From: Moscow
To: AGWAR

Nr. 114, 27th December 1943

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff from Dean.

Molotov has given Harriman assurance which would indicate closer collaboration may be expected with the Soviet in the future. Soviet Air Force Command has been directed to begin preliminary conversations on the use of Soviet bases for shuttle bombing. They are also authorized to discuss establishment of Washington Moscow Tehran air route.

Soviet has indicated agreement to use existing facilities to obtain intelligence concerning Japan and to transmit such intelligence through the Military Mission. They have also agreed to exchange information concerning weather in the Far East. Soviet Meteorological Service has been instructed to exchange this information through the Military Mission on a reciprocal basis. Concerning physical surveys of air bases in the Far East, Soviet unprepared to give answer "At this time".

For more detailed account of these agreements, see Harriman's number 113 of 26th Dec to the President.

While these agreements only scratch the surface of the projects we have before Soviet Government and while they are still in the conversational stage, I feel that they are an indication of a change in the attitude and will open the door to further acts of collaboration. I will follow them up at once with view of making these agreements effective as soon as possible.

No Sig

ACTION: JCS (Captain Royal USN)
INFORMATION: OPD, G-2, CG AAF, LOG

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RMP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974
COPY No.

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 1/2/94
CONFIDENTIAL

REDs ANSWER CNO 42239 FOLLOWING ARE ONLY OBSTACLES SET SO FAR THROUGHOUT WAR. MINES PLANTED IN WATER IN APPROACHES TO LANDING BEACHES AND WHERE TROOPS WOULD GO OVER SIDE FROM LANDING BOATS. SOME ARE ON BOTTOM AND OPERATED BY TRIP WIRES. OTHERS SUSPENDED FROM WIRES SUPPORTED BY FIXED DOUGHS. WATER OBSTACLES 3 INCH WIRE CABLE STRUNG BETWEEN POSTS AT A HEIGHT OF ABOUT 30 CENTIMETERS ABOVE WATER. THESE WIRES EACH FROM 100 TO 150 METERS LONG WITH INTERVAL OF ABOUT 10 METERS BETWEEN THEM. DISTANCE FROM THE BEACH 100 METERS OR LESS. AFTER THIS FIRST LINE OF WIRES AT A DISTANCE 20 TO 30 METERS CLOSER TO BEACH.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
A SECOND LINE MADE UP OF SHORTER SECTIONS THAN THE FIRST LINE. THE SECOND LINE OF WIRES COVER THE OPENINGS IN FIRST LINE. BEIDES PROVIDING AN OBSTACLE TO APPROACH THESE WIRES FORCE APPROACHING LANDING BOATS TO TURN BROADSIDE TO FIRE FROM BEACH IN ORDER TO NEGOTIATE OPENING. ADVANCE INFO RECEIVED THAT WHEN PORTS ARE TO BE A ABANDONED IN FUTURE GERMANS PLAN SUSPEND MINES FROM LOG BOOMS FLOATING IN HARBOR. BACKDOOR BEACH DEFENSES BLOCKHOUSES GIVING FULL FIRE COVER OVER AREA TO BE DEFENDED. DEFENSE OF CITY DATE FRONTS CHIEFLY REINFORCED CONCRETE BLOCKHOUSES WITH OCCASION REINFORCED CONCRETE OR BRICK WALL FORMERLY A HOUSE OR FENCE ROOFED OVER AND WITH LOOPHOLES CUT THROUGH DECKS IN FRONT OF DEFENSES MINED AND CAKE BETWEEN

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to deck watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVY)
FIRST AND SUCCEEDING LINES OF DEFENSE. BARBED WIRE
USUALLY IN 2 OR 3 SETS OF POSTS TO FORM ONE
BARRIER 3 OR 4 METERS WIDE. USUALLY TYPE REINFORCED
CONCRETE BLOCKHOUSE HAS 2 OR 3 LOW PLACED LOOPOHLES
EACH COVERING FIRE SECTOR OF 90 DEGREES. WALL
THICKNESS OF 1 METER STOPS 155 MM SHELL. ROOF ABOUT
2 METERS ABOVE GROUND AND LITTLE ATTEMPT AT
GROUTAGE. OCCASIONALLY ARMOR PLATE CUPOLAS
MOUNTED ON FOUNDATION IN DUGOUT. WHERE LOCAL
MATERIALS AVAILABLE BLOCKHOUSES AND DUGOUTS OF CEMENTED
BRICK OR STONE WITH CONCRETE ROOF. IN ISOLATED SPOTS
WHERE MATERIAL LATING LOG DUGOUTS WITH 3 OR 4 LAYERS
LOG ROOF LOOSE STONE AND ABOUT 2 METERS OF EARTH
OVER 300 AND OCCASIONALLY RAILROAD RAILS OF IRON
BARS. THIS TYPE DUGOUT NATURALLY HAS ROOF HIGH ABOVE GROUND AND DIFFICULT TO HIDE. AVERAGE SIZE HOLE IN WHICH DUGOUTS AND BLOCKHOUSES CONSTRUCTED THREE METERS SQUARE BY 2 DEEP. DUGOUTS CONNECTED WITH EACH OTHER AND WITH SUPPORTING FIRE TRENCHES BY COMMUNICATION TRENCHES. OCCASIONAL DUMMY GUNS AND SHELTERS VERY WELL DONE. CONCEALING IN GENERAL VERY POOR AND INEFFECTIVE FROM AIR OR SEA. SECOND AND LAST 24136. MAILING MORE DETAILS ABOVE AND PHOTOS OF DUGOUTS AND BLOCKHOUSES.

*NOTE: AS RECEIVED.

16...ACT

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Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVYREG)

OPNAV-N-814-36

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/14/64

MAY 9 1973

By DS3
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Moscow  
To: AGWAR  
No. 122114/72/11, 21 December 1943

From Deane for C-2.

Some notes given me by the Chief of the British Military Mission on air support of ground troops follow. They record the results of conversations with Soviet General Staff on the subject:

Support for ground troops in the attack and before the attack, support is divided into 2 phases:

(A) Bombing attacks on successive nights against front line defenses, reserve localities, communication centers, etc. These attacks are carried out on a wide front with the object of softening the defenses, tiring out the defenders and lowering their morale.

(B) Attacks by bombers and Sturmovikas in conjunction with the artillery preparation. These attacks are concentrated on the front of the main thrust with the object of further softening the defenses and pinning down the defenders.

Once the attack has started, the Air Force attacks centers of resistance which are holding up the advance. This type of support is almost invariably employed. It is again normally concentrated on the front of the main thrust, and during the first day of an attack, is normally maintained continuously by successive groups of aircraft.

Attacks on MT columns: Such attacks are normally carried out by day. Night operations of this type are effective only on very bright nights owing to the difficulty of locating and hitting the target.

The success of such attacks is dependent on early info of the appearance of suitable targets and
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: AGWAR
To: AGWAR
No.: 122114/TZ/11, 21 December 1943

full intelligence as to direction of movement, speed, AA defenses etc.

The attacks are carried out by small groups of 6 to 9 aircraft—either bombers, fighters or Sturmoviks.

Bombers operate at heights of from 800 to 2,000 meters, according to the density of the AA fire. Either level or dive bombing is used. If the AA fire is weak, the bombing attack is followed by a low level attack with MGs.

Sturmoviks operate at any height from 50 to 12,000 meters. They prefer to operate at as low an altitude as possible, although this increases the difficulty of locating the target. When operating in an area where enemy fighter air craft are liable to be met, Sturmoviks themselves require fighter protection. In a typical operation, 6 Sturmoviks were protected by 5 fighters. They attack with bombs, cannon, and MGs, and the column is attacked several times in quick succession.

Fighters attack in a similar manner to Sturmoviks if no enemy fighters are in the vicinity. They carry no bombs, but attack with cannon and MGs. German NZ columns are normally protected by AA machine guns and small caliber AA guns; occasionally, medium caliber guns are included in the column. More intense flak is met with from Panzer columns.

A surprise attack gives the greatest chance of success. Surprise is achieved by attack from unexpected direction from out of cloud, or out of the sun, or by hedgehopping, in which case additional cover is provided by the dust raised by the moving column.

If surprise is impossible, certain aircraft are detailed to attack the AA defenses, while the remainder attack the column.

Recognition signals: The Russians agree that it is extremely difficult to distinguish from the air between one's own troops and the enemy. They consider that they most satisfactory means of indicating friendly troops are smoke and light signals.

CM-IN-14651 (23 Dec 43)

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NLR 101
By RT, NASA, Date 4/1/44

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Other signals are employed, but none of these present any unusual feature. As an example in one attack, the infantry forward positions were indicated by light signals fired vertically and by ground panels; the flanks of the break through were marked by smoke, and targets were indicated by light signals fired on to them. These methods are said to have enabled the supporting aircraft to sustain attacks on targets 300 to 400 meters in front of their own advancing infantry.

The system of laying down a "Bomb-line" is never used.

Aircraft versus tank: Russians make considerable use of cannon attacks on tanks. The 37mm cannon can knock out a medium tank. Fire should be directed at the sides or back from a dive not steeper than 30 degrees and at a range not greater than 450 degrees and the range should not be greater than 400 meters.

The Russians advocate attacking tanks from the back rather than from the side.

The Hurricane 2D (may be 11D) has not yet been used to any extent by the Russians, but Sturmovik suffers heavy casualties if it encounters dense flak at low altitudes. In such cases, it is forced to increase height and alter its tactics with consequent loss of effect. The Sturmovik is most successful against concentrations of troops or WT with weak AA defenses.

Control of Air Forces in close support of ground troops: The Command Post of the Air Force Commander is established near the Command Post of the Commander controlling the Land Forces. Communication is maintained by WT.

Use is also made of Liaison Officers who form part of the staff of every force of all arms. These officers are provided with WT. Their task is to pass back to the Commander all demands for air support, to direct the Air Force on to the target, and to report on the results of the attacks.
The general plan for air support is prepared in advance. Given this, the Russians consider that there is no particular difficulty in controlling air support.

No Sig

"Being Serviced"

ACTION: GEN STRONG

INFORMATION: GEN HARDY
JT/S (CAPT ROYAL, USN)
GEN ARNOLD
LOG

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

CM-IN-14651 (23 Dec 43) 1944Z mos

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24-529046800
The White House Map Room
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Colonel Chester Hammond

Gentlemen:

I am transmitting herewith one copy of R & A No. 1570, "Russian Foreign Economic Relations and Her Interests in International Monetary Stabilization", prepared in the Research and Analysis Branch of this office and classified as confidential.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

William L. Banger
Director, Branch of Research & Analysis

Enclosure

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By [Signature] Date MAY 21 1973
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Research and Analysis Branch

R & A No. 1570

RUSSIAN FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS
AND HER INFLUENT IN
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY STABILIZATION

Description
A study of the trends in Russia's foreign trade
and an analysis of her foreign exchange and trade
policies from the point of view of their effect on
her attitude towards proposed monetary stabilization
schemes.

13 December 1943

Copy No. 54

DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED letter 1-11-75
State Sec. letter 1-11-74
MAY 21 1973
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State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By_ Date_MAY 21_1973

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/73
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RUSSIAN FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS
AND HER INTEREST IN
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY STABILIZATION

Summary and Conclusions

1. As a state monopoly, Russia's foreign trade is conducted by government agencies. Subject to the reservation that Russia's foreign trade is greatly affected by economic and political developments abroad, this sector of the Soviet economy is administered in accord with the over-all economic plans.

2. Prior to the present war Russia's foreign trade was much smaller than that of Tsarist Russia, in relation both to her national product and to the total volume of world trade. In 1937 the Russian share of world trade amounted to little more than one per cent. Under the impetus of the intensive drive for industrialization, initiated under the First Five-Year Plan, the volume of trade increased sharply and almost reached the pre-revolutionary level. With the development of an independent industrial base, however, the volume of foreign trade tapered off. In the case of a few commodities, Russia's exports continued to bulk large in world trade, but her dependence on imports had almost ceased by the outbreak of the war.

3. While the international political and military situation after the war is expected to increase Russia's feeling of security, she will not be willing to sacrifice her self-sufficiency with respect to strategically important items in the interest of higher living standards.

4. Committed thus to self-sufficiency in basic industries and in agriculture, Russia will not enjoy in the production of export goods comparative advantages great enough to warrant concentration of any large amount of resources on their output for the purpose of paying for sizeable imports of consumption goods. If after the war, as before, Russia should have to balance her imports by an equal amount of exports, no substantial increase in the volume of her foreign trade could be expected.
Even in the postwar reconstruction period, if no foreign credits are forthcoming, Russia's foreign trade will be severely limited by the fact that the resources that might be used to pay for a large increase in imports can also be used most advantageously for the direct satisfaction of domestic needs.

5. Should long-term foreign loans be available to the Russians, however, they probably would be prepared to expand correspondingly their imports in the immediate postwar period, and possibly to maintain them for some time thereafter at a higher level than before the war. On the other hand, Russians would be reluctant to use short-term credits, over and above those required for ordinary working-capital purposes, to finance more than the most urgent reconstruction needs.

While a large part of Russia's reconstruction needs may be met out of reparations from Germany, it can be expected that Russia will still be interested in foreign loans.

6. Prior to the war, gold was the most important single Russian export. So long as the purchasing power of gold remains at the high prewar level, this commodity should continue to be a major item of export after the war. In 1940 Russia's annual gold production had reached some six million ounces.

7. Because of the fact that Soviet foreign trade is a government monopoly, an agreement to stabilize foreign exchanges would affect Russian interests quite differently from those of other countries.

Except in the case of transactions with foreigners sojourning in Russia, foreign exchange rates have purely an accounting function in the USSR. An agreement to stabilize the ruble at a particular rate would in no way affect any decisions of Russia with respect to the volume and character of her foreign trade. Accordingly, Russia's attitude towards the proposed stabilization agreements will be determined by the following more indirect considerations, all of which will lead her to be favorably disposed towards such arrangements:
(a) While the Russians have participated in numerous bilateral trade agreements, their foreign economic relations have been to a large extent multilateral. Fluctuations in the exchange rates as between foreign currencies could cause considerable embarrassment to the Russians in meeting their commitments and would make more difficult the planning of their foreign trade.

(b) As a large gold producer Russia will be vitally interested in any monetary stabilization program that ties foreign currencies to gold at a satisfactory parity level.

(c) To the extent that the Russians contract long-term foreign loans, their interest in the stabilization of exchange probably will be enhanced, especially if the exchange stabilization programs are associated with measures to prevent large scale declines in world prices.

(d) To the extent that the envisaged international monetary organization will prove a source of additional foreign credits to Russia, this may be a further inducement to her participation in such an arrangement.

3. The fears that the Russians might undermine a monetary stabilization agreement by using their monopoly position in foreign trade to dump surpluses abroad are entirely unfounded, while the official ruble equivalents of Russian export prices, as quoted in foreign currencies, are generally far below the prices at which these goods are sold at home, this resemblance to the familiar price pattern which is established by the dumping of private monopolists is purely superficial, and is explained by the fact that the Russians gave the ruble in terms of foreign currencies an arbitrarily high accounting value. However, the Russians might conceivably cut export prices on occasion in order to capture a foreign market or to exert political pressure.
I. INTRODUCTION

The Soviet Government finds itself in the unique position of being immune to numerous technical difficulties faced by other countries participating in the present international monetary negotiations.

Thus Russia's attitude toward the problem of monetary stabilization will reflect directly its basic policies with respect to foreign trade.

This memorandum draws its conclusion in respect to Russia's probable attitude in the forthcoming monetary negotiations from an analysis of the basic trends and prospects of her foreign economic relations and from a study of her foreign exchange and trade practices.

II. PREWAR FOREIGN TRADE DEVELOPMENTS AND FOREIGN TRADE POLICIES

A. Policy of Industrialization and its Relation to Foreign Trade

1. Russia's share in the world's international trade after the Revolution, although fluctuating very considerably, was much smaller than before the First World War. From 3.0 per cent in 1913 it went down to about 1.4 per cent in 1928. This relative contraction of trade was even more pronounced if compared with the development of Russia's total output. According to some Russian statistics, the share of Russia's total production which went into exports declined from 11.6 per cent in 1913 to 0.3 per cent in 1938. A trend towards further decline was clearly discernible. The reasons for this development are manifold. The inauguration of the vast industrialization and self-sufficiency program in 1920 is, however, the most outstanding one.

2. Since 1920, when the First Five-Year Plan was launched, Russia's foreign trade has been conducted in accordance with the basic considerations underlying her general economic policy. Having adopted the goal of rapid industrialization and being unable to obtain long-term foreign loans, the Soviet government initiated a drastic program of "forced saving." The high rate at which this investment was carried out entailed a ruthless curtailment of civilian consumption, and direction
of a large share of the nation's economic effort into laying the foundations of a new industrial economy. The process of industrialization was considered to be indissolubly bound up with the achievement of socialism in Russia and with the defense of the socialist state against foreign enemies.

3. A large part of the capital equipment required for the realization of the First Five-Year Plan could not be produced at home and had thus to be imported. Long-term foreign loans being, however, barred to the Soviet Union at this time, the foreign exchange necessary for such purchases could be secured only by exports of commodities and of gold. Commodities suitable for export were available only in insufficient quantities. The smallness and backwardness of the Russian industry precluded the development of industrial exports. At the same time the conditions prevailing in agriculture rendered the total agricultural output barely adequate to maintain a population growing by leaps and bounds. The productivity of labor was distressingly low in the characteristic small-scale units of Russian agriculture; without enlargement of units and mechanization of operations it would have been difficult to realize either a substantial saving of labor or a considerable increase in output. The only important export item that was rather flexible in output was gold, and the Soviet government made all possible efforts to step up its production.

4. Thus, except for gold and some other less important items, a significant increase, at an early date, in the total output of goods suitable for export was impossible. The Soviet government was forced, therefore, in spite of heavy costs and dangerous political friction involved, to reduce severely the domestic consumption. In this way sizeable quantities of grain, cotton textiles, flax, lumber, and other commodities in very short supply at home, were made available for export. In spite of this "high pressure" even in the crucial years of the First Five-Year Plan, total exports amounted to only about 70 per cent of Russia's pre-revolutionary exports.

The imports had to be confined to the narrow limits drawn by the export potentialities. For the most part, only items which could not possibly be supplied by domestic industry were acquired abroad. The Great Depression which fell precisely into this period aggravated the situation.
In foreign markets, the prices of raw materials which Russia exported dropped much more than the prices of the commodities which she had to import, and the terms of international trade turned sharply against her. Most important among the raw materials for which the Soviet Union was the only important Russian export item was the purchasing power of which on the international market was enhanced by the world-wide depression. The net exports of gold paid, accordingly, during the last two years of the First Five-Year Plan, for about 30 per cent of the total Russian imports. A mitigating factor was Russia's ability to take advantage of the competition among exporters during the depression, and to procure some credits in foreign countries. Short-term as they were, they nevertheless permitted her to raise the value of her imports during the period covered by the First Five-Year Plan above the value of her exports by about two billion rubles (as calculated in rubles of 1936 gold parity).

5. The inauguration of the Second Five-Year Plan marked a turning point in the development of Russian foreign trade. Having obtained the most indispensable equipment from abroad and having completed the first stage of a tremendous construction program at home, Russian industry itself came into a position of supplying most of the prerequisites of further investment programs. Imports of industrial equipment and such materials as iron and steel could, therefore, be curtailed or entirely discontinued. At the same time the increasing demands of domestic industry, combined with a moderate rise in the living standards of the population, as well as a large program of strategic stock piling, absorbed an ever growing share of domestic products previously earmarked for export.

The volume of foreign trade thus fell off sharply, and, in spite of more favorable prices prevailing on the world markets, the average annual value of exports, during the Second Five-Year Plan, was about 75-80 per cent lower than in the peak years of the First Five-Year Plan.

The composition of Russian exports began also to reflect the changing structure of the domestic economy. Significantly enough, industrial commodities like tractors and machine tools now made their entrance into the list of Russian export items, and imports consisted increasingly of products technically unobtainable in Russia (coffee, and the like), and of certain raw materials (like crude rubber) required for industrial and stock piling purposes.
The fundamental character of this transition is emphasized by several other changes: Russia began to show a favorable balance of trade; she was in the position to liquidate almost entirely the foreign indebtedness incurred in the early thirties; and she was for a time able to keep her annual gold exports below the current rate of output.

6. Had not the war interrupted this development, Russia's share in world trade might have shrunk even further in spite of the continuous expansion of the volume of new capital investments and of production in Russia. Except for a number of minor items, she would have become virtually independent of imports. At the same time, except for a few items of which she had "genuine export surpluses" (like lumber, furs, etc.), she could hardly yet have entered world markets as a large exporter.
### D. Foreign Trade Development

1. The development of Russia's foreign trade from 1910 to 1930 is presented in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Export</th>
<th>Import</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thousand</td>
<td>Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910-13</td>
<td>24,596.6</td>
<td>6,023.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>24,118.8</td>
<td>6,208.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>20.9</td>
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<td>1915</td>
<td>29.2</td>
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<td>1917</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>23.3</td>
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<td>1921(Jan.-Sept.)</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>43.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922-23</td>
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<td>277.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1924-25</td>
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<td>2,447.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1927-28</td>
<td>9,073.0</td>
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<td>1928(Oct.-Dec.)</td>
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<td>446.3</td>
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<td>1937</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>10,697.0</td>
<td>1,069.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Notes:
- a/ All figures, except the ones for 1930, are from Vneshniaia Torgovliya SSR as 20 lot 1910-1937 (Foreign Trade of the USSR), for 20 years, 1910-1937, Moscow 1938, p. 11. The figures for 1930 are taken from Vneshniaia Torgovliya (Foreign Trade), December 1930.
- b/ It should be noted that only the figures from 1923 on are completely comparable, since in earlier years both the territory and the methods of computations were different.
- c/ All ruble amounts are in terms of the 1936 gold parity. One pre-1936 gold ruble is equivalent of 4.30 new gold rubles. To obtain a rough value of Russian imports and exports, the ruble values have to be divided by 5.
These statistics show that the value of Russia's foreign trade was largest during the three crucial years of the First Five-Year Plan. The increase in the volume of exports from 1929 to 1930, as compared with the increase in their value, reflects the low prices received for Russian exports during the Great Depression. The urgent need for foreign equipment forced the Russians to step up the volume of their exports to finance their purchases abroad. These exports were supplemented by short-term credits and by shipments of gold. 1/ The excess of imports over exports reached in the four years of the First Five-Year Plan about 1.3 billion rubles. At the end of the First Five-Year Plan, the first stage of the industrialization program was completed and Russia was able to produce most of the equipment necessary for further capital investment. Accordingly, the volume of imports was decreased during the Second Five-Year Plan, and the necessity of further forced exports was much reduced. The total volume of foreign trade dropped by about 70 per cent to a level which prevailed through 1935. Although trade statistics for the last prewar years have not been published, available information indicates that no marked changes in this trend took place prior to the outbreak of the war.

The diminishing importance of foreign trade in the Soviet economy is reflected by the following figures, which present Russian exports as a percentage of gross domestic output: 2/

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>3.5</td>
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<td>1.3</td>
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<td>1936</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1/ Cf. Appendix D.

2/ D. D. Mishustin, Vneshniaia zaryaovliya i industrializatsiya, Moscow, 1935, p. 59. Although the author does not explain the method by which these comparisons were calculated, it appears justifiable to use them as reflecting a trend known also from other evidence.
The composition of exports and imports changed in accord with the changing structure of the Russian economy. While during the First Five-Year Plan, machinery constituted 51 per cent of total imports, during the Second Five-Year Plan, machinery represented only 36 per cent of a much reduced total. 1

The following indices show the increase of the domestic output of machinery, as compared with the decline in the imports of similar equipment: 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domestic output</th>
<th>Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>612</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the early years of industrialization Russia had to acquire abroad large quantities of metals. Thus during the First Five-Year Plan, over 3 million tons of ferrous and 0.5 million tons of non-ferrous metals were imported. 3

Except for an insignificant tonnage of high-grade steel, ferrous metals disappeared entirely from the bill of imported goods during the time of the Second Five-Year Plan. Despite the increase in the domestic output of non-ferrous metals, imports continued on a substantial scale, presumably largely for stockpiling purposes.

In 1933-1937, the Russians increased somewhat their purchases of raw materials for the production of consumers' goods, particularly wool and leather.

1/ D. D. Mishustin, op. cit., p. 86.
2/ Ibid., p. 56. The reservations made in footnote 2, page 8, apply also to these statistics.
3/ Vneshniaia Torgovlya SSSR (Foreign Trade of the USSR), Moscow, 1934, p. 106.
The main shift in the composition of exports was from agricultural products to raw and semi-manufactured industrial commodities.

CHIEF ARTICLES OF EXPORTS

(in million 1938 rubles)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodities</th>
<th>1926-1928</th>
<th>1929-1930</th>
<th>1932-1933</th>
<th>1936</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grain</td>
<td>2,606</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leguminous vegetables</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber mill products</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butter</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil-sea</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furs</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hides and leather</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manganese ore</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical products (inc. fertilizer)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton textiles</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plex</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron, steel, &amp; their products</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machines and equipment</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


With respect to lumber, petroleum, manganese ore, coal, textile fibers and furs, Russia occupied an important place in the world markets. As the expanding Russian economy was absorbing increasing quantities of the domestic output, however, exports of these commodities declined during the period of the Second Five-Year Plan.
C. Foreign Credits

After the inauguration of the First Five-Year Plan the Soviet government made repeated efforts to obtain long-term foreign loans. These efforts were unsuccessful. The Soviet government's refusal to recognize any loans contracted before the Revolution as well as the general Russian attitude towards private property, rendered Russian issues unmarketable abroad. At the same time, foreign governments refused to guarantee long-term commitments of the Soviet Union. Such guarantees were forthcoming, however, for short-term credits. These were usually granted to the Russians with the stipulation that the proceeds should be spent in the lending countries. The interest charged for such credits was high, running up in some cases to 10 per cent per annum. Germany was the principal source of these short-term credits, but such loans were also obtained in Britain, Italy, and other countries.

Because of the stipulation that the proceeds be spent in the countries of origin, the Russians occasionally refrained from utilizing fully the credit facilities made available. Where governmental guarantees were unobtainable, the Russians occasionally had recourse to private short-term borrowing. The interest rates charged in these transactions were exorbitant and the Russians made use of such credits only under conditions of great stringency.

Under the First Five-Year Plan, short-term foreign credits were relied on not only to meet immediate needs for working capital, but also to finance to a very limited extent the industrialization program. Under the Second Five-Year Plan the volume of short-term credit currently outstanding was sharply reduced, and the total indebtedness accumulated in the years of the First Five-Year Plan, which at one point reached about £1.2 billion was largely liquidated.
III. PROSPECTS FOR THE POSTWAR PERIOD

A. The Period of Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

Russia will emerge from this war with the living standards of very large groups of its population approaching the state of destitution and the productive capacity of its industry and agriculture considerably below the prewar levels. At the same time the balance between the various branches of its national economy, as compared with their prewar relationships, will have been shifted markedly in the direction of greater industrialization. With its agriculture and consumers' goods industries damaged very badly, Russia has been able to maintain the capacity of its heavy and of some of its extractive industries at a relatively high level.

Greatly deficient in all kinds of goods and materials, Russia, immediately after the cessation of hostilities, will not find itself in possession of any relative surpluses (with a possible exception of oil) which it can export in exchange for more immediately needed commodities. At the end of a two-year reconstruction period, the Donets coal basin can be expected to yield an exportable surplus of 10 million tons of coal.

Beyond that, the Russians will pay for their imports with their current gold output, which before the war reached $200 million dollars per annum, and with withdrawals from their existing gold reserve, which amounts to approximately 1,500-2,000 million dollars.

Russia may accept limited foreign relief for some of its most ravaged areas, but cannot be expected to become a purchaser of very large quantities of food or consumers' goods.

In the reconstruction of its industrial plant, Russia will rely to as great an extent as possible upon German reparations in kind. These will have to include transfers of various types of industrial equipment and perhaps direct German labor services to be used mainly in housing construction and for other kinds of public works.

To speed up the reconstruction process and to further the fulfillment of its long-term investment program, Russia will be desirous of obtaining as soon as possible substantial foreign loans. These most likely will be used mainly to finance the importation of capital goods and to a much lesser degree for foreign purchases of consumers' goods.

During the latter part of the reconstruction period, and until livestock herds are restored to the prewar level, a sizeable surplus of grain also may be available for export.
E. Probable Economic Trends and Their Effects on Foreign Trade

1. It seems almost certain that the attainment of a high degree of industrialization, comparable to that of the leading Western countries, will still be a supreme goal of successive Russian economic plans to be inaugurated after the conclusion of the period of immediate postwar rehabilitation and reconstruction. New investments of large volume, in industry and agriculture, will almost certainly be resumed soon.

With the increase in national income, the policy of allowing a controlled rise in living standards (characteristic of the last prewar Five-Year Plan) can be expected to be systematically pursued. The rate of this rise will, to a large extent, depend on the international political and military situation. If present trends continue and the international regime of collective security is successfully developed, the share of the Russian national income diverted to consumption should increase markedly. A favorable political situation could also have an immediate effect in the same direction, if it leads to the granting to Russia of substantial long-term credits. These would enable the Soviet government to finance its investment program with a smaller volume of domestic saving.

2. Before the war the industrialization process had reduced Russian participation in world trade almost to a vanishing point. It is unlikely that in the foreseeable future the continued industrialization will proceed so far as to make Russia a large-scale exporter of industrial commodities and importer of raw materials, not to say of agricultural products.

Increased domestic consumption will be supported primarily by the development of the domestic production of basic articles of mass consumption. At the same time, however, the raising of living standards will probably require increasing resort to imports of highly fabricated types of consumers' goods. To pay for these imports, Russia might expand her exports of certain industrial raw materials and agricultural products. While exports of some finished industrial products to less developed adjoining countries may be expected to increase, the volume of such trade will remain strictly limited for a long time. At the same time Russia will continue to obtain from abroad certain specialized industrial products.
The indicated diversification of foreign trade has been and will continue to be a subsidiary objective of Russian foreign trade policies, for the reason that such diversification lessens the impact of instability in world markets on her planned domestic economy. The same type of consideration obviously will place Russia on the side of countries interested in the establishment and maintenance of stable exchange rates after the war.

3. So long as Russia must continue to pay for her imports with current exports, the development of her foreign trade will be narrowly circumscribed. Even if the postwar international situation should be such as to allay Russian feelings of insecurity, she cannot be expected to allow her self-sufficiency with respect to basic strategic supplies to be weakened in the interest of an improvement in living standards.

If long-term credits are made available to the Russians, however, the volume of her trade may be expected to increase correspondingly. In the absence of such credits, Russia’s exports in the postwar period would probably be quite small; hence such foreign credits will probably lead to an increase in imports, rather than to a further shrinkage of exports.

With such credits the Russians will be able to undertake the long overdue modernization and extension of their railroad system, as well as to accelerate the expansion of their industrial plant, including that of the lagging consumption goods industries. Thus the increased imports might be expected to consist largely of railroad and industrial equipment and machinery.

Among the export industries which the Russians can be expected to develop in anticipation of future interest payments, the coal industry will certainly be one of the most important. Russia’s attitude toward foreign loans thus will be affected in no small measure by the organization of the postwar international coal market.
IV. RUSSIAN FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND TRADE
PRACITCES AND THE PROTOCOL MANDATING
STABILIZATION AGREEMENTS

A. Foreign Exchange Practice

1. As might be expected, in view of the fact that the
government is itself the monopolist of foreign trade, the
Russians have dispensed entirely with the mechanism of a
foreign exchange market to assure that their foreign
accounts are currently in balance. This function is per-
formed by the government, through appropriate departments
and agencies. /1/

The procedure followed, in principle at least, is
simple. Transactions with foreigners are conducted directly
in terms of foreign currency, the foreign exchange realized
from the sales of exports and from other sources being applied
by the government — again, through the departments and
agencies concerned — to the purchase of imports and to foreign
payments on other accounts. Foreign traders thus have no
rubles either to buy or sell. Through its planned adminis-
tration of foreign trade and of other foreign transactions
and its day to day control over them, the government is able
to assure that current requirements for foreign exchange can
be met — if not from the balances on hand available on
current account, then from accumulated balances of exchange
or stocks of gold, or from foreign credits.

2. The state's trading monopoly, however, does not obviate
the need to relate the ruble in some systematic way to foreign
currencies. For internal bookkeeping purposes, purchases
and sales abroad must be converted into the internal unit of
account, and, accordingly, at least accounting exchange rates
must be established. Ruble exchange rates which serve this
purpose are in fact quoted in the USSR, the agency performing
this task being the State Bank. Prior to the war these rates
were also the rates at which tourists and other foreigners
sojourning in the USSR might legally exchange their currency
for rubles.

/1/ Details on the agencies administering Russian foreign
trade are presented in Appendix A of this report.
3. Oddly enough, these exchange rates, at least before the war, were essentially the gold parity rates prevailing between the ruble and other currencies. For nominally the Soviet currency continues to be tied to gold; indeed, the Tsarist gold parity for the ruble was one of the few pre-revolutionary institutions that was revived in the 1920's and survived even the liquidation of the New Economic Policy. This parity was abandoned in 1936, however, when, as the upshot of a decree revaluing the ruble in terms of francs, the gold content of the ruble was in effect reduced from the old rate of .76 grams of fine gold to .10 grams. 

A translation of the decree of 1936 devaluing the ruble is presented in a note below. 


2/ Decree Revaluing the Ruble, 23 February 1936. The Council of Commissars of the USSR decrees:

1. To request the National Commissariat of Foreign Trade and of Finances of the USSR to apply, from April 1, 1936, the exchange rate of 1 ruble = 3 francs in all the accounts of export and import organizations and in all other currency operations.

2. To request the State Bank of the USSR to carry out the purchase and sale of foreign currency, both from export and import organizations, and in all other currency operations by applying the rate of 1 ruble = 3 francs.

3. In correspondence with Articles 1 and 2 of the present decree, the State Bank of the USSR is authorized to revalue, according to the status on April 1, 1936, the balances of gold and exchange it has on hand.

From: Collected Decrees, First Section, Decree No. 26. This decree followed one of 14 November 1936 which established the new exchange rate for the sale of currency to foreigners sojourning in the USSR.
establishing the ruble-franc rate as the point of departure for foreign exchange calculations presumably was that France was one of the few countries still on a free gold standard. Let it be thought that the ruble was thereby tied to the franc, it should be remarked at once that when the gold content of the franc was in turn reduced in the latter part of 1936, the franc-ruble rate was altered appropriately—from 5 to 1 before the devaluation of the franc, to 4.25 to 1 after. 1

In the case of countries whose currencies were not tied to gold, however, it seems clear that the Soviet practice was to fix the ruble exchange rate on the basis of the free market exchange rate between the foreign currency and that of a country whose currency was tied to gold. The language of the decree just referred to would suggest that after 1936 this country was France. Whether the market value of the franc also was taken as the point of departure in determining the day to day relation of the ruble to those currencies that were tied to gold is uncertain. In keeping their international accounts the Soviet authorities apparently do not adhere rigidly to the gold parity rates of exchange, but reckon with the short-run market conditions affecting the value of different currencies. 2

4. Taking into account the devaluation of the dollar in 1933 as well as the ruble devaluation of 1936, the ruble-dollar gold parity since 1924, when the Soviets reverted to the old gold ruble, is as follows: 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Rubles to Dollar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1924-32</td>
<td>1.94 rubles = 1 dollar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934-36</td>
<td>1.15 rubles = 1 dollar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936-</td>
<td>5.06 rubles = 1 dollar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1/ Arnold, op. cit., p. 449.


3/ Compiled from figures in A. Z. Arnold, op. cit.
Subject to the reservation that the current ruble-dollar rate quoted by the State Bank might differ in some measure from the parity rate, this rate of 5.06 rubles to a dollar is the rate at which, after 1936, sales of exports to the US and purchases of imports therefrom were converted from dollars to rubles in the accounts of the state trading agencies. The exact rate at which rubles were sold to tourists in the summer of 1937 seems to have been 5.00 rubles to a dollar.

5. It goes without saying that the fact that the ruble has a fixed gold content in no way implies that gold is made available on these terms to private citizens, either Russian or foreign. Nor does it follow that the gold parity determines the price at which state gold producing enterprises are remunerated for their product, though what accounting price is in fact used in this case is not known.

It should be remarked finally that, though black markets for rubles have been operated abroad as well as in Russia, tourists and other persons sojourning in Russia who wish to exchange their currency for rubles may do so legally only through a state agency. No legal free market for rubles exists.

B. The Internal and External Value of the Ruble

1. While the inflationary spiral movement that followed the revolution was halted temporarily by the Soviet authorities in 1934, prices remained far above the prewar level, and they continued to rise thereafter. By the end of 1936, according to the official Soviet cost of living index, prices were 214 per cent of prewar. One writer has calculated that in 1937 the prices of six living-standard items, of which five were foods, were on the average almost 14 times those of 1913.

Since the cost of living must have risen much more than prices in general, these figures cannot be taken as representative. But they strongly suggest that the ruble was

1/ TSO, Statisticheskii Spravochnik SSSR, za 1922 god., Moscow, 1923, p. 725.

2/ Prokopovich, Bulletin, November-December, 1937.
considerably overvalued in terms of foreign currencies after 1924. The establishment of special shops in 1931 for foreigners in possession of foreign currencies was a tacit acknowledgment of this fact by the government, though, at this time, it should be noted, rationing and a dual price system were in operation. The devaluation of the ruble by about 50 per cent in 1936—the special shops for foreigners were liquidated at the same time—presumably also was premised on the assumption that the ruble had been overvalued.

2. A glance at the figures in the table below, however, strongly suggests that even this drastic devaluation did not bring the ruble exchange rates into line with any sort of purchasing power parity. For the foods listed in the table the average ruble price realized from exports in 1936 apparently was about a tenth of the retail prices realized from the sale of these goods in Moscow. 1/ Since the commodities studied are all foods, these price relations cannot be extrapolated with any assurance to all of Russia's export trade, but together they represent an important sector of the total.

1/ The average export prices are computed by dividing the total ruble value of the different exports for the year, as it is published in the Soviet trade statistics, by the physical quantity of the export. For the early months of 1936, it is clear, the Soviet officials revalued the exports to reflect the later devaluation of the ruble.
### Retail Prices in Moscow in January, 1936

AND CALCULATED AVERAGE EXPORT PRICES IN 1936
FOR SPECIFIED COMMODITIES, USSR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Retail prices</th>
<th>Calculated average export price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wheat flour</strong></td>
<td><strong>Roubles</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moscow January, 1936 a/</td>
<td>1.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Rye flour</td>
<td>1.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Butter</td>
<td>14.00-20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Sugar</td>
<td>5.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**a/ From L. E. Hubbard, Soviet Money and Finance, London, 1936, p. 197.**

**b/ Calculated from data in Vneshnyaya Torgovlya SSSR za 20 let, 1918-1937, Moscow, 1939, and GUSISTEPI Vneshei Torgovlii SSSR, December 1938.**

Information is not at hand to permit a satisfactory appraisal of the relation between ruble export prices and ruble costs of production, but if costs are understood in the usual economic sense of the value of an opportunity foregone, the ruble export prices clearly were below ruble costs.

3. Presumably, in the case of imports a reverse situation obtains, though here it should be noted that many of the items that Russia imports are not produced at all in the USSR, and that only a quite small share of them are disposed of on the consumers' goods market and accordingly are sold at prices which are not merely accounting prices.
C. Russia's Interests in Stabilized Ruble Exchange Rates

1. It should be evident from the above that the level of the ruble exchange rate with foreign currencies is a matter of little moment to the Soviet authorities. Apparently the Soviet authorities are deterred not at all from exporting goods by the fact that they incur large ruble losses in doing so; patently, even if the Soviets were disposed to load it, the large ruble profit that might be earned on imports could not in itself be the basis for expanding the overall volume of these imports.

Evidently the only way in which the exchange rates affect the volume of Soviet trade is through the effect of these rates on tourist traffic. With respect to this item, it is worth noting that the ruble devaluation of 1936 may have been motivated in part by a desire to liquidate, without imposing an undue hardship on foreigners, the special low-price shops that had been maintained for their benefit since 1924. The Soviets have shown no disposition, however, to undervalue the ruble for the benefit of tourists.

2. Clearly the Soviets would have little cause to oppose stabilization of the ruble exchange rates. Indeed, if the present experience is indicative, they should have reasons of their own for desiring such an arrangement. On the whole, after 1924, their behavior with respect to the foreign exchange was a model of bourgeois virtue; only one devaluation was indulged in, up to the outbreak of the war.

As to their reasons for desiring a stable ruble exchange rate, one consideration perhaps is administrative convenience: fluctuating exchange rates, for example, should make it more difficult to estimate in advance the ruble balance realized from foreign trade and to arrange internal financial plans on this basis. At the same time an analysis of past records for the purpose of determining future policies would be rendered more difficult.

"It might be ventured that "sound" principles of socialist bookkeeping would also dictate that the foreign exchange rates bear some relation to prices in different countries, and that, at the same time, the ruble profit or loss realized from exports and imports, under the application of such rates, should be taken into account by the socialist administrators in determining their trade policies."
But such considerations have not troubled the Soviet authorities. It cannot be expected that Russia's adherence to an exchange stabilization agreement would itself restrict her in any way to determining the volume and character of her foreign trade.

3. The foregoing is not to be taken to imply that the Russians have no interest in the stabilization of foreign currencies with respect to one another. Because of the fact that Russia's foreign trade is to a large extent multilateral, international exchange fluctuations are obviously a matter of real concern to her. Such fluctuations could be a source of real embarrassment to her in meeting her foreign commitments; at the same time they make more difficult her planned administration of foreign trade. While exchange fluctuations also might be an occasional source of gain to Russia, it may be taken as a matter of course that the possibility of such gains will not be considered by her to be as important as the potential disadvantages of such fluctuations.

D. Dumping

1. A Soviet agreement to stabilize the rouble exchanges evidently would have little more than symbolic value. Doubtless the agreement would be of some value none the less; but if the commitment by one participant in an international exchange agreement has such a limited character, the question inevitably arises as to whether the agreement itself can have a fair chance of success.

This question, perhaps, could be disposed of without more ado, merely by reference to the very limited role in world commerce that the Russians have occupied. There is some reason to believe, however, that the Russian share of world trade may increase after the war. Furthermore, in

1/ This is not to imply, however, that the relative profits and losses earned on different commodities are a matter of indifference to the Soviet authorities. If the argument advanced in the text, infra, on the Soviet attitude towards dumping, is correct, all the Russians are very much concerned with the real costs and the real terms of trade, the relative profits and losses realized on different products should be a matter of genuine importance to them even though — at the arbitrary exchange rates established — they are prepared to export indefinitely at a rouble loss.
particular lines, such as lumber, furs, and on occasion petroleum and certain types of grains and textiles, Soviet exports constituted considerable parts of the world totals. 1/ Accordingly it is just as well to examine further the question that has been raised.

The question centers, of course, on Russian export price policies, and on the problem of whether and to what extent the Russians are likely to engage in dumping. More specifically, will the Russians, having foregone exchange depreciation as a weapon to expand their world markets, simply attain the same result by cutting their export prices or maintaining these prices at a low level, thereby flooding the world market with cheap goods?

This question cannot be entirely disposed of here, but it is believed that the following a priori considerations go far towards providing the answer:

a. Granted, that at the ruble exchange rates they maintained, the Russians sold their exports before the war at lower ruble prices than they could have realized for the same goods at home;

b. Yet this fact in no way indicates that by diverting the resources which were necessary to produce the exported goods to domestic production of commodities purchased abroad with the foreign exchange received for their exports the Russians would have secured higher returns;

c. The Russians have no incentive to discuss of their exports at a loss in this sense; or, what is the equivalent, to push their exports at the expense of a loss in the community's total real income (real consumption plus investment);

d. Accordingly, any resemblance between Soviet export practices and capitalistic dumping must be purely superficial, reflecting the fact that the Soviets use an arbitrarily high ruble exchange rate in calculating the ruble proceeds from their trade.

If these propositions are correct, it would appear that the prevalent concern over Russian dumping is unwarranted. If before the war the Russians exported quantities of scarce consumers' goods to purchase machinery

1/ See Appendix D.
and the like, this indicates not that the Soviet administrators were, like monopolists, exploiting the home market, but only that they attached a very high value to their imports, and that no satisfactory substitute for these imports could be produced at home in the time available at less than the imports cost them. If, furthermore, the Russians at time, as in the early thirties, even expanded their exports in the face of falling prices, this must be attributed to the fact that the needed imports had not only a high value for the Russians, but that the Russian demand for them was quite inelastic.

But granting that these practices cannot be described as dumping, it must be acknowledged that under certain circumstances they might tend to decoralize world markets all the same, and conceivably might constitute a threat to a monetary stabilization agreement. To the limited extent that they participated in world trade in the early thirties, the Russians, because of their rigid import needs (determined under the First Five-Year Plan) and their consequent need to export, probably contributed their share to the deterioration in world markets for foodstuffs and raw materials. Russia's exports of grain, for example, which did not exceed two million tons at any time in the twenties, and which amounted to only a few hundred thousand tons in 1928 and 1929, rose to 4.8 million tons in 1930 and to 5.1 million tons in 1931. 1 Bread rationing, which was initiated in the latter part of 1928 in the USSR, remained in effect through 1934.

Russia's post-war exchange requirements and needs are discussed in detail in Part II of this report, but a few remarks on this subject should be made here. Because of her pressing reconstruction needs, Russia's bargaining position in world markets may again be weak in the immediate post-war period, though for reasons that are indicated in the preceding part of this report, it is quite unlikely that she will be seeking to dispose of any large quantities of goods abroad, even if the terms are more favorable than they were in the early thirties. Her chances of obtaining foreign credits, furthermore, will be considerably improved; if reparations are extracted from the Germans, this too will strengthen Russia's trading position, though, since it is difficult to conceive of the Germans having any exchange surpluses to spare, Russia's necessary purchases from countries other than Germany may have to be financed from other sources.

1/ Vneshiyaya Torgovlya SSSR za 20 let, 1918-1937, Moscow, 1938, p. 22.
It may confidently be predicted that in the long-run future, Russia's bargaining position in world markets will be decidedly stronger than it has been in the past. With self-sufficiency already largely achieved before the war -- in those lines where it was possible and, in the interests of security, necessary -- and with Germany probably conclusively defeated at the end of this war, the Russians may be expected to be much more sensitive than hitherto to the terms on which they must conduct their trade. The elasticity of their demand for imports should increase decidedly.

E. Other Monopoly Practices

1. If the Russians engage in practices of systematic monopolistic discrimination at all in conducting their foreign trade, these practices will not consist of dumping goods abroad, but rather of the exploitation of the world market for the benefit of the Russians. In particular, it is to be expected that after the war the Russians will use their foreign trade monopoly, and perhaps their vastly enhanced prestige and political weight as well, to extract as high a price as possible for their exports and to obtain their imports as cheaply as possible. On the other hand the Russians might conceivably decide to cut prices for a time in order to capture a foreign market or to exert political pressure.

It is to be remarked here again that while Russia's share of world trade has been quite small, she has had a sizeable role in the trade in certain particular commodities, and, accordingly, might be expected to have an appreciable amount of monopoly power in these lines. In this connection, it should be observed that the Russians at one time or another were a member of a number of international cartels before the war -- reported in petroleum and lumber, two of Russia's major exports. It has been reported, too, that the Russians, on occasion at least, dealt with a German chemical cartel, and extracted quite favorable terms therefrom.

To the extent that the Russians engage in monopoly practices after the war, this will no doubt make a restoration of liberal trading principles somewhat costly to practitioners of such principles. It is difficult to see, however, any way in which the Russian behavior might constitute a direct threat to the success of an international monetary stabilization agreement.

1/ Appendix D.
Such monopoly practices will not in any case be unique with Russia. In this connection it should be noted, furthermore, that the bilateralism which has been an important feature of Russia’s foreign economic relations has to a considerable extent been imposed on her by other countries.
APPENDIX A

DECLARATION OF USSR'S FOREIGN TRADE MONOPOLY

1. All Russian exports and imports are conducted by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade (Narkomvneshtorg), which is the only agency in charge of Soviet foreign trade. (Foreign trade monopoly decree of 22 April 1918, and Article 14(h) of the constitution of 1926.) By law, no Soviet citizen and no governmental institution may buy or sell abroad, except through the Commissariat for Foreign Trade and its agencies.

The actual procedure of conducting commercial transactions abroad rests in the hands of the Trade Delegations and of twenty-two separate export and import combines. The former are established in foreign capitals by virtue of commercial treaties in which the Russians almost invariably secure the right to set up such delegations with the customary privileges of diplomatic immunity. Most of the formal aspects of maintaining trade relations between the USSR and the country in question are handled by the Trade Delegation—acting under the authority of the Commissariat for Foreign Trade.

The combines, on the other hand, deal more directly with the purely business aspects of Russian foreign commerce. Of these twenty-two combines, each specifically created to handle the export and/or import of certain products, fourteen are largely concerned with the trade of Western Europe and America, such as, for example, Sovuzpromexport (Union Industrial Export), Eksport (Export Lueber), etc. Each of these units acts on the basis of laws determining its functions and structure. Each unit acts abroad as a juridical person (resembling a corporation); it can sue and be sued; it maintains immediate relations with the original market in order to obtain the best possible conditions in buying and selling; and finally, it makes agreements with foreign firms involving all sorts of financial obligations. Such agreements

1/ Sbornik deiatvovmehshich dekretov i postanovlenii po vnesnii trade (Collection of Extant Decrees and Legislation for Foreign Trade), Moscow, 1924–27, 1, II.

2/ D. D. Dushkin, Vnesnii trade of the USSR, Moscow, 1941, p. 68.
are signed on the part of the Soviet combine in question by two responsible members. It is apparent, therefore, that within the limits of its export and/or import license and the State Bank's control of foreign currency, the individual combine enjoys considerable autonomy.

2. All Soviet accounts with foreign countries are settled through the Commissariat for Foreign Trade and the State Bank ( Gosbank) at Moscow; the latter handles the foreign currency resources of the USSR. In a few instances, foreign currency may also be handled through a subsidiary bank acting under the State Bank's supervision. The State Bank is thus the internal and international center of the Soviet Union for all foreign monetary business.

Foreign currency receipts from exports, credits, and other operations go through the State Bank (Gosbank), or else are deposited to its account in foreign banks. In accordance with this system, the Soviet practice has been to include articles in its trade treaties calling for the clearing of all monetary transactions through the national bank of the state concerned and in the national currency of that state. The chief exceptions to this practice have been in the recent commercial treaties of the Soviet Union with Turkey (1937) and Latvia (1939), in which clearing operations are conducted through two accounts — one in Moscow and the other in the national bank of the other state. Likewise, in their eagerness to acquire foreign exchange, there has been a notable tendency on the part of the Russians to pick up extra foreign currency by trading with smaller countries with whom they have a favorable balance of trade, stimulating in their agreements with these states that balances shall be released to the USSR "in foreign currency of its choice." The treaty with Greece (1927) affords a good example of such practice.

1/ Ginsburg, I. S. Vneshnyaya Torgovlya SSSR (The Foreign Trade of the USSR), Moscow, 1937, p. 119; I. L. Mishustin, op. cit., p. 66.

2/ I. L. Mishustin, p. 18d.
APPENDIX B

STATISTICS ON THE GOLD POSITION OF THE USSR

1. Gold Holdings, 1 January 1945. Studies of the Soviet gold position have been made by the University of Birmingham and the University of London, by the British Ministry of Economic Warfare, and also by research departments within the Federal Reserve System. These studies utilized such official Soviet statistics as were available, council reports, and customs statistics of other countries.

On the basis of these studies, two independent estimates of Soviet gold holdings as of 1 January 1945 have been made in the present report. According to one estimate, the holdings were 68.83 million ounces, and according to the other, 60.01 million ounces. Each of these estimates includes 14.58 million ounces of gold which, according to the report of the Bank of Spain, was sent from Spain to Russia during the Spanish revolution. According to these estimates, therefore, the Soviet gold reserve at the beginning of 1945 may be assessed at about 52,000,000,000 (.55.50 to the ounce).

2. Summary of Estimates of Gold Holdings as of 1 January 1943. One estimate was made by totalling for the period 1914-1943 the gold acquisitions from various sources and subtracting the known gold exports made during the same period. The elements in the calculation are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Millions of Ounces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gold Acquired 1914-1943</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inherited from the Tsarist Government (minus reparations paid to Germany)</td>
<td>24.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recovered from the population</td>
<td>9.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total production</td>
<td>64.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports /</td>
<td>14.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1/ Only the imports from Spain, referred to in the text, are included. Other imports are subtracted from exports, the export figure presented in this calculation being not of imports.
Dispositions

Net exports 1931-1942 1/ ........ 40.63
Balance, 1 January 1943 ............ 56.06

The second estimate was made by adding to gold transferred to the Finance Commissariat in 1936, gold held in the Reserve Bank as of 1 January 1937, gold obtained through production and imports since that date, and subtracting gold exports since 1936. The elements in this estimate may be summarized as follows:

Million of ounces

Holdings, 1 January, 1937

Gold in Finance Commissariat
(Transferred in April 1936) ........ 20.28
Reserve Bank holdings, 1 January 1937 10.69

Gold Acquisitions, 1937-1943

Production 23.50
Imports (from Spain only) .......... 14.38
Net exports, 1937-1942 ............. 14.64
Balance, 1 January 1943 ............ 50.01

The details of these estimates are set forth in the following paragraphs. It will be evident from the following remarks that the estimates can be accepted only with considerable reserve.

5. Gold Inherited from French Property. Official statistics on the amount of gold inherited by the Soviet government from the French government apparently are not available. According to estimates which have been widely accepted, the amount of gold obtained by the Soviet government in the period 1917-1920, after the payment of reparations to the Germans under the Saint-Germain treaty and the capture of the gold holdings of Admiral Kolchak, amounted to about 54.6 million ounces or 1.56 billion post-1936.

1/ The exports net of all imports except the imports from Spain, referred to in the text, which are entered separately above.
4. Gold Recovered from the Population. Official statistics on the amount of gold seized from the population, recovered from gold coin in circulation, and obtained via the bargain stores and through the confiscation of gold artifacts of the Church are not available.

It has been estimated that the value of gold recovered from all of the above sources by the beginning of 1934 amounted to 1,750,000,000 new rubles or about 54.52 million ounces of gold. 3

5. Production. Tabulated below are several independent estimates of Soviet gold production. The publication of absolute figures on Soviet gold production was discontinued in 1937, since that date the Soviet authorities have contented themselves with stating the percentage by which production in one year exceeded output in the preceding year. The figures on gold production compiled by R. Tirana, a member of the staff of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, are based on these official Soviet percentage figures as well as on the absolute gold output data published by the Soviet authorities through 1937.

Estimates on the basis just indicated are available only for the period 1918-1930, but output statistics for the remaining years may be obtained from a series prepared in the Federal Reserve Board. With the help of these statistics, it is estimated that the total amount of gold produced in the entire period 1918-1942 amounts to 54.52 million ounces.

3/ A. Balaklow - op. cit. p. 22

Table I

Estimates of Gold Produced in USSR
(Thousands of ounces)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>M. Tiran a/</th>
<th>Federal Reserve Board b/</th>
<th>US Bureau of Mines c/</th>
<th>Ministry of Economic Warfare d/</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>854</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>174</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>66</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>101</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>506</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>1924</td>
<td>546</td>
<td></td>
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<td>1925</td>
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<td>680</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>1928</td>
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<td>1929</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>1,501</td>
<td>1,470</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>1,774</td>
<td>1,601</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>1,937</td>
<td>1,959</td>
<td>4,000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>2,905</td>
<td>2,703</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>2,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>5,300</td>
<td>5,590</td>
<td>5,010</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>6,510</td>
<td>6,560</td>
<td>5,600</td>
<td>3,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>7,550</td>
<td>7,680</td>
<td>5,640</td>
<td>5,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>5,143</td>
<td>5,286</td>
<td>5,526</td>
<td>5,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,034</td>
<td>9,070</td>
<td>5,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>4,900</td>
<td>4,520</td>
<td>4,220</td>
<td>4,120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>6,140</td>
<td>4,534</td>
<td>4,000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>4,342</td>
<td>3,145</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a/ The source is an unpublished memorandum by Mr. Mifat Tiran entitled "Gold reserves of the USSR" dated 2 October 1938. The data for the years 1910-1933 are the same as those which appeared in an unsigned article entitled "Russian Gold" in the "Engineering and Mining Journal," June, 1938.

b/ Data are taken from an unpublished and undated study prepared in the Research Division, and regarded as preliminary.


d/ UN - Soviet Finance, 24 September 1943.
6. Imports from Spain. The destination of the gold which disappeared from the Bank of Spain during the Civil War, amounting to 14.08 million ounces, is uncertain. According to a conversation of Mr. Titran of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York with Mr. del Velco, former Spanish Republican minister of Foreign Affairs, this Spanish gold was not shipped to Russia, but was disposed of in Europe. According to later information given in the report of the Bank of Spain 1936-41, gold bullion in the amount of 14.8 million ounces "...was sent... first to Cartagena and then to Moscow."

On the basis of this official report, the Spanish gold is included in the estimate of Russia gold holdings.

7. Exports. The most complete investigation of net gold exports from the USSR at hand is the above mentioned study of R. Titran of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. This study is based mainly on official trade statistics of different countries which appeared from time to time in the Federal Reserve Bulletin, the net gold imports of the different countries from Russia (as determined from the trade statistics) simply being totalled.

For the period 1938 through 1938 the total net gold export from Russia thus calculated amounts to 45.87 million ounces of gold.

While not all countries receiving gold from Russia are covered by this calculation, it is believed that the total represents the bulk of Russian gold exports during the period studied. The principal gold importing countries covered are: the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and Sweden.

For the period 1930 through 1942, statistics compiled by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Board indicate that exports amounted to 5.17 million ounces. Thus known net exports for the entire period from 1930 through 1942 amounted to 40.05 million ounces.

Table II
(Thousands of ounces)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tirana ²</th>
<th>Federal Reserve Board ²³</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1919</td>
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<tr>
<td>1920</td>
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<td>1111</td>
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<td>1924</td>
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<td>1928</td>
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<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>1111</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>1111</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>43,668</td>
<td>14,856</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

²/ Tirana, op. cit. Data are taken mainly from the Federal Reserve Bulletin. Countries covered: Sweden (through 1922), U.K., Germany (through 1937) and U.S.A. Figures for 1919-1920 are rough estimates.

²³/ Federal Reserve Board, op. cit.
G. Gold Holdings of the Gosbank. Although the Gosbank is not the only depository of gold in the Soviet Union, it is believed that up to 1936 the major portion of gold was concentrated in its vaults. The Commissariat of Finance was reported to have had a small gold reserve of its own in the early 1920's, but the amount held at that time is not known. The gold reserve of the Gosbank was revalued in the course of the devaluation of the ruble in April 1926. Gold equivalent to the "book profit" of 20.20 million ounces was transferred from the Gosbank to the Finance Commissariat.\(^2\)

This transfer was reflected in subsequent statements of the Gosbank. The reported gold holdings on 1 April 1936 were 7.93 million ounces against 21.26 million ounces on 1 January 1935. The last available Gosbank statement as of 1 January 1937 shows gold holdings in the amount of 10.99 million ounces. Statistics on gold holdings of the Gosbank for the period 1923-1937 are presented in the following table.

---

2/ Federal Reserve Bank of New York, *op.cit.*
### Table III

**GOLD & SILVER IN AMBULIONS**

(Millions of ounces)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Holdings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 January 1923</td>
<td>4.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 January 1924</td>
<td>4.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 October 1924</td>
<td>3.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 January 1925</td>
<td>3.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 October 1925</td>
<td>4.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 January 1926</td>
<td>4.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 October 1926</td>
<td>4.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 January 1927</td>
<td>4.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 October 1927</td>
<td>4.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 January 1928</td>
<td>4.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 October 1928</td>
<td>4.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 January 1929</td>
<td>6.38</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 October 1929</td>
<td>5.86</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 January 1930</td>
<td>9.46</td>
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<td>1 October 1930</td>
<td>12.06</td>
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<td>1 January 1931</td>
<td>12.04</td>
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<td>1 October 1931</td>
<td>14.19</td>
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<td>1 August 1932</td>
<td>15.09</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 January 1933</td>
<td>17.29</td>
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<td>1 August 1933</td>
<td>17.43</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 January 1934</td>
<td>20.42</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 January 1935</td>
<td>21.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 March 1936</td>
<td>22.99b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 April 1936</td>
<td>7.95b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 January 1937</td>
<td>10.89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a/ Tirana, op.cit.; Soviet Finance, op.cit.

b/ 20.29 million ounces transferred to Commissariat of Finance.
It is interesting to note that the amount of gold held by the Gosbank in 1934 and 1935 was somewhat in excess of the total amount of gold estimated to be in the country. The computation is shown below.

| Gold obtained from the population up to 1934 | 9.97 |
| Cold inherited from the Tsarist Government | 24.91 |
| Production, 1918-1933 | 12.94 |
| Exports, 1918-1933 | 30.96 |
| Balance (1 January 1934) | 16.86 |

By adding the subsequent production and subtracting exports, the amount of gold in the country at the beginning of 1935 can be computed as 18.54 million ounces.

The reported Gosbank holdings are 20.12 million ounces and 21.26 million ounces respectively. This difference suggests either that the estimates of gold production and of other acquisitions are too low, or that the estimated exports are too high, or that the Gosbank figures themselves are inflated.

1/ Soviet Finance, op. cit.
2/ FRBRX, op. cit., Consular Report from FISa No. 1156-20, April 1936
ART. IX C
ILLUSTRATIONS OF RUSSIA'S POLITICAL ATTITUDE TO ARMS PREPARATIONS

1. The task of quantitative assessment of the damage done to the Soviet Union by the German invaders has been entrusted to an Extraordinary State Commission. The work of this Commission seems to consist presently of collection of relevant information and material. The claims for reparations to be advanced by the Soviet government at the peace conference cannot be completed, obviously, until the war is ended.

2. Certain indications of the order of magnitude involved, as well as some insight into the trend of thought on this subject prevailing in Moscow, are furnished by various statements made recently by a number of prominent Soviet personalities. Most outstanding among them is Eugen Varga, a noted Soviet economist. In a lecture delivered in Moscow on August 31, 1943, Professor Varga gives a systematic presentation of his attitude toward reparations.

As member of the Academy of Sciences, Director of the Institute of World Economics and World Politics and formerly one of the leading staff members of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, Varga must certainly be regarded as a responsible spokesman of the ruling circles in the Soviet Union. Since no statement on an important subject appears in the Soviet press without official sanction, and since Varga's views were given added prominence by radio broadcasts, it may be assumed that the contents expressed by him find approval of the Soviet authorities.

The basic position, known also from other Soviet utterances, is stated at the outset: "The destruction which the ravaging armies of Hitler perpetrated in our country is unprecedented in the history of mankind. This destruction is not so much the consequence of military action proper, as the results of a policy of annihilation and robbery conscientiously conducted by the German invaders. Destruction was also carried through by the armies of Germany's allies fighting on our territory. Therefore, not only Germany, but also Finland, Hungary, Romania, and Italy are responsible for the material damage which they inflicted upon us."1

1/ Stereographic text of a public lecture delivered by the Academician E. S. Varga on August 31, 1943. Moscow, 1943, p. 3.
It is interesting to note that Varga buttresses the claim for reparations by reference to "Wilson's 14 points" as well as the fact that the principle of reparations was laid down in the Treaty of Versailles. Having thus established Russia's right to demand reparations, Varga points out that his country will not face any such transfer difficulties as prevented the Allies from collecting their reparations in the First World War. Russia will not demand from Germany foreign exchange, which Germany could secure only by exports to countries whose markets may be unwilling to absorb German goods. Russia will insist on reparations in kind, which Germany will be able to supply directly. Two sources of such supplies are at the disposal of the axis: First, the national wealth of the aggressor countries; secondly, their annual product. Certain items of national wealth will have to be surrendered: Machinery, transportation equipment, livestock, etc., are cited as examples. Such deliveries must remain, however, narrowly circumscribed lest the productive capacity of the axis nations be seriously damaged. "One cannot slaughter a cow, consume its meat, and continue to receive milk." The main source of reparations will have to be, therefore, the current output of the vanquished countries. Citing official German sources on the size of the share of the German national product devoted to war, Varga contends that it would be appropriate to employ this share to make good the damage done by the Germans. The quantity of resources available for this purpose could be increased, if necessary, by some reduction of the German standard of living. It would not be just, says Varga, if the peoples which dispossessed Russia should after the war live better than the Russians.

3. The extent of Russia's reparations demand is estimated by Varga only very vaguely. The German ravaged during the First World War about 80,000 square kilometers of French territory. This damage was estimated by the French to amount to 30 billion gold marks. Varga believes that that was a gross overstatement, and that 15 billion gold marks would have been a more appropriate figure. Since the Soviet territory affected by war is about 20-30 times larger than the part of France devastated in 1914-1918, the material damage might reach 300-400 billion gold marks. This estimate is clearly extremely tentative. Varga believes that the destruction in this war is much more thorough and systematic than during the First World War in France; and he does not take this consideration into account in his estimate. It no less furthermore the deportation of civilians
for work in Germany, and does not include damage to un-occupied parts of Russia done by military action from the air.1

To make his listeners appreciate more fully the significance of this figure, Varga expresses it in terms of man-years of labor. Assuming that the average annual product of a skilled worker in Germany amounts roughly to 4,000 gold marks, he suggests that the restorations of the damage done would require 10 million men working 10 years. Some of this work could actually be performed, he says, by Germans and other nationals of the Axis in Russian cities and villages.

4. The distribution of the proceeds of reparations among the United Nations should be determined, in the view of Varga, by two criteria. First, the extent and the specific weight of the damage suffered by each country; and, secondly, the ability of each country to restore this damage without help from outside. Poland, France, Greece, Yugoslavia, Norway, Belgium, and more than anyone else the Soviet Union, would have to receive preferential treatment on both grounds. The USA and England will have suffered such smaller damage, and will find it much easier to repair it with the help of their own resources. They should, therefore, receive reparations at a later date.

5. Other prominent Russians also have expressed themselves on the reparations issue. The Academician Trubnikov and Venediktov are the well known journalist. Zaslavsky have written and spoken over the radio announc- ing, Russia's right and determination to receive from the Axis full compensation for her grievous losses. From the reports on their statements available here, it does not appear, however, that they contain any ideas additional to those summarized by Professor Varga.

1/ It should be noted, however, that the initial figure may involve a large overstatement, since presumably the 50,000 square km. of Northern France contained very much more wealth than an average space of 50,000 square km. in occupied Russia.
### APPENDIX D

**RUSSIAN EXPORTS OF SELECTED COMMODITIES**

**AS A PERCENTAGE OF WORLD EXPORTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>1929</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1935</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1937</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lumber</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Props</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulp wood</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sawn lumber</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sleepers</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logs</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rye</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barley</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oats</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corn</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>8/</td>
<td>8/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubricants</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerosene</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel oil</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gasoline</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crude oil</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>1/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butter</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil cake</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich — 1930, Berlin.

8/ Data not available.
BOFORS INFORMED ME AND THEIR US LAWYERS ON 14 DEC THAT
CAPT. HARVEY COMBE DOES NOT REPRESENT BOFORS IN US.
ALUSNA LEARNS THIS DONE TO CIRCUMVENT ANY ATTEMPT BY
COMBE TO SUE ACCOUNT ALLEGED BREACH OF CONTRACT, NAMELY
"DELIVERY OF 46 MM GUNS TO RUSSIA BY US".

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Annex 4.2.14.1.2.1.4).}

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
**NAVAL MESSAGE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DRAGART</th>
<th>EXTENSION NUMBER</th>
<th>ADDRESSES</th>
<th>PRECEDENCE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ROULLARD</td>
<td></td>
<td>VLADIVOSTOK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**RELEASED BY**

15 DECEMBER 1943

**TOR CODEROOM**

9755

**DECODED BY**

SCHULTZ

**PARAPHRASED BY**

RODGERS

**ROUTED BY**

KNIGHT

**INFORMATION**

CNO MOSCOW

**DECLASSIFIED**

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter May 1973

**ACTION**

DEFERRED

**ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>GET</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**(ACTION CNO AND MOSCOW)**

2 HRS GCT CONVOY OFFICER INFORMED HE HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO CONCLUDE AGREEMENT WITH SOVIET FISHING VESSELS TO PREVENT PILOTS FROM FIRING ON THEM FROM THE AIR WHICH IS

**SECRET**

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS)

OFPNAV-NCR-15  A 33052

142310  Sec. Russia

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/87
FREQUENT OCCURRENCE. STATED IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO BE KEPT CONSTANTLY AND ACCURATELY INFORMED OF ROUTES AND MOVEMENTS ALL SMALL FISHING CRAFT. REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS.
Soviets have diplomatically (3 letters missing)* 0 transport approximately $2000 worth of food and clothing how San Fran for Chinese Conch Vladivostok in spite extreme necessity and strong appeals by Chinese here and in USA.

* Probably "Refused 1"
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT ADVISES MASTER OF SOVIET KLARA ZETKIN ENROUTE AGAK ISLAND IS CONSTANTINE S BADYGIN
CAPTAIN THIRD RANK SOVIET NAVY X HE IS ARCTIC AUTHORITY
AND HERO OF USSR WAS MEMBER ICEBREAKING STAFF LAST WINTER
AT ARCHANGEL X DO NOT DIVULGE ABOVE KNOWLEDGE HIS
IDENTITY BUT ENDEAVOR ESTABLISH IT BY HIS OWN ADMISSION
X IF SUCCESSFUL ENDEAVOR OBTAIN INFORMATION ICE CONDITIONS
AND PRESENT WHEREABOUTS AND ASSIGNMENTS THIS WINTER OF
VARIOUS SOVIET ICEBREAKERS AND THEIR CAPABILITIES TO
KEEP OPEN SIBERIAN AND NORTH RUSSIAN PORTS X

CONFIDENTIAL

CNO....COMINCH.....NAVJDE.....FX39.....
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: ROULLARD - VLADIVOSTOK
RELEASED BY:
DATE: 11 DECEMBER 1943
TOR CODE ROOM: 2348/19
DECODED BY: WILHE
PARAPHRASED BY: SANDBERG
ROUTED BY: SOBEL

TO: ALUSNA MOSCOW

CNO

INFORMATION

10188
NCR 3786

ACTION CNO AND MOSCOW.

MASTER SS KLAAR ZETKIN NOW ENROUTE ADAK ISLAND VIA PETROPAVLOVSK IS CAPT 3RD RANK RED NAVY KONSTANTINE S. BADYGIN ON ACTIVE DUTY BUT TO ALL OUTWARD APPEARANCES A CIVILIANS.

HE IS ARCTIC AUTHORITY AND HERO OF USSR AS MEMBER OF ICE BREAKING STAFF ARCHANGEL DURING LAST WINTER CONFIRMS SUSPICIONS THAT THERE ARE OTHER RED NAVAL OFFICERS PROCEEDING US AS MERCHANT OFFICERS.

16...ACT

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Robin Watch Officer in person. See Art. 78 (d) NAVCGR
OPNAV 5400.06C

10/10/10 Moscow Field

DECLASSIFIED
10/12/75, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
ILR 101

By RT, HARA, Date 4/24/76
AFTER TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER CONFERRED WITH EDEN AT CAIRO FOLLOWING MOSCOW CONFERENCE, RUSSIANS INFORMED TURKS THEY APPROVED TURKISH REPLY TO BRITISH. RUSSIANS ADDED THAT BRITISH ARE SPILLING RUSSIAN BLOOD FOR THEIR OWN BENEFIT AND WANT TURKS TO DO SAME. ABOVE FROM LOCAL AGENT WHO REFERRED TO IT AS RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA. HE SAID RUSSIANS RESIST BRITISH-TURKISH ALLIANCE.

16...ACT.
COMINCH...2/10...13...NAVAIDE...
From: Algiers  
To: War  
No.  8597, 02 December 1943.

From AHPQ for American Military Mission, Moscow for Deane signed Eisenhower cite YMIA. Reference your cable number 3 dated 14th November.

Russian Generals Vasilivu and Solodovnik and three other Russian Army Officers left today for two weeks visit to cover Italian Front. Have been taken to War Room, given Order Battle this Theater and secret information on operations, furnished an automobile. Hope this will secure your corresponding privileges and request you inform us what you and British colleagues get, to assist in determination our policy handling them.

No Sig

Note:

"This message has been relayed to General Deane by the War Department Code Center in accordance with the originator's request".

Corrected copy of CM-IN-1508 (3 Dec 43) JCS

ACTION: JCS INFORMATION: OPD, SGS, GEN STRONG, LOG

CM-IN-1638 (3 Dec 43) 0958Z moa

DECLASSIFIED JCS LETTER. 7-5-72

WDOG

DECLASSIFIED BY DBS, DATE

MAY 21 1973

COPY NO. 13

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
BELIEVE SOON DIRECT PASSENGER RAIL ROSTOV MOSCOW 
ELIMINATING STALINGRAD DOGLEG. CORROBORATED PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISE BEING OFFICIALLY ENCOURAGED KHARKOV AND 
KIEV REGIONS POSSIBLY ALL OF RED UKRAINE. SEVERAL 
INDICATIONS INDEPENDENT UKRAINIAN PARTISAN DETACHMENTS 
IN CONSIDERABLE STRENGTH ACTIVE AGAINST REDS AND 
OCCASIONALLY AGAINST GERMANS AS WELL SOMETHING ON 
ORDER OF PETLURA OF PERIOD OF INTERVENTION. HOPE 
TO GET PHOTOSTAT OF ANTI-RED PANPHLET SAID TO BE 
CIRCULATING HERE. SINCE CONFERENCE INDIVIDUALS OF 
PUBLIC INCREASING FRIENDLY AND ANXIOUS TO STRIKE UP 
CONVERSATION PRAISING ALLIED ASSISTANCE TO COMMON 
CAUSE. SOLDIERS PARTICULARLY ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT 
AMERICAN TRUCKS JEEPS AND PLANES. POSTAGE STAMP

DECLASSIFIED 
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4 
NLR 101 
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
JUST ISSUED SOVIET BRITISH AMERICAN FLAGS OVER
"LONG LIVE THE VICTORY OF THE ANGLO-SOVIET AMERICAN
FIGHTING ALLIANCE SIGNED STALIN". COMES JUST VISITED
KIEV SAY MAJORITY DAMAGE OLD AND DONE WHEN CITY ORIGI-
NALLY FELL GERMANS. TOTAL DAMAGE NOT LARGE. LACK OF
GERMAN DESTRUCTION ON EVACUATION MAY INDICATE INTENDED
HOLD OR RECAPTURE. FRANKEL AND BASSINGER HAVE BEEN
GROUNDED 9 DAYS STALINGRAD. BAD ICING CONDITIONS AND
FEL PLANES EQUIPPED WITH DEIERS. CONSIDERABLE GRUMBLING
OVERHEARD IN PUBLIC PLACES OVER RECENT BREAD RATION
OUT. LOWEST NORM NOW 3/4 GRAINS DAILY FOR CHILDREN AND
NON WORKERS WITH AVERAGE WORKER RECEIVING 550
GRAINS. LITTLE ELSE AVAILABLE EXCEPT BLACK MARKET AT FANTASTIC
PRICES.
WORCHEL, TEHERAN TO NOSHAUR IN 56 TRUCK RED MILITARY CONVOY CARRYING METAL STOCK FOR SEA TRANSPORT NOSHAUR TO KRAKODAR. ROAD FAIR GRADED DIRT. TRAFFIC HEAVY IRANIAN MAINTAINED. CONVOY DISCIPLINE AND EFFICIENCY OF OPERATION 1ST CLASS. WORCHEL CONTINUED VIA TRUCK TO PAILEVI ON GOOD DIRT ROAD WITH LITTLE TRAFFIC. ALL CLOSELY RED CONTROLLED PATROLLED TO MAINTAIN WIRE AND ROAD COMMUNICATIONS. WHOLE AREA INFILTRATED WITH VERY CENTRAL AND MILITARY REDS. VIA ELVENEHUNDRED TON SHIP CARGO METAL STOCK TO BAKU. AT BAKU 9 SMALL SUBS SAID TO BE UNDER CONSTRUCTION. THEN A VIA RAIL MAKHATCHI-KALA TEKORETSK STALINGRAD. ALL TRACK IN FORMER GERMAN OCCUPIED AREA MINERAL WOODY TO BEYOND STALINGRAD HAD BEEN CHANGED TO GERMAN GAUGE AND NOW BACK TO

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to first Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art 16) 301134 300 RUSSIA by Log Date 2 1 1973

DECLASSIFIED
O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
ILR 101
Date W 2 1 73
RUSSIAN. MUCH DAMAGE TO TRACK AND EVIDENCE FIGHTING
ONLY ONE OF TWO TRACKS IN DOUBLED SECTIONS YET
REPAIRED. CONSIDERABLE EX GERMAN ROLLING STOCK.
ROADBED CONDITION POOR. NEAR MAKHATCH-KALA ON
FLATCARS HEADED SOUTH 7 USED MTBS SAID BY ACCOMPANYING
SAILOR TO BE FROM VLADI AND ENROUTE BLACK SEA VIA
BAKU INDICATING NOVOROSISK STILL TOO HOT TO USE FOR
LAUNCHING BASE. ACCOMPANYING CREWS WEARING BALTIIC
INSIGNIA. FOOD ENROUTE FAIRLY PLENTIFUL AND MORE SO
THE NEARER MOSCOW. CHECKEN, MEAT, EGGS BUT NO BREAD
PEASANTS NOW SELLING ONLY FOR ROBES IN CONTRAST
SITUATION YEAR AGO WHEN INTERESTED CHEIFLY IN BARTER
INDICATION GROWING CONFIDENCE.

16...ACT.

CONFIDENTIAL
UNVERIFIED REPORT RECEIVED THAT SOVIET FISHING BOAT INVOLVED IN GUN ENGAGEMENT WITH AMERICAN SUBMARINE WHICH WAS MISSED AS JAP 38. 3 OF SUB'S CREW SUPPOSEDLY KILLED. REMAINING SURVIVORS LANDED AKUTAN. SURVIVORS FROM SOVIET CRAFT LANDED VLADIVOSTOK TIME PLACE AND CIRCUMSTANCES UNKNOWN.
NAVAL MESSAGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DRAFTER</th>
<th>EXTENSION NUMBER</th>
<th>ADDRESSEES</th>
<th>PRECEDENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMERICAN CONSUL VLADIVOSTOK (ROULLARD)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>CHO ALUSNA MOSCOW</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RELEASED BY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>FOR ACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 DEC 1943</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOR CODEROOM: C356

DECODED BY: SAMSON

PARAPHRASED BY: ROTHROCK

ROUTED BY: [Redacted]

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

301112 NCR 6427

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

ACTION TO CHO AND MOSCOW.

CHO’S 1921C6 CONVOY OFFICER STATES SOVIET SKIPPERS HAVE NEVER OBSERVED TANKERS OF ANY DESCRIPTION ENROUTE SAKHALIN TO EMPIRE NOR HAVE THERE BEEN ANY REPORTS CONNECTION AUXILIARY TANKERS. SUGGESTS FOREIGN OFFICE BE APPROACHED BY NAVAL ATTACHE MOSCOW FOR METHODS JAPS USE TRANSPORT OIL FROM CONCESSIONS.

16...ACT

20G...GOMINCH...CHO...

SECRET

[Redacted]
NAVAL MESSAGE  NAVY DEPART.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>PRECEDENCE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FROM: AMERICAN CONSUL</td>
<td></td>
<td>CHO ALUSHA MOSCOW</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELEASED BY:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE: 1 DEC 43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOR CODED: 0448/1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DECODED BY: SAISON</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARAPHRASED BY: HAMILTON</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROUTED BY: WATKINS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>GCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ACTION CHO AND ALUSHA MOSCOW

liaison officer states info available Moscow foreign office shots 192838 and 216666, which handles all jap concessions including fishing lots. he suggests naval attaché make official representations. offered personal opinion that Japs received very little oil from sakhalin past year and for that reason they would undoubtedly be endeavoring obtain increase. no info concerning interference vip fish industry by aie subs.

16...ACT
27G...COMNH...CHO...23OP...NAVAIDE...

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(R) and Sec. 6(R)
OSD letter, May 1973

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Coda Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date

300410

DECLASSTIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/29/44
Analysis of 91 round trips made by Russian merchant ships in the Pacific reveal unexplained and excessive delays in Soviet ports.

Graphs show average number of days in Soviet ports, per trip, of merchant ships (Liberty Ships, Lend-Lease, Pre-War Russian) and tankers (Lend-Lease and Pre-War Russian), compared to normal estimates.

1. The Russians recently admitted (20 Sept. 1943) that two of their principal organizations are not functioning properly. They had poor planning on the part of foreign trade and the Far Eastern shipping as responsible for the USSR failure to clear cargo efficiently in Russian Pacific ports.

2. The validity of these admissions may be seen in the following analysis of 91 round trips (79 freighters, 12 tankers) made between U.S. and Russian Pacific ports. (Note: Graph at right reveals freighters averaged twice as much time in port as was necessary for efficient unloading.)

Distribution By Originator

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Route</th>
<th>Originator</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Op-16-A-3-a</td>
<td>Cominch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Op-16-A-3-b (via Op-16-F)</td>
<td>Cominch F-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Op-16-FE (2)</td>
<td>Cominch FK-37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Op-16-FI-5 (2)</td>
<td>Comencap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Op-16-FF</td>
<td>ComNWSFron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Op-16-F-1</td>
<td>ComNWSFron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Op-16-F-4</td>
<td>ComNRFacFor (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Op-16-B-5 (2)</td>
<td>Alusma: Moscow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Op-09</td>
<td>Alusma: Vladivostok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Op-39</td>
<td>Naval District Portland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Op-10-J-I-S</td>
<td>Naval Intell Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Op-12</td>
<td>NOS Dutch Harbor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Op-16-F</td>
<td>State Dept. (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.S.H.Q. Ottaw (2)</td>
<td>Lend-Lease Admin. (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W.S.A. (2)</td>
<td>Naval Supply Depot, Akutan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.I.S. (5)</td>
<td>DIG: 11 (3), 12 (3), 13 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-2 (Capt. Henderson)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Analysis of the twelve tanker trips reveals stays in Soviet ports ranging from 5 to 45 days. Assuming 8 days to be ample time for unloading, the average of 15.7 days shows marked inefficiency of operation. (It is not known whether Russians are using tankers for storage in port.)

**TANKERS BY TYPE**

4. Five of the tankers were pre-war Soviet ships and seven were modern Lend-Lease vessels. A graphic breakdown of the tanker operation shows the Lend-Lease tankers being operated less efficiently than the older Russian oilers.

**CARGO SHIPS BY TYPE**

5. A similar hard-to-explain situation is apparent in the operation of the freighters. The original pre-war Soviet hulls appear to be the most efficiently used, while the more modern Liberty and Lend-Lease ships are required to spend considerably longer periods in port.

NOTE: Lacking "on-the-spot" Russian coverage, the above statistical study includes only those Russian ships that have returned to U.S. ports.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAVAL MESSAGE</th>
<th>NAVY DEPARTMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DRAFTER</td>
<td>RELEASED BY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROM: ALESSA STOCKHOLM</td>
<td>23 NOV. 1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE: 23 NOV. 1943</td>
<td>ROUTE CODEROOM 1846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DECoded BY: GRUNEWALD</td>
<td>PARAPHRASED BY: CLOSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROUTED BY: HUTCHINSON</td>
<td></td>
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TRYING CONSTANTLY TO OBTAIN SUBJECT YOUR 355212.
NO INFO AT PRESENT.
OSS SAYS AT NOON 24 OCTOBER SOVIET PLANE DROPPED MINES IN CHANNEL AT LAT. 59-45 LONG. 23-33 FINNISH SHIP NEARBY. 2 HOURS LATER FINNS SPOTTED 2 MINES.

16...ACT
COWICH...CNO...

PIA

SECRET
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: ROULLARD VLADIVOSTOK
RELEASED BY: 
DATE: 21 NOV 1943
TOR CODEROOM: 3745/21
DECODED BY: KLEINER
PARAPHRASED BY: BERLIN
ROUTED BY: ALNESSBONTH

TO: CNO

ADDRESSES: MOSCOW

FOR ACTION: INFORMATION

PRECEDENCE: DEFERRED

EXTENSION NUMBER:

ADDRESS:

ADDRESSEE: CNO

AUTOMATIC (* MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE:

212413 KCR 3753

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:

DATE: 
TIME: 
OCT: 20

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(ACTION CNO INFO MOSCOW)

POSITION CONFIRMED. CNO's 181976 convoy officer advised for first time today that ship aground on jap island shinkushito. stated negotiations in progress for periyogos send tanker stanley cut felt by time con-

cluded could other vessel would be available or harpaul lost nevertheless, iuap will be delayed. radio

sealed and stp under guard with all hands aboard. states soviet embassy tokyo notified they have request-

ed permission send consul scene of grounding to dete-

mine extent damage and feasibility salvage. desktabs

japs as being very nasty about whole affair.

16...ACT

FX37...19...CONM...AMPO...CNO...NAVALT...FILE

SECRET

RECEIVED

E.O. 11842, Sec. (NR) and (R)
OCD letter, May 4, 1946

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101

BY RT, NASA, Date 4/13/1964

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 70 (4) NAVREGs.)

202013 Russia Fld/
(ACTION CNO INFO MOSCOM)

TO DATE THERE HAVE BEEN NO INDICATIONS THAT SOVIETS
WOULD ACT AS ESTIMATED BY CNO'S 162931 OTHER THAN FACT
THAT THEY ENDEavored LAST YEAR TO CLEAR OUT ALL SHIPS
AND IT IS CHARACTERISTICALLY RUSSIAN TO USE SAME PRO-
CEDURE THIS WINTER. HOWEVER PRESENCE OF LARGE ICE
BREAKERS KRASSIN AND KAGANOVITCH AND RUMORS THAT
JOSEPH STALIN IN THIS AREA INDICATES EVERY EFFORT WILL
BE MADE KEEP LAPEROUSE OPEN WHICH IS FEASIBLE WITH
THESE VESSELS. ONLY ICE BREAKER THIS AREA LAST YEAR
WAS SMALL ICE BREAKING SHIP KUZNETSKSTROI.

16...ACT
CNO...COMINCH...FX37...NAVALDE...FILE
(ACTION CHO AND MOSCOW)

APPROACHED RED NAVY AUTHORITIES CONCERNING CHO'S 1943. THEY ADMIT FAIRLY COMPLETE INFO IS AVAILABLE.

IT IS FURNISHED FOR EAST ARMY HEADQUARTERS BY SOVIET BORDER PATROLS AND THEN SENT MOSCOW ALL JAP ISLANDS.

PLUS LOWER SAKHALIN COME UNDER RED ARMY INTELLIGENCE JURISDICTION AND INFO MUST BE OBTAINED BY ALUSHA.

MOSCOW AS NAVY HEADQUARTERS HAS INCOMPLETE DATA AND NO AUTHORITY FOR DISSEMINATION. CONVOY OFFICIAL UNOFFICIAL.

SAYS HE HAS LEARNED FROM CONVERSATION WITH HERSELFS THAT AIR PATROLS ARE CONDUCTED FROM BASES ON EITHER SIDE LAPEROUSE AND EXTEND ALONG ENTIRE ROUTE BETWEEN THAT POINT AND FIRST STRAIT JOINING WITH PATROLS FROM PARANUSHIRO. PATROL CONDUCTED ENTIRELY BY JAP ARMY. NO ORANGE NAVY PLANES HAVE EVER BEEN OBSERVED IN LAPEROUSE AREA.

16...ACT

SECRET
From: USFOR London
To: War
Nr: W 7469 20th November 1943

For Marshall from Devers.

Would appreciate receiving information copies of periodic tactical and strategical reports on Russian military situation if these are being rendered by General Deane in Moscow as I find reports of Martell Mission which British make available to me, of considerable interest.

No Sig

ACTION: OPD
INFORMATION: SGS
JCS

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO 127-73
DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO 127-73

CM-IN-12767 (21 Nov 43) 0253Z mos

300 Russian

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/44
BELOW INFO OBTAINED FROM USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE.

SOURCE KNOWN TO THIS OFFICE FOR PAST TWO YEARS AND
MANY STATEMENTS MADE BY INFORMER PROVED CORRECT.

OF 18 RED ARMY ENGINEERS OPERATING WITH FORCES THAT
CROSSED THE DNEPER RIVER AND RECAPPED KIEV 3

SURVIVED AND RETURNED TO MOSCOW TO RECRUIT NEW CON-
STRUCTION GANG AFTER BEING DECORATED WITH ORDER OF
LENIN, CROSSING SUCCESSFUL ONLY AFTER 3 DAYS! CON-
STANT USE HEAVY COVERING SMOKE SCREENS AND ARTILLERY

FIRE WHICH DESTROYED EVERY POSSIBLE CONCEALMENT OF
ENEMY ON OPPOSITE SHORE AND WHICH TOOK TERRIFIC TOLL.

FURTHER STATES KIEV WAS DEFENDED BY SMALL GERMAN FORCE
INSTEAD WHAT EXPECTED BY RUSSIANS. DUE HEAVY FORTIFI-
CATIONS SURROUNDING AND IN CITY SMALL FORCE TOOK
DISASTROUS TOLL AND DELAYED PROGRESS. RECAPTURE KIEV
TO HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED 4 DAYS BEFORE ACTUALLY TAKEN.

16...ACT
CNO...COMINCH...2GC...NAVALDE...FILE

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
SUBJECT: Use of Terms Relating to U.S.S.R.

TO: Chiefs of All Headquarters Offices.

1. The Secretariat of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has circulated the following information with reference to the use of certain terms relating to the U.S.S.R.:

"Soviet Officers referred very much every time reference were made to their country as Russia or to their Army as Russian Army or to their Soldier as Soldier. Here are the terms that should be used.

'Russia' is the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or Soviet Union for short or U.S.S.R. because Russia is only one of 16 republics which form the Soviet Union. 'Army' and 'Navy' on all occasions Red Army and Red Navy. 'Soldier' term not used in Soviet Army. The enlisted man is called Red Soldier as one word. The word 'Russian' is used only in reference to the spoken language."

2. It will be the responsibility of all individuals in Headquarters preparing communications to be dispatched to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to use these terms in accordance with the above instruction.

By command of General ARNOLD:

BARNEY N. GILES
Major General, United States Army
Chief of Air Staff

OFFICIAL:

JOHN B. COOLEY
Colonel, AOG
Air Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
As indicated

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 6/15/72
From: Moscow
To: AOWAR

Nr.: Nr.62 14th November 1943
For Operations Division from Deane.

On 6 November I reported a conversation that Mr. Harriman had had with Mr. Molotov in which Mr. Molotov expressed Soviet dissatisfaction of the pressure Anglo-American Forces were maintaining in Italy. We requested an estimate from the Combined Chiefs of Staff which would include a summary of operations planned. At the same time the British Ambassador reported Harriman's conversation to the Prime Minister who sent back his personal estimate of the Italian situation. This has not yet been shown to the Soviet Authorities because Harriman has been hoping to get something from the Chiefs of Staff on the subject.

Since Chiefs of Staff have probably left Washington now request that Harriman be sent an estimate from the Operations Division indicating that might be expected in Italy with particular reference to our ability to pin down German Forces in that area.

Since the subject was first taken up with Harriman it is desirable that a reply to Molotov should come from US first.

See CM-IN-5170 (9 Nov 43)OPD
ACTION: OPD
INFORMATION: Cc/s (Captain Royal USA) Log
CM-IN-8993 (15 Nov 43) 02402 med

SECRET
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
HAVE THERE BEEN ANY LOCAL INDICATIONS WHICH WOULD ENABLE YOU TO DETERMINE WHETHER RELATIONS BETWEEN USSR AND NIPPON ARE IMPROVING OR DETERIORATING. HAS TREATMENT JAPANESE CONSULAR OFFICIALS OR RESIDENTS BEEN CHANGED IN ANY WAY. HOW MANY JAPS ARE NOW ESTIMATED IN MARITIME PROVINCE AREA.

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (d) NAVREGS.)
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Moscow
To: AOWAR Washington DC

Unnumbered 11th November 1943
For Marshall from Deane.

Had a long talk with Voroshilov today. Gave him a paraphrase of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff's views on Alekseyev's estimate—your no. 792 of 28 Oct. He was pleased and will no doubt show it to Stalin and others. He then went on the offensive. Said the Germans had moved 11 divisions to the Eastern front in last 40 days. Five from France, 4 from Balkans and 2 from Italy. Said there were only 10 German divisions left in Italy. He repeated Molotov's dissatisfaction previously reported that there is not sufficient pressure in Italy to prevent German freedom of action in moving divisions. I gave our side of story narrow front, defensive strength of terrain, secure flanks, landing craft bottleneck, how we hope to obtain more decisive results and so on. It is difficult for them to see how combined Anglo-American resources cannot exert more pressure. I gave him our intelligence estimates and other pertinent arguments—report this because it will be an issue to be met when you see them. Voroshilov and others seem perfectly content to wait until next year for OVERLORD but are insistent that more be done now. They are grateful for our support on the Turkey proposition. I questioned him on the effects of getting Sweden to permit use of air bases—Soviet do not want to use them but suggest that we do. Really they hope such action would pull Sweden into the war and thus further disperse the German war effort although they do not venture to say to what extent or in what manner Sweden's entry would affect German strength. I am seeing Antonoff Deputy Chief of Staff tomorrow.

No Sig
792 is CM-OUT-12665 (28 Oct 43)
Gen. Handy
ACTION: General Handy
INFORMATION: General Arnold, JC/3, Admiral King, LOG
CM-IN-7461 (12 Nov 43) 1852Z med

COPY No.

340 Russia
Account of trip via highway to village of Petrovskoye, 30 km from the center of Moscow to the westward.
Subject: USSR - Notes on highway to Petrovskoye, Con't.

Account of trip via highway to village of Petrovskoye, 30 km from the center of Moscow to the westward.

On 7 November, 1943, a trip via motor car was made to Petrovskoye, on the Moscow River, to the westward, 30 km from the center of Moscow.

The road stops at this town, there being beyond this point nothing other than trails through fields suitable for small, horse drawn vehicles.

The region immediately surrounding Petrovskoye is apparently a "dacha" * community for government officials, there being a number of the high, green, board fences surrounding large areas, the usual mark of dachas occupied by people of importance.

The road as far as Petrovskoye is two lane, asphalt, about twenty-five feet wide. It is well drained, ditched and is in very good condition throughout. Shoulders are stone. Culverts are of concrete.

At Oshino, 9 miles from the center of Moscow, within the bend formed by the Moscow River, is a circular airfield about one mile in diameter and occupying the entire space within this bend. There were approximately two-hundred aircraft parked on this field, equally divided between fighters, twin motored bombers and light observation reconnaissance biplanes. There were about half a dozen Douglas type transports. The twin motored bombers were chiefly A-20's. There are three brick or concrete hangars in the north east corner of the field, two estimated to be 150' X 150' and one 75' X 150'.

The north approach is impeded by a row of houses parallel to the road, by poles and wires, and by a low range of hills which rise to the north of the road. The east side of the field particularly to northward, has hazards in the form of a high railway embankment and a number of houses. The south side of the field has a row of low houses parallel to it.

The western approach is clear.

There are no runways, the entire surface of the field being turf.

At twelve miles, there is a DUGB field, placed in an almost identical though slightly smaller arm of the river. It may actually be usable as a flying field, though there was no indication that it was being so employed. There were about thirty either dummy or scrapped planes on snowshores on various parts of this field.

At fourteen miles, on the south side of the road, there was a motor transport park of about fifty large trucks and thirty mobile antiaircraft guns, apparently 3". The latter were parked in a group, not so close together that they would not be used, but as they were still on their wheels, it did not appear they were being used as a ready battery. About six guns were scattered around the area in ready condition and manned.

* A "dacha" is a summer residence outside the city, in which the better class in Czarist Russia spent their summers to escape the heat of the towns. At the present time, government officials, factory managers and the like privileged classes have these dachas in which they spend weekends or even live permanently during the summer, commuting to Moscow. A few of the Intelligentsia and middle class still own dachas, in which the family spends the summer outside of the city, or may even live the year around.

* * * * *
Subject: C.O.R., Notes on Highway to Petrovskoye, Con't.

- Airfield
- Niska (river station)
- Point where Moscow canal crosses highway on viaduct.
- AA Guns
- False Airfield
- Kremlin
- Petrovskoye

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- highways
- railway
- Moscow river and canal system

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Subject: INTELLIGENCE REPORT

From: Op-16-FT

At: Washington, D.C.

Date: 2 November, 1973

Reference: Op-16-FT Serial 74-4 (September Summary)

Source: Official Records

Evaluation: ONIB 2

NOTE: Supply traffic from U.S. in Soviet ships of ex-U.S. registry has been inside-routed via Tertiary Straits since July. Early freeze of Tertiary evidently expedited settlement, possibly through Soviet concessions to Japan demands. Opening of La Perouse by Japs should be read in connection with an earlier unconfirmed report from Chungking of a new Russian-Japan trade agreement. Also with reference to the renewal of the usual Russian-Japan Kanchatska Fishing Agreement, ordinarily negotiated in the autumn, through which the Soviet government may have been exerting some counter pressure.

1. News on 26 October of the reopening of La Perouse to all Soviet ships (Liberties included) came on the heels of a report of early freezing in Tertiary Straits, which were expected previously to have been open to navigation during November. This marks the first relief in the traffic jam situation created by Japanese detention of Russian ships at Ootani during May, June and July, with consequent limitation of La Perouse transits to ships of pre-war Russian registry. During last week in October, seven ex-U.S. ships transited La Perouse eastbound from Vladivostok.

2. While La Perouse has remained open during the summer to Soviet ships of pre-war registry - all Lend Lease vessels, comprising 62% of Soviet transpacific tonnage, have been shut out and forced to use territorial waters under extremely difficult operating conditions, necessitating partial discharge of such ships before attempting passage of the shallow Straits of Tertiary.

3. With La Perouse now temporarily open to Soviet traffic, ships presently outbound bound from Vladivostok should be able to make one round trip to U.S. ports and return before La Perouse becomes icebound, - ordinarily by the end of January.

Distribution By Originator

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/74

R.B.
U.S. LOADING DOWN IN OCTOBER

4. From U.S. Pacific ports Soviet sailings shrunk rapidly, as anticipated, with but 28 departures, compared to 61 departures in September. Approximately 180,000 tons of Lend Lease cargo moved in October, compared to 312,000 tons in September.

5. During October, 61 Soviet ships departed Siberian ports for the United States (12 in the last week of the month), compared to 31 in September, evidencing some relief to the protracted shipping congestion in Siberian ports.

NOTE: Sharp increases in departures from U.S. and Canadian ports should take place in November and early December, in result of resumption of Lend Lease traffic via La Perouse.

OFF-BALANCE DIFFICULTIES

6. Traffic tribulations of the Russians in handling transpecfic war supplies this year are indicated in following graph showing ship departures from Siberian ports, compared to departures from U.S. ports for each of the past ten months. Departure records show the continuous "off-balance" position of Soviet shipping in the Pacific, with 381 westbound movements in 10 months, compared to 313 eastbound, reflecting the progressive delays in turnrounds and relieved only by the continuous additions of Lease Lend ship tonnage from the American side, to keep supplies moving. (Seasonal Arctic port movements are excluded.)

7. Low spot for the period in March last (10 departures from U.S.S.R. ports) was result of closing of La Perouse by ice, and the ill-fated usage of the southern route through Taushina which came to a full stop after the torpedoing and loss of the KOLA and ILIEN near Japan last February.

8. Best shipping month from the United States was September. This peak under ordinary circumstances should have been reached in July and carried through with equal speed for the following two months, but for the traffic jam created by the shrewdly timed detentions of Russian ships in Ootamri in May, June and July.

9. From May to July, 32 ships in all sailed from the United States for Providence Bay and ports on the Arctic passage, the bulk of them in July. This group of special seasonal sailings should be separated from a study of transpecific traffic efficiency.

CONGESTION AT VLADIVOSTOK

10. Shortage of railroad cars at Vladivostok during October caused additional cargo congestion in that area, reversing the marked improvement in handling of cargoes on the docks early in the summer. With cold weather prevalent in Siberian north during October, consequent earlier closing of northern ports to winter navigation is anticipated, automatically increasing the load on Vladivostok facilities.
TWO ADDITIONS TO SOVIET PACIFIC FLEET

11. Two additional Soviet ships, formerly operating in the north Atlantic, have transited the Panama Canal during October. Vessels are the BUREYA (2,723 g.r.t.) and the SHEKSNA (2,914 g.r.t.).

12. One additional tanker, the newly-built THOMAS GALLAUPET, will be transferred by War Shipping Administration via Lend Lease to Soviet registry during November, bringing Soviet Pacific tanker fleet to a total of 21 ships, of which 12 are ex-U.S.

CANADIAN LEND LEASE PARTICIPATION

13. Vancouver has been named by Canadian authorities as loading terminal for Canadian Lend Lease cargo to Siberia. Five Russian vessels are scheduled to complete loadings at Vancouver during November.

COMMENT

11. Jap Squeeze. In retrospect, Japs are estimated to have jammed deliveries of essential Lend Lease supplies this past summer by cutting down the efficiency of Soviet ship operations by 30 to 40% during the critical summer peak traffic period. Evidence of this is in slow-motion turnarounds of Russian ships on the Siberian side, the product of cumulative jams and delays from diversion of traffic via Tertiary Straits and the necessity of off-loading cargo to get ships through. From an Axis viewpoint, Jap timing was excellent.

NOTE: Peak shipping season for Siberia is May - October, inclusive. Five consecutive detentions by Japs at Otonari in early summer, plus one unexplained torpedo attack on Russian ships in territorial waters in August, forced rerouting all ships (except of pre-war Russian registry) via Tertiary.

15. Timing of the reopening of La Perouse to all Soviet ships in late October provides limited relief, depending on how soon and to what extent la Perouse becomes ice blocked. Ordinarily this is effective for a month or more each winter.

NOTE: Larger tonnage ships, including Liberties, are believed too large, possibly too tender, for navigation in heavy ice. Smaller ships, properly reinforced, are regarded by Russian shipmasters as better fitted for use with icebreakers.

16. Next Deadline in January. By the end of January, navigation of La Perouse may be very difficult, depending on ice conditions. At that time next move might be to route outbound ships from Vladivostok southward via Tushima, provided Japs grant permission, as was done last year.

NOTE: After the torpedoing of KOLKA and ILMEN last February, following passage through Tushima, Soviets promptly recalled all vessels outward bound, to await the reopening of navigation via La Perouse. (See para. 7.)

17. Precautionary Action. Facing this winter situation, one alternative available to Soviets would be to move out all available ships from Vladivostok area prior to ice season in La Perouse, for loading and repair at U.S. West Coast ports during February. Vessels could proceed from U.S. ports at least as far as Petropavlovsk to await reopening of the Straits, usually in March. This might be preferable to immobilization of freighters in Siberian ports during the winter, or to the risks of attempting Tushima routing.
IN CONVERSATION DURING CONFERENCE SOVIETS APPROVED IDEA OF IMPROVING EXCHANGE OF WEATHER INFORMATION. IF THEY SHOULD EXTEND INVITATION TO HAVE A U.S. HYDROMETEOROLOGICAL MISSION VISIT RUSSIA AS RETURN VISIT OF THEIR MISSION TO U.S. LAST APRIL WOULD IT BE ACCEPTED.

DECLASSIFIED
R. O. 110 Declassified Sec. 7(f) and 5(d) or (s) On or about Declassification Date May 21, 1973

By DBS

13 ACT
34 16 COMINCH 28P4 28 DUAER
OP-03 OPDO

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVRECS.)

OPNAV-NCR-33
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1954-051-560-0

091010 300 Russia

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/84
SECURITY CONTROL

From: Moscow
To: AGWAR

Number 51, 9 November 1943
From Deane for Joint Chiefs of Staff.

As background for the coming conference I send following impressions.

Above all Soviets want to end war quickly and feel that they can do it. They may attach less importance to OVERLORD than heretofore -- this is indicated by Stalin's calm acceptance of Alexander's Italian estimate and by Conference's acceptance that OVERLORD is to be next year without press for it being moved forward. They seem much more concerned about immediate measures -- this is indicated by their anxiety to get Turkey and Sweden into the war and their concern over our pressure in Italy. You may be confronted with insistence that further operations be undertaken in the Mediterranean now such as increased pressure in Italy and some venture in the Balkans for the purpose of quickly drawing German strength from the eastern front - they may even urge some delay to OVERLORD if it would make more immediate results possible. Their impressions may not be correct but I feel that the possibilities should be considered before meeting with red military authorities. Harriman feels that Soviets are as keen as ever on second front but he feels also a choice between a spring OVERLORD and more immediate help elsewhere would be a difficult one of Soviets to make.

No Sig

ACTION: JC/3 (Capt Royal USN) (Adm. Leahy)

INFORMATION: OPD
CofS
Adm. King
Gen. Arnold.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By REF, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

17

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/23/94

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
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FROM

RELEASED BY

DATE

FOR ACTION

ADDRESSSES

PRECEDENCE

CALLAN (ALUSNA LONDON)

5 NOV 1943

CNO

RRRRRRRR

RUTINE

DEFERRED

1902/5

STONE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

ROONEY

STANDARD

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

TEXT

ALUSNA LONDON SPEAKS TO CNO FROM CALLAN VERY SECRET.

WORD REACHED NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT LONDON TODAY THAT FOLLOWING THREE FINNS HAVE LEFT OR ARE LEAVING IMMEDIATE FUTURE FOR MOSCOW WITH DEFINITE OBJECTIVE ARRANGE PEACE TERMS WITH RUSSIA:

FAASIKIVI, INDUSTRIALIST AND FINNISH REPRESENTATIVE MOSCOW BEFORE RELATIONS BROKEN;

GRIPENBERG, FORMER MINISTER TO LONDON;

FAGERHOLM, FORMER CABINET MINISTER AND LEADING SOCIAL DEMOCRAT.

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 2(B) and 5(D) or 6

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By DBS

Date: Nov 27, 1972

ACTION

COMINCH NAVAIDE

$51631
Serial 51-43
Monograph Index Guide No. 601-400
(To correspond with 2603892 index number, see O. N. 7, Index Guide, back reports report for each monograph.)

From Assistant Naval Attaché of Moscow, U.S.S.R. Date 2 November 1943

Reference (files, files, unit, district, office, station, or person)

Source Personal Observations. Evaluation A-1

Subject U.S.S.R., Trip via Motor Car NARO - FOMINSK.

Note: Report covering trip via motor car to NARO - FOMINSK, 72 kilometers from Moscow on Bratsk road.
Subject: USSR, Trip via motor car NAROFORMINSK, Cont.

During October a motor trip was made to Naro-Fominsk and return, time consumed being approximately five hours.

The road throughout is asphalt surfaced, with the exception of passages of a few hundred yards to half a mile which is cobbled, bordered with asphalt. These areas are in all probability ones that were either destroyed by the retreating Russians in 1941 or blown up by German bombing.

Width sufficient for three lane traffic, being at least forty feet wide throughout.

The top speed which the vehicle is capable of could be taken advantage of as the road is extremely well constructed, with a level, smooth surface, easy gradients and curves. Where the newer cobbled sections join the original asphalted surface sections there is sometimes a ridge restricting speed.

The entire length is excellently drained by clean ditches about two feet deep. The road itself is cambered sufficiently to provide proper drainage from the surface.

There is one small concrete bridge and a number of minor concrete culverts, all in apparently sound condition. All of these are as wide as the road itself. There are no underpasses or tunnels.

The country is largely open, with scattered patches of woodland for the first 40 km out of Moscow. Farther, it is predominantly wooded with an equal proportion of conifers and deciduous trees, mostly fully matured and growing closely enough together to constitute an impassable obstacle to wheeled traffic.

Beyond the crossroads about three km south of Naro-Fominsk, the roads are combination stone and dirt and appear to be in exceptionally poor condition.

NAROFORMINSK is a combination of old country villages of log-thatch huts and large, "modern" five story brick apartments. There is at least one large factory building. The modern buildings have been gutted by bombing and fire and have been abandoned. The small log dwellings have been almost entirely untouched, and are all inhabited by swarms of people. There is no indication of repair or rehabilitation of the modern area or the factory building.

A new railroad line has very recently been laid in the vicinity of the town, crossing to westward, and a new line not indicated on the map crosses the main highway some five km toward Moscow.

I would estimate the peace time population of Naro-Fominsk at three thousand, judging by the number of houses.

LANDING FIELD:

At approximately 46 km from Moscow there is a landing field approximately 3/4 mile long, on the west side of the main highway, south of the branch road leading to Kolitamo (Nosaiaisk highway). A strip of woodland about 300 yards deep separates it from the main highway. The high tail of an A-20 or a plane similar to it was seen at the south end of the field. There were several antiaircraft platforms on the northeast end and the entire area was surrounded by a high, barbed wire fence.
Moscow Serial 51-43 5 November 1943

Subject: USSR, Trip via motor car NARO-POKROVSK, Cont.

The road leading to Galitsino is of asphalt, two lanes. That part of it seen from the main highway appeared to be of excellent construction, well graded, ditched and drained. This was the only asphalt road leading off the main highway.

At approximately 60 km from Moscow, on the south side of the highway, about fifteen heavy guns, similar to our 155 mm guns, and elevated to 45°, were emplaced at the edge of a patch of woodland. There were a number of camouflaged antiaircraft guns in the same area. A number of troops were moving about the guns. As this is far removed from the front, no reason for this emplacement can be imagined.

At about 50 km from Moscow, in a patch of woodland on the north side of the highway, there were a number of roadways, spaced some fifty yards apart, extending along a stretch of some half mile, leading into the woods. The whole area was surrounded by barbed wire and there was evidence that the entire area was a military bivouac with heavy vehicles and transport.

No large bodies of troops were seen on the trip, but there were a number of individual soldiers in the vicinity of the military establishments noted above plus several other smaller military posts enroute.

There were about five military barriers (gates) scattered along the route, of the type where documents are inspected, but none of them were manned. The only document inspection was at the outskirts of Moscow and at no other place were we stopped or questioned.

Traffic was very light, there being no more than half a dozen trucks and three or four passenger cars on the entire trip.

The villages along the highway and those visible from the road do not appear to have suffered any damage whatever.

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 8(D) or (E)
ORD letter, May 1, 1972
By DBS Date: MAY 21 1973

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
UNCLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 8(D) or (E)
NSC letter, May 4, 1972
By DBS Date MAY 2 1 1 9 7 3

RETAI N

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DECLASSIFIED
E. 0. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94.
Subject: USSR, Soviet Espionage, Con't.

An American, visiting a foreign country, can scarcely help having his interest excited by the many differences existing between it and his home land. An average male can be counted on to include in his appraisal the native female, and if it can possibly be arranged, to mix with the people themselves in order to more pleasantly spend his spare time.

The above is especially true in the Soviet Union, partially due to the lack of normal outside entertainment for visitors in the way of night clubs, restaurants and movies and partially to the individual desire to check up on the preconceived ideas of a country so much in the news but really so little known.

The average "big shot" is of course taken in hand on arrival by the high pressure front men, banqueted, shown the town, possibly a chosen factory, surrounded by charming girls who seem to have all the open good fellowship of the usual American, to whom the Russians are so often compared. He may occasionally have an opportunity to break away from his own, and this is even more probable if he is in the country other than on a flying visit such as that of Wilka. He may then more closely approach the situation enjoyed by the more junior visitor, such as members of the plane crew who occasionally bring in distinguished personnel, or armed guard officers from the northern convoy ports.

The situation confronting the little fellow is something like this: He goes to the theatre. During the inter-acts, when the majority of the audience goes out into the foyer to circle around and view the crowd, he notices that there are a lot of unattached girls of from about 17 to 25. Sometimes they will ask for a light. Sometimes they will give a discreet "glad eye". Sometimes they don't have to do anything, if the visiting American has been in the desert long enough. In any case, it is not long before the visitor has a girl to chat with. They make a date to go to the theatre together the next night. The visitor is thrilled with his good luck, and it is easy to see by the nice clothes she has that she is not one of the common herd. Probably a commissar's daughter who is afraid to identify herself with a strange foreigner. In four or five days she will probably go over to the National hotel with him to spend a quiet evening, particularly if he suggests food. He has "made the grade", and by this time is an authority on life in the USSR.

The situation confronting the little fellow is something like this: No honest, ordinary citizenship of Moscow may associate with foreigners unless he has an official reason or unless he or she is a widely known member of the theatrical or artistic world or a government employee who has regular contacts with foreigners in his official capacity. There are from time to time some who try it, through ignorance of the official attitude. After a very few contacts, they find some sort of excuse to drop out of the picture.

There are employed in the various foreign missions here and in the offices of foreign newspaper correspondents a few Soviet citizens, some of whom will go out with foreigners. Some of these are ordinary, presumably honest clerks and stenographers who have no more or less normal to a Soviet citizen, with certain ramifications to be elaborated on later. A few of these employes belong to a slightly different classification which might roughly be labelled "NKVD Prostitutes, Unlimited".

From "NKVD Prostitutes, Unlimited" come the contacts which transient foreigners make in the USSR and from which certain of those regularly stationed here obtain introductions or more or less permanent basis. From this group, the girls who regularly can be found in the foyer of the ballet theatre, when an ordinary citizen can obtain a ticket only at rare intervals and only after waiting in line for many hours. They are the only women in the USSR...
other than wives of high officials who wear silk stockings and casual coats and have what by local standards are fine clothes. The more blatant of these blend into the color of straw. Their manners and behavior in polite company are far above the average of the contemporary Soviet, that of even the official, due to their association with foreigners and their easy access to foreign apartments. Those who are not employed in foreign missions usually claim to be students at one of the several institutes in Moscow and some are actually engaged in part time activity in such places. There are others however who have no visible means of obtaining a ration legally. (It must be remembered that unless a Soviet citizen works, attends a university or is physically incapable of working, he receives no ration card, equivalent to a death sentence by starvation).

It may seem at first glance that these girls can be of little value to their own employers or do no harm to us. It has always been the American mentality to pooh-pooh espionage and belittle the painstaking efforts of such as the Japanese to assemble minute bits of seemingly irrelevant information to perhaps eventually make a picture meaning a Pearl Harbor. That this intelligence is employed by an organization having the scope, experience, reputation and centuries of background enjoyed by the Soviet secret police should be sufficient indication that they are not doing it for amusement.

In conjunction with the above, let it be remembered that NOT A SINGLE SOVIET EMPLOYEE OF A FOREIGN ACTIVITY IS ALLOWED TO CONTINUE SUCH WORK ANY LENGTH OF TIME WITHOUT BEING CALLED IN FOR QUESTIONING BY THE KGB. The majority of them are required to make periodic reports of great length and detail. Their chief desire is of course a copy of cipher or code used. Next in importance is carbon paper or copies of cipher messages. These prises can scarcely hope to be obtained by any but the luckiest of hunters through extreme carelessness or looseness of tongue on the part of those handling such matters. They may however, spend their time quite profitably. Of interest to us are the personalities and habits of all individuals, their weaknesses, vices, sympathies, viewpoints toward the Soviet, other countries and whatever questions are pending at the moment. They are interested in seemingly trivial items which it appears certain they could obtain from other sources, and it is probable that these questions are asked in order to continually test the veracity, initiative and trustworthiness of these agents. The recent tripartite conference has had the "YMDA" on its toes to the exclusion of all other business, trying to find out what the American attitude was on the play by play progress of the discussions.

It is unquestionable that many of these girls, through threat of reprisal to families or other circumstances beyond their control, have been forced into these activities. There are many of course, as there are in all countries, who simply enjoy the life of a "refined" prostitute, particularly when the advantages of associating with their clients include food and comforts unheard of in their own circles.

It may be interesting to recount the case history of a girl now employed by the American Military Mission in Moscow as a Russian teacher. Part of the story is her own, part is through my own personal knowledge and part from third parties considered entirely reliable.

She is of an admixture of Tarter and Russian Blood, with a suggestion of the characteristic blue eyes folds of a tartar and with all their fiery general temperament. About 26 years old now, she was married at about eighteen to a musician, an Austrian communist, who had come to the USSR with the apparent intention of settling here. Through him, she made many contacts with the musical world in Moscow. During a trip in the south of Russia, the husband contracted some sort of fever and after a lingering illness of several months died. The worry and sorrow in connection with this caused our subject to have an abortion of a baby of some four months, leaving her in a very poor condition of mental and physical health for several years. By 1936-37, she...
had renewed old musical acquaintances in Moscow, becoming most intimate with the well known Jewish pianist Jacob Fliesser and in all probability becoming his mistress. This happy arrangement was eventually terminated by Fliesser, a man of whiskey, leaving our heroine, after a short vacation, to make up with a member of the Italian Embassy. Prior to the outbreak of the Soviet-German war, this Italian was evacuated, and after another short interval the girl became very intimate with a member of the British Mission. Her marriage to an Austrian and the subsequent association with an Italian had undoubtedly put her in a difficult position, which the NKVD was in a position to capitalize on.

Her parents are from what would correspond to the lower middle class in the United States, the family consisting of father, an agriculitur inspector, mother, who works in a factory, 23 year old sister, who is supposed to be studying music in the conservatory, and Leda, a white spirt. In a country where food is scarce, the latter is the only indication of opulence which the family can boast of, living as they do in an incredibly rusty, dirty, single room in a basement. The father was banished from the city of Moscow some time ago for reasons unexplained to me, but has recently been allowed to return, no doubt through the acceptable performances of the daughter. The sister is never allowed to visit foreigners homes and her association with foreigners has to date been limited to going on several picnic parties in the country.

In January of 1942, Brigadier General Paysonville, USA, Chief of the Supply Mission to the USSR, returned to Moscow from Kubyshev, to which the foreign missions had evacuated in October of 1941. On the advice of a Miss Tolstaya, this girl was at this time employed as a Russian teacher, although she claims to speak no English and has never been heard to do so. (In passing it may be said that Tolstaya, a relative of the author Tolstaya, has worked for the American Embassy and for Paysonville for ten years and if anybody were in a solid position with the Lubyanka (GIU NKVD it would be Tolstaya).

During the period our subject has been employed, she has made every effort to establish intimate relations with Americans. She became the mistress of a Vice Consul on a week's acquaintance and continued until this Vice Consul was transferred. She then associated herself with an officer member of Major General Bradley's plane crew. On his departure, she made unabashed efforts to "move in" with me in a newly occupied apartment well supplied with food. The "offer" was not accepted, if for no other purpose than the excellent possibilities for blackmail through false official pregnancy as a result of her recent associations elsewhere. Following this, she established herself with another member of the embassy staff where she has carried on for a period of about one year. During her "career", she has had seven abortions.

Has a nice careful coat, too.

The above somewhat absurd account is more or less typical of the slightly better-than-average girl who comprises those available for associations with foreigners, with the exceptions of those of the world of letters or art who are too high to keep segregated.

If any visiting general is flattered by the attention he receives from a well dressed twenty year old, or any young officer labor under the impression he has by great good luck run into a com missar's daughter in the lobby of the hotel, he should be gently told the facts of life in the USSR. If those who have not visited the USSR advance the idea from reading Hindu or the newspapers that the USSR is a free country, respecting the freedom of others, they may be as much a menace to the eventual security of the United States as any enemy spy within our own borders. There are always among us, unfortunately, those who never believe it until they see it themselves.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11461, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 1, 1972
By DBS Date MAY 2 1 1973

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94
Observations during overland trip from Teheran to Pahlavi and boat trip from Pahlavi to Baku.

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Subject: Trip from Teheran to Pahlavi by truck - Report of. (Cont’d)

1. In company with some seven tons of stores and dental equipment, loaded on two U.S.O.C. trucks we left Teheran for Pahlavi, Iran, at 7 P.M., September 9, 1943.

The road out of Teheran and for a distance of approximately 20 miles was asphalt surfaced and, while narrow, would compare favorably with what we term a two-lane highway. A sustained speed of thirty-five miles an hour was not difficult.

Upon leaving the paving, the road held its former width but the surface was sparsely graded and had quite a rolling "washboard" design. Speed was necessarily cut to some fifteen miles an hour and anything above that produced a lurching of the truck, that would have soon destroyed both it and the freight it was carrying.

The road continued thus with short patches better or worse until we reached Kasvin, some ninety odd miles from Teheran, at 2 AM. Omitting thirty minutes we lost thru stopping for gas and water, our average speed was in the neighborhood of 11 miles an hour.

We left Kasvin at 7:15 AM., September 10, 1943, to start thru the Caucasus. The road from Kasvin to Pahlavi for the first two hours is about the same as we encountered before entering Kasvin. From there on it became nothing short of a nightmare, necessitating second gear driving. The "rolling washboard" became a regular "washboard" of definite cuts about eighteen inches apart with no smooth places anywhere. At various "hairecd" turns thru the Caucasus the U.S. Army has girl soldiers stationed to stop you, or motion you on, if other cars are, or are not coming. For two trucks to pass at these places, in most instances, is an impossibility. I counted 44 such corners. There are no guard rails at any precarious turns, altho a few did have some small boards lined up to serve as such. I am glad we did not have to test their efficacy, as the several I pushed against with one hand, could have been sent over the side with little effort. We saw hundreds of Persian laborers thru the Caucasus, mostly women, repairing the road. The repairs consisting of placing loose dirt in the cuts of the road surface. In three different places I saw Soviets and Persians working to improve, by widening, three of the bad turns. The road all thru the mountains is natural surface, very dusty, and very slippery when wet. We had rain the last hour during our trip thru them and the truck, a six-wheeler, was quite difficult to manage. There are no tunnels or underpasses on this highway anywhere and very few small bridges. I would estimate that there are no more than six small bridges, built on steel girders with asphalt surface. Culverts are a rarity; in most instances the topography of the country has been rounded out to produce a "dip". The road thru the mountains is poorly constructed from a drainage standpoint. I noticed at most of the bad turns on the mountain side of the highway a drainage ditch that followed the length of the turn. These ditches were about eight inches deep and eight inches wide, lined and sided with small stone blocks. They were not curbed and I saw three trucks stuck in them. Apparently they had tried to pass and their front wheels had dropped into these ditches. As the ditch was somewhere near the same width of the tire of the front wheel (the wheels would wedge into them), it presented quite a problem in getting them out. The shoulders of this hi-way, for its entire length, after leaving the paving, are to be avoided. They are very soft and sandy.

The rest of the trip was the same as described. After leaving the mountains we dropped into a fertile green valley and comparatively straight roads.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 7(B) and 8(B) or (R)
OSD letter, May 3, 1973
By DSB
Date: May 21, 1973

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 5/2/73
Subject: Trip from Teheran to Pahlevi by truck - Report of. (Cont'd)

They have recently completed a new hi-way from Teheran to Pahlevi.  So traveled over this road.  It is mostly graded but unsurfaced.  But while it was raining all the way from Teheran to Pahlevi the road was not slippery.  The distance between these two towns is approximately 20 to 30 miles.  They have made a fill where you leave the old road for the new and this fill could not be negotiated with a much larger load than we had (during wet seasons), as it is extremely soft and full of mud deep ruts.  This fill is about a quarter of a mile long.  The new road from Teheran to Pahlevi is two cars wide and at the time we traveled over it it was not as rough as we had seen but speed of over 20 miles per hour would be dangerous as there are many very bad spots.

We reached Pahlevi at 11 PM., September 10, 1943, covering the distance from Kasvin in 16 hours, 8 miles per hour.  A distance of approximately a hundred and thirty miles, of which I would estimate, seventy five were mountainous.  At Pahlevi we were rigidly inspected by the Red Army representatives and allowed to proceed to the storage yards.

2.  When we arrived at Kasvin the highway was blocked by two gates and we were stopped and inspected by members of the Red Army.  Kasvin is, of course, the beginning of the Russian sphere of influence.  We were stopped and inspected five times between Kasvin and Pahlevi by Red Army representatives.  Altho I presented a courier letter for all the freight I carried, both loads were gone over carefully, each time we were halted.

While getting gasoline at Kasvin I counted approximately two-thousand trucks, Studebakers and General Motors.  Some loading, some unloading, the majority idle.  The amount of freight seen at Kasvin, off-loaded into vacant lots, along little used highways and temporary warehouses is impossible to describe.  Much of it, you could tell, had been there for a long time and would never be loaded.  One of the loaders, a civilean, said he could see where the weight had become concentrated and with the cases.  An interesting sideline was to see wooden cases labeled; "Grease - lubrication", packaged in wooden boxes, stored in sheds out of the weather; whereas, there was row after row of cardboard cartons exposed to the weather, those containing mostly foodstuffs.  I recall seeing tons, tons of salmon and caviar unrefrigerated.  Many of these cases had deteriorated to the extent that they had spewed their contents into the dust and their labels had long since disappeared, and there was evidence of much rust.  Tons and tons of cable, of various sizes, were piled here and there, in the open, and to my inexpert eye, not capable of holding the load for which they were originally intended.

From Kasvin to Pahlevi I counted one-thousand one-hundred and nineteen trucks traveling in both directions.  Easily two-thirds were loaded and going in our direction.  They were all either General Motors or Studebakers.  Over this same stretch of highway I saw six (visible from the highway), that had left the road, turned over, and in each case were badly smashed.  Three others I saw had left the road and headed into the ditch but had not overturned.  All three of these were on the levellest, straightest stretch of highway from Kasvin.  This indicated, to me at least, that the drivers of these trucks were exhausted and once they had navigated the horrible section thru the mountains, relaxed at the sight of a straight road and fell asleep.  Our drivers, Persians, said that they always saw from five to twenty (each trip) piled up along the highway.  The drivers of these trucks (for the Russians) are all Russian soldiers, with an average age of perhaps sixteen.  The leading truck and the last one each carried a Russian Officer.  All of their drivers were armed and each truck I peered into carried a "Tommy-Gun".  The largest convoy I saw was three-hundred and fifty-five, and the smallest was twenty-eight.

E. O. 11462, Sec. (7)D and (8)D or (M)
OSD letter, May 1, 1917
By DBS
MAY 21 1973

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date
Subject: Trip from Teheran to Pahlavi by truck - Report of. (Cont'd)

An interesting sidelight was the small amount of mechanical failure witnessed in all these trucks, traveling overloaded, on this almost impossible highway. I did not but one time, see a truck stopped because of any mechanical trouble. This one, a G.M. had stopped in the center of the straight stretch of highway, beyond the mountains, and the housing about four inches to the right of the differential was broken clear thru, as was that which it housed, so that the rear wheels had buckled in at the top and the truck was resting with its springs on the highway. There was a surprisingly large amount of tire trouble observed.

3. We off-loaded the morning after our arrival and there was a distinct repetition of what I had seen in Kasvin so far as freight and its storage was concerned.

Our freight stuffs were loaded, three days later, onto a small Russian freighter, the "CENTRO GIUSE". I would estimate she was about 600 tons. The Captain, while he did not know her size, said she was built in 1888. The trip across the Caspian from Pahlavi to Baku took 23 hours. At Baku my freight was turned over to Intourist for rail shipment to Moscow and I returned to Moscow by plane.

The English, who operate the U.K.C.O., were extremely helpful in solving all matters that arose over handling the freight and its storage in Pahlavi. Mr. Beecher, in charge, paid the labor costs involved, and secured the men to do the work. Our Persian drivers were excellent, but I would not recommend them traveling unaccompanied as they are prone to sell what they are carrying, thru the country side, and return with a tale of being "hi-jacked". They also need constant shepherding each time you stop as otherwise they will get a pipeful of opium and later fall asleep at the wheel. There are opium houses all thru Persia, operating legally.

4. The Armenians, who dominate the mercantile trade at Pahlavi, told me that each boat brings about forty new Russians that disappear into the country side. There are four boat arrivals a week from Baku. All boats I saw were no larger than the one I rode. Only two boats a week carry passengers. They also said that prior to the Russian shelling and occupation bandits were everywhere. These, they said, have all been wiped out, and where stores used to be raided two and three times a week are now never molested. Travel in the countryside, they further stated, is now safe, whereas formerly it was impossible without donating part of what you were carrying or a substantial sum of money (to these bands that roamed the hills). I am inclined to put full faith in this statement as the Armenians expressed extreme dislike for the Russians and went so far as to say that if the day comes, and they feel it will, when Russia occupies Northern Iran for keeps, they will suffer most because they have been thrifty. They were extremely grateful to the Red Army for the law and order they have brought to Northern Iran.

5. It is necessary to carry your own food and water on this trip as there are no places to secure foods but that are filthy. The sleeping house at Kasvin serves breakfast, but it is not recommended. The bed was relatively clean.
During a period of two years in the USSR, the writer has had the opportunity to talk to a great many Russian stevedores working in Soviet ports receiving American War Material, i.e., Murmansk, Archangel and Vladivostok. The majority of these stevedores are political prisoners while the remaining few are mobilised laborers, criminals convicted of minor offenses etc. These men represent practically all professions and are from all walks of life. Some intelligent, others merely ignorant peasants. All are frank in their opinions, and for the most part bear no particular grudge against Russia; that is, apart from the present Soviet régime. They are proud of the Red Army successes and realize what Russia is fighting for. As a matter of fact they are probably better acquainted with the progress of the war on the Russian front than the ordinary Soviet citizen as their "grapevine" telegraph is much more efficient and is supplemented from time to time with first hand information from court-martialed troops sentenced to labor in their respective concentration camps. These stevedores are not afraid to talk to foreigners whenever given an opportunity as they feel they haven't anything to lose, and in most cases the only punishment they receive for such an offense is a kick from their guard for loafing on the job. This, the stevedore figures is well worth an American cigarette plus the novelty of talking to an outsider.

These men know better than anyone else in the Soviet Union the help Russia is receiving from the United States. They are loud in their praise of American equipment, the way things are packed, and the huge amount of it that is received. They admit that a great deal of it is damaged by themselves, not intentionally, but because they have had insufficient experience handling cargo or are too eager to work well. This last reason is due to poor pay and most rations. Recently, in the Port of Vladivostok, some cargo from the "Standard Tool Co." and the "National Twist Drill Co." was received with paper labels pasted on the boxes bearing the picture of a small American flag and the following in Russian, "From the United States of America, One of the United Nations."
Subject: People & Social Forces

This, the stevedores explained was very, very good as they know that few people in the USSR knew what products came from the USA and these labels would leave no doubt. Also, they have heard of Soviet "bolshoi nachalniki" (big shots) telling the people that some of the U.S. equipment in evidence was captured trophies or was "Soviet made," for export. These labels in the Russian Language would put an end to such things, they felt.

The opinion of these stevedores in the writer's opinion is significant as they represent the majority of "Workers" in Seaport cities and have no particular motive for praising or criticizing American products. Likewise, as was mentioned before, their "grapevine" leads to approximately two to three million other laborers living in concentration camps scattered throughout the whole of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the practice of labeling IN THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE material shipped to the USSR, appears to be an excellent means of overcoming Soviet clamoring for a second front plus their reluctance to inform the people that capitalist United States is doing something besides getting rich off the hard fighting, hard working Soviet citizen.

* * * * *
(ACTION CNO INFO COM 12TH FLT O&G AND ALUSNA MOSCOW.)

SHORTAGE OF RAILWAY CARS THIS AREA NOW CAUSING CARGO CONGESTION PORT OF VLADIVOSTOK. SITUATION WILL NOT IMPROVE WITH COLD WEATHER SETTING IN AND CLOSE OF SHIPPING SEASON NORTH SIBERIAN PORTS.

16...ACT
FX37...COMINCH...28G...MAYAVE...CNO...230P...
FILE

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/4/44

CONFIDENTIAL
FROM: ROULLARD VLADIVOSTOCK  202122  ROUTINE DER
ACT: OPNAV  20 OCT 43  NCR 3647
INFO: MOSCOW

FIRST HEAVY SNOW FALL REPORTED NEAR KHARBAROVSK X EXTREMELY COLD WEATHER REPORTED SOVGAJAN AREA AND SHIPPING ACTIVITY ALMOST FINISHED X VLADIVOSTOK WEATHER CONTINUES COOL AND CLEAR WITH BARRAGE BALOON DRILL AND ANTIAIRCRAFT TARGET PRACTICE HELD ALMOST DAILY

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 1, 1972
By DBS  Date: MAY 21 1977

RS

For information about this dispatch call Branch 8285 (Room 3638)
FROM: ALUSNA MOSCOW 180946 NCR 36093 18 OCT 43 BJW
ACT: CNO

RESTRICTED/ROUTINE

A1 REPORT STALIN RECEIVED NELSON IN FULL DRESS MARSHALS UNIFORM WHICH WORN FIRST TIME

DISTRIBUTION:
16 ACTION
NAVAID...COMINCH..OP-11S-55A..FILE

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11683, Sec. 3(B) and 5(D) or (F)
OSD letter, May 4, 1973
By DBS Date MAY 21 1973

For information about this dispatch call Branch 3004 (Room 2625)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/20/94
During the month of September, 1943, Rear Admiral J. H. Duncan, U.S.N., and Commander Kemp Tolley, U.S.N., spent four days (4 - 7 and 12th) at Khabarovsky while enroute to Komsomol to inspect shipbuilding facilities at the latter city. (See Moscow serial 40-43).

The following information was gotten during conversations with local officials and by several walks around the town. It covers general questions of superficial appearances, industries, local political and economic situation.
Foreigners have no access to the interior of Siberia except as necessary in transit. No stopover privileges are ever granted to visit Siberian cities. Trains stop no longer than forty minutes in each city; the stations are often two to eight kilometers from the city itself and there is no transportation, so flying visits by passengers-throughs via train are not possible.

In connection with the ban on foreigners in the areas east of Lake Baikal, all Chinese, Koreans and Japanese have some time ago been either required to leave the USSR or have been shipped off to remote areas in central Asiatic USSR. No Orientals other than Burid Mongolians are seen in Siberia, and practically none of those east of Chita.

The President of the City Soviet of Khabarovsk is named Ryabov.

He said he was born in European Russia and that previous to his election to the city soviet, was a factory executive. He is about thirty-eight or forty at most and affects the proletarian worker’s cap and sloppy attached collar and bulging tie knot of the new Soviet official. He is a small, heavyset, energetic type, very affable and with a clean cut face. A bobbing-from-the-waist hand shaker with a probable background of honest endeavor and accomplishment in the politico-mercantile field. He met us at the station on our arrival, had a farewell meal with us in our hotel on the return from Komsomol and presented the Admiral with a Siberian bear as “a farewell present from the people of Khabarovsk”. Combination of crude Grover Whalen and Mayor LaGuardia rolled into one and dressed in a very badly fitting set of mail order clothes.

The Secretary of the City Soviet, Shiryayev, was appointed by Ryabov to stock with us in Khabarovsk and care for our wants. He was a professor of history and current events in a Khabarovsk “middle school” until elected to the City Soviet. Shiryayev has read widely and has amassed a large fund of assorted information with a decidedly communist slant. He is eagerly interested in hearing anything about anywhere, particularly the United States. The “Novy Kuras” (New Deal) has particularly impressed him as a not entirely peaceful change in American Government practically amounting to a bloodless revolution and he was most anxious to know what it implications might be. There have been many explanations of American politics appearing from time to time in Soviet papers and Shiryayev’s eagerness to hear the story from an American indicates a certain lack of trust in his own sources. This in spite of a pro communist “front” and anti-capitalist attitude on any subject brought up. Not particularly intelligent but probably impressive to a Soviet by virtue of his store of “facts”. Born in Siberia and extremely crude socially, even for a Soviet. His wife is one of the three announcers over the city broadcasting system and of the Khabarovsk radio station. Nearly all Soviet cities have powerful loudspeakers literally spread around built to distribute, over which news, broadcasts, propaganda speeches and music blare forth from sunrise to midnight, with few pages. In Moscow this system is less used as practically every large building and many houses have this service “piped” to then to substitute for the private radios which were confiscated at the beginning of the war.

Captain Lieutenant Tarasov (liaison officer sent with us from Moscow) and I, both in uniform, covered the main street of the city and the waterfront on foot. See Moscow serial 39-43. While resting in a park, about six boys, ranging in age from seven to twelve, hovered off in the background, intensely interested in my foreign uniform as was every other citizen we met. One finally mustered courage to dash over and inquire, “are you a minister?” darting back to his fellows again in confusion. They finally got bolder and eased over to offer us some berries they had pulled off a tree. The conversation was something like this:

Small boy: “You’re an American!”
Tarasov: “No! He’s a Japanese!”
Small Boy: “He is not! We don’t allow any of those sons of bitches around here. We would kill them.”
TARASOV: "Go on, beat it!"
TOLLEY: "How do you know I'm an American? Did you ever see an American before?"
SMALL BOY: "No, but you can't fool me. I know. "Try some of these berries".
TARASOV: "Scram! He doesn't want any of those filthy things".
SMALL BOY: "If I could only live half my life but spend that half in America, I would go right away and be glad to do it".
TOLLEY: "Now do you know it's any better than here? Maybe you would be disappointed and want to come back to Russia".
SMALL BOY: "Ahhi! Everybody here knows it's better in America."
TARASOV: (Showing visible uneasiness) "Scram! Beat it!"
SMALL BOY: "Here's a cigarette, now go on away".
TARASOV: "Ten young men from Komsomol tried to get to America not long ago, but only four of them got away."

The conversation was brought up here by Tarasov's insinuating we go back to the hotel in order to be in time for dinner. Later, in Komsomol, we were again walking in the park, followed by swarms of kids. They too were all speaking about "American Dyadska", literally "American uncle", meaning "old boy", "old scout" or something similar. So determined was Tarasov to prevent a repetition of the Khabarovsk embarrassment that he cut a switch from a tree and didn't allow the kids to come close when we sat down to rest.

The population of Khabarovsk is very close to 300,000, by the census of 1941, according to Shiryayev. It is the capital of the Khabarovsk Krai (region), which embraces the entire Pacific coast of Siberia, including Kamchatka, with the exception of the Vladivostok region south of the Amur mouth. This fact probably makes it of more political importance than Vladivostok.

The headquarters of the Amur River Flotilla are here, Vice Admiral Oktyabrsky commanding. He was formerly in the Black Sea area. His Chief of Staff, Captain 2nd rank Brachtman, graduated from the Leningrad Naval School in 1929, is exceptionally intelligent, well informed, interested in America and gives an appearance of being quite pro American. (See Moscow serial 35-43).

Admiral Oktyabrsky was away "on autumn maneuvers" during our visit and stayed away some days longer than expected, as we inadvertently found out from junior officers. He undoubtedly had no intention of meeting Admiral Duncan, not wanting to give the slightest impression to anyone (including the Japanese) that anything touching on Far Eastern joint action might be in the wind. His Chief of Staff was most cooperative however, and had the local naval hydrographer, a Red Navy senior lieutenant, give detailed data on the Amur river and tributaries. (See Moscow serial 36-43).

In the theatre and on the streets, my uniform was a tremendous source of restrained curiosity. In the theatre foyer during intermissions, the entire audience practically formed a ring around our party. It is entirely probable that the majority of the Russian there have never seen a foreign uniform since intervention. In view of the present tension in connection with our Far eastern war, the appearance of American must have aroused wide speculation.

There is a Japanese consul in Blagovesychensk but none in Khabarovsk. Traffic with the Japanese across the river is practically nil at any of the river ports and the vast amount of smuggling which went on in the early 1930's has ceased due to the tightening up of border control.
Zone - 10 time is used in both Khabarovsk and Komomolak.

The main street of the town runs on top of a ridge perpendicular to the river. There are about five additional ridges parallel to this one, the majority of the town being visible from the hotel, located on the main street. No factory chimneys or large buildings which might be used as factories were noted from this vantage point. The various officials met all stated that the chief industries of the region were fish processing, hunting for fur, lumbering and minor crafts to provide consumer goods for the local population.

The museum, devoted largely to exhibits of the natural wealth and activities of the Khabarovsk Krai, covered mostly fishing and hunting. There was a small exhibit from a local factory producing machine tools and gears, the only one indicating any local industrial developments.

There is a river station with pontoon loading platforms. Two river steamers estimated to be 275 feet long were tied up, but activity of any sort was negligible and there was no indication of any cargo transfer. During a three hour period, the only river traffic noted was a 30 or 40 ton tug, which broke down in midstream and had to be towed in, and a small gasoline launch towing a 50 foot lightship tug. Boats were made in a number of places about the possibility of going via steamer from Khabarovsk to Komomolak. All these sources, several of them independent, indicated that there were two steamers in this service, but sailings were irregular, possibly once every ten days, requiring five days for the trip downriver.

I do not believe there is any important manufacturing in Khabarovsk, all information and indications being to the contrary and in view of its vulnerability to attack from Manchuria.

Housing is estimated at 25% post revolutionary, the old buildings being the typical Imperial Russian two or three story stuccoed brick with much wood incorporated in the interior. New buildings are five or six stord apartments and office buildings, of stuccoed brick or concrete. Many are in modernistic style with much glass. Nearly all buildings have flat or almost flat tin roofs, many with two or three foot cornices.

Khabarovsk is brightly lighted and there were no means installed in our hotel rooms for blanking out. Buildings are not camouflaged, even the railway station or government offices.

The citizens are not as "stillyish" dressed as those of Moscow (i.e. not so many sweats of government, high army and N.K.V.D. officials) but neither are they in the ragged old three-piece suits of Arkhangel or Kubyshev. Life in Khabarovsk is probably more normal than any other city in the USSR. There are no refugees from the battle zones and nobody has been evacuated. There is a preponderance of women in such public gatherings as the theatre due to the men being off in the army, something which does not exist in Moscow due to presence of numbers of the military on leave or on duty there. The people look better fed and have a better color than in European Russia. No food lines were seen and the menu in the hotel included many locally grown vegetables and locally caught fish. Beer, wine and soft drinks are also produced locally from grain and fruit grown in the surrounding region. In general, the food situation does not seem as in the large western cities, serious.

We stayed at the best and probably the only hotel in Khabarovsk. It was of four stories, and about four-hundred feet long by fifty feet wide, of stuccoed brick. There was one bathroom on our floor, containing two bath tubs with a small screen between. As the hot water piping was inoperative, the tubes were filled by bucket by appointment. On removing the plug, piece of stove wood wrapped with rag, the majority of the water ran out on the floor through a leak in the overflow pipe. The toilets, in a dark recess opposite the bath, were incredibly filthy islands surrounded by a half inch pool of urine, partly due to leaks and partly to the Russian habit of standing on the seats. They also prefer to throw the used toilet paper on the floor, believing that if placed in the bowls it clogs up the piping. If anyone is laboring under the delusion the average Russian is a civilized individual, he should visit a Russian toilet.
Bedbugs were plentiful and voracious. None of the doors would close properly or lock nor would the windows open. The mirror was hung on the wall at the opposite end of the room from the washbowl. There was a telephone, but it didn't work. The light switch was cleverly concealed behind the door as you entered the room and would produce a sharp jolt if not grasped in the right manner. In short, it was a typical Soviet hotel outside of Moscow.

Upkeep of everything in the city was at a minimum, as is the case almost everywhere in the Soviet Union now. Houses are badly in need of repair, buses are ramshackle, streets are full of holes, several new apartment houses are half completed and the dance pavilions and such in the parks are falling to ruin. This may be to some extent due to the war but the general appearance of neglect and disinterestedness on the part of the people occupying the buildings is just as it was in 1934 and 1936 when I visited the country in peacetime.

The only indication of defense measures were two barrage balloons on an island in the Amur over which the railway bridge passes.

No planes were seen or heard during our stay.

There were less troops on the streets than in any other city I have visited in the USSR with the exception of Komsomol. No organized detachments or units in military formation were seen nor any military or naval installations.

The local newspaper is of one sheet and prints almost exclusively domestic news and propaganda. During the period we were in this area the capitalization of Italy was taking place, but there was scant or no mention of this in the local paper. "Pravda", from Moscow, is received two weeks late and posted on various bulletin boards around town.

Local (Khabarovsk) news broadcasts carry only Soviet war news. Once a day, the Moscow news is rebroadcast over the Khabarovsk low frequency circuit and the city's loudspeakers, and this contains a small amount of foreign news. In general, the people met seemed entirely indifferent to developments in Europe with the exception of the possibility of opening the secondary front. Italy left them cold. This is probably due to the small news coverage given anything outside of the USSR, plus the universal official desire to blow up the achievements of the Red Army in order to maintain popular morale.

CONCLUSION: Khabarovsk does not expect a Japanese attack. Life is more normal there and "livable" than in the vast majority of the USSR.

No attempt is being made to build up popular enthusiasm for the possibility of Far Eastern Soviet-American military collaboration.

Americans as a whole are looked upon with friendliness and the United States as a country to be jealous of, both in her achievements and in her plenty.

* * * *

Shipbuilding facility, ships and ships on the building way.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11850, Sec. 8(R) and 8(D) or (3)

OSD Letter, May 4, 1973

By DBS Date MAY 21, 1973
Subject: U.S.S.R. Ship Building, Repair, & Salvage Facilities, Materials & Supplies. (Continued)

During 9th and 10th September, 1943, Rear Admiral Duncan, USN, accompanied by Commander Kemp Tolley, USN, inspected the shipbuilding and repairing yard at Komsorolak, on the Anabar River.

The visit was authorized after Admiral Duncan had indicated that the US Navy would not look with favor on further supplying of lend-lease shipbuilding material to the Soviets if US naval representatives were not allowed to visit a Soviet shipyard.

The reason given in requesting permission to make the inspection was that we wanted to see what lend-lease material was being or could be used and the efficiency with which it was being or could be used. In accomplishing this purpose it was deemed expedient to inspect and obtain details of the military features of vessels under construction.

It is believed that all shops and facilities were freely shown, including exteriors of ships on ways.

Komsorolak is of course within easy bombing range of Kandalakha, Any knowledge of Soviet facilities or building at Komsorolak would be of considerable interest to the Japs or any other potential enemy. This, coupled with the Soviet fetish for secrecy, has closed the majority of the Far Eastern Territories to foreigners for some years. It is highly probable that the Soviets at Komsorolak were telling the truth when they said we were the first accredited foreigners to get to Komsorolak.

The information following was obtained by observation and by questioning the manager of the shipbuilding plant and the naval inspector. The assistant manager and various plant foremen were without exception unwilling to express an opinion or give the answer to any question, all deferring to the manager or naval inspector and making them the sole mouthpieces.

Komsorolak is 365 km. by river from Khabarovsk, and approximately the same distance by single track Russian standard gauge railway which branches off the trans-Siberian about 30 km. west of Khabarovsk.

Construction of the city was started about ten years ago and the plan is only very partially filled in probably due to delays incident to the war. This construction of a new city in the wilderness was part of the scheme to industrialize Siberia and make it to a certain extent independent of western USSR.

The shipbuilding yard was commenced about six years ago and has had greater emphasis placed on it since the outbreak of war due to the exposed positions of the shipbuilding facilities in western Russia.

As might be expected, the city and the shipbuilding yard with all its adjuncts have been thrown up in a garrison fashion even for the USSR, due to the lack of materials and the urgent need for haste. Conditions for the workers are most primitive and would be considered little less than savage by American standards. For Russian workmen they are bearable, there being no alternative, and work goes on, although at a much less efficient pace than would be the case in a similar American establishment.

The buildings of the shipyard are of locally made brick, plastered and painted white outside. The buildings are well spaced about, too to three hundred yards apart in some cases. Roofs are dirt or cobblestone. Railways go into or alongside all large shops. A great quantity of material excavated from the eastern areas is lying about in large piles, much of it junk and little of it usable in a shipyard. The manager remarked that the collection of material for excavation was made amid bursting bombs and in face of imminent capture by
the Germans. It was very much like the frantic householder rescuing his belongings from his burning house, throwing the clutter out the window and carrying the pillows downstairs in his arms.

Windows of all buildings, after the Russian custom, are double, to keep out the 40 - 50 degree winter cold. Buildings were also covered so that work may continue 12 months a year. Steam heating, from a central plant.

It is probably that no ship launching could be made between the end of December and end of March due to freezing of the basin and the Arun river. Freezing of the river at Nikolaevka (the mouth) commenced on the 1st of November and ice breaks up about 15th of May.

The manager said they receive steel plate and like material from sources outside Komsorolak. It were shown a rather considerable supply of plate, flat sheets 30' X 6', thicknesses 4 to 10 mm, stocked outside the rolling mill. There was a railway spur near the yard, along which were about five hundred or more six foot piles of slag, several feet thick, apparently off the top of a ladle of hot metal. No info was forthcoming on this, but it indicates that an appreciable amount of foundry work was being done in the vicinity.

In one of the machine shops, a small number of lathes and shapers were in use for other than shipbuilding work. Several hundred cases of 100 lb. borax were being turned from steel castings, made in the foundry. A small amount of chain for harvesting combines was being made and the manager explained that it was a local order. They accepted such small orders in view of the lack of enough materials to keep the plant fully employed on shipbuilding and also in the interests of efficiency in supplying local demands for small articles in small quantities. This may indicate a lack of other machine shop facilities in Komsorolak.

Following are additional details of personnel, shops and ships.

Inspector: Alexander Tokarev, born 1903 at Nikolaev, on Black Sea. Before war was at Nikolaev shipyards. Traveled in Europe and spoke some Italian and German. Spent two years in Italy and one in Germany studying shipbuilding technique and as an observer during construction of Soviet ships in Italian yards. Keen, intelligent, exceptionally aggressive and forceful. Appears to be of Turkish or Caucasian extraction.

Naval Inspector: Engineer Captain first rank Petr Fomin, has been on this duty since factory started, about six years ago. Is a seagoing engineer officer, about 40 years old. Intelligent. Appears to understand, very thoroughly, his business and the functioning of plant and in as familiar with details as manager.

Yarders: 5,000 - 505 workers; about 10% of males are 16 - 20 year old boys. Those departments requiring heavy labor, such as foundry, plate mill and work on board vessels building, staffed largely by men. Operators of small machine tools, office employees, light labor, principally women or boys. Yarders live in houses and "apartments" (little more than barracks) which are not more than a kilometer from the yard. Many have small vegetable gardens in which they grow a scruffy variety of cabbage, potatoes or tomatoes during the short summer, to augment their poor rations. Recreation facilities are sparse. There is a small park with a rattlesnake dance pavilion and a movie theatre. The club was not shown.

Two shifts of twelve hours each in those for plants which work 24 hours. 12 hours out for rest and eating during middle of shift. Plant idle during this period. About 30% of plant works two shifts (24 hour daily). Remainder, 1 shift, 12 hours daily. Lack of material and labor reason given for
Subject: U.S.S.R. Ship Building, Repair, & Salvage facilities, Materials & Supplies. (Continued)

lack of full time operation.

as a whole, I would class the labor as inefficient and un-
intelligent. At least 10% in every department were standing around list-
lessly, doing nothing. On many occasions the manager spoke sharply to
individuals, telling them to get to work and stop loafing around. Judging
from the amount of activity in the various shops and the number of ido-
machines, I would estimate the entire yard to be working at not more than
20% of the capacity it would be capable of with efficient planning, good
workers and ample material. Three destroyers (40% complete) and two escort
vessels (80% complete), have been on the ways over three years; one light
cruiser (75% complete) about 5 years. In addition to these, a small number
of very small vessels have been completed or are building. For a yard em-
ploying 5,000 workmen, this is not an outstanding record; and as the shops
are well equipped with a wide variety of British and American machinery,
it is indicated that labor and planning are chiefly at fault.

Having had some experience with the shortcomings of Soviet
workmen in many categories, and having seen many examples of batched Soviet
construction in housing and transportation, it seems unreasonable to believe
that their shipbuilding technique or workmanship is of a standard as high as
ours or even approaching it.

Workers are paid a flat wage plus up to a maximum of 100% more
as a bonus for exceeding the norm. Those consistently falling below the norm
are transferred to work they can handle. Those who are consistently late or
absent without reason or otherwise fail to produce may be tried by a labor
court.

Labor is obtained locally (population of Komsovoink, 110,000)
and trained after hiring by apprenticing to an experienced workman. The appren-
tice receives a small salary and his food during the two to six months training
period. There are no aptitude tests. The laborer is assigned work according to
the demands of the plant. The country surrounding Komsovoink is very sparsely
inhabited, so the only source of labor is the city itself. (According to the
Soviets, Komsovoink was built during the last ten years by fiery Young Commu-
nists who volunteered to open up the wilderness. Other, less inspired sources,
indicate that a great lot of the work was done by some of the many millions of
political prisoners.) At any rate, the workers and the general run of the popu-
lation appear young. Practically no elderly or even middle aged people are seen
anymore.

As there are no consumer goods available in Komsovoink (very
little anywhere in the USSR) money has practically no value and is no great
incentive to work. Food, clothing and quarters are the only things that count.

Shipbuilding ways: Total of six, all enclosed in two brick build-
ings with very large glass skylights and windows. Very little shop equipment
in these buildings other than cranes and portable gear for fitting out ships. In
one building, two ways, 650 ft. X 50 ft. and (50 ft. X 60 ft. (Approximate measure-
ments). Light cruiser KALINOVSKII in larger of these and six steel anti-submarine
vessels in smaller. In other building, ways as follows: First, 250 ft. X 50 ft.,
empty; second, 350 ft. X 60 ft., escort vessel (AI{ATRANGI); third, same size, one
destroyer; fourth, same size, two destroyers.

Ways are of concrete, with ends closed by steel gate. Ships
launched by floating ways.

No railway cranes noted inside covered ways and believe all
handling done by overhead cranes, one over each way.

See sketch for method of floating ships out of ways.
SPRINT SHELLING METHOD OF FLOATING SHIPS OUT OF
MULTIPLE AREAS OF RESISTANCE

ATRIVER (Not to scale, actually wider)

-A- Basin dredged out to depth slightly greater than river.
-B- Embankment surrounding high basin - E -
-C- Caisson (gate) for closing basin - E -
-D- Basin dug out to same depth as - A - Actually a part of basin - E -
-E- Basin which is ordinarily dry. May be flooded by closing gate at - C -
and pumping in water. - D - Simply a deeper part of - E -
-F- G - Building rays, total of six.
-H- Pontons, where ships tied up under repair. Also one anti-torpedo vessel outfitting.
-I- 50 ton floating crane. Only outside lifting facility.

OPERATION: To float ship out of - F - or - C -, individual gate to building
bay is opened. Gate - C - is closed and basin - E - pumped full, floating ship
in opened bay. Ship is floated over deep part of basin at - D - . Water is run
out of basin - D - E - , allowing ship to float in deep part of - D - . - E - is now dry. Gate - C - is removed and ship may be passed out into basin - A - .
Subject: U.S.N.R. Ship Building, Repair & Salvage Facilities, Materials & Supplies. (Continued)

Fitting out basin: It is probable that ships are almost entirely completed while in the ways, as the fitting out basin has no facilities other than a fifty ton floating crane. There is not even a suitable pier. Due to the fluctuations in river level, ships are tied up to pontoons.

Shop: The following were visited -

Cord loft: About 700 ft. x 60 ft., without any pillars or such obstructions. Very well lighted by large glass windows (double) and by electricity. Elaborate heating installation. No project in evidence, but number of bottoms lying around.

Sheet mill: Six radial drills for boring rivet holes in plates. Two very large sets of rolls for shaping and curving plates, about twenty-five feet long. Two smaller such rolls. Lathes for turning propeller shafts. Two sets for roughing out propellers, one of which was in lathe but no work being done. Length about 135 feet of large diameter, about one foot. Two 3 bladed bronze one piece propellers for ex-Cruiser being machined. Dozer said cast elsewhere. Destroyer propellers were the largest one piece propellers they had facilities for casting. All heavy machinery in this shop British made. Number of four to six foot lathes, shapers, screw cutters in same shop, to number of about fifty total. Practically all American made. Practically no activity in this shop with exception of several special jobs being done on smaller lathes, and several plates being bored for riveting.

Galvanizing shop: Connected to above shop. Fitted to electroplate pieces up to 30' x 3' x 2'. No work in hand. Said they use very little galvanized material in any sort of ship. Did not note any galvanized parts on any of ships building.

Foundry: About ten gas furnaces of small capacity, possibly 1,000 pounds, being used at the time for casting large bearings, bush cases, ship fittings. One electric furnace of several ton capacity, not being used. Sand in molds turned with electric turner, do not locally obtained and appeared to be of exceedingly poor quality. Mixer and grinder for removing and reworking old sand and conditioning use. About six steam hammers, operated by women with work handled by men. One fifty ton hydraulic press.

Machine shop: Two buildings, about 400' x 175', floor space filled with lathes, milling machines, and like small machine tools. Separate room attached to one of these buildings contained about six large grinding machines, the only ones seen in the yard. About fifty percent of this machinery operated by women. Seventy-five percent of machines idle. Practically all of machinery American.

Carpenter shop: Engaged mostly in manufacturing small amount of wooden furniture and wooden cabinetry, apparently for use in ships. One not particularly well built 13th output just completed. Shop almost entirely idle.

Stock room: One very large building, about 250' square. Filled with ship fittings, valves, pumps, linoleum, wire, cable, boatmen's stores, machine fittings, sheet metal, pipe, small electric motors, condenser tubing, fan, boiler spares, diesel generators and spare parts. The manager complained of a lack of small fittings, such as valves, oars, bolts, electrical fittings. The reason of lack of standardization due to inability of Foreign equipment was a very troublesome one.
Subject: U.S.N.R. Ship Building, Repair & Salvage Facilities, Materials & Supplies. (Continued)

Land - Lease equipment: According to manager and naval inspector Pond, no lease-land equipment had as yet been installed in any ship building at the yard. Two small, portable diesel electric generators had been installed in the K.M.O. #1 area, but were said to have been obtained by ordinary purchase before lease-land. They were not shown. The only lease-land material seen was:

- 5 - 1,000 H.P. General motors diesel engine for installation in antiship submarine vessels being built at the yard. One of the engines had been unlocked except several for inspection purposes. There was a considerable amount of superficial rusting. Installation of these engines was being held up (according to manager) because auxiliaries had not been received. The auxiliaries were to be installed in such a position that it was necessary to have them in prior to installing the main engines.

- 4 - 150 E. General motors diesel locomotives with spare parts. No info there to be installed. Order No. 39/44261.

Large quantity of yellow linoleum, for decks inside destroyers and cruiser.

About six 25 E. General motors diesel generators and auxiliaries. Order No. 4776 and 4777.

Shipbuilding: Hulls, decks and superstructure of all ships (antiship, destroyers, cruiser, submarines) all riveted. No welding seen topside other than several deck seams on forecastle of K.M.O. #2 and very seams on K.M.O. #1 and destroyer deck house. On deck of K.M.O. #2 there were about fifteen riveting machines, with area just below decks, indicating that interior construction includes considerable amount of wiring. Even small tallow fittings like ladders, stairs and deck fittings made of castings and riveted in place. In most new construction, the bare metal remained, without any protecting coat of red lead or other preservative. There was a considerable amount of superficial rust on all metal surfaces (rust excepted) as a result.

Prefabrication: The manager was most impressed by the record of the Kaiser shipyards and particularly the prefabrication methods employed there. He was trying to use much of this as might be applicable in the construction of his antiship submarines and pointed out several prefabrication assemblies lying beside the dock waiting to be swung on to the hulls when they were ready for them. Other than this very important example, there was no evidence of prefabrication of anything, nor the possibility of its employment under the limitations of this yard and its slow production rate. The K.M.O. #1 area's after deck house was being assembled on the main deck aft amidship No. 3 turret and was to be lifted into position by the overhead crane when ready for installation.

Protection: The yard is fenced with barred wire and guarded by civil employees. There are no troops stationed in the compound with the exception of a small detachment of 20 sailors manning multiple machine guns until aircraft installations. Total seen, about six multiple 30 cal. (approximately) machine guns. One quadruple mount was carried on a truck. Some of these sailors were working in an excavation near one of the covered ways and may have been preparing a position for a larger gun.

There is no blackout in Honolulu, nor provisions yet installed in the buildings for it.

No camouflage, other than painting some of the buildings white to blend with winter snow.
Subject: U.S.S.R. Ship Building, Repair & Salvage facilities, Materials & Supplies. (Continued)

Follow: It appears from the lack of material furnished this plant that scarce effort is being lavished on the equipping of the army, allowing construction in the Fleet to languish. This is reasonable, in view of the preponderance of allied surface war power and the small difference the addition of a half dozen small ships would make in the balance of naval tonnage, particularly in the Far East.

The yard will be available for ship construction on a moderate scale when materials are obtainable, but certainly will not be as overall a desirable location as some of the western shipbuilding areas. Raw materials must be carried from a distance. Labor will remain a problem due to the small local production of consumers' goods and food. The limiting depth of the near river to Komsomolak will adversely affect both inbound shipping and the launching and sending to sea of large ships in the completed state. As a supplement to the western building yards, Komsomolak may eventually be useful in producing small ships for use in the Pacific: tugs, fishing boats, river vessels, larger, Landing.

Conclusion: It is sincerely believed that the Soviets allowed this visit only under strong pressure and threat of retaliation. It is the first visit since the beginning of the war the naval or military representatives attached to the embassy have ever made to a plant producing war goods, or to a regular surface ship! This is an almost incredible fact when one considers the freedom and considerateness Soviet representatives have from the beginning enjoyed in the United States.

It is further believed, from reports by technical representatives of lend-lease who have assisted in making engine installations at Kuznetz and inspected installations in U.S.S.R. at Dabu, the unimportant state of the Minsk (near archangel) yard, and the visit described in this report, that the Soviets are quite unable to use at the present time the considerable quantities of engines and other marine equipment they are receiving and continuing to order. It is obvious that the great majority of it must be stored for future use and in all probability only a fraction of it will be utilized in the present war.

It is only reasonable caution to weigh carefully the value of supplying the U.S.S.R. with war material which they are not willing to prove to us can be used in the present war against Germany. As it stands now, the Soviets have been and are unwilling and probably unable to furnish this proof, which they could do by allowing visits to their plants.

It may be a first glance seem unfriendly to remind ourselves that such American arms from and other such materials are not being returned to us with a vengeance by the Japanese, materials which we ourselves could have used to vary good advantage had we been sure furnished. The present trend of official policy in the U.S.S.R., the tone of their propaganda to their own people and the proving Soviet independence and lack of trust should give occasion for deep consideration of the possibilities of this situation.
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM ALUSNA MOSCON
RELEASED BY
DATE 4 OCT 1943
TOR CODEWORD 011
DECODED BY COLQUITT
PARAPHRASED BY GERHOLTZER
ROUTED BY KNIGHT

ADDRESSES
ONC
PRC: ARARR

ASTÉRISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSES
ONC
PRC: ARARR

INFORMATION


cı11111

COORDINATOR FILE IN DATE AND TIME

ADD MOSCON 221516 SEPT TARASOV SAYS CERANS HAVE BUILT RAILROAD PEREKOP TO DNEPER OPPOSITE KHERSON

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 8(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 1, 1972
By DBS Date MAY 21 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (c) NAVERBS.)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/14/94
FIRST OF 2 SECTIONS**

INFORMATION FROM DIFFERENT SOURCES INCLUDING TURKISH MILITARY ATTACHÉ BERLIN WHOM ADEE TENDED, VISIT EASTERN FRONT LATE JULY BRINGS LOCAL AGENT TO CONCLUSIONS "DUE SERIOUS FOOD SHORTAGE RUSSIANS DECREED RECOVER UKRAINE AT ANY COST AND MASSED STRONG FORCE OREL-BIELGOROD POCKET FOR DRIVE ON KHARKOV. GERMANS REALIZING SITUATION MADE THREATS FROM VICINITY OREL AND BIELGOROD TO WEAKEN RUSSIAN FORCE BEFORE ATTACK STARTED. MEANWHILE THEY CONCLUDED COULD NOT DESTROY RUSSIAN ARMY ON PRESENT FRONT AND DECIDED WITHDRAW WESTWARD LEAVING TAKE COMPLETELY DEVASTATED IN ORDER FORCE RUSSIANS EXTEND LINE FAR FROM BASES AND SUFFER THIS WINTER AS GERMANS SUFFERED PAST 2 WINTERS. PLAN APPEARS TO BE TAKE UP POSITION REQUIRING MINIMUM DEFENSIVE EFFORT WITH POSSIBLY AS LITTLE AS 150 DIVISIONS AND EMPLOY REMAINING FORCES TO LIQUIDATE SITUATION ITALY THEN THROW ALL FORCES AGAINST RUSSIANS WHILE ANGLO SAXONS REORGANIZE FOR NEW OFFENSIVE. GERMANS NOW FIGHTING ONLY WHERE
**NECESSARY TO COMPLETE DEMOLITIONS AND WITHDRAW.**

**SECOND SECTION IS 291900.**

16.....ACTION

COMICHE...29C.....NAVAIDE...CNO...290P.....FILE

DECLASSIFIED

OSD Letter, 5-3-72

MAY 20 1974
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| PART 1    | 221516 | NCR 9842 |
| PART 2    | 231473 | NCR 9946 |
| PART 3    | 231610 | NCR 9970 |
| PART 4    | 221316 | NCR 9917 |

RETURNED. 22 FROM KOMSOMOLSK POPULATION 11,136 WHERE SHOWN KACANOVICH OF KITROV CLASS LAY DOWN 1938 RUN 75%. COMPLETE, LACKS MOSTLY INTERIOR AND ENGINEERING FITTINGS, 3 LARGE DESTROYERS AND 2 ESCORT VESSELS ALL ABOUT 50%. COMPLETE LAYED DOWN 1944 LACKING MAIN PROPELLING MACHINERY AND AUXILIARIES. 7 SUBS UNDER MAJOR OVERHAUL BUT NONE BUILDING. 30 CM 1230HP DIESELS 2 CM 150 KV DIESEL GENERATORS AND LITHOIEUM ONLY LEASE LEND GLEN AND NONE INSTALLED. ALLOWED RUN OF YARD WHICH WELL EQUIPPED AND SUFFICIENT WORKERS BUT MATERIALS LACKING FOR FULL OPERATION. NOT TAKEN BELOW MAIN DECK OF ANY SHIPS OTHER THAN MALIEKI AND SCHIKA TYPE SUBS WHICH LATTER FULLY INSPECTED. NO INFO ON AIRFIELD FUEL PRODUCTION OR FAR EASTERN ARMED FORCES.

NO RAILROAD OR OTHER ROAD KOMSOMOLSK TO NIKOLADEV OR SOVIET CAVAN. AJUR NORTH CHANNEL DRY WITH SOUTH WIND.

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 7b (c) NAVREGS.)

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED

201716 30 Russia

[Signature]
AND LOW TIDE. MAXIMUM WITH HIGH TIDE AND NORTH-WEST WIND 12 METERS. SOUTH CHANNEL MINIMUM 2 METERS MAXIMUM 10.

LIMITING DEPTH TO KOMSOMOLSK 5 METERS WHICH MAINTAINED OVER BARS BY DREDGES TO HARBOROVSK 3 METERS.

TARTAR STRAITS CHANNEL LEAST DEPTH 5 METERS AT POINT WHERE SOUTH AMUR CHANNEL ENTERS. MAY INCREASE TO MAXIMUM 10 METERS WITH SOUTH WIND AND HIGH TIDE. SOUTH ENTRANCE TIDAL CURRENTS UP TO 5 KNOTS. FREEZES 1° ICE.

TO 15 MAY BUT CAN BE FORCED BY ICEBREAKERS. ICE FREEZES BY 1° DEGREES.

NOV. BREAKS 11 MAY 2 MAY 19 MAY RESPECTIVELY. FREEZES TO 24°. NO EVIDENCE WHATEVER.

ANY UNUSUAL MILITARY ACTIVITY EAST OF KAMSK, FEW TROOPS BEEN EAST OF BAIDAL AND ALL SOVIETS CLAIM BORDER ENTRAINED. CONFLICT PEACEFUL AND NOT EXPECTING JAP ATTACK. IN GENERAL REFUSE TO DISCUSS JAP SITUATION AT ALL.

4 JAP MANNED MANCHUKUO GUNBOATS AND NUMBER SMALL ARMED LAUNCHES OCCASIONALLY OPERATE ON AMUR MOSTLY IN SUGORI AND WINTERING IN HARBIN. Khabarovsky FULLY LIGHTENED.

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See ART 70 (4) NAVREG)

OFFNAV-NICR-40 A 33053
PEOPLE LOOK WELL FEED AND CITY IN TOP CONDITION BY SOVIET STANDARDS. RAILROAD KHABAROVSK OMSK EXCELLENT

CONDITION TOLLEY SAYS MUCH IMPROVED OVER CONDITION ROADBED IN 1935. FROM OMSK TO BUT ROADBED ONLY FAIR.

FROM NOVOSIBIRSK TO KHABAROVSK ONE-THIRD OF TRAFFIC TANK CARS OF CRUDE OIL OR FUEL OIL, PLUS OCCASIONAL

TRAINLOADS SCRAPPED GERMAN BAR MATERIAL, REMAINDER EMPTY FLATS AND BOX CARS IN EQUAL NUMBERS. WESTBOUND

FREIGHTS FULL LEASE GOODS NUMBER OF SOVIETS HAVE MADE REMARKS THAT NO INFORMATION GIVEN ALLIES AS THEY

HAVE FOUND IT GENERALLY APPEARED IN NEWSPAPER SHORTLY AFTER OR WAS OTHERWISE COMPROMISED. IN THIS CONNECTION

STRONGLY ANY INFO FROM THIS OFFICE BE GIVEN NARROWEST REASONABLE DISSEMINATION IF WE ARE TO CONTINUE THE

PRESENT FAVORABLE TRENDS CAPT LIEUT STEPHAN TARASOV 1937 ATTACHED REL EMBASSY

WASH ACCOMPANIED AND ACTED AS LIAISON OFFICER. WE WERE SHOWN EVERY CONSIDERATION AND ALL

EXPENSES MET BY REL NAVY. TARASOV SAYS RAILROAD

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 74 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-54 A 53953
**NAVAL MESSAGE**

**NAVY DEPARTMENT**

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**PAGE 4 OF 4**

**ORIGINATOR FILE IN DATE AND TIME**

**DATE**

**ACTION**

221552

**PUBLIC**

**PHOTO**

**E. O. 11655, Sec. 3(b) and 6(b) or CDR**

**GSR letter, May 1, 1941**

**MAY 21, 1941**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 78 (4) NAVREC)

OPNAV-NCR-62 A 330453

**DECLASSIFIED**

E. O. 12355, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

**HLR 101**

By RT, NARA, Date Virgil
ON 10TH FOLLOWING TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
ROULARD REQUESTED NAVAL LIAISON OFFICER HERE
HAVE APPROPRIATE INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED VLADIVOSTOK
TO PERMIT ROULARD PROCEED KHABAROVSK TO CONFER
WITH ADM DUNCAN. 74 HOURS LATER LIAISON OFFICER
REPORTED THAT AUTHORITIES CONCERNED DID NOT
CONSIDE IT DESIRABLE (RUSSIAN JELATELNO) FOR
ROULARD TO MAKE PROPOSED TRIP. SUBSEQUENTLY
CONGEN WARLD TRIED UNSUCCESSFULLY TO GET
PERMISSION FOR WALLACE CLERK TAKE EMBASSY MAIL
TO KHABAROVSK AND HAND TO ADM DUNCAN

CON F I D E N T I A L
**NAVAL MESSAGE**

**DATE:** 11 Sept 43  

**TOR CODE ROOM:** 112228  

**RECEIVED BY:** REEGAN  

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*(ACTION CNO INFO MOSCOW)*

**SECRET**

**TO:** Admiral Duncan  

ADDED INTO CNO INFO FROM ADM DUNCAN OF HIS PROJECTED TRIP TO KOMSOLOMSK ACCOMPANIED BY COMDR TOLLEY AND THAT THERE WAS POSSIBILITY AFTER ALLEGMENTS FOR ME TO PERSONALLY CONTACT THEM IN KHRABAROVSK SINCE ADM NOT PERMITTED.

VISIT VLADIVOSTOK, THIS INFO WAS RELAYED TO SOVIET LIASON OFFICER WITH REQUEST FOR PERMISSION PROCEEDED KHRABAROVSK ON SHORT NOTICE IN CASE ADM DESIRED MEET ME 2 DAYS LATER SOVIETS INFORMED THAT ADM "DID NOT WANT TO CONTACT ME CONSEQUENTLY THERE WAS NO REASON FOR ISSUING TRAVEL PASS FURTHER THAT I WOULD BE INFORMED ABOUT EVERYTHING UPON RETURN OF ADM MOSCOW". THIS PROVED TO BE DELIBERATE FALSEHOOD REVEALED IN PHONE CONVERSATION WITH COMDR TOLLEY IN KHRABAROVSK 6 SEPT. AT THIS TIME TOLLEY INSTRUCTED ME TO Endeavor MEET ADM.

**Note:** Classified.

**DESIGNATION:** CONFIDENTIAL

**E.O.:** 11682, Sec. 2B (D) 

**G.O.:** OSD letter, May 1972

**DECLASSIFIED E.O.:** 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

**NLR:** 101

**By:** RT, NARA Date 4/13/74
NAVAL MESSAGE
NAVY DEPARTMENT

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PAGE 2 OF 4
KCR 2436

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME
DATE TIME GET
ACTION

UPON HIS RETURN KHBAROVSK FROM Komsomolrk,
LIAISON OFFICER WAS INFORMED OF EVENTS SAME DAY
AND PERMISSION AGAIN REQUESTED PROCEED KHBAROVSK
9TH, AFTER NOON OF 8TH HAVING RECEIVED NO WORD FROM
SOVIET NAVAL AUTHORITIES AND UNABLE CONTACT LIAISON
OFFICER WHO CONVENIENTLY FAILED TO APPEAR IN HIS OFFICE
FOR THREE DAYS REQUESTED CONDEE TAKE UP MATTER WITH
DIPLOMATIC AGENT AND THAT I BE ALLOWED DEPART NOT
LATER THAN 11TH AS ADM WAS ARRIVING KHBAROVSK 12TH.
ON MORNING OF 9TH DIP AGENT INFORMED CONDEE THAT HE
WOUULD BE UNABLE ISSUE TRAVEL PERMIT SINCE DECISION
RESTED WITH MOSCOW CENTRAL MILITARY AUTHORITIES.
THAT
AFTERNOON ADDRESSED LETTER TO CHIEF OF STAFF PACIFIC
FLEET REAR ADMIRAL ALEFATOV SETTING FORTH CIRCUMSTANCES.
EARLY MORNING OF 11TH 19 DAYS AFTER ORIGINAL REQUEST
3 DAYS AFTER SECOND REQUEST AND 1 DAY AFTER SCHEDULED
DEPARTURE LIAISON OFFICER COLDLY INFORMED PERMISSION
REFUSED TO PROCEED KHBAROVSK STATING QUESTION HAD NOT
BEEN TAKEN UP IN MOSCOW BEFORE ADM'S DEPARTURE FOR CNO'S

SECRET

E. O. 11655, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) or (E)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
BY RT, NARA, DATE 4/13/94

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 CNO NAVPERS)
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW

RECEIVED BY

DATE

TOR CODE ROOM

DECODED BY

PARAPHRASED BY

ROUTED BY

INFO CINC PAC IS AUTHORIZED ISSUE TRAVEL PERMITS TO ANY NAVAL PERSONNEL TRAVELLING WITHIN HIS DISTRICT.

THE HUMILIATION AND UNWARRANTED LACK OF COOPERATION FORCED UPON THIS OFFICE BY THE SOVIET LIAISON OFFICER SHOULDN'T BE APART FROM THE LOSS IN PRESTIGE OF THE CINC PAC WHO HAS DONE EVERYTHING IN HIS POWER TO ASSIST IN THIS MATTER AND WHO LIKewise DOES HIS UTMOST TO FACILITATE PASSAGE OF SOVIET NAVAL PERSONNEL TO PORTS IN UNITED STATES. INFO REQUESTED IF THERE HAVE BEEN ANY INSTANCES WHERE SOVIET NAVAL OFFICERS IN US WERE FORBIDDEN TRAVEL DISTANCES OF 400 MILES BY TRAIN IN ORDER TO PREVENT THEM FROM PERSONALLY REPORTING TO THEIR SUPERIORS. SINCE MY OPINION THIS IS DELIBERATE AND CHARACTERISTIC INTERFERENCE ON THE PART OF THE SOVIETS TO HINDER ME IN CARRYING OUT INSTRUCTIONS AND THE PROPER PERFORMANCE OF DUTY, ALSO PREVENTING ME FROM PERSONALLY REPORTING TO THE NAVAL ATTACHE THE ACTUAL PICTURE OF PRESENT AFFAIRS IN THIS PORT.

(SECRET)

(See Art. 76 of NAGP and Art. 44 of [1])

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person.

E. O. 11683, Sec. (15) and (16)

OPNAV-NCR-45

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1949-3032-6-5 10

By DBS Date MAY 21 1973

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
MEMORANDUM FOR: Major DeForest Van Slyck
SUBJECT: Russian Front

1. Russian forces continue to advance, and in three sectors of the front are now within 80 miles of the Dnieper River.

2. Bryansk Sector: Russian forces are closing in on Bryansk from two directions, having captured a town 20 miles to the north and on the south are now 10 miles away.

3. Konotop Sector: The rail junction at Bakhrach, which had previously been flanked on the north and south, fell before Russian advance yesterday.

4. Sumy Sector: This salient was broadened yesterday as the Russians captured a number of towns west and northwest of Lebedin.

5. Donets Sector: Advancing northwest of Stalingrad, the Soviets captured the city of Novo-Pavlovka, about 75 miles from the Dnieper River. A German report stated that amphibious forces of the Russians have attempted a landing on the Sea of Azov without success, but there has been no confirmation by the Russians of this report.

6. It was reported that mining engineers accompanied Soviet troops into the Donets Basin. This area was, before the war, the most vital coke, coal and metallurgical region of the Soviet Union. Had the Russians not developed the Ural and Kuzbas areas under the Five Year Plan, the
loss of the Donets Basin might have been fatal. It will be a long time before the region can be fully restored. However, it is already reported that several small coal mines have started operations.

JOSEPH H. TAGGART
Captain, Air Corps
European Theatre Officer
AC/AS, Intelligence
4 September 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR:  Major DeForest Van Slyek

SUBJECT: Russian Report

1. Yesterday the Russians continued to make notable gains in two important sectors of the front.

2. Sevsk Sector: Moving southwest toward Konotop, the Russians captured the town of Altinovka, about 15 miles from the vital junction. Moving west from Sumi, another Soviet force captured Putivl, about 25 miles from Konotop. In all, the capture of 160 towns and villages was reported in this sector.

3. Donets Sector: The capture of Euyevka, 23 miles east of the Nazi headquarters at Stalino, was reported yesterday. In addition, 150 towns and cities were taken, cutting network of railroads supplying Nazi troops in the sector.

An unconfirmed neutral report states that because of conditions on the Russian front, the Nazis have been forced to revise their plans to evacuate German residents in bombed areas to new homes in the west. The Germans' explanation is that the elastic strategy in the east renders plans hitherto considered safe likely to become theatres of war.

JOSEPH E. ZAGGART, Captain, Air Corps
European Theatre Officer, A-2

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 7(R) and 5(D) or (E)
OSED letter, May 1, 1973
By DBS Date 2/1/1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Major DeForest Van Slyck

SUBJECT: Russian Front

3 September 1943

Yesterday the Russians achieved additional important gains in key sectors of the front. The vital rail line from Kiev to Briansk was cut at Kovel'vets, 25 miles north of the junction at Konotop, and at Yampol, about 35 miles southwest of Sevka. The loss of this railroad will complicate German supply problems for armies in the central sector of the Russian front and will substantially lengthen the distance traffic must move between Kiev and Briansk. Furthermore, new Russian positions which flank Briansk constitute a serious threat to German forces there.

Yesterday the city of Sumy, formerly an important German base of operations in this sector, fell before Russian assaults. The newly captured positions at Sumy and on the Kiev-Briansk railway threaten the rail junction at Konotop, against which a pincer movement could conceivably be launched.

In the Donets region, Soviet forces captured the coal and iron center of Lisichansk, Chistye Kovo, and other important points, which impede the network of railways supplying German troops in this area, have also fallen to Russian attacks.

In the South, German forces moving along the Sea of Azov are approximately 25 miles from Mariupol.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 7(P) and 8(D) or (E)
OSD letter, 3/4-1, 1972
By DES
Date: May 21, 1977

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
Meanwhile, Soviet air forces are attacking key rail junctions, such as Konotop and Belzecen, which, it is reported, are glutted with German troop trains bringing reinforcements to protect positions in the central and southern sectors of the front.

JOSEPH H. TAGGART
Captain, Air Corps
European Theatre Officer
AG/AS, Intelligence
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FROM ERDMAN. RDO WASH PASS TO DNI FOR ACTION.

DUE TO IMPORTANCE AMICABLE SOVIET AMERICAN RELATIONS NOW AND FUTURE AND POSSIBILITY THAT TROUBLE RESTS WITH HABITUALLY SUSPICIOUS NARCOMINEL NOT SOVIET NAVY BELIEVE OUR MISSION SHOULD PROCEED; HOWEVER RECOMMEND WE REQUIRE REAFFIRMATION SPIRIT OF PAR THREE AKULXNS LETTER JAN. 4 WITH MORE CONCRETE AUTHORITY AS OUTLINED IN PAR FOUR MY MEMO TO MAJOR WYLIE FEB. 3 PLUS DISTINCT STATEMENT THAT THIS MISSION SHALL BE GRANTED INDEFINITE VISAS SIMILAR TO THOSE GRANTED DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES. AS EVIDENCE GOOD FAITH THIS MUST BE RECEIVED IN WRITING

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/74
PRIOR DEPARTURE NEXT GROUP VESSELS FROM TAMPA AREA ABOUT SEPT 20; OTHERWISE REMAINDER LEND-LEASE PROGRAM IN JEOPARDY. THERE CAN BE NO VALID REASON FOR SOVIET GOVT TO SUSPICION OUR MOTIVES WHICH ARE CLEARLY EXPRESSED IN PAR THREE MY ORDERS OF FEB. 10. OUT RELATIONS WITH THEIR NAVAL COMMAND EXCELLENT. AM INCLINED TO BELIEVE THIS WILL CONTINUE.

16......ACTION

COMINCH....BUSHIPS.....12.....OP55G.....NAVAIDE...

FILE.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Major DeForest Van Slyke
SUBJECT: Russian Front

German broadcasts speak of great defensive victories on the Eastern front, in which the Russians were unsuccessful in preventing the Nazis from shortening their lines. The large claims made by the Russians in the Taganrog area indicate that the withdrawal was not altogether successful. The Soviet communiqué stated that 35,000 Germans were killed and large numbers of tanks, planes, trucks, and matériel were destroyed and captured. Pushing forward their gains in this sector in the face of German reinforcements shifted from the north, Russian forces advanced four to six miles in the direction of Stalin, German headquarters on the Donets front, and moving toward the rail junction at Debaltsevo.

Apparantly the assaults on the Kuban bridgehead are continuing. In the Svir area the Russians have broadened their salient by the capture yesterday of Komarichi, about 20 miles northeast of Svir on the railroad to Bryansk. In the Smolensk area, west and south of Volna, the Russians have reported the capture of 60 inhabited localities. Thus the Russians continue their offensive efforts on widely separated fronts, preventing heavy German concentrations and reinforcement of ground troops and particularly of airpower, at any one point.

DECLASIFIED
E.O. 11850, Sec. 3(B) and 5(D) or (E)
OLD FORM: JUN 1952
By DDS Dated MAY 2, 1973

JOSEPH H. TAGGART
Captain, Air Corps
European Theatre Officer
AG/AS, Intelligence

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/74
INFORMED EGIJKO REPRESENTING COMMUNIST ACTION VICE CNO 231741, NEITHER COMMUNIST NOR CHIEF OF STAFF HAD YET REACHED OFFICE AND I AM NOW STARTING KOMSOMOLSK TRIP. I STATED WE CONSIDERED THEIR ACTION DIRECT BREACH OF FAITH AND SILENCE CONTRACT, THAT NATURALLY US NAVY WOULD NOT SOON FORGET AND THAT SOVIET ACTION WAS MOST UNFORTUNATE. I SAID ONLY WAY TO SHOT GOOD FAITH WAS TO ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS IMMEDIATELY DELAYING SAILING OF SOVIET SHIPS UNTIL PROPER ACTION WAS TAKEN. IF SHIPS SAILED WITHOUT MINE MISSION THIS MISSION COULD NEVER COME. EGIJKO AND ASST AGREED SOVIETS WERE ENTIRELY AT FAULT. HE SAID HE FULLY EXPECTED COMMUNIST WOULD DELAY SAILING UNTIL MATTER HAD BEEN SATISFACTORILY SETTLED. INDICATED FOREIGN OFFICE TO SLAVE THROUGH MISUNDERSTANDING, LEFT COPIES LETTERS EXCHANGED BETWEEN CNO AND ADMIRAL AKULIN.

Allen will send priority as to Navy action.

Page One of Two Pages

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 75 (c) NMPH, May 3, 1973)
NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRATER

FROM

ALUSNA MOSCOW

RELEASED BY

DATE

24 AUGUST 1943

TOR CODEROOR

O107

DECODED BY

RINDS

PARAPHRASED BY

SANDBERG

ROUTED BY

ROBINSON

ADDRESSSES

CNO

PRECEDENCE

PRIORITY

RRRRRR

ADVISORY

DEFERRED

PRIORITY

RUTINE

DEFERRED

OCCURRING DISPARTE PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

"LIMITED DISTRIBUTION"

MY TRIP TO KOMSOMOLSK WAS DEFERRED BY SOVIETS FROM 23RD TO 24. I ASKED SEVERAL DAYS AGO THAT YORKE ALSO ACCOMPANY ME. AFTER STALLING FOR A WEEK THEY TODAY PRESENTED WEAK EXCUSE THAT YORKE COULD NOT GO AS THEY HAD INSUFFICIENT TIME TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS. WAS ALSO INFORMED THEY DID NOT WANT ME TO VISIT VLADIVOSTOK AS SUCH VISIT WOULD MAKE THEIR POSITION WITH JAPS MORE DIFFICULT. COMMISSAR PERSONALLY INDICATED WE COULD ACCOMPLISH HERE WORK INTENDED FOR YORKE AND I HAVE SUBMITTED TO HIM LENGTHY MEMORANDUM SETTING FORTH GENERAL AND SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OF BUSHIPS IN CONNECTION WITH SOVIET PROCUREMENT PROBLEMS.

COPY THIS MEMORANDUM IS NOW ENROUTE CNO. WOULD LIKE BUSHIPS TO SUBMIT ANY ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS TO TEST

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 74)
SOVIET GOOD FAITH. I HAVE INSTRUCTED ALLEN THAT IN MY ABSENCE HE IS TO PRESS WITH YORKE FOR ANSWERS TO CERTAIN SPECIFIC OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS ON WHICH BUSHIPS IS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED. MY OPINION IS WE WILL GET NO COOPERATION HERE AS REGARDS YORKES SPECIALTY. IF NOT I SHALL RECOMMEND HE RETURN WASHINGTON WITHIN SHORT TIME AFTER I RETURN MOSCOW.

MOSCOW WILL BE ABLE COMMUNICATE CONFIDENTIALLY WITH ME AT KOMSOMOLSK.

16....ACT

BUSHIPS....NAVAIDE....FILE
INTELLIGENCE REPORT

From: P. P. Paulikopf, Maj., USNR, of Vladyvostok, USSR
Date: August 19, 1943

Reference:

Source:

Subject: U.S.S.R. Observations made along Trans-Siberian R.R.

Observations made along Trans-Siberian Railroad during the period of July 22 to August 2, 1943.

General impression and observations made of the following:

(1) Freight, traffic and movement of supplies.

(2) Upkeep.

(3) Passenger Traffic.

(4) Military Points of Interest.

(5) Food Conditions.

(6) Morale.

(7) Other Points of Interest.
Reser. is: U.S.D.R. Observations made along Trans-Siberian R.R., (Cont'd)

(1) CONCLUSION TO PREVIOUS REPORT

The freight and other traffic all through Siberia seems to have moved as very little is seen lying idle on the side lines, but almost in sight being reorganized for a train load and shipped for some destination on the main Trans-Siberian Railway. One seen nothing, but American supplies all thru Siberia. Small amounts of American food are being utilized wherever the railroad line runs along the main railroad line. Seems as if everything is being railroaded into European Russia.

(2) TRAINS

The railroads and all the trains with their cars are lubricated at the key cities enroute along the Trans-Siberian railway. It is also noted that wooden ties are being replaced by new ones all along the Trans-Sib. railway. Leon seen to be doing all the operating and repair work on all the railroads. All thru Siberia one sees damaged and demolished railroad cars, locomotives, automobiles, many tanks, planes, etc. representing France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Latvia, etc. Idly on the side lines or on the ground of the main line.

(3) PASSENGER TRAFFIC

In my opinion the passenger traffic is under better control than it was last November, 1942, when I rode the same trip from Ulusno to Vladivostok. People who have tickets are usually accommodated. Only in a few instances did I see people with tickets and no passage arrangements available for them. The third and fourth class cars were packed to capacity with people, but I didn't see the same sight as I did eight months ago, when people were hanging on the sides, some under the railroad cars, others on the roof. The amount of passenger traffic last November 1942 was far more than the Japanese railroad could handle. From conversations I gather that one has to have specific reasons for travelling, thereby controlling, and this unnecessary traveling about the country. At each station or point of passengers destination, one has to have his or her documents reviewed by railroad officials, who see to it that no one other than the individual with authorized authority enters any village, town or city. Industrial towns have special army detachments surrounding the station to prevent any escape of individuals from the railroad station without proper authorization.

(4) LILINOY PONT OF VIEW

While enroute from Khabarovsky, I got acquainted with a Lieutenant from the Russian Naval Flying Corps, who was on his way to the front. The flyer related that he spent four and one half years in the East flying and was well acquainted with the airfields and concentrations. He further said that he made reconnaissance flights near the border, this being prior to the big attack by Germans on Russia. From his observations, he estimated that the Japs had about 22 divisions ready for attack in the section between Chita and Khabarovsky.

This attack could cut the Trans-Siberian Railway and continue up on along the Amur river, thereby cutting the south western section of Siberia from the East, where most of the vital points exist. He also stated that after the German attack failed on Russia, most of the divisions must have been transferred as about two or three only were visible.

On this same trip, I made the acquaintance of an "Old" Captain, Sergey Petrovich Timofeyev, Engineers Corps, who served during the First World War in the Cavalry. He was educated mostly abroad, especially in Germany, has visited the United States on several occasions and studied our methods of building airfields and airfields. His last visit to the United States was in
1031. He related that most of his time is spent visiting the East looking for new locations for airfields and airbases. He boarded the train at Khabarovsk, meaning that he must have had business in that section. After he finds a suitable site, he then comes back to the Central Authorities in Moscow for their final approval. In the midst of the conversations during the trip he made known are the following facts:

(a) That Mr. Hillie on his trip thru Siberia to Yenisek, stopped and visited several of the new airfields not airbases near the border.
(b) That our authorities knew the locations of most of these airfields and airbases.
(c) That these airbases can accommodate 1,000 planes, fuel them and furnish convenient quarters for the crews.
(d) He didn't state the number of airbases or airfields existing, but stated that the number is of sufficient quantity to bomb Japan off the Earth.
(e) He confessed his hatred for the Japs and called them many sarcastic names.
(f) The Japs have some knowledge of Russia's strength and air supremacy in the East, therefore the hull and no evidence of large troop concentrations.
(g) That Japan will not strike as she cannot afford it at this time, and that Russia will be the one to strike when the proper moment arises.
(h) That Russia will not strike until the Eastern front in Europe is quite successful.
(i) That Russia has just as big an army in the East and that equally vast amounts of equipment and air power exist there as she has in the East.
(j) In all of these facts, he stated that he is quite certain that Japan will not strike Russia, unless Japan wants to commit suicide.
(k) This "GMD" Captain confirmed the fact that the Japs have only a few divisions concentrated in the section between Chita and Khabarovsk.

All of the above facts lead me to believe that Japan will not attack unless she is invited by the Soviet Union. The observers knowledge of all the loose-end supplies that are coming in a steady flow from the United States thru Japanese protected waters, lead me to believe more firmly to the fact that Japan does not want to rage war with Russia at the present time and that she is doing all she can to maintain peace, even with all the things that are going on in Japanese waters, such as stopping U.S. ships under Russian command, detaining ships for an indefinite time, and the torpedoing of a few Russian merchant ships.

It is noted while enroute that every bridge is protected by military troops. Every village and town has troops near the Trans-Siberian line. From Khabarovsk to Vladivostok one can see armored railroad cars parked between towns, at places which in my estimation are vital points. It was also noted that from Veroseklov to Khabarovsk and then to Chita, airfield photos were observed nearly concealed with approximately 20 to 30 fighter planes, single motor, at each field. Heavy tank barriers were in evidence along with armored trains.

A conversation which later turned out to be of great informational value was with a Director of the Novo-Sibirsk Railway center. It disclosed the following facts, part of which were proven true by the recent Russian Railroad Map.
A railroad which is being constructed begins at Talashk and 900 kilometers of it is completed to Komsomol. A short distance of it has been completed from Komsomol, but he didn't know the kilometers.

From a Russian Railroad map published in December 1941 showing the Far East, I observed that the following railroads exist:

1. Naboloda to Ovchurny. Ovchurny is about 30 kilometers from Vladivostok going north to Khabarovsk.
2. Velayachevsko to Komsomol. Velayachevsko is about 60 kilometers from Khabarovsk going toward Chita.

From conversations I am led to believe that the tunnel under the Amur River is completed but use of which is delayed. Noted from personal observation that the entrance was guarded by soldiers on the opposite side of the River out of Khabarovsk and that the rails were rusty, giving the impression that no traffic is routed via the tunnel.

5. Food conditions

Food conditions all thru Siberia are getting worse. Although large amounts of American food were seen along the route, only military personnel of the air corps and high ranking officers were seen taking use of it. Majority of people are living on a diet of black bread and vegetables. Since bread is practically the only medium of exchange for vegetables or dairy produce, very few people were able to exchange because no one cared to sacrifice too much of their daily bread ration. Some people lived mostly on bread and boiled water which is obtainable at each station. The following produce was obtainable: cucumbers, melonish, carrots, tomatoes, raspberries, blackberries, eggs, butter, honey, fresh and sour milk. Many Soviets living along the route don't have their own gardens, so they have to surrender part of their daily ration of bread for vegetables. It was also noted that all along the railway you could see large plots of ground cultivated and growing the following: potatoes, wheat, cabbage and tomatoes.

6. Morale

The morale in Vladivostok is the lowest that I have encountered anywhere enroute. The most logical reason for that is that no enemy action has been experienced in that section of the USSR, although many people there are from evacuated cities in European Russia. All along the route the people are thinking of crossing the sea in the shortest time possible and to begin living peacefully and prosperous. Many speak very highly of American way of life and are fascinated by American technology and are looking forward to warm cooperation after the war. Many people believe sincerely that their sacrifices are not in vain and that being under nourished and under clothed will be compensated by a better and front rate of life.

7. Other points of interest

I was introduced to a young lady by some of my Russian friends. They wanted me to see that a young Institute lady looks like with the highest order bestowed in this country on her, the "Order of Lenin." In our conversations she related that she was an instructor on the faculty of Sverdlovsk, there she had a class of 120 students, many of them became outstanding within recent years. She stated she was 17 by all her age 20, struggled all her life in a "Kolhoz" for the day when she could live prosperous. She said that she has never lived well. Here the "KGB" Captain spoke
up and said to the young lady, "you must not say all you know before foreigners." She came back at him, stating she is a Soviet citizen and the constitution gives her freedom to speak her mind. She then said, that if it wasn't for American, she herself and her "Kolhoz" could have starved. I could see the "I.G.D." Captain get infuriated and then the young lady spoke up again, and asked me if I had seen American magazines with me. I had a few and brought them to her to look through. She was amazed at the quality of paper, the wonderful pictures, and how well the people were. She then remarked, that "we the Soviets have a long way to go to be able to live as the Americans." The "I.G.D." Captain vexed for that, but said that shortly after the war conditions will be much better and that it will be a matter of years before life in general will be durable for all. So from the conversations I gathered that because of some of the accomplishments of her students and because of being liked, she was awarded the "Order of Lenin." She said she wasn't a Communist and didn't belong to any party. Believe this decoration was just for morale sake.

The "I.G.D." Captain was accompanied by an army major who just recently came from the Rubun front in the Caucasus. He had high praise for our Jeeps, Dodge and Ford trucks, but radio thugs, that the more parts which were necessary for the Jeeps were unobtainable. I stated that they probably were available but at some hams from which they operate. He didn't know that. The following are his comments:

1. That many of these Jeeps which encountered breakdowns were taken back to bases and that when they came back were better than new. What he wants is that the spare parts necessary for a quick overhaul be attached to the Jeep.
2. His work is a Railway Engineer. He was reconstructing railways which were reconquered from the Germans in the Caucasus.
3. He stated that the Jeep was the only car that could make the way thru mud and climb hills and snows where other cars could not penetrate. Also that they pulled a cannon and guns.
4. He stated that the synthetic rubber used on our tires were out to rapidly and that the Russian red rubber was more durable.
5. That Russia was being renumeration for all her assistance, in gold which is produced in the Kalian Valley, loaded onto ships and taken to San Francisco.
6. He, as the rest of the Russians have no use for Capitalists and do not hide or refrain from making that remark.
7. He said that after the war for all of our assistance we will probably request a small strip of land from the East extending from the Pacific Ocean to the Ural Mountains.
8. He is very strong for the occupation of the Baltic States after the war, plus Karelian Inlands and Estonia so that the guns will always be pointing onto Germany from sea and land. He emphasized that Russia would fight to the last man if she has to in order to have the Baltic States.
9. That the Allies do not wait till Russia is on her knees to come in to give the final thrust and then claim all the glory and dictate the terms.
10. He said that if the much Hitler soon, Russia will turn suddenly on Japan, her bitter and hated enemy.
11. He commented on the splendid work our Boston and Lockheed bakers were doing in the Rubun Sector.
Observations made along Trans-Siberian R.R. (Contd)

(12) He mentioned that every five kilometers that the Germans occupy, they fortify with grand batteries, pill boxes and strong fortifications, so that when the Russians do start an offensive they run up against great resistance.

(13) He mentioned that the Russian soldier is adequately clothed on all fronts.

(14) He said that the Russian soldiers complained about American canned foods, that they would rather have rough food, than prepared. They are more accustomed to just mangare, cheese, black bread, vodka.

(15) States that the Siberia troops have proven their superiority over the Germans in Russia, because of the resistance against cold, thereby enabling him to fight under much lower temperatures than others are accustomed to.

(16) He mentioned that the Germans began using light poison gas on the Khuban front without success. These gases produced tears and weakened the Russians, but that was soon solved.

(17) Road rail yards junctions were burned up so that they could not be rearrested and used over again. This new rails would have to be secured.

(18) Noted that when the Germans occupied any land, they ate well, and that in many instances, soldiers could send packages back to Germany, because of the food shortages, another reason to show the people back home that they were doing well on the Eastern Front.

On the afternoon of July 31, 1943, 20 young Estonians boarded the train. They were enroute to a small town called Klianski between Kursenov and Bogodavich. I made their acquaintance while they were passing through my car. Two of them spoke English and two others spoke Russian, the remaining spoke Estonian. They were all happy to see an American and regretted that probably they will never see another. This group represented the Estonian basketball and football teams.

I became fairly well acquainted with a young Estonian Lieutenant named Arvo Remt in the Russian army who spoke Russian and English well. After the remaining men left the train at Klianski, this Lieutenant accompanied me to overlondik, as he was going to settle some business for future rents for his team.

The Lieutenant related the following story about the occupation and fall of Estonia:

In the summer of 1939, when the Hitler Jomden were threatening all of the eastern part of Europe, the Russians were seeking bases from which to protect themselves. First they received a base from Finland called Hango in June 1939, the others in the Baltic Sea. Next year about the same time in June 1940, the Russians occupied all of the Baltic countries, taking over the big buildings, apartment houses, bought all of the merchandise that was obtainable. The government was ousted and its political leaders liquidated. Others evacuated up north around Archangel; others into Siberia.

Finally the citizens of Estonia who were left behind were only permitted to have nine square meters of floor space, where formerly each individual had 72 or more square meters of space. Thus, many of the Estonians had to dispose and give away their furniture. Much of it was taken away from them by the Russians. Next move was to evacuate the Estonians into Russia. Out of 120 ships which were filled to capacity with Estonian evacuees, 132 ships were sent by German five barrages with heavy loss of life, while enroute to Lonningrad.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/21/44
Subject: U.S.S.R. Observations made along Trans-Siberian R.R. (Cont'd)

The people who survived were driven to starvation by the Russians after arriving in Russia. The ship STALIN, a 10,000 tonner which was at sea, saved 500 Estonians who would have perished during the evacuation of the 120 ships. At the present time, there are approximately 7,000 Estonians in Northern Russia and about 3,500 in Blancki section in Siberia.

During the occupation of Estonia by the Russians, many of them were forced to resist Russian aggression but were liquidated. They were asked for assistance from Latvia and Lithuania, but both refused, still a group of Estonians wanted to organize their last stand, but these were seized and liquidated. Others fled to the woods and starved.

After the distribution of Estonians, a group of them were organized and fought at Walki Lohi December 1941. As they went on, he said, the Estonians fought well, but their heart wasn't in the fight as they were fighting on foreign soil. At the present time, there are two divisions of Estonians; the 7th which is near Blancki and the 2-9th in northern European Russia.

During the fighting at Walki Lohi, one whole battalion went over to the German side. Estonians in enemy hands fighting for the Germans requested the rest of the Estonians to come over onto the German side. While the fighting was in progress many Estonians were killed. The Illustrated stated that in this conflict many of the Estonian commanders were killed, those who were not killed, were released of their command and sent into Siberia. Out of the whole groups that fought only 150 commanders and enlisted men remained. All of the old reserve officers were removed and replaced by Russians. In this way many were gradually liquidated.

The Estonians in the Soviet Union are under the leadership of Soviet Estonians, natives of the USSR, who also occupy the key posts. He states that on the average of once a month, men are detached from their camp and sent to unidentified posts by the "MVD", gradually reducing the number of men in this one camp.

For two years this group of 3,500 Estonians has been located in Blancki, living on 600 grams of bread per day and soup. Items such as fresh fruits and confections are unheard of. They reside in underground huts. On the 24th of February, 1943, one of these underground huts was set afire, burning to death 40 officers and 25 red army men. The fault was blamed on an overheated stove and on the weather the following day.

He also related that when Estonia was being occupied by the Russians in order to prove their loyalty the Estonians were to Russia, they requested that all Estonians come to vote. Those who were unable, arrived by old age etc., were brought to town in handcuffs and made to vote. The final outcome of the voting was 70% of Estonia wanted the to remain under Russian protection and government. The real joke of this was the Lieutenant related to me was that only one name appeared on the ballot, a Soviet, and no one dared to substitute any other name.
REFERENCE SHAPIRO LENINGRAD ARTICLE IN WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS. I ASKED BEFORE HIS TRIP THERE THAT HE OBTAIN INFORMATION FOR ME. HE COULD DESCRIBE NOTHING OF REAL INTEREST WHEN HE RETURNED AS HE SAW NO SHIPS OR NAVAL INSTALLATIONS. ALL U.S. CORRESPONDENTS HERE ARE ANXIOUS TO ASSIST IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE BUT WRITE ONLY FROM HANDOUTS AND RARE CLOSELY CONDUCTED TRIPS.

16...ACTION

COMINCH...

NAVALSE...FILE
Rear Adm. Kuchev at Archangel says Germans maintain 3 subs to eastward Novaya Zemlya and 2 to westward. Corroborates that German ship believed to be Admiral Scheer bombarded port Diukson. Ship was unescorted and was driven off by shore batteries. Says fragments 11" shell found ashore but ship not positively identified. Frankel submits opinion that it was a merchant raider. Questioning a number of SOVIET OFFICERS INDICATES SUCH THING AS SEPARATE MARINE CORPS DOES NOT EXIST IN USSR. SHORE DEFENSES AND FIXED SHORE BATTERIES MANNED BY NAVY AND THESE PLUS PERSONNEL OF ORDINARY NAVAL INSTALLATIONS ASHORE AND MEN FROM SUNKEN SHIPS ORGANIZED INTO SEMI-ARMAMENT EMERGENCY UNITS ALONG ARMY LINES. THIS

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Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 50, of NAVARCH.) By L/PD

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ARRANGEMENT SIMPLY TO MAKE USE OF PERSONNEL FROM NAVAL SHORE ESTABLISHMENTS IN HANDS OF ENEMY AND DESTROYED SHIPS.

16...ACT.

COME INCH...NAVAL DE...

FILE.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 5(D) or (F)
OBS letter, May 1, 1972-02
By ODS
MAY 21 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/11/96
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

DATE
TIME
GCT

ACTION

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CONFIDENTIAL

(PART 1 OF 2 PARTS. *)

VICE ADM GOLOVKO SAYS GERMAN AIR ACTIVITY MURMANSK AREA NIL LAST 3 MONTHS. INCREASING RED ACTION OVER NEARER ENEMY FIELDS. NO INDICATION ANY FINNISH AIR OR LAND ACTIVITY WHATEVER. GERMAN REPORT OF ATTEMPTED RED LANDING FINNISH COAST ENTIRELY FALSE. "OVER 20" RED SUBS OPERATING NORTHERN FLEET. SAW 2 FLEET TYPE OVERHAULING AT ARCHANGEL. M-172 CAPT FISANOVINCH BEST WITH 2 DESTROYERS 11 CARGO SHIPS SUNK. QUICK TRIP THROUGH SUB ALLOWED ONLY SUPERFICIAL OBSERVATION. 6 FORWARD TUBES WITH 6 SPARES. 2 AFTER TUBES NO SPARES. 2 MAIN ENGINES VERY SMALL CASED IN AND LOOKED MOST INACCESSIBLE FOR REPAIR OR INSPECTION.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/44
AUXILIARY DIESEL HALF SIZE OF MAIN ENGINES, HATCHES AND DOORS CIRCULAR AND HAVE SINGLE DOGS WITHOUT QUICK CLOSING FEATURE. CO SAID NO SPECIAL COLD WEATHER BATTERIES. TO INQUIRY WHAT MOST COMMON CAUSE LOSSES THEIR SUBS SAID DID NOT KNOW. NEVER ABLE RECOVER ANY TO FIND OUT AND NO SURVIVORS.

*NOTE: NCR HAS NOT RECEIVED A MESSAGE REFERRING TO 061312 AS PART 1. HOWEVER, ALUSNA MOSCOW'S 062014 APPEARS TO BE PART 2 DISTRIBUTED SEPARATELY, OF THIS DISPATCH.

16...ACT COMINCH...10/11...20G.... NAVAIDE...20P....// FILE.
NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

FROM

ALUSNA MOSCOW

RELEASED BY

DATE

7 AUG 1943

TOR CODE ROOM

Baldwin

DECODED BY

PARAPHRASED BY

BLACK

ROUTED BY

WIDMAN

ADDRESSSES

CNO

FOR ACTION

INFORMATION

COORDINATE

ADDRESSSES

PRECEDENCE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

RESCUE GEAR OF ANY TYPE NOTED. NO EXTENSIONS
LOWER HATCH COAMING TO ALLOW EASY USE ESCAPE LUNG
EVEN IF PROVIDED. INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL APPEARANCE
BOTH SUBMARINE AND DESTROYER EXCEPTIONALLY CLEAN AND
IN GOOD CONDITION PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS
ESSENTIALS SUCH AS DOGS KITCHEN EXXIE GASKETS AND
CARE IN PAINTING AROUND MOVING PARTS. BOTH
VISITS AT MY REQUEST ON SPYR OF MOMENT AND NOT
ANTICIPATED. RADAR SCREEN ON CROMKI. TORPEDO
CONTROL ON URITPY CLASS LIKE OUR OLD IOHAS.
BATTERY CONTROL APPARENTLY LOCAL. ELECTRIC
HEATING OF TORPEDOES TO PREVENT FREEZING WATER.

CONFIDENTIAL

E. O. 11492, Sec. 3(e) and 5(d) or (b)
OHD letter, May 1, 1972.

By DBS

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/1944

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
NOTE: NCR HAS NOT RECEIVED A 061218 FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW, AND THIS MESSAGE APPEARS TO BE PART 2 OF 061312 FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW. IF DESIRED NCR WILL REQUEST 061218.

16...ACT

COMINCH...10/11...2@G....

NVAIDE...200P.....

FILE.
IN MANY FRANK CONVERSATIONS OVER VODKA WITH SOVIET OFFICERS IN FAR NORTH NEITHER MYSELF NOR TOLLEY HEARD ANY MENTION OF BORD "SECOND-FRONT" OR ANY EXPRESSION WHATEVER OF ANY DIS- SATISFACTION OUR CONDUCT OF WAR AS GOING AT PRESENT. THIS IN SPITE INCREASING NUMBER NEWSPAPER ARTICLES BLEATING FOR SECOND FRONT AND BELITTLING OUR EFFORTS IN AFRICA AND BIDILY AS COMPARED TO ACHIEVEMENTS RED ARMY. NONE OF OFFICERS HAD ANY IDEA STRENGTH USA FORCES OUTSIDE USA AND VAST ARE ARE THEIR DISPERSION. ALL WERE ASTOUNDED AT EXTENT ALLIED SHIPPING LOSSES AND ON WHICH THEY HERETOFONE UNINFORMED AND WITHOUT APPRECIATION EFFECT THESE LOSSES ON ESTABLISHMENT SECOND FRONT. VERY LITTLE ENTHUSIASM OR REACTION EXCEPT CHARGING SUBJECT WHEN SUGGESTION MADE OF SOVIET ACTION AGAINST JAPS. ONLY 1 OFFICER VENTURED OPINION THAT SOVIETS WOULD ACT OR

CONFIDENTIAL
CUT FURNISH US BATTLE AGAINST JAPS WHEN CEREALED FILD.
ALL UNIVERSELY TO DISL JAPS OUT THE UTTER RESIST.
T IN THIS SUBJECT, INDICATES ALL THOSE WHO ARE EX-
CUCTED TO SINGLE WITH US HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY COACH.
A THAT LINE TO FOLLOW.
NAVAL MESSAGE

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'51316 NCR 9853

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

DATE: 1943

RETURNED FROM 7 DAY TRIP MURMANSK AND ARCHANGEL ACCOMPANIED BY TOLLEY TO PERSONALLY PRESENT MEDALS INSPECT CONDITIONS OUR MERSHIPS AND GENERALLY SHOW FLAG. RED NAVY FURNISHED PRIVATE DOUGLAS. IN POLYARNOE DECORATED GURIN, FISANOVICH, DEMIDOV, KUKUSHKIN, LEIKOV.

BANQUET FOLLOWED CEREMONY AND FOLLOWING THAT MADE FLYING VISIT TO DESTROYER URITSKY CLASS AND LARGE SUBMARINE. BRIT REAR ADM ARCHER AND 2 AIDES ACCOMPANIED FOR FIRST VISIT THEY HAVE MADE ON RUSS WARSHIP. AT ARCHANGEL DECORATED REAR ADM KUCHEROV. IN BOTH CITIES ELABORATE CEREMONY WITH GROUPS SAILORS OFFICERS MANY PHOTOGRAPHERS AND NEWSREELERS. POLYARNOE

CONFDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (i) NAVCEN)

OPNAV-NOR-16-15-5

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
CEREMONY REPORTED BY RUSS LANGUAGE MOSCOW NEWS BROADCAST. GREATEST FRIENDLINESS AND COOPERATION THROUGHOUT TRIP. AT MURMANSK ENTERTAINED BY NAVY ENGINEER GEN DUBROVIN AND SHOWN EXTENSIVE AND EXCELLENTLY EQUIPPED SUBTERRANEAN HEADQUARTERS. MORE DETAILS FOLLOW.

16...ACT
COMINCH...10/11...NAVAIDE...FILE

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 2(R) and 6(D) or (B)
GSS letter, May 1973
By DBS

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/84
ROULLARD ORDERED EXECUTE USNAVYCOM 3/2122 JUNE
REPORTS "CONVOY OFFICER HAS APPARENTLY RECEIVED
GREEN LIGHT AS EXPRESSED NO SURPRISE. HE EXPLAINED
ISSUANCE PERMANENT PASS PERMITTING ME VISIT PORT
UNACCOMPANIED WOULD BE UNSATISFACTORY FROM BOTH
SIDES SINCE MY FOREIGN APPEARANCE UNMISTAKABLE AND
WOULD BE ARRESTED BY ZEALOUS SENTRY ON MERE SUSPIC-
TION REGARDLESS OF PASS. FURTHER THAT IT WAS IMPOSS-
IBLE TO INFORM ALL SENTRY STATUS. STATED HE WOULD
BE GLAD ACCOMPANY OR SEND ASST. WITH ME ANY TIME
PORT VISIT DESIRED REGARDLESS OF FREQUENCY AND THAT
PERMISSION GRANTED INTERVIEW ANY OR ALL SKIPPERS

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<tr>
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<th>DATE</th>
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Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (1) E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4 NLR 101)

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
Either aboard ship or in his office, explained this system would be more convenient and quicker since he would probably be called upon by NKVD to bail me out of jail each time port visited independently and he preferred keeping me out of trouble as well as himself. Believe his argument sincere. Requested visit immediately and went to port morning of 24th in his car accompanied by his ass't. director far east ship co. and my interpreter. Visited areas chosen by me; inspected new American cranes recently installed and at my choice went aboard steamer Transjalt which recently arrived from San Francisco with 10,000 sugar. Spent 2 hours wining and dining and casually looking over ship. This visit not anticipated by ships crew but vessel ready for

CONFIDENTIAL
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**Naval Message**

**Date:**

**Time:**

**Action:**

**Navy Department**

**Naval Message**

**Drafted by:**

**Addressed to:**

**Precedence:**

**Priority:**

**Routine:**

**Deferred:**

**Tori Code Room:**

**Decoded by:**

**Paraphrased by:**

**Routed by:**

**Page Three of Four**

**Originator Fill in Date and Time**

**Date:**

**Time:**

**Get:**

**Confidential**

**Message:**

- Inspection since they were receiving a banner of state committee of defense that afternoon for excellence in performance. Skipper and Chief Mate spoke English were friendly spontaneously praised treatment in USA though pressed by me for any complaints they had about loading delays repairs and liberty ashore.

- Conversation trends were toward war progress but JAP question completely avoided in spite fact this ship routed through LA Perouse and Skipper pressed for info about JAP treatment and patrols that area they were not as enthusiastic about Aleutian campaign as one would expect nor did the old second front topic come up. Paramushiro bombing.
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM
RELEASED BY
DATE
TOR CODEROOM
DECODED BY
PARAPHRASED BY
ROUTED BY

FOR ACTION
INFORMATION

PAGE FOUR OF FOUR

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME
DATE
TIME

ACTION
F-0
F-01
F-02
F-05
F-07
F-1
F-2
F-50
F-3
F-30
F-31
F-32
F-33
F-34
F-4
FX01
FX02
FX37
FX40
FX-00
FX99

TOPIC AVOIDED, COGEN ALSO UNABLE GET ANY LOCAL
REACTION THIS KURILE OPERATION, BELIEVE OFFICIALS
HERE NONSINCERELY ENDEAVORING FULFILL REPRESENTAT-
IONS MADE BY YOU AND AMBASSADOR. INTEND REQUEST
VISIT PORT 2 OR 3 TIMES PER MONTH OR OFTENER IF
OCCASION DEMANDS AND TO TALK FREQUENTLY TO
SKIPPERS ALTHOUGH FEEL THEY WILL HAVE BEEN INSTRU-
CTED REGARDING PERMISSABLE SUBJECTS FOR DISCUSSION

16...ACT

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVY FOR.)
OPNAV-SCB-18

R.C. 17639, Sec. 212 and 213 or (2)
M.A. 17639, NAVY FOR.

MAY 1973

I.

DECLASSIFIED
R.C. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
LIR 101

By RT. NARA, Date 10/1/1973
MEMORANDUM FOR Op-26
Via Op-26-FR
Op-26-F
Op-26-1-F

3 August 1943

Subject: Soviet Naval Officers in U.S.A. Disguised as Civilians.

Ref: (a) Conf. dispatch from Rivard to ONI and Alums, Moscow, G10303 of 3 August 1943.

1. The "Grilov" referred to in reference (a) is Ensign Joseph F. Grof, USN, E-4(V), at present stationed at Anitami to board Soviet merchant and act as liaison officer.

2. However, there seems to be little doubt that there are many Soviet naval officers stationed in the U.S.A., and especially in West Coast ports, who are carried officially as civilian employees of various Soviet organizations, especially the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission.

Andrew Wyllie

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11352, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 4, 1972
By DBS Date MAY 21, 1973

[Confidential]
PRIVATE CONVERSATION OVERHEARD BETWEEN CONVOY OFFICER AND SKIPPER OF TRANS BALT REVEALS THERE ARE SEVERAL SOVIET NAVAL OFFICERS IN U.S.A. DISGUISED AS CIVILIANS WORKING FOR SOVIET SHIPPING INTERESTS. THEIR IDENTITY IS NOT REVEALED TO CAPTS OF SOVIET SHIPS WHO CONTACT THEM UPON ARRIVAL U.S.A. ONE MAN NAMED ORLOV LOCATED AKUTAN AREA. THIS SOMEWHAT CONFIRMS SUSPICIONS OF COMGEN THAT MANY SOVIET MERCHANT CAPTS ARE REGULAR NAVAL OFFICERS.
**NAVAL MESSAGE**

**FROM:** ROULLARD - VLADIVOSTOK

**RELEASED BY:**

**DATE:** 3 AUGUST 1943

**TOR CODE ROOM:** 1256

**DECODED BY:** VOSBURGH

**PARA PHRASED BY:** SAMUEL

**ROUTED BY:** J ALLEN

**ADDRESSED:**

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<td>FAYMONVILLE</td>
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**ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME**

**DATE:** 3 AUGUST 1943

**TIME:**

**OCT:**

**ACTION:**

ACTION CNO INFO MOSCOW AND FAYMONVILLE.

VISIT TO PORT AREA IN COMPANY CONVOY OFFICER REVEALS 4 ADDITIONAL WASHINGTON THREE TON ELECTRIC TRAVELLING CRANES AT PIER 18 WHICH PLUMB SHIPS HOLDS, PORT AREA AND WARE HOUSES ALMOST ENTIRELY CLEARED OF CARGO IN COMPARISON TO SOMETIME CONGESTED CONDITION WHICH EXISTED ON LAST VISIT IN MAY IN COMPANY LEND LEASE REPRESENTATIVE. THIS UNDOUBTEDLY DUE WIDE DISTRIBUTION SHIPPING NORTH SIBERIAN PORTS THEREBY RELIEVING STRAIN ON VLADIVOSTOK, HOWEVER THIS PORT THOUGH EQUIPPED TO DO SO IS NOT OPERATING UP TO CAPACITY DURING THESE SUMMER MONTHS WHILE TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILWAY IS BEST ABLE TO ACCOMMODATE PEAK LOAD.
**INTELLIGENCE REPORT**

**SERIAL:** 29-43

**MONOGRAPH INDEX GUIDE NO.:** 602

**FROM:** Assistant Naval Attaché of Moscow, U.S.S.R.  
**DATE:** July 29, 1943

**REFERENCE:** 

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<td>(direct, correspondence, previous related report, etc.)</td>
<td>(as official, personal information, publication, press, conversation with—)</td>
<td>(as submitted)</td>
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**DECLASSIFIED**

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) or (F)

OSD letter, May 4, 1973

**By:** DBS  
**Date:** MAY 21 1973

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
NLR 101  
**By RT, NARA, Date:** 4/12/44
Subject: Report of trip from Washington, D.C. to Fairbanks, Alaska and Siberia. (Continued)

1. W1W Plane #4708 departed Washington, D.C. 1110, 2 July 1943 with Lieutenant L. D. Premier, USA, pilot; Lieutenant (jg) J. S. Holt, USA, co-pilot, 3 crew members and Mr. W. H. Marilton of State Department and myself as passengers.

2. Enroute to Ladd Field, Fairbanks, Alaska, stops were made at Minneapolis, Minn.; Great Falls, Mont.; Edmonton, Canada; and Whitehorse, Yukon. Arrived at Ladd Field, the United States Terminal of the Russian Transport Route at 2000, 7 July 1943 and met by Colonel R. F. Kitchingman, the liaison officer with the local Russian representatives. Quarters were arranged in the B.O.Q.

3. By previous arrangement a Russian navigator and radio man were to board the plane here and accompany us to Moscow. However, Ladd Field had not been notified of our arrival and it was impossible to locate the two Russian officers that night. The following day, July 6, 1943, the Russian personnel left Ladd Field for a picnic nearby and we did not meet Colonel H. A. Ischin until late in the evening. It was then discovered that neither officer was sending with our plane could speak English, therefore, the question of an interpreter came up. Colonel Ischin, the commanding officer of the Russian Ferry Group at this Field, at first stated he could not spare an interpreter from his staff but when he was finally convinced that no one on board could speak Russian, he agreed to send his aide Lieutenant Slobodorski, who spoke very good English and later proved to be a great help.

4. Colonel Kitchingman has established very good relations here with the Russians and it is believed his efforts in securing an interpreter prompted Colonel Ischin to let his aide come with us. The Army has several officers here who speak the Russian language and through their efforts have established a very cooperative spirit.

5. The number of Russian personnel here varies but it is believed to average about 100. This includes administration officer, pilots, mechanics, clerical force and a branch office of the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission.

6. The Russians have some mess facilities in their quarters but it was noted that large numbers eat at the B.O.Q. mess and oftentimes pay for their meals with old type American paper dollars of 1927 and 1918 issue.

7. Two large buildings originally designed for officers quarters are assigned to the Russians and additional space in other buildings is utilized by them in other buildings for office space.

8. Friday morning, 9 July, a meeting was held with Colonel Ischin, Colonel Kitchingman, the Russian navigator — Captain Nikolai Grigorovsko and Lieutenant Paul Dechar the radio operator, briefing the route from Fairbanks to Moscow. Colonel Ischin did not want to let Lieutenant Slobodorski leave that day no takeoff was scheduled for Saturday morning, 10 July.

9. The Soviet pilots are good customers for the Fairbanks merchants. They purchase a wide range of articles; everything from lipstick to overcoats and suits of clothing — also large quantities of cigarettes and candy. One local Fairbanks store unloaded a large stock of old-style high button type shoes that had been on hand for many years.

10. When the A.T.O. deliver planes to this field and they are turned over to the Russians, they inspect and test every plane before starting next. Colonel Ischin is on the job during all inspections and works his men far into the night when necessary.
Subject: Report of trip from Washington, DC to Iseam, U.S.S.R. via Fairbanks, Alaska and Siberia. (Continued)

11. Colonel Hashin told us before departing that he appreciated the help we were giving them in the form of these airplanes and stated that he liked the P-39 and A-20 planes because of their heavy fire power and good maneuverability.

12. Departed Fairbanks 10:30, 10 July 1943 and stopped at Nome, Alaska, 13:30 for fuel and weather information. The weather across the Bering Straits and at 'ikal and Barako would not permit takeoff and we were grounded here until 18:30, 15 July 1943, waiting for the first break in the overcast at either 'ikal or Barako. This point appears to be a bottleneck on the route, as far as weather is concerned, especially during the summer months.

13. At the time we landed in Nome, 19 Lend-Lease planes were on the field and later the same day 5 more arrived from Fairbanks and all were held up on account of weather conditions and in fact were still there when we departed.

14. The Russian pilots soon to enjoy any delays in Nome as they are provided good quarters and have recently formed a club where a new pool table, ping pong tables, radios, slot machines, reading rooms, etc., have been provided. The pool table was purchased by the Russians and the space and other equipment furnished by the A.T.C. The rooms are used by both Russian and American officers.

15. All the Russian pilots seen here and in Fairbanks wear side arms, then asked why they wore side arms while in the U.S., they stated it was part of their uniform.

16. It is understood that the majority of all pilots on this route have been decorated and all have served some time on the front. Their duty as ferry pilots is usually of short duration and is considered as a vacation from duty on the front. With the exception of certain squadron leaders the longest time served by any one pilot on the run has been 10 months.

17. Captain A. A. Coates, Commanding Officer of the A.T.C. here, has established good relations with the Soviets and has recently completed arrangements to quarter 1/25 men at one time as it is expected that the number of planes through this point will be increased considerably. At the present time the number of planes out of Nome varies from 65 to 75 a week.

18. On leaving Nome we crossed the Bering Straits in a heavy overcast and landed at 'ikal, Siberia (distance 422 miles) 20:10, 16 July 1943, having crossed the international date line. Lst at the field by Lieut-Colonel Folinikov and his staff who told us promptly that our planes was the first American plane to land on this field.

19. 'ikal is located on the Gulf of the Cross, near a small native village. The field was constructed in December 1942, and has one long runway made of wooden strips tied together on the underside and having a mat surface similar to steel mats used by U.S. Air Force. It is an ideal field from an aviators viewpoint due to good approaches and good runway, however, repair facilities are limited to minor repairs and on-the-spot replacements. hangars are planned but not yet erected, however, much new construction is in progress both in living quarters and buildings for shops.

20. The weather here is exceptionally cold during winter months but the air in filled with blood thirsty mosquitoes. The living quarters consist of 2 large 2 story buildings which are also used for offices and approximately 5 dozens small Canadian type houses insulated on the outside with tarps and on the inside with reindeer hide. Some of the houses are connected by paved streets and it appears that such combination houses are assigned to officers and more reserved for ferry pilots.
21. As soon as the plane was serviced, and this included wiping down, we adjourned to one of the "combination houses" for what the Russians called "tea" but what turned out to be a very bountiful meal complete with much "clean alcohol".

22. The Russian officers were very cordial and hospitable and after dinner showed us around the field and answered all questions without any reluctance on their part, in fact, they seemed very much pleased to have American visitors and expressed the hope that others would follow.

23. Many women are present here but we were told that all have regular duties on the field or other activities. The weather office is handled by a woman and she appeared to be very well qualified.

24. Electricity is furnished to all buildings by a small gasoline engine generator, but plumbing is something to be added at a later date - probably a very late date.

25. Ten planes were observed on the field including 2 A-20's, 6 P-39's and 2 C-47 cargo planes. The C-47 type planes operate between Fairbanks and Naknek or Yarkovo. We were told that to date the route has been without accident to fighter planes, although, one C-47 was recently lost in bad weather.

26. All supplies are brought in by cargo planes and small freighters. One small freighter was unloading close by the shore when we arrived. Practically all supplies are from the U.S. It was noted that the flour sacks bore the name of Fisher Mills, Seattle, Washington. (Mr. Fisher is Mr. Hamilton's father-in-law.)

27. Due to weather conditions we were forced to stay overnight and were served a huge breakfast at 0700 the next morning. Before departing our passports were stamped at the plane, the officer using the radiator of the American jeep for a desk. No mention was made of inspecting baggage and, in fact, they did not enter the airplane.

28. The commanding officer gave Mr. Hamilton, the pilots and myself valium teak letter openers made in the native village as souvenirs of our visit to Yarkovo.

29. At breakfast the assistant to Lieut-Colonel Melnikov indicated that he would like to go as far as Yakutsk with us. The pilot, in a joking manner, invited him along and he accepted immediately. He explained that he had recently returned from the front where he had been awarded the "Red Star" for putting 5 tanks out of commission and wanted to take a few days leave in Yakutsk.

30. With our additional passenger, departed Yarkovo at 1020, 17 July, and arrived in Yakutsk at 1220 - distance 306 miles. During flight only barren lookingundra country was observed.

31. The field at Yakutsk is unsurfaced and very rough but with good approaches. The runway is 3,775 foot long; and 200 feet wide with a 315 foot parking strip. 95 octane gas was delivered to the plane in drums and poured to the tanks from an old model Russian made Ford truck. Hangars or repair shops have not been built and very little was observed in the way of repair facilities. Only 2 P-39 planes were on the field, one waiting for a new propeller.

32. As weather information was not immediately available we were invited to "tea" which proved to be a rice type meal as served at "obiel" but supplemented by fresh fish caught in the Anadyr river and in addition to the
Subject: Report of trip from Washington, DC to Moscow, U.S.S.R. via Fairbanks, Alaska and Siberia. (Continued)

"clear alcohol", they had wine and brandy so that the many toasts could be drunk with a variety. We were told that 2 men catch 350 pounds of fish daily from the river for consumption at the field.

33. After lunch Captain Gaishin, the commanding officer, showed us about the field which is located about 1 mile from the village. The houses are all new log construction and very neat and clean. They took pride in showing us the interior of several houses and the small gardens nearby where lettuce, cabbage, and potatoes seemed to be principal vegetables grown.

34. Flat bottom shallow draft river barges bring their supplies in from Andyeva Bay.

35. During the meal we were advised that weather conditions ahead would not permit a clearance but they expected suitable weather within a few hours. Inasmuch as one of their C-47 planes came in after we did and departed for Seimchun ahead of us, it was evident that the officers along the route had been instructed that we were not to fly unless weather conditions were ideal. Captain Gaishin arranged rooms for us and at 2200 we were advised that the front between Seimchun and Irkutovo has not as yet passed but another meal was waiting which was a duplicate of the earlier meal but on a larger scale. The Russians stressed that we stay until morning as the latest weather reports indicated it would be several hours before we could take off. We agreed to go to bed with the understanding that they would call us with the first break in the weather and they did so at 0200, 18 July, departed Irkutovo at 0220.

36. For several hours out of Irkutovo the plane flew above the clouds and when the navigator estimated we were above Seimchun airport, Holt, who was pilot on this run, took the plane down through the clouds; it developed that the navigator had not calculated the cross-wind and we had drifted south of the course. A river was finally located and followed for 15 miles and presently sighted a small emergency field located between two high hills. All the Russians on board insisted that the field was Seimchun but when the pilots looked it over they decided they could never get the plane off and it certainly couldn't be Seimchun airfield as their information indicated that Seimchun was a large field with good approaches. Then the pilots decided that the navigator was obviously lost, they instructed the radio operator to ask Seimchun radio to place a radio recording on and then they put a bearing on it they "rode it in" to Seimchun, arriving at 0710, one hour late. The emergency field we had looked over is 20 or 30 miles south of Seimchun.

37. At the field by Colonel Skorolto-otv, the commanding officer who reported here 5 days ago, and his staff, escorted us through swarms of mosquitoes to breakfast which consisted of the usual Russian food with 10 different kinds of wines, Russian style chocolate, cake, etc., and with plenty of butter and the ever present black bread. On the walls of the room large pictures of President Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin were hung. It has been noted that pictures of Stalin, Polotov, Lein, Kalinin, party leaders, etc., have been prominently displayed at each stop so far, but these were the first pictures we had seen of Roosevelt or Churchill and incidentally, proved to be the last.

38. The field at Seimchun is larger than Lokol or Irkutovo but the landing strip is unsurfaced and very rough. Oil and gas is brought in by barges on the Kolyma river and piped into 24 large storage tanks. 6 service trucks and a jeep are used on the field. The trucks are all Russian makes. The field does not have hangars and we could not see any new construction that would indicate hangars are being built, although, buildings of various sizes are being erected.
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39. Colonel Shirakaptev was questioned about the field we had seen. He first indicated that he did not know of such a field but later on admitted that it was probably one of several emergency fields in the vicinity.

40. Lumber is the one industry here and it was noted that the river was crowded with logs floating down. The river at places is very narrow but evidently deep enough to permit passage of river boats. All open spaces in this heavily wooded area are under cultivation.

41. Departed Seilochan 9:40, 10 July 1943, having satatches past 1 hour and arrived Yakutat 11:15, having flown over mountainous region with nothing to be seen but vast water and snow. Met at field by General I. S. Seimov, Colonel I. P. Ilumrav, Colonel V. I. Ivanov, Colonel A. J. Potashov, and Intourist representatives. Time differential between Yakutak and Seilochan in 2 hours. General Seimov and Colonel Potashov are inaugurating Os layer visiting the field. Colonel Ilumrav, in charge of the ferry route between Fairbanks and Kamenogorsk and maintaining headquarters here, Colonel Ivanov is warden, officer of Yakutak field.

42. Plane taken into the city of Yakutak over a five mile rough road in three big "W.W.1" lorries. On the way into town we passed a parade of school children, or rather drove through a parade. The native policemen were stopping little traffic that would be seen but the driver of our car merely blew the horn louder and put on speed while Colonel Ivanov sat in the front seat caluting. Will never know how he ever went down that street without killing at least 6 children and 2 policemen. We were quartered in 3 rooms in what the Russians call a hotel and Colonel Ivanov was host at a 3 hour luncheon.

43. Yakutak is located on the Lena river with a population of 25,000. In contradiction to Mr. "likie, in 'one world,' we did not observe the natives "laughing their heads off" as we. The population has increased in the last 2 years due to the evacuation of Leningrad. The main street is paved with mud blocks, the only paved street in town. New construction in progress of heavy insulated timber. The greater percentage of the new building was started before the war and little progress has been made on it for 2 years. The older buildings in the city are for the main part in a run down, delapidated condition and the natives are very poorly dressed.

44. The Lena river is navigable at this point and many barges and river boats were operating. The natives seem proud of the fact that the city is without a railroad and it used to take 2 years to get a letter to Moscow, whereas now it takes 2 days. In other words the airfield has changed many things in connection with their lives.

45. After a 5 hour sleep, made very difficult by flies and mosquitos, we were taken to the theatre by Colonel Ivanov, and later to a racisical. The play may have been good, but not understanding the language, we couldn't be sure; however, the calibre of music, as demonstrated by the Leningrad conserervies at the musical, was well above average. On returning to the hotel we found that we were guests of General Seimov and Colonel Ilumrav at a dinner, with the first course at midnight and the last toast at 0:30. This proved to be the high point of Soviet entertainment on the entire trip. The dinner conversation was helped by 3 interpreters and one of the interpreters, a 23 year old girl, remembered Mr. Hamilton from a train trip, 7 years ago, from Japan to Moscow.

46. Colonel Ilumrav is a noted Russian aviator. He has the gold star of the "Hero of the Soviet Union" awarded to him for his daring rescue of 3 North Pole explorers in 1937, and was the first pilot to fly over the so-called Trans-Aib route now used for bringing Land-Leone air-

planes in and the route we have been following. We in roll read on aviation subjects and much of the dinner conversation was in connection with

aeronautics. He stated that the F-39's and A-20's were being used to very good effect by the Red Air Force and the pilots liked the plane very much. However, he said they had a great need for C-24's, bombers and C-54's cargo planes. The C-54's are especially needed on the ferry route, as they have considerable difficulties getting their pilots back to Fairbanks in large enough numbers using the C-47 plane. He needs a plane capable of carrying 37 to 50

pilots. His only advance on American planes was in connection with rubber tires. He stated that our rubber tires did not hold up in the severe

Siberian winter weather.

47. Colonel Ivanov, who is not over 5 feet tall, is a very brilliant officer and in fact he has been impressed by the type of air force officers encountered. They are all very military in manner and appearance.

48. Then we arrived at Yakutsk. Colonel Lamuruk had a session immediately with the navigator and radio man, evidently brought about by our late arrival at Swanchen. At the end of their meeting Colon Lamuruk stated that he was going to send another radio operator, us to Moscow, a Lieut. J. S. Shuchukov, and gave as the reason the fact that this operator was more familiar with the route, but in our minds the navigator placed the blame for the delay on the radio operator and Colonel Lamuruk relieved him. However, he later asked if we would take it. Sochan to Moscow as a passenger and Fruenier agreed to do so.

49. Departed Yakutsk 0900, 19 July 1943 and arrived Kirov 1405 having passed over heavy timberland with no sign of habitation. Many areas have been burned out due to forest fires and in fact we saw 2 forest fires in the distance.

50. Kirov is located on the Lamsi river in a prosperous looking farming region. Farms appear to be in good condition and every available piece of land is under cultivation. The fields and buildings are all very

recent construction. The field itself is very rough but it is very long and has very good approaches. Although hangars are not up, work is being pushed on one large hangar and a repair shop. As usual we were met by the commanding officer and his staff and invited to lunch. The local authorities were introduced and they joined us in a lunch where only local grown vegetables etc. were served. The commanding officer had just arrived at this station from duty at the front and at lunch showed us a cigarette lighter he had taken from a German officer he had killed - with the words "made in Germany" stamped in English on the bottom of the lighter.

51. Departed Kirov 1615 and proceeded to Krasnoiarksk arriving there at 2015. Lost of time above the clouds but when we could see below,

only heavy wooded areas were observed. Not at the place by Intourist representatives who had taken a bus off the regular city run to take us into town.

52. Although the city has 2 hotels we were quartered at the Party headquarters in the heart of the city. No one had an apartment for any more Russian food so dinner was dispensed with much to the disappointment of the Intourist "chief" who had to be satisfied with serving beer - a very poor quality beer. The Party headquarters houses the offices and meeting rooms of the various party organizations and also the students here for propaganda training. After courses ranging from 3 months to 1 year these students go back to their provinces and spread the doctrine taught here.

53. On our way into town we passed a large hospital used exclusively for wounded soldiers. Evidently many wounded soldiers are brought in here to recuperate as many were noticed on the streets in bandages, on crutches, etc.

54. The population of Krasnoiarksk has increased in the last few years from 600,000 to over 900,000. This increase is due to the expanded

manufacturing industry. The industrial part of the city is located across the river.
and extends 5 or 6 miles along the river. The only means of reaching it is by 2 ferries operating on 2 hour schedule. Between the islands a bridge has never been built connecting the city proper with the new industrial area. When we asked about the type of manufacture we were told that it was all war products. To one know we could say exactly what was being produced. Dr. Hamilton attempted to arrange a visit to the industrial area before takeoff. 20 July, but due to difficulties in transportation and the fact that we could not get passes to visit the factories the trip did not materialize.

55. Arrived at the field 0630, 20 July and were advised that weather conditions were not good but expected that we could clear at 1100. However we also found that the repairs to the port engine had not been completed. An oil leak had developed and it was necessary to replace the filter. Either the mechanics didn't have the tools or the ability as it took 3 hours to complete a comparatively easy job. They refused to allow our plane mechanics to get near the engine.

56. At 1100 the weather ahead had not cleared but they indicated it would be satisfactory at 1200. However we remained advised to wait until 1600. At which time the commanding officer said he could not clear the plane until the following morning so the bus which had brought us to the field and stayed all day took us back to our rooms at Party Headquarters.

57. The field at Krasnoyarsk located on a hill overlooking the city, in a large oval equpped layout with one concrete runway and several bare surfaced tar strips. Your large hangars are well equipped with 100 0-47's and 10 0-47 Land-Lease planes were lined up on the field. Then we questioned the large number of planes here it was explained that this was the terminal of the ferry route and the distribution point to various fronts. In addition to the military planes, several civilian built 0-47s, a 1932 model North Pole type 2 engine transport, large numbers of 3 place single 100 hp engine trainers and many 2 engine radial and light bomber planes were noted. The bombers are stationed here for training purposes. It was also explained that the small training planes have been used for many purposes at the front such as ambulance work, carrying doctors and nurses to places impossible to reach by larger planes and have been used to carry light bombs.

58. The commanding officer, who has just returned from duty in the Far East and Vladivostok, was host at dinner in our honor in one of the party meeting rooms. He was very non-committal on any questions regarding the city or industrial purposes. His reply to the question regarding increase in local manufacturing was that he was a soldier and not interested in figures.

59. After dinner we were taken to the local park where the walks are lined with war posters and pictures of the party leaders and prominent army officers. Dancing on a large scale is held in an open air pavilion. The crew members attempted to dance with some of the girls but with little success.

60. Departed Krasnoyarsk 0720, 21 July 1943 and arrived over the industrial part of the city. Large new buildings have been erected and large numbers of oil or gas storage tanks were noted. About 180 miles west of Krasnoyarsk we crossed over a high tension power line running 30. Many small furnaces communities could be seen but no evidence of anyone working or farm machinery visible from our 5,000 foot altitude. However, about 190 or 200 miles west of Krasnoyarsk we passed over the first active farming area. Much equipment could be seen working, and many fields had been plowed. stationed to be full grain cheat. At 210 miles west we crossed over a river at a small town where the double tracked Trans-Siberian railroad; crosses the river. Therewere the railroad could be seen from starboard, it ran double tracked.

61. Approximately 670 miles out we passed over a small railroad town where large shops and round houses served the railroad. From this point west for only 250 miles it was noted that 104 forty-two car freight trains were running for a clear block west. The trains moving west were carrying large quantities of coal. The record of 1,000 feet altitude appears to be well maintained and in good condition. 4 to 5 telephone and power lines follow the roadbed.

62. arrived 1230, 21 July 1943 at Oskar. In circling the city to land, 2 large airfields with concrete runways were observed but were instructed to land at the civilian airport which turned out to be a very short, narrow and exceptionally rough field. Then the pilot questioned the officers as to the reason for using this field. He was told that arrangements had been made here for lunch. The other 2 fields are military airfields and this field is used for commercial flying, which evidently is limited to very small planes as the landing field is barely adequate, both in size or condition of field, to accommodate planes of the type we were flying.

63. The only planes on the field were 2 captured German Ju 88 engines transport planes. It was told that they have been taken at Stalingrad along with 100 other similar planes which have since been repaired and put into service.

64. During the usual lunch a Major sitting across the table from me made the only remarks we had heard regarding the Japanese. Mr. Hamilton was keeping the interpreter busy at the other end of the table and since the Major's English was limited to 2 words I gathered from his gestures that he had already placed the Japs in the same category with the Germans.

65. Departed Oskar 1445 and circled the city to head west. From the air it is a good looking city with many modern looking buildings. From the number of railroad shops located here it is evidently a railroad repair center. Two railroad bridges each with one track and one trestle bridge for traffic across the river at this point.

66. Arrived Kassan 2015, 21 July 1943 intending to refuel and leave immediately for Moscow but the commanding officer would not give the pilot clearance as he said we could not take Moscow before the barrage balloons went up. Premier insisted he could take Moscow well ahead of such time but found that the Colonel meant that he said we were prepared to spend the night here.

67. Some of the quarters we were furnished on this trip had been bad but the field house at Kassan turned out to be the worst one of all and we decided that the mail served fell far below the type we had experienced since landing at 'alkal 6 days before.

68. The field here is well equipped with 2 long concrete runways, one large hangar and several small repair shops. All of the planes on the field are of Russian make. The C-47 type planes are equipped with machine guns and bomb racks. These planes are used for parachute troops. Several German 3 engine Junkers, 2 North Pole type 4 engine, 12 year old, transports, many 2 engine radium dive bombers and single engine 100 hp trainers were also on the field.

69. The commanding officer has just reported here 15 years duty at a fighter training school to take charge of training activities at this field.

70. Departed Kassan for Moscow at 1715, 22 July and in circling the city noted a large area of new construction. Part of this area appears to be an ammunition depot and it is entirely camouflaged and surrounded by high wire fence.

71. J hard surfaced highways lead out from the city. On the outskirts of the city some factories were noted but they are evidently not working as indicated by the absence of smoke, railroad cars on the sidings or any activity about the buildings. From here on to Moscow it appears that every piece of land is under cultivation.

72. It has been noted on the entire trip that the meteorologists are all women and their reports proved that they are well qualified for their work. Every forecast we had proved to be accurate.

73. In surveying the field in Moscow it was noted that it is very well protected with camouflage anti-aircraft gun placements.

74. Landed Moscow 1110, 22 June 1943.