REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

MR 310, Sec. 2 - INVASION AND OFFENSIVES, PLANS, LANDING OF TROOPS.

1942 - 1945

MR 103

DECLASIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
COMNAVFORFRANCE SENDS ACTION 6TH ARMY GROUP INFO ANCXF COMNAVEU COMINCH. TOP SECRET.

I HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY MY REPRESENTATIVE WITH THE HEADQUARTERS OF GENERAL DE LARMATIN THAT D DAY FOR OPERATION IS NOW SET FOR 15TH. I AM MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR NAVAL PARTICIPATION ACCORDINGLY.

COMINCH: COPIES #1 TO #8 INCLUSIVE.

ACTION: F-30
(COMNAVFORFRANCE SENDS ACTION COMINCH INFO COMNAVEU)

TOP SECRET.

PLANS FOR OPERATION VENERABLE ARE COMPLETED. I PROPOSE TO OCCUPY ADVANCED HEADQUARTERS VICINITY COGNAC DURING THE OPERATION.
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Forward, Rheims, France
To: War Department
Nr: FWD 18243 80AP 251 27 March 1945

To Combined Chiefs of Staff for action and to AM380 for British Chiefs of Staff, BROADNESS 5, SCOPOH for information signed Eisenhower ref no FWD 18243 TOP SECRET. This is SCAP number 251.

Scales of equipment for Norwegian liberated manpower units is subject.

1. Existing military situation in Finnmark approximated to ALADDIN conditions and the two light infantry battalions operating in this area are required to operate in mobile role and under winter conditions. Certain items of arctic equipment have been issued to these two battalions to enable them to operate.

2. In view of large number of Germans likely to be found in Norway and the small US/British forces that will be operating there under APOSTLE conditions, the fullest possible use must be made of liberated manpower units for the tasks of rounding up small German forces that have refused to surrender. For guarding surrendered German forces, and for dealing with hostile pro-German Norwegian elements. Distance and wide areas over which liberated manpower units will be spread makes it necessary to afford them a greater degree of mobility and transport for maintenance than that of similar Allied units.

CM-IN-29016

(27 Mar 45)

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JCS 34 - 71

DEC 22 1971

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/11/94
3. In view of foregoing, covering approval is requested for items of arctic equipment issued to two light infantry battalions operating in Finnmark, and for an increased scale of transport and equipment to be issued to other liberated manpower units to enable them to carry out their proposed role, provided that any items in short supply are not issued to Norwegian units to the detriment of forces now engaged on the continent.

4. Details of vehicles and equipment required by Norwegian forces, including liberated manpower units, is at present being examined by War Office, who will, if necessary, bid on US through BSA.
DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date

TOP SECRET

PART 1: 291087A NCR 8451; PART 2: 291085A NCR 8445; PART 3: 291087A NCR 8452

(UECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4)

THE FRENCH NAVAL TASK FORCE FOR OPERATION INDEPENDENCE COMPOSED OF THE FOLLOWING SHIPS: LORRAINE DUQUESNE BASQUE LE FORTUNE ALYON AND NOVA ADRIATUL MOUCHE FRENCH MINESWEEPERS D312 313 314 316 317 341 352 353 AND 356 AND 3 ADDITIONAL ESCORTS TO BE DESIGNATED BY ADMIRALTZ.

IS ESTABLISHED AS FROM 1 APRIL 31. DESTROYERS REPORTING UPON ARRIVAL AT PLYMOUTH SHORT TITLE FNTF. REAR ADMIRAL RUE IN COMMAND SHORT TITLE CFNTF.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANCFX DIRECTIVE 102/56 NOT TO ALL CTF 122 WILL BE RESPONSIBLE TO ANCFX FOR DIRECTING THE NAVAL PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF OPERATION INDEPENDENCE. DIRECT OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF FNTF WILL BE EXERCISED BY CFNTF. THE FRENCH NAVAL TASK FORCE WILL BE UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL COMMANDING GENERAL FRENCH ARMY DETACHMENT OF ATLANTIC WHILE ENGAGED IN OPERATIONS INVOLVING JOINT GROUND AND NAVAL FORCES.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date

TOP SECRET

291087A

29/2/1973

OPNAV 50-70
### JP SECRET DISPATCH

**Originator** fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP

(Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

---

**3.** CFNTF IS TO ARRANGE DIRECT WITH CINC PLYMOUTH FOR THE LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF THE TASK FORGE WHILE IT IS BASED AT PLYMOUTH. LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR ANY UNITS BASED AT BREST IS TO BE ARRANGED BETWEEN CFNTF AND CTF 122 FOR ITEMS WHICH CANNOT BE PROVIDED FROM FRENCH SOURCES.

**4.** THE BRITISH 31ST MINE-SWEEPING FlOTILLA HAS BEEN PLACED UNDER CFNTF FOR NECESSARY EXERCISES AND FOR THE OPERATION. A RAF SQUADRON HAS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE BY HQ FIGHTER COMMAND FOR AIR SPOTTING OF NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT.

**5.** COMMUNICATION ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE AS NOW IN FORCE AND AS SUPPLEMENTED BY THOSE IN NAVAL PLAN INDEPENDENCE WHICH WILL BE ISSUED SHORTLY.

**6.** CTF 122 NOW AT PARIS BUT DURING ACTUAL OPERATION WILL FUNCTION FROM ADVANCED HEADQUARTERS ADJACENT TO THAT OF COMMANDING GENERAL FRENCH ARMY DETACHMENT OF THE ATLANTIC.

---

**DECLASSIFIED**

E. O. 11693, Sec. 3(D) and 8(D) or (B)

OSD letter, May 1, 1973

By DBS

**TOP SECRET**

Handle only in accordance with Top Secret restrictions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations.
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

URGENT

From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, Forward, Rheims, France.

To: War Department
   CG, 6th Army Group, Main, Vitell, France
   CG, 12th Army Group, Main
   Air Ministry Special Signals Office, London, England
   CG, First Allied Airborne Army
   Headquarters Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations, US Army, Paris, France
   CG, Provisional Allied Naval Commander Allied Expeditionary Forces
   Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main, Versailles, France.
   CG, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe
   Saint Germain, France.
   CG, 9th Air Force, France.
   CG, 21st Army Group, Main

No: FWD 18179 [SCAF 247] 25 March 1945

To for action CG 12th Army Group; CG 6th Army Group CINC EXFOR; to for info AOWAR for CG3; AMSG for BGGS; CG FAAA; CG USSTAF; ANGCF; AOC-in-C 2nd TAF; CG 9th Air Force; CG 1st TACAF; Com Zone; SHAFF Main from SHAFF Forward, FWD 18179 signed Eisenhower cite SHOT

1. Limit distribution of this message to absolute minimum. Delivery only to addressee or his appointed representative.

2. Current operations have as their object the

CM-IN-26992 (26 Mar 45)

[Signature]

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 1/8/94

[Signature]
From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, Forward, Rheims, France.

No: FWD 18179 SCAP 247 25 March 1945

Seizing of two bridgeheads across the Rhine, one in the area north of the Ruhr, the other in the Frankfurt area.

3. As soon as these bridgeheads have been established and logistical arrangements to support a further advance permit, it is my intention to isolate the Ruhr as follows:

A. Northern Group of Armies from the north, and Central Group of Armies from the south will advance to effect junction in the general area Kamel-Duderborn. These advances will take place at time to be decided by CINC Northern Group of Armies and CO, Central Group of Armies, respectively.

B. Having effected junction, Northern and Central Group of Armies will mop up and occupy the whole area east of the Rhine enclosed by their advances and prepare for a further advance into Germany.

5. Southern Group of Armies will protect the right flank of Central Group of Armies as far north as the Hohe Rhon Hill mass and will be prepared at a later date to release one or two Divisions to Central Group of Armies.

4. General boundaries, subject to adjustment at the time,

A. Between Northern and Central Group of Armies west of the Rhine will be notified later. Northern
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Urgent

Page 3

From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces,
Forward, Rheims, France.

No: FMD 18179 SCAF 247 25 March 1945

and Central Groups of Armies will be responsible for the
protection of their inner flanks east of the Rhine.

B. Between Central and Northern Groups of
Armies, as soon as the tactical situation permits: Saar-
brucken-Neunkirchen-Nohfelden-thence along railroad follow-
ing Moselle River to Bad Kreuznach-Main-Main River to Frankfurt
(all to Central Group of Armies)—railroad north Main River
to Hanau-Fulda-Heidelberg (all to Southern Group of Armies).

6. For CCS and BCCS this is SCAF 247.

7. Acknowledge.

End

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Date: DEC 22 1971

Signature: 

NOTE: Receipt acknowledged by WDSCB

ACTION: CC/S

INFO: Admiral Leahy, General Arnold, General Hull,
General Bissell, Admiral King, C of S

CM-IN-26992 (26 Mar 45) DPG 251940Z m/m

COPY No.

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/14/94
FROM: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Forward, Rheims, France

TO: War Department
CG, 6th Army Group, Main, Vittel
CG, 21st Army Group, France
CG, 12th Army Group, Main
Special Officer, Signal Ministry, London, England
Headquarters, lst Allied Airborne Army
Headquarters, Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations, US Army, Paris, France
Provisional Allied Naval Commander EF, Overseas
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main, Versailles, France
Headquarters, lst Tactical Air Force (Provisional)
CG, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe,
St Germain, France
CG, 9th Air Force, France

No: FWD 18157 SOAF 246 25 March 1945

To for action CG 12th Army Group; CINC EXFOR; CG 6th Army Group to for info AGWAR for CCS;IAMSSO for BOS; CG FAAA; ANBSP; CG USASAP; AOC-in-C 2nd TAF; CG 9th Air Force; CG lst TACAP; CG 5th Zone; SHAEF Main from SHAEF Forward. Forward 18157 signed Eisenhower eite SHAEF TOP SECRET. This is SOAF 246.

1. Limit distribution of this message to absolute minimum. Delivery only to addressee or his appointed representative.
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
Page 2

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
Forward, Rheims, France

No: FWD 18157 SCAF 246 25 March 1945

2. Paragraph 3b of SCAF 232 (forward 17839) is rescinded. First Army is available to Central Group of Armies for operations from Reunigen bridgehead.

3. As soon as possible and not later than 1 April Central Group of Armies will relieve elements of Northern Group of Armies on the west bank of the Rhine as far north as approximately Heusen. Boundary between Central and Northern Groups of Armies, subject to adjustment in detail by agreement between commanders concerned, will be all inclusive to Northern Group of Armies line of railroad from Dutch-German frontier at R 9064 to Wegberg 9783-Rheindahlen 0384-Wickrath 0782-Glehn 1986-road junction 242862-Neus 2789.

4. This boundary will be adjusted again about 5 April further to the north. Instructions will follow.

5. For CCS and BCOS.

6. Acknowledge.

NOTE: SCAF 232 is CM IN 14093 (14 Mar 45) receipt acknowledged by WDSCB.

ACTION: CC/S

INFO: Admiral Leahy, General Arnold, General Hull, General Bissell, Admiral King, C of S

CM-IN-26964 (25 Mar 45) DTC 251720A m/m

The making of an exact copy of this message is forbidden.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Forward, Rheims, France
To: War Department
Nr: FWD 18138  SCAF 243

24 March 1945


Provision of shipping for operation APOSTLE is subject.

1. Careful consideration has been given to the shipping requirements for the implementation of this operation, and the minimum number of sailings necessary to effect and consolidate the initial entry into Norway over a period of 31 days, is estimated to be as follows:

   Personnel 14
   MT stores 65
   Colliers 45
   Animals 4

2. At the end of this period the number of sailings required will steadily diminish and every effort will be made by initiating individual sailings and other means to release shipping from the operation as fast as circumstances will permit.

CM-IN-26069 (25 Mar 45)
War Department
Classified Message Center
Incoming Classified Message

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Forward, Rheims, France

Nr: FWD 18138 SCAP 243 24 March 1945

3. A considerable proportion of the shipping tonnage will be utilized for the early introduction of civil affairs supplies into areas which will probably have been badly scorched before entry is effected.

4. It is difficult to assess what the overall shipping position and commitments in this Theater will be after organized resistance has ceased, but it is considered that very little if any shipping will be available for this operation from existing SHAPE resources.

5. Authority is therefore requested for shipping up to the amount specified in Para 1 above to be provided as and when operation APOSTLE is ordered to be mounted.

End

Action: CC/S


CM-IN-26069 (25 Mar 45) MFG: 24/1930A ngr

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Declassified per JCS 34-71
Dec 22 1971

RHP

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main, Versailles, France.

To: War Department, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Forward, Rheims, France.

Nr: S 83020 28 March 1945.

Reference your FACS 158. We had anticipated your decision and put plan in abeyance but we have given authority for the use of the intruder technique for small scale operations designed to cause local civic confusion in Germany. Expressly these do not involve deception of our own peoples civil or military on a scale greater than current black output. Nor do they infringe upon demands of Bomber Command.

End.

FOOTNOTE: FACS 158 is CM-CUT-50932 (10 March 45) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S


Adm. King, Cofs

CM-IN-26376 (25 March 45) DFG 241900A

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Forward, Rheims, France

To: War Department
   Headquarters, 1st Allied Airborne Army
   CG, 6th Army Group Main, France
   CG, 12th Army Group Main
   CG, Special Signal Ministry, London, England
   Headquarters, Communications Zone, European Theater
   of Operations, US Army, Paris, France
   Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main, Versailles, France
   CO, 21st Army Group
   Headquarters, 1st Tactical Air Force (Provisional)
   CG, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe
   St. Germain, France
   CG, 5th Air Force, France
   Provisional Allied Naval Commander, EF Overseas.

Nr: FWD 18052 SCAF 240 22 March 1945

FWD 18052 TOP SECRET to for action CG Sixth Army
Group, CG Twelfth Army Group, CG FAAA, to for info AQWAR
for CCOS AMSO for BOOS, CINC EXFOR, ANCXP, CG USSTAF,
ACC in C 2nd TAF, CG Ninth Air Force, CG First TACAF, CG
COMZONE, SHAPE Main from SHAPE Forward signed Eisenhöver
omite SHOFT TOP SECRET. For CGS and BOOS. This is SCAF nhr 240.

1. Distribution of this message will be limited
to the absolute minimum. Delivery will be made only to
the addressee or his authorized representative.

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Per 5MSA.91

Date: DEC 22 1971

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Forward, Rheims, France

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Forward, Rheims, France

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Forward, Rheims, France

2. Operations "UNDERGROUND" (SCAF 224) and "VOYAGE" (SCAF 232) will be pushed vigorously with the object of establishing a firm bridgehead across the Rhine in the Frankfort area from which an advance in strength can be made at a later date in the general direction of Kassel. The bridgehead area will be the general area: Neckar River to Eberbach, Amorbach-Main river to Hanau-Glessen-Siegen-Siegen River to its junction with the Rhine.

3. By agreement between Commanding Generals 6th and 12th Army Groups as to temporary army group boundaries full advantage will be taken by Seventh and Third Armies of any opportunity for crossing the Rhine between Mainz and Mannheim. It is desired, however, that ultimately Sixth Army Group will be responsible for the bridgehead area south of the Main River and Twelfth Army Group for the bridgehead area north of the Main River. Commanding Generals Sixth and Twelfth Army Groups will be guided by this ultimate area of responsibility in the development of the initial bridgehead south of the Main River.

4. As soon as the tactical situation permits, the boundary between Sixth and Twelfth Army Groups, subject to adjustment as agreed by Army Group Commanders concerned, will be as follows:

Saarbrucken-Neunkirchen-Hohfelden-thence along railroad following Nahe river to Bad Krauznach-Mainz-Main River to
From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Forward, Rheims, France

Nr: FWD 18052 22 March 1945

Hansu-Friedburg-Geissen (all to Twelfth Army Group).

5. The planning and execution of operation "CHOCKER" remains the responsibility of First Allied Airborne Army in conjunction with Sixth Army Group and First Tactical Air Force.

6. Acknowledge.

End

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DECLASSIFIED
per SM 522.04

Date: DEC 22 1971

Signature: RHG

NOTE: Acknowledged by WDSCB
SCAP-232 is CM-IN-14093 (14 Mar 45) CC/S
SCAP-224 is CM-IN-8824 (9 Mar 45) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S (Gen McFarland)
INFO: Adm. Leahy, Gen Arnold, Gen Hullah, Adm. King, C of S
CM-IN-23039 (22 Mar 45) DPG 22 NFT
WESTERN FRONT

NORTHERN ARMY GROUP
Operation to seize Rhine crossing north of Ruhr using airborne troops.
TARGET DATE: 24 March

CENTRAL ARMY GROUP
Exploit Remagen bridgehead in direction of Frankfort. Assist Southern Group operations by attacking 35 across Moselle. First Army will provide 10 divisions for exploitation of bridgehead north of Ruhr. Probable date 15 April.

SOUTHERN ARMY GROUP
Operations in Saar area to contain enemy forces from main effort in north, destroy enemy west of Rhine south of Moselle River and establish bridgehead over Rhine Mannheim area.
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff
Col. C.R. Peck (W 7)

13 March 1945

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Forward
Echelon, Rheims, France

British Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.

Number: WARX 52635

TOPSEC book message to SHAPE Rheims for Eisenhower for action,
to AMSSO pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information, FACS
160 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Situation in northwest Holland requires that further consideration
should be given to possibilities of early liberation. You
should, therefore, without delay, prepare an appreciation and
plan showing requirements of an operation to liberate Holland
as soon as practicable after you have secured your Rhine crossing
and the effect upon your existing plans.

Plans should include introduction of food supplies
simultaneously with the arrival of the liberating forces.

End

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/74
From: SHAFF  
To: War Department  
No: FW 17839, SCAF 232  

1. Distribution of this message will be held to the absolute minimum. Delivery will be made only to the addressee or to the person designated to receive the message for him.

2. The rapid success gained in operation LUMBERJACK has brought our forces on to an economical defensive position along the Rhine north of the Moselle. The capture or a footing east of the Rhine & Remagen offers an opportunity to exploit this success in order to assist operations PLUNDER and UNDERTONE without detracting from the effort already allocated to them.

3. Twelfth Army Group will firmly secure the bridgehead at Remagen, and launch a thrust there from towards Frankfurt, subject to the following requirements:

A. That assistance to operation UNDERTONE be given as directed in SCAF 224.

B. Readiness to employ First Army in strength of not less than ten divisions for exploitation of the bridgehead north of the Ruhr. Present progress indicates 15th April as initiation date for such employment.

4. The Allied Air Forces will cooperate with Twelfth Army Group in the bridgehead operation; allocation of air effort, however, will be such as not to prejudice the higher priority being accorded operations PLUNDER and UNDERTONE.

5. For CCS and BOOS this is SCAF number 232.

6. Acknowledge.

CM-IN-14093 (14 March 45)
FROM: SHAEF
To: War Dept
No: Field 170624 Order 231

13 March 1945

In confirmation of previous instructions, Northern Group of Armies, with the Ninth United States Army, on its right, operating under control of Commander in Chief, Northern Group of Armies, will execute operation "FLUSSER" with target date 4th March, with the object of gaining a firm bridgehead over the Rhine, north of the Ruhr, as a base for eventual operations to isolate the Ruhr.

The Commander in Chief, Northern Group of Armies will be responsible for the protection of his southern flank east of the Rhine.

First Allied Airborne Army, employing XVIII Airborne Corps with two Divisions and the necessary air lift, will participate in the operation.

Allied Air Forces will accord the highest priority to the execution of operation "FLUSSER".

At a time to be agreed between commanders concerned, the boundary between Northern and Central Groups of Armies will be:

Inclusive to northern group Kochwiler-Mersen-Steinstrauss-Flörsbach, hence along the Rhine river to its junction with the Rhine. Adjustments may be made by agreement between army group commanders.

For CGU and BDOS this is oCAF 231.

CG-1a 13641
13 Mar 45
War Department
 Classified Message Center

Outgoing Message

Combined Chiefs of Staff
W.D. Ext. 77500 Col C.
10 March 1945

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Forward Echelon
Rheims, France

British Joint Staff Mission
Washington, D.C.

Number: WARX 50932

Book message to SHAEF Rheims for Eisenhower for action, to AMSSO pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information, FACS 158 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Combined Chiefs of Staff consider that it is unwise to implement the proposed plan for employment of the ASPIDISTRA technique unless there appears to be a high probability that the military results derived from it are such to justify assuming the risk involved. When the disintegration of Germany has progressed to a point where you can foresee that collapse is imminent, you should consider submitting a specific plan based on the ASPIDISTRA technique.

End.

Declassified

205 memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NR, Date May 21 1974

Originator: OC/S

Information: Adm Leahy, General Arnold, General Hull,
General Bissell, Adm King, C of S

CM-OUT-50932 (March 35) DTG 101906Z da

Copy No. 33

The making of an exact copy of this message is forbidden

Declassified

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/44
10 March 1945

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Forward Echelon, Rheims, France

British Joint Staff Mission, Washington, D.C.

Number: VARX 50931

TOPSEC book message to SHAEF Rheims for Eisenhower for information, to ANSIG pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information, FACS 157 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Dispatch of further forces to northern Norway is the subject. Following for your information is the text of a letter sent by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Department of State and the Foreign Office.

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have considered the proposals for the dispatch of further forces to northern Norway presented by the Norwegian Ambassador in his letter dated 18 January 1945 to the Secretary of State, and by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs in his letter dated 15 January 1945 to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff fully appreciate the desirability and the urgency of taking all possible steps to alleviate conditions in northern Norway, and to assist the Norwegian government in assuming control of the liberated areas. However, the scale of the proposed plan has definite military objections when considered in conjunction with the requirements of current operations. These military objections are, in particular:

   (a) Certain of the naval units and the especially trained and equipped No. 333 R.A.F. Squadron (Norwegian) are fully employed in countering the present U-Boat offensive.

CM-OUT-50931 (Mar 45)
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Page 2

Number: WAXX 50931

10 March 1945

(b) The shipping requirement for the dispatch and
maintenance of this force in addition to that necessary for
the relief of the liberated area would be a further demand
on the already acutely over-all shipping position.

(c) The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force
is unable to accept the maintenance commitment for these
proposals and it is considered that there is a grave risk
of administrative breakdown in view of the lack of trained
Norwegian administrative units.

(d) A German withdrawal or possible counter offensive
would, in all probability, lead to calls for increased support
that cannot be met at this stage of the war.

3. In view of the above, the Combined Chiefs of Staff
regret that they are unable to accept the Norwegian Government's
plan as at present proposed. They suggest that the Norwegian
Government be asked to reconsider their plans confining their
proposals to those measures required to ensure minimum proper
supervision of relief in the liberated area. Should the
revised plans require additional forces, the Combined Chiefs
of Staff might be willing to release Norwegian naval units
(with some exceptions) and land forces and to consider the
substitution of a Norwegian Spitfire Squadron now employed
with 2nd Tactical Air Force in France in lieu of No. 333
Squadron R.A.F, which is presently employed in anti-submarine
patrol. Since the provision and shipment of supplies for
these forces cannot be promised at this juncture, the Norwegians
should be asked to keep the commitment to a minimum and to
make clear their requirements and the extent to which these
can be met from Swedish sources when they submit their revised
plans." End of message.

End

ORIGINATOR: C C/S

Adm. King, C of S

CM-OUT-50931 (Mar 45)  D30 1019062

DECLASSIFIED

DEC 22 1973

DAT 741316

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/1944
From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Forward, Rheims, France

To: War Department
CG, 6th Army Group, Main, Vittel, France
CG, 12th Army Group, Main
Headquarters, Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations, US Army, Paris, France
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main, Versailles, France
CG, 1st Tactical Air Force
CG, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe, St Germain, France
CG, 9th Air Force, France
CG, Special Signal Air Ministry
CG, Provisional Allied Naval Command

No: FWD 17711 CAF 226 9 March 1945

From SHAEF Forward signed Eisenhower ref FWD 17711 cite SHORUT. TOP SECRET. For action CG 12th Army Group, CG 6th Army Group, for info AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff, AMSSO for ECOS, CIRC EXPOR, CG PAAA, CG USSTAF, ANEX, AOC-in-C 2nd TAP, CG Ninth Air Force, CG 1st TACAF, CG Com Zone, SHAEF Main.

1. Distribution of this message will be held to the absolute minimum. Delivery will be made only to the addresses or to the person designated to receive the message for him.
From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Forward, Rheims, France

No: FWD 17711 SCAF 226  9 March 1945

2. Reference is made to SCAF TOO 224, 8th March 1945.

3. Target date for operation "UNDERTONE" is March 15th.

4. For Combined Chiefs of Staff and British Chiefs of Staff this is SCAF number 226.

5. Acknowledge.

End

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per JCS 34-71

Date: DEC 22 1971

Signature: RA

Footnote: SCAF 224 is CM-IN-3825 (8 Mar 45)

ACTION: CC/S

INFO: Gen Arnold; Gen Hull; Gen Bissell; Adm King; C of S

CM-IN-10338   (10 Mar 45) DTG: 092100Z  cw

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
Nr PWD 17655 SCAF 224 8 March 1945

From SHAFF, Forward, Rheims, France.

1. Distribution of this message will be held to a minimum, etc.

2. As soon as the necessary preparations have been completed 21st Army Group is to initiate operation "PLUNDER". The First Allied Airborne Army, employing the XVIII Corps, is to participate in the operation. Target date 24 March.

3. During the period of preparation for this operation 12th Army Group is proceeding with the execution of operation "LUMBERJACK ". SCAF dated 3 March refers.

4. As soon as the attainment of the objectives of LUMBERJACK is assured the 6th Army Group will initiate offensive operations in the Saar. The object of these operations is to contain all possible German forces away from the main effort in the north by defeating the enemy west of the Rhine from the Moselle southward and establishing bridgeheads over the Rhine in the Mainz-Mannheim sector.

5. The 12th Army Group will assist in the Saar attack by striking southeast from the Moselle in the rear of the enemy and protecting the left flank of the 6th Army Group.

6. Allied Air Force will support and cooperate with the above operations.

7. Boundary between the 6th and 12th Army Groups: Conflans - Saarlautern (to 6th Army Group) - Birkenfeld - Oberstein - Kirn - Soberheim - northern highway through Bas-Kreuznach - Bingen (all to 12th Army Group). Effective date for change to new boundary will be as agreed by commanding generals 6th and 12th Army Groups. Adjustments in boundary may be made by agreement between Army Group commanders concerned. The occupancy and use of their existing installations south of the new boundary are reserved to the 12th Army Group (Third Army).

8. For Combined Chiefs of Staff and British Chiefs of Staff this is SCAF 224.


CM-IN-8825 (9 March 1945) INTO 081650A
URGENT

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main, Versailles, France
To: War Department

Nr: S 76695 SCAF 187 26 January 1945

261700 Jan AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff info AMSG for British Chiefs of Staff, Admiralty, War Office, Air Ministry. C in C Rosyth, SECPO, AOC 13 Group RAF; Air Ministry please pass Fighter Command, SHAPE Air Rear. From SHAPE Main signed Eisenhower. S76695, to Combined Chiefs of Staff for action and to British Chiefs of Staff for information this is SCAF number 187 TOP SECRET.

Subject to approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, following is action it is proposed to take in north Norway in certain eventualities.

Germans are withdrawing in the extreme north although present evidence suggests their withdrawal is unlikely to extend initially beyond Narvik. Russian intentions are unknown but thought that they intend to remain in Kirkenes area. Hietus area is thus developing in which remaining inhabitants are suffering extreme hardship due to scorched earth policy. Thus Hietus area may eventually extend as far as Trondheim. There is no indication at present of intention to withdraw beyond Trondheim. The possibility cannot be overlooked in view of present situation on the Eastern Front; but the total evacuation of Southern Norway would take some months to complete as it is unlikely that it could be speeded up beyond the present rate of 2-3 divisions per month.

Norwegian token force is at present operating in North Norway under Russian command (operation CROFTER)

CM-IN-26116 (26 Jan 45)

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DEC 22 1971

33

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/94
From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main, Versailles, France

Nr: S 76695 SCAF 187 26 January 1945

and is giving relief to local inhabitants within reach.

It is understood that Norwegian government may shortly propose the dispatch of all available Norwegian units to North Norway to occupy as much of the country as possible.

Present SHAEF plans (ALADDIN) for operations in event of German withdrawal from Norway envisage dispatch of United States and British forces. Diversification of such forces to Norway clearly cannot be considered at this time. The use of all available Norwegian forces to occupy the Hiaus area is, therefore, welcomed provided they can be administered form resources other than those available to SHAEF.

If Norwegian forces are dispatched, the most satisfactory system of command would be that forces come initially under Russian operational control. As forces leave Russian orbit and enter Hiaus area, they should come under SHAEF control. This will enable sufficient British and United States personnel to be dispatched with the forces to ensure the proper use of Civil Affairs supplies.

To sum up, we are prepared to agree with the Norwegian proposal to dispatch all available Norwegian forces to North Norway on condition that maintenance falls on other than SHAEF resources.

This message has been relayed to ARGONAUT (1)

ACTION: Gen MacFarland (CC/S)
INFORMATION: Adm Leahy Gen Hull Adm King Gen Arnold Gen Bissell Corps
CM-IN-26116 (26 Jan 45) DTH 261920A bjm

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main, V ersailles, France

To: War Department

Nrr: S 76529 25 January 1945

To for action AMSO for British Chiefs of Staff for information to JSM Washington ref no S 76529 from SHAPE Main signed Eisenhower cite SHOOT. TO-secret

Question of occupation of Norway in event of German collapse is subject, your 490 of 18th January refers.

Anticipate minimum time lag of four to six weeks between order to mount APOSTLE 1 and arrival of main Allied Force in south Norway.

See no objection to suggestion that foreign office should pass this information to the Norwegian Government. Consider in interest of present deception operations, however, exchange of this information should be delayed three weeks.

Extremely remote possibility of APOSTLE 2 conditions arising. Consider that information that forces for this operation could not be made available until conditions on mainland of Europe permitted their release would unduly alarm Norwegian Government and they should not therefore be told at this time that provision will be more difficult than for APOSTLE 1.

If not already considered, believe Norwegian approach to Sweden for military assistance under APOSTLE 1 and 2 should be raised.

Situation under A LADDIN conditions is subject of separate cable.

End.

CM-IN-24906 (25 Jan 45)

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
Main, Versailles, France

Nr: 8 76529 25 January 1945

Footnote:
490 is CM-IN-18520 (19 Jan 45) CC/S
This message has been relayed to ARGONAUT (1)

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
Gen Hull
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Cofs

CM-IN-24906 (25 Jan 45) DTG 251415A

bjm

DECLASSIFIED
JCS LETTER, 7-8-72
BY DES. DATE

MAY 22 1973 33

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
This is top secret. COM 8th FLT reenciphers CINCMED top secret 191143 for COMINCH and COM 8th FLT (OPS) for info.

"CINCMED" sends action COM 8th FLT. INFO COMPHIBS 8th FLT FOTALI NLO BAAF.

Operation accomplish. Request you detail 2 LST's to be in position ready to load at Bari as follows: 1 on January 29th the other on Jan 30th. Medco 233 and 234 refer. These 2 LST will operate under orders of FOTALI.

COMINCH copies 1 to 8 inclusive.

Date: DEC 2 1971

Signature: "C"
From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main Versailles France

To: War Department
Headquarters Special Force London England
CG United Kingdom Base Section London England
Headquarters Communications Zone European Theater
of Operations US Army Paris France

Nr: S 73960
6 January 1945

From SHAEF Main to for action AGWAR for Joint Chiefs
of Staff and OSS to for info COM 2: AFHQ: ETOUSA for OSS: UK Base for OSS: S-73960

1. Several Norwegian resisters at present number approximately 30,000 men. Their primary role will be counte-
sorcing and protective work during the difficult period
in Norway before regular Allied Forces land in ALLA\*DDIN or
APOSTLE. They are also employed on sabotaging enemy
communications and shipping.

2. Arctic equipment now urgently needed both for
Norwegian resistants forced to flee Gestapo or to avoid
conscription, and for such resisters as we may wish to
calm into Maquis bases for training. Estimated that
10,000 sets of equipment required for these men, which will
be packed in containers and held ready for immediate
delivery.

3. 20,000 further resisters will carry out counter-
sorcing and protective roles during ALA\*DDIN or APPOSTLE

OM-IN-6310 (7 Jan 45)

DECLASSIFIED
JCS LETER, 7-9-73
D 44 DATE
MAY 22 1973

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/74
From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main Versailles France

Nr: 137360 6 January 1945

conditions and will need certain items of arctic equipment such as boots, parkas and wool mittens if they have to carry out their task during the winter months. Equipment for these resistsants would be held in depots, and not released to packing stations immediately.

4. List of equipment operationally required has been drawn up by Representatives of Special Operations Executive, Office of Strategic Services and Norwegian authorities. This list has received backing of military force commander for Norway. We are informed by Office of Strategic Services, London, that:
   A. The items listed are available in the United States.
   B. Office of Strategic Services, Washington, is making preliminary efforts through the War Department to procure this equipment.

5. British equivalent to required items are either not available or unsuitable in all cases: Nor is spare arctic equipment available in this theater from United States resources.

6. Sixth Army Group has submitted to Communications Zone a requirement of 110,000 sets arctic clothing consisting of parka, pile lined, reversible, toque wool knit, trousers, beret lined, mittens and inserts, trigger finger.

7. Following items are approved by this headquarters

OK-IN-6310 (7 Jan 45)
From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces 
Main Versailles France 

Nr: S 73960 6 January 1945

in a priority lower than that for theater requirements.
Delivery of following should be made in United Kingdom
15th February or earlier if practicable.
Item A boots, ski, mountain, with rubber cleated
soles: Size 7 5% size 8 20% size 9 25% size 10 25%
size 11 20% size 12 2% quantity pre 30,000.
Item B bags, sleeping, kapoo or mountain quantity
each 10,000
Item C parkas, reversible, ski, fur trimmed quantity
each 30,000
Item D trousers, ski, quantity pre 10,000
Item E tent, mountain, 2-men, complete with pins and
poles quantity each 5,000
Item F skis, complete with poles laminated type,
binding ski kandehar type and quantity set 2,000
Item G mittens, wool quantity pre 30,000
Item H socks, wool, heavy quantity pre 30,000
Item J toques, wool-knit quantity 30,000 (note: An
absolute minimum on parka requirements is 10,000. The
balance of 20,000 in the event of shortage of this item,
may be made up by the jacket, field M 1943.)

8. In addition request you earmark another 10,000
of items A, C, G, H and J and hold these for future shipment
to the United Kingdom against probable further expansion of
Norwegian resistance.

9. Understand that Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, prepared to make shipping arrangements direct

CM-IN-6310 (7 Jan 45)

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Page 4

From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main Versailles France

O. 73960 6 January 1945

with Office of Strategic Services.

End

* Being Serviced

Corrected inserted

ACTION: JC/3

INFO: Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
Gen Hull
Gen Bissell
Adm King

C of S

CM-IN-6310 (7 Jan 45) DTG: 061745A pa MAY 2 2 1973

33

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main, Versailles, France
To: War Department
CG, United Kingdom Base Section, London, England
Headquarters Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations, US Army, Paris, France
Nr: S 73960 6 January 1945

From SHAEF Main to for action AGWAR for Joint Chiefs of Staff and OSS to for info COMZ: AFRHQ: ETOUSA
for OSS: UK Base for OSS: S-73960 TOP SECRET signed Eisenhower cite SHQCT.

1. Norwegian resisters at present number approximately 30,000 men. Their primary role will be counterviterritory and protective work during the difficult period in Norway before regular Allied Forces land in ALADDIN or APOSTLE. They are also employed on sabotaging enemy communications and shipping.

2. Arctic equipment now urgently needed both for Norwegian resisters forced to flee Gestapo or to avoid conscription and for such resisters as we may wish to calm Maquis bases for training. Estimated that 10,000 sets of equipment required for these men which will be packed in containers and held ready for immediate delivery.

3. 20,000 further resisters will carry out counterviterritory and protective roles during ALADDIN or APOSTLE conditions and will need certain items of arctic equipment such as boots, parkas and wool mittens if they have to carry
From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main, Versailles, France

To: War Department
CG, United Kingdom Base Section, London, England
Headquarters Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations, US Army, Paris, France

Sr: S 73960

6 January 1945

Out their task during the winter months. Equipment for these resisters would be held in depots and not released to packing stations immediately.

4. List of equipment operationally required has been drawn up by Representatives of Special Operations Executive, Office of Strategic Services and Norwegian authorities. This list has received backing of military force commander for Norway. We are informed by Office of Strategic Services, London, that:

A. The items listed are available in the United States.

B. Office of Strategic Services, Washington, is making preliminary efforts through the War Department to procure this equipment.

5. British equivalent to required items are either not available or unsuitable in all cases: Nor is spare arctic equipment available in this theatre from United States resources.

CM-IN-7042 (8 Jan 45)
From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces
       Main, Versailles, France

6 January 1945

6. Sixth Army Group has submitted to Communications Zone a requirement of 110,000 sets arctic clothing consisting of parka, pile lined, reversible, toque wool knit, trousers jersey lined, mittens and inserts, trigger fingers.

7. Following items are approved by this Headquarters in a priority lower than that for theater requirements. Delivery of following should be made in United Kingdom 15th February or earlier if practicable.

A. Boots, ski, mountain, with rubber cleated soles: size 75% size 8, 20% size 9, 25% size 10, 25% size 11, 20% size 12, 5% quantity per 30,000.

B. Bags, sleeping, kapok or mountain quantity each 10,000.

C. Parkas, reversible, ski, fur trimmed quantity each 30,000.

D. Trousers, ski, white quantity per 10,000.

E. Tent, mountain, 2-men, complete with pins and poles quantity each 5,000.

F. Skis, complete with poles laminated type, binding ski Kandahar type and wax quantity set 2,000.

CM-IN-7042 (8 Jan 45)
WAR DEPARTMENT
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TO: PRIORITY

CORRECTED COPY

Page 4

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main, Versailles, France

No: 8 73960 6 January 1945

G. Mittens, wool quantity per 30,000.

H. Socks, wool, heavy quantity per 30,000.

J. Toques, wool-knit quantity 30,000 (note: an absolute minimum on parka requirements is 10,000. The balance of 20,000 in the event of shortage of this item, may be made up by the jacket, field N 1943).

8. In addition request you earmark another 10,000 of items A, C, G, H and J and hold these for future shipment to the United Kingdom against probable further expansion of Norwegian resistance.

9. Understand that office of Strategic Services, Washington, prepared to make shipping arrangements direct with Office of Strategic Services, London.

End

Corrected copy of CM-IN-6310 (7 Jan 45) JC/S

ACTION: JC/S

INFO: ADM. LEAHY, GEN. ARNOLD, GEN. HULL, GEN. BISSELL
ADM. KING, GEN. DONOVAN,

CM-IN-7042 (8 Jan 45) DTG 061745A by

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JCS LETTER, 5-3-72
BY DBS. DATE
MAY 2 2 1973

COPY No. 33

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94
Commander in Chief
Southwest Pacific Area
Hollandia, New Guinea

Commander in Chief
Pacific Ocean Areas
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Commanding General
Alaskan Department
Near Echelon
Fort Richardson, Alaska

Commanding General
Alaskan Department
Advance Command Post
Adak, Alaska

Number: WARX 84948

Action MacArthur and Nimitz information CONGEN Alaska from Joint Security Control signed Bissell.

Desire results of conference ref CINCPOAs 040346 December or subsequent conferences in order to properly apply postponement implementation as outlined JCS WARX 70546 of 30 November or to substitute other postponement implementation as and if desired and also to perform any necessary radio or physical coordination from here with theaters and CONGEN Alaska. Therefore request specific data on postponement, supporting movements, date and manner of breaking off of culture threat in theater.

End

ORIGINATOR: Gen. Bissell (Joint Security Control)


CM-OUT-84948 (31 Dec 1944) 15182 emh

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHF, NLR, Date MAY 21 1974
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces,
Main, Versailles, France

To: War Department
Headquarters Communications Zone, European Theater
of Operations, US Army, Paris, France
United Kingdom Base Section, London, England
Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, Caserta, Italy
Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

No: 3 71946
22 December 1944

TOfSECRET SHAEP Main signed Eisenhower cite SHQCI
to AQWAR for CCS, Central District UK Base for BCS5 rptd
AFHQ, C in C Med, USSTAF AAGSF, Sixth Army Group, Twelfth
Army Group, Ninth Air Force, First TACAF Prov, COMZ ETUSA,
HQ MTUSA, SOLOC, EAPOR 94th Inf Div Twelfth Army Group
please pass. SCAF 156 3 71946.

212304.

1. Status of operation INDEPENDENCE was reported
to CCS in our S 70051 of 8th December. Target date for
assault was given as 25th December subject to further few
days postponement.

2. Subsequently INDEPENDENCE has been indefinitely
postponed.

3. New estimate of target date will be notified
when situation clearer.

End
S 70051 is CM-IN-10197 (11 Dec 44) GEN HULL
ACTION: CCS
INFO : ADM LEAHY, GEN ARNOLD, GEN HULL, GEN BISSELL,
ADM KING, C OF S
CM-IN-22313 (23 Dec 44) 1048Z mcs

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24-76774

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/8/44
Your 172316 is reference. As indicated in my 121363 of June, on
6 March 1944 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations
contained in Paragraphs 5 and 6 of JCS 741. This paper approved
the interchange of information on the planning level between
the Joint Staff planners in Washington and the Joint Planning
staffs of area and theater commanders. It also provided that the
contents of the reports, studies, plans, and messages exchanged
between planning staffs under this authority should not be considered
as having approved status nor as binding on any Command or Agency.
It further specified that the messages be properly identified in
order to be distinguishable as planning messages. Experience has
indicated the necessity and the workability of this arrangement.
It is recognized that the Joint Staff planners in Washington being

Top Secret
### TOP SECRET DISPATCH

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**FOR ACTION**

**OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW**

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(Use G. C. T.)

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RESPONSIBLE TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ARE IN A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT STATUS THAN THE JOINT PLANNING STAFF OF AN AREA OR THEATER COMMANDER WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE ONLY TO SUCH COMMANDER. IT IS ESSENTIAL TO THEIR WORK IN LONG RANGE PLANNING THAT THEY HAVE THE BENEFIT OF THE VIEWS OF THE THEATER AND AREA PLANNERS. THESE CONTACTS WITH SWPA AND CINCPAC ARE PARTICULARLY NECESSARY TO FACILITATE THE JOINT EXPLORATION OF AVAILABILITY OF AND PLANNING FOR RESOURCES AS A BASIS FOR RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. IT IS NOT INTENDED THAT THE PLANNING STAFF OF AN AREA OR THEATER COMMANDER SHOULD BE IN ANY WAY RESPONSIBLE TO THE PLANNING STAFF OF A HIGHER CHIEF OF COMMAND, THE SOLE PURPOSE OF THE ARRANGEMENT BEING TO FURTHER THE INTERCHANGE OF THOUGHT AND OF INFORMATION WHICH IS NECESSARY FOR ADVANCE PLANNING. THIS IN EFFECT IS A SUBSTITUTE FOR STAFF CONFERENCES WHICH ARE NOT PRACTICABLE BECAUSE OF THE DISTANCES SEPARATING ---

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94

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TIPO SECRET DISPATCH

EXT.  ADDRESSES  PRECEDENCE

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ASTERISK (*) VAILGRAN ADDRESSE

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INFORMATION

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BASEGRAM

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

PAGE 3 OF 3  192536  NCR 49343

Operator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

THE VARIOUS HEADQUARTERS. YOUR PERSONAL APPROVAL OR CLEARANCE OF PLANNING MESSAGES FROM YOUR AREA IS A MATTER FOR YOUR DISCRETION, HOWEVER, IT IS NECESSARY THAT SUCH MESSAGES BE IDENTIFIED AS MESSAGES PERTAINING TO THIS SYSTEM OF EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND SHOULD CONTAIN THE EXPRESSION, "THIS IS A PLANNERS MESSAGE FOR THE JOINT STAFF PLANNERS IN WASHINGTON ".

COMINCH: COPIES #1 TO #6 INCLUSIVE.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 4, 1973

By DBS  Date: MAY 22, 1973

No. 1 ADMIRAL.  No. 2 FILE.  No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM.  No. 4 SPECIAL.

TOP SECRET

Public only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in article 70, Navy Regulations.

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

192536
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main, Versailles France.

To: War Department
United Kingdom Base Section, London England

Mr: S 71338
18 December 1944

This is SCAF 146. S 71338 to AGWAR for CCOS
Central District UK Base for CCOS USSTAF Bomber Command
AMOX F PAAA from SHAPE Main signed Eisenhower cite SHOUT

Instructions in our S-71300 17th December
SCAF 145 are suspended.

New target date will be notified later.

End

71300 is CM-IN-17022 (18 Dec 44) CC/S
ACTION: CC/S
INFORMATION: Adm Leahy Gen Hull Adm King
Gen Arnold Gen Bissell CofS
CM-IN-17611 (18 Dec 44) 1633Z bjm

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MAY 21 1974
1974

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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COPY NO. 33
From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main, Versailles, France

To: War Department, OG, United Kingdom Base Section, London, England

No. S 71300 SCADF 145 17 December 1944

S 71300 to for action OG AGMAR for GOOS, Central District UK Base for ECOs, USSTAF, Bomber Command, ANUXF, FAAM from SHAEF Main signed Eisenhower. This is SCAF 145 cite SHOOT.

1. The following change in boundary is repeated for your information.

2. With target date of 20 December, at an hour to be fixed by agreement between commanders concerned, 12th Army Group will relieve 21st Army Group east of the River Maas.

3. New boundary, effective as above, subject to adjustment in detail by commanders concerned, as follows:
   A. As at present from west to east up to the River Maas north of Maastricht then to follow the line of the River Meuse to Roermond thence all inclusive to 12th Army Group Roermond-Monchen-Gladbach-Dusseldorf with full running rights in triangle Maastricht-Maastricht-Hasselt, to 12th Army Group.
   B. In addition to troops serving the British 7th Armoured Division, accommodations within the triangle Maastricht-Maastricht-Hasselt to be provided for 5000 United States troops, if required.
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main, Versailles, France

No. 871300 SGAF 145 17 December 1944

C. Maintenance of bridges at Borkharen and Berg to be responsibility of 12th Army Group.

4. With target date of 20 December, the British 7th Armoured Division will pass to operational command of 12th Army Group. It will continue to be maintained by 21st Army Group.

End

ACTION: CCS
INFO: ADM LEAHY
GEN ARNOLD
CPD
GEN RUSSELL
ADM KING
C OF S

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHF, NLR, Date MAY 21 1974

CM-IN-17022 (16 Dec 44) 00422 mcs

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/74
From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, Paris, Versailles, France

To: War Department

No.: S 70051

6 December 1944

To XYZ

1. Code name for operation order W 73331 of 6th December remains unchanged.

2. Target date for assault is 35th December, but is subject to further postponement of a few days.

3. Fourth Zouaves have already secured Bordeaux. First Regiment Spahis Marocaine are protecting lines of communication in area of Bordeaux. Field force consists of one DLI, two DE, with Corps supporting troops including three Artillery Battalions, one AAA gun, 1st Battalion, engineer, medical, Ordnance and Quartermaster units.

4. AEF cable 131520 A November '44 to French Naval Authorities under Admiral Lemasson to support operations.

5. Air support under operational control of Commanding General, First Tactical Air Force, will normally be provided as "Force Aérienne De L'Ouest" commanded by Colonel Corneille-Bonnin and consisting of two Naval Air Squadrons and an assault unit comprising A-24, A-30 and B-7 aircraft known as "Group Fairies," 32 Squadron Royal Air Force Fighter Command under operational control of

CM-IN-8613 (9 Dec 44)

DECLASSIFIED
JCS LETTER 7-4-74
BY DIA, DATE
MAY 22 1973

COPY NO.
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, Nan, Versailles, France

No: S 70051 3 December 1944

AMCF will act as spotting aircraft for naval bombardment and anti U-boat cover will be provided in Bay of Biscay from December 15 by Royal Air Force Coastal Command.

6. Whole operation under General De Larrinat with headquarters at COGNAC working to Sixth Army Group directives.

End

ACTION: Gen Hull
INFO: Gen Arnold, Gen Bissell, C of S

CM-IN-8613 (9 Dec 44) 0653Z ngs

DECLASSIFIED
JCS LETTER, 7-3-72

BY DES. DATE

MAY 2 2 1973

COPY NO. 32

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

24-19784
From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main, Versailles France

To: War Department
CG, United Kingdom Base Section, London, England
Commander in Chief Mediterranean Theater of Operations. Caserta, Italy
Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
Headquarters Communications Zone, Mediterranean Theater of Operations US Army, Main, Caserta, Italy

Nr: S 67131 SCAF 133 17 November 1944

From SHAPE Main G-3 DNG 161925A to for action Sixth Army Group to for info (1) Combined Chiefs of Staff (2) Central District UK Base for British Chiefs of Staff (3) APHC (4) CINC Med (5) USSTAF (6) AHCSEP (7) Twelfth Army Group (8) 9th Inf Div (9) Ninth Air Force (10) First TACAF (11) COMZ ETUSA (12) COMZ NTUSA (13) COMZ NTUSA Advance (14) EXFOR ref nr S 67131 reported signed Eisenhower. This is SCAF 133 cite SHUT.

1. Paragraph 3 of our S 65164 of 2nd November 1944 (SCAF 119) is amended as follows:

2. Delete and substitute: "3. General De Larmasq, by appointment of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, commands all French forces detailed for operations against the enemy concentrations on the Atlantic coast. General De Larmasq will conduct operation INDEPENDENCE in accordance with orders and directives issued by you.

3. Action addresses acknowledge.

ACTION: CC/S
INFO: Adm Leahy Gen Arnold Gen Hull Gen Bissell Adm King C of S
CM-IN-17192 (18 Nov 44) 0329Z pa

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 6/13/44
Joint Chiefs of Staff
77500
15 November 1944

Commander in Chief
Pacific Ocean Areas
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii

Commander in Chief
Southwest Pacific Area
Hollandia, New Guinea

Commanding General
USAF China Theater
Chungking, China

Commanding General
USAF China-Burma Theater
New Delhi, India

Commanding General
Alaskan Department
Rear Echelon
Fort Richardson, Alaska

Commanding General
Alaskan Department
Advance Command Post
Adak, Alaska

Number WARX 63125

book message to Nimitz, MacArthur, Wedemeyer, Sultan, and Emmons for action from the Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Recent press and radio references to the existence of deception and cover plans have drawn attention to the necessity for maintaining highest possible secrecy on all details of strategic and tactical deception planning and the secret methods used. The present state of the war against

CM-OUT-63125 (15 Nov 44)

DECLASSIFIED
200 memo, 1-4-74
By RMF, NLR, Date MAY 21 1974

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
Germany does not permit any slackening in security as deception methods successfully used against Germany may be used to assist in the defeat of Japan. It is recognized there is a necessity for inclusion in training manuals and courses of subject matter with respect to the use of special equipment and devices for tactical deception purposes. Present control by technical and training services of the progressive downgrading of classification of deception devices in a manner similar to that for secret weapons and equipment is adequate and should be followed. Appropriate instructions should be issued to subordinate commanders.

2. All practicable steps shall be taken to prevent references to strategic or tactical deception by the press or radio.

End
(COMINCH AND CNO FOR ACTION FROM COMNAVEU AND PASS FOR INFO TO BUORD BUSHIPS (620) AND COORDINATOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT)

SECRET

MAJOR H Q A REEVES OF INTER SERVICE RESEARCH BUREAU DESIGNER SLEEPING BEAUTY WILL BE IN US ABOUT 1 NOVEMBER ENROUTE AUSTRALIA. HE WILL REPORT TO ISRB REPRESENTATIVE, HE PLANS TO BRING WITH HIM ONE SLEEPING BEAUTY TWO OPERATORS AND ONE MAINTENANCE MAN AND WILL BE AVAILABLE 30 DAY PERIOD FOR ANY DESIRED TRIALS AND CONFERENCES.

COMNAVEU SECRET REPORTS 3247, 3944, 4179 OF 1943 HAVE DESCRIBED SLEEPING BEAUTY IN DETAIL. TOP SECRET REPORT X 681 OF 19 AUGUST GAVE RECENT IMPROVEMENTS. ITS POSSIBILITIES FOR UNDERWATER RECONNAISSANCE WERE SUBJECT TOP SECRET REPORT X 836 OF 1 SEPTEMBER, BELIEVE MAJOR REEVES TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL KNOWLEDGE ALL PHASES

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94
SMALL SUBMERSIBLE OPERATIONS SHOULD BE FULLY CAPITALIZED. DEMONSTRATION ABILITY HIS CRAFT TO NEGOTIATE NETS BOOMS.

AND OTHER ELEMENTS HARBOR DEFENSE SHOULD ASSIST CURRENT DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTERMEASURES THIS FORM OF ATTACK.

ALSG RECOMMEND FIRST HAND DEMONSTRATION ITS POSSIBILITIES FOR RECONNAISSANCE PRIOR TO SALVAGE OPERATIONS AND FOR LOCATION OF MINES. ABOVE WILL HAVE SPECIAL INTEREST SECTION RE-7 BUORD AND OP 30-3N. PLEASE ADVISE TRIALS DESIRED AND GROUPS HE SHOULD CONTACT.

ORIGINAL NCR DISTRIBUTION:
COMINCH & CNO(#1-8)......ACT
BUORD(#9)......BUSHIPS(#10)......30(#11)......20S(#12)....
CORD. RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT(#13).....

TOP-SECRET

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in article 76, Navy Regulations.
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Forward, Versailles, France.

To: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces Main, London, England

CG, United Kingdom Base Section, London, England

Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

Nr: FWD 16737 3rd October 1944

Reference your WX 39193 dated 30th Sept, 1944.
To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff to for info SHAPE Main, Hq, Comm Zone, APhQ for Wilson, Central District, UK Base Section, London for British Chiefs of Staff, ref Nr FWD 16737 from SHAPE Forward signed Eisenhower cite SHOCT SCAF 98

It is noted that plan BODGURD is cancelled.

The necessity for cover requirements for future operations this theater is now under review. No threat against Scandinavia is being maintained other than to indicate to the enemy the presence of an unspecified Rankin B Force in United Kingdom.

Acknowledge.

End

FOOTNOTE: Receipt of SCAF 98 acknowledged by WDMC

ACTION: CC/S

INFO: Adm Leahy, Gen Arnold, OPD, Gen Bissell, Adm King, C of S

CM-IN-3440 (4 Oct 44) 1407Z ekk

DECLASSIFIED
JUS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date May 21, 1974

COPY NO.
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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12355, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94
Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main Echelon
London, England

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Forward Echelon
Versailles, France

Commanding General
Allied Force Headquarters
Caserta, Italy

Commanding General
United Kingdom Base Section
London, England

Headquarters, Communications Zone
European Theater of Operations
Main Echelon
Paris, France

Number: WARX 39193

Book message to Eisenhower London, Versailles and Hq
Close Zone ETO Paris, and to Wilson Caserta for action, to Cen-
tral District United Kingdom Base Section London pass to Brit-
ish Chiefs of Staff for information. This message is FACS 89
to Eisenhower and FAN 451 to Wilson from the Combined Chiefs
of Staff.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff consider that lack of German
reserves has now become so acute that enemy has been obliged
to thin out his forces in non-operational fronts and may have
to continue this process. In consequence deception threats
against non-active sectors such as Scandinavia may not suc-
ceed in containing enemy forces as heretofore.

CM-OUT-39193 (30 Sep 44)
Cost of maintaining our present threat to Scandinavia would not justify effort required. As regards Balkans, recent events in Roumania, Bulgaria and Turkey render deceptive threats unnecessary.

In view of present rapidly changing situation it has been decided to cancel plan BODYGUARD and you should therefore prepare short-term deception plans to cover your respective operational requirements. These plans to be co-ordinated through London control section.

Russians have agreed to cancellation of plan BODYGUARD.

End

Scandinavian deception

DRORIGINATOR: CC/S
INFORMATION: Adm Leahy, General Arnold, OPD, General Rissell, Adm King, C of S

CM-OUT-39193 (30 Sep 44) 16292 ek2

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By HHF, NLR, Date

MAY 21 1974

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia  
To: War Department  
No: MX 21177  
28 September 1944

AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff, and copy to SHAEP for information General Eisenhower and British Chiefs of Staff. MX 21177 WAR please pass copy to SHAEP.

The Soviets General Staff today formally agreed that planned BODY GUARD is cancelled.

Note: This message is being relayed to SHAEP by W.D.C.C. according to the originator's instructions.

ACTION: CC/S
INFO: Adm Leahy, Gen Arnold, Gen Handy, Gen Bissell, Adm King, C of S

CM-IN-26704 (29 Sep 44) 02412 JB

DECLASSIFIED
20S memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 21 1974

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/94

COPY NO. 32
From: OCTAGON

To: War Department
US Military Mission in Moscow, Russia

Mr: OCTAGON 30 14 September 1944

The Combined Chiefs of Staff consider that lack of German reserves has now become so acute that the enemy has been obliged to thin out his forces in non-operational fronts and may have to continue this process. In consequence deception threats against non-active sectors such as Scandinavia may not succeed in containing enemy forces as heretofore.

The cost of maintaining our present threat to Scandinavia would not justify the effort required. As regards the Balkans recent events in Roumania, Bulgaria and Turkey render deceptive threats unnecessary.

It is directed that you consult with the Soviet General Staff regarding the cancellation of plan "Bodyguard" and notify the Combined Chiefs of Staff when you have obtained their agreement thereto.

ACTION: CC/3
INFO: Adm. Leahy
      Gen. Arnold
      Gen. Handy
      Gen. Bissell
      Adm. King
      C of S

CM-IN-13329 (14 Sep 44) 23362 by
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
PRIORITY

FROM: APHQ (Signed Wilson)
To: British Chiefs of Staff
Rptd: J. S. M. for U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff
No: FX 88222 26 August 1944
MEDCOS 176 FX.88222

Further to our immediately preceding signal.
Date referred to is September 1st.

T.O.O. 232130B

ACTION: CC/S
INFO: Adm Leahy, Gen Arnold, Gen Handy, Gen Bissell,
Adm King, C of S
CM-IN-26988 (29 Aug 44) 1609Z Jb

DECLASSIFIED
40B memo, 1-4-74
By RJP, NLR, Date MAY 21 1974

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
3/0
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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
3/0
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
3/0
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

From: Chiefs of Staff
To: SACMED
Rptd: SHAEF and JSM Washington
Nr: COSMED 158 26 July 1944

Reference S 55814.

While appreciating the desire of the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean for mounting a threat against the Biscay area, in view of doubtful results and possible adverse effect on Fortitude Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the recommendation of the Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force that existent latent threat only to the Biscay coast be maintained.

End
T.O.O. 261500Z

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
CorS
CM-IN-22168 (27 Jul 44) 0330Z

DECLASSIFIED

OS memo, 1-4-74
By RHF, NLR, Date MAY 21 1974

bjm

COPY NO.

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To: War Department
   CO, Strategic Air Forces in Europe, London, England
   CO, Iceland Base Command, Iceland

No. FX 39753, 25 July 1944

Signed Eisenhower EX 39753. War pass to Eastern Defense Command for action.

As directed in cable TOP SECRET WARX 66933 of 18th July command of United States Army Forces in Iceland will be transferred to you effective 30th July. Plan PISTEONS authorizes shipment of units and casualties to UK until approved ceiling is reached; this involves shipment of approximately 3,000 troops during July and August. Plan also includes shipment excess supplies to UK until approved levels are reached. Request you authorize direct communication after 30th July between this headquarters and IHC for tactical planning.

Note: This message has been relayed to Eastern Defense Command by WDC in accordance with the originator's request.

ACTION: OPD
INFO: Gen Arnold
Gen Somervell
Gen Blissell
Gen Maxwell
Adm King
Log
CM-IN-21094 (25 Jul 44) 2141Z

The making of an exact copy of this message is forbidden

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

To: Chiefs of Staff
From: Joint Staff Mission
Number: J.S.M. 145 20 July 1944

BILGE, ANVIL.

Please pass following from Combined Chiefs of Staff to
APHQ and repeat to SHAEF:

Begins:
Policy and guidance for Plan "BODYGUARD" contained
in COSMED 146 is approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

End
T.O.O. 202319Z

Footnote: COSMED 146 is CM-IN-8766 (11 July 44) CC/3

ACTION: CC/3

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
Gen Handy
Gen Bissell
Adm King
C of S
Adm Leamy

DECLASSIFIED
JOS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 21 1974

CM-IN-17640 (21 Jul 44) 1749Z om

33

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War Department
Classified Message Center
Incoming Classified Message

From: SHAEF
To: AMSSO (FOR CHIEFS OF STAFF)
Rptd: AFRHQ, ALGIERS
JSM WASHINGTON
AFHQ ADV COMMAND POST

No: 55814

19th July 1944

BIGHT. ANVIL.

Signed Eisenhower cite SHOOT.

With reference COSMED 150 15th July.

1. In order to assist ANVIL, AFRHQ, recommends that
SHAEF exert strong threat to Biscay Coast.

2. To exert too many threats is not plausible and
consequently each individual threat is weakened. There
is a further possibility in so doing of compromising
our deception as a whole.

3. SHAEF considers FORTITUDE threat to Fos de Calais
vital to OVERLORD and that nothing should be allowed to
detract from this threat. SHAEF also considers that
strong threat to Biscay Coast is unlikely to be effective
and therefore might weaken and even compromise FORTITUDE.

4. In view therefore of doubtful results and possible
adverse effect on FORTITUDE SHAEF recommends the advis-
ability of maintaining the existing latent threat only
to the Biscay Coast

T 0 0. 1913008

Note: COSMED 150 is CM-IN-13971 (17 Jul 44) CC/S
ACTION: CCS
C of S Adm. Leahy

CM-IN-16557 (20 Jul 44) 1627Z ejv
TO: A.F.H.Q.
INFO: J.S.M.
S.H.A.E.P.
FROM: C.O.S.
DATE: 15 July 1944

BIGOT.

COSMED 150

Reference MEDCOS 155 and FX 68506 of 5th July.

1. Possibility of exerting strong threat to Biscay area has been carefully considered. Following are our conclusions.

2. Threat is unlikely to assist OVERLORD since enemy does not apparently possess any general reserve from which formations might be drawn to the Biscay area. S.H.A.E.P. are in agreement with this view.

3. Since the Biscay area is already very lightly held it is unlikely that the enemy will be in a position to move any appreciable forces away from this area, even if present latent threat were not increased, nor do we consider that an increased threat to Biscay area would induce enemy to transfer forces from ANVIL area.

4. For geographical and military reasons the threat is unlikely to be convincing. We would have great difficulty in implementing it as we doubt whether we shall be able to...
support the shore by real movements or activities.

5. We doubt whether threat is worthwhile but are prepared to recommend O.C.S. to issue instructions to S.H.A.E.F. to exert maximum threat to Biscay coast to reach its peak effect immediately prior to ANVIL D day if you wish.

T.O.O. 1515352
End

NOTE: MEDCOB 155 is CM-IN-4623 (6 Jul 44) CC/S
68506 is CM-IN-4624 (6 Jul 44) CC/S

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED

ACTION: CC/S
INFO: Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
Gen Handy
Gen Bissell
Adm King
C of S

CM-IN-13971 (17 Jul 44) 1630Z beans

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
To: War Department
No. FWD 12370 10 July 1944

From SHAEF to AGWAR FWD 12370 to AGWAR for General Marshall signed Eisenhower cite SHSOS SEC BIGOT. Reference your cablegram W62656 dated 9 July.

Concurring in your proposed announcement relative General McNair's assignment, but request no mention be made of dates of departure, arrival or assignment.

ACTION: OPD

INPO: Gen Arnold
Gen White
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Adm Leahy
C of S

CM-IN-8145 (10 Jul 44) 1940Z ejm
From: Chiefs of Staff
To: A.P.H.Q.
Rptd: J.S.N. Washington, SHAPE, AFRIC Advanced CP
Nr: COSMED 145 10 July 1944

Following from Chiefs of Staff
Reference MEDCOS 155 paragraph 1.

1. BODYGUARD guidance is given in our immediately following telegram. This policy is subject to approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff who are requested to signal their approval. The Russians will also be asked to agree and to cooperate.

2. Reference your paragraph 2. Threat to Biscay coast is under urgent consideration by SHAPE and London controlling section.

3. SHAPE's current deception plan FORTITUDE of which you have copy is being revised and L.O.S. hope to forward a new plan during next few days.

End

T.O.O. 101730Z

NOTE: MEDCOS 155 is CM-IN-4623 (6 Jul 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold Adm King
Gen Handy Adm Leahy
Gen Blissell COFS

CM-IN-8892 (11 Jul 44) 2023Z lee

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Operations Division
Executive Office 2904
9 July 1944

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Number WAR 62666

TO GENERAL EISENHOWER FROM GENERAL MARSHALL

McNair accompanied by one Aide will leave for your headquarters about 12 July for assignment indicated in your 355125 of 6 July and our 61630 of 7 July. You will be informed later exact time of departure. We propose to announce upon his departure that he has been given an important assignment overseas unless you desire otherwise.

End

ORIGINAL: OPD

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
Gen White
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Adm Leahy
Oofs

CM-OUT-62666 (9 Jul 44) 1930Z pa

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 8(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By DBS Date May 22, 1973

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

COPY No. 28
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

From: Chiefs of Staff
To: APHQ
Rptd: JSM Washington
Nr: COSMED 143 8 July 1944

Following for General Wilson from Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Reference MEDCOS 155. Plan FERDINAND is approved.

End
T.O.O. 081635Z

ACTION: CC/S
INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Adm Leahy
Cofs

DECLASSIFIED
May 21 1974
By RNP, NLR, Date

CM-IN-7362 (10 Jul 44) 0057Z bjm

42

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

FROM: Chiefs of Staff
TO: Joint Staff Mission
NR: 008(W) 154 8th July 1944

Following from Chiefs of Staff, reference J.S.M. 125.

View of U. S. Chiefs of Staff have been passed to
Controlling officer who is in close touch with SACMED.
2. We are informing SACMED that FERDINAND has been
   approved.

End
T.O.O. 061630Z

ACTION: CO/S
INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
              OPD
              Gen Bissell
              Adm King
              Adm Leahy
              CoFs

CM-IN-7361 (10 Jul 44) 0057Z lee

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94
Supreme Headquarters,
Allied Expeditionary Forces,

Number: WAR 61630

TOPSEC for Eisenhower's EYES ONLY from Marshall reference your 8 55125 of 6 July.

McNair is out of town and returns tomorrow, Saturday night, so I have had no opportunity to determine his views. In view of McNair's prominent and well-known position here, he appears to be the logical man for this position. I propose to put General Lear in command of the Army Ground Forces during McNair's absence. The fact that Lear has taken over the Ground Forces and McNair has left the country will assist, I believe, materially in your deception plan. I will inform you further as soon as McNair returns and his wishes on the matter are known.

You are authorized to make the necessary changes in designations of Army groups to fit your plan.

End.

ORIGINATOR: SCS
INFORMATION: GEN ARNOLD
GEN HANDY
GEN BISSELL
ADMIRAL LEAHY
ADMIRAL KING
C OF S

CM-OUT-61630 (7 Jul 44) 1717Z mcs
EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) or 88
ORD letter, May 1, 1972
By DBS
Date: MAY 22, 1973

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/1974

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

PRIORITY

CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY REQUIRES ADDITION OF LETTERS "TOT" TO CLASSIFICATION OF REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE.

To: War Department
Nr: 8 55127 6 July 1944

To FREEDOM pass to FREEDOM Adv C/ for info AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff, Britman Washington for US Joint Chiefs of Staff, S 55127 from SHAPE signed Eisenhower cite SHOT.

With reference your FX 68506 dated 5th July.

1. Having now received story of plan FERDINAND from London controlling section and appreciating the difficulty of maintaining threat to south of France, we agree FERDINAND in principle.

2. We are urgently examining the possibilities of exerting threat to Biscey Coast. Results of this examination will be communicated to you as soon as known.

Note: 68506 is CM-IN-4624 (6 Jul 44) CCS
ACTION: JCS
INFO: Gen. Arnold
       Gen. Handy
       Gen. Bissell
       Adm. King
       Adm. Leahy
       C of S

CM-IN-5101 (7 Jul 44) 0446Z

DECLASSIFIED
JCS LETTER, 7-5-72
BY OMB. DATE
MAY 22 1973

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42
 WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

EYES ONLY

CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY REQUIRES ADDITION OF LETTERS "TOT", TO CLASSIFICATION OF REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE.

FOR GENERAL MARSHALL'S EYES ONLY
URGENT

To: War Department
No. 55125 6 July 1944

S 55125 to AGWAR for Marshall for his eyes only from Eisenhower cite SHQT.

OVERLORD cover and deception plan (PORTITUDE) has proved remarkably effective. Reliable intelligence indicates that enemy is preparing for decisive Allied effort by First US Army Group in Pas De Calais area under the command of Patton.

Since under the existing plans the enemy will unquestionably soon learn of the presence in the lodgement areas of First US Army Group and Patton with his Third Army, it has been necessary to devise a new and plausible plan for continuing the cover threat. The new cover plan involves retention First Army Group nominally in United Kingdom, redesignation of First Army Group in France under Bradley's command as Twelfth Army Group, down grading Patton from his fictitious status as commander of First Army Group to actual command Third Army, and naming suitable well known commander of high reputation as the commander of the proposed fictitious First Army Group comprising assumed United States and British Divisions in the United Kingdom. The designation of "Twelfth Army Group" has been selected for Bradley's Army Group to obviate confusion in mail and other communications resulting if a number identical with one of the Armies in

CM-IN-4746 (6 Jul 44)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11662, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD Letter, May 1, 1973
By DBS

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No. 3 55125 6 July 1944

this theater were to be selected.

All arrangements to implement the new cover plan can be made here except that a suitable notional commander for the First Army Group is not available in this area. Desire therefore to suggest for your consideration that some well known officer such as McNair, DeWitt, or another of corresponding reputation be ordered to this theater without delay. He would be required here for a considerable period, probably at least 3 months, the exact period being determined by the length of time the new cover plan remains effective. During his stay the officer would be usefully employed, and he would have unusual opportunities for observation.

The names I have given you are suggested because they have been fairly well advertised throughout the world. While I had thought of using Simpson for this purpose, I feel that his name will not be of sufficient significance to the enemy. If you find it impossible to comply, I will have to start immediately to build up Simpson as well as I can.

I would be most grateful for a radio reply as time is pressing and I cannot over-emphasize the great importance of maintaining as long as humanly possible the Allied threat to the Pas De Calais area, which has already paid enormous dividends and, with care, will continue to do so.

ACTION: Gen Handy
INFO: Gen White, Gen Bissell, C of S, Gen Arnold
CM IN-4746 (6 Jul 44) 2019Z jb

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 1, 1973
By DBS

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

TO: BRITISH C.O.S.

INFO: J.S.M. for U.S. Joint C.O.S.

A.F.H.Q. Adv. C. P.

FROM: A.F.H.Q. (Signed Wilson)

AVAIL

MEDC. 246

1. By agreement with S.C.A.E.F., the deception plan ZEPPELIN has been operated in this theatre to maintain threats against Bulgaria, Albania, Istria, and S. W. France during the OVERLORD critical period.

2. Following measures are proposed to terminate plan. These have been coordinated with London Controlling Section and are understood to be acceptable to S.C.A.E.F.

3. S. W. France. Threat is being kept alive as much as possible until July 6th after which our policy must be to calm German apprehensions in preparation for AVAIL.

4. Istria and Albania. Threats will be fully maintained until July 3rd and then allowed to fade out. No deliberate steps will be taken to end threats.

5. Bulgaria. Physical implementation to represent preparations for British moves towards Eastern Greece connected with Russian threat to Varna must end on June 26th as forces concerned are required for other duties. General theme of Russian threat to Bulgaria will however be continued for the present and no active steps taken to end this effect.

From: 240th

Per SM 522-71

C.P.
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INCOMING MESSAGE

I consider plan ZEPPELIN has in general achieved the required objectives.

End

Date: 23 Jun 44

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DEC 22 1971

Signature: RAP

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94
WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE
IMMEDIATE

19 June 1944

From: AFRIC ADV CP
To: British Chiefs of Staff

MEDGOS 135

Air Ministry Special Signals Office for British Chiefs of Staff and Joint Staff Mission Washington for U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff rptd. for info. Hq MAAF and AFRIC for Brigadier Dudley Clarke SHAPE. Signed Wilson cita MEDGOS (008). Reference plan BODYGUARD and MEDGOS 94 of April 16th.

1. I gave notice that the lack of troops in Middle East and North Africa would probably reduce effective value of BODYGUARD threats to equivalent scale of attack of 6 divisions in the eastern Mediterranean and four in the western Mediterranean.

2. Large numbers of documents; mostly emanating from the German War Office, captured from Headquarters German (14) Army now give us clear and authentic evidence of enemy views as to our order of battle at end of May.

3. This shows that we can confidently expect scale of present threats to amount to not less than the equivalent of 10 divisions in eastern Mediterranean and 9 in western Mediterranean, w’thouse counting on the withdrawal of any divisions from Italy.

End

T.O.O. 191120B

FOOTNOTE: MEDGOS 94 is OM-IN-12248 (17 Apr 44) GOS

ACTION: CC/3

INFO: Gen Arnold, OFD, Gen Bissell, Adm King, Gen Park, C of S

MEDGOS 135 (20 Jun 44) 01447 Jb

per SM522-71

310

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/8/94

signature: [illegible]
Following is the essence of cover plan BODYGUARD:

(1) To create the impression that preparations for OVERLORD will delay this operation until late summer.

(2) To feint a Soviet amphibious attack in the Black Sea against Rumania.

(3) To feint a Soviet attack against Petsamo.

(4) To feint an Anglo-American landing on the Dalmatian coast.
IMMEDIATE

From: AFHQ

To: AGWAR (OPD)
   Troopers (NO 5)
   Rptd: Hq MAAP (Caserta)
   MidEast
   AAI
   Fairbanks

No: F49404

Signed Wilson cite FHQCT

Weekly planning telegram number 37.

1. Planning during last week has been concentrated principally on:
   (A) Implementation of plans designed to assist NEPTUNE.
   (B) Various alternative amphibious operations as indicated in para 1 of Weekly Planning telegram 36.

2. SAC has decided in view of representations made by French to defer operation ERASSARD until the June moon period.

3. Other matters under examination have included:
   (A) Rankin planning.
   (B) Relief in Yugoslavia and Albania.
   (C) Occupation of the Iodecanese.
   (D) Preparation of a directive to General Alexander laying down the policy for the conduct of operations in Italy after the capture of Rome.

No Sig

T.O.O. WH

ACTION: OPD
INFO: CC/5, Gen Arnold, Gen Bissell, Col Mark, Log
CM-IN-17586 (23 May 44) 2050Z

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 6/13/44

COPY No. 22

DECCLASSIFIED
JCS LETTER, 7-3-72
BY DBS, DATE
MAY 22 1973
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

FROM: AFRQ Algiers
TO: AROAR for OPD (B.A.S. Pass),
War Office for MOS,
Info, HQ MAAP (Caserta) Middle East AAI (Please pass
copy to MAAP).

No: F40292 May 1, 1944

B I G O T

Signed Wilson cite PHIL.

Weekly planning telegram No. 34.

One. Assistance to NEPTUNE at critical period. Detailed
planning continues as indicated in para 1 of Weekly Planning
Telegram No. 33.

Two. Mediterranean strategy in post NEPTUNE period.
Examination in hand of the various alternative courses of
action as set out in MEDOOS 101. It is clear that except
for minor operations in close tactical support of the main
forces anything less than a 3 Division assault with immediate
follow up of 3 Divisions is likely to lack penetrating power
and be contained. Events during the next 5 months may com-
pletely change the overall Mediterranean picture and we do
NOT exclude the possibility of a major amphibious operation
this year. In order to be prepared for all possibilities
planning continues on the assumption that additional resources
will be made available after the initial NEPTUNE period.

Three. BRASSARD. Planning by Force Commanders and Staffs
continues.

Siegfried Elbe
CM-IN-1325 (2 May 44)

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JCS LETTER, 7-5-72
BY DES. DATE
MAY 22 1973

20

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date
Four. Trans Adriatic Operations. JPS have recommended the establishment of a suitable Headquarters controlling all operations across the Adriatic the intention being to increase raiding activities against the Dalmatian Islands and coast and when the situation becomes favorable to utilize regular formations for large-scale raids. This has been approved in principle.

T.O.O. 0122308

FOOTNOTE: MEDCOS 101 is CM-IN-128(1 May 44) CC/S
ACTION: OPD
INFO: CC/S
Gen Arnold
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Col Park
C of S

CM-IN-1325 (2 May 44) 2023Z bem

DECLASSIFIED
JCS LETTER 7-4-72
BY DOSS. DATE
MAY 22 1973

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From: AFHQ Algiers
To: AGWAR (OPD), War Office MO5.
Rptd. HK, MAAP (Caserta);
Middle East AAl.

No: F38499
From AFHQ signed Wilson cite PHQT.

Text of para two of F38176 sent garbled. Please substitute following paraphrase for original para two.

Strategy in Mediterranean during period post NEPTUNE. Various alternative courses are now being examined. The possibility of launching major amphibious operations at some time against Southern France or elsewhere is still envisaged in planning as we hope that after the successful launching NEPTUNE, you will be able to increase our resources of assault shipping and craft for Mediterranean theatre. To enable us also to have any degree of flexibility here you will understand that it is essential for us to have shipping available which can carry out moves at short notice.

No Sig
T.O.O. 271900

FOOTNOTE: 38176 is CM-IN-20513 (28 Apr 44) OPD

ACTION: OPD
INFO: 00/5, Gen Arnold, C of S

CM-IN-21180 (28 Apr 44) 20342 jb

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JCS LETTER, 7-9-72
BY DSS. DATE
MAY 22 1973

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COPY No.
TO: British Chiefs of Staff  
Repeated: JEN for US Joint Chiefs of Staff Hq MAOF

FROM: AP HQ

This is MEDECOS No. 94.

Signed Wilson cite FIVJCT

Reference plan BODYGUARD.

1. Am anxious you should appreciate that the demands of the campaign in Italy must necessarily reduce now our capacity to implement in full the Mediterranean part of plan BODYGUARD.

2. In this the limiting factor is the number of divisions not committed to the battle which could conceivably constitute threats to areas outside Italy. In particular the constant flow of troops from ME to Italy will certainly have started already doubts in the enemy's mind as to our ability to launch a substantial Balkan invasion.

3. This situation will become progressively worse until mid May when the effective value of our resources in ME will scarcely exceed the equivalent of three divisions. We hope to succeed in exaggerating this by deceptive measures to six divisions but cannot expect to exceed that total.

4. For various practical reasons we can only use formations in Italy to a very limited extent to implement threats to outside areas.

5. We cannot therefore hold out good prospects of sustaining during the critical period of OVERLORD threats which the enemy is likely to appreciate beyond the following scales of attack. Six divisions in the Eastern Mediterranean and four divisions in the Western Mediterranean.

DECLASSIFIED  
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By EHP, NLR, Date  
MAY 21, 1974

COPY No. 31

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6. We are taking all possible measures to strengthen and perhaps increase these threats. They include the diversion of 91st US Infantry Division to open and manipulation of the proposed relief of 4th Division in Italy by 6th Ind. division from PAICO, also the training of one DIV at the combined training center at Salerno during May. Do not however consider that anything beyond the scales described in Paragraph 5 can be relied upon unless the resources of the theater are increased from outside.

7. The most effective means of increasing the Balkan threat would be to move second British division from India to NE. Apart from the many advantages already advanced this would enable US to raise the scale of the Balkan threat to one of eight divisions. I realize, however, from previous correspondence on this matter that the suggested move is likely to be impracticable.

No Sig

Time of Origin 162030B

ACTION: CC/S

INFO: Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Col Pake
C of S

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 21 1974

CM-IN-12248 (17 Apr 44) 1600Z mlo

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: A.F.H.Q. Algiers
To: AGWAR (OPD) B.A.S.W. please pass) War Office (M.O.S.)
     rptd HQ MAAP Caserta (Fairbanks please pass) Middle East AAI
No: 67579

BIGOT

ANVIL.

Signed Wilson cite FHQCT.
Weekly planning telegram number 28.

PARA ONE. Future operations.

(A) Preliminary study of possible amphibious operations in FIUME and VENICE areas continues.
(B) Study being made to determine method by which YUGOSLAV Partisans can best assist OVERLORD.

PARA TWO. ADRIATIC. Adv HQ Force 133 has been renamed Force 266. Force 266 remains responsible to Force 133
for OSS/SE operations in YUGOSLAVIA and ALBANIA pending the establishment of HQ Special Operations Mediterranean and to
A.F.H.Q. for military operation in same area.

PARA THREE. Middle East. Chief of Staff and Political Advisor from Middle East recently attended discussions here on
following:

(A) Policy to be adopted with respect to BULGARIA and ROUMANIA.
(B) Methods of reviving GREEK resistance movement.

CM-IN-16192 (23 Mar 44)

DECLASSIFIED
JOS. LETTER, 7-5-72
BY OSS, DATE

MAY 22 1973

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/44
PARA FOUR. Armistice Terms. Ref para four of weekly planning telegram number 27. We are still awaiting US Chiefs of Staff view.

PARA FIVE. Supreme Commander has presented to General De Gaulle the signed agreement approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff governing the employment of French forces under Allied Command.

PARA SIX. ANVIL. Discussion now in progress with French as to command setup for this operation. Supreme Commander briefed General De Gaulle 15 March.

Time of Origin Nil

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: CC/3
Gen Arnold
Adm King
Col Mathewson
CofS

CM-IN-16192 (23 Mar 44) 0256Z bjm

DECLASSIFIED
JCS LETTER, 7-5-72
BY DBR, DATE
MAY 22 1973

COPY No. 2
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Moscow
To: AGWAR
No: 283 6th March 1944

For Joint Chiefs of Staff from Deane.

Following is translation of the protocol signed by Lt Gen F Kuznetsov representing the Soviet Command, Col Bevan representing the British Chiefs of Staff, and myself:

On the ratification of the plan bodyguard (the overall policy of deception in the war against Germany) (See attached memo)

The signatories below representatives of the American, Soviet and British Commands, acting on the authority of their Governments, have subscribed to the authentic protocol as follows:

1. Plan bodyguard submitted by the American High Command and by the British High Command (the overall policy of deception in the war against Germany) is accepted without changes.

2. The accepted and agreed plan bodyguard's to be put into action from the day of its signature.

Drawn up in the city of Moscow in 3 copies, each in the English and Russian languages.

March 1944.

ACTION: JC/3(CAPT. ROYAL, USN)
INFORMATION: GEN. RANDY
GEN. ARNOLD
ADM. KING
COL. MATHESON

CM-IN-4713 (7 Mar 44)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
TO:  BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF
FROM:  APHQ SIGNED WILSON
INFO:  J.S.M. WASHINGTON FOR U.S. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Number:  M0028

It is important for our plans to assist Tito that
certain islands in the Adriatic should be held. Without
these the Navy cannot operate effectively in the lower
Adriatic to insure movement of stores to Tito by sea. Prop-
ose to employ dissident Yugoslav now in Middle East to
hold these islands. I cannot afford to look up British
or American troops for this purpose. Subject to politi-
cal agreement intend also to use Italian troops to garrison
any islands in this area which formed part of Italian
territory.

T.O.O. 051821A

ACTION:  CCS

INFORMATION:  OPD
Gen Bissell
Gen Arnold
Adm King

White House
Log

CM-IN-4199  (6 Feb 44)  1752Z

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 1/18/94
TO: A.F.H.Q. ALGIERS

INFO: J.S.M. WASHINGTON AS A.C.S. (N) 1105

Number COSMED 13, January 29, 1944

Following for General Wilson from Chiefs of Staff.

1. Air attacks on Burgas and Varna may have considerable moral effect and may result in interference with traffic between Turkey and Germany particularly that in chrome ore.

2. On those occasions when air effort is directed against Bulgaria you should consider the advisability of bombing these ports which should be regarded as secondary only to Sofia among objectives in Bulgaria.

3. Such attacks are not to be undertaken at the expense of POINTBLANK or the Battle of Italy.

T.O.O. 2918552

ACTION: COS

INFORMATION: OPD

General Strong
General Arnold
Adm King
White House

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Per SMS 22-71

CM-IN-20248 (30 Jan 44) 16542 mow

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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COPY No. 25
SATURN - Establishment of British forces in Turkey prior to her entry into war.

HARDIHOOD - Placing of RAF squadrons, Anti-tank and armored units in Turkey.
FROM WILSON.

1. HAVE DISCUSSED WITH EAKER AND SLESSOR, WHO HAS CONSULTED PARK, THE IMPLICATIONS OF PRESENT SITUATION IN RESPECT OF SATURN AND HARDNOOD, AND IT IS CLEAR THAT TIME HAS COME WHEN A DECISION ON THIS OPERATION CAN NO LONGER BE DELAYED. WHILE DULY APPRECIATING VALUE OF KEEPING BALL ROLLING IN ACCORDANCE COSMED 2, WE APPEAR NOW TO BE IN SOME DANGER OF LETTING OURSELVES IN FOR A COMMITMENT WHICH IN THE EVENT WE SHALL BE UNABLE TO MEET WITHOUT SERIOUS PREJUDICE TO OTHER MORE IMPORTANT OPERATIONS IN THIS THEATRE.

2. THE FIRST POINT IS THAT EAKER HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO RELEASE DURING FEBRUARY 2 OF HIS MOST EXPERIENCED FIGHTER...
GROUPS - THE EQUIVALENT OF 9 BRITISH SQUADRONS - FOR
DISPATCH TO SOUTH EAST ASIA. FROM DISCUSSION WITH GEN-
ERAL GILES, IT APPEARS THAT THERE IS NO PROSPECT OF U.S.
CHIEFS OF STAFF AGREEING TO (? CANCEL) THIS COMMITMENT.
WHILE IT WOULD NO DOUBT BE POSSIBLE TO MAKE CERTAIN MINOR
SAVINGS IN COASTAL AIR FORCE, IT WOULD BE QUITE IMPOSSIBLE
TO REPLACE IN TOTO THESE FIGHTER GROUPS IN ITALY OR ANY
WITHOUT DRAWING ON FIGHTER SQUADRONS FROM MIDDLE EAST NOW
EARMARKED FOR HARDIHOOD.

3. SECONDLY, UNDER PLAN 437 IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT 7
FIGHTER SQUADRONS BE OPERATIONAL IN TURKEY WITHIN 48 HOURS
OF ZERO AND THIS CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED BY THE USE OF 2
GROUPS OF TROOP CARRIER AIRCRAFT. OF THE 7 GROUPS IN THE
THEATRE 4 ARE TO RETURN TO U.K. THE REMAINING 3 GROUPS

| PAGE 2 OF 8 | MEDDG 8 | JAN 22, 1944 | NCR 16186-S |
WILL BE REQUIRED TO BE AVAILABLE AT LEAST 2 MONTH AND PREFERABLY 6 WEEKS BEFORE D DAY ANVIL TO TRAIN AND MOVE TO THEIR ANVIL STATIONS. ASSUMING D DAY ANVIL TO BE ABOUT Y MINUS 24 DAYS THESE TROOP CARRIER AIRCRAFT MUST BE RELEASED NOT LATER THAN Y MINUS 31 DAYS WHICH WOULD PUT LATEST DATE FOR D DAY HARDIHOOD Y MINUS 76 DAYS. AFTER THAT DATE WE COULD NOT MEET THE COMMITMENT WE HAVE MADE WITH THE TURKS TO AFFORD FIGHTER PROTECTION IMMEDIATELY THEY ENTER THE WAR.

4. IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE MANY FACTORS THERE ARE OTHER POINTS WHICH MUST BE CONSIDERED. THESE ARE:
(A) PLAN 437 REQUIRES BY PRELIMINARY BOMBING THE REDUCTION OF THE EXISTING GERMAN ABILITY TO OPERATE
MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

F C KER Extension Number

ADDRESSES

PRECEDENCE

FROM

RELEASED BY

DATE

TOR CODE ROOM

DECODED BY

PARAPHRASED BY

ROUTED BY

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:

DATE

TIME

OCT

MESSAGE

BOMBERS OVER TURKEY. THIS REQUIREMENT IS LIABLE TO DISTRACT FROM THE BOMBING EFFORT AVAILABLE FOR OVERLORD, ANVIL AND POINTBLANK.

(B) THE NEED TO KEEP SQUADRONS AND OTHER AIR FORCE UNITS COMMITTED TO HARDIHOOD IS UNECONOMICAL AS THESE UNITS CANNOT BE USED IN CURRENT OPERATIONS NOR CONSIDERED FOR EMPLOYMENT IN FORTHCOMING OPERATIONS.

(C) LESSOR HAS JUST BEEN INSTRUCTED TO RETURN 14,000 R.A.F. PERSONNEL TO U.K. BY FIRST MARCH FOR OVERLORD. IT IS OBVIOUSLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO DECIDE HOW TO ALLOCATE THESE REDUCTIONS WITH THE LEAST PREJUDICE TO OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY IN FACE OF THE
INDEFINITE COMMITMENT PRESENTED BY HARDIHOOD IN ITS PRESENT UNSETTLED CONDITION.

5. YOU ARE OBVIOUSLY IN A BETTER POSITION THAN I AM TO ASSESS THE WIDEN POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS THAT WOULD FOLLOW IF WE ABANDONED THE ATTEMPT TO BRING TURKEY INTO THE WAR. BUT I AM BOUND TO ADVISE YOU FROM A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW THAT THERE IS NOT ENOUGH CLOTH FOR ALL THESE DIFFERENT COATS - ANVIL, THE ITALIAN FRONT, THE PROTECTION OF SHIPPING AND HARDIHOOD, AND THAT IN MY VIEW WE MUST MAKE OUR MINDS TO CONCENTRATE OUR AVAILABLE RESOURCES ON ENSURING THE SUCCESS OF THE FIRST THREE EVEN IF IT MEANS ABANDONING THE FOURTH, WHICH, IN MY VIEW, IS NOT AFFECTING GERMAN STRATEGY.
6. FURTHER, EVEN IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO REPLACE FROM ELSEWHERE THE TWO GROUPS EARMARKED FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND, IT IS STILL ESSENTIAL TO OBTAIN AN EARLY DECISION FROM THE TURKS IF WE ARE TO STAGE OPERATION HARDIHOOD ON THE BASIS OF PLAN 437 WITHOUT AFFECTING EITHER ANVIL OR OVERLORD. IN THIS APPARENTLY IMPROBABLE EVENT I RECOMMEND:

(A) THAT OUR REPRESENTATIVES IN ANKARA BE INSTRUCTED TO BRING NEGOTIATIONS TO A HEAD AND IF POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN A CLEAR DECISION ONE WAY OR ANOTHER BY FEBRUARY 1ST. THIS IS THE LATEST DATE ON WHICH INFILTRATION AND PREPARATIONS BY TURKS MUST BEGIN ON FULLY ADEQUATE SCALE IF HARDIHOOD IS TO BE LAUNCHED BY MARCH 15TH.
(B) That if no definite favorable decision can be obtained by February 1st, Plan 437 be abandoned. It will then be for your consideration as to how necessary cover can be maintained to keep Germans guessing and preserve semblance of threat. It would have to be made clear, after February 1st, that basis of plan on our side has changed and that we can only afford a reduced scale of assistance and that not so immediately; but it should also be emphasized that the degree of reduction in the scale and tempo of our assistance will depend largely on the extent to which the Turks will co-operate.

(c) That a further plan be prepared on a very reduced scale making use of resources that can be spared.
WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO OVERLORD, ANVIL OR ITALIAN FRONT IN EVENT OF TURKS GIVING WAY TO PRESSURE AFTER FEBRUARY 1ST.

7. THIS TELEGRAM WAS DRAFTED BEFORE RECEIPT OF COPY OF 576 ADDRESSED BY LINNELL TO LONDON. THIS MESSAGE CONFIRMS (?) ALL VIEWS I HAVE EXPRESSED ABOVE.

TIME OF ORIGIN 221355Z

CM-IN-17938 (27 JAN 44) 1418Z
With the AVALANCHE landing now apparently secure against any major counter-attack that could seriously threaten us, it appears to me important that one major lesson should never be lost light of in future planning. Personal from the Commander In Chief to AGWAR for the Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFOR for the British Chiefs of Staff from Fairfield Rear. Repeated to Freedom. This is WAP number 376. BIGOT AVALANCHE. This lesson is that during the critical stages of a landing operation every item of available force including land, sea, and air, must be wholly concentrated in the support of the landing until troops are in position to take care of themselves. This most emphatically includes the so-called Strategic Air Force.

In early September, as the date for the launching of AVALANCHE approached, our intelligence showed an increasing deterioration of our chances for success, due to the concentration of hostile forces around the Salerno area. Calculations so clearly showed the ability of the enemy to bring against us, through succeeding days, forces superior to any our buildup could possibly develop, that serious questions were raised here in responsible quarters as to the wisdom of making the attack. Aside from the great advantage to be gained through a successful landing, the single element that justified adherence to the plan was the knowledge that we had complete Command of the sea with ability to support our forces with heavy Naval gunfire and Command of the air with ability to pour the full power of our complete Air Force on the enemy that was seeking to destroy our landing troops. During those critical days even our night bombing force contributed markedly to the effort of sustaining ourselves on the beaches and it is my
conviction that without this concentrated use of our Naval and Air strength we could scarcely have hoped to prevent the enemy from driving our forces back into the sea. Those enemy forces were not only strong but were experienced and had sizeable formations of armor. More than this, they had every advantage of terrain because our landing beaches were surrounded by a high range of hills, all of which were in possession of the enemy. All this was clear to us in advance of the assault.

I earnestly believe that even given the Ground Forces necessary to break through the crust of defenses at a beach line, there will normally ensue a critical period, during which their ability to sustain themselves will depend upon overwhelming Air and Naval strength to cover them while the Ground Forces themselves are built up to satisfactory levels.

To accomplish the necessary concentration of all available Naval and Air Forces, some of these units will have to be temporarily diverted from normal missions. This period will be short and the resultant advantages both to the progress of the war as a whole and to each of the several services will more than compensate for the diversion.

These views, which have been constantly supported by all my Commanders in Chief, are submitted for such use as the CCS may care to make of them.

ACTION: CC/S
INFORMATION: OPD
Gen. Strong
Gen. Arnold
SGS
Adm. King
Log.

CM-IN-15558 (21 Sep 43) 17392 bjn
COMMANDING GENERAL
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
USFOR LONDON ENGLAND

Number F. 9242

At a meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff this date, it was agreed that periodic analyses should be made of the effects of the Combined Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom. For Commanding General European Theater of Operations, USFOR London, from The Joint Chiefs of Staff. The British Air Ministry will be asked to initiate these analyses in cooperation with General Eaker.

No Sig

ORIGINATOR: JCS
INFORMATION: OPD

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHF, NLR, Date MAY 21 1974

CM-OUT-1975 (5 June 43) 0242Z as

COPY No. 11

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94
SECRET
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SECURITY CONTROL
Operations Division War Dept
General Staff Combined Subjects
Section WDOPD, WDGS
LJL OPD 370.5 Sec (5-24-43)

May 23, 1943

COMMANING GENERAL
US FORCES IN EUROPEAN THEATRE OF OPERATIONS
UKFCH, LONDON, ENGLAND

Number E-8870

In their 95th meeting the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed that the necessary service troops for the build up of the Boloce Forcics will be given priority in mailings as necessary to service the build up of the combat troops, without prejudice (Marshall to Devers) to Sitek. This information is forwarded for appropriate action.

ORIGINATOR: OPD
INFORMATION: GENERAL ARNOLD
ADMIRAL KING

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 1, 1972
By DBS Date MAY 22 1773

CM-OUT-10997 (26 May 43) 1336Z med

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
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Operations Division
W.D.G.S. OPD 381 Sec(5-19-43)
Combined Subjects Section 5 & P Group
WDOPD LNL

SECURITY CONTROL
May 20, 1943

COMMANDING GENERAL
US FORCES IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
US FOR LONDON ENGLAND

Number R-8716

On the 18th of May 1943 the Combined Chiefs of Staff
approved of General Eaker's plan for a combined bomber
offensive from the United Kingdom. (Marshall to Devers)
and a copy of CCS 217 which describes this plan follows by air
mail.

ORIGI NATOR: OPD

INFORMATION: CC/S
ADM KING
GEN ARNOLD

CM-OUT-9216 (21 May 43) 22112 Flw

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD Letter, May 1, 1972
By DBS Date MAY 22 1973

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

COPY No.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/74
**NAVAL MESSAGE**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>DRAFTER</th>
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<td>RRRR</td>
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<td></td>
<td>ALUSNA LIMA</td>
<td>DEFERRED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>14 MAY 43</td>
<td>(PASSED BY RDO BALBOA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOR CODEROOM</td>
<td>6543</td>
<td>COM 15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DECODED BY</td>
<td>STRONG/SHOAF</td>
<td>ALUSNA LIMA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CONCEPALFOR</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>ALUSLO'S AFOSTA</td>
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<td>CHANARAL, IQUIQUE, Tocop.</td>
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**BUDEL** 132140

**NOR 5791**

**ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME**

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**TEXT**

(ACtioN CHO INFO COM 15, ALUSNA LIMA, CONCEPALFOR ALUSLO'S AFOSTA, CHANARAL, IQUIQUE, Tocop, COM 15 PASS TO ALL EXCEPT ALUSLO. LATTER HAVE.)

ANOTHER REPORT TO MILITARY ATTACHE FROM GERMAN SOURCE SAYS JAPS PLAN AN AERO NAVAL OFFENSIVE IN PACIFIC INCLUDING ATTACKS ARICA, IQUIQUE, ANTOFAGASTA IN CONJUNCTION WITH LOCAL SABOTEURS. EXPECTED MAY 23-22 PERHAPS LATER. ALUSNA CLASSIFIES B-4. BRITISH HAVE SAME REPORT FROM OTHER SOURCE. STILL NO MENTION OF TALARA.

16.,.,.,.,.,ACT

COMINCH...10/11...200A...NAVAIDE...230P...17... FILE...

CONFIDENTIAL
Plan for combined bomber offensive from UK presented to Joint Chiefs of Staff on April 29 has been approved to maximum extent practicable (for CG European Theater of Operations from Joint Chief of Staff) consistent with meeting aircraft production objectives, and with availability of shipping.

No Sig

ORIGINATOR: GEN DEANE (JCS)
INFORMATION: OGD
ADM KINO
LOG

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12156, Sec. 3(D) or 3(E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By DBS

CW-OUT-757
(5 May 43)
0036Z
sb

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/44
NAVY DEPARTMENT.

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<tr>
<th>NAVAL MESSAGE</th>
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<tr>
<td>DRAFTER</td>
<td>EXTENSION NUMBER</td>
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<tr>
<td>FROM ALUSNA SANTIAGO, CHILE</td>
<td>OPNAV</td>
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<tr>
<td>RELEASED BY</td>
<td>27 APR 43</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOR CODE ROOM</td>
<td>1055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DECODED BY REINER/LINGENMEYER</td>
<td>TAYLOR</td>
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<tr>
<td>PARAPHRASED BY TAYLOR</td>
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INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

ROONEY 262350 NCR 4547

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GET

ACTION

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(ONNAV ACTION COM 15 ALUSNA LIMA COMSOPACFOR INFO. LATTER HAS BY SAFE HAND, FROM ALUSNA STCO)

MORE INFO TO MIL ATTACH FROM SAME SOURCE REF MY DIS 231959 INDICATES JAPAN ATTACKING 4 PLACES IN MAY.

1 SAN DIEGO
2 CANAL
3 ALASKA
4 AUSTRALIA

JAPS REPORTED LOADING SUB OF LARGEST TYPES TO GERMANS. ABOVE ATTACKS TO BE AIDED BY GERMAN ITALIAN SUCIDE AIR SQUADRONS ATTACKING EAST COAST.

RELIABILITY C-3. STILL NO MENTION OF TALARA.

16...ACT
1/1/1...C...NAVATL...COMINCH...2OP...FILE...

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/94

N2350 Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
(ACTION OPNAV, INFO COM 15, ALUSNAS LIMA AND BOGOTA. CONSEAPACFOR HAS BY BAND. ALL HAVE)

MILITARY ATTACHE SUPPLIES UNCONFIRMED RUMORS AS DOES BRITISH INTELLIGENCE PREDICTING JAP ATTACKS FIRSTLY SAN DIEGO, CALIF. AREA, SECOND COLOMBIAN COAST, THIRD BOLIVIAN TIN MINES, LASTLY CHILE DURING MAY. DESIGNED DIVERT OUR FORCES AND WEAKEN MORALE. ONE SOURCE STATED TO BE JAP NAVAL ATTACHE SANTIAGO. OWN INFO INCLUDES CANAL WITH ABOVE. EVALUATION C-3. NO MENTION OF TALARA.

CONFIDENTIAL

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/44
INTERCEPTED RADIO MESSAGE ENCODED IN ENGLISH DATED 5 OCTOBER 1942 PARTELY GARbled TEXT IN SUBSTANCE;
ATTACK IS PLANNED MARCH OR APRIL ON US BASES SANTA ELENA POINT AND GALAPAGOS. NO OTHER DETAILS.

ACTION: 16.....
COMINCH...16/11...20G....17....NAVAID....
200P....FILE.
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: USAFFE London England
To: AGWAR

Fom 290 N, August 23, 1942

Final report of thirty first Fighter Group August nineteenth in Dieppe operation. For Arnold. Our losses one killed, one wounded, five missing. Group credited with one FW one ninety destroyed, three FW and ninety probable, one FW one ninety damaged and one DO two seventeen damaged.

Spaatz

Action Copy: CG AAF
Info. Copies: OPD

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11492, Sec. 3(D) and 8(D) or (R)
GSA order, May 1, 1972

CH-IN-8751 (8/23/42) 1925Z

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
Fifty of our rangers participated in large raid today. For Operations Division few details as yet except that fighting was very heavy. Big air fight was brought on, in which our Fighter Squadrons have been participating. All details will be submitted when available.

Eisenhower
CONFIDENTIAL
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

July 18, 1942

PARAPHRASE

Telegram no. 1041

Dated: 7-16-42 6 p.m.

From: Vichy

Rec'd: 7-16-42 6:07 p.m.

For Military Intelligence Service:

As reported by military sources considered reliable, there are indications that the Germans in occupied territory are greatly concerned over a probable British-American landing on the continent. Recently there was a false alert at St. Nazaire and defences were completely manned. Divisions, for example the Tenth Armored Division, which were due to move from France, have discontinued their departure preparations. Movement to the interior, it is further reported, of a large part of the ammunition stocks in the coastal districts has taken place.

TUCK

Action Copy: G-2 WE

Info. Copies: OPD
A-2
CG AAF
TAG
LOG
FILE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 7(2) and 6(D) or (B)
OIB letter, May 1, 1972
By DBS
Data MAY 22 1973

CM-IN-6177 (7/18/43) 1014X

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
SECRET

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Tanger
To: Hill
No. 161 May 14, 1943

Atmosphere throughout Southern Morocco especially
Agadir 1 of immediate expectations of American landing
partially caused by greatly exaggerated reports of American
naval units near Gibraltar and rumors of sighting units off
of Southern Morocco Coast. In recent French maneuvers
100 marines debarked and captured defending Staff and
Commander in 1st hour. Only 4 guns 155 millimeters defending
harbor and excellently undefended beaches north and
south town for many kilometers utilized by invading Marines.
Some officers expressed hope of immediate American landing
and expressed sorrow that they would have to make a
defense of honor. 13 Douglas Bombers at lightly defended
very isolated airports which is capable fortress operations
and which could be easily taken by parachutists.

Bentley

Action Copy: G-2
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Info. Copies: OPD
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FILE

CM-IN-4145 (5/15/42) 4:12 PM

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
From: Tanger
To: MILID
No. 163 May 14, 1942

Informed by N transatlantic "German studying plans of combating American landing IFA: French resisting Germans will send large air force and Vedettesmukla from Atlantic ports to attack convoy which they estimate will total several hundred ships IFA: French do not resist Germans will send in Spanish troops and take over later themselves beginning with part armored divisions reputed to be camouflaged in Spain with personnel now in conventional clothes utilizing in part German merchant ships now in Spanish ports Germans plan threatening they will rape all principal French African cities by Stukas and state Vedettes and air force will annihilate convoy.

Option not yet presented French staff and German pondering best method persuading French staff to accept their help in resisting.

Bentley

Action Copy: G-2 WE

Info. Copies: OPD
A-2
CG AAF
TAG
File

CM-IN-4095 (5/15/42) PM 2:07

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 10-1-944

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
SHALLOW WATER, LOW, SANDY BEACHES AND SWAMPY RIVER DELTAS WOULD MAKE LANDINGS DIFFICULT HERE

COUNTRY WELL SUITED FOR ALLIED ATTACKS UNDER COVER OF RAF, BUT HEAVILY GUARDED BY NAZIS

STEEP CLIFFS AND FEW BEACHES; DISTANCE FROM IMPORTANT AREAS LESSENS LIKELIHOOD OF INVASION HERE