell the Japs the same story as all foreigners including the Chinese are treated in the same manner. However, this same treatment was accorded American personnel before the war and in undoubtedly part of the local "system." Foreigners are allowed to leave the city without a special pass by only one road. This road extends all the way to Khabarovsky but foreigners are allowed to drive a distance of only 15 km. out of town on it. All other roads leaving the city are guarded with most officious and impolite sentries.
NAVAL MESSAGE

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RELEASED BY

DATE      MAY 3, 1943
TOR CODEROOM 1803

OPNAV MOSCOW

PRIORITY RRRRRRRR DEFERRED

INFORMATION

PARAPHRASED BY

REEGAN 030950 NCR 8492

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

OORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

TEXT

(ACTION CNO AND MOSCOW)

ALUSNOB MOSCOWS 18417 MARCH. ALTHOUGH REPEATED REQUESTS TO LIAS OFFICER AS TO TIME OF ARRIVAL AND ASSUMPTION OF DUTIES REAR ADMIRAL ALAFUZOV NO INFO DIVULGED. HOWEVER MAY 1 ORDER OF DAY TO PACFLEET PUBLISHED IN LOCAL NEWSPAPER WAS SIGNED BY CINCPAC VICE ADM YUMASHEV AND CHIEF OF STAFF REAR ADM ALAFUZOV.

16...ACTION
10/11...COMmhch....2YG....13....
NAVAID...20OP......FILE.
NAVAL MESSAGE

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PARAPHRASED BY

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INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.
HILL 30910 NCR 6817
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME
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F-57
10-00
1200

(FOR ACTION MOSCOW AND CNO)

CORRECT MY 2701193 BY INSERTING AT BEGINNING
OF MSG "ACTION ADDRESSES OPHAY AND MOSCOW."
ANSWERING MOSCOW'S 296657.

RE: POOR GRADE AMERICAN SHOES GOING TO USSR
CREATING BAD PROPAGANDA OF SUPER SOVIET MATERIAL,
ETC.

16 . ACT
COMINC . 10/11 . 13 . 2GC . NAVADE . FILE
DECLASSIFIED
R. O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 3(D) or (E)
OSD later. May 5, 1972
By DBS May 21, 1973

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12355, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/8/94
POOREST GRADE AMERICAN SHOES BEING RATIONED ENTIRE SOVIET CIVILIAN POPULATION THIS AREA WHICH LAST ABOUT 2 WEEKS WITH RESULTANT MALICIOUS PROPAGANDA OF SUPERIOR SOVIET MATERIAL AND INFERIOR AMERICAN. AMERICAN LUXURY FOODS ALSO BEING ISSUED CIVILIANS SUCH AS PUFFED RICE, SHREDDED WHEAT, CANNED SHRIMP AND OYSTERS PLUS OFF-GRAGE SUGAR WITH SIMILAR PROPAGANDA SINCE FOOD NOT SUITABLE FOR LABORER OR RUSSIAN DIET.
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: ALUSNA MOSCOW
RELEASED BY:
DATE: 27 APRIL 1943
TOR CODENO: 271415
DECODED BY: TAYLOR
PARAPHRASED BY: LEWIS

REICIPHERMENT OF MOSCOW 1610 OF 23RD
PARKED ON AIRFIELD AT MOSCOW ESTIMATE 15 TRANSPORTS
50 SINGLE ENGINE FIGHTERS 30 TWIN ENGINE ATTACK BOMBERS
30 MISCELLANEOUS, MASSED IN MANNER INDICATING NO FEAR
AIR RAIDS. AT ARCHANGEL 1 FIELD 51 PLANES PRACTICALLY
ALL SINGLE ENGINE FIGHTERS, BOARD RUNWAY, ANOTHER FIELD
GRAVEL SURFACE ABOUT 15 SINGLE MOTOR FIGHTERS OF WHICH
ABOUT 5 NEWLY UNCRATED HURRICANES. AT MURMANSK VAENGA
ABOUT 20 PLANES MIXED 1 AND 2 ENGINE FIGHTERS WITH SEVERAL
AIRACOBAS, ARCH AND MURM PLANES NEARLY ALL ENCLOSED IN
EARTH REVETMENTS MANY OF WHICH ROOFED OVER. NO EVIDENCE
GERMAN BOMBING ANY FIELD. SAW PARK 100 ANTIAIRCRAFT GUNS
ALONGSIDE MOJAIK HIGHWAY ABOUT 8 MILES OUTSIDE MOSCOW.

*RECEIVED UNDECIPHERABLE

16...ACT
10/11...20G...COMITICH...NAVAIDE...20OP...FILE...
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NATIONAL WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT

INDICATIONS THAT GERMANS HAVE ABANDONED ORIGINAL PLANS TO SPLIT UP RUSSIA INTO SEVERAL INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES THAT WOULD BE DOMINATED BY THEM AND ARE NOW TRYING TO COME TO UNDERSTANDING WITH RUSSIAN PEOPLE AND SLAV PEOPLE GENERALLY. THEIR PREVIOUS PROPOSAL TO PEOPLE OF AZERBAIJAN THAT A NATIONAL AZERBAIJAN COMMITTEE BE CREATED IN BERLIN UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF REZULKADEMINBEY AND THAT A LOAN BE MADE TO THIS COMMITTEE IN THE NAME AND INTEREST OF THE AZERBAIJAN GOVERNMENT AND OF DECLARING INDEPENDENCE OF AZERBAIJAN HAS LATELY BEEN WITHDRAWN. ATTEMPT NOW BEING MADE TO ESTABLISH A RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT AT SWOLENSK UNDER LEADERSHIP OF A RUSSIAN GENERAL AND TO OPEN A RUSSIAN UNIVERSITY IN CRIMEA. ABOVE FROM LOCAL AGENT.
FORMER SECRETARY FOR SOVIET NAVY LIAISON OFFICER
IN MOSCOW, CAPT. EGIPKO WHOSE NAME IS GALINA GOLOVINA
HAS BEEN HERE FOR PAST TWO WEEKS AWAITING TRANSPORTATION TO USA WHERE SHE WAS TO WORK FOR SOVIET
NAVAL ATTACHÉ IN WASHINGTON HAS HAD PASSAGE CANCELLED, WAS ARRESTED BY NKVD, QUESTIONED AND SENT
MOSCON FOR MAKING FRIENDLY VISIT TO CONSULATE AND
FOR ASSOCIATING IN PUBLIC WITH MEMBERS OF COMCEN'S
STAFF.

ACT: 16....
13.....COMINCH....10/11....20G....NAVAIDE....

FILE
**NAVAL MESSAGE**

**FROM:** ALUSSA MOSCOW  
**RELEASED BY:**  
**DATE:** 24 APRIL 1943  
**TOK CODE ROOM:** 2985  
**DECODED BY:** JOHNSON/NIKELL  
**PARAPHRASED BY:**  

**ADDRESSES**  
**FOR ACTION:** OPNAV  
**INFORMATION:**  

**NAVY DEPARTMENT**  
**PRECEDENCE**  
**PRIORITY**  
**ROUTINE**  
**DEFERRED**

**PAGE 1 OF 3**

231718 NCR 2484

**HATCH**
UNLESS INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

**ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME**

**TEXT**

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PART 1 231718 NCR 2484, PART 2 231416 NCR 2613

ADMIRAL GOLOVKO CINC NORTHERN FLEET POLYARNOE ABOUT 35 YEARS OLD, KEEN, ALERT AGGRESSIVE. SERVED IN SPAIN DURING CIVIL WAR THERE. SAID FOLLOWING 26 SUBS OPERATING OUT OF POLYARNOE OF WHICH AVERAGE 8 ALWAYS ON STATION. RED LOSSES TO DATE 1 DESTROYER, 11 SUBS, 200 AIRCRAFT. OF SUBS LOST SAVED CREW OF 1 ONLY AND THIS HAD STRUCK A MINE. CONSIDERABLE SUB MINE LAYING IN FJORD ON NORWEGIAN COAST. GERMANS IN SUPPLYING NORTH FINLAND FORCES VIA SEA. CONSTANT RED NAVY PRESSURE ON THIS SUPPLY LINE HAS SAVED WURMANSK AND LIMITED GERMAN OFFENSIVE ACTION IN NORTH IN GENERAL.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person By: Admin.  24th Feb. 1944

DECLASSIFIED  E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101  By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
WITH MORE DESTROYERS AND CRUISERS COULD CUT LINE ENTIRELY.
DECLINED GIVE ESTIMATE NUMBER SHIPS REQUIRED. FORCES
OPPOSITE MURMANSK AREA 5 DIVISIONS ALL GERMAN EX NORWAY
UNDER GENERAL DIEYL. NO FINNS. MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS FROM
USA STILL UNDER TEST SO FAR NOT EXCEEDING 26 KNOTS. ACK-
NOWLEDGED RED FAULT FAILURE SPECIFY LENGTH TORPEDO TUBES.
PLAN JURY RIG TO LAUNCH TORPEDOES OVER SIDE. REDS.HAVE
AERIAL TORPEDO FOR DROPPING FROM HIGH ALTITUDE BY PARA-
CHUTE INTO HARBORS OR WHERE MASSED SHIPPING. TORPEDO
FOLLOWS PATH OF INCREASING SPIRALS. ARE AWARE OF GERMAN
TORPEDO OF SIMILAR TYPE." POLYARNOE EXCELLENTLY SITUATED
WELL PROTECTED FOR SMALL CRAFT AND SURROUNDED BY 500' HILLS.
NO BOMBING TO DATE WHICH DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND IF RED
CLAIMS THEIR SUB SUCCESSES TRUE.
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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) or 5(D) or (E)
OSD Letter, May 1, 1973
By DBS

MAY 21, 1973

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
FOLLOWING VIEWS EXPRESSED BY CAPT LIEUT KAMINSKY ASST LIAISON OFFICER ARCH. SOVIETS DISPLEASED AT LARGE NUMBER BRIT MILITARY AIR NAVAL PERSONNEL THAT AREA WITH NO VISIBLE JUSTIFICATION. APPROXIMATELY 15 OFFICERS 35 MEN ARCH 3 OFFICERS 16 MEN BAKIRITSA, 2 OFFICERS 3 MEN MOLOTOVSK. THIS DISPLEASURE INDICATED OFFICIALLY BY REFUSAL GRANT VISAS REPLACEMENTS. NUMBER AMERICAN PERSONNEL ARCH HAS BEEN INADEQUATE. WOULD LIKE SEE PERMANENT REPLS BAKIRITSA AND MOLOTOVSK AS WELL AS ARCH. DO NOT NEED LARGE ESTABLISHMENT. NEED CHIEFLY FOR LIAISON AND CEC/MP TROUBLE BH. WITH AMERICAN CREWS AND SHIPS. TECHNICAL AND TRANSPORT PROBLEM CONNECTION LANDED CARGO HANDLED TO FULL RED SATISFACTION WITHOUL FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND WITH NO APPRECIABLE CONFUSION OR MISTAKES IN IDENTITY MATERIAL. UNQUOTE. BELIEVE KAMINSKY ACCURATELY REFLECTS SOVIET OPINION ARCH NAVAL STAFF.

CLASSIFIED

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
CAPT MAUND OPENLY ANTIPATHETIC TOWARD KAMINSKY AND TO FOREIGN REpresentative Krasilnikov. Reasons not apparent as both on best terms with American reps and have been most helpful and friendly. Open Brit mission dealing black market and selling chocolate and cigarettes to obtain cheap roubles source of much annoyance to reds and in sharp contrast to American practice obtaining roubles at legal rate in legal fashion. This of course not applying to personnel of ships of all nations who barter goods for roubles as only reasonable was of obtaining them. Tourd Bakiritsa in Brit motor car Brit enlisted chauffeur of which furnished descriptive monologue of their local activities of nature extremely patronising to soviets and infuriating to Kaminsky who part of audience. Typical sort indiscretion which constantly occurring. Rubs raw Red inferiority complex and keeps red Brit relations on tender basis. With arrival Richardson, Worche, Johnston.
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: ALUSNA MOSCOW
RELEASED BY:
DATE:
TOR CODEROOM:
DECODED BY:
PARAPHRASED BY:

FOR ACTION
INFORMATION
PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TREATED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

ACTION
MACDONALD, KLOPOVIC, HUTNICK AND 2 PHARMACISTS MATES NORTHERN AREA WILL BE ADEQUATELY STAFFED. WILL PERMIT MORE EFFICIENT FULFILLMENT HANDLING CONVOYS AND ALSO PERMIT MORE TIME TO BE DEVOTED TO ACCUMULATION INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL AND TO FOSTERING CLOSER RELATIONS WITH RUSSIANS.

PART 1 231415 NCR 2455
PART 2 231330 NCR 2463
PART 3 231345 NCR 2435

NOTE: RECEIVED CONFIDENTIAL AND RAISED TO SECRET BY NCR.
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION:
16......ACTION
NAVATIE......
SOVIET NAVY CHARGED WITH AIR DEFENSE OF PORT OF HURMANSK AND MERCHANT SHIPPING KOLA INLET WHICH IS ADMINISTERED BY NAVY GENERAL ANDREEV UNDER CINC NORTHERN FLEET. MAIN AIRFIELD AT VAENGA WITH 2 SMALL AUXILIARY WINTER FIELDS 1½ AND 2½ KILOMETERS SOUTH OF FORMER. OBSERVED OPERATING FROM THESE FIELDS - HURRICANES, P40's, P39's AND SOVIET TWIN-ENGINE FIGHTERS, DESIGNATION P3. ESTIMATE 65 FIGHTERS IN ALL. IN ADDITION, 12 HAMPSDEN TORPEDO BOMBERS WHICH HAVE BEEN ACTIVE AGAINST GERMAN TRANSPORTS PLUS UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF SOVIET MEDIUM BOMBERS AND 6 OBSOLETE SCOUT BIPLANES. NAVAL SEAPLANES STATION AT CRAZNAVA WITH 2 SEAPLANES, TYPE MBR 2 AND FACILITIES FOR HANDLING CATALINAS OF WHICH
NONE HAVE BEEN PRESENT DURING PAST YEAR. ADMIRAL GOLOVKO STATED 2 AIRFIELDS ON NOVAYA ZEMLYA NOW READY TO OPERATE AS BASE FOR LONG RANGE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT. ARMY AIRFIELD AT MURMASHEI, NEAR KOLA FROM SOVIET INFORMATION, PLAYS SMALL PART IN DEFENSE OF HURMANSK BUT IS USED AS BASE FOR ATTACKS ON ENEMY POSITIONS NORTHERN FRONT PLUS INTERCEPTION OF REPORTED GERMAN BOMBER FLIGHTS. NO INFORMATION ON NUMBER OR TYPES OF AIRCRAFT. PREVIOUS COMMANDER SOVIET NAVAL AIR FORCES HURMANSK AREA NAVY GENERAL KUZNETSOV RECENTLY TRANSFERRED VLADIVOSTOK WHICH SIGNIFICANT BECAUSE OF HIS EXCELLENT REPUTATION DURING ACTIVE EXPERIENCE IN ALMOST DAILY CONTACT WITH ENEMY AIR FORCE HURMANSK AREA.
CONFIDENTIAL

ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS NAVY DEPARTMENT

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Serial 5-43

Monograph Index Guide No. 923-300

From Ships Clark B. Hartley and USS at Moscow, USSR

Date 20 April 1943

Reference.

Source. Conversation (Direct, personal observation, publication, press, conversation with...

Evaluation Available (All reliable, information, etc., etc., etc., etc.)

Subject. USSR - Red Army Women - Information obtained from

(Brief) (Main title as per index guide) (Details) Make separate report for each title

BRIEF - Enter careful summary of report, containing substance only. (Include important facts, names, dates, etc.)

USS: USSR: RED ARMY WOMEN: Age, Source of Induction, Induction:

1. Average age of women inducted into Red Army from 15 to 25.
2. Source of Induction, schools, institutes, offices, and factories.
3. Induction into service against own free will.
4. Training that of regular Red Army Soldiers.
5. Equipment and clothing - required to bring own and some furnished by Gov't.
6. Food - poorly fed.
8. In the field - hardships, diseases, fighting, and care of wounded.
9. Return home after being in the field.

The average age of girls inducted into the Red Army varies from 15 to 25. This induction is not one of free will but inductees are compelled to refrain from voicing opinions (not daring to refuse induction) for the sake of avoiding trouble and unnecessary hardships that would naturally follow if over such was the case.

Girls are inducted chiefly from schools, institutes, offices, and factories. Such "unfortunates", as they call themselves, live a life of hardships and discomfort as listed below: (This divulged very openly and intended for underprivileged who is well acquainted with informants. Red Army Women desired to describe life of "NAAC" and "NAVAC", as they put it, in order put duties and life lead by each on comparative basis.)

10. It is a question of employment that she is to appear at a given address with her toilet articles (if any) and essentials such as clothing, shoes, and underwear. A notification is furnished her employer who treats her with great respect. After reporting to address, she is physically examined, given a blanket, soldiers' winter coat (male), and any loose clothing to compensate for what she didn't bring from home, assigned a domiciliary and position, then ready for "schooling".

Training: Women are trained along the same lines as Red Army Soldiers, use of rifle, bayonet, marching, gas mask instructions, first aid, sanitation, and "how to rough it" (which begins upon entry into service). Training in the schools is normally outlined in a "Plan of the Camp" as follows:

Archives
Monograph
OP-12
Cominich (3)
Bullers
R.L.E.S (3)
Nevada
J.W.D.C.
Naval War College
M.I.S. (5)
State

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/44

O.R.L. 23-4-45
Serial 6-43  CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: USSR - Red Army Women - Information obtained from (Cont’d)

Drilling and training from 0600 to 1200 of each day, including Sundays in many cases, then after the noonmeal working parties are assigned to street cleaning, assisting in nearby war plants, loading lumber, coal, freight cars, driving trucks, standing watches over military factories, zones, and fortified areas. An average of 12 to 16 hours is the ordinary day of the Red Army Women while in “Boot Camp”. The training period is from 30 days to date of departure for duty which may be anytime after the 30 days of training.

Living Conditions at Training Centers:

Large barn type buildings house the women in training which are inadequately furnished, dismal running water, very unsanitary, outdoor toilets, no beds or linen (rough boards used as bunks) not mattresses. (The informant states that she has slept on bare boards for the past 45 days using her overcoat for a mattress and blanket). Quoting informant, “I wish you could see our outdoor toilets (Shibenira), they give off such a strong odor that it blinds one temporarily so therefore we cannot use them but since nature provided hedges and shrubbery, we use that as a means of relieving ourselves, since it serves the purpose and in my opinion is much more sanitary.” Continuing, “I am in hopes that I will not be here when the thaw comes as it will be most unpleasant and impossible to bear since all hands do the same.” The buildings are not furnished with heat, no covered floor space, no running water or flush type toilets, and are very damp. It was stated that these conditions exist in the other two known training centers in and around Moscow.

Equipment and Clothing:

When entering training, the women are required to bring their own clothing, as much as they possess, as very little is issued them by the Govt. The undersigned inquired where she obtained her shoes from which were in a sad, denuded condition and wet throughout, reply was, “I have had these for 2 years but when completely worn through, I will barter something off for another pair or possibly obtain another pair at the front (from a dead soldier undoubtedly) or Red Cross shoes that are being distributed at the front.” (The shoes informant wore were of the "Old fashioned" type - laced well over ankle, and well worn through on the soles.)

Food:

The food situation is critical, a diet of black bread (400 grams) and fish or cabbage soup, once daily, is the normal menu. The trainees receive a helping of “hand outs” from home when visiting parents or friends are permitted to see them, but attention is called to a little unsanitary habit of a little handful of the trainees taking their own clothing. On several occasions one of the women in training has asked for left over bread to take back to camp with her in order not to go hungry the next day, witnessed by the undersigned.

Moral:

Moral is very low due to working under trying conditions, constantly hungry, dirty, and being cold. There is one thought in the minds of practically every Red Army Woman, and that is to get home and away from Army life. A Statement made by practically every contact was, “When will this war come to an end so that this misery, slow starvation, and life of discontentment may end and a proper life established once again. (Before the war it is a known fact that the populace was better fed than at this writing.)

In the Field:

Informant was questioned if ever under fire and what were her reactions: “Yes, twice, I didn’t have a rifle, or any other equipment, but soon found one and put it to good use. The action I am speaking of took place near VERECH”, where I saw several of my close friends killed. He was in one of the “freed” villages for about 3 days when the Germans launched an unsuccessful attack, after a few hours they withdrew but not until inflicting heavy casualties and destroying what temporary repairs we had made to buildings and communications. Then our work started in earnest as we had many dead, wounded, and dying on our hands. It was terrible and pitiful because since we had hardly any medical equipment and supplies with us, our supply was exhausted on the first few patients so that many others without medical assistance except for making them a little comfortable or resetting broken bones. Of course many died due to lack of proper medical attention but there isn’t too much a person can do cut on the front, one is very fortunate to get by with a whole skin, considering the conditions we work and fight under.”

Page 82.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 1/4/67
In the Field: (Cont'd)

Two Red Army Women, very good friends of the undersigned, have supplied the following: "Our work is to clean up and restore suitable living conditions in the rehabilitated areas, such as restoring sanitation, delouse homes, install communications, repair waterlines, gas lines, restore electricity, stamp out prevailing diseases, and help feed the populace in whatever zone we happen to be in. When questioned what was the general feeling of the Red Army Women in regard to the above, the following reply received, "We aren't "Chinese Pigs" or horses, why should we expose ourselves to diseases, hunger, mined areas, bombing and strafing by enemy planes, cooking for thousands that have been exposed to every disease known to man kind, and why leave my old parents starving in Moscow. Furthermore, practically all my acquaintances in the Red Army are suffering from venereal diseases, some have sold themselves for bread and sometimes made to oblige the soldiers. I don't want to be a prostitute, most army women turn that way after being in the field for months and living with men. I want to live a normal life but it seems that one can't do such a thing in this country. The only possible way that I can return to Moscow to see my folks is to be wounded or pregnant and I don't want to pay that penalty but if there is no other alternative, it is not too much of a sacrifice to make.

Return homeward:

When asked how informant returned to Moscow, reply was, "I escorted and attended wounded soldiers, that required hospitalisation, to Moscow, and have been granted a few weeks leave." Then she added, "Of course this would not have been possible had I not known the Captain in command of my platoon." When asked if she was to return to the same area, reply was, "I will be reassigned to another sector of the front upon expiration of my leave because my regiment is being transferred somewhere south. I will not know until I get there (somewhere south). Informant added, "I could think of a thousand more pleasant ways to die than returning to that slow miserable and cold death at the front."

Note: Two of the above mentioned Red Army Women are well acquainted with undersigned and have been in "foreigners" company repeatedly prior to induction. Both have returned from the front and voluntarily gave above information. Their reason, to this day, for being in the Red Army is due to associating with foreigners, undoubtedly the result of the Secret Police (NKVD) convictions. Similar information has dribbled in corresponding to that given above but was never from "first person". It is believed that statements made by the 3 Red Army Women are true and can be considered reliable since 2 of the women are not acquainted with one another.

* * * * *

- 3 -
Observations made along Trans-Siberian Railroad
April 4 - 16, 1942.

Confirmation and addition to Asst. Naval Attaché's report
7-43 of 1 April, 1943.

1. Freight, traffic and movement of supplies.
2. Rolling Stock.
3. Upkeep.
4. Passenger traffic.
5. Military points of interest.
6. Food conditions.
7. Morale.
8. Minor points of interest.
9. Distance Table.

Distribution By Originator

Director of Naval Intelligence and Alusna Moscow.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/94
CONFIDENTIAL

Serial 9-43

Subject: USSR. Observations made along Trans-Siberian RR.

Observations made along the Trans-Siberian route by Major Clinton W. Olson, USA, who completed the journey on 16 April, 1943 confirmed those of Lt. Comdr. Rouillard set forth in Serial 9-43 of 1 April, 1943 with the following exceptions and additions:

1. Freight, traffic and movement of supplies.
   Supplies entering the USSR via Murmansk and Archangel were seen moving east as far as Omsk. Most of these supplies were raw materials with the exception of a huge number of American trucks.
   The heavy coal train traffic in the Ural Area and around Omsk was confirmed.
   During the journey only one train of Potash was seen headed west. No chrome ore in evidence.

2. Rolling Stock.
   Confirmed entirely.

3. Upkeep
   Confirmed except different size and weight of rails were seen in use along the route indicating that there is a scarcity of rails and that upkeep is maintained with anything available.

   Confirmed entirely.

5. Military Points of Interest
   Three hospital trains were seen between Novosibirsk and Omsk Eastbound with wounded. One trainload of 37 mm anti-tank guns was seen west of Omsk going westward while in the railroad yard at Omsk a trainload of 75 mm field guns and mortars were observed Eastbound.
   American light tanks were seen operating in Omsk.
   Soviet passengers volunteered information that many German prisoners were concentrated at IMAN and in that vicinity.
   Confirmed strong fortifications between Khabarovsky and Voroshilov plus fact that few planes were seen in operation. However, some new YAK-7's were seen in use at Voroshilov.
   One armored train was seen in outskirts of Vladivostok on the alert indicating that it had completed its patrol from Chita and would probably start back in a few days.

   Confirmed entirely.

7. Morale.
   Confirmed entirely.

8. Minor points of interest.
   Major Olson set a precedent by travelling without a special Soviet permit and had his documents examined only about six times during the entire trip. Only one of these document examinations occurred after Lake Baikal.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/31
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MY AMERICAN BORN INTERPRETER AND TRANSLATOR A NATURALIZED SOVIET SINCE 1929 WHO HAS WORKED LOYALLY FOR AMERICAN INTERESTS FOR PAST 9 MONTHS WAS GRILLED ON 12 APRIL FOR 5 HOURS BY SOVIET SECRET POLICE IN VLADIVOSTOK REGARDING FOLLOWING:

MY REACTION TO OBSERVATIONS ON RAIL JOURNEY, PERSONAL HABITS WEAKNESSES PRO AND ANTI SOVIET VIEWS REASON FOR DEPARTURE FROM ARCHANGEL WHETHER ORDERED VLAD VOLUNTEERED OR SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED DUTY RELATIONS WITH CONGEN CLOSE FRIENDS IN CONSULATE REACTION TO SINKING OF SOVIET SHIP KOLA CONGENS AND MY TREATMENT OF SOVIET EMPLOYEES INTERRELATION OF MY WORK WITH CONGEN AT NESS TO CORRESPONDENCE AND MESSAGES.
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PERSONAL CORRESPONDENCE, ACQUAINTANCES, AND SOVIET FRIENDS OF TEACHERS WHOM HE HAD INTRODUCED. THEY VOLUNTEERED OPINION THAT SINCE THERE WERE NO AMERICAN SHIPS OR INTERESTS HERE CONSULATE WAS MAINTAINED BY UNITED STATES ONLY FOR PURPOSE OF AGITATING WAR BETWEEN JAPAN AND USSR. THIS IS FIRST TIME INTERPRETER HAS BEEN QUESTIONED WHILE EMPLOYED BY AMERICANS. ANSWERS GIVEN WERE DISCREET AND NONE JEOPARDIZED INTERESTS. THIS QUESTIONING REVEALED THAT SERVANTS HAVE ALSO BEEN RECENTLY GRILLED AND THAT ALL MOVEMENTS WITHIN AS WELL AS OUTSIDE OF CONSULATE ARE CLOSELY WATCHED EVEN TO NUMBER OF MY VISITS TO CONSUL'S RESIDENCE. HAVE TAKEN GREAT PAINS TO AVOID POSSIBLE CRITICISM FROM SOVIETS AS NKVD APART FROM RED NAVY ARE OBVIOUSLY AWAITING ANY OPPORTUNITY TO REPORT SLIGHTEST INDECENCY ANYONE CONNECTED WITH CONSULATE.

16...ACTION

...2IC...NAVAAIDE...2ICOPCLUDFILE

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/1973
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: ALUSNA MOSCOW
RELEASED BY:
DATE: 9 APRIL 43
TOR CODEROOM: 1538
DECODED BY: YANOVER
PARAPHRASED BY: HILL

PRIORITY INFORMATION
FOR ACTION:
OPNAV

PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

LT.COM GARTH 381234 NCR 2945 S
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

TEXT:

LIEUT GENERAL MARTEL NOW MOSCOW AS HEAD BRITISH MISSION VICE REAR ADMIRAL WILES WHO HAS RETURNED LONDON.

REAR ADMIRAL FISHER NOW POLYARNOE WILL JOIN MISSION BEING RELIEVED BY CAPTAIN MAUND AS SNO NORTH RUSSIA. MAUND NOW ARCHANGEL. AM INFORMED MARTEL HAS LETTERS FROM CHURCHILL DESIGNED PLACE HIM IN CONTACT WITH HIGH SOVIET MILITARY COUNCILS. MARTEL STATES HE WILL REMAIN HERE ONLY SHORT TIME IF HE IS UNABLE ACCOMPLISH SOMETHING OF REAL VALUE. AM INFORMED AS RESULT OF BRITISH SOVIET CONTROVERSY REGARDING LANDING BRITISH AIR UNIT NORTH RUSSIA BRITISH AMBASSADOR HAS INFORMED SOVIETS NORTH RUSSIA CONVOYS WILL BE STOPPED UNTIL SEPTEMBER. COMMODORE LAST INCOMING CONVOY NOW MOSCOW EXPECTS TO FLY TO MURMANSK WITH DUNCAN TO PICK UP PERSONAL EFFECTS RETURNING BY AIR TO UK VIA SOUTHERN ROUTE.

EXCEPT THROUGH BRITISH NO INFORMATION HAS REACHED AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES HERE ON ACTUAL OR PROPOSED CHANGES OF CONVOYS.

REQUEST I BE ADVISED OF ANY DECISION THIS SUBJECT.

COMINCH ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11933, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
by RT, NARA, Date 4/13/1973

SEIZED

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVRECS.)

DECLASSIFIED E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/1973
NEW SOVIET LIGHT CRUISER KAGANOVITCH WHICH HAS BEEN FITTING OUT HERE FOR SEVERAL MONTHS AS RUMORED TO HAVE BEEN BUILT AT KALININ, VYUGA, RAZYASHCHEN, MOLNIYA, CRIM, VOROSHILOVSK AND AVCUR IDENTIFIED FROM SAILORS CAP RIBBONS NAVY PERSONNEL HERE STILL WEARS, YZPS NAME ON RIBBON. SOVIET NAVAL LIASON PERSONNEL DECLARE TALK ABOUT COMMON PROFESSIONAL SUBJECTS AND EVOKE ALL DISCREET LEADING QUESTIONS CONCERNING WAR SHIPS PRESENT. COMPARED TO SOVIET NAVAL OFFICER ACQUAINTANCES OFFICIAL AND OTHERWISE IN THE KURLINSK, ARCHANGELOE AREA PERSONNEL HERE ARE DEFINITELY UNFRIENDLY, RELUCTANT TO ASSIST.
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*NOTE: FOR CODEROOM ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.*

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GET

**TEXT**

AND PREFER TO AVOID ALL CONTACT WITH AMERICANS.

---

This dispatch confirms the experience of our former N.O. at this port. He tells Taftet he stood it as long as possible then requested he be relieved.

_Will_  

16...ACT  

1/11...CONING...13...25...2G...NAV:1DE...2UP...
### Naval Message

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ROONEY 051617 NCR 1181

Unless otherwise indicated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

**Text**

FRANKEL SAYS 2 LEASE LEAD MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS JUST RECEIVED HIGHLY SATISFACTORY TO ADMIRAL NORTHERN FLEET BUT LATTER STATES TORPEDO TUBES TOO SHORT FOR RED TORPEDOES. APPEARS EITHER REDS FAILED SUPPLY SUFFICIENT OR ACCURATE DATA OR WE NOT COOPERATING OR COORDINATING FULLY. REQUEST INFO ON RESPONSIBILITY IN ORDER CLARIFY OUR POSITION AND IMPROVE FUTURE COOPERATION.

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16...ACTION
11/11...23...DUSHIPS...111...12...COMINCH......
SUOR:...NAVATE...230P......FILE......

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVVPS.)

内存信息：弗兰克尔说，2艘租来的装有导弹的快艇刚刚收到，对北方舰队的人士来说，非常满意。后者提到，发射管太短，无法装入红色的鱼雷。看起来，要么是红色的一方提供了错误的数据，要么是我们没有合作或协调好。请求提供责任信息，以便澄清我们的位置，并改善未来合作。

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**BUSHIPS LETTER SERIAL 71/0 OF 10 FEB REGARDING MATERIAL TO COMPLETE SOVIET CRUISER. SOVIET PURCHASING COMMISSION PREVIOUSLY REQUESTED MATERIAL TO COMPLETE DESTROYERS BUILDING IN NORTH RUSSIA. WHEN I MADE INQUIRIES HERE NAVY STATED NONE WERE BUILDING THERE AND ASTALUSNA ARCHANGEL CONFIRMED. URGE BUSHIPS PERMIT NO COMMITMENTS UNLESS UNITED STATES OFFICER ACTUALLY INSPECTS CRUISER PURPORTED TO BE BUILDING.**

**BUSHIPS...ACTION**

20/11...16...29.../COMINCH...FILE

---

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

---

**DECLASSIFIED**

L. O. 12356, Sec. 2.3 or Sec. 3.4

**ILR 101**

By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/66
From: Moscow
To: Milid

In Reply Cite: 138, April 3, 1943.


No Sig

ACTION: G-2
INFORMATION: OPD
CG AAF

CM-IN-2051 (4 Apr 43) 0324Z ems

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/44
SOVIETS ARE PROVIDING ME WITH SPECIAL PLANE FOR INSPECTION TRIP TO ARCHANGEL AND MISHKAN. WEATHER PERMITTING WILL START TRIP APRIL 3. TOLLEY ACCOMPANYING ME. EXPECT RETURN WITHIN 1 WEEK.

16...ACT
10/11...COMINCH...
FILE
NAVAL MESSAGE
FROM:
OPNAV
RELEASED BY:
H. C. TRAIN
DATE:
2 APRIL 1943
TOR CODE ROOM:
1701
DECODED BY:
CONLON/ WELLINGTON/ DELAHAY
PARAPHRASED BY:

ALTUSNA LONDON

PRIORITY:
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

IN CONGRESS BENDER REPUBLICAN OHIO DEMANDED RECALL AND INVESTIGATION OF STATE DEPARTMENT. IN SENATE VANDENBURG AMAEZED, WHEELER DOUBTED TRUTH OF STATEMENT, CONNALLY SAID UNFORTUNATE, WILLKIE SAID STATEMENT CAN CAUSE ONLY HARM. TIME MAGAZINE SAID WHEN THOUSANDS RUSSIANS BEING KILLED THEY CANNOT GO INTO ECST CIES OVER US EQUIPMENT AND THEY DISLIKE BEING TREATED LIKE POOR COUSINS. N Y TRIBUNE SAYS INCIDENT CALLED ATTENTION TO NEED FOR SINGLE FOREIGN POLICY AND BETTER QUALIFIED REPRESENTATIVES. N Y TIMES SAID WORDS ALONE DO NOT GOVERN RUSSIANS MUCH. WALL STREET JOURNAL AND LOUISVILLE COURIER APPLAUSED FRANKNESS. PHILADELPHIA RECORD SAID STATEMENTS WERE AMMUNITION FOR OPPONENTS OF LEND LEASE.
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LIPPMAN SAID DANGEROUS ERROR TO THINK OF LEND LEASE AS CHARITY. REBUTTY OF AP SAID SOVIET PRESS HAD PUBLISHED ACCOUNT OF AID. CHAIRMAN RUSSIAN WAR RELIEF SAID HE HAD RECEIVED MANY THANKS FROM RUSSIAN OFFICIALS, AND CITIZENS. STATE AND HIS SENDING CONFOMENTS SEPARATELY.

16...ORIG
12/11...CONTOCH...13...AVAID...FILE...
Observations made along Trans-Siberian Railroad
March 11 - 25, 1943

General impression and observations made of the following:
1. Freight, traffic and movement of supplies.
2. Rolling Stock.
3. Upkeep.
4. Passenger traffic.
5. Military points of interest.
6. Food conditions.
7. Morale.
8. Minor points of interest.

RETIRED
Subject: USSR. Observations made along Trans-Siberian RR.

I. Freight, Traffic and Movement of Supplies.

Great numbers of freight trains loaded with American and British supplies were observed Eastbound after reaching the main East-West line at "Bui" junction. These supplies were identified as having entered the USSR via Murmansk and Archangel. All along the route to Sverdlovsk foreign supplies were seen on sidings, at stations and enroute to the Ural area. The supplies consisted mostly of raw materials and a few machine tools, in addition were huge numbers of unassembled American trucks, all Eastbound. At Sverdlovsk an entire train of 40 cars was seen on a siding loaded with American trucks. Thus indicating that the great supply of trucks reaching the USSR are not all being used at the front as Soviet Foreign Trade Officials in Archangel and Murmansk led American and British representatives to believe. Also indicating that in spite of huge shipping delays, supplies to the USSR are further delayed by the Soviet rail system as a great deal of the cargo observed on sidings was identified as having reached Archangel three months previous.

Great numbers of coal trains were in evidence between Molotov and Sverdlovsk and again in the Chita section. All were Eastbound.

On the stretch of railroad between "Bui" and "SVERDLOVSK", only two Eastbound freight trains were seen loaded with Chrome Ore and Potash which is the principal outbound cargo for American ships on the Northern Route.

After passing the Ural Mountains, Eastbound cargo was no longer seen but instead every freight was Eastbound loaded to capacity with American supplies obviously from Pacific ports. Average length of freights were 40 cars, average speed 50-60 km. per hour. All freights were given the right-of-way and passed on an average of one every four hours. Thus making the progress of passenger trains very slow on the single-tracked stretch between Sverdlovsk and Chmak. However, work is steadily going forward on the double tracking of this section, but is greatly hampered by the slowness of prison labor and weather conditions.

After passing Chita great numbers of freights consisting entirely of oil tank cars were observed, all Eastbound, consisting of an average of 50-40 cars. These oil trains also passed at an average rate of one every four hours until after passing Blagoveshchensk.

Outside of Krasnoyarsk one train was seen loaded with new Soviet fighter planes and a complete new M.A. unit. This is noteworthy as it was the only Eastbound military supply train observed. Outside of Irkutsk a Westbound military train was observed consisting entirely of new Soviet two motored bombers lettered with the words "Primorski Krai" on each plane thus indicating they had been assembled and manufactured in the Maritime province and were probably being sent as a gift from the province to the Red Army.
In general supplies from the East seemed to be moving much faster and with greater efficiency than those from the West.

Trains, both passenger and freight are dispatched promptly when possible and it was interesting to note that although the passenger train on which the observer took passage was ten hours late up to arrival at Omak all of this time was made up until arrival at Khabarovsk. From this point five hours were lost until final arrival at Vladivostok. Total length of journey 12 days, 8-1/2 hours. Seven hour gain in local time.

2. Rolling Stock.

It was noted with great interest that not a single empty freight train was seen and empty freight cars on sidings were exceedingly rare. However, what is considered to be a great number of idle locomotives were seen. These locomotives were all located on sidings at rail junctions in various states of upkeep, a few were boarded up, obviously being held in reserve. By actual count during daylight hours they were located as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Junction</th>
<th>Number</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vershakhagino</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>Sverdlovsk</td>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Barabinsk</td>
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<td>Ulan-Ude</td>
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<td>Shilka</td>
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<td>Zitova</td>
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<td>Tyuga</td>
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<td>Mantzovka</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Voroshilov</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>328</strong></td>
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It is interesting to note that only 14 "laid up" locomotives were seen west of the Ural at Vershakhagino and in the Ural at Sverdlovsk, the balance of reserves being in Siberia.

3. Upkeep.

Locomotives and cars appeared to be in a much better state of repair and upkeep on the Trans-Siberian Line East of the Ural where all locomotives are coal burning and of modern construction. The majority of locomotives operating in the Ural area were 8-wheel drive, "Felix Dzerjinski" type. The greater majority of freight cars were 40-50 ton capacity with four wheeled trucks. War damaged freight cars appear to be equally distributed all along the Trans-Siberian route at repair yards. Among these damaged cars are a few Estonian, Latvian and German cars.

Upkeep of the Trans-Siberian Line appeared to be excellent as compared with other Soviet Lines with spare rails, sleepers and ballast located at strategic intervals along the entire route. Likewise, sufficient fuel both wood and coal appeared to be available with ample stock piles at fueling junctions. Trains are regularly inspected and
Subject: USSR. Observations made along Trans-Siberian RR.

repair crews available with spare parts to make necessary minor repairs at each dispatching section.


Passenger trains leave Moscow on Tuesdays, Thursdays, Saturdays and Sundays because of the heavy volume of traffic it is necessary to get reservations on the one "International" car at least two days ahead of time.

Every station enroute was jammed with travelling trying to get passage and it seems to be common practice for station masters to sell three times as many tickets as there are places. The majority of passengers were crippled ex-Red Army men going home to start live anew or those searching for their families that had been evacuated from occupied areas. The rest of the passengers were minor civilian officials being transferred to new locations plus a few Naval and Army officers proceeding to new posts.

Passenger traffic between Khabarovsk and Vladivostok was quite light and only about half of the spaces aboard the train were occupied.

5. Military Points of Interest.

Only about four or five military trains were seen Westbound. About twelve or fourteen hospital trains were seen Westbound... all empty. Very likely they had unloaded their patients at hospitals along the route and were bound for the front for another load. No full hospital trains were seen Eastbound.

A few troops were seen at stations who were from the front being transferred to Siberian posts for a rest and change of duty.

Between Chita and Khabarovsk only two armored trains were in evidence. However, both were on the alert and fully manned.

Every bridge, railway yard and tunnel along the route is guarded by seatrips (NKVD troops). Every bridge, regardless of size has a machine gun emplacement and in addition to the machine gun nests are situated at each end of larger bridges are A.A. Batteries.

Along Lake Baikal Red Navy units were very much in evidence and a Navy Academy is located at Marinakaya.

Beginning at Chita large concentrations of troops were observed along the route to Khabarovsk. These concentrations were all comprised of A.A. units, artillery units, cavalry units, and air units. A few plane detection posts were observed on the alert, equipped with “ears”...no RADAR units seen although several British RARAD units were seen Eastbound on flatcars East of Holotove.

Between Khabarovsk and Voroshilov (Nikolak Ussurski) every kilometer of track is guarded. Gun emplacements are strategically located, posts are constantly manned and emergency, camouflaged airfields are ready to be put in operation although few planes were in evidence. On this route the large concentrations were seen at Yevgenievo and Voroshilov. At these two points light tank equipment and armored cars were seen as well as unusually large well camouflaged airfields, but again only few planes.
CONFIDENTIAL

Serial 9-43

Subject: USSR. Observations made along Trans-Siberian Rd.

Although the tunnel under the Amur River is reported to be completed, from the train it doesn’t look as though it is now in operation as the grading and the railway siding branching off from the Trans-Siberian Line on the left bank is not complete.

5. Food Conditions.

Passenger trains on the Trans-Siberian Line Eastbound carry a dining car which attempts to give all passengers one meal a day. This one meal consisted of soup, kasha and black bread with a never changing menu. Passengers are issued chits daily for meals with the scheduled time of serving pencilled on such chits. However, in order to secure a meal it was necessary to stand in line for as long as two or three hours. The long wait was conducted by officials, heroes and other privileged persons crowding in ahead which meets with great indignation from the “common herd” but who do nothing more than “growl.”

Each principal station operated a military bread stall where army and navy personnel were able to get bread for their “halon.” Likewise, there were military dining halls at the large stations where hot meals were sometimes available. However, none of the above conveniences existed for the civilian traveler who had to carry his own food. At all of the small stops there was a certain amount of food sold by the peasants. This consisted principally of milk, eggs and cold pancakes. Sometimes the peasants would take rubles for their products, but generally wanted bread, soup or articles of clothing. There was a gradual diminishing of food for sale the farther East the train progressed. However, bread was always available at the stations for the military personnel and railway personnel.


The discipline and moral of the military personnel aboard the train was exceedingly low. This was due in part by the unexpected recapture of Kharkov by the Germans, but in most cases it was deep seated and the complaints of the cripples, those on sick leave, and those travelling to new posts were bitter about the treatment received enroute. They complained about the poor rations, the fact that the healthy order bearers crowded them out of line for their bread and that none of the civilians or minor railway officials seemed to appreciate the fact that they had lost an arm or leg in the defense of the fatherland. At stations, not a soul would help the men on crutches on or off the train so that they could get their rations. The old “comradeship” quite evident among troops a year ago seems to be dwindling and everyone is too occupied taking care of himself to bother about a friend in need. In general, these men often expressed “what have we been fighting for...this?”

This poor morale is quite in contrast to that of the troops in the North. The soldiers convalescing, on sick leave and home on leave are full of spirit and anxious to get back to the front.

7. Minor Points of Interest.

At Marinsk two huge boxes on two flat cars were observed, addressed to Lt. Col. H.B. Gray, o/o Traffic Agent, New York. These flat cars were on a train Eastbound. Lt. Col. Gray is a member of the supply mission in Moscow and is in charge of the American tank assembling unit that had been working at Archangel and Gorki.
CONFIDENTIAL

Aerial 7-43

Subject: USSR - Observations made along Trans-Siberian RR.

At Ulan-Ude two American State Department mail pouches were taken off the mail car and seen on the platform. They were addressed in Russian to the Ulan-Ude Post Office.

Documents of all passengers were examined upon entering each new Oblast or Krai.

At Ishim, between Sverdlovsk and Omak a member of a labor battalion tried to force his way into the "International" car as the train was pulling out of the station. His attempt was unsuccessful so he tried to force his way into the car next aterrain. The man car attendant rushed him off and he fell under the wheels of the train. He was quickly moved from under the car and carried in a stretcher to a first aid station. Both car attendants were arrested on the spot and put in prison without being allowed to get their overcoats or belongings and the train pulled off without them. The remaining attendant in the international car explained that if the attendants were found guilty they might have to work for six months without pay, or were liable to imprisonment for from two to eight years depending upon the seriousness of the laborer's injuries.

All car attendants would take bribes for smuggling passengers aboard and would often arrange so that the smuggled passengers got by without passport or document examination.

The station at Sverdlovsk was utter chaos. Thousands of refugees, wounded and crippled, thronged the station while the women guards and militia men were unable to cope with the situation. They stormed the train and slept in the passageways or stood in between the cars.

Telegramas were sent to Moscow and Vladivostok along the way with little trouble as most of the large stations have a telegraph office in the building and accept government stamped messages without question. However, they must be in the Russian language. The telegrams were received with only reasonable delays by the Embassy in Moscow and the Consulate in Vladivostok.

At Chita the railway "Inquiry Bureau" stated that it was quite possible to buy tickets to Mancuihi and that the trains departed from Chita on odd days of the week. The branch line to Mancuihi joins the main line at Kamchakaya. An attempt was made to find out if trains from Voroshilov still operated to Pogranchny, but passengers were not allowed off the platform. Entrance into the city and into the station was closely guarded by NKVD troops who allowed passage to only those possessing "passes" to Voroshilov.

Russian local newspapers could not be bought at the stations enroute, but were available to military personnel at stations having an "agitpunkt" (propaganda room and bureau for military personnel).
NAVAL MESSAGE

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RELEASED BY
1 APRIL 43

TOR CODEROOM
358

DECODED BY
CONLON

PARAPHRASED BY
CONROE

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

ROONEY 3119-9 NCR 6166

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

DATE TIME GET

TEXT

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VCON

WILL ESTIMATE REQUESTED MOSCOW 161232 WILL BE PROVIDED

CONFIDENTIAL RE: RUSSIAN PRESS RELEASES, LEASE-LEASE AID AND AMBASSADOR'S REACTION THERETO.

16...ACTION

10/11...2PG...COMM...INC...13...BOP...NAVAVY...FILE...

DELETED

R. 11040, Sec. 1(G) and 1(D) or (G)

OBD letter, May 1, 1973

By DBS Date: MAY 21 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
**NAVAL MESSAGE**

**DRATER:** BEYOGLU  
**RELEASED BY:**  
**DATE:** 27 MARCH 1943  
**TOR CODEROOM:** 2228  
**DECODED BY:** GOODFORD/DELANNOY  
**PARAPHRASED BY:**  

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**INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.**

HATCH 261627 NCR 2139  
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.  

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AN OFFICER OF THE TURKISH GENERAL STAFF QUOTES ITALIAN MILITARY ATTACHE WHO RECENTLY RETURNED FROM ITALY: "ITALIAN DIVISIONS WITHDRAWN FROM RUSSIA WILL NOT BE REPLACED. CONDITIONS IN ITALY NOT AS BAD AS EXPECTED. THERE IS NO HOPE THAT AXIS CAN WIN THE WAR".

RUSSIAN NAVAL ATTACHE BELIEVES HUNGARIAN ITALIAN AND RUMANIAN TROOPS IN RUSSIA WILL BE FORMED AS A RESERVE AND NO LONGER BE USED IN FRONT LINES IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. HE SAYS RUMANIANS ARE FORMING 6 NEW DIVISIONS 5 OF WHICH WILL PROBABLY GO TO RUSSIA.

A GERMAN AGENT OF THE CZECH REPRESENTATIVE REPORTED UPON ARRIVAL FROM BERLIN ON MARCH 5 THAT DRILLS IN GAS WARFARE HAD BEGUN LATELY.

16......ACT

COWINGCH......10/11......26.26......NAVYFAI....230P......
The following paragraphs, part of a routine report never forwarded, have lain in the safe for two months, there having been no outgoing confidential mail since 15 January. It is of interest to compare the material with current conditions and to note what a perceptible change in the general situation has taken place during that time. The changes in the case of this report are largely due to (a) the reversal of the military situation in the north, and, (b) Ambassador Standley's pronouncement on lease-land.

1 February 1943

It is believed that the continued Soviet successes at the front have had a tremendously good effect on civilian morale, certainly in the Moscow area. These successes will in all probability have the further effect of definitely raising and any possibility of any British or American military units operating in this country. I am thoroughly convinced that such permission would have been granted only in case of direct necessity and in the face of imminent disaster.

The Soviet Government has no desire for the Soviet people to think that any but Soviet effort and Soviet arm are driving the Germans from their soil. This policy is carried out to the extent of keeping dark the fact that the allies are furnishing the Soviets with quantities of war material on a basis that will probably amount largely to a gift.

Those who do know that American material is coming to the USSR have little or no knowledge of lease-land and believe only that the capitalist nations are selling for cash at a good profit. No attempt is made in the newspapers or by any other form of publicity to correct this impression.

American Red Cross material is being used in hospitals in the interior, but the individual using it has no knowledge of the fact that is a gift paid for by popular subscription. They simply think it is a sale by the U.S. Government, as most of this material to date has been marked only in English, which seems no more to the recipient here than would Russian in

Archives

KIA (S)

State

Admiral Reeves

MGS

RETIRED

Dialer

USNC

COMMACH (3)

NEW

Coordinator of Res. & Dev.

Op-16-PA-3

8O-16-6

Op-16-I-4

Op-16-1

Monograph

80-17

By DBS

Date

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/44

The only foreign military force that has been allowed any freedom of action is a small detachment of French aviators, which has been training for several months at Ivanovo. They are using Soviet planes, which to date no other foreign aviator has been able to even approach. This friendliness is certainly not merely due to a desire to augment their pilot personnel. They can only be interested in the propaganda possibilities among Frenchmen all over the world, particularly in France itself.  

24 March 1944

Since the above was written, the Soviet drive in the south has been stopped and Kharkov retaken by the Germans. This has had a considerable sobering effect on the people and removed any illusions that the war was soon going to be fought on German soil. The "reverses" are not nearly sufficient to upset the state of morale, nor cause gloom. Stalingrad has furnished enough inspiration and satisfaction to last through any a reverse which might yet be faced. To all outward appearances; the mass of the population has simply settled into that state of dogged, almost apathetic determination to hang on that the British and Chinese seem to have developed after several years of deprivations, dangers, weathered and indifferent successes enjoyed.

In nine months that I have been here, I notice no great change in popular sentiment as regards the war.

The lack of a SUDDEN FRONT still proys on the Russian mind, but it has taken on the character of a dull and constant pain, rather than the violent twinges that had kids in the street yelling "Voron Front!" at foreigners, nine months ago.

The most remarkable developments have been the aftermath of Admiral Standley's remark that the Soviet population was unaware of the character of the help being received from their allies.

Since that time, there have been numerous articles in all newspapers covering this subject, a matter that was handled in such a way previously that no individual could possibly have had any conception of the amount of material received or the methods under which the transfer took place. Conversations with well informed (by Soviet standards) and intelligent people as well as chance contacts in the streets and subways bear out this view. Amounts of material received are now being published frequently, giving percentages of total American production, percentages of total furnished other United Nations, weight in tons and values in dollars. To complete the picture, the State Bank of the USSR recently published the official exchange rate of the Rouble against the chief foreign currencies. (1 = 5.30 roubles). There has been a great deal of news on Red Cross or Russian Relief, but I cannot determine if any attempts are being made.

Individually, practically every person in the USSR knows that American supplies are being furnished. Every soldier sees and perhaps drives American trucks, tanks or jeeps, eats a considerable percentage of American food and smokes some American tobacco. Every civilian sees American sugar and meat on the nearly bare shelves of the grocery stores. But up until the time of Admiral Standley's pronouncement, no individual could have had any idea of the quantities supplied and the effort that was being made to give this much. The average Russian is well aware that the United States is a "fantastically" rich country, and that the struggle (as far as they know) of "capitalist" Russia re-chaining the USSR had no meaning whatever to a people so desperately endowed as the USSR.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date
The one fact which is a continual source of astonishment to the average well informed foreigner in the USSR, is how can this people fight such a tremendous war so successfully yet present such a picture of inefficiency in every observable activity in the rear. In the army operation anything like the lines of exchange or disarmament, with the continual procrastination and bungling and inefficiency which blocks those ports, then HOW can the Red Army withstand the German Army, let alone drive it back?

The answer as far as the civil activities are concerned is of course, bureaucracy, lack of individual intelligence in more than a very few, and fear to take responsibility. Second hand, but reliable information indicates that typical examples of "commissars" of industry and allied activities are boorish, selfish and jealous of their prerogatives to a degree that can be understood only in a country where privilege means so much. Their direct assistants are "yes" men of not enough intelligence to be dangerous but with enough stupidity and avarice and political ability to maintain their "front" men in his position. This is not to imply that commissars are not intelligent, nor that they do not carry on a fair job of directing their enterprises. It does mean that they do not by a long shot compare with similar people in the United States. It means that they are a personally rather unattractive combination of American ward boss and American racketeer, frequently Jewish, occasionally Georgian or Armenian. They all act well, have cars, better living conditions by far than the average Russian, like to play hard after dark and enjoy their mistresses or such hungry girls as come along.

The result of this condition is somewhat comparable to that existing in the United States. The average Soviet has no complaint as to his form of government. It compares very favorably with the economic inequalities and foreign exploitation which characterized the Czarist regime. What is resented, and naturally, is the manner in which this form of government is carried out by the current incumbents in office. It can be compared to such city governments as Chicago in the bootlegging days or New York under Boss Tweed, in that the citizens had no desire to change the form of government, but eventually became enormously fed up with the administrators. In the USSR under the present situation, the NKVD is in a position to see that the administrators maintain themselves.

This situation is generally well recognized, and reflects itself in various outlooks as expressed by individual Soviets. One girl remarked that she had no intention of getting married as far into the future as she could imagine the future. It would simply mean a life of wrangling over poor living quarters, insufficient food and clothing; probably the added burden of children to look after and try to provide for. Things were uncomfortable enough long before the war and there was no reason whatever to expect that they would be any better after the war if the same government remained in effect. The only way to live a comfortable life in the USSR was to make a marriage of convenience to a comrade or other public official, with the full knowledge that he would have mistresses galore and not provide much normal home life. There would however, be enough food and money.

Additional informants have indicated that the consumer supplies which are now known to be coming into the USSR, clothing, shoes, material and the like, are largely being diverted to the privileged classes. Wives of political and military officers and members of the "intelligentsia" (theatre, art, music, ballet, a few top flight scientists and authors) are comparatively well provided for, if they have the right connections. As for the public, the stores are now almost completely empty of the barest necessities of life, to an extent that an average American simply cannot believe without seeing.

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/44

The population as individuals continues most friendly to foreigners. People in theaters, trains, subway trains and public places will enter freely into conversation with foreigners than would an American under similar circumstances in the United States. Their opinions and questions and answers are practically identical, which indicates the tremendous effect of government control of public information. There seems to be extraordinarily little divergence of opinions or original ideas or thought, from peasant girl to colonel in the army.

The average Red Army man displays a very obvious curiosity in foreign uniforms, yet it is remarkable how rarely he knows what nationality the wearer is or manifests much interest in the matter. Even Red aviators will rarely know the difference between Royal Air Force blue and U. S. Army Air Corps Olive drab. They all know that British aviators flew very effectively for a time in North Russia, and inquire if the American aviators pointed out to them are going to the front. The whole business however, seems to be more in the way of polite attention than a desire for information or a keen enthusiasm that foreign military personnel should be in the USSR. The question of man power assistance in the USSR itself leaves then cold. They want war material and a second front in Europe, and no large body of organized foreign military around to remind them of the dark days of intervention and Civil War.

The average Russian is an exceedingly friendly, generous, patient, hospitable, graciousful fellow. In addition, the various individuals in the army have no illusions that when compared to "capitalist" officers, they are likely to make other than an inferior social performance. As a result, when attention is shown them in the way of entertainment or sincere attempts to be friendly, they generally behave like a long neglected puppy having its back scratched.

The British take full advantage of this situation and entertain Soviet officials with the friendliest benevolence, both in the North and at Moscow. From outward appearances, their personal relations with the Reds are on a very firm basis as a result of it. Even though this may not affect major policy, it cannot but provide a considerable amount of general information and background of a type which allows intelligent appreciations of the various questions which present themselves from time to time.

The Japanese question is played down to an absolute minimum. Officials refuse to even discuss it, and private individuals know nothing about it other than that they don't like Japs personally and that the Red Army gave them a limited trouncing at Changfufeng and Komschan. I have met several officers who had friends or relatives killed at Komschan. Although resentful, they are not enthusiastically bitter, looking on it as though they had been killed by falling under a train, with nobody particularly at fault. This in my opinion is simply because the soviet propaganda machine has for a considerable time soft pedaled the Jap enemies.

Several Red officers have voiced the opinion that the Germans would mount an offensive in the spring and summer, probably aimed at Stalingrad, or possibly between Stalingrad and Moscow so as to cut north south communications. They didn't believe the Germans had the offensive power left to seriously endanger the Red Army, although considerable ground might be recaptured.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/64
RUSSIAN ASSISTANT NAVAL ATTACHE CAPTAIN FIKHAILOFF SAYS RUSSIA HAS SCATTERED THROUGHOUT SIBERIA EQUIVALENT OF 150 DIVISIONS INCLUDING VOLUNTEERS IN REGULARS AND NAVAL UNITS. THAT JAPAN HAS 30 DIVISIONS CONCENTRATED IN MANCHUKO ABOUT 200 MILES NORTH VLADIVOSTOK. THAT RUSSIA EXPECTS NO ATTACK DUE TO JAPAN'S PRESENT COMMITMENTS. THAT RUSSIA COULD NOT CARRY OUT SUCCESSFUL OFFENSIVE THERE WITHOUT MORE MUNITIONS FACTORIES EAST OF BIAKAL AND ON ACCOUNT VULNERABLE TUNNELS AND CUTTINGS ALONG RAILWAY. THAT IF RUSSIA DEALS SUCCESSFULLY WITH NAZIS THIS SUMMER SHE MIGHT ATTACK JAPAN A YEAR FROM NOW IF LATTER STILL IN

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/44
WAR. HE SAYS NOVOROSSISK WILL FALL WITHIN FEW WEEKS. THAT GERMAN POSITION KUBAN PRE-
CARIUS. THAT GERMAN POSITION ON DONETZ IS
DELICATE. THAT RUSSIANS PREPARING GREAT
RESERVES AND MAY DRAW LARGE GERMAN FORCES
FROM CENTRAL FRONT BY OFFENSIVE IN LENINGRAD
AREA. THAT GENERAL BUDENNY IS BUILDING LARGE
ARMY IN EAST.
FRENCH AIR SQUADRON STILL TRAINING YAK-7. SPEED 450 MILES PER HOUR AND BETTER GENERAL PERFORMANCE THAN SPITFIRE. INFO FROM MAJOR POULIQUE CORRECT NAME MY 272020. IN 1ST WORLD WAR FLYER LATER PUBLICITY MAN PARIS SOIR ESCAPED AFTER CAPITULATION FRANCE. SAYS 30 GOOD PILOTS. SOVIETS PLAN LET THEM START MILITARY OPERATIONS FRONT APRIL WHEN FLYING CONDITIONS AND FIELDS 1ST CLASS. WANT THEM HAVE BEST POSSIBLE CHANCE KNOCK DOWN MANY ENEMY AS POSSIBLE WITHOUT ADDED DANGER WET FIELDS FROZEN MOTORS. PURPOSES MORE PUBLICITY THAN MILITARY. CORROBORATES PETITS CONVERSATION MOSCOW 06150 IN THAT ENTIRE SHOW IS FOR PROPAGANDA REASONS TO INFLUENCE FRENCH OPINION WORLDWIDE. CAPTAIN MILES FRENCH ARMY RELIEVING GEN PETIT AS FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE MOSCOW. LATTER PLANNING PROCEED DIRECT LONDON VIA NEXT STRATOSPHERE PLANE.

DECLASSIFIED
O 11552, Sec. 2(D) and 6(D) or (E)
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/1974

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/1974

By DBS
Date MAY 2 1 1973
NAVAL MESSAGE

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PAGE TWO OF 231455 NCR 296

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/1974

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NCR—45

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E. O. 111552, Sec. 2(B) and 5(D) or (E)
OIB letter, May 1, 1972

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/1974

SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State:

Referring to your telegram No. 160 of March 14, seven p.m. from the American Ambassador in Russia, it is my opinion that your reply should acknowledge receipt of the message and inform the Ambassador that the matter contained therein is under consideration for study.

Signed F.D.R.

Copy for President's files

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
Date: MAY 21 1973
THE SECRETARY

March 17, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY

I believe the President will be interested in seeing this at an early hour.

John F. Stone
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 18, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
MISS TULLY:

The attached despatch was read by the President last night. He commented that the way to answer it was to tell the Soviets we were "studying their request".

I believe perhaps he might like to sight the message once more, as perhaps he may wish to communicate his thoughts in the matter to the State Department.

Very respectfully,

W. C. MOTT
Lt. Comdr., U.S.N.R.

Attachment.

[Handwritten note: "President informed State Dept. by memorandum 20 March 1943"]
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

MARCH 14, 1943, 7 P.M. (SECRET ONE)

In a note dated February 20 the Foreign Office has requested the Embassy's assistance in obtaining through the appropriate organizations in the United States any available technical information and documents including designs concerning the following shipbuilding questions in America:

A. The statutes of the Maritime Commission and a detailed description of its activities with respect to the building of navy and transport ships (standardized shipbuilding).

B. A scheme of the organization of the shipbuilding industry, coordination of work between the shipbuilding works and the docks and liaison between the factories and the related branches of industry.

C. Statutes concerning the control by representatives of the Navy Department over the building of navy ships at shipbuilding enterprises.

D. Description of the organization of production and labor at the works building standardized ships

(preparatory)
(preparatory work treatment of metals, assembling installation of equipment, and so on).

E. Official rules for building navy ships and which regulate the system of designing and acceptance.

Tactical and technical data on the main types of the latest navy ships (battleships, heavy and light cruisers, destroyers, aircraft carriers, patrol ships, submarine chasers, submarines, torpedo boats, et cetera).

G. Description of machinery and boilers of American warships together with specifications of their mechanisms, boilers, electric power equipment, special machinery diagrams and drawings showing their spacing, pipelines, et cetera.

H. Outlines showing the armoring of the latest battleships and description and diagram of anti-submarine defense devices.

I. The norms and methods in use for calculating the strength, stability, buoyancy and maintenance, of course under given conditions, of navy ships.

J. Norms and instructions of the navy with regard to the installation of main engines, boilers, propeller shaftings, diesel generators.

K. Programs of the final delivery tests of navy and standard ships.

L. Data
-3- J160, March 14, 7 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from Moscow

L. Data on scientific works concerning the engines for submarines and their practical results.

M. Material and designs (pertaining to technical design) of various types of standardized ships of the transport fleet.

N. Tactical and technical data concerning ships and aerial torpedoes (weight of charge, speed, and range speeds at which torpedoes may be set, caliber length, total weight, height of flight, and speed of airplane at time of discharging torpedoes, et cetera).

O. Types and designs of torpedo engines, heating apparatus and machine regulators and their technical characteristics.

P. Design and description of torpedoes with turbine engines: Type and technical characteristics of the turbine design of reductors and screw propellers, design of the release mechanism of the turbine of the heating apparatus and of the ignition apparatus.

Q. Design and description of devices that control torpedoes in so far as depth and destruction are concerned.

R. Design of a torpedo with an electric motor, technical data, design of motor batteries, and of the system of driving the screw propellers.

S. Design and description of radio-directed and self-directed
April 16, 1941, 7 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from Moscow

self-directed torpedoes: Source of power principal

diagram sets.

T. Types and brief characteristics of apparatus

used on warships of all kinds for radio communication.

U. Methods of deciphering radio transmissions and
description diagrams and designs of apparatus used

therefore.

V. Description, diagrams and design of the

modern types of hydroacoustic apparatus for communication
and observation.

SECRET

LMS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Dated March 14, 1943
Rec'd 5:03 p.m. 15th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

160, March 14, 7 p.m. (SECTION TWO)
I have delayed forwarding the text of this note pending an opportunity to discuss its significance with Naval Attaché and Molotov. Understand that Duncan has telegraphed Navy his views thereon and I now wish to make the following observations:

(1) From the scope of extreme importance and in many instances the secret nature of the information requested it seems doubtful that this matter can be adequately handled by an exchange of notes between the Foreign Office and Embassy and that a more advisable course would be to send a Soviet Naval Mission to Washington to study the subject thoroughly or at least to turn it over to our Naval Attaché or to the Soviet Naval Attaché in Washington. I stated these views to Molotov who was aware of the note and he told me that the Soviets had no intention of sending a naval mission to Washington but that they desired to obtain if possible the information. He did not explain why the matter

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/94
the matter was being handled through the Foreign Office and not through the Naval authorities and he did not appear to wish to discuss the question.

(2) I do not believe that the note represents a routine request for information and I feel sure that some other purpose lies beneath it. The Soviet Government must realize that specifications on ship designs worth millions of dollars, information on coding devices and confidential technical data on naval matériel are not being handed over on a mere request of the Foreign Office.

(3) Taking into consideration the repeated requests we have made for information of a military nature and the consistent failure of the Soviets to cooperate I can not help but feel that the Soviet Government realizing fully well that it is doubtful that we will comply with their present request at least to any satisfactory degree has submitted this extraordinary note for the express purpose of endeavoring to maneuver us into a position where they can accuse us of non-cooperation thereby justifying their refusal to release military information.

(4) On the other hand it is possible though doubtful that the Soviet authorities may now be prepared to release

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
to release military information to us in exchange for the navy information in question.

(5) A third consideration is the possibility that the Foreign Office which in my estimation is advocating a policy of closer collaboration with the United States had endeavors to prevail upon the Soviet military authorities to adopt a more liberal position in regard to the release of military information and that the military have replied with the suggestion that the Foreign Office endeavor to obtain the naval information and thus gauge our liberality in a field in which we are supreme. They apparently do not hold our army in high regard and have probably obtained already most of the military information they desire from us.

(6) It might be pointed out that in view of the limited ship building facilities in the Soviet Union the release of the information in question would contribute little to the Soviet war effort. It is of course, possible that the Soviet Government is using the note as a means to inform us of its intention or desire to construct a large navy and become a first class seapower after the war. It seems to me that this...
this note raises a postwar problem and should be dealt with as such.

(7) So far as the British Ambassador is aware the British have not been asked for similar information.

(8) I suggest that the Department request Office of Naval Intelligence to advise it of Duncan’s views on this matter and that it inform me in due course of the nature of the reply the Department desires I make to the note the receipt of which I have acknowledged stating that I would refer the matter to the interested American authorities. In this respect I wish to refer to my 143 of March 10.

(END OF MESSAGE)

STANDLEY

KL
My dear Mr. President:

I am sending you Admiral Standley's message which gives his summary of what he said at his press conference. It does not seem to me that his version differs in any essential manner from the press reports carried in the newspapers yesterday.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:
From Moscow, 139, March 9, 7 p.m.

The President,
The White House.
This telegram must be paraphrased before being communicated to anyone other than a governmental agency. (BR)

Moscow

Dated March 9, 1943

Rec'd 1:10 a.m. 10th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

139, March 9, 7 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

Yesterday in a press conference I made remarks along the following lines to the Moscow correspondents and stated that I could be quoted:

(1) Ever since I have been in the Soviet Union I have been carefully looking for recognition in the Russian press of the fact that the Russians are getting material aid from the United States not only through Lend-Lease but also the Red Cross and American Russian Relief. I have thus far failed to find any real acknowledgment in the press of this fact.

(2) There is no question that the American public knows that relief and other supplies are coming to the Soviet Union. However, the Russian people apparently do not realize this. It is not fair to misled the American people who are giving millions of
139, March 9, 7 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from Moscow
millions of dollars and think that they are aiding
the Russian people when at the same time the
Russian people do not realize that this aid is
coming from the American people. The American
people are doing this out of friendship for
the Russian people but the Russian people are
not aware of this fact.

(3) Question: Why have the Soviet authorities
not informed the people of this aid? The
Soviet authorities seem to be endeavoring to
create the impression at home as well as
abroad that they are fighting the war alone
and with their own resources rather than to
acknowledge aid from anyone else.

(4) Question: What is the present status
of Land-Lease legislation? I have heard that
the new Land-Lease bill has passed the Foreign
Affairs Committee but as those who familiar
with American legislative procedure know there
is a long way from the Foreign Affairs Committee
to the actual enactment. Congress is rather
sensitive; it is generous and big hearted so long
as it feels that it is helping someone. But give
it the idea that it is not -- then might be an
entirely different story.
139, March 9, 7 p.m., (SECTION ONE) from Moscow

(8) Question: Is there any change in the situation with respect to the exchange of military information? There is no obvious change in the Russian attitude regarding the exchange of information on the conduct of the war.

STANDIEY

KLP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State,  
Washington,  

US URGENT  
139, March 9, 7 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

I have been subsequently informed that the correspondent's despatches on the conference were passed late last night after considerable consultation and delay, that the Soviet censors appeared quite apprehensive and crestfallen and that it is likely that the authority of some high ranking official in the Soviet Government, possibly Molotov, was obtained before the despatches were released.

As I have informed the Department (see my 106, February 8, 8 p.m.) I have been endeavoring for some time and without success to obtain information on Lend-Lease benefits in the Soviet Union. I have discussed this question with Molotov, Vyshinski, and Lonovski and have emphasized the importance of releasing this information in the United States in view of pending Lend-Lease Legislation.

I realize that
-3-2139, March 9, 7 p.m. (SECRET NO) from Moscow.

I realize that my remarks may well cause displeasure to the Soviet Government and that there may be reverberations. The Department may wish to state that I was speaking in a personal capacity and that it was not consulted. However, I do not feel that we should sit back and continue to accept the ingratitude of the leaders of this country, especially insofar as relief supplies from the American people are concerned and I hope that my remarks may help clear the air by emphasizing to the Soviet Government that we are not satisfied with their policy in this respect.

(END OF MESSAGE).

STANLEY

HTM

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/44
From Cairo
To: AGWAR-Milid

In reply cite 22, March 19th, 1943.

General Oak Czech commander here advises that on set in Russia almost month ahead of schedule disrupting Russian plans. Area Kharkov-Rostov has little communication so Russians could not consolidate gains. Germans brought up some 25 fresh divisions for their successful offensive. He opinion that direction Kharkov-Voronezh-Penza offensive would split Russian army in two. And that Germans must make it but that Nazi would need there 100 divisions. By end of March steppes in that area will be dry permitting movement all vehicles for Korner from Szymanski from Breton. Says Russians have 280 divisions on front and about 10,000,000 in training. Puts Axis overall strength at 480 divisions and German non returnable losses at 3,000,000 Russians losses at 6,000,000.

No Sig

Action: G-2

Information: QPD
CG AAF
LOG

CH-IN-10355 (20 Mar 43) 0206Z

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11662, Sec. 2(E) and 5(D) or (F)
OSD letter, May 1, 1972

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

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E. O. 12355, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/94
(ACTION OPNAV INFO TAECKER)

CHANGES RED COMMAND REAR ADM KUTCHEROV FROM CINCNORTHERN FLEET HQTRS MURMANSK TO COMDR WHITE SEA FLOTILLA HQTRS ARCHANGEL. REAR ADM ALAFUZOV RELIEVED ASST CHIEF NAVAL STAFF BY VICE ADM STEPANOY. CINCNORTH. ALAFUZOV TO CINCPACIFIC. REAR ADM FEDOROV FROM VOLGA FLOTILLA TO DUTY HQTRS NORTHERN FLEET. ALAFUZOV IS ABOUT 45 KEEN ALERT FORCIFUL. I CONSIDER HIM BEST INFORMED AND MOST CAPABLE OF SOVIET FLAG OFFICER. RS I HAVE LET AND FEEL FROM UNITED STATES POINT OF VIEW HE IS HAPPY CHOICE IN NEW POSITION.

16...ACT

10/11...COM INCH...2;C...NAV AIDE...198...30P...MAY 21, 1973

CONFIDENTIAL
March 17, 1943.

RECOMMENDATION FOR: Admiral Standley.

As directed by you, I took Admiral Duncan’s despatch to the State Department and showed it to Mr. Welles.

Mr. Welles, after reading it, requested that I show it to Mr. Hull, who, after a careful reading, stated that he felt it was a sound document and requested that he be allowed to show it to his Russian experts. Accordingly, Mr. Hull called in Mr. Atterton, Mr. Sumner and Mr. Henderson and requested that the despatch be read to them. All these gentlemen agreed with Mr. Hull that the advice given by Admiral Duncan should be followed.

Mr. Henderson mentioned to the Secretary that Admiral Standley’s despatch on the same subject had been received in the State Department and followed much the same line as Admiral Duncan’s despatch. I asked him if a copy of this despatch had been sent to the White House and he said yes. He also added that he felt a copy should be delivered to Admiral King and asked me whether I did not agree. When I answered in the affirmative, he requested the appropriate party in the State Department to see that Admiral King get a copy.

I ascertained from Miss Tully on my return that the President had not yet seen Admiral Standley’s despatch, and the President’s copy is attached hereto.

Mr. Hopkins agreed with me and told me that we should, under any conditions, give the Russians the naval information they requested and he immediately advised Admiral King of his stand in the matter. He further told Admiral King that he felt the whole problem should henceforth be handled by the President and the State Department and that he was going to talk to the President further on the subject. Mr. Hopkins was particularly depressed with the sound reasoning in paragraph 3 of section 2 of Admiral Standley’s despatch. He seemed to feel (1) that the President should immediately meet Admiral King’s mind at rest by reassuring him that we are not going to give any of the secret naval information requested, and (2) take up with the State Department method of replying which would not offend the Russians and, at the same time, stall them off as far as giving them the information concerned.

It is noted that paragraph 3 of section 2 of Admiral Standley’s despatch recommends that the State Department request that Naval Intelligence advise them of Admiral Duncan’s views in this matter. In view of the fact that this has already been accomplished, perhaps you will want to have O.A.I. notified, directly or indirectly. Incidentally, they are listed as the action addressees.

Very respectfully,

W. C. Mott

W. C. Mott,
Lieutenant Commander, PEN.

E.O. 11652, Sec. 18 and 16X or 18X

Office of the Secretary, May 1, 1943

By D. S. B.
FOREIGN OFFICE DELIVERED NOTE TO AMBASSADOR IN KUIBISHEV IN WHICH SOVIETS ASK OUR GOVERNMENT TO GIVE THEM FOLLOWING ORGANIZATION OF COMMERCIAL AND GOVERNMENTAL SHIPBUILDING FACILITIES AND INFORMATION AS TO NAVYS CONTROL THEREOF. PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS OUR LATEST BATTLESHIP CARRIER CRUISER DESTROYER SUBMARINE, DETAILED PLANS AND DRAWINGS SURFACE AERIAL AND ELECTRIC TORPEDO; SHIP AND AIRCRAFT RADIO. DETAILS OUR SECRET CIPHERING DEVICES. NAVY HAS NOT PREVIOUSLY REQUESTED ANY OF ABOVE FROM ME NOR HAVE THEY SINCE MADE REFERENCE TO FACT REQUEST WAS SUBMITTED THROUGH FOREIGN OFFICE.

AMBASSADOR DELAYED FORWARDING PENDING DISCUSSION WITH ME AND QUESTIONING OF MOLOTOV IN MOSCOW AS TO SIGNIFICANCE OF SUCH UNPRECEDENTED REQUEST. MOLOTOV STATED IT WAS SIMPLE REQUEST FOR INFORMATION THEY DESIRED. FOLLOWING IS MY ANALYSIS

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<td>PART THREE 151023 NCR 3144</td>
<td>141214 NCR 2619</td>
<td>PART SIX 141214 NCR 2619</td>
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OPNAV FROM MOSCOW)
OF SOVIET REASONS FOR MAKING REQUEST AND SUBMITTING THROUGH STATE, IN LEN D LEASE MILITARY EQUIPMENT THEY HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED MAJORITY OF OUR ARMS MOST MODERN EQUIPMENT. THEY HAVE NOT BEEN FORCED TO REPAY IN INFORMATION REGARDING RED ARMY EQUIPMENT NOR WILL THEY REPAY UNLESS FORCED, IN OBTAINING OUR EQUIPMENT THEY HAVE DEALT WITH UNITED STATES CIVIL ORGANIZATIONS AND NOT WITH ARMY, THEY REALIZE NAVY WILL NOT GIVE ANOTHER NATION FRUITS OF LONG TECHNICAL EXPERIENCE WITHOUT RECIPROCAL TREATMENT, SOVIETS HAVE NOTHING OF COMPARABLE NAVAL VALUE TO WHAT THEY ASK BUT DO NOT PLAN GIVE WHAT THEY DO HAVE NOR DO THEY PROPOSE IN NOTE ANY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, THEY HOPE BY SUBMITTING THROUGH STATE REQUEST WILL MEET EYES OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES OF SUFFICIENT INFLUENCE WHO BECAUSE OF THEIR SYMPATHY FOR THE SOVIETS AND DESIRE TO MOLLIFY AND PLACATE THEM WILL FORCE NAVY TO DIVULGE INFORMATION WHICH NAVY WOULD NOT OTHERWISE GIVE. I SHOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT THAT DEARTh OF ADEQUATE SOVIET BUILDING FACILITIES MAKE INFORMATION THEY REQUEST OF NO POSSIBLE VALUE TO THEM IN PRESENT WAR, THEY HOPE THAT SENTIMENT OR PLAIN STUPIDITY
ON OUR PART WILL RESULT IN OUR GIVING THEM INFORMATION THAT MIGHT POSSIBLY BE AGAINST US LATER. THE SOVIETS HAVE THE EUFFRONTERY TO MAKE THIS REQUEST WHILE DENYING OR DELAYING REPLYS TO OUR QUESTIONS THE ANSWERS TO WHICH WOULD GIVE US INFO WHICH WE COULD USE NOW AGAINST A COMMON ENEMY.

I RECOMMEND NO ANSWER BE MADE TO THIS NOTE. IF SOVIETS BRING UP QUESTION AGAIN I RECOMMEND WE REPLY THAT WE ARE QUOTE STUDYING UNQUOTE. THIS IS SOVIET METHOD AND IS ANSWER I HAVE FREQUENTLY RECEIVED.

I AM IN FULL SYMPATHY WITH THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE AND HEART-ILY ENDORSE ASSISTING THEM IN ANY POSSIBLE WAY IN THIS WAR AND LATER. I FURTHER REALIZE HOW VITAL IS MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATION IN POST WAR SETTLEMENTS. MY RELUCTANT CONCLUSION IS THAT THIS CAN ONLY BE ATTAINED BY DEALING WITH THEM ON A HARD BOILED HORSETRYING BASIS, IT IS THEIR METHOD OF DEALING AND THE ONLY METHOD THEY RESPECT IN OTHERS, OUR CHARITABLE METHOD IS SUSPECT EITHER OF WEAKNESS OR AS A CLOAK FOR SOME HIDDEN NEFARIOUS SCHEME.
MY FURTHER OPINION IS THAT WE WILL OBTAIN NO COOPERATION UNLESS WE NOW USE STRONG MEASURES TO FORCE IT FROM THEM. IN LENDE LEASE AND IN US PUBLIC OPINION WE HAVE TWO WEAPONS WHICH THE SOVIETS RESPECT AND FEAR. I BELIEVE THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES THE SOVIETS AND THE WORLD AT LARGE WILL BEST BE SERVED BY USING THESE WEAPONS TO SMOKE THEM OUT AT THIS TIME. IT WOULD SEEM BETTER THAT WE MEET THE ISSUE NOW RATHER THAN TO WAIT FOR THE SECOND FRONT TO COME FACE TO FACE WITH THE SOVIET FRONT ON THE BATTLEFIELDS OF EUROPE. I THEREFORE STRONGLY URGE THAT THE NAVY IN ITS SEPARATE DEALINGS OPERATE ON THIS BASIS AND THAT IN HIGHER COUNCILS OUR REPRESENTATIVES URGE LIKE ACTION BY OTHERS.
NAVAL MESSAGE

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RELEASED BY 16 MARCH 1943

FOR CODEROOM WOLBER

DECODED BY PATTERSON

PARAPHRASED BY

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

ROONEY 151232 NCR 3145

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

TEXT

MOSCOW PAPERS ARE NOW PRINTING DAILY NEWS ACCOUNTS OF LEND LEASE AID TO RUSSIA. ALL ARE UNDER DATE LINES US CITIES. NO EDITORIAL OR OFFICIAL COMMENT HERE SINCE STALIN STATEMENT IN REPLY TO CASSIDY. SO FAR NO MENTION HAS BEEN MADE OF RED CROSS OR RUSSIAN RELIEF. REQUEST I BE GIVEN CONFIDENTIAL ESTIMATE OFFICIAL AND PUBLIC REACTION AMBASSADORS RECENT PRESS STATEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT.

16...ACT

10/11...240...COMINC...13...RAWON...

NAVAIDE....FILE

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<td>MANSON</td>
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INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

**LT. ROBINSON** 151430 NCR 6260

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

**ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME**

**TEXT**

**ACTION**

- P-00
- P-01
- P-015
- P-0150
- P-05
- P-07
- P-1
- P-11
- P-2
- P-3
- P-30
- P-31
- P-32
- P-33
- P-34
- P-35
- P-37
- 10-00
- VON

HEAVY AND CONTINUOUS NIGHT RAIDS PLUS SEVERAL DAYLIGHT RAIDS LAST 4 DAYS HAVE RESULTED IN:

(A) BRITISH SHIP OCEAN FREEDOM 2 DIRECT HITS SINKING AT DOCK CONSIDER TOTAL LOSS AND WILL PROBABLY RENDER USELESS 1 BERTH.

(B) SOVIET STEAMER LENA WHILE BEING SALVAGED TURNED TURTLE AND BERTH DEMOLISHED BY BOMB.

(C) INCENDIARIES LANDED ON AMERICAN SHIPS BUT EXTINGUISHED WITHOUT DAMAGE.

(D) SEVERAL LARGE BUILDINGS DESTROYED BY LAND MINES AND INCENDIARIES WITH FAIRLY HEAVY CASUALTIES.

(E) WARE HOUSE AND TRACKS II MARSALLING YARDS PARTIALLY DESTROYED.

(F) GERMANS USING DELAYED ACTION 30MMBS 1 OF WHICH EXPLODED

**CONFIDENTIAL**
ALONG SIDE OUR BUILDING MINOR DAMAGE TO OFFICE ALTHOUGH
NO PUBLIC UTILITIES FUNCTIONING, WORK IN PORT PRACTICALLY
AT STANDSTILL DUE PARTIALLY LOW MORALE AND SHORTAGE
RAIL TRANSPORT WHICH WAS HEAVILY BOMBED SOUTH OF
SURMANSK.

ACTION: F.37...

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

DECLASSIFIED
J. O. 12386, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
BIR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/8/66
**Naval Message**

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<td><strong>Indicate by</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Address</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Originator</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Films Photo Sets</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Compilled Sunken</strong></td>
<td>F-0015</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Submarine Salvage</strong></td>
<td>F-06, F-07</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Location</strong></td>
<td>F-1, F-11, F-7, F-1, F-11</td>
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<td><strong>Method Of Ascertaining</strong></td>
<td>F-7, F-1</td>
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<td><strong>Resting Position</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Recovering Sunken</strong></td>
<td>QNH. SUBHIPS 101/11</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Equipment For Their</strong></td>
<td>Navy</td>
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<td><strong>Technical Study</strong></td>
<td>As well as providing salvage equipment for their navy.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Suggest Above</strong></td>
<td>Be requested from Washington soonest and we advised whether it will be furnished.</td>
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<td><strong>16...</strong></td>
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**Confidential**

Make original only. Deliver to communications watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

**Declassified**

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
PART ONE 191414 NCR 9436
PART TWO 191111 NCR 9451

CONNECTION AMBASSADORS RECENT STATEMENT LACK OF INFORMATION RUSSIAN PEOPLE OF UNITED STATES AID TODAY'S IZVESTIA PRINTS ON BACK PAGE FIRST NEWS PUBLISHED MOSCOW CONCERNING AMERICAN SUPPLIES. ARTICLE UNDER NEW YORK DATE LINE IS SIMPLY EXTRACTS FROM STETTINUS ARTICLE FROM AMERICAN MAGAZINE. NOT ONLY HAS THERE BEEN NO INFORMATION OF UNITED STATES AID HERETOFORE PUBLISHED BUT ROULLARD REPORTS RUSSIANS ARCHANGEL AREA HOLD BELIEF AMERICAN BRITISH MATERIALS ARE SOLD AT EXCESSIVE PROFITS BY U.S. AND THAT WE ARE ENRICHING OURSELVES AT SOVIET EXPENSE. I HAVE HEARD FROM OTHER SOURCES SUCH IMPRESSIONS ARE HELD ELSEWHERE BY SOVIET CITIZENS. ALSO UNCONFIRMED RUMORS CERTAIN RELIEF

---

**DECLASSIFIED**

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
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**NAVAL MESSAGE**

**NAVY DEPARTMENT**

**FROM**

**RELEASED BY**

**DATE**

**TOR CODE ROOM**

**DECODED BY**

**PARAPHRASED BY**

**INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.**

**PAGE TWO OF 101414**

**NCR 94136**

**UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.**

**ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME**

**DATE**

**TIME**

**GCT**

**TEXT ACTION**

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**SUPPLIES ARE SOLD IN GOVERNMENT STORES. RECENT VISIT OFFICERS THIS OFFICE FOREMOST RED NAVY HOSPITAL MOSCOW DISCLOSED RED CROSS MATERIAL FORMED CONSIDERABLE PORTION THEIR EQUIPMENT. STAFF KNEW IT SUPPLIED FREE BUT UNDER IMPRESSION DIRECT FROM U S GOVT AND NO IDEA IT PUBLIC DONATIONS THROUGH NON OFFICIAL ORGANIZATION. WHILE THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION AS TO VITAL VALUE TO SOVIETS OF LEND LEASE AND OTHER U S AID GOVERNMENT LEADER OBVIOUSLY ARE LOATHES TO ADMIT THIS TO THEIR OWN PEOPLE OR THE WORLD AT LARGE.**

16...ACT

**DECLASSIFIED**

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVFREGS.)

E. O. 11652, Sec. 20(b) and 5(c) or (6)

CIA letter, May 1, 1972

By DBB Date MAY 21 1972
From: Cairo
To: MILID

In reply cite: AMSME 8, March 10, 1943

Reliable confirmation comes from various Polish sources (from Szymanski from Brereton for Kroner) of destruction by Germans of 3rd Russian Panzer Army between Kharkov and Rostov.

No Sig.
INCOMING MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Secretary

Paraphrase

From: Madrid   Dated: March 10, 1943, 1 p.m.
No.: 563   Rec'd: March 10, 1943, 7:18 p.m.

A Spanish officer returning from the winter defensive
operations in the Lake Ilmen area stated that the
Germans ran like rabbits and that the Blue Division
had suffered the loss of 2,000 artillery men including
180 officers up to several weeks ago. The Spaniards
who had taken part in this operation and who have
returned to Spain state that Russian soldiers are
superior to the German soldiers and they show great
admiration for the Russian civilians. The aviation
unit of the Blue Division is at Orel and not with the
division.

Lately there have been no large movements of troops
out of Spain. A few days ago 1,000 soldiers of the
Blue Division returned to Spain.

Besulac

Action: G-2
Information: OPD
            CG AAF

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By Date MAY 21 1973

CM-IN-5862 (12 Mar 43)  1032 Z MHS

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/74
MURMANSK AND PORT AREA SUFFERED INTENSIVE AIR RAID LAST NIGHT HOUR AND A HALF LAST NIGHT, AT LEAST 23 PLANES DROPPED BOMBS WHICH RESULTED IN 5 FIRES IN TOWN 1 OF WHICH DESTROYED ONLY HOTEL. BRITISH SHIP EMPIRE KINSMAN STRUCK BY 2 BOMBS CAN BE REPAIRED. OTHER BOMBS PORT AREA DESTROYED SMALL QUANTITY AMUNITION AND CAUSED SMALL FIRE.

FRANKEL.

16.....ACT
10/11......F37......230......COMINCH......NAVYDA......
240P......BADO......FILE......

CONVENIENT
MAJOR J M POULI FRENCH ARMY JUST DETACHED AS COMDR FRENCH FIGHTER SQUADRON WHICH HE SAYS IN RESERVE NEAR FRONT AND NOT COMMENCING ACTIVE OPERATIONS FOR ANOTHER 20 DAYS OR SO. SAYS RED LIMIT FOR FIGHTER PILOTS 35 YEARS. POULI NOW ORDERED LONDON. ATTEMPTING SECURE PASSAGE VIA AMERICAN CARGO PLANE EXPECTED MOSCOW SOON VIA TEHERAN.

ACTION: 16....

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Moscow
To: MILID
In Reply Cite: 83 March 6, 1943

Maj Gen Dubininac of Red Army agreed March 4th to exchange enemy information and last night gave following as of March 1st on German Units:

186 Divisions Soviet front 1c Germany 21 France
4 Norway 1 Denmark 3 Belgium 1 Holland 2 Austria 2
Protectorate 7 Poland 6 Yugoslavia 3 Greece 2 Italy
5 North Africa 7 enroute to Soviet front making grand total 262 Divisions including 28 TAQD Divs, 9 Mz Divs, 9 new infantry Divs smaller than normal for protection airbases and bases but which can be used in front line and 49 Divisions which have suffered extreme losses and must be reformed. 28 Divs have been destroyed since November 19th not included.

Further breakdown and details promised in subsequent meetings next one March 8 (The General stated that before Nov 19 there were 39 Divs in France including 7 Armored Divs not fully equipped of which 13 Inf and 6 Armored Divs were since sent to Soviet front and used to bring other units up to strength. 25th Armored Div has remained and 1st Armored Div has since returned to be recruited and reequipped. Of 21 Divs now in France 5 are in combat readiness and 16 are reserve or guard units and comprising soldier and less trained personnel. Of 25 Divs in France Belgium Holland 18 are reserve or guard units. Since Nov 19 13 Divs from strategic reserve in Germany and 1 from Norway were

CM-IN-3334 (7 Mar 43)

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLIR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Moscow
To: MILID

In Reply Cite: 83 March 6, 1943

transferred to USSB. Believe above reference Soviet front reliable but since 2nd front cry is being revived strength on Continent may be too low.

No Sig.

Action: G-254

Information: OPD
CG AAF
SGS
LOG

CM-IN-3334 (7 Mar 43) 1140 Z MVS

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: DUNCAN (MOSCOW)

RELEASED BY:

DATE: 7 May 43

TOR CODEROOM: 1443

DECODED BY: THISDIANT

PARAPHRASED BY: CONNOR

ADDRESSSES: OPNAV

PRIORITY: ROUTINE

PRECEDENCE: DEFERRED

FRENCH FIGHTER SQUADRON LEFT 2ND FOR UNDISCLOSED SECTOR

FRONT ACCORDING INFO LOCAL FRENCH. GENERAL PETITE DE

GAULLE V. REPRESENTATIVE MOSCOW INDICATED SOVIETS EX-

TEMPEREDLY COOPERATIVE FRIENDLY. EXPRESS OPINION FRANCE

ONLY ALLIED COUNTRY WITH WHOM SOVIETS HAVE NO POSSIBILITY

POST WAR MISUNDERSTANDING. ULTIMATE DISPOSITION GERMAN

PROBLEM OF VASTLY GREATER IMPORTANCE USSR AND FRANCE

THAN ANY OTHER COUNTRY. TASK IN WHICH THEY MUST COLLAB-

ORATE NOT ONLY AS ALLIES BUT FRIENDS AS THEY HAVE SO

OFTEN BEEN IN PAST. STATED THAT AS RESULT OCCUPATION

FRANCE MAJORITY LARGE PROPRIETERS WOULD HAVE BEEN WIPED

OUT AND INDUSTRY PROBABLY BECOME LARGE STATE MANAGED.

THIS PLUS SOCIALIST LEANINGS MANY FRENCH PLUS COMMON

HATRED GERMANS WOULD TEND SMOOTH OVER CONTROVERSIES AND

DIFFERENCES OPINION WHICH MIGHT HAVE EXISTED PRIOR

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/64

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See

1990, Sec. 6(D) and 8(D) or (E)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

1992

By

DBS

MAY 5, 1973
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**PRESENT WAR.**

ALL INDICATIONS RED DESIRE PROMOTE PRO SOVIET SENTIMENT FRANCE AND ENCOURAGE PROCOMMUNIST ELEMENT THAT COUNTRY BOTH FOR PRESENT COLLABORATION AGAINST GERMANY AND TO PROMOTE COOPERATION AFTER WAR. ATTITUDE MANIFESTED TOWARD FRENCH AVIATORS IN MARKED CONTRAST THEIR REFUSAL GRANT PERMISSION OTHER ALLIED PERSONNEL EVEN VISIT FRONT AND DISCOURAGEMENT BRITISH TORPEDO PLANE SQUADRON KOLA INLET.

**ACTION:** 16.....

**COMINCH:** 20G.....13.....NA: AIDE.....20OP...

**FILE:** CNO.....
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM DUKE

RELEASED BY

DATE 9 MARCH 43

TOR CODE NUMBER 0321

DECODED BY BRINKLEY

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

HILL 021099 NCR 3098

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRIORITY.

TEXT

PART ONE 021099 NCR 3098
PART TWO 021095 NCR 3108
PART THREE 021037 NCR 5119

INFO COMMAYEO PASS FOR ACTION TO OPNAV

LT HARSHAW NOW IN CHARGE ARCHANGEL (COULIARD ARRIVED MOSCOW)

SAYS 16" ICE EKONOMIA AND EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO OPERATE
FOR REMAINDER WINTER SEASON. WOULD REQUIRE BRINGING LARGE
ICE BREAKER OVER BAR AND COULD ACCOMMODATE ONLY SMALLER
SHIPS. CARRYING LUMBER VIA NR EKONOMIA ACROSS DJINA ICE
TO KOLTOVSKY FOR OUTBOUND CARGOES. NO SHIPS ANY DESCRIP-
TION NOW EKONOMIA BAVRTSA OR ARCHANGEL HARBORS. ROADS
AND ENVIRONS ARCHANGEL AND STREETS AND ROADS KOLTOVSKY
AREA IMPASSABLE FOR MOTOR CARS AND TRUCKS DUE SNOW. TEM-
PERATURE AVERAGE MINUS 29 CENTIGRADE. WILD WINTER ALL USSR.

RELINQUED
H.O. 11835, Sec. 6(D) and 6(2) or 8

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
H.O. 12386, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

LHA 101

1973

300 Annex

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 78 (4) NAVGRO)

3/21/00

2/21/00

By RT. NAPA Data, W.A. 11410-8

300 Annex

1973

DECLASSIFIED
H.O. 12386, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

LHA 101

1973

300 Annex

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 78 (4) NAVGRO)

2/21/00

By RT. NAPA Data, W.A. 11410-8

300 Annex

1973
LABOR SHORTAGE ALL ACTIVITIES. CONSIDERABLE AMERICAN
FOOD BEING USED PARTICULARLY STAPLES BUTTER FLOUR SUGAR.
QUANTITIES AMERICAN CIGARETTES APPEARSSENT FROM AS
NONE DISTRIBUTED LOCALLY. CHOCOLATE BAR 150 ROUBLES
PACK CIGARETTES 60. WITH MILITARY AUTHORITIES STOP
SUCH SPECULATION. NO INDICATION ANY RED CROSS OR RUSSIAN
RELIEF MEDICAL OR OTHER SUPPLIES BEING DISTRIBUTED FREE
OR OTHERWISE. GREAT SCARCITY GASOLINE EVEN FOR OFFICIALS
AND GOVT ACTIVITIES. NO AIR RAIDS SINCE OCTOBER BUT OCCASIONAL ALERTS FROM GERMAN RECONNAISSANCE PLANES. FOOD
SITUATION FAIR IMPROVED SINCE LAST WINTER WITH PRACTICALLY
NO QUEUES. GENERAL CIVIL AND OFFICIAL ATTITUDE BEGINNING TO MANIFEST ANTI BRITISH TENDENCIES DUE STIRRING UP MEM-

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94
NAVAL MESSAGE

| ORES BRITISH ACTION LAST WAR THERE PLUS CERTAIN DIS- | PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES. |
| ULLUSION OVER SLOWNESS ALLIED INTERVENTION OF CON- | $21,990 |
| TINENT PLUS BELIEF THAT INCOMING SUPPLIES BOUGHT FROM | NCR 3098 |
| PROFITEERING CAPITALIST NATIONS FOR CASH. INDIVIDUALS | UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE. |
| HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE LEASE LEND. SOVIETS EXPRESS WONDER | ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME |
| OVER PRESENCE APPROXIMATELY 10,000 BRITISH MILITARY NAVAL | DATE |
| PERSONNEL ARCHANGEL AREA AND THEIR APPARENT LACK USEFUL | TIME |
| BOMBERS VIA PURPOSE FOR SUCH NUMBER./INCOMING CONVOYS ASSEMBLED | OCT |
| KOLOTVSK AND FLOWN OFF TO INTERIOR. FIGHTERS SHIPPED | TEST |
| RAIL TRAIN CRATES. TRIP ARCHANGEL BLOCKS MOVED DAILY | ACTION |
| IDLE CARS OUT NO LOCOMOTIVES. MUCH LEASE LEND MATERIAL | |
| SIDETRACKED WITH INDICATIONS THERE LONG PERIOD. DOUBLING | |
| RAILWAY KOKOSHA TO ISSAKAGORKA IN SCATTERED STRETCHES | |

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/1974

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver in communication watch officer in person. NLR 76 (4/3/1974)

MAY 21 1973

D.B.S.
FOR PASSING PURPOSES WITH NO INDICATION COMPLETE DOUBLE TRACKING INTENDED PRESENT TIME. TRAINS ALL ROADS CONSIDERABLY DELAYED PROBABLY DUE WAR MATERIAL AND TROOP MOVEMENTS.

16...ACT

CONNINCH...20G...F37...NAVADE...

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (R)
OGD letter, May 1, 1972
By DBS  Date M AY 2 1 19 7 2
From: Moscow
To: Milid

In Reply Cite: 75, March 2, 1943.

Press Correspondents back from Kharkov report
that Soviet operations west thereof slowed up by
transport problems since Germans blew up all rail-
road bridges removed switches frogs etc and set fire
to City. Mud caused by thaws hindering truck trans-
port which is the only supply transport available at
present. No American equipment used in operations
except trucks.

Definite evidence of Ukrainian Nationalist
movement of which Germans took advantage and Soviets
now executing many. Population of City now about
350,000.

Rumors and reports of epidemic of Rabbit Fever
that area supported by Soviet press announcement
that many doctors are being sent there.

Huge stores captured show Germans well supplied
with food including from Portugal sardines Balkans
tobacco France wines Caucasus fruit.

Propaganda on 2nd front being revived.

Action: G-2

Information: OPD
CG AAF
LOG

CM-IN-1056 (3 Mar 43) 0212 Z

Michela

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/94
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: London
To: Milid

No. 4347 March 1 1943

Czech Staff predict Germans will fall back eventually to line Riga, Vilna, possibly Dniester to Odessa or probably the Dnieper. From this prepared line (signed Solbert) Germans may start spring offensive. Polish Staff feel Germany has definitely reverted to defensive strategy preferring contracted line even farther west than Czech estimate because of supply lines and manpower.

ACTION: G-2 EA

INFORMATION: CPD CGAAP

CM-IN-357 (1 Mar 43) 2219Z

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
**NAVAL MESSAGE**

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**INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.**

**REEGAN**

| 12390 |

**NCR 4217**

**UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.**

**ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME**

| DATE | TIME | OCT |

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**TEXT**

LAST NIGHT PORT AREA AND TOWN ATTACKED BY NIGHT FLIGHT OF 12 JUNKERS 88'S. 2 SOVIET SHIPS STRUCK BY SMALL BOMBS WITH MINOR DAMAGE. SEVERAL INCENDIARY FIRES IN TOWN AND CONSIDERABLE NUMBER BOMBS FROM 50 TO 500 KILOS. HEAVIEST CONCENTRATED BOMBING THIS YEAR.

16....ACT

COMINCH....1/11.....

FILE: NAVADEDE...2'0P.....

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

DECLASSIFIED

J. D. 1186, 1455, 2158, 2359, 1005, and 6105 (or 6)

OCD letter, May 4, 1973

1000 AMER

MAY 21 1973

By DBB

500 AMEN

DECLASSIFIED

J. O. 12358, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

[ILR 101]

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/66
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

CCMWF
Feb. 25, 1943
1432Z

From: London
To: Wilid Washington.
No. NR 4324 February 25, 1943.

Fighting French Military Mission Moscow report impending German counter offensive from Rzhev and Orel toward Moscow, stating Russians holding troops from Stalingrad to meet same (sgd Hughes). British War Office discounts report believing German troops not available present time.

ACTION: G-2
INFORMATION: OPD CG AAF

CM-IN-12945 (25 Feb 43) 1927Z

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/11/94
From: Moscow
To: MILID Washington, D. C.
No. 63 February 22, 1943

Fairly reliable Soviet War Correspondent told American Press Correspondent that 13th German Army Corps commanded by General Strom now at Kursk as part of 2nd Army under Lieutenant General Von Zalmuth. Kursk defended by other undesignated 2nd army troops under General Schneider and Von Blum. Source states Germans abandoned Voronez fully armed but forced out of Kursk but practically destroyed town. Soviet advances find German troops excellently supplied with canned food from all parts of Europe. Also Captured German Staff Officers to effect that the Germans will withdraw to west of Dneiper.

Michela

ACTION: G-2/E A
INFORMATION: OPD/CG AAF

CM-IN-11715 (23 Feb 43) 0340Z flw
FREQUENT AIR RAIDS DURING LAST 4 DAYS AND NIGHTS HAVE RESULTED IN VERY LITTLE MATERIAL DAMAGE ALTHOUGH HEAVY TONNAGE HIGH EXPLOSIVES AND INCENDIARIES DROPPED BY MESSERSCHMIDT 109'S AND JUNKERS 88. EFFICIENCY OF PORT REDUCED BY 50 PERCENT BECAUSE OF WORKERS SEEKING SHELTER. CIVILIAN POPULACE JITTERY BECAUSE OF LACK OF SLEEP. MORALE OF SHIPS IS GRATIFYINGLY HIGH.
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**INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.**

ROONEY 201845 NCR 7438

**UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.**

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**TEXT**

NIGHT BEFORE LAST RAIDS FROM 2300 UNTIL 0600.
LAST NIGHT FROM 1630 TO 2400 IN ALL ABOUT 36 RAIDS
MOSTLY BY SINGLE PLANES. HIGH EXPLOSIVES UP TO 1 TON
DROPPED PLUS INCENDIARIES. A LARGE STORAGE SHED
DEMOLISHED AND ABOUT 2300 TONS WAR MATERIAL DESTROYED
BY DIRECT HIT IN LOCK AREA. SUPERFICIAL DAMAGE TO
STEAMERS NICOLAS GILLMAN AND ISLAD. MINOR INJURIES TO
2 MEMBERS FORMER'S CREW. ABOUT 43,000 TONS CARGO STILL
CROWS THE PORT.

16 ACTION
11/11 2300 24 01 COMING NAVATE 23 03 OP FILE

CONFIDENTIAL

201845

30 Russia
From: Moscow
To: MILID
No: 58 February 17, 1943

Unusually early thaw setting in and natives say winter is over. Reliably informed 6000 tractor tread rear assembly units adaptable to standard trucks for use in heavy mud have been produced here.

Rumors of impending Soviet offensive near Leningrad current.

Michela

Action: G-2 EA
Information: OPD CG AAF

CM-IN-8824 (17 Feb 43) 2255Z VC
From: Moscow
To: (Redacted)
No. 522; Feb 15, 1943

Recent press today mentions 7th Company of 93rd Motorized Regiment of 13th German Tank Division was in Ochakov vicinity. 13th Company Bavarian 204th Regiment of 97th German Infantry Division at Tuspoe and 6th Company of 88th Regiment Bavarian 370th German Infantry Division in Caucasus exact location not given.

Michels.

ACTION: (Redacted)
INFO: C/N
CSC/AMF

CGH-29E440 (16 Feb 43) 0234Z wjc

N.N.B. JOURNAL NO. 42 FEB 16 1943

COPY No.

DECLASSIFIED
EE-0-12256, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLIR 001
By:RT, NARA, Date 4/3/44
From: London
To: Milid

No. 4252, February 12, 1943.

British Moscow Mission states Soviet General Staff 10th saw no evidence withdrawal Germans from Rostov or Donets Elbow. However German withdrawal elsewhere shows evidences haste such as scattered and unconcealed mines (egd Hughes). First Panzer and 17th Armies highly disorganised in retreat. Axis formations drawn from other theaters frequently thrown hastily into battle and defeated by Russians in detail.

No Sig

ACTION: G-2 & C

INFORMATION: OPD
CG AAF
Log

CM-IN-6247 (12 Feb 43) 2143Z

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12355, Sec. 3(3) or Sec. 3(4)
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/8/94
Morale of Army, Navy and Air Force personnel and Russian Citizens in general is said to be as good as almost anywhere in the Soviet Union at the present time. Some of the measures used by the Soviet Secret Police, (the NKVD) seem very short sighted to foreign observers in Russia at the present time.

In general the morale of all Russian citizens in the Vladivostok area is said to be as good as almost any place in the Soviet Union at the present time.

However many means of law enforcement used by the Soviet secret police, the organization of which is called the "People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs" are very strange to foreign observers and diplomats residing in the country. For example in Vladivostok, of all Americans connected with the American Consulate General, and five Chinese connected with the Chinese Consulate General, none are able to have steady acquaintances among the Soviets, except for occasional chance encounters.

The means used by the NKVD to prevent Americans and other foreigners from cultivating friendships is to keep Russians away from the Americans and other foreigners. Members of the American and Chinese Consulates who are known to appear in public frequently are followed or "shadowed" by plain clothes men. If the former go in a car, then the plain clothes men follow in a car. Many times at a theatre or movie, the plain clothesman will be as close as 15 feet to the person he is "shadowing."
Confidential

Serial 15 - 43

Subject: U.S.S.R. Morale in Relation to Prosecution of War.

Young Russian ladies or gentlemen who may become acquainted with a foreigner, and who may think there is no harm in going with a foreigner, will associate with him for a few times until suddenly the Russian is no longer met. In some such cases the Russian never again appears, or if he (or she) does, explains he can no longer go or be seen with a foreigner. Sometimes the Russian will admit he or she has been warned and sometimes he will not give that admission.

It is understood in certain instances Citizens have been arrested and or sent away from this city for associating with foreigners. In this respect it is considered that the isolation of foreigners in Vladivostok is much more severe than in any other part of the Soviet Union at the present time.

As a result of long careful study and of conversations with practically all members of the American and Chinese Consulate Generals here in Vladivostok the following fact is generally agreed upon by all the foregoing: Every officer and each member of the crew of Russian ships who is permitted to voyage abroad must be a member of the Communist party or of unquestioned loyalty. In addition he must leave behind a wife, family, or other close relative as hostage (s) or have some other very strong ties to the Soviet Union.
From: Moscow
To: Milid

No. NR 43 February 10, 1943

Walter Kerr just returned second time from Stalingrad state that 21st 57th 62nd 64th 65th 66th Soviet Armies each of 9 or more divisions operated that offensive and that all except 62nd have been sent West. He also states as reliable information to the effect that Apanaseiko Commanding General far eastern front was called Moscow 1 week ago for 3 days conference.

Various reports troops ammunition supply movements westerly from Moscow indicating Soviet offensive opening that area soon.

Michels

Action: G-2 E/A
Information: OPD

CM IN-5465 (11 Feb 43) 0753 Z

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(M) and 5(D) or (M)
OSD Letter, May 1, 1972
By DBS Date: MAY 21 1973

M I S JOURNAL NO. 85 FEB 11 1943
COPY No. 26

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
NAVY MESSAGE

NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM FRANKEL VIA HOURMARSH

RELEASED BY 8 FEB 1943

TOR CODEROOM SCRUGGS

DECODED BY GUILLAUME

PARAPHRASED BY JOHNS

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME OCT

ACTION AIR RAID THIS DATE RESULTED IN BOMBS ON TOWN AND NEAR

SHIPS IN

CONFIDENTIAL

052142 300 Russia

DECLASSIFIED
A NEW RUSSIAN ACTIVITY IN TURKEY IS SENDING AGENTS TO BALKANS TO EXPLAIN TO COMMUNISTS THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN COMMUNISM AND BOLSHEVISM AND THAT PRESENT ALLIANCE WITH BRITAIN AND UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED AS FRIENDSHIP BECAUSE THESE COUNTRIES REMAIN CAPITALISTIC AND ARE ENEMIES. ABOVE FROM LOCAL AGENT WHO ALSO REPORTS INCREASED ESPIONAGE IN TURKEY. NEW AGENTS HAVE ARRIVED AND HAVE SECRETLY INSTALLED RADIO SENDING STATION IN ISTANBUL.
WHEN ARRANGING WITH ALAFUSOV THAT ROULLARD REPLACE TAECKER VLADIVOSTOK I COMPLAINED AT RESTRICTIONS PLACED UPON TAECKER AND REQUESTED ROULLARD HAVE CLOSER LIASON WITH NAVY AND BE PERMITTED VISIT SHIPS AND NAVAL INSTALLATIONS. ALAFUSOV EVIDENCED SURPRISE TAECKER HAD BEEN SO RESTRICTED AND INDICATED ROULLARD MIGHT EXPECT TO SEE SOMETHING. WHILE TAKING ABOVE WITH GRAIN OF SALT AM CONVINCED MANY OF OUR DIFFICULTIES ARE BORN OF PETTY BUREAUCRACY IN OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND THAT NAVY HAS SINCERE DESIRE FOR CLOSER COOPERATION. I HAVE BEEN FURNISHED WITH CONSIDERABLE DATA ON SOVIET MERCHANT MARINE INCLUDING ADDITIONAL DATA ON SHIPS LISTED IN LLOYDS FULL INFORMATION ON SHIPS LISTED IN LLOYDS FULL INFORMA-

(DECIDED)
FORMATION ON SHIPS NOT LISTED IN LLOYDS AND SOVIET NAMES OF SHIPS PURCHASED U.S. ABOVE BY NEXT POUCH, WAS TOLD AGAIN ANSWERS TO PREVIOUS REQUESTS WERE IN PROCESS OF PREPARATION AND WOULD BE GIVEN ME.

16....ACT
CNO...F37....13....2G....COMINCH....NAVAIDE....
2OP....FILE....

(PAGE 2 OF 2)
FROM: MOSCOW (DUNCAN) 031311 NCR 327 3 FEB 43 SENIA
ACTION: OPNAV

REDS CURRENTLY DOING MUCH ENTERTAINING OUTER MONGOLIAN DELEGATION DURING PERIOD OVER A MONTH X STALIN DINNER HOST MONGOL PREMIER MARSHAL CHOIBALSAN AND PARTY X ALSO PRESENT

MOLOTOV X MIKOIAN X BERIA X XUKOV X KAWANOVICH HELPING PUT ON THE HEAT

DISTRIBUTION:
16........ACTION
10/11......COMINCH.....
20.......05.......FILE..... MARK ANY REPLY RESTRICTED

For information about this dispatch call Branch 3904 (Room 2622)
RED STAR CONNECTION PUTTING ON NEW UNIFORMS ONE FEB REITERATES WILL IMPROVE DISCIPLINE AND SENSE RESPONSIBILITY AND INSTILL RECOGNITION SUPERIOR RANK X EFFORTS ON BATTLEFIELD GIVES RIGHT OUR COMDRS WEAR EPAULETTES MARKS DIGNITY OF OFFICER X WITH PUTTING ON NEW MARKS MUST IMPROVE BEHAVIOR X FORBIDDEN ENTER THEATRE MOVIES PUBLIC PLACES IN FELT BOOTS QUILTED JACKETS UNSHINED BUTTONS X CANNOT ENTER BAZAARS MARKETS IN UNIFORM X NO HANGING ON STEPS TRAMS BUSES X EXCEPT TRAVELING NO CARRYING OF BUNDLES EXCEPT SMALL NEAT PARCEL LEFT HAND X IN TRAMS BUSES FORBIDDEN SIT DOWN IN PRESENCE SENIOR X QUOTE ABOVE INFO NOT PASSED BY CENSORS FOR FOREIGN CHERES X ABOVE PLUS MANY OTHER RECENT MANIFESTATIONS INDICATES CONTINUE SWING RIGHT AND STRENGTHENING ARMY HAND WHICH POSSIBLY PORTENDING WEAKENING INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL AND NON MILITARY X ARMY NOW VERY POPULAR X RELIABLE SOVIET INFORMANT AT RECENT PARTY WITH COMPOSER PROKOVIEFF WHO SAID HE IS WORKING ON NEW ANTHEM TO REPLACE INTERNATIONAL DISTRIBUTION: 16 ACTION COMMONLY 19 20 FILE MARK ANY REPLY RESTRICTED
CONFIDENTIAL
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE
Feb 4, 1943
15242

From: New Delhi
To: AGWAR

No. AQUILA F 88 D Feb 2, 1943

Rangoon docks January 31 (AFABIL FDIS info MILID Stilwell Brady from Bissell) torpedo boat of Otori class, 5 merchant men 275 to 350 feet. At Moulmein a 300 foot paddle steamer and tanker 275 feet January 28. Hurricanes sighted submarine position 7 degrees 0 North 70 Degrees 0 East January 30.

Photos 31st showed 1 place Shwebo, Maida Vale 5 small, Vagwe 1, Heho 6 bombers 3 fighters, Mingaladon 7 bombers 10 fighters, Zayatkin 5: none, Onbauk, Monywa, Wetthali, Bmaugbinya, Kyaukyu, Aungban, Pyawbwe, Maubbi, Blegu, Cascade.

Unrated report from British says Japs doubled number fighter planes at Hongkong Jan 15 with latest types.

No Sig

ACTION: G-2
INFORMATION: OPD
CG AAF

CM-IN-2108 (4 Feb 43) 2257Z mcs

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 5(D) or (G)
OSD letter, May 1, 1973
By DBS
Date

M. I. B. JOURNAL NO. 1
COPY No. 26

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date
German's have publicly announced Stalingrad defeat and declared several days period.

From: London Embassy
To: MILID
No. 4182, February 2, 1943

British mission Russia states General Staff view Leningrad situation: country difficult, Germans resisting stubbornly, and foolish to expect same German reaction to Russian attack as in southern sectors (signed Hughes).

Russian figures on strength Stalingrad
German forces generally accepted. 22 Axis Divisions would number 550000 men if at full strength. Probably actual strength nearer 350000, of which many made good escape. Escape losses probably offset by inclusion members Todt organization, police and rear services.

Action: G-2 EA
Information: OPD
CG AAF
LOG

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11643, Sec. 2(B) and 5(D) or (E)
OIB letter, May 1, 1972
By DBS Date: MAY 21 1973

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

MK 9
1845/2
KW

CCWD
Feb 3 1943
0257

FROM: Moscow
TO: Milid

NO. 28 Jan 31 1943

Red Star editorial describes model of new conduct
Red Army Officers on and off duty connection with
wearing new uniform insignia. Conduct and insignia
practically identical those Tsarist Army. Reliably
informed Academy of Musicians Moscow has been instructed
write new National Anthem.

Above with abandonment political Commissars and
personnel changes in high command indicate growing
strength of Red Army influence in internal affairs.
Trend is to the right.

Michels

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: OPD
CG AAF

CM-IN-1308 (3 Feb 43) 1141Z cen

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11685, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (F)
OSD letter, May 4, 1972
By DBS

M.I. 3 JOURNAL No. 108 FEB 1943

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/44
9 SOVIET VESSELS NOW AT AKUTAN AND DUTCH HARBOR UNABLE TO MOVE FOR LACK OF COAL. DOCTOR UMLEBY SOLID FUEL COORDINATOR HAD 7,000 TON ORDER THROUGH CONTINENTAL COAL DULUTH TO SEATTLE TO RELIEVE SITUATION NOW ADVISED ODT ORDERS THAT GONDOLAS MAY NOT BE USED. RAILROADS HERE REFUSE PERMIT COAL IN BOX CARS TO BLOCK TERMINALS WAITING UNAVAILABLE LABOR TO UNLOAD FOR TRANSSHIPMENT TO VESSELS. URGENTLY RECOMMEND IMMEDIATE STEPS BE TAKEN TO ENSURE PERMISSION USE GONDOLAS FOR THIS VITAL MOVEMENT AND AT LEAST 40% GONDOLAS FUTURE MOVEMENTS. ADDITIONAL 7,000 TONS REQUIRED WEEK BEGINNING 1 FEBRUARY FOR SHIPS NOW LOADING ESSENTIAL MATERIALS FOR RUSSIA IN THIS FRONTIER. REQUEST BE ADVISED ACTION TAKEN.
UPON RETURN TO MOSCOW WAS RECEIVED WITH MINIMUM DELAY
BOTH BY NAVY COMMISSAR AND ACTING CHIEF OF STAFF REAR
ADMIRAL PATELEYEFF. CHIEF OF STAFF ISAKOFF HAS BEEN
WITH FLEET FORCES FOR THE PAST NINE MONTHS AND DEPUTY
CHIEF OF STAFF ALAFUSOV HAS BEEN ABSENT FROM MOSCOW
FOR PAST TWO MONTHS. I DELIVERED GREETINGS FROM SECONAV
TO COMMISSAR WHO EXPRESSED APPRECIATION THEREFOR AND
REQUESTED THAT I PERSONALLY CONVEY HIS THANKS TO SECONAV
FOR ASSISTANCE GIVEN SOVIET SUBMARINES WHILE IN U. S.
WATERS. HE PARTICULARLY DESIRED TO EXPRESS HIS
ADMIRATION FOR THE COURTEOUS AND EFFICIENT HANDLING
OF REPAIR SUPPLY AND ESCORT PROBLEMS BY OUR NAVAL
Personnel as conveyed to him by submarine commanders and Russian Navy representatives Washington.

When I expressed regret over the loss of one of their submarines the commissar remarked such was to be expected in war and that besides they should have kept better lookout.

Upon parting the commissar requested that I feel free to come to him personally at any time that I might consider it desirable in furtherance of our mutual relations. Admiral Pateleyeff invited me to deal directly with him on any question. He brought up the subject of unanswered questions which I have pending and stated I would receive answers as soon as they could provide them.
MY INCREASED RANK HAS GIVEN ME ENTRÉE TO UPPER NAVAL CIRCLES AND IT SEEMS APPARENT THAT SOVIETS ARE FLATTERED THAT U.S. NAVY IS REPRESENTED BY RANK OF REAR ADMIRAL. PREVIOUS NAVAL ATTITUDE THROUGH FRIENDLY, IS NOW NOTICEABLY MUCH WARMER.

ACTION...16

COMINCH....

FILE: CNO....2/OP....NAVAIDE....4/F....

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11852, Sec. 3(b) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 4, 1972
By DBS Date: MAY 21, 1973
From: Moscow
To: MILID

No. 21, January 26, 1943

Reliably informed that Academy of Sciences Moscow has been directed by Soviet government to organize Cadre Engineers and Technicians for assignment to Kharkov to repair and put in operation tank and tractor factory there that city.

Michel

ACTION: G-2 - EA

INFORMATION: OPD
CG AAF
Log

CM-IN-12933 (28 Jan 43) 0216Z cms By DBS Date May 21 1979

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD Letter, May 1, 1972

M. I. & JOURNAL NO. 28 JAN 8 1943
COPY No. 25

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/44
From: London Am Embassy
To: Millard

No. 4144, January 26th, 1943.

Recent conversation Russian General Staff reported by British Mission Russia as follows: capture Rostov not likely near future. German communications generally better than Russian, Russians being handicapped so long Germans trapped west of Stalingrad block railroad service westward. Incompletely frozen rivers provide serious obstacles to Russian advance (signed Hughes).

Evacuation Germans via Kerch Strait most difficult due to small port capacity, inadequate beaches and impossibility construction even pontoon bridges because strong currents. Freezing of Straits improbable, having happened only 1918 and 1941. Probable Germans must abandon all heavy equipment, though mass personnel may be saved in small boats in Kerch evacuation. Retention Rostov therefore mandatory. Russian General Staff stated present successes achieved only at very great costs, and Germans not yet beaten nor demoralized.

War Office believes relief Leningrad useless for industrial development until railway restored eastward, then will enable increased output Naval
shipbuilding. Despite gains territory farther south, Russian food situation will probably not benefit heavily because lack tractor and other farm machinery.

No Sig
Taecker Vladivostok

OPNAV

Prioriy: RRRR
Routine: Deferred
Deferred: Deferred

Date: 26 January 1943

Time:

Text:

RE: Weather in Vladivostok at present cold but in general has been mild and excellent so far this winter. Some Soviets say is best winter they have had in 1½ years. Land military operations could be conducted here now if necessary. Upper region Amur Bay frozen over but portion bordering and adjacent open sea not frozen over. Is some ice in harbor Zolotoirog but same not enough to interfere with traffic. Food supply decaying worse. Nearly all foreigners living on supplies imported. Reds morale said be as good as any place in Soviet Union present time. However Russians are ruthlessly and emphatically kept away from foreigners. No Americans here able associate with Soviets either now or at any time since have been here except for occasional.
NAVAL MESSAGE

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RELEASED BY

DATE

TOR CODEROOM

DECODED BY

PARAPHRASED BY

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

250610 NOR 3620 PAGE 2 OF 2

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

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CHANCE ENCOUNTERS. THUS FOR AMERICANS HERE LIFE IS LIKE THAT IN GLASS CAGE. ALL FOREIGNERS AGREE THAT EACH OFFICER AND MEMBER OF CREW OF RUSSIAN SHIPS PERMITTED TO VOYAGE ABROAD MUST BE MEMBER OF COMMUNISTIC PARTY OR OF UNQUESTIONED LOYALTY AND MUST LEAVE BEHIND WIFE, FAMILY, OR OTHER CLOSE RELATIVE AS HOSTAGES OR HAVE SOME OTHER VERY STRONG TIES TO COUNTRY. IS OBVIOUS SOVIETS COMBING POPULATION FOR MORE XI

DESPATCH ENDS

ACTION: 16....

23G...COMINCH...CNO...NAVATCG...FILE

DECLASSIFIED

L. O. 12505, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

PROVIDE REASONABLE DETERMINATION OF REASON FOR DECISION TO DECLASSIFY

M. O. 11663, Sec. 6(b) and 6(d) or 6(c)

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Delivery to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVARCS.)

M. O. 11663, Sec. 6(b) and 6(d) or 6(c)

RELATE

M. O. 11663, Sec. 6(b) and 6(d) or 6(c)

CNO letter, May 1, 1975

by DBS

Date

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**TEXT**

RELIABLE REPORT 2 GERMAN OBSERVATION PLANES HIGH OVER OSCOW 17TH IS SHOT DOWN. NO ALERT SOUNDED.

WEATHER BRIGHT CLEAR LAST 3 DAYS FIRST IN MANY WEEKS.

TEMPERATURES OSCOW AVERAGE 25 DEGREES CENT. BLACKOUT LATELY EASED WITH DIMMED STREET LIGHTS AND LITTLE ATTENTION BRIGHT CAR HEADLIGHTS BOARD PROTECTION WINDOWS SLOWLY CONTINUING.

ACTION: 16...

FILE

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVRULES."

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12333, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
ILR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 6/21/73
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HILL 191411 NCR 8861

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

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MOSCON 19993° INSERT CUOTE REMOVING UNCUOTE AFRER HEADLIGHTS.

16...ACTION

CUNICH...NAVADE...00...24OP...FILE.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

R.C. 11685 Sec. 1001 and USA Sec. 3.4
OSD letter, May 3 1973

By DBB  Date MAY 21 1973
From: Moscow
To: Milid

No. 12, January 18, 1943.

Following from American Correspondents returned yesterday from Stalingrad Front: Present Soviet offensive genuine and not result German withdrawal to winter quarters that 70,000 German troops now encircled Stalingrad doomed that German air supply efforts are not successful. Soviet commanders stated Germans have superiority in tanks and planes generally but these had not been disposed to meet this Soviet offensive also that Soviet successes due partially to inaccurate German intelligence on Soviets strength, dispositions and intentions. Soviet commanders also stated African campaign did not lessen pressure but on contrary Germans kept in additional new units (Soviet Foreign Liaison Officer stated same but since subject of "Another" front is beginning to arise I believe such is intended for propaganda).

Morale Soviet officers very high but private soldiers asked when war would end and showed signs weariness. No signs food shortage were noted.

Single track railroads Aratov to Stalingrad east bank Volga show evidence heavy bombing much railway equipment damaged. At least three pontoon bridges at Stalingrad over Volga now frozen solid.

Prisoners of German air force average 23 with 26 years experience showed excellent morale but surly.
manner with contempt for Russians. They were no better
clothed than a year ago but appeared well fed. These
though only one division trapped at Stalingrad which
they compared to Staraya Russia and which they predicted
would fall easily next spring also that reason for
Soviet success was slight German miscalculation on Soviet
strength. Germans stated they expected no quarters
from Russians as opposed to that expected from British
and Americans. They also stated that African campaign
not too important to Germany. (Identity of correspon-
dents was known to prisoners) Morale Italian and Roumanian
prisoners low these expressed that was was lost for them
as well as dislike but fear of Germans.

No American equipment except trucks was observed
and Soviet commanders stated they had none but know
such was being used by other fronts.

Soviet citizens stated they were treated exception-
ally well while under German occupation. Captured
German RR equipment was in excellent condition some new.
Practically no field fortifications were noted east of
present line, campaign definitely one of movement.

Soviet officers now mentioning tank corps instead
of tank brigade but correspondents believe that units
are one and same. Remarks: Although I give above
considerable credence generally there is possibility
that German troops in Stalingrad were left there boldly
and deliberately with reserve stocks supplied by rail
before encirclement and supplemented by planes after
encirclement to carry them over until predicted early
Spring however no information available on this.

ACTION COPY: G-2
INFO. COPIES: OPD
(C)AAF
LOG
CH-IN-9021 (1/30/43)

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
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**AXIS ARMIES IN RUSSIA WILL FALL BACK TO PREPARED LINE THOUGHT TO BE APPROXIMATELY THE SAME AS LINE HELD LAST WINTER. DETACHMENTS LEFT IN ADVANCED POSITIONS AS HOLDING FORCE WILL BE SACRIFICED. ABOVE FROM LOCAL AGENT.**

16...ACTION
18/11...2PG...COMINCH...NAVADE...200P...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTION</th>
<th>TEXT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P-00</td>
<td>German winter operations will be limited to local counter action aimed at stopping Russian offensive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-01</td>
<td>B2 Official Polish source.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-05</td>
<td>Offensive plan Leningrad sector deferred owing withdrawal numerous formations to threatened Central and Southern sectors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-07</td>
<td>Due serious lack oil German high command decided offensive Theater spring Summer '43 will be Southern sector Eastern front with General Objective on line drawn Baku-Astrakhan-Anchangel.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION:

16... ACTION

CONINCH... 28G... CHO... NaVAID... FILE

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (a) NAVREGS.)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/74

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(R) and 6(D) or (B)
GSD letter, May 21, 1973
By DBS Date 2/1/73
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Am Embassy London
To: Milid
No. 4028 January 5, 1943

Soviet review last six weeks campaigns accepted as reasonable by war office although German casualties estimate believed high (Caren signed Hughes). War Office believes equivalent twelve full divisions surrounded west Stalingrad.

No Sig

ACTION COPY: G-2
INFO. COPIES: OPD CG AAF

CM-IN-2351 (1/6/43) 0758Z cen

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/47
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COPY No. 29
SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT JAN 2, 1943
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER 2350Z

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Moscow
To: Milid
No. 1 Jan 2, 1943

Official of Soviet Foreign Liaison Office stated yesterday that while Soviets were highly gratified with victories in south until Rostov was recaptured and German army smashed in Caucasus and Don regions the prime objective has not yet been reached.

Boswell

Action Copy: G-2
Info. Copies: OPD
CG AAP
Log

CM-IN-1111 (1-3-43) 1216Z

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) or (R)
OSD Letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date: MAY 31, 1972

U.S. JOURNAL NO. 1 02 JAN 1943

COPY No. 28

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/44

300 Russia
From: Cairo
To: A/GWAR

No. ANSHE 3575, December 30, 1942

Information from reliable A-one British Colonel who just returned from Russia follows Soviets slowed down in advance toward Rostov by inability to convert railroad gauge which German changed to own use. For Marshall from Andrews. However little opposition being encountered in advance and estimate is that Rostov can fall if supply situation is conquered. Russians expect to meet powerful German defenses fifteen miles east of Rostov. Of twelve million inhabitants Leningrad two million died from starvation during year. Just before Colonel left Moscow December two four he saw seven persons die on streets from starvation. Estimate by this officer who is Chief of mission is that by end of next six months Soviet demands for Lend Lease equipment will be replaced by urgent appeal for food. In all their planning for operations Russians disregard Finnish Italian Hungarian Rumanian Bulgarian Troops. Of all satellite forces they consider Rumanian combat efficiency best and others poor.

Andrews

ACTION COPY: G-2
INFO COPIES: OPD, CG AAF, LOG

CH-IN-12966 (12-30-42) 23532 eob
FROM: Moscow
To: Milid

No. 158, December 28, 1942

US Rep HR Ter recently returned from trip to Stalingrad front stated last night Red Army Staff Officers were openly gratified by Anglo American successes in Africa. They intimated that Germans had been forced to withdraw airplanes to latter front thus materially aiding present Red Army drive in south. Censors will not allow story filed however as Soviet Government wishes world to give full credit for victories to USSR.

Boswell

Note: Corrected copy of 158 CM-IN-12264 (12-29-42) G-2.

Action Copy: G-2 & 4
Info. Copies: OPD
CG AAF
CONFIDENTIAL
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE
CCWD
Dec 28, 1942
01552

From: Moscow
To: MILID
No. 160 Dec 28, 1942

Primary reason for Soviet successes on all fronts believed due to house cleaning of Officer personnel particularly in field grades during last six months. No Marshalls with possible exception of Timoshenko in north or full Generals with exception of Zhukov or Rokossovsky front are known to hold high combat command. Colonel General Vetutinco SW front has been cited but most of credit is being given to Lieutenant Generals such as Badinov CD Second Guard Tank Corps who is claimed responsible for present break through in middle Don area. These Generals are Military men rather than political figures, practically all under fifty with many around forty, and all widely experienced in present Soviet German war. Staff work showing marked improvement both as to precise planning and execution of operations but supply system still weak link in chain.

Elimination of Political Commissars has improved Officer morale as well as provided many new experienced commanders particularly in grades Col on down although Pol Commissars have by no means been accepted for command duties except those who have proven themselves. With weather working in their favor and taste of first real victory exceeding expectations it is believed that leadership has skyrocketed.

Boswell

Action Copy: G-2 E-A
Info. Copies: OPD, CG AAF, Log

CH-IN-12297 (12-29-42) 12356

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

COPY No. 30

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SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER 2334Z

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Moscow
To: Milid
No. 158 Dec 28, 1942

US Rep Mr Ter recently returned from trip Stalingrad front stated last night Red Army Staff Officers were openly gratified by Anglo American successes in Africa. They intimated that Germans had been forced to withdraw airplanes to latter front thus materially aiding present Red Army drive in south. Censura will not allow story filed however as Soviet Government wishes world to give full credit for victories to USSR.

Roswell

Action Copy: G-2
Info. Copies: OPD CG AAF LOG
CM-IN-12264 (12/29/42) 1032Z ce

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 5(CD) or (CI)
OSD letter, May 1, 1972
By DBS Date MAY 21 1973
COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
VLADIVOSTOK QUIET. AN AIR RAID ALARM WAS HELD FOR AN HOUR AND A HALF EARLY MORNING DEC 25. NO SNOW ON STREETS BUT IS SOME IN RAVINES CULEYIES AND OUT OF WAY PLACES. AKUR BAY HAS SOME ICE BUT HAS YET HAD FIRST COMPLETE FREEZE OVER. HARBOR ZOLO TO 1200 COMPLETELY OPEN. IS NO UNUSUAL MILITARY OR NAVAL ACTIVITY HERE. MERCHANDISE SHIPS FREQUENTLY COMING AND GOING. FOOD VERY SCARCE. SUPPLIES OF NON EDIBLE CONSUMABLE GOODS IN STORES PRACTICALLY NIL AND PEOPLE SEEM TO BE LIVING ON THOSE THEY HAVE HAD. USED ARTICLES ARE SOLD OVER AND OVER AGAIN IN COMMISSION SHIPS. WEATHER CLEAR COLD AND INVIGORATING. CONSIDER HAS BEEN NO WEATHER TO DATE THAT WOULD HAVE BARRED MILITARY OR NAVAL OPERATIONS HAD SAME BEGUN IN EARLIER PART OF YEAR. SOUTHERN STATE LAPERGUE STILL OPEN AND THEIR SHIPS PROCEEDING THROUGH IT. THEY SAY JAPANESE FORCES ESCORT VESSELS THRU SAME BUT DO NOT BOARD THEIR SHIPS. FOOD AND GOODS HAVE LARGELY REPLACED MONEY AS MEDIUM OF EXCHANGE AND HAS COMPLETELY DONE SO WHERE EXCHANGE IS BETWEEN PRIVATE PERSONS AND WHEREEVER CAN BE DONE WITHOUT ARREST.

Vladivostok 28 Dec 42

ROONEY

Naval Message

FROM: TEACHER VLADIVOSTOK
RELEASED BY: KIRK\N PATRICK
DATE: 28 DEC 42
TOR CODEBOOK: 1715
DECODED BY: KIRK\N PATRICK
PARAPHRASED BY: LON\N

INFORMATION

PRIORITY
DEFERRED

FOR ACTION
OPNAV

NAVY DEPARTMENTS

PRIORITY
DEFERRED

ADDRESS

PRIORITY
DEFERRED

INTERJUNCTION

PRIORITY
DEFERRED

DECLASSIFIED

SEC. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

28 DEC 42

Russia

28 Dec 42

M. 129886, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

RELEASED

By DSS

01/15/73

DELIVER TO COMMUNICATION WATCH OFFICER IN PERSON.

(See Art. 76 of NAVARTB)
CONFIDENTIAL
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE
December 27, 1942.

FROM ALUSMA BEYOGLU
FOR ACTION OPMAY

263015 MCR 9535

Following from Russian source considered reliable, Bulgarian have 6 motor torpedo boats. There are no Germans serving on Bulgarian ships except 1 Petty Officer on each patrol vessel. In October torpedo boat Deraz was sunk by mine near Varna. German Naval division IIA located as follows Sofia 2000 Varna 1600 Oomopol 1200. At each station about half the personnel are permanent and others are recruits receiving primary training for 3 months after which they are sent to France for gunnery training at batteries in Maginot Line. Then they are assigned to coastal defense. Admiral Schuster at Sofia remains Commandant Naval bases Black Sea and Aegean. Coast defense and antiaircraft batteries in Bulgaria now manned entirely by Bulgarians but still under command Schuster who has liaison officer each battery. On 20 November 16 6 inch guns removed from Odessa coastal area passed through Bulgaria enroute Greece.

Received from COMINCH communications.

NAVY DISTRIBUTION:
ACTION: COMINCH...
10/11...COMINCH...NAVAIDE...20G...20OP...FILE
P-6...16-F...F-4...16-C...16-J...16...N

ARMY DISTRIBUTION:
ACTION COPY: G-2 EA
INFO. COPIES: OPO
CG AAF

DEC 28 1942

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E. O. 12355, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
CONFIDENTIAL
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE
27 December 1942

FROM ALUSKA BEYOGLU
FOR ACTION OPHAY

261930 MCR 9474

Russian Naval Attache, recently returned from Moscow where he had been called for conference says Admiralty has inspired great confidence in Russian Minister of Marine and latter has directed him cooperate fully with me in future he could furnish no information regarding situation in Black Sea.

NAVY DISTRIBUTION:
ACTION 16
COMINCH NAVAIDE 20G 10/11 200P FILE
F-6 Action... 16...16-F...F-5...F-1...16-G...I

ARMY DISTRIBUTION:
ACTION COPY: G-2 EA
INFO. COPIES: OPD CG AAF
CM-IN-11815 (12/28/42) 01527 con

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 11/27/44

COPY No. 23

28252

DEC 28 1942
**Naval Message**

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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>27 December 1942</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tor Code Room</td>
<td>8306/27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decoded By</td>
<td>Hutchinson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraphrased By</td>
<td>Rinds</td>
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**Naval Department**

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<th>OPNAV</th>
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</thead>
</table>

**Unclassified Information**

**Lt. Schall**

261935

NCR 9474

Unless otherwise indicated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

**Originator Fill in Date and Time**

**Text**

**Russian Naval Attache,**

Recently returned from Moscow where he had been called for conference says Admiralty has inspired great confidence in Russian Minister of Marine and latter has directed him cooperate fully with me in future. He could furnish no information regarding situation in Black Sea.

**Action:** 18

**Confidential**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 16 (4) NAVERGS.)

**Declassified**

L.O. 12355 Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NR 101

By RT, NARA, May 23, 1975

[Signature]
From: Moscow
To: Milid

No. 155 December 24, 1942

Member of Red Army General Staff in meeting with heads of British Military Mission last night stated that present westward drive in south is aim with Voroshilovgrad as objective and is proceeding far beyond Soviet expectations.

Boswell

ACTION COPY: G-2
INFO. COPIES: OPD
CG AAF
SBS
LOG

CM-IN-10902 (12-25-42) 1545Z mfs

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E.O. 11852, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) or (S)
OSD letter, May 1, 1973
By DBS Date, MAY 2, 1973

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COPY No.
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

WVNT17
1415/19
EW

CCWD
Dec 20 1942
0632Z

From: Basra
To: Milid

No. 175 Dec 19 1942

Today Soviets requested all vehicles be sent to Tabriz instead East of Caspian Sea as per my no one hundred three dated August eleven furthermore Soviets have requested that by January five nineteen forty three ten thousand tons rail and two thousand tons fasteners will be in Russia. Rail fastenings will be trucked via Tabriz to Russia. Soviets also pushing very hard to have every available truck this region go northward at earliest possible moment for use in Caucasus.

Ondrick

103 was CM-IN-4776 (8-13-42) G-2
Action copy: G-2 [Handwritten]

Info. copies: OPD
             CG AAF
             SOS-TAG
             LOG

CM-IN-6917 (12-20-42) 2245 Z. jrp

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(a) and 3(d) or (f)
OSD letter, May 1, 1972
By DBS 205 DEC 20 1942

COPY No. 29
From: London
To: Midid

No 3954 December 18, 1942.

In Tripolitania portion enemy rear guard cut off sixty miles west El Agheila being attacked by British armour from east, however situation remains obscure.

West of Moscow German claims to have trapped and annihilated large Russian formations are unconfirmed and considered exaggerated (sgd Hughes) operations this area made difficult by unseasonable rains however heavy frosts have set in and operating conditions should improve rapidly. Southwest Stalingrad German counterattacks continue.

No Sig.

ACTION COPY: O-3 EA
INFO. COPY: OPD CG AAF LOG

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 2(B) and 1(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 1, 1973

MAY 21 1973

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
Over 1,000 workers now occupied laying railroad across
Dvina south of Bakaritsa and constructing bridge over
Ice from Solomol'stva Archangel in preparation! Use
Economia Beringo! Printed by British in Solvarne
have just completed turning over two destroyers to
Red Navy, names and class unknown.

... 16... Act...

Conrad... 18/11... 29... Navaire... 29...
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Moscow
To: Milid

No. 144, December 13th, 1942.

At cocktail party given yesterday by three Assistant Military Attaches in Military Attache's apartment for Generals Hurley and Adler, 8 of the 11 Soviet Officers invited appeared. Beside them only Americans were invited and the feeling of cordiality both felt and openly expressed between Soviets and Americans was more marked than at any previous similar function which I have attended.

Park

Action Copy: G-2 FA
More information from officers accompanying Gen. Hurley on his trip to Russian Front.

From: Moscow
To: Milid
No. 141, December 12, 1942

Continuation of one more Dec tenth, OMA
Don Volga all frozen, temperatures zero to twelve degrees centigrade, three clear days since Nov one eight, Volga at Saratov not frozen solid enough to permit auto traffic as yet stated one more week required. Saw airdromes at Borisogleb and Novoassy Envoy a Pan Filov, much air staff activity at Kumishemakaya, chief aviation Stalingrad front stated Boston wonderful machine but aft fire weak Soviets install rear top turrets on same, Aircoobra superb in all respects but too few, YA-Five new high altitude fighter seven hundred M per hr. Army tank corps is T-three four Med. Tank, no American tanks on Stalingrad front, Vatutine recaptured five six one Soviet TANK, captured a new German T-four with seventy five MM with "continental" rubber bogie suspension wheels, new German tank destroyer with seventy five MM gun of forty degree traverse and extremely high muzzle vel judging from length of rot forty two in and case approx one zero five MM. Chief of Artillery stated Soviet artillery organized same as our in triangular division seven six point two MM basic weapons one hundred two two MM how gen support, disguised new tactics of "artillery attack" wherein art. moves close on heels of tank in running fight firing direct laying this possible only because Soviets have great new art. so far extremely successful, dam-

(CM-IN-6106)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(3) and 5(3) or (3)
OSD letter, May 1, 1973
By DBS
Date MAY 21 1973

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

COPY NO
From: Moscow
To: Mildred

No. 141, December 13, 1942

Aged guns repaired on spot or shipped to interior, lay of fire same as ours, Soviet art sixty P
motorized, all Army art motorized, almost all mortars horse-drawn, Soviets can hand shift the
fire of a complete artillery regiment in thirty
five minutes, fire control same as ours, twenty
first Army has twelve Bns mortars various sizes,
Soviets state they have plenty of artificial
rubber and artificial silk, plenty of gasoline
and oil. In general armies have only one rail-
head two at most, army transports from RH to
division and division transports down. For
northern Pincer one single track RH supplying
three armies, trains pack siding traffic heavy.

One officer stated Germans using flame throw-
er tanks which are as lethal as gas. Soviets are
not using gas but are prepared one Chemical
Warfare Officer on Army Staff in case. Remarkable
night battle fought at Selivanovo. German Sixth
Army among others surrounded, Soviet Liaison
Officer stated good sign small groups breaking
out indicating lack of control. Fifty first
Guard Division has been fighting for fifteen
months without interruption and the troops look
fine, averaged forty RH per day on advance.
Soviet ration nine hundred grams bread two hot
meals soup, meat, butter salt away soldiers well
fed. Better than majority of trucking American
Forces Studebakers OML, many Peeps. School of
aviation and barracke young pilots get six to
eight to ten months training depending upon
state of previous training fighter pilots more.

Note: 139 was CM-IN-5520 (12-13-42) G-2.
Action Copy: G-2
Info. Copies: OPD, CG AAF, Log CM-IN-6106 (12-14)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3.3 and 3.79 or (F
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/64
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NAVAL MESSAGE

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<td>TAECKER, VLADIVOSTOK</td>
<td></td>
<td>OPNAV</td>
<td>PRIORITY</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

RELEASED BY

DATE 13 DECEMBER 1942

TOR CODEROOM 13265

DECODED BY MONTGOMERY

PARAPHRASED BY BRINKLEY

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

LT HATCH 123215 NCR 9455

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

DATE 13 DECEMBER 1942

TIME 0000 GMT

OCT

ACTION

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<th>F-09</th>
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</thead>
</table>

TEXT

VLADIVOSTOK QUIET. AMUR BAY HAS ICE IN SOME PLACES. WEATHER EXCELLENT, CLEAR AND COOL. HARBOR ZOLOTOIROG COMPLETELY OPEN.

WEATHER HERE AT THIS SEASON OF YEAR MUCH HILDER THAN PROBABLY GENERALLY BELIEVED IN OUR NAVY CIRCLES. DUE DATE HAS SHOWN ONLY ONCE AND THAT NOT GREAT AMOUNT. SLIGHT SHOW SHORE SNOW REMAINS AROUND. NONE ON STREETS. NO SPECIAL MILITARY OR NAVAL ACTIVITY TO BE NOTED. SOME SAILORS AND NAVAL OFFICERS IN EVIDENCE DURING SURPRISE. SAME BELIEVED DUE TO FREEZING MORE NORTHERLY SIBERIAN PORTS. FOOD SITUATION ABOUT SAME AS AT END HARVEST SEASON AND EXPECT TO REMAIN SO UNTIL ABOUT FEBRUARY 1. FROM THAT DATE ON TO ABOUT MAY 15 ESTIMATED FOOD SUPPLY WILL BE AT LOWEST EBB OF YEAR. AMOUNT OF INEDIBLE GOODS FOR SALE IN SYNDICATE SECOND HAND SHARE ALMOST NIL.

RECEIVED WITH PORTIONS MISSING AND IS SUBJECT TO CORRECTION

CONFIDENTIAL

December 15, 1942

NAVY DEPARTMENT

P兹 P

123215 NCR 9455

DECLASSIFIED

L.O. 123215, Sec. 2.3 or Sec. 3.4

NAVY

AM-59-8-1

MAY 21, 1973

300 Russia

DECLASSIFIED

L.O. 123215, Sec. 2.3 or Sec. 3.4

NAVY

AM-59-8-1

MAY 21, 1973

300 Russia

DECLASSIFIED

L.O. 123215, Sec. 2.3 or Sec. 3.4

NAVY

AM-59-8-1

MAY 21, 1973

300 Russia
MURMANSK UNDERWENT AIR RAID WHICH LASTED FROM 16 HOURS 8TH UNTIL 7 HOURS 9TH. CITY, DOCKS SHIPS EMPIRE SCOTLAND EMPIRE ELGAR WERE TARGETS SHIPS RECEIVED SEVERAL NEAR MISSES BUT NO DAMAGE. CITY MURMANSK HAS BEEN BOMBED REGULARLY FOR PAST EIGHT DAYS.
From: Moscow
To: Milid

No. 139, December 10, 1942., Part one of three part message

This is a paraphrase for Cract Brig Gen Pat Hurley returned to Moscow on Dec seventh from ten day tour Don Stalingrad front He came to USSR as special represent Roosevelt to confer Stalin from whom he received permission make tour including combat areas in present southern offensive.

He invited me as aside with Major Henry AC. He was told by Gene interviews that our party first foreign mil personnel see actual combat operations Russian front.

He has already reported to President whom he informed Maj Henry and I preparing report to G dash Two.

ACTION: G-2
INFO. COPIES: OPD, CGMAF
CONFIDENTIAL
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

WAR D 76
17102/11th
egf

CCWD
Dec 12, 1942
12472

From: Moscow
To: MILID
No. 139 Dec 10, 1942

We visited Lt Gen Vatutines group of five armies at a point of break through of northern pincer of Stalingrade counter offensive of Nov one nine to twenty four. Followed Comrnruf Chistitous twenty first army spearhead divs across Don Bend thru Serasimovich Kletnaya Verknsya Budinskgo Lubayaki Tosoka Revaihc Fivene Esacsp inspected five one guard Div Maj Gen Tshertkaladze who broke through after twelve days and nights fighting and effected junction with General Vatutines Division of southern pincer consisting of U S Armies under General Strufanov and Talbukhin. Stated Lt Gen Romanyenko from Voromakh front protecting Chistakovas right or west flank. It appears Chirskov destroyed Russian Army as effective force. Batov and separate units of the two southern armies said to be on left flank, twenty first Army pressing encircles twenty two of original twenty nine German Divisions South, Germany now fighting along Cheer River. Fighting quality Soviets believed excelled. Morale up off position Vatutines surrounding army weakened by distance from rail heads one two zero miles in some cases great difficulty in supplying southern pincer by aero sled and truck. Surrounded Germans being supplied by flights of two six J U five tons at high altitudes all other air activity at absolute minimum since one sight Nov due to unsuitable flying weather originating over Black and Caspian Seas. It is believed Germans are far from licked anything can happen to pincer either from west or east or both. Commissars from tank and Cavalry Corps and Division down now "political assistants" and

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E. O. 11850, Sec. 3(2) and 4(2) or (6)
By DBS
Date MAY 21 1973

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/44
CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Moscow
To: Milid No. 139 Dec 10, 1942

Army up are "Members of Military Soviet" all are gradually receiving comparable military rank all Military Commanders now have supreme command. Excellent picture of line of communications. Vatutine since promoted to Col Gen. Zhukkvon Central front Timoshenko said to be Leningr 1 front. Further reports later.

Park.

ACTION COPY: G-2
INFO COPIES: OPD, CG AAF, LOG
CM-IN-5520 (12/13/42) 1301Z mer

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) or (E)

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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**NAVAL MESSAGE**

**FROM**  
ROULLARD ARCHANGEL

**RELEASED BY**

**DATE**  
8 DEC 42

**TOR CODEROOM**
0626

**DECODED BY**
ERCK

**PARAPHRASED BY**
WIDMAN

**ADDRESSEES**

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<th>OPNAV</th>
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**INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.**

**ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME**

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**TEXT**

ABOUT 2,000 BRITISH OFFICERS AND MEN IN THIS AREA NOW DUE TO BE RELIEVED AFTER 12 MONTHS SERVICE NORTH RUSSIA.

RECENTLY INFORMED VISAS FOR RELIEFS WILL NOT BE GRANTED BY SOVIETS.

**ACTION....16**

**COMINCH....**

**FILES: 280P...NAVYDE....05....**

**DECLASSIFIED**

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

**By RT, NARA, Date 6/2/94**
RUSSIAN ASSISTANT NAVAL ATTACHE STATES THAT HARDLY A HOUSE IS STANDING IN STALINGRAD. WHOLE CIVIL POPULATION EVACUATED. NO ARMS FACTORY HAS ESCAPED HITS AND NO NEW PRODUCTION IS GOING ON BUT ONLY REPAIRS IN THE SKI STILL STANDING BARRACKS. ABOUT 1,000,000 SOLDIERS OCCUPY CITY LIVING MAINLY UNDERGROUND AND OUTSIDE ARE STRONG OUTPOSTS IN THE NORTHWEST AND SOUTHWEST. HE ESTIMATED GERMAN TROOPS CLOSE OUTSIDE CITY AT 300,000

16...ACT

COMINCH...19/11...20G...HAVAIDE...250P...
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE
CCWD
12-2-42
14382

From: London
To: Milid
No. 3879, December 2, 1942

Russian defensive flank facing west runs approximately Veshenskaya-River Chir to confluence with Don (Germans retaining few footholds)-River Don to Verkhne Kurnoyarskaya thence northeast of Katelnikov into Kalmuk Steppe, says War office (your two one four zero). Part sixth German Army encircled is in area (signed Hughes) approximately north part Stalingrad-northwestwards to Don Bend east of Golubinakoi (about Vertyachi)-point south of railway east of Krivomuginskaya-point north of Beketovskaya on Volga.

No Sig

FOOTNOTE: WD 2140 is CM-OUT-272 (12/1/42) G-2
Action Copy: G-2 E4
Info. Copies: OPD CG AAF
CM-IN-702 (12/2/42) 1639Z

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

COPY No.

300 Russia

J. C. A. •
111uoa
olt
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

LCR8
1135/1
EW

From: London
To: Milid

No. 3875 Dec 1 1942

Comments War Office relative Stalingrad situation: (Signed Hughes) Sixth Armies sitting before Stalingrad without indication serious attempt withdrawal westward possibly means eventual German counter thrust that area to rejoin Sixth Army.

No sig

ACTION COPY: G-2 FA
INFO COPIES: OPD, CG AAF, LOG

CM-IN-230 (12-1-42) 1351Z eob

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 6(D) cr (E)
OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS  Date MAY 21 1973

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Moscow
To: Millid
No. 128, November 28, 1942

Parr departed today with General Hurley on visit to front. Probably itinerary: fly to Novo-Amskaya, by automobile to Kazanskaya then to Akurshchynansk & officers by planes to Stalingrad area, officers by planes Guriev-Baku-Tiflis, by automobile to Ordjonikidze, return Baku officers by plane. Trip expected to last 10 to 12 days.

McCabe arrived Kuibyshev today.

E. Osburn

Action: G-2
Info: OPD CG AAF

CM-IX-12766 (11/30/42) 05042

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(5) and 5(12) or (2)
OSD letter, May 15, 1972
By DBS Date May 21, 1973

COPY No.

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NARA, OP 240-01

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/5/94
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<td>F-96</td>
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</table>

NOVEMBER 24 FIRST FAIR AMOUNT SNOW FELL IN VLADIVOSTOK. SAME WAS ACCOMPANYED BY STRONG COLD WINDS. WEATHER IN GENERAL FROM 1 AUGUST TO DATE HAS BEEN EXCELLENT AND CLEAR. IF MILITARY OPERATIONS HAD BEGUN HERE IN SUMMER OR EARLY FALL THEY COULD HAVE BEEN CONTINUED TO DATE WITH NO LET UP. WEATHER NOW NO MAJOR BAR TO OPERATIONS. AT PRESENT WEATHER CLEAR COOL AND INVIGORATING.

FILE.
FROM: Moscow
To: Milid

No. 133, November 24, 1942.

Adler mission following same grooves as other missions to the Soviet Union. There will never be any change. The Soviets feel have accomplished their mission to kill Germans. The next move is up to Russia's Allies.

Park

Action Copy: G-2-ER
Info. Copies: OPD
CG AAF
LOG
From: Moscow
To: Mild

No. 119 November 21, 1942

I will accompany Burley and aides to front next few days Stalin approves his inspection of Don Front from Elbow to and including Stalingrad thence to Caucasus. Adler arrives Moscow by train today. Boswell to Moscow.

Park
LIAISON OFFICER BLACK SEA REPORTED 18 NOVEMBER ENEMY ARE USING LARGE NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT ON TUAPSE FRONT IN A DETERMINED EFFORT TO MAKE AN APPRECIABLE ADVANCE. ALL ATTACKS HELD AND RUSSIANS COUNTER ATTACKING. NOVEMBER 15TH 70 AIRCRAFT ATTACKED TUAPSE CAUSING DAMAGE TO PROPERTY BUT NO SHIPS OR PORT INSTALLATIONS WERE HIT. RUSSIANS TAKING ADVANTAGE OF RELAXED ENEMY AIR ACTIVITY ON NOVHIROSSIISK FRONT TO MAKE IMPORTANT LOCAL ADVANCES EITHER SIDE OF THE ADIN RIVER AND HAVE OCCUPIED THE SOUTHEAST PART OF NEBERDZHAIKAYA.

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (E) NAVRECS.)
CONFIDENTIAL
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE
NOVEMBER 19, 1942

FROM:        ALUSMA ANKARA
FOR ACTION:  ONRMA

191445 MCR 1955

Received from Russia dated Nov 14. "Very little change at Tuapse but enemy aircraft very active both over the Port and at nearby Front. In Novorossiak area Russians have been attacking at points about 20 miles S. W. of Krasnodar but have met with strong resistance. On Nov 12 Russian seamen raided coast near Anapa cut communication lines and destroyed machine gun nests. Russians believe a German submarine either U-35 or U-37 is working from Burgas." There is no evidence at Istanbul that this or any other German Submarine is operating in Black Sea. On Nov 15 German Tanker Ossag 2793 gross tons northbound from Bosporus torpedoed by Russian submarine in Black Sea returned to Istanbul with large hole in side.

NAVY DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION:  16...
10/11...20G...COMINC...HAVAIDE...200P...FILE, F-6 Action...
16-F...F-5...F-8...16-C...16-J...F-4...BC
11/19/42/12/1942 7 A.M.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 1(2) and 2(2) or (3)
OHD letter, May 3, 1973

ARMY DISTRIBUTION:
Action Copy:  G-2
Info. Copies:  OPD
CG AAF

CM-IN-8235 (11/19/42)  20FZ NEW 29

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/67
RECEIVED FROM RUSSIA DATED NOV 14.

"VERY LITTLE CHANGE AT TUAPSE BUT ENEMY AIRCRAFT VERY
ACTIVE BOTH OVER THE PORT AND AT NEARBY FRONT. IN
NOVOROGISK AREA RUSSIANS HAVE BEEN ATTACKING AT POINTS A-
BOUT 20 MILES S.W. OF KRASNOYAR BUT HAVE MET WITH STRONG
RESISTANCE. ON NOV 12 RUSSIAN SEAMEN RAIDED COAST NEAR
ANAPA CUT COMMUNICATION LINES AND DESTROYED MACHINE GUN
NESTS. RUSSIANS BELIEVE A GERMAN SUBMARINE EITHER U-35
OR U-37 IS WORKING FROM BURGAS."

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE AT ISTANBUL THAT THIS OR ANY OTHER
GERMAN SUBMARINE IS OPERATING IN BLACK SEA. ON NOV 15
GERMAN TANKER OSSAG 2793 CROSS TONS NORTHBOUND FROM
BOSPORUS TORPEDOED BY RUSSIAN SUBMARINE IN BLACK SEA
RETURNED TO ISTANBUL WITH LARGE HOLE IN SIDE.
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE
November 16, 1942
CCWD
0651 Z

From: Moscow
To: Hild Washington DC

No. November 15th, 1942

For your information, only Hurley had 1
1/2 hour conference with Stalin result very
satisfactory discussed war situation on all
theaters and agreed situation was good.
Stalin granted Hurley 3 or 4 days trip to
Stalingrad front will take me if allowed to.

Park

Action Copy: G-2 EQ

Info. Copies: OPD, CG AAF, LOG

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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DECLASSIFIED

Copy No. 30

SECRET

From: Moscow
To: Hild Washington DC

No. November 15th, 1942

For your information only Hurley had 1
1/2 hour conference with Stalin result very
satisfactory discussed war situation on all
theaters and agreed situation was good.
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Park

Action Copy: G-2 EQ

Info. Copies: OPD, CG AAF, LOG

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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Action Copy: G-2 EQ

Info. Copies: OPD, CG AAF, LOG

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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Copy No. 30
CONFIDENTIAL
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Toheran Iran
To: Cllid

No. 158 Nov 14, 1942

Stalingrad front PW German 305 Inf Div reported
some companies reduced to 30 men no sector given for PW
930 regiment and 5th Chasseur Regiment of 1st Romanian
Div.

Ondrick

Action Copy: G-2 EA
Info. Copies: OPD CG AAF

CM-IN-7200 (11/17/42) 0639Z law

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11632, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (B)
OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS Date MAY 21 1973

CONFDENTIAL
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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/94

COPY No. 29
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE
CCWD
11-13-42
1708Z

From: Moscow
To: Milid
No. 118, November 13, 1942

Attended meeting at Soviet foreign office with British air attaché at his invitation re combined
air raid Caucasus. British air attaché stated
that Air Marshall Drummond with Staff and General
Adler American Commander due to arrive Moscow soon.
Further stated that 14 British squadrons and 6
American squadrons to participate in action estimated
around first of year.

Park

Action Copy: G-2

Info. Copies: OPP
CG AAF
Log

CM-IN-5731 (11/13/42) 2015Z

MAY 21, 1972

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3 (B) and 5 (D) or (E)

By DBS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

COPY No. 31
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INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

J ALLEN 121212 NCR 7298

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILLED IN DATE AND TIME

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NORTH RUSSIAN PORTS REQUIRE BOOM INSPECTION CERTIFICATES. SUGGEST MARITIME COMMISSION BE ADVISED PROVIDE ALL VESSELS WITH SUCH IN ORDER AVOID COMPLICATIONS AS OCCURRED WITH S.S. CHARLES MC CORWICK WHEN SOVIET COMMISVAR KILLED BY BREAKING OF OVERLOADED BOOM WITH RESULTANT DRAWN-OUT LEGAL INVESTIGATION

16...ACT
10/11...30...COMINCH...F-37...39....
FILE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(b) and 6(d) or (g)
OGL Letter, May

By DBS Date

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 74 (4) NAVREGS.)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/28/44
TAECKEVLADIVOSTOK

Date: 11 NOV 1942

TO: C0916
FROM: LONG

RELEASED BY

OPNAV

INFORMATION

MOSCON

PIORITY

REARRRR

DATE

TIME

OCT

TEXT

ACTION

F-00
F-01
F-015
F-0015
F-05
F-07
F-1
F-11
F-2
F-3
F-30
F-31
F-32
F-33
F-34
F-35
F-37
10-00
VC00

(INFO MOSCON ACTION OPNAV)

THERE IS NO OPPORTUNITY HERE TO ASCERTAIN NUMBER OR NATURE OF INDUSTRIES TRANSPLANTED FROM WEST TO EASTERN SIBERIA. VLADIVOSTOK APPEARS HAVE NONE SUCH THAT HAVE BEEN MOVED HERE SINCE START OF WAR. LIKewise NO GOOD ESTIMATE CAN BE MADE OF OUTPUT, STOCK, PILES AND PROVISIONS. IN GENERAL IS MY BELIEF VERY FEW INDUSTRIES HAVE BEEN SO MOVED BUT THAT MANY PEOPLE HAVE BEEN EVACUATED INTO CENTRAL AND EASTERN SIBERIA. THESE NEW ARRIVALS THEN HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TOWARDS EXPANDING FACILITIES ALREADY EXISTENT IN PLACES TO WHICH MOVED. DUE TO TRAFFIC CONGESTION DOUBT IF MUCH MATERIAL HAS MOVED EAST OTHER THAN RAILROAD EQUIPMENT. SUPPLY OF RAW MATERIAL THROUGHTOUT SIBERIA ESTIMATED BE VERY SCARCE.

16.....ACTION

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVregs.)
November 11, 1942

PARAPHRASE

Telegram No. 1006  Dated: November 10, 4 pm
From: Helsinki  Rec'd: November 10, 3:15 pm

According to information which we have received the Germans had made plans late in August to assault Leningrad. Heavy siege guns had been brought into position, troop movements took place and 2 air fleets had been ordered up from the south in support of the proposed attack. Because the promised air support failed to appear, the attack was called off after waiting for 2 weeks. This would seem to be another indication of countermanded orders and a serious difference of opinion on the part of the German High Command which has apparently become characteristic of German military activity since last summer.

SCHOFIELD

ACTION: G-2
INFO. COPIES: OPD, CG AAF

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

No 110 November 9, 1942

From: Moscow
To: MILID

Soviet liaison officer stated following today: situation at Stalingrad could be a lot worse; freezing conditions setting in; Volga about to freeze; conditions improved by freezing of ground; Red Army to conduct a winter offensive; oil supply normal and sufficient to conduct winter offensive; oil situation with Germans very bad; separate peace between Russia and Germany unheard of; outwardly pleased with American invasion; expressed hope of invasion by Americans of Italy; destruction of Hitler to be accomplished in the spring. Further said I would go to front (this is the 4th such answer since October 8th).

 copied

ACTION: OA EA
INFO. COPIES: OPD

CM-IN-4127 (11/10/43) 09322 bjm

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 1, 1973
By DBS Date MAY 2 1 1973

COPY No. 28
From: Baghdad
To: Milid

No. 143, November 9, 1942

Rumors that Germans are withdrawing 50 divisions from entire Russian front heard by British Intelligence Ankara but unconfirmed and discounted here. Referring to your telegram 34 November 7th. No other information available at present.

Baker

WDCMC believes 34 to be 24 (CM-OUT-2093 11/7/42) G-2

ACTION: G-2 \*
INFO. COPIES: OPD

CM-IN-4117 (11/10/42) 0847Z bjm

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 2(E) and 2(D) or (W)
OSD Letter, May 16, 1973
By DBS Date: MAY 21, 1973

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/1994
QUESTION OF SUPPLIES AND PROVISIONS OUTBOUND SHIPS CONTINUES TO BE MAJOR PROBLEM IN NORTH RUSSIA IN SPITE HIGHE SHIPMENTS SO FAR RECEIVED. LACK OF WAREHOUSE SPACE, SAFE STORAGE, FIRE, SECURITY AND SMALL BOAT TRANSPORTATION IN HARBOR AREA CAN ONLY BE SOLVED BY SMALL WELL STOCKED SUPPLY SHIP. IMPOSSIBLE TO PREVENT POORLY FED LOCAL POPULATION FROM THEFT IN SPITE OF LOCKS AND ARMED GUARDS. SIDES OF WAREHOUSES ARE LITERALLY TORN DOWN AND GUARDS ARE BRIBED INTO BLINDNESS. HEAVY LOSSES HAVE BEEN SUFFERED BY THIS AND ALL FOREIGN MISSIONS NOW ARCHANGEL AREA FROM THEFT WHICH WILL INCREASE DURING WINTER. ABOVE QUESTION TAKEN UP WITH BRITISH NAVAL AUTHORITIES WHO CONCUR.

DISTRIBUTION:

RCA. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1942.08.03

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
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<td>EXTENSION NUMBER</td>
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<td>FROM: ALUSHA BEYOCLU</td>
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<td>RELEASED BY</td>
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<td>DATE: 6 NOV 1942</td>
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<td>TCR CODEROOM</td>
<td>1751</td>
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<td>DECIDED BY: KINGSTON</td>
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<td>PARAPHRASED BY: COURTNEY</td>
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Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

LT HATCH 05196 2546

Unless otherwise indicated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME OCT

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<td>F-00</td>
<td>LIASON OFFICER BLACK SEA REPORTS NIGHT OF OCT 23 RUSSIAN</td>
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<tr>
<td>F-01</td>
<td>8 BOATS RAIDED A BAY WEST OF SEVASTOPOL AND PROBABLY SANK</td>
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<td>F-02</td>
<td>1 TANKER. NIGHT OF OCT 23 8 BOATS RAIDED ANAPA AND</td>
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<td>F-03</td>
<td>DESPITE HER BUNK DEFENSE 4 TUG AND 2 T BARCES WERE SUNK.</td>
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<td>F-04</td>
<td>ENEMY 8 BOATS ACTIVE BUT HAVE HAD NO SUCCESS. ON OCT. 24</td>
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<td>F-05</td>
<td>ENEMY SUBMARINE SIGHTED OFF TURKSE. ENEMY AIRCRAFT VERY</td>
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<td>F-06</td>
<td>ACTIVE OFF THIS COAST. A RUSSIAN CONVOY WAS UNSUCCESSFULLY</td>
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<td>F-07</td>
<td>ATTACKED FROM AIR. RUSSIAN PLANES BOMBED ANAPA OCT 24, ONE</td>
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<td>F-08</td>
<td>8 BOAT AND ONE SCHODER SUNK. NIGHT OCT 25 ENEMY ATTEMPTED</td>
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<td>TO LAND FROM 8 30 R BOATS AT A POINT 18 KM SOUTH EAST OF</td>
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<td>NOVOROSSISK, LANDING PARTIES DRIVEN OFF BY ARTILLERY AND</td>
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<td>MACHINE GUN FIRE. SAME NIGHT RUSSIAN 8 BOATS TOOK OFF A</td>
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<td>RECONNAISSANCE PARTY WHICH LANDED A FEW DAYS BEFORE NEAR</td>
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<td>ANAPA. THEY HAD KILLED ONE HUNDRED OF ENEMY AND CAPTURED</td>
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<td>F-14</td>
<td>DOCUMENTS. ENEMY AIRPATROLS ARE</td>
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<td>F-15</td>
<td>NOW OPERATING OFF SULCARIAN</td>
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<th>TEXT</th>
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<tr>
<td>P-60</td>
<td>COAST. LITTLE FIGHTING AT NOVOSSISK RUSSIAN ARTILLERY ARIESE VERY EFFECTIVE. TUAPSE NO LONGER USED AS NAVAL BASE BUT SMALL CRAFT STILL LAND SUPPLIES THERE. DURING THE PAST WEEK ENEMY ADVANCED TO WITHIN 20 RELA BUT HAS NOT BEEN DRIVEN BACK ABOUT 10 MILES WHERE THE RUSSIAN COUNTERATTACK IS HELD. SINCE CAPTURING NAPOIEN ENEMY HAS BEEN HEAVILY FORDERING NAPOIEN.</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-61</td>
<td>AS RECEIVED.</td>
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<tr>
<td>F-11</td>
<td>26.: ACTION</td>
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<td>F-30</td>
<td>CONTRIB .... 19/11 .... 203 .... NAVAIL .... 290P .... FILE.</td>
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Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (6) NAVSHIPS)
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<th>EXTENSION NUMBER</th>
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<th>PRECEDENCE</th>
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<tr>
<td>FROM ALLEN, MOSCOW</td>
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<td>INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.</td>
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UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

ACTION

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TEXT

CORRECT MOSCOW'S 985% OF SEPTEMBER 29 TO READ 70 TANKERS TOTALING 550,000 TONS.

16 . . ACT
COMMON . . . CNO . . 2PG . . NAVAIDE .
200P . . . FILE

SECRET

MAY 21 1973

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
**Confidential**

Schoharie completed loading 1,062 standard poor quality lumber in 9 days at Omea and returned here master and ships company report huge Soviet air base and large troop concentration including tank battalion recently concentrated that port. City and surroundings have not yet been bombed but AA protection much in evidence. One 850' foot berth and 2 450' foot berths available with 15 ft water at low tide but ships can only get within 25 ft from dock because sunken logs and barges and must rig skids to load. Rise and fall tide alongside dock 6 ft. 95' foot channel dredged to 16 ft at low water with 2 foot rise and fall tide. Schoharie loaded 75% of cargo alongside to 17 foot draft and topped off from barges at anchorage in Lea Shoogi Island where good holding ground available. No cranes warehouses or loading facilities on dock other than ships own gear.

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**Confidential**

... (REST OF TEXT CUT OFF)
**NAVAL MESSAGE**

**NAVY DEPARTMENT**

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**PAGE 2 OF 2**

**27222 (FILED ARCHANGEL 36174Col) MCR 3892**

**ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME**

**DATE**

**TIME**

**GCT**

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**TEXT**

NO PROVISIONS FUEL OR REPAIRS AVAILABLE AND ONLY SMALL AMOUNT FRESH WATER OTHER THAN RIVER WHICH IS SUITABLE FOR SCOTCH BOILERS ONLY ONE 5½ HORSE TUG AND ANOTHER 1½ HORSE PEOPLE EXTREMELY HOSPITABLE. BRITISH PROVIDED 1 TRAWLER FOR PROTECTION AS FAR AS JÜGINSKI ISLAND LIGHT OFF CAPE LEVINORLOV WHERE SHIPS MUST ANCHOR OVER NIGHT. NO SHIP PROTECTION ON RETURN ALTHOUGH REQUESTED FROM BRITISH HOWEVER SOVIETS MAINTAINED AIR PATROL AT MY REQUEST.

**ACTION: 16...**

10/11...COMINCH...2JG...F37...NVAID1...200P...FILE.