

MR 300, Sec. 5 -- WARFARE (RUSSIA)

MR 300, Sec. 5 -- WARFARE (RUSSIA)

July-Dec, 1944

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July-Dec, 1944

Map Room  
Box 100

## NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
AMCON VLADIVOSTOK		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		CNO	PRIORITY RRRR ROUTINE
DATE 31 DEC 1944			DEFERRED
TON CODEROOM 1347			
DECODED BY SMALL		MOSCOW	PRIORITY RRRR ROUTINE
TYPED BY VEROSKY			DEFERRED
ROUTED BY MORRIS			

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

381145

NCR 1872

IF OPERATIONAL  
CHECK BELOW

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:

DATE

TIME

GCT

AMCON VLAD SENDS CNO INFO MOSCOW.

WEATHER VLAD AREA DURING DEC HAS BEEN ABOUT 10 DEGREES  
COLDER WITH MORE SNOW THAN NORMAL. FIGHTER PLANES IN  
GROUPS OF 4 AND 6 OBSERVED OPERATING AT HIGH ALTITUDES  
APPROX 18,000 FT. TYPES NOT IDENTIFIED. 3 MBR-2 TYPE  
FLYING BOATS HAVE PRACTICED FORMATION FLYING AND SINGLY  
TUNED SLEEVES FOR TARGET PRACTICE TWICE PER WEEK. PLANES  
OPERATE WITH LANDING WHEELS ATTACHED IN ADDITION TO  
LARGE WING TIP FLOATS. NO PBN'S OBSERVED TO DATE. EAST  
OF URAL MTS THERE IS A NAVAL AIR BASE ON WEST SHORE OF  
LAKE ANDREEVSKI JUST EAST OF YUMEN. 2 MEDIUM HANGARS  
CONSIDERABLE NAVAL PERSONNEL AND NO PLANES OBSERVED.

16...ACT

COMINCH..CNO..NAVAIDE..200P..34..0P03..200..

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. let. 1-1-72

DATE MAY 21 1973

VON

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 78 (4) NAVREGS.)

OP *Eso Ruman*

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E.O. 12366, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

PLR 101

by RT, NARA, Date 4/2/04



WAR DEPARTMENT  
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

██████████ "IVI"

From: CG U.S. Army Forces, Rumania  
To: War Department  
Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy  
Nr: M 212, 30th December 1944

Ref number M 212 AFHQ pass to AGWAR action OPD  
General Hull G-2 MIS from Schuyler Rumania.

On 30th December, Colonel Melohousky, Russian Army member of ACC for Rumania, stated that the fall of Budapest is imminent. He revealed that the Red Army has six German-Hungarian Divisions encircled in Budapest and four German-Hungarian Divisions completely encircled west of Budapest. Melohousky is confident that these 10 enemy Divisions will be destroyed or captured. He emphasized the fact that Moscow delights in making official announcements of victories on holidays and predicts that the capture of Budapest will be announced on 1st January 1945.

End

Message received by AGWAR as retransmission from  
AFHQ under date time group 310759A.

ACTION: G-2

INFO: CGAAF OPD Col Park C of S

CM-IN-151 (1 Jan 45)

0353Z

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 8(b) and 5(D) or (E)  
OSD letter, May 1, 1973  
By DHS Date MAY 21 1973

bem

42

300 Russia

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

*J*  
[REDACTED] AMUG  
PRIORITY  
*WS*

From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia  
To: War Department  
US Military Attache, London, England  
CG US Strategic Air Forces in Europe, St Germain France  
Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces,  
Caserta, Italy  
Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

No: MX 22201 29 December 1944

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff info Arnold, Speatz, Alexander, and Baker, Central District United Kingdom Base Section London for British Chiefs of Staff from Archer and Deane ~~MX 22201~~ MX 22201. London Military Attache please pass to CD UKBS London for British Chiefs of Staff.

Continued and full representation of air liaison requirements have been made to the Soviets since this requirement was first proposed. No Soviet commitment, either positive or negative, was forthcoming. Ambassador Harriman made a very thorough and persistent representation to Marshal Stalin of air liaison requirements on 14 December. No commitment, either positive or negative, resulted therefrom.

On 26 December a letter was directed to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Red Army, by Deane and Archer setting forth and substantiating requirements.

On 28 December Deane and Archer were notified by the Red Army General Staff that the establishment of MAAF Air Liaison detachments with the Ukrainian Armies would not be authorized but that air liaison could be effected through Moscow as at present.

CM-IN-28413

(29 Dec 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

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[REDACTED] ANUG  
PRIORITY

Page 2.

From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia

No: MX 22201

29 December 1944

It is our belief that the reason for Soviet disapproval in this instance is based on their desire to preclude observation by foreign observers of activities at or near their front lines. This is borne out by their recent disapproval to grant officers of Eastern Command authority to fly to location of disabled aircraft in Russian-occupied Poland without in each instance securing approval from Red General Staff in Moscow through the US Military Mission.

End

ACTION: CC/S

INFO: Adm Leahy  
Gen Arnold  
Gen Hull  
Gen Bissell  
Adm King  
C of S

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 20 1974

CM-IN-28413

(29 Dec 44)

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~~TOP SECRET AMUG~~

PRIORITY

From: CG US Strategic Air Forces in Europe, St Germain, France  
To : War Department  
Air Ministry London, England  
CG Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, Caserta Italy  
No : UAX 51930 28 December 1944

To Arnold info Eaker and Air Ministry from Spaatz  
UAX 51930. ~~TOP SECRET~~

Establishing and changing bomblines is subject cited  
WX 75402 Dec 11th. In view of fact that 36 to 48 hours  
minimum time will be necessary to coordinate all changes  
in bomblines, Eaker and I recommend that proposals in cited  
message should be as follows.

1. That SACMED be charged with the responsibility of  
establishing and changing the bomblines south of Vienna  
(inclusive), information of all action taken to be forwarded  
to Moscow, Commanding General USSTAF, the Deputy Chief of  
the Air Staff and Combined Chiefs.

2. The Commanding General USSTAF, and the Deputy Chief  
Air Staff to agree jointly on the \* and changes in the bomb  
line north of Vienna (exclusive), and Commanding General,  
USSTAF, to inform Moscow, SACMED and Combined Chiefs.

End

\* Being Serviced

ACTION: Gen Arnold

INFORMATION: JC/S, Adm Leahy, Gen Hull, Gen Bissell, Adm King,  
CofS

CM-IN-27704 (29 Dec 44)

0034Z

bjm

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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~~SECRET~~ AMUG  
CORRECTED COPY

From: CG, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe,  
St. Germain, France

To: War Department  
Air Ministry, London England  
Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces,  
Caserta, Italy

Nr: UAX 51930 28 December 1944

To Arnold info Eaker and Air Ministry from Spaatz  
UAX 51930. ~~SECRET~~ Cite WX 75402 December 11th.

Establishing and changing bomblines is subject.  
In view of fact that 36 to 48 hours minimum time will be  
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1-That SACMED be charged with the responsibility  
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(inclusive), information of all action taken to be forwarded  
to Moscow, Commanding General USSTAF, the Deputy Chief of  
the Air Staff and Combined Chiefs.

2-The Commanding General USSTAF, and the Deputy  
Chief Air Staff to agree jointly on the establishment and  
changes in the bomblines north of Vienna (exclusive), the  
Commanding General USSTAF, to inform Moscow, SACMED and  
Combined Chiefs.

End

Corrected copy of CM-IN-27704 (29 Dec 44) GEN ARNOLD

ACTION: GEN ARNOLD

INFO : JC/S, ADM LEAHY, GEN HULL, GEN BISSEL, ADM KING, C OF S  
CM-IN-28144 (29 Dec 44) 1043Z mos

~~SECRET~~  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 5(b) and 5(d) or (f)

OSD letter, May 1973

By DBS

Date

MAY 21 1973

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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~ IVI  
URGENT

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J.C.S. Regrading Memo

522-71

By

Date MAY 21 1973

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
Main, Versailles, France

To: War Department  
United Kingdom Base Section, London, England  
Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

Nr: S 70854 SCAF 144 14 December 1944

To AGWAR S 70854 for the Combined Chiefs of Staff  
for action and to Central District UK Base Section for  
British Chiefs of Staff and AFHQ for information signed  
Eisenhower. This is SCAF 144. TOP SEC.

Reference your FACS 112, recommend that our initial  
liaison with the Soviet armed forces should be restricted  
to as few of their headquarters as possible, preferably  
only one if there is a Soviet counterpart of this headquarters.

From this beginning, it is hoped to pave the way for  
liaison on the army group level if required at a later stage.

In considering SHAEF liaison, first priority must  
be given to the air forces since their arrangements must be  
well established prior to the time the eastern and western  
fronts come within three hundred miles of each other.

My belief is that in the beginning these missions  
should be very small with the idea of avoiding suspicion  
on the part of the Russians. After being established, the  
missions themselves will be able to make a more accurate  
estimate of the strength they require to carry on their  
duties and which will be acceptable to the Russians.

CM-IN-14325 (15 Dec 44)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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~~SECRET~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~  
ORIGIN

~~SECRET~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 2

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
Main, Versailles, France

Nr: S 70854 SCAF 144

14 December 1944

Initially, so far as this headquarters is concerned, there should be one mission which should deal with the corresponding Russian Supreme Headquarters in the field. It is assumed that this can be established at first on a very simple basis. It should be headed by an air officer of the rank of Major General who should initially have not more than five or six commissioned assistants and possibly ten to fifteen enlisted men. We could provide transport, clerical assistance and personnel for billeting and mess duties, but it is assumed that the Russians themselves must provide the answer as to how many such personnel will be required or allowed. It is assumed that in the beginning communications would be via the Combined Chiefs of Staff Mission in Moscow.

End

FACS 112 is CM-OUT-69568 (28 Nov 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy  
Gen Arnold  
Gen Hull  
Gen Bissell  
Adm King  
CofS

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J.G.S. Reopening Memo 522-71  
By SPB Date MAY 21 1973

CM-IN-14325 (15 Dec 44) 0106Z bjm

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

██████████ "IVI" ██████████

URGENT

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy.

To: War Department.  
United Kingdom Base Section, London, England.  
CG U.S. Strategic Air Forces St Germaine, France.  
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
Main, Versailles, France.

Nr: FX 67300 NAF 826 12 December 1944.

FX 67300 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to Central District United Kingdom Base Section London for British Chiefs of Staff repeated Moscow for Archer and Deane, ACC Bulgaria for Murray, Bucharest for Batjer, USSTAF SHAEP for information signed McNarney cite PHDCC. This is NAF number 826. TOP SECRET.

Deane and Archer have been advised this date that north of Doboj the tactical bomblines is being withdrawn from Russian positions effective immediately to following position:

(Inclusive to our Forces) Doboj thence road to Sijekovac thence (exclusive to our forces) river Sava to Zagreb thence (inclusive to our Forces) to road junction due west of Zagreb 1 Samobor road thence road through Zagretje-Ptuj-St Jans-Maribor.

2. Note that in this case the line is being moved in our direction based upon our knowledge of Russian advances.

End.

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Admiral Leahy General Hull Admiral King  
General Arnold General Bissell Log

CM-IN-12020 (12 Dec 44) 1556Z bjm

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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~~TOP SECRET~~ IVI

PRIORITY

~~TOP SECRET~~

From: CG, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces,  
Caserta, Italy

To: War Department

Nr: M 40607

11 December 1944

~~TOP SECRET~~ T to AGWAR for Arnold from Baker cite  
M 40607.

Reur WARX 75402, all here feel it outlines the  
best possible present course of action.

End

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

ACTION: Gen Arnold

INFO : JCS, Adm. Leahy, OPD, Gen Bissell, Adm. King, C of S

CM-IN- 11059 ( 11 Dec 44 ) 1831Z

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

AC/AS Plans AFAFP Oper  
Plans Div European Br 725

10 December 1944

Commanding General  
US Strategic Air Forces in Europe  
Granville France

Commanding General  
US Military Mission to USSR  
Moscow Russia

Commanding General  
Allied Force Headquarters  
Caserta Italy

Commanding General  
Mediterranean Allied Air Forces  
Caserta Italy

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

Number WAX 75402

To Spaatz info Deane and Faker from Arnold

Points outlined in your UAX 51204 of 8 December are covered in JCS proposal of 9 December to CCS in which Joint Chiefs proposed dispatch of cable paraphrased below to Archer, Deane, Wilson, Spaatz and Bottomley information Faker and McNarney.

Paraphrase begins.

By direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, the Commanding General, USSTAF and the Deputy Chief of Air Staff will establish a temporary bomb line which will be the eastward limit of Allied air operations. After coordinating, if necessary, with the Commanding General, USSTAF and the Deputy Chief of Air Staff, the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean shall establish the portion thereof south of Vienna (exclusive) and shall inform the heads of the British and US Military

CN-OUT 75402 (10 Dec 44)

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94



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OUTGOING MESSAGE

WARX 75402

Page 2

Missions in Moscow of the line established and of any subsequent changes therein. The heads of the Military Missions will transmit this information to its Red General Staff. After coordination, if necessary, with the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, the Commanding General, USSTAF, and the Deputy Chief of Air Staff will establish the portion of the line northward of Vienna (inclusive) likewise informing the heads of the Military Missions in Moscow. All concerned are authorized to communicate directly on establishment and changes in bomb line, information copies to be sent to Combined Chiefs.

Admiral Archer and General Deane should notify Red Staff that, in accordance with the situation, the bomb line will be subject to change and should be considered as merely a temporary expedient until direct air liaison is established, at least between forces in Mediterranean Theater of Operations and Russian Balkan forces.

This is action of Combined Chiefs of NAF 827 from Wilson and MX 21984 and MX 21926 from Archer and Deane.

Paraphrase ends.

Combined Chiefs have not yet acted on above.

Fnd

AF 1353

ORIGINATOR: Gen Arnold

INFORMATION: JC/S

Adm Leahy

CFD

Gen Bissell

Adm King

C of S

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

GM-OUT 75402 (10 Dec 44)

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IVI

PRIORITY

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy  
To: War Department  
United Kingdom Base Section, London, England  
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
Main, Versailles, France  
Nr: FX 66201 NAF 828 10 December 1944

TOPSECRET. This is NAF 828 FX 66201 signed Wilson cite FHGCT. Added AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff rptd Central District UK Base Section for British Chiefs of Staff, MILMIS Moscow, SHAEF.

1. Liaison with Russian armies is subject in reply to FAN 460. What is urgently required at present is operational liaison between the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces and each of the three Russian armies on the southern flank of the 3rd Ukrainian Group of Russian armies, and with the headquarters of the 3rd Ukrainian Group of Russian armies. To provide this operational liaison, we propose an air liaison section with each army to consist of: 1 Colonel, 1 Officer interpreter, 2 EM radio operators, 1 EM code clerk and an air mission with the Headquarters of the 3rd Ukrainian Group of Russian Armies to consist of: 1 Brigadier General, 1 Lt Col operations officer, 1 major intelligence officer, 1 officer interpreter, 1 medical officer, 9 EM including: 1 communications chief, 1 sergeant major, 1 weather forecaster, 3 radio operators, 2 code clerks, 1 typist. Equivalent RAF rank will be appropriate in each case.

CM-IN-10068

(10 Dec 44)

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IVI

PRIORITY

Page 2.

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

Nr: FX 66201 NAF 828 10 December 1944

2. In view of the advice of both the US and British ambassadors, when passing through this theater recently, we have proposed these initial missions at the barest minimum necessary.

3. When the above missions are established, it is expected that more and more mutual reliance will be placed upon them and therefore more demands made upon them. It is proposed therefore that at a favorable opportunity authority be sought to augment the above missions to a total as follows in order to fulfill the tasks appropriate with a normal Allied army and army group: Those with each army:

- 1 Colonel,
- 4 Officers, majors or lower rank including:
  - 1 intelligence,
  - 1 interpreter,
  - 1 medical,
  - 1 administrative,

- 8 EM including:
  - 3 radio operators,
  - 2 code clerks
  - 1 radio mechanic
  - 1 weather,
  - 1 sergeant major.

Total 5 officers, 8 EM. That with the group of armies:

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(10 Dec 44)

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PRIORITY

Page 3.

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

Nr: FX 66201 NAF 828 10 December 1944

1 brigadier general,  
1 colonel - operations,  
1 lieutenant colonel - intelligence,  
8 officers (4 majors, 3 captains, 1 lieutenant)

including:

2 operations,  
1 intelligence,  
1 communications,  
1 weather,  
2 interpreters,  
1 medical,

24 EM including:

5 weather,  
1 medical,  
6 radio operators,  
3 radio mechanics,  
3 code clerks,  
1 sergeant major,  
3 typists and draftsmen,  
1 auto mechanic,  
1 aircraft mechanic.

Total 11 officers, 24 EM.

4. The next requirement if without prejudice to the above air missions, is for the establishment of an overall SACMED mission to the 3rd Ukrainian Group of Armies. At that time, the air mission with the Headquarters of the

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(10 Dec 44)

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~~SECRET~~ IVI  
PRIORITY

Page 4

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

Nr: FX 66201 NAF 828 10 December 1944

3rd Ukrainian Group of Russian Armies would be absorbed by this overall SACMED mission. Personnel for the SACMED mission would be composed of the following who are in addition to the air mission with the 3rd Ukrainian Group of Russian Armies as recommended above:

- 1 major general - head of mission,
- 1 colonel who will coordinate allocation of radio frequencies,
- 4 lieutenant colonels including:
  - 1 operations,
  - 1 intelligence,
  - 1 officer interpreter,
  - 1 administrative officer dealing with evacuees, prisoners and similar matters,
- 2 majors including:
  - 1 secretary and internal administration,
  - 1 signal communications,
- 1 captain aide to head of mission,
- 14 EM including:
  - 1 clerk stenographer,
  - 1 clerk typist,
  - 1 interpreter,
  - 1 mess and supply sergeant,
  - 2 cooks,
  - 4 orderlies,
  - 3 chauffeurs,
  - 1 medical orderly.

CM-IN-10068

(10 Dec 44)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94



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PRIORITY

Page 5.

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Onserts, Italy

Nr: FX 66201 NAF 828 10 December 1944

Total, 8 officers, 14 EM.

5. Still later as the Russians and our forces approach each other there should be established with the adjacent Russian army an 8 Army mission composed as follows:

- 1 brigadier - head of mission,
- 1 GSO 1 operations,
- 1 GSO 2 intelligence,
- 5 other ranks including:
  - 1 Army signal sergeant,
  - 1 interpreter,
  - 1 clerk and typist,
  - 1 chauffer,
  - 1 servant.

Total, 3 officers, 5 other ranks.

6. The following comments apply to the above:

A. No naval representation considered necessary. Naval matters can be taken up through existing missions.

B. No separate AAI mission is contemplated. The SACMED mission will represent both AFHQ and AAI interests. Should the Russians desire to send a mission to AAI, it is acceptable.

C. In each case where Allied liaison is established the Russians should be accorded the privilege of establishing

CM-IN-10068

(10 Dec 44)

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IVI  
PRIORITY

Page 6.

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

Nr: FX 66201 NAF 828 10 December 1944

similar missions if they desire.

D. Russians should be asked to agree to furnish certain services to our missions with the understanding that we would reciprocate.

E. The SACMED mission will require direct communication to SACMED and to Moscow.

End.

Note: FAN 460 is CM-OUT-69568 (28 Nov 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFO: Adm Leahy  
Gen Arnold  
OPD  
Gen Bissell  
Adm King  
C of S

CM-IN-10068

(10 Dec 44)

2340Z pa

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RFP 6-9-71

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces  
Main Versailles France

To: War Department

Nr: S-64550 SCAF 116

10 December 1944

To: AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff. For info:  
Central District UK Base Section for British Chiefs of Staff,  
AFHQ. From: SHAEF Main signed Eisenhower. Ref No S-64550.  
Cite: SHGCT TOO 291535A October TOPSECRET. This is SCAF  
116.

1. Under consideration here is method of obtaining closer liaison with Russian armies as our respective forces approach each other. Subjects on which liaison will be required include coordination of action of Tactical Air Forces, and of operation wireless frequencies, local problems of prisoners of war and displaced persons, coordination of local offensives and plans, and under TALISMAN conditions local problems of entry into Berlin and coordination of action along boundary between Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force and Russian zones.

2. As determined by operational range of Tactical Air Forces, closer liaison will become essential when armies approach within some 300 miles of each other.

3. Understand consultative committee of Russian, United States and British officers may set up in Moscow. Best method of initiating closer liaison might be for authority to be given to Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force, to deal direct with the British/United States mission in Moscow or with this new committee when set up. Specialists could be sent from Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force to Moscow to assist on particular subjects under

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(10 Dec 44)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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~~SECRET~~

Page 2

From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces  
Main Versailles France

Nr: S-64550 SCAF 116 10 December 1944

discussion. At later stage, Russians might be prepared to accept small liaison missions from army groups with Russian equivalents of army groups.

4. If you agree, request authority to initiate direct communications between Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force and United States/British mission in Moscow or with United States/British elements of the committee in Moscow, when formed.

End

ACTION: CC/S

INFO: Adm Leahy  
Gen Arnold  
OPD  
Gen Bissell  
Adm King

CM-IN-10067 (10 Dec 44) 2338Z pa

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
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IMMEDIATE

From: 30 Military Mission  
To: British Chiefs of Staff  
Info: Joint Staff Mission  
APHQ  
SHAEP

Nr: MIL 2164

9 December 1944

Soviet Staff Communiqué 8th December report capture  
of Polgardi south of Szekesfehervar.

End

T.O.O. 090630Z

ACTION: OPD

INFO : CC/S  
CGAAP  
G-2  
Adm. King  
Col. Park ✓  
Log

CM-IN-10595 (11 Dec 44)

1036Z

  
ejm

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JCS MEMO, 1-17-73  
BY DBS, DATE

MAY 21 1973

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[REDACTED] "TOT"

From: U.S. Military Mission, Moscow, Russia

To: War Department

No. M21978 8 December 1944

Bissell from Crockett signed Deane M21978.

Infantry Divisions 44th and 71st from Italy now  
Army Group F according to Soviet Orbat Officer. 271st Inf  
Div from France now Army Group South.

Formed summer this year in Silesia and in reserve East  
Prussia are 27th and 28th Panzer Divisions. Also East Prussia  
151st Reserve Division.

In Army Group F are 3rd Croat Mountain Brigade and  
new 31st SS Inf Div with Inf Regts 78, 79 and 80 and 31st  
Arty Regt.

For Arty Regts Inf Divs 547, 562 and 563 add 1,000  
to divisional number.

590th Inf Div new identification definitely established  
moving in rear of Army Group North Ukraine but destination  
unknown. Unconfirmed testimony of prisoners of war that  
forming on Soviet front is Second Motorized Hermann Goering  
Division.

End

ACTION: G-2

INFO : CG AAF  
OPD  
COL PARK

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

CM-IN-8227 (8 Dec 44) 2206Z mcs

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[REDACTED] AMUG

URGENT

From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia  
To : War Department  
US Military Attache, London, England  
Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy  
No : MX 21984 8 December 1944

To AGWAR for the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Wash, info to Central District UK Base Section, London pass to British Chiefs of Staff and to AFHQ, Caserta for McNarney and Eaker from Deane ~~XXXXXX~~ MX 21984. US Military Attache, London pls pass msg to Central District UK Base Section, London and to British Chiefs of Staff.

With Admiral Archer's concurrence, I have informed the Soviet General Staff in writing that henceforth we shall observe the temporary bomb line given in NAF - 827 of 8th December. This notification was sent by letter by hand at 2230Z, 8th December.

Both Archer and I felt that it would be useless to request Soviet concurrence since the representative with whom we would meet would not have power to concur without reference to the Soviet High Command and even after this was done we are certain that they would wish to adopt a bomb line over the entire German-Soviet front. We are not prepared to negotiate such a bomb line until we receive an answer to our MX 21926 of 3rd December. In any event since it was indicated the bomb line given in NAF-827 has already been adopted we thought it best to simply inform them of this fact and then inform you of any protest we might receive from the Soviets.

NOTE: NAF 827 is CM-IN-8028 (8 Dec 44) End  
ACTION: CC/

INFO: Adm. Leahy, Gen. Arnold, Gen. Hull, Gen. Bissell,  
Adm. King, C of S

CM-IN-8455 (9 Dec 1944) 0259Z emh

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20, 1974

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24-78766

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~~SECRET~~ "IVI"  
PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~

From: CG US Strategic Air Forces in Europe Granville France  
To: War Department  
US Military Mission Moscow, Russia  
CG Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, Caserta, Italy  
Nr: UAX 51204 8 December 1944

~~SECRET~~ Action to Arnold info Deane Eaker and  
Air Ministry from Spaatz UAX 51204.

After reading MX 21926 Dec 3rd from Military Mission at Moscow, I must emphasize recommendations in my SP 163 Nov 28th. Any bomb line agreed upon must be fluid and provision for deviation from this line must be set up on basis which will permit us to launch attacks within 12 hours notice. I do not believe that strategic bomb line more than 50 miles from Russian front line is required. I further believe that burden for advising us of location of Russian front lines must be placed upon Russians by means of direct United States Army Air Force liaison representation with each Russian Army Group commander. Harriman and Hill carried this recommendation to Moscow. Bomb line proposed in MX 21926 is entirely unacceptable for it excludes certain priority targets, particularly Blechhammers, essential to carrying out of our strategic offensive.

NOTE : 21926 is CM-IN- <sup>End</sup> 3951 (4 Dec 44) CC/S  
SP 163 is CM-IN- 28017 (29 Nov 44) Gen Arnold  
ACTION: Gen Arnold

INFO : JCS, Adm. Leahy, OPD, Gen Bissell, Adm. King, CofS  
CM-IN- 9026 ( 9 Dec 44 ) 1816Z wk

~~SECRET~~

3cc Russia

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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~~SECRET~~ TOT  
URGENT

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy  
To: War Department  
No: FX 65085 NAF 827 8 December 1944

AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff Washington (R) to Central District United Kingdom Base Section London pass to British Chiefs of Staff (R) to Moscow for Archer and Deane, Rumania for Batjer, Murray Bulgaria, from Wilson signed McNarney, this is NAF 827, TOP SECRET, FX 65085.

The changing military situation in Yugoslavia makes necessary revision of the temporary bomblines now in effect. It will be noted that some changes have been made in the temporary bomblines south of Sarejevo and extends the bomblines north of Sarejevo to Zagreb. This addition to the north is made necessary by the advances of the German withdrawing forces and our present ability and urgent requirement to strike them wherever they are found.

General Deane in Moscow has been notified of these proposals and that our units are in the meantime observing this bomblines in our operations. The bomblines is as follows:

Ref map 500,000 air: Inclusive to our forces, road from Sesvete, 7 miles east Zagreb to Bugoselo, Bidrenjak, Jaruga, thence railroad Novska, Batrina, thence road Brod, Dobo, thence railroad Zabidovici, Predrazici, Olovo, thence road Han-Pijesak, Sokolac, Dobron, Prijepolje, thence River Lim to Kisilici.

Exclusive to attack by our forces town Kisilici, road Kisilici, Berane, Andrejevica, Klopot.

Inclusive to attack by our forces, road Klopot, Podgorica.

CM-IN-8028

(8 Dec 44)

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~~SECRET~~  
URGENT

TOT

*J*  
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy  
No: FX 65085      NAF 827      8 December 1944

Exclusive to attack by our forces, east shore of  
Lake Scutari, River Bajana to coast.

Your confirmation of this course of action is  
requested.

It is recommended that authority be granted to  
take up directly with Deane any further changes in the  
tactical bombline in Yugoslavia found necessary due to the  
military situation, without further reference to the Combined  
Chiefs of Staff.

End

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RHP 6-9-71

ACTION: CC/S

INFO:      Adm Leahy      Adm King  
            Gen Arnold      SCS (Col Newsome)  
            OPD      C of S  
            Gen Bissell

CM-IN-8028

(8 Dec 44)

1746Z

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94



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IVI  
PRIORITY

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
Main, Versailles, France

To: War Department  
United Kingdom Base Section, London, England

Nr: S 69659 6 December 1944

Reference WX 68911 and message 6958 from the British  
Chiefs of Staff. S 69659 to AGWAR for Joint Chiefs of Staff  
to for info Central District UK Base for Br Chiefs of Staff  
from SHAEF Main signed Eisenhower cite SHGAP

Dragun, Major General, has arrived at Paris and has  
established contact with Supreme Headquarters Allied Expedit-  
ionary Force.

We are now engaged in conversation with him in an effort  
to work out a procedure acceptable to both parties. Will  
advise Joint Chiefs of Staff as to final arrangements.

End.

FOOTNOTE: 6958 not in WDCMC files.

ACTION: JC/S

INFO : Admiral Leahy, CG AAF, OPD, G-1, G-2, Admiral King,  
C of S.

CM-IN-6014 (6 Dec 44) 1917Z m/m

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JCS LETTER, 7-8-72  
BY DRS, DATE

MAY 21 1973

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

# TOP SECRET DISPATCH

DATE	EXT.	ADDRESSEES		PRECEDENCE
FROM	SCHUYLER RUMANIA	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE		URGENT 1
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION	JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF	PRIORITY 2
DATE	5 DECEMBER 1944			ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROM	050705			DEFERRED 4
DECODED BY	WALP			BASEGRAM 5
PARAPHRASED BY	BALDWIN	INFORMATION	COMGEN US ARMY FORCES AFHQ CNO	URGENT 6
CHECKED BY	BALDWIN			PRIORITY 7
DITTOED BY	BALDWIN			ROUTINE 8
ROUTED BY	BALDWIN			DEFERRED 9
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.				BASEGRAM 10
PAGE 1 OF 2	041923B*	NCR	3526	IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW <input type="checkbox"/> 11

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(CONTROL SECRET REF M 132 TO JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON D C INFORMATION C GENERAL US ARMY FORCES AFHQ. OPNAV (DNI) FROM SCHUYLER RUMANIA. THIS IS REENCIPHERMENT BY CRYPTO AFHQ OF MESSAGE FILED 041923B)

UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF ARMISTICE AGREEMENT RUMANIA IS REQUIRED TO DELIVER VARIOUS MATERIALS INCLUDING "SUNDRY MACHINERY" IN PAYMENT OF FIXED WAR INDEMNITY. RUSSIOIS INTERPRETING THE QUOTED PHRASE TO INCLUDE ENTIRE FACTORIES AND IN PURSUANCE OF THIS POLICY HAS DEMANDED DELIVER OF ALL MACHINERY EQUIPMENT AND ACCESSORIES OF THE MALAZA TUBE FACTORY. THIS FACTORY MANUFACTURES TUBING UTILIZED IN THE DRILLING OF OIL WELLS AND IS REPORTED TO BE THE ONLY ONE OF ITS KIND IN RUMANIA AND THE THIRD LARGEST IN EUROPE. IT IS ALSO REPORTED THAT SEIZURE OF THE FACTORY WOULD SERIOUSLY AFFECT RUMANIA'S OIL PRODUCTION. THIS APPEARS REASONABLE IN VIEW OF RUSSIAN EXPROPRIATION OF SUPPLIES

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No. 1 ADMIRAL.

No. 2 FILE.

No. 3F-1 OR CHARTER

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3.2 and 3.4 (D) or (E).

With letter, May 1, 1979

DBS Date MAY 21 1979

~~TOP SECRET~~

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041923B

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

# TOP SECRET DISPATCH

DRAFTER		EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE		1
RELEASED BY		FOR ACTION	JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF	PRIORITY
DATE				ROUTINE
TOR CODER ROOM				DEFERRED
DECODED BY				BASEGRAM
PARAPHRASED				PRIORITY
BY	CHECKED BY	INFORMATION		ROUTINE
ROUTED BY	DITTOED BY			DEFERRED
				BASEGRAM
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PAGE 2 OF 2		041923B	NCR 3526	<input type="checkbox"/>

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ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

OF TUBING NOW ON HAND AND OF THE CURRENT ABSENCE OF IM-  
 PORTS OF THESE SUPPLIES. OWNER MALAZA ASSERTS THAT AMERICAN  
 CAPITAL IS INVESTED IN COMPANY BUT THIS HAS NOT BEEN CON-  
 FIRMED. RUSSIANS HAVE SO FAR REFUSED ALL COMPROMISES BASED  
 ON ASSIGNING TO THEM A PORTION OF PLANT PRODUCTION. IT IS  
 POSSIBLE THAT RUSSIANS ARE DETERMINED TO TAKE PLANT IN  
 CONSIDERATION OF MALAZA'S RECORD OF GERMAN COLLABORATION.

\*RECEIVED AS 050425A

RECEIVED SECRET, RAISED TO TOPSEC ACCORDING TO CONTENT.

NCR ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:

16(#1)....COG

COMINCH(#2-9)....NAVAIDE(#10-11)...

(ARMY HAS DISTRIBUTED TO JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF)

No. 1 ADMIRAL.

No. 2 FILE.

No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

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 By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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OUTGOING MESSAGE

Hq AAF AC/AS Plans  
Operational Plans Div  
European Branch 72700

4 December 1944

Commanding General  
US Military Mission to USSR  
Moscow Russia

Number WAR 72205

To Deane from Arnold ~~TO~~

For your information General Eisenhower has seen and is in accord with General Spaatz proposal relative establishment strategic bomblines as outlined in our WAR 70090 dated November 29 this year.

End

AF 378

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 4, 1972

By DBS Date MAY 21 1973

ORIGINATOR: Gen Arnold

INFORMATION: CC/s  
Adm Leahy  
Gen Hull  
Gen Bissell  
Adm King  
C of S

CM-OUT 72205 (4 Dec 44) 1616Z khc

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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~~SECRET~~ IVI

PRIORITY

From: Headquarters Mediterranean Allied Air Forces,  
Caserta, Italy

To: War Department

No: M 130 4 December 1944

M 130 to GPD Washington attention General Hull from  
Schuyler.

On the afternoon of 2 December approximately 3000 well  
equipped Russian Infantry troops moved south through Bucharest  
Rumania confirmed report states that these troops were a part  
of a larger movement of Russian troops to Giurgiu.

Rumanian General Staff reports that three Russian  
Divisions will be quartered in and near the harbor of Giurgiu  
which has been fortified by Russians.

It is interesting to note that the harbor of Giurgiu  
was also occupied by the German Army when it came to Rumania.  
Giurgiu is the head of the oil pipe line from Rumania oil  
fields and the Danube River traffic can be checked and ob-  
served at this point.

End

ACTION: OPD

INFO: G-2; C of S

CM-IN-4166 (4 Dec 44)

2347Z

ekx

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JCS LETTER, 7-8-78  
BY DMS, DATE  
MAY 21 1973

*col Panke*

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IVI

PRIORITY

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
Main, Versailles, France

To: War Department  
CG United Kingdom Base Section, London, England  
Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

Nr: S 69473 SCAF 142 4 December 1944

S 69473 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff,  
to for info Central District UK Base Section, London for  
British Chiefs of Staff, Allied Force Headquarters from  
SHAEP Main, signed Eisenhower cite SHGCT. Reference your  
FACS 112. This is SCAF number 142.

Subject of liaison with Russians under study. Will  
forward recommendations prior to 9th December. T

End

FACS 112 is CM-OUT-69568 (28 Nov 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Admiral Leahy  
CG AAF  
OPD  
General Bissell  
Admiral King  
Log

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RAMP 6-9-71

CM-IN-4378 (5 Dec 44) 0404Z bjm

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[REDACTED] AMUG  
PRIORITY [REDACTED]

From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia  
To: War Department  
CG, US Strategic Air Forces, Granville, France  
Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy  
No: MX 21926 3 December 1944

To Combined Chiefs of Staff Washington repeated to Central District United Kingdom Base Section London pass to British Chiefs of Staff repeated to MAAF for Wilson and Eaker, to USSTAF from Spaatz from Deane [REDACTED] MX 21926. USSTAF pass to UK Base Section and AFHQ pass to Eaker.

After sending formal notification early yesterday morning to the Soviet General Staff giving the information contained in FAN 461, we requested an appointment with General Staff Representative in order that we might make sure:

- 1st. That the formal notification had been delivered.
- 2nd. That it was understood.

We had the requested appointment this afternoon.

We first explained the decision given in FAN 461 and what it meant and then explained that we wished to discuss the appointment of air liaison officers between Headquarters in the field, emphasizing the reasons why our Chiefs of Staff think this is important.

General Slavin, Soviet General Staff representative \* apparently not authorized to discuss the question of air liaison officers, but countersigned a proposal for establishment of a temporary bomblines.

We argued at length that we were not authorized to a bomblines and that we wished an apmt with General Antcnov to  
CM-IN-3951 (4 Dec 44)

[REDACTED] DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

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 AMUG  
PRIORITY

  
Page 2

From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia

No: MX 21926

3 December 1944

discuss the question of providing air liaison officers.

Since General Slavin had no authority to act, the subject was concluded with the decision that he would agree present our request to General Antonov for a meeting to discuss providing air liaison officers and we would inform you of the bomblines which they propose. This bomblines is:

Starting from the north Koslin - Schneidemuhl - Posnag - Breslau - Olemutz - crossing the Danube halfway between \* and Bratislava - thence the point where the boundaries of Austria, Hungary and Yugoslavia meet - thence a point midway between Zagreb and Bjeftovar - Sarajevo - Visegrad - Prijepolje - Sjenica - thence the Albanian border to the southern border of Yugoslavia - thence across the southern border of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.

Their proposed bomblines as drawn on their map includes all points on the bomblines adopted in PAN 461 all points on the proposed Soviet bomblines are inclusive to Allied Air Forces.

In pressing his argument for the bomblines, Slavin indicated one of its main purposes was to prevent dropping supplies to the Polish Partisans who operate under the London Emigre Government, claiming that these Partisans are fighting against the Soviets and have Allied equipment. We refused to discuss this aspect of the question with him.

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
JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 20 1974

CM-IN-3951

(4 Dec 44)

  
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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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 **PRIORITY**

AMUG

  
Page 3

From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia

No: MX 21926

3 December 1944

We feel that the action taken in FAN 461 was salutary in that their proposed bombline includes the area in Yugoslavia which we insist upon. It might be worth considering \* with whatever amendments you wish to make including presumably, \* provided that accept the establishment of air liaison officers between field headquarters.

End

\*Being serviced

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

ACTION: CCS

INFO: Adm Leahy; General Arnold; General Hull; Gen Bissell  
Adm King; C of S.

CM-IN-3951

(4 Dec 44)

2032Z

bls



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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED] AMUG  
PRIORITY  
CORRECTED COPY

From: US Military Mission Moscow, Russia

To : War Department  
CG US Strategic Forces, Granville, France  
Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta Italy

No : MX 21926

3 December 1944

To Combined Chiefs of Staff Washington repeated to Central District United Kingdom Base Section London pass to British Chiefs of Staff repeated to MAAF for Wilson and Eaker, to USSTAF for Spaatz from Deane [REDACTED] MX 21926. USSTAF pass to UK Base Section and AFHQ pass to Eaker.

After sending formal notification early yesterday morning to the Soviet General Staff giving the information contained in FAN 461, we requested an appointment with General Staff Representative in order that we might make sure;

First, that the formal notification had been delivered and;

Second, that it was understood. We had the requested appointment this afternoon.

We first explained the decision given in FAN 461 and what it meant and then explained that we wished to discuss the appointment of air liaison officers between headquarters in the field, emphasizing the reasons why our Chiefs of Staff think this is important.

General Slavin, Soviet General Staff representative was apparently not authorized to discuss the question of air liaison officers, but countered with a proposal for establishment of a temporary bomblime. We argued at length that we were not authorized to discuss a bomblime and that

CM-IN-4503 (5 Dec 44)

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JOS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 20 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

300 Russia

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 AMUG  
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Page 2

From: US Military Mission Moscow, Russia

No : MX 21926

3 December 1944


we wished an appointment with General Antonov to discuss the question of providing air liaison officers. Since General Slavin had no authority to act, the subject was concluded with the decision that he would again present our request to General Antonov for a meeting to discuss providing air liaison officers and we would inform you of the Bombline which they propose.

This Bombline is : Starting from the north Koslin-Schneidemuhl-Poznan-Breslau-Olemtz-crossing the Danube halfway between Vienna and Bratislava-thence the point where the boundaries of Austria, Hungary and Yugoslavia meet-thence a point midway between Zagreb and Bjefovar-Sarajevo-Visegrad-Prijepolje-Sjenica-thence the Albania border to the southern border of Yugoslavia-thence across the southern border of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Their proposed Bombline as drawn on their map includes all points on the Bombline adopted in FAN 461 and all points on the proposed Soviet Bombline are inclusive to Allied Air Forces.

In pressing his argument for the Bombline, Slavin indicated one of its main purposes was to prevent dropping supplies to the Polish Partisans who operate under the London Emigre Government, claiming that these Partisans are fighting against the Soviets and have Allied equipment. We refused to discuss this aspect of the question with him. We feel that the action taken in FAN 461 was salutary in that their proposed bombline includes the area in Yugoslavia which

CM-IN-4503

(5 Dec 44)

  
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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

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[REDACTED] AMUG  
PRIORITY  
CORRECTED COPY

Page 3

From: US Military Mission Moscow, Russia

No : MX 21926

3 December 1944

we insist upon. It might be worth considering authorizing us to accept their bomblines with whatever amendments you wish to make including, presumably, Dansig, provided they accept the establishment of air liaison officers between field headquarters.

End

Corrected copy of CM-IN-3951 (4 Dec 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Admiral Leahy  
General Arnold  
General Hull  
General Bissell  
Admiral King  
CofS

CM-IN-4503 (5 Dec 44) 0742Z bjm

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

URGENT

"AMUG"

From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia  
To: War Department  
Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy  
No: MX 21911 2 December 1944

To Combined Chiefs of Staff, and to Wilson, McNarney, Eaker, Eisenhower, and Central District United Kingdom Base Section London pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information from Deane and Archer ~~SECRET~~ MX 21911. CRYPTO AFHQ pls pass a copy to Hq MAAF. CRYPTO WAR pls pass copies to Central District United Kingdom Base Section London and to British Chiefs of Staff. Copy of message has been sent direct to Eisenhower.

Soviet authorities given information contained in your WARX 71154 (FAN 461) of 1 December, at 0135, 2nd December.

End.

NOTE: This message has been relayed to United Kingdom Base Section by WDCC per originator's request.

ACTION: CCS

INFO : ADM LEAHY, GEN ARNOLD, GEN HULL, GEN BISSELL,  
ADM KING, C OF S

CM-IN-1498 (2 Dec 44) 0559Z mos

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 20 1974 32

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED]-TOT

URGENT

From: US Military Mission in Moscow Russia

To: War Department

Nr: M 21916

2 December 1944

To Joint Chiefs of Staff from Deane [REDACTED] M 21916

British Ambassador here has received a message from the Prime Minister to transmit to Stalin. Message asks for concurrence in bomblime proposed in NAF 820 but implies that we will await Stalin's concurrence. Apparently the Prime Minister's message was sent without knowledge of CCS instructions to Archer and me contained in WARK 71154. The British Ambassador has not delivered the Prime Minister's message to Stalin but has cable to the Prime Minister calling his attention to the instructions contained in WARK 71154 and informing him that Archer and I have already informed the Soviet authorities that General Wilson will adopt the NAF-820 bomblime at 0200Z, 3 December. The British Ambassador suggested to the Prime Minister that he alter his message to Stalin to conform to our instructions and the action already taken. I believe that having informed the Soviets of our intentions, it would be a grave mistake not to follow through.

End

Note: NAF 820 is CM-IN-26907 (28 Nov 44) CC/S

ACTION: JC/S

INFO: Adm Leahy                      Adm King  
         Gen Arnold                      C of S  
         OPD  
         Gen Bissell

CM-IN-1914

(2 Dec 44)

1312Z

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 20 1974<sup>33</sup>

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

*300 Russia*

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff  
77500

1 December 1944

Commanding General  
U.S. Military Mission U.S.S.R.  
Moscow, Russia

Commanding General  
Allied Force Headquarters  
Caserta Italy

Supreme Headquarters  
Allied Expeditionary Forces  
Main Echelon  
Versailles France

Commanding General  
United Kingdom Base Section  
London, England

Commanding General  
Mediterranean Allied Air Forces  
Caserta Italy

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RHP 6-9-71

Number WARX 71154

TOPSEC book message to Deane, Archer and Wilson for action, to McNarney, Eaker, Eisenhower, and Central District United Kingdom Base Section London pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information. This message is FAN 461 to Wilson from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff concur with the recommendation in MX 21891. Deane and Archer should inform the Red Staff that the Combined Chiefs of Staff feel there is an urgent military necessity to seize this fleeting opportunity to attack the heavy German concentrations between the present bomb line and that proposed to the Red Staff on 28 November. Further delay in throwing the weight of our Mediterranean Air Forces against these enemy concentrations

CM-OUT-71154 (1 Dec 44)

Adm. Leahy  
COPY No. 32

300 Russia

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94



WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Number WARX 71154

Page 1

may permit their escape and subsequent use against us on other battle fronts. The Combined Chiefs of Staff therefore feel the situation justifies a new directive concerning the bomb line and therefore approve the action proposed in WAF 822 and direct General Wilson to adopt, effective 0100Z, 3 December, the bomb line proposed on 28 November to the Red Staff.

End

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold  
Gen Bull  
Gen Bissell  
Adm King  
C of S  
Adm Leahy

CM-OUT-71154 (1 Dec 44) 2118Z ngs

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RHP 6-9-71

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED] TOT

URGENT

From: U. S. Military Mission, Moscow, Russia.

To: War Department

No: MX 21891

30 November 1944

To AGWAR for the Combined Chiefs of Staff and to MAAF  
for McNarney from Deane and Archer MX 21891 [REDACTED]

We have just received a message from General McNarney in which he states that the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces propose to adopt the bomb line on 3 December recommended in their NAF-820 dated 27 November. Further that they shall take this action even though we have not been able to clear it with the Russians by that time. McNarney states that the fleeting opportunity and urgent necessity for attacking the heavy German concentrations between the agreed and proposed bomb lines make this action mandatory in the war interest. He further states that the Combined Chiefs of Staff are being requested to confirm this action.

Upon receipt of NAF-820 on 28 November General Deane requested the Soviet General Staff to approve the bomb line proposed therein. This action was reported to you in General Deane's MX 21868 of 28 November.

Upon receipt of your WARX 69568 of 28 November we formally requested an appointment with General Antonov Deputy Chief of the Red Army General Staff for the purpose of presenting proposals from the British and American Chiefs of Staff regarding coordination of operations in the Balkans. So far, we have had no reply. In the absence of an appointment we have now sent your proposals to General Antonov in writing, and in the letter we have also again recommended the adoption

CM-IN-29777 (30 Nov 44)

[REDACTED]  
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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 30 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOT

URGENT

Page 2

From: U. S. Military Mission, Moscow, Russia.

No: MX 21891

30 November 1944

of the bomb line proposed in NAF-820.

We recommend that you send us instructions to inform Soviet General Staff that effective at a specified hour on the morning of 3 December we withdraw our agreement to the present bomb line and that thereafter we shall observe the bomb line recommended in NAF-820.

We feel that the above action is justified because on November 28th we presented a request for approval of the amended bomb line to the Red Army General Staff. Further on November 29th we requested a meeting with the Deputy Chief of Staff to discuss the question of coordination of operations in the Balkans, and to present proposals which had been received from the British and American Chiefs of Staff. Today, November 30th we requested information as to when a meeting might be held with the Deputy Chief of Staff and we also sent the Deputy Chief of Staff, General Antonov, the proposals for liaison and for the amendment of the present bomb line in writing. To none of these approaches have we had any response.

End

NAF 820 is CM-IN-26907 (28 Nov 44) CC/S  
21868 is CM-IN-27795 (28 Nov 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy Gen Hull Adm King  
Gen Arnold Gen Bissell Cofs

CM-IN-29777 (30 Nov 44) 2301Z bjm

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 20 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

# DISPATCH

DRAFTER		EXT.	ADDRESSEES		PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>USNAV REPRESENTATIVE ALLIED</b>			ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE		<b>PRIORITY</b>
CONTROL COMMISSION FOR					PRIORITY
RUMANIA.					ROUTINE
RELEASED BY			CNO		DEFERRED
DATE <b>30 NOVEMBER 1944</b>					BASEGRAM
TOR CODEROM <b>1753</b>					
DECODED BY <b>IMRIE</b>					PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED					ROUTINE
BY <b>FISHER</b>	CHECKED BY <b>FISHER</b>				DEFERRED
ROUTED BY <b>COOK</b>	DITTOED BY <b>FISHER</b>				BASEGRAM

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE. IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

PAGE 1 OF 2 300926 B NCR 8533

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

CRYPTO AFHQ REENCIPHERED MESSAGE 300926B AS 301515A.

(CONTROL SECRET REF NO. U 120 TO OPNAV WASHINGTON FROM USNAV REPRESENTATIVE ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION FOR RUMANIA.)

EVERY INDICATION THAT RUSSIANS ARE CONTINUING TO REMOVE OIL EQUIPMENT FROM BRITISH AMERICAN AND RUMANIAN COMPANIES. ON 27 NOVEMBER CHIEF US REPRESENTATIVE ON CONTROL COMMISSION PROTESTED REMOVAL OF TUBING CASING AND RELATED EQUIPMENT BELONGING TO ROMANO-AMERICAN OIL COMPANY WHICH IS AMERICAN OWNED. GENERAL VINCORADOV MAINTAINED THAT EQUIPMENT HAD GERMAN MARKINGS AND HAD BEEN SENT INTO RUMANIA FOR USE IN RUSSIAN OIL FIELDS WHEN CAPTURED. HE CONSIDERED EQUIPMENT WAR BOOTY AND REFUSED TO HALT REMOVAL PENDING INVESTIGATION INTO OWNERSHIP. IT IS BELIEVED THAT ONLY THE STRONGEST REPRESENTATIONS

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in JCS MEMO, 1-4-44. By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

# DISPATCH

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES		PRECEDENCE
FROM		FOR ACTION	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY			PRIORITY	2
DATE			ROUTINE	3
FOR CODEROOM			DEFERRED	4
DECODED BY		INFORMATION	BASEGRAM	5
PARAPHRASED	CHECKED		PRIORITY	6
BY	BY		ROUTINE	7
ROUTED BY	DITTOED		DEFERRED	8
	BY		BASEGRAM	9

PAGE 2 OF 2 300926 B NCR 8533 IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW ☐

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

TO MOSCOW WILL HALT PRACTICE.

RECEIVED SECRET, RECLASSIFIED TOP SECRET IN ACCORDANCE WITH CONTENT.

NCR ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:

16(1)....ACT

COMINCH(12-0)....NAVALDE(117).....

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations. COPT 80.

OPNAV 19-78

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94



WAR DEPARTMENT  
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IVI

URGENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy  
To: War Department  
CG United Kingdom Base Section, London, England  
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
Main, Versailles, France  
CG US Strategic Air Forces in Europe, London, England  
Nr: FX 60542 NAF 822 30 November 1944

TOPSEC. FX 60542 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated to Central District UK Base Section for British Chiefs of Staff, SHAEF, USSTAF for information. This is NAF 822 cite PHCOS signed Wilson.

The following message dispatched to Deane (MOSCOW) this date. "On 3rd December we propose to adopt the bomb-line recommended in our NAF 820 even though you have not been able to clear it with the Russians by that time. The urgent necessity and fleeting opportunity for attacking the heavy German concentrations in the area between your agreed and our proposed bomblines make such action mandatory in the war interest in our view. Harriman concurs."

Request your confirmation of this course of action.

End

ACTION: CC/S  
INFO : Admiral Leahy, General Arnold, General Hull, General Bissell, Admiral King, C of S.

CM-IN-29659 (30 Nov 44) 1939Z bjm

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340 Russia

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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**OUTGOING MESSAGE**

Hq, AAF, AC/AS, Plans, J-5  
Operational Plans Division  
European Branch  
Lt Col Delziel, 72538

29 November 1944

Commanding General  
US Military Mission to USSR  
Moscow, Russia

Number: WAR 70090

To Deane from Arnold

Paraphrased herewith extract from message received this date from Spaatz reference Russian bomb lines.

Paraphrase begins: Referring to WARX 67986, Baker and I conferred in this regard on November 26. I concur in the proposal put forth by Deane for a strategic bomb line approximately 50 to 100 miles to the west of Russian lines. Any such line should include Blechhammer, Danzig, Vienna area and Posen with their strategic targets on our side, at least until the advance of Russians insures effective Russian Air Force attacks against vital targets in these areas. I am of the opinion that this can be done only by their Tactical Air Force. Paraphrase ends.

Agree with Spaatz views with regard to including localities mentioned within the bomblines.

End  
4289

ORIGINATOR: Gen Arnold

INFORMATION: CC/S. Gen Hull, Gen Bissell, Adm King, C of S,  
Adm Leahy

CM-OUT-70090

(29 Nov 44)

2057Z

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OSD letter, May 4, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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[REDACTED] **PRIORITY**

TOT

From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia

To: War Department

No: MX 21868

28 November 1944

To Wilson from Deane, [REDACTED] and to Combined  
Chiefs of Staff MX 21868.

At a meeting with Soviet General Staff representative  
this afternoon I presented the amended bomb line as pro-  
posed by General Wilson in his number FX 59100 of  
27 November.

Soviet General Staff representative took negative  
view, but this is normal, and he agreed to refer the matter  
to his superiors and let me know the result as soon as  
possible. I presented the amended bomb line with Admiral  
Archer's concurrence.

In presenting it, I made it plain that the combined  
\* proposals in the near future for a system of liaison  
between headquarters in the field and that the temporary  
bomb line now in effect and the amendments to it as  
proposed were only considered by us as temporary measures  
until the proposals from the Combined Chiefs of Staff are  
received and acted on.

End

\* Being Serviced

59100 is CM-IN-26907 (28 Nov 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy  
Gen Arnold

OPD

Gen Bissell

Adm King  
CofS

CM-IN-27795 (28 Nov 44)

2059Z bjm

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

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~~SECRET~~  
[REDACTED] AMUG  
PRIORITY

From: CG, US Strategic Air Forces, Mobile, France  
To: War Department  
Air Ministry, London, England  
CG, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe, London, England  
Nr. SP 163 28 November 1944

Personal to Arnold from Spaatz SP 163 [REDACTED]  
Information to SHAEF MAON, MAAF Caserta, USSTAF Rear and Air  
Ministry for Bottomley.

Am referring to WARX 67986. Have discussed this matter with Baker at conference on 26th November. Am in complete accord with recommendations contained in Wilson's FX 57190 dated 24th November and FX 59100 dated 27th November. The coordination of effort can only be achieved as Wilson suggest by Air Liaison parties with the Armies in the field. The strategic attacks on oil, German Air Force, and important industrial areas can be controlled to avoid conflict if timely information of Russian advances is received. Our strategic targets at the present time are at a greater distance from the Russian positions than the limits prescribed in WARX 67986 for operations north of Sarajevo.

Deane's proposal for a strategic bomblime roughly 50 to 100 miles west of the Russian lines is concurred in. Such line must include Vienna area, Elechhammer, Posen, and Danzig on our side, at least until such time as Russian advances insure effective attacks on the vital targets in these areas by the Russian Air forces, which I believe can only be done by their tactical Air Forces.

ACTION: GEN ARNOLD

End

INFO : CCS, ADM. LEAHY, OPD, GEN. BISSELL, ADM. KING, C of S.

CM-IN-28017 (29 Nov 44) 0439Z mcs

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
OSD letter, May 4, 1972

By DBS Date MAY 21 1973

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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**OUTGOING MESSAGE**

Combined Chiefs of Staff  
77500

28 November 1944

Commanding General  
US Military Mission USSR  
Moscow Russia

Supreme Headquarters  
Allied Expeditionary Forces  
Main Echelon  
Versailles, France

Commanding General  
Allied Force Headquarters  
Caserta, Italy

Commanding General  
United Kingdom Base Section  
London, England

Number: WARX 69568

TOPSSC book message to Deane and Archer Moscow, Eisenhower Versailles, Wilson Caserta for action, to Central District United Kingdom Base Section London pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information. This message is FACS 112 to Eisenhower and FAN 460 to Wilson from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have had under consideration the matter of improving the liaison arrangements with the Russian Armies in the field.

2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff consider that the ultimate solution lies in the exchange of full scale liaison missions between SCAEP's and SACMED's Headquarters and the appropriate Russian commanders in the field. The need to exchange these missions, however, is not immediate as Allied land forces are still a long way from the Russian Armies. What is of urgent

CM-OUT-69568

(28 Nov 44)

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94



~~SECRET~~  
WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**OUTGOING MESSAGE**

WARX 69568

Page 2

importance is to obtain Russian agreement to the appointment of Allied air liaison officers to the forward elements of Russian Armies operating in the vicinity of SACMED's Command.

3. United States and British Missions in Moscow are accordingly instructed to approach the Russian High Command at once and seek their agreement, as a matter of urgency, to the attachment of air liaison officers from the Mediterranean Theater to the appropriate forward elements of the Russian Southern Armies. From General Deane's telegram MX 21802 it is evident that the Russians completely fail to understand the purpose of a bomblines, which is not to divide an area into theaters of operations, but merely to enable land operations to be supported by air forces without risk of damage to friendly troops through faulty identification or unexpectedly rapid movement. For this purpose a bomblines even 50 miles from the scene of the line battle is unacceptable. The Soviet proposal that a bomblines 50 to 100 miles west of the Soviet front line would unnecessarily restrict the Soviet ground forces is incomprehensible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, but such a line would certainly unduly restrict the Allied air action designed to assist the Russian advance. Moreover it would exclude from attack by our Strategic Air Forces a number of objectives of the highest importance, including at least 8 important oil production plants. In making this approach, therefore, to the Russian High Command, the U.S. and British Missions should explain that in the view of the Combined Chiefs of Staff the only satisfactory method of fixing bomblines is by establishing adequate liaison between the nearest local commanders in contiguous areas of operation. The liaison officers which we propose should be appointed to the Russian Southern Armies should therefore have full authority to agree with the Russian commanders to whom they are accredited the day to day adjustment of the bomblines.

4. Once these air liaison officers to the Russian Southern Armies have been appointed, the Combined Chiefs of Staff

CM-OUT-69568

(28 Nov 44)

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**OUTGOING MESSAGE**

WARX 69568

Page ~~SECRET~~

propose to take up strongly with the Russian High Command the question of the exchange of full scale liaison missions between SCAEF's and SACMED's Headquarters and the appropriate Russian commanders in the field. SCAEF and SACMED will accordingly submit their recommendations without delay to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. These recommendations will include the size of missions, ranks of officers, communications, designation of headquarters by type which would establish liaison, and any other pertinent matters. The United States and British Missions will make no mention of the proposed exchange of liaison missions until receipt of further instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which will be provided on receipt of recommendations from SCAEF and SACMED.

5. Since drafting the above, the Combined Chiefs of Staff have seen WAF 820. They endorse the proposals in paragraph 4 of that telegram regarding the delineation of the temporary bomb line and direct that the heads of the United States and British Missions in Moscow endeavor to obtain the immediate agreement of the Russian High Command to this temporary delineation, and to the immediate appointment of the air liaison officers. Direct communication between Wilson, Deane and Archer in connection with the appointment of these liaison officers is authorized.

End

ORIGINATOR: CCS

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy  
Gen Arnold  
Gen Hull  
Gen Bissell  
Adm King  
C of S

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(28 Nov 44) 2211Z hrt

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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FROM <b>AMCON VLAD</b>	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
RELEASED BY		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
DATE <b>NOV 28 1944</b>		CNO	PRIORITY
TOR CODER00N <b>280319</b>			DEFERRED
DECODED BY <b>KOHOUTEK</b>			BASEGRAM
PARAPHRASED BY <b>W MONTGOMERY</b>	CHECKED BY <b>MONTGOMERY</b>		
ROUTED BY <b>COOK</b>	ROUTED BY <b>MONTGOMERY</b>	ALUSNA MOSCOW	PRIORITY
			DEFERRED
			BASEGRAM
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
<b>270530</b>			<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>NCR 6007</b>			
Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP			(Use G. C. T.)

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AMCON VLAD SENDS ACTION OPNAV INFO ALUSNA MOSCOW X

1 RED ARMY COLONEL GENERAL REPORTED TO ARMY HDQTS CHITA AND WAS MET BY COLONEL GENERAL AND PART OF STAFF ON 1

NOVEMBER. INDICATIONS THAT RED ARMY IN FAR EAST BEING GRADUALLY REINFORCED WITH UNITS FROM EUROPEAN FRONT.

TRANSPORTATION VIA SPECIAL HOSPITAL TRAINS OF 16 OR 18 CARS 3 TIMES WEEKLY. MAJOR INCREASES IN ULAN UDE-CHITA

AREA

RECEIVED AS SECRET, RECLASSIFIED AS TOP SECRET ACCORDING TO CONTENTS.

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COMINCH(#2TO#9).....NAVAIDE(#10 & #11).....

No. 1 ADMIRAL.

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State Dept. letter, 1-11-73  
MAY 21 1973

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OPNAV 19-70

270530

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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*g*  
[REDACTED] "IVI"

URGENT

From: Allied Force Headquarters Caserta Italy  
To: War Department  
United Kingdom Base Section, London England  
CG US Strategic Air Forces in Europe, London England  
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
Main Versailles France.  
Nr: FX 59100 NAF 820 27 November 1944

FX 59100 TOPSEC to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to Central District UK Base Section London for British Chiefs of Staff repeated SHAEF USSTAF and Moscow for Deane for information signed Wilson cite FHSGS This is NAF number 820.

Am referring to PAN 458. Germans are escaping from Yugoslavia and it is vital to us and to the Russians that they be attacked.

A strict interpretation of the present temporary bomblime imposed upon our forces by an unrecognizable straight line drawn on a map from Sarajevo to Prilep would virtually stop all Allied air effort against disorganized and retreating Germans. This temporary bomblime would in effect take out of our action and reach the most lucrative targets along remaining escape routes left open to the Germans, getting out of southern Yugoslavia.

2. For example, there has been much movement the past few days on the main escape route Novipazar-Prijepolje-Visegrad. Also during this time six major concentrations of parked vehicles were revealed by reconnaissance between Rogatica and Novipazar. These concentrations were reported to be from three to eight miles in length. Under a strict

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
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~~SECRET~~ "IVI"

URGENT

page 2

From: Allied Force Headquarters Caserta Italy

Nr: FX 59100 NAF 820

27 November 1944

application of the temporary bomblines now laid down, these lucrative targets would be denied the weight of our air effort. The Sarajevo area is known to be of increasing importance to the German in his concentration of troops and supplies, yet with the current bomblines that area would be free from Allied air attack.

3. In the general area Scutari-Podgorica are also two German Divisions. The probable escape route of these divisions would be Podgorica-Matesevo thence via Kolasin or Berane-Prijepolje-Sarajevo. The initial part of this route under present conditions is open to us for attack. However, the greater majority of the route would enjoy the protection of the temporary bomblines which would preclude our forces from taking action against these concentrations.

4. Instead of a straight bomblines from Sarajevo to Philip we propose the following bomblines which follows certain recognizable features such as enemy's communications lines and roads which constitute his escape routes, and to include these on our side of the bomblines. The following is the way in which we propose to delineate this temporary bomblines: Reference is 1/500000 Europe (air), all places inclusive to our forces: The roads Sarajevo-Mokro-Sokolac-Rogatica-Pesurici-Dobrun-Uvac-Prijepolje-Sjenica-thence (exclusive to our forces) Suvido-Krstaca-Lesnica River-Bioca-thence (inclusive to our forces) road Berane-Podgorica-Scutari. Within these areas, known Partisan held areas would be exempted from attack.

CM-IN-26907 (28 Nov 44)

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94



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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~ "IVI"

URGENT

page 3

From: Allied Force Headquarters Caserta Italy

Nr: FX 59100 NAF 820

27 November 1944

5. Obviously this delineation must be changed almost daily in accord with information furnished to us as to the Soviet forward elements.

6. It is desired to point out that although some of these places are included on our side of the bomblines, this in no way precludes the Russian Air Forces from attacking any of these localities where targets may be offered. In effect it offers the opportunity for our forces as well as the Russian forces to attack them.

7. The forward Soviet and Partisan lines as known to us this date are as follows: Boljevoi-Obrenovac-Lajkovac-Valjevo-Kreljevo-Mitrovica-Pristina-Prizren-Lesh.

8. Request your authorization of this amended bomblines and that you immediately advise Soviets to this effect.

9. Further request you press the immediate acceptance of field liaison and that no future commitments concerning bomblines in this area be made without prior reference to this theater.

End

FAN 458 is CM-OUT-67986 (24 Nov 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Admiral Leahy  
General Arnold  
OPD

General Bissell  
Admiral King  
CofS

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CM-IN-26907 (28 Nov 44)

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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IMMEDIATE

From: 30 Mission

To: Combined Chiefs of Staff

Repeated: S.H.A.E.F., A.F.H.Q.

No: MIL 2123 26 November 1944


Re (Soviet) General Staff Communiqué for November  
25th reports south of Budapest on Island between Ugouae  
(Danube) and Chapeli-Duaag following places captured  
Segetsent-Miklosh, Tekel, Lorev, Makad.

T.O.O. 261151Z

ACTION: CG-8

INFO : CG AAF, OPD, G-2, Adm King, Col Park, Log.

CM-IN-26591 (27 Nov 44) 1533Z m/m

  
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JCS MEMO, 1-17-72  
BY DSS, DATE

MAY 21 1973

*3 cc Russia*  
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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

# TOP SECRET DISPATCH

ORIGINATOR	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
AMCON VLAD (ROULLARD)		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
FROM		CNO	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY	NOV 26 1944		ROUTINE
DATE	252319		DEFERRED
TOR CODER/ROOM	KOROUTEK		BASEGRAM
DECODED BY		ALUSNA MOSCOW	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED	CHECKED		ROUTINE
BY	BY		DEFERRED
ROUTED BY	BY		BASEGRAM
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED IN THE FOLLOWING PRECEDENCE AND AT ADMINISTRATIVE.		250415	NCR 3552
			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
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Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

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AMCON VLAD SENDS ACTION OPNAV INFO ALUSNA MOSCOW.

LOCAL REACTION TO SPEECH OF STALIN ON NOVEMBER 7. SOVIETS OPENLY BOAST THAT JAPAN IS NOW AFRAID SOVIET UNION WILL

SOON ATTACK JAPAN AND HELP AMERICANS WIN WAR IN PACIFIC. LOCAL POPULACE DANGEROUSLY OVER CONFIDENT OF IMMEDIATE

SUCCESS VOICING SAME COMMENTS THAT I ENCOUNTERED IN SINGAPORE IN JULY AND AUGUST 1941. MILITARILY THIS AREA IS

MUCH BETTER PREPARED THAN MALAYA AND PHILIPPINES WERE FOR SURPRISE ATTACK

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No. 1 ADMIRAL.

No. 2 FILE.

No. 3F-1 OR CHARTERED State Dept. letter, 12-1-78

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Date MAY 21 1973

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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DRAFTER <b>AMCON VLAD (ROULLARD)</b>	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY <b>NOV 26 1944</b>		<b>CNO</b>	<b>PRIORITY</b> <b>R R R R</b>
DATE <b>252319</b>			<b>ROUTINE</b>
TOR CODER ROOM <b>KOHOUTEK</b>			<b>DEFERRED</b>
DECODED BY <b>W. MONTGOMERY</b>		<b>ALUSNA MOSCOW</b>	<b>BASEGRAM</b>
PARAPHRASED BY <b>MONTGOMERY</b>	CHECKED BY <b>MONTGOMERY</b>		
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<b>250415</b>			<b>NCR 3552</b>

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LOCAL REACTION TO SPEECH OF STALIN ON NOVEMBER 7. SOVIETS OPENLY BOAST THAT JAPAN IS NOW AFRAID SOVIET UNION WILL

SOON ATTACK JAPAN AND HELP AMERICANS WIN WAR IN PACIFIC. LOCAL POPULACE DANGEROUSLY OVER CONFIDENT OF IMMEDIATE

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No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTERED 4 SPECIAL. State Dept. letter, 1-13-72  
**TOP SECRET** By Date MAY 21 1973  
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*See Russia* 250415

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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OUTGOING MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff  
77500

24 November 1944

U.S. Military Mission to the USSR  
Moscow, Russia

Commanding General  
Allied Force Headquarters  
Caserta, Italy

Commanding General  
Mediterranean Allied Air Forces  
Caserta, Italy

Commanding General  
U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe  
London, England

Commanding General  
United Kingdom Base Section  
London, England

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

Number WARI 67985

Book Message to General Deane and Admiral Archer for action, to Generals Wilson, McFarney, Baker, Speatz, and Central District United Kingdom Base Section London pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The establishment of a temporary bomb line from Sarajevo to Prilep and thence southeast to the southern border of Yugoslavia with both points named inclusive to the Soviets is approved and instructions have been issued to our forces making this line effective until such time as a change is agreed upon or more effective methods of coordination by Liaison have been established.

Further Soviet proposals contained in your MX 21802, November 22, are under consideration and you will be advised.

ORIGINATOR: CCS

End

INFORMATION: Adm. Leahy, Gen. Arnold, OPD, Gen. Bissell, Adm. King,  
C of S

CM-OUT 67985

(24 Nov 44)

2151Z

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94



WAR DEPARTMENT  
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OUTGOING MESSAGE

Joint Chiefs of Staff  
77500

24 November 1944

U.S. Military Mission  
Moscow, Russia

Supreme Headquarters  
Allied Expeditionary Forces  
Main Echelon  
Versailles, France

Commanding General  
Allied Force Headquarters  
Caserta, Italy

Commanding General  
U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe  
London, England

Number: WARX 67900

Book message to Deane for action, to Eisenhower, McNarney, and Spaatz for information from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the proposed bomb line as agreed with the Soviets, namely, Sarajevo, Priep, and southeast to southern border to Yugoslavia, be accepted as an emergency measure to preclude probability of further incidents.

However, the extension of this line to the north as proposed by the U.S.S.R. is not acceptable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in that it prohibits operations by our Air Forces against vital industrial targets in eastern Germany, especially the Vienna area. Such an arrangement would result in eastern Germany being comparatively free from air attacks since the Soviet Strategic Air Force is not capable of conducting the necessary intensive air operations in

CM-OUT-67900

(24 Nov 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 20 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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**OUTGOING MESSAGE**

Number: WARX 67900

24 November 1944

that area.

The proposal by General Slavin definitely indicates the trend of thought in the Soviet General Staff since the establishment of a bomb line such as he recommends would preclude the necessity of close liaison and would make contact through Moscow the only solution to the problem. Based upon all of our past experience in effective air operations, particularly on a fluid front, we feel that the only plausible solution to the present problem is close liaison between the Field Headquarters of the Allied and Soviet Armies. These views are in accordance with those of General Wilson as expressed in a message from him dated November 22nd. The British have agreed that it might be advantageous to have an exchange of liaison missions in the field at a later date. We have now proposed to the British that negotiations for such exchange should begin at once. You will be informed of British action on this proposal.

End

ORIGINATOR: Joint Chiefs of Staff

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy; Gen Arnold; Gen Hull; Gen Bissell;  
Adm King; C of S

CM-OUT-67900

(24 Nov 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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**OUTGOING MESSAGE**

Combined Chiefs of Staff  
77500

24 November 1944

Commanding General  
Allied Force Headquarters  
Caserta, Italy

Supreme Headquarters  
Allied Expeditionary Forces  
Main Echelon  
Versailles, France

Commanding General  
U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe  
London, England

U.S. Military Mission  
Moscow, Russia

Commanding General  
United Kingdom Base Section  
London, England

Number WARK 67986

TOPSEC Book Message to Wilson, Eisenhower, and Spaatz for action, to General Deane, Admiral Archer, and Central District United Kingdom Base Section London pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information. This message is PAN 458 to Wilson and PACS 110 to Eisenhower from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Effective at once a temporary bomb line is established restricting Allied Air Force operations to the line from Sarajevo to Prilep and thence southeast to the southern border of Yugoslavia. The points Sarajevo and Prilep are both inclusive to the Soviet Forces. Until more effective methods of coordination by Liaison have been established, this bomb line will continue in effect subject to change as agreed.

North of Sarajevo continue to operate under your existing instructions to Air Forces, namely: Strategic targets not attacked within forty miles for bombers and eighty miles for fighters of the known forward elements of the Red Army.

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Number WARX 67986

-2-

24 November

Your comments and recommendations are desired on the other proposals contained in MX 21802, dated 22 November from Archer and Deane, copy of which you have.

End

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ORIGINATOR: CCS

INFORMATION: ADM LEAHY, GEN ARNOLD, OPD, GEN BISSELL, ADM KING,  
C of S

CM-OUT 67986

(24 Nov 44) 2152Z OM

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URGENT

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy  
To: War Department  
US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia  
Nr. FX 57190 24 November 1944

FX 57190 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated Central District UK Base Section London for British Chiefs of Staff for action and to SHAEP, USSTAF, and Moscow for Deane and Archer for information signed Wilson cite FHSGS. TOPSEC. This is NAF 817.

There was received today MK 21802 from General Deane and Admiral Archer in Moscow delineating a bomb line between Soviet and Anglo-United States Forces. In accordance with their recommendation the CG MAAF has directed the Strategic Air Forces to confine their activities for the present to the area on the Adriatic side of the line: Sarajevo Freilip thence southeast to southern border of Yugoslavia.

To allow this bomblines to stand for the Strategic Forces would seriously reduce the total air effort to be brought to bear on the retreating enemy. If any suggestion were made and followed that such a bomblines were to be applied as well to the Balkan Air Force and the Tactical Air Force it would mean the virtual cessation of all Anglo-United States air effort against the retreating and disorganized Germans until they are almost out of the trap. Such a position would be untenable. Although this particular bomblines is unsatisfactory, clearly some method of coordination must be in effect between the Air Forces and the Russians. As air action must be applied where there are targets, any system of merely drawing a straight line on the map and ignoring the enemy's critical points is unsatisfactory. As pilots must use visual references on the ground

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94



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AMUG

URGENT

Page 2

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

Nr. FX 57190

24 November 1944

in identifying their areas, bomblines must be clearly traceable on the ground and follow major landmarks. Evidently such a bomblines would permit operations with safety closer to friendly troops than an indefinite one.

Maximum destruction to the enemy is only to be brought about if he is kept under air attack the greatest possible time. Evidence at hand now indicates the panic caused to enemy columns at the word of imminent air attack. His vehicles scatter in all directions where possible and results in material loss of time to him and increased expenditure of precious fuel. The acceptance of some risks in this respect will in the end save casualties entailed by the eventual ground actions necessary to kill these same men.

The only method which can work is that of establishing air liaison parties with the Ground Forces in the field. Our experience throughout the entire war points to this conclusion. Only in the field is it possible to keep abreast both of the enemy's movements and own positions in time to bring air action to bear. In this respect considerable progress has already been made by the skeleton MAAF Liaison Detachment at Bucharest with the Rear Echelon of Second Ukrainian Army and by the RAF members of the Allied Control Commission in Sofia. They have been passing timely and valuable information to us upon which air attacks have been based. Even these contacts are losing their value because the Field Headquarters have moved farther forward. Efforts are being made for the Bucharest Detachment to move forward but authority therefor has not yet been granted by the Russians.

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

AMUG

URGENT

Page 3

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

Nr. FX 57190

24 November 1944

I believe that we should be firm in our conviction that the only acceptable solution to this problem is the establishment of adequate air liaison parties with each Russian Field Army and I so recommend. Request you ratify the action taken here in applying the restriction as proposed by Deane and Archer to the Strategic Air Force only, and only until the proper coordinating arrangements are decided upon. I further recommend that the subject bomblines be not ratified but that it be replaced by lines agreed between the Liaison Officers and the Russian Field Commanders.

With respect to the proposed bomblines for Strategic Forces north of Sarajevo, that obviously would be entirely unacceptable. It would have to be referred to General Spaatz and Air Ministry in any case. The proposed line would eliminate the Blechhammer synthetic oil plants, the 6 oil refineries of Vienna and 18 other of our first priority strategic oil objectives. It would eliminate the rail facilities at Vienna, Lignitz and Breslau areas and a vast number of other objectives in our second priority system. It would confine the activities of the Fifteenth Air Force only to that area which is most frequently blocked by weather incident to the necessity of crossing the Alps. The relaxation of the pressure at this time in the restricted area would result in a near collapse of the Strategic Air Force program and the gaining by the German of a respite in the destruction of his oil facilities.

End

ACTION: CCS

INFO : ADM LEAHY, GEN ARNOLD, OPD, GEN BISSELL, SGS,  
ADM KING, LOG  
CM-IN-23779 (24 Nov 44) 1957Z mcs

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RAIP 6-9-71

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

NAVY DEPARTMENT

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	19
			GET

ULYSSES BAY 3 MILES SOUTHEAST OF VLAD IS NAVAL BASE FOR  
RED NAVY SMALL CRAFT. REF HO CHART 2071. FOLLOWING OB-  
SERVED. QUARTER MILE SOUTHWEST OF WATER TOWER 1 FRAGILE  
WHARF LENGTH OF 2 CAMOUFLAGED SMALL DESTROYERS SECURED  
ALONG SIDE. NORTHEAST OF TOWER NEAR CREEK 2 SMALL MARINE  
RAILWAYS EACH WITH SUBMARINE PROBABLY MALODKA CLASS UN-  
DER CONSTRUCTION APPROX 90 PERCENT COMPLETED. SMALL FIN-  
GER PIER WITH 6 MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS SECURED BOWS ON 600  
YARDS SOUTHEAST OF TOWER. NAVAL BARRACKS AND SMALL CRAFT  
CONSTRUCTION ALONG SOUTHEAST SHORE. SOURCES VERY RELI-  
ABLE

ABLE

~~SECRET~~

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State Dept. letter 1-11-72  
MAY 21 1973

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS)

23 05 20

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

16...ACT

COMINCH...CNO...20G...NAVAIDE...200P...

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State Dept. letter, 1-11-72  
By \_\_\_\_\_ Date MAY 21 1973

Originator AM CON VLAD 230520 2040 Page 2 Of 2 Pages.  
D/T Group \_\_\_\_\_ NCR \_\_\_\_\_

OPNAV-10-51  
434100

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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~~SECRET~~  
"IVI"

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY  
*WS*

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy  
To: War Department  
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
Main, Versailles, France  
CG, United Kingdom Base Section, London, England  
Re: FX 56110 NAF 816 22 November 1944

TOPSECRET. To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated Central District U K Base Section London for British Chiefs of Staff and SHAFF for information FX 56110 signed Wilson cite FHCOS. This is NAF 816. Reference PAN 454.

I agree fully with Combined Chiefs of Staff action and General McNarney has made his report as directed.

With respect to discontinuing air operations over Soviet Zone of activity until temporary bomblines is designated, Air Forces in this theater have already established as a policy that targets will not be attacked near known Red Army Forces. As indicated to you in General McNarney's report, strategic targets are not attacked within 40 miles for bombers and 80 miles for fighters of the known forward elements of the Red Army. Believe that this is the best procedure pending establishment of the bomblines.

It has been demonstrated in the past that in a rapidly moving situation any bomblines designated from Moscow is likely to be unsatisfactory. A much better plan would be to have air liaison officers from this theater with the forward elements of the Red Armies to keep us advised of the locations of their forward echelons from day to day, plus a

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*300 Russia*

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94



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~~SECRET~~ "IVI"  
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Page #2

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

No: FX 56110 NAF 816 22 November 1944

general agreement that we will not execute missions closer than agreed number of miles to these forces unless specifically requested by the Red Army commanders to do so. We have made every effort in this theater to follow the latter procedure and have a mission with the rear echelon of the Second Ukrainian Army. With respect to operations in southern Yugoslavia, the air member of the Allied Control Commission in Bulgaria is serving the same purpose. Repeated efforts have been made here to obtain authorization for such liaison parties, both through our mission in Moscow and by direct contact with the Red Army commanders, to date without success except to the limited extent outlined above.

End

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RAF 6-9-71

ACTION: CCS

INFO : ADM LEAHY  
GEN ARNOLD  
GEN HULL  
GEN BISSELL  
ADM KING  
C OF S

CM-IN-21828 (22 Nov 44) 2055Z mcs

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[REDACTED] VI

[REDACTED]

From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia  
To: War Department  
CG, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, Caserta, Italy  
No: MX 21781 21 November 1944

AGWAR for Joint Chiefs of Staff and to MAAF for  
General Eaker from Deane [REDACTED] MX 21781, MAAF please pass  
to Eaker.

The message presented in your WARX 65545 has been  
formally presented to the Red Army General Staff.

End

ACTION: JC/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy  
Gen Arnold  
Gen Hull  
Gen Bissell  
Adm King  
CofS

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

CM-IN-21461 (22 Nov 44) 1311Z bjm

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**OUTGOING MESSAGE**

Combined Chiefs of Staff  
77500

20 November 1944

Headquarters, Communications Zone  
European Theater of Operations  
Main Echelon  
Paris, France

Supreme Headquarters  
Allied Expeditionary Forces  
Main Echelon  
Versailles, France

Commanding General  
United Kingdom Base Section  
London, England

Commanding General  
Allied Force Headquarters  
Caserta, Italy

Number WARX 65818

TOPSEC Book Message to Wilson for action, to SHAEP Versailles for Eisenhower, and to Central District United Kingdom Base Section London pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information, FAN 454 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The United States Chiefs of Staff have received a communication, dated 10 November, from General Deane which states that a Soviet automobile column was attacked between Nis and Aleksinac in Yugoslavia by a group of American fighters, composed of 27 Lightning planes on 7 November 1944 at 1250 hours. Also attacked was a protecting group of nine Soviet fighters taking off from the Nis airdrome. It is claimed that as a result of the attack, one Lt General, two other officers and three men were killed; twenty automobiles with equipment set afire; and three Soviet planes shot down with two pilots killed. The Soviets have requested an immediate investigation of this incident and punishment of those who are responsible. They further request that flights of Allied aviation into the Zone of Activity of the Soviet troops be prohibited unless and until there is preliminary agreement with the General Staff of the Red Army.

CM-OUT 65818

(20 Nov 44)

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**OUTGOING MESSAGE**

Number WARX 65818

-2-

20 November 1944

~~SECRET~~

The Combined Chiefs of Staff desire that you support the action taken by the United States Chiefs of Staff in directing General McNarney to investigate and report on this incident, and to make recommendations pertinent thereto. The U. S. and British Military Missions to U. S. S. R. have been instructed to attempt to arrange for the immediate establishment of a temporary bomb line, pending the establishment of effective Liaison. If investigation shows the necessity for it, you will halt all operations over Soviet zone of activity until a temporary bomb line is established.

End

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RAP 6-9-71

ORIGINATOR: CCS

INFORMATION: ADM. LEAHY, GEN. ARNOLD, OPD, GEN. BISSELL, ADM. KING,  
C of S.

CM-OUT 65818

( 20 Nov 44 )

2309Z

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Joint Chiefs of Staff  
77500

20 November 1944

United States  
Military Mission  
Moscow, Russia

Number: WAR 65838

from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Deane Moscow

Your MX 21660 refers. SACMED has been advised, if investigation warrants, to suspend operations in the Soviet Zone of Activity pending the establishment of a temporary bomb line. In collaboration with Burrows, who is being advised by the British Chiefs of Staff, you should take immediate steps to reach an agreement with the Soviets for the establishment of a temporary bomb line pending the establishment of effective liaison. Advise us as a matter of priority of the outcome of such negotiations.

Consideration is being given by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff to proposals to the Soviets for the establishment of permanent liaison and you will be advised as soon as Combined Chiefs of Staff agreement is reached.

End.

ORIGINATOR: Joint Chiefs of Staff

INFORMATION: Adm. Leahy, Gen. Arnold, OPD, Gen. Bissell,  
Adm. King, C of S

CM-OUT-65838

(20 Nov 44)

2321Z

of

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 20 1974

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WFO 10-22044-1

24-75724

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94



WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Joint Chiefs of Staff  
77500

19 November 1944

U.S. Military Mission  
Moscow, Russia

Commanding General  
Allied Force Headquarters  
Caserta, Italy

Commanding General  
Mediterranean Allied Air Forces  
Caserta, Italy

Number WARX 65545

to Deane for action to McNarney and Eaker for  
information from the Joint Chief of Staff.

You should present the following to the Red Army General  
Staff from the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

"Detailed investigation of the attack by United States  
Lightnings on a Soviet Column in Yugoslavia on 7 November  
has been completed. The results of this investigation  
show that the strafing between Nis and Aleksinac was carried  
out by one squadron of a group which had been dispatched to  
attack enemy columns and rail movements between Sjenica,  
Novi Pazar, Raska and Mitrovica. After group split-up, this  
squadron headed for its assigned portion of the target at  
treetop level. Arriving at what the leader thought to be  
Novi Pazar, heavy traffic was observed and the column was  
immediately strafed. At the completion of the strafing run,  
squadron was justifiably attacked by Soviet fighters defending  
their column and one lightning was shot down in the first  
clash. The U.S. leader then recognized the Soviet markings,  
but before he could disengage his unit from the ensuing air  
fight, another Lightning and two or three Soviet fighters were  
shot down. The Soviet Flight Leader courageously closed into  
formation with the U. S. flight leader and mutual identification  
was confirmed.

CM-OUT 65545

(19 Nov 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Number WARX 65545

- 2 -

19 November 1944

The Group Commander who personally led the squadron which made the strafing run was an experienced combat pilot, having flown more than 4,000 hours. The group was carefully briefed on their assigned target. A navigational error by the leader, together with striking similarity between the map appearance of the target briefed and the target actually attacked, caused the leader to feel positive as to the identification of the communication lines he was attacking. All personnel on the mission were equally certain that this was the correct target until gun camera film was developed which positively established that the wrong road had been attacked. The respective roads are approximately 45 miles, or less than ten minutes flying time, apart. After careful analysis, we find that this regrettable incident has resulted from a type of error which has occurred in all theaters of war and which we have been unable to eliminate entirely, even with the exercise of the greatest care and foresight. In our experience, it has been demonstrated that the best way to prevent such incidents is to maintain close liaison between air and ground forces involved. This is particularly true in fast offensive operations, such as our breakthrough in France.

Between 18 August and 11 November, the Fifteenth Air Force has flown 37 bombing and strafing missions near Soviet lines in Yugoslavia and Hungary against the escape route of retreating Nazi columns. These missions have resulted in the destruction of 621 enemy aircraft and damage to 306 others, as well as destruction of large numbers of railway rolling stock, vehicles and Germans. The incident of 7 November is the only known error that has occurred.

The Group Commander who led the attacking squadron has been relieved of his command. Additional restrictions have now been applied in this theater normally prohibiting tactical air operations closer than 80 miles from known Soviet positions. Exceptions to these restrictions will be made only by agreement and after special briefing.

CM-OUT 65545

(19 Nov 44)

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JOS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Number WARX 65545

- 3 -

19 November 1944

The Joint Chiefs of Staff again express their deep regret that such an incident has occurred. We feel that we must continue our efforts to develop a system of close liaison between operational headquarters with a view to eliminating the possibility of mistakes while at the same time retaining the material contribution to the destruction of the common enemy that can be attained through close cooperation of our air and ground forces in the field."

In MX-36696, November 10 and MX-37011, November 13, both from Eaker, you now have copies of all available information on the results of the investigation of this incident. Copies of the detailed report referred to in the latter message will be forwarded to you by courier.

End

ORIGINATOR: JCS

INFORMATION: ADM. LEAHY  
GEN. ARNOLD  
GEN. HULL  
GEN. BISSELL  
ADM. KING  
C of S

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 20 1974

CM-OUT 65545

(19 Nov 44)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

ACAS/Plans 5833

17 November 1944

Commanding General  
Allied Force Headquarters  
Caserta Italy

Commanding General  
Mediterranean Allied Air Forces  
Caserta Italy

Number WARX 64457

To McNarney and Baker from Arnold signed Marshall T

It would be most unfortunate to have the incident of November 7th appear first in the foreign press in an unfavorable light. Agree with you that a controlled and orderly presentation to the press, reference your M 37308 dated November 16 1944, will be advantageous to all concerned. However, bear in mind that the liaison which you have established with Red Army and Red Air Force in the Balkans does not have approval of the Red Army General Staff in Moscow. It is essential, therefore, that you tie in release with Deane and protect his position in his negotiations to establish overall coordination and liaison between our Ground and Air Forces and Soviet Ground and Air Forces. Subject to complete coordination with and approval by Deane, you are authorized to release this story whenever and however you deem most advisable.

End  
AF 2578

ORIGINATOR: Gen Arnold

INFORMATION: OPD

Gen Biasell  
Col Park  
Gen Surles  
C of S

CM-OUT 64457 (17 Nov 44)

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 4, 1972

By DBS Date MAY 21 1973

2156Z khc

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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PRIORITY

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (H)

OSD letter, May 1, 1978

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

From: CG, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, Caserta, Italy

To: War Department

Nr: M 37308

16 November 1944

To AGWAR for Arnold from Baker cite M 37308

A RAF Air Commodore recently returned from Sofia, who attended the funeral of the Russian Lieutenant General whom we accidentally killed, talked with the senior Russian officers and stated "They received it very well and said that it was clearly an error and they showed no resentment at all. This incident does not appear to have affected the willingness of the Russians to continue their liaison for air operational purposes and does in fact seem to have increased their willingness to do so".

I have information which indicates that this incident is known to a newspaper man in Belgrade and will therefore eventually be known to a number of newspaper men. I feel that this story should be released in the near future to the press from here at a regular press conference where we can show the maps, point out the similarity of terrain features and also include full data as to what we have done to help the Russian campaign. The Theater Commander and the Supreme Commander I believe agree with me fully on this procedure. The War Department and Deane and our Military Mission in Moscow are also interested. I wish you would let me know whether this proposed plan meets with your and the War Department's approval. I am also

CM-IN-15926

(17 Nov 44)

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*3as Russia*

*Col Park*  
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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94



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~~SECRET~~ VI  
PRIORITY

Page 2.

From: CG, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, Caserta, Italy

Nr: M 37308 16 November 1944

telling Deane of this proposal and determining whether it will embarrass him in any way.

Courier departs on the 18th with the full detailed report on this incident.

End

ACTION: Gen. Arnold

INFORMATION: OPD  
Gen. Surles  
C of S

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
OSD letter, May 1, 1972  
By DBS Date MAY 21 1973

CM-IN-15926

(17 Nov 44)

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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~~SECRET~~ TOT

From: US Military Attache, London, England

To: War Department

No: 69774

16 November 1944

From Dunn serial number 69774 signed Lee.

Chief Norwegian Intelligence Office Stockholm  
reports Russians withdrawing from Kirkenes to Petsamo.

End

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 1, 1973

By DDB

Date

MAY 21 1973

ACTION: G-2

INFO : CG AAF, OPD, Col Park, Log

CM-IX-16250 (17 Nov 44) 0705Z m/m

*3as Russia*

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

## NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTML

DRAFTER <b>OP-13/EAH</b>		EXTENSION NUMBER <b>2612</b>	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE	1
FROM <b>COMINCH AND CNO</b>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE			2
RELEASED BY <b>R.S. EDWARDS</b>		ALUSNA MOSCOW		PRIORITY	3
DATE <b>15 NOV 44</b>				ROUTINE	4
TOR CODEROM <b>1432</b>				DEFERRED	5
DECODED BY					6
PARAPHRASED BY <b>CRANE</b> <i>Brewer</i>		FOR ACTION		PRIORITY	7
ROUTED BY <b>MORRIS</b>		INFORMATION		ROUTINE	8
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.				DEFERRED	9
					10
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				IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW	15
				<input type="checkbox"/>	16
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ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:		DATE	TIME	GCT	21
					22

OR OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

VISA SITUATION YOUR 030935Z HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH STATE DEPARTMENT WHICH HAS FURTHER DISCUSSED THE MATTER WITH AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN. STATE ADVISES CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IS BEING DIRECTED TO UNDERTAKE RECIPROCAL AGREEMENT WITH SOVIETS ON FIFTEEN DAY DELAY BASIS

OP-13.....ORIG

CNO.....NAVALAIDE.....20G.....200P.....OP16.....COMINCH.....

ACTION		
F-0		23
F-01		24
F-02		25
F-05		26
F-07		27
F-1		28
F-2		29
F-20		30
F-3		31
F-30		32
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F-34		36
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FX01		38
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FX37		40
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E. O. 11652, Sec. 5(E) and 5(D)-56 (S)

OSD letter, May 1, 1973

Date

By DBS

**SECRET**

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OP-13 10-97

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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[REDACTED] AMUG

From: US Military Mission Moscow, Russia  
To : War Department  
Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy  
No : MX 21707 14 November 1944

To General Marshall info to Eaker and McNarney from  
Deane [REDACTED] MX 21707.

I have map referred to in General Eaker's MX 37011 of 13th November. This is the British map scale one to 500,000 Europe air Shkodra (Scutari) sheet corrected through January 42. This information furnished in case you wish me to refer to or enclose the map in any report you may direct me to give to the Soviets.

End

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

FOOTNOTE: MX 37011 is CM IN 12918 (14 Nov 44) General Hull

ACTION: General Hull

INFO : JC/S, Admiral Leahy, General Arnold, General Bissell  
Admiral King, General Handy, C of S

CM-IN-13937 (15 Nov 44) 0715Z m/m

300 Russia

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOT

URGENT

SUPPLEMENTARY COPY

From: Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces,  
Caserta, Italy.

To: War Department.

Nr: MX 37011. 13th November 1944.

[REDACTED], MX 37011 Marshall R Deane Moscow info  
AFHQ from Baker signed McNarney.

This in reply to your WARX 60574 and WX 60708 and  
further to our MX 36696 of 10th November.

Error occurs on:

Page 1, line 24.

He began his strafing at Krusevac and continued  
through Cicevac to Nis Nis. As his squadron completed its  
strafing.

Page 3, line 19.

Obviously General Antonov in Moscow does not under-  
stand that our tactical forces as well as strategic operating.

End.

FOOTNOTE: Supplementary copy of CM IN 12918 (14 Nov 44)  
General Hull

ACTION: General Hull

INFO : JC.S, General Arnold, General Bissell, Admiral King  
(Admiral Leahy) General Handy, C of S.  
CM-IN-13123 (14 Nov 44) 0640Z m/m

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 8(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
OSD letter, May 4, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94



WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOT  
URGENT

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

To: War Department

No: MX 37011 13 November 1944

Re: MX 37011 Marshall Deane Moscow info AFHQ  
from Baker sgd McHarney. This in reply to your WARK 60574 and  
WX 60708 and further to our MX 36696 of 10 November.

Detailed investigation here completed concerning  
attack by USAFF Lightnings on Soviet column in Yugoslavia on  
7 November.

The 2nd Fighter Group was dispatched on adequate  
information to attack a legitimate target after proper  
briefing. The Group Commander Colonel C. T. Edvinson, an  
experienced pilot with more than 4000 hours and a veteran  
of 27 combat missions, personally led the mission. The assigned  
mission was to attack enemy columns and rail movements  
between Sjenica Novipasar Baska and Nitrovia. Colonel  
Edvinson assigned one squadron to the section between Sjenica  
and Novipasar. He assigned another squadron to act as high  
cover and he led the third squadron in the attack on the  
balance of the route.

At about 60 miles south west of Sjenica the squadron  
split up and hit the deck headed for their respective  
assignments. Colonel Edvinson's squadron arrived at what he  
thought to be Novipasar, found the road heavily trafficked  
and proceeded with his strafing. Actually as verified by  
our camera later, he began his strafing at Krusevac and  
continued through Cicevan to \*

NIS 45

CM-IN-12918 (14 Nov 44)

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JCS LETTER, 7-8-72  
BY DSS, DATE

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[REDACTED] - TOT  
URGENT

Page 2.

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

No: MX 37011

13 November 1944

As his squadron completed its strafing and pulled off they were attacked by Red Air Force Yaks and in first pass one Lightning was shot down. Colonel Edwinston immediately recognized the attackers as Yaks but in the ensuing air fight before he could disengage and assemble his fighters another Lightning and two or three Yaks were shot down. As his squadron was assembling the Yak flight leader slid up to him and the two flight leaders confirmed mutual identification. Throughout this time the top cover squadron did not join the fray.

There is a startling similarity between the map appearance of the briefed target and the actual target strafed as will be seen on map being forwarded. Map used was British 1 to 500000 Europe Air Shkodra (Scutari) sheet corrected through January 1942. Recommend you have plotted now.

Upon return to base the top cover leader was equally as positive as to the identification of the point where strafing began and only when gun camera film was developed did it become established that the wrong road had been attacked. The respective roads are roughly 55 miles apart.

All pilots will readily understand how even one as experienced as Colonel Edwinston, flying on the deck in such rugged country, under frequent flak attack as he was, could make a mistake of 10 minutes in navigation.

Detailed report is being forwarded to you by courier

CM-IN-12918

(14 Nov 44)

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JCS LETTER, 7-5-72  
BY DSS, DATE  
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[REDACTED] TOT  
URGENT

Page 3.

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

No: MX 37011

13 November 1944

including copies of radiograms of regret sent to Marshal Tolbukin by General Wilson and by me upon my arrival 12 November.

Careful analysis reveals that the incident had only the one cause: Navigational error. There were no contributory causes. In the face of the subject incident and two days later the Soviets have requested through our established skeleton liaison that we attack the same road as briefed upon 7 November as it is of vital and continuing importance. We are taking every conceivable precaution however so as to avoid that type of mistake as well as any others. Restrictions have been applied normally prohibiting ground operations of strategic fighters closer than 80 miles from known Soviet positions. In exceptional circumstances with special briefing exceptions will be authorized.

*in Moscow does not*  
Entirely aside from this incident however it is desirable that we continue our efforts to establish closer and more complete liaison. Obviously General Antonovrin strategic operating in a tactical role are making consistent material contribution to the destruction of the enemy in the Balkan and Hungarian areas. Timely, accurate, field liaison is essential for their efficiency.

*W* Point out that 37 bombing or strafing missions have been flown by 15th Air Force between 18 August and 11 November near Soviet lines in Yugoslavia and Hungary. They have resulted in destruction of 621 enemy aircraft and damage to 306 as well as destruction of great numbers of

CM-IN-12918

(14 Nov 44)

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BY DSS, DATE

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TOT  
URGENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 4.

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

No: MX 37011

13 November 1944

railway rolling stock and vehicles and Germans. This is first unfortunate occasion in all that effort.

This Headquarters, the 15th Air Force and the pilots involved are sincerely distressed at this unfortunate incident and do not blame the Red fighters for fighting to protect their charge. We are determined to leave no stone unturned to prevent such accidents but do not intend to allow these hazards to cause a reduction of pressure upon the enemy.

End

\* Being serviced.

FOOTNOTE: 36696 is CM IN 9840 (10 Nov 44) CG AAF

ACTION: General Hull

INFO : JC/S, General Arnold, General Bissell, Admiral King, General Handy, C of S. Adm Leahy.

CM-IN-12918 (14 Nov 44) 0243Z m/m

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JCS LETTER, 7-6-72  
BY DRS, DATE  
MAY 21 1973

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOT

URGENT

From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia

To: War Department

Nr. MX 21660

10 November 1944

To MAAF for Eaker and to AGWAR for the Joint Chiefs  
of Staff from Deane MX 21660

General Antonov, Deputy Chief of the Red Army General Staff, called me to his office tonight and handed me the following letter: This is to bring to your attention that at 1250 hours, 7 November 1944, between Nis and Aleksinac in Yugoslavia an automobile column of Red Army troops was attacked by a group of American Fighters, composed of 27 Lightning planes. A protecting group of 9 Soviet Fighters took off from the Nis Airdrome. The Soviet planes were attacked while they were gaining altitude in spite of the fact that they were clearly marked as planes of the Red Army Air Force.

Nevertheless for 15 minutes the American Lightning planes continued attacking the Soviet Fighters, forcing them to defend themselves.

The attack of the Lightnings was stopped only after the leader of the group of Soviet Fighters, Captain Koldunov, at the risk of being shot down, took position under the leader of the group of American Fighters and showed him the markings of his plane.

As a result of the attack of the American planes on the Soviet automobile column, Lieutenant General Kotov, the Commander of TZE Corps, was killed, also two officers and three men. 20 automobiles with equipment were set on fire. Of the group of Soviet fighters, three planes were shot down.  
CM-IN-9448 (10 Nov 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 20 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94



WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOT

URGENT

Page 2

From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia

Nr. MX 21660

10 November 1944

Two pilots were killed. In addition to this, in the region of the airdrome, four people were killed by the fire from the American planes.

This unwarranted instance of an attack by American Planes on a column of troops and the group of Red Army Planes completely perplexes us, since the attack was 50 kilometers behind the front line, between the towns of Nis and Aleksinac. On the 14th and 16th of October information was given in the Soviet Communique that these two towns had had been captured by the Red Army. The clearly visible markings on the Soviet Planes also removes the possibility that there might have been mistakes in determining to whom these planes belonged. There is also no justification for these operations of American Air Forces not having been coordinated with the General Staff of the Red Army.

Please inform the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the altogether deplorable facts stated above and ask them to carry out an immediate investigation of this incident and to severely punish those responsible for this unexplainable attack on Soviet Units. Ask them also that henceforth they not allow flights of Allied aviation into the Zone of Activity of the Soviet Troops without preliminary agreement with the General Staff of the Red Army.

Please let me know the results of the investigation and the measures being taken. Sincerely yours, Antonov."

Antonov went over the incident orally before he handed me the letter. I immediately expressed the regret

CM-IN-9448

(10 Nov 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED] TOT

URGENT

Page 3

From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia

Nr. MK 21660

10 November 1944

of our Chiefs of Staff and of the Army Air Forces in particular that this incident occurred and assured General Antonov that we would take the measures requested in his letter and inform him of the results of the investigation and the action taken. At the same time I called to his attention that we have consistently taken the initiative in attempting to arrange for coordination between our air forces and the Soviet Ground and Air Forces. I outlined to him the steps that we had already taken in this connection and proposed that we settle, at once, on a method of coordination that would minimize the chance of such incidents as this happening in the future. He asked what I proposed, and I stated that I thought that liaison between the Headquarters concerned in the field would be the most effective method. I proposed that either the American Air Forces have liaison officers with the Soviet Headquarters in the field, or that the Red Army assign liaison officers to the Headquarters of the Mediterranean Allied Air Force, and that in either case an adequate system of radio communications be established. Antonov insisted that it was not necessary to have liaison officers assigned to headquarters in the field, but that liaison should be effected with the General Staff in Moscow. His reason for this was that all operations of the Soviet Strategic Air Forces are directed by the Red Army General Staff from Moscow. I pointed out that, in my opinion, this was not the best method because of the difficulty of communications between our Headquarters in Italy and Moscow and would result in delays which would seriously interfere with operations. I suggested that, if they insisted on the liaison be effected in Moscow, they establish a boundary line between the operations of our air forces and their ground and air forces

CM-IN-9448

(10 Nov 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

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TOT

URGENT

Page 4

From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia

Nr. MX 21660

beyond which our aviation would not operate and that they change their boundary as frequently as they thought necessary. Antonov said he was in favor of this suggestion, but could not agree to it until he had presented it to the Soviet High Command.

Antonov stated that when our ground forces came closer together, he thought it would be time for us to establish a method of liaison between headquarters in the field.

At the present time, the system for liaison that has been approved both by the United States Chiefs of Staff and the Soviet General Staff is the coordination will be effected in Moscow with regard to FRANTIC operations, and on any other operations in which the action of our air forces is apt to conflict with Soviet ground or air operations. In addition to this, MAAF now has two liaison officers with the headquarters of the Second Ukrainian front for the purpose of effecting liaison between our air forces and the Soviet ground and air forces. General Antonov stated that he knew nothing of the liaison being effected at the Second Ukrainian front, although I had informed him specifically of the fact in a letter dated 24 October, when asking that the liaison group be expanded, upon request of General Eaker.

Request that I be informed of the action taken in this matter, the reply that you desire be made to General Antonov, and any instructions that you may have for the establishment of a more adequate means of liaison between the Soviet forces and our air forces.

End

ACTION: JC/S

INFO: Adm Leahy Gen Arnold Gen Hull Gen Bissell  
Adm King C of S

CM-IN-9448 (10 Nov 44) 1218Z pa

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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OUTGOING MESSAGE

Operations Division,  
Executive Office 2904  
Hull

10 November 1944

Commanding General  
Allied Force Headquarters  
Caserta, Italy

Commanding General  
Mediterranean Allied Air Forces  
Caserta, Italy

Number: WARX 60708

TOPSEC to General McNarney information Generals Wilson and  
Eaker from Marshall.

With further reference to our WARX 60574 of November 10  
information desired of measures being taken to prevent  
recurrence of alleged incident referred to.

End

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

ORIGINATOR: Gen. Hull

INFORMATION: Adm. Leahy, General Arnold, General Handy,  
General Bissell, Adm. King, C of S

CM-OUT-60708 (10 Nov 1944) 2105Z emh

17

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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OUTGOING MESSAGE

Operations Division WDC  
Executive Office 2904

10 November 1944

Commanding General  
US Military Mission to USSR  
Moscow Russia

Commanding General  
Mediterranean Allied Air Force  
Caserta Italy

Commanding General  
Allied Force Headquarters  
Caserta Italy

Number WARX 60574

TOPSEC to General McNarney for action and information for  
Generals Wilson, Baker and Deane from General Marshall

Immediate report desired on information known regarding  
alleged attack by American Lightnings on automobile column  
of Red Army troops between Nis and Aleksinac at 1250 hours  
7 November 44 during which according to protest made to  
Deane by Antonov Red Army Lieutenant General Kotov and 5  
others were killed and protecting group of 9 Soviet fighters  
were attacked with loss of 3 planes though clearly marked  
as planes of Red Army Air Force. In this connection see  
Deane's MX 21660 of 10 November copy of which was sent to  
Baker. It is desired that such immediate report be followed  
by a complete investigation and report of all facts bearing  
on this incident to include recommendations pertinent thereto  
and reasons why this incident was not previously reported  
by your Headquarters.

ORIGINATOR: Gen Hull

End

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy  
Gen Arnold  
Gen Bissell  
Adm King  
Gen Handy  
C of S

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 20 1974

CM-OUT 60574 (10 Nov 44) 1741Z khc

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94



WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Joint Chiefs of Staff  
77500

10 November, 1944

U. S. Military Mission,  
Moscow, Russia.

Number: WAR 60623

to Deane Moscow from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Please deliver the following to the Red General Staff, reference incident reported in your MX 21660 of 10 November:

"The United States Chiefs of Staff have received from General Deane your report of the incident of 7 November in Yugoslavia and express their deep regret. Immediate investigation is being made and appropriate action will follow. You will be informed of the results of the investigation and the measures being taken to prevent a recurrence."

This is an interim action. Copies of messages directing the investigation and results of such investigation will be transmitted to you. Your message was the first information we have received of this incident. You will be informed of the measures being taken to prevent recurrence as well as further instructions regarding establishment of liaison between the field forces.

End.

ORIGINATOR : GEN MCFARLAND (JC/S)

INFORMATION: ADM LEAHY  
GEN ARNOLD  
GEN HULL  
GEN BISSELL  
ADM KING  
C OF S

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHF, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

CM-OUT-60623 (10 Nov 44) 1905Z mce

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

## NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALUSNA MOSCOW</u>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		CNO	PRIORITY
DATE <u>11 NOVEMBER 1944</u>	FOR ACTION		ROUTINE
TOR CODEROM <u>0233</u>			DEFERRED
DECODED BY <u>MELTON</u>	FOR INFORMATION		PRIORITY
TYPED BY <u>BROOK Miller</u>			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY <u>PARMENTER</u>			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
PAGE 1 OF 2			<input type="checkbox"/>
101410Z			
NCR 8847			
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

VLADIVOSTOK SAYS "FURTHER INFO. IT IS ASSUMED THAT SOVIET COMMISSION IN REMOVING ARMAMENT PROBABLY  
DAMAGED CERTAIN INSTRUMENTS AND LOCAL SOVIETS BLAME US CREW FOR PRESENT CONDITION". UR 012210. THE FOR  
LOWING IS QUOTED FROM MY MOSCOW SECRET REPORT NR 2639 DATED ON 8 OCTOBER "ALL CLASSIFIED INFO WITH  
THE EXCEPTION OF RADAR WAS DESTROYED. WE TORE ALL CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS INTO SMALL BITS AND PUT THEM IN  
THE WHEEL WELL. WHEELS WERE LOWERED OVER THE BAY AND THE STUFF JUST FLEW LIKE SNOW. THE RUSSIANS WERE SORE  
AS HELL THAT WE HAD DESTROYED OUR STUFF THIS WAY. THIS REPORT WRITTEN BY ARMY OFFICER AFTER CONVERSATION  
AT TASHKENT WITH PILOT OF THE PLANE. SUBSEQUENT ATTEMPT BY INTERVIEWING OFFICER TO RECALL ALL DETAILS  
OF CONVERSATION RESULTS IN GENERAL IMPRESSION THAT PILOT SPOKE ONLY OF "CLASSIFIED INFORMATION DOCUMENTS  
AND STUFF" WITH THE EXCEPTION THAT HE NOW REMEMBERS THAT STATED IFF WAS DESTROYED. IN VIEW ROULLARDS 281300

**SECRET**DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) on (B)

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person.

(See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date

MAY 21 1973

OPRAY 19 17  
300 Russia

101410Z

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

OCTOBER AND HIS QUOTED OPINION IT APPEARS LIKELY THAT  
ONLY BOMB SIGHT AND IFF WERE DESTROYED AND AT LEAST NOT  
ENOUGH INSTRUMENTS TO ENDANGER FLYING OF PLANE BY SOVIETS.  
WE HAVE NO MEANS OF GETTING FURTHER INFO FROM INTERNEES  
UNTIL ANOTHER VISIT IS ALLOWED.

\*CODE GROUP MISSING

16...ACT

COMINCH...

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 9(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

Originator ALUSNA MOSCOW D/T Group 101410Z NCR 8847 Page 2 Of 2 Pages.


OPNAV-10-51  
AS4100

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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 IVI  
PRIORITY

From: HQ Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, Caserta, Italy  
To: War Department  
CG US Strategic Air Forces, Mobile, France  
Nr: MX 36696 10 November 1944  
To Arnold and Spaatz, Marle Le Roi, Deane, Moscow,  
Batjer Bucharest, and Twining from Esker MX 36696

Preliminary reports indicate that P-38 fighters of the Strategic Air Force on strafing mission in Yugoslavia 7 November became engaged Soviet fighters and possibly attacked Soviet columns.

First reports indicate possibility of navigational error on part of formation leader caused penetration too far to east. This being supplied for your information and no action is expected.

Investigation continues and will advise any additional information.

Believe 2 YAK fighters destroyed and 2 of MASAF fighters also missing from this engagement.

The YAK and P-38 fighters finally established mutual recognition, broke off engagement and flew formation with one another before proceeding to respective bases.

CM-IN-9840

(10 Nov 44)

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JCS LETTER 7-72  
BY DSS, DATE

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[REDACTED]  
PRIORITY

Page -2-

From: HQ Mediterranean Allied Air Force, Caserta, Italy  
Nr: MX 36696 10 November 1944

Believe every effort has been made to prevent such incidents by close liaison etc. and that present procedure is as near perfect as can be expected in the circumstances.

While not suggesting that this incident would have been avoided, would like to point out that Russians have not appreciated necessity for a bomb line clearly defined by prominent land marks and been most tardy in giving approval for liaison mission to work with Second Ukrainian Army.

Portion of USAAF element of the MAAF mission with the Army Headquarters is at present functioning there in its incomplete form and without official Russian permission.

In view of extremely fluid situation and desire to inflict maximum damage on fleeing enemy, many air elements are operating in restricted areas when weather permits and occasional incidents such as that reported are apt occasionally to occur.

End

ACTION: CG AAF

INFO : Adm Leahy, OPD, G-2, Adm King, C of S.

CM-IN-9840 (10 Nov 44) 2349Z m/m

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JCS LETTER, 7-5-72  
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WAR DEPARTMENT  
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**OUTGOING MESSAGE**

Office of the Commanding General, AAF 2766

10 November 1944

U.S. Military Mission  
Moscow, Russia

Commanding General  
Mediterranean Allied Air Forces  
Caserta, Italy

Commanding General  
Allied Force Headquarters  
Caserta, Italy

**DECLASSIFIED**

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (E)

OSD Letter, May 4, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

Number: WARX 60602

To Deane for Marshal Novikov, Chief Marshal Red Air Forces  
personal from Arnold.

Look up your cable MX 21660 November 10th from General Deane today informs me of advice to him regarding attack by aircraft of U.S. Army Air Forces on Red Army and Air Force elements in Yugoslavia on November 7th. I am sure you understand that such an affair could only have been the result of a most unfortunate mistake on the part of our units. Action is being initiated at once to determine the full facts and responsibility for such a mistake to assure prevention of any further incident of this nature. In the meantime I want to express to you my personal regret that USAAF flyers could have participated in any such mistaken attack on forces of our Ally, my sorrow over the resulting losses and my admiration of the described conduct of the Red Air Force flyers. It is my sincere hope that there may promptly be established a successful method of co-ordination of the effort of our Air Forces with the Red Army and Air Force in the area of your magnificent and successful operations which will assure prevention of any such incident in the future and the rendering of maximum assistance to your operations by our flyers.

End

AF 1458

ORIGINATOR: Gen Arnold  
INFORMATION: Adm Leahy; Gen Hull; Gen Bissell; Adm King; C of S  
CM-OUT-60602 (10 Nov 44) 1832Z ekk

TO: [REDACTED]

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

**SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**OUTGOING MESSAGE**

CG/AAF 2766

10 November 1944

Commanding General  
Allied Force Headquarters  
Caserta, Italy

Commanding General  
Mediterranean Allied Air Forces  
Caserta, Italy

Number: WARX 60626

For Eaker from Arnold.

Following cable was dispatched today to Deane:  
"Ten November from General Deane today informs me of advice to him regarding attack by aircraft of U S Army Air Forces on Red Army and Air Force elements in Yugoslavia on 7 November. (To Deane for Marshal Novikov, Chief Marshal Red Air Forces personal from Arnold) I am sure you understand that such an affair could only have been the result of a most unfortunate mistake on the part of our units. Action is being initiated at once to determine the full facts and responsibility for such a mistake to assure prevention of any further incident of this nature. In the meantime I want to express to you my personal regret that USAAF flyers could have participated in any such mistaken attack on forces of our ally, my sorrow over the resulting losses and my admiration of the described conduct of the Red Air Force flyers. It is my sincere hope that there may promptly be established a successful method of coordination of the effort of our Air Forces with the Red Army and Air Force in the area of your magnificent and successful operations which will assure prevention of any such incident in the future and the rendering of maximum assistance to your operations by our flyers." Specific instructions being cabled to theatre commander for immediate and thorough investigation. Desire you give me flash report of an interim investigation immediately.

End. AF 1469

ORIGINATOR : Gen Arnold

INFORMATION: JC/S, Adm Leshy, Gen Hull, Gen Bissell, Adm King,  
C of S

CM-OUT-60626

(10 Nov 44) 1912Z vh

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter 4-1873

DATE 4/2/94

DATE

MAY 21 1973

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24-75724

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

# DISPATCH

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA MURMANSK		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		CNO	PRIORITY
DATE 13 NOVEMBER 1944			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROM 131532			DEFERRED
DECODED BY ELY			BASEGRAM
PARAPHRASE BY BALDWIN	CHECKED BY FISHER	ALUSNA MOSCOW	PRIORITY
ROUTED BY BALDWIN	DITTOED BY FISHER		ROUTINE
			DEFERRED
			BASEGRAM
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
091510 NCR 1245			<input type="checkbox"/>

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT  
(INFO CNO MOSCOW)

INFORMED BY GENERAL NORWEGIAN MILITARY ATTACHE STEFFENS

260 NORWEGIANS SAILED TODAY FOR KIRKENES. MY 080735. GENERAL IS ADVISED BY SOVIETS ALL BUT 20 HOUSES IN KIRKENES

DESTROYED BUT 4,000 NORWEGIANS IN AREA WHO HAVE ORGANIZED PARTISAN FORCE OF 1,500 AND ASKED WEAPONS FROM SOVIETS WHICH

THEY REFUSED PENDING ARRIVAL NORWEGIAN AUTHORITIES. GENERAL SAYS PLANS DISCUSSED FOR CONVOY OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN

SUPPLIES FROM UK TO EITHER MURMANSK OR NORTH NORWEGIAN PORT. SAYS SOVIETS PLAN OCCUPATION NORTH AND SOUTH FINMARK BY 20

NOVEMBER AND NARVIK BY 1 JANUARY. SAYS NORWEGIAN CIVIL AUTHORITY RESTORED IN KIRKENES AND SOVIETS SO FAR MOST COOPERATIVE.

NCR ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION

16(1)....ACT

COMINCH(12-5)....20G(110)

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM

No. 4 SPECIAL

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OPNAV 19-78

091510

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

# TOP SECRET DISPATCH

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>ALUSNA MOSCOW</u>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		CNO	PRIORITY
DATE <u>10 NOVEMBER 1944</u>			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM <u>1020</u>			<b>ROUTINE</b>
DECODED BY			BASEGRAM
PARAPHRASED <u>HANSEN</u>	CHECKED		PRIORITY
BY <u>FISHER</u>	BY <u>FISHER</u>		ROUTINE
ROUTED BY <u>GLUNT</u>	BY <u>FISHER</u>		DEFERRED
			BASEGRAM

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091240\* NCR 7909

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP. (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

THIS REENCIPHERS ALUSNA MOSCOW'S 091240.\*

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM FEOL EL AS RESULT CONVERSATION WITH ADMIRAL GOLOVO:

MANY ENEMY AND RUSSIAN MINES SWEPT BY US BUILT SWEEPERS PETSAMO AND KIRKENES AREA. PETSAMO NOT BADLY DAMAGED BUT KIRKENES LEVELLED AND SOME CASUALTIES BY TIME BOMBS. NOR-VEGIANS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY BEING FURNISHED FOOD BY RUSSIANS BUT NOT GIVEN ARMS AS THEY REQUESTED. COMBINED SEA AND LAND OPERATIONS PLANNED FOR VARDØ IN WHICH BATTLESHIP ARCHANGEL MAY TAKE PART.

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (S)

OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS Date MAY 21 1973

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

**TOP SECRET**

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COPT No.

OPNAV 19-78 *For Russia* 091240

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

# TOP SECRET DISPATCH

DRAFTER		EXT.	ADDRESSEES		PRECEDENCE
FROM			ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE		1
RELEASED BY					PRIORITY 2
DATE					ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOM					DEFERRED 4
					BASEGRAM 5
DECODED BY					6
PARAPHRASED		CHECKED			PRIORITY 9
BY		BY			ROUTINE 10
ROUTED BY		DITTOED			DEFERRED 11
		BY		BASEGRAM 12	
				13	
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.					14
					IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
					<input type="checkbox"/>
PAGE 2 OF 2 091240* 7909					15
Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)					16

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\*RECEIVED AS 091840.

RECEIVED SECRET, RECLASSIFIED TOP SECRET ACCORDING TO CONTENT

NCR ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION.

16(#1).....ACT

COMINCH(#2-9)...(NAVAIDE(#10)....30(#11)....20G(#12)....

13(#13)....

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (R)

OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

10



# **TOP SECRET DISPATCH**

DRAFTER	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>ALUSNA MOURMANSK</b>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY <i>[Signature]</i>			PRIORITY
DATE <b>10 NOVEMBER 1944</b>			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM <b>1457</b>			DEFERRED
DECODED BY <b>KURTZ</b>			BASEGRAM
PARAPHRASED BY <b>FISHER</b>	CHECKED BY <b>FISHER</b>	CNO	PRIORITY
ROUTED BY <b>PIPP</b>	DITTOED BY <b>FISHER</b>	ALUSNA MOSCOW	ROUTINE
			DEFERRED
			BASEGRAM
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
<b>080735</b>			<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>NCR 8329</b>			
Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP			(Use G. C. T.)

(INFO CNO MOSCOW)

ARRIVED MOURMANSK 6 NOVEMBER BRITISH SHIPS EMPRESS OF AUSTRALIA AND SCYTHIA REPORTEDLY WITH TOTAL OF 10,000 SOVIET REPATRIATES. ALSO ON BRITISH MAN OF WAR, 260 NORWEGIAN TROOPS REPORTEDLY FIRST OF LARGER CONTINGENT FOR OPERATION NORTH NORWAY.

RECEIVED SECRET, RECLASSIFIED TOP SECRET ACCORDING TO CONTENT.

NCR ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION.

16(#1)....COG

COMINCH(#2-9)....20G(#10)....

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No. 2 FILE.

No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL.

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300 Russia  
OPNAV 19-78

080735

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

5

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED] UHR

From: US Military Attache Stockholm Sweden  
To: War Department  
Nr: 643 1 November 1944  
MILID Washington DC 643 rptd London.

Center gravity Red Army Finland shifted northward from Sall area to east of Ivalo lessening Finn concern expressed in my report number 2224. Russian Control Commission has halted further demobilization Finn Army. From 278 rated B 2.

Finn Army in north organized into two corps under Genl Tohquist. Sulasvuo commands First comprising Heiskanen and Hersalo Divisions plus four brigades now pushing north from Muonio. Second Corps led by Laatikainen consisting of Kuistio, Lagus, and Puroma Divs plus two brigades has passed Vuotso. Colonel Kuistio replaced Pajari as Div Commander, latter in arrest as war criminal in Tampere Hospital chronic but serious heart condition.

Finn communiques reliable.

Finn Milattache Stockholm relieved as of today. Replacement Colonel Vonessen has arrived.

Rayens

2224 not identified in WDCMC.  
ACTION: G-2

INFO : CG AAF, OPD, COL PARK, LOG

CM-IN-1370 (2 Nov 44) 0540Z mcs

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OSD Letter, 8-3-72

[REDACTED] MAY 20 1974

3 to Russia

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

# DISPATCH

DRAFTER <b>CAPT MCDILL</b> EXT. <b>3784</b>		ADDRESSEES		PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>COMINCH</b>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE		1
RELEASED BY <b>G M COOKE</b>		<b>CINCPAC</b>		PRIORITY 2
DATE <b>31 OCT 1944</b>				ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROM <b>2216/31</b>				DEFERRED 5
DECODED BY		<b>COMNORPAC COMFAIRWING 4 COMGEN 11TH AIR FORCE</b>		BASEGRAM 6
PARAPHRASED BY <b>ELY</b>	CHECKED BY <b>MCKEEL</b>			PRIORITY 9
ROUTED BY	DITTOED BY			ROUTINE 10
ROUTED BY <b>ELY</b>				DEFERRED 12
				BASEGRAM 13
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.				14
<b>1 OF 2 PAGES</b>		<b>312149</b>		IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW 15
		<b>NCR 47671</b>		16

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP

(Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS FROM THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.  
FIRST INFO ADDRESSEE PASS TO COMGEN 11TH AIR FORCE. TWO

COMMUNICATIONS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED FROM THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT  
REQUESTING THAT URGENT MEASURES BE TAKEN TO PUT AN END TO THE

VIOLATIONS BY AMERICAN PLANES OPERATING AGAINST KURILES OF THE  
SOVIET STATE BORDERS AND TERRITORIAL WATERS, INCLUDING ATTACKS

ON SOVIET SHIPPING, IN THE KAMCHATKA - KOMANDORSKIE REGION.  
THE SUBSTANCE OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN ONE OF THESE

REQUESTS, MADE THROUGH THE US MILITARY MISSION, MOSCOW, HAS  
ALREADY BEEN COMMUNICATED TO CINCPAC AND COMNORPAC (COMINCH

301550 NOT TO ALL REFERS). THE OTHER REQUEST, DATED 20 SEPTEMBER,  
WAS RECEIVED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT THROUGH THE SOVIET EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON. IN SUPPORT OF THESE REQUESTS THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT  
CITES 125 VIOLATIONS BETWEEN JANUARY AND AUGUST 1944, INCLUSIVE.

90 OF THESE ARE STATED TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE REGIONS OF  
THE KAMCHATKA PENINSULA AND KOMANDORSKIE ISLANDS. IN ONE WEEK,

14 - 21 SEPTEMBER, 13 AMERICAN PLANES ARE SAID TO HAVE VIOLATED  
THE SOVIET BORDER. IN ADDITION TO FLIGHTS OVER SOVIET TERRITORY,

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM

No. 4 SPECIAL

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OPNAV 19-78

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By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

# DISPATCH

EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
		PRIORITY 1
		ROUTINE 2
		DEFERRED 3
		BASEGRAM 4
		PRIORITY 5
		ROUTINE 6
		DEFERRED 7
		BASEGRAM 8
		PRIORITY 9
		ROUTINE 10
		DEFERRED 11
		BASEGRAM 12
		IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW 13
		<input type="checkbox"/> 14

2 OF 2 PAGES

312149

NCR 47671

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP

(Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

IT IS STATED THAT THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF INCIDENTS WHEN US PLANES HAVE DROPPED BOMBS ON KAMCHATKA OR IN SOVIET

TERRITORIAL WATERS. ONE INCIDENT IS CITED WHEN AN AMERICAN PLANE MACHINE - GUNNED A SOVIET PATROL VESSEL IN THE FIRST

KURILE STRAIT.

THE DIFFICULT CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH OPERATIONS AGAINST THE

THE KURILES ARE CARRIED OUT ARE FULLY APPRECIATED. HOWEVER, THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF DIRECT THAT THE COMMANDERS CONCERNED

IMMEDIATELY TAKE ALL PRACTICABLE ADDITIONAL MEASURES TO AVOID FURTHER VIOLATIONS OF THE KIND REFERRED TO.

COMINCH: COPIES 1 TO 6 INCLUSIVE.

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

SCR HAS DELIVERED TO NCR FOR FURTHER DISTRIBUTION TO SECRETARIAT, J.C.S.

No. 1 ADMIRAL.

No. 2 FILE.

No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL.

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COPT 80.

OPNAV 19-78

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Joint Chiefs of Staff

31 October 1944

U S Military Mission,  
Moscow, Russia

Number: WAR 55467

to Deane from Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Violation of Soviet state borders in Kamchatka and Komandorskie areas. Reference your M-21173, 28 September 1944, has also been raised by Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, through Soviet Embassy here, with State Department. Soviet Government repeats request for urgent action to prevent further violations, and State Department has requested advice of Joint Chiefs of Staff as to action taken by them, in order that reply can be made to the Soviet Government.

The alleged violations of the Soviet territory in the areas in question have not been possible of verification, but it is considered altogether likely that such violations may have occurred due to mistakes in the identification of target areas.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are replying to the State Department by pointing out the difficulties under which operations in the Kuriles are conducted, including bad weather conditions, which make visual identification of targets difficult and necessitate bombing by instruments; similarity of Kamchatka terrain and coast lines to those of northern Kuriles, which also contributes to mistaken identification; and the extreme distances which must be flown in these operations, requiring flights on course relatively close to Cape Lopatka. It is being suggested to State Department that it reply to Soviet Government by pointing out these difficulties and informing that government that all practicable measures will be taken to avoid violations by American planes of Soviet territory and

CM-OUT-55467 (1 Nov 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94



WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Number: WAR 55467

31 October 1944

Page 2

territorial waters. If you consider it necessary to reply to Soviet authorities, your reply should be along the lines indicated above and should be coordinated with the nature and timing of State Department's reply. To facilitate this, State Department is being requested to furnish Ambassador Harriman with the necessary information concerning its reply.

The Commander, North Pacific Areas, has advised that the following measures, if taken by the Soviet authorities, would assist U.S. pilots in respecting Russian territorial integrity:

a. Continuous operation of radio beacon on Cape Lopatka, now operated only when local visibility is poor.

b. Provision on Komandorskies of radio navigational aids.

c. Improvement in practice of Soviet ships with regard to answering challenges and showing prescribed identification markings.

If you consider it advisable, you are authorized to approach the appropriate Soviet authorities, after State Department's reply has been made to Soviet Government, with suggestion that such assistance be provided by them.

End.

ORIGINATOR : JC/S

INFORMATION: Adm. Leahy  
Gen. Arnold  
Gen. Hull  
Gen. Bissell  
Adm. King  
C of S

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

CM-OUT-55467 (1 Nov 44) 0157Z hy

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24-75724

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

## NAVAL MESSAGE

## NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
NAVAL ATTACHE RUSSIA		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		CNO	PRIORITY
DATE 29 OCT 1944			ROUTINE
TON CODER ROOM	291306		DEFERRED
DECODED BY ROGERS			PRIORITY
TYPED BY TILLERY/			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY PARMENTER			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
290903			NCR 6323
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT

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IN CONVERSATION WITH ALAFUZOV HE INFORMED ME THAT  
 PETSAMO AND KIRKENES LANDINGS WERE ACCOMPLISHED  
 MOSTLY WITH US BUILT SUBCHASERS HIGGINS AND VOSPER  
 BOATS AND SOVIETS WERE VERY PLEASED WITH THEIR PER-  
 FORMANCE.

## ACTION

F-0	
F-01	
F-02	
F-05	
F-07	
F-1	
F-2	
F-20	
F-3	
F-30	
F-31	
F-32	
F-33	
F-34	
FX01	
FX30	
FX37	
FX40	
IG-00	
VCND	

CLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 1973

By DBS

Date

MAY 21 1973

23.....ACTION

ADD NAVAIDE.....(PER CCWO)

COMINCH.....BUSHIPS....16....

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV IN-300 Russia

290903

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E.O. 12386, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED] - IVI

From: US Military Attache, London, England

To: War Department

No: 69553

28 October 1944

From Dunn sr nr 69553. To MILID, Washington, D.C.

Norwegian authorities inform us that large Norwegian military mission enroute northern Norway to join Russians. Preparations also being made send one Norwegian battalion from UK and three battalions recruited among evacuees elsewhere. These to be equipped by Russians. Details follow by letter.

Peabody

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 1, 1973

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

ACTION: G-2

INFO : CG AAF, OPD, Col Park, Log

CM-IN-26761 (28 Oct 44) 1555Z m/m

3 do Russia  
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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

## NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM AMERICAN CONSUL, VLADIVOSTOK		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		CNO	PRIORITY
DATE 28 OCT 44			ROUTINE
TOR CODER ROOM 1352			RRRRR
DECODED BY VER			DEFERRED
TYPED BY BOUCHARD		ALUSNA MOSCOW	PRIORITY
ROUTED BY ROLL			ROUTINE
			RRRRR
			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
280123 NCR 5353			<input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

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(FROM AMERICAN COUNCIL VLADIVOSTOK. ACTION CNO INFO ALUSNA MOSCOW)

B29 WHICH LANDED USSR 29 JULY STILL AT UGOLNAYA ABOUT 20 VISITING PARTIES FROM ARMY, NAVY AND CIVILIAN ORGANIZATIONS ALLOWED VIEW PLANE BUT REQUESTS FROM THIS OFFICE FOR SIMILAR PRIVILEGE REFUSED. SPECIAL SOVIET MILITARY COMMISSION FROM MOSCOW INSPECTED. REMOVED ALL ARMAMENT WHICH THEY TOOK MOSCOW. SOVIET AVIATORS HAVE FLOWN PLANE IN THE VICINITY AND ENTHUSIASTIC OVER PERFORMANCE BUT CURSE CREW FOR DESTROYING BOMB SIGHT AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS.

16....ACT

COMINCH..CNO..206..NAVAID..2008..13

**SECRET**

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State Dept.

Letter 1-11-72  
MAY 21 1973

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OPNAV 19-62

300 Russia 280123

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff

25 October 1944

U S Military Mission,  
Moscow, Russia

Commanding General,  
United Kingdom Base Section,  
London, England

Number: WARX 52122

Book message to Generals Daane and Burrows,  
repeated Central District United Kingdom Base Section  
London pass to British Chiefs of Staff from the Combined  
Chiefs of Staff.

The Scottish Command has been directed by SHAEF to dispatch  
by cruiser from the United Kingdom to Murmansk as soon as  
possible a token Norwegian Force comprising 230 personnel  
and 150 tons of stores for operations with the Russians  
in northern Norway.

Force accompanied by no United States or British liaison  
personnel. Since Petsamo is not possible, force will be  
dispatched to Murmansk where it will come under Russian  
command on arrival.

End.

ORIGINATOR : CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm. Leahy  
Gen. Arnold  
Gen. Hull  
Gen. Bissell  
Adm. King  
C of S

CM-OUT-52122 (25 Oct 44) 2208Z hy

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94



WAR DEPARTMENT  
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

*[Handwritten signature]*  
[REDACTED] - IVI  
URGENT  
*[Handwritten signature]*  
[REDACTED]

From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces  
Main, Versailles, France

To: War Department  
OG, United Kingdom Base Section, London, England

Nr: S 63873 SCAF 113 24 October 1944

S 63873 info Central District United Kingdom Base  
Section for British Chiefs of Staff to AGWAR for Combined  
Chiefs of Staff from SHAEF Main signed Eisenhower cite  
SHGCT TOP SECRET. This is SCAF number 113.

1. The following directive has been dispatched  
to SCOTCO: "In WX 50871, 23rd October, not to all addressees,  
the Combined Chiefs of Staff have directed the dispatch forth-  
with of a token Norwegian force for operation with the Russ-  
ians in northern Norway.

You will therefore execute your planned operation,  
previously approved for planning purposes by this Headquarters,  
for the dispatch of a Norwegian force by cruiser from the  
United Kingdom to Murmansk as soon as possible. This force  
will be comprised of about 230 personnel and 150 tons of  
stores and will come under Russian command on arrival Murman-  
sk. No United States or British liaison personnel will accom-  
pany the force."

2. It will be noted that the force will be dis-  
patched to Murmansk since Petsamo is not possible.

ACTION : Gen. McFarland(CC/S) End  
INFO : Adm. Leahy, Gen. Arnold, Gen. Hull, Gen. Bissell  
Adm. King, C. of S.  
CM-IN-23100 (24 Oct 44) 2358Z by

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

*J*  
**OUTGOING MESSAGE**

Combined Chiefs of Staff

23 October 1944

Supreme Headquarters,  
Allied Expeditionary Forces,  
Main Echelon,  
Versailles, France

Supreme Headquarters,  
Allied Expeditionary Forces  
Rear Echelon,  
London, England

Commanding General,  
United Kingdom Base Section,  
London, England

U S Military Mission,  
Moscow, Russia

Number: WARX 50871

TOPSEC Book Message to SHAEF Versailles for Eisenhower for action, to SHAEF London, Central District United Kingdom Base Section London pass to British Chiefs of Staff, and Generals Deane and Burrows for information, FACS 99 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

FACS 67 is the reference.

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have been informed that the Soviet government have now given approval to a proposal that a token Norwegian Force should operate with the Russians in northern Norway. The Russians have agreed, we are informed, to give all possible assistance to a token force of Norwegians to be sent to Petsamo for this purpose.

2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff consider that the Norwegian force should come under Russian command on arrival.

CM-OUT-50871 (23 Oct 44)

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**TOP  
SECRET**

Number: WARX 50871      23 October 1944      Page 2

3. In FACS 67 paragraph 2 the Combined Chiefs of Staff instructed you to make preparations for the situation which has now arisen. You should, therefore, arrange as a matter of urgency for the Norwegian force to be despatched forthwith to reach Petsamo in the next few days, and come under Russian command on arrival.

End .

ORIGINATOR : Gen. McFarland (CC/S)

INFORMATION: Adm. Leahy  
Gen. Arnold  
Gen. Hull  
Gen. Bissell  
Adm. King  
C of S

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CM-OUT-50871 (23 Oct 44) 2124Z hy

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

FROM	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
AMCON VLADIVOSTOK		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		CNO	PRIORITY
DATE	0132 22 OCT 1944		ROUTED RRRRR
FOR CODEROOM	0132		DEFERRED
DECODED BY	SAGER/SACHS		PRIORITY
TYPE	VOSBURGH	ALUSNA MOSCOW	ROUTED RRRRR
BY	<i>Smith</i>		DEFERRED
ROUTED BY	KLAFF		
210430		NCR 560	

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GCT

OR DISPATCHES DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ACTION CNO INFO MOSCOW.

ABOUT 6 TO 8 THOUSAND TONS HEAVY CARGO CONSISTING  
PRINCIPALLY MACHINE TOOL BASES AND OTHER HEAVY IN-  
DUSTRY SUPPLIES FROM USA WAS OBSERVED STOWED IN OPEN  
OUT OF WAY CORNERS 28 JULY 43 WHICH WAS FIRST AND  
ONLY TIME RED NAVY HAS PERMITTED ME VISIT VLAD PORT  
CARGO STORAGE AREA ALTHO ALLOWED WITHIN LIMITED AREA  
VICINITY ENTRANCE GATES AND CUSTOMS HOUSE ON SEVERAL  
OCCASIONS. TO DATE SUBJECT CARGO REMAINS IN SAME  
LOCATION UNTOUCHED AND HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED FROM VANTAGE  
POINTS ON HILLS OVERLOOKING AND OUTSIDE PORT. ABOUT  
2 THOUSAND TONS SIMILAR CARGO HAS LA \* SOHAM \*\*  
SIDE OF HARBOR SINCE 1 JAN THIS YEAR.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 1(D) or (B)

OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

16...ACT

\* 17 LETTERS OMITTED

\*\* 2 LETTERS OMITTED

COMINCH...20G...CNO...NAVAIDE...200P...

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300 Russia 210430

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

## NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
ALUSNA BEYOGLU		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
FROM		CNO	
RELEASED BY	20 OCT 1944		PRIORITY
DATE	2114/20		ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM	TIBBALS		DEFERRED
DECODED BY	MOORHEAD		PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY	ROLL		ROUTINE
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			
201310		NCR 9406	IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
			<input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

FROM LT COMDR EARLE TO NAVAL AID TO PRESIDENT.

WERNER POLISH PRESS ATTACHE HERE FIVE SEE FOLLOWING.  
SELIM SERPER NEW TURKISH AMBASSADOR TO RUSSIA TOLD HIM

THERE HAD BEEN NO RECENT RUSSIAN DEMANDS ON TURKEY.  
ALSO THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT INSTRUCTION OF HIS GOVERN-

MENT WAS BY EVERY MEANS POSSIBLE TO CONVINCE THE RUSSIAN  
GOVERNMENT THAT THE SOLE HOPE FOR A PEACEFUL AND PROSPEROUS

WORLD WAS COOPERATION BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN AND ANGLO-SAXON  
NATIONS. WERNER ALSO SAID THAT THE OFFICERS OF THE

POLISH UNDERGROUND ARMY FIGHTING AT LWOFF VILNA ETC  
WELCOMING THE ARRIVAL OF THE RUSSIAN ARMIES WERE EITHER

PROMPTLY SHOT OR DEPORTED BY RUSSIANS THE POLISH SOLDIERS  
WERE GIVEN CHOICE OF DEPORTATION OR FIGHTING UNDER POLISH

LIBERATION COMMITTEE.

DECLASSIFIED  
OSD Letter, 6-3-72  
MAY 20 1974

16.....ACT

NAVAIDE....COMINCH....CNO....200....200P....13....

ACTION		
F-0		22
F-01		23
F-02		24
F-05		25
F-07		26
F-1		27
F-2		28
F-20		29
F-3		30
F-30		31
F-31		32
F-32		33
F-33		34
F-34		35
F-4		36
FX01		37
FX30		38
FX37		39
FX40		40
IG-00		41
VCNO		42

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OPNAV 19-61 201310

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94



## NAVAL MESSAGE

## NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRIORITY
FROM	AMERICAN CONSUL VLADIVOSTOK	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	RRRRRR
RELEASED BY		CNO COM 10TH FLT C&R	DEFERRED
DATE	19 OCT 1944		
TOW CODEWORD	1948/18		
DECODED BY	GEORGION	ALUSNA MOSCOW	RRRRR
TYPED BY	SMITH/Arnold		DEFERRED
ROUTED BY	READY		

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

IF OPERATIONAL  
CHECK, BELOW

180900

NCR 7439

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

DATE

TIME

GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ACTION CNO AND COM 10TH FLT C&R INFO MOSCOW FROM  
AMERICAN CONSUL VLADIVOSTOK.

WEEKLY SHIPPING NEWSPAPER MORSKOIFLOT CONTINUES  
CRITICIZE VLAD PORT IN LATEST ISSUE SIGHTING  
POOR ORGANIZATION OF LABOR BRIGADES AND IM-  
PROPER UTILIZATION STEVEDORES WORKING TIME IM-  
PLYING NO LABOR SHORTAGE. MY 270215 SEPT. FOR  
TRADE VICE COMMISSAR KUZMIN DEPARTED 16TH FOR  
MOSCOW AFTER SPENDING 2 MONTHS INVESTIGATING AND  
REORGANIZING FAR EAST SOVIET SHIPPING. CROWDED  
PORT CONDITIONS UNCHANGED.

16.....ACT  
COMINCH....CNO....20G....FX37.....NAVAIDE...200P...

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3 00 Russia 180900 By \_\_\_\_\_ Date MAY 21 1973

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~ "UHR"

From: US Military Attache, Ankara, Turkey

To: War Department 462  
CG, US Army Forces in Middle East, Cairo, Egypt 1135

17 October 1944

Number MILID 462 AMSME 1135

Apparently Russians have not used Bulgarian Communists to any great extent as channel for disseminating propaganda. Even have restrained Bulgar Communists from excessive actions. So far Russian conduct in Bulgaria seems generally consistent with theory of our Ambassador what Russians will insist in very left wing government but will not upset social system by insisting on communist revolution.

Turk intelligence still believes however that Russians are merely concealing intentions to Bolshevize Balkans and say if Russians worked openly or through Bulgarian Communists that their motives would be revealed to all. Believe Russians may seek to work through Zveno Group which has strategic position in Bulgar politics.

Bulgar Government control outside Sofia is limited. Militia controls large part of country. Government continuance believed depend somewhat on harshness or leniency of Allied terms. Appears only mildly revolutionary.

ACTION: G-2

INFO : CG AAF

OPD

Col Park

C of S

End

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 5(E) and 5(D) or (G)

OSD letter, May 4, 1978

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

CM-IN-16669

(18 Oct 44)

0701Z

ejm

300 Russian

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

## NAVAL MESSAGE

## NAVY DEPARTMENT

CHAPTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY	ALUSNA MOSCOW		2
DATE	160930Z 16 OCT 1944		3
TOR CODE ROOM	1449	CNO	4
DECODED BY	HANSEN		5
PARAPHRASED BY	ARNOLD		6
ROUTED BY	READY		7
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS MESSAGE IS TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			8
IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW			9
<input type="checkbox"/>			10
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: 160930Z			11
DATE			12
TIME			13
GCT			14

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

SOVIET CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF MADE DEFINITE STATEMENT  
 THAT RUSSIANS CAPTURED NO GERMAN MERCHANT SHIPPING  
 IN BULGARIAN PORTS AND THAT LOCAL INHABITANTS REPORT  
 FOLLOWING GERMAN SHIPS SCUTTLED BUT INFO NOT VERIFIED:  
 3 SUBS, 16 MINESWEEPERS, 2 MERCHANT SHIPS, 4 MOTOR  
 BOATS, 12 BARGES, 9 OTHER CRAFT.

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 6(D) or (H)

OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date

16....ACT

COMINCH....200....CNO....NAYAIDE....200P....

**SECRET**

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OPNAV 10-67

200 Russia 160930Z

F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-07	26
F-1	27
F-2	28
F-20	29
F-3	30
F-30	31
F-31	32
F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
FX01	37
FX30	38
FX37	39
FX40	40
IG-00	41
VCNO	42

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72  
By ABJ Date MAY 21 1973

POLITICAL BRANCH

Project No. 50

14 October 1944.

POLITICAL ESTIMATE OF THE U.S.S.R., 6 OCTOBER TO 12 OCTOBER, INCLUSIVE.

1. Domestic Affairs.

a. USSR Prepares for Reconversion to Peace Economy.

Several foreign correspondents report from Moscow that the Soviets are already planning many phases of the transition from war to peace. According to one observer, "the war is very far from Moscow. More than ever in wartime, attention is being given to the rear, to reconstruction, to industrial problems, to questions like education and the training of skilled labor. Meetings of youth, farm, and factory organizations to discuss these matters make one realize how unstandardized the Russian mind really is, how much their people do their own thinking." (1) Another correspondent declares that "the process of reconversion is closely linked with that of reconstruction", and such a synthesis is to be expected in a country where so much industrial equipment has been smashed or worn out. An architects' committee, directly responsible to the Council of People's Commissars, has been charged with replanning the wrecked cities. There has been a slight let-up in working hours due to the recent government decree forbidding overtime and establishing night schools for working youth in factories and on farms. (2) It is also reported from Moscow that the Peoples Commissariat of Electric Stations has recreated a special body known as "Dniprostroel" for the purpose of rebuilding the famous Dniester dam and power station, blown up in August 1941 to prevent its falling intact into the hands of

300 Russia

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(Domestic Affairs cont'd)

the Germans. (3) This report is confirmed by an announcement from the General Electric Company that it will manufacture nine giant generators for the project. (4)

b. Mass Political Work in Liberated Areas.

The economic efforts described above have their counterpart in the domestic political sphere, especially in the liberated areas. Here, according to the *PRAVDA* editorial of 7 October, "particular attention should be paid to the question of implanting in the population a socialist attitude towards labor and public property, strengthening state discipline, and overcoming the private-property, anti-collective-farm, and anti-state tendencies planted by the German occupants". The editorial says this type of political work "is a most important requisite for the successful mobilization of the toilers for the restoration of the economic system", and is of equal importance with the rebuilding of industrial and agricultural enterprises. (5) This is the clearest Soviet admission to date that the capitalist way of life has had an effect upon their citizens in occupied areas. That such effect will be stamped out is clearly implied.

c. Frontier Guards Again on Western Border.

Lt. General Stakhonov, head of the Central Administration of Frontier Guards of the Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) said in an interview granted a *RED STAR* correspondent that his organization has once again taken up the task of guarding the western frontier. (6) This confirms the fact that the NKVD has followed the Red Army into the liberated territory.

d. Church Support of War.

The Metropolitan Nikolai, member of the Holy Synod of the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



SECRET

(Baltic Affairs cont'd)

Russian Orthodox Church who is now administering the Moscow diocese, has written an article on the position of his church in the USSR and its support of the Fatherland War. The article was broadcast in the Greek language. (7)

c. New Commissariat Established in Byelorussia.

A decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Byelorussian SSR has created the republican Peoples Commissariat of House and Civil Construction, according to an announcement from Minsk. (8)

2. Baltic Affairs.

a. Soviet Appeal to Estonian Soldiers in German Army.

On 14 September, the Leningrad Radio broadcast to Estonian soldiers in the German Army a speech containing this statement: "You are not members of the SS. We know that this name has been forced upon you; therefore, we promise to spare your lives, irrespective of the units in which the Germans have forced you to fight, provided you surrender voluntarily to the Red Army". (9)

b. Collectivization to be Optional in Estonia.

Arnold Viemer, former Vice-chairman and now Chairman of the Council of Peoples Commissars of the Estonian SSR, says the issue of collectivization of agriculture in his republic will be <sup>up</sup> to the will of the citizenry, although the Communist Party will carry on a press and radio "education" program for its establishment. Viemer also said that small enterprises of less than 10 employees will remain in private hands, and that a farmer may employ as many persons and have as many cows as he wishes,

- 3 -

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(Malice Affairs cont'd)

although his land holdings will be restricted to about 75 acres. Wisner did not indicate how the Latvians would express their views on the collectivization question, nor did he comment upon the system to be installed in the other Malice States. (10)

e. Nazi Murder Camp Discovered in Latvia.

At Elga, eighteen miles from Tallin, the Russians have found a German labor camp where it is said 3,000 Jews, Russians and Latvians were killed in a few days last month. The Germans are alleged to have shot, burned and beaten their victims rather than allow them to fall into the hands of the advancing Red Army. (11)

d. Behavior of Soviets in Estonia.

The U.S. Military Attache in Stockholm reports that the actions of the Red Army in Estonia are above reproach, but that Communist Party officials deport people to the USSR and force them into labor camps where they eventually disappear. The Military Attache says that over 20,000 Estonian refugees have come to Sweden, where they await the return of their country to independent status. (12)

e. Germans Mobilize More Latvians.

By order of the Police General, all male Latvians born between 1900 and 1905 were to report by 11 October for military service in building railroads. Certain occupational exceptions are allowed, and families may accompany the laborers. (13) In addition, the Germans are encouraging Latvians to go to Germany by ship, and are promising jobs to those who accept. The tone of the announcements imply that few persons so far have accepted the invitation. (14)

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(Baltic Affairs cont'd)

f. Alleged Lithuanian Resistance to NKVD.

According to an unconfirmed report of a Lithuanian author now residing in Stockholm, Lithuanian troops under the command of the Defense Committee are making armed resistance against the German SS and Gestapo on the one hand and against the NKVD on the other. No resistance is made against the Red Army. The author accuses the Soviets of having executed a bishop, and says that the Lithuanian clergy, upon request from the Vatican, are remaining at their posts. (15)

g. Scandinavian Affairs.

a. Finland.

Soviet personnel of the Allied Control Commission are arriving in all major Finnish ports, and, according to Mallet, British Minister in Stockholm, the British Control Commission group will soon reach Finland. (16) There are at present 112 officials on the Soviet Control Commission in Helsinki and they are in complete charge of communications and Foreign Office activities. (17) Colonel General Zhdanov, chairman of the Control Commission, came to Helsinki on 5 October. (18) It is reported that he has already met with President Mannerheim, Premier Castren and Foreign Minister Backell. (19, 20)

The Soviet delegation to the mixed Soviet-Finnish Commission for the demarcation of the border of the Porkkala area arrived in Finland on 4 October and held its first meeting with the Finnish delegation on 5 October. Admiral Alexandrov, the Soviet Control Commission's naval expert who took part in the armistice negotiations, heads the Soviet delegation. (21)

SECRET

(Scandinavian Affairs cont'd)

Yeliseyev, of the Stockholm Soviet Legation, left for Finland on 29 September to serve as chief assistant of Orlov, political adviser to the Soviet Control Commission. Prior to the winter war, Yeliseyev spent some time in Finland, and has worked in USSR with Orlov. He is familiar with the Finnish situation and has always expressed a friendliness toward the Finnish people. Yeliseyev was concerned regarding pro-Nazi Finns who have fled to Sweden, and presumed that demands for their return will be made of the Swedish Government. (See Sweden, paragraph 3 b.) He included as war criminals, people responsible for the anti-Soviet and pro-Nazi policy which was formerly adhered to in Finland, as well as persons directly to blame for acts of crime, such as mistreatment of prisoners. (War criminal lists, composed of political, military and civilian leaders, are reported to have been made up.) (22) Yeliseyev expects that Finnish refugees now reaching Sweden will combine with some Swedish circles in an effort to throw suspicion on everything done in Finland by the Soviets and to sabotage any betterment in Soviet-Finnish relations. (23)

The Soviets have modified the armistice to permit the Finns to use their air force, and have waived the armistice clause obliging the Finns to demobilize within two and one-half months. The Soviets have not interfered with the Finnish campaign against the Germans, although they have observers attached to the Finnish Army. The Soviet Control Commission has also given the Finns permission to use Finnish ships now interned in Swedish harbors for transporting food supplies from Sweden to Finland. (24, 25)

According to information received from the Finnish Military

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(Scandinavian Affairs cont'd)

Attache in Lisbon, based on messages from the Finnish Chief of Staff, Soviet Commission officials are beyond reproach in their behavior and their treatment of the Finnish population. (26)

b. Sweden

In connection with the flight of some pro-Nazi firms to Sweden, an unconfirmed report from Finnish sources in Stockholm states that a list of 30 names has been submitted to the Helsinki Swedish Legation, asking that refuge be refused to them. (27)

The Soviets have rescinded their objection to Swedish donations of clothing to Russian war prisoners in Finland, and shipments are now being sent with all speed. (28)

According to an agreement between USSR, Sweden and Finland, ten Soviet Marine officers who had been interned in Sweden are leaving there for the USSR via Finland. Under this same agreement, approximately 700 to 800 other Soviets, now interned in Sweden, are also being returned to USSR via Finland. (See Weekly Political Estimate, 23 September 1944, para. 3 b.) The Swedes maintain that these men are not military prisoners. (29)

h. Polish Affairs.

a. The Lublin Government.

POLPRESS, the Lublin Government's news agency, and the London Government press have continued their mutual accusations during the week, still largely concentrating on the Komorowski appointment and the question of responsibility for the Warsaw debacle. POLPRESS, echoing Soviet press, characterized the appointment as "nothing but a changing of



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(Polish Affairs cont'd)

the guard which smelted of provocation against the Polish people". (30)  
The London Government was in the position of being almost pleased that Komorowski was captured, since his capture gave the lie to Lublin's and Moscow's charges that Komorowski was absent from Warsaw during the entire rising. (31)

The Lublin Government is engaged in further consolidation of its position in Poland. TASS announced on 5 October the measures towards rehabilitation of the national economy and democratization of political life. The Polish Committee of National Liberation has been organized to govern according to basic principles of the 1921 Constitution. Peasants have been declared free to trade their produce after state quotas have been delivered. Organisation of consumption distribution has begun; banks are opening and schools have started functioning in the liberated areas. (32)

The Polish Committee of National Liberation has also taken upon itself the definition of New Poland's "duty to the New Europe". This consists of maintenance in Polish lands of the Pomorze bridgehead and annexation of east German territories to the Oder River line. All German males would be deported from this area and possibly used for reconstruction work in Poland and USSR. (33)

b. The London Government.

The Government-in-exile at the beginning of this week decided to halt its policy of conciliation towards Moscow and wait for Moscow to make the next move. Aware that its case has become a dangerous factor in Anglo-American-Soviet relations, the cabinet has apparently decided to

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(Polish Affairs cont'd)

unofficially suppress all news of its internal bickering and leave its affairs in the hands of the British and the Americans. Since the latter has become increasingly the case, there has been noted more reluctance on the part of cabinet members to go as far as Premier Mikolajczyk is willing to go in dealing with the Soviet-supported Polish Committee of National Liberation. This reluctance crystallized when General Gembkowski's ouster and General Komorowski's appointment in response to Soviet pressure were received in Moscow and Lublin with attacks on Komorowski as a "criminal" and <sup>on</sup> the appointment as an "act of madness". (34)

c. International Attitudes.

The visit of Prime Minister Churchill to Moscow this week may remove this stalemate. The United Kingdom and the United States, faced with the alternatives of sacrificing the London Government which they supported for so long, or of putting increased pressure upon Moscow to compromise with the London Poles, show signs of choosing the latter. What may be the final showdown conference between the Government-in-exile and the Polish Committee of National Liberation is now underway in Moscow. Premier Mikolajczyk arrived in Moscow on 12 October accompanied by Foreign Minister Romer and Professor Grabki, Polish ethnographical expert, and General Tabor, the only Polish high ranking officer to go to the USSR since Polish-Soviet diplomatic break. (35, 36)

It is difficult to predict what the Moscow discussions of the Polish question will produce. To judge from the Soviet press for lack of official statements on the subject, the USSR seems firmly and exclusively behind the Polish Committee of National Liberation. Gembkowski in his

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SECRET

(Polish Affairs cont'd)

interview with Ambassador Harriman last week appeared as determined as ever to treat with the London Poles on his own terms. He claims wide support for the Polish Committee of National Liberation in liberated Poland, blaming all disorder, assassinations, etc. on terrorism directed by adherents of the reactionaries of the London clique. (37)

British policy re the Polish question would seem to be clearer cut than that of the U.S. There is no available evidence that the State Department has as yet given Ambassador Harriman any instructions concerning Osobka-Morawski's request that a Polish Committee of National Liberation member be permitted to visit the United States to discuss reconstruction with Polish groups and experts here. (38) President Roosevelt in a conference on 11 October with leaders of various Polish-American organizations stated that world opinion would back the Allied objective of reconstituting a strong Polish nation, but he did not discuss the boundary and governmental jurisdiction questions. (39) Also, the U.S. has not officially recognized the reliability of the report that the "Kosciusko Radio" (Soviet-controlled) broadcast an order to the Warsaw Underground to rise on 31 July 1944. (40)

UNRRA is faced with a difficult decision on relief for Poland. Both the Anglo-American sponsored London Government and the Soviet-sponsored Committee of National Liberation have made application for UNRRA aid. The problem is delaying immediate action, but it is believed that relief will be distributed to Polish war victims through a Red Army organization to be

- 10 -

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SECRET

(Polish Affairs cont'd)

utilised in the same way that it is planned to utilise the Allied Command in Western Europe. Information from Moscow and Lublin indicates the desperate need for relief in liberated Poland. The Soviet Press, on 2 October, took advantage of this situation, pointing out that relief has been given to date by only one of Poland's Allies, the USSR. UNRRA's dilemma is aggravated by the suspicion that any supplies given to Poland via the USSR may be exploited for Soviet political purposes. (41, 42)

5. Relations with the Allies and United Nations.

a. Soviet Reactions to Joint Declaration of Dumbarton Oaks Conference.

On 30 September the Soviet press published the text of the joint Anglo-Soviet-American communique which promised an early declaration on the achievements of the Conference. No comment was carried other than the statement that the communique was issued by the heads of the three delegations. (43)

The actual joint declaration received much fuller attention in Moscow. IZVESTIA and PRAVDA devoted editorials to the subject on 10 and 11 October, respectively, and Soviet Home Service broadcast both articles on the radio. Neither editorial went far beyond consideration of the proposed International Security Organisation, which topic has all along been of paramount interest to the USSR, a preoccupation which threatened at one time to wreck the entire conference. PRAVDA expressed approval of the fact that the proposals

"consist not so much in defining the aims and tasks of the future international organisation (as a whole) as in solving the problem of its leading organ (the Security Council)... In the light of

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historic lessons, it becomes clear how important it is to establish a principle... according to which the adoption of any decision by the Security Council must presuppose the agreement of all its permanent members (the USSR, the United States, Great Britain, the Chinese Republic, and -- later -- France). Agreement among the principal peace-loving powers is the only reliable basis on which an International Security Organization can and must be constructed, and the statutes of the Security Council must set down the principle of accord and unanimity among these powers as a compulsory condition for the settlement of any problem arising before the Security Council. This principle must permit no exceptions, no excuses". (kk)

INVESTIA approached the problem from the historical viewpoint, recalling the great struggles in this war, the resultant determination of the peoples to prevent its repetition, the early steps toward world peace taken at the Moscow and Tehran three-power conferences, and the grave mistake of the League of Nations in failing to establish "a stable agreement and collective action of the leading peace-loving powers". The editorial then points out the lesson to be derived from this failure: "Only a complete accord of action of the part of the leading world powers, based on mutual confidence and a desire for close cooperation, can serve as a stable guarantee of the international security of large and small states". Thus the official Government organ contains many of the points covered in the presentation of the Party paper, but the former goes on to speak of other measures essential to the establishment and preservation of world peace:

"It is quite understandable that the Security Council will be able to fulfil this role only if certain conditions are present... A decisive role can belong only to those states which have at their disposal sufficiently tangible methods to wage a struggle... that is, strong armies, considerable material and technical resources, and (the ability) to act harmoniously and unanimously... It is not for nothing that in the Security Council itself permanent seats are assigned to the leading world powers, taking on themselves the entire basic burden of the struggle with the aggressors and the main responsibility

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for the success of this cause... A system of dealing with problems must be established by the Security Council, under which the Council can adopt no measure without the agreement of all its permanent members".

The editorial closes with a clear enunciation of Soviet interest in international affairs: "The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is invariably determined not only by the interests of its own security, but also by the struggle to check the aggressor threatening the security of all other peace-loving peoples, large and small." (45)

It is thought by some officials in Washington that the USSR won a major point at the Conference by insisting upon the insertion of the clause requiring the United Nations to keep certain air force contingents immediately available for combined international enforcement action, even though the original Soviet demand was for an outright international air force. (46) There is no doubt that the USSR delegation wielded much power at the Conference, particularly in regard to the character and powers of the Security Council, and there is reason to believe that the Soviet insistence upon unanimity in the Council as a prerequisite to action will finally prevail.

b. Churchill-Stalin Conferences in Moscow.

On 9 October Churchill and Eden, accompanied by high British officials, arrived in Moscow for conferences with the heads of the Soviet Government. From Churchill's first words at the airport, where he paid tribute to the Red Army and asked the Russians to judge the contribution of Anglo-American might, the visit got off to an auspicious start. The

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Vladimirov immediately went into conference with Stalin and Molotov, who were joined later by Vyshinski. The next two days witnessed a degree of hospitality never before accorded a foreign representative. On 10 October Stalin entertained at Luncheon in Spirtonovna House (social headquarters of the Foreign Office), Molotov gave a cocktail party on 11 October to which came many Soviets, Allied and neutral dignitaries, and the same night Churchill tendered a full state dinner at the British Embassy. Stalin's presence at this affair represented his first appearance at a foreign embassy, and constituted a signal honor to the Prime Minister.

Stalin so far has given three informal speeches to the British delegation and other guests. He spoke twice at his Luncheon party, first emphasizing the need for cooperation in the interests of international security, and later expressing appreciation for the assistance given his country by the United States and Britain, especially praising the factors of military might, U.S. material aid, Anglo-American planning, and the work of the secretariat marine of both countries. In addition, he spoke of the achievements of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, particularly in regard to international security, and commended Secretary of State Hull. Both Churchill and U.S. Ambassador Harriman (who is attending some of the conferences but taking no active part) rose to thank Stalin for his compliments.

It was during the dinner at the British Embassy, however, that the Soviet Premier commented most generously upon the Allied role in the present conflict. Perhaps stimulated by Churchill's remarks at the airport, Stalin declared that both Britain and Russia had played great

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parts in the coming victory, but that it was the stupendous production and organizing ability of the U.S. which had turned the tide. Although Stalin and Churchill sat side by side and conversed long and earnestly, when the time came for toasts Stalin offered only two — the first to President Roosevelt and the second to the United States. It is significant that, at a dinner given by the British in the British Embassy, Stalin should have given major credit and most attention to the United States.

Subsequent conferences to be held this week will consider the Polish question (see page 9) and other problems perplexing the Allies and the USSR. (47)

c. Soviets Considering Education Proposal.

Andrei A. Vyshinski, Soviet Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs, has acknowledged receipt from Ambassador Harriman of the tentative draft proposing a United Nations Organisation for Educational and Cultural Reconstruction. Vyshinski promises to reply after he has studied the question. (48)

d. Soviets Again Refuse U.S. Air Transport from Sweden.

Both recent attempts on the part of the U.S. Government to have our Air Transport Command carry Soviet-owned Swedish ball bearings direct from Stockholm to Moscow have been turned down by the Soviet Government. The alternative suggested by the latter — that we take the bearings to London and send them on to the USSR by ship — has been refused by the U.S. Government. (See Weekly Political Estimates for 2 September page 16 and 7 October page 15.) (49)

e. Beaverbrook Paper Forecasts U.S. Bases in USSR.

The DAILY NEWS, in a special despatch from Washington,

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(Relations with the Allies and United Nations cont'd)

said on 10 October that Marshal Stalin had pledged to a high-ranking American official the use of Siberian bases as soon as war ends in Europe, although Russia will take no other active part against Japan. (50) The statement is given authority in that Lord Beaverbrook, recently decorated by the USSR for his contributions to British-Soviet relations, is Minister of Information as well as publisher of the *Express*, and thus would hardly allow a statement to be printed in his own paper unless the British Government desired it to appear.

f. Captured Red Army Men May be Returned to Soviets.

The Allied Armies on the western front have captured a number of Red Army men who have been compelled to serve with the German forces. The Soviets have requested the return of these men to the Red Army, and the British Foreign Office has ruled that such surrender would not violate the terms of the Geneva Convention. (51)

g. Soviet Radio Comment on Relations with Allies.

Referring to last week's awards to Lord Beaverbrook and Oliver Lyttleton (see Weekly Political Estimate of 7 October, page 14), the commentator Mikhail Mikhailov spoke of the firm friendship which has existed between Britain and the USSR since 1941. He also pointed out how the Tehran Conference laid the groundwork for the recent military successes in Europe, and closed with the following declaration: "The Allies are marching towards victory and the creation of a firm peace of security. Their friendship, tried and tested in the years of the common war against the common foe is unshakable, and every day brings fresh proof of the strengthening of their

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(Relations with the Allies and United Nations cont'd)  
fighting collaboration." (52)

h. re Germany.

The Russian Army newspaper RED STAR, charging that certain American and British interests plan to revive their pre-war cartel agreements with German industry, said on 11 October that Allied military victory must be followed by the economic disarmament of Germany and the destruction of the international cartel system. Unnamed American and British "internationalists" were accused of originating most of the "soft peace" feelers. These groups are responsible, according to RED STAR, for what the paper calls a mushroom growth of new factories recently established in Switzerland, Sweden, Spain and Portugal as a basis for postwar revival of the German cartels. (53)

A dispatch from a Swiss correspondent in Weissensee, Germany reports that German girls are paying high prices and risking the death penalty in order to marry Russian workers in hopes that such marriages will enable them to escape reprisals for Nazi activities should the Soviet Armies enter the country. The correspondent witnessed such a wedding, held in secret, between a girl "of good bourgeois family" and a Russian "half dead with hunger". The priest was paid 2,000 M. and the husband 4,000. (54)

i. re Rumania.

The Soviet Government has no objections to an increase in the number of U.S. representatives to the Control Commission in Rumania, provided an agreement as to the extent of the increase is reached with the Chairman of the Commission. (55)

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It is expected that Major General Vasilov will head the Commission. Relations between the Russians and the British Liaison officers is cordial, efficient and friendly. (56)

j. re Bulgaria.

It was reported to General Wilson that in Sofia, the Soviet attitude towards Bulgarians seemed cool and that apparently all Soviet forces now in Bulgaria are in the northwest. Wilson believes that the Russians hope to reach the railroad between Salomika and Belgrade soon and that it is reasonable for the Russians to insist that units of the Bulgarian Army remain in Thrace to protect the Soviet left flank.

It is reported that Molotov told the British Ambassador in Moscow that the Red Army would not cross the Greek frontier, a credible statement, since if the Red Army does not enter Greece, Bulgar troops under Marshal Tolbukhin can still work in the Soviet interest. (Bulgarian Colonel Radev in Thrace, placing British Liaison Mission under House arrest, reportedly stated that he acted upon orders. Orders presumably came from Marshal Tolbukhin.) The British Liaison Officer in Sofia states that failing swift British action, the Greek Communists and the Bulgarians working in close collaboration will demand an autonomous Communist state of Macedonia. (57, 58)

k. re Yugoslavia.

Further indication of Tito's independence from the British is found in a report that he probably has joined General Popovich and General Gerasimov of the Soviet Mission, who were scheduled to leave on 5 October for

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(Relations with the Allies and United Nations cont'd)

an unknown destination to discuss relations between the Partisans and the USSR. (59) General Popovich is Partisan Commander in East Serbia to whom the Russian Mission under General Gersikov is apparently attached. British policy of surrounding Tito with advisors in order to hold him captive has apparently failed. Tito's present whereabouts are unknown. It is rumored that he is in Moscow. (60) Brigadier Molson missed no words regarding British jealousy over recent difficulties in Anglo-Partisan relations. He wondered whether the Partisans would care to terminate all their relations between the two countries. (61)

1. re Iran.

The Iranian Government has decided to postpone negotiations for oil concessions until after the war. The Prime Minister has expressed the hope that the U.S. will not be irritated by this action. The press comments that this ruling came at the time when the "northern ally" (Russia) had sent representatives to discuss exploitation of oil and other minerals in northern Iran to the exclusion of other foreigners. (62)

6. Other Foreign Relations.

a. With U.S.A.

In striking contrast to the publication of the complete text of President Roosevelt's first campaign speech, the Soviet press handled the second in a very brief manner. Omitted were the praise of our aid to the Allies, of our military effort and war production, and of all references to Communism as a foreign ideology. The pledge of cooperation with the Allies to keep the peace, using force if necessary, was rendered briefly as an appeal for the collaboration of all the Allies in setting up a firm peace.

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(Other Foreign Relations omitted)

Statements made by the President concerning the present alliance with the Soviet people and his hope for an alliance after the war were so reported as to give the impression that Roosevelt assumed that a postwar alliance was taken for granted by the American people. (65)

On 5 October the Moscow press described plans made by the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship for celebrating the eleventh anniversary of Soviet-U.S. diplomatic relations. The item omitted KAVDA's most prominent foreign news story of the day. (64)

Other press accounts reported Republican defection to Roosevelt and his analysis of heavy contributions to Dewey's campaign. (65)

Dmitri Skopin, Master of the Soviet vessel S.S. Rubin, told U.S. Navy interviewers at Seattle that Soviet naval authorities in Vladivostok are encouraging the study of English. Upon a ship's return to port from the U.S., all new members, especially Masters, are required to hand in completed lessons. If a Master shows marked improvement over the period of a year, his salary is increased 10%; if he shows no progress, his income is reduced 10%. (66)

b. With Cuba.

Ambassador Braden was advised on 5 October that President-elect Truman was annoyed at the abrupt Soviet refusal to send a special envoy for his inauguration. Braden suggested to Senator Bell, who is handling the inauguration ceremonies and who is prospective Cuban Ambassador to the U.S., that he have a frank talk with the Soviet Charge. As a result of this conversation the Charge asked Moscow to name a special envoy. The Soviet reply

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had not come on 6 October and President-elect Grau was so incensed that he had directed that the names of all Soviet Legation members be stricken from invitation lists. He stated that unless this situation is remedied prior to the inauguration (10 October at noon) "... he will take strong measures".

Immediately following Grau's election on 1 June friction developed between his supporters and the Cuban Communist Party (Partido Socialista Popular) which had supported the Batista candidate. Grau's intransigent attitude towards the Communists is probably responsible for this Soviet slight. (67)

President-elect Grau's strong stand has resulted in the Soviets backing down. Ambassador Braden reports on 9 October that "the Soviet Charge in Habana has been designated as the special Soviet representative to the inauguration ceremonies of Dr. Grau, the President-elect of Cuba, and has attended the presentation of credential ceremonies together with two members of his staff." (68)

### c. With France.

On the surface, French Provisional Government-Soviet relations are most correct. Bogomolev, Soviet Ambassador to Paris, has been received by General De Gaulle. It is significant to note that although both Mr. Duff Cooper and Mr. Chapin have expressed desire for interviews with General De Gaulle, their requests have been ignored. (69) Governor General of Algiers, Yves Chataigneau, opened on 8 October the Congress of French Empire delegates to a meeting of the France-U.S.S.R. Association. The purpose of this organization is to promote closer Franco-Soviet relations,

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(Other Foreign Relations cont'd)

and official interest in work of this organization is expressed in the opening address by the Governor General. (70, 71)

d. With The Vatican.

Recent Russian comment runs contrary to previous policy of moderation in Italy which resulted in friendly conferences between Communist Togliatti and the Pope, although the latter loudly condemned Catholic Communism.

According to the Russian semi-official publication, "War and the Working Class", the Vatican has actively supported Fascism in Europe and Pope Pius seeks a compromise peace for Germany. The article attacks current "peace manoeuvres" and says the Catholic Church, which has never openly condemned Hitler, regards Franco regime as "prototype of Christian state". "The sinister shadow of Vatican foreign policy lies across the history and origins of the second World War," the article said. (72)

The society of Jesus has answered Moscow with an unequivocal denial of Soviet charges. The Reverend La Farge, S. J. said, "the Pope's utter reprobation of National Socialism and its racist doctrines is so completely evident that this alone must be rather embarrassing to the Soviet press. With all their thundering against 'Hitlerites' this press seems to have no courage to print a word against Nazis or nazism as such." (73)

e. With Hungary.

Hungary's capitulation is believed imminent in Moscow and may come while Prime Minister Churchill is there. British Minister in Caserta gave our representative the particulars concerning the arrival

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of a Hungarian mission in Moscow, a letter from Horthy to Stalin, and the Soviet answer. The messages of the British Ambassador in Moscow signify that our Embassy there is informed about the proceedings. (74)

f. With Rumania.

A weak Rumanian Government and the consequent unsettled conditions are providing ample opportunity for Communist infiltration. Despite Malcev's assurances that Russia would not interfere with Rumania's internal politics, the USSR is apparently taking advantage of the situation.

According to an OSS source Soviet political officers are addressing public gatherings. Russia is putting out two newspapers in the Rumanian language ostensibly for the Red Army but actually Rumanians are the only ones to read them. Confiscated radio sets are being distributed to new Communist Party members. Soviet radio Romania Libera is attacking the non-Communist political leaders Maniu and Bratianu. (75) Prince Stirbey maintains that the USSR is silently and unofficially building up the Communist Party in Rumania. Until recently without funds, the Party is now well financed, and issues quantities of newspapers. (76)

The inability of the Government to introduce a systematic purge is generally considered as one of the worst threats to its stability. The Rumanians cannot agree on the list of war criminals and it is still possible that the Russians may step into conduct their own purge. (77) Between 50,000 and 60,000 Bucharest workers met on 8 October to hear Communist leaders condemn the Government and call for a Communist-Socialist alliance in a united workers front. (78) Max Ausnit, a strongly pro-ally

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industrialist, maintains that Rumania needs a strong government which could be trusted by both National Peasant leaders and Communists. He reports that the Communists have asked the Peasant leader Maniu if he would be willing to accept Prince Stirbey. (79) While Stirbey asserts that he has not yet been approached officially, he admits that he has talked with certain Communists. (80)

Prince Stirbey possesses considerable prestige in Rumania.

However, he told an OSS official in Rumania around 3 October that he had no desire to form a government and would accept a request only if all political leaders would promise him full support. He apparently enjoys Russian favor since his country estates have not been molested by the Red Army and the USSR has indicated that it will treat his person and property with respect. On the other hand, while Rumanian Communists are demanding that such men as Tatarescu and Mihai Bralea be inducted into the Government, Stirbey appears to side with Maniu who says that these "leaders without parties" have no right to participate in the Government. According to Prince Stirbey, this demand on the part of the Communists is blocking the change in Government which nearly all Rumanian party leaders and Rumanian Ministers admit is necessary. (81)

g. With Turkey.

According to Hakkı Bey, Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry, the Soviet Government has proposed to the Turkish Government that Russia, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey share control of the Straits on a "quadrilateral" basis. Rumors of Soviet troops in some force along the Bulgar-Turk frontier have caused some alarm. Bey has stated that if the

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(Other Foreign Relations cont'd)

above were true and an official proposal were made to the Turkish Government, Turkey would fight rather than accept. (82)

It is believed that control of, or at least free access to the Bosphorous-Dardanelles area, is a prerequisite to the achievement of Soviet long-range objectives in the Near East. Rumors of a similar nature have been previously reported, but it is believed that the Soviet-Balkan position is not yet sufficiently stabilized to permit exertion of the necessary pressure to attain this objective.

h. With India.

The Soviet press has been rendering short reports almost daily on the progress of the Jinnah-Gandhi talks, and on 4 October published a London despatch reporting Gandhi's regret that Jinnah had not accepted his proposals for Hindu-Muslim unity. (83)

Reciprocal interest in the Indian press was evidenced by the publication in a Karachi paper of an article "An Example for India" by C. Rajagopalachari, prominent exponent of Hindu-Muslim unity. His interest in the Soviet solution of the national problem is typical of appreciation in India of Soviet policy. (84)

i. With Japan.

The Japanese Naval Attache in Turkey says his country is happy about the Russian drive in the Balkans, for the reason that it permits greater German resistance against the Allies and thus will prolong the war. A Bulgarian diplomat just returned from Moscow reports that the Japanese there are active and now more confident of influencing Stalin. (85)

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According to the Dumas Agency, the Soviet Government at Moscow announced on 9 October that the airline network connecting Soviet Sakhalin, the Kamchatka Peninsula, and the Khabarovsk region of northeast Siberia has been completed and is already in operation. (86)

A radio report from London states that the publication in Moscow of a 700-page book with comments on the history of Port Arthur has caused a literary sensation in the USSR. In reviewing the book, PRAVDA mentions Port Arthur as the genuine symbol of the Fatherland and says it was formerly the most important Russian port in the Far East. It will be recalled that this great naval fortress was taken from Russia by Japan in the war of 1904-5. (87)

J. With China.

Harrison reports that the Soviet press has treated very briefly the Chinese phase of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, but that PRAVDA on 9 October carried a small item quoting portions of the joint declaration by heads of the delegation declaring the conversations had been satisfactory largely because of the successful work in the first (Soviet) phase of the conversations. (88)

On its side, the Chinese press has been active in its treatment of Soviet affairs, especially in regard to relations with Japan. On 2 October in a broadcast in English to North America, the Chungking radio deplores the necessity of dividing the Dumbarton Oaks Conference into two phases. Referring to a recent article in Ta Kung Pao (independent, liberal, and highly respected Chungking newspaper), the broadcast says that all such

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future difficulties should be avoided by the promotion of Sino-Soviet relations and a declaration of war by the USSR on Japan, and quotes the newspaper as saying "we firmly believe that she will finally fight Japan". (89)

Another Chinese newspaper, SHIN SHIN KHEIN PAO, devoted an editorial to the topic, "USSR Policy in the Far East", and forecasts the same eventuality. The editorial describes the monumental effort of the Soviets in the liberation of Europe, a task which obviously has kept her attention from the East. But this does not mean that the USSR undervalues the political situation in the Pacific Ocean area, for her silence has merely been "expedient with the present stage of events". Despite the April 1941 neutrality pact between Japan and the Soviets, Hitler's attack made them "friendly enemies," and the relations became even more complicated with Pearl Harbor. Now "this neutrality status has been considerably weakened, and it is possible that both countries will at any time enter into a state of war." While the editorial recalls Lenin's views on the inimical position of Japan and states that "the USSR will join the struggle" against her, it is realistic enough to admit that "the USSR does not want to arrange its future policy or solve its Far Eastern problems on the basis of the points (interests) of England and China". (90) Another significant factor is that the TASS agency in Chungking beamed this radio talk in Russian to the USSR.

The evident Chinese desire to placate the Soviets in regard to Sinkiang has led them to appoint Liu Tse-Yung as the new Commissioner for Foreign Affairs at Urumchi, replacing Chauser H. Wu. Liu has recently been

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Counselor of the Chinese Embassy in Moscow, and thus is familiar with the Soviet attitude toward the provinces which he will now represent. The Domei Agency sees in this appointment, coming upon the heels of other replacements in Sinkiang, definite indication of Chungking's leanings toward the USSR and away from the Allies. (91)

It is difficult, however, to accept this view in the light of the recent Chungking attitude toward the real sore spot in Chinese-Soviet relations -- the Chinese Communists. Upon the failure of the People's Political Council to bring harmony, the Government's treatment of the Communists has stiffened to the extent of suppressing discussion, censoring despatches, and even closing the Communist newspaper in Chungking. (92)

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- (4) AP, Schenectady, 12 October 1944.
- (5) FCC, Moscow, Soviet Home Service, 7 October 1944.
- (6) FEIS, Russia, 29 September 1944.
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- (9) S/D, Airgram, Stockholm, 20 September 1944.
- (10) AP, Tallinn, Estonia, 5 October 1944.
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- (18) FCC, Finnish Home Service, 5 October 1944.
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- (44) FCC, Soviet Home Service, 11 October 1944.
- (45) FCC, Soviet Home Service, 10 October 1944.
- (46) UP, Washington, 10 October 1944.
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- (48) S/D Airgram, Moscow, 23 September 1944.
- (49) WD, Moscow, 29 September 1944.

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- (53) UP, Moscow, 11 October 1944.
- (54) AP, Bern, 8 October 1944.
- (55) S/D, Moscow, 8 October 1944.
- (56) CG AFHQ, Caserta, 9 October 1944.
- (57) S/D, Caserta, 5 October 1944.
- (58) S/D, Caserta, 8 October 1944.
- (59) S/D, Caserta, 7 October 1944.
- (60) AP, Moscow, 12 October 1944.
- (61) S/D, Caserta, 10 October 1944.
- (62) S/D, Tehran, 9 October 1944.
- (63) S/D, Moscow, 11 October 1944.
- (64) S/D, Moscow, 5 October 1944.
- (65) S/D, Moscow, 5 October 1944.
- (66) IS, I & S, Seattle FOE, 18 September 1944.
- (67) S/D, Cuba, 7 October 1944.
- (68) S/D, Habana, 9 October 1944.
- (69) S/D, Paris, 9 October 1944.
- (70) FCC, Brazzaville, 5 October 1944.
- (71) FCC, Algiers, 8 October 1944.
- (72) UP, 9 October 1944, Moscow.
- (73) NYT, 11 October 1944.
- (74) S/D, Caserta, 10 October 1944.
- (75) S/D, Caserta, 6 October 1944.
- (76) S/D, Caserta, 7 October 1944.
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- (78) AP, Bucharest, 8 October 1944.
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- (81) S/D, Caserta, 7 October 1944.
- (82) S/D, Cairo, 4 October 1944.
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- (84) Daily Worker, 8 October 1944.
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- (88) S/D, Moscow, 9 October 1944.
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To: War Department

Nr: FX 38061

13 Oct. 1944

██████████ Signed Wilson cite FHQBI action TROOPERS  
AGWAR, MIDEAST FX 38061.

Russian intentions reliably reported as follows via  
OSS Bucharest:

Main effort being directed at two points.

(A) Eastwards for Backa to secure bridgehead  
across Danube.

(B) Drive on Budapest via Szolnok and Kecskemet.

Our allies expect reach capital by 16th October.  
Operations in northern Serbia including Belgrade of subsidiary  
nature only. Secondary thrust to northeast from Debreczen  
to Bu supported by drive southwest from Slovakia with object  
cutting off enemy troops east of Transylvania. Latter no  
doubt to be developed on defection Hungarian forces. Russian  
forces operating from northwest Roumania include Roumanian  
troops. Roumanian GS claim joint Russo-Roumanian forces  
twice as numerous as enemy but we consider this statement  
exaggerated.

End

ACTION: Gen Bissell

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold  
Gen Handy  
CofS

CM-IN-12177 (13 Oct 44) 0737Z bjm

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JCS LETTER, 7-5-72  
BY DMB, DATE  
MAY 21 1973

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED] "UHR"

From: US Military Attache, Stockholm, Sweden

To: War Department

Nr: 610 10 October 1944

610 to MILID Wash DC

On Oct 8 the Finns were advancing with 3 Divs abreast followed probably by 2 more according to 278 rated B2. General Pajaris Inf Div with tanks attached was advancing from Torneseonkoivu and Aavasaksa. Thus the Kemi-Rovaniemi-Sallade laying position mentioned in my 598 is flanked. General Lagus Mechanized Div still South of the Kemi River was advancing North on Koivu and Rovaniemi. Colonel Puromas Inf Div advancing north was on Lagus right (east). Russians in north were attacking westward toward Petsamo over difficult terrain. Reds relatively quiet in Salla Area where the Germans were lightly holding at Saija and Marka Jarvi with the bulk of their force on a stronger rear line from Pelko Senniemi to Kemi Jarvi. Advance elements Hqs Twentieth Army has withdrawn to village on Vika Jarvi-Sodankyla Road just north of Vika Jarvi. New hqs being prepared at Ivalo.

ACTION: G-2

Rayens.

INFORMATION: CG AAF

OPD

Col Park

Log

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OSD Letter, 6-8-72

MAY 20 1974

CM-IN-10119 (11 Oct 44) 1142Z bjm

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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# Soviets Already Reconverting Plants

By KATHA PARSONS

Special Correspondent  
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MOSCOW, Oct. 7.—The thoroughness of the Soviet Union's preparations for war and the total nature of mobilization when it came, enabled the Soviet Government to start the reconversion of industry to non-military purposes while the war was still going on. This was also facilitated by a substantial increase in the labor reserve resulting from the liberation of the vast expanses of territory which had been overrun so fast that much manpower was not touched out by the 1941 mobilization.

Thus, although no public discussion of reconversion plans and stepping up of production of consumer goods is permissible in the press comparable with that in the U. S. A., the process has been going on under the pressure of events.

Roofs have had to be replaced, those robbed by the Germans had to be provided with shoes and clothes, and hundreds of thousands of cripples had to be placed in jobs. Cities and factories, coal mines and ports could not be left in ruins when the huge quantities of wide areas of liberated Russia depended on repair and the food demands were ever increasing.

On the other hand, evidence is available that large-scale conversion to civilian needs has taken place as yet in the key industries.

Inevitably the process of reconversion is closely linked with that of reconstruction. That is why the problem does not pose itself in the clear-cut manner of U. S. A.

Take the case of cities, for instance. The projects committed has been established, directly responsible to the Council of People's

Commissioners, to replace the wrecked cities. The ambitious projects being drawn up are intended to go much further than mere restoration. But at the same time the provision of temporary houses, mostly constructed of local materials—timber in the north, brick and clay in the steppes—has high priority, second only to transportation in the urgent list drawn up last year.

## Materials Set Aside

As a result, labor and material are directed to the opening of brick kilns, furniture manufacture, window glass, etc. Designed to meet an immediate emergency, these measures are nonetheless likely to effect a change in long-range planning, and a process of decentralization in the building industry, an outward visible sign of which will be the use of more local material and local styles, seems likely.

Similarly, the development of local industry for the manufacture of consumer goods, mostly in the form of municipal enterprises, which for the past two years has enabled the Russian housewife to keep going without straining trans-

port, will probably be a feature of the postwar years.

It should be remembered that the drafting of millions of new hands into industry during the war, the encouragement given to home industry and the training of millions of youths in labor reserve schools have immensely increased the skill of the Russian people.

The planning side of reconversion is the job of the Gosplan—the State Planning Commission—first publicized of the Soviet Union's war-winning organizations.

The planning of Soviet reconversion would follow, roughly, the following process: The government decides in outline whether the main emphasis is to be on production for immediate consumption or on capital investment for future production. Then the Gosplan, in consultation with the appropriate Commissariats and the Central Committee of Trade Unions, makes plans of economic activity for a given period, assigning quotas for each industry, each factory within the industry, each state and collective farm.

These plans, provisional as yet, are sent down the administrative ladder to the factory unit. All the way down suggestions and criticisms accrue. Finally, the plan is

considered on the lowest level by meetings of factory and farm workers, and it goes up the ladder again for final fixation by the Gosplan.

Sometimes the process is reversed. The initiative may come from an enterprise, municipality, factory or even from an individual worker.

## Letup on Workers

This may all sound cumbersome. Yet in practice it has the advantage that every production unit has an opportunity to become acquainted with the provisional plan and to raise objections to its capabilities.

Meanwhile there are one or two highly practical indications that there has been a slight let-up in the demand on working time. A recent government decree established a pilot school for working youth and forbade overtime. On Nov. 1, pilot schools are opening on the farms, where a 40-hour week of schooling is proposed.

Last week the press, for the first time since the war's outbreak, referred to reconversion in the post-war task of reconstruction. It forecast that the tempo of reconstruction would surpass that of the Five Year Plan.

PM, Sunday, October 8, 1944

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State Dept. letter, 1-11-72  
By DRS Date MAY 21 1973

Project No. 50

7 October 1944.

POLITICAL ESTIMATE OF THE U.S.S.R., 29 SEPTEMBER TO 5 OCTOBER, INCLUSIVE.

1. Domestic Affairs.

a. Political Commissars in Navy.

There are indications from Vladivostok that the Soviets are planning to reinstitute the office of political commissar aboard merchant ships. Actually, a man has served as such on each ship even though the rank itself was abolished in 1941. Commonly known as "Pampolit", the post will receive some pay and rank as Master, and will be devoted to political morale and party duties. Reinstallation of post is due to reports of bad conduct of officers and crew in U.S. ports and their open expression of dissatisfaction with the socialist system. There have been several recent examples of this tendency in Seattle, where a number of Soviet merchant seamen have deserted their ships and made anti-Soviet statements. (1)

b. Revival of Ideological Propaganda Among Masses.

Party ideological work has been unavoidably neglected during the war but is now being revived in the press with an emphasis on patriotism. Harriman forecasts that during the coming months one of the big jobs facing internal propaganda will be the reconciliation of Marxism with a very earnest Russian patriotism. (2)

c. New Textbook in History of USSR for IX Grade.

The Institute of History, under the USSR Academy of Sciences, has published a new History of the USSR for use in the IX grade of the secondary schools (pupils about 17 years of age). The new text, edited by Professor A. M. Pankratova (a woman), does not differ essentially from that

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(Domestic Affairs cont'd)

of Professor Shestakov, which was published several years ago for younger pupils in the IV grade, but the treatment of the material is fuller and more specific. Russia's "glorious past" is devoted to Peter I, another to Catherine II, and a genealogical table of the Romanov dynasty is included. The years since 1917 are not considered. (C)

4. Rights of Roman Catholics Engranted by Soviet Official.

The Religious News Service reports from Moscow an interview with Ivan Wallerish Polynsky, Chairman of the newly established Council on Affairs of Religious Faiths, which has jurisdiction in matters pertaining to churches other than the Orthodox. (See Weekly Political Estimate of 7 July, page 1.) In general, the interview was similar to the one recently granted by G. S. Burkov, head of the Council on Greek Orthodox Church Affairs. (See Weekly Political Estimate of 23 September 1944, page 1.) Polynsky, in the first official comment on the status of Roman Catholics in the USSR, maintained that they have equal rights with all other religious groups, but must also accept the same limitations. These limitations forbid the teaching of Catholicism in schools because the separation between church and state is required by law, and also forbid contributions to Rome from Soviet citizens for the reason that there is a law against the export of currency and other valuables. On the other hand, Catholics may communicate with the Pope and even hold congresses for the nomination of cardinals. Thus Catholics citizens have the same rights as all other believers". (A)

5. Meeting of Polish Supreme Soviet.

The sixth session of the Supreme Soviet of the Polish SSR ad-

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(Domestic Affairs cont'd)

Journed on 28 September after passing laws establishing the Bulm-eyyblaan Commissariats of Defense and Foreign Affairs. The session also approved the 19th state budget, several amendments to the Constitution of the Dohok SM, and all decrees issued by the Presidium of the Dohok Supreme Soviet since the last session. (5)

**f. Estonian Government and Party Appointments.**

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SM has appointed A. Veider to the post of Chairman of the Council of Peoples Commissars of the Estonian SM. The Plenum Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia has elected as its First Secretary Nikolai O. Burdakov. (6)

**g. Health Services in Lithuania.**

The All-Lithuan Commissariat of Health has begun to restore medical and sanitary conditions in the Lithuanian SM and expects to spend 1 1/2 million rubles on medical supplies and equipment before the end of the year. Hospitals will be opened in the villages and all emigrated doctors will be returned. (7)

**h. Refugees From the Baltic States.**

U.S. Ambassador Johnson reports from Stockholm that literally thousands of people of all political followings are making pole-stratum efforts to escape from the Baltic coastal areas. Over 300 were rescued from Latvia, 150 from Lithuania and about 250 from Estonia, where others swim in the sea in vain efforts to climb aboard the boats. These people are not fleeing from the advancing Red Army, but from German threats of massacre. So far, not a single Jew has contrived to escape by sea but a

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(Domestic Affairs cont'd)

rescued Catholic priest says that a large number of Jews have been able to reach Soviet-occupied areas of Lithuania and are said to be treated extremely well, while others are being protected by Lithuanian farmers or supplied with false birth certificates by Catholic priests. (8) The Germans seem to be assisting the departure of some of these evacuees, except the Jews, for on 4 October the Riga radio directed all those "in possession of control blanks numbers 1 - 5,000" to obtain their steamer tickets at the Bank of Latvia. (9)

### 2. Polish Affairs.

#### a. London Government.

On 30 September, President Raczkiewicz announced the replacement of General Sosnkowski as Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces by General "Ber", identified as Lt. General Tadeusz Komarowski, leader of the Warsaw patriot insurgents. The announcement, coming as it did without disruption of the internal unity of the Government-in-Exile was a tactical victory of no small importance for Premier Mikolajczyk. It was expected in the United States and the United Kingdom to pave the way to some solution of the Polish question; since Sosnkowski's anti-Soviet attitude has been consistently highlighted by the Lublin Poles as one of the chief stumbling blocks to Polish-Soviet negotiations. (10)

Meanwhile, the semi-official Polish press published an editorial accusing the Polish Committee of National Liberation of not only neglecting to help the underground fighting in Warsaw, but of standing in the way of assistance. On Tuesday all underground resistance in Warsaw had ceased. Polish Headquarters in London refused to locate General Komarowski save as

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## SECRET

(Polish Affairs cont'd)

"in the battle area, for the obvious reason that both the Germans and the Soviet-backed Polish Committee of National Liberation have a price on his head". Komarowski's Tuesday Communiqué said "Warsaw has fallen after exhausting all supplies of food and ammunition on the 63rd day of fighting in the face of overwhelming enemy superiority". Although first reports out of Moscow stated that Komarowski, himself, did not conduct the surrender but was represented by Colonel Menter, Berlin reports and the London Government confirm that Komarowski was captured with his troops, thereby removing the issue created by Soviet-inspired aspersions concerning the General's whereabouts. Losses of civilian and military personnel are estimated at about 200,000, and the Warsaw Army originally numbering some 30,000 is probably decimated. (11, 12, 13, 14)

b. The Lublin Government.

On 28 September, "President" Berut, Polish Committee of National Liberation Chairman Gombin-Warawski, General Rola-Szykowski and Deputy Chairman Witas arrived to spend the week-end in Moscow where they were met by A. I. Vyshinski and Colonel General Bulganin, Soviet representative to the Committee. Premier Stalin received them as "Poland's representatives" on 29 September. (15) On 1 October they attended a meeting of the Polish Colony in Moscow called "in aid of the population of Warsaw". The large attendance was ascribed by the Union of Polish Patriots Moscow radio to "their burning desire to give help to the martyred capital". (16) The fate of Warsaw was blamed on Polish reactionary elements who had exploited for their own selfish ends the suffering of the Polish



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(Polish Affairs cont'd)

people. The USSR was profusely thanked for its "generous and true help" in supplying foodstuffs, medical supplies and doctors to Poland.

The Polish Committee of National Liberation representatives also held a press conference in Moscow, in which they reiterated charges that General Ber-Komorowski had not consulted any of the Allied Governments or staff. Blaming General Komorowski as entirely responsible for the destruction of the capital, they stated, "Ber is the author of Warsaw's tragedy. Ber is responsible. Ber will be brought to court."

The above mentioned appointment of General Ber as Polish Commander-in-Chief by the London Government evoked a tirade from the Polish Committee of National Liberation against this attempted appeasement. The Polish Committee of National Liberation announced with horror that "the man on whom personally rests the sin of having brought all that destruction on the capital of Poland has been appointed by the London clique to succeed the hated Sankowski". (17)

### c. International Attitudes.

"Pravda" on 2 October commented with finality on activities of the London Government designed to placate the USSR. "The crisis of the Polish emigre Government is a crisis of all Polish emigres in London which have been separated from the Polish people, from the true and live Poland. This crisis is too deep and cannot be overcome by any changes in personnel". (18)

In the meantime, the London "Times" diplomatic correspondent wrote an article on 2 October stating categorically that since General Komorowski's forces had been recognized by Great Britain and the United States as a responsible combatant army, Russia as their ally should have under-

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(Polish Affairs cont'd)

taken to supply the defenders with arms. (19) The London "Daily Worker", however, castigated the Government-in-Exile, characterizing the Warsaw rising as a "foul political intrigue" designed to destroy United Nations solidarity and using the lives of the insurgents as "mere pawns in the game". (20)

A speech in the House of Commons last week urged "plain talk" to the USSR regarding British-Soviet guarantees of Polish freedom. Prime Minister Churchill was guarded in his reply, saying only that "loose talk" could worsen Polish-Soviet relations. (21) President Roosevelt, at his 3 October press conference, also confined himself to implying that the Polish question was explosive. (22)

Technically, nevertheless the Polish Government-in-Exile is still recognized as the Government of Poland by the United States and the United Kingdom. For example, arrangements are being made for a London Government Delegation to attend the Civil Aviation Conference to be held in the United States on 1 November. (23) How long such technical recognition can be maintained without precipitating an open Anglo-American-Soviet break is a question, in the face of daily weakening of the London Government's position and the "in situ" position of the Lublin Government. UNRRA has decided to send representatives to liberated Poland to handle relief. Obviously, such representatives will have to deal with the Soviet-backed Polish Committee of National Liberation Government. (24) German acceptance of Anglo-American support of the London Government, as indicated in the Communiqué announcing the insurgents' surrender and stating that

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(Polish Affairs cont'd)

Polish prisoners are to be treated in accordance with the Hague Convention, shows that Germany, in any case, believes that the United States and the United Kingdom are committed to back the London Government to the hilt.

3. Finnish Affairs.

a. Fulfillment of armistice terms.

The Finnish Government is endeavoring to demonstrate its intentions to live up to the armistice and to establish good relations with USSR. Premier Castren, in a broadcast on 3 October, described steps leading to the signing of the armistice and explained various articles of the agreement. He announced action already taken in accordance with the terms and appealed for tremendous efforts in fulfilling the country's obligations so that the nation could return to normal conditions. The Premier called for the exiles of the entire nation to be directed toward improving relations with USSR. (25)

The Government has formulated a decree for the mobilization of Finnish industries whose production is to be made use of for paying compensation to the Soviets. (26) Two departments are being set up in the Finnish Foreign Ministry: one, headed by General Martener will deal with routine affairs and the other, headed by Foreign Minister Ruskell will deal only with the Soviet Control Commission. (27)

The Soviet Control Commission is behaving properly toward the Finns according to a reliable Finnish informant. (28) Stockholm reports that it is expected that several British members of the Allied Control Commission will soon arrive in Helsinki and that the U.S. will also send

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(Finnish Affairs cont'd)

military observers to Helsinki. (29) There have been meetings in Stockholm between Finnish and Soviet Legation officials. On 30 September, Madame Kallontay invited the entire staff of the Finnish Legation to lunch at the Soviet Legation. (30)

The Finns, however, are still apprehensive about Soviet intentions toward Finland. Finns desiring to escape into Sweden to get away from the Soviet Control Commission are being transported clandestinely by fishermen and others. It is said that Finns connected with the Ryti Government are leaving Finland also, many going to Sweden. They fear the Soviet Control Commission will close the frontier, classify them as war criminals, and execute punishment without making the action public. Recent arrivals in Sweden were Anthoni, former chief of Finnish Political Police, Kotilainen, formerly connected with Finnish Administration of East Karelia, Procope, and General Wallenius, Commander of Finnish troops in the Karelian Isthmus during the Winter War. (31, 32)

On 28 September, the Soviet press made the first mention of any Finnish advance or military effort since Pravda attacked the Finns for their failure to expel German troops. The press also presented brief items on dissolution of Fascist-style organizations in Finland and German outrages committed in North Finland. (33)

It is believed that following a Finnish general election, now scheduled for January or February, a new government with more strongly leftist tendencies will be formed. (34)

b. Swedish Reactions.

The Swedish paper, Aftonbladet reports that Finland will

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(Finnish Affairs cont'd)

have no diplomatic representative in Moscow and that the Soviet Central Commission will settle all questions concerning USSR and Finland until peace is concluded. (35)

On 1 October, Sweden was again attacked by the Soviet Press (See Weekly Political Estimate of 23 September 1944, para. 3 b) "Frieden" charged that certain Swedish papers are in the hands of Goebbels's organizations and that German propaganda is quoting Swedish press opinion about Soviet-Finnish armistice terms. (36)

Swedish concern over Soviet-Finnish relations is demonstrated by the following statement of Caspersson, press representative of Swedish Labor Federation. A petition will be sent to Moscow through the Stockholm Soviet Legation urging Soviet Government to show generosity in treatment of the Finns, because Finland's participation in the war on Germany's side was the fault of a small clique. Names include Caspersson, left-wing Socialist Bengtson, radical novelist Sylind Johnson, and Professor Aglund of the Conservative Party. Caspersson feels the significance of the petition is in the fact that Madame Kollontay initiated its preparation to strengthen her hand in Moscow. (37)

b. Relations with the Allies.

a. Soviet Phase of Dumbarton Oaks Conference Closure.

On 23 September the tripartite conventions of the United States, Great Britain and the USSR ended at Dumbarton Oaks. A joint statement issued by the three chief delegates was very vague about the decisions of the Conference, but provided further information after the delegates

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(Relations with the Allies cont'd)

have reported to their respective governments. (38) Most observers believed the conference unable to agree on the problem of voting in the case of aggression by a major nation, and it is expected that talks must now be undertaken on a higher echelon. (39)

b. Continued Soviet Press Emphasis on War Criminals.

Barvian reports that the Soviet press is still advocating stern measures against war criminals. British and U.S. groups who were thought to be taking a sentimental or legalistic approach were treated with impatience. Frederick Kah's recent press charges against the Allied War Crimes Commission in London were given prominence, as was the London report of fraternization between Germans and U.S. soldiers. On 27 September "Red Star" published an article by Ilya Ehrenburg which reviewed these differences of opinion and promised that the Soviets would not permit Fascist crimes to go unpunished. (40)

c. Moscow Reaction to Churchill Speech.

The 28 September speech of Winston Churchill in Commons was given more than half a page on 29 September in "Izvestia" and "Pravda". "Red Star" gave a much shorter account of it. Items completely omitted by the Soviet coverage were:

(1) Churchill's remarks on the extraordinary, unprecedented, and historically decisive characteristics of Allied operations. Thus, while a very full account of these operations was given, the story did not include Churchill's assertion that the Normandy battle was the "most decisive of the entire war", his tribute to the gigantic scale and heroism of the parachute

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(Relations with the Allies cont'd)

operation in Holland, nor his remarks on the incredible speed with which U.S. and British troops deployed. Only a brief account was given of the activities in Burma. Churchill's recapitulation of services rendered to India by Britain over the past 80 years was left out. American aid to China was mentioned quite briefly.

(2) Britain's desire to accord recognition to the special role of the USSR in Poland and to achieve a solution of the Polish question along lines acceptable to all the Allies was indicated, but Churchill's praise of Mikolajczyk was left out, as was his remark that he hoped for the restoration of Polish sovereignty, after the centuries-long struggle of the Poles to achieve it. Reported, however, was Churchill's hope that conversations in Moscow would soon be taken up again by Mikolajczyk.

(3) No reference was made to Churchill's desire for strictly legal punishment for war crimes, nor his attack upon the Roman lynching, nor his mentions of Bonomi and Badoglio, nor his assertion that the attitude of the population of Italy is enthusiastic toward the soldiers of the Allies.

(4) What he said on France was cut severely. His lifelong views on the need for a British-French alliance were omitted, as was his expression of gratification that it was now possible for the Allies to accept the blessing and gratitude of the people of France, and his comment on the creation of a political organization representing the whole of the people of France. No mention was made of his passing reference to the need for the French to be partners in negotiations concerning the disposition to be made of the Reich.

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(Relations with the Allied cont'd)

(5) His statements on the close alignment of interests binding Holland, Belgium, and Great Britain together was omitted, and so were his statements that the Belgian people were enthusiastic when the Allied soldiers came in.

What he said about the accomplishments of the conference at Dumbarton Oaks was fully reported, as was his declaration about the satisfactory execution of the Tehran program and about the need for cooperation among the three great powers. (hl)

d. "Izvestia" Reviews Allied Relations.

In commenting upon the recent publication in Moscow of a volume of documents on Soviet foreign policy in wartime, the newspaper "Izvestia" said many interesting things about Allied-USSR relations. Declaring that the present anti-Hitler coalition arose out of "the Soviet Union's heroic fight for peace and collective security ... and the world's farsighted men of politics in countries like Great Britain and the U.S.", the article claims that "the world was saved by the sagacious and farseeing policy of the USSR". That the Soviet Government wishes to assure the world of its desire to perpetuate the coalition is revealed in the following passages quoted from the article:

"The documents in this volume make it clear that the Soviet Government does not regard the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition as a temporary and tidal association but as one rooted in a community of fundamental interests between the peoples of the USSR, the United States and Great Britain and, in fact, all peace-loving people, as an association to endure for a long time to come and intended not only to achieve complete victory over the common foe but to establish a stable, lasting peace and economic, political and cultural cooperation among nations.

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(Relations with the Allies cont'd)

"Soviet diplomacy does not close its eyes to the difficulties which arise in organizing joint action by members of the anti-Hitlerite coalition, in particular, these difficulties generated by differences in ideology and social systems. But a common element in the basic interests of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition decisively outweighs the difficulties mentioned. This element provides the all-essential prerequisite for the joint defeat of Hitler Germany and the joint organization of lasting peace between Nations.

"The documents define the tasks of Soviet foreign policy with utmost clarity and decision. 'This policy', says 'Izvestia', is remarkable for its thorough-going logic and principles, its flexibility and high endeavor, its far-sightedness and realistic approach. Its object is to smash Hitler Germany in the shortest possible time, secure the state interests of our country, eliminate war and aggression, arrange peaceful and friendly relations with all neighboring democratic states and first and foremost with our great allies, Great Britain and the United States." (h3)

e. European Economic Commission Proposed.

Secretary Hall has proposed the establishment of a European Economic Commission to act in an advisory capacity for the liberated areas. The Allied nations on the continent would be the main members, with Britain, U.S., and USSR as full members, but advisory. The USSR has been informed of the plan. (h3)

f. Awards to Americans and Britons.

LT. General Mark Clark and LT. General Omar Bradley have been awarded the Order of Suvorov, First Class, for their exploits in Italy and France, respectively. The same decoration was bestowed upon Lord Beaverbrook and Oliver Lyttleton for their roles in "the organization of the delivery of military supplies from Great Britain to the USSR, which played an important role in the struggle against the common enemy, Germany". Several British generals and admirals also received awards. (h4)

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(Relations with the Allies cont'd)

g. Trade Union Delegation to Great Britain.

Vassili V. Kuznetsov, Chairman of the Central Council of Trade Unions of the USSR, heads the delegation which arrived in London on 30 October. (h5)

h. Soviets Agree to Accept Packets for U.S. Prisoners.

Letter packets containing medical supplies for U.S. prisoners of war and civilians in the Far East will be accepted by the Soviet postal authorities provided the Japanese postal administration agrees to accept such packets from the Soviets, according to a note from the Soviet Foreign Office, dated 28 September, which also set up regulations as to size and labeling. (h6)

i. Matter of Air Transport Command in USSR Reopened.

Although Harriman seemed to regard the matter as closed last August, the U.S. is again making efforts to have Soviet-owned ball bearings transported directly from Sweden to the USSR. (See Weekly Political Estimate dated 2 September, page 16-17) The recent Soviet encouragement of the Swedish aviation company, ABA, regarding opening of Stockholm-Moscow air route may have stimulated the State Department to renewed efforts. (See Weekly Political Estimate dated 23 September 1944, page 10.) (h7)

j. Soviet Comment on Pending U.S. Elections.

An article on "Present American Isolationism" in "War and the Working Class" for 15 September says that there are many Republican Party members who still adhere to isolationism and that their party "has

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(Relations with the Allies cont'd)

always been considered as isolationism's citadel". The article strongly attacks "reactionary groups" led by Landon and Hoover and subsidized by the National Association of Manufacturers which includes Ford and DuPont. Cissy Patterson and Evelyn Nelson are also singled out for attacks, and another article blames strikes in U.S. on selfish reactionaries like John L. Lewis. (48, 49) In Pravda's full publication of Roosevelt's first campaign speech, the editor supplied explanations of the innuendoes about Lewis. (50, 51)

k. Stalin Receives Ambassador Harriman.

On 4 October, U.S. Ambassador Harriman personally presented to Stalin a bust of President Roosevelt, in a ceremony marking the anniversary of the signing of the first protocol on supplies to the USSR. (52)

l. re Germany.

The dual propaganda of the USSR with regard to the treatment of postwar Germany continues. (See Weekly Political Estimate, 1 October 1944) Although a Free Germany broadcast of 3 October preached a gospel of brotherly love to be practiced in the future between German Communists and German Christians — an appeal which is calculated to calm the average German's fear of brutal retribution — Ehrenburg throws suspicion upon what he terms "idle humanists" in London who seek to place war guilt only on the high Nazi leaders. "The crimes and those guilty of them," he says, "number hundreds of thousands; there are thousands of accomplices, they are all guilty and they must all be punished". (53, 54)

m. re France.

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(Relations with the Allies cont'd)

The Soviets apparently oppose admitting France, as represented by the De Gaulle Provisional Government, to the European Advisory Commission. This Russian attitude is probably a parallel to that of the French communist press which, while boosting the USSR at the expense of the Western Powers, also admonishes the Provisional Government to promote revolutionary action or lose "popular" (i.e. Communist) support. The Soviets are making clear to the Provisional Government their conditions for its acceptance as a de jure Government and for France's acceptance as a great power.

Ambassador Winant believes that the question of French admission to the EAC, when it is submitted formally to the Commission, may receive British support. The question may therefore, introduce a new note of friction into Allied relations in Europe. (55, 56, 57)

n. re Italy.

Action possibly connected with Palmiro Togliatti's request last week for wider combat supplies and opportunities for Partisan divisions in Italy is being taken by the Garibaldi Partisans in the district north-east of Udine. A reliable source, whose report is being investigated, has informed Headquarters of the Allied Armies in Italy that these partisans are burying arms supplied them by the Allies with the intention of using them against the Anglo-Americans should the latter refuse to give free rein to Communism behind the lines when hostilities cease on the Italian Front. (58)

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94



SECRET

(Relations with the Allies cont'd)

c. re Yugoslavia.

On 29 September, Simic informed Ambassador Harriman that he was again to be the Yugoslav Government's diplomatic representative in Moscow. Simic had previously resigned because he did not believe the Yugoslav Government represented the people. After his resignation, he stayed on in Moscow as Tito's official representative. Premier Subasic has told him, however, that his resignation was never accepted by the king and that he is, therefore, still representing the Yugoslav Government. (59)

With Soviet support close at hand, Tito has shown an increasingly independent attitude towards the British. A MacLean Mission member, at the Partisan Headquarters in Serbia, reports that Tito was there on 28 October. This marks the second trip which Tito has taken unknown to the British, in spite of the fact that he promised not to leave unless accompanied by a British Mission member. (60)

The Chief of the Yugoslav Partisan military Mission in Russia recently ordered the transfer of \$90,000 in lire to Ivan Milutinovic, an attorney for financial affairs and representative of the National Committee for the People's Liberation in Yugoslavia. Excessive expenditures by the Soviet Advisory Council for representation in Italy are reported and Russian missions in the Mediterranean Theater may be using some of this money for political purposes. (61)

p. re Rumania.

OSR personnel in Bucharest have not been questioned by the USSR because they have succeeded so well in appearing to be part of a United States military unit there. All U.S. military work is coordinated in their

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(Continued with the Allies sent's)

headquarters. The Russians consider their job necessary and legitimate. (62)

4. re Bulgaria.

Reports from reliable sources indicate that there has been no important Bulgarian withdrawal from Macedonia and Thrace. The Soviets have supported the Anglo-American demand for complete withdrawal as a prerequisite for concluding the Bulgarian armistice. However, they are apparently making no effort to force withdrawal, although the Bulgarian Army is now under Soviet command.

Announced intentions in occupied Greek areas conflict. Quoting an official statement by the Bulgarian Propaganda Minister, Radko Anbarov has announced that the Bulgarian Government and Soviet Russia have agreed to joint military occupation of eastern and western Thrace until the armistice is signed. (63) The Bulgarian Telegraph Agency on the other hand has denied that Bulgar-Soviet troops are occupying Greek Thrace, asserting that Bulgarian authorities withdrew from the occupied territories after handing over administration to the local authorities. (64)

The Bulgarian Minister in Ankara has requested suggestions from Allied representatives regarding the transfer of local administration in Thrace. He asserts that efforts to turn over the administration in certain areas has increased misunderstanding and struggle among rival factions and that Bulgarian troops are the only guarantee of order at the present time. (65) It is also maintained by the Turkish Chief of Staff that the continued presence of Bulgarian troops in Thrace is a justifiable military precaution to protect the Left Flank of the Russian Army. (66)

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(Relations with the Allies cont'd)

According to the JOD in Sofia on 3 October, the Minister of Propaganda in Bulgaria has announced a new provisional regime for Thrace and Macedonia which is to last until the Allies reach further conclusions regarding the area. The latest arrangements provide that the Bulgars control communications for military reasons, that internal order be maintained by the local authorities and that no products be exported from these territories to Bulgaria. (67) The Turkish Press Agency reports a statement of the Bulgarian Propaganda Minister to the effect that Bulgarian troops, under the Russian Commander Marshal Tolubchin, will continue as the main army of occupation in Thrace and Eastern Macedonia. The same source also states that Gavr Gerasovki, Bulgarian delegate to this area, will have the authority to transfer the administration gradually to the local population. Gerasovki, who is a member of the Bulgarian Communist Party, will be assisted by another Bulgarian, a Turk and two Greeks, to be elected by local members of the population. (68)

Bulsoev has been instructed to allow the OSS group to remain in Bulgaria, according to a senior RWD officer. (69) A properly accredited British Mission was expected to arrive in Sofia on 3 October, headed by Major General Oakley. (70) The return of the OSS group and the arrival of the British Mission should relieve a delicate situation which has existed in Sofia between the Russians on one hand and the British and Americans on the other. OSS officials have stated that, throughout the affair, relations with the Soviet authorities at Sofia have been most friendly. (71)

This comment on the attitude of the Soviet authorities is corroborated by Colonel Elbeem, senior member of the group of British

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(Relations with the Allies cont'd)

officers expelled by the Soviets from Bulgaria. Colonel Gibson informed Ambassador Steinhardt that the Soviets had shown a friendly and sympathetic attitude toward all the American and British officers. It has been suggested from other sources, however, that the relations were expelled because of Soviet dislike for the three senior officers in the British group. Colonel Gibson, who was born in Russia, headed the British Intelligence Service in the Baltic States during the Russian occupation. Of the other two officers, one is married to a Russian and the other to a Russian widow. (78)

Communist demonstrations have come to an abrupt standstill in Bulgaria. Red flags have been taken down, communist posters have disappeared and the Bulgarian civil administrators and soldiers have been forbidden to wear the red badge in private or when on duty. It was also reported that the Russian Commander at Varna ordered the execution of seven Communists, on 21 September, for having made arrests without the power to do so. (79) The Bulgarian High Command informed the Turkish Military Attache in Sofia that the recent wave of communism in the Bulgarian Army is transitory and already disappearing. (79a)

According to the Deputy Chief of the Turkish Intelligence, the Bulgarian Cabinet will soon fall and be replaced by a communist government. He also maintained that George Markov, former Secretary of the III International, is expected to arrive in Bulgaria to supervise communism of the Balkans. (79) This is possibly true, however, Turkey's terror of communist influences will curb public utterances.

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(Reactions with the Allies cont'd)

r. re Iran.

Long-established Soviet propaganda activities in Iran are being intensified. Rasadin, Press Attache and First Secretary at the Soviet Embassy, is making particular efforts to establish friendly liaison between the Tehran press and the Soviet Embassy. The number of Russian literary works is steadily increasing and the Soviets are curtailng distribution of American publications through the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Censorship Bureau. Since Soviet publications are published by the state they do not have to undergo censorship in Persia. The Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Censorship Bureau is dominated by the Russians and on its banned list are fourteen American publications including Life, Time, Reader's Digest, Harper's Bazaar, and Colliers. The Iranian-Soviet Cultural Relations Society has extended its activities to Isfah, Meshed, Tabriz and Reshtyeh. (76)

On 1 October, Ambassador Maklakov and Sergei Karyakadev, Soviet Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs, requested exclusive five-year rights for petroleum exploration covering 200,000 square miles in north Iran. The Shah referred the request to the Premier and the Cabinet for consideration in the light of British and American requests. The Soviets objected to this on the ground that the British and American requests are commercial while the Russian requests are based on an international agreement. (77)

s. re Japan.

On 30 September, the newspaper Pravda presented in a long article the most pessimistic view of Japan's chances of winning the war

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(Relations with the Allies cont'd)

yet noted in the Soviet press. The article indicated that Japan is in an almost hopeless military position as a result of tremendous American war production and great Allied superiority in the air and on the sea, but it made no mention of Soviet-Japanese relations. (78)

While the Japanese made no direct press reply to this treatment, the Tokyo radio broadcast to Italy on 2 October revealed a stiffening attitude toward Soviet foreign policy. The commentary, entitled "The Soviet Union Without Compromise", characterized Moscow's policy toward her Allies as "arrogant", and specified recent events in Poland and Bulgaria as examples. The Japanese pointed out that minor details are left for the Allies to thresh out, while the Soviets concentrate on achievement of all their major objectives. (79)

In regard to Soviet propaganda concerning her own part in the war in the Far East, the Headquarters of the Second Service Command, ASF, at Governor's Island, New York, reports the following:

"It has come to the attention of this Division through well informed industrial contacts that the Russian engineers and purchasing agents, who usually never express any opinions on political questions and avoid any conversation as to conditions in their country, etc., now are discussing the coming USSR-Japan conflict not as a possibility, but as a certainty, and are apparently seeking opportunities to state this and this can only be interpreted as being done by order and for a specific political purpose."

This political purpose may simply be the Soviet desire to create "good-will" as a background for trade negotiations. These agents have a semi-official status which vests their utterances with some authority but never actually commits their Government to anything.



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5. Other Foreign Relations.

a. With Cuba.

The Cuban Charge d'Affaires on 10 August in Moscow extended an invitation to the Soviet Government to designate a special envoy to President-elect Grom's inauguration. The Soviet Foreign Office did not answer the invitation until 27 September, when they headed the Charge a note stating merely that the Soviet Government "did not propose to designate a special envoy". The Cuban Charge was disturbed by the lack of explanation or regret. His interpretation is that the Soviet Government may dislike the Grom administration and is expressing its disapproval by this diplomatic slight. (80)

b. With Italy.

While the Italian Government official radio was attempting to enhance Soviet-Italian solidarity by giving broad coverage to Premier Bonomi's reception of the Soviet Trade Union Delegation in Rome, it was officially conveyed by the Soviets to the Italian Foreign Office that Italian Legations in Bucharest and Sofia are not permitted to function for the present. There has been no indication of the permanency of the measure. (81, 82)

c. With Rumania.

The fate of the Government organized a month ago is rapidly approaching a climax. The proposed war criminal trials and the Government personnel purge have not been going ahead very fast. Actually few significant arrests or removals have taken place and young Rumanians are beginning to realize that the Russians are likely to do the job unless the

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(Other Foreign Relations cont'd)

Rumanians do it themselves. According to the Chief of the Political Section of the British Mission in Rumania, the Soviets at any moment may have to start a purge which would have serious consequences. Premier Maniu concedes that collaborationists must be removed from their posts, including those who collaborated with former King Carol. (83, 84) The Rumanian Minister of Justice, Aurelia Capatsana, was accused of liberalizing an act designed to initiate a purge of Nazi collaborationists. According to Lucratiu Patrascanu, communist Minister of State, the law as promulgated was much weaker than the draft handed to Capatsana for presentation to King Michael. As a result of the accusation, Capatsana resigned on 23 September. (85)

The Red Army apparently has been directed to treat Rumanians with distance and reserve. Reports from Rumania indicate that the Russians are hostile toward the Rumanians because their cities did not undergo the destruction suffered by the Russian cities and because Rumanians became prosperous under Axis control. (86)

d. With Turkey.

Salim Sarper, Director General of Press and Information, is to be the new Turkish Ambassador to Russia, it was announced 29 September. The appointment was interpreted in Ankara as evidence of the Government's desire to improve relations with the Soviets. He is an able diplomat and, although not pro-Ally, has worked to promote Turko-American friendship. (87)

The Turkish correspondent Talshin has apparently shifted his broadside attacks from Russia to Bulgaria. A few weeks earlier his sharp criticism of Russia's policy in the Balkans brought forth bitter USSR comment. In a recent editorial he writes that it is impossible to reconcile Bulgarian

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(Other Foreign Relations cont'd)

claims to Thrace and Macedonia with Bulgarian professions of friendliness towards Turkey. He states that the arrival of foreign power in the Aegean and in Western Thrace is as serious as an actual attack on Turkish territory. Other Turkish papers condemn Bulgaria's "expansionist policy" and in some cases assert that Bulgarians are using Soviet occupation to further Bulgarian territorial aims. (88) This shift may be prompted by the Turkish Government's recent ban on the newspaper Tasviri Efkar for exhibiting an anti-Soviet tendency in articles on Bulgaria. (89)

e. With China.

On 1 October, General Wu Chung-hsin, recently appointed Chairman of the Sinkiang Provisional Government, left Chungking for his new post, accompanied by other new officials. The Soviet Charge d'Affaires at Chungking has reportedly expressed his disappointment at the appointment of Wu and also some of his commissioners, but he has lodged no formal objections. (See Weekly Political Estimate of 2 September, page 15-16) One matter hanging over from the former regime which might strengthen Soviet pessimism is the case of certain Chungking officials who were imprisoned by Sheng Shih-ts'ai and forced through torture to sign confessions that they had participated in a Communist plot to establish a Soviet Republic of Sinkiang. Although these facts have been established by a special investigator from Chungking, the persecuted officials remain under arrest in order to save Sheng's "Face". (90, 91)

Four and a half months of negotiations of the tangled Communist issue having failed to yield agreement on a single point, Lin

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(Other Foreign Relations cont'd)

Tao-han, chairman of the Chinese Communist Government, will return this week to Yenan. He will be accompanied by Tung Fa-wo, Communist "Ambassador" to Chungking, and five members of the Peoples' Political Council, who are going to Yenan to investigate conditions in the Communist-dominated area of China. (92)

Despite these dissensions, the Soviet press avoids all mention of the distressing situation in China, and Roosevelt's recent mention of her plight was omitted. (93)

- 27 -

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SOURCES OF INFORMATION

- (1) WB, MDCON, Vladivostok, 29 September 1944.
- (2) S/D, Moscow, 27 September 1944.
- (3) Enclosure to M/A, Ankara, 16 September 1944.
- (4) NYT, 4 October 1944.
- (5) FOC, Soviet Home Service, 29 September 1944.
- (6) FOC, Moscow TASS, 3 October 1944.
- (7) FOC, Soviet Home Service, 3 October 1944.
- (8) S/D, Stockholm, 29 September 1944.
- (9) FOC, Riga, 4 October 1944.
- (10) S/D, London, 28 September 1944.
- (11) AP, London, 3 October 1944.
- (12) AP, Moscow, 3 October 1944.
- (13) AP, London, 4 October 1944.
- (14) AP, London, 5 October 1944.
- (15) FOC, Moscow, 29 September 1944.
- (16) FOC, Moscow, 4 October 1944.
- (17) FOC, Radio Polskie Lublin, 2 October 1944.
- (18) Moscow radio, 2 October 1944.
- (19) FOC, London, 2 October 1944.
- (20) AP, London, 3 October 1944.
- (21) S/D, London, 28 September 1944.
- (22) AP, Washington, 3 October 1944.
- (23) S/D, London, 25 September 1944.
- (24) AP, Moscow, 1 October 1944.
- (25) FOC, Finnish Home Service, 3 October 1944.
- (26) HNS, Berlin, 27 September 1944.
- (27) S/D, Stockholm, 28 September 1944.
- (28) S/D, Stockholm, 28 September 1944.
- (29) FOC, Finland, 1 October 1944.
- (30) S/D, Stockholm, 27 September 1944.
- (31) S/D, Stockholm, 26 September 1944.
- (32) Rya Dagligt Allehanda, 23 September 1944.
- (33) S/D, Moscow, 30 September 1944.
- (34) AP, Stockholm, 5 October 1944.
- (35) FOC, Berlin, 3 October 1944.
- (36) AP, Moscow, 1 October 1944.
- (37) S/D, Stockholm, 30 September 1944.
- (38) WP, Washington, 29 September 1944.
- (39) S/D, London, 29 September 1944.
- (40) S/D, Moscow, 30 September 1944.
- (41) S/D, Moscow, 3 October 1944.
- (42) FOC, Soviet European Service, 29 September 1944.
- (43) S/D, Moscow, 30 September 1944.
- (44) FOC, Moscow, 5 October 1944.
- (45) FOC, Moscow, 4 October 1944.
- (46) S/D, Moscow, 30 September 1944.
- (47) S/D, Stockholm, 28 September 1944.
- (48) S/D, Moscow, 28 September 1944.
- (49) S/D, Moscow, 29 September 1944.

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- (50) A/D, Moscow, 26 September 1944.
- (51) A/D, 27 September 1944.
- (52) AF, London, 4 October 1944.
- (53) FOC, Moscow, 3 October 1944.
- (54) FOC, Moscow, 28 September 1944.
- (55) A/D, Washington, 2 October 1944.
- (56) A/D, London, 3 October 1944.
- (57) A/D, Paris, 24 September 1944.
- (58) WD, HQA, 1 October 1944.
- (59) A/D, Moscow, 30 September 1944.
- (60) A/D, Caserta, 30 September 1944.
- (61) A/D, Caserta, 30 September 1944.
- (62) A/D, Caserta, 26 September 1944.
- (63) AF, London, 30 September 1944.
- (64) FOC, Ankara, 1 October 1944.
- (65) A/D, Ankara, 2 October 1944.
- (66) M/A, Ankara, 3 October 1944.
- (67) FOC, Sofia, 3 October 1944.
- (68) M/A, Ankara, 3 October 1944.
- (69) A/D, Moscow, 28 September 1944.
- (70) A/D, Caserta, 29 September 1944.
- (71) A/D, Caserta, 26 September 1944.
- (72) A/D, Ankara, 2 October 1944.
- (73) A/D, 2 October 1944.
- (74) M/A, Ankara, 3 October 1944.
- (75) M/A, Ankara, 27 September 1944.
- (76) M/A, Tehran, 9 September 1944.
- (77) A/D, Tehran, 2 October 1944.
- (78) AF, Moscow, 30 September 1944.
- (79) FOC, Tokyo in Italian, 2 October 1944.
- (80) A/D, Moscow, 1 October 1944.
- (81) FOC, Italian Home Service, 28 September 1944.
- (82) A/D, Rome, 29 September 1944.
- (83) A/D, Caserta, 1 October 1944.
- (84) A/D, Caserta, 26 September 1944.
- (85) AF, Bucharest, 28 September 1944.
- (86) A/D, Moscow, 27 September 1944.
- (87) AF, Ankara, 29 September 1944.
- (88) M/A, Ankara, 3 October 1944.
- (89) FOC, Turkish Telegraph Service, 2 October 1944.
- (90) A/D, Chungking, 3 October 1944.
- (91) A/D, 5 October 1944.
- (92) HET, 3 October 1944.
- (93) A/D, Moscow, 27 September 1944.

SECRET



WAR DEPARTMENT  
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[REDACTED] "TOT"

From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia

To: War Department

Mr: M 21265

4 Oct 1944

AGWAR for Bissell from Corokett signed Deane M21265

Following information from Soviets at ORABAT Conference. 1st Hungarian Panzer Div confirmed on front but German 25th Panzer Div not yet indentified. No German divisions in Baltics have as yet been removed from Soviet combat estimate; they continue to carry 28 Hun Divs this area.

Regarding situating German Division in Finland Soviets state all divisions, Albeit not all divisional units, have been identified since 1st October. Definite evacuation proceeding principally via northern roads into Norway.

106th and 107th Panzer Brigades arrived Army Group Center from Germany.

Hungarian light divisions recently arrived Soviet front:

4, 8th, 9th, 12, and 23rd.

German Divisions reformed and again in combat:

95th and 343rd Inf Divs Army Group Center, 357th Inf Div north Ukraine and 13th Panzer Div south Ukraine (Hungary).

ACTION: G-2

End

INFO: CG AAF OPD Col Park Log

CM-IN-4010

(5 Oct 44)

0045Z

pa

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

# TOP SECRET DISPATCH

ORIGINATOR	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>COMNORPAC</b>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		CINCPAC	PRIORITY 2
DATE <b>6 OCTOBER 1944</b>			ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROM: <b>061611</b>			BASEGRAM 6
DECODED BY <b>8JOSTEN</b>		COMINCH CTF 90	PRIORITY 9
PARAPHRASED BY <b>MONROE</b>	CHECKED BY		ROUTINE 10
ROUTED BY	DITTOED BY		BASEGRAM 13
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			14
<b>032357</b>			15
<b>NCR 6794</b>			16
Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP			17
(Use G. C. T.)			18

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(COMNORPAC SENDS. ACTION CINCPAC. CTF 90 HAS INFO BY HAND)

COMINCH 301550 SEPTEMBER. ADDITIONAL MEASURES HAVE BEEN TAKEN THAT ARE EXPECTED TO STOP ATTACKS ON RUSSIAN SHIPPING. HOWEVER LIMITED RANGE AIRCRAFT USED ON KURILE MISSIONS MAKES USE GREAT CIRCLE ROUTE PASSING NEAR CAPE LOPATKA MANDATORY. VISUAL ORIENTATION INTRODUCED VISIBILITY DIFFICULT ON ACCOUNT SIMILARITY COAST LINES AND TERRAIN KAMCHATKA AND NORTHERN KURILES. SUGGEST FOLLOWING IN ASSISTING U S PILOTS IN RESPECTING RUSSIAN TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

- ACCURATE TOPOGRAPHICAL CHARTS KAMCHATKA BE PROVIDED.
- OPERATION RADIO BEACON CAPE LOPATKA AT ALL TIMES (LOPATKA BEACON NOW OPERATES ONLY DURING LOW VISIBILITY)
- ESTABLISHMENT OF RADIO NAVIGATIONAL AIDS ON KOMONDORSKIS.

No. 1 ADMIRAL.

No. 2 FILE.

No. 3F-1 OR CHARTERED TRANSPORT

**TOP SECRET**

By DBS Date 4/2/94

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OPNAV 19-70

300 Russia 032357

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

# TOP SECRET DISPATCH

DRAFTER		EXT.	ADDRESSEES		PRECEDENCE
FROM			ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE		1
RELEASED BY			FOR ACTION		PRIORITY 2
DATE					ROUTINE 3
TOR CODEROOK					DEFERRED 4
					BASEGRAM 5
DECODED BY			INFORMATION		6
PARAPHRASED	CHECKED				PRIORITY 9
BY	BY				ROUTINE 10
ROUTED BY	DITTOED				DEFERRED 11
				BASEGRAM 12	13

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

IF OPERATIONAL  
CHECK BELOW  
☐

PAGE 2 OF 2

032357

NCR 6794

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP

(Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

RELUCTANCE RUSSIAN SHIPS TO ANSWER CHALLENGES PROMPTLY AND  
SHOW PRESCRIBED FLAGS AND IDENTIFICATION MARKINGS CONTINUES  
UNSATISFACTORY.

RDO HONOLULU PASSED INFO TO COMINCH AS 032357

COMINCH: COPIES 1 TO 8 INCLUSIVE

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OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM

No. 4 SPECIAL

**TOP SECRET**

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OPNAV 19-78

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

 UHR

*fi*  
From: US Military Attache, Ankara, Turkey

To: War Department 440  
CG, US Army Forces in Middle East, Cairo, Egypt. 1093  
2 October 1944

Number MILID 440 AMSME 1093.

Popularity of Russians and Communism has suffered noticeably as result widespread seizure of property in Bulgaria also ruthless conduct according Bulgarian official Kisselov who is in Turkey. His story corroborated by Americans who have just left Bulgaria including one correspondent.

End.

ACTION: G-2

INFO : CG AAP


OPD

COL PARK

G-CP-5

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OSD Letter, 6-8-72

MAY 20 1974

CM-IN-2127 (3 Oct 44) 0637Z mcs  



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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

-UHR  
CORRECTED COPY

From: US Military Attache, Ankara, Turkey

To: War Department

Nr: 443

2 October 1944

Number 443. MILID, Washington, D.C.

Dislike of Russians for certain individuals among British sent into Bulgaria, notably Gibson, Wolfson and Ellerington, is reported real reason Russians ordered British and American personnel out of Bulgaria.

All these considered by Russians to have White Russian sympathies and to be in Reds bad graces.

End.

Corrected copy of CM-IN-2231 (3 Oct 44) GEN BISSELL

ACTION: GEN BISSELL

INFO : GEN ARNOLD

OPD  
COL PARK  
C OF S


DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 5(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 4, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

CM-IN-4293 (5 Oct 44) 0500Z mcs  


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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~ "HR"

From: US Military Attache, Ankara, Turkey  
To: War Department  
Nr: 443 2 October 1944  
Mag nbr 443.

Dislike of Russians for certain individuals among British sent into Bulgaria notably \* is reported real reason Russians ordered British and American personnel out of Bulgaria all these considered by Russians to have White Russian sympathies and to be in \* graces.

End

\* Being Serviced.

ACTION: GEN BISSELL

INFO : GEN ARNOLD  
OPD  
COL PARK  
C OF S

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS Date MAY 21 1973

CM-IN-2231 (3 Oct 44) 1035Z mcs

~~SECRET~~

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94



WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

██████████  
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

30th September 44

From: War Cabinet Offices

To: Joint Staff Mission

NR: OZ 5684

Following received from 30 Mission.

"Begins"

AMSSO SHARF (AMSSO pass) APHQ (MAAF pass)

MIL 1922 September 30.

For Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated British Chiefs of Staff. Soviet G.S. communique for 29 September reports following places captured.

1. Riga direction Kalntsiemmuisha.
2. West and Southwest of Delatyn Ganek Mogelki Kereshmeze Lazeshchine.

End

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: CG AAF, OPD, G-2, Adm. King, Col. Park,  
Log

OM-IN-750 (1 Oct 44) 2133Z mk

██████████  
DECLASSIFIED  
JCS MEMO, 1-17-73  
BY DBS, DATE  
MAY 21 1973

*300 Russia*

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72  
By WBL Date MAY 21 1973

POLITICAL BRANCH

Project No. 50

30 September 1944.

POLITICAL ESTIMATE OF THE U.S.S.R., 22 SEPTEMBER TO 28 SEPTEMBER, INCLUSIVE.

1. Domestic Affairs.

a. Moscow Prepares for V-Day.

Leading architects in Moscow have been directed to make plans for the appropriate decoration of the city when Germany surrenders. When it is recalled that even minor victories have been celebrated flamboyantly by Moscovites, some idea may be gained regarding the scope of the current preparations.

Other reports describe the emersion of the people from the rather gloomy atmosphere imposed ever since 1941. Trade in the stores is brisk, restaurants are doing a land-office business, twenty theatres have opened their season, and more automobiles are appearing on the streets. The population is almost at its pre-war level, while the people are buskier and better clothed than last year. A dimout has replaced the four-year blackout, and thousands of workmen are restoring the most important buildings damaged by bombs. (Source 1)

b. Conferences of Rural Medical Workers.

The TASS agency reports that sixty conferences of rural medical workers are under way this week in various sections of the Russian S.F.S.R., attended by 50,000 delegates. Tretyakov, the Commissar of Health for the republic, claims that rural medical services have actually improved during the war: 1500 new medical stations have been opened, and last year rural doctors treated 100 million peasants in polyclinics and another million at

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home. These statements are quite at variance with reports of other observers who state that nearly all doctors and other medical workers were drawn into military service, permitting civilian health to decline. (Source 2)

c. Red Army Warned about Capitalist Civilization.

Leonard Sobolev, prominent Soviet war correspondent now in Bucharest, has written an article on reactions of Red Army men there to the trappings of capitalist civilization. His dispatch, printed both in "Pravda" and in "Red Fleet", implies that these Marxist-trained youths have been very favorably impressed by the painted and fashionably dressed women, the general cleanliness of the city, and the well-stocked stores and markets. Warning that true Red Army men will not be misled by "a lot of tawdry brilliance (and) deceitful phantoms of pseudo civilization", Sobolev pours scorn on the morals, culture and honesty of the Rumanians, who looted the Crimea while Soviet citizens starved. The chief significance of the article lies in the fact that it would never have been published had there not been too many cases of defection to be handled by punitive means. (Source 3)

d. Political Education in Red Army.

Ambassador Harriman reports that two articles have recently appeared in "Red Star" which indicate the constant Soviet concern with the political indoctrination of troops. The first article is devoted to the education of officers, and calls for the improvement of their intellectual and political qualifications through study of Marxism-Leninism. The second article demands a dynamic approach to the education of recruits, using "heart-to-heart comradely conversation" to make them see the relation between political aims and military success. (Source 4)

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e. Estonian SSR is Liberated.

Both the Berlin and the Leningrad radio stations announce the complete liberation of Soviet Estonia. Nikolas Karotamm, Secretary of the Estonian Communist Party, has declared that the retreating Germans did much damage to Tallin's industries but that these will soon be restored. (Source 5)

2. Polish Affairs.

a. International Attitudes.

Mr. Hull and Mr. Eden both stressed the delicacy of the Polish question this week. Mr. Hull moreover told a group of midwestern congressmen that the appointment of Mr. Arthur Lane as Ambassador to the London Government was additional assurance that the United States will stand by the Polish Government-in-Exile. (Source 6) Persistent questions in Commons as to why Russia had not earlier aided the Polish Patriot rising inside Warsaw led Mr. Eden to state that "...the question at issue is why one Allied Government did not give facilities to another ... that is a question that might well be discussed in the House". (Source 7)

Prime Minister Churchill said in Commons on 28 September that Poland would have to submit to postwar territorial changes but he added that "it would be an affectation to pretend that the attitude of the British Government ... and I believe of the United States ... toward Poland is identical with that of the Soviet Union".

To date Moscow has expressed no reaction to these implied Anglo-American criticisms of Soviet policy in Poland. Stalin in an interview with Ambassador Harriman "showed none of the animosity towards Warsaw Poles which he had manifested previously". (Source 8) However, he deprecated insurgent strength and said that General Bor could not be located in Warsaw, being

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presumably in hiding "commanding a radio station".

b. The London Government.

Political news from the London Government centers this week around their two most prominent generals, Bor<sup>and</sup>/Sosnkowski. The Germans, according to the London Government, place a rather higher value than Marshal Stalin on General Bor. They have put a price of \$1,600,000 on his head and have 200 secret agents on his trail. General Bor has been identified as Lieutenant General Tadeusz Komarowski, a Polish career officer from Lwow, (Source 9)

The question of General Sosnkowski's resignation, voted unanimously by the Mikolajczyk Cabinet on 22 September, has brought the internal crisis of the London Government to a head. It is an executive prerogative under the 1935 constitution to refuse to accept the Cabinet's suggestion in such matters. President Raczkiewicz, however, seems disposed to oust Sosnkowski if the Cabinet will counter by strengthening its Nationalist Party representation, now consisting of MM. Komarnicki and Seyda. Addition of M. Beresowski, underground representative of the Nationalist Party, has been suggested. (Source 10) Premier Mikolajczyk is anxious to avoid inclusion in the Cabinet of elements likely to antagonize the Soviet Government or the pro-Soviet Polish Committee of National Liberation; but the removal of Sosnkowski is so essential to Polish-British as well as to Polish-Soviet relations that almost any bargain would be acceptable. According to Charge d'Affaires Schoenfeld, Premier Churchill informed President Raczkiewicz through Mr. Eden that Sosnkowski must go. His resignation is probably the condition for any British implementation of Premier Mikolajczyk's suggestion to Mr.

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Eden that the British urge the Soviets to begin talks on the proposals made by the Polish Government.

The Polish situation has now crystallized to the point where direct action by the London Government is out of the question. Premier Mikolajczyk recognizes this fact. He indicated as much to Mr. Eden when the latter, on his return from Quebec, said that he "would like to see action on Polish-Soviet matters". Mikolajczyk-Soviet relations are at an impasse because the Soviet attitude is still that there is no Polish-Soviet dispute. The Polish Committee of National Liberation's appointment of Berut as Polish President makes Mikolajczyk-Polish Committee of National Liberation discussions impossible. (Source 11)

The only alternative to London Government action is some sort of British demarche backed by American approval. That this may be forthcoming is evidenced by Mr. Hull's statement and by AOC American Representative Kirk's favorable attitude towards General Anders' request that Poles in Rumania be evacuated. (Source 12) A definite limit has been set on the nature of such a demarche by Premier Churchill's remarks in Commons on 20 September concerning the "formidable and practicable difficulties" faced by Britain in promoting a London Government-Soviet accord. (Source 13)

c. The Lublin Government.

Undeterred by obvious Anglo-American disregard, the Lublin Government is continuing to consolidate its position. It has concluded a third international pact, this one with the Lithuanian SSR concerning transfer of population between Poland and Lithuania. The agreement was signed in Lublin by Osobka-Morawski on 22 September. (Source 14) The pact does not differ in its essentials from those concluded with the Ukrainian and Byelo-Russian SSRs.

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A transcript of a recent violent attack on the London "reactionary emigre" Government made by Osubka-Morawski in Lublin was broadcast by the Moscow radio on 25 September. (Source 15) This speech was apparently delivered to a convention of the Workers Party of Polish Socialists (left-wing Socialists) in Lublin, at which the Party pledged its support to the Council of the Homeland and the Polish Committee of National Liberation as the "democratic forms of rule which correspond to the will of the Polish people". A Provisional Supreme Council was elected with Boleslaw Brobner as Chairman and Osubka-Morawski as Chairman of the Central Executive Committee. (Source 16)

3. International Relations.

a. With Finland.

Eighty-five Russian members of the AGC arrived in Finland on 26 September and Colonel General Zhdanov, chairman of the Commission, is to arrive on 27 September. (Source 17) Former Soviet Minister to Helsinki P. D. Orlov has been designated as political adviser with the AGC. (Other Soviet members are: G. K. Yermakov, D. I. Popov, A. J. Ayefimov, P. I. Petuchov, M. G. Yermenko, K. N. Schmelev, M. A. Fisch, I. E. Tomilin, A. F. Semykin and N. W. Kolobaschkin. Remaining Soviet members and British members are to date unidentified.) (Source 18) Major Wallden and Lt. Colonel Ursin of the Finnish Army and certain officials of the Finnish Foreign Ministry will act as Liaison Officers between the Commission and Finnish authorities. (Source 19)

A Soviet Military Commission is to be sent to the Aland Islands, according to Stockholm's "Tidningen". Aland Islands' Soviet Consul Orlenko is

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expected to be head of the Commission. (Source 20)

On 23 September the Finnish Diet passed unanimously and without debate the armistice ratification bill and also gave its approval to the armistice agreement. (Source 21)

Finland has already started to fulfill the armistice terms. Finnish police are rounding up German and Hungarian Nationals for internment. (Source 22) A group of political prisoners have already been released. (Source 23) State Council has ordered suspension of 400 organizations and societies, in accordance with 21st article of armistice. (Refer to Weekly Political Estimate, 23 September 1944, paragraph 3 a.) (Source 24) Withdrawal of Finnish troops to 1940 frontiers was to be completed by 24 September. (Source 25) Porkkala will be handed over officially to Soviets on 29 September. (Source 26) Mannerheim's order of the day of 23 September requested troops to disarm or eject German troops in Finland. (Source 27)

b. With Germany.

The U.S.S.R. is continuing to express a dual policy towards Germany -- the "Free Germany" policy on the one hand and, on the other hand, the drastic policy publicized by Professor A. N. Trainin and Ilya Ehrenburg. The "Free Germany" radio in Moscow broadcast to Germany on 23 September a talk by a German officer urging that the Germans follow the Finnish example and, by contributing to Hitler's downfall, gain "leniency and magnanimity". (Source 28) A new group of 16 high German Army officers of the recently defeated Southern Ukrainian Army Group has issued to the German people an appeal endorsing the Seydlitz-Central Army Group appeal of 23 July. Total blame for defeat was placed on Hitler. This new appeal demonstrates continued Russian interest in sponsoring Army attacks on Hitler and the Party. By sheer

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numbers they are seeking to show that such appeals are genuine.

The Political Administration of the Red Army is giving special training to German POW's who are assigned to return to the lines and persuade others to surrender by describing the good treatment given German prisoners. (Source 29)

At the same time, the Soviet press implies disapproval of fraternization between U.S. and German troops by featuring letters of readers of English newspapers protesting such actions. (Source 30) That there is no real contradiction in these apparently conflicting Soviet attitudes is revealed by the fact that it has long been Soviet policy to encourage soldiers of capitalist nations to desert to the Red Army, while discouraging such desertion to the armies of any capitalist power even though the latter be an ally of the U.S.S.R.

Germany meanwhile is considerably modifying her policy towards Soviet POW's, as announced by Field Marshal Keitel for the High Command. The order reads as follows:

1. Membership in the Communist Party, for instance, Komsomol and its subdivisions, should have no influence on the treatment of prisoners of war.
2. In order to avoid disease, urgent care must be taken as to the regular feeding of Soviet officers, non-commissioned officers and lower ranks after they have been taken prisoner.
3. Cooperation of medical officers should be enlisted in an arrangement of accommodation for prisoners of war and also in connection with points near the front.
4. Equally correct behavior must be observed towards officers, non-commissioned officers and lower ranks, insignia, orders and medals should not be taken from them as souvenirs.
5. This order should be once again made known to all German units in the East in order that facts known to German officers and

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soldiers of bad treatment of comrades in Soviet captivity should not lead to retribution.

6. Members of the Red Army who lay down their arms for National, Political or personal motives should be given preference. (Source 31)

The recall to Berlin of heads of the German diplomatic missions to Lisbon and Madrid is alleged by Abwehr (German Military Intelligence in Lisbon) to be for advice on a Russo-German rapprochement. This statement parallels rumors of a German-Russian understanding current in Lisbon. Since Lisbon, however, has been the point of origin of other such statements designed to create suspicion among the Allies, the Abwehr report is presumed to be a "plant", (despite past information that some members of that service favor a separate peace with the Anglo-Americans). (Source 32)

c. With Italy.

A Soviet Trade Union Delegation is visiting Italy at the invitation of the Italian General Confederation of Labor, previously extended to American and British trade union leaders. (Source 33, 34) The official nature of Soviet Trade Union organization and hence the official character of their visit as distinguished from that of Anglo-American labor leaders is significant.

That the Soviet Government is not so occupied in Southeast Europe as to neglect its political interests in the west is indicated by the statements of Palmiro Togliatti, Italian Communist leader, supporting Bonomi's request for reduction of ACC control in Italy as regards internal economic problems and asking for an increase in combat opportunities for Italian Communist Partisans. He said that these Partisans had units to the strength of six divisions and named 300,000 as Communist Party membership in Italy. (Source 35)

d. With France.

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There are three possibly related reports from France this week which may be another indication of Soviet interest in western political stability. The Paris Communist Press is veiledly threatening General De Gaulle with popular disfavor if he fails to push revolutionary action. (Source 36) Ambassador Hayes reports that what amounts to an autonomous communist state defying Provisional Government authority has been established in Southeastern France. (Source 37) Generals De Gaulle and Juin have asked for French forces in North Africa to be sent to France "...as they are badly needed for preservation of order" and SHANF has approved their request by ordering AFHQ to transport these troops to France as soon as possible. (Source 38)

If these French troops are destined to restore order in Southern France and bulwark the Provisional Government against Communist pressure which due to difficulty of communication, etc. have a freer hand in the South of France than in Paris, or if they are intended to protect Franco's Spain against reported infiltration by 40,000 armed Spanish radicals, SHANF's action will probably disturb the Soviet Foreign Office.

The Paris Committee of Liberation took occasion to address a message to Marshal Stalin on the arrival of Soviet Charge d'Affairs Kostylov in Paris. The message expressed gratitude to the Soviet Union for her part in French liberation. Stress was laid on the necessity of close cooperation between France and Russia for the peace of the postwar world. The Paris Committee has a definite Soviet orientation. (Source 39)

e. With Bulgaria.

According to Soviet Ambassador to Turkey Sergei A. Vinogradov the Bulgarian Armistice terms are being discussed between the British, American and Soviet Governments, and the Soviet Government will insist that the

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negotiations be held in Moscow, with Ankara as the alternative. Vinogradov also stated that the Soviet commanders in Bulgaria had been instructed to rearm the Bulgarian troops which they had disarmed and that the Bulgarians are to be given every assistance in ousting Germans from Bulgaria. (Source 40)

The U.S.S.R. has agreed that as a pre-requisite to the Bulgarian armistice all Bulgarian troops be withdrawn from Yugoslavia and Greece, according to information obtained from the British Chiefs of Staff. The British Chiefs of Staff hope that the Soviets will be willing to announce these conditions to the Bulgarians without waiting for settlement of the armistice terms. (Source 41) General Wilson has been told that, owing to the change in the relations between Bulgaria and the U.S.S.R. (resulting from the latter's declaration of war upon the former) and the necessity of modifying the original Allies-Bulgarian armistice, the new armistice must be approved by the U.S.S.R. (Source 42)

On 25 September, Colonel Zaitsev<sup>14V</sup> of the Russian High Command requested OSS representatives to leave Bulgaria immediately. This action was taken on the ground that Soviet Government had not been informed of the exact functions of the OSS representatives. The Russians have indicated that OSS officials will not be allowed in the area until their status is clarified. (Source 43) The peremptory manner in which the order was issued may be deplored. However, the Soviet Government is undoubtedly anxious to dominate the Bulgarian scene, as it has the Rumanian. Until the Bulgarian armistice terms have been agreed upon, the situation in Bulgaria, particularly with respect to the functions of Allied representatives in the area, will remain confused. Withdrawal of the OSS personnel in Sofia, as well as of British Liaison officers

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who were also asked to leave because they had not been properly accredited, is being arranged by the Soviets. (Source 44)

According to FCC, Berlin reports that the Bulgarian Government has been compelled to fix the Soviet ruble at 15 lev (Bulgarian currency). Since the normal value of a ruble is 2 lev, this measure will effect rapid devaluation of Bulgarian currency. The Soviet Government has used this method before to link the national economy of Soviet-dominated countries inextricably with her own. (Source 45)

Russia, however, <sup>is</sup> apparently continuing a policy of moderation within Bulgaria, and normal order has been restored. Russian sound trucks, driving through the streets, assert that the U.S.S.R. does not propose to force its form of government on the Bulgarians, that the U.S.S.R. will help the Bulgarians set up any type of democratic government they desire, that the Red Army is not "occupying" the country, and that the U.S.S.R. will not enforce common ownership of property and land. (Source 46)

f. With Rumania.

Rumanians continue to complain about enforcement of the armistice terms. There is a feeling that the United States and Great Britain have broken their promises and abandoned Rumania. According to the Rumanian Armistice Commission, the Soviet representatives at the meeting in Moscow dominated the negotiations. It is also reported that the Russians intend to undermine King Michael and his Government. The King's representatives were ignored for 48 hours by the Russian General, Burenin. By disregarding its existence, the Russians have made it difficult for the Russian Government to function, and the Government's downfall is probable. (Source 47)

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According to an OSS source from Bucharest, 90% of the peasants in Rumania are opposed to communism but a great many industrial workers are sympathetic with Soviet Russia. (Source 48)

Russia has appointed the following as members of the Allied Control Commission: Chairman, Marshal Rodion Ya. Malinowski; Vice Chairman, Lt. General C. P. Vinogradov; Assistants to the Chairman, Rear Admiral P. L. Bogdanko and Colonel I. S. Sidorov. (Source 49)

Diplomatic circles in Mexico City are discussing the possibility of Carol's return to the Rumanian throne, as a result of conversations understood to be taking place between the Russian Ambassador, Constantine Gumanaky, and Carol. If the Rumanian people decide they want Carol back, it is alleged that Russia will offer no objections. It is asserted that Carol played an important part in Rumania's defection from the Axis, and that he had advised his son Michael to oust Antonescu. (Source 50)

g. With Albania

According to an OSS representative, certain National Liberation Committee members in Albania are glorifying Russia at the expense of the United States. The Soviet Mission, which arrived about a month ago, was greeted enthusiastically and, since then, four-fifths of the bulletins and news releases of National Liberation Committee have been datelined Moscow. (Source 51)

h. With Yugoslavia.

It was suspected that Tito, who left Vis on 18-19 September accompanied by General Marko Rankovic, Secretary of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, had gone to the Russian Headquarters on the Yugoslav-Rumanian border. (Source 52)

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Yugoslavia has granted Russia permission to operate against Germans and Hungarians from Yugoslavian soil. It is stipulated, that Russian forces must be removed as soon as they are no longer necessary, and that the Yugoslav National Liberation Movement's civil administration must be in power at the rear of the Soviet lines. (Source 53)

1. With Turkey.

Modifying his recent strong statements in Tanin, Yalchin asserted, in 15 September issue, that it was not the actual arrival of Russian forces in the Balkans but the manner of their arrival which disturbed Turkey. He went on to say that if the Russians had entered Bulgaria after reaching an agreement with the British and Americans, Turkey would not have been apprehensive. He added that, since it was not likely that Great Britain and the United States would allow Russia to dominate the Balkans, a controversy was inevitable. In contrast to this point of view, the Turkish paper Son Telgraf, for 14 September, claimed that Turkey did not consider the "establishment of a new and temporary neighborhood with the Soviets as a political or military event to cause anxiety". (Source 54)

j. With India.

On 17 September, the Soviet press published a dispatch datelined Delhi which forecasts the burial of the Atlantic Charter so far as the East is concerned. The dispatch also describes a proposal by S. J. J. Singh, President of the Indian League in America, that an arbitration council composed of United States, Soviet and Chinese representatives be sent immediately to India to plan Indian independence. This is the second of two items recently published on India, after a silence of almost two years. The method

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of publishing foreign dispatches is a typical Soviet method of preparing the ground for future editorial attacks. (Source 55)

k. With Iran.

A Russian Commission is now in Tehran chiefly to discuss the oil fields of northern Iran. It is headed by Sergei Kavtaradze, Vice-Commissar of Foreign Affairs, in charge of the Near Eastern Affairs. General Soviet-Iranian commercial and economic relations also will be explored by the Commission. Russian troops have been guarding the Kavir-Khourian oil concession which is strategically located athwart the rail and highway routes leading east and northeast to Tehran. The concession was acquired by Russia in 1925, and was the subject of an exchange of notes in 1941, the final Soviet note stating that it was understood that Iran was "prepared to conclude a new accord" in regard to the concession. (Source 56)

l. With Japan

U.S. Ambassador Steinhardt has definitely established that the Japanese Embassy in Ankara was the source of a rumor that the U.S.S.R. had made far-reaching demands on the Turkish Government. Since neither the Soviet Embassy nor the Turkish Foreign Office seems to have been aware of the rumor, the affair appears to have been a Japanese attempt to create Allied disunity, especially since Steinhardt heard about it from the Spanish Ambassador.

Evidently with the approval of the Soviets, the Finns broke relations with Japan on 22 September. Two days later the Japanese broke relations with Finland but refrained from offering the usual propaganda tirade, possibly in a desire to avoid any criticism of the U.S.S.R. Again, on 24 September all Soviet newspapers and the Moscow radio announced Stalin's

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reception of the U.S. and British Ambassadors to U.S.S.R., stating that they had reported on "decisions reached at Quebec" without mentioning that these decisions were concerned with how to crush Japan. It is significant that this news passed Moscow censorship, since all Russians known from previous Soviet dispatches that the two Allied leaders laid plans for Japan's defeat. It would appear from the events that the Japanese are more wary than the Russians about diplomatic good will toward each other. (Source 57, 58, 59)

m. With China.

The United States Consul at Tihwa predicts continued Sino-Soviet struggle for resources and control of Sinkiang. Current developments are: 1 Sheng, removed as governor in late August, finally proceeded to his new post at Chungking after participating in the 6 September trial of Chungking officials at Tihwa whom he had earlier arrested; 2 the fate of the arrested officials, who have confessed participation in the plot to establish a Soviet Sinkiang republic, is still undecided but our Consul questions the guilt of the Reconstruction Commissioner, despite his confession; 3 Soviet Consul being permanently transferred 5 September but he doubts that the change of chairmen will improve Sino-Soviet relations; 4 more Chungking troops and Secret Service agents were recently sent to Tihwa. (Source 60)

n. With the Allies and United Nations.

(1) In the Balkans.

The trend of Soviet-Anglo-American relations in the Balkans indicates that both the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom are determined to dominate politics in the Western Balkans. The United States and the United Kingdom, taking a lesson from Soviet diplomatic tactics, are making every concession on minor points of protocol while insisting on the integrity of their

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major policies. For example, the British Mission to the Soviet military authorities is being hurried to Bucharest in accordance with Russian desires, and the most polite official thanks have been presented to Soviet General Burenin for his assistance in evacuating U.S. POW's from Rumania (Source 61, 62) But the "forceful Anglo-American representations" concerning the unilateral behavior of Colonels Sokolov and Melnikov and insisting on "proper control" of Russian air operations in the Mediterranean suggested by General Wilson last week have been approved by the War office and forwarded to Joint Chiefs of Staff for immediate action. (Source 63, 64)

*Re Admin Bureau suggestion*

The Soviets have sustained several other such political reverses for their Mediterranean and Balkan policy vis a vis the Allies this week. The statement issued by Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt about Italy's status as an ally was broadcasted over the radio before Ambassador Harriman could act on instructions from the State Department to inform the Soviet Foreign Office concerning the Anglo-American decision, with the result that the only advance notification of this announcement given by the U.S. to the Soviets was a copy of the statement presented to the Russian Embassy in Washington. (Source 65)

With regard to the U.S. 7th Army's request for a Soviet officer to assist in handling displaced persons in Southern France, the British advise that such a request should be postponed until the Anglo-American Allies can ask for reciprocity in areas controlled by the Russians. (Source 66) Due to the Soviet ban on communications in Rumania, a separate British diplomatic mission (as opposed to the previously mentioned mission to Soviet authorities in Rumania) will have to be appointed for direct contact with Rumanian authorities, since the British section of the Control Commission will not have such

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communication. In a strong note to the Soviet Government, Britain cites Soviet action in Italy as precedent for this and for British refusal to limit British members of the Control Commission to five. The Soviet ban on communications from Rumania is also preventing the Swedish Minister in Bucharest from communicating with Stockholm. The State Department has requested Ambassador Harriman to inform the Soviet Foreign Office that "it is not reasonable" to keep the Swedish Minister from sending messages in the clear from Bucharest. (Source 67)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have informed the Supreme Allied Command in the Mediterranean that the shipping of U.S. supplies now in the Persian Gulf area to Bari for Yugoslavia under the Soviet flag cannot be approved. It is to be carefully explained to the Russians that the shortage of small ships in the Mediterranean Area and the abundance of supplies in Italy to supply Southeastern Europe are the reasons for this shipping policy. All Mediterranean shipping questions are henceforth to be regulated by the decisions of the U.S. and British Shipping Administrations. The Combined Chiefs of Staff pronouncement is the answer to the July demands of the Soviet Ambassador in Algiers which were obviously intended to promote Soviet stock in Yugoslavia. (Source 68)

The Anglo-American policy, however, has not been entirely successful. The question remains of how far west in the Balkans the Soviet sphere of influence shall extend, the test being Yugoslavia, where Tito has defied the Anglo-Americans, presumably under Soviet directions. His rejection of the British supported Subasic Government in favor of the Communist Partisan National Committee of Liberation was met by Anglo-American withdrawal of supplies. (Source 69) But the proximity of the Red Army and probable promise

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of full Soviet political support, have emboldened Marshal Tito to restrict Anglo-American freedom of action in Yugoslavia. (Source 70) This coupled with the Soviet request that British liaison officers and OSS personnel in Bulgaria be withdrawn immediately, indicates that the Soviets are anxious to consolidate their position in Bulgaria, and eventually in Yugoslavia, without Allied supervision. (Source 71) (For indications of Allied-Soviet friction in Bulgaria, see section 3 e)

(2) War Criminals.

It is becoming apparent that punishment for war crimes will be one of the Soviet High Command's main preoccupations in southeastern Europe, regardless of whether the Allies adopt a more lenient attitude in the west. A vast amount of evidence for use in prosecuting Balkan collaborationists for persecution of Russian and Allied peoples has been collected and the Soviet-supervised purges of State and Military machines in Rumania and Bulgaria will dispose of many "war criminals". (Source 72)

Ambassador Harriman states Soviet attitude towards war criminals is based on a political rather than a legal outlook, since the Russians do not recognize any law of war. He cites the example of differentiation in Soviet treatment between Germany Army officers on "Free Germany" Committee and Germany Army officers recently seized in the Balkans, although by legal standards individual guilt would be the same in both groups. (Source 73) Such unilateral decisions by the U.S.S.R. have been questioned by Dr. Boheman, Swedish Foreign Office Secretary, who seeks clarification as to the role to be played by the Allied War Criminals Commission. (Source 74)

(3) UNRRA.

The attitude of the U.S.S.R. toward UNRRA has been rather

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uncooperative. As in the question of definition of war criminals, the Soviets are attempting to use relief as a political weapon.

The Soviet Delegation to UNRRA has succeeded in introducing a new principle into relief distribution. They maintain that UNRRA relief should be distributed in Europe in such a way as to benefit the people who have contributed most to victory, making merit and not need the criterion of relief distribution, and the resolution adopted by the policy committee now embodies this principle. (Source 75) The U.S.S.R. has failed to submit the report requested by UNRRA on relief measures taken by Russian military authorities particularly in Poland. No action can be taken on American Poles' request that the State Department help move relief supplies into Poland's liberated areas because no permission has been given for the use of Russian railroads.

The U.S.S.R. has also vouchsafed no reply to UNRRA's letter asking whether UNRRA's aid would be needed to return the people who have either been driven from their homes by the war or deported. (Source 76)

The Russian delegation was unable to secure adoption of a plan whereby the U.S.S.R. would receive the lion's share of relief and the power to determine how much food, clothing and other supplies should go to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Greece. They were able, however, to win a reduction of their share of 1945 administrative expenses from \$1,125,000 to \$750,000. (Source 77)

(4) Postwar Terms for Germany.

TASS has said that the following conclusions on the results achieved by the European Advisory Commission could be drawn from available

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reports out of London, dependent, of course, on the results of a prospective meeting of Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt with Marshal Stalin: First, Germany's unconditional surrender, and second, Germany's division into three zones of occupation, the eastern part of Germany, including also East Prussia, constituting the zone of occupation by the Soviet armed forces. Berlin, although it falls into the zone of occupation of the Soviet armed forces in conformity with the agreement reached, shall also be divided into three zones and occupied by troops of all three powers. (Source 78)

The U.S.S.R. is expected to insist that the prospective three-power control plan for Germany spare industry in the Reich until the Germans have made payment in kind for the damage inflicted on Russia. According to one Soviet official, Russia wants to be paid, not in money, but in German production, and wants her property restored by German labor regardless of the length of time required to accomplish this and regardless of the consequent prolongation of Allied military occupation of Germany. Premier Stalin's own plans with respect to Germany apparently still are not known in detail in Washington.

According to Secretary Morgenthau, Russia wants East Prussia and most of Silesia to go to Poland in order to offset Poland's loss of eastern territory to the Soviet Union; she also wants labor battalions to work on reconstruction in the Soviet Union. Mr. Morgenthau feels that with her own huge needs for manpower, Russia is not interested in prolonged military occupation of Germany and would be willing to have Britain, the United States and other Allied countries do the job.

Secretary Hull is known to disagree with Mr. Morgenthau's views and to be determined that whatever plan is decided on finally here must

**SECRET**

## SECRET

be agreeable to Russia. He feels that it is essential to have British-Soviet American cooperation in immediate postwar Europe as a basis for long-range cooperation in a world security organization. (Source 79)

### (5) The November Election.

Marshal Stalin was quoted by Eric Johnston in October "Readers Digest" as saying: "I like to do business with American businessmen. You fellows know what you want. Your word is good, and, best of all, you stay in office a long time -- just like we do over here. But a politician is here today and gone tomorrow, and then you have to make arrangements all over with a new set". (Source 80)

The Soviet Premier's remark on the uncertain tenure of office of American state executives is highlighted by Earl Browder's speech in New York on 28 September, expressing in detail the Communist line with regard to the coming elections. Mr. Browder said that the election of the Republican candidate "...would...be an American invitation to Europe to plunge immediately or soon into the most devastating civil war". (Source 81)

- 22 -

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE  
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

STATE DEPT CABLE FOR INFO OF WAR DEPT  
WF

From: Ankara, Turkey

To: War Department

Nr: 1877

30 September 1944

The Prime Minister told me in conversation this morning that the Soviets were planning to occupy Macedonia and Thrace, according to information given him last night.

The Prime Minister was uncertain as to whether Salonika was included or not.

Steinhardt.

ACTION: Gen Bissell

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold  
Gen Handy  
CofS

CM-IN-700 (1 Oct 44) 2002Z bjm

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~  
DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72  
By DBS Date MAY 21 1971

300 Russia

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94



WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED] TOT

From: US Military Mission, Moscow Russia

To : War Department

Nr : M 21181

29 Sept 44

Operations Division from Deane M 21181.

Major General Michael Pavlovich Kutuzov has replaced Major General Evstigneev as Chief of the Foreign Relations Section of the Commissariat of Defense. No other information available.

End

ACTION: OPD

INFO : CG AAF  
G-2  
COL PARK  
C OF S

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 20 1974

CM-IN-27874 (30 Sep 44) 0211Z mos

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~ UHR

From: US Military Attache, Ankara, Turkey  
To: War Department 436  
CG, US Army Forces in Middle East, Cairo, Egypt 1086  
29 September 1944  
Number MILID 436 AMEME 1086

Returning to Buglaria shortly with Russian approval  
are ejected OSS lads who arrived Istanbul Thursday. All  
reported cleared at top.

End.

ACTION: Gen. Bissell

INFO : Gen. Arnold  
OPD  
Col. Park  
C of S

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 4, 1972

By DBS Date MAY 21 1973

CM-IN-28152 (30 Sep 44) 0713Z mlm

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

## NAVAL MESSAGE

## NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>ALUSNA MOSCOW</b>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY		CNO	2
DATE <b>29 SEPT 1944</b>	FOR ACTION		3
TOR CODEROOM <b>1301</b>			4
DECODED BY <b>MCPHERSON</b>	INFORMATION		5
PARAPHRASED BY <b>ARNOLD</b>		YORK PROTOCOL COMMITTEE	6
ROUTED BY <b>READY</b>			7
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			8
291010Z NCR 1443			9
IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW			10
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ORIGINATOR: FILL IN DATE AND TIME:

DATE

TIME

GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

FOR INFORMATION FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW TO YORK PROTOCOL COMMITTEE.

STATED BY RED NAVY CHIEF OF STAFF THAT MINES IN BLACK SEA PRESENT NO OBSTACLES TO REOPENING SHIPPING THERE AS ALL PORTS NOW BEING USED TO MINOR EXTENT THROUGH SWEEP CHANNELS. ANY INCOMING SHIPPING WOULD BE SOVIET PILOTED THROUGH PROPER CHANNELS. MINES IN BLACK SEA NOT CONSIDERED EXTENSIVE BECAUSE OF DEPTH OF WATER AND SOVIETS HOPE TO HAVE WHOLE AREA CLEARED BY END OF OCTOBER OR SHORTLY THEREAFTER

16...ACT

COMINCH...20G...CNO...NAVAIDE...200P

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3.3 and 3.4 of (S)

OSD Letter, May 1972

By DBS

DOWNO

**SECRET**

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV 19-67

291010Z

300 Russia

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED] "TOP"

PRIORITY

From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia

To: War Department

No: M 21173

28 September 1944

To AGWAR for the Chiefs of Staff from Deane. TOPSEC.  
M 21173.

The Peoples Commissariat of the USSR desire to bring the following violations of the Soviet State Border by American planes to your attention and request that immediate measures be taken to prevent further such violations.

At 1830 on 18th Sept two US aircraft appeared within the three mile territorial zone two miles southeast of Cape Lopatka Kamohatka; one of which opened machine gun fire on the Border Coast Guard Vessel Dzerzhinski while she was passing through the First Kurile Strait.

During the single week 14th-21st Sept the Soviet State Border was violated 13 times by American planes.

In connection with this subject the verification of identification warning instructions to Soviet Coastal Vessels as requested in US NAVCOM 232131 was made of the Red Navy on 24th Sept and no answer yet received. This may be related to above complaint.

End

ACTION: Joint Chiefs of Staff

INFO : Adm Leahy, Gen Arnold, OPD, Gen Bissell, Adm King  
C of S

CM-IN-26660 (29 Sep 44) 0144Z ejm

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 20 1974

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32

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED] "TOT"  
PRIORITY

*WHL*

From: US Military Mission in Moscow, Russia  
To: War Department  
No: MX 21161 27 September 1944

To AGWAR for Joint Chiefs of Staff and to AFHQ  
Caserta for General Wilson signed Deane. MX 21161.

Molotov has just asked the Ambassador to inform the US Government that Soviets recently requested Yugoslav Command and National Committee to allow Soviet units to enter temporarily Yugoslav territory adjacent to Hungary to operate against Germans and Hungarians on condition that Red Army Forces should be removed from Yugoslavia when their presence is no longer necessary. Molotov stated that the Yugoslavs had acceded to Soviet request with the proviso that the Yugoslav Civil Administration of the National Liberation Movement should function exclusively in the rear of the Soviet Forces. Molotov stated that the Soviet Command had accepted this proviso.

End.

ACTION: JC/S

INFO : Adm Leahy, CGAAF, OPD, G-2, Adm King, Log

CM-IN-25795 (28 Sep 44) 0310Z jb

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 20 1974

*300 Russia*

39

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94



MESSAGE		NAVY DEPARTMENT	
DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
M	AMERICAN CONSUL VLADIVOSTOK	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY		CNO	ROUTINE
DATE	26 SEPT 1944		DEFERRED
TOR CODEROM	2338		
DECODED BY	SAGER	ALUSNA MOSCOW	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY	WHITTINGTON / Baker		ROUTINE
ROUTED BY	KLAFF		DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
262300		NCR 9588	<input type="checkbox"/>

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

PART 1 - 260510, NCR 9602  
PART 2 - 262300, NCR 9588

ACTION CNO INFO MOSCOW FROM AMERICAN CONSUL  
VLADIVOSTOK.

LAST NIGHT MY INTERPRETER QUESTIONED FOR ONE HOUR  
BY SOVIET NKVD WHICH FIRST TIME SINCE JAN. THEY  
INTERESTED IN FOLLOWING. REASON CONGEN WARD'S  
DEPARTURE HIS FUTURE POST AND DUTIES WITH POSSIBLE  
CONNECTION USSR. WHETHER AMESTAFF REMAIN IN U.S.  
OR...\*.VEX IMPRESSIONS AND HABITS NEW CONGEN CLUBB.  
REASONS FOR CHIEF YEO PASHKOFF'S DEPARTURE AND  
DESTINATION. WHETHER HE DETACHED BY MY OR CONGEN'S  
ORDERS. CHARACTER AND HABITS HIS RELIEF. REASONS  
FOR LIEUT CRAM'S SUPERFICIAL COURIER VISIT AND

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

By Date MAY 21 1973

OPNAV 18-57

For Russia 262300

DECLASSIFIED  
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94



POSSIBILITY HIM RELIEVING ME. ASKED IF SHE HEARD OUR SOVIET SERVANTS SAY ANYTHING ANTI-AMERICAN OR PRO-GERMAN AND REQUESTED SHE REPORT ANY SOVIET UTTERING THINGS AGAINST AMERICA. ANSWERS DISCREET AND FAVORABLE HAD OPPORTUNITY COACH HER BEFOREHAND. QUESTIONING CONDUCTED BY ONE OF SAME OFFICERS IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES BUT EXTREMELY POLITE AND SOLICITIOUS COMPARED PREVIOUS OCCASIONS. HAVE REASON BELIEVE ALL SOVIET EMPLOYEES RECENTLY QUESTIONED BY NKVD CONCERNING PERSONNEL CHANGES HERE. APPARENTLY THEY ANTICIPATE UNKNOWN REPERCUSSIONS AND POSSIBLE REDUCTION AMERICAN AID TO USSR AS THERE HAS BEEN NO PREVIOUS EFFORT BY SOVIETS HERE TO CURB OCCASIONAL ANTI-AMERICAN FEELING.

NOT IN NEWS

\*2 GROUPS MISSING. WILL BE SERVICED IF REQUIRED.

16.....ACTION

COMINCH....20G....CNO....NAVAIDE....200P.....

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By \_\_\_\_\_ Date MAY 21 1973

AMCON VLAD

D/T Group 262300

NC 9588

Page 2

Of 2

Pages.

~~SECRET~~

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

From: War Cabinet Offices.

To : Joint Staff Mission.

Nr : OZ 5573. 26th September 1944.

Following received from 30 Mission Moscow T00 260835.

MIL 1901 for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated  
British Chiefs of Staff, SHAEF, Allied Force HQ, Soviet  
General Staff Communiqué 25th September. Report complete  
clearings of southern Estonia between Lake Võrtsjärv and  
Gulf of Riga. Latter reaches on coastal sector Pernovainazi.

T.O.O. 261255Z

End.

ACTION: OPD

INFO: CGAAP  
G-2  
Adm King  
Col Park

CM-IN-24926 (27 Sep 44)

0505Z

ben

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JCS MEMO. 1-17-73  
BY DSS, DATE

MAY 21 1973

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50

*Eas Russia*

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~ TOP  
URGENT

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

To: War Department

Nr: F 30321 25 September 1944

██████████ to AGWAR F 30321 for Marshall from  
Devers signed Wilson cite FHGBI

1. This refers to an order recieved from Russian High Command at 1100 hours 25 September which directed OSS (SI) to quit Bulgaria at once. The party was located at Sofia. The reason for this order is given that the US Government has not formally notified the Russian Government in Moscow of the status and functions of such party in the area controlled by the Russians.

2. The withdrawal of this party has been directed pending further representation through proper channels to determine the status of future SI parties. Understand Donovan and State Department have been advised of above through own channels.

End

ACTION: GEN BISSELL

INFO : GEN ARNOLD  
GEN HANDY  
C OF S

CM-IN-23740 (25 Sep 44) 2005Z mcs  
██████████

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JCS LETTER, 7-8-72  
BY DMS, DATE

MAY 21 1973

*Col. Park*

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

300 Russia

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

*J*  
[REDACTED] "UHR"

From: US Military Attache, Ankara, Turkey.  
To : War Department.  
CG, US Army Forces in the Middle East,  
Cairo, Egypt.  
Nr : 428 25 September 1944  
Number MILID 428 AMSME 1073.

Ordered out of Bulgaria under threat of arrest by  
Russians OSS Lads in Sofia and members of British intelligence  
are headed toward Turk frontier believed under Russian escort.  
Were told to leave by 1700 Monday or else. OSS Istanbul is  
source.

End.

See CM-IN-23740 (25 Sep 44) GEN BISSELL.

ACTION: GEN BISSELL

INFO : GEN ARNOLD  
GEN HANDY  
COL PARK  
C OF S

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) or (B)

OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

CM-IN-23818 (25 Sep 44) 2159Z by  
[REDACTED]

*300 Russia*  
18

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED] - UHR

WS.

See B

From: US Military Attache, Ankara, Turkey  
To: War Department  
CG, US Army Forces in Middle East, Cairo, Egypt  
No: MILID 410 AMSME 1052 18 September 1944  
Number MILID 410 AMSME 1052.

Head of Turkish Intelligence insists Russians are not interested in Straits but will seek control Persian Gulf and are interested in Persian oil. Majority Turk officials Istanbul including police chief are mortally afraid Russians will move in. Some rich Turks have moved from Istanbul and certain others are going.

Russian Air Attache says Straits will have be internationalized after war. Says does not think Russia has territorial ambitions at Turkish expense.

Russian Ambassador has recently with reference Turks made venomous remarks twice.

End.

ACTION: G-2

INFO: CG AAF  
OPD

Col Park  
Log

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OSD Letter, 5-3-72  
MAY 20 1974

CM-IN-17009

(18 Sep 44)

2111Z

pa

[REDACTED]

320 Russia

44

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94



## NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTEE	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>ALUSNA BEYOGLU</b>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY		<b>CNO</b>	<b>RRRRRRRR</b>
DATE <b>17 SEPT 1944</b>			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM <b>171715</b>			
DECODED BY <b>SMALL</b>			PRIORITY
TYPED BY <b>MARZOLF / Baker</b>			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY <b>READY</b>			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
<b>171159</b>			<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>NCR 1766</b>			

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:

DATE

TIME

GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ACTION

SPANISH MINISTER TELLS LT CONDR EARLE HE HAS REPORTED HIS GOVERNMENT INFORMATION FROM RELIABLE TURKISH SOURCE THAT RUSSIANS HANDED TURKS MEMORANDUM 12 SEPTEMBER CONTAINING FOLLOWING FOUR REQUESTS:

WITHDRAWAL TURKISH TROOPS 50 KILOMETRES FROM CAUCASIAN AND THRACIAN BORDERS.

ANGLO SAXON TECHNICIANS TO BE REPLACED BY RUSSIANS.

ABROGATION MONTREUX CONVENTION AND APPOINTMENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION WITH RUSSIAN CHAIRMAN TO GOVERN STRAITS.

TURKS TO GRANT RUSSIANS USE OF NAVAL AND AIR BASES AND TOLIA TO PROTECT STRAITS.

16...ACT

COMINCH...CNO...20G

NAVAIDE...2004...

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CONFIRMATION

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OPNAV 12-64

300 Russia

171159

DECLASSIFIED  
68D Letter 5-8-72  
MAY 20 1974

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

PLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94



## NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER

EXTENSION NUMBER

ADDRESSEES

PRECEDENCE

FROM **ALUSNA BEYOGLU**

ASTERISK (\*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE

CNO

RELEASED BY

DATE **12 SEPT 1944**TOR CODEROM **2124/12**DECODED BY **RISHIN**PARAPHRASE **MOORHEAD**BY **MORRIS**

ROUTED BY

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

121456

NCR 7130

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:

DATE

TIME

GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

FOR NAVAL AIDE TO PRESIDENT FROM LT COMDR EARLE.

WERNER POLISH PRESS ATTACHE HERE HITHERTO RELIABLE  
GIVES FOLLOWING REASONS FOR UNPRECEDENTED VIOLENCE  
OF PRESENT ATTACKS BY OFFICIAL MOSCOW RADIO ON  
TURKISH GOVERNMENT AND OFFICIALS HE BELIEVES  
THERE IS POSSIBILITY OF RUSSIAN ULTIMATUM TO  
TURKEY DEMANDING NAVAL AND AIR BASES ON PRETEXT  
OF DRIVING GERMANS FROM AEGEAN AND GREECE. SIMILAR  
MOSCOW RADIO ATTACKS HAVE PRECEDED RUSSIAN MOVES  
AGAINST OTHER COUNTRIES SOWI.

16.....ACT

COMINCH.....20G.....CNO....NAVAIDE...20OP....

ACTION

F-0	22
F-01	23
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OPNAV-NCR-12

121456

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983 Letter, 5-8-78  
MAY 20 1974

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

PLR 101

by RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>ALUSNA MOSCOW</b>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		<b>CNO</b>	PRIORITY
DATE <b>9 SEPT 1944</b>			<b>RRRRRRRR</b>
TOR CODEROM <b>1522</b>			DEFERRED
DECODED BY <b>BOUDREAU</b>			
PARAPHRASED BY <b>VOSBURGH</b>			PRIORITY
ROUTED BY <b>WHITTINGTON</b>			ROUTINE
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			DEFERRED
<b>090912Z</b>			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
<b>NCR 4736</b>			<input type="checkbox"/>
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:			
DATE			TIME
			GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

BRITISH INTELLIGENCE REPORT INDICATES SOVIETS HAVE  
CAPTURED FOLLOWING VESSELS IN CONSTANTA

29 SMALL NAVAL CRAFT

23 MERCHANT SHIPS

4 TUGS

8 HARBOR SURFACE CRAFT (PRESUMABLY LIGHTERS)

NO KNOWLEDGE OF SUBMARINES BUT THEY ARE STILL OPER-  
ATING AND HAVE BEEN HEARD WORKING SOFIA W/T

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 8(b) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

16.....ACT

COMINCH....20G....CNO....NAVAIDF....200P.....**SECRET**

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-19-07

090912Z

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

ACTION	
F-0	
F-01	
F-02	
F-05	
F-07	
F-1	
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F-20	
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F-33	
F-34	
F-4	
FX01	
FX30	
FX37	
FX40	
IG-00	
VCNO	

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE  
URGENT

From: US Military Mission in Moscow, Russia

To: War Department

No. M 20890

8 September 1944

To Joint Chiefs of Staff from Deane [REDACTED] M20890.

It appears that the time has arrived when collaboration between Anglo-American Forces and Red Army Forces is necessary. Soviets are undoubtedly regrouping and bringing up supplies for resumption of general offensive. Presume that it will soon be necessary for Anglo-American forces to consolidate gains and develop further plans which may cause temporary lull in our operations. It would seem to be of utmost value to us to know when the Red Army offensive is to be resumed and of equal value to Soviets to know our plans as far as they can be foreseen. Suggest that Combined Chiefs of Staff send Burrows and me instructions on the subject. //

In view of the concentration of German air strength on Russian Front suggest that consideration be given to offering to support new Russian offensive for limited period with from four to eight groups of Fighters or Fighter-Bombers provided they are clearly surplus and we cannot use them to advantage. These groups could be based as far forward as possible, at points designated by the Russians. They could carry out missions assigned by Russians under American operational control. Elaborate installations should be avoided. Servicing could be done from present American bases by flying mechanics, spare parts, etc. To the airdromes which were used. Gasoline and oil and spare parts could be shipped in advance from present American bases.

CM-IN-6817 (8 Sep 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 20 1974

33

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

"TOT"

URGENT

Page 2

From: US Military Mission in Moscow, Russia

No. M 20890

8 September 1944

I do not know what the Russian reaction to such an offer would be. They might refuse because of a desire to accomplish victory single-handed, but even a refusal would be of some value in enabling us to gauge the extent of Russian desire to collaborate. In the event you believe that such an offer should be made I recommend that they be given not to exceed one week to accept or decline.

End

ACTION: JCS

INFO : Adm Leahy, Gen Arnold, Gen Handy, Gen Bissell,  
Adm King, C of S

CM-IN-6817 (8 Sep 44) 1225Z jb

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RUSSIAN ARMY COMMANDERS

Finnish Front	General Frolov
Leningrad Front	Marshal Govorov
3d Baltic	General Maslennikov
2d Baltic	General Yerenenko
1st Baltic	General Bagramian
3d Byelo-Russian	General Cherniakovsky
2d " "	General Zakharov
1st " "	Marshal Rokossovsky
1st Ukraine	Marshal Konev
4th Ukraine	?
2d Ukraine	?
3d Ukraine	General Malinovsky

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DDO EML 5200.0 (9/27/88)

Date- 6-9-71

Signature- RHP

300 Russia

[Filed between telegrams dated  
Sept 8 & Sept 1944]

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94



~~SECRET~~  
WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**OUTGOING MESSAGE**

Combined Chiefs of Staff  
77500

5 September 1944

Commanding General  
Allied Force Headquarters  
Caserta, Italy

Supreme Headquarters  
Allied Expeditionary Forces  
Main Echelon  
London, England

Commanding General  
European Theater of Operations  
United States Army (Rear Echelon)  
London, England

Commanding General  
USAF In Middle East  
Cairo, Egypt

Commanding General  
Persian Gulf Command  
Teheran, Iran

Number: WARX 25952

TOPSEC to Wilson for action, to SHAEF London for Eisenhower, to ETOUSA London pass to British Chiefs of Staff, to Giles pass to Paget, and to Connolly for information, FAN 405 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

1. The reference is NAF 736. Combined Chiefs of Staff agree:

- (a) Only those special types of supplies, including such required by the Russian Air Squadron, not available in the Mediterranean should be furnished by the Russians through the Persian Gulf

CM-OUT-25952

(6 Sept 44)

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RHP 6-9-71

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39

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3 to Russia  
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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94



~~SECRET~~  
WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**OUTGOING MESSAGE**

Page 2

Number: WARR 25952

5 September 1944

and transported in Allied shipping. Special types of supplies, however, for the Partisans should also be restricted to those for which the Partisans have a definite operational need, urgent enough to ensure priority in delivery from Italy to Yugoslavia.

- (b) That no craft should be transferred to the Soviet Flag for carriage of supplies to Bari from the Persian Gulf.

2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff are informed that approximately 3,000 tons of Soviet supplies consigned to Bari have arrived at Khorramshahr and are being held by the Commanding General, Persian Gulf Command, pending further instructions. When you are informed of the nature of these supplies you should call forward, through the Commanding General, Persian Gulf Command, such types as fall within the category described in paragraph 1 (a) above.

3. Shipping space can be arranged for by application to British or U. S. shipping authorities.

4. Combined Chiefs of Staff consider that in order to avoid misunderstanding with the Russians you should inform the Russian authorities of the reason for imposing restrictions on shipments (E. G. with shortage of small craft in the Mediterranean and the abundance of supplies now available in southern Italy) and arrange for the Russians to coordinate with you such movement of specific stores intended for delivery to Marshal Tito.

End

ORIGINATOR: Gen. MacFarland (CC/S)

INFORMATION: Gen. Somervell  
Gen. Arnold  
Adm. Leahy  
OPD  
Gen. Bissell  
Adm. King  
LOG

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RHP 6-9-71

CM-OUT-25952

(6 Sept 44) 0222Z ss

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PLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED] - IVI

WHL

From: US Military Attache, London, England

To: War Department

No: 14118

4/September 1944

From Dunn ar nr 14118.

Chief Czechoslovakian Intel Department who in very close Russians, states they intimate Germans are opening western frontier to Anglo-Americans and holding in east. When he demonstrated utter rout German armies in west Russians said second front had now become principal front and they are worried western Allies will get to Berlin before them. Same sources states Warsaw episode "political warfare" meaning lack of cooperation by Russians with Poles deliberate design to destroy Partisan groups controlled by Polish London Govt and discredit same. A2 our evaluation.

End.

ACTION: G-2

INFO : CG AAF

OPD

COL PARK

LOG

DECLASSIFIED

OSD Letter, 8-8-72

MAY 20 1974

CM-IN-3698 (5 Sep 44) 0537Z mcs

[REDACTED]

3 as Russia

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PREDICENCE
FROM	ALUSNA MOSCOW	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY		CNO	ROUTINE
DATE	31 AUGUST 1944		DEFERRED
FOR COORDINATOR	1530		
DECODED BY	OLEARY		PRIORITY
TYPED BY	FAGER		ROUTINE
ROUTED BY	NORNGEN		DEFERRED

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS MESSAGE WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PREDICENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

PAGE 1 OF 2 311215Z NCR 8217

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME OCT

OR OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ALUSNA MOSCOW SENDS ACTION CNO

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM ROULLARD VLADIVOSTOK WHEN ASKED FOR ANY AVAILABLE INFO OF A RAILROAD FROM PETROPAVLOVSK TO CAPE LOPATKA AS MENTIONED IN JPS 467 REVISED.

"PERSONAL OPINION RR DOES NOT EXIST YOUR 290940.

BELIEVE THERE IS FAIR MOTOR ROAD CONNECTING LOPATKA WITH UST BOLSHERETSK THENCE PETRO VIA RR. ONLY TRAILS ON EAST COAST. OPINION BASED ON CONVERSATION WITH SAILORS AND LABORERS WHO HAVE WORKED OR CALLED PETRO WITHIN PAST FEW WEEKS. SOVIET 2ND 5 YEAR PLAN CALLED FOR RR FROM PETRO TO UST BOLSHERETSK THIS WAS COMPLETED ABOUT 3 YEARS AGO AND HAVE CONFIRMED EXISTENCE FROM VARIOUS FAIRLY RELIABLE SOURCES. PLAN ALSO CALLED FOR EXTENSION OF RR FROM UST BOLSHERETSK

**SECRET**

O. 11662, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVY REGS.)

MAY 21 1973

OPNAV IN-AT 300 Russia

311215Z

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
PLR 101  
By RT-NARA, Date 4/2/94

SOUTH TO OZERNAYA AND NORTH TO ICHABUTI HAVE NO CONFIRMATION. PURPOSE OF LATTER WAS TO SERVE CANNING FACTORIES AND NO MENTION OF RR ANYWHERE EAST COAST OF PENINSULA PROBABLY NOT FEASIBLE DUE DIFFICULT TERRAIN AND LITTLE COMMERCIAL ADVANTAGE. LIKEWISE NOT MUCH MILITARY ADVANTAGE BECAUSE SUBJECT WITHIN BOMBING RANGE JAPS COMGEN WARD HAS NO INFO SUBJECT RR AND DURING HIS TOUR OF DUTY IN FAR EAST HAS HEARD NOTHING. NAVIGATIONAL AIDS ON LOPATKA AND VICINITY ACCORDING RED NAVY SERVED ONLY BY SEA. SUGGEST FURTHER INQUIRIES BE MADE FROM COM 17 ADAK SINCE OUR BOMBERS AND RECTA PLANES RED NAVY STATES REGULARLY FLY OVER AREA"

**DECLASSIFIED**

E.O. 11652, Sec. 5(b) and 5(d) or (H)

OSD letter, May 1, 1973

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

16....ACTION

COMINCH....CNO....27G....NAVAIDE....27OP....13....

Originator ALUSNA MOSCOW D/T Group 3112157 <sup>8217</sup> NCR Page 2 Of 2 Pages.

OPNAV-10-81  
184100

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E.O. 12386, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
PLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94



WAR DEPARTMENT  
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY  
MOST IMMEDIATE

From: War Cabinet Offices

To: J.S.M. Washington

No: OZ 4798 28 August 1944

Following received from 30 Mission.

BEGINS

MIL 1791

28th August 1944


For Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated: British  
Chiefs of Staff, SUPreme H. Q. Allied Expeditionary  
Force and Allied Forces H. Q. (via MAAF).

Russian General Staff report forcing of Danube  
south of Ismail and capture of Tulcea on August 29th.

T.O.O. 281433Z

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : CGAAF, OPD, G-2, Adm King, Col Park, Log

CM-IN-26973 (29 Aug 44) 1549Z jb  


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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~  
URGENT

28 August 1944

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy  
To: British Chiefs of Staff  
Info: Joint Staff Mission, for U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff

Signed Wilson cite PACOS. FX 88974. Medcos 177.

In view of COS(W) 280\* I think I should make it clear, in amplification of paragraph 6 of Medcos 142, that I have nothing against Colonel Sokolov personally and would indeed be reluctant to see him replaced as Soviet Representative at Bari. (AOC) Balkan Air Force has now succeeded in working up a very good personal relationship with Sokolov and thinks any replacement would be most unlikely to be an improvement. Furthermore we now know that the initiative in the incident described in Medcos 142 did not lie with Sokolov but that he acted on instructions from Colonel Melnikov, the acting head of the Russian Mission to Tito, and Sokolov's immediate superior. Melnikov has recently gone out of his way to make this clear to AOC, BAF.

I should therefore prefer that no request be made at this juncture for the withdrawal of Sokolov. For the rest I adhere to the views expressed in MEDCOS 142 and concur in the recommendations made in COS (W) 280 that strong combined representations should be made to the Soviet Military Authorities in Moscow.

End

MEDCOS 142 is CM-IN-2607 (3 Aug 44) CCS

\*C.C.S. 638/2.  
ACTION: CCS.

INFO : ADM LEAHY, CG AAF, OPD, GEN BISSELL, ADM KING, LOG

CM-IN-745 (1 Sep 44) 1945Z mcs

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JCS LETTER, 7-8-72  
BY DSS, DATE

MAY 21 1973

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94



WAR DEPARTMENT  
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

From: 30 Mission Moscow

To: Joint Staff Mission  
AFHQ

Nr: OZ 4743 25 August 1944

Following received from 30 Mission Moscow MIL 4869  
82 for C.C.S. (R) SHAEF, AFHQ.

Russian G 260 summary of operations for 24th August  
states enemy group of not less than 12 divisions now sur-  
rounded south west of Chisinau, as result of advances by  
second and third Ukranian front.

End

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: CG AAF  
OPD  
G-2  
Adm King  
Col Park  
Log

CM-IN-24072

(26 Aug 44)

1458Z hrt

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JCS MEMO, 1-17-22  
BY DSS, DATE

MAY 21 1973 65

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED] "TOT"

From: US Military Mission, Moscow Russia

To: War Department

Nr. M 20688 24 August 1944

For Bissell from Crist signed Deane M 20688.

Soviet air reconnaissance report 19th August says

"Germans between 13th August and 17th August transported 31st Field Division from Insterburg to Tairgulinna by use of 120 JU 52 based on Insterburg. Arrival of 2 more divisions by air expected."

Is ground intelligence from above quoted source desired by WD or does such intelligence arrive through air or Russian channels?

End

ACTION: G-2

INFO : CG AAF  
OPD  
Col. Park

CM-IN-22638 (24 Aug 44) 2351Z ulm

[REDACTED]  
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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 20 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

From: War Cabinet Offices  
To: Joint Staff Mission  
Nr: MIL 1775 23 August 1944

Following received from 30 Mission Moscow for CCS  
repeated British Chiefs of Staff, SHAEF, AFHQ. From  
Generals Deane and Burrows.

Soviet General Staff summary of operations for  
22nd August report capture of Negepstî, Rafaile, Buhaesti  
in Jarey sector. T.O.O. Nil.

End

ACTION: CC/S  
INFORMATION: CG AAF  
OPD  
G-2  
601 Park

CM-IN-22610

(24 Aug 44) 2327Z amb

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JCS MEMO, 1-17-72  
BY DSS, DATE

MAY 21 1973

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY REQUIRES ADDITION OF LETTERS  
"TOT" TO CLASSIFICATION OF REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

From: US Military Mission Moscow, Russia  
To: War Department  
Nr: M 20527 10 August 1944  
To WDGBI signed Deane M 20527.  
No change our M 20335 answering your WAR 74036  
relative morale.

End.

NOTE: M 20335 is CM-IN-24603 (29 July 1944) G-2

ACTION: G-2

INFO: CGAAF, OPD, Col. Park ✓

CM-IN-9932 (11 Aug 1944) 1543Z emh

[REDACTED]

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 20 1974

300 Russia

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
NAVY DEPARTMENT

**INTELLIGENCE REPORT**

Serial FT-55-144 Monograph Index Guide No. 505-200  
(Start new series each year, 1. a. 1-40, 2-40)  
(To correspond with SUBJECT given below. See O. M. I. Index Guide. Make separate report for each main title.)

From Op-16-FT at Washington, D. C. Date 9 August, 1944  
(Ship, fleet, unit, district, office, station, or person)

Reference Op-16-FT serial 52-144 of 8 July 1944, Soviet Shipping - June 1944  
(Directive, correspondence, previous related report, etc., if applicable)

Source Official Records Evaluation R-2  
(As official, personal observation, publication, press, conversation with—  
Identify when practicable, etc.) (As reliable, doubtful, unverified, etc.)

Subject SOVIET SHIPPING - PACIFIC - JULY 1944  
(Nation reported on) (Main title as per index guide) (Subtitle) (Make separate report for each title)

BRIEF.—(Here enter careful summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated; include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

LA PEROUSE RESTRICTIONS LIFTED FOR SOVIET VESSELS...MERSHIP  
IDENTIFICATIONS USED BY NAVY CRAFT...ARCTIC PROGRAM...  
SIBERIAN PORT OPERATION...DROP IN SIBERIAN TURNAROUND RECORD...  
NAGAEVO CONSTRUCTION INDICATED...WEST COAST OPERATIONS...  
ADDITIONS AND REVISIONS...REPAIRS...LOSSES AND ATTACKS...  
SUMMER SLUMP ANTICIPATED.

LA PEROUSE RESTRICTIONS LIFTED FOR SOVIET MERSHIPS

1. Absence of reports of ships transiting Tartary Strait en route to Vladivostok from U. S. west coast indicates that Soviets are routing their merchant vessels through La Perouse regardless of former U. S. registry or "strategic" nature of deck cargo. Liberty-type ships now carry jeeps on deck through these Jap-patrolled waters. This practice contradicts earlier report that Tartary would be used for ships loaded with war materiel.
2. Only known instance of cargo off-loaded at Petropavlovsk, presumably for policy reasons, was of PT boats discharged early in June by the new Lend-Lease tanker TAGANROG before proceeding through La Perouse to Vladivostok. PT boats carried uncrated on deck by Russian tanker BATUMI, presently en route Vladivostok, will also be discharged at Petropavlovsk, it is expected, before transit of La Perouse.
3. Since mid-July, warships and auxiliaries of Red Navy and hydrographic vessels proceeding through Siberian waters to Cape Lopatka vicinity have kept to standard route established for merchant vessels via Tartary Straits and northern Okhotsk Sea. Hydrographic vessels may in exceptional cases only use La Perouse.

MERSHIP IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM ADOPTED BY NAVY CRAFT

4. Naval vessels of the Soviet Pacific Fleet now carry the same identification system as merships, in addition to naval ensign or naval auxiliary flags.

Note: Naval auxiliary flag, as distinguished from Red Naval Ensign, has blue field with white union carrying red star, hammer and sickle.

Distribution By Originator

Routing space below for use in O. M. I.

Op-16-A-3-e	Op-20-G (3)	Alusna Moscow	NID 18 (5)
(via Op-16-F)	Op-50-C	Alusna Ottawa	NSD Akutan
Op-16-B-5	Cominch	AmCon Vladivostok	MID (7)
Op-16-B-2	Cominch F-22 (3)	Port Directors:	WSA (3)
Op-16-FA-5	Cominch FX-37	San Pedro	FEA (2)
Op-16-FE (2)	CinCPac (2)	San Francisco	FEA (Div. Soviet Supply) (2)
Op-16-FP (2)	ComSubPac (2)	Seattle	
Op-16-P-2	ComNorPacFor (5)	ZDIO Portland, Ore.	Naval Aide
Op-16-P-4	ComAlasSeaFron (2)	ZDIO San Pedro	USCG
Op-16-Z (1)	ComWestSeaFron (2)	EDIO Anchorage	DIO:
(O.S.S.) (2)	ComHawSeaFron	NOB Dutch Harbor	3, 11, 12, 13 (3),
Op-16-J.I.S.	Adv.Int.Ctr. NorPac	NOB Adak IU	17.
Op-12	NSHQ Ottawa (1) (4)	NOB Attu IU	BuShips
Op-13	Alusna Vancouver (2)	State (2)	

DECLASSIFIED  
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

11652, Sec. 303 and 4(1) or (2)

OSD letter, May 1 1972

DBS

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10

10



9 August 1944

ARCTIC PROGRAM

5. Sixteen of the 30 vessels slated for Arctic ports during 1944 departed west coast ports in July, making a total of 22 sailings to this area in the present season. These ships have taken two routes between Akutan and Providence Bay, approximately half following the course, in reverse, prescribed by Soviets naval authorities for vessels sailing from Providence for U. S. during the 1943 season, through 56.50N - 174.30W and 60.30N - 174.30W. Others have been routed through the points 57.01N - 167.30W and 63.02N - 172.44W.

6. With one exception, all icebreakers which had been concentrated in the Vladivostok area for repairs departed during the first week of July for the Arctic, where they are assisting vessels through Bering Strait and along the Arctic coast. The icebreaker JOSEF STALIN, in operation out of Molotovsk during the past winter, departed 4 July eastbound, scheduled to make shuttle trip to Bering.

7. Sixteen vessels sailing for Arctic ports in July carried a total cargo of 65,500 tons, consisting mainly of petroleum products, vehicles, foodstuffs, machinery and clothing. The large shipments of petroleum products to Ambarchik and Tiksi are reportedly for use of Alsib air route, to be transhipped by river to airports at Seimohan and Yakutsk. Airfields at Velkal and Markovo are supplied by shipments direct to Kresty Bay, Ugolnaya, and Anadyr.

SIBERIAN PORT OPERATIONS

8. July movement at Siberian ports of vessels in the transpacific run was as follows:

	<u>Sailings</u>	<u>Arrivals</u>
Vladivostok and Nahodka	27	42
Nikolaevo	2	1
Petropavlovsk	2	3
Nagaevo	1	5
Sovietskaya Gavan	1	
Port Rybnovsk	1	3
Providence Bay	2	19
	36	73

DROP IN SIBERIAN TURNAROUND RECORD

9. Average turnaround time for all vessels departing Siberian ports during the month lengthened to 14 days, compared with 8.4 in June. Tankers discharged and sailed within 6.8 days, against 5.2 in June. At Vladivostok, unloading required more time than at other ports, Liberty ships remaining in port as long as 20 days at this main terminus. As the month of July progressed, turnaround time tended to increase, presumably due to the faster rhythm of arrivals. In spite of the large number of arrivals, the inward westbound cargo on the wharves of Vladivostok was estimated in mid-July not to exceed 100,000 tons. Rail clearance at that time was being effected without delay.

NAGAEVO CONSTRUCTION INDICATED

10. Cargo of steel railroad turnouts and switch stands consigned to Nagaevo on one of the five vessels arriving at this port from U. S. during July gives rise to speculation on possible railroad construction in this area.

WEST COAST OPERATIONS

11. Fifty-four July sailings of Soviet merchant ships loaded with aggregate cargo of 339,500 tons topped all previous monthly totals, although falling somewhat short of expectations, partly due to shortage of longshoremen at Portland. (A sizable advance had been anticipated over June total of 333,000.)

(Over)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3.3 and 3.4  
OSD Letter, May 4, 1972  
Date MAY 21 1973  
By DBS



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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(R) and 5(D) or (H)

Op-16-FT  
FT-55-44

OSD letter, May 1, 1973

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

-3-

9 August 1944

12. In addition to the unusually large number of locomotives loaded during the month of July (108), the first shipment of power trains via the transpacific run left on 27 July aboard the EC-2 KAMENETS PODOLSK. A number of such shipments are contemplated on Liberty ships with strengthened deck plates, each vessel carrying two complete trains consisting of 10 cars sixably larger than ordinary locomotive.

#### ADDITIONS AND REVERSIONS

13. Another EC-2 converted tanker, the APSHERON (ex-CHARLOTTE GILMAN), was transferred to the U.S.S.R. on 25 July, no replacement being required of the Soviets. On her first voyage, the new vessel will carry lubricating oil.

14. The JOSEF STALIN has been decided upon as the second tanker to revert to U. S. in exchange for the EMBA (see Op-16-FT serial 52-44, dated 8 July 1944). In view of the tight petroleum shipping schedule, however, a second trip to Siberian ports will be permitted the STALIN before she is turned back.

#### WEST COAST REPAIRS

15. In order to relieve U. S. west coast shipyard condition, arrangements have been made for repair of Soviet vessels in Victoria, B. C. Upon completion of the work, vessels will return to U. S. ports for cargo loading. Canada will attempt repair of the icebreaker DOBRINYA NIKITICH, which WSA had declined.

#### LOSSES AND ATTACKS

16. On 5 July the Soviet coastal vessel OB (2,198 g.r.t.), bound from Vladivostok to Petropavlovsk with 2300 tons of coal, 60 passengers and a crew of 40, was torpedoed and sunk at approximately 51.29N - 155.11E, seventy miles northwest of Cape Lopatka. Twenty-one survivors reached Ozernoye by lifeboat. At this position, the OB was 80 miles south of the standard route for Soviet ships, having apparently laid course directly for the First Kuril Strait. It has been reported that Soviet masters have deviated frequently from proscribed courses in order to save time.

17. Two firemen of crew of BELORUSSIA (last reported in March drifting in icefield off Etorufu Shima) arrived Vladivostok the end of June from Japan. Only survivors of the 25 or 30 who abandoned ship, they reported that their ship had been sunk by three torpedoes from an unidentified submarine on or about 3 March. After making their way across 3 miles of broken icefields to Etorufu, they were eventually picked up on shore by Japanese fishing boats, transferred to a Japanese ship, and taken to the mainland. Upon demand of Soviet Consul, Japs permitted their return to U.S.S.R.

#### LATE SUMMER SLUMP IN LOADINGS EXPECTED

18. Soviet vessels are unfavorably distributed to continue performance of last two months in delivering large volume of cargo to Siberian ports. As of 1 August, the number of ships in U. S. ports and enroute reached a new low of 58, after a steady decline over a period of months (98 as of 9 June). This one-sided position, coupled with the rising trend of turnaround time at Siberian ports, where the bulk of the larger warships are now concentrated, is expected to result in a sharp reduction in sailings from Pacific coast in August or September.

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY REQUIRES ADDITION OF  
LETTERS "UHR" TO CLASSIFICATION OF REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

From: US Military Attache, Ankara, Turkey

To: War Department

No: 313

7 August 1944

Message srl nbr 313

Concrete military plans for armed opposition to  
Germans being drawn up by Antonescu and certain members  
Rumanian General Staff according source C 2. Predicts final  
approval within week. Indications are plan will be submitted  
to Allies with request for assistance.

Uncertain to what extent political maneuver or desire  
to bargain are still involved. Obvious German weakness  
everywhere and recent Balkan developments somewhat enhance  
chances Rumania will finally take decisive action.

End.

ACTION: G-2

INFO : CG AAF

OPD

Col. Park

H.S.  
2505

# 452  
R96  
Bari

CM-IN-6803

(8 Aug 44)

0657Z gkc

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OSD Letter, 5-3-72

MAY 20 1974

42

300 Russia

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

NAVAL MESSAGE <i>Pouch</i>		NAVY DEPARTMENT	
DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>ALUSNA BEYOGLU</b>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		CNO	PRIORITY
DATE <b>7 AUG 44</b>			DEFERRED
TON CODER ROOM <b>1825/7</b>			
DECODED BY <b>BECKMAN</b>			
PARAPHRASED BY <b>HAMILTON</b> <i>Hamil</i>			PRIORITY
ROUTED BY <b>READY</b>			ROUTINE
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			DEFERRED
			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
<b>071100 NCR 854</b>			
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

**LT COMDR EARLE REQUESTS DELIVERY TO NAVAL AIDE TO PRESIDENT**

POLISH PRESS AT RACHE HITHERTO RELIABLE INFORMS ME RESPONDING TO MOSCOW RADIO JULY 31 THAT FINAL RUSSIAN ATTACK ON WARSAW WOULD BE LAUNCHED IMMEDIATELY THAT POLISH UNDERGROUND ARMY OF 30000 ARMED ONLY WITH 2000 MACHINE GUNS ATTACKED GERMANS IN WARSAW. FOR FIVE DAYS THEY HAVE BEEN FIGHTING ALONE AND ARE STEADILY BEING DESTROYED BY SUPERIOR GERMAN ARMAMENT AND TROOPS WHILE RUSSIAN ATTACK PROMISED IS NOT FORTHCOMING. ARMED COMMUNIST FORCE NUMBERING 5000 IN WARSAW IS TAKING PART IN REVOLT. ON DAY AFTER ARRIVAL POLISH PREMIER IN MOSCOW RUSSIAN RADIO RIDICULED POLISH GOVERNMENT

ACTION		
F-0		22
F-01		23
F-02		24
F-05		25
F-07		26
F-1		27
F-2		28
F-20		29
F-3		30
F-30		31
F-31		32
F-32		33
F-33		34
F-34		35
F-4		36
FX01		37
FX30		38
FX37		39
FX40		40
FX00		41
VCNO		42
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OPNS 15-60 *300 Russia*

**071100**

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08D Letter 5-3-72  
MAY 20 1974

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

AL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

ORIGINATOR	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY			PRIORITY
DATE			ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM			DEFERRED
DECODED BY			
PARAPHRASED BY			PRIORITY
			ROUTINE
			DEFERRED
ROUTED BY			

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

PAGE 2 071100 NCR 854

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME GCT

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IN LONDON SAYING IT REPRESENTED NOT FIVE PER CENT  
POLISH PEOPLE.

NAVAIDE.....ACT

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OSD Letter, 6-3-73  
MAY 20 1974

ACTION		21
F-0		22
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F-02		24
F-03		25
F-04		26
F-05		27
F-06		28
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OPNAV 19-68

071100

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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"IVI" TO CLASSIFICATION OF REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE

[REDACTED]  
PRIORITY

From: CG US Army Forces in the Middle East, Cairo, Egypt

To: War Department

No. N 27332 7 August 1944

To 1200 hours 7th August Political Intelligence  
SE Europe number 265 A WDGBI cite MECBI signed Giles N 27332.  
Greece (OSS).

Russian Mission in Ploesti area reportedly consists  
of three Lt Colonels and four enlisted men under Lt Colonel  
Popov attached to Russian Mission to Tito, Russians disclaim  
all political interests and expect to remain in Greece for  
several months while visiting Elan and Xervas forces.

End

ACTION: G-2

INFO: CG AAF  
OPD  
Log

CM-IN-6338 (7 Aug 1944) 1751Z emh

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 4, 1972

By DBS Date MAY 21 1973

*col. Park*

*3 as Russia*

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"CUM" TO CLASSIFICATION OF REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE

*Hold for Col. Park*

From: U.S. Military Mission, Moscow, Russia

To: War Department

No: M 20454

5 Aug 1944

To Bissell for Lovell signed Deane M 20454.

New 544th Infantry Division identified army group North Ukraine with 1082nd and 1083rd regts. In addition, the following separate regiments have been identified, assignment to division is not yet known:

1041st,  
1060th,  
1067th,  
1070th, and  
1084th.

While POWs have not indicated that there are other new divisions besides 541st, 542nd and 544th, unassigned regts listed here and my M 20327 indicate a new wave of at least 6 divisions. Soviets have not yet assembled details as to organization and personnel. However there is no Artillery Regiment in the new divisions. East of Warsaw on 26 July arrived SS Panzer Division Hermann Goering. Also central sector arrived 761st Infantry Brigade from Germany; identification confirmed but composition unknown. Soviets concede only one regiment, number unknown, of 2nd Parachute Div on Eastern front. They reiterate staunchly that 19th Panzer Div in full is on their front. 1st Mtn Div has arrived army group North Ukraine. 6th Hungarian Inf Div now considered in Hungary and not on Soviet-German front.

CM-IN-4544 (5 Aug 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 20 1974

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

*340 Russia*

*Colonel  
Park*



WAR DEPARTMENT  
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Page 2

From: U.S. Military Mission, Moscow, Russia

No: M 20454

5 August 1944

One unconfirmed report gives name Horst Vessel to 18th SS PZ Div. Regiments this div confirmed; those of 19th and 20th divs being checked. Soviets have unconfirmed report that 1st SS PZ Div Adolf Hitler on Eastern front. Desire date last identification France. Being verified by Soviets is unconfirmed info of 173rd Reserve Div in army group North Ukraine. No regiments of 576th Inf Div have been identified. Div contains number of personnel from 301st Inf Regt as well as remnants from many other destroyed units. Remaining personnel is from recovered hospital cases. Reur WAR 74024 August 1 Soviets have no information German troop evacuation Balkans Scandinavia. They ask same question, are particularly interested in what divisions may be moved from these territories to the Soviet-German front. Sovinformburo this date announces present commander army group north Genobst Schoerner. For third time Soviets not prepared to give German divisions destroyed and mauled at and subsequent to Minsk. Can only feel continued reluctance disclose information indicates orderly withdrawal Germans, effective rear guard action and considerable less loss than indicated in press accounts. Soviets latest information Infantry Table Organisation is General Staff document of 1 August 43. Do you desire? Do diagrams special series 22 March 31 1944 represent latest documentary figures? Highlights last documentary evidence Soviets re Inf Div:

3 Inf Regts of two battalions, maximum strength 11,

CM-IN-4544 (5 Aug 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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[REDACTED]

Page 3

From: U.S. Military Mission, Moscow, Russia

No: M 20454

5 August 1944

150 plus \*,  
005 volunteers from occupied countries, minimum  
10, 703.

If division maximum strength 700 LMG, 78 HVMG,  
49-88 MMAT guns, 14 self-propelled 88 MMAT guns, 37  
self-propelled 20 M\* A guns, 12-150 MM Field Hows \*\*.

End

\*Being Serviced

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: CG AAP  
OFD  
Col Park  
Log

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 20 1974

CM-IN-4544 (5 Aug 44)

2354Z

bjm

[REDACTED]

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

## NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPART

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>ASTALUSNA ARCHANGEL</b>	FOR ACTION	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY RRRR ROUTINE DEFERRED
RELEASED BY		CNO	
DATE <b>4 AUGUST 1944</b>			
TOR CODEROM <b>1520</b>			
DECODED BY <b>KLAIF</b>	INFORMATION	ASTALUSNA MURMANSK ALUSNA MOSCOW	PRIORITY RRRR DEFERRED
PARAPHRASED BY <b>VOSBURGH</b>			
ROUTED BY <b>READY</b>			
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW <input type="checkbox"/>
041020		NCR 8622	
ORIGINATOR: FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

INFO ON RED NAVY BASE AT BYELUSHYA BAY NOVAYAZEMLYA,  
CHANNEL SWEEP THROUGH GERMAN MINED AREA IN BAY DEPTH  
WATER FIFTY FEET. ONLY ONE QUAY 200 FEET LONG DEPTH  
WATER 15 FEET. AREA STRONGLY DEFENDED WITH 8 INCH  
COASTAL BATTERIES AND AA GUNS. 2 CATALINAS MOORED  
IN HARBOR. PATROL DAILY. SETTLEMENT POPULATION 1,000  
COMMANDED BY CAPT FIRST RANK DIANOV. 8 OIL TANKS NEAR  
QUAY.  
SERIAL REPORT FOLLOWS.

16...ACT

COMINCH...20G...CNO...~~NAVAIDE~~...200P...

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 6(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

~~SECRET~~

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OPNAV-NCR-15

300 Russia

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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IMMEDIATE

3 August 1944

FROM: FREEDOM  
TO: Air Ministry for British Chiefs of Staff  
RPTD: Joint Staff Mission for U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and Balkan Air Force.

MEDCOS 142.

Signed Wilson cite FECOS No. FX78448

1. Reference MEDCOS 140 and COS(W) 215 from British Chiefs of Staff. The incident described below when a Russian Mission clandestinely landed in Greece emphasizes the importance of coming to a clear understanding with Moscow in the matter of Russian collaboration in the Mediterranean war, on the lines set out in para 3 of COS(W) 215.
2. On the 23rd July, request was made to Air Officer commanding Balkan Air Force by the Russian Air Group for permission to carry out a training flight from Bari to a point just inland from the coast on the mainland of Greece opposite Corfu. The flight was authorized but had to be postponed on account of weather until the night of 25th/26th July, when it took place. The permission for the flight specifically indicated that no dropping or landing operations were to be undertaken. Subsequently it transpired that this permission was abused in that the aircraft carried a Russian colonel and up to 9 other officers (number unconfirmed), comprising members of the Soviet Mission to Tito and including Tito men, who were dropped in Greece at one of our landing grounds without prior knowledge of British in Cairo or Allied Mission in Greece. ALOS in Greece report arrival of this Mission at ELASGHQ.
3. Colonel Socolov, commanding the Russian Air Group, admits that after the aircraft took off it was diverted to a point in Greece by W/T and that officers were landed in Greece. According to Socolov, the orders for the flight were received from Colonel Melnikof who is acting head of the Russian Mission to Tito. Colonel Socolov's explanation

CM-IN-2607

(3 Aug 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

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3 as Russia

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IMMEDIATE

FROM: FREEDOM

3 August 1944

Page 2

MEDCOS 142

for not reporting the intention is that he had not considered the matter of sufficient importance to interest us.

4. ALOS have been instructed to maintain strictly correct but noncommittal attitude. Colonel Hammond of Allied Mission and Colonel West of OSS/80, now in Greece, have been ordered to proceed ELAS Hq to report full facts.

5. This incident is yet another of a series of incidents with the Russians in this theater, and amounts to a clear breach of their agreement with us regarding the operation of Russian aircraft in this theatre. It adds strength to the impression that their object is to take advantage of the position they have gained to further their own political objects without co-ordination or collaboration with us, covering up such activities by dissimulation or a bland show of ignorance.

6. Unless, early action is taken with Moscow, as recommended in para 3 of COS(W) 215, to ensure that all relations in this theatre between the British and Americans on the one hand and the Russians on the other are on a basis of complete frankness and mutual confidence, the mistrust and confusion which is certain to result seems likely to have unfortunate and far reaching political results. I am most anxious not to bring matters to a head, but feel that the adoption of a firm attitude offers the best chance of understanding with the Russians, and if there are any further incidents of this sort I think we must consider asking the Russian authorities to replace their commanding officer at Bari on the grounds that he is unable or unwilling to cooperate with us.

End

T.O.O. 030944B

CM-IN-2607

(3 Aug 44)

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By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94



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[REDACTED]  
IMMEDIATE

FROM: FREEDOM

3 August 1944

Page 3

MEDCOS 142

FOOTNOTE: MEDCOS 140 is CM-IN-20290 (24 Jul 44) CC/S  
COS(W) 215 is a CC/S paper

ACTION: CC/S

INFO: Adm Leahy, Gen Arnold, Gen Handy, Gen Bissell,  
SGS (Lt Col Newsome), Adm King, Mr Stimson, C of S

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 20 1974

CM-IN-2607

(3 Aug 44)

2117Z

ekk

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94



## NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	ASTALUSNA ARCHANGELSK	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY	AUG 3 1944	CNO	PRIORITY
DATE			R R R R
FOR CODEROOM	031340		ROUTINE
DECODED BY	RISHIN		DEFERRED
PARAPHRASED BY	WJ MONTGOMERY <i>Hutchinson</i>		
ROUTED BY	HUTCHINSON		
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			
030530			NCR 7711
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

*W. of Marmora*  
 SOVIET PLANES BOMBED PORT OF KIRKINNESS NORWAY.  
 REPORTS RED NAVY CHIEF OF STAFF HERE

16.....ACT

2 OP.....CNO.....NAVAID.....2 G.....COMINCH.....

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) (E)

OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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"AMUG" TO CLASSIFICATION OF REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE.

URGENT

From: US, Military Mission in Moscow, Russia  
To: War Department  
No: MX 20399 1 August, 1944

To Spaatz, Doolittle Baker, Twining from Walsh  
signed Deane information Kessler MX 20399. WAR please  
pass to USSTAF London, MAAF Caserta and ESCOM Poltava.

Advance points Russian front south of Bialostok  
as follows:

Pietkowo (52D 55M north, 22D 56M east)  
Topoxewo (52D 52M north, 22D 56M east)  
Bransk (52D 46M north, 22D 52M east)  
Drohiczyn (52D 20M north, 22D 43M east)  
Ziomaki (52D 15M north, 22D 09M east)  
Sluchocin (52D 14M north, 21D 58M east)  
Last Sluchocin Kaluszyń (52D 15M north, 21D 50M  
east).

No other changes below 53D north.

End

This message has been relayed to USSTAF, London,  
MAAF, Caserta and ESCOM, Poltava by the War Department  
Code Center in accordance with originator's request.

ACTION: OPD  
INFO : CG AAF, G-2, COL PARK, LOG  
CM-IN-914 (2 Aug 44) 0342Z mcs

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

3 as Russia

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY REQUIRES ADDITION OF LETTERS  
"AMUG" TO CLASSIFICATION OF REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE

URGENT

From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia.

To : War Department.

Nr : MX 20368 31 July 1944

To Spaatz, Doolittle, Baker, Twining from Walsh  
sgd Deane MX 20368 please pass to London and Caserta.

Advance points, Russian front northwest of Brest  
as follows:

Sarnake, Mordy (52 degrees 25 minutes north, 22  
degrees 55 minutes east),  
Krzeslin, Broszkow, Dembe-Welkie (52 degrees 10  
minutes north, 22 degrees 25 minutes east),  
Minsk Mazowieckie southwest and south of Przemysl  
(52 degrees 10 minutes north, 21 degrees 35 minutes east),  
Bruzuska (49 degrees 45 minutes north, 22 degrees  
30 minutes east),  
Lomna (49 degrees 40 minutes north, 22 degrees  
30 minutes east),  
Hermanowice (49 degrees 45 minutes north, 22 degrees  
50 minutes east),  
Nowe Miasto (49 degrees 40 minutes north, 22 degrees  
50 minutes east).

End.

Note: This message has been relayed to London and Caserta,  
per originator's request by the War Department Code Center.

ACTION: OPD

INFO : CC/S CG AAF G-2 Adm. King Col. Park Log  
CM-IN-26 (1 Aug 44) 00432 gkc

DECLASSIFIED  
JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 20 1974

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

300 Russia

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY REQUIRES ADDITION OF  
LETTERS "AMUG" TO CLASSIFICATION OF REPLY  
TO THIS MESSAGE.

URGENT

From: U.S. Military Attache, Moscow, Russia  
To: War Department  
Nr: MX 20352 29 July 1944

To Spatz bounce Doolittle, Eaker bounce Twining from  
Walsh signed Deane MX 20352. CRYPTO WAR please pass to Hq  
MAAF Caserta and USSTAF.

Advance points, Russian. Front south of Lublin as  
follows:

Grebow, Wydrxa (50 degrees 32 minutes north 21 degrees  
53 minutes east), Bojanow, Wola-Ranizowska, Mazury (50  
degrees 15 minutes north 22 degrees 5 minutes east), Wysoka,  
Stobierna, Gluchow, Zagorze (49 degrees 54 minutes north  
22 degrees 24 minutes east, Jawornik- Polski, Dynow.

End

This message has been relayed to Hq MAAF Caserta  
and USSTAF by the War Dept Code Center per origina-  
tor's request.

ACTION: OPD

INFO : CC/S, CGAAF, G-2, Adm. King, Col. Park, Log

CM-IN- 24837 ( 30 July 44 ) 0429Z wk

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (M)

OSD letter, May 1972

By DBS

Date

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY REQUIRES ADDITION  
OF LETTERS "TOT" TO CLASSIFICATION OF  
REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE.

URGENT

From: U.S. Military Mission, Moscow, Russia

To: War Department

Nr: MX 20330 28 July 1944

Speatz bounce Doolittle Baker bounce Twining from  
Welsh signed Deane MX 20330. CRYPTO WAR please pass to Hq  
MAAF other addressees have been sent by originator.

Following Soviet front line south of 53 degrees:

Brest, Visokoe, Terespol, Klyukovich, Bordzevka,  
Vulka, Zazheche, Stavi, Shumaki, Pugachevo, Gershoni, Mokrani,  
Rokitno and railway station Visoko-Litovsk.

North-west and west of Lublin; Stochek, Listovich,  
Tsegluv, Sennitsa Kolbel, Kazimezh, Kamen, and railway  
stations Piliava, Zhichin, Vonvolnitsa, Nedzhvitsa.

On 1st Ukrainian front:

Peremishl and Yaroslav.

West and south-west of Stanislaw: Pereginsko, Sol-  
otvin, Dobrovliani, Novitsa, Ruvnia, Krasna, Porogi, Krichka  
Maniava.

End

This message has been relayed to Hq MAAF, Caserta,  
Italy by the War Dept Code Center per originator's  
request.

ACTION: OPD

INFO : CCS, CGAAF, G-2, Adm. King, Col. Park, LOG

CM-IN-23839

(28 Jul 44)

2342Z

ejv

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 20 1974  
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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE  
CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY REQUIRES ADDITION OF  
LETTERS "TOT" TO CLASSIFICATION OF REPLY TO  
THIS MESSAGE.

[REDACTED]  
URGENT

From: US Military Mission in Moscow, Russia.

To: War Department.

Nr: MX 20323

27 July 1944

To Spaatz bounce Doolittle, to Baker bounce Twining  
from Walsh signed Deane MX 20323. WAR please pass to Hq  
MAAF other addresses sent by originator.

Advance points Russian front South Brest-Litovsk  
Warsaw line as follows:

Siedlce, Garwolin, Zelechow, Deblin, Opole (west of  
Liublin), Krasnik, Janov, Nisko, Rudnik, Przewesk, Radymno,  
Rudki, Bobrka, Rohatyn, Kalusz, Bogoradchany (southwest of  
Stanislaw).

End

This message has been relayed to Caserta by the  
War Department code center in accordance with originator's  
request.

ACTION: OPD  
INFO: CCS, CGAAF, G-2, Col. Park, LOG

CM-IN-22979

(28 Jul 44) 0007Z

ejv

[REDACTED]  
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JOS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

3 as Russia

59

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94



## NAVAL MESSAGE

## NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER

EXTENSION NUMBER

ADDRESSEES

PRECEDENCE

FROM ASTALUSNA RCHANGEL

ASTERISK (\*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE

RELEASED BY

CNO

DATE 27 JULY 1944

TOR CODEROOM 2328/26

DECODED BY MOORHEAD

PARAPHRASED

BY MOORHEAD / *[Signature]*

ROUTED BY ROLL

FOR ACTION

INFORMATION

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

IF OPERATIONAL  
CHECK BELOW☐

261030

NCR 2490

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:

DATE

TIME

GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ACTION

OBSERVED AT MOLOTOVSK:

EXTENDING DOCK 200 FEET.

CONSTRUCTING RECORD OIL QUAY NEXT TO FORMER ONE.

ON WAYS OF NAVY YARD 2 SUBCHASERS AND 2 DESTROYERS

PLUS 1 SUBMARINE IN PROCESS OF COMPLETION.

F-0

F-01

F-02

F-05

F-07

F-1

F-2

F-20

F-3

F-30

F-31

F-32

F-33

F-34

F-4

FX01

FX30

FX37

FX40

IG-00

VCNO

16...ACT

COMINCH...CNO...20G...NAVAIDE...200P...

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 6(D) or (S)

OSD letter, May 1, 1978

By DBS

Date

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVYREGS.)

DPNAV-NCR-16

500 Russia

261030

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12958, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

PLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

## NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	ALUSNA MOSCOW	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY		CNO	RRRRR
DATE	26 JULY 1944		DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM	261117		
DECODED BY	CHEESMAN		PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY	THOMSEN <i>W. H. STEIN</i>		ROUTINE
ROUTED BY	GIBSON		RRRRR
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
261041		NCR 2096	
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW FOR CNO

VICE ADMIRAL V A ALAFUZOV FORMERLY CHIEF OF STAFF PACIFIC FLEET ASSUMED DUTIES AS CHIEF OF THE NAVAL GENERAL STAFF MOSCOW EFFECTIVE 25 JULY RELIEVING ACTING CHIEF NAVAL GENERAL STAFF VICE ADMIRAL G A STEPANOV. ROULLARDS 190110 AND 240030. STEPANOV GOES TO IMPORTANT DUTIES LENINGRAD EXACT NATURE NOT KNOWN BUT NOT NECESSARILY INVOLVING RELIEF ANYONE NOW THAT AREA

16...ART

COMINCH...CNO....20G....NAVAIDE...20OP....

DECLASSIFIED  
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 4(D) or (E)  
OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 21 1973

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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For Russia

261041

DECLASSIFIED  
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>VLADIVOSTOK</b>	FOR ACTION	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE <b>CNO MOSCOW</b>	1
RELEASED BY		ROUTINE	2
DATE <b>24 JULY 1944</b>			3
TOR CODEROOM <b>1829</b>			4
DECODED BY <b>HUDSON</b>	DEFERRED		5
PARAPHRASED BY <b>BEECHLER</b>		6	
ROUTED BY <b>MORRIS</b>		7	
		8	
	INFORMATION	PRIORITY	9
		ROUTINE	10
		DEFERRED	11
			12
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			13
<b>240530</b>			14
<b>NCR 522</b>			15
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME: DATE TIME			16
ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT			17
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			52

(ACTION OPHAV AND MOSCOW.)

MY 191117. ORDER OF THE DAY ISSUED AND PUBLISHED TO  
PACIFIC FLEET ON RED NAVY DAY (23RD) SIGNED BY ADM  
YUMASHEV AND HIS CHIEF OF STAFF REAR ADM FROLOV THUS  
CONFIRMING TRANSFER VICE ADM ALAFUZOV.

16....ACT

COMINCH...200...NAYAIDE...CNO...200P...

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(F)

OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date

MAY 21 1973

VCNO

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

REPLY 840 Russia

240530

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

From: AFHQ, (Signed Wilson)

To : British Chiefs of Staff

Info: J.S.M. Washington for U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff

No : FX 74594

23 July 1944

MEDCOS 140

1. There have been certain developments in connection with the Russian Air Force detachment at Bari which raise issues of some importance bearing on Anglo-American relations with Russia and with Tito. As far as the latter is concerned they can be dealt with locally. But I do not think there are any Russian officials in this theatre with the necessary authority to discuss them as affecting the Russians.

2. First there was the incident, of which you will be aware, when a minor accident, in which a Russian aircraft was slightly damaged by an RAF vehicle, was reported in Moscow as a deliberate act of sabotage. This fantastic allegation had but small importance in itself but bodes ill for our future dealings with the Russian representatives in this theatre. I hope our representatives in Moscow will be instructed to deal most firmly with this incident.

3. Secondly, it will be remembered that, with the agreement of the Combined Chiefs of Staff the Russians were authorized to establish at Bari under the operational control of MAAF one squadron of twelve Dakotas and another of twelve fighters for the purpose of supplying the Partisans. The arrangements for this detachment were laid down after lengthy negotiations in a carefully worded agreement with General Gorshkov. In the course of these negotiations the Russian representatives wished it to be worded to provide for "not less than twelve transport aircraft and twelve fighters". Air Marshal Linnell who conducted the negotiations on behalf of MAAF pointed out that this would amount to an indefinite commitment and insisted that the numbers

CM-IN-20290

(24 Jul 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

3cc Russia

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Page 2

From: AFHQ

No : FX 74594

23 July 1944

should be limited to the 24 aircraft for which the Soviet authorities in Moscow had asked the agreement of H.M. Ambassador. This was agreed and the specific number of 24 aircraft was included in the agreement.

4. On the arrival of the Russian transport squadron at Bari it transpired that they had brought with them four light communication aircraft which it is intended to present to the Partisans. AOC Balkan Air Forces has since been informed by Colonel Sokolov, the Russian Air Force Commander at Bari, that the Soviets propose also to present Marshal Tito with 2 Dakotas. These aircraft are to be flown by Russian crews until the Partisans are in a position to take them over. This raises a number of somewhat complex issues.

5. The Russians may argue that their action does not constitute a breach of the agreement because these aircraft are intended as a present for the Partisans and are only to be flown temporarily by Russian crews. This may be held to be a tenable argument though it is not difficult to imagine the reactions if for instance American aircraft entering Russia for "FRANTIC" operations were to bring with them light aircraft as a present for the Poles to be flown temporarily by American pilots, and using Russian petrol without any previous consultation with the Soviet authorities. The question whether a purely political presentation to Tito is a proper use of American aircraft supplied to Russia under Lend/Lease arrangements is one on which no doubt the U.S. Chiefs of Staff will comment.

6. I suggest however that the main point at issue should be that if the Russians and ourselves are to operate as Allies in the same theatre of war as we are now beginning to do for the first time in Yugoslavia it must be on a basis of complete frankness and mutual confidence. If the

CM-IN-20290

(24 Jul 44)

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By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94



WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Page 3

From: AFHQ

No : FX 74594

23 July 1944

British and Americans on the one hand or the Russians on the other attempt to conduct operations in Yugoslavia or equip Partisan forces without mutual consultation and agreement the result can only be political mistrust and operational chaos.

7. This involves the question of the recognition of Yugoslavia as part of the Anglo - American Mediterranean theatre of operations. This has been accepted in principle by the Russians in the Caserta agreement which provides for local operational coordination of Russian aircraft operating from Bari by the AOC Balkan Air Force. If any form of independent air activity over Yugoslavia by Russian or Partisan aircraft whether operating from the east coast of Italy or from bases in Yugoslavia were permitted the situation would become impossible and would inevitably lead sooner or later to unfortunate incidents including the shooting down of Russian or Partisan aircraft by the much larger numbers of British aircraft of superior performance operating daily over Yugoslavia. If later on the Russian advance brings them within air operating distance of Yugoslavia from behind their own lines some special liaison arrangements will have to be made but that is not the situation we are dealing with at the moment.

8. I suggest our representatives in Moscow should be instructed to proceed on the following lines. I would particularly impress the importance of the U.S. representative being fully associated with these discussions with the object of ensuring that no action taken in connection with these Russian air activities in Yugoslavia prejudices the arrangements in connection with operation FRANTIC in which the U.S. Air Force is substantially dependent upon Russian collaboration.

(a). The Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean on the one hand and the head of the Russian Mission

CM-IN-20290

(24 Jul 44)

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By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94



WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Page 4

From: AFHQ

No : FX 74594

23 July 1944

with Marshal Tito on the other shall be informed in advance of any major items of arms and equipment with which the Soviet and Anglo-American authorities propose to supply the Partisans.

(b). In order to ensure the most economical employment of resources and to avoid risk of unfortunate incidents all air activities over Yugoslavia whether the aircraft concerned are based in Italy or Yugoslavia shall be subject to the local operational coordination of AOC Balkan Air Force acting as the agent of the Supreme Allied Commander.

9. As far as Tito is concerned I consider the procedure adopted in this matter is far from satisfactory. This may in the main be due to an almost brutal ignorance among the Partisans of anything to do with air warfare or air force organization. But I am by no means satisfied that Tito or his representatives have played straight with us and suspect them of giving way to the temptation to play off Russians and British against each other. I propose to deal bluntly with Tito on this matter during the forthcoming discussions at Caserta and to insist that as a condition of our continued support on the present scale no Yugoslav unit whether equipped by Russia or the Allies shall be formed without our previous agreement or operated except under our control. I propose in the last resort to threaten to suspend the formation of the Second Partisan Squadron and the arrangements for the training of Partisan crews on the grounds that we have neither the time nor the inclination to train personnel who are to be used to operate aircraft provided by the Russians in a manner which we consider uneconomical and dangerous. I should be glad of your agreement to this line of policy.

CM-IN-20290

(24 Jul 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 20 1974

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Page 5

From: AFHQ

No : FX 74594

23 July 1944

10. Meanwhile in order to avoid any implication that we are attempting to sabotage Russian aid to Tito AOC Balkan Air Force has been authorized to permit the despatch to Yugoslavia of the light aircraft referred to in Para 4 about as soon as he is satisfied with the arrangements for their operational control. For the same reason it is a matter of immediate importance to know the policy which is to be adopted on the offer of Dakotas to Tito.

T.O.O. 231400B

ACTION: CCS

INFO : Adm Leahy  
Gen. Arnold  
OPD  
Gen. Bissell  
Adm. King  
C of S

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 20 1974

CM-IN-20290

(24 Jul 44)

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e jv

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY REQUIRES ADDITION OF LETTERS  
"TVI" TO CLASSIFICATION OF REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

From: CG US Army Forces in the Middle East, Cairo, Egypt  
To: War Department  
Fr: N 26645 21 July 1944

JICAME number 232 for Bissell WDGBI from MEJIC signed  
Giles msg nbr N 26645.

Source hitherto reliable reports Russian preparations  
in Crimea for early landing at Varna Bulgaria designed to  
collapse all German resistance in Balkans. No confirmation  
this report from other sources.

End

ACTION: G-2

INFO : CG AAF  
OPD  
Col Park

CM-IN-17799 (21 Jul 44) 2218Z ejm

[REDACTED]

RECEIVED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
OSD letter, May 4, 1972  
By DBS  
Date MAY 21 1973

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

## NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFT		EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM			ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY				PRIORITY
DATE				ROUTINE
TOR CODEROM				DEFERRED
DECODED BY				PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY				ROUTINE
ROUTED BY				DEFERRED
PAGE 1 OF 2		190110	NCR 6213	11 OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

ORIGINATOR FILE IN DATE AND TIME. DATE. TIME. GCT.

( ACTION CNO MOSCOW FROM AMCON VLAD )

FAIRLY RELIABLE SOURCES STATE VICE ADM V A ALAFUZOV  
CHIEF of STAFF RED PAC FLT SOON TO BE TRANSFERRED  
NAVY GEN STAFF MOSCOW. CHANGE NOT ROUTINE CONSIDERED  
EXTREMELY SIGNIFICANT SINCE HE WAS ORDERED PRESENT  
POST DURING TENSE PERIOD FOLLOWING JAP SINKING  
STEAMERS KOLA AND ILMEN SPRING 43 AND NOW RETURNING  
MOSCOW DURING SLACK PERIOD. FORMER US NAVAL ATTACHE  
REAR ADM DUNCAN DESCRIBED ALAFUZOV AS KEEN ALERT  
FORCEFUL BEST INFORMED AND MOST CAPABLE OF SOVIET  
FLAG OFFICERS HE HAD MET LOCAL REPUTATION CONFIRMS.  
WEDNESDAY LIBERTY FOR PERSONNEL PAC FLT RECENTLY  
RESTORED AFTER DISCONTINUANCE AT WAR OUTBREAK PLUS

ACTION

F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-03	25
F-04	26
F-05	27
F-06	28
F-07	29
F-08	30
F-09	31
F-10	32
F-11	33
F-12	34
F-13	35
F-14	36
F-15	37
F-16	38
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F-19	41
F-20	42
F-21	43
F-22	44
F-23	45
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F-29	51
F-30	52

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State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By \_\_\_\_\_ Date MAY 21 1973

300 Russia

DECLASSIFIED  
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY	FOR ACTION	ROUTINE
DATE		DEFERRED
FOR CODEROOM		
DECODED BY	INFORMATION	PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY		ROUTINE
ROUTED BY		DEFERRED
ON ALL COMMUNICATIONS INDICATED THIS MESSAGE WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND IS ADMINISTRATIVE		IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

PAGE 2 OF 2

190110

NCR 6213

COMMUNICATIONS WILL BE IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME OCT

ON OUTGOING COMMUNICATIONS PLEASE LEAVE AMPLITUDE AND WAVELENGTH MARKS CLEAR, FOLLOWING TEXT

RETURN PEACETIME POLICY ALLOWING 30 PERCENT SHIPS  
CREWS ASHORE AT ONE TIME. TROOPS ON DUTY MAZCHUKO AND  
BORDER TOW BEING GRANTED PERIODIC LEAVE AND RECREATION  
PERIODS WHICH CHANGE FROM FORMER CONTINUOUS ALERT  
POLICY.

16.....ACT

COMINCH.....20G.....NAVAIDE.....CNO.....20OP.....

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. letter, 1-11-73

By \_\_\_\_\_ Date MAY 21 1973

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DECLASSIFIED  
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/21/94

## NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>ALUSNA MOSCOW</b>		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY			2
DATE <b>20 JULY 1944</b>			3
TOR CODEROOM <b>1136/20</b>			4
DECODED BY <b>HANSEN</b>			5
PARAPHRASED BY <b>LOBB/</b>			6
ROUTED BY <b>BALDWIN</b>			7
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			8
<b>200902Z</b>			9
<b>NCR 6605</b>			10
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ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

## ACTION

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*Russia*  
*Reported*  
 ALUSNA MOSCOW SENDS ACTION CNO

DATE POSSIBLE REOPENING WHITE SEA BALTIC CANAL  
 STILL UNCERTAIN. VADM SPETYNOV STATES ALL LOCKS

IN AREA HELD BY FINNS ARE DESTROYED AND A COMMISSION  
 IS NOW ON GROUND SURVEYING RECONSTRUCTION PROBLEM

16.....ACT  
 COMINCH.....FX-37.....200.....CNO.....  
 NAVATBE.....200P.....

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3.3 and 3.4 (D) (E)

OSD letter, May 19 1972

By DBS

MAY 24 1973

**SECRET**

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

HFMAY 10-67

300 Russia

DECLASSIFIED  
 E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
 NLR 101  
 By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94



WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

July 15, 1944

FROM: War Cabinet Offices

TO: Joint Staff Mission

RPTD: A.F.H.Q.

Following repetition of telegram from 30 Mission

MIL 1604 for C.O.S. (R) B.C. of S., A.F.H.Q. SHAEF  
from Generals Deane and Burrows.

1. Karelian Front Local advances area of Suryarvi.
2. 2nd Baltic Front Forces have made advances north of Idritsa capturing 40 places including railway station of OPOCHKA. Break through into town of OPOCHKA where street fighting in progress.
3. Northwest of Poldownak more than 20 places taken including Za (?uk)sevo and Kokhanovichki.
4. Northwest of (?Sv)entsyani more than 70 places captured including Uzhp(?yv)yai, Dobeiki, Vizhuni, Butisishki, Zibali, Shirvinti and railway station of Stobuluhki, Trumbatishki, Rubikyai.
5. Northwest and southwest of Wilno 3rd BeloRussian front troops took over 60 places including Kernovo, Musniklo, Zhosli, Prelai, Porechye and railway stations Sanovo, Druseniki, Rybnitza.
6. Fighting in outskirts (Ed?)odno over 50 places taken including both towns and railway stations (Sk(id?)el, Ezery, Vertzelishki, Guashhitzi, Lunnaross, railway stations Zhidomlya, Cherleha.

CM-IN-12810 (16 Jul. 44)

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JCS MEMO, 1-17-73  
BY DMS, DATE  
MAY 21 1973

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

FROM: War Cabinet Offices  
TO: Joint Staff Mission

Page 2

7. Second BeloRussian troops took 70 places including Volkovysk and following railway stations Bonna, Gora, Podorka, Trukhoyoviche (or Tronkhonoviche) Novoselki, Strykhin (53 miles S.E. of Volkovysk). Commander of German 45 Infantry Division, Major General Engel, taken prisoner.

End.

T.O.O. 151145Z

ACTION: CC/3

INFORMATION: Adm. Leahy  
CG AAF  
OPD  
G-2  
Adm. King  
Col. Park  
Log

CM-IN-12810 (16 Jul 44) 0420Z mk

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BY DSS, DATE  
MAY 21 1973

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