

MR 310, Sec. / -- INVASION PLANS, OFFENSIVES, LANDING OF TROOPS

1943-1945-

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

MR 103

CONTINUED

MR 310, Sec. / -- INVASION PLANS, OFFENSIVES, LANDING OF TROOPS

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

Hercules

Hercules

[REDACTED]
FROM WD INCOMING CM-IN-3806
JANUARY 5, 1944
FILED: "310 SHINGLE"

Index Number

INDEX SHEET

***** *Operation HERCULES. HERCULES now cancelled. Units
and resources earmarked for this operation will be released for other
purposes. *****

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 4, 1972

By DBS Date MAY 22 1973

[REDACTED]
Show classification number and date of communication on first line, drop two spaces, show source of communication and to whom addressed, then drop two spaces again and give a brief synopsis of subject matter sufficient to identify the document.

W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0523
Mar 10-73

310 Jhercule

2-4614

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL
PRIORITY

JCS 29-71
SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers
To: War

No: W-8934/21498, 30 December 1943

Action AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff info USFOR
for British Chiefs of Staff M-deast for Commanders in Chief
301730 from AFHQ W 8934/21498 signed Eisenhower cite FHGCT.
BIGOT This our number 271 factor NAF

It has been decided after careful review of all factors
involved that the time, the provision of landing craft and ser-
vice units to launch the operation, the movement of air forces
to Corsica to support ANVIL and the requirements of the Main
Battle in Italy preclude the possibility of launching HERCULES
without running unwarranted risks of prejudicing the success of
ANVIL. Accordingly it has been decided that operation HERCULES
would be postponed indefinitely.

Capture of
Rhodes.

ACTION: CC/S (Capt Royal USN)

No sig

INFORMATION: OPD
General Strong
General Arnold
Admiral King
LOG

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

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JCS 29-71 per

Date- DEC 22 1971

Signature- RHP

CM-IN-19009 (31 Dec 43)

0549Z vd

310 Hercules

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24-53394ABC

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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FROM WD INCOMING CM-IN-18114
29 DECEMBER 1943
FILED: "310 SHINGLE"

Index Number

INDEX SHEET

BIGOT. Weekly planning telegram number 16.

***** At same conference it was decided that HERCULES would be postponed indefinitely as the mounting of this operation would detract from main battle in Italy and would be running grave risk of prejudicing success of ANVIL. *****

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (B)

OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 22 1973

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EXERPT FROM WAR DEPARTMENT INCOMING MESSAGE OF 29 DECEMBER 1943 (CM-IN-17889, FILED "310 ANVIL").

***** B. Any of the LCT in the Levant, for even if they are not required for HERCULES they are of very low operational value and it would not be possible to bring them to Western Mediterranean.*****
(NOTE: See table included in Cm-In-17889 listing location and disposition of landing craft).

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS Date MAY 22 1973

270 Hercules

~~SECRET~~

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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EXCERPT FROM WAR DEPARTMENT INCOMING DISPATCH OF 21 DECEMBER 1943,
(CM-IN-14459) FILED "310 ANVIL".

*****HERCULES. A owing largely to logistic difficulties in connection with establishment of Air Forces, earliest date for which Middle East can plan to mount HERCULES assault is 22 March. This date is subject to postponement by various factors, including weather. It is necessary, however, that craft for ANVIL should leave ALEX for Western Mediterranean not later than one month before D Day of that operation. B on the time factor alone, therefore, it is doubtful if we can stage HERCULES unless OVERLORD ANVIL have to be postponed for some reason. We cannot afford to take risks as regards our ability to launch ANVIL on date required in conjunction with OVERLORD. C planning is however proceeding for HERCULES and initial steps, such as movement of British Fourth Division to Middle East, have been taken in the hopes that a combination of circumstances may arise which will enable us to stage the operation. *****

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 5(B) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 1, 1978

By DBS

Date MAY 22 1973

310 Hercules

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

JM
~~SECURITY CONTROL~~

SECURITY CONTROL

URGENT

From: Algiers
To: War

No. W-8009, 19 December 1943

To Mideast Commanders in Chief rptd USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff and AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff rptd Fairbanks. Signed Eisenhower cite FHGCT. [REDACTED] BIGOT.

Your CC/359 of 18th December, and further to our W 7936/15772 of 18th December.

Paragraph 7 your telegram. On present evidence it is by no means certain that we shall be able to carry out HERCULES. In your discussions with the Turks you should therefore on no account commit us in any way to carry out HERCULES.

Subject to above and to any specific remarks which may be received from British or Combined Chiefs of Staff the proposals set out in paragraph 12 of your telegram under reference are approved.

7936 is CM-IN-11530 (18 Dec 43) CC/S

No Sig

ACTION: CC/S (Capt Royal USN)

INFORMATION: OPD

CM-IN-12146 (19 Dec 43) 1520Z bjm

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JCS LETTER, 7-5-72
BY DRS, DATE

MAY 22 1973

310. (Hercules) [REDACTED]

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

for
EYES ONLY

*Show Pres
Munday per
Adm TB-*

CORRECTED COPY

PRIORITY

GENERAL MARSHALL'S EYES ALONE

From: Cairo
To: War

Nr. AMSME 217 N, 19th December 1943

Eyes of Marshall alone signed Royce.

(Rhodes)
HERCULES-BIGOT reference Air Ministry despatch OZ4112 addressed AFHQ and repeated to JSM Washington for information US Chiefs of Staff Mideast Commanders in Chief plan depart for Ankara 20th December for further negotiation with Turkish Government as suggested. In my opinion Turkish demands are out of all reason and are aimed at further bargaining and delay to their entry into the war. Even if their exorbitant demands for equipment and supplies could be met they would plead for additional time for training so that July or August would be the earliest possible date of Turkish participation. In view of Turkish position British are again thinking of possible action along the lines of HERCULES plan without Turkish angle.

No Sig

Note: Original message "Commanders in THIEF" instead of "Commanders in Chief"

Corrected copy of CM-IN-1201* (19 Dec 43) Gen. Hull

ACTION: General Hull

INFORMATION: SGS
General Strong
General Arnold
LOG

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (H)
OSD letter, May 4, 1972

By DBS

Date MAY 8 1973

late Rhodes

CM-IN-12032 (19 Dec 43) 1131Z med

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310 Hercules

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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EXCERPT FROM WAR DEPARTMENT INCOMING DISPATCH OF 17 DECEMBER 1943
(CM-IN-11026, FILED "310 ANVIL").

***** Subject to detailed examination it should however, prove possible to augment the craft Ex Buccaneer sufficiently to make up an assault of 1 Division for HERCULES.

The status of the 4th British Division makes it impossible for that Division to be ready before 22 March. The 4th British Division is now under orders for movement to the DELTA for employment in HERCULES should final decision be to mount that operation. 1 Brigade group and the Gibraltar Brigade Gp are scheduled for arrival about 22 December, the remainder of the Division about 30 December, however, 2 truck companies, about 600 men, may not arrive Mideast until about 7 January.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 6(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 4, 1972

By DBS Date MAY 22 1973

310 Anvil

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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FROM WB INCOMING CM-IN-8873
14 DECEMBER 1943
FILED: 310 SHINGLE

Index Number

INDEX SHEET

*****Weekly planning telegram number 14.

Feasibility of HERCULES under urgent examination. Question hinges largely on timing date, i.e. earliest Middle East can launch assault vis a vis latest date by which craft can be employed and still return in time for ANVIL. Appears at present that only conditions under which HERCULES is likely to be launched are those in which some change outside this theater made it necessary to decide on a postponement of OVERLORD several months ahead of projected launching date of that operation. *****

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (B)
OSD letter, May 4 1972

By DBS Date MAY 22 1973

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W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0622
May 22-72

310 Hercules

9-6014

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

Post-Husky Operations

Post-Husky Operations

JDJD A47
Filed 06/1629B
AR

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

PRIORITY

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers
To: WAR

No. W-9276, 6 September 1943

As a result of 2 days continuous discussion between Officers of my Staff and General C, I have made following adjustments to my plans so as to take maximum advantage of circumstances which may exist if Italians abide, so far as lies within their power, by the armistice terms. (To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower. This is NAF 359. BIGOT PRICELESS).

BAYTOWN. No change.

AVALANCHE. There are now no Airborne Troops employed. A certain strengthening of seaborne lift has been made possible by diversion of additional landing craft from the later stages of BAYTOWN. The reinforced RCT of 82nd Airborne Division which formed part of floating reserve has been withdrawn for task outlined below and has been replaced by a 2nd RCT of 45th Division.

U.S. — Rome. Airfields at Guidonis, Littorio, Cerneteri and Forbara are being made available by Italians who have undertaken to protect them during arrival of part of 82nd AB Division during night AVALANCHE D minus 1/D. Strength will be built up on subsequent nights providing situation permits. Italians will provide essential transportation. Further ammunition, supplies and a few heavy weapons will be sent in landing craft up the Tiber to Rendezvous to be arranged. A Senior Officer of 82nd Airborne Division is now on his way to Rome to settle details.

all vicinity Rome

Task of 82nd Airborne Division is to assist Italian forces in preventing Germans from occupying Rome.

CM-IN-4870 (6 Sept 43)

Franklin D. Roosevelt
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Ampl
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Date- DEC 22 1971

Signature- *RHP* COPY No. 16

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers (Page 2)
To: WAR
No. W-9276, 6 September 1943

Heel. Italians have undertaken to open ports of Taranto and Brindisi. Intend to move personnel of 1st (British) Airborne Division with limited amount of equipment into Taranto on warships as soon as Naval situation permits in order to gain control of these ports. Timing will be governed primarily by movement of Italian fleet: As soon as latter is under our control in accordance with armistice terms, C in C Med will be able to release cruisers and destroyers to move 1st Airborne Division: This may be about D plus 2 or D plus 3. Intend to follow up with minimum air defenses required and to bring in 8th Indian Infantry Division now loading in Middle East as soon as it is ready which is estimated at September 25.

Timing of broadcasts. I am arranging that simultaneous broadcasts shall be made by Badoglio and myself at 1830B hours on AVALANCHE D minus 1. Badoglio will proclaim the armistice by every available means, by broadcast, announcement to the Press and Foreign Diplomatic Corps and by telephone and telegraph to all agencies of the Italian Government and armed forces. The timing will permit cancellation of airborne operation at Rome if for some reason the Italian announcement should not be made.

No Sig

ACTION: CCS (Gen Deane)

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen. Strong
Gen. Arnold
SGS
CofS
Adm. King

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Date- DEC 22 1971

Signature

CM-IN-4870 (6 Sept 43) 2212Z fbh

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

JDJD C 31
021031B
HJH

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

JCS 29-71

SECURITY CONTROL

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: Algiers
To : War
No : W-8906/9216, 2 September 1943

BIGOT AVALANCHE. Immediately following cable refers D day (to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff Troopers 15 Army Gp 5 Army NAAF Malta mid east for CSINC Tundist E BS Trip dist from Freedom W-8906/9216 nil nil NAF/349 signed Eisenhower cite FRGCT . And H hour AVALANCHE.

No Sig

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Strong
Gen Arnold
Adm King
CoFS

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per JCS 29-71

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Signature-

CM-IN-1081 (2 Sept 43) 1328Z flw

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310 *Port Hurdley*
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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

JDJD C 30
021032B
glv

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INCOMING MESSAGE

JCS 29-71

SECURITY CONTROL

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: Algiers
To: WAR

Nr.: W 8907 2 September 1943

MAF/350 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff USFOR
for British Chiefs of Staff Troopers 10th Army Group 5th
Army NAAF Malta Mideast for CSINC, Tunisia (R) BS Tripoli
from Freedom W 8907 NIL NIL signed Eisenhower cite FROCT)

BIGOT. AVALANCHE. ^{D-Day} Preceding cable refers 9 September,
0330B hours.

Sept 8 - 9:30 pm. E.W.T.

No Sig

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Gen Strong
Gen Arnold
Adm King
Cofs
OPD

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per JCS 29-71

Date- DEC 22 1971

Signature- RAMP

CM-IN-1082 (2 Sept 43) 1331Z flw

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

JDJD A19
Filed 31/1718B
rlw

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE CONTROL

JCS 29-71
SECURITY CONTROL
31 August 1943

Avalanche Plan

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per JCS 29-71

PRIORITY

Date- DEC 22 1971

From: Algiers
To: War

Signature- RNP

Number W-8786/8549, NAF 345

31 August 1943

Naples

Ensuing is skeleton appreciation and outline plan for AVALANCHE. For information. This is my NAF number 345. Reference FAN 205. To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff rptd USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff. BIGOT AVALANCHE. Signed Eisenhower. Cite FHGCT. This telegram is in 3 parts.

Part 1. A. Skeleton appreciation.

1. Assault in 1 of 3 areas considered.

- (A) North of Pantaloon. *Naples*
- (B) Through Scantling. *Gulf of Naples*
- (C) Through Harpsichord. *Gulf of Salerno*

2. Area (A) was dismissed because out of range of long range Spitfires and poor beaches. Area (B) was dismissed owing to strength of coast defences. Area (C) selected because it avoids above disadvantages, in spite of its distance from Pantaloon and the mountainous bottle-neck north of Vulpine. *Salerno*

B. Outline Plan.

3. 5th Army mission to seize Port of Pantaloon and to secure the airfields in Pantaloon area with a view to preparing a firm base for further offensive operation. *Naples*

4. Forces under 5th Army are 6th Corps, 34th, 36th, 45th Inf Divs, 1 Armd Div, 10th Corps, 46th, 56th Inf Divs, 7th Armd Div, 2nd and 41st Commandos, 3 Ranger Bns. Area TPS 82nd Airborne Div.

- 5. Assault in Harpsichord. *Gulf of Salerno*
6th Corps - US
10th Corps - British

(A) Right 6th Corps. Left 10th Corps. Dividing

CM-IN-23717

43)

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310 Port Huelley

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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SECURITY CONTROL

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

From: Algiers
To: War

Page 2

Number W-8788/8549, NAF 345

31 August 1943

line incl 6th Corps River Sele.

(B) 6th Corps ^{right} assault. 36th Div ship to shore on 2nd BDE front with 1 Tank Bn under command. Missions: to seize high ground covering Vulpine Plain; to secure the Army Right flank south of Ponte Sele; to prevent movement of enemy forces into the plain within 6th Corps Sector.

(C) 10th Corps ^{left} assault. Shore to shore.

1. Right 56th Div with 1 Tank Bn and 1 Med Regt RA under command, assault 2 BDE front. Missions: to capture Monte Corvino Airfield; to seize high ground covering Vulpine Plain on left of 6th Corps.

2. Left 46th Div with 1 Tank Bn, 1 Med Regt RA under command, assault on 1 BDE front. Missions: to capture Port of Vulpine; to advance northwest as rapidly as possible to seize dominating terrain south of Pantaloon *Naples* plain. (End of Part 1, Part 2 follows this).

No Sig

6178 is FAN 305 and is CM-OUT-11324 (27 Aug 43) CCS

ACTION: CCS

INFORMATION: OPD
General Strong
General Arnold
Adm. King
C of S

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REF ACQUIRED

per JCS 29-71

Date- DEC 22 1971

Signature- *Reto*

CM-IN-23717

(31 Aug 43) 2048Z mjc

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JDJD NR C 70
Filed 31/17/43
DLB

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

31 Aug 1943
19552

PRIORITY

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers
To: WAR

NR: W-8789/8850, 31st August 1943

Part 2 of 3 part message. This is my NAF number 345. To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff rpt USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff. BIGOT AVALANCHE. Signed Eisenhower. Cite FBGCT.

Capua

Para 6. 82 (DS) Airborne Div. 1 reinforced parachute BCT to drop North of Pantaloon. Mission to destroy bridges Over River Volturno and to delay enemy moving South across the river; to withdraw from Boyle along high ground SE or towards PANTALOOON to meet 5th Army Forces.

Naples

Para 7. Naval Forces will create a diversion against beaches NW of PANTALOOON with object to divert maximum hostile forces away from main assaults.

Para 8. Army floating reserves available D day, 3 separate forces.

(A) Reinforced BCT 45 Div. Mission: To land

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per JCS 29-71

Date- DEC 22 1971

Signature- RHP

CM-IN-23768 (31 Aug 43)

14

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers
To: WAR

Page 2

NR: W-8789/8850, 31st August 1943

over any previously captured beaches.

(B) Reinforced RCT 82 Airborne Div. Mission: To land with light equipment on beaches which have not previously been captured.

Para 9. ^{British} Phrase 2. ^{Naples} 10th Corps to advance to capture the port of PANTALON and the 2 nearby air-dromes, and to secure army right flank North of river Sele.

Para 10. Air Plan.

(A) Prior to D day maximum neutralization of enemy occupied airfields within range of the assault area.

(B) Protection of assault convoy and landing area. Initially by 3 groups US P-38 and 1 group US Spitfires and up to 18 Sqdns RAF Spitfires, maintaining 36 aircraft over area on D day. In addition 1 light fleet carrier and 4 escort carriers maintaining 22 aircraft over area on D day.

(C) Fly in Sqdns will be prepared as follows: D or D plus 1-3 Sqdns Spitfires, D plus 1 or 2-4 more Sqdns Spitfires plus 1/2 Sqn night fighters, D plus 2 or 3-4 more Sqdns Spitfires, D plus 3 or 4-3 Sqdns P-40, D plus 5 or 6-6 Sqdns A-38. End of part 2, Part 3 follows.

ACTION: CCS

INFORMATION: OPD, GEN STRONG, GEN ARNOLD, ^{and} CLOPDS, ^{for} ADMCKINS, ^{library}

CM-IN-23768 (31 Aug 43) 2246Z mcs

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per JCS 89-71

Date- DEC 22 1971

Signature- *RNF* COPY No.

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JCS 29-71

WAR DEPARTMENT
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OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

Combined Chiefs of Staff

August 27, 1943

CG FREEDOM ALGIERS

Number 6178

USFOR LONDON ENGLAND

Number R-2327

Reference your NAF 326. This is a ~~book~~ message BIGOT for Eisenhower Freedom Algiers (FAN 205) from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Request you will telegraph urgently your appreciation and plan for AVALANCHE based on latest available information.

Naples

No Sig

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Arnold
Gen Strong
Adm King
Log

CM-OUT-11324 (27 Aug 43) 2049Z s1b
CM-OUT-11325

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per JCS 29-71

Date: DEC 22 1971

Signature: RHP

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310 Post Kustay

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

JCS 29-71

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

Combined Chiefs of Staff
20th August 1943

To: Freedom, Algiers #100
USFOR London, for British Chiefs of Staff #101
WAR (Information) #102-W-48

The promising situation existing throughout the Italian area would appear to offer an excellent opportunity by means of 5th column activities to establish conditions in Sardinia for an unopposed occupation of that Island or an unopposed landing on it with Italian help. For Eisenhower Freedom Algiers, PAR 198, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The O S S and S O E organizations might collaborate in accomplishing this. Furthermore this presents an excellent opportunity to test the effectiveness of these organizations and to provide them with experience and training for future operations of a similar character. Corsica also may be worth your attention. Your comments requested and recommendations.

Nosig.

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION:	White House	Adm Cooke	Gen Wedemeyer
	Adm Leahy	Gen Marshall	Gen Kuter
	Adm King	Gen Arnold	Gen Fairchild
	Adm Willson	Gen Handy	Col Connor

BOSCO-OUT-100
BOSCO-OUT-101
BOSCO-OUT-102

(20th Aug 43) 22322 EMK

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per JCS 29-71

Date- DEC 22 1971

Signature- RAB

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310 Post (Handy)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR 14
192001Z
EMK

~~SECRET~~
WAR DEPARTMENT
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QCC
19th Aug 43

INCOMING MESSAGE **SECURITY CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL
URGENT

From: WAR (relayed from Algiers W 7710/3224)
To: BOSCO
No: 117, 19th Aug 43

In view of decision of Combined Chiefs of Staff, as cited in message from Arnold to Eaker concerning 3 B24 (Liberators) groups now in this area it appears that they have in view other important strategic objectives whose attainment will more than compensate for the added risks this immediate transfer places upon AVALANCHE. To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFOR for the British Chiefs of Staff from the Commander in Chief NAF number 332. BIGOT AVALANCHE.

Assuming no great change in German strength we are determined to go ahead with AVALANCHE with whatever forces we have at the moment, but I think it only fair to the Combined Chiefs of Staff to give them the essential factors on which risks must be calculated. There is a complete German Corps of 3 divisions in the area between Naples and the toe. This does not include the Hermann Goering Division which will unquestionably be rapidly rehabilitated and used as a reserve in the same region. It should be realized also that certain Italian units in the last days of the Sicilian campaign fought determinedly and well. While these were unquestionably the cream of all the Italian forces on the island and are not representative of what is to be expected from the Italian army as a whole, yet the possibility of effective Italian aid to the Germans cannot be discounted. We must count on the air to impede the concentration of the hostile force against our landing.

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BOSCO-IN-151

(19th Aug 43) EMK

Date- DEC 22 1971

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3/0 Pal. Husky

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE CONTROL

SECURITY
CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL
URGENT

Page 2

From: WAR(relayed from Algiers W 7710/3224)
To: BOSCO

No: 117, 19th Aug 43

As heretofore reported, the local German bomber strength is building up. On the night of the 17th an estimated 100 JU88's raided Bizerte and caused some casualties. An additional German bomber group is now entering the area. When the 3, B24 groups, already referred to, leave here, our heavy bomber strength will be reduced to 4, B17 (Fortress) groups and 2 under strength B 24 groups. Because of our high monthly rate of missions flown, the 15 per cent replacement rate for crews has failed to meet our needs and these groups, particularly the B17 groups, will be operating at reduced effectiveness. The best way to keep down the hostile air threat is to raid his airfields intensively during the week preceding AVALANCHE, but we will not be able to do this on the desired scale.

During the assault phases of HUSKY, in spite of our very great preponderance of air power and in spite of all out effort on the part of our fighters, we lost a number of ships by aerial bombing and from aerial torpedoes. My attention has been called to a report made to Admiral King by one of our returning admirals that our air coverage in that operation was, in his opinion, not adequate. The operation which we are about to undertake will be infinitely more difficult from the air point of view. The assault will be at extreme range of single engine fighter and the hostile airfields are scattered over a great area. Some of our P38 (Lightnings) pilots are also approaching the point of exhaustion. As a consequence of these things our convoys will have to anticipate higher losses from air attack while at sea and while lying offshore.

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(19th Aug 43)

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Date- DEC 22 1971

SECURITY CONTROL

Signature:

URGENT

Page 3

From: WAR (relayed from Algiers W 7710/3224)
To: BOSCO

No: 117, 19th Aug 43

Air Chief Marshall Tedder and General Spaatz are convinced that the immediate subtraction of these 3 groups will definitely add to the risks of the AVALANCHE operation. I repeat that my plans for attack will not be altered as a result of this transfer.

Nosig.

NOTE: Attention invited to BOSCO-OUT-59 (18 Aug 43) Gen Arnold

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: White House Gen Marshall Gen Fairchild
Adm Leahy Gen Handy Gen Wedemeyer
Adm King Gen Arnold Col Connor
Adm Cooke Gen Kuter Col Starbird
Adm Willson

BOSCO-IN-151

(19th Aug 43)

2047Z

EMK

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INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

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U R G E N T

From: Algiers
To: War

Date: DEC 22 1971

No. W 7710/3224, 19 August 1943/NAF 332 ^{Signature-}

In view of decision of Combined Chiefs of Staff, as cited in message from Arnold to Eaker concerning 3 B24 (Liberators) groups now in this area it appears that they have in view other important strategic objectives whose attainment will more than compensate for the added risks this immediate transfer places upon AVALANCHE. To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFOR for the British Chiefs of Staff from the Commander in Chief. NAF number 332. BIGOT AVALANCHE. Assuming no great change in German strength we are determined to go ahead with AVALANCHE with whatever forces we have at the moment. But I think it only fair to the Combined Chiefs of Staff to give them the essential factors on which risks must be calculated. There is a complete German Corps of 3 Divisions in the area between Naples and the Toe. This does not include the Hermann Goerring Division which will unquestionably be rapidly rehabilitated and used as a reserve in the same region. It should be realized also that certain Italian Units in the last days of the Sicilian Campaign fought determinedly and well. While these were unquestionably the cream of all the Italian Forces on the Island and are not representative of what is to be expected from the Italian Army as a whole, yet the possibility of effective Italian aid to the Germans cannot be discounted. We must count on the air to impede the

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CM-IN-14200 (19 Aug 43)

19

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SECURITY CONTROL
INCOMING MESSAGE

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

From: Algiers
To: War

No. W 7710/3224, 19 August 1943 /NAF 332

concentration of the Hostile Force against our landing.

As heretofore reported, the local German Bomber strength is building up. On the night of the 17th an estimated 100 JU88's raided Bizerte and caused some casualties. An additional German Bomber Group is now entering the area. When the 3 B24 Groups, already referred to, leave here, our heavy bomber strength will be reduced to 4 B17 (Fortress) Groups and 2 under strength B24 Groups. Because of our high monthly rate of missions flown, the 15% replacement rate for crews has failed to meet our needs and these Groups, particularly the B17 Groups, will be operating at reduced effectiveness. The best way to keep down the hostile air threat is to raid his airfields intensively during the week preceding AVALANCHE, but we will not be able to do this on the desired scale. During the assault phases of HUSKY, in spite of our very great preponderance of air power and in spite of all out effort on the part of our fighters, we lost a number of ships by aerial bombing and from aerial torpedoes. My attention has been called to a report made to Admiral King by one of our returning Admirals that our air coverage in that operation was, in his opinion, not adequate. The operation which we are about to undertake will be infinitely more difficult from the air point of view. The assault will be at extreme range of single engine fighters and the hostile airfields are scattered over a great area. Some of our P38 (Lightnings) Pilots are also approaching the point of exhaustion. As a consequence of these things our convoys will have to anticipate higher losses from air attack while at sea and while lying offshore.

Air Chief Marshal Tedder and General Spaatz are convinced that the immediate subtraction of these 3 Groups will definitely add to the risks of the

CM-IN-14200 (19 Aug 43)

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Date- DEC 22 1971

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers
To: War

No. W 7710/3224, 19 August 1943/NAF 332

AVALANCHE operation. I repeat that my plans for attack will not be altered as a result of this transfer.

No Sig

FOOTNOTE: Attention is invited to CM-IN-13563 (18 Aug 43)
CGAAF
Relayed to Quebec as Number 117

ACTION: CCS

INFORMATION: OPD
General Strong
General Arnold
SGS
Admiral King
General Hildring
LOG

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Signature- [Signature]

CM-IN-14200 (19 Aug 43) 1823Z ejv

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WCR 11
191556Z
RAC

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QCC
18 Aug.

INCOMING MESSAGE

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

U R G E N T

SECURITY CONTROL

From: WAR (relay from Algiers W-7627)
To : BOSCO

No : 96 18 August 43

Action AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff rptd
USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff, CINC MED from FREEDOM
signed Eisenhower cite FHGCT W-7627/2714 18 Aug nil.

BIGOT. 10 US LST's are due to leave Oran 20
August for India. This is NAF 330 shortages of LST's
in this theater is critical factor limiting timing,
scale of assault and rate of build up in our next
operations. Both BAYTOWN and AVALANCHE are planned on
absolute minimum of LST's and craft and even then
AVALANCHE is dependent on transfer of proportion of
LST's after BAYTOWN assault. Acceptable time margin
for AVALANCHE is only 48 hours and we could ill-
afford delay till after moonlight period which lack of
LST's sufficient for both operations might impose.

Admiral Cunningham personally joins in my
earnest request to hold 10 LST's earmarked for India
to be used in launching forthcoming operations.

Even if approved for 1 trip only this would
be of greatest assistance. If we could hold them
until 30 September their assistance would be even
greater. Grateful for earliest reply.

No Sig

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Per JCS 29-71

BOSCO-IN-122

Date- DEC 22 1971

Signature- RHP

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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U R G E N T
SECURITY CONTROL

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

From: WAR (relay from Algiers W-7627)
TO : BOSCO

No : 96 18 August 43

ACTION: CC/S

Information: White House
Adm Leahy
Adm King
Adm Cooke

Adm Willson
Gen Marshall
Gen Handy
Gen Arnold

Gen Kuter
Gen Fairchild
Gen Wedemeyer
Col Connor
Col Starbird

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Signature- RHP

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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JCS 29-71
SECURITY CONTROL
COPY
18 Aug. 1943
12007

SECURITY CONTROL
URGENT

From: Algiers
To: WAR W-7627
Troopers London 2714

18 August, 1943

(Action AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff rptd
USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff, CINC Med from Free-
dom signed Eisenhower cite FHGCT W-7627/2714 18 Aug nil).

BIGOT. 10 US LST's are due to leave Oran 20
August for India. This is WAF 330 shortages of LST's
in this theater is critical factor limiting timing,
scale of assault and rate of build up in our next operat-
ions. Both Baytown and Avalanche are planned on ab-
solute minimum of LST's and craft and even then Avalanche
is dependent on transfer of proportion of LST's after
Baytown assault. Acceptable time margin for Avalanche
is only 48 hours and we could ill afford delay till
after moonlight period which lack of LST's sufficient
for both operations might impose. Admiral Cunningham
personally joins in my earnest request to hold 10 LST's
 earmarked for India to be used in launching forthcoming
operations. Even if approved for one trip only this
would be of greatest assistance. If we could hold them
until 30 September their assistance would be even great-
er. Grateful for earliest reply.

No Sig.

NOTE: Relayed to Quebec as # 96.

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD, General Strong, General Arnold,
Admiral King, General Hilldring, LOG

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CM-IN-13359 (18 Aug 43) 1521Z ejv

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Date- DEC 19 1943

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

310 Pol History

WWN 4
172100Z
RAC

WAR DEPARTMENT
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QCC
17 Aug.

INCOMING MESSAGE **SECURITY CONTROL**
SECURITY CONTROL
PRIORITY

DECLASSIFIED

From: NAVY
To : BOSCO

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 1, 1972

No : 172100

By DBS Date MAY 22 1973

Following is COMNAVNEWS 171206 received in reply to directive sent him to load LCTS on LSTS of PHIBDETIND in accordance with your 161323 serial 2 "BIGOT.AVALANCHE." In order comply urdis 161806 will be necessary to

(A) sail 6 LSTS to Agouti exchange crews unload pontoon causeways part of which are deck loaded and return LSTS to FASCIST for loading LCTS.

(B) sail 10 LCTS from Agouti to FASCIST for loading of the remaining 97 LCTS this theatre 32 are in HURRIED 1 in Tufton and 64 in Agouti area. Only 20 of the 64 are operational at this time. 24 are required for AVALANCHE. Due to shortage of escorts congestion of all ports and serious interference with operation AVALANCHE it is recommended that LSTS be sailed in accordance my Dis 152033B without LCTS.

If not approved estimate earliest date LSTS can sail from FASCIST will be 15 September."

No action taken here awaiting your instructions. This is our serial number 9.

Note: 161323Z is BOSCO-OUT-33 (16 Aug. 43) COMINCH

ACTION: Adm King

Information: White House Gen Marshall Gen Kuter
Adm Leahy Gen Handy Gen Fairchild
Adm Cooke Gen Deane Gen Somervell
Adm Willson Gen Arnold Gen Wedemeyer

BOSCO-IN-109

(17 Aug 5 43)

2151Z RAC

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

JDD B30
171307B
EMK

QCC
17th Aug 43

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL
URGENT

From: Algiers
(Information to WAR)
To: BOSCO
No: W 7543-2306 17th Aug 43

(Action MKAD information AGWAR)
Personal to General Whiteley from General Smith.
Secret BIGOT. Signed Eisenhower. Cite FHGCT. My
preceding telegram. 9th September.

Nosig.

Note: Reference is to BOSCO-IN-98 (15th Aug 43) Gen Whiteley

ACTION: Gen Whiteley

INFORMATION: White House Gen Marshall Gen Fairchild
Adm Leahy Gen Handy Gen Wedemeyer
Adm King CC/S Col Starbird
Adm Cooke Gen Arnold Col Connor
Adm Willson Gen Kuter Gen Somervell

BOSCO-IN-99 (17th Aug 43) 1308Z

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EXEMPT, 7-5-72
DATE
MAY 22 1973

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310 Post Husky

JDJD No. 40
171306B
jc

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QCC
17 Aug 43

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INCOMING MESSAGE

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

U R G E N T

From: Algiers
(Information to WAR)

To : BOSCO

No. W 7542-2305 17 Aug 43

Personal for General Whiteley from General Smith.
Signed Eisenhower. BIGOT. Cite FPGCT. Addsd KKAD
rptd AGWAR.

Action ordered on decisions conference La Marsa
16th as follows:

Operation AVALANCHE will be undertaken before next moonlight
period and preceded at maximum interval by BAYTOWN
which GO C in C, 15th Army Group, hopes to launch before
end of August or early September. Target date AVALANCHE
in my immediately following telegram may be deferred up
to 2 days if essential to maintain adequate interval.

Allocation of landing craft which C in C Med now
withdrawing to be agreed by him with 15th Army Group.
5th Army pass to Command 15th Army Group today. When
GOBLET planning as complete as now practicable 5th Corps
revert to AFHQ reserve.

ACTION : Gen Whiteley

INFORMATION:	White House	Gen Marshall	Gen Fairchild
	Adm Leahy	Gen Handy	Gen Somervell
	Adm King	CC/S	Gen Wedemeyer
	Adm Cooke	Gen Arnold	Col Starbird
	Adm Willson	Gen Kuter	Col Connor

BOSCO-IN-98 (17 Aug 43) 1318Z jc

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JCS LETTER, 7-5-72
BY DBS, DATE

MAY 22 1973

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR 11
161812Z
RAC

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INCOMING MESSAGE

QCC
16 Aug

SECURITY CONTROL
PRIORITY

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

From: WAR (relayed from Algiers W-7495 NAF 326)
To : BOSCO

No : 76 16 August 43

Sicilian phase of the campaign is now drawing rapidly to a close (to AGWAR for The Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFOR for the British Chiefs of Staff from the Commander in Chief). BIGOT AVALANCHE. In spite of every effort by all 3 services, the enemy is succeeding in evacuating considerable numbers of personnel and light equipment. At the Commanders in Chief meeting today it was concluded that crossing of straits should be attempted as quickly as necessary supporting guns and supplies could be accumulated. Present indications are this date will be between September 1st and September 4th. Assuming no great change in general situation, AVALANCHE will be launched target date of September 9th.

Since a 10 day interval between the 2 assaults would greatly alleviate our difficulties in landing craft, we are straining every nerve to make the first assault at the earliest possible date. Information on outline of AVALANCHE plan will be submitted at an early date.

ACTION: CC/S

Information:

White House
Adm Leahy
Adm King
Adm Cooke
Adm Willson
Gen Marshall
Gen Handy

Gen Arnold
Gen Kuter
Gen Fairchild
Gen Somervell
Gen Wedemeyer
Col Betts
CAD

BOSCO-IN-84 (16 August 43) 2001Z

RAC

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

310 Bat Husky

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INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

JDJD C-13
Filed 16/18219
rlw

URGENT

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers
To: War W-7495 NAF 326
USFOR London 2074

16 August 1943

Sicilian phase of the campaign is now drawing rapidly to a close (To AGWAR for the Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFOR for the British Chiefs of Staff from the Commander in Chief). BIGOT AVALANCHE. In spite of every effort by all 3 services, the enemy is succeeding in evacuating considerable numbers of personnel and light equipment. At the Commanders in Chief meeting today it was concluded that crossing of straits should be attempted as quickly as necessary supporting guns and supplies could be accumulated. Present indications are this date will be between September 1st and September 4th. Assuming no great change in general situation, *AVALANCHE will be launched target date of September 9th. Since a 10 day interval between the 2 assaults would greatly alleviate our difficulties in landing craft, we are straining every nerve to make the first assault at the earliest possible date. Information on outline of AVALANCHE plan will be submitted at an early date.

* Direct amphibious operations against Naples. No Sig

NOTE: Relayed to KKAD as 76.

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD, General Strong,
General Arnold, SGS,
Admiral King, General
Hilldring, Log.

CM-IN-11966 (16 Aug 43) 1809Z [redacted] oms

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

311 Pool/Husby

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JDJD A1
13/0031
IBH

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

U R G E N T

FOR MARSHALL EYES ONLY

Pouch
From: Algiers
To : War

No. 7205 - 13 August 1943

In replying to your 4751 I give below my present personal thoughts on the 3 questions raised in your message. For Marshall for his eyes only from Eisenhower cite FHCOS. As you know all of our planning and efforts have been directed to cut the means at our disposal to fit the objectives assigned us, but it is dangerous to try to make exact logistical calculations far into the future as all of our operations are strictly regulated by the availability of ships and landing craft.

Occupation of Italy. There are many indications of German intentions to reinforce Italy. If Italy continues a policy of cooperation with Germany, it will be a race between German and Allied Forces, the result depending upon relative rates of buildup. Our rate is contingent upon landing craft and shipping availability and the German rate is contingent upon Italian cooperation and the availability of German Divisions. If we can once get a firm grasp of the Naples area, we shall be well placed but once we are committed to operations on the Continent, the question of whether or not the force available to us will be adequate depends entirely on the nature of German reaction. I doubt whether it will be practicable to limit our occupation to a line just North of Rome and I do not believe we can contemplate an Allied Army in central Italy and a German force in Northern Italy with a No Mans Land between them. We shall have to gain contact with a view to either destroying the German forces, driving them out of Italy, or if they are strongly reinforced, preventing them from ejecting us. This means that there might be required all the forces that our transport facilities and particularly the port capacity will allow us to move into Italy. Thereafter we should be able to establish a firm base in Northern Italy from which to threaten

CM-IN-9451 (13 AUG 43)

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

From: **INCOMING MESSAGE**
To : **SECURITY CONTROL**
No. 7205 - 13 August 1943

SECURITY CONTROL

Southern France. I believe that if operations develop favorably and no great German reinforcement takes place, the Mediterranean resources should be adequate to take us so far. If operations do not develop favorably, and particularly if German reaction and reinforcement are stronger than now anticipated, our resources, less the 7 Divisions earmarked for the United Kingdom may not be sufficient even to gain and hold a position in the Naples-Rome area. With regard to Sardinia and Corsica, it is clearly desirable to occupy them but I do not consider that any effort should be diverted from the main task outlined above. If I can occupy them with small forces and can spare the shipping I shall certainly do so. Whether this will be possible depends entirely upon the progress of the battle in Italy.

Diversionary attack against Southern France. By Spring 1944 after withdrawing 7 Divisions to United Kingdom and providing the Middle East are not required to make any additional commitments, we will have 24 organized divisions but the number of these available for active operations is governed first by the availability of equipment of all kinds, both to replace heavy losses inevitable between now and next Spring as well as to reequip divisions now grounded for lack of equipment; second, adequate personnel replacements and third, ability to transport formations now in North Africa or the Middle East to the scene of operations (IE ships and landing craft). With regard to the first and second of these considerations our past experience indicates that it is unwise to count on more than 2/3 of the total number of organized divisions being ready for operations at any one time. Of course this depends primarily on the flow of equipment and personnel from United States and United Kingdom and is governed by decisions taken in London and Washington. With regard to the third consideration, this depends upon port capacities here and in Italy as well as upon the constantly annoying and limiting factor of shipping and landing craft, together with so many other unknown factors, such as condition of ports in Italy after occupation and serviceability of landing craft that it is not possible to make anything like accurate long

CM-IN-9451 (13 Aug 43)

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AP 1331-1333

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[REDACTED]

WAR DEPARTMENT
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From: Algeria
To : [REDACTED]
No. 7203 - 13 August 1943

SECURITY CONTROL

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

range calculations. Once we have established ourselves firmly in Northern Italy, I agree that 10 divisions should be adequate for defense and the remainder of our organized and equipped divisions will be available for offensive operations as required by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Offensive operations against Southern France are now being studied although up to now other demands upon our planning staff have made the examination of this possibility rather sketchy. The same limitations discussed in previous paragraphs apply here. Desirable areas for assault in Southern France cannot be covered by single-engine, shore-based fighters from Northern Italy or from Corsica and operations might therefore depend for success on the German Air Force in Western Europe having been so reduced as to render fighter cover other than from carrier-borne or twin-engine aircraft unnecessary. It is not possible to predict now whether this will be the case in May or June 1944. Our own air effort will shortly begin to take a downward curve because the replacement rate of trained personnel is not sufficient to maintain our present tempo. This is being covered in another message to you.

Additional United States Division. While this is not essential and while limitations are more of equipment and transportation than in actual division strengths, we are always short of troops for garrison duties and prisoner of war guards. This might be a good place to use one of your divisions which does not give much promise of ever being a high class combat unit and which we could use for garrison duty. However if the United States strength here were to be maintained at 6 divisions then I would prefer to send 3 instead of 4 United States Divisions to the United Kingdom and certainly this would be more economical in shipping.

To summarize: Our capabilities for the future are limited by replacements of men and material more than by actual divisional strength and particularly by shipping and landing craft. I doubt if it is realized at home how rapidly the serviceability of landing craft declines during active operation and what a high per-

CM-IN-9451 (13 Aug [REDACTED])

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

Printed in

PDDE, PP. 1331-1333

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WAR DEPARTMENT

From: Algiers CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

To : War **INCOMING MESSAGE**

No. 7205

SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

centage are constantly out of action because of repairs and damage. Their operational life, without major overhaul, is surprisingly short and we find that after their use in an operation 30% of them require almost 3 weeks of laying up before they can be used again. In spite of these limitations I confidently believe that we shall be able to do our job here and that the views of the United States joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed in your 4751 are generally correct.

No Sig

4751 is CM-OUT-4031 (11 Aug 43) OPD

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: GEN ARNOLD
SGS
GEN DEANE (CCS)
ADM KING
LOG

CM-IN-9451 (13 Aug 43) 0805Z mcs

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Filed 12/1446B
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INCOMING MESSAGE

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

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U R G E N T

From: Algiers.
To: WAR W 7138NAF 319
USFOR London No#

12th August 1943.

Ploesti In view of the critical situation in Italy we consider that the B24 force which carried out the attack on TIDALWAVE and which is now awaiting suitable weather conditions (to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower cite FHCOS, BIGOT-TIDALWAVE. This is NAF 319.) For attack on JUGGLER coordinated with B17 force from 8th Bomber Command should, immediately on completion of JUGGLER, be concentrated on targets in Italy. We consider that at this juncture every available force should be brought to bear against Italy and the German in Italy. Once we are established in Italy follow up attacks on TIDALWAVE will from every point of view be easier to carry out than they now are from African bases.

coordinated operations against German fighter factories by 8th AF and No. Africa AF.

No Sig.

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Strong
Gen Arnold
SGS
Adm King
Gen Hilldring
LOG

CM-IN-8737 (12 Aug 43) 1445Z jb

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OUTGOING MESSAGE
SECURITY CONTROL

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

Poveh

Operations Division, WDGS
Executive Office, JEH

August 11, 1943

COMMANDING GENERAL
FREEDOM, ALGIERS

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date *WST* MAY 21 1974

Number 4751

It is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and we understand from Rooks statements at 91st JPS meeting that it is your view, that the forces now committed to the Mediterranean (less the 7 divisions for transfer to UK) will be adequate to attain the desired ends of occupying Italy to a line North of Rome, seizing Sardinia and Corsica and making a diversionary effort against France from the Mediterranean about May or June 1944. It is estimated that 10 divisions will be sufficient to contain any remaining German forces in Italy, unless Germany sends large reinforcements to the peninsula, and that there will be available 14 offensive divisions and adequate combat aircraft to launch a combined amphibious and overland assault on Southern France in coordination with the main effort of the initial 29 divisions across the channel. General Rooks stated to the planners that an additional US division in the Mediterranean this fall, while not considered essential, would be desirable for garrison duties and would be a definite contribution to your effort. (From Marshall for personal attention of Eisenhower) Please give me anything you desire to add to Rooks statement concerning an additional US division and your reaction to the above expressed views of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and the explanation of your views by General Rooks.

No Sig.

ORIGINATOR: OPD
INFORMATION: General Arnold, General Deane (CCS), Adm King, LOG

CM-OUT-4031 (11 Aug 43) 2018Z ejv

Mag Room

13

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310 Pat Hensley

JBBB 23

filed 10/0953
md

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

1943

U R G E N T

From: AFHQ in North Africa
To: USFOR London 9620
5th Army Unnumbered
WAR NAF 318, W-6932
Fosterswitch Unnumbered

10 August, 1943

(From Freedom to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff repeated 15th Army Group for personal attention of General Alexander, 5th Army for personal attention of General Clark and Adastra La Marsa for personal attention of Air Chief Marshal Tedder signed Eisenhower cite FRCIC W 6952/9620 10th Aug 0920B) This is NAF number 318 (BIGOT AVALANCHE).

BIGOT. Meeting of Commanders in Chief was held today in Tunis. General agreement to effect that every effort must be made to mount AVALANCHE and with 10th Corps so equipped with landing craft that it can be used either on that operation or on Buttress, if latter proves necessary. Every effort will be made to establish necessary bridgehead on Toe, employing only troops and means now in Sicily. Agreed that we should avoid, if humanly possible, penning up of sizable forces in Toe where they could be rather easily contained, particularly since to do so will practically eliminate any change of AVALANCHE type of operation this year. This is because of necessary use of landing craft in maintaining over beaches all the troops we would have in Toe.

Strategic Air Force is concentrating on communications and for this reason it is entirely possible we will go back to Rome marshalling yards in near future. You will be kept informed of plans. The P-38 (Lightnings) have done very good work in Toe in cutting communications and in destroying jammed up transport and railway equipment back of breaks.

Indications are that German troops in Sicily are

CM-IN-7262 (10 Aug 43)

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INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY
CONTROL

From: AFHQ in North Africa
To: USFOR London 9620
5th Army Unnumbered
WAR MAF 318, W-6932
Fosterswitch Unnumbered

10 August, 1943

getting near the limit of their endurance, provided only
that we can keep up the pressure. This Alexander is
doing

No Sig

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
General Strong
General Arnold
Admiral King
LOG

CM-IN-7262 (10 Aug 43) 18487 ejv

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

105 29-71
SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

Combined Chiefs of Staff

August 6, 1943

CG, FREEDOM, ALGIERS

Number 4372

USFOR, LONDON, ENGLAND
(For British Chiefs of Staff)

Number R-1546

1. The plan outlined in your NAF 298 is approved, subject to the addition in paragraph 2 below, and is based on the accomplishment of your assumptions, i.e., (A) Recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation by both governments. (B) French Forces under a French Commander to take part in combined operation "Firebrand". This is book message. (C) Reservation to yourself of similar rights, privileges and immunities to those prevailing in North Africa. To Eisenhower, Freedom, Algiers, FAN 185, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

2. In view of proximity of "Firebrand" to enemy held mainland, there should be established military control of the administration under "Etat De Siege".

3. It is assumed that in implementing the above plan, you will assure the necessary coordination with the French Committee of National Liberation.

4. In the event that any 1 of the above assumptions is not accomplished, you will be guided by the directive which follows:
(Main heading) Directive for Administration of Civil Affairs in Corsica
(Sub heading) Section 1 Political and Miscellaneous.

Para 1. By proclamation issuing from your headquarters:
(A) You will proclaim the Liberation of Corsica, accomplished by the united effort of the French, American, and British Forces.
(B) You will establish an administration for civil Affairs for Corsica, subject to your supreme authority. (C) You will designate General Blank (Commanding General of the French Troops engaged in the Invasion) as Director of the Civil Administration.

Para 2. The administration shall be solely French.
British-American Forces will not participate in the administration,
CM-OUT-2133 and 2134 (6 Aug 43)

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Per Sec 29-71

DEC 22 1971

Date-

Signature: RHP

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SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

Page 2

August 6, 1943

Rock message

but will maintain liaison by means of a Military Mission.

Para 3. Subject to your supreme authority, legislative, administrative, executive and judicial powers shall be vested in the Director, provided, however, that his jurisdiction as Civil Administrator shall extend over the civil population.

Para 4. The replacement or retention of present officials will be as ordered by the Director. The Director will decide whether the functioning of the administration is better served by the appointment of officers of the French Forces, or by the use of the services of local French Civil Officials.

Para 5. You will advise the Director as follows: (A) During the period of military operations, no political activity of any kind shall be countenanced. (B) Known Axis leaders and Axis partisans shall be arrested. (C) All property belonging to any Axis or associated country or their nationals will be impounded or sequestered, pending further instructions.

Para 6. All facilities, territory, and installations shall be made available for future Allied operations, and any request in furthering such operations made by the Allied Commander in Chief shall be observed.

Para 7. The arrangements contained in this directive pertain to Corsica and have no force elsewhere.

No Sig.

ORIGINATOR: General Doane (CCS)

INFORMATION: OPD
General Arnold
General Strong
Admiral King
General Hilldring
LOG

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per JCS 29-11

Date- DEC 22 1971

CM-OUT-2133 (6 Aug 43) 2121 Z mvh
CM-OUT-2134

Signature- RHP

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

10529-71

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SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

Combined Chiefs of Staff

August 5, 1943

CG
FREEDOM, ALGIERS

Number 4247

BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF
USFOR LONDON, ENGLAND

Number R1493

The Combined Chiefs of Staff (BIGOT-Priceless for Eisenhower Freedom Algiers, ~~FAN 182~~ from the Combined Chiefs of Staff) have no comments to make on your NAF 307 but desire that more details of your plans be submitted when they are ready.

310 Post Number

No Sig

ORIGINATOR: CCS
INFORMATION: OPD
Adm. King
Gen. Arnold
Gen. Strong
Gen. Hilldring
Log

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per 10529-71

CM-OUT-1607 (5 Aug 43) 1622Z fbh
CM-OUT-1608

Date- DEC 22 1971

Signature- RHP

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

310 Post Number

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SECURITY CONTROL
C. D. CASE
5 AUG

SECURITY CONTROL

URGENT

From: Algiers
To: War W-6568
USFOR 7972

5th August 1943

I have just sent you a short situation report which is a summary of reports received from several sources. (To AGWAR for the Combined Chiefs of Staff and for USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower cite FBCIC.) This is MAF 312. Supplementing this report, our estimate of the enemy situation on August 4 is as follows: in area south and southwest of Catania the enemy has commenced withdrawing. Documents have shown enemy prepared to retire in 3 stages from present line to main bridgehead line which would be exclusive Acireale inclusive Biancavilla, Aderno. Capture of Centuripe by us is likely to precipitate this withdrawal. Enemy situation in center critical since fall of Centuripe and advance towards Adrano threatens to split forces and destroy cohesion of front. This threat appreciated by enemy and further intense fighting likely. In the northern sector, the enemy continues oppose maximum resistance to growing allied pressure. Fierce opposition and counter attacks in area Troina. This town is last outpost before probable final defensive line Cassaro San Fratello. On coast enemys main forces probably already withdrawn to San Fratello as all bridges blown to west. No certain indications that enemy already intends withdraw behind Etna, but ability to maintain anticipated line depends mainly on successful defense of Adrano.

My present estimate is that a feeling of restrained optimism with regard to Sicily is justified and that the clean up may come sooner than the 30 days estimated. by some of our Commanders last week. It seems possible,

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CM-IN-3428 (5 Aug 1943)
P. 1370

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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SECURITY CONTROL

From: **INGOMING MESSAGE**
To: War W-6588
USFOR 7972

SECURITY CONTROL

according to Allied G-2, that an opportunity for a quick victory existed during the very early days of the invasion. If this was so I did not sufficiently appreciate the situation. In any event the present enemy position does not seem to have much depth and once we are through his main defensive line, it is likely that progress will be rapid. On the other hand, the Germans have used the time to build a strong fortress area, thick with anti aircraft, on the Reggio side of the narrows and this will have its effect on our efforts to interfere with his evacuation when the break comes.

My next formal meeting with the principal Commanders takes place on the 9th in Tunis. Although we have not been able to gather much information on the internal situation in Italy, there now seems to be sufficient evidence to justify a preliminary estimate as to the possible courses of our future operations. It seems less & less likely that operation Barracuda can be undertaken. Even if a total collapse of Resistance by the Italians were now to occur, it is inevitable that the Germans would occupy and make every effort to hold the port of Naples as flank protection for the withdrawal of the German forces from the southern part of the peninsula, and it is extremely unlikely that a sudden weak attempt on our part would be successful. On the other hand, the possibilities of a successful Avalanche seem to me to be increasing, always providing we can do a successful Buttress with the troops now in Sicily. Although the Germans have 1 division in the Avalanche area, our plans contemplate a landing in sufficient force to give reasonable assurance of securing a bridgehead, and our follow up would increase the strength of this force sufficiently to enable it to deal with such German opposition as our estimates indicate it is likely to encounter. Bigot. Buttress is a necessary followup for Husky, not only to secure a passage through the narrows which we will probably need, but also to constitute a threat and a holding attack which would contribute materially to a successful Avalanche. We are loading 10 corps in such a way as to provide sufficient flexibility to permit its employment either

Landing small force Naples.

Direct amphib. against Naples.

Toe of Italy

CM-IN-3428 (5 Aug 43)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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From: **INCOMING MESSAGE**
To: War W-8568
USFOR 7972

SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

in Buttress or Avalanche. This necessity for flexibility has brought us up against a very complicated problem in ship and landing craft assignment, but our Naval people are approaching a workable solution. There will necessarily, however, be some sacrifice of efficiency in the interest of flexibility. I believe that the final decision on Barracuda can be taken at our next meeting, and I will submit a detailed report immediately thereafter.

No Sig

ACTION: CC/S

- INFORMATION: OPD
- GEN. STRONG
- GEN. ARNOLD
- SGS
- GEN. HILLDRING
- ADM. KING
- LOG

CM-IN-3428 (5 Aug 43) 1804Z cen

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

105 29-71

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SECURITY CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

Combined Chiefs of Staff

August 2, 1943

CG
FREEDOM ALGIERS

Number 3986

BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF
USFOR LONDON ENGLAND

Number R 1381

It is deemed (BIGOT-Avalanche) of the utmost importance that the combined bomber offensive from bases now available in U K be sustained and intensified. For Eisenhower Freedom Algiers FAN 180, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, reference your MAP 303. The Combined Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the temporary transfer of additional heavy bomber units (B-17s) from 8th Air Force to Mediterranean would seriously impair the combined bomber offensive at a critical period. Consequently, notwithstanding advantages to bomber offensive which will ultimately accrue from success in your further operations, the Combined Chiefs of Staff cannot approve your request for the diversion of these units to your theater.

No Sig

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per JCS 29-71

ORIGINATOR: CCS

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Hilldring
Adm King
Gen Arnold
Gen Strong
LOG

Date- DEC 22 1971

Signature- RHP

CM-OUT-323 (2 Aug 43)
CM-OUT-324

1500Z fbh

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CCWD
2 AUG.
1943
SECURITY CONTROL

U R G E N T

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Date-

From: Algiers
To : WAR

Signature-

No : W-6330

2 August 43

Yesterday I had a meeting with the 3 Commanders in Chief at Finance. To AGWAR for the Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFOR for the British Chiefs of Staff from the Commander in Chief NAF number 307. BIGOT AVALANCHE. Conclusions reached were in line with those reported following a similar conference of a week ago. We are positive that a lodgement must be made in the BUTTRESS area before any bold stroke should be attempted, such as AVALANCHE. On the other hand, our hope is that this lodgement can be made without employing troops otherwise available for AVALANCHE. If ad hoc crossing of straits proves too difficult and formal landing operations in close support of that effort are forced upon us, then the AVALANCHE project must be delayed materially. To meet the conflicting requirements in preparation we are employing in the AVALANCHE plan the same corps that would do BUTTRESS if that operation should become necessary. In this way we are enabled to send landing craft to the proper ports of embarkation immediately. Assuming that the situation develops sufficiently favorably so that AVALANCHE can be undertaken without committing the 10th Corps to BUTTRESS, then that corps will be employed on the right of the landing operations in AVALANCHE and will rejoin the 8th Army soon as contact can be established.

CM-IN-1142 (2 Aug 43)

Printed in PDDE p. 1305 [redacted]

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**URGENT
SECURITY CONTROL**

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

From: Algiers
To : WAR

No : W-6330

2 August 43

Page -2-

The only other complication is that some British landing craft will have to be used with American troops and vice versa. This is undesirable but we cannot possibly afford to let any technical detail stand in the way of the required flexibility in plan, which is the only way that we can now achieve speed in operations. The planning is well in hand and, if the current attack should go rapidly and allow TB to rush substantial parts of 8th Army across the Straits, we are going full out on the more ambitious plan.

In the current battle our land forces have most difficult lines of approach to the hostile position. It is almost impossible to use the road running along the northern coast. My hope is that the attack of the 8th Army, with its main effort on its left, will be so violent as to break through immediately to control the road running along the west of Mount Etna. Then with the support of Naval gun fire on the right, we should be able to cut off a large part of the German garrison now in Catania and hasten the destruction of the enemy. In the 7th Army area where vast distances have been covered at tremendous speed, there has been no opportunity to deploy our strength in line and the operations will be principally conducted along the roads. This circumstance provides great depth in our formations and we will attempt to capitalize on the situation by keeping up the pressure continuously day and night in an effort to crack the enemy's morale. I repeat that the road along the northern coast is almost unbelievably difficult and small landing operations along that coast offer about the only means of advance. Likewise,

CM-IN-1142 (2 Aug 43)

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INCOMING MESSAGE

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

U R G E N T

From: Algiers
To : WAR

No : W-6330 2 August 43 Page -3-

ordinary methods of supply must be supplemented
by the use of landing craft along that coast.
We are going full out in the whole effort.

No Sig

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
 GEN. STRONG
 GEN. HILLDRING
 ADM. KING
 GEN. ARNOLD
 LOG

CM-IN-1142 (2 Aug 43) 1820Z cen

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JDJD B 44
Filed 1501E/30th
efg

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL
30 July 1943
1501E/30th

SECURITY CONTROL

FOR GENERAL MARSHALL'S EYES ONLY

U R G E N T

From: Algiers
To: WAR

No. W 6099 30 July 1943

Naples, amphibious

I have just seen comments made by General Devers on my NAF 303. From Eisenhower to General Marshall for eyes only. BIGOT AVALANCHE. I should like to make it clear that my proposal was submitted from an disinterested viewpoint as I could possibly adopt. It was my thought that in the possession of great numbers of long range bombers, the United Nations possess a mobile offensive weapon that can be used for particular periods at any point the Combined chiefs of Staff may consider desirable. We believe that the reinforcements suggested would immeasurably strengthen our chances for a successful major blow at the Italian mainland, but I should like to make it clear to you personally that my decisions will not be dependent upon the receipt of such reinforcements. I am doing everything possible to shake up things so as to get in position to take a real shot at the enemy in the AVALANCHE operation, and I do sincerely believe that the use of additional bomber strength would work out, in the long run, to the advantage both of the Mediterranean campaign and of the bomber operations against Germany.

Naples

No Sig.

* Being serviced.
NAF 303 is CM-IN-20257 (28 Jul 43) CCS
WDCMC invites attention to CM-IN-21175 (29 Jul 43) OPD
ACTION: OPD
INFORMATION: SGS, GEN DEANE (CCS), GEN ARNOLD, LOG

CM-IN-21774 (30 Jul 43) 1551Z mcs

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310 Paul Hester

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

JCS 29-71
SECURITY CONTROL

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SECURITY CONTROL

Combined Chiefs of Staff

July 30, 1943

FREEDOM ALGIERS

Number 3823

USFOR, LONDON ENGLAND
(For British Chiefs of Staff)

Number R-1290

*Post-Husky,
general*

With reference carrier-borne air support PRICELESS (BIGOT-PRICELESS) the British Chiefs of Staff have indicated it will require some time for the escort carriers to collect their aircraft and work up, but this is being hastened as much as possible. This is a book message to Eisenhower, Freedom, Algiers, FAN 177, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The British Chiefs of Staff propose to leave the "standstill" order regarding the removal of British resources from the Mediterranean in force until the meeting at Quadrant. They also propose to leave you the 3 Wellington Squadrons lent to you for HUSKY pending discussion at Quadrant.

No Sig

ORIGINATOR: CC of S

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Strong
Gen Arnold
Adm King
Gen Hilldring
LOG

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per JCS 29-71

Date- DEC 22 1971

Signature- RHP

CM-OUT-12142
CM-OUT-12143 (30 July 43) 2356Z flw

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INCOMING MESSAGE

JDJD B44
301501B
BMS

SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

Marshall's Eyes Only

URGENT---CORRECTION

From: Algiers
To: War
No: W-6099 30th July 1943

Underlined portion should read:
Mobile strategic weapon.

No Sig

Correction to CM-IN-21774 (30 Jul 43) OPD

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: SGS
GEN DEANE (CCS)
GEN ARNOLD

CM-IN-21848 (30 Jul 43) 1848Z mcs

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BY DSS, DATE

MAY 22 1973

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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1626Z/29
esf

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INCOMING MESSAGE
SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL
CCWD
29 July
1943

URGENT

FOR MARSHALL'S EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

From: USFOR London
To : War
Nr : W 2530 29th July 1943

Both Baker and I feel very strongly about SICKLE (FOR MARSHALL'S EYES ONLY signed Devers) any diversion at this time will be fatal. I have forwarded the following which expresses our thoughts:

"Devers to Eisenhower re your WAF 303, I cannot agree to the diversion of the 4 heavy groups for the following reasons:

A. The 8th Air Force is now engaged in a death struggle with German aviation with a strength still too small to assure success. Depletion of this Force by 4 groups would make it impossible to continue this vital effort.

B. The period from now until September 15th is the critical one for the combined bomber offensive. This is the period when German Fighter production is marked for destruction. It is the period which favors these long range attacks and the finding of these small point targets.

C. The 8th Air Force is just reaching a size where it can cooperate with RAF Bomber Command in coordinated attacks. These attacks pay much bigger dividends than the single effort of either, and losses are much less in this larger combined effort.

D. The many successful attacks of 8th Air Force on submarines sheds and buildings has played a big part

CM-IN-21175 (29 Jul 43)

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JCS LETTER, 7-8-72
BY DWS, DATE

EYES ONLY MAY 22 1973

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710 Post-Hawkeye

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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SECURITY CONTROL
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URGENT
FOR EYES ONLY
INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

From: USFOR London
To : War
Nr : W 2530 29th July 1943

8TH AF **EYES ONLY**
BUILD-UP
CROSS CHANNEL

in keeping down the Sub menace. The continuation of this phase of SICKLE is important to our shipping in all theaters and vital to the build up for OVERLORD.

E. Here, with support of their maintenance crews, out of their fixed and established bases in a theater in which they have been trained to fight and in a climate, weather and communications system with which they are familiar, our bombers can operate at maximum efficiency. There, where none of these conditions pertain, they would operate at greatly reduced effectiveness.

F. The Germans are struggling hard to find an adequate counter measure or antidote to our daylight bombing. We must press this campaign to the maximum in the meantime before they discover or devise a method of making it too expensive.

G. Finally I must consider the overall war effort. I must be guided by the greatest damage to the German enemy and I must never lose sight of the imminence of OVERLORD. The loss of this force would prevent the accomplishment of SICKLE which is preparatory for a vital essential to OVERLORD. German industry has been recognized by the Combined Chiefs of Staff as of highest priority in their approval of SICKLE. Our heavy bombers are effectively destroying this industry. We can just accomplish SICKLE with all the force we have and what we have been told we shall get. Any reduction will be fatal to its accomplishment. If the German High Command could dispose of the 8th Air Force I am sure they would take it out of Germany where it is today and has been for 5 out of the last 6 days and send it to North Africa or anywhere else. I hope you will not press for the depletion of the 8th Air Force. It is doing a magnificent job against Vital German Targets in Germany. It should never be diverted from this primary task."

ACTION: OPD
INFORMATION: General Arnold,
SGS, Log,
General Deane (CCS).
CM-IN-21175 (29 Jul 43) 2124Z

No Sig

EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED
JCS LETTER, 7-8-72
BY DSS, DATE

ejv

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

JDDJ B51
28 NPT
RAC

~~SECRET~~

SM 522-71

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SECURITY CONTROL

CCWD
28 July
039Z

URGENT

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SECURITY CONTROL

DECLASSIFIED

per SM 522-71

Date- DEC 22 1971

From: Algiers
To : AGWAR

Signature- *RHP attached*

No : W-5915/5144 28 July 43

Amphibious assault - Naples

With further reference to my AGWAR W 5831 and USFOR 4805 MAF number 300, I have conferred at length with Air Chief Marshal Tedder. BIGOT. To AGWAR for The Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFOR for the British Chiefs of Staff from The Commander in Chief. MAF number 303. The air problem facing us in AVALANCHE is one of some difficulty, 1st, because of distance from possible bases to provide fighter cover for the initial assault and, 2nd, because of the increased effort required for neutralization of hostile air and disrupting lines of communication. Another difficulty arises because of the intensive air effort we have been maintaining for some weeks and the additional necessity for continuing this effort to assist in rapid clean up of HUSKY operation. This clean up is an essential preliminary to the AVALANCHE operation in order to get necessary air fields and to have a reasonable birdgehead in the BUTTRESS area in order that German reserves may not be, with immunity, rushed directly to the point of landing.

Toe of Italy

We completely agree with the tenor of all messages received from London and Washington that anticipate great results from the present situation in Italy, provided only we are prepared to take bold and rapid advantage of that situation. Of all types of additional strength that could now be made available to us to assure a reasonable success in the whole venture, a temporary doubling of our heavy bomber types

CM-IN-20257 (28 Jul 43)

~~Printed in code~~

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310 Paul Huskey

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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URGENT

SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers
To : AGWAR

No : W-5915/5144

28 July 43

Page -2-

would be the most effective. Had we such strength, we believe that we could practically paralyze the German air effort in all Southern Italy and almost immobilize his ground units. If The Combined Chiefs of Staff should find it possible to direct several heavy groups of the 8th Air Force to shift their base of operations to this area from now until September 15th, it appears to us that the chances for achieving a decisive success in this region would be tremendously enhanced. Since one of the great purposes in this region is to secure new and better bases for continuation of the bombing against the Central European stronghold, we see this as a strategically correct employment of General Eaker's force for a period of 4 to 5 weeks. I personally suggest that if this matter is favorably considered, General Eaker should, if possible, lead his formations here in person in order that there may be no misapprehension as to the temporary and specific nature of the reinforcement. Our estimate is that the size of the reinforcement should be 4 full groups of B-17's (flying fortress).

16 groups
now in UK

The availability of shipping and landing craft make it appear that a formal AVALANCHE can be launched by September 9th. This would indicate the proper period for the use of the air reinforcement to be from about August 10th to September 15th.

We are preparing an AD BOC AVALANCHE of about 1 division, designed only to take instant advantage of complete collapse in Italy.

Nosig
W5831 /4805 is CM-IN-19438 (27 Jul 43) CC/S
NAF 300 is CM-IN-19363 (27 Jul 43) CC/S
ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD, GEN ARNOLD, GEN STRONG, ADM. KING, D. Roosevelt Library
GEN HILDRING, LOG SGS

CM-IN-20257 (28 Jul 43) 1648Z mcs

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

5M522-71

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JDJD B 5
Filed 1252B/27th
efg

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

WAZ

U R G E N T

From: Algiers
To: WAR

No. W 5831/4805 27 July 1943

1. Yesterday I met all Commanders in Tunis. To AGWAR for the Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower. BIGOT. This is NAF number 300. Plans for operations against the mainland of Italy were reviewed and I ordered the preparation of the following alternative plans (A) BUTTRESS, as previously conceived. (B) AVALANCHE, employing 5th Army with a United States and British Corps and contemplating French followup formations. The following was para 1.

file

Naples

Para 2. The military significance of recent political changes in Italy ought to be revealed during the next few days and it will then be possible to decide which of the 2 plans to put into effect. My one concern is speed of action and all our efforts are bent on launching the next operation as soon after the completion of HUSKY as it is humanly possible to do so.

Para 3. In addition, a plan is being prepared for a small force of a division, together with an airborne division, to rush into Naples at short notice in the event of a complete Italian collapse or a rapid German withdrawal from Southern Italy.

CM-IN-19362 (27 July 43)

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Per 5M522-71

Date- DEC 22 1987 15

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310 Col. Huskey

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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SECURITY CONTROL
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From: **INCOMING MESSAGE**
To: **WAR**
No. W 5831/4805 27 July 1943

SECURITY CONTROL

Para 4. Considerations applying to air situation will be forwarded to you following upon further conferences today with Tedder.

No Sig.

ACTION: GEN DEANE (CC/S)

INFORMATION: OPD
GEN STRONG
GEN ARNOLD
SGS
ADM KING
GEN HILDRING
LOG

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per SM 522-71

Date- DEC 22 1971

Signature- RHP

CM-IN-19362 (27 July 43) 1331Z flw

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JDJD B 54
Filed 1252B/274
jr

INCOMING MESSAGE

CCWD
27 July 1943
1218 Z

U R G E N T

From: Algiers
To : War

No. W 5831/4805 27 July 1943

Per advice from originator NAF number should be 300 instead of 200 as originally shown.

W.D.C.C.

FOOTNOTE: NAF 200 is CM-IN-19362 (27 July 43) CCS

ACTION: CCS

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Strong
Gen Arnold
Adm King
Gen Hilldring

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Date- DEC 22 1971

Signature- RHP

CM-IN-19438 (27 July 43) 1532Z flw

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SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

Combined Chiefs of Staff

July 26, 1943

COMMANDING GENERAL
FREEDOM, ALGIERS

Number 3444

BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF
USFOR, LONDON, ENGLAND

Number R-1145

With the object (BIGOT-AVALANCHE) of expediting the elimination of Italy from the war, the Combined Chiefs of Staff consider that you should plan forthwith AVALANCHE to be mounted at the earliest possible date using the resources already available to you for PRICELESS. For Eisenhower Freedom Algiers, FAN 175, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Carrier borne air support (1 Heavy and 4 Escort) will be available to you. Date of availability will be confirmed by the Admiralty.

No Sig.

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
General Strong
General Arnold
Adm. King
General Hilldring
LOG

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 21 1974

CM-OUT-10374
CM-OUT-10375

(26 Jul 43)

1956Z

ejv

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/23/94

310 Post-Header

General term
for Post-
Husky Med.
Mediterranean
operations

Amphibious operations against Naples

~~SECRET~~

JCS 29-71

WAR DEPARTMENT
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SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

Combined Chiefs of Staff

July 23, 1943

CG FREEDOM ALGIEIS

Number 3251

BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF USFOR LONDON ENGLAND Number R1073

You are informed reference your ^{attached} NAF 290 15 July, that the 6 US Troop Carrier Groups assigned to North Africa and the 1 US Troop Carrier Group assigned to the Middle East will not be transferred from the Mediterranean Area prior to the end of 1943 if you require them until that time. (To Eisenhower, Freedom Algiers, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, FAN 173.) The US Troop Carrier aircraft and crews now on loan from the United Kingdom for HUSKY operations must be returned by 15 November. The 40 British transports on loan for HUSKY operations can be retained until the end of October and replacements contemplated necessary to maintaining that strength will be furnished. The scheduled Troop Carrier aircraft replacements for the 7 US groups in the Mediterranean Area is 35 per month. This commitment will be increased by 20 to a total of 55 for August only. Due to the commitment of all available troop carrier aircraft to authorized operations, the only source of additional aircraft would be the diversion of a new troop carrier group scheduled to depart the United States 15 September for the United Kingdom. The aircraft and crews of this group will be made temporarily available to you up to 15 November if absolutely necessary

No Sig.

ORIGINATOR: CCS GLN DEANE

INFORMATION: OPD
ADM KING
GEN ARNOLD
GEN STRONG
GEN HILLDRING
LOG

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per JCS 29-71

CM-OUT-9587 (23 Jul 43) 2308Z mcs
CM-OUT-9588

Date- UCU 22 1971

Signature- RHP

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

310 Post-1943-1

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JCS 29-71

SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

Combined Chiefs of Staff

July 20, 1943

CG, FREEDOM, ALGIERS

Number 3003

USFOR, LONDON, ENGLAND
(For British Chiefs of Staff)

Number R-950

1. The recommendations contained in the last paragraph of your NAF 265, 18 July 1943, are approved. You should, however, extend your amphibious operations northwards as shore based fighter cover can be made effective. To Eisenhower, Freedom, Algiers, FAN 169, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff this is a book message.

2. Assuming that no U. S. combat loaders will be lost in HUSKY operations, you will have available in US lift for post HUSKY 7 APA's, 2 XAP's and 4 AKA's. British combat shipping available to you will be as indicated in 302050/May, Admiralty to CINC Mediterranean.

3. 90 cargo ships are allocated to your forces for post HUSKY.

4. 15 destroyers (U.S.) and 3 old destroyers (U.S.) will remain at your disposal as well as submarine chasers and minesweepers now assigned. Up to 3 U.S. cruiser will be made available if required. You will return 15 destroyers on or before 31 July and a 2nd group of 15 on or before 12 August. HUSKY losses will be taken from the returning 30 destroyers, unless losses prove excessive, in which case review of allocations will be necessary.

5. UGF-10 will sail in late August carrying troops requested by you in so far as units are available. It will carry in addition the replacements heretofore set up for August unescorted and 1 September unescorted. These unescorted will be diverted to the U K.

CM-OUT-8200 (20 July 43)

Receivable Ministry

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Per JCS 29-71

DEC 22 1971

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310 Paul H. ...

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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**SECURITY
CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Page 2

Book Message

July 20, 1943

6. Additional long range fighter aircraft, including the 20th Fighter Group, cannot be provided, even temporarily, since requirements for these aircraft in the U K as escorts for combined bomber offensive are considered as of primary urgency.

7. AMGOT officers. Are 930 Civil Affairs Officer to be 1/2 British and 1/2 American, totalling American requirements of 465? Also request you itemize these by specialties and approximate training. Give approximate date for arrival in theater.

8. We are planning to allocate a total of 30 ships per month beginning in January 1944, for civilian requirements for occupied or liberated countries in the Mediterranean.

No Sig.

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
Admiral King
General Arnold
General Strong
LOG

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per JCS 29-71

DEC 22 1971

Signature: RHP

CM-OUT-8200 (20 July 43) 2254 Z mvh
CM-OUT-8201

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JQJD B28
191152B
BMS

SECURITY CONTROL

CCD
1948Z
19 Jul

SECURITY CONTROL

EYES ONLY

URGENT

General Marshall's Eyes Only

From: Algiers
To: War

No: W-5189 19th July 1943

Proposals contained your 2234 July 10th, reference my W 4722 July 12th, have now been referred to Admiral Cunningham, who considers it is preferable to retain 2 APAS, 7 ZAPS. This provides a homogeneous unit. (To AGWAR for General Marshall's eyes only from Smith). Therefore request you allot on this basis.

No Sig

2234 is CM-OUT-4368 (10 July 43) OPD
W 4722 is CM-IN-8438 (12 July 43) OPD

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: Sec Gen Staff Adm King Log
Gen Deane (CC/S)

CM-IN-13407 (19 July 43) 1138Z rb

EYES ONLY

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JCS LETTER, 7-4-78
BY GDS, DATE

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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SM503-71

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SECURITY CONTROL

JDJD B36
Filed 18/1233B
ecm

FRCC
18 July 1943
1341Z

Post-Husky

URGENT

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Per SM 522-71

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers
To: War

Date- DEC 22 1943
Signature- RHP

No. NAF 265 131 18 July 1943

I had a meeting yesterday with Cunningham, Tedder and Alexander to consider post HUSKY operations. (To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff from Eisenhower repeat to FREEDOM. NAF number 265.) There is no question that Italian resistance is negligible but the German army is bitterly contesting our advance and is reinforcing as rapidly as possible. German air action is slight but attempts are being made to strengthen it.

Neither Alexander nor I contemplate any prolonged resistance in the West of Sicily but owing to the very difficult nature of the country in the North-east of the island and particularly in the Mount Etna region, we should not overlook the possibility of some delay in capturing Messina-possibly until mid August. Distance and terrain alone are considerable obstacles, while there is every indication that the German is determined to hold the Mount Etna line.

All commanders are agreed, however, that Italian morale is such as to indicate the mainland of Italy as the best area for exploitation with a view to achieving our object of forcing Italy out of the war and of containing the maximum German forces. We cannot yet discount the possibility of a substantial German reinforcement of Southern Italy. Such an eventuality

(CM-IN-12818 18 Jul 43)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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Page 2
SECURITY CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: [redacted]
To: War
No. NAF 265 131 18 July 1943

will, of course, be minimized by speed on our part, but we will have to watch the matter closely in the event we do not have Messina before August 10th-15th.

Part I

It is too early to be precise about the methods which we would employ because we cannot foretell what casualties our divisions in Sicily will have suffered nor our losses in landing craft. Up to the present the latter have been fewer than estimated but we have still to maintain 7th Army over the beaches for about another fortnight.

The possible courses for which we are preparing, of which some are alternative, are:

(A) Quick exploitation by forces in Sicily across the straits on the Toe assisted by landings of one or more fresh divisions from Africa in modified Buttress.

(B) Buttress -

Toe of Italy

(C) Quick exploitation from the Toe to the Ball.

(D) GOBLET.

Catrone

(E) Repeated out flanking movements by small amphibious forces.

Heel of Italy

(F) MUSKET, if as seems possible sufficient landing craft are available.

(G) Introducing a reinforcing force into Naples after the port has been captured as a result of our land advance.

The possibility of an assault on Naples is being re-examined. It had hitherto been discarded because:

(A) Of the shortage of landing craft

(CM-IN-12818 18 Jul 43)

[redacted]

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Date: 054 24 1971

Signature: RHP

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Page 3

From: Algiers
To: **INCOMING MESSAGE**
No. A-1 265 131 18 July 1943

SECURITY CONTROL

(B) The assault would be beyond the limit of effective fighter support, and it would be an unwarranted risk to use aircraft carriers.

(C) It would be unlikely to succeed against an enemy resisting to a degree sufficient to hold up our land advance.

In view of these considerations and assuming that substantial German reinforcement of Southern Italy has not taken place, I recommend carrying the war to the Mainland of Italy immediately Sicily has been captured and request very early approval in order that no time may be lost in making preparation.

no sig

ACTION: General Deane (CCS)

INFORMATION: OPD
General Strong
General Arnold
Sec.Gen.Staff
Admiral King
Log

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per 5M522-71

Date- DEC 22 1971

Signature- RHP

CM-IN-12818 (18 Jul 43) 1625Z ems

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

Joint Chiefs of Staff

July 17, 1943

CG
FREEDOM ALGIERS

Number 2789

BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF
USFOR LONDON ENGLAND

Number R-825

*Request for
post-Husky
plans*

For their information and study The Combined Staff Planners request that you send copies of plans now being considered (for Eisenhower Freedom Algiers, FAN 186, from The Joint Chiefs of Staff) in connection with post HUSKY operations, if they are available.

No Sig

ORIGINATOR: JCS (Gen. Deane)

INFORMATION: OPD
Adm. King
Gen. Arnold
Gen. Strong
Gen. Hilldring
LOG

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per JCS 29-71

CM-OUT-7188 (17 Jul 43) 2233Z vc
CM-OUT-7189

Date- DEC 22 1971

Signature- RHP

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JCS 29-71

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**SECURITY
CONTROL**

Post-Huskey

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff
July 16, 1943

COMMANDING GENERAL
FREEDOM ALGIERS

Number 2686

BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF
USFOR LONDON ENGLAND

Number R-775

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have accepted for planning purposes your strategic concept set forth in NAF 250, 30th June.

For Eisenhower Freedom Algiers, FAN 165, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In addition, the Combined Chiefs of Staff wish to express their interest in the possibilities of a direct amphibious landing operation against Naples in lieu of an attack on Sardinia, if the indications regarding Italian resistance should make the risks involved worth while.

No Sig

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Strong
Gen Arnold
Adm King
Gen Hilldring
LOG

CM-OUT-6683 (16 July 43) 2211Z flw
CM-OUT-6684

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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JDJD B 116
Filed 1801B/1943
efg

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

PRIORITY

From: Algiers
To: WAR

No. W 4942/988 15 July 1943

Subject: Maintenance of airborne formations.
This is my WAF 290. To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs
of Staff rptd USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff.
Signed Eisenhower. Cite FBGCT. Brimstone BIGOT.

1. In view of possible post HUSKY operations it is of utmost importance to maintain the airborne forces in this Theater in a continuous state of readiness for employment in their proper role. Whether these formations will be operational for post HUSKY employment will depend primarily upon the maintenance to strength of personnel, gliders and transport aircraft.

2. Losses of transport aircraft in the opening phases of present operations are below previous estimates. It is felt however that firm estimates cannot be made at this time. On the basis of the present commitment of 360 transport aircraft to lift airborne formations, it would appear that about 100 replacement aircraft may be required in August. Thereafter, assuming comparable losses in subsequent operations and training, and assuming further that airborne forces will participate in 2 post HUSKY operations, an additional 150 may be required during 1943. Though actual requirements may vary from these figures it is hoped that the principle of maintaining the existing 360 operational aircraft up to strength will be accepted.

CM-IN-10690 (15 July 43)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 21 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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SECURITY CONTROL

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: [REDACTED]
To: WAR
No. W 4942/988 15 July 1943

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

3. The replacement of personnel and gliders will, in themselves, contribute little to the combat efficiency of the airborne formations if adequate lift is not available. We therefore propose to defer raising the question of their replacement until a decision is reached which will indicate the lift in transport aircraft which we may expect to have available for post HUSKY airborne operations. It is requested that this be considered as a matter of urgency.

No Sig.

ACTION: CCS

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Strong
Gen Arnold
Gen Hildring
Adm King
LOG

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 21 1974

CM-IN-10690 (15 July 43) 2241Z flw

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SECURITY
CONTROL

JDJD A 98
Filed 121743B
evb

17 JUL 1943
1739Z

U R G E N T

FOR MARSEALL'S EYES ALONE

From: Algiers
To: War

No. W 4722, 12 July 1943

*Ammt locate
not filed*

Previous estimates of shipping available for post HUSKY operations have already been given to the planning staffs. (For General Marshall's Eyes Only from Smith) Reference our NAF 250 of June 30th and your 2234 of July 10th. As plans are now formulating on the basis of these estimates the Commanders concerned must have an opportunity to study implications of the alternative allotments of combat loaders given in your 2234 and our reply must also be coordinated with Admiral Sir John Cunningham. The following is therefore in the nature of an interim reply and final recommendation will be made in about 4 days.

So far as we can see here any one of the 3 alternatives given in your 2234 should be acceptable but preliminary examination suggests that the British Military Staff proposal outlined in para 3 of your 2234 would be the best solution. Para 2 of your 2234 implies the combat loader lift is for United States Troops. We arrange as far as possible that American and British forces use ships belonging to their respective nations but in principle shipping allotted for operations in this area must be considered as available for the operation as a whole without regard to the nationality of the troops lifted and depending on the local situation. I am sure there can be no objection to this.

No Sig

Note: NAF 250 is CM-IN-434 (1 July 43) CC/S
2234 is CM-OUT-4368 (10 July 43) OPD

Action: OPD
Information: SGS, Gen. Deane (CC/S), Adm King, LOG
CM-IN-8438 (12 July 43) 1905Z law

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BY DSG, DATE

MAY 22 1973

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OUTGOING MESSAGE
EYES ONLY

Operations Division WDGS
North African Section, WDOPD
OPD 560 Sec (10 Jul 43)

July 10, 1943

GENERAL W.B. SMITH
FREEDOM ALGIERS

Number 2234

Combat loaders BIGOT (reur NAF 250 of 30 June this year from Marshall for General Smiths EYES ONLY).

Part 1. In order to assist in meeting your post HUSKY requirements of 9 APAS it has been proposed to the British that they return 3 LSILS and 2 LSIMS, set up in CCS 244/1 for lifebelt, to the Mediterranean after completion of lifebelt and make them available to you for lift of US troops.

This plan would leave you, after withdrawal of 3 APAS for the Pacific and assuming actual HUSKY losses as estimated, a total in combat loaders (personnel) for lift of US troops as shown by the alternative lists following:

4 APAS (including Funston and OHara)
3 LSILS
2 LSIMS

OR

2 APAS
2 XAPS
3 LSILS
2 LSIMS

In case you selected the 1st alternative list, 7 XAPS would be withdrawn for the Bolero-Sickle buildup. In case you selected the 2nd list the Funston and OHara and 5 XAPS would be withdrawn.

Part 2. The British Military Staff in Washington has countered with the proposal to leave the 7 XAPS in the Mediterranean for lift of US troops in post HUSKY operations

CM-OUT-4368 (10 July 43)

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BY DSS, DATE

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DATE 11/11/94

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

PAGE 2

FREEDOM ALGIERS
Number 2234

July 10, 1943

EYES ONLY

and to provide for the Bolero-Sickle buildup an equivalent lift in British shipping.

This would give you, after withdrawal of Funston and OHara for Bolero-Sickle, the following:

- 2 APAS
- 7 XAPS.

Part 3. We are awaiting reply from British Admiralty. Your comments are desired immediately.

No Sig

ORIGINATOR: OPD

INFORMATION: CC/S
ADM KING
LOG

CM-OUT-4368 (10 July 43) 2227Z flw

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JCS LETTER, 7-5-72
BY DBS, DATE

MAY 22 1973

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INCOMING MESSAGE

EYES ONLY

JDJD C 61
filed 05/1914B
dm

SECURITY CONTROL

SCWD
5 Jul
1952

URGENT

FOR GENERAL MARSHALL'S EYES ALONE

From: Algiers
To: War

No. W-4187 5 July, 1943

This is 2 part message. To AGWAR for General Marshall for his eyes only. Signed Eisenhower. Cite FHGCT. BIGOT. Reference your Fortune 418. Part 1:

1. Your para 2.

(A). Considered that 30 days are required between withdrawing landing craft from 1 operation to mounting another. The following figures are insisted upon by the Navy as minimum that will apply to a formal assault in these circumstances: 3 days in withdrawal, 7 days to refit, 5 days for loading, 7 days for rehearsals, 5 days move back to concentration points and reload, 1 day enroute to assault. Total 28 days, say 30.

(B). Landing craft when withdrawn will be moved to suitable North African ports for refitting and then to concentration areas for training and rehearsals. BUTTRESS and GOBLET will be launched from Africa. *Top of Italy*

(C). The above timings do not apply to the type of operation indicated in para 8 of NAF 250, which will be carried out as an improvised operation employing whatever craft can be made available.

(D). All landing craft estimates in my NAF 250 are based on full scale assaults.

CM-IN-3455 (5 Jul 43)

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JOB LETTER, 7-3-92
BY GARY G. MOORE

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INCOMING MESSAGE

EYES ONLY

From: Algiers
To: War
No. W-4187 5 July, 1943

page 2

Part 2:

2. Your para 3. GOBLET can only be launched by the use of some of the landing craft used in BUTTRESS. For reasons given in para 1 A above and in order to establish necessary airfields in BUTTRESS Area, GOBLET assault cannot be less than 30 days after D-Day of operation BUTTRESS. It would, however, not be necessary to await outcome of overland advance on CROTONE before removing landing craft to load for the Amphibious assault.

Crotone, Italy

3. Your para 4. For BRIMSTONE, at least 3 additional groups of long range fighters (P-38 or P-51) will be required for a period of a fortnight. This reinforcement will be necessary in order to provide a measure of fighter protection for the most northerly assaults (ORISTANO), which is approximately 200 miles from fighter bases in North Africa and therefore outside the range of normal fighter cover.

4. Your para 5. Detailed plans for POST-HUSKY operations still being examined. XAP/S were not mentioned specifically in my NAF 250 because initial planning was based on 9 combat loaders personnel and 4 combat loaders cargo or equivalent remaining in this Theater. If 9 combat loaders personnel and 4 combat loaders cargo or equivalent are permitted to remain in this Theater there will be no conflict with my present planning. However additional XAPS will greatly strengthen BRIMSTONE floating reserve and rate of build-up. Commander Smith, USN, JWP. Just returned from here, is fully briefed as to the planning situation this Theater.

No Sig

418 is CM-OUT-1759 (4 Jul 43) OPD

ACTION: OPD
INFORMATION: GEN DEANE (CCS), LOG

CM-IN-3455 (5 Jul 43) 22532 mcs

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JCS LETTER, 7-5-72
BY DSS, DATE

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

EYES ONLY

OPD 370.5 Sec (3 July 43) Operations
Division, WDGS North African Section,
WOOPD WEC

July 3, 1943

EYES ONLY

FORTUNE, ALGIERS:

Number 418

Operations POST-HUSKY reference your NAF 250 (to Eisenhower for his eyes only from Marshall).

1. Your NAF 250 has been referred to the CPS for consideration of troop requirements, escorts, assault shipping and all other matters taken up therein. You will be advised of progress of action. Request prompt reply to this message to facilitate action of the CPS.

2. Reference your Para 6. In connection with sequence of operations, information is desired as to the reasons upon which the necessity for the withdrawal of landing craft 30 days prior to any further assault is based. To where are these landing craft to be withdrawn? Are Buttress and/or Goblet to be launched from Horrified or Africa?

3. Reference your Para 10. Request information as to the reasons why the Goblet operation must be delayed 30 days after an assumed failure of a land advance on crotone.

4. Reference your Par 14 E. In what quantity and for what specific purpose may additional long range fighter forces be required? Availability is tight due to increased demands for escorts in UK and Southwest Pacific.

5. Reference your Par 15. In your discussion as to the lift which will be available for POST-HUSKY Operations and as to the landing craft available and essential to retain you make no mention of the modified combat loaders XAPS. Do you require these XAPS for troops to constitute a floating reserve or otherwise? It is presently planned to withdraw the XAPS to assist in the Bolero SICKLE build up. Will this conflict with your interests.

ORIGINATOR: OPD

INFORMATION: GENERAL DEANE (CCS), LOG

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BY LETTER, 7-8-72
DATE
MAY 22, 1973

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310 Post-Husky

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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MC

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SECURITY CONTROL

URGENT
SECURITY CONTROL

*Troop Requirements
for Post Husky*

From: AFHQ in North Africa
To: War

Nr: W-3935/6691 2 July 1943

*See
attached
file*

General Smith's figure of 30,000 was over and above requirements which had already been submitted for current operations and maintenance of North Africa. Added Marshall rptd Fantom signed Eisenhower cite FHGCT BIGOT your Fortune 406 refers. The figure of 47851 does include the 30,000 and mentioned by General Smith except that it does not include AA units which it was then believed would have to come in part from US and which we now hope to obtain from British (Middle East) sources. Thus the 47851 figure includes all our requirements except those listed in paras 2 and 3 below. These matters were emphasized in paras 3 C and 6 of OPW W 3359 dated 23rd June.

If we cannot solve the prisoner of war and housekeeping problems by getting additional Battalions from Mideast or assistance from the French, or both, for which we are now negotiating, we shall want 42 PW escort guard companies as well if we are to carry out post-HUSKY operations.

In any event there will be an additional requirement for hospitalization as present resources (including those already requested) are inadequate to meet prospective HUSKY casualties. This will be of the order of 21,000 fixed bed hospital capacity to bring capacity in theater to 10%. See our cable

CM-IN-1089 (2 Jul 43)

S [REDACTED]

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BY G4S, DATE
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**SECURITY
CONTROL**

From: AFHQ in North Africa
To: War

Nr: W-3935/8691 2 July 1943

W 3682 dated 1st July.

The result of not obtaining these requirements will probably prevent American troops from participating to any extent in post-HUSKY operations quite apart from immediate necessities.

In case there were to be no post-HUSKY operations the 47851 figure by 10481 could be reduced.

No Sig.

3359 is CM-IN-14852 (24 June 43) OPD
406 is CM-OUT-12380 (29 June 43) OPD
3862 is CM-IN-657 (2 Jul 43) GEN SOMERVELL

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: C OF S
GEN SOMERVELL
G-4
GEN DEANE

CM-IN-1089 (2 Jul 43) 1556Z mcs

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**SECURITY
CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Operations Division, WDCG
OPD 370.5 (1 July 43) Sec
North African Section

July 1, 1943

COMMANDING GENERAL
FREEDOM, ALGIERS

Number: 1519

Acknowledgement and immediate reply (BIGOT HUSKY from Marshall
for Eisenhower cite FREEDOM) to our 406 dated 29 June requested reply
in round numbers acceptable

No Sig

attached

ORIGINATOR: OPD

INFORMATION: GENERAL SOMERVELL
GENERAL DEANE (CCS)
OIC WDCMC

OW-CUT-341 (1 July 43) 2119Z rb

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Date: DEC 22 1971

Signature: RHP.

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

Admiral Brown
to file

~~SECRET~~

JCS 29-71

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL June 30, 1943

To: U.S. WAR DEPT FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
rptd WAR OFFICE FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

Number: 5973 30 June 43. W3771

HUSKY BIGOT

Cite FHGCT signed Eisenhower.

This is my reply to FAN 128. NAF 250.

Para 1. Decisions to carry my mission following HUSKY, i.e. eliminate Italy from the War; contain maximum number of German Forces; must be based on result of opening phases of HUSKY. I have examined possible operations which might be carried out employing the resources at present at my disposal and the shipping provisionally allotted in CCS 244/1. In considering the resources in ground troops available to me, I have made due allowance for the return of 4 U.S. Divisions and 3 British Divisions with necessary ancillaries units to U.K. after HUSKY.

Para 2. In event of HUSKY being successful but Italian resistance NOT collapsing, I have two alternatives:
(A) to carry operations on to the mainland by mounting operation BUTTRESS, followed by operation GOBLET of CROTONE area cannot be taken by an overland advance.
(B) to carry out operation BRIMSTONE *Sardinia*

Para 3. I do NOT consider it will be possible to mount operation this year, for the following reasons:
(A) the weather will be unsuitable for prolonged maintenance over the beaches at the time when the operation would require to be mounted - (about 1 November)
(B) it is almost certain that the number of landing craft remaining operationally serviceable as a result of the 3 previous assaults, will be too few to permit an assault on the scale necessary.

(C) the provision of adequate air cover for an amphibious assault from the airfields which will be occupied at this time will be doubtful, if the enemy air forces are operating in strength from the heel,

I do NOT therefore consider operation MUSKET as an amphibious assault any further in this report.

CM-IN-434 (1 Jul 43)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

Page 2

Number 5973

June 30, 1944

Sardinia

Para 4. It will NOT be possible for me to say which of the 2 courses, A or B in Para 2 I recommend, until the probable result of HUSKY becomes apparent. It is clear that HUSKY is going to be successful but that HUSKY alone has NOT caused the collapse of the Italian will to resist, I shall have to decide whether to recommend that operations should be mounted on the Italian mainland or BRIMSTONE. Much will depend on the number and location of German Forces at this time and on the morale of the Italian Army. If my appreciation should show that even if German units are present, Italian morale is so low as to make effective and prolonged resistance by Axis Forces unlikely, I shall recommend the former course. I am satisfied that from a purely military point of view it would be unsound to commit to the Italian mainland 6 divisions (operations BUTTRESS and GOBLET) if the appreciation at the time shows that these forces will neither be able to occupy the Heel nor exploit as far as NAPLES. If this is the case I shall probably recommend operation BRIMSTONE.

Para 5. In order to be in a position to take advantage of whichever line of action shows itself more likely to achieve my mission, I have arranged for planning to be undertaken for:

- (A) Operation BUTTRESS and operation GOBLET.
- (B) Operation BUTTRESS followed by rapid overland exploitation to the Heel, NAPLES and ROME and a reinforcement by sea of 3 divisions into NAPLES.
- (C) Operation BRIMSTONE both on a full and modified scale, the latter being in sufficient strength to overcome German resistance if Italian Army has ceased to fight.

(D) After operation BRIMSTONE, it may be possible to carry out operation FIREBRAND. The French are now actively examining this problem.

Corsica (?)

Para 6. As all major landing craft are required for the maintenance of HUSKY over the beaches, the dates on which further operations can be mounted must remain problematical. The landing craft required must be withdrawn 30 days before any further assault can be mounted.

Para 7. The whole purpose of our plans is to be prepared to take the most rapid advantage of any opportunity which may arise from a collapse of enemy resistance. The speed of exploitation must depend upon the degree of such collapse.

CM-IN-434 (1 Jul 43)

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JCS 29-71

Date- DEC 22 19/1

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SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

Page 3

Number 5973

June 30, 1943

Para 8. If Italian will to resist shows signs of collapsing completely in the early stages of HUSKY, it may be possible to exploit on to the toe of Italy by ferrying across Force from HORRIFIED.

Para 9. In circumstances less advantageous to us it may be necessary to launch operation BUTTRESS. If this caused an Italian collapse, I assume the German Forces would be withdrawn northwards, in which event I would exploit to NAPLES, later executing a modified BRIMSTONE.

Para 10. Should the exploitation of operation BUTTRESS NOT result in the capture of the CROTONE Area, it will be necessary to carry out operation GOULET. This operation cannot be mounted until 30 days after operation BUTTRESS.

Para 11. If NO mainland operations are undertaken, operation BRIMSTONE, (full) could be mounted at earliest on the First of October.

Para 12. This concentration of troops in Italy and/or SARDINIA together with the French Divisions in North Africa, which will be available by early 1944, will create a land, air and amphibious threat to Southern France, which should contribute substantially to Spring operations from U.K.

Para 13. In reaching these conclusions I have been obliged to work on various assumptions, since I have NO exact knowledge of the following items:

- (A) Strength of U.S. Navy and amount of U.S. Assault shipping which will be available post HUSKY
- (B) Whether certain American units asked for on convoys UFG 10 and UNO 6 will be provided.

Para 14. In making my examination, the following limiting factors have become apparent:

- (A) AA Artillery. For this we are dependent on extent to which Middle East can make good our deficiencies.
- (B) Provision of Prisoner of War guards. It will be necessary to find a solution to this problem other than employing combat troops, which would seriously reduce our offensive power. It is possible that Middle East can provide the necessary static forces.

M-IN-434 (1 Jul 43)

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SECURITY CONTROL
Page 4

Number 5973

June 30, 1942

SECURITY CONTROL

(C) Provision of equipment for British formations. It will probably be necessary to strip Middle East Divisions NOT likely to be required in operations undertaken in this theatre, in order to make good deficiencies of those units earmarked for the alternative operations outlined.

(D) Training. Any of the suggested operations will require amphibious assaults. The training which it will be possible to give the assaulting formations both British and American will be meagre, since appropriate landing craft and shipping will NOT be available for training purposes. As a result the degree of training in amphibious operations of those units undertaking assaults will be considerably lower than is desirable.

(E) Air. Assuming that wastage in operational and transport aircraft is made good, the only limitation in this sphere will be that it may be necessary to increase our long range fighter forces by loans from other sources, to provide adequate protection in the assault stages and until our air forces are established ashore.

(F) Military Government. In event of a rapid Italian collapse an additional 930 officer personnel will be required for AMGOT. This addition allows for the use of the 400 individuals already allotted for HORRIFIED.

Para 15. Naval forces and assault shipping.

(A) British Mediterranean Fleet as constituted after HUSKY will be adequate to provide cover for any operations contemplated in exploitation and to provide escorts for assaults mounted in British ships or craft. Estimated that British assault shipping and craft remaining after HUSKY will give lift of 44,000 personnel and 10,500 vehicles.

(B) I consider it essential that 9 combat loaders personnel and 4 combat loaders cargo should be retained in this theatre thus giving, with U.S. landing craft operational after HUSKY, a lift in U.S. ships and craft of 27,000 personnel, 3,500 vehicles. I recommend that 15 U. S. Destroyers and 3 old Destroyers should also be retained to provide escort for U.S. combat loaders and craft and for follow up convoys. I presume that Submarine Chasers and Mine Sweepers assigned North African Waters will remain.

(C) If U.S. escort forces are NOT assigned, it is estimated that through Mediterranean convoys would have to be reduced by 50% to enable British escorts to be provided.

Signature. RHP

CM-IN-434 (1) ~~SECRET~~

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SECURITY
CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

Page 5.

Number 5973

June 30, 1943

Para 16. Shipping. Allocation of MT and personnel shipping for operations in the Mediterranean in CCS 244/1 is accepted as adequate, though NOT meeting all the requirements of plans.

The 40 ships per month which I understand have provisionally been allocated for civilian supply requirements in Italy should be sufficient to supply the area likely to be occupied.

FAN 128 is CM-OUT-10874 (26 May 43) CCS

ACTION: CCS

INFORMATION: OPD
GEN STRONG
AND KING
GEN ARNOLD
LOG

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Date-

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Signature-

RHP

CM-IN-434 (1 Jul 43) 17482 mcs

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

Operations Division WDGS
European-North African Section
WDOPD CPD 370.5 Sec
(29 June 43) CBF

June 29, 1943

FORTUNE, ALGIERS

Number 406

General Smith stated in the Algiers conference 31 May BIGOT HUSKY (Marshall to Eisenhower cite FHGCT) that 63,000 additional troops, US and British, would be needed for the Post-HUSKY operations. Of these approximately 30,000 would be US and 33,000 British. Your W-3359 of 23 June now brings the total requested to 47,851.

The following information is urgently requested in connection with a decision to be made on the sailing of UGF-10 convoy:

1. Does the figure 47,851 contained in your W-3359 include the 30,000 mentioned by General Smith, in other words, does this figure 47,851 include all your requirements for both the completion of HUSKY and Post-HUSKY operations?
2. In case there were to be no Post-HUSKY operations what reduction could be effected in your figure of 47,851? This last question is not to be taken in any way changing your planning now being accomplished under current CCS directives.

at chd

No Sig

ORIGINATOR: OPD
INFORMATION: GENERAL DEANE (CC/S)
GENERAL SOMERVELL
LOG

CH-OUT-12380 (29 June 43) 2341Z med

DECLASSIFIED
SER. 7-5-72
DATE
MAY 22 1970

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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URGENT

SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers
To : WAR

No 3359

23 June 1943

Reports of further study of FAN 128 reference your 9151 of 30 May and answers to your 168 of 13 June, 372 of 17 June and Fortune 375 of 18 June follows: added Marshall signed Eisenhower cite FHGCT BIGOT HUSKY 1 Your attention is invited to the fact that units bid for in our W 1486 were considered essential on the assumption that there would be no further offensive operations involving US troops in Mediterranean subsequent to HUSKY. These units are being included in plans for post Husky operations.

2. We have made every effort to reduce the list by utilizing to the maximum extent resources now in the Theater as well as those that can be made available from Middle East and Paic and by eliminating all units which are not considered vital. Eliminate from list bid for UGF 10 the following serials: 2, 3, 20, 21, 39, 43, 59, 65, 68, 159, 163, 164, 165, 3. The following remarks apply to units reported your Fortune 375 as non available: A Serial 40. In view of seriousness of water supply situation it is necessary that this serial be furnished or that its equivalent be provided from a Water Supply Battalion.

B Serials 10, 79, and 92 These units are needed for important work of renovation of ammunition and repair of salvage in the Theater. If they cannot be furnished the additional shipping commitment that would be saved by the presence of these units in the Theater must be released and accepted.

C Serials 56, 66, 67, 77, 89, 90, 102. Station and

CM-IN-14852

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*Details
Troop requirements
Post-Husky*

310 Husky

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URGENT

SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers
To : WAR

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field hospitals. The Surgeon General has been pressing for a 120 day evacuation policy for this Theater. Cable AGWAR 8977 of 28 May recommended that this Theater have a 10% fixed bed capacity by 30 Sept and 15% fixed bed capacity by 1st January 1944. If all the above serials are shipped the total fixed bed capacity for the Theater will be only 5.97%. This is considered to be a dangerously low level, and units must be furnished without fail.

D Serials 93 and 148, MP Bns(ZI) At present the duties that are being performed by troops from combat divisions. In order that training and operations may be carried out these troops must be released.

E In view of seriousness of Signal situation serial 13 for UNO 6 and serials 69 and 81 for UGF 10 must be shipped without fail. 4 units enumerated in your Fortune 375 as non available with the exception of those listed in par 3 above must be accepted by us. 5 In order to under take POST HUSKY operations it is considered essential to have UNO 6 and UGF 10 as amended by par 2 and 3 above plus the following: 1 Field Artillery Brigade consisting of Brigade HQ, 1 FA OBSN BN, 1 group 155 MM on biguns and 2 groups 155 MM 1 howitzers, 1 Engineer Combat Group of 2 Combat Battalions 4 QM Service Bns 1 Port BN TC 2 Signal Depot Co 1 Signal OPN Co 1 Signal Port Service Co 2 QM Laundry Co 2 Engineer Petr Distr Units 4 QM Truck Co 2 Submarine Cable OPN Teams 50 SIS Personnel 28 Cryptographers (806) 8 Signal Co Wing 3 Signal Co AVN If Signal Depot Companies cannot possible be made available request Signal Corps fillers of substantially the same

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(24 June 43)
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qualifications be shipped as follows: 191 Personnel in 24 July UNO 5 and 191 Personnel in UGF 10 6 we are exploring every source for Prisoner of War Guards failing this we may require 43 PW Escort Guards COS or equivalent to meet present and anticipated future requirements. 7 In assigning above requirements, we have relied upon obtaining all additional anti aircraft resources required, which are considerable, from Middle East. 8 UGF 10 should sail to reach North Africa by 1 September. 9 While plans for POST HUSKY operations are not from this Theater has the obligation under the Trident Conference and the Algiers Conferences to be prepared to mount several alter native operations. The time element is such that the provision of adequate troops can not await a firm decision. Unless requests contained in this cable are granted it must be accepted that a situation may arise when this Headquarters for lack of certain essential supporting and Service Troops will be unable to mount inadequate scale a desirable operation in line with directions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Atten an early decision is requested in order that tonnage allocations may be made for UGS 14 to lift TBA which must arrive in sufficient time for combat loading for assault.

Nosig

372 is CM-OUT-6410 (16 June 43) ASF-Trans
168 is CM-OUT-5142 (12 June 43) OPD
375 is CM-OUT-7594 (18 June 43) OPD
1486 is CM-IN-17979 (28 May 43) OPD
FAN 128 is CM-OUT-10874 (28 May 43) CC/S
9151 is CM-OUT-12639 (29 May 43) OPD

Action: OPD

Information: Gen. Somervell

CM-OUT-10862 OF AN EX-24 (June 43) IS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

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JCS 29-71

Index Number

INDEX SHEET

For file in: "MR 310 POST-HUSKY"

May 25, 1943.

From: CCS

To: CG, Fortune Algiers, No. 278
USFOR London, England, No. R-8859

FAN 128

Part 2

That the Allied Commander in Chief North Africa will be instructed, as a matter of urgency, to plan such operations in exploitation of HUSKY as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and to contain the maximum number of German Forces. Which of the various specific operations should be adopted, and thereafter mounted, is a decision which will be reserved to the Combined Chiefs of Staff

Part 3.

You are directed to submit proposals with appropriate recommendations for operations in the Mediterranean Area, to be carried out concurrently with or subsequent to a successful HUSKY

Original filed: MR 310

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Date: DEC 22 1971

RHP

Show classification number and date of communication on first line, drop two spaces, show source of communication and to whom addressed, then drop two spaces again and give a brief synopsis of subject matter sufficient to identify the document.

W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0693
May 20-23

2-414

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