

MR 300 Sec. 4 -- WARFARE -- Russia

MR 300, Sec. 4 -- WARFARE -- Russia

January-June, 1944

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January-June, 1944

*Top down
Box 100*

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

30 June 1944

From: War Cabinet Offices

To : Joint Staff Mission

Info: A.F.H.Q.

OZ 3439

Following is repetition of telegram MIL 1507 received from 30 Mission Moscow.

For C.C.S. (R) British C.O.S., SHAEF, AFHQ from Generals Deane and Burrows.

1. Following communique for 29th June from Soviet G.S. 2330 hours tonight.
2. On the Karelian front Petrozavodsk and the railway station at Kondopoga were taken. The Murmansk railway had thus been cleared of enemy (through ?) out its whole length. (West ?) and south of Medvezhegorsk the advance was continued.
3. On Leningrad front on 28th June Island of Uran Sari in Gulf of Finland was completely cleared of enemy and town and railway station of (Uras ?) Trongsund taken.
4. Troops on 1st Baltic front continued offensive and took 150 places including Ushachi and town and railway station of Vetrino. Railway Dimlotsk, Molodechno has been cut.
5. In Minsk sector Soviet troops beached River Berezina north of Borisov on a front of 60 kilometers.
6. Troops second Belo Russian front have advanced 35 kilometers across River Drut captured 500 inhabited

CM-IN-24978 (30 Jun 44)

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JCS MEMO. 1-17-73
BY DSS, DATE

MAY 21 1973

Col Park

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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Number OZ 3439

Page 2

places, 12 major ones including town Belevichi and railway station Vendrish and Semukouitch.

7. In Bobruisk area railway station Yasen Ta(ta?)rka Dernutsi, Daraganovo captured.

8. Nothing to report on other front.

T.O.O. 301120Z

End.

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: CG AAF
OPD
G-2
Adm. King
Col. Park
Log

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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From: War Cabinet Offices

To: Joint Staff Mission

Rptd: A.F.H.Q.

Dated 29th June 1944

O.T.P.

OZ 3453

Following received from 30 Mission Moscow begins
MIL 1506, June 29th. For C.C.S. (R) British C.O.S.,
SHAEP, A.F.H.Q. from Generals Deane and Burrows.

1. Beloyd Industrial Centre Bobnuisk captured. Enemy
lost 20,000 killed and 12,000 captured.

2. On Karelian front town Petrozavodsk captured.
T.O.O. 291750Z. Ends.

T.O.O. 292345Z

ACTION: CC/S
INFO: CGAAF
OPD
G-2
Adm King
Col Park
LOG

CM-IN-24977

(30 Jun 44)

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INCOMING MESSAGE

From: War Cabinet Offices
To: Joint Staff Mission and A.F.H.Q.
Nr: OZ 3401 28 June 1944

Following received from 30 Mission.

BEGINS:

MIL 1489, June. Following for C.C.S. (R) British Chiefs of Staff from Generals Deane and Burrows.

Following from Soviet War Communique, 27 June.

1. Karelian Front. Between Lakes Onega and Ladoga more than 30 inhabited places reported captured including SHELTORZERE, (regional centre Karelia Finnish Soviet Republic) LADVA, NOBINKI, and railway station LADVA (?LU) RJIPOL, PAE, REVSELGA and TEKARI.

2. First Baltic and third Belo Russian Front. Liquidation of 4, 197, 206, 246 infantry divisions and 6 airfield divisions of 3 German tank army complete with capitulation of remnants.

Prisoners include 4 General Intelligence Officers, and more than 10,000 other ranks. Town and railway centre of ORSHA stormed and taken. In direction LEPELSK more than 200 inhabited places reported taken including CHASHNIKI, (regional centre of VITEBSK Province), USHACH, KAMEN, and railway station VARTNA and CHASHNIKI. In direction of BORISEV more than 350, (or 360?) places claimed including railway station of (?) TOLOCHIN and BOER. In direction of MOGILEV pursuit of enemy continues, river APIA having been crossed at South and North of town and railway MOGILEV-ORSHA cut, street fighting already begun in town of Mogilev. In this centre more than 300 places claimed, including railway station of Zubri, Dari and Lipolovo.

In (?) direction of BOBRUISK advance continues and encirclement of 5 German Infantry Division South East of BOBRUISK completed. Soviet troops closing in on BOBRUISK and fighting has begun in outskirts. Road and railway

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NR: OZ 3401

28 June 1944

Page 2

BOBRUISK-MINSK has been cut and more than 600 places liberated including GLUSK and KARPELOVKA, (regional centre of POLESK), GORODETZ, LAMI, 5 kilometres to South of BOBRUISK and many smaller places with railway station of ZAGR?PI) (?E), KRASNY, BEREYNN, OMELNAYA, (?KRASNY), BROD, ZALESY, BABKOR and MIRADINQ.

3. **Air.** Full air support given all operations. On June 26th Red Air Force flew 8096 sorties. Incomplete return for first half June 27th show 3038 sorties were flown.

4. Other Front no change.

MESSAGE ENDS.

T.O.O. 281445Z

ACTION : CC/3

INFO : Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Col Park
LOG

CM-IN-23858

29 Jun 44) 1427Z hy

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To: J. S. M. A.F.H.Q.

From: War Cabinet Offices

Nr: OZ 3390

27 June 1944

Following from 30 Mission.

BEGINS:

MIL 1479 26th June for C.C.S., repeated
British C.O.S. SHAEF, A.F.H.Q.

Following from General Deane and Burrows.

1. Following from Soviet General Staff at 2315 hours 26th.
2. On 26th June troops of Karelian Force ? continued advance between lake Ladoga and Onega capturing more than 40 inhabited places. Among them were Kotchola, Yuksila, Sudalitsa, Nanulltsa, Kuitiyashi, Karpovka, Zinikovo. North Lake Onega our troops advanced 30 kilometre West and South from Medvezhegorsk capturing Karels (7jo)ya, Mselga (?) Locinaya, Gozu, Medvezhya, Gozu, Pereguba and railway station Unites Kyappeselga (on Murmansk line).
3. In Gulf of Finland (the ?) Islands of Koivisto and Tilrin, Sari have been cleared of enemy.
4. Troops of first Baltic and three Belo Russian fronts have destroyed the enemy troops surrounded in the Vitebsk area. Vitebsk itself has been captured to westward S.W. of Vitebsk more than 300 (or 700) inhabited places have been taken including Ulla, Obol, Bocheikovo Kamenshchina, Waleksinich, Chereya and railway station at Obol.
5. In the Orsha area more than 400 inhabited places have been taken including Dubrovno, Staiki, Omolyani, Oboltsi, Pishohalova, Polovi, Karabanovichi (SV ?) Atoshhtsa, Taybulskaaya and railway station, Staiki, Yurtsevo, Smflyany, Lemnitsa. Road Orsha Vorisov and railway Orsha Lepel also cut.

CM-IN-23857

27 June 1944

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BY DMS, DATE
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NR: OZ 3390

27 June 1944

Page 2

6. On two Belo Russian fronts there was an advance towards Mogtilevi in which 450 inhabited places were taken including Godki, Masalik, Sloboda, Kazimiroc, Skaya, Stan Timokhoe, Ka, Ruditsi, Fashchevka, Dubrovka, Bel Pleshchitsi, Yevdokimovichin, Mostik, Mashinaki, Zarudeyvka, Bolshi (HH?) and Maliye, Amkhimchi, Garbovichi, Ostrovi and railway station Ehausi, Blagovich, Resta, Pogodino. To north of Mogilev troops reach Dnieper.

7. On 1 Belo Russian front Zhlobin and 150 other places captured including Osobnik, Bolshaya and Mayayakrushinovka Palevichi, Tikhinichi, Bronnoe, Koshisti Yd Abolotye Lebedevka, Colonoe, Mormal, Zludichi, Kozlovka, Moiseyevka Brozha, Makarovichi, Ratmirovichi, Ozemlya, Shkava, Aymovi (ch?) i railway station Zhlubin Podolshaya Mormal Prozha Ratmirovichi.

8. Nothing to report on other fronts.

T.O.O. 262348. ENDS.

ACTION : CG/S

INFO : Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissel
Col. Park
LOG

CM-IN-23857

(29 Jun 44)

14252 hy

TO

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia.

To : War Department.

Rr : 752

27 June 1944.

To Bissell sgd Deane.

Map Soviet front line published press here being forwarded today via pouch reur WAR 55540 June 24. Herewith front line as of 22 June north to south:

Along Svir River from Lake Onega to Lake Ladoga. From west side Lake Ladoga, 75 kilometers north of southwestern tip of Lake, to Vipuri and then along coast to Narva. About 3 kms south of railroads is salient in line Narva-Gdov 30 kms deep and 20 kms wide. Line continues along east coast Lake Peipus to about 7 kms north west and south of Pakov to Velikaya River 32 kms northwest of Ostrov. Thence to 18 kms east of Ostrov, south to 40 kms north of Opochka, southeast 45 kms to 50 kms northeast of Opochka, then south, railroads being out 85 kms west of Velikye Luki and 30 kms northeast of Polotsk. Southeast to railroad 25 kms northwest of Vitebsk, thence 20 kms north and east of Vitebsk to 25 kms south of city. Southeast to railroad 40 kms east of Orsha, south to 50 kms east of Mogilev, southwest to 45 kms east of Bobruisk. Ten kms south railroad line point 70 kms northwest of Gomel.

Further check points. 35 kilometers west of Mazyr, 50 kms north of Sarny, 90 kms southeast of Brest on Brest-Sarny line. From Kovel line follows Turja River to 40 kms west of Luck, 5 kms northeast Brody, 18 kms west of Tarnopol, Dniester crossed 20 kms northwest of Horodenka, Prut crossed 40 kms southeast of Stanislawow, 50 kms west of Ceruanti,

CM-IN-22336

(27 Jun 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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Page Two.

From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia.

Nr : 752

27 June 1944.

50 kms west of Botosani, Prut out 60 kms westnorthwest of Iasi, 15 kms north of Iasi to Orhei and thence along river to Dniester and down Dniester to Black Sea.

End.

ACTION: G-2
INFO : CGAAP
OPD
Col. Park

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

CM-IN-22336

(27 Jun 44)

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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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From: War Cabinet Offices

To : Joint Staff Mission

Info: A.F.H.Q.

Nr : 02 3327

24th June 1944

Following from 30 Mission Moscow.

MIL 1467 to C.C.S. info C.O.S. SHAFT, AFHQ from
Generals Deane and Burrows.

Sloop crossed river Svir. All the way from Lake
Onega to Lake Ladoga. On 24th June they advanced 20 klms
and occupied 80 places including Forlga, Mikhailovskoe,
(? Pechnaya), (? Mikentieni) Megro, Zero, Berezhnaya,
Medvezhye Gorsk north of Lake Onega.

2. Break through west and northwest of Vitebsk has been
widened up to 80 klms and advance up to 40 (50) klms reaching
west Dvina River on front of 35 klms.

3. 200 places were reoccupied on 24th June largest being
railway station of Lovsha and Uzaliatino, Dubrovskoe, And-
rosovkhi, Kutino, Baranuvskiye, Vishnevra, Mishkovichi,
Zaselye, Zagorye, Miasoyedovo, Prygonovo, Khodorvka and
Dolgaya Niva.

CM-IN-21505

(25 June 44)

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Page 2.

From: War Cabinet Offices

Nr : CZ 3327

24th June 1944

4. Front south west of Vitebsk has been widened up to 80 klms and deepened to 25 klms. Over 150 inhabited points occupied the biggest being Rogi, Khamishchevo, Plissy, Zambshchenye, Zadorye, Upper and Lower Aleksandrovo, Zaos (?er) ye, 18 Kilometres south-west of Vitebsk, Fileto, Skog, Upper and Lower Gryada, Luchesa, Bolshaya, Shchmovka, Ryzhki, and railway stations of Lychkovskovo and Susnovka.

5. An offensive has begun in Ormia direction and deep fortified German defence Zones have been taken up to depth of 10-15 kilometres on front up to 20 kilometers. More than 50 places taken including Zrernishche, Yuryev, Verteyye (or Vereteye?). Shibany, Zabezhnitsa, Starina, Zamoshchye, St (?ous) ye, Kholmy, (or Sholmy?).

6. An offensive north (?) of Chaussy in direction Mogilev has broken strong defences and forced Pronia River with advance on front up to 50 kilometres to depth up to 29 (or 20?); more than 70 places occupied including Belivitsa, Chernavtsy, Razinkka, Popovka, Khonkovichi, Slobodka, Shestari, Zhukovka, Chernovka, Korouchino, Stary, Pribuzh, Volovichi, Zalozhye, Budino, Radvohi.

7. There are no substantial changes on other fronts.

8. Do you obtain any value from this series of reports. If not, we will continue to obtain them from Soviet G. S. in hopes that they may lead to something better; but will not waste cypher and signal time by sending them until we obtain something additional to Soviet broadcast news.

T.O.O. 240620Z End.

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : CG AAF, OPD, G-2, Col Park, Log

CM-IN-21505

(26 June 44)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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From : War Cabinet Offices

To : Joint Staff Mission
AFHQ

Number: OZ 3309 24 June, 1944

Following received from 30 Mission. BEGINS.

To J.S.M. (R) Air Ministry, SSO, SHAEP, AFHQ, MIL
1460, 23rd June for CCS (R) British Chiefs of Staff from
Generals Deane and Burrows.

1 P.M. today Red Army started offensive Northwest
and Southeast of Vitebsk.

2. In latter direction our troops broke through
highly fortified defence lines, 8 to 10 kilometres in depth
on a front of 25 kilometres. Amongst over 70 (or 50?) places
occupied are Zabelino, Liadenki, Lushkinopol, Visochany,
Kuzmentey, Kurtenki, Shnitki, Osinova and cutting Vitebsk-
Orsh Railway the station Zamostochye.

3. To the northwest of Vitebsk on a front 30
kilometres to a depth of from 12 to 35 kilometres our troops
broke through the strongly fortified defence line. Among
over 100 places occupied are: Shumilino, Volotovki, Pligovki,
Grebentey, (Rylkovo ?), Ilvoselki, Verballi, Dobrino, Zalushye,
Kritskie, Dvorishche, Khotilovo, Bogdanova, Shapki, Riabushkovo,
Gubitsa, and on the railway Polo(?)tsk - Vitebsk, stations
Yasvino and Sirotino.

4. (?Similarly) on Karelian Isthmus following are
among the points occupied: Reploa, Launtamaya, Tali, Kuivala,
Kostiala, Mustalahti.

5. Continuing advances between Lakes Ladoga and
Onega following were taken Suvalda, (Gumbaritsay?) Kut, Lahta,
Gorka, Kovkenitsy, Staryo, Segezhi, Uterozo, Podcl. Ruchyi,
Karelskaya, Churova, Gora, Kohdushi, Chemodanova, Gora,
Kekerlagi, Miatusovo, Voronichi.

CM-IN-19916 (24 Jun 44)

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BY DSS, DATE
MAY 21 1973

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Number: OZ 3309

24 June 44

Page 2.

6. No change on other fronts.

T.O.O. 232359.

ENDS.

ACTION: OCS

INFO : CG AAF
OPD
G-2
COL PARK
LOG

CM-IN-19916 (24 Jun 44) 1659Z MOS

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BY DBS, DATE /

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER

EXTENSION NUMBER

ADDRESSEES

PRECEDENCE

FROM

ASTALUSNA ARCHANGEL

ATTENTION (FOR MESSAGE ADDRESSES)

RELEASED BY

DATE

24 JUNE 1944

FOR CODERSON

2022

DELETED BY

HUDSON

PARAPHRASED BY

VOSBURGH/HORWITZ

BY

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240830

NCR 8634

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

DATE

TIME

OCT

ON OUTSIDE ROUTINGS PLEASE LEAVE BLANK UNTIL ONE HOUR BEFORE SENDING ATTENDING TO

ACTION

ARCHANGEL STREETS, HOUSES, SEWAGE, DOCK UNDER
EXTENSIVE REPAIRS. MARKET PRICES LOWER NOW
50 PERCENT THAN LAST YEAR. BARTERING NEGLIGIBLE.
INCREASING CIRCULATION AMERICAN CANNED FOODS.

16.....ACTION

COMINCH....CNO....20G....NAVAIDE.....200P.....

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 6(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

Make original only. 1. to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 74 (1) NAVREGS.)

FORM 10-10

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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TOP SECRET

From: War Cabinet Offices

To : Joint Staff Mission

No : OZ 3286

23 June 1944

Following received from 30 Mission.

BEGINS:--

MIL 1457 22nd June. For C.C.S., British C.O.S.
SHAEP, AFHQ from Generals Deane and Burrows.

1. Advance continues on Karelian Isthmus and several inhabited places taken.
2. In course of advance north of Lake Onega, eastern and northern outskirts of Medvezhegorsk occupied as well as inhabited places Comlikaya, Guba and railway stations Lumboshozero, Malyga, Vanzozero. Enemy thrown back on line Lake Oster-River Kumsa.
3. On Onega-Ladoga Front, Red Army forced river Svir on evening 21st in Ladeyncepole district and on 22nd fought to enlarge bridgehead on northern bank of Svir. Podporozhe Nazarevskaya, Staraya and Novaya Sloboda taken. On other fronts there is nothing to report.

T.O.O. 222000Z ENDS

T.O.O. 230025Z

ACTION: CCS

INFO : Gen. Arnold, Gen. Handy, Gen. Bissell, Adm. King,
Col. Park, Log

CM-IN-18978

(23 Jun 44)

1551Z

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Office, Commanding General
Army Air Forces 2766

23 June 1944

Commanding General
US Military Mission to U.S.S.R
Moscow, Russia

(M-522)

Number: WAR 56070

Personal from Arnold, Top Secret to Deane.

Comments which follow are arranged according to the same item numbers as those in your number 718 of June 19th.

Item No. 1. Concur that the operation of American forces should be established as the basis of the discussions to be held. The extent of our participation compared to Russian participation should be substantially on an airplane to airplane basis.

For planning purposes it is assumed that USSR is not likely to go to war with Japan until after the defeat of Germany. Based on this assumption, we are prepared to furnish long range fighters to the Soviet Air Force in the quantity of one or two fighters for each heavy bomber which the Russians commit to these operations.

I feel it is also very important to our planning, particularly in order to reduce logistical and service requirements, that the equipment for both the Soviet and American Air Forces be restricted to the fewest possible models of aircraft. Heavy bombers should be B-17s or B-24s and fighter aircraft should be P-51s.

Item No. 2. The size of the American and Soviet Air Forces to be operated in eastern Russia will depend largely on your discussions with the Soviets as to the logistical capabilities to support those forces. There

CM-OUT-56070 (25 Jun 44)

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 8(E) and 5(H) or (G)

OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

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Number: WAR 56070

Page 2

has already been sent to you a detailed Air Staff study titled "Logistics of operating heavy bombers against Japan from bases in the Maritime Provinces". This study has as its basis and conclusion that a force of ten heavy bombardment groups and ten fighter groups could be moved by air to the Maritime Provinces by the use of ten troop carrier groups. Initially therefore, we should prepare to put in ten heavy bomber groups of which the United States contribution should be six groups and the Russian contribution four group (unit equipment and reserve aircraft for four heavy bomb groups are within the capabilities of the number of B-24 and B-17 aircraft committed to the Russians). We should likewise prepare to put in ten long range fighter groups of which the United States contribution should be six groups and the Russian contribution four groups. Ten troop carrier groups could be employed on a temporary basis for the movement to Siberia, with subsequent support by ATC.

The augmented size of the initial two Air Forces above will depend upon the outcome of the discussions with the Soviets as to bases and logistical capabilities. For your information, the planned maximum availability of forces that could be deployed in Siberia and the Maritime Provinces, after the defeat of Germany, include 12 heavy bomber groups, 15 fighter groups, 4 reconnaissance groups and 4 troop carrier groups.

Item No. 3. In view of the Japanese strength in Manchukuo, unless there is a large increase in Russian Army units, there appears little likelihood that the 12 bases which Marshal Stalin indicates as having been already constructed between Vladivostok and Sovetsk Gavan can be used. Stalin admitted this in conversation with undersigned at Teheran. We should therefore press for alternate heavy bomber bases, fighter bases, and at least one large operating base which would include a sub-depot. The initial forces to be deployed might well be restricted by the capacity of these alternate bases.

CM-OUT-56070

(25 Jun 44)

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OSP letter, May 4, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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OUTGOING MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

Number: WAR 56070

Page 3

Item No. 4. Concur in this item.

Item No. 5. The build-up Soviet Strategic Air Forces has already been agreed upon in conferences between General Arnold, Mr. Harriman and General Walsh. Item No. 1 covers the additional provision of long range fighters.

Item No. 6. Concur. However, the opening up of the Pacific route and the Eastern Siberian ports, including their security, will depend on naval collaboration. Further, I pointed out to you in my cable WAR 25241 April 19, 1944 that in an ATC route via Alaska the long hauls involved will limit the tonnage. A minimum of 500 transport aircraft will be required to maintain a constant flow of air cargo. This would also require considerable airdrome facilities and supplies along the route. However we should have no shortage of cargo planes when needed for that purpose.

Item No. 7. Reference Paragraph A. Concur that we insist on United States administrative and operational control of United States units. My views on the command set-up are that we should run our own Air Forces independent of but coordinating with the command set-up of the Soviet Air Force. Reference Paragraph B. The group, service group and depot group organization for the American Air Force should be completely American. I would be willing to utilize Soviet manpower to maximum extent possible as airport engineers, anti-aircraft, transportation, guard, and some communications. It will require a total of approximately 4,000 combat and service troops in support of each combat group. While it would be ideal if these could be American, Soviet manpower can be utilized. There will always be required an absolute minimum of 2,600 American combat and support troops per combat group.

Reference Paragraph C. Concur as to Soviet construction of airdromes and facilities and the storage of

CM-OUT-56070

(25 Jun 44)

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OSD letter, May 4, 1972

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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OUTGOING MESSAGE

Number: WAR 56070

Page 4

supplies that we make available. We should insist on a small advisory and inspection organization.

Reference Paragraph D. This information being obtained by you, is awaited. We must make every effort in the preparatory phase to reduce transportation requirements. The Soviets should be urged, in this connection, to supply the necessary base stocks of gasoline.

Item No. 8. Concur that the Soviets could provide anti-aircraft protection, at least initially. I do not, however, concur that the Soviets provide fighter defenses of our installations. We should insist that we operate the fighter defenses of our own bases. In this connection the P-51 long range fighter is suitable for performing both escort and defense missions.

3022

End.

ORIGINATOR: General Arnold

INFORMATION: General Handy
General Bissell
Mr. Stimson
Colonel Park
C of S

CM-OUT-56070

(25 Jun 44)

2039Z

ojv

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OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTM

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	AMCON VLADIVOSTOK	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEES	
RELEASED BY	22 JUNE 44	CNO MOSCOW	PRIORITY
DATE	1617		ROUTINE
TOR CODEROM	SLUTZ		DEFERRED
DECODED BY	MANUEL <i>Zimmerman</i>		PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY	HARRINGTON		ROUTINE
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED

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220340 NCR 4741

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GCT

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(FOR CNO MOSCOW FROM AMCON VLA)

2 BEJO RUSSIA SURVIVORS LANDED JAP TERRITORY IN
LIFEBOAT PRESUMABLY ISLAND YETOROFUNCW ENROUTE
USSR OVERLAND ACCOMPANIED BY SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE
FROM JAPAN. UNOFFICIALLY LIAS OFFICER BELIEVES
WERE RELEASED ONLY AFTER JAPS HAD FORCED DESIRABLE
INFO FROM THEM AND MADE SIGN STATEMENTS. BELIEVES
OTHER SURVIVORS LANDED BUT THINKS EXECUTED OR
JAILED THESE 2 BELIEVED TEMPORARILY INSANE. THIS
INFO NOT TO BE DISCUSSED WITH SOVIETS
16...ACT

COMINCH...CNO...NAVATDE...20G...200P...

~~SECRET~~

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1652, Sec. 3(E) and 4(C), of (S)

OSD letter, May 1, 1979

By DBS

Date

MAY 21 1973

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OPNAV-NCR-12 A 33052

3 do Russia

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

From: US Military Mission Moscow, Russia

To: War Department

Nr: 722

22 June 1944

[REDACTED] for Joint Chiefs of Staff from Spalding
signed Deane info York (Protocol).

The following report regarding the Far East is
submitted in reference to cable 688, 13 June, Deane to
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Left Moscow 23 May by Soviet plane, transferred to
Trans-Siberian railway at Kraskeyarsk and returned by rail-
road to Alma Ata, thence by plane to Moscow, arriving 18
June. Primary purpose of trip was to obtain information
as to Soviet ability to receive and forward cargo from the
United States and, secondarily, general familiarization with
Far East. Soviet authorities freely discussed port operations,
rail transport in connection therewith and provided full
opportunity for observation of ports of Vladivostok and
Nahodka, in so far as facilities for receiving US cargo
were concerned. Was accompanied in trip by Lieutenant Col-
onel J D Wilmeth, U S Army, and Captian Rubancz, A Russian
officer attached to foreign trade commissariat. At Soviet
request, civilian clothes were worn so as not to attract
attention of "our friends." Great appreciation for Lend-
Lease supplies was expressed by authorities who regard these
supplies as a major contribution to the war effort. The
attitude of complete confidence to cope with any Japanese
aggression was encountered. Sentiment towards Japanese is
most unfriendly. Even Soviet children were heard to say,

CM-IN-18568

(23 June 1944)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

3 to Russia

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Page 2

From: US Military Mission Moscow, Russia

Nr: 722

22 June 1944

"They beat small children," In the private car of a Soviet General in charge of the Vladivostok area railroads, in which we traveled to Nahodka, there were many phonograph records of inspirational songs against the Japanese.

Present plans call for shipments from the United States to the Soviet Far East of 340,000 tons of cargo in June, and the same amount in July. These cargoes should arrive in the Far East in July and August, except for part which will be shipped to Arctic ports. Soviet authorities state that the ports have the capacity to receive and forward 535,000 tons monthly from July to October, inclusive, and if the season is favorable, during November. During the winter season, the capacity is cut to about 1/2 due to closing to Tartar Straits and the Amur and Sakhalin ports, ice difficulties in the Laprouche Straits, and reduced efficiency of railroads. Details of capacity have been forwarded by cable to O.N.I. or, Bissell and Protocol Committee.

It was stated that the capacity of the railroads would be adequate to forward the incoming cargoes to required destinations. It was also said that about 240,000 tons monthly would go through to the Far West, that Muchnof the industrial equipment would only go west as far as Irkutsk and Novosibirsk, that most of the floud, including Canadian, would be consumed from Chita East, and that a great deal would be consumed by the "Big Siberian Army now being maintained." Considerable data has obtained during the trip concerning current railroad operations. This is now being

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(23 June 1944)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Page 3

From: U S Military Mission Moscow, Russia

Hr: 722

22 June 1944

analysed to determine if possible the capacity of the railroad and will be made the subject in a separate report.

In any planning, it is important to note that the Tartar Straits and Amur River Ports to include Nikolaevsk and Komsomolsk, are frozen in from November to the latter part of June, making the Amur River available as a line of communication only for a period of about 4 months.

As indicated by an analysis based primarily on observation of port operations at Vladivostok and Nahodka, of current traffic on the Trans-Siberian Railroad, and in comparison with performances in the northern ports during the past winter, the Soviet estimate of capacity in my opinion is sound.

Port operations observed were excellent. However, Soviet authorities in Moscow have agreed to take all possible measures in attempting to reduce turn around time in port still further.

That action will be taken to expedite repair and loading of vessels in the United States is greatly appreciated. Soviets report that as of June 15th, loading in Seattle, Portland, and San Francisco was still unsatisfactory. One ship in Seattle had been loading since May 23rd, 1 since May 28th, and had not yet finished loading. Four ships in Portland have been loading since late May. Two ships in Portland were idle due to lack of Stevedores. Labor had been somewhat increased, but not adequately.

CM-IN-18568

(23 June 1944)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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Page 4

From: US Military Mission Moscow, Russia

Nr: 722

22 June 1944

The Far East, during next winter, will be comparatively isolated. All ports serving the interior will be closed except Vladivostok and nearby Ports, and these can only be reached via Laperouse Straits. The Trans-Siberian Railroad in winter operates at considerably reduced efficiency. On the other hand, the Japanese line of communications is not seriously affected by winter conditions. Late fall or winter would therefore seem to be the more favorable time for Japanese aggression. It would be highly desirable to take the fullest possible advantage of the open season this summer to advance Protocol deliveries, both to accelerate the overall Soviet war effort and also to have the Far East, in the event of hostilities, in the best possible state of readiness as regards supplies while it is noted in cable of 12 June (WAR 49607) that availability of ships could not at that time be foreseen, it is recommended that the situation as to availability of additional ships this summer be kept under continuous review. If ships can be made available, it is recommended that within the capacity of the ports as noted above, they be allocated to the Soviet Pacific route. As these ships can not be used during the winter months, it should be understood that they will then be released by the Soviets, or used in some other route to be specified by the United States.

End.

688 in CM-IN 12019 (15 June 44) JCS

ACTION: JCS

INFO: Gen Arnold, OPD, Gen Bissell, Adm. King, Col. Park, Gen York, C of S

CM-IN-18568

(23 June 1944)

0237Z

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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[REDACTED]

From: US Military Mission Moscow, Russia

To: War Department

Nr: 721 21 June 1944

For Bissell, ONI and McPherson of Portocol Committee from Deane.

The following corrections should be made in my cable No 649 of 6 June:

(A) Vladivostok November to April inclusive 170,000 tons monthly; May to October, inclusive, 370,000 tons monthly.

Also cable No 665 of 9 June. (A) Alexandrovsk 30,000 tons for the year, for local use only.

The following supplemental information is furnished by General Spalding who has now returned to Moscow:

Discharge for October 1943 at Vladivostok 364,000 tons;

November 1943, 113,000 tons ;

December, 243,000 tons - a total of 720,000 tons for the quarter.

Foreign Trade representative stated that the maximum accumulation in the port during this period was 100,000 tons, well within the working capacity of the port stated to be 150,000 tons.

CM-IN-18388 (22 Jun 44)

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By RHP, NLR, Date

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Carl Park

300 Russia

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

Page 2

From: US Military Mission Moscow, Russia

Nr: 721

21 June 1944

It should be pointed out that this is at variance with estimate made by Roullard of 200,000 tons accumulation in port at that time.

Based on observation of Vladivostok and Nahodka port operations and facilities and comparing them with actual operations in the northern ports this last winter, Spalding is convinced that the capacities of the ports to received US import cargo as stated in the previous cablegrams, are sound, if the Soviets give sufficient priority to the assignment of railroad equipment.

End.

649 is CM-IN-6039 (8 Jun 44) G-2
665 is CM-IN-8147 (10 Jun 44) G-2

ACTION: G-2

INFO : OPD
NAVY (ONI)
Col Park
MAB

CM-IN-18388

(22 June 1944)

2359Z

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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		CNO	PRIORITY
DATE 23 JUNE 1944			ROUTINE
TOR CODE 0505			DEFERRED
DECODED BY REEGAN/DUMMIT/VISSCHER			
PARAPHRASE HERWITZ/CLENDENIN			PRIORITY
ROUTED BY ROLL			ROUTINE
			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AS ADMINISTRATIVE			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
201230 NCR 3319			<input type="checkbox"/>

PAGE 1 OF 5

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PART 1. 221102 NCR 4922
 PART 2. 230813 NCR 5756
 PART 3. 201230 NCR 3319

ACTION

F-0	
F-01	
F-02	
F-05	
F-07	
F-1	
F-2	
F-20	
F-3	
F-30	
F-31	
F-32	
F-33	
F-34	
F-4	
FX01	
FX30	
FX37	
FX40	
IG-00	
VCNO	

FOLLOWING REPORT SHIPS INSPECTED BY RADN OLSENS PARTY
 AT Leningrad AND Kronstadt. ALL SHIPS IMMACULATE OB-
 VIOUSLY NON SEAGOING LONG TIME MOST OF CREW ASHORE.
 EXTREME SPECIAL PREPARATION INSPECTION. MADE OFFICIAL
 CALL ON CINC BALTIC ABOARD "OCTOBER REVOLUTION" MOORED
 SOUTH SIDE ENTRANCE NEVA RIVER WITH CLEAR RANGE TOWARD
 FINNISH FRONT. THIS AND MOORING 200 YARDS AWAY ONLY
 LOCATIONS MAIN BATTERY USABLE DURING SIEGE. OTHER
 BERTHS UP RIVER. CLAIM MAIN BATTERY SHELLS FINNISH
 FRONT MORNING OF VISITS BUT CONDITION OF SHIP ALL
 TO CONTRARY. CLAIM READY FOR SEA PROBABLY TRUE BUT
 UNABLE GO MUCH BEYOND MORSKOI CHANNEL DUE MINES.

~~SECRET~~

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 OPRAY 18-67 *300 Russia* By DBS Date **MAY 21 1973**

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 NLR 101
 By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

CAMOUFLAGED TO BLEND WATERFRONT. NO CATAPULT OR RADAR. AA NOTED ON EXTREME BOW 1 37 MM TWIN AND 1 LARGER CAL TWIN C ON MAINMAST STRUCTURE 6 37 MM SINGLES WITH DIRECTOR. ON FORWARD AND AFTER TURRET TOPS 3 75 MM SINGLES. NO SMALLER CALIBRES NOTED. RECEIVED 16 SHELL HITS NO BOMBS SAID NEVER OUT OF COMMISSION. INSPECTED CRUISER KIROV IN MERCHANT BASIN PAINTED WAR COLOR SAID READY FOR SEA. SHIP GIVEN ORDER RED BANNER FOR DEFENSE LENINGRAD. CO AND CREW PROUD AND SPIRITED. MANY YOUNG SAILORS FEW OLD TIMERS. CO CONDUCTING TOUR SHOWED UNUSUAL DETAILED KNOWLEDGE ALL PARTS SHIP AND EQUIPMENT. INSPECTION CONTROL TOP TOWER BILGES INDICATED SHIP PRIMED FOR PEACETIME ANNUAL INSPECTION. GREAT 2 INCH SLABS ARMOR PLATES ON DECKS OVERALL VULNERABLE AREAS WHICH TO BE REMOVED PRIOR GOING SEA. SHORT TURRET DRILL VERY SMART. COMPRESSED AIR LOADING MECHANISM FOR 3 GUNS IN ONE BLOCK OPERATED BY ONE MAN BEHIND EACH GUN. ALL ORDERS BY VOICE NO PHONES. TURRET OFFICER LEFT SIDE TURRET NO BOOTH. DRILLS 37 MM AA BATTERY AND PLOTTING ROOM ALSO VOICE CONTROL DIRECT AND BY TUBE. NO FIRE CONTROL PHONES OR HEADSETS NOTED ABOUT SHIP BUT REGULAR INTERNAL COMMUNICATION PHONES AVAILABLE. CHIEF ENGINEER AND FLOOD CONTROL OFFICERS STATIONED SAME COMPARTMENT WITH COMPLETE CONTROL INSTRUMENTS AND PHONE COMMUNICATION. TURN

ALUSNA MOSCOW 2012300 3319
 Originator D/T Group NCR Page 2
 O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 4(D) or (E)
 OSD letter, May 1, 1972 Pages 5
 Date MAY 21 1973
 By DBS

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 NLR 101
 By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

OF VALVE ON METAL FLOOD CONTROL DIAGRAM OF EACH DECK SENDS FLOOD SIGNAL TO FLOOD STATIONS NEAR COMPT. CLAIM NO WORRIES OVER FIRE HAZARDS. AMERICAN NAVY FIRE FIGHTING BOARD WOULD ENJOY FIELD DAY ON CARPETS LARGE SILK LAMP-SHADES CURTAINS OVERSTUFFED WOODEN FURNITURE WOODEN SHEATHING ETC. HEAVY STATUARY AND ORNAMENTS ABOUT OFFICERS QUARTERS. FEW FIRE EXTINGUISHERS NO FOG NOZZELS UNUSED LINEN FIRE HOSE NO LIFE RAFTS NO STENCILLING ON ANY LINES. TWO TRIPLE TORPEDO TUBES NO TORPEDOES. TWO DEPTH CHARGE RACKS MINE TRACKS NO CHARGES. NO RADAR OR CATAPULT. CONNING TOWER CONTROL SPACIOUS COMPLETELY EQUIPPED MANNED 6 OFFICERS 3 MEN. ALL STEREO RANGEFINDERS WITH ABOUT 35 OPERATORS TRAINED. 2 PARAVANES READY TRIPPING POSITION ALL TIMES. BELOW DECKS AFT A₄ PLOTTING MACHINES AND BOARD ONLY ONPUT BEARINGS AND RANGE-FINDER RANGES. MAXIM GERKI NEARBY CAMOUFLAGED BLEND BOCKS READINESS SEA VERY DOUBTFUL. INSPECTED DD STROGI IMMACULATE AND SMART BUT ONLY 35 PERCENT CREW ON BOARD. SAME REMARKS AS KIROV REGARDING FIRE HAZARD. NO TORPEDOES ABOARD. FEW PHONE BOXES NO HEADPHONES NOTED. WT INTEGRITY BAD MOST HATCH COMBINGS BELOW DECKS ABOUT 1 INCH WITH 1 HINGE 2 DOGS NO GRAD HANDLES. VENTILATION POOR NO BLOWERS RUNNING. PARAVANES IN CRADLES EACH SIDE FORD STACK BUT RIGGED FOR READY TRIPPING. FIBER INSULATING CONES COVER ENTIRE LENGTH TOW WIRE.

ALUSNA MOSCOW 201230 3319
 Originator _____ D/T Group _____ NCR _____ Page 3
 OF 11662, Sec. 5(B) and 5(D) or (E) Pages.
 OSD letter, May 3, 1972
 By DBS Date MAY 21 1973

OPNAV-10-01
 184100

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 NLR 101
 By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

SOUND LISTENING DEVICE NO CHEMICAL RECORDER. CLOSED BRIDGE
ELECTRIC STEERING NO WHEEL. OPEN BRIDGE AFT CLOSED ONE WITH
AUX STEERING AND ENGINE CONTROLS. AA NOTED 4 T 5.1.
33 INCH 50'S. 6 37 MM, 4 12.7 MM, 1 SEARCHLIGHT 1 RDF. NO
TORPEDOES DCS OR MINES ABOARD. SISTER SHIP STROHNI AT SAME
DOCK. THIRD SHIP SAME CLASS 80 PERCENT COMPLETE AT NEARBY
DOCK. INSPECTED SUB K 52. 3 THIS CLASS IN PORT. CO DECORATED
US NAVY CROSS CONGRATULATED. IDENTICAL TO K 21 POLYARNOE
INSPECTION MY 211315 JAN FOR K52 INDICATED ALL UPKEEP NO
SEAGOING. NO TORPEDOES ABOARD. INTERIOR SHIP IMMACULATE
RED CARPETS FULL LENGTH SHIP RED TABLE AND DESK COVERS ALL
PAINT WORK NEAT AND PLANNED. ALL OPERATING PARTS
CLEAN WELL OILED GREASED. SAY CREWS TRAINED TO STAY AT SEA FOR
80 DAYS BUT NONE THIS BEEN SEA FOR PAST YEAR ACCOUNT MINE
BLOCKADE. SUB SERVICE MORALE EXCEPTIONALLY HIGH WITH NO
DESIRE TRANSFER OTHER TYPES. INSPECTED SHCHUKA CLASS SUB
AT KRONSTADT. MOST POPULAR SOVIET COMBAT SUB. INTERIOR IMMAC-
ULATE MACHINERY SPARKLING CREW SHORE BASED. ALL TUBES LOADED.
EQUAL NUMBER SPACES ABOARD. SOVIETS DUE WAR NECESSITY HAVE
SHORTENED STANDARD TORPEDO ABOUT 10 INCHES AND COMPENSATED
IN TUBE BY PLACING BRASS SPIDER BLOCK IN REAR END OF TUBE
TOPSIDE CABLES HEAVILY COATED WITH INSULATION. OF TOTAL 17

DECLASSIFIED

ALUSNA MOSCOW 201230 3319
Originator D/T Group NCR Page 4
OSD letter, May 1973
MAY 21 1973
Pages.

OPNAV-10-61
124100

~~SECRET~~

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

TORPEDOES SEEN DURING ENTIRE VISIT

12 WERE ON THIS SUB. 2 ON TORPEDO CUTTER AND 3 ON PLANES
YET THIS SUB HAS NOT BEEN TO SEA ON PATROL FOR OVER A
YEAR. MAX PREVIOUS CRUISE 40 DAYS.

16.....ACTION/

COMINCH.....CNO.....200P.....20G.....NAVAIDE.....

DELAYED BY SERVICE

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972

ALUSNA MOSCOW 201230 33198 By DSS Date MAY 21 1972
Originator D/T Group NCR Page 5 Of 5 Pages.

OPNAV-10-51
194186

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER		EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW			ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION	CNO	PRIORITY
DATE 23 JUNE 1944				ROUTINE
FOR CODEROOM 2023				DEFERRED
DECODED BY KRANING		INFORMATION		PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY HOUSTON				ROUTINE
ROUTED BY MORRIS				DEFERRED

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PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

201243

NCR 3530

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ACTION

VISIT KRONSTADT 12

JUNE BY RADM OLSENS PARTY. WEST END SEA WALL BADLY
DAMAGED. BB PETROPAVLOVSK ON BOTTOM PARALLEL SEAWALL
PORT QUARTER CLOSE TO SW MOLE OF CENTRAL BASIN PARTLY
OBSTRUCTING CHANNEL. SHIPS PRESENT PETROPAVLOVSK. 3
DL. 2 GUNBOATS. 1 DM. 1 SS. SEVERAL SMALL FREIGHTERS
DREDGE. 2 MEDIUM FLOAT CRANES. 1 HEAVY FLOAT CRANE
ABOUT 60 SUBCHASERS AND SWEEPS. PETROPAVLOVSK ABOUT
10 FOOT FREEBOARD BOW NR 1 TURRET FOREMAST AND FORWARD
STACK BLOWN OFF BY BOMBS. CAMOUFLAGED LIKE STONE
MOLE. CLAIM 3 TURRETS WORKING AND USED AGAINST PETERHOF.
CLAIM ENGINES OK AND HOPE RAISE SHIP TO WELD ON BOW
OF ANOTHER SHIP. 1 75 MM AA GUN ON TOP EACH TURRET.

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 2(b)

OSD letter, May 1972

By DBS

Date

MAY 21 1973

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

300 Russia

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

NO OTHERS NOTED. INSPECTION FORT ROCK RAILROAD BATTERY
 AIR PORT COMMUNICATION SCHOOL AND TOWN. ONLY NAVAL FAMILIES
 ALLOWED ON ISLAND. 80% WOMEN SEEN WERE PREGNANT OR HAD BABY
IN ARMS. INSPECTION TRIP NEVA RIVER SHOWS CHANNEL CLEAR
 ALL BRIDGES INTACT AND OPERATIVE. MANY HULKS SHIPS AND SMALL
 CRAFT ALONG SEAWALLS SOME SUNK. EXTENSIVE DAMAGE ALL SHIP
 YARDS FACTORIES AND MAJOR BUILDINGS. ALL COVERED IN INTELL-
 IGENCE REPORT. SIGHTSEEING TRIPS PETERHOF AND PUSHKIN SHOW
 COMPLETE DEMOLITION EVERYTHING USEABLE.

16.....ACTION

COMINCH.....CNO.....NAVAIDE.....200P...

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 2(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 4, 1972

By DBS

Date

MAY 21 1973

ALUSNA MOSCOW

201243

Originator.....D/T Group.....NCR.....Page 2 Of 2 Pages.

OPNAV-10-51
 124100

~~SECRET~~

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPTMTL

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW	FOR ACTION	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY		CNO	ROUTINE
DATE 23 JUNE 1944			DEFERRED
FOR CODEROOM 1845/22			
DECODED BY HANSEN	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY SANDBERG			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY MORRIS			DEFERRED

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

(PAGE 1 OF 2)

201247

NCR 3267

IF OPERATIONAL
CHECK BELOW

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ACTION

RADM OLSENS PARTY AT Leningrad inspected 120 FT NINE-
SWEEPER MJ TYPE, 100 FT ARMORED SUBCHASER VMO TYPE AND
MTB SIMILAR HIGGINS TYPE.

SOVIETS LIKE 3 SUPERIOR DIESELS IN MINESWEEPS CLAIM
SHORTAGE HOLDING UP CONSTRUCTION MORE BOATS. ALSO DESIRE
HEAVIER ENGINE TO BUILD HEAVIER BOAT AND TO ADD DIESEL
GENERATOR FOR MAGNETIC SWEEPING.

THESE SMALLEST OF OCEAN GOING TYPE HAVE 1 SMALL DOUBLE
SWEEP DRUM BUT NO OTHER SWEEP EQUIPMENT SEEN.
TRACKS FOR 15 MINES. 50 BUILDING THIS YEAR 100 FOLLOWING
YEAR.

ARMORED SUBCHASER 2 PACKARD ENGINES 1 CONTINENTAL
CRUISING MAKES 8 KNOTS CRUISING 20 KNOTS FULL.

- F-0
- F-01
- F-02
- F-05
- F-07
- F-1
- F-2
- F-20
- F-3
- F-30
- F-31
- F-32
- F-33
- F-34
- FX01
- FX30
- FX37
- FX40
- IG-00

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 1, 1972

Date MAY 21 1973

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300 Russia

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

MESSAGE

NAVY DEPTMTL

FROM	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRIORITY
ALUSNA 110800W		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY	FOR ACTION		PRIORITY
DATE			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM			DEFERRED
DECODED BY	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRIORITY AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW <input type="checkbox"/>
(PAGE 2 OF 2)	241247	NOR 3267	

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME OCT

ON OUTSIDE DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

HAS 2 DO RACKS FOR 8 CHARGES AND TRACK FOR 10 MINES.
HAS LISTENING GEAR. MTB HAD 3 PACKARDS SPEED 40 KNOTS
2 TORPEDOES ON AFTER DECK IN SIDE LAUNCHING RACKS
OPERATED COMPRESSED AIR AUXILIARY RELEASE BY HAND.
HAS SMOKE SCREEN GENERATOR AND 8 50 LB DEPTH CHARGES.
MINIMUM OF EQUIPMENT INSTALLED ON ALL THESE CRAFT.
OFFICER GUIDE IS REPRESENTATIVE OF SHIPBUILDING
COMMISSARIAT SPECIALLY SENT LENINGRAD SUPERVISE
CONSTRUCTION SMALL CRAFT HAS MADE HIGH RECORD EXPRESSED
GENERAL NEED FOR SPARE PARTS ALL TYPES.
STATED HAVE ABOUT 200 SWEEPS AND SUBCHASERS IN AREA
BUT NEED OVER 500. HAVE FACILITIES TO BUILD ANY NUMBER
HULLS BUT LACK ENGINES AND EQUIPMENT.

16....ACT
COMINCH....CNO....NAVAIDE....200P....

SECRET

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 6(D) or (F)

OSD letter, May 1, 1969

by DBS

Date

MAY 21 1978

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 of NRPREGS.)

10/10/10

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E.O. 12386, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
by RT, NARA, Date 4/12/04

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

From : War Cabinet Offices
To : Joint Staff Mission
Info : A.F.H.Q., Algiers
Number : 023217 20th June, 1944

Following received from 30 Mission.

BEGINS:

To Joint Staff Mission (R) A.M.S.S.O., S.H.A.E.F.,
A.F.H.Q., MIL 1441.

19th June. Following from Generals Deane and Burrows
for C.C.S (R) British C.O.S.

1. Following from Soviet General Staff 2115 hours
today.

2. On Karelian Isthmus on 19th June the advance
was continued west of (Lake?) Voukso Yarvi. Our troops
broke through Mannerheim Line at all points.

3. The following places were among those taken:
Lapinlahti, Kivvniemi, Iokicu, Kyca, Muola, Summa,
Ilyakyulya, Lippolo, Rokkala, Iohannes, Vatuori, Rempetti
and railway stations Petyayarvi, Kyanya (ry?)a, Leipyacu, Iohannes.

4. The enemy outskirts cleaned completely from
southern shore Lake Voukso Yarvi and Savanto Yarvi.

5. Nothing to report other fronts.

End.

T.O.O. 200150Z

ACTION: G-2
INFO : CCS
CG AAF
OPD
Log
CM-IN-16441

(20 Jun 44)

1624Z 1a

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
MAY 21 1973

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

20 June 1944

From: War Cabinet Offices

To : Joint Staff Mission

Info: AFHQ Algiers

No : 02 3217

The classification of this message was changed from
restricted to secret.

WDCMO

ACTION: G-2

INFO : CC/S
CGAAF
OPD
Log

CM-IN-16441 (20 Jun 44) 1624Z jh/1s

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JCS MEMO, 1-17-73
BY DSS, DATE

MAY 21 1973

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: U S Military Mission, Moscow

To: War Department

Nr: 718 19th June 1944

To General Arnold, personal from Deane.

In view of possible discussions on Soviet American air collaboration in the Far East, the following is a proposed agenda which we shall try to follow in these discussions and upon which we should like to have your comments and instructions. The items listed show the general subjects, followed by explanatory notes which indicate our conception of the scope of the discussions under each item. The draft agenda follows:

Item 1: Basis of discussion:

That when the U S S R is ready to go to war with Japan, Soviet and American Air Forces will operate heavy bombers with long range fighter protection against Japan from Soviet bases in eastern Siberia and the Maritime provinces.

Note: The operation of American forces has already been agreed to in principle by Stalin but it should be established as the basis of the discussions to be held. With regard to the Soviet Air Force, would appreciate knowing if you will be prepared to furnish them any long range fighters.

CM-IN-16680 (21 Jun 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

300 Russia

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

Page 2

From: U S Military Mission, Moscow

Nr: 718 19th June 1944

Item 2: Size of American and Soviet Air Forces to be operated in eastern Russia.

Note: Request that you indicate the size air force, including bombers, fighters, and transports, that we should strive for, both American and Soviet. It is important to get the size of the 2 air forces settled as this will establish the goal towards which all subsequent discussions will be pointed.

Item 3: Number and location of the bases that should be ready for initial operations.

Note: Marshal Stalin has indicated that 12 bases suitable for 4 engine bombers have already been constructed between Vladivostok and Sovetsk Gavan. He has stated that 6 or 7 of these can be made available to us. These will be sufficient to care for our heavy bombers at 2 groups per base. However, they are located in the area most vulnerable to enemy action. Stalin has indicated that additional bases may be constructed with steel mat runways. I believe that we should press for alternate heavy bomber bases, fighter bases, and at least 1 large operating base which would include a sub-depot.

Item 4: Measures to be initiated at once:

A. Preparations for an air transport movement of

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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INCOMING MESSAGE

Page 3

From: U S Military Mission, Moscow

Re: 718 19th June 1944

initial Soviet and American Air Forces to eastern Siberia.

B. Constructions of airdromes including sub-depot

C. Buildup of airdrome equipment and a 6 months supply level for operations of Soviet and American Air Forces.

Note: Reference paragraph A. Movement of forces from the UK and from western Russia should be accomplished as an operation requiring the minimum facilities. These include provision for gasoline storage, possible provision of bolted gasoline tanks, radio aids to navigation and limited plans to ground and point to point equipment, housing and messing in railway cars or existing buildings, minimum of stockage of spare parts and other supplies, and improvement of runways, using steel mats at all airdromes along air transport route. In this connection consideration might be given to moving any American units then stationed in Russia independently to an operating base located at Chita or some other place of comparable safety from which they could quickly operate to slow down an initial Japanese offensive.

Reference paragraph B. Marshal Stalin has indicated that the construction of airdromes has already started.

Reference paragraph C. It is believed that a 6 months supply for operations should be stocked in

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By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 20 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Page 4

From: U S Military Mission, Moscow

Rr: 718 19th June 1944

accordance with contemplated disposition of our forces. It would be desirable to dispose our forces at once in the Vladivostok-Komsomolsk area and to stock these airdromes in advance, provided it could be done with safety. This is the area most vulnerable to enemy action. At present we feel that consideration should be given to placing the 6 months stockage at Chita or some place of comparable safety. If this is done and possible Japanese offensive action is unsuccessful, supplies will be available for movement east. On the other hand, if the Japanese do succeed in controlling the Vladivostok-Komsomolsk area, supplies will be available for operations from the Chita area against Japanese communications in Manchuria. In any event, final selections of sites for stockage of supplies can only be made after full discussion with the Soviets giving consideration to the safety of the sites considered and the transportation problems involved.

Item 5: Build up of Soviet strategic air forces:

- A. Number of planes to be made available and when.
- B. Method of training Soviet personnel.

Note: In this connection we will attempt to remain within the authorization given in a memorandum to General Walsh signed by General Kuter, dated May 18th 44, which confirms conclusions reached at a conference between General Arnold, Mr Harriman, and General Walsh. This

CM-IN-16680 (21 Jun 44)

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By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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[REDACTED]

Page 5

From: U S Military Mission, Moscow

Nr: 718 19th June 1944

authorization, however, does not provide for long range fighter aircraft.

Item 6: Supply lines needed for the:

A. Preparation of air transport route from England to eastern Siberia.

B. Buildup of 6 months supply level.

C. Maintenance of operations.

Note: This will involve determination of the portion and the time that the capacity of the northern ports, the Persian Gulf, the Transsiberian railroad, the Pacific route, and eastern Siberian ports can be made available to us for preparatory build-up. Once operations start, the maintenance of supplies will be dependent on Naval operations in the Pacific, including the security of the Pacific route and eastern Siberian ports, an air transport route via Alaska or the Aleutians, and the possibility of utilizing the Amur river. Admiral Olsen is asking for instructions from Admiral King on what we should strive for with regard to Naval collaboration. I believe that once operations have started, we must rely on supplies via the Pacific.

Item 7: Organizational arrangements.

CM-IN-16680 (21 Jun 44)

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By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Page 6

From: U S Military Mission, Moscow

Re: 718 19th June 1944

- A. Administrative and operational control.
- B. Personnel strength of American force.
- C. Responsibility for carrying out preparatory measures.
- D. Responsibility for furnishing supplies and equipment needed for preparatory measures.

Notes:

Reference Paragraph A. We shall insist on US administrative and operational control of US units. Would appreciate your views on command setup desired, including method of coordination with Soviet operations.

Reference Paragraph B. Do you desire a completely self-contained American Air Force or are you willing to utilize Soviet man power and to what extent?

Reference Paragraph C. Soviets will undoubtedly insist on Soviet construction of airdromes and facilities and the storage of supplies that we make available. If so, I believe we should insist on a small advisory and inspection organization in civilian clothes, if necessary.

Reference Paragraph D. We shall obtain information from the Soviets as to what construction materials and supplies can be made available by them in order to reduce transportation requirements.

OM-IN-16680 (21 Jun 44)

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By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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Page 7

From: US Military Mission, Moscow

Nr: 718 19 June 1944

Item 8. Responsibility for antiaircraft and fighter defenses of all installations.

Note: Unless instructed to the contrary, we shall press Soviet responsibility in this regard.

(End of draft agenda).

It is requested that you amend the above agenda as you desire and have it studied in the Air Staff with a view to their furnishing me with any supporting data that you consider pertinent.

End

ACTION: Gen Arnold

INFO : OPD
Gen Bissell
Col. Park
C of S

CM-IN-16680 (21 Jun 44) 00332 jb

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 20 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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~~TOP SECRET~~

From: War Cabinet Office
To : Joint Staff Mission
Info: AFHQ, Algiers

No : OZ 3202 19 June 1944

Following received from 30 Military Mission T.O.O.
181915Z, BEGINS -

From 30 Military Mission Moscow to CCS (R) British
C.O.S. SHAEF, AFHQ Algiers, MIL 1428, 18th June from
Generals Deane and Burrows.

Hammerheim line broke 18th June as result rapid ad-
vance in Viborg direction in area Murila-Ila-Kirjola.
Total advance between 15 and 20 K/Ms.

Following places captured: Bjorko; Koivisto,
Humaljoki, Lahtenmaki, Makkalahti, Rautu, Vaskela,
Hurmijarvi, Lipola, Oravanjemi, Nousijala, Valkjarvi,
Telkeala; (pi) (tk) ainen, Parkkila, Sispolo, Pihkala,
Hjetanen, Kolkkala; Makkalahdenkyla, 28 kilos south of
Viborg, Lahtenmaki, Kotterlahti, Penttila.

Nothing to report on other fronts. KNDG

T.O.O. 190252Z

ACTION: CCS

INFO : General Arnold
OPD
General Bissell
Admiral King
Col. Park
Log

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JCS MEMO. 1-17-73
BY DSS, DAIR

MAY 21 1973

CM-IN-15630

(19 Jun 44)

1712Z

ojv

3 cc Russia

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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TOP SECRET

From: War Cabinet Offices

To : J.S.M. Washington

Info: AFHQ
SHAEP

No : OZ 3195

18 June 1944

Following is repetition of MIL 1427, T.O.O. 172300 received from 30 Mission, Moscow.

BEGINS:

From Generals Deane and Burrows for Combined Chiefs of Staff, information British Chiefs of Staff.

1. During 17th June Soviet troops advanced 12 to 18 km. on Finnish front and occupied 120 inhabited places.
2. Among these places are: Saunasari, Metsienirtti, Kosela, Rikola, Palikevalia, Rasuli, Vusta, Rihisiuria, Perkiarvi; Tommila, Halila, Tarikkala, Kariainen, Etukiulia, Seiviaste, Maiakanmiaki, Sortevala and railway stations Rasuli, Perkiarvi, Koolenaiarvi.
3. Other fronts, no changes.

ENDS.

T.O.O. 180440Z

ACTION: CCS

INFO : Gen. Arnold, OPD, Gen. Bissell, Adm. King,
Col. Park, Log

CM-IN-15018

(18 Jun 44)

1904Z

ejv

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BY DBS, DATE

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

See Russia

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

From: War Cabinet Offices
To: Joint Staff Mission
Info: A.F.H.Q., SHAEP

No: O.T.P. OZ 3180 17 June 1944

Following is repetition of telegram MIL 1424
T.O.O. 162250 from 30 Mission Moscow. Begins -

Following from Generals Deane and Burrows for
Combined Chiefs of Staff and British C.O.S.

1. Following communique from Soviet General Staff at 2130 today.
2. Advance of some 10 kilometers in Karelian Isthmus on June 16th.
3. Following places occupied: Tappari, Sarcinen, Centaus, Hatakola, Korli, Aliska, Great and Little Kirkiamyaki, Leykola, Hetcelya, Haryu, Loumatioiki, Leislilya, Putrola, Piyapala, Masteryarvi, Yorola, Ukkola, and following Railway Stations: (? Iunnelyarvi) Lounatioki, Mastermarvi and Yapilya.
4. Nothing to report on other sectors.

T.O.O. 170200z
End

ACTION: CC/B

INFO: Gen. Arnold, OPD, Gen Bissell, Adm King, Col Park,
Log

CM-IN-14079 (17 June 44) 1848Z blv

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BY DDP, DATE
MAY 21 1973

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		CNO	PRIORITY
DATE 18 JUN 44			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROM 0011			DEFERRED
DECODED BY			
PARAPHRASED WIDMAN/WIDMAN			PRIORITY
ROUTED BY WIDMAN/WIDMAN			ROUTINE
			DEFERRED
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PAGE 1 OF 2			<input type="checkbox"/>
171111 NCR 181			

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

READM OLSEN WITH CAPTS ALLEN FELT ZONDOOAK
 VISITED Leningrad 9TH THROUGH 13TH GUESTS SOVIET NAVY.
 COMMODORE A. P. ALEXANDROFF COMMANDER Leningrad NAVAL
 BASE ACTED AS OFFICIAL AND HOST AND DEVOTED HIS WHOLE
 TIME TO AMERICAN PARTY. EVERYONE EXTREMELY CORDIAL
 NO APPARENT DISPOSITION TO WITHHOLD ANYTHING IF ASKED FOR
 BUT LOTS NOT SHOWN IN CAREFULLY PREPARED SCHEDULE. MET
 DINED CINC BALTIC FLEET, COMMANDER NAVAL BASE KRONSTADT
 AND MET MANY OTHER OFFICERS ON FRONT LINE DUTY. ALL
 FRANK CORDIAL ALERT AND AGREE WORKING ON JAPAN AFTER
 GERMANY. INSPECTED AIRFIELDS SHIPS AND KRONSTADT BASE
 REPORTS FOLLOWING. SHIPS AND MANY AA BARGES HAVE BEEN
 USED TO ASSIST IN AA DEFENSE OF AREA AND MORE RECENTLY FOR
 SHELLING ENEMY POSITIONS FINNISH COAST. SEVERE DAMAGE
 Leningrad NOT SPACED EVENLY THROUGHOUT CITY MOSTLY IN
 SW AREA. SUPERFICIALLY CENTER APPEARS RELATIVELY UNTOUCHED
 BUT MANY BUILDINGS DAMAGED INSIDE THOUGH WALLS APPARENTLY
 INTACT. PUBLIC UTILITIES FUNCTIONING. STREETS GIVE

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED**SECRET**

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) ~~NAVY~~ May 1, 1972)

NCR 18 *300 Russia*

By DBS

Date

MAY 24 1973

DECLASSIFIED
 E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
 NLR 101
 By RT, NARA, Date *4/12/94*

NAVAL MESSAGE

DRAFTER		EXTENSION NUMBER		ASTERISK (*)		
FROM	FOR ACTION			PRIORITY	11	
RELEASED BY					12	
DATE					13	
TOR CODEROOM					14	
DECODED BY	INFORMATION			ROUTINE	15	
PARAPHRASED BY					16	
ROUTED BY					17	
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.					IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW	18
PAGE TWO OF 171111 NCR 181					<input type="checkbox"/>	19

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

IMPRESSION OF EMPTINESS AFTER MOSCOW. RETURN OF
EVACUATED CITIZENS STRICTLY CONTROLLED AND LIMITED BY
LACK OF LIVING QUARTERS. LITTLE WORK IN PROGRESS DUE
TO MANPOWER SHORTAGE. FACTORY WORKERS TURNING TO ON
REPAIR ON DAY OFF. INHABITANTS GENERALLY WELL DRESSED
HEALTHY. NO BREAD LINES OR QUEUES. GREAT CIVIC
PRIDE FEELING OF SUPERIORITY HATRED OF FINNS MORE THAN
GERMANS CHARACTERIZES PEOPLE WHO WENT THROUGH SIEGE.

ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:

16(#1)...ACTION

COMINCH(#2-9)...OP01(#10)...NAVAIDE(#11-12)...

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 1, 1972
By DBS Date MAY 21 1973

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED

~~SECRET~~

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NCR 18

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

FROM	ALUSNA MOSCOW	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
RELEASED BY	18 JUNE 1944	FOR ACTION	CNO	PRIORITY ROUTINE
DATE	180011	DEFERRED		
TOR CODE ROOM				
DECODED BY	MCCLELLAN			PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY	RASH/HUTCHINSON			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY				DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW	
PAGE 1 OF 3			NCR 182	
171114				

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

VISITS TO KAMENKABAND KRONSTADT AIRFIELDS
BY RADH OLSEN AND PARTY. FORMER LOCATED 9 MILES
NW CENTER OF LENINGRAD. NO SEAPLANE OPERATIONS
IN THIS AREA. NO SEAPLANE SHORE STATIONS OBSERVED
SCHLUSSELBURG DEMOLISHED. NO SHIPBOARD AVIATION
FACILITIES ON GANGUT OR CRUISERS. PETROPAVLOVSK
DAMAGED AND ON BOTTOM DID HAVE 1 CATAPULT AND
2 PLANES. CATAPULT NOW ON THE DOCK AND PROBABLY
BEYOND REPAIR OFFICERS AND MEN OF VTB AND VF
REGIMENTS VISITED YOUNG ENTHUSIASTIC NEAT AND
FRIENDLY. MORALE HIGH WITH PRIDE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.
VTB EQUIPPED WITH BOSTONS AND RUSSIAN

ACTION

F-0 21

F-01 22

F-02 23

F-03 24

F-04 25

F-05 26

F-06 27

F-07 28

F-08 29

F-09 30

F-10 31

F-11 32

F-12 33

F-13 34

F-14 35

F-15 36

F-16 37

F-17 38

F-18 39

F-19 40

F-20 41

F-21 42

F-22 43

F-23 44

F-24 45

F-25 46

F-26 47

F-27 48

F-28 49

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F-30 51

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F-36 57

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F-41 62

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F-688 709

F-689 710

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F-699 720

F-700 721

F-701 722

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F-718 739

F-719 740

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F-722 743

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F-820 841

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F-825 846

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F-827 848

F-828 849

F-829 850

F-830 851

F-831 852

F-832 8

TORPEDOES CREDITED WITH SINKING 100 SHIPS. VF
EQUIPPED WITH LAVOCHIN 5'S CREDITED WITH 200 SHOOT
DOWNS. NAVY FRANKLY EXPRESSES ITS PRIDE IN THE
NAVAL AVIATION SERVICE AND ITS ACCOMPLISHMENTS.
TORPEDO RACK IS CONVENTIONAL BOMB RACK TYPE ABOUT
3 FEET LONG WITH 1 POINT SUSPENSION AND SWAY
BRACES EITHER SIDE OF SUSPENSION POINT. WITNESSED
LANDINGS MADE WITH TORPEDO SWUNG SOLIDLY THAN USUAL
4 FOOT CORRUGATED METAL STABILIZER FITTED. CLAIM
THEY DROP AT 440 YARDS DISTANCE AT FLYING SPEED
180 MILES FROM HEIGHT 35 TO 165 FEET THAT WEAPON
ARMS IN ABOUT 165 YARDS RUN AND THAT WORKSHIP AT FIELD
CAN DO COMPLETE TORPEDO OVERHAUL. WARRED 550 POUNDS.
WANT FASTER PLANE AND SAY HAVE ADEQUATE TORPEDOES BUT
WOULD BE NICE IF FISH WERE DELIVERED WITH AIRCRAFT.
FIGHTER WITH 220 MILLIMETER SYNCHRONIZED GUNS. USUAL
RUSSIAN WOOD CONSTRUCTION. CLEAN AND GOOD PERFORMANCE.
FIELD OPERATIONS WITHOUT BENEFIT OF TOWER AND TRO
RADIO COMMUNICATION UNTIL PLANES ARE AIRBORNE. NIGHT
FLYING CLAIMED BUT NO EQUIPMENT NOTED. AUTOMOTIVE
EQUIPMENT SCARCE. NO CRASH EQUIPMENT SEEN.

ALUSNA MOSCOW 171114 182 2 3
Originator _____ D/T Group _____ NCR _____ Page _____ Of _____ Pages.
OPNAV-10-01 184104 **SECRET** OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By DBS Date MAY 21 1973

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

VF MAINTAINS COMBAT AIR PATROL WITH RELIEF ON ALERT
 IN COCKPITS. NO RADAR SEEN. VTB OPERATES SINGLE
 PLANE PATROLS. PILOT BRIEFING AT THE PLANE. MAIN-
 TENANCE IN THE FIELD. NO HANGARS BUT LOG REVETMENTS
 SOME COVERED WITH EARTH. ALSO NOTED IL 4 TWIN ENGINE
 BOMBERS AT 1ST FIELD AND IL 2 STORMOVIS AT KRONSTAD.
 SOVIETS SAY FORMER OBSOLESCENT AND SELDOM USED.
 AT REQUEST LATTER WAS SHOWN. NO ROCKET GEAR INSTALLED.
 REGIMENTS INSPECTED CONSISTED OF 3 SQUADRONS. APPROX-
 IMATELY 20 PLANES NOW ASSIGNED EACH REGIMENT UNLESS
 OLD BOMBERS AND STURMOVIS ARE ALSO PART-
 OF THE REGIMENT. MORE PROBABLE THAT THEY ASSIGNED
 OTHER SQUADRONS. DETAILED REPORTS FOLLOW BY MAIL.

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

16...ACT

COMINCH.....31.....OP03....BUAER....CNO.....NAVAIDE.....

Originator ALUSNA 171114 102 3 3
MOSCOW D/T Group NCR Page Of Pages.

SECRET

OPNAV-10-01
 134100

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

NAVY MESSAGE

NAVY TELETYPE

ORIGINATOR

EXTENSION NUMBER

ADDRESSES

REFERENCE

1 ON ASTALUSNA ARCHANGEL

AUTOMAT (P) NAVYGRAM ADDRESS

RELEASED BY

CNO

PRIORITY
RRRRR

DATE 17 JUNE 1944

DEFERRED

TOR CODEROM 1954

DECODED BY BECKMAN

PRIORITY
RRRRR

PARAPHRASED BY BAKER

ALUSNA MOSCOW

DEFERRED

ROUTED BY WHITTINGTON

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRIORITY AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

171620

NCR 9875

IF OPERATIONAL
CHECK BELOW

ORIGINATOR-FILL IN DATE AND TIME

DATE

TIME

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ACTION CNO INFO MOSCOW.

SOVIET DISPATCH SIGHTED BY OUR MINE MISSION ABOARD
SOVIET MINE SWEEPER STATED THAT ON JUNE 16 10 GERMAN
AIRCRAFT BOMBED KANDALAKSHA. ^{67.9 N 52.30 E} RESULTS OF BOMBING
UNKNOWN. ALSO GERMAN RECONNAISSANCE PLANE OVER
NOVAYA ZEMLYA AND ARCHANGEL AREA ON 14 JUNE.

16.... ACTION

COMINCH....200....CNO....NAVAIDE....200P....

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 1, 1973

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified only. Deliver in Code Room Watch Office in person. (Code List TS 10) NAVAIDE

300 Russia

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRIORITY
FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		CNO	PRIORITY
DATE 18 JUNE 1944			ROUTINE
TOR CODER ROOM	171701		DEFERRED
DECODED BY BAKER			PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY STALLINGS			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY HARRINGTON			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRIORITY AND AN ADMINISTRATIVE			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
PAGE 1	162000	NCR 9765	<input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

PART 1 -161718 NCR 9706
 PART 2 -161700 NCR 9766
 PART 3 -162000 NCR 9765

ACTION

F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-07	26
F-1	27
F-2	28
F-20	29
F-3	30
F-30	31
F-31	32
F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
FX01	37
FX30	38
FX37	39
FX40	40
IG-00	41
VCNO	42

PERSONAL OPINION VLAD PORT CAPACITY FIGURES GIVEN SPAULDING ABOUT 20% TOO HIGH. LARGEST TONNAGE THUS FAR HANDLED THIS PORT WAS 178,000 DURING DEC 43 AT WHICH TIME LA PEROUSE OPEN. PORT BADLY CONGESTED AND RAIL FACILITIES INADEQUATE. USING ABOVE EXAMPLE AS COMPARISON AND FACT THAT THIS BEST EQUIPPED AND BEST RUN PORT IN SIBERIA CAN SAFELY SAY PORT CAP FIGURES OTHER TERMINALS LIKEWISE EXAGGERATED AND AT LEAST 20% HIGH. ABOVE BASED ON HANDLING OF GENERAL CARGO. AVERAGE PAST PERFORMANCE AND SHIP TURN AROUND HOWEVER, IN PORTS WHERE INCOMING SUPPLIES FOR LOCAL

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 5(D) of (B)

OSD letter, May 1973

Date MAY 21 1973

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 78 (4) NAVPERS)

OPNAV-19-87

3 as Russia

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
 NLR 101
 By RT, NARA, Date 4/21/94

AL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

FROM		EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRIORITY
ALUSNA MOSCOW			ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION	CNO	PRIORITY
DATE				ROUTINE
TON CODEBOOK				DEFERRED
DECODED BY		INFORMATION		PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY				ROUTINE
ROUTED BY				DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS MESSAGE WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH PRIORITY AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.				IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
PAGE 2				<input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:

DATE

TIME

GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

USE ONLY AND WILL PROBABLY CONSIST MAINLY FLOUR AND FOODSTUFFS. SOVIET FIGURES BELIEVED RELIABLE SINCE SUCH CARGOS EASILY AND QUICKLY HANDLED WITH SUFFICIENT HAND LABOR. 240,000 TONS MONTHLY CAP FIGURE FOR RAILROAD BELIEVED PEAK WITH IDEAL CONDITIONS WHICH THUS FAR SELDOM REACHED. RR CAP IS KEY TO WHOLE SITUATION AND ALTHOUGH WELL AND EFFICIENTLY OPERATED HAS LIMITATIONS WITH SPECIAL REGARD TO EQUIPMENT AND WEATHER. DURING PAST YEAR VIA TRANSID WERE INSUFFICIENT EMPTY FRT CARS HANDLE INCOMING CARGO AND RR AUTHORITIES FAVOR CONSTANTLY SOUGHT AFTER BY VARIOUS LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR SHIPPING SPACE. HAVE OBSERVED CONSIDERABLE US SUGAR BEET SEED BEING SHIPPED BY BAGGAGE AT EXCESSIVE

ACTION

F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-07	26
F-1	27
F-2	28
F-20	29
F-3	30
F-30	31
F-31	32
F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
FX01	37
FX30	38
FX37	39
FX40	40
IG-00	41
YCHO	42
and 5(D) or (E)	43
OSD letter, May 1973	44
MAY 21 1973	45

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 1(c)

OSD letter, May 1973

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Date

CEMAY-19-07

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/11/01

AL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

FROM		EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
ALUSNA MOSCOW			ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY	FOR ACTION			PRIORITY 1
DATE				ROUTINE 2
TOR CODEROOM				DEFERRED 3
DECODED BY				DEFERRED 4
PARAPHRASED BY	INFORMATION			PRIORITY 5
ROUTED BY				ROUTINE 6
				DEFERRED 7
				DEFERRED 8
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.				IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
PAGE 3	162000	NCR 9765		<input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR	FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ACTION	
F-0	21
F-01	22
F-02	23
F-05	24
F-07	25
F-1	26
F-2	27
F-20	28
F-3	29
F-30	30
F-31	31
F-32	32
F-33	33
F-34	34
F-4	35
FX01	36
FX30	37
FX37	38
FX40	39
IG-00	40
VCNO and 4(D) or (E)	41

RATES SIMPLY BECAUSE FRT SPACE NOT AVAILABLE AND SHIPPER FELT THAT FRT NOT SUFFICIENTLY RELIABLE DELIVER SEED IN TIME SPRING PLANTING. AM IN AGREEMENT WITH REMAINDER GEN INFO AND BELIEVE IT RELIABLE. DID NOT ACCOMPANY HIM AND NOT INVITED. HOWEVER DURING WET BANQUET ON FIRST NIGHT OF ARRIVAL RECD LEFT HANDED GESTURE INVITATION FROM LOCAL FOR TRADE REPRESENTATIVE ACCOMPANY PARTY ON VISIT TO SECT OF PORT WHICH HAVE PREVIOUSLY INSPECTED AND WHICH HE KNEW WAS FAMILIAR WITH. NO OTHER GESTURES MADE AND NONE SOUGHT. REDS APPARENTLY WANTED GIVE VISITORS AS ROSY A PICTURE AS POSSIBLE WITHOUT ALLOWING RESIDENT AMERICANS TELL HOW MUCH DIRT HAS SWEEP UNDER CARPET. LIAS OFFICER

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E)
OSD letter, May 1, 1972
Date MAY 21 1973

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OPNAV-19-67

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

AL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER		EXTENSION NUMBER		ADDRESSEES		PRECEDENCE	
FROM		ALUSNA MOSCOW		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE			
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION				PRIORITY	
DATE						ROUTINE	
TOR CODEROOM						DEFERRED	
DECODED BY		INFORMATION				PRIORITY	
PARAPHRASED BY						ROUTINE	
ROUTED BY						DEFERRED	
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE (N) AS ADMINISTRATIVE.						IF OPERATIONAL CHECK, BELOW	
PAGE 4		162000		NCR 9765		<input type="checkbox"/>	

ORIGINATOR: FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

YESTERDAY ASKED IF SPALDING HAD VISITED NAHODKA
UPON RECEIVING AFFIRMATIVE REPLIED THAT THERE WAS
PROBABLY NOW NO REASON WHY ROULLARD SHOULD WANT TO
GO THERE

16...ACT

COMINCH...CRO...NAVAIDE...FX37...12...0P05G...39...

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(R)

OSD letter, May 1972

By DBS

Date

MAY 21 1973

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OPNAV-19-67

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER

EXTENSION NUMBER

ADDRESSEES

PRECEDENCE

FPO:

AMCON VLADIVOSTOK

RELEASED BY

DATE

17 JUNE 9144

TOR CODEROOM

1210/17

DECODED BY

RISHIN

PARAPHRASED BY

MC FESNEY

ROUTED BY

HUTCHINSON

FOR ACTION

INFORMATION

ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE

CNO
ALUSNA MOSCOW

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

IF OPERATIONAL
CHECK BELOW

160530

NCR 9594

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:

DATE

TIME

GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ACTION

ACTION CNO MOSCOW FROM AMCON VLAD.

INQUIRED FROM CONVOY OFFICER IF SOVIETS

INTENDED ATTEMPT SALVAGE MARIOPOL THIS

SUMMER REPLIED NEGATIVE. EXPRESSED

POSSIBILITY JAP APPROPRIATION FOR SCRAP HE

ANSWERED THAT EVERY SOVIET SKIPPER PASSING

THRU FIRST STRAIT REQUIRED CLOSELY OBSERVE

WRECK AND PROMPTLY REPORT ANY JAP DISTURBANCE.

THUS FAR NOTHING REPORTED.

16...ACT

220P...20G...CNO...COMINCH...NAVAIDE...13...

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 1.2(b) and 1.4(d) or (e)
OBD letter, May 1988
By DBS Date MAY 21 1973

F-0	32
F-01	23
F-02	25
F-03	26
F-07	27
F-1	28
F-2	29
F-20	30
F-3	31
F-30	32
F-31	33
F-32	34
F-33	35
F-34	36
F-4	37
F-40	38
10-00	39
WCNO	40

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300 Russia

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
PLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/04

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~
MOST INDEPENDENT

16 June 1944

From: War Cabinet Offices

To: J.S.M. Washington

Number: OZ 3154

Following received from 30 Mission. BEGINS.

AMSSO from 30 Mission

MIL 1420 15 June

Combined Chiefs of Staff, rptd. British Chiefs of Staff,
A. F. H. Q.. SHAEF, from Generals Deane and Burrows.
T.O.O. 2355.

1. Following communique from Soviet General Staff at 2215 hours today.
2. Soviet advance in Karelian Isthmus continued after breaking through second line of heavily defended fortifications.
3. Following places occupied 15th June: Mattivanmyaki, Lautaranta, Ino Station, Sienkanemi, Martisanmyaki, Myatsyakulya, Rasvatu, Vammelyarvi, Yusenmyaki, Inonkyulya, Markuksemmyaki, Kannelervi, Neuvola Sukyiyalya, Mustomyke, Bolshoy, Kaidalovo, Maly-Kaidalovo, Troitskoe, Ristolovo, Sirkiytsari.
4. Offensive is now on a front of 70 Kms. and total advance from start of offensive is up to 90 Kms.
5. German defensive zones have been heavily mined and strongly prepared for defense against infantry and tanks. Over 435 guns captured or destroyed.

CM-III-13207 (16 Jun 44)

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 1-17-73
BY DATE
MAY 21 1973

300 Russia

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED]
MOST IMMEDIATE

Number: OZ 3154

16 June 1944

Page 2

6. Nothing to report other fronts.

End.

T.O.O. 160125Z

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OG AAF
OPD
G-2
Adm. King
Col. Park
Log

CM-IN-13207,

(16 Jun 44)

1632Z

smd

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JCS MEMO, 1-17-73
BY DSS, DATE
MAY 21 1973

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED]
IMMEDIATE

14 June 1944

From: War Cabinet Offices

To: Joint Staff Mission

MIL 1411

Following received from 30 Mission Moscow.

Begins: To Combined COS Washington repeated British Chiefs of Staff SHAEP, AFHQ Algiers from 30 Mission from Generals Deane and Barrows.

1. Soviet General Staff announced at 2030 hours that offensive in Karelian Isthmus continues.
2. Soviet troops captured inhabited localities of Mustelovo, Kornikula, Kuterselnya, Yarvi.
3. In direction of last two named places this is an advance of five kilos from yesterday's line.
4. Strong enemy counter attack these areas.
5. No change other fronts.
6. (Enemy?) reserves being brought up but no new identification yet available.
7. Only defenses now being encountered of permanent reinforced concrete. This necessitates heavy forcing and accounts for slow advance. Ends.

ACTION: CC/S

T.O.O. 150045Z

INFO : CG AAF, OPD, G-2, Adm King, Col Park, Log

CM-IN-12233 (15 Jun 44) 1822Z ejm

[REDACTED]
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JCS MEMO. 147-23
BY DES. DATE
MAY 21 1973

300 Russia

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

PRIORITY

From: US Military Attache, Stockholm, Sweden

To: War Department

Nr: 399

14 June 1944

399 WAR and London. For US only by agreement with source.

Initial Russian Karelian attack was preceded by a two day artillery preparation according to 278 who states there were 11 Infantry, 5 Panzer and 7 Artillery Divisions in the main effort directed at Kivennapa. Approx 1000 Russian planes were employed. Rated B2. On 12 June a new attack was initiated by 5 Infantry and an unknown number of Panzer Divisions in the direction Rautu. The Russian concentration for the Karelian Campaign was skillful and rapid. 2 participating divisions only recently were on the Nagva front. Remaining divisions, some lately re-organized, came from Leningrad area. Following the initial artillery and bombing preparations, Panzer units pressed forward closely followed by Infantry. Kronstadt heavy coast artillery is shelling Finnish coast with Russian Baltic Fleet also participating.

Finnish military circles believe Red Army primary objective is South Coast of Finland so as to control Baltic Sea North of Gotland Island. Same group expects Russian two pronged offensive in the North, one aimed at Petsamo the other in the direction Sallan-Rovaniemi-Tornio. Belief

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 4, 1972

By DBS

Date

MAY 21 1973

ON-IN-11654

(15 Jun 44)

3 to Russia

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

PRIORITY

Page 2

From: US Military Attache, Stockholm, Sweden

Nr: 399

14 June 1944

exists that these drives will be coordinated with Anglo
American Landings in Southern Norway and in Denmark.

Credit 229 and notify his office.

Rayens

ACTION: G-2

INFO : CGAAP
OPD
Col. Park
C of S

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 7(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 4, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

CW-IN-11654

(15 Jun 44)

0132Z

ejv

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

From: US Military Attache, London, England.

To : War Department.

Nr : 13309

13 June 1944.

Serial nr 13309.

Spokesman MI 3 (C) disclosed today Russian offensive on Karelian Isthmus apparently surprised Finns as much as it did his office. Further that operation probably had 3 purposes:

Warning to other satellite nations,

Impress on Finns, Soviet power and punish them for not having accepted terms which were thought most generous,

To gain advantages during hostilities rather than wait and probably have to argue for them around peace table.

End.

ACTION: G-2

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 5-3-72 MAY 20 1974

INFORMATION: OPD
Col Park
Log

CM-IN-10759 (14 Jun 44) 0239Z bjm

[REDACTED]

30

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

300 Russia

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: US Military Mission Moscow, Russia
To: War Department
Nr: 688

13 June 1944

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff from Deane.

General Spalding is now returning from visit to Vladivostock and should reach Moscow in about 1 week. The purpose of his visit was to explore the possibilities of the Soviet far eastern ports and estimate what could be done to increase their capacity. With reference to your 49607, I shall have General Spalding render a complete report upon his return together with recommendations as to what he thinks should be done to improve the situation at Siberian ports.

End.

ACTION: Joint Chiefs of Staff

INFO : Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Col Park
Gen York
C of S

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

OM-IN-12019 (15 Jun 44) 12167 jb

TOP SECRET

32

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

From: Alusna, Chungking

To: CNO

No: 120838 12 June 1944

The USSR Military Advisors for the 8th China War Area departed for Russia on the 10th, according to a foreign source rated B-2. This move was apparently in conjunction with the general withdrawal of all such advisers from the Chinese territory.

End

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: CG AAF
OPD
Col Park

CM-IN-10646 (13 Jun 44) 2245Z bjm

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 1.4 and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

COPY NO.

40

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	AMCON VLADIVOSTOK	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		CNO	PRIORITY
DATE	12 JUNE 1944	ALUSNA MOSCOW	RRRRR
TOR CODEROOM	1548		DEFERRED
DECODED BY	COLDEN		
PARAPHRASED BY	BAKER / THOMPSON		PRIORITY
EDITED BY	PIPP		ROUTINE
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS MESSAGE WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE			DEFERRED
121000			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
NCR 4869			

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

FOR CNO AND MOSCOW FROM AMCON VLAD.

LANDING FIELD SUITABLE FOR BOMBERS REPORTED IN MY
 181314 MAY '43 NOW COMPLETED BUT NOT BEING USED.
 READY IN ALL RESPECTS EXCEPT HANGARS NOT CONSTRUCTED
 NOR IN PROCESS. FUEL STORAGE TANKS FILLED AND ENTIRE
 BASE NOW STRICTLY GUARDED BY NAVY COASTAL TROOPS.

16....ACT.

COMINCH....12....20G....NAVAIDE....20CP....
 26....

By DBS

ACTION	
F-0	23
F-01	24
F-02	25
F-05	26
F-07	27
F-1	28
F-2	29
F-20	30
F-3	31
F-30	32
F-31	33
F-32	34
F-33	35
F-34	36
F-4	37
FX01	38
FX30	39
FX31	40
FX32	41
FX33	42
FX34	43
FX35	44
FX36	45
FX37	46
FX38	47
FX39	48
FX40	49
FX41	50
FX42	51
FX43	52

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NAVY 10-10

300 Russia

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 E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
 NLR 101
 By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
ALUSNA		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
FROM CHUNGKING CHINA			PRIORITY
RELEASED BY		CNO	ROUTINE
DATE 12 JUNE 1944			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM 121911			
DECODED BY YORK			PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY PARKER / O'LEARY			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY ROLL			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
121338 NCR 4684			<input type="checkbox"/>
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	SEC

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ALUSNA SENDS

RATED B2 ADVISES

FOREIGN SOURCE ~~NOT B2~~ ADVISES SOVIET MILITARY
 ADVISORS BTM CHINESE WAR AREA LEFT 10TH FOR
 RUSSIA APPARENTLY IN CONJUNCTION WITH GENERAL
 WITHDRAWAL ALL SUCH ADVISORS FROM CHINA.

16...ACT

CONTINCH...CNO...210...NAVALE...210P...

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 11652, Sec. 5(B) and 5(D) or (F)
 OSD letter, May 1, 1973

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Date MAY 21 1973

OPNAV-NCR-15

120938

300 Russia

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 E.O. 12366, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
 SLR 101
 By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

To: Joint Staff Mission

From: War Cabinet Offices

No: OZ 3053

The following received from 30 Mission:

"From Generals Deane and Burrows. For Combined
Chiefs of Staff, Washington, Chiefs of Staff, London.

MIL 1390. 10 June 1944

Molotoff has just announced that Red Army
started an offensive on Leningrad front on 0600 hours
today."

End

T.O.O. 101840Z

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
Gen Handy
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Col Park
CofS

CM-IN-8375 (10 Jun 44) 2144Z bjm

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JCS MEMO, 1-17-73
BY DMS, DATE

MAY 21 1973

34

3 cc Russia

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24-75724

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	US MILITARY MISSION MOSCOW RUSSIA	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY	11 JUNE 1944	WAR DEPT	PRIORITY
DATE	2331/10		ROUTINE
FOR CODEROOM			DEFERRED
DECODED BY		DECLASSIFIED	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY	SMITH	JCS memo, 1-4-74	ROUTINE
ROUTED BY	HARRINGTON	By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974	DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			
NR 665	9 JUNE 1944	NCR 19592	IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
PAGE 1 OF 3.			<input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GET

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(RECEIVED BY HAND FROM ARMY)

FOR MCPHERSON OF PROTOCOL COMMITTEE, BISSELL WDGBI,
ONI FROM DEANE.

FOLLOWING INFORMATION SUPPLEMENTAL TO MY NUMBER 649
OF 6 JUNE 1944. INFORMATION FURNISHED TO GENERAL SPALDING
BY LOCAL SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES. FOLLOWING FIGURES ARE
PORT CAPACITIES FOR IMPORT FROM USA IN LONG TONS:

(A). KOVSK AND ALEX. 30,000 FOR YEAR. FOR LOCAL
USE ONLY;

(B) MOSKALVO-SAKHALAIN. TOTAL FOR YEAR FOR LOCAL USE
30,000;

(C) NIKOLAEVSK. DEPENDING ON SEASON, TOTAL FOR YEAR
120 TO 150,000 DRY CARGO. IN ADDITION TANKER PRODUCTS OF
13,500 PER MONTH CARRIED IN 3 BARGES, EACH WITH CAPACITY
OF 4500 TONS. SEASON ABOUT 4 MONTHS. AS SAFETY FACTOR,
SMALLER BARGES ARE AVAILABLE;

(D) MARGOT. LOCATED AT MOUTH OF AMUR. SMALL VESSELS
UP TO 3500 TONS CAN BE HANDLED IN NEW FISHING PORT WHICH
HAS 3 BERTHS. LIGHTER FROM LARGER VESSELS ALSO POSSIBLE.
FOR 4 MONTHS SEASON THE CAPACITY IS 30,000. THE STORAGE
SPACE AVAILABLE IS CONSIDERABLE.

(E). KOMOSOMOLSK. CAN ACCOMMODATE 3 OR 4 3500 TON

ACTION	
F-0	
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Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-15

300 Russia

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

VESSELS PER MONTH DURING SEASON, IN ADDITION TO BARGES. 20,000 TO 30,000 FOR SEASON CONSIDERED MOST SATISFACTORY SINCE BARGE FREIGHT CAN BE HANDLED MORE EFFICIENTLY. PART OF BARGES WILL DISCHARGE AT BLAGOVESHCHENSK AND KHABAROVSK;

(F). POSIETTE. ON AMUR GULF OPPOSITE VLADIVOSTOK, HAS 1 BERTH WITH AN ADDITIONAL 1 IN JULY. PRIMARILY INTENDED TO BE USED AS LUMBER EXPORT PORT WITH 1 FOR IMPORTS FROM US AND OTHER FOR LEADING. CONNECTED BY RAIL WITH TRANS-SIBERIAN. MONTHLY CAPACITY 20,000;

(G) PETRO. PORT IS NEW AND MECHANIZATION GOOD. MAINLY A TRANSIT PORT. NEEDED LOCALLY AND FOR FISHING AND TROOPS. TOTAL FOR YEAR 100,000. LIMITED AMOUNT OF OIL STORAGE USED MOSTLY FOR BUNKER OIL;

(H) NAGAEVO. INTRANSIT ONLY AND NO PROGRAM FOR USE THIS YEAR. REQUIRED FOR LOCAL USE 70,000 AND 5 TANKERS.

THROUGHOUT FAR EAST STORAGE FACILITIES APPEAR LARGE AND PRESUMED TO BE NECESSARY IN PART FOR MAINTAINING WAR RESERVE STOCKS. VLAD PORT STORAGE CAPACITY 150,000 WITH SUFFICIENT SPACE FOR WORKING. PROBABLY 100,000 IS COVERED OF WHICH 15,000 IS REFRIGERATED STORAGE. OF COVERED STORAGE LITTLE BEING USED. VLAD TANKER PRODUCTS STORAGE CAPACITY IS 110,000. SOME OF THIS IS BEING USED FOR BUNKER OIL. NOT INCLUDED IS BUNKER OIL STORAGE FOR NAVY USE. ACCORDING TO MY INFORMATION PERHAPS 240,000 LONG TONS MONTHLY COULD BE TRANSPORTED TO FAR WEST BY RAIL AND REMAINDER ABSORBED EAST OF OMSK.

MUCH WOULD BE ABSORBED EAST OF CHITA; AND NOVOSIBIRSK, IRKUTSK AND KRASNOYARSK WOULD TAKE CONSIDERABLE. EAST OF CHITA THE LARGER PART OF FLOUR IS CONSUMED. THIS INCLUDED CANADIAN.

THE POSSIBILITY OF THIS PROGRAM IS CONFIRMED HERE BY RAIL AUTHORITIES. TRAINS ARE HANDLING TRAFFIC WITHOUT APPARENT DIFFICULTY AND APPEAR TO BE ON SCHEDULE. QUITE A FEW GERMAN FREIGHT CARS ARE IN USE AND MANY OTHERS ARE BEING REPAIRED AND MODIFIED IN RAILROAD SHOPS ALL THE WAY FROM VLAD TO KRASNOYARSK.

THE PORT AND RAIL AUTHORITIES I HAVE MET HERE ARE HARD WORKING ALERT AND APPEAR TO BE CAPABLE. THEY HAVE BEEN VERY FRANK AND SEEM TO BE SINCERE IN BELIEF THAT THEIR STATEMENT OF CAPABILITIES REPRESENTS AN HONEST STATEMENT.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By NRP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

US MIL MISS MOSCOW 9 JUNE 1944 19592 Page 2 Of 3 Pages.
Originator D/T Group NCR

FORM 10-51
434105

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

AS FAR AS RAIL AND PORT FACILITIES ARE CONCERNED, I THINK THAT THIS PROGRAM OF WHIPPING 240,000 LONG TONS TO THE FAR WEST PER MONTH COULD BE LARGELY MET, IF SUFFICIENT ROLLING STOCK PRIORITY WOULD BE MADE. IN LA PEROUSE A MAJOR FACTOR WILL BE ICE CONDITIONS. LAST YEARS EXPERIENCE, THEY BELIEVE, WILL NOT BE REPEATED NEXT YEAR.

AT VLAD, PORT OPERATIONS ARE REPORTED TO BE 90 PER CENT MECHANIZED. PORT OPERATIONS THERE WERE BEING HANDLED EFFECTIVELY AND VERY SMOOTHLY. IN ORDER TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPEN SEASON CONDITIONS, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT EVERYTHING PRACTICABLE BE DONE TO EXPEDITE SHIPMENTS THIS SUMMER WITHIN CAPACITY STATED.

IN VIEW OF FACT THAT REPRESENTATIVES WENT BEYOND THEIR SPHERE OF RESPONSIBILITY IN FURNISHING PART OF THIS INFORMATION, IT SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH SOVIETS.

16.....COG

COMINCH...39.....FX37.....ANPB... ATCC.....12OP/5G.....CNO...

NAVATDE.....

CM-1W-8147(10 JUNE 1944)

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

MILIT MISSION
MOSCOW

9 JUNE 1944

19392

3

3

Originator _____ D/T Group _____ NCR _____ Page _____ Of _____ Pages.

OPNAV-10-31
134100

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia

To: War Department

Nr: 665 9 June 1944

For McPherson of Protocol committee, Bissell WDGBI,
ONI from Deane.

Following information supplemental to my number 649
of 6 June 1944. Information furnished to General Spalding
by local Soviet representatives. Following figures are
port capacities for import from USA in long tons:

A. Korsk and Alex. 30,000 for year. For local
use only;

B. Moskalvo-Sakhalain. Total for year for local
use 30,000;

C. Nikolaevsk. Depending on season, total for year
120 to 150,000 dry cargo. In addition tanker products of
13,500 per month carried in 3 barges, each with capacity
of 4500 tons. Season about 4 months. As safety factor,
smaller barges are available;

D. Margot. Located at mouth of Amur. Small vessels
up to 3500 tons can be handled in new fishing port which has
3 berths. Lighter from larger vessels also possible. For
4 months season the capacity is 30,000. The storage space
available is considerable.

E. Komosomolsk. Can accommodate 3 or 4 3500 ton

CM-IN-8147 (10 Jun 44)

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

300 Russia

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

30

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia

Nr: 665

9 June 1944

Page 2

vessels per month during season, in addition to barges. 20,000 to 30,000 for season considered most satisfactory since barge freight can be handled more efficiently. Part of barges will discharge at Blagoveschensk and Khabarovsk;

F. Posietie. On Amur Gulf opposite Vladivostok, has 1 berth with an additional 1 in July. Primarily intended to be used as lumber export port with 1 for imports from US and other for leading. Connected by rail with Trans-Siberian. Monthly capacity 20,000;

G. Petro. Port is new and mechanization good. Mainly a transit port. Needed locally and for fishing and troops. Total for year 100000. Limited amount of oil storage used mostly for bunker oil;

H. Nagaevo. Intransit only and no program for use this year. Required for local use 70,000 and 5 tankers.

Throughout far east storage facilities appear large and presumed to be necessary in past for maintaining war reserve stocks. Vlad Port storage capacity 150,000 with sufficient space for working. Probably 100,000 is covered of which 15,000 is refrigerated storage. Of covered storage little being used. Vlad tanker products storage capacity is 110,000. Some of this is being used for bunker oil. Not included is bunker oil storage for Navy use. According to my information perhaps 240,000 long tons monthly could be transported to far west by rail and remainder absorbed east of Omsk.

CM-IN-8147

(10 Jun 44)

[REDACTED]

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 20 1974

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia

Nr: 665 9 June 1944

Page 3

Much would be absorbed east of Chita; and Novovibirsk, Irkutsk and Krasnoyarsk would take considerable. East of Chita the larger part of flour is consumed. This includes Canadian.

The possibility of this program is confirmed here by rail authorities. Trains are handling traffic without apparent difficulty and appear to be on schedule. Quite a few German freight cars are in use and many others are being repaired and modified in railroad shops all the way from Vlad to Krasnoyarsk.

The port and rail authorities I have met here are hard working, alert and appear to be capable. They have been very frank and seem to be sincere in belief that their statement of capabilities represents an honest statement.

As far as rail and port facilities are concerned, I think that this program of whipping 240,000 long tons to the far west per month could be largely met, if sufficient rolling stock priority would be made. In La Perouse a major factor will be ice conditions. Last years experience, they believe, will not be repeated next year.

At Vlad, port operations are reported to be 90 per cent mechanized. Port operations there were being handled effectively and very smoothly. In order to take advantage

CM-IN-8147 (10 Jun 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 20 1974

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia

Hr: 665

9 June 1944

Page 4

of open season conditions, it is recommended that everything practicable be done to expedite shipments this summer within capacity stated.

In view of fact that representatives went beyond their sphere of responsibility in furnishing part of this information, it should not be discussed with Soviets.

End

ACTION: G-2

INFO : OPD
Navy (ONI)
Col Park ✓

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

CM-IN-8147 (10 Jun 44) 1722Z ejm

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

From: US Military Attache, Ankara

To: War Department

Nr: 208

8 June 1944

Msg Nr 208.

While break between Bulgaria and Russia has not come, relations are bad. Our Ambassador does not exclude eventual occupation of Bulgaria by Russians unless Bulgarians change attitude.

End.

ACTION: G-2

INFO : OPD
Col Park

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 4, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

CM-IN-6578 (9 Jun 44) 01297 jb

[REDACTED]

28

320 Russia

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM US MILITARY MISSION MOSCOW		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		WAR DEPARTMENT	PRIORITY
DATE 8 JUNE 1944			ROUTINE
TO CODEROOM 1158			DEFERRED
DECODED BY			
PARAPHRASED BY RODGERS/ <i>Tusdon</i>		DECLASSIFIED	PRIORITY
ROUTED BY HUTCHINSON		JCS memo, 1-4-74	ROUTINE
		By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974	DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED THIS MESSAGE WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
NR 649	7 JUNE 1944	NCR 19364	<input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(REC'D BY PRINTER FROM ARMY)

FOR BISSELL, ONI, AND MCPHERSON OF PROTOCOL COMMITTEE FROM DEANE.

FOR YOUR INFORMATION FOLLOWING IS SUBSTANCE OF RADIO SENT TO ME BY GENERAL SPALDING WHO IS NOW AT VLADIVOSTOK:

AVAILABLE INFORMATION SHOWS SOVGAVAN-KOMSONOLSK RAILROAD AND THE RAILWAY TO KOMSONOLSK NORTH OF BAIKAL HAS NOT BEEN COMPLETED.

EXCEPT FOR A SHORT SECTION NEAR OMSK, THE TRANS-SIBERIAN IS DOUBLE-TRACKED. FROM OBSERVATIONS AND ACCORDING TO INFORMATION RECEIVED, THE ROAD BED IS IN GOOD SHAPE, RAILWAYS AND SIDING APPEAR VERY ADEQUATE.

LOCAL REPRESENTATIVES FURNISHED FOLLOWING FIGURES ON PORT CAPACITIES FOR IMPORT FROM USA IN LONG TONS OF CARGO.

FIGURES ARE BASED ON EXPECTED AVAILABILITY OF RAIL TRANS-

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FX40	
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VCND	

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OPNAV-NCR-15

300 Russia

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

PORTATION UNDER SEASONAL CONDITIONS:

- (A) VLADIVOSTOK-DECEMBER TO APRIL INCLUSIVE 70,000;
MAY TO NOVEMBER INCLUSIVE 370,000.
- (B) NAHODKA-30,000 PER MONTH.
- (C) SOVGAVAN-30,000 TO 40,000 IS THE TOTAL FOR THE YEAR, LOCAL
USE ONLY.

FIGURES SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS AS THEY
WERE GIVEN UNOFFICIALLY AND CONFIDENTIALLY.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

CM IN 6039

16.....COG

NAVAIDE...200.....200P.....COMINCH.....13.....CNO.....

US MILITARY MISSION

Originator MOSCOW D/T Group 7 JUNE 04 19304 Page 2 Of 2 Pages.

OP#47-10-21
126100

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

USSR

From: U.S. Military Mission, Moscow, Russia

To: War Department

Mr: 649 7 June 1944

For Bissell, CMI, and McPherson of Protocol Committee from Deane.

For your information following is substance of radio sent to me by General Spalding who is now at Vladivostok:

Available information shows Sovgavan-Komsomolsk railroad and the railway to Komsomolsk north of Baikal has not been completed.

Except for a short section near Onak, The Trans-Siberian is double-tracked. From observations and according to information received, the road bed is in good shape, railways and siding appear very adequate.

Local representatives furnished following figures on port capacities for import from USA in long tons of cargo. Figures are based on expected availability of rail transportation under seasonal conditions:

- A. Vladivostok-December to April inclusive 70000;
May to November inclusive 370000.

CM-IN-6039

(8 June 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 20 1974

300 Russia

Col. Park

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

Page 2

From: U. S. Military Mission, Moscow, Russia

Nr: 649

7 June 1944

B. Mahodka-30000 per month.

C. Sovgavan-30000 to 40000 is the total for the year, local use only.

Figures should not be discussed with Soviet officials as they were given unofficially and confidentially.

End

ACTION: G-2

INFO : OPD
NAVY(ONI)
Col. Park

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

CM-IN-6039

(8 June 44)

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

~~SECRET~~
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From : War Cabinet Offices

To : J.S.M. Washington

Number: OZ 2995 7th June, 1944.

Following received from 30 Mission Moscow. BEGINS.

To Combined Chiefs of Staff, Washington, repeated
British Chiefs of Staff, London. From 30 Mission.

MIL 1375. 7 June, 1944.

From Generals Deane and Burrows.

Slavin handed us today a letter from General
Antonov of which the following is the text:

*Same as
Stalin Tel
6/7/44*

I am instructed by the Chief of the General Staff
of the Red Army, Marshal Vasilievsky, to request you to in-
form the Chiefs of the Combined General Staffs of the plan
for the summer offensive of the Soviet Forces worked out in
accordance with the terms of the Teheran Conference. The
summer offensive of the Soviet Forces will begin towards the
middle of June on one of the important sectors of the front.
The general offensive of the Soviet Forces will be developed
in stages by the successive launching of armies on offensive
operations. At the end of June and during July the offen-
sive operations will be converted into a general offensive of
the Soviet Armies. Information on the progress of the
offensive operation will be given you in due course. ENDS.

ACTION: CCS T.O.O. 072120Z
INFORMATION: Gen Arnold, Gen Handy, Gen Bissell, Adm King,
Col Park, C of S
CM-IN-5750 (7 Jun 44) 2339Z mos

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JCS MEMO. 1-17-73
BY DSS, DATE

MAY 21 1973

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From : War Cabinet Offices

To : J.S.M. Washington

Number: OZ 2995 7th June, 1944.

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middle of June on one of the important sectors of the front.
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in stages by the successive launching of armies on offensive
operations. At the end of June and during July the offen-
sive operations will be converted into a general offensive of
the Soviet Armies. Information on the progress of the
offensive operation will be given you in due course. ENDS.

ACTION: CCS T.O.C. 072120Z
INFORMATION: Gen Arnold, Gen Handy, Gen Bissell, Adm King,
Col Park, C of S
CM-IN-5750 (7 Jun 44) 2339Z mss

~~SECRET~~

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BY MEMO, 14723
BY DSS, DATE
MAY 21 1973

COPY No. 38
24-78784 DSS

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

300 Russia

NA MESSAGE

NAVY DEPART

DRAFTER		EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
ALBONA			ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEES	
FROM MOSCOW				
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION	CNO	PRIORITY
DATE 3 JUNE 1944				ROUTINE
TOR CODEROM 2129				DEFERRED
DECODED BY KARABINUS		INFORMATION		PRIORITY
PARAPHRASE BY HOUSTON				ROUTINE
ROUTED BY WHITTINGTON				DEFERRED

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

021114

MCR 7152

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
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ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

WHEN MY #14730 SENT OUT IT WAS THOUGHT US MAYCOM
 302025 REFERRED TO FISHING RIGHTS AS US NAVCOM
 302020 ON IDENTIFICATION NOT RECEIVED HERE UNTIL 2
 JUNE. SOVIETS HAVE BEEN REQUESTED TO REAFFIRM
 PROMULGATION OF IDENTIFICATION AGREEMENTS OF MY
 301505 OF APRIL TO ALL VESSELS INCLUDING FISHING
 CRAFT IN PHOTSK NORPAC AND BERING AREAS. THEY HAVE
 BEEN INFORMED OF SPECIFIC SIGHTING IMPROPERLY
 IDENTIFIED AND THAT ALL SUCH CRAFT SO SIGHTED MUST
 ACCEPT RISK OF BEING CONSIDERED AS MASQUERADING JAP
 PATROLS AND MUST ACCEPT RISK OF ATTACK. ACCEPTANCE
 RISK APPROVED BY SOVIET NAVAL LIAISON OFFICER WHO
 REAFFIRMS THAT FULL NOTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS WERE
 DISEMINATED TO ALL PACIFIC COMMERCIAL CRAFT
 INCLUDING FISHING VESSELS.

SECRET
 DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and
 OSD letter, May 1, 1978

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 OPNAV-NCR-15 A 33052

021114 360 Russia

 DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
 NLR 101
 By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

16.....ACTION

COMINCH....CNO....2/F....13....FX37....2/OP....WAVEIDE ...

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (B)
OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS Date MAY 21 1973

Originator ALUSNA MOSCO 721114 7152
D/T Group NCR Page 2 Of 2 Pages.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		CNO	PRIORITY
DATE 2 JUNE 1944			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM 2336/2			DEFERRED
DECODED BY MCCLELLAN			PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY C. STRONG/TROMPSON			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY MIDMAN			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
010730			NCR 6439

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

UPON RECEIPT USNAVCOM 211450 MARCH SOVIET NAVY DEFINITELY INFORMED IN WRITING AND VERBALLY THAT NAVY HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER FISHING OR WHALING RIGHTS AND THAT QUESTION SHOULD BE SETTLED THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. USNAVCOM 062025 FEB. STATED THIS SUBJECT UNDER ADVISEMENT BY STATE DEPT AND THAT ROULLARD WOULD BE KEPT INFORMED. NO FURTHER INFO RECEIVED. SECSTATE DISPATCH 684 OF 23 MARCH INFORMED EMBASSY OF DISCUSSION ON SUBJECT WITH CANADA AND THAT IT WAS INTENDED TO INFORM SOVIETS OF RESULTS THESE CONVERSATIONS AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE STAGE BUT MEANWHILE IT WAS FELT THAT NO APPROACH SHOULD BE MADE TO SOVIET GOVT UNTIL DEPT POLICY HAD BEEN CLARIFIED AND COORDINATED WITH CANADIANS AND THAT EMBASSY WOULD BE KEPT CLOSELY INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS MATTER. NO FURTHER INFO RECEIVED TO DATE CONSEQUENTLY

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

By DBS Date MAY 21 1973

010730 300 Russia

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

EMBASSY DID NOT OPEN SUBJECT HERE. NEITHER SOVIET NAVY
NOR FOREIGN OFFICE HAS MADE FURTHER MENTION OF SUBJECT.
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OSD letter, May 1, 1973

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

Originator ALUSNA MOSCOW D/T Group 010730 6439 Page 2 Of 2 Pages.

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER

EXTENSION NUMBER

ADDRESSEES

PRECEDENCE

FROM AMERICAN CONSUL VLADIVOSTOK

ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE

RELEASED BY

DATE 29 MAY 1944

TOR CODE ROOM 292148

DECODED BY BOWMAN

PARAPHRASED BY

TOUPASZ *Hokautis*

ROUTED BY MORRIS

CNO

MOSCOW

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OR OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ACTION

(ACTION CNO INFO MOSCOW FROM AMCON.)

DURING PAST FEW DAYS SEVERAL HUNDRED RUSSIAN PRISONERS
WITH FAMILIES GUILTY ASSOCIATION NAZIS IN RECENTLY FREED
AREAS ARRIVED BY TRAIN TO WORK ON NEW CONSTRUCTION AND
RAILROADS.

16....ACT

COMINCH....200P....CNO....NAVAIDE....13....200G....

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

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290715 300 Russia

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

From: U.S. Military Attache, Chungking, China

To: War Department

Fr: 23515 28 May 1944

Our 23515

Former Chief Chinese Intelligence says unofficially all Russian military advisers recalled. Gissimo told due need officers German front. Source thinks indication Jap Rus-ian agreement enable Japan withdraw troops Manchuria. Rated B 1.

Depass

ACTION: G-2

INFO : CMAAF

OPD

Col. Park

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, 5-3-72

MAY 20 1974

CM-IN-2177 (28 May 44) 2134Z

ejv

3 as Russia

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

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DATE 11 MAY 1944		ALUSNA MOSCOW	ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM 2345/13 JUNE			DEFERRED
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E.O. 11652, Sec. 5(b) and 5(c) or (d)

OBD letter, May 1, 1973

By DBS Date MAY 21 1973

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OPNAV-NCR-12

3 as Russia

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BLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

EXTENSION NUMBER		ADDRESSEES		PRECEDENCE
FROM	ROULLARD - VLADIVOSTOK	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE		
RELEASED BY		CNO		PRIORITY
DATE	8 MAY 1949	ALBINA MOSCOW		ROUTINE
FOR CODER ROOM	1935			DEFERRED
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PARAPHRASED BY	LEVIS			ROUTINE
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ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT
(FOR CNO AND MOSCOW)

SOVIETS CONSTRUCTING HUGE NEW LANDING FIELD OFF SHORE
SKREBTSOV ISLAND ON RIGHT. APPROXIMATELY 43-12 N
LAT 131-55 E LONG WHEN COMPLETED WILL HAVE SINGLE
RECTANGULAR BRICK RUNWAY 5000 FEET BY 500 FEET
RUNNING NORTHEAST AND SOUTHWEST PREVAILING WINDS
BLOW SAME DIRECTION. HANGARS AND FUEL TANKS WILL
BE UNDER GROUND. FIELD IS 15.4 KILOMETERS FROM
CENTER OF VLAD LYING BETWEEN RAILROAD AND ASPHALT
COVERED MOTOR ROAD WITHIN EASY ACCESS TO BOTH
MOST PROMINENT OBJECT IN VICINITY IS SMALL ROCKY
SKREBTSOV ISLAND. RADIO STATION FOR FIELD COMPLETED
AND LOCATED ON HILL INBOARD OF FIELD NEXT TO MOTOR
ROAD EQUIPPED WITH DIRECTIONAL TYPE ANTENNA AND
INDEPENDENT POWER SUPPLY.

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300 Russia
MAY 21 1949

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E.O. 12386, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
PLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/04

PAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

EXTENSION NUMBER		ADDRESSEES		PRECEDENCE	
FROM		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE			
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION		PRIORITY	1
DATE			ROUTINE	2	
FOR CODEROOM			DEFERRED	3	
DECODED BY		INFORMATION		PRIORITY	4
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ROUTED BY			DEFERRED	6	

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PAGE 2 OF

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16 NEW BELOW

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ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

COPY TO BUAET.....OP28..

16.....CAUTION

COMINCH....10/11.....20G.....

NAVAIDE...20OP.....FILE

ACTION	21
F-0	22
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F-33	34
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E.O. 11652, Sec. 8(B) and 8(D)

OSD letter, May 1, 1973

By DBS

Date

MAY 21 1973

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OPNAV 10-04

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

BLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

NAVY DEPARTMENT

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: _____ DATE _____ TIME _____ OCT _____

SOVIET TRANS SIBERIAN RAILROAD PLANNING INAUGURATE
FAST PASSENGER TRAIN SERVICE FROM VLADIVOSTOK
TO MOSCOW WITH 2 TRAINS WEEKLY MAKING PASSAGE
IN 2 DAYS COMPARED WITH PRESENT 12. SERVICE TO
BEGIN 15TH. INDICATES RAILROAD AUTHORITIES
BELIEVE FREIGHT FACILITIES AMPLIFIED HANDLE SUMMER
FLOW LENDLEASE CARGO AND ANTICIPATE NO TRAFFIC
CONGESTION WITH INCOMING WAR SUPPLIES ENROUTE FROM

COMINCH...NAVAIDE...CNO...12...

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(b) and 5(D) b6
b7C

OSD letter, May 1, 1978

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1964

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0405-06 300 Russia

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MLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

From: CG Persian Gulf Command, Teheran, Iran
To: War Department
Joint Intell Coll Agency ME Cairo, Egypt
Nr: M 32165 30th April 1944
M32165 from Rigg acting to JICAME and MIS number
M 32165

Soviet Ambassador still ailing departed this week for Moscow. He donated 1 million Rials to Gurgan earthquake relief. Labor difficulties continue in Isfahan. Russians have established weekly air service from Teheran to Meshed, trip costs 1200 Rials also service to Tabriz but according to British Ambassador no Americans or British passengers will be taken in Azerbaijan, Russians planning to open soon schools teaching Turkish and Russian. Schwarzkopf maintains Soviets instigating much of criticism directed against all American missions. He says Soviet indirectly obstructing him in Gendarmerie plans.

Grain collections. Ending 20th April from Teheran vicinity 16,845 tons wheat, 11,471 tons barley, from north zone 80,390 tons wheat, 46,852 barley. From southern area 53,969 tons barley, wheat 108,199 tons- Present stocks are 120,549 tons total grain.

No Sig

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: OPD
201 Park
Log

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 1, 1973

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

CM-IN-22705 (30 Apr 44)

1910Z

bjm

[REDACTED]

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C. (25)

~~SECRET~~

27 April 1944


The White House Map Room
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Colonel Richard Parks, Jr.

Gentlemen:

I am transmitting herewith Copy No. 19 of R & A No.
1899, "Russian War Damage and Possible Reparation Claims, Part
I. General Statement", prepared in the Research and Analysis
Branch of this office and classified as secret.

Sincerely yours,



William L. Langer
Director, Branch of
Research & Analysis

Enclosure

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By ABS Date MAY 21 1973

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Research and Analysis Branch

~~SECRET~~

R & A No. 1899

RUSSIAN WAR DAMAGE AND POSSIBLE REPARATION CLAIMS

Part I. GENERAL STATEMENT

This study presents preliminary estimates of the different types of war damage which might constitute the basis for Russian reparation claims after the war. Part I, a general statement of the results, is supplemented by Part II, which contains a detailed description of the statistical procedure used.

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By WJL Date MAY 21 1973

8 March 1944

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Part I. GENERAL STATEMENT

	Page
Summary and Conclusions.	1
A. Introductory.	5
B. Possible Bases for Russian Reparation Claims	7
C. Tentative Estimates of Russian War Damage .	9
1. Damage to Property	9
2. Current Output Seized by the Germans . .	13
3. Pensions and Allowances.	13
4. Reimbursement for Forced Labor	17
5. Other Damage to Civilians.	17
6. Damage to Property and to Citizens in Areas Incorporated in USSR in 1939-1940	18
D. War Costs	18
E. Value of Russian War Damage in Terms of Dollars and Reichsmarks.	19
F. Comment	21

RUSSIAN WAR DAMAGE AND POSSIBLE REPARATION CLAIMS

Part I. General Statement

Summary and Conclusions

1. Numerous public pronouncements on reparations which have been made in Russia by prominent personalities outside the government indicate that Russia expects sizable compensation from the aggressor nations for the damage they inflicted on her.

2. The Russian government's policies with respect to reparations constitute an integral element in its policies with respect to the post-war settlement in general, and as such probably have not yet been finally settled.

Urgent reconstruction needs and popular sentiment will combine to set a minimum limit to the reparations the Russians will demand from the defeated enemy. If necessary, however, Russia could achieve her reconstruction from her own resources by an effort comparable to that ~~made in~~ the Third Five Year Plan.

The Russian spokesmen recognize that the post-war economic potential of the enemy countries will determine the upper limit to reparations payments, but advocate, as a guiding principle, that it would be unjust if the peoples of the aggressor countries should be in a better "economic position" after the war than the Russians.

3. Should the Russians demand reparations, the magnitude of their claim, and in particular their relative share in the total payments by the Axis, will depend on the following:

- a. The categories of damage which are included in the bill;
- b. The estimated ruble values of the different types of damage;
- c. The rate of exchange at which the ruble values are converted into the currency that is used as a standard in the reparations accounts.

4. While questions arising in connection with items 3-b and 3-c are matters of statistical procedure, problems connected with item 3-a will have to be settled by political negotiation.

5. Preliminary estimates of the magnitude of the different types of damage which the Russians will have sustained as a result of the war are presented in paragraphs 6 through 11 below. If the Russians choose to derive their assessment of war damage by conventional statistical procedures, the estimates below should indicate the possible order of magnitude of their claims for the various categories of damage.

The estimates are generally expressed in terms of 1937 dollars at a calculated effective price parity for industrial output of eight rubles to a dollar. At the official rate of exchange that prevailed in 1937, five rubles to a dollar, the dollar amounts would be sixty percent greater.

6. Property losses. According to the Russian pronouncements, compensation for this category of damage should be given highest priority. The total property losses that will have been sustained either through war destruction or German requisitioning are estimated at 18 billion dollars. This figure does not include losses sustained in areas incorporated in the USSR in 1939 and 1940. If, as is probable, reparations are claimed for damage in these areas also, another 4 billions might have to be added to the bill.

For physical property alone (within the pre-1939 Russian borders), it may be noted, the total destruction amounts to about a fifth of the total pre-war value of the property, and in toto is less than the amount of investment which was projected for the Third Five Year Plan.

7. Pensions. The Russian spokesmen refer explicitly to the costs of war pensions as an item to be included in the reparations settlement. Should this be done, the total reparations bill would be greatly increased, though at the relatively low Russian pension rates, not as much as might be expected. Taking into account only the casualties that will be sustained up to July 1944, it is estimated that after the war the Russians will have to care for some 1.8 million war invalids, their dependents and the dependents of four and a half million war dead. It is estimated that the total pensions paid these persons, under the present Russian pension law, might be of the order of 17 billion dollars. Discounted at 4 percent, the calculated pension payments would have a present value of 10 billion dollars.

If, as in the Versailles settlement, separation allowances to the dependents of men in the armed forces are included in the reparations bill, an item of some one and a half billion dollars would have to be added on this account.

In the Versailles settlement, the French pension rates were accepted as a standard for the calculation of the pensions bill of all the reparations claimants. If the rates of a country paying higher pensions than the Russians--the United States or Great Britain, for example--are accepted as a standard after the present war, Russia's pensions bill would be much larger than calculated.

8. Personal Damage to Civilians. Should the Russians follow the precedent of the Versailles settlement, they will include in their reparations bill, in addition to the items already enumerated, the personal damage suffered by civilians through "acts of war" and "acts of cruelty" on the enemy's part. In particular, the following items might be included:

- a. Damage to labor deportees. The damage done these persons by being compelled to work in Germany for inadequate remuneration may be put at one billion dollars.
- b. Atrocities. Russian statements as to the number of citizens murdered by the Germans make it clear that the inclusion of damage claims on this account would greatly expand the reparations bill, but the amount would of necessity be quite arbitrary.

9. War Costs. The inclusion of this item would greatly increase the absolute magnitude of Russia's reparation claim, but would reduce her relative share. For this reason it might be expected that the Russians will follow the precedent of Versailles and not press for the inclusion of this item. As yet the Russian spokesmen have not referred to it as an item in the future reparations bill.

If defense expenditures may be taken as indicative of war costs, the total amount of this item could be put at 71 billion dollars for the three years ending in June 1944.

10. Summarizing:

	Billions of dollars
a. Property losses within pre-1939 borders, in- cluding German requi- sitions	18
b. Property losses in areas incorporated in USSR after 1 September 1939	4
c. War pensions and al- lowances (present discounted value)	12
d. Personal damage to civilians (i) For labor de- portations (ii) Atrocities	1 ?
e. War costs	71

11. The above estimates take into account the damage that might be sustained up to July 1944. Unless the Germans once more take the offensive, continuance of hostilities beyond that date should not increase the total property losses very appreciably. All other damage claims should vary roughly in proportion to the length of the war.

A. Introductory

1. At the end of last summer the question of reparations became a subject of public discussion in Russia. A number of statements made since that time in the press, on the radio and elsewhere emphasize the view that the Russian people, as well as others injured by Fascist aggression, have a moral and material right to be compensated by the aggressors for the damage and injury sustained as a result of the war.

One of the earliest pronouncements is, for example, a public lecture delivered in August by E. Varga, an economist and a member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. 1/ Varga calls the attention of his audience to the unprecedented destruction inflicted on Russia by the invaders, presents very tentative estimates of the possible reparations claims that may be levied against the aggressors after the war, and discusses in some detail the methods by which these claims might be made effective.

This lecture, together with another statement made by Varga more recently, contains the most detailed review of the reparations problem from the Russian point of view that has appeared up to now. All other spokesmen join him in emphasizing that the Russians expect reparation to be made for the losses they have suffered. 2/ The Axis satellites (in Varga's lecture--Hungary, Rumania, Finland, and Italy) as well as Germany are mentioned as prospective payers.

2. It is notable that no statement on reparations has been made yet by a government official. A prominent journalist and several professional economists and jurists, most of whom are Academicians, are among the participants in the present public discussion. No statement on such an important subject, however, would be made public in Russia without at least tacit official approval; the pronouncements most likely reflect the present state of official thinking on the question.

1/ Varga, E. S., O vozmeshchenii ushcherba prichinennogo Gitlerovskoy Germaniyei Sovetskomu Soyuzu, lecture delivered in Moscow, 31 August 1943, subsequently printed as a pamphlet.

2/ A number of extracts from the various statements that have been made containing the more significant passages, are inserted in Part II of this report.

Significantly, one of the functions of the Extraordinary State Commission for Ascertaining and Investigating the Crimes of the German Fascist Invaders and Their Accomplices, which was established on 2 November 1942, is to assess the material damages sustained by the Russians as a result of the war. The published detailed reports of this Commission on losses in particular localities were utilized in obtaining the estimates on Russian war damage which are inserted in the following sections of the present memorandum.

3. Needless to say, Russia's policies in respect of reparations constitute one aspect of her general attitude towards the post-war settlement. Since the stand that Russia will take towards the post-war settlement will be affected by future developments, particularly with respect to the character of German government, it cannot be assumed that her reparations policies are as yet finally settled.

Russia's huge economic reconstruction needs, however, probably will set the minimum limit to her post-war reparation demands; independently of economic considerations, popular sentiment, too, may require the exaction of considerable compensation from the vanquished enemy.

Furthermore, the post-war economic potential of the enemy countries has been recognized by the Russian spokesmen as setting an upper limit to the aggregate reparations payments. In this connection it is important to note that according to the spokesman referred to above, E. Varga, "One of the principles which should determine the bounds of reparations payments" is the consideration that "it would be absolutely unjust if the peoples of the aggressor countries ...should find themselves in a better economic position" than the Russians after the war. The transfer problem which loomed so large in the reparations discussions and policies after the last war, according to the same authority, does not exist for Soviet Russia.

4. As a first step in the analysis of Russia's post-war reparations policy, this report offers an assessment of the various types of war damages which the Russians have suffered. If the Russians should assess their damages by the methods similar to the conventional ones used here, the estimates presented should indicate the rough magnitude of the reparations claims which they might make for the different categories of damage.

- 7 -

A later investigation will be devoted to an analysis of Russia's post-war reconstruction needs and policies and of the manner in which these needs and policies may affect the character of her reparations claims in terms of different types of goods and services. It is intended also in a further study to attempt to assess Russia's probable desires for the future of Germany, and the possible influence of these desires upon the character and size of Russia's claims against Germany, as well as the time-period over which the collections will be distributed.

B. Possible Bases for Russian Reparation Claims

1. If the negotiations after the First World War provide a precedent, the determination of the total reparations claimed from the Axis will require the prior agreement as to the types of losses which should be admitted as valid bases for reparations. The distribution of the total reparation proceeds--a problem of first importance that arises in wars of alliance--depends to a large extent upon the decision as to which items are to be included in the reparations bill and which not.

2. The statements of Soviet personalities dealing with the reparations problem indicate that the following items might be considered for inclusion in Russia's reparations bill ^{1/}:

- a. Physical damage to property, including livestock;
- b. Property confiscated by the Germans or taken with inadequate remuneration;
- c. Pensions to war invalids, their dependents, and the dependents of the killed;
- d. Reimbursement for forced labor of civilians.

3. Significantly, all the items listed were included in the Versailles Treaty as elements in the Allies' reparations claim. In this treaty, the Allies also demanded reparations for a number of categories of personal damage which have not yet been referred to explicitly by the Russian spokesmen: damage to injured civilians from acts of war and from acts of cruelty; the cost to the Allied Governments of assistance to prisoners and their families and of allowances to the dependents of mobilized persons; and damage in the form of fines, fees, etc. imposed by the Germans and their allies on the civilian population. The Russian spokesmen, however, make no

^{1/} See Part II of this report, Section A on Russian pronouncements on reparations, for pertinent quotations.

pretense of treating this aspect of the subject systematically or exhaustively; accordingly the inclusion or exclusion of one or another item in their statements cannot be regarded as especially significant.

The exaction of compensation for the fines, etc. levied on civilians by the Germans during the last war, presumably would provide a precedent, if one were wanted, for the exaction of compensation for the occupation charges levied by the Germans during this war. While the Russians are not among those affected, their spokesmen indicate their willingness to admit this item in the general reparations settlement.

4. War costs, which were seriously considered for inclusion in the reparations bill after the last war but which were finally dropped as incompatible with the Fourteen Points, have not been mentioned in the Russian pronouncements. Needless to say, while the inclusion of this item would greatly increase Russia's total claim, it would reduce her fractional share of the reparations bill; it is unlikely that the Russians will press for the inclusion of this item in the reparations settlement. 1/

5. In the light of the same considerations, it is not surprising that compensation for materiel damages is given most attention by the Russians. Their spokesmen come out clearly with the thesis that the satisfaction of this type of claim should be given priority over all others.

6. The Russian spokesmen do not commit themselves on the question of whether Russia will ask reparations for war damages sustained by the peoples of areas annexed by the Russians in 1939 and 1940: the Baltic States, Eastern Poland, Bessarabia. From the statements that the Russians have made on their general attitude towards these areas, however, it is more than likely that compensation would be asked for damages to all areas within the post-war borders of the USSR, without regard to the question whether the areas were acquired after 1938 or not.

1/ Baruch, B. M. (Making of the Reparations and the Economic Clauses of the Peace Treaty, New York, 1920, p. 21) presents figures which indicate what the shares of the different reparations claimants after the last war would have been, on the one hand, if the "illegally inflicted damages" formula of the Fourteen Points had been adhered to rigorously and, on the other, if war costs and "other items" were included. France's share, for example, was calculated in the former case to be 43 percent, and, in the latter case, 24 percent.

C. Tentative Estimates of Russian War Damage

1. Damage to Property. Table 1 presents preliminary estimates of the property damage which the Russians will have sustained as a result of the invasion. The figures relate to areas within the pre-1939 Russian borders. Property damage, in areas annexed by Russia in 1939 and 1940 is discussed separately in Section 6, below.

The statistical procedures by which the figures in Table 1 and the estimates presented in later sections were derived are set forth in detail in Part II of this report. Briefly the approach, in the case of the figures in Table 1, is as follows:

- a. For almost all types of property, Soviet statistics are available on the total amount of investment for some pre-war years. Where necessary, these statistics are brought up to June 1941 by extrapolation, on the basis of supplementary and often incomplete information. ^{1/}
- b. Similar procedures were used to obtain estimates of the June 1941 territorial distribution of the investment between invaded and never-occupied areas. Where no pre-war data were available on the regional distribution of the investment, appropriate indices were used to allocate the investment regionally, e.g., in the case of housing, population figures constitute the basis for the regional distribution.
- c. The estimates of the amount of damage to property in the invaded areas, for the most part, are based on scattered current information on the destruction in various liberated localities. An important source is the reports of the Russian Extraordinary State Commission already referred to. The

^{1/} In the case of household articles and clothing, the total investment as of June 1941 was estimated from a consideration of statistics on current consumer acquisitions year by year and on the average length of life of these items. In the case of arable land and forests, a very speculative estimate of damage was obtained, without calculating the total pre-war value, by resort to the estimates of destruction which were used in implementing the Versailles settlement. (See Part II)

Table 1. PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF RUSSIAN PROPERTY
LOSSES DUE TO WAR, IN 1937 RUBLES ^{a/}

	(1) Total value of property in USSR (pre-1939 borders) as of June 1941 (Billions)	(2) Value of property in areas invaded by the Axis (Billions)	(3) Estimated value of property loss (Billions)	(4) Property loss as percent of total pro- perty in USSR (2) ÷ (1)
A. Industry: plant and equipment; inventories and goods in process	246.5	99.7	60.4	24.5
B. Railway and water transport; commu- nications	52.9	25.0	12.6	23.8
C. Agriculture b/:				
1. Productive structures and equipment	78.6	14.7	12.0	31.1
2. Damage to arable land and forests	---	---	9.0	---
3. Live stock; grain stocks	---	---	5.6 c/	---
D. Trader stores and warehouses: inven- tories	11.1	4.7	3.9	75.1
E. Public institu- tions; municipal enterprises	40.5	13.3	8.4	20.7
F. Housing (urban and rural)	75.6 d/	31.0 d/	12.2 d/	16.1
G. Household articles; personal effects	100.7 e/	40.3 e/	14.5 e/	14.4
H. Total				
1. Excluding damage to arable land and forests; live stock; grain stocks	565.9	229.7	124.0	21.9
2. Including damage to arable land and forests; live stock; grain stocks	---	---	139.6	---

Table 1. (Continued)

- a/ All physical property values except perhaps those on transport and communications, are net of depreciation.
- b/ In the case of tractors, horses, and motor trucks, the amounts of military requisition by the Russians from their own civilian population are taken to be probably lost for the most part and are included in the estimate of war damage.
- c/ The estimated loss, in terms of the value figures in which the property values were originally expressed-- 1926-27 rubles--, amounted to 2.8 billion rubles.
- d/ Because of the fact that much of Russian housing is still very old, these depreciated values are probably far below the reproduction cost new of the total housing space.
- e/ These figures are in terms of wholesale prices. The values are substantially inflated, relative to other values in the table, by the comparatively large turnover taxes which are included in the wholesale prices of consumption goods.

estimates of losses take into account the amount of property which the retreating Russians were able to evacuate in advance of the enemy occupation. This item is important in the case of industrial and agricultural machinery, railway rolling stock, and cattle.

- d. A particularly difficult problem is that of obtaining a uniform evaluation of the different types of property. The original Soviet figures used express the value of investment in one or another of several different types of rubles, such as "1926-27 rubles", "1937 rubles", "current rubles". To reduce these to a common denominator, the various categories of investment are revalued in terms of calculated 1937 rubles.

As no official Russian price index numbers have been published for recent years an independent estimate of recent changes in the price level is made. Essentially the index of prices is obtained by dividing the calculated value of industrial output in current rubles by the official Soviet index of changes in the physical volume of industrial production. Necessarily, the resulting figures reflect the change in the price level of fabricated and processed goods only. For lack of any reliable information on the changes in the price level of agricultural commodities, the figures on investment in cattle and grain stocks were expressed in 1937 rubles by use of the over-all index. Retail food prices are known to have increased much more than the over-all index (the index is 204 percent in 1937 on 1926-27 as a base), but this increase is probably largely a reflection of the large increases in the turnover tax on agricultural products. The original investment figures for cattle and grain stocks, in terms of 1926-27 rubles, are noted. Quite possibly, the values expressed in 1937 rubles represent an understatement.

It should be noted that the estimated values of invested capital are net of depreciation. Because of the fact that much of Russian housing space is very old, the reproduction cost new of this space would be much higher than the depreciated value. The values of household articles and clothing are inflated relative to other values by the high Soviet turnover taxes on consumption goods.

2. Current Output Seized by the Germans. This category is intended to comprise only the estimated value of agricultural and industrial raw material output produced during the German occupation, and either consumed by the occupying army or exported to the Axis countries.

While the Germans purchased some of the agricultural items and paid wages to workers producing the industrial raw materials, no significant amount of goods was imported from the Axis to redeem the occupation currency issued. Tractors imported from Germany constitute an exception. These, however, are already allowed for in the calculation of net property damage in Table 1 (category C-1).

The information on this category of damage is very incomplete; on the basis of the scattered information at hand, the round sum of five billion 1937 rubles is taken to indicate roughly the general magnitude of the item.

3. Pensions and Allowances. Table 2 presents a very tentative estimate of the costs of war pensions which might be used by Russia if this type of war loss were included in the reparations bill. The estimates take into account the total casualties that Russia may be expected to have suffered by July 1944.

The computation is based on two sets of primary information:

- a. The Russian war pension law of 1940, with subsequent revisions;
- b. Estimates of Russian casualties derived in the USSR Division of the Office of Strategic Services. 1/

1/ Russian Capabilities and Prospects, Part I, Manpower,
R & A No. 1355.1.

Table 2. ESTIMATED RUSSIAN PENSION CLAIMS
RESULTING FROM THE WAR ^{a/}

A. Total payments for war pensions, billions of rubles	128.2
B. Present value of total pensions, discounted at 4 percent, billions of rubles	82.6
C. Total war casualties on basis of which pensions are paid (battle and non-battle dead and dis- abled), millions	6.2
D. Average present value of pension per war casualty, thousands of rubles	13.5

^{a/} The pensions, which depend on the level of previous earnings of the soldier, are calculated in this table on the basis of the wage structure prevailing in 1937.

The Russian war pension laws, like those of most other countries, provide pensions not only for war invalids, but for their dependents and for the dependents of the war dead. The pensions in all cases vary with the previous earnings of the invalided or deceased soldier. In the case of the invalided, the degree of invalidism is also a factor, while the pension to the families of the war dead or the deceased war invalid varies with the number of surviving dependents. 1/

The estimation of the number of pensioners in the various pension categories and of the amounts of their pensions involved a laborious and exceedingly speculative statistical procedure. The calculation of the amount of pensions to war invalids alone involved the following steps:

- a. Obtaining estimates of the distribution of the war invalids by age and degree of invalidism--a very rough calculation, based on scattered information relating to the experience of Russia and other belligerents in this and the last war;
- b. Aging the invalids in the different categories--here the mortality tables for Russian civilian males were used, with appropriate modifications;
- c. The result was a series of yearly estimates of the number of war invalids in each category. Appropriate pension rates for the invalids in each category were established from a consideration of the pension law and of the Soviet wage structure in 1937.
- d. The capitalized value of annual total pension payments was obtained by discounting the annual total at the rate of four percent.

In respect of the pensions to dependents, as well as to war invalids, the pensions were related to the wage structure prevailing in Russia in 1937. The purpose was to obtain figures comparable to the ruble value figures derived for

1/ The provisions of the pension law are outlined in Part II of the present report, where the details of the calculation of the Russian pension bill also are presented.

property losses. The calculation of the amount of pensions to dependents makes use of information on the composition of Russian families and on the normal civilian mortality experience to determine the amount of pensions to be paid in toto to "typical families" of different sizes. The distribution of the total payments over time for all families is calculated rather arbitrarily, and the annual amounts of pensions thus calculated are discounted at 4 percent to get their present capitalized value.

Because of an ambiguity in the Russian pension law, it is uncertain whether all widows of deceased servicemen automatically become eligible for pensions on reaching the age of 55. The figures in Table 2 were calculated on the assumption that they do; if this is incorrect, it is calculated that the total pension bill would be reduced by about one-seventh.

In the Versailles settlement, the French pension rates were established as a standard for all the Allies in the computation of their pension bill. If after this war also, some one country's rates were taken as a standard, and as is likely this country were not Russia, the Russian pension bill manifestly would be different from and possibly much higher than that calculated.

If the Russians follow the precedent of the Versailles settlement, they will claim compensation not only for the cost of war pensions but also for the cost of separation allowances paid during the war to the dependents of mobilized men. It is estimated that by July 1944 the Russians will have paid some 18.0 billion rubles to the dependents of members of the armed forces, or about 13 billion in terms of 1937 levels of wages and prices. 1/

Another item which appears in the Versailles settlement, the "cost of assistance by the Government of the Allied and Associated Powers to prisoners of war and to their families and dependents" would not apply to Russia in this war, except to the extent that it is covered in the family allowances already calculated.

- 1/ The family allowances, unlike the war pensions, do not depend on the earnings (or previous earnings) of members of the armed forces. But to obtain a total which is comparable to the total war pensions, the allowances were adjusted in proportion to the change in the level of wages from 1937 to 1940.

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4. Reimbursement for Forced Labor. It is estimated that 1.7 million Russians have been deported to Germany and that these workers will have supplied 3.2 million labor years to the Germans by July 1944. 1/ Although these deportees were provided with upkeep of a sort and some nominal compensation in money, the total wage was well below the normal payment for the same type of work.

The Russian spokesmen do not give any precise indication of how the damage done to labor deportees should be reckoned. 2/ A possible course, however, would be to charge the Germans the difference between the normal earnings of the deportees and the values actually provided them. In this case it is estimated that, in terms of the normal earnings of Russian workers in 1937, 3/ the Russian bill would amount to about 4.9 billion rubles.

5. Other Damage to Civilians. According to the Versailles settlement, reparations were to be made for damage to injured civilians from acts of war and from acts of cruelty. No estimates can be advanced as to the amount of damage that might be asked if the Russians included this item in their reparations claim.

The published reports of the Extraordinary State Commission on the number of Russian citizens killed by the Germans under the occupation, however, indicate that if the Russians do ask compensation for this category of damage, the claim will be substantial. The Commission's report for Smolensk and its environs alone charges the Germans with the murder of some 135 thousand Russian citizens; for Stalino, the number of killed charged to the Germans is also impressively high, 25 thousand; for Orel and the Orel Oblast, however, the total killed is figured at six thousand.

1/ These figures relate only to inhabitants of the pre-1939 areas of the USSR. Deportees from areas annexed by Russia in 1939 and 1940 are referred to below, Section 6.

2/ Nor is this matter clear in the Versailles settlement, where it is stated simply that "the damage caused to civilians by being forced by Germany or her allies to labour without just remuneration" was to be among the items for which reparation was to be made.

3/ The normal earnings of a German worker, perhaps, would be a more appropriate figure to use.

6. Damage to Property and to Citizens of Areas Annexed by the Russians in 1939 and 1940. The total population of the areas annexed by Russia in 1939 and 1940 was about 23 millions before the war, or about one-third of the pre-war population of the areas within the pre-1939 Russian borders that were invaded by the Germans. Because of the fact that the peoples of the annexed areas to a larger extent than those in the invaded areas of pre-1939 Russia were engaged in agricultural pursuits, the per capita wealth in the former areas was probably much less than in the latter. Taking into account this difference in the occupational structure of the population, and also the fact that the rates of destruction in the annexed areas probably will be less than in the other invaded areas, it is safe to assume that the total property damage (including requisitions) in the annexed areas would not exceed one-fourth of that in the invaded areas within the pre-1939 borders, or about 35 billion 1937 rubles.

Information is not available on the number of deportees from the annexed areas, but if the total damage to such citizens, in comparison with the damage to deportees from invaded areas within the pre-1939 borders, were proportionate to the population in the annexed areas, it would amount to nearly two billion rubles.

D. War Costs

The inclusion of war costs in the reparations bill would greatly inflate the total magnitude of Russia's claim but would diminish her share in comparison with that of the other claimants.

The following figures on the magnitude of Russia's defense expenditures afford some notion of what her claim for reparations on account of war costs would amount to:

	Current Billion Rubles
June-December 1941	56.0 (Estimated)
1942	108.4
1943	124.7
January-June 1944	64.2 (One-half of appropriation for 1944)
Total	353.3

Should Russia have to repay her allies for the munitions and other aid they have sent her, the total amount of her war costs, of course, would be greatly increased.

E. Value of Russian War Damage in Terms of Dollars and Reichsmarks.

1. In Table 3 the estimates derived in preceding sections are expressed in terms of dollars and reichsmarks. In the case of the dollar figures, two rates of translation are used:

- a. The official rate of exchange of five rubles to a dollar.
- b. The effective wholesale industrial price parity rate prevailing in 1937 --calculated for the purpose of this memorandum--of eight rubles to a dollar.

The reichsmark figures were calculated by converting the dollar figures obtained by using the second of these two translation rates into reichsmarks at the rate of 2.5 reichsmarks to one dollar, which was the official reichsmark-dollar gold parity exchange rate in 1937.

2. The wholesale industrial price parity rate referred to above was obtained from a consideration of the following:

- a. The relative hourly productivity of labor in Soviet and American industry, as measured in Soviet official statistics.
- b. The money wage rates of Soviet and American labor.
- c. The ratio of wages to other elements in money prices in Russia and in the United States.

3. The final results of our calculation in Table 3 may be compared with the highly tentative figures advanced by Professor Varga. In his public lecture he indicated that the material damage to Russia might amount to some 300-450 billion gold marks. Varga's calculation is as follows: (i) a figure of 15 billion marks is accepted as a rough measure of the amount of material damage to France in the last war (this is one-half the value placed on the damage by the French); (ii) the ravaged area of the USSR in the present war is estimated to be about 20 to 30 times that of France in the last war; (iii) the total damage is taken to be proportionate to the areas ravaged. In a more recent pronouncement, Varga uses the same method to calculate the material damage to all occupied areas in Europe and arrives at a sum of 200 billion gold rubles (presumably old gold rubles), or about 400 billion gold marks.

Table 3. POSSIBLE ELEMENTS IN RUSSIA'S POST-WAR REPARATIONS CLAIMS, ESTIMATED IN RUBLES, DOLLARS AND REICHSMARKS (In Billions)

	(1) In 1937 rubles	(2) In dollars, at official ruble-dollar exchange rate: five rubles to one dollar	(3) In dollars in terms of wholesale industrial price-parity in 1937: eight rubles to one dollar	(4) In terms of reichsmarks: the total in (3) converted at the official dollar-reichs- mark parity rate in 1937: 2.5 reichs- marks equal one dollar
A. Property losses within pre-1939 borders, inclu- ding German re- quisitions	143.0	28.7	18.0	45.0
B. Property losses in incorporated areas	35.0	7.0	4.4	11.0
C. War pensions and allowances	<u>96.6</u>	<u>19.3</u>	<u>12.1</u>	<u>30.3</u>
D. Total: A-C	275.2	55.0	34.5	86.3
E. Personal damage to civilians				
1. For labor deportations	4.0 a/	1.0 a/	.6 a/	1.5 a/
2. Atrocities	?	?	?	?
F. War costs	253.3 b/	70.7	70.7 c/	176.8

a/ Not including damage due to labor deportations from annexed areas, which might amount to another two billion rubles.

b/ This represents the magnitude of defense expenditures, in terms of current rather than 1937 rubles.

c/ For defense expenditures the general industrial price parity is believed to be a less accurate indicator of the actual value of the war materials, etc. in dollar terms than is the official rate of exchange.

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- 21 -

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P. Comment

The estimates that have been presented in the previous pages are very rough, and in some instances may be substantially in error. Attention should be called especially to the following:

- a. Most of the investment figures which are expressed in terms of 1937 rubles in Section C-1 were originally expressed in terms of either 1926-27 rubles or 1933 rubles. The price index used to translate these figures into terms of 1937 rubles relates to the price level of all goods produced by industry, including consumption goods. Since the prices of the latter goods probably rose more than the prices of investment goods, the ruble capital investment figures in terms of 1937 rubles, and accordingly the figures on property destruction, probably are too high.
- b. The overstatement, however, is probably offset when the ruble figures are converted into dollars, for here the translation rate, eight to one, is based on the comparative level of wholesale industrial prices in general in Russia and in the United States. The rate based on the comparative prices of investment goods alone would be lower.
- c. It should be kept in mind that the rates of property destruction were computed on the basis of very incomplete information, and in some cases are more or less arbitrary.
- d. The calculation of the amount of pensions required numerous statistical simplifications, which may involve a sizable error. Also, as has already been indicated, a different interpretation of the Russian pension law from the one used in the calculation would reduce the total pension bill by about one ~~seventh~~ ^{seventh}.

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	ROULLARD	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY			PRIORITY
DATE	28 APRIL 1944	MOSCOW	ROUTINE
TON CODEROOM	1734		DEFERRED
DECODED BY	HENKE		
PARAPHRASED BY	UPTEGROVE / H. H. H.	CNO	PRIORITY
ROUTED BY	PIPP		ROUTINE
			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			
262324		NCR 9437	IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	SET

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

LIASON OFFICER PROMISES NAPODKA TRIP EITHER BY BOAT OR CAR SOON AS WEATHER WARMS UP ONLY TODAY CONFIRMED MOSCOWS PERMISSION. CHANCE TALK WITH MASTER SEVASTOPOL IN BERESTETSKYS OFFICE REVEALED SHIP QUICKLY DRY DOCKED AND REPAIRED IN VANCOUVER STATES WITH SINCERITY REPAIRS THAT PORTLAND RACKED LIBERTIES BETTER THAN IN US SINCE THEY REINFORCED MAIN DECK WITH RIVETED LONGITUDINAL STRIP RUNNING THREE FOURTHS LENGTH SHIP IN ADDITION TO REINFORCING SHEER STAKES CORNERS OF ALL HOLDS AND WELDING RAISED PLATES. WITNESSED US RAID ON PARAMUSHIRO ABOUT 0300 LCT 16TH. STATES WAS 40 MILES AWAY BUT SAW THRU GLASSES FLAMES AND MUCH WRECKAGE BLOWN HIGH IN AIR.

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3.2 and 3.3 or 3.5

OSD letter, May 1, 1974

DATE MAY 21 1973

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Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NOP

262324 300 Russia

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

PLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

PER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	FOR ACTION	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY		ROUTINE	
DATE		DEFERRED	
FOR CODER ROOM			
DECODED BY	INFORMATION	PRIORITY	
PARAPHRASED BY		ROUTINE	
ROUTED BY		DEFERRED	
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PAGE 2 OF	262324	NCR 9437	
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F-30	
VCNO	

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 4(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 1, 1978

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1978

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OPNAV-NCR-16

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

From: CG, Persian Gulf Command, Teheran, Iran

To: War Department

Nr: P 13415 24 April, 1944

P 13415 from Connolly to Dunlop acting The Adjutant General.

Memorandum number W850-44 dated 5 April current year is referred to. As a testimonial of good will existing between the two Allies recently the Soviet railway service operating in Iran presented Commanding General Persian Gulf Command with a brown bear cub. It is desired in order to perpetuate this consideration that this bear be transported to the United States and installed in the National Zoo at Washington District Columbia. Request is made therefore that you secure from the Secretary of the Interior permission to import into the United States one brown bear cub. Further arrangements should be made for installation of said bear at above zoo. Since the cub is now over two months old and growing rapidly request early action in order that transportation can be completed while animal is small enough to handle.

No Sig

ACTION: ASF
INFO: OPD
G-2 (Sec of Interior)
BPR
LOG

CM-IN-17882 (24 Apr 44)

1810Z med

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 2(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 4, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

300 Russia

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER		EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM US MILITARY MISSION MOSCOW RUSSIA			ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION	WAR DEPT NO. 464	PRIORITY
DATE 23 APRIL 1944				ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM 2000				DEFERRED
DECODED BY				
PARAPHRASED BY BAKER		INFORMATION		PRIORITY
ROUTED BY WILMAN				ROUTINE
				DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.				
NO. 464		22 APRIL 1944	NCR 10626	IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW <input type="checkbox"/>

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(RECEIVED FROM ARMY BY PRINTER)

INFO CWO FROM GENERAL DEANE.

DURING RECENT VISIT OF AMBASSADOR AND RADM OLSEN TO NORTH RUSSIAN PORTS FOLLOWING WAS NOTED: BOSTONS WERE CONVERTED TO CARRY 1 18-INCH TORPEDO ON EACH SIDE OF FUSELAGE. WHEN PLANE ON PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE OR LONG RANGE MISSION ONLY 1 TORPEDO WAS CARRIED. AIRCOWRAS FITTED TO CARRY A 250 KILO BOMB UNDER FUSELAGE AND 50 KILO BOMB UNDER EACH WING. 50 KILO BOMBS SEEN WERE CONVERTED ARTILLERY SHELLS. BULLET PROOF GLASS WAS BEING REMOVED FROM HURRICANES TO PLACE BEHIND PILOT SEAT IN AIRCOWRAS FOR BETTER VISION AND PROTECTION. SOVIETS WOULD PREFER AIRCOWRAS DELIVERED WITH BULLET PROOF GLASS BACK SHIELD PROVIDED

FOR PILOT
CM-IN-17178

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

CMNAV-NCR-15

300 Russia

MAY 20 1974

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY			PRIORITY
DATE			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROM			DEFERRED
DECODED BY			
PARAPHRASED BY			PRIORITY
ROUTED BY			ROUTINE
			DEFERRED

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

IF OPERATIONAL
CHECK BELOW

PAGE 2

23 APRIL 1944

NCR 1626

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:

DATE

TIME

GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

SOVIETS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR THE A2GB AS AGAINST
THE A2LG BECAUSE OF VISIBILITY IN NOSE.

BRITISH WERE MAINTAINING SMALL PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE
GROUP OPERATING SPITFIRES FROM MURMANSK IN CONNECTION
DEVELOPING INFO TIRPITZ WHICH UNDERSTAND BEING DIS-
CONTINUED.

ON RETURN MOSCOW AMBASSADOR WAS TOLD BY MR MIKOYAN
THAT NORTHERN AIR FORCE LIKES BOSTONS FOR TORPEDO
BOMBERS, BUT RED AIR FORCE AT FRONT PREFERS STORMO-
VIKS TO BOSTON.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

CONTINCH....COG.

OP03....16....CNO....24 OP....NAVAIDE....

CM-IN-17178

ACTION	
F-0	
F-01	
F-02	
F-05	
F-07	
F-1	
F-2	
F-20	
F-3	
F-30	
F-31	
F-32	
F-33	
F-34	
F-4	
FX01	
FX30	
FX37	
FX40	
IG-00	
VCNO	

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OPNAV-NCR-15

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		CNO	PRIORITY
DATE 22 APRIL 1944	FOR ACTION		ROUTINE
TCR CODEROM 2038			RRRR
DECODED BY MCCLELLAN	INFORMATION	COMNAVEU	DEFERRED
PARAPHRASED BY BAKER			
ROUTED BY WIDMAN			
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			
221028		NCR 5051	IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME. DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW ACTION CNO INFO COMNAVEU WHO PASS TO CNO.

Don't have
 IMMEDIATELY USNAVCO: 102200* RECEIVED CONTACTED RADN FISHER FOR DETAILS THEN APPROACHED SOVIETS FOR AUTHORITY SEND 2 U.S. OFFICERS TO COMBINE INSPECTION WITH BRITISH. REPEATED PRESSURE HAS NOT YET EXTRACTED ANSWER. BRITISH OFFICER DELAYED UNKNOWN REASONS. HAVE ASKED IF DELAY TOO LONG MY OFFICERS PROCEED NOVOROSSISK AND ALL MAJOR PORTS WEST TO ODESSA. HAVE ALSO REQUESTED INSPECTION TRIP BLACK SEA PORTS FOR GEN SPALDING AND CAPT FRANKEL AND TO ESTABLISH PERMANENT OFFICER AT ODESSA AT LATER DATE. NO RESULTS TO DATE.

*COMNAVNAW'S 061123 PASSED TO ALUSNA MOSCOW AS 102200.
 16....ACT.

34... 00:10CH... BUORD...

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (B)
 OSD letter, May 1, 1972
 MAY 21 1973

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(1) NAV-NCB-16

221028 300 Russia

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
 NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRIORITY
FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		CNO	ROUTINE
DATE 19 APRIL 1944			DEFERRED
TOR CODE 191438			
DECODED BY DECKMAN			PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY PARKER			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY WJ DMAN			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRIORITY AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
191212			NCR 1963

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

RED NAVY DESIRES SEND 3 CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERS TO WASHINGTON TO STUDY PLANNING CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION US NAVY YARDS AND BASES IN CONNECTION RECONSTRUCTION ALL OF THEIR BASES. PLEASE ADVISE IF THIS AGREEABLE AND IF SO WHOM THEY SHOULD FIRST CONTACT IN WASHINGTON ON SUBJECT.

ACTION		
F-0		21
F-01		22
F-02		23
F-05		24
F-07		25
F-1		26
F-2		27
F-20		28
F-3		29
F-30		30
F-31		31
F-32		32
F-33		33
F-34		34
F-4		35
FX30		36
FX37		37
FX40		38
IG-00		39
VCNO		40

RECEIVED

H. O. 11652, Sec. 5(D) and 5(D) or (B)

OBD letter, May 1, 1973

By DBS Date MAY 21 1973

16....ACT

COMINCH...13...34...BUDOCKS...CNO...NAVAID...

SECRET

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OPNAV-NCR-13

191212

300 Russia

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/06

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

ORIGINATOR	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		CNO	PRIORITY
DATE 15 APRIL 1944			ROUTINE
TON CODEROM 1845			DEFERRED
DECODED BY DOCKWEILER			PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY SAMUEL			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY HARRINGTON			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
150845			<input type="checkbox"/>
NCR 9326			

ORIGINATOR: FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME OCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT.

RED NAVAL FORCES MURMANSK AREA GIVE EVERY INDICATION
BEING VERY ACTIVE AGAINST GERMAN SHIPS AND AIRFIELDS
NORTHERN FINLAND. ON ARRIVAL MURMANSK 7TH INSPECTED
DAMAGED AIRCRAFT JUST RETURNED FROM ATTACK ON GERMAN
CONVOY NO. 10 PETSAMO OF WHICH THEY CLAIM 3 TRANSPORTS
AND SEVERAL ESCORTS SUNK. ON DEPARTURE 12TH ATTACK
PLANES JUST RETURNING FROM ATTACK ON 8 TRANSPORTS
PLANES WHICH LANDED ON FIELD SOUTH OF PETSAMO PREVIOUS
NIGHT. CLAIM DESTRUCTION 7. ABSENCE ANY ATTACK
AGAINST CROWDED SHIPPING KOLA INLET WITH FRONT ONLY 15
MINUTES FLYING TIME AWAY CAN ONLY MEAN LACK GERMAN
PLANES THIS AREA OR EFFECTIVE NEUTRALIZATION BY RED AIR
FORCES. SAW BOSTONS FITTED CARRY TWO TORPEDOES OUTBOARD
OF FUSELAGE PLUS GUNS ORIGINALLY DELIVERED. AIRCRAFTS
FITTED WITH SMALL SKI IN PLACE NOSE WHEEL WHICH REDS

ACTION	
F-0	
F-01	
F-02	
F-05	
F-07	
F-1	
F-2	
F-20	
F-3	
F-30	
F-31	
F-32	
F-33	
F-34	
F-4	
FX01	
FX30	
FX37	
FX40	
IG-00	
VCNO	

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OPNAV-NCR-15

R. O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 3(D) - (S)

Declassified letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

MESSAGE		NAVY DEPARTMENT	
FROM	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY	FOR ACTION		PRIORITY
DATE			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM			DEFERRED
DECODED BY			
PARAPHRASED BY	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
			ROUTINE
			DEFERRED
ROUTED BY			
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			
PAGE 2 OF		151845	NOR 9326
			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
			<input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR: FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

SAY GREATLY IMPROVES SNOW OPERATION.

16....ACT.

COMINCH....CNO....NAVATDE....94....CP-13....BUAER....

200P....

ACTION		21
F-0		22
F-01		23
F-02		24
F-05		25
F-07		26
F-1		27
F-2		28
F-20		29
F-3		30
F-30		31
F-31		32
F-32		33
F-33		34
F-34		35
F-4		36
FX01		37
FX30		38
FX37		39
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		52

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(1) (7449 (E))

OSD letter, May 3, 1973

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

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OPNAV-NCR-13

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

April 11, 1944

From: A.F.H.Q. signed Wilson

To : Chiefs of Staff Joint Staff Mission for U.S.
Chiefs of Staff

Rptd: H.Q. MAAF.

MEDCOS 90

Reference COSMED 57, 22

Brigadier MacLean accompanied by mission from Tito will arrive this headquarters 16th (?) Question of Russian aircraft facilities at Bari for supply of Russian Mission to Tito will certainly be raised. Moreover, Vasiliev, Russian Military Representative with Allied Control Commission, made a formal enquiry to the Chief of Staff two days ago as to whether any decision had been reached, and asked that note should be taken of the fact that this had been done. A decision is therefore urgently required. As regards operational control, from conversations with Vasiliev it seems clear that the Russians will be prepared to accept our views on this question. In fact, the one Russian aircraft now working from Bari is conforming to our requirements without any difficulty.

T.O.O. 121415B

ACTION: CCS

INFO : Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Col Park
C of S

DECLASSIFIED
J.C.S. Regrading Memo 54522-71
By DBS Date MAY 21 1973

CM-IN-8802 (13 Apr 44)

0229Z amr

For Russia

~~SECRET~~

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: U.S. Military Attache,
Ankara, Turkey

To: War Department

Nr: MILID 93 8 April 44

MILID Number 93 AMSNE 707.

Recent statement of Molotov on Russian post war policy regarding Rumania and Balkans elicits marked comment in Turkish editorials of April 5th and 6th. Editorial comment expresses almost completely uniform pleasure at his "First light coming from Russia over the dark world" from Gurtrua in Yeni Halk but equally stresses the fact that future developments will have to prove sincerity of Molotov pronouncements.

Yeni Halk, also, states that so far Russia has not failed keep promise "Annuled documents or considered treaties as scraps of paper". Editorials generally consider announcement very smart move on Russias part directed to Allies as well as Rumania and likely play part in defeat of Germany as ~~improvisi~~ ^{improvisi} ~~hitt~~ ^{hitt} military moves. Comment, also, decries fact England and America do not follow similar policy or any concrete post war policy instead of sticking to "Unconditional surrender" theme. They believe new Russian policy will, and particularly if followed by all Allies, be found to shorten war, first by inducing Axis Satellites to detach from Germany and second by undermining German Government and German will to resist.

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 1, 1973

By DBS.

Date MAY 21 1973

CM-IN-6516 (9 Apr 44)

Cal. Park

300 *Russ* ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Page 2

From: U.S. Military Attache,
Ankara, Turkey

Mr: MILID 93 8 April 44

Some papers consider statement opening line to reduce doubts now existing between Russia and her Allies and consider this a good sign. Some papers do not mention possibility Russian statement not sincere. Yugoslav Royalist elements here are much more doubtful of Russias intention carry out policy and believe actions will follow letter of statement but evade spirit.

For example they believe elections will be staged in Rumania to assure collaboration with Russia in spite of Yugoslav certainty that Rumania does not want communism. Rumanian attitude toward announcement generally one of pleased surprise mixed with some mistrust. Rumanians hopeful because announcement addressed to Rumania but to Hungary not.

No sig.

**Being Serviced

ACTION: G-2

INFO : CG AAF
OPD
Col Park
Log

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 5(D) or (H)

OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS Date MAY 21 1973

CM-IN-6516 (9 Apr 44) 23137 mcs

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

CONFIDENTIAL
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: U.S. Military Attache, Ankara, Turkey

To: War Department
CG U.S. Army Forces in the Middle
East, Cairo, Egypt

86
702

6 April 44

Number MILID 86 AMSME 702.

Varied reaction in Turk press to Russian Japanese agreement but bulk consider two powers defined respecting zones influence and will continue mutual neutrality. Deputy in VAKIT says it weakens agreements at Cairo and is detrimental to Anglo American prestige in Far East. Chinese Minister considers ominous sign but both he and Czech representative who close to Russians considers it sign weakness on Japanese part.

No sig.

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: CG AAF
OPD
Col Park

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (H)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

CM-IN-4292 (6 Apr 44) 2155Z bjm

40

360 Russia

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

April 6, 1944

From: ALUSNA MOSCOW

051004

Date: 5 April 1944

Action: CNO

9 Navy had yesterday
In conversations with Chief of Staff Navy Air. Chief of Navy Communications and Navy Liaison Officer indicate they consider major objective of Red Army to make an early occupation of Ploesti. They also promote the idea that the capture of Ploesti, regardless of any Allied moves in the west, will be a decisive point of War.

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: CG AAF
OPD
COL PARK
LOG

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS Date MAY 21 1973

CM-IN-4231

(6 Apr 44)

2009Z

1cm

340 Russia

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date *4/12/94*

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTM

DRAFTER		EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM			ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION	CNO	ROUTINE
DATE				ROUTINE
TOR CODER ROOM				DEFERRED
DECODED BY				PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY		INFORMATION		ROUTINE
ROUTED BY				DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.				
051004			NCR 2452	IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW <input type="checkbox"/>
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:		DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

CONVERSATIONS WITH CHIEF OF STAFF NAVY AIR.
CHIEF OF NAVY COMMUNICATIONS AND NAVY LIAISON
OFFICER INDICATE THEY CONSIDER RED ARMY MAKING
EARLY OCCUPATION PLOESTI MAJOR OBJECTIVE THEY
ALSO PROMOTING IDEA CAPTURE PLOESTI WILL BE A
DECISIVE POINT OF WAR REGARDLESS ANY ALLIED MOVES
IN WEST.

16...ACT

COMINCH...CNO...21G...NAVAIDE...21OP...13....

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and

OSD letter, May 1, 1970

DBS

Date

 MAY 21 1973
 10-00
 800-00 (E)
 50
 50
~~SECRET~~

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OPNAV-NCR-13

051004

300 Russia

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 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
 NLR 101
 By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM AMERICAN CONSUL VLADIVOSTOK		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELAYED BY		CNO	PRIORITY
DATE 5 APRIL 1944			ROUTINE
			DEFERRED
FOR CODEROM 1610		MOSCOW	PRIORITY
DECODED BY WEBB			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY FAGER/LTK/GIBSON			DEFERRED
ROUTED BY WILLIAMS			
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
040110			NCR 2384

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ACTION CNO INFO MOSCOW FROM AMERICAN CONSUL VLADIVOSTOK

MERSHIP KULU CARRING 244 SOVIET PASSENGERS WHICH FLEET PERSONNEL OFFICER STATES INCLUDE 112 RED NAVY MEN CREWS FOR SUB CHASERS 217-220 INCLUSIVE. 22 ARE UNKNOWN CABIN PASSENGERS AND REMAINING 110 HE CANNOT ACCOUNT FOR AND THEIR IDENTITY IS UNKNOWN TO CONGEN WHOM THEY HAVE BEEN REPORTED ON BILL OF HEALTH ONLY AS STEERAGE PASSENGERS

ACTION		
F-0		21
F-01		22
F-02		23
F-03		24
F-04		25
F-05		26
F-06		27
F-07		28
F-08		29
F-09		30
F-10		31
F-11		32
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F-18		39
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F-66		87
F-67		88
F-68		89
F-69		90
F-70		91
F-71		92
F-72		93
F-73		94
F-74		95
F-75		96
F-76		97
F-77		98
F-78		99
F-79		100

16...ACT

ADD: 13 (PER 16)...COMINCH...

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 5(D) of (E)
OSD letter, May 4, 1972
By DBS Date MAY 21 1973

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OPNAV-NCH-16

040110 300 Russia

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

T O [REDACTED]

April 1, 1944

To : Joint Staff Mission

From: Air Ministry

AX 400

Following received from 30 Mission, Moscow.

Addressed to Air Attache Teheran repeated Air Ministry Whitehall, Britman Washington (Air Min Whitehall pass), H.Q. RAF ME Rear, 216 Group (HQ RAF ME pass).

Air 952 March 31. Russians just informed us that two Dakotas with Tito Mission will arrive Teheran April 3. Strength of party 17 with personal kit and 2250 kilos of freight.

2. Russians stress the fact that personnel are just common people and they do not wish any parties arranged en route, but want them to reach Bari early as possible.

3. Grateful if last addressee can forecast probable date of arrival Bari and arrange we are kept informed progress of aircraft and actual arrival.

No Sig

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Col Park ✓

CM-IN-1047 (2 Apr 44) 1029Z jb

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO, 1-17-73
BY DBA, DATE

MAY 21 1973

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24-75724A3CD-25X

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

1 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL BROWN:

Subject: Estimated Situation on the Soviet-German Front as of 1 June 1944.

In compliance with your instructions, the following is an estimate of the situation on the Eastern Front, to include the probable location of the front line as of 1 June 1944.

It is suggested that due to the dearth of information on the Red Army, any prediction must be nothing better than an "educated guess."

It is generally agreed that Soviet manpower is such that the Red Army is able to maintain a superiority of numbers, and with a peak war production, is able to replace battle wastages, particularly in artillery and tanks. Lend-Lease fills out the other two vital factors--planes and food.

Therefore, a definite strategy is opened to the Soviets which they have relentlessly maintained. This strategy involves pressure along the entire front, and when a soft spot in the German lines appears, it is developed to the limit. Meanwhile, pressure is not relaxed on the remainder of the front, thereby pinning down lateral movement of German reinforcements.

To date no major Soviet drive has been launched without simultaneous pressure all along the rest of the front. Further, it is believed that during April the ground from the Pripet marches north will

- 1 -

greatly restrict large scale pressure. Therefore, in spite of the fact that the southern sectors of the front may permit large scale operations, the accompanying pressure in the north will be absent, thus preventing the Red Army temporarily from continuing its overall strategy.

The actual period of thaw may only be about four weeks duration but men and materiel are not moved up to the front-until the ground is hard, and this movement requires time. The latter part of May then will permit the Soviets to resume their strategy.

Therefore, I estimate the front on 1 June will be substantially the same as at present except for that portion from the vicinity of Cernauti to the Black Sea, where it may be along the Carpathians to approximately the mouth of the Danube or to some point on the coast more to the north.

RICHARD PARK, JR.,
Colonel, General Staff.

SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING MESSAGE

WAC

OPD 336 Poland (31 Mar 44)
OPD WDGS Middle East-Central
African Thr. WDOPD 3851 DVJ

March 31, 1944

US Military Mission
Union Soviet Socialist Republic
Moscow, Russia

Number: WAR 17513 (M-39)

To Deane from Marshall

Pursuant to specific instructions from the Commander in Chief of the Polish Army in London, the Polish Military Attache in Washington has officially requested the WD to explain the visit by General Crist to Polish Army units in the USSR. Attache pointed out the worldwide publicity given by the Soviets to that visit to show that the US supports forces of the Polish Army in the USSR which are not recognized by the London Polish government. The War Department's answer to the attache was that the visit carried no political significance, that it was made because it was an event of military interest, that General Crist was unaware of the political implications and that both War and State Departments were sending appropriate instructions to Moscow. By this message the War Department complies with the last statement.

No sig

ORIGINATOR: OPD

INFORMATION: G-2
Log

CN-OUT-17513 (1 Apr 44)

2312Z

1b*

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

300 Russia

Col. Park

27

COPY No.

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OPD 10-5204-1

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date *4/12/94*

SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Military Attache Stockholm, Sweden
To: War Department
No #230 30 March, 1944
To MILID.

Russian reinforcements continue to arrive on the Murmansk-Salla-Louhi fronts, strength, composition and point of origin yet unknown according to 136 who adds that unusually heavy snow past three weeks 5 feet deep in some areas (230 repeated London) with low temperatures ranging to minus 22 degrees Fahrenheit has dampened Russian probing tactics in Louhi Sector. Credit 98 who requests OSS be informed.

Rayens

ACTION: G-2

INFO : OPD
Col Park

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (B)
OSD letter, May 1, 1972
By DBS Date MAY 21 1973

CM-IN-21885 (30 Mar 44) 2309Z mcs

300 Russia

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28

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

From: CG, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces
Caserta, Italy

To: War Department

Re: AS 225 27 March 1944

AAA RRR AFHQ RRR Britman Washington RRR Mideast
from HQ MAAF AS 225 27th March Top Secret.

Air Ministry COSMED 70 received here today. Action
was taken by us on 22 March to get 2 Dakotas to Teheran
as soon as possible for 30 mission. Have informed Air
Ministry FREEDOM Advance Force 266 and AFHQ.

No Sig

COSMED 70 is CM-IN-18505 (26 Mar 44) CCS

ACTION: CCS

INFORMATION: GEN. ARNOLD
OPD
GEN. BISSELL
ADM. KING
COL. MATHEWSON
LOG

CM-IN-19798 (28 Mar 44) 0834Z cng

DECLASSIFIED
JCS LETTER, 7-5-72
BY DBS, DATE MAY 21 1973

COPY No. 3

300 Russia
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

24-75724ABCD-25X

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

~~SECRET~~
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Chiefs of Staff
To: A.F.H.Q.
Rptd: J.S.M., Washington,
MIDEAST, and No. 30 MISSION.
Date: 25 March 1944.

COSMED 70

Following for General Wilson from Chiefs of Staff.

Reference COSMED 65, and 30 Mission Signal 0.1027 Cypher
(Not to Britman or Mideast).

Important that 2 Dakotas be made available at Teheran as
requested in COSMED 65 as soon as possible. Request report
of present position.

Time of Origin 251550Z

COSMED 65 is CM-IN-13204 (19 Mar 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: GEN. ARNOLD OPD GEN. BISSELL ADM. KING
COL. MATHEWSON LOG

CM-IN-18505 (26 Mar 44) 1035Z cng

DECLASSIFIED
J.C.S. Regrading Memo SM522-71
By ABJ Date MAY 21 1973

31

~~SECRET~~
COPY No.

300 Russia
COSMED-70605 THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: US Military Mission Moscow Russia

To: War Department

Nr: 340

22 March 1944

OPD info G2 sgd Deane.

The Naval Attache at Murmansk reports an unusual amount of Red transport is moving to West bank of Kola inlet and that rumor indicates Rolessovski will soon start operations against Finland from Kandalaksha as a center. A Naval Officer recently arrived from Murmansk noticed movement to North of approximately 30 trains of trucks and personnel with key tanks and light artillery pieces.

Canadian Military Attache on recent trip from Archangel also reported movement of Soviet troops and trucks to North. Nothing more than this is known. Will send any new evidence that we receive.

No Sig

ACTION: G-2

INFO : CGAAP
OPD
Col Mathewson
Log

CM-IN-16475 (23 Mar 44)

1421Z jb

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

300 Russia

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40

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

March 19, 1944

FROM: MAAF Caserta and A.F.H.Q. Algiers

TO : Thirty Mission Moscow
Rptd. Air Ministry for British Chiefs of Staff
B.A.D. Washington
Middle East
Advance Force 133 at Bari Headquarters

NO : 1294

From Fairbanks from Wilson.

Two Dakota type Aircraft will be made available at Teheran for transport of Soviet personnel and stores from that point to Tito Mission via Cairo and Bara. Arrangements will be similar to those on previous operation of same nature. Details will be coordinated between Headquarters MAAF Caserta and Advance Force 133 Bari. Request first addressee advise date aircraft are desired at Teheran as early as possible. This refers to COSMED 65.

No Sig

Time of Origin 191600

FOOTNOTE: COSMED 65 is CM-IN-13204 (19 Mar 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Gen Arnold
CPD
Gen Bissell
Adm. King
Col. Mathewson
Log

CM-N -18168 (25 Mar 44) 2207Z jb

DECLASSIFIED
JCS LETTER 7-8-72
BY DSS, DATE

MAY 21 1973

~~SECRET~~

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31

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

300 Russia
cosmed.medcas

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM COMNAVEU		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		CNO	PRIORITY
DATE 12 MARCH 1944	FOR ACTION		RRRR
TOR CODEROOM 121246			DEFERRED
DECODED BY MITCHELL			PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY ROGERS/GIBSON	INFORMATION		ROUTINE
ROUTED BY WILLIAMS			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
PAGE 1 OF 2.	111756	NCR 5159	<input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(COMNAVEU SENDS ACTION CNO)

RUSSIAN MILITARY DELEGATION RECENTLY ASKED A GOOD MANY MILITARY AND NAVAL QUESTIONS FROM ARMY AND NAVY HERE. RECENT DIRECTIVE FROM MILID WASHINGTON TO ETOUSA STATES THAT WAR DEPARTMENT IS NOT IN FAVOR OF BEGINNING IN LONDON THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WITH THE RUSSIANS AND DIRECTS THAT WHEN THEY ASK FOR INFORMATION THEY BE ADVISED THAT THE US MILITARY MISSION IN MOSCOW IS THE ONLY OFFICE WHICH CAN PROVIDE FOR SUCH INFORMATION. SHALL I ASSUME THIS POLICY TO HOLD ALSO FOR THE NAVY. BRITISH ARE TIGHT WITH THEIR INFORMATION IN ENDEAVOR TO GET SOME EXCHANGE OF WHICH THERE IS PRACTICALLY NONE AT PRESENT. HAVE RECENTLY GIVEN RUSSIANS CONDUCTED IRIP TO AN AMPHIBIOUS BASE AND LONDONDERRY NOW BEING INSPECTED. HOWEVER AM REFUSING TAKE THEM DUNKSWELL BECAUSE OF PRESENCE OF

ACTION	
F-0	
F-01	
F-02	
F-05	
F-07	
F-1	
F-2	
F-20	
F-3	
F-30	
F-31	
F-32	
F-33	
F-34	
F-4	
FX01	
FX30	
FX37	
FX40	
IG-00	
VCNO	

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 3(D) or (2) OSD letter, May 1, 1972

Date **MAY 21 197**

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) N. B. DBS)

OPNAVSUBS 111756 300 Russia

DECLASSIFIED E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4 NLR 101 By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

MESSAGE		EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM			ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION		PRIORITY
DATE				ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM				DEFERRED
DECODED BY				
PARAPHRASED BY		INFORMATION		PRIORITY
ROUTED BY				ROUTINE
				DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.				IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
PAGE 2 OF 2.		111756	NCR 5159	<input type="checkbox"/>
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT	

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

SECRET WEAPONS THERE. ESTABLISHING VERY CORDIAL
RELATIONS BUT ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS BEING AVOIDED.

16.....ACT

ARMY.....COMINCH....20G.....CNO.....NAVAIDE.....13.....

20OP.....

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-13

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

ACTION		21
F-0		22
F-01		23
F-02		24
F-05		25
F-07		26
F-1		27
F-2		28
F-20		29
F-3		30
F-30		31
F-31		32
F-32		33
F-33		34
F-34		35
F-4		36
FX01		37
FX30		38
FX37		39
FX40		40
VCNO		41
		42
		43
		44
		45
		46
		47
		48
		49
		50
		51
		52

NAVAL MESSAGE VIA NAVY

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRIORITY
FROM AMCON VLADIVOSTOK		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEES	
RELEASED BY		CNO	PRIORITY
DATE 29 FEBRUARY 1944		ALUSNA MOSCOW	ROUTINE
TOR CODEBOOK 1624			DEFERRED
DECODED BY WOODMAN			PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY KORSGAARD-2 (23L)			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY HARRINGTON			DEFERRED

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRIORITY

290230 NCR 27065

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME OCT 20

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(ACTION CNO, MOSCOW FROM AMCON VLAD)

INCREASE IN RAIL CAR SUPPLY GOOD LOCAL WEATHER AND ONLY ONE SHIP ARRIVAL DURING FEBRUARY HAVE ENABLED VLADIVOSTOK PORT TO APPRECIABLE REDUCE BACKLOG OF CARGO THUS FAR ACCUMULATED. HOWEVER PORT AREA STILL BADLY CONGESTED WITH AN ESTIMATED 200,000 TONS REMAINING.

NO DISTRIBUTION BY MCR
MCR PASSED TO NCR FOR DISTRIBUTION
TOR NCR 1747/29

16....ACTION

39....CCMINCH.....FX37.....CNO.....NAVAID.....

220P.....

R. O. 11502, Sec. 2 (E) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) (51) (52) (53) (54) (55) (56) (57) (58) (59) (60) (61) (62) (63) (64) (65) (66) (67) (68) (69) (70) (71) (72) (73) (74) (75) (76) (77) (78) (79) (80) (81) (82) (83) (84) (85) (86) (87) (88) (89) (90) (91) (92) (93) (94) (95) (96) (97) (98) (99) (100)

OSD letter, May 1973

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

10-00 51

VCNO 53

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Office in person. (See APL 74 (4) NAVREGS)

OPNAV-MCR-16 A 33053

190130 300 Russia

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

PLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C. (25)

SECRET

29 February 1944

The White House Map Room
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Colonel L. Mathewson

Gentlemen:

I am transmitting herewith one copy of R & A No.
1355.2, "Russian Capabilities and Prospects, Part VII. Morale",
prepared in the Research and Analysis Branch of this office
and classified as secret.

Sincerely yours,

William L. Langer
William L. Langer
Director, Branch of
Research & Analysis

Enclosure

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By *AB* Date MAY 21 1973

300 Russia

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date *4/2/94*

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Research and Analysis Branch

R & A No. 13552

RUSSIAN CAPABILITIES AND PROSPECTS

Part VII. MORALE

Description

This study of morale as affecting Soviet military potential presents evidence as to the state of civilian, military, and governmental morale in the USSR, and analyzes phenomena relating to morale, such as propaganda, nationalism, religion, losses and hardship, and the like.

29 December 1943

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By WJS Date MAY 21 1973

If and when this study outlives its usefulness to you, kindly return it to:

Office of Strategic Services
Director, Research and Analysis Branch
25th and E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C. (25)

34169

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Summary and Conclusions	1
A. Civilian Morale	1
B. Red Army Morale	13
C. Morale of the Soviet Government	17
D. Probable Morale Changes in the Event of Military Reverses	18

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

RUSSIAN CAPABILITIES AND PROSPECTS

PART VII. MORALE

Summary and Conclusions

1. The morale of the people of the USSR has mounted considerably since Stalingrad largely as a consequence of the victories of the Red Army. Furthermore, hatred of the enemy is universal. The vast majority, therefore, accepts great hardships in order to carry on the fight, and, in the occupied areas, undertakes guerrilla activity rather than submit to the Germans. This determination is caused by the conviction that they are fighting a defensive war with right wholly on their side. Patriotic inspiration, traditional Slavic hostility to Germans, and resentment inspired by German atrocities enforce this determination. With rare individual exceptions, the various national minorities have apparently proved their loyalty to the Soviet regime, in spite of German attempts to arouse dissension and to create "anti-Bolshevik" armies. In addition, the leading religious bodies of the Soviet Union have taken a strong stand against the Germans, while the efforts of a pro-Axis section of the clergy in the occupied regions have had little effect. The re-established Patriarchate in Moscow is strongly supporting the Soviet War effort. It is probable that Anglo-American supplies help Soviet morale. The effective use the Soviet government has made of press, radio, moving pictures, theater, music, art, and literature is an additional reason for good popular spirit.

Much of the evidence on Soviet morale, comes, of course, from sources either wholly or in part provided by Soviet authorities who would probably not report many unfavorable manifestations. On the other hand, there is considerable available evidence not subject to Soviet control which also supports the impression that the morale of Russian civilians is strong.

2. There are certain factors, however, which unless compensated for, would tend to lower the morale of the Soviet peoples. They have had to endure great losses and great hardships. The long working hours and many exhausting demands upon free time have produced a good deal of physical weariness. The poor diet of 15.5 million miscellaneous workers and employees and the great shortage of consumers' goods have probably had a more or less unfavorable influence upon morale. Furthermore, the 23 million dependents who are probably in a seriously sub-standard condition have, in their family relationships with soldiers and war workers, probably had an adverse influence on morale in general. These serious hardships, however, have not undermined the Soviet war effort. Occasional evidences of weak discipline or collaboration with the enemy are effectively dealt with by the secret police.

3. The morale of the Red Army is also high. Here, too, recent successes in the field play a leading role in raising spirits to new levels. Conditions within the armed forces themselves are also important; effective and sufficient supplies and good equipment; good medical care for the wounded; the growth of firm discipline, military tradition and esprit de corps; and confidence in the technical ability of officers and men. The Red Army enjoys strong support from the civilian population, with which its ties are very close. The government and Party have carried on in recent months an intensive campaign to indoctrinate the troops with military zeal and loyalty to the Soviet regime and to increase the ranks of the Communist Party and Komsomol. Finally, the evidence of German brutality seen by Red Army men has induced stern determination. The discouraging effect of heavy casualties has not appreciably counteracted these favorable factors.

4. Evidence of the Soviet government's confidence in the outcome of the war is indicated by demands for an all-out attack to bring speedy victory and for reparations from the Germans, by the training of administrators for the still unconquered Baltic, and by a recent broadcast declaring that Soviet troops would soon reach the Vistula and the Nieman, the Bug and the Danube.

5. It does not seem likely that important checks to the Red Army's offensive would bring a decline in the morale of the Soviet population sufficient to impair the war effort. If, however, the food situation should deteriorate markedly, increased hunger added to existing undernourishment, plus the cumulative effects of physical exhaustion, the shortage of consumers' goods, and other dire suffering, would probably lower the morale of the people and the Army enough to reduce the net striking power of the USSR to a significant degree.

A. Civilian Morale

Almost all available evidence indicates that the war effort of the USSR enjoys exceedingly strong popular support. In June 1943, William Slater, Australian Minister to Russia, expressed his considered opinion that "the Russian people's morale is the highest in the world." There was no question in his mind of Russia's seeking a separate peace. 1/ Despite an almost unbearably low standard of living, many foreign observers agree that the Soviet people are of excellent spirit and have no doubt concerning ultimate victory. The almost unbroken series of victories since Stalingrad has naturally played a most important role in bolstering popular morale and the recent rapid succession of triumphs in the Ukraine has been received with especial jubilation, both popular and official. In Moscow, foreign correspondents report, rockets and booming cannon have saluted the recent victories as the people poured into the streets, shouting with delight, and embracing strangers. 2/

This high morale has found concrete expression in all parts of the USSR. On 28 March 1943, Red Star announced that public donations to the Red Army totalled several billion rubles, much of which was in the form of badly needed clothing. Moreover, the Second National War Loan of 12 billion rubles was over-subscribed in one day by 2.86 billion rubles. 3/

In the occupied regions of the USSR the persistent activity of the partisans is evidence of the popular determination to destroy the enemy. Guided by Moscow, the partisans are organized as an "army of avengers" seeking retribution for "bloody repression." The Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of 28 July 1943, declares that the production centers in occupied areas must be closely guarded, and German leaders must be prepared to fight at all times. The Corriere della Sera recently placed the number of Soviet guerrillas at 300,000, and stated that partisan warfare in Russia is assuming an unprecedented scope which has required the use of picked, regular troops. 4/ Radio Moscow claimed on 28 June 1943 that in two years Soviet partisans had killed 300,000 of the enemy, wrecked 3,000 trains, demolished 3,263 railway and highway bridges and 895 ammunition and food dumps. 5/

1/ New York Herald Tribune, 20 June 1943.

2/ New York Herald Tribune, 10 September 1942; The Evening Star, Washington, D. C., 28 February 1943; "Gilmore of AP Back in Capital; Praises Russians' Philosophy," ibid., 11 June 1943; Time, 20 September 1943, p. 36.

3/ New York Herald Tribune, 29 March 1943; domestic broadcast, Khabarovsk, as monitored by FCC, 5 June 1943; FCC Teletype, A93; 8 June 1943; ibid., A251, 10 June 1943.

4/ BBC Daily Digest of World Broadcasts, 4A USSR Home (vi); 7 July 1943; ibid., 4A USSR Home (xii), 16 June 1943; Cable #4632, Bern, 1 August 1943.

5/ BBC Daily Digest of World Broadcasts, 4A USSR Home, 18, 20, 28 June 1943.

Light recently shed on an "underground" communist youth organization called "The Young Guards," which was formed in Voroshilovgrad region in July 1942, shows the difficulties faced by the Germans in subduing the population. The organization chiefly sought to maintain the morale of the people in the occupied regions by informing them of Soviet victories, displaying Red flags on Soviet holidays, sending packages to Gestapo prisoners, and aiding their families. Shortly before the liberation of Voroshilovgrad, the organization was nearly wiped out by the Germans as a result of the activities of informers. 1/

There are obvious signs, too, that the Germans are facing a widespread campaign of non-cooperation. "Every tentative investigation," declares Krakirski Visti, of 21 July 1942, "meets with the silence of the 'fatalism of the Russian.' People work, earn enough to live on and collaborate in daily life. But there is no sign of a decisive change, especially among the young." 2/ Gunnar Mullern, correspondent for Aftonbladet of Stockholm, who visited the Ukraine in the summer of 1943, gives a similar account. According to him, the Germans in the Ukraine, who found that collaboration was a swiftly disappearing dream, lived in constant fear for their lives. He pointed out that the attitude of the Ukrainian population was one explanation for the Red Army's victories in the summer of 1943. The attitude of the White Russian population, he added, is identical with that of the Ukrainians. 3/ The statements of a German prisoner of war captured in the Mediterranean area also indicated that the civilian population fought the invaders with ferocity. When captured and executed, he said, the population, men, women and children, died with hymns on their lips. This was the situation everywhere in Russia.

Mention should be made of the fact that the Germans have repeatedly claimed that the Russian workers in Germany had proved to be very docile and skillful, even in the manufacture of munitions. In November 1943 Reichministers Ley and Sauckel held a big demonstration of foreign workers. Both officials claimed that the Russians were very efficient and performed little sabotage. 4/ These German propaganda claims,

- 1/ Domestic broadcast, Khabarovsk, as monitored by FCC, 15 September 1943.
- 2/ Despatch from Stockholm, 2 October 1942, OSS #25301 (Restricted).
- 3/ Cable, Stockholm, #3169, 2 October 1943.
- 4/ OSS #14921, 10 April 1943; OSS #25409, 24 November 1943.

are naturally denied by the Russians, who have printed many letters allegedly from "voluntary" workers in Germany, relating brutal treatment endured. Also, in October, 1942, Izvestiya printed an article, allegedly taken from the Frankfurter Zeitung, which described the barbed wire, guards, and the whips used to keep control over workers from the occupied USSR. 1/ Similar testimony comes from Sweden. A Swedish worker who returned to Sweden after five months in a factory near Salzburg published an account of his experiences in Aftonidningen for 31 October 1943. He stated that the various foreign workers in the plant showed an amazing capacity for sabotage. The Russians received the worst treatment, being quartered in an old shed patched with tarpaper. Nevertheless, in spite of all hardship, the Russians kept up their courage, and nearly always sang. Trotski reported that several thousand Russian workers employed by Krupps made their hands unfit for work by repeated rubbing with sandpaper. Even though the German shot them for this practice, the Germans were unable to control actions of this sort. 2/

One of the chief reasons for the determination of the Soviet peoples is that they believe they are fighting a righteous war of defense. "Every citizen of the Soviet Union," declared M.I. Kalinin, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, "fully realizes that dangers threaten not only himself but his family, our whole way of life." 3/ In addition the invasion has brought great hardships to all. According to an often critical student of Soviet affairs, "The war...must postpone the better life that was just dawning, and this, no less than the sense of outrage at the hands of a treacherous enemy, has aroused a bitter feeling of hate and loathing for Nazi Germany." 4/ The transition to the offensive and the recent victories must, therefore, serve only to intensify the resolve of the Russians to make every effort to drive the enemy out.

The wrath of the people of the USSR against the Germans is reinforced by a hatred generated by the brutalities of the Axis troops. Maurice Hindus wrote in July 1942, "One must be here to appreciate the flaming hate of the Germans and the tempestuous resolve to fight with every weapon available." 5/

1/ Izvestiya, 23 October 1942.

2/ OSS #26409, 24 November 1943; Airgram, Stockholm, AB76, 16 November 1943 (Restricted).

3/ English broadcast, Moscow, as monitored by FCC, 31 March 1943.

4/ L. E. Hubbard, Soviet Labour and Industry, London, 1942, p. vii.

5/ New York Herald Tribune, 28 July 1942.

The record of wanton destruction, murder, torture, rape and enslavement has been detailed in the formal statements published by the Extraordinary State Committee for the Ascertaining and Investigation of the Crimes of the German Fascist Invaders, of 6 April 1943, 26 June 1943, 6 August 1943 and 7 September 1943, and Molotov's Note of 11 May 1943, to all countries with which the USSR maintains diplomatic relations. 1/ Molotov quoted the German-controlled Minsker Zeitung of 14 January 1943 to the effect that 2,000,000 persons were dispatched to Germany from the occupied regions of the East, and Pravda sharply attacked the practice of treating Soviet citizens like cattle in an "open market." 2/ Among the many shocking instances cited by the committee were the alleged mass executions by poisoning of over 1,000 psychiatric patients in a Kursk hospital and 6,000 citizens in Krasnodar, and the alleged slaughter by various means 12,000 to 14,000 inhabitants of Orel. 3/ Izvestiya on 26 August 1943 stated the official belief that the systematic destruction and annihilation of the whole economy and wealth of the Soviet Union was a deliberate German policy to hurt the Soviet people and undermine their strength for many years to come. 4/

The misdeeds of the invaders have been made known to the populace in all manner of ways -- by photographs of the victims, by moving pictures, by the printed word and by accounts of eyewitnesses and escaped victims. 5/

1/ Pravda, 7 April 1943, 12 May 1943, and 25 June 1943; English broadcast, Moscow, as monitored by FCC, 11 September 1943; BBC, Daily Digest of World Broadcasts, 4A USSR Home (vi), 6 August 1943.

2/ Embassy of the USSR, Information Bulletin, 15 May 1943; domestic broadcast, Khabarovsk, as monitored by FCC, 12 May 1943.

3/ Domestic broadcast, Khabarovsk, as monitored by FCC, 7 July 1943; Daily Report, Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, FCC, 26 June 1943, p. OI; English broadcast, Moscow, as monitored by FCC, 11 September 1943; ibid., 19 July 1943.

Anglo-American correspondents were permitted to view the enemy's handiwork in the Orel region. See Werth, Alexander, "12,000 Died in Orel Under Nazi Rule," The New York Times, 14 August 1943; Cassidy, Henry C., "Grave of 8,000 Slain by Nazis at Orel Opened," New York Herald Tribune, 17 August 1943; BBC, Daily Digest of World Broadcasts, 10 Americans, (ii), (iii), 16 August 1943.

4/ BBC, Daily Digest of World Broadcasts, 4A USSR Home (v), 26 August 1943.

5/ e.g., English broadcast, Moscow, as monitored by FCC, 3 April 1943; BBC Daily Digest of World Broadcasts, 4A USSR Home (vi), 26 June 1943; ibid., 4A USSR Home (x), 5 July 1943.

A Pravda editorial of 7 April declared: "...By nature, the Russian people are generous, ...but...this [the atrocities in Vyazma, Rzhev, Sychevka, Gahatsk, Kharkov, Smolensk] has aroused their anger, their hatred for the base German invaders. We shall forgive nothing, forget nothing..." 1/

Nationalism is another factor strengthening morale. The Soviet regime has long encouraged the people to take pride in Alexander Nevsky, Peter the Great, Suvorov, Kutuzov and more recently Brusilov. Patriotism has been carefully inculcated and has given the people inspiration to emulate the deeds of their forefathers. The Soviet people have been made to feel that they are the inheritors of a glorious tradition which the invaders are seeking to destroy. 2/ They have also been taught to view the present war as a new phase in the age-old struggle between German and Slav. At the three All-Slav meetings held at Moscow since June 1941 the kinship of the Slavs in this war has been stressed. 3/

The German racial program has given point to the Soviet policy of the brotherhood of peoples. The Volksdeutsche in the Ukraine enjoy revocable German citizenship, entitling them to numerous special privileges not enjoyed by the natives. They receive higher wages than the Ukrainians, and enjoy special labor, educational, and legal rights. 4/ The Soviet system of complete equality of all races, as shown by the honors paid to Kazakhs, Mordvins, Tatars, Latvians, and many others, probably appeals much more to the national minorities of the USSR than does the doctrine of the Herrenvolk. 5/ Representatives of these national groups in the Red Army are told that they, too, share the Union's traditions. Specially prepared texts teach them the Russian language, if they are not already familiar with it, and at the same time acquaint them with Russia's national heroes. 6/

1/ FCC Teletype, A213, 7 April 1943.

2/ Information Bulletin, Embassy of the USSR, 23 May 1942, 13 August 1942, 17 September 1942, 23 September 1942, 27 March 1943; domestic broadcast, Khabarovsk, as monitored by FCC, 18 May 1943; ibid., 13 September 1943.

3/ Pravda, 5 April 1942; ibid., 7 April 1942; Information Bulletin, Embassy of the USSR, 13 May 1943.

4/ Cable #3394, Bern, 5 June 1943 (Restricted); News Digest, 8 October 1942; ibid., 29-30 November 1942; ibid., 21 December 1942; Cable #1945, Stockholm, 27 July 1942 (Restricted).

5/ New York Herald Tribune, 24 January 1943; Pravda, 5 October 1942; Embassy of the USSR, Information Bulletin, 6 July 1943, 25 May 1943, 7 August 1943, 14 September 1943.

6/ Izvestiya, 3 October 1942.

An American diplomat who recently returned from the USSR states that during the war there has been no dissension among the minor nationalities of the Soviet Union. While there have been vague rumors of trouble in a few frontier areas, no movements of any significance developed. 1/ It is significant, however, that at one time the government felt it necessary to warn against the activities of dissident nationalists (see below).

In an attempt to use nationalist rivalries for their own ends and thus create a civil war in the USSR, the Germans have formed "anti-Bolshevik" military units from among the national groups in the occupied parts of the USSR. Recruits for these forces -- chiefly former prisoners of war, Soviet civilians and Red Army deserters -- have been obtained by threats and glowing promises of land and national independence, and, in some instances, as a result of hatred for the Bolshevik regime. The army of General Vlasov is probably the most important of these forces. It is impossible to determine to what extent Axis claims as to their strength are exaggerations. It is possible to state, however, that to date these troops have played no important role in the conflict. Recent reports indicate that the Germans have disbanded Vlasov's army as a fighting force. 2/

In spite of the formerly active anti-religious policy of the USSR, religion is another force that has strengthened rather than weakened the Soviet government. In the first days of the Russo-German war Acting Patriarch Sergei and other leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church came out strongly in support of the Soviet government against the invaders. Parish clergy and congregations have given considerable sums of money to the Fund of the Red Army. In return, the Soviet authorities ceased anti-religious propaganda, permitted churchmen to broadcast, and even named Metropolitan Nikolai of Kiev, a leading churchman, as member of the ten-man commission to investigate the crimes and outrages committed by the Germans on Soviet territory. He was also given a place among the speakers at the All-Slav Congress on 9 May 1943. Also, in January 1943, when the Acting Patriarch announced a Church donation for the construction of a tank column, and with it sent New Year's greetings to Stalin, the latter made a cordial acknowledgement.

While a recent article by Kalinin, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, indicated that the Soviet leaders were still not favorable to religion, 3/ developments in August and September 1943 show a much more benevolent official attitude. On 5 August it was announced that the Soviet authorities had released a famous ikon for the veneration of the faithful. 4/ This was followed by the announcement that on

1/ Interview of 8 June 1943, Notes on interview with C. E. Dickerson, Jr., 8 June 1943.

2/ See R & A Report The Army of General Vlasov, 16 August 1943; OSS #22961, 29 September 1943.

3/ Kalinin, M. I., "Slovo Agitatora na fronte," (Remarks of a front Agitator), Sputnik Agitatora (Agitator's Guidebook), No. 10, May 1943, p. 6.

4/ Novaya Russkaya Slovo (New Russian Word), New York, 6 August 1943.

4 September Stalin and Molotov had received Acting Patriarch Sergei and the Metropolitans of Kiev and Leningrad. Stalin declared that he was sympathetic toward their desire to elect a Patriarch and to establish a Holy Synod, and that the government had no objection. 1/

Shortly after this sensational development a council of bishops was held, at which Acting Patriarch Sergei was named Patriarch, and a Synod elected, composed of the Patriarch, the two metropolitans, and three archbishops. In an interview Patriarch Sergei outlined plans for the establishment of theological courses for priests, thus indicating still another concession by the Kremlin. 2/ The council of bishops published a message blessing the government, and urging all peoples of the world to unite against the forces of evil; 3/ excommunication was proclaimed against those guilty of the "Judas treachery" of helping the foe. 4/ Finally, the visit of the Archbishop of York to the new Patriarch, 5/ which doubtless was arranged with the approval of Stalin, emphasized the beginning of the new era in the history of the Russian Church.

While the Soviet government has greatly modified its attitude toward the Orthodox Church, it will gain considerably thereby. It will enjoy the full support of the Russian Church, which has been greatly strengthened by the election of the Patriarch and the Synod. Moreover, any Orthodox citizens who were disposed to criticize the Soviet regime on religious grounds will no longer have occasion to do so.

The Baptist and Evangelical Protestant Communities of Russia have also lent their support to the Soviet cause, as have Moslems, and members of the Armenian Church. Prayers for Soviet victory have been ordered in all Protestant churches and in all mosques, while the Armenian Catholics blessed the arms of those fighting "Nazi despotism and tyranny." 6/

1/ Cable, Moscow, #1289, 7 September 1943.

2/ Cable, Moscow, #1320, 9 September 1943; ibid., #1334, 11 September 1943.

3/ "Soviet Government Blessed," New York Times, 16 September 1943.

4/ FCC Teletype, A204, 18 September 1943.

5/ "Moscow Welcomes the Archbishop of York," New York Times, 20 September 1943.

6/ Censor Intercept MI-33700, Confidential; Information Bulletin, Embassy of the USSR, 16 June 1942; ibid., 27 June 1942.

To counter this support for the Soviet regime the Nazis have used a stream of propaganda against the "godless Bolsheviks of the Kremlin," and have tried the device of sponsoring an autocephalous Ukrainian Church. Its head, Archbishop Polikarp of Lutsk, is reported to have stated: "The Ukrainian nation prays to God for the final victory over the criminals, Jews, and tyrants of the Kremlin." 1/ Archbishop Polikarp was thereupon accused of insubordination by Acting Patriarch Sergei of Moscow. The Germans found that Polikarp's organization did not have the strength claimed for it, and consequently they have also supported hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church who refuse to recognize the authority of Moscow, and have encouraged the Ukrainian Uniate Church, which recognizes the authority of the Pope. 2/ The Nazi attempt to use religion to win popular support does not appear, however, to have gained much for them, either within the free or the occupied parts of the USSR. It is probable that the Russian Orthodox Church in the unoccupied USSR, with Patriarch Sergei at its head, enjoys much greater prestige than any of the religious bodies within Axis-controlled parts of the Soviet Union.

As was to be expected, the Soviet authorities have skillfully mobilized all mediums of propaganda to inculcate good morale. An editorial in Pravda, entitled "The Fighting Tasks of the Bolshevik Press," had the following to say concerning the function of the newspaper in the USSR: "The written word, like the bayonet, must always be sharp, must always be smiting the hated enemy, must always serve the cause of our victory." 3/ Needless to say, this precept is followed to the letter. Pravda also indicated the function of the arts in similar fashion: "Let dramatists, composers, poets, writers, artists glorify the heroic deeds of the Red Army and of all the Soviet people... Let them raise still higher fiery hatred for the invaders and great love for the Red Army, which is marching... to liberate our land from the pack of mad Fascist dogs that broke into our country." 4/ This advice was taken to heart. A vast body of literature on the war has been produced by Soviet authors. In the Moscow branch of the Writers' Union alone, 230 of the 800 members have gone to the front. Several well-known novelists have been killed in the front line. The Soviet film industry has worked incessantly to produce films on the war or on

1/ Ministry of Information, News Digest, 2 September 1942, p. CXIII.

2/ Censor Materials, USSR, 6 January 1943; Cable, Stockholm, #2532, 16 September 1942; Sulzberger, C.L.: "Axis Inspires Split in Russian Church," New York Times, 2 July 1943.

3/ Domestic broadcast, Moscow, as monitored by FCC, 5 May 1943.

4/ Pravda, 14 February 1942.

patriotic themes. Documentary films, historical pieces about Suvorov, Dmitrii Donskoy, Kutuzov, and the fighting against the Germans in 1916, and films on the present war, like the grim "She Fights for Her Country," and "The People's Avengers" are all intended to heighten morale. 1/

Other mediums serve the same purpose. The theater produces war plays like "The Russian People" or historical dramas, of which "Ivan IV" is a recent specimen, and new operas deal with Suvorov or the guerrillas of 1812. 2/ Composers such as Shostakovich and Prokofiev and many lesser ones, do their part. Nor are the older masters forgotten: the works of Mussorgsky, Borodin, Arensky, and others of the past century are often given. On the 131st anniversary of the battle of Borodino in 1812 a celebration took place in Moscow, one of the features of which was the solemn performance of Chaikovsky's "1812 Overture." 3/

Posters, an art form well understood by the Russians, are used to portray the cruelty and lust of the foe, over captions like "There will be no mercy for the enemy!" and "Partisans! Avenge without Mercy!" Others are inspirational, like one showing a woman worker beside several large shells, with the caption "All for victory!" and "To the front from the women of the USSR." 4/

Another factor adding the good morale noticeable in the USSR is the fact that their American and British Allies are rendering tangible aid by sending imposing quantities of munitions and foodstuffs to the warring Soviets. In his speech on 6 November 1943, Stalin stated that the war materials and other supplies furnished by the Allies had been of considerable assistance to the USSR. 5/

To these positive factors promoting good morale should be added a negative factor -- the secret police of the NKVD. While little is heard of its activities, an occasional item appears in the press showing

1/ New York Times, 21 June 1942; ibid., 13 September 1942; Information Bulletin, Embassy of the USSR, 27 June 1942; ibid., 21 August 1943; ibid., 11 September 1943; ibid., 5 August 1943.

2/ New York Times, 13 September 1942; Information Bulletin, Embassy of the USSR, 19 August 1943.

3/ New York Times, 18 October 1942; ibid., 27 September 1942; domestic broadcast, Moscow, as monitored by FCC, 7 September 1943.

4/ New York Herald Tribune, 12 October 1942; Information Bulletin, Embassy of the USSR, 11 May 1943.

5/ "Stalin's Speech to Moscow Workers," New York Times, 7 November 1943.

that it is zealously tracking down potential foes within the body politic. 1/

It should of course be borne in mind that much of the evidence on Soviet morale comes from the Soviet press, radio, and other sources controlled by the authorities of the USSR. These sources doubtless do not report unfavorable manifestations, or at best minimize them. On the other hand, there is available considerable evidence that is not subject to such control -- notably, State Department cables, reports of returned eye-witnesses, and the like. This evidence also supports the conclusion that civilian morale in the USSR is strong.

Against the above influences inducing good morale must be set several unfavorable factors. The USSR has suffered colossal losses in territory, many of its largest cities and thousands of villages are in ruins, and many millions of its soldiers and its civilians have been killed or maimed. There are great numbers of families that have not suffered the loss of at least one of their members.

For those who remain there are great privations. As is stated in the section of this report on the Russian Food Situation, the poor diet of some 15.5 million miscellaneous workers and employees has probably had a more or less unfavorable effect upon their morale, and, by the process of osmosis, to some extent upon the morale of the whole population. Furthermore, the 23 million dependents whose rations for some time have been seriously below standard have probably suffered severely. Their sufferings, in addition to affecting their own morale, have, through their family relationships with soldiers and war workers, probably adversely affected morale in general. The long working hours now in effect, and the many exhausting demands upon the free time of the workers have produced a good deal of physical weariness. Housing is insufficient in many of the war industry centers, and clothing, footwear, household equipment, soap, and domestic fuel are very scarce. Even to obtain the scanty supplies that are available someone must stand in line, often for five hours or more. In the rigorous winter climate of much of the USSR these privations may cause disease among many of the weakened population, and in some instances, death. All these are unfavorable factors in respect to morale.

Certain signs of weakening under wartime strains have been noticed in the USSR. In order to end absenteeism from war factories the Soviet government early in the war found it advisable to place workers in war industry under martial law, with penalties of imprisonment for from five to eight years for "desertion." 2/

1/ New York Times, 6 August 1942.

2/ Izvestiya, 12 December 1941.

The same measure of control was applied to Soviet railroad workers on 16 April 1943, 1/ and on 10 May to workers in water transport. 2/ Dishonest food store employees, lax factory heads, and thieves stealing from victory gardens have been punished at various times. 3/ More ominous have been the reports that have occasionally appeared that some Soviet citizens have collaborated with the Nazis in the occupied regions. An American correspondent who visited Kotelnikovo not long before the Germans left saw evidence of such collaboration, and in Kharkov saw a long line of women outside the NKVD headquarters, where they were waiting to leave food for prisoners, presumably collaborationists. 4/ In July Col. General Ulrich of the Justice Department of the Red Army gave a radio talk warning of the danger from spies, diversionists, and assassins recruited by German Intelligence from the ranks of the "Trotskyist-Bukharinite anti-Soviet underworld," from among minority nationalists, especially Ukrainians, and from kulaks and criminal elements. Often, he warned, the Gestapo has succeeded in recruiting as agents persons whose families are in the occupied territory. 5/ Not long after this, eight traitors were publicly hanged at Krasnodar. 6/

Other elements of the population are also probably disaffected, or not entirely reliable. Estimates have been made that there are ten or twenty million political prisoners in the USSR. These figures seem somewhat excessive, as the Soviet government has been very secretive on this point, and no one has been able to count these prisoners. As stated in the Manpower Section of this report, the male political prisoners of 17 years of age or over probably are fewer than 3.5 million; there are probably fewer female political prisoners. It seems likely that a certain number of these might side with the Germans if given the opportunity. Furthermore, after September 1939 the USSR evacuated an estimated 2.1 million persons from Eastern Poland and the Baltic States. While many of these were removed to save them from execution by the Germans, others probably were removed because they were

1/ Cable, Moscow, #323, 19 April 1943.

2/ New York Times, 11 May 1943.

3/ New York Times, 21 June 1943; New York Herald Tribune, 4 November 1942; OSS #20581, 30 July 1943.

4/ Interview with Eddie Gilmore, 22 June 1943.

5/ BBC, Daily Digest of World Broadcasts, 13 July 1943, USSR Home, (vii-ix).

6/ "30,000 Russians See 8 Traitors Hanged," New York Times, 19 July 1943.

enemies of the Soviet regime. In addition, in 1939 there were 1.4 million Germans in the USSR (including 0.6 million Volga Germans), of whom some must have been disloyal. Thus there may be some 10 million persons in the USSR whose loyalty may be subject to question.

In spite of the tribulations and the weak spots, however, it appears that Soviet morale is higher now than it has been in many months. Of necessity, the people of Russia have learned to endure hardships, so that while the present afflictions have doubtless lowered efficiency somewhat, they have not broken the spirit of the people. Only if the food situation became serious in the spring and summer of 1944, would morale be adversely affected. If large numbers of urban dependents should suffer greatly increased hunger, the war spirit of the USSR might decline. For the present, the Russian people are confident in the ability of the Red Army.

B. Red Army Morale

The fighting spirit of the Red Army is at a very high level. Even during the disastrous days of 1941, and again in the summer of 1942, when the German torrent swept on and on, the Soviet forces resisted strongly. Since November, 1942 the confidence of the Red Army has been immensely strengthened by a momentous series of victories, from Stalingrad to Smolensk and Kiev. The first successful Soviet summer offensive is an event of prime significance. Moreover, the victories of the Allies, although given but slight recognition by the Russians, have helped to keep the Germans off balance. There is every reason for the Red Army to feel encouraged.

Moreover, the members of the Soviet fighting forces find that conditions in the Red Army are favorable to continued success. As pointed out in the Industrial and Military Supplies Section of this report, the Soviet forces are provided with equipment and supplies not inferior to those used by the Germans, and with quantities that meet the needs of the front. Only in motor transport are there occasional temporary shortages, apparently caused by delays in getting the vehicles from the factories to the front. Probably never before have Russian armies enjoyed such a relatively favorable situation in respect to equipment and supply.

Another encouraging factor for the Red warrior is that he knows his wounds will receive the best care available. The Soviet medical authorities claim great success in using sulpha drugs, blood transfusions, physiotherapy, anti-gangrene serum, and other modern techniques. They have repeatedly claimed that only 1.5 percent of Soviet wounded have died, while 70 percent recover sufficiently to return to duty. 1/ A recent article in Izvestiya gave the proportion of the wounded who returned to combat duty after hospitalization as 86 percent, instead of 70 percent formerly given. 2/ Whether the latter figure represents Soviet experience during a limited period, or is the corrected figure for the result of medical care for the entire war to date, cannot be ascertained at this moment. In either case, it is probable that Russian medical care in the present war is much more effective than that available in any previous Russian war, although probably less efficient than that in the British and American forces.

Another factor in promoting a confident spirit in the Red Army is the careful inculcation of professional pride and a consciousness of a glorious military tradition. In October 1940 new disciplinary statutes were introduced giving officers the right to have soldiers shot for gross

1/ Mitrev, G., in Izvestiya, 23 May 1943; Sovetskaya Meditsina (Soviet Medicine), 1942, No. 7, pp. 3-4; Koton, B., in Hygeia, April 1943, pp. 268-270. The Manpower Section of this report, however uses a figure of 7 percent for the wounded who die.

2/ OSS #22705, 18 September 1943.

breaches of discipline, and providing penalties for commanders who displayed a lack of firmness. 1/ The prestige of the officers of the army and fleet was further heightened in October 1942 by a decree abolishing the military commissars who had acted as a check on the officers. This important step was explained as a result of the fact that the Soviet Union now had a large staff of well trained and loyal officers, who could be trusted with full responsibility and unity of command. 2/ Subsequently shoulder straps were added to the uniforms of the officers, as method of elevating them, in the eyes of the public, above the rank and file. 3/ In July 1943 a decree granted regular military titles to all officers, who were henceforth to be called "officers" rather than "commanders". The officers are now members of an "officers' corps" with the privileges and obligations proper to such a calling. More importance began to be attached to the personal appearance of officers. Lt. General Vasiliev of Guards Tanks insisted in Red Star that Red Army officers must maintain their smart appearance both on and off duty. Before going on leave the officer must be sure that his buckle is polished and his boots shined, and that he himself must look dashing. 4/

The rank and file of the Red Army, as well as its officers, have been taught that they have a glorious tradition to uphold. The men in the ranks are made to feel that in carrying out the oath of a soldier they are obeying the precepts of Russian military leaders from Peter the Great and Suworov to Brusilov, Lenin, and Frunze. 5/ Frequent articles in the press praise the military achievements of the Russian arms under Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, Suworov, and Kutuzov, and emphasize Russian military traditions. 6/

An apparently effective method of promoting high morale in the troops is the creation of Guards divisions and corps. The Guards units, which receive double pay, are entrusted with special banners which each man personally swears to defend to the death. If the banner is captured, the

1/ Werth, Alexander, Moscow War Diary, New York, 1942, pp. 90-91.

2/ Pravda, 11 October 1942.

3/ OSS No. 10209, 5 January 1943.

4/ Weekly Political Intelligence Summary, 4 August 1943.

5/ BBC, Daily Digest of World Broadcasts, 26 June 1943.

6/ OSS No. 17943, 5 June 1943.

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division or corps is disbanded in disgrace and its members scattered among other units. The Guards troops have an esprit de corps probably equal to that of any troops in other armies. 1/ Another device used to develop divisional traditions is the bestowal of the name of a city upon a division participating in its capture -- e.g., the 50th Staline Infantry Division of Guards, or the 280th Konotop Infantry Division.

In addition, the Red Army is now a veteran army with the confidence in its own powers that is won under fire. A note recently stressed in Soviet press articles and editorials is that now the fighters of the USSR know their jobs and have full technical competence. In Stalin's May Day Order of the Day he stated:

In the course of the war the Red Army has acquired rich military experience. Hundreds of thousands of Red Army men have learned to use their arms to perfection. Many commanders have learned to direct their men skillfully on the field of action. 2/

An interesting account was recently given of an informal talk of a group of Soviet staff officers following the capture of Belgorod from the Germans. One of the younger majors remarked that the Germans were no longer the fighters that they had been in 1942; whereupon the divisional commander looked up sharply to say, "No, that's not the point at all... We are the ones who have changed. We fight better. We fight more cleverly. That's the crux of the whole matter." 3/ Such a belief, which seems to be widespread in the USSR, will certainly add to the nation's fighting spirit.

This growing professional spirit in the Soviet forces should not be taken as evidence that they are coming to regard themselves as a military caste divorced from civilian society. The bonds between army and civil population are strong. The widespread use of slogans like "Everything for the front!", the donation of huge sums of money to the Fund of the Red Army, and similar signs, point to strong popular support for the fighting forces. (Doubtless these manifestations began as a result of official inspiration rather than spontaneously, but they assumed such large proportions that they became real expressions of popular feeling.)

1/ Sulsberger, C. L., "Red Army's Elite Win Guards Title", New York Times, 27 June 1943; OSS No. 17943, 5 June 1943.

2/ Information Bulletin, Embassy of the USSR, 4 May 1943.

3/ Inter-Continent News, Radio from Moscow, 5 September 1943.

Moreover, the intensive campaign for more voluntary as well as institutional aid for the families of men at the front shows that the army is loyally supported by the civilian population. Not only are the orphans of fallen soldiers cared for, but the houses of soldiers are repaired by neighbors, their wives receive help with their gardens, apartments are found for urban families, lectures and reading aloud are provided for them, and other services are rendered, in addition to pecuniary help. 1/

The bond between army and society is also maintained, and military morale strengthened, by the intensive political propaganda to which the armed forces are subjected. The political agitators of the Red Army and the Red Fleet, who have replaced the military commissars, continuously work to educate the men as to the cause for which they are fighting, and concerning the responsibility which falls on the individual soldiers as inheritors of the Russian military tradition established under Alexander Nevsky, under Peter the Great at Poltava, under Suworov, Kutuzov, Brusilov, and other great leaders of the past. The front agitators also carry on unceasing propaganda for Party authority and discipline. 2/

The oral exhortations of the agitators are greatly facilitated by the hundreds of divisional and army newspapers and the millions of brochures and leaflets published by the Chief Political Administration of the Red Army. The front newspapers especially, ranging from crude handwritten or typed sheets posted up for the soldiers to read to more elaborate mimeographed or printed sheets, all seek to inculcate hatred for the enemy and loyalty to the Soviet regime, and the spirit of the offensive. 3/ Another highly important factor in strengthening the morale of the Red Army is the rapid increase in the number of Communist Party members within its ranks. Hundreds of thousands of soldiers and officers have joined the Party after donning uniforms, so that never before have the Party organizations of the Red Army and the Red Fleet grown so rapidly. A similar growth of the Komsomol has also taken place. 4/ A recent article by Major General Kronin, "The Training of Military Reserves for the Red Army," read over the Khabarovsk radio, indicates the importance attached to political education by the leaders of the Red Army.

1/ Izvestiya, 11 April 1943; ibid., 9 June 1943; Pravda Vostoka (Truth of the East), Uzbekistan, 29 May 1943; Pravda, 4 April 1943; ibid., 19 May 1943.

2/ Report of interview with Laurence Le Sueur, 26 January 1943. ONI. Bolshevik, No. 14, 1942, p. 3; Pravda, 17 March 1942; ibid., 16 January 1942.

3/ Pravda, 17 March 1942; Cable, Moscow, No. 939, 25 July 1943.

4/ Pravda, 3 April 1943; Cable, Moscow No. 939, 17 July 1943.

Gen. Kronin said:

Special attention must be paid to the political training and morale of the soldier. At the start of the soldier's training period, great responsibility falls upon the Party and the Young Communist organizations. Everyone must be acquainted with the book by Comrade Stalin, The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. 1/

An additional reason for the Soviet will to victory is the fact that the Red Army men have been infuriated by the instances of German brutality that they have seen or heard of, often from their own families. Ralph Parker, New York Times correspondent, wrote: "What the Red soldier has seen of German brutality as he passes through rescued villages has made him the angriest man in the world." 2/ Recent Soviet documentary films such as "Stalingrad", and illustrations in the Soviet press showing German atrocities, as well as the accounts of those who have escaped from slavery in Germany, must be a powerful stimulus to hatred.

Among the factors that might possibly undermine the morale of the Red Army are the heavy losses suffered by the Soviet forces. As stated in the Manpower section of this report, as of 1 December 1943 some 5.5 million men will have been killed, missing or captured. If disabled are included, the permanent losses of the Red Army will amount to over seven million by that date. (The permanent German losses (including disabled) from June 1941 to 1 December 1943 are estimated to be somewhat over 4.9 million, 97 per cent of them on the Eastern Front.) 3/ Nevertheless, there is every reason to believe that at present the favorable factors far outweigh the unfavorable items, and unless the Soviet military situation deteriorates greatly the confidence of the armed forces will continue to be great.

C. Morale of the Soviet Government

With the spirit of both civilian population and fighting forces in excellent condition, it is not surprising that the Soviet government is confident. All recent military articles in the Soviet press indicate a high degree of optimism concerning imminent victory. The official Soviet press has called for adoption of Foch's strategy of 1918 ("Attack! Attack! Attack!") and the throwing of all reserves into one grand scale

1/ FCC Teletype, A 122, 18 September 1943.

2/ New York Times, 10 March 1942.

3/ Estimate of Economic Subdivision, Europe-Africa Division, OSS.

offensive. 1/ The return of the diplomatic missions from Kuibyshev to Moscow, the issuing of the Free Germany Manifesto, and the freely announced presence of Stalin at the front, 2/ all point to confidence concerning the military situation. Furthermore, the extensive efforts toward the reconstruction of recovered territory only recently close to the German lines, 3/ and the report that Latvians and Estonians are being released from the Red Army to take training courses for the administration of their homelands, 4/ both support this impression. Additional evidence as to the Soviet determination to push the war to a victorious conclusion was recently given by an article by the well-known writer David Zaslavsky, in Red Star. He declared that the Soviet Union would not destroy German cities and villages in retaliation for German destruction, but would make Germany pay in full, in brick, glass and iron, as well as in other ways. 5/

In view of the above evidence, it appears unlikely that the Kremlin, which in the past has been ruthless in pushing through its policies in spite of hardships suffered by the people, will be disposed to weaken now that victory is approaching. The apparent willingness of the people of the USSR to endure suffering until final triumph is assured gives every reason to think that the Soviet authorities may be expected to prosecute the war to the end with grimness and determination. The following somewhat extravagant broadcast on the Moscow radio indicates that the authorities believe that that end will not be long deferred:

Beyond the fields of Smolensk glitter the waters of the Vistula and the Nieman. All the blood of the Russian people, all the tears of Russian mothers and wives and sweethearts, all the torment of our land will be avenged in full. Today our horses drink from the Dniiper. Soon they will drink from the Bug and the Danube. 6/

D. Probable Morale Changes in the Event of Military Reverses

The Soviets are apparently so confident of victory that a defeat administered to the advancing Red Army would undoubtedly be a severe shock. In the event that the Soviet offensive were definitely halted, there would certainly be a fresh outburst of demands for a Second Front,

1/ OSS No. 20866, 6 August 1943; Middleton, Drew, "British See Russians Aiming for Decision by Next Spring," New York Times, 12 August 1943; "Russia Still Yearns for Large Second Front," ibid., 11 August 1943.

2/ OSS No. 20569, 2 August 1943.

3/ BDC, Daily Digest of World Broadcasts, 23 August 1943.

4/ OSS No. 22417, 15 September 1943.

5/ Wireless to Inter-Continent News, 24 September 1943.

6/ PM, 29 September 1943.

and possible sharp recriminations against the British and the Americans. War weariness would doubtless increase, and the civilian war effort would probably suffer a temporary decline. It does not seem likely, however, that the discouragement would be sufficiently long or intense to impair seriously the fighting strength of the Soviet forces. Military morale could probably endure the effects of a setback, and the powerful propaganda and coercive machinery of the government would almost certainly be able to restore civilian determination within a short time.

In the event of a marked deterioration of the food situation, a definite impairment of morale might be expected. Since sizeable parts of the population are already undernourished, any significant reduction in rations would bring severe suffering. Inasmuch as to this would be added the effects of physical exhaustion, the grave shortage of consumers' goods, poor heating of homes and other buildings, and the like, it seems probable that this eventuality would lower the morale of the people and the Army sufficiently to make it impossible for the USSR to fight as effectively as before.

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		CNO	PRIORITY
DATE 23 FEB 44			ROUTINE
TO CODE ROOM			DEFERRED
DECODED BY			
PARAPHRASED BY THOMSON			PRIORITY
ROUTED BY HILL			ROUTINE
			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
221110			<input type="checkbox"/>
NCR 2542			
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

NO TRUSTWORTHY OFFICIAL INFO CAN BE
 EXPECTED USNAVCOM 161623. CANAL NOW
 BLOCKED BY ENEMY OCCUPATION PETROZAVODSK
 BUT BELIEVE NO PART ACTUAL CANAL EVEN
 IN ENEMY HANDS AND DAMAGE SUPERFICIAL.

16...ACT
 COMINCH...

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5 (U) (R)

OSD letter, May 1, 1978

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

10-00

VCNO

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-15

221110 300 Russia

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

PLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

*Chet
Kemp*

From: Moscow
To: AGWAR

NR: 222, 18th February 1944

To Bissell for Lovell from Hall signed Deane,

Soviet General Staff officially announced at O B meeting that Inf Divs 268th, 328th and 339th had been destroyed. Last week 16th Panz Gren Div moved from 3rd Panz Army to 18th Army. At beginning of February 3 Divs moved to 1st Panz Army to support attempts to break through to surrounded divs north of Zvenigorodka:

1st Panz Division and SS Adolph Hitler from 4th Panz Army and 13th Panz Division from 8th Army.

Roumanian OB: Soviets no longer consider as existing the 3 line of Charlin Divs in Transnistria and there has been no confirmation of their existence for some time and there is reason to believe they are disbanded. Soviets acknowledge existence of 24th Inf Division and locate it north of Kherson. In 3rd Roumanian Army which is partly in Crimea and partly in Kherpin region.

Reur 287: Soviets continue to carry 708 Infantry Division Russian Center, consider 319 Infantry Div on coast in Pas De Calais. They have received no further data on SS Ketting. Infantry Division 13th and 69 are in 16th Army, 110 in 9th Army, 113th in 4th, Army 257 in 4th Tank Army and 16th

CM-IN-13986 (20 Feb 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

300 Russia

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Moscow
To: AGWAR
NR: 222, 18th February 1944

Page 2

Pans Gren in 18th Army (moved from 3rd Pans). 336 and 371 Infantry Division are in Russia South. Soviet representative unable to identify 5 encircled divs north of Nikopol. Unable to get official commitment on my questions regarding encircled divs north of Zvenigorodka, but paper today announces their liquidation. Soviets have unconfirmed reports of Rommel being appointed Deputy Chief of Staff of Army.

Info given by Soviets on Finnish order of battle meager and not specific. Their info follows:

2 Armies called Karelian Army and Karelian Isthmus Army;
7 Corps all Infantry and numbered consecutively 1 to 7;
15 Infantry Divisions numbered through 10th and 11th 14th, 15th, 17th, 18th and 19th;

1st, 2nd, 3rd and 15th Infantry Brig, Onega coast are brig and cavalry brig. Also armored brig (called divs by Finns) under Maj Gen Lagus and consisting of 2 Motorized Battalions and 2 Tank Battalions, latter equipped with germ mark 4's captured Russian tanks and pre war English tanks. When asked for corps organization Soviets replied their makeup had not changed since last Finnish OB meeting some months ago. All Finnish divs on front line.

Reyour 287 will get Germ OB in Russia south at next meeting. Soviets request location of German factories producing tanks and artillery and number each type produced by particular factory. Made no promise as to when answer could be supplied.

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: OPD

CG AAF

CG/S Capt. Royal, USN

White House

CM-IN-13986 (20 Feb 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 20 1974

0609Z amr

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: M A Ankara
To: MILID
Number: 973 18 February 1944

From Tindall Ankara.

Parleys reported between Finns and Russians taken seriously here. Swedish Minister says his info indicates meetings are on.

NoSig.

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: OPD
WHITE HOUSE
LOG

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 4, 1972
By DBS Date MAY 21 1973

CM-IN-12681 (18 Feb 44) 1447Z ong

300 Russia

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPART

DRAFTER	EXTENSION	NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	CNO		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY	R E SCHUIRMANN	FOR ACTION	ALUSNA STOCKHOLM	PRIORITY
DATE	16 FEB 1944		ALUSNA MOSCOW	ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM	161622			DEFERRED
DECODED BY		INFORMATION	ASTALUSNA MURMANSK	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY	PIPP			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY	HILL			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.				IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
161623				<input type="checkbox"/>
MCR 6780				
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT	

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ALL INFORMATION DESIRED STALIN CANAL WHITE
SEA-BALTIC. ESTIMATE GERMAN DEMOLITION.

16...ORIG

CONTINCH...

ACTION		
F-0		22
F-01		23
F-02		24
F-05		25
F-07		26
F-1		27
F-2		28
F-3		29
F-30		30
F-31		31
F-32		32
F-33		33
F-34		34
F-4		35
FX01		36
FX30		37
IG-7		38
VCNO		39
		40
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		50
		51
		52

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D), (a) (2)

OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS Date MAY 30 1973

~~SECRET~~

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OPNAV-NCR-15

161623 3as Russia

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFT

EXTENSION NUMBER

ADDRESSES

ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE

MA, ANKARA

RECEIVED BY

MILID

DATE 7 FEB 1944

TOR CORDEROM 2432

DECODED BY

SMITH

SOURCE BY

HARRINGTON

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

NO. 953

6TH FEBRUARY 1944

NCR 18048

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:

DATE

TIME

GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT
(RECEIVED BY PRINTER FROM ARMY)

FROM TINDALL ANKARA.

PRESS OF TURKEY STRONGLY FEATURES MOLOTOV ANNOUNCEMENT REGARDING PROPOSED CHANGES IN SOVIET CONSTITUTION. MEANING OF CHANGES INTERPRETED VARIOUSLY BUT SEVERAL EDITORIALISTS STATE THAT SOVIET UNION HAS "LEFT THE DOOR AJAR FOR NEW MEMBERS." SOME POSSIBLE NEW SOVIET-REPUBLICS NAMED ARE POLAND, YUGOSLAVIA, AND BULGARIA. STRENGTHENING OF SOVIET INFLUENCE AT PEACE AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES AND IN POST WAR WORLD IS ALSO GENERALLY ACCEPTED AS CONSEQUENCE OF PROPOSED CHANGE. TURK WRITERS COMPARE NEW AUTONOMY OF SOVIET MEMBER REPUBLICS WITH FREEDOM OF BRITISH DOMINIONS INDICATING THAT UNION WILL THEREBY GAIN STRENGTH INTERNALLY AS DID BRITISH COMMONWEALTH.

ACTION

F-0	21
F-01	22
F-02	23
F-03	24
F-04	25
F-05	26
F-06	27
F-07	28
F-08	29
F-09	30
F-10	31
F-11	32
F-12	33
F-13	34
F-14	35
F-15	36
F-16	37
F-17	38
F-18	39
F-19	40
F-20	41
F-21	42
F-22	43
F-23	44
F-24	45
F-25	46
F-26	47
F-27	48
F-28	49
F-29	50
F-30	51
F-31	52

CONFIDENTIAL
By DBS Date 2-2-54

Make original only. Deliver to Room Watch Office in person. (See APL 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

100-5-10-10

3 as Russia

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12386, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
PLR 101
BY RT, NARA Date 4/14/01

MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

TER

EXTENSION NUMBER

ADDRESSEES

PRECEDENCE

FROM

ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE

RELEASED BY

FOR ACTION

PRIORITY

DATE

ROUTINE

TOR CODEROOM

DEFERRED

DECODED BY

INFORMATION

PRIORITY

PARAPHRASED BY

ROUTINE

ROUTED BY

DEFERRED

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

IF OPERATIONAL
CHECK BELOW

PAGE 2

6TH FEB 1944

NCR 18048

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:

DATE

TIME

GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ACTION

ONE KNOWN PRO-COMMUNIST WRITER STATES THIS IS A
 "BLOW TO THOSE ACCUSING SOVIET RUSSIA OF IMPERIALIS-
 TIC ASPIRATIONS" SINCE IT FOLLOWS DISSOLUTION OF
 COMINTERN, LIFTING BAN OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS AND
 ADOPTION REVISED NATIONAL ANTHEM. GENERAL SENTIMENT
 MAY BE SUMMARIZED AS SOMEWHAT OVERAWED CONFIRMATION
 OF GENERAL TURKISH CONVICTION THAT SOVIET GOLOSSUS
 IS GOING TO BECOME EVEN STRONGER AND PUZZLE ANGLO-
 SAXONS MORE THAN EVER.

16.....COG

19.....COMINCH.....20G.....CNO.....NAVAIDE.....20OP.....

CM-IN-4330

 R. O. 11682, Sec. 3(B) and 3(D) on (C)
 OGD letter, May 1, 1973
 MAY 2 1973
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 OPNAV-NCR-16

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

PLR 101

by RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION CNO	PRIORITY RRRR
DATE 5 FEB 1944			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM 2047		INFORMATION	PRIORITY
DECODED BY ANDERSON			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY KHALAK			DEFERRED
ROUTED BY BORUGDS			
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW <input type="checkbox"/>
PAGE 1 OF 2		041230	NCR 17

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE: TIME: GCT:

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

041230(?)

FURTHERANCE MOSCOW 041210. ORIGINAL POPULATIONS
MOVROSSISK 140,000. EVACUATED WITH RETREATING
REDS OR ESCAPED DURING OCCUPATION 120,000. CIVI-
LIANS KILLED IN MILITARY OPERATIONS 2,000. PRIOR
RED REOCCUPATION GERMANS EVACUATED EVERY LIVING
CIVILIAN. LEFT TOWN 98% WRECKED RESULT MILITARY
ACTION AND DEMOLITION. RED LANDING ATTACK ON
PENINSULA NORTHWEST OF CITY UNDERTAKEN BY NAVY
WITH MAKESHIFT LANDING VESSELS IN INSUFFICIENT
NUMBER MAKING FERRY TRIPS FROM GELENDJIK. LOSSES
EXCEEDINGLY HIGH IN VIEW TOTAL INVOLVED WHICH
TRUE ALSO OF KERCH LANDING. KERCH UTTERLY DEMOL-
ISHED. SMALL AREA NORTHWEST OF TOWN TAKEN AND
HELD BY RED NAVY. LANDING ATTEMPT SAME TIME NEAR
FEODOSIA UNSUCCESSFUL. LANDINGS CARRIED OUT FROM
MAKESHIFT AND ENTIRELY UNSUITABLE BOATS SUCCEEDED
THROUGH EXTRAORDINARY COURAGE AND DETERMINATION
PART NAVAL LANDING FORCES. NO TANK CARRIERS

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

O. 11662, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (B)

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVY REGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-15

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

041230 300 Russia

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER

EXTENSION NUMBER

ADDRESSEES

PRECEDENCE

FROM

ALUSNA MOSCOW

RELEASED BY

DATE

TGR CODEROOM

DECODED BY

PARAPHRASED BY

ROUTED BY

ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE

FOR ACTION

INFORMATION

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

IF OPERATIONAL
CHECK BELOW

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:

DATE

TIME

GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ACTION

AVAILABLE. ALL AIR FORCES BLACK SEA AREA
RED NAVAL ALL TYPES LAND BASED EXCEPT PLANES

CARRIED ON VOROSHILOV AND A FEW OLD TYPE
FLYING BOATS. AZOV SEA ONLY LIGHTLY FROZEN

THIS WINTER. RANK AND FILE CIVIL POPULATION
EXPRESS OPINION AND DESIRE ALLIES TO FURNISH

MATERIAL AND WORKMEN TO REHABILITATE BLACK
SEA AREAS DEVASTED BY GERMANS. OFFICIAL

REACTION TO SUCH SUGGESTIONS MADE BY INFORMA-
TE DEAD SILENCE.

16...ACT

CNO...COMINCH...NAVAIDE...

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 6(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

NAVY MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER		EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW			ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION	CNO	PRIORITY
DATE 5 FEB 1944				DEFERRED
TOR CODEROM 050336				
DECODED BY MELTON				
PARAPHRASED BY STEVENS		INFORMATION		PRIORITY
ROUTED BY HUTCHINSON				ROUTINE
				DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.				IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
041220				NCR 9291

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

CAPT GARWOOD RN JUST RETURNED FROM 18 MOS TOUR ON BLACK STATION MOSTLY AT SUKHUM WITH OCCASIONAL TRIPS ALL OTHER EAST BLACK SEA PORTS GIVES FOLLOWING INFO. HE RECENTLY RELIEVED BY CMDR LEE RN WHO PREVIOUSLY ON MILITARY MISSION MOSCOW. NO OTHER FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVE HAS BEEN ALLOWED THIS AREA. GARWOOD HAD GREAT DIFFICULTY GAINING CONFIDENCE SOVIET STAFF BUT ONCE ESTABLISHED MAINTAINED CLOSE LIAISON WITH BLACK SEA FLEET WHO FURNISHED HIM RADIO STATION AND OPERATORS FOR COMMUNICATION BRITISH SECRET RADIO STATION ISTANBUL AND BRIT RDO MOSCOW. GARWOOD INDICATED BRITS HAVE EXCELLENT AND FULL INFO ENEMY ACTIVITIES BLACK SEA SUCH AS SAILINGS MINE FIELDS OPERATING UNITS AND FIXED DEFENCES AND THAT THIS INFO FURNISHED RED STAFF AT GELENJIK. REDS HIGHLY VALUE THIS SERVICE NOW AFTER EX-

ACTION	
F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-03	25
F-04	26
F-05	27
F-06	28
F-07	29
F-1	30
F-2	31
F-3	32
F-4	33
F-5	34
F-6	35
F-7	36
F-8	37
F-9	38
F-10	39
F-11	40
F-12	41
F-13	42
F-14	43
F-15	44
F-16	45
F-17	46
F-18	47
F-19	48
F-20	49
F-21	50
F-22	51
F-23	52

SECRET

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 ONSAV-NCR-15 041220 300 Russia
 By DBS Date MAY 21 1973

DECLASSIFIED
 E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
 NLR 101
 By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

MESSAGE		NAVY DEPARTMENT	
ORIGINATOR	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION	PRIORITY
DATE			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM			DEFERRED
DECODED BY		INFORMATION	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY STEVENS			ROUTINE
BY HUTCHINSON			DEFERRED
ROUTED BY			
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
PAGE 2 OF 2 041220 NCR 9291			<input type="checkbox"/>
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:		DATE	TIME
			GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

PERIENCE PROVED INFO CORRECT. APPARENTLY BRITS MAKE EVERY EFFORT SUPPLY WORTHWHILE INFO IN ORDER JUSTIFY CONTINUANCE POST BARRED TO OTHER NATIONS. 4 DESPATCHES TO FOLLOW GIVES INFO GIVEN ME BY GARWOOD WHO MOST COOPERATIVE. HE MAKING FULL REPORT TO ADMIRALTY ON RETURN LONDON IN FEW DAYS. MAY BE AVAILABLE OUR STAFF THERE.

16....ACT

NAVAIDE....COMINCH....

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 1973

By DBS

Date

VCNO

SECRET

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OPNAV-NCR-15

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

[REDACTED]

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Moscow
To: AGWAR

No: 19 4 February, 1944

To Marshall for Strong WDGBI from Deane.

SS Reiah Div is in Southern Army Group in Sector 4th Panzer Army reported within past 10 days. No confirmation of 319th Inf though Soviets state it is in movement to Soviet Front. SS Nordland in Leningrad sector and part of 3rd SS Frontier Corps according prisoners taken 1 February. 5th Light Div from prisoner reports has been on Soviet Front since 12 January. Above reur nr 197 and 216. No comment by Soviets on remaining order of battle.

Soviet battle info follows:

SS Nederland, 78th and 175th Inf Divs identified on Soviet Front. Only 1 report however on last named div.

6th Mountain Div now on northern Soviet Front in 20th Germ Army according to prisoners taken on 15th January. Prisoners stated that in September and October 10 to 15 veterans were taken from each division for assignment to another front. 254th Div moved from north to south in 4th Panzer Army as of 14 January; 1st Ski Brig formed in Minsk from 197th Div and now operating on sector of 2nd Army; 12th Panz Div transferred from 2nd to 18th Army on Leningrad sector as of 1 February (this is sole Panz Div in Northern Army Group and was brought into action a regiment at a time); and the 336th Inf Div has been moved to Kerch from Perikop.

Satellites: 9th Rumanian Cavalry Div replaced above Germ Div at Perikop; prisoners have been captured from

CM-IN-3391 (5 Feb 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

300 Russia

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Moscow
To: AOWAR
Re: 19

Page 2

4 February, 1944

5th Rumanian Div on Southern Sector near Rovno; 21st Rumanian Div evidently in reserve same area though not confirmed; and 18th Light and 19th Hungarian Inf Divs reported for first time are in sector of German Second Army.

No sig.

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: OPD
CG AAF
CCS (CAPT ROYAL, USN)

CM-IN-3391 (5 Feb 44) 1243Z MOS

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 20 1974

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALUSNA MOSCOW</u>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		CNC	PRIORITY
DATE <u>29 JAN 1944</u>	FOR ACTION		ROUTED
TOR CODEROOM <u>2304/23</u>			DEFERRED
DECODED BY <u>LAWRENCE</u>	INFORMATION	ROULLARD	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY <u>ROTHROCK</u>			ROUTED
ROUTED BY <u>SCRUGGS</u>			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
280915 NCR 3514			<input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ACTION CNO INFO ROULLARD.

RED ARMY APPROACHED REF VLADI 280610 OF NOV BUT
 THEY MUX EXCHANGE INFO ON FAR EAST NOT YET AGREED
 ON BETWEEN AMERICAN AND RED ARMIES THE NEGOTIATIONS
 UNDER WAY. NO HOPING FOR RESULTS IN NEAR FUTURE.

16...ACT

COMINCH...

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (F)

OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS Date MAY 29 1973

VCNO

~~SECRET~~

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-13

280915 300 Russia

DECLASSIFIED
 E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
 NLR 101
 By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALUSNA MOSCOW</u>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY			2
DATE <u>23 JAN 1944</u>			3
TOR CODEROM <u>221932</u>			4
DECODED BY <u>TOUSIGNANT/MCCLELLAN/</u>			5
PARAPHRASED BY <u>STRICKLAND</u>			6
ROUTED BY <u>SOBEL</u>			7
			8
			9
			10
			11
			12
			13
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			17
			18
			19
			20
			21

LIMITED

211409

NCR 9803

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:

DA

IML

CET

ON OUTGOING SHIPMENTS PLEASE LEAVE (1) DATE (2) TIME (3) DAY (4) MONTH (5) YEAR

PART 1 211402 NCR 9870
 PART 2 211407 NCR 44
 PART 3 211409 NCR 9803

ADM OLSEN PARTY MOLOTOVSK SHIPYARD VISIT.
 YOUNG CAPABLE DIRECTOR BOUGULYUBOV FORMERLY DIRECTOR
 LENINGRAD SHIPYARD. CONSTRUCTION STARTED ABOUT
 1936 IN OPERATION NOW ABOUT 3 YEARS. BUILT ON
 SWAMPLAND REQUIRING MUCH CONCRETE PILING WITH MANY
 BUILDING PROBLEMS. COMPLETED PLAN TO HAVE 4 BATTLE-
 SHIP AND CRUISER WAYS UNDER 2 BUILDINGS ABOUT
 FOURHUNDRED A BY 130 METERS EACH. PLUS DESTROYER,
 SUBMARINE, SUBCHASER, AND SMALL CRAFT WAYS. PLAN
 DRYDOCK AND ALL ACCOMPANYING WATERFRONT FACILITIES
 WITH 10 OR 11 SHOP BUILDINGS HAVING FLOOR SPACE OF
 ABOUT A MILLION AND HALF SQUARE FEET. AREA COMPOUND

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (B)

OSD letter, May 1, 1972

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 of NARS)

Date MAY 21 1973

OPNAV-NCR-15

211409 300 Russia

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

NAVY DEPARTMENT

PRECEDENT

ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE

ROUTED BY

FOR ACTION

INFORMATION

DEFERRED

IF OPERATIONAL
CHECK BELOW

NCR 9803

PMH

EN OUTGOING, BUSINESSES HAVE LEAD: 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 2036 2037 2038 2039 2040 2041 2042 2043 2044 2045 2046 2047 2048 2049 2050 2051 2052 2053 2054 2055 2056 2057 2058 2059 2060 2061 2062 2063 2064 2065 2066 2067 2068 2069 2070 2071 2072 2073 2074 2075 2076 2077 2078 2079 2080 2081 2082 2083 2084 2085 2086 2087 2088 2089 2090 2091 2092 2093 2094 2095 2096 2097 2098 2099 2100 2101 2102 2103 2104 2105 2106 2107 2108 2109 2110 2111 2112 2113 2114 2115 2116 2117 2118 2119 2120 2121 2122 2123 2124 2125 2126 2127 2128 2129 2130 2131 2132 2133 2134 2135 2136 2137 2138 2139 2140 2141 2142 2143 2144 2145 2146 2147 2148 2149 2150 2151 2152 2153 2154 2155 2156 2157 2158 2159 2160 2161 2162 2163 2164 2165 2166 2167 2168 2169 2170 2171 2172 2173 2174 2175 2176 2177 2178 2179 2180 2181 2182 2183 2184 2185 2186 2187 2188 2189 2190 2191 2192 2193 2194 2195 2196 2197 2198 2199 2200 2201 2202 2203 2204 2205 2206 2207 2208 2209 2210 2211 2212 2213 2214 2215 2216 2217 2218 2219 2220 2221 2222 2223 2224 2225 2226 2227 2228 2229 2230 2231 2232 2233 2234 2235 2236 2237 2238 2239 2240 2241 2242 2243 2244 2245 2246 2247 2248 2249 2250 2251 2252 2253 2254 2255 2256 2257 2258 2259 2260 2261 2262 2263 2264 2265 2266 2267 2268 2269 2270 2271 2272 2273 2274 2275 2276 2277 2278 2279 2280 2281 2282 2283 2284 2285 2286 2287 2288 2289 2290 2291 2292 2293 2294 2295 2296 2297 2298 2299 2300 2301 2302 2303 2304 2305 2306 2307 2308 2309 2310 2311 2312 2313 2314 2315 2316 2317 2318 2319 2320 2321 2322 2323 2324 2325 2326 2327 2328 2329 2330 2331 2332 2333 2334 2335 2336 2337 2338 2339 2340 2341 2342 2343 2344 2345 2346 2347 2348 2349 2350 2351 2352 2353 2354 2355 2356 2357 2358 2359 2360 2361 2362 2363 2364 2365 2366 2367 2368 2369 2370 2371 2372 2373 2374 2375 2376 2377 2378 2379 2380 2381 2382 2383 2384 2385 2386 2387 2388 2389 2390 2391 2392 2393 2394 2395 2396 2397 2398 2399 2400 2401 2402 2403 2404 2405 2406 2407 2408 2409 2410 2411 2412 2413 2414 2415 2416 2417 2418 2419 2420 2421 2422 2423 2424 2425 2426 2427 2428 2429 2430 2431 2432 2433 2434 2435 2436 2437 2438 2439 2440 2441 2442 2443 2444 2445 2446 2447 2448 2449 2450 2451 2452 2453 2454 2455 2456 2457 2458 2459 2460 2461 2462 2463 2464 2465 2466 2467 2468 2469 2470 2471 2472 2473 2474 2475 2476 2477 2478 2479 2480 2481 2482 2483 2484 2485 2486 2487 2488 2489 2490 2491 2492 2493 2494 2495 2496 2497 2498 2499 2500 2501 2502 2503 2504 2505 2506 2507 2508 2509 2510 2511 2512 2513 2514 2515 2516 2517 2518 2519 2520 2521 2522 2523 2524 2525 2526 2527 2528 2529 2530 2531 2532 2533 2534 2535 2536 2537 2538 2539 2540 2541 2542 2543 2544 2545 2546 2547 2548 2549 2550 2551 2552 2553 2554 2555 2556 2557 2558 2559 2560 2561 2562 2563 2564 2565 2566 2567 2568 2569 2570 2571 2572 2573 2574 2575 2576 2577 2578 2579 2580 2581 2582 2583 2584 2585 2586 2587 2588 2589 2590 2591 2592 2593 2594 2595 2596 2597 2598 2599 2600 2601 2602 2603 2604 2605 2606 2607 2608 2609 2610 2611 2612 2613 2614 2615 2616 2617 2618 2619 2620 2621 2622 2623 2624 2625 2626 2627 2628 2629 2630 2631 2632 2633 2634 2635 2636 2637 2638 2639 2640 2641 2642 2643 2644 2645 2646 2647 2648 2649 2650 2651 2652 2653 2654 2655 2656 2657 2658 2659 2660 2661 2662 2663 2664 2665 2666 2667 2668 2669 2670 2671 2672 2673 2674 2675 2676 2677 2678 2679 2680 2681 2682 2683 2684 2685 2686 2687 2688 2689 2690 2691 2692 2693 2694 2695 2696 2697 2698 2699 2700 2701 2702 2703 2704 2705 2706 2707 2708 2709 2710 2711 2712 2713 2714 2715 2716 2717 2718 2719 2720 2721 2722 2723 2724 2725 2726 2727 2728 2729 2730 2731 2732 2733 2734 2735 2736 2737 2738 2739 2740 2741 2742 2743 2744 2745 2746 2747 2748 2749 2750 2751 2752 2753 2754 2755 2756 2757 2758 2759 2760 2761 2762 2763 2764 2765 2766 2767 2768 2769 2770 2771 2772 2773 2774 2775 2776 2777 2778 2779 2780 2781 2782 2783 2784 2785 2786 2787 2788 2789 2790 2791 2792 2793 2794 2795 2796 2797 2798 2799 2800 2801 2802 2803 2804 2805 2806 2807 2808 2809 2810 2811 2812 2813 2814 2815 2816 2817 2

ACTION

ACTION	21
0	21
-01	24
-02	26
-05	27
-07	28
-1	29
-2	30
-3	31
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-4	49
-4	50
-4	51
-4	52

OPEN ASSAULT

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

Date MAY 21 1973

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (Sec Art. 76 (4) ~~NAVJAG~~ 138.)
OPNAV-NCR-13

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY			ROUTINE
DATE			DEFERRED
FOR CODEROOM			
DECODED BY			PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED			ROUTINE
BY			DEFERRED
ROUTED BY			

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

PAGE 3 211409 NCR 9803

ORIGINATOR: FILL IN DATE AND TIME:

DA

IML

C-1

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE: (1) ONE (2) TWO (3) THREE (4) FOUR (5) FIVE (6) SIX (7) SEVEN (8) EIGHT (9) NINE (10) TEN (11) ELEVEN (12) TWELVE (13) THIRTEEN (14) FOURTEEN (15) FIFTEEN (16) SIXTEEN (17) SEVENTEEN (18) EIGHTEEN (19) NINETEEN (20) TWENTY (21) TWENTY-ONE (22) TWENTY-TWO (23) TWENTY-THREE (24) TWENTY-FOUR (25) TWENTY-FIVE (26) TWENTY-SIX (27) TWENTY-SEVEN (28) TWENTY-EIGHT (29) TWENTY-NINE (30) THIRTY (31) THIRTY-ONE (32) THIRTY-TWO (33) THIRTY-THREE (34) THIRTY-FOUR (35) THIRTY-FIVE (36) THIRTY-SIX (37) THIRTY-SEVEN (38) THIRTY-EIGHT (39) THIRTY-NINE (40) FORTY (41) FORTY-ONE (42) FORTY-TWO (43) FORTY-THREE (44) FORTY-FOUR (45) FORTY-FIVE (46) FORTY-SIX (47) FORTY-SEVEN (48) FORTY-EIGHT (49) FORTY-NINE (50) FIFTY (51) FIFTY-ONE (52) FIFTY-TWO (53) FIFTY-THREE (54) FIFTY-FOUR (55) FIFTY-FIVE (56) FIFTY-SIX (57) FIFTY-SEVEN (58) FIFTY-EIGHT (59) FIFTY-NINE (60) SIXTY (61) SIXTY-ONE (62) SIXTY-TWO (63) SIXTY-THREE (64) SIXTY-FOUR (65) SIXTY-FIVE (66) SIXTY-SIX (67) SIXTY-SEVEN (68) SIXTY-EIGHT (69) SIXTY-NINE (70) SEVENTY (71) SEVENTY-ONE (72) SEVENTY-TWO (73) SEVENTY-THREE (74) SEVENTY-FOUR (75) SEVENTY-FIVE (76) SEVENTY-SIX (77) SEVENTY-SEVEN (78) SEVENTY-EIGHT (79) SEVENTY-NINE (80) EIGHTY (81) EIGHTY-ONE (82) EIGHTY-TWO (83) EIGHTY-THREE (84) EIGHTY-FOUR (85) EIGHTY-FIVE (86) EIGHTY-SIX (87) EIGHTY-SEVEN (88) EIGHTY-EIGHT (89) EIGHTY-NINE (90) NINETY (91) NINETY-ONE (92) NINETY-TWO (93) NINETY-THREE (94) NINETY-FOUR (95) NINETY-FIVE (96) NINETY-SIX (97) NINETY-SEVEN (98) NINETY-EIGHT (99) HUNDRED

PLETE WITH BOILERS READY BUT WORK AT SNAILS PACE.
 CONSTRUCTION VERY POOR WITH NO MATERIAL PRESERVATIVE
 MEASURES.
 NUMBER OF 160 FT. SUBCHASERS UNDER CONSTRUCTION AND
 PLANNED FOR USE WITH 1200 HP GENERAL MOTORS LENDLEASE
 DIESELS 12 OF WHICH INSTALLED AND 33 MORE ORDERED.
 HULL BUILT IN 6 SECTIONS SUBASSEMBLY METHOD THEN
 JOINED AND LAUNCHED VIA MARINE RAILWAY FOR INSTALLATION
 ENGINES AND FITTING OUT. ALL RIVITED. 2 READY FOR
 TRIALS FEBRUARY. 2 60% AND 2 WITH SECTIONS UNDER
 CONSTRUCTION. YARD WORKS 2 SHIFTS 11 HOURS EACH WITH
 PRESENT TOTAL EMPLOYMENT ABOUT 11,000 OF WHICH 30%
 WOMEN AND ESTIMATE ANOTHER 20%
 BOYS FROM 12 TO 16. WHOLE LOT LOCK MISERABLY UNDER-
 NOURISHED, ILL CLOTHED, FILTHY AND UTTERLY SPIRITLESS.

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (2)

OSD letter, May 4, 1979

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVJAG 1978)

OPNAV-NCR-15

Date MAY 21 1973

DECLASSIFIED
 E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
 NLR 101
 By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY			ROUTINE
DATE			DEFERRED
FOR CODEROOM			
DECODED BY			PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED			ROUTINE
BY			DEFERRED
ROUTED BY			

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRIORITY AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

PAGE 4

211409

NCR 9803

IF OPERATIONAL
CHECK BELOW

ORIGINATOR: FILL IN DATE AND TIME:

DA

TIME

C/L

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE: (1) ONE (2) TWO (3) THREE (4) FOUR (5) FIVE (6) SIX (7) SEVEN (8) EIGHT (9) NINE (10) TEN (11) ELEVEN (12) TWELVE (13) THIRTEEN (14) FOURTEEN (15) FIFTEEN (16) SIXTEEN (17) SEVENTEEN (18) EIGHTEEN (19) NINETEEN (20) TWENTY (21) TWENTY-ONE (22) TWENTY-TWO (23) TWENTY-THREE (24) TWENTY-FOUR (25) TWENTY-FIVE (26) TWENTY-SIX (27) TWENTY-SEVEN (28) TWENTY-EIGHT (29) TWENTY-NINE (30) THIRTY (31) THIRTY-ONE (32) THIRTY-TWO (33) THIRTY-THREE (34) THIRTY-FOUR (35) THIRTY-FIVE (36) THIRTY-SIX (37) THIRTY-SEVEN (38) THIRTY-EIGHT (39) THIRTY-NINE (40) FORTY (41) FORTY-ONE (42) FORTY-TWO (43) FORTY-THREE (44) FORTY-FOUR (45) FORTY-FIVE (46) FORTY-SIX (47) FORTY-SEVEN (48) FORTY-EIGHT (49) FORTY-NINE (50) FIFTY (51) FIFTY-ONE (52) FIFTY-TWO (53) FIFTY-THREE (54) FIFTY-FOUR (55) FIFTY-FIVE (56) FIFTY-SIX (57) FIFTY-SEVEN (58) FIFTY-EIGHT (59) FIFTY-NINE (60) SIXTY (61) SIXTY-ONE (62) SIXTY-TWO (63) SIXTY-THREE (64) SIXTY-FOUR (65) SIXTY-FIVE (66) SIXTY-SIX (67) SIXTY-SEVEN (68) SIXTY-EIGHT (69) SIXTY-NINE (70) SEVENTY (71) SEVENTY-ONE (72) SEVENTY-TWO (73) SEVENTY-THREE (74) SEVENTY-FOUR (75) SEVENTY-FIVE (76) SEVENTY-SIX (77) SEVENTY-SEVEN (78) SEVENTY-EIGHT (79) SEVENTY-NINE (80) EIGHTY (81) EIGHTY-ONE (82) EIGHTY-TWO (83) EIGHTY-THREE (84) EIGHTY-FOUR (85) EIGHTY-FIVE (86) EIGHTY-SIX (87) EIGHTY-SEVEN (88) EIGHTY-EIGHT (89) EIGHTY-NINE (90) NINETY (91) NINETY-ONE (92) NINETY-TWO (93) NINETY-THREE (94) NINETY-FOUR (95) NINETY-FIVE (96) NINETY-SIX (97) NINETY-SEVEN (98) NINETY-EIGHT (99) HUNDRED (100)

NEARLY ALL MACHINE TOOLS EXCEPTION HEAVIEST SOVIET
MANUFACTURE LATTER BRITISH. EFFICIENCY AN EXPLOI-
TATION OF PLANT FACILITIES ESTIMATED NOT OVER 10%
OF CAPACITY. GREAT MAJORITY MACHINE TOOLS IDLE
THRU LACK EXPERIENCED WORKMEN AND SICKNESS. YARD
IN ADDITION TO SHIPBUILDING AND REPAIR ACTIVITIES
MANUFACTURES SOME BOMB CASES AND NON-NAVAL MATERIAL.
NO SCHOOLS FOR WORKERS WHO LEARN BY APPRENTICE
METHOD. WORKING CONDITIONS INCREDIBLY BAD TO AN
AMERICAN. EXCELLENT NATURAL LIGHT CUT OFF BY BLACK
PAINT FOR BLACKOUT INTERIOR SHOPS ALMOST TOO DARK TO
WALK AROUND. **

WORKERS BUNDLED UP IN SHAWLS RAGS FELT BOOTS.

** LINE OF CODE OMITTED - BEING SERVICED.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(F) or (G)

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS) and letter, May 3, 1972

OPNAV-NCR-15

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY			ROUTINE
DATE			DEFERRED
FOR CODEROOM			
DECODED BY			PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS MESSAGE WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS AIRMAIL TYPE.

PAGE 5 211409 NCR 9803

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DA TIME CLT

ON OUTGOING MESSAGE PLEASE LEAVE SPACE FOR: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

COAL SHORTAGE GIVEN AS REASON FOR LACK ILLUMINATION BUT VERY FEW FIXTURES SEEN EXCEPT IN MOLD LOFT WHICH ALSO EQUIPPED AIR CONDITIONING. CURRENT CONSTRUCTION ALL RIVETED WITH EXCEPTION OF DECKHOUSES WHERE WELDING UNIVERSALLY SO POOR THAT MUST CERTAINLY BE TORN OUT. 1937 DESTROYER INSPECTED AT POLYARNOE NEARLY ALL WELDED. HER OFFICERS SAY WELDING HIGHLY SATISFACTORY. LACK WELDING CURRENT CONSTRUCTION HERE AND AT KOMSOMOLSK INDICATES PRACTICALLY TOTAL LACK CAPABLE WELDERS. SHIPYARD HAS GREAT POSTWAR POTENTIALITY BUT PRESENT STATUS DUE LACK WORKERS AND MATERIAL WHICH IN TURN DUE TO CONCENTRATION ON WAR EFFORT. ONLY SHIPS YARD CAN POSSIBLY COMPLETE DURING WAR ARE 160 FOOT SUBCHASERS IN VERY LIMITED NUMBER. NO FOREIGNER HAS BEEN PERMITTED WITHIN COMPOUND BEFORE

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 6(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 1, 1972

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (Sec Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

OPNAV-NCR-15

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DISPATCH

CHARACTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSES	PRIORITY
FROM		ATTENTION (**) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY			ROUTINE
DATE			DEFERRED
FOR COODROOM			
DECODED BY			PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND IS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
PAGE 6	211409	NCR 9803	<input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

BRITISH HAVE BEEN BARRED ADMITTANCE EVEN TO SHIPS UNLOADING IN OR NEAR COMPOUND AND ARE VERY CURIOUS. STRONGLY RECOMMEND NO RELEASE OR DISCUSSION ABOVE INFORMATION WHICH MAY JEOPARDIZE OUR FREEDOM OF FURTHER MOVEMENT HERE. SOVIETS HAVE FREQUENTLY STATED THEY CANNOT TRUST US WITH INFORMATION BECAUSE THE BRITISH GET IT AND USE IT TO APPLY PRESSURE ON THEM OR IT APPEARS IN THE PAPERS IN A SHORT TIME.

ACTION		
F-0		22
F-01		23
F-02		24
F-05		25
F-07		26
F-1		27
F-2		28
F-20		29
F-3		30
F-30		31
F-31		32
F-32		33
F-33		34
F-34		35
F-4		36
FX01		37
FX30		38
FX37		39
FX40		40
FX41		41
FX42		42
FX43		43
FX44		44
FX45		45
FX46		46
FX47		47
FX48		48
FX49		49
FX50		50

16...ACT

OP-01...COMINCH...NAVAIDE....

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 1, 1984

By DBS

Date

MAY 21 1973

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (c) NAVREGS) (SPRAY-NCR-13)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE*
FROM <u>ALUSNA MOSCOW</u>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY		CNO	ROUTINE
DATE <u>22 JAN 44</u>			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROM <u>1925/22</u>			PRIORITY
DECODED BY <u>ALTENHOF</u>			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY <u>HAMILTON</u>			DEFERRED
ROUTED BY <u>WILKIN</u>			

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

211315 NCR 9804

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW ☐

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ADM OLSEN'S PARTY INSPECTED K21. 6 TUBES FORWARD WITH 1 SPARE TORPEDOES IN FWD ROOM. 4 TUBES AFT. UPPER TWO CANNOT BE RELOADED. 10 KNOTS SUBMERGED FOR ONE HOUR OR 36 HOURS AT ECONOMICAL SPEED. 2000 TONS SURFACE. COMMANDED BY FOREMOST SUB COMMANDER HERO SOVIET UNION LUNIN WHO CREDITED WITH TORPEDOING TIRPITZ AND SINKING 40000 TONS ENEMY SHIPS. TWO TUBES AMIDSHIPS FOR DROPPING 18 MINES THROUGH BOTTOM. NO AIR CONDITION SYSTEM. 48 DEPTH CHARGE ATTACKS WITH NO DAMAGE. DISCIPLINE AND MORALE EXCELLENT. APPEARANCE OFFICERS AND CREW VERY SMART. BOAT IS ABSOLUTELY TIPTOP CONDITON IN EVERY RESPECT.

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-10

211315 300 Russia

MAY 21 1973

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

BY RT, NARA Date 4/11/01

AGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

EXTENSION NUMBER		ADDRESSEES		PRECEDENCE
		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE		
RELEASED BY	FOR ACTION			PRIORITY
DATE				ROUTINE
TOR CODER ROOM				DEFERRED
DECODED BY				
PARAPHRASED BY	INFORMATION			PRIORITY
				ROUTINE
ROUTED BY				DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.				IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
PAGE 2 211315 NCR 984				<input type="checkbox"/>
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:		DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

16....ACT

COMINCH...20G...CNO...200P...NAVAIDE...

ACTION

F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-07	26
F-1	27
F-2	28
F-20	29
F-3	30
F-30	31
F-31	32
F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
FX01	37
FX30	38
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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(2) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 1, 1973

By DBS Date MAY 21 1973

VCNO

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OPNAV-NCR-10

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 E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
 NLR 101
 By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE CNO	
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION	PRIORITY
DATE 23 JAN 1944			ROUTINE
TON CODEROM 2237			DEFERRED
DECODED BY AL TENHOF		INFORMATION	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY BLACK			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY ALLEN			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AN ADMINISTRATIVE			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
211300			<input type="checkbox"/>
NCR 9915			

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME OCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

RADM OLSENS PARTY INSPECTED DESTROYER RAXUMNY AT POLYARNOE. THIS SHIP TRANSFERRED 4 YEARS AGO FROM VLADIVOSTOK VIA NORTHERN ROUTE. SAME COMING OFFICER IN HER. NEARLY ALL WELDED INCLUDING GUNHOUSES. ARMAMENT AND FIRE CONTROL GEAR IN FIRST CLASS CONDITION. SALVO FIRING BUT NO DIRECTOR FIRE FOR BATTERY OR REMOTE CONTROL GUNLAYING. NO RADAR. CONTROL TOWER CONTAINS 2 RANGEFINDERS AND SPOTTING GLASSES. TORPEDO DIRECTOR ON BRIDGE WINGS. MANY INSTRUMENTS ON BRIDGE WINGS AND IN CHART HOUSE. MATERIAL CONDITION FAIR WITH LITTLE REPLACEMENTS PARTS UNTIL WORN OUT. LARGE ANT WOOD PANELLING NO EVIDENCE ANY ATTEMPT STRIP SHIP OR OF DAMAGE CONTROL

ACTION

F-0	
F-01	
F-02	
F-05	
F-07	
F-1	
F-2	
F-20	
F-3	
F-30	
F-31	
F-32	
F-33	
F-34	
F-4	
FX01	
FX30	
FX37	
FX40	
IG-00	

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OPNAV-NCR-19

211300

300 Bureau

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E.O. 12366, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
PLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY			PRIORITY
DATE			ROUTINE
TON CODERDOM			DEFERRED
DECODED BY			PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
PAGE 2 OF	211300	ICR 9915	<input type="checkbox"/>
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

SYSTEM. DEPTH CHARGES IN SLOT IN STERN FROZEN
SOLID WITH ICE ACCUMULATION. ENGINEERING PLANT
CONGESTED AND POOR. STATED SPEED 28 KNOTS.
WARDROOM AND OFFICERS COUNTRY VERY LARGE COMFORTABLE
SUPERIOR TO OURS WHILE CREW ACCOMMODATIONS CONGESTED
AND INFERIOR OURS DESPITE GOOD SIZED RECREATION
ROOM. REFLECTS OLD IMPERIAL NAVY IN DESIGN IN
THEIR SATTLE EFFICIENCY SACRIFICED FOR COMFORT.
GENERAL DESIGN NOT SO GOOD AS THAT OUR OLD FOUR
STACKERS. APPEARANCE OFFICERS FAIR CREW DIRTY.
SHIPS WOR GOING ON GAVE IMPRESSION OF EXCESSIVE
OVERHAUL ALL WORKING PORTS WHICH PROBABLY SOVIET
SYSTEM OF LEARNING BY PRACTICE IN LIEU OF BOOKS.

16....ACT

COMINCH...CNO....200P....NAVAIDE....

E. O. 11652, Sec. 5(E) and 5(F) or (G)

OSD letter, May 1962

By DBS Date MAY 21 1963

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OPNAV-NCR-16

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E. O. 12958, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

PLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/04

NAVAL MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION CNO	PRIORITY RRRRRR
DATE 22 JAN 1944			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROM 2157			
DECODED BY ALTENHOF		INFORMATION BUMED	PRIORITY RRRRRR
PARAPHRASED BY ROTHROCK			DEFERRED
ROUTED BY WIDMAN			
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AT ADMINISTRATIVE			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
211200			NCR 9855

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

CNO PASS BUMED INFO.

OBSERVATIONS CDR LANG MC ACCOMPANYING RADM OLSEN
VISIT NORTH RUSSIA PORTS.

APPROXIMATELY 50 PER CENT CIVILIANS SHOWED EVIDENCE
1 OR MORE DEFICIENCY DISEASES. CONDITIONS OF CIVILIAN
FOOD SUBOPTIMAL. FUEL SUPPLY IMPROVED OVER LAST
YEAR. POLYARNOE NAVAL HOSPITAL CONVERTED SCHOOLHOUSE
WITH CAPACITY FOR 100 PATIENTS AND CAPABLE EXPANDING
TO 1000 NOW WELL FILLED. EQUIPMENT AND MEDICAL
SUPPLIES ADEQUATE AND FAIRLY MODERN. ALL SERIOUSLY
ILL PATIENTS HOSPITALIZED IN HUGE WELL CONSTRUCTED
AND VENTILATED ROOM BUILT IN CAVE CARVED IN SOLID
ROCK IN WHICH VENTILATION GAS PROTECTED. AIR RAID
SHELTER SUFFICIENT FOR ALL PATIENTS AND STAFF SAME

ACTION	
F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-03	25
F-04	26
F-05	27
F-06	28
F-07	29
F-08	30
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F-72	94
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F-77	99
F-78	100

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OPNAV-NCR-16

211200 300 Russia

By DES

Date MAY 21 1973

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

AL MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT

ORIGINATOR	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY			PRIORITY
DATE			ROUTINE
TO: CODER ROOM			DEFERRED
DECODED BY			PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY			ROUTINE
			DEFERRED

ROUTED BY

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

PAGE 2 OF

211200

NCR 9855

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT

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LOCATION. OBSERVED SOVIET DESTROYER SANITATION HYGIENE AND SICKBAY FACILITIES TO BE ALL BELOW OUR POOREST OPERATING STANDARDS. MOLOTOVSK SHIPYARD SHOPS WOEFULLY LACKING ANY HEALTH SAFEGUARDS OR ACCIDENT PREVENTION MEASURES. DESPITE EMPLOYMENT OVER 10,000 WORKERS NO INDUSTRIAL MEDICINE ORGANIZATION AND SANITATION MOST PRIMITIVE. INTELL REPORT FOLLOWS.

ACTION
F-01
F-02
F-07
F-1
F-2
F-20
F-3
F-30
F-31
F-32
F-33
F-34
F-4
FX01
FX30
VCNO

16...ACT

BUMED...COMINCH...NAVAIDE...CNO...2COP...

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(F) or
OSD letter, May 1972
By DBS Date MAY 21 1972

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 21, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The President.

The following statement appears in the "Joint Intelligence Committee Weekly Summary" of 19 January. The statement is a part of an article on the subject of USSR Policy Toward Poland":

"Meanwhile Moscow newspapers publicized the proposal of a Polish Committee of National Liberation made by the leader of the American Friends of Poland in the United States. According to this plan, a committee would be formed containing representatives of the Polish Socialist and Peasant Parties in London, the Union of Polish Patriots in the USSR, and democratic Polish organizations in other countries. It was proposed that the committee should establish diplomatic relations with the USSR, become a signatory of the Soviet-Czech treaty, revise military commands in Polish forces stationed in the Near East, and act as interim government for liberated Poland. The press in Moscow continued to carry attacks on the Polish Government-in-exile, intimating that a change of regime would be necessary before a resumption of relations."

The following paragraph on Russia is also of interest:

"A continuing interest in gold currency of fixed value as a basis for international monetary stabilization appears as a significant feature of Soviet post-war planning. Even during the war, the USSR, unlike the United States, has continued to operate its gold mines and to stockpile the output as an investment for the future."

Very respectfully,

WILSON BROWN.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By

Date

MAY 21 1973

300 Russia

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Mr. Hopkins (?)

From: Lisbon
To: MILID

No. 1103

21 January 1944.

Rptd Madrid.

That Pravda article and Germ weak resistance to Red penetration into Poland are not unconnected is asserted by Polish source A1 who declares Germ Brit peace palaver reports Berlin fabricated. According to informant Russia and Germany united in desire to draw advantages from Poland's plight first by putting Allies before fait accompli of terrain occupation second by inciting Poles to resist Red advance and creating confusion in Allied camp.

Source affirms Germans have 60 good divs in Poland have invited Polish well organized and equipped under ground army of million men to take defensive action against Reds with Germ support and under command Polish gen to be freed from Germ prison camp. This action would be rewarded by far reaching concessions to Poland. All Germ overtures rejected by Poles source declares. Reur 780.

He asserts Red armies making supreme effort but are sorely tried and becoming more dependent on Allied food and equipment supplies. He considers improbable Red capability to deal Germans coup de grace climax to present campaign. He calls my attn to Red vulnerability in Sarny salient of Manstein strong enough which judging by delayed action to withdraw his troops from South may well be case. He affirms Crimea will be defended to last man due to resulting air threat to Ploesti.

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CM-1N-14720 (21 Jan 44)

E.O. 11652, Sec. 9(E) and 5(D) or (H)

OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1972

300 Russia

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Lisbon
To: MILID

No. 1103 22 January 1944. page 2

Sovya

Sodece opines frontier bickering not real issue between Reds and Poles but accute stage reached in present considerations due alleged Red demands on Poles to deliver names and addresses of all ranking members Polish underground army which is to be controlled by Russia. This he says would lead to mass executions and deportations. He further asserts Russia unwilling Anders army participate eventual Balkan campaign fearing junction with Hungary and proximity to Poland and states two Polish divs now at Bari destined to reinforce Allied troops Italy. More coming continuation of above.

Solborg.

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: OPD
LOG

CM-IN-14720 (23 Jan 44) 0010Z cng

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OSD letter, May 1, 1973

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	ALUSNA WSCOW	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY	21 JAN 1944	CNO	ROUTINE
DATE	0639		DEFERRED
TOR CODEROM	CHERNOCK/GOLDEN		PRIORITY
DECODED BY	SAMUEL		ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY	ROLL		DEFERRED
ROUTED BY			
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.		IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW	
21247		NCR 8895	

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

CONVERSATIONS RADM CLSENS PARTY SOVIET OFFICERS NORTH RUSSIA INDICATES FOLLOWING INFO:

KARELIAN FRONT QUIESCENT. NORTHERN SECTOR STILL EXCLUSIVELY GERMAN TROOPS LARGELY AUSTRIAN MOUNTAIN UNITS. LITTLE OTHER THAN PATROL ACTION EITHER SIDE. WHITE SEA CANAL INOPERATIVE DUE FINNISH OCCUPATION PETROZAVODSK AND LINE SOUTH TO LAKE LADOGA. NORTH FINNISH FRONT SUPPLIED WHOLLY BY SEA. GERMAN TRANSPORTS HUG COAST AND FOLLOW INSIDE PASSAGE BEHIND MINEFIELD MAKING RED SUB ATTACK DIFFICULT. SOVIETS CONSISTENTLY BOMBING NORTHERN FINNISH AIRFIELDS. CONSIDER GERMANS HAVE INSUFFICIENT BOMBS AND GAS FOR AIR ACTIVITY MURMANSK AREA BUT ALWAYS DANGER OF A CONCENTRATED EFFORT. NO GERMAN STRAFING MURMANSK LINE TRAINS SINCE OCTOBER BUT TRAINS STILL CARRYING 2 OR MORE ANTI AIRCRAFT CARS. AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE INDICATES WELDING AND REPAIR WORK UNDERWAY

ACTION	
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F-31	
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FX01	
FX30	
FX37	
FX40	
IG-00	
VCN0	

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OPNAV-NCR-16

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

201247 300 Russia

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

AL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTM

DRAFTER		EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
ALUSNA 110800W			ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEES	
FROM	FOR ACTION		PRIORITY	1
RELEASED BY			ROUTINE	2
DATE			DEFERRED	3
TOR CODEROOM				4
DECODED BY	INFORMATION		PRIORITY	5
PARAPHRASED BY			ROUTINE	6
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED	7
				8

PAGE 2

261247

NCR 8895

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME OCT 20

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHER PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ON TIRPITZ. ACCESS TO AREA BY NORWEGIANIANS WORKING AS SOVIET AGENTS INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT. ALL SOURCES EMPHATIC IN THAT KIROV MAKING ORKY AGAC 2 BATTLESHIPS STILL AFLOAT BALTIC. 1 OF LATTER DAMAGED. EX GERMAN LUTSONHIA 2 TWIN TURRETS MOUNTED AND PARTICIPATED IN DEFENCE Leningrad and is still afloat. DIRECTOR MOLOTOVSK SHIPYARD RECENTLY DIRECTOR Leningrad YARD SAYS LATTER IN FULL OPERATION. FLOATING DRY DOCK OF ABOUT 10,000 TONS WHICH PASSED THROUGH HONGKONG ABOUT 1937 ENROUTE FROM NIKOLAEV PROBABLY NOW PETROPALVLOVSK. GERMAN SUBS LAID MINES PASSAGES PAST NOVAYA ZEMLYA IN ANTICIPATION LARGE CONVOYS FROM USA VIA NORTHERN SEA ROUTE. VERY FEW MINES KOLA INLET OR WHITE SEA AND APPROACHES TO BOTH. NO SHIP LOSSES THIS CAUSE.

ACTION		21
F-0		22
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F-05		25
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F-20		29
F-3		30
F-30		31
F-31		32
F-32		33
F-33		34
F-34		35
F-4		36
FX01		37
FX30		38
FX37		39
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16...ACT

COMINCH..CNO..21G. HAVAIDE..21OP..13...

B. O. 21551, Sec. 3(B) and 3(C) (or 3)

OSD letter, May 1, 1971

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1971

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LR 101
BY RT. NARA Date 4/10/01

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

U R G E N T

From: Moscow, Russia
To: WAR

No. 148 17 January 1944

For G2 from Deane.

Following are highlights of report of trip to Kiev front made by General Connolly and party, including Colonel McCabe of this mission:

Connolly will render detailed report upon return to Teheran and McCabe's report will be forwarded by pouch.

Party went by rail from Moscow to Orel, Kursk, and Kiev; by motor from Kiev to Zhitomir and to village of Vysokaya Pechka, 40 kilometers South West of Zhitomir. Russian morale good as to be expected during advance. No serious indication of crack in German morale. German prisoners well clothed, clean, and confident looking. Ages estimated 20 to 35 years. Russian soldiers appear younger on the average. Russians report more than 50% of prisoners, when interviewed alone, express pessimism as to outcome of War. While atrocity stories probably gain in horror in retelling, there is sufficient evidence that reports in general are true. Entire party impressed with ruthlessness of Germans and convinced that Russian hatred will not be satisfied with less than unconditional surrender. Russian bitterness toward the Finns second only to hatred of Germans.

While no definite information on future operations, party was informed that Pripet Marshes are not frozen, therefore operations in that direction impossible. Weight of attack seems to be Southwest in general direction Kiev-Vnetsia with the objective of cutting rail communications to the

CM-IN-11578 (18 Jan 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Moscow
To: WAR
No. 148

Page -2-

17 January 1944

Southeast and making first crossing of Bug in its upper reaches. Battlefields observed were apparently scenes of rear guard action. Russian advance follows roads closely and most tank casualties observed near roads and around villages used as strong points. Front extremely fluid and seldom clearly defined. Large cities avoided and reduced by pinching out. Russian Forces well supplied and system in general parallels ours. Pressing need for railroad equipment including rails and locomotives. German destruction of rails and ties during withdrawal was complete. Ten percent destruction of ties cut in middle or burned. Russian repair railroads by salvaging from double track to single track. Railroad bridge over Dnepr built in 12 days. Bridging already planned for all crossings even beyond the Dniestr and bridging materials always available.

Supplies moved by rail as far as Army and in some cases to division railheads. Truck Companies and Battalions move supplies from railheads. Horse transport only used for supply from Regiments forward. Also indications that it is used to some extent in rear areas of Army. 25 to 30% of trucks observed were American and 15 to 20% German, balance Russian. Great enthusiasm for American trucks, with Studebakers most popular and Ford least popular. Shortage of truck transportation made by towing sleds by trucks and tractors. No indication of shortage in aircraft. Russian boast complete superiority in air but subjected to nuisance bombing by few individual German bombers.

At least 2 trainloads of 36 M-4 American tanks each observed moving West from Kiev Yards. None observed on battle fields.

Germans completely destroy signal communications during withdrawal. Only American Signal equipment seen were desk and field telephones.

CM-IN-11578 (18 Jan 44)

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JOS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 20 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Moscow, Russia
To: WAR
No. 148

Page -3-

Russian troops well fed. Large quantities of American food in evidence. Food situation still difficult for civilian population with bread norm in Kiev 300 grams a day and only item of ration.

Russian combat troops well clothed and armed, particularly in automatic weapons. German winter clothing has improved.

Approximately 20% of Soviet armored vehicles were 76 MM tank destroyers mounted on T34 chassis. Some equipped with extra long barrel while other Howitzer type. Many German tanks now covered with rough thin layer of cement, probably for winter operations and prevent reflection.

If more details immediate information is desired on any of the above subjects, request should be cabled.

No Sig

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: OPD
CG AAF
CGGN
ASF
JCS Capt Royal USN
White House
LOG

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

CM-IN-11578 (18 Jan 44)

1441Z

ejm

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: MA London
To: MILID

No: 6508, 10th Jan 1944

Signed Peabody.

Very satisfactory progress opinion MI officers
War Office re Russian drives West and Southwest Kiev
and Kirovograd Region. Weather reported becoming
colder along Southern front and ground frozen. Russians
expected out railroads West and South Smela and capture
town. Pervomayak probable objective for drive West
Korovograd.

No Sig

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: OPD
CG AAF
WHITE HOUSE
LOG

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (B)

OSD letter, May 1, 1973

CM-IN-6323 (10 Jan 44) 1741Z ms By DBS Date MAY 21 1973

500 Russia

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

P R I O R I T Y

From: Moscow
To: AGWAR

No: 126, 3rd Jan 1944

For G-2 from Deane.

General Spalding and Colonel Bond just returned from a 3 day trip to Leningrad with General Connolly's party. Complete report will be submitted but following are high lights:

Hostile lines 4 to 5 kilometers from outskirts of city and at places trenches 35 meters apart. Front stabilized but patrolling is maintained which results in capture of some prisoners. Small arms fire and artillery fire is maintained between front lines and artillery fire on Leningrad daily at the rate of 200 to 1000 rounds per day. The calibers are from 4 to 10 inches. A chart which records 100,000 shells over period of the siege indicates enemy fire concentrated on areas of greatest congestion without regard to military objectives although the industrial areas have been badly hit. Rarely more than 1 shell in 1 locality at a time as Germans have found that populace takes cover under ground after first shell. The battle front extends from Gulf of Finland within 4 kilometers of city gradually swinging to southeast and east in an arc at gradually increasing distance from city and thence to the east at point south of Lake Ladoga and thence to south. The Finns occupy the northern part of the line around the city and maintain their share of artillery fire on Leningrad. Russians deeply resentful of Finns and leading officials remarked "We will never forgive them" which represents general attitude. The German soldiers captured are in age groups 20 or over 30. There is no indication of large scale activity on either side in the near future.

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 29 1974

364 Russia

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

Page-2

From: Moscow
To: AGWAR
No: 126, 3rd Jan 1944

No German aircraft over Leningrad since May. In the last raid Germans lost 56 out of 90 planes. Russians claim their fighter and anti-aircraft protection is strong enough to prevent future Axis raids. Russian aircraft based on 17 airfields east of city none of which were visited by party Soviet claims to have radar for plane detection which is superior to British. 2 sets furnished by the U S are now being installed.

Morale of population high and rationed better than at Moscow. No attention paid artillery fire. Krivoiski factory making rockets, mortar shells, and ammunition operating 5 kilometers from front. It has been badly damaged but any part that is useable is working. This gives dispersal and the use of factory is camouflaged by the appearance of it being in ruins. Soviets were able to ship 50% of equipment from this factory to factories further east. This probably represents percentage of salvage in all damaged factories. Street cars, theaters, schools all in operation. Apparently no defeatism and only thought is to work for certain victory. Kittyhawk played important heroic role in defense of city. 1 Russian pilot has credit for 17 Germans while flying Kittyhawk.

No Sig

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: OPD
CGAAP
CC/S (Capt Royal USN)
White House
Log

CM-IN-6287

(10 Jan 44)

1620Z

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By RHP, NLR, Date

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

31 December 1945

~~SECRET~~
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL BROWN:

Subject: Estimated Situation on the Russo-German Front as of March, 1944.

1. In compliance with your instructions, the following is an estimate of the situation on the Eastern Front, to include probable location of the front line as of March, 1944.

2. As will be appreciated, a proper analysis of this subject must be based largely on a determination of the lines of action which are open to each of the opposing forces and of the course of action which each is most apt to pursue. Unfortunately, the answers to the above questions are based upon so many imponderables, that any conclusion reached at the present time can be considered not much better than an "educated guess". However, I have endeavored to weigh the factors involved, based on the meager information available, and the following is presented for what it may be worth.

3. Capabilities.

a. The Soviets appear to have a preponderance of strength over the Germans of about three to one along the entire front. From this standpoint, they appear to be in a position to launch large scale winter operations at any time, at any point, and with reasonable chance of success. If and when they choose to commit their strategic reserves, it is likely that they may effect at least an initial break-through of serious proportions. Their ability to fully exploit such a break-through

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OSD letter, May 1972

By DBS

Date

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- 1 -

320 Russia
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on a sustained basis and carry it through to a decisive conclusion remains a matter of speculation, due largely to the supply and communications problems involved.

b. If the past is any criterion, the German Army appears capable of continuing an organized defense as long as operations against them remain on approximately the same scale as at present. To date, they have been able to hold in critical areas, and even launch limited counter-offensives in order to prevent the encirclement of sizeable units. While it is true the German Armies have been forced to give ground, their withdrawals have, for the most part, been made in good order and without serious loss of manpower and equipment. If, on the other hand, the Russians should make an all-out effort to break the line at any given point, it is doubtful if the Germans could hold. The remarkable recuperative powers of German units in the face of disaster must continue to be a vital factor in determining the scope of their defeat under any given set of conditions.

4. Intentions.

a. It is doubtful if the Russians have any intention of committing their forces to an all-out effort within the next three months. Gain in territory does not appear to be a predominant factor in their winter plans, since each important advance to the West is necessarily attended by new and serious problems from a supply and communications standpoint. Rather, it would seem to their best interests, for the present, to keep up sufficient pressure to retain the initiative in critical areas and to contain the maximum enemy forces and wear them

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- 2 -

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down by attrition. Thus the ground work would be prepared for what, we may reasonably hope, will be a major commitment of strategic reserves on the Eastern Front in coordination with Anglo-American invasion on the West.

b. German efforts, meanwhile, may well be calculated to preserve the integrity of their defense and to conserve manpower even at the cost of terrain.

5. Conclusions.

a. From the above, it may be concluded that no material change will occur in the situation on the Eastern front during the next three months.

b. Winter operations may be expected to force a German withdrawal by March to the following general line (north to south): Lake Peipus - Polotsk - Slavnos - Bobruisk - Masyr - Olevsk - Zhitomir - Vinnitsa - southeast along the Bug River to Nikolayev. (See attached map). Withdrawal from the Crimea is also included in the above.

c. Since the center of gravity of the Russian Armies is now massed in the Gomel - Kiev area, a German withdrawal in the south to the Bug River is considered more likely than a withdrawal to the Lake Peipus - Polotsk line in the north.

L. MATHEWSON,
Colonel, General Staff.

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- 3 -

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