Folder 4
Box 104
Map Room

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
BYRT, NARA, Date 12/31/2014

1943-1944

ME 310, --- INVASION AND OFFENSIVES, PLANS, LANDING OF TROOPS (PACIFIC)

1943-1944

1943-1944
Dispatch

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP
(Use G. C. 1)

(USS PASATCH PASSED ACTION COMINCH ALL TFG'S 7TH FLEET ALL TCG'S 7TH FLEET CINCPAC UNDER SAME DATE TIME GROUP)

(ACTION COMMANDING GENERAL 6TH US ARMY COMMANDING GENERAL 6TH US ARMY COMMANDER ALLIED NAVAL FORCES (PASATCH) COMMANDER ALLIED AIR FORCES (ADV ECH) FROM HQ SSPPA SIGNED MACARTHUR CITE (OX 54133))

OPERATION OF 11TH AIRBORNE DIVISION DIRECTED IN 01 73 ARE SUSPENDED UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS BY 01 73/15 BEING ISSUED THIS DATE. PRIORITY IN ENGINEER CONSTRUCTION EFFORT WILL BE DIRECTED TOWARDS THE COMPLETION OF AIRFIELD AND INSTALLATIONS FOR THE DIRECT SUPPORT OF THE L3 AND M1 OPERATIONS.

#GARbled CALL-PRESUMED TO BE PASATCH.

COMINCH: COPIES 1 TO 8 INCLUSIVE.

ACTION: F-1

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/44
### OP-SECRET DISPATCH

**Drafters**: COMAIR SEVENTHFLT

**Addr. From**: COMAIR SEVENTHFLT

**Addr. To**: COMAIRPAC ADMIN, COMAIR SEVENTHFLT LOGISTICS, COMAIR SEVENTHFLT, CINCPOA

**Precedence**: DEFERRED, DEFERRED, BASEGRAM

**Date**: 2 Dec 1944

**TOR CODES**: 0853

**Decoded By**: PETERSON

**Routed By**: WHITTINGTON

**Decrch By**: WHITTINGTON

**Checked By**: WHITTINGTON

**FOR ACTION**: COMAIRPAC ADMIN INFO COMAIR SEVENTHFLT LOGISTICS CON/SEVENTHFLT AND CINCPOA.

**PROJECTED EMPLOYMENT ACORNS NOW ASSIGNED FOLLOW IN THIS ORDER.**

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<th>Approximate Arrival Date Desired</th>
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<td>Obstructive</td>
<td>1 Feb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Steamroller</td>
<td>20 Feb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Accumulation</td>
<td>15 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>5 Dec</td>
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<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Oxygen</td>
<td>15 Feb</td>
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**ADDITIONAL ACORNS REQUIRED FOLLOW IN SAME ORDER AS ABOVE.**

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<td>Oxygen</td>
<td>15 Feb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Landplane</td>
<td>Steamroller</td>
<td>20 Feb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Landplane and Seaplane</td>
<td>Unceasing</td>
<td>15 March</td>
</tr>
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</table>
WILL REQUIRE 2 CASUS (F) AT STEAMROLLER.

COMPOSITION OF ADDITIONAL ACORNS WILL BE SUBMITTED
BY MY LOGISTICS SECTION.

REC'D SECRET - RECLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO CONTENT.

NCR ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:
30(#1).....COG
COMINCH(#2-#9).....CPO5G(#10)....12(#11).....CPO3(#12).....

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94
CINCWSNA

RELEASED BY
30 NOVEMBER 1964

TOR CODECORDER
2107

DECODED BY
SCHMICK

PARAPHRASED BY
HOFNER

ROUTED BY
SCHMICK

FROM CINCSPWA

DATE 30 NOVEMBER 1964

URGENT

SCHMICK

INFO CINCPOA COM 3RD FLEET
INFO COM 7TH FLEET (TOP SECRET)

CINCPOA 292349 AND COM 3RD FLEET 290400 ARE REFERENCES.

DATED JANUARY 9, Coordination with 3rd Fleet will be effected
by later dispatch.

COMINCH: COPIES 1 TO 8

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/75
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: Commander in Chief, Advance Echelon, SWPA, Leyte, Philippines

To: War Department
Radio, Lualualei, Oahu, T H
Radio, Hollandia, New Guinea
General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Hollandia, New Guinea

No: CA 54167 30 November 1944

From GHQ SWPA sgd MacArthur to CINCPOA, COMUSAAF
Washington, Com Allied Land Forces Hollandia, CG Eighth Army, Com 7th Amphibious Force, Com 7th Fleet please pass, Com Allied Naval Forces Hollandia and WASATCH, OG USAFFE, Rear Echelon USASOS APO 501, Coordinator Finschhafen, Coordinator Blak, Detachment GHQ Hollandia, Com 3rd Fleet Com 7th Fleet please pass, Com South Pacific Area, CG Sixth Army, CG XIV Corps, Com Allied Air Forces, Com Naval Force NORSOLS Com SOPAC please pass, OG USASOS APO 707, Intermediate Section USASOS, Coordinator Milne Bay, Coordinator Hollandia cite CA 54167. TOP SECRET

U Day, operations instructions 74 this headquarters, is 15th December 1944.

S Day, operations instructions 73 this headquarters, is 9th January 1945.

ACTION: Gen Hull

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold, Gen Bissell, Adm King, CTF
CM-IN-29666 (30 Nov 44) 19562 bjm

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date
From: General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Leyte, Philippines

To: War Department

Nr: C 54164 30 November 1944

DELETED. From GHQ SWPA sgd MacArthur to Chief of Staff War Department cite C 54164.

Due to exceptional weather which has delayed development of airfields and pursuant to recommendations Kinkaid Halsey and Nimitz I have postponed L3 to December 15 and Ml operations to January 9th.

End

Note: Corrected copy of CM-IN-306 (1 Dec 44) Gen Hull

ACTION: Gen Hull

INFO: Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
Gen Bissell
Adm King
C of S

CM-IN-7981 (8 Dec 44) 15172 pa

R.O. 116/1, Mem (E) and (F) or (G)
Comm Order, May 1, 1972
By SLR Date: 1-2-74

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
DISPATCH

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RELEASED BY: [Signature]

DATE: 20 NOVEMBER 1944

TOR CODE: 429

DECODED BY: SJOSTEN

PARAPHRASED BY: SJOSTEN CHECKED DOTTED

FOR ACTION: COMINC

INFORMATION: R.O. 11665, Rev. 3 (TD) and NCM 10009

OIS dated, May 1, 1972

PAGE 1 OF 2

205324

RCL 7772

TOP SECRET

(CINCPAC SENDS ACTION COM 3RD FLEET AND INFO COMINC, NIMITZ TO HALSEY, INFO KING.)

YOU 260700 REACHED ME ON MY RETURN TO PEARL. THE DIFFICULTY IN MEETING FLEET MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS IS DUE IN PART TO ADHERENCE TO TARGET DATES WHICH DO NOT TAKE FLEET REQUIREMENTS SUFFICIENTLY INTO ACCOUNT. IT WAS FOR THAT REASON THAT MY 210835 DESIZED THAT NO COMMITMENT BE MADE IN CONNECTION WITH THE WINDORO OPERA-

TION. HOWEVER, YOUR 244443 (YOUR CP ORDER 24-44) CONSTITUTED A DEFINITE COMMITMENT FURTHER SUBSTANTIATED BY THE CONFERENCES REPORTED BY MACARTHUR CXC 54038.

2. THERE APPEARS NO SEEMING ALTERNATIVE EXCEPT TO CARRY ON UNDER THE TERMS OF MY 254715 AND REEXAMINE THE OVERALL SITUATION AFTER L-3. IF THE FLEET IS NOT THEN ABLE TO MEET THE COMMITMENTS.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
TOP SECRET

DISPATCH

FROM: CINC PAC
RELEASED BY:
DATE:
TOR CODE:

DECODED BY:
PARAPHRASED BY:
ROUTED BY:

ADDRESSEES:
ASTERISK (*) HAILGRAM ADDRESSEE:

PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED
BASEGRAM

PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED
BASEGRAM

IF OPERATIONAL
CHECK BELOW

PAGE 2 OF 2
291324
NCR 7372

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP
(Use O.C.T.)

WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE FOR THE M-1 OPERATION (PURSUANT TO THE
DIRECTIVE FROM THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO PROVIDE COVER AND
SUPPORT FOR THAT OPERATION) IT MAY BECOME NECESSARY TO REQUEST
A DELAY IN THAT OPERATION. HOWEVER SUCH A DELAY MAY MEANWHILE
BECOME NECESSARY FOR OTHER REASONS WHICH WILL EASE THE SITUATION
FOR THE FLEET.

CO:MANCE: COPIES 1 AND 2. PLUS 3 - 15

DECLASSIFIED

B. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
OIC Navy, Jan 1974

By SLR Date: JAN 1 1974

No. 1 ADMIRAL
No. 2 FILE
No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM
No. 5 SPECIAL

T

PAGES 20-70
DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/44

COPY NO.
291324
TOP SECRET

The enemy is making a decisive stand in the Philippines. Operation L-3 involves a penetration to Ubique on 5 December.

We do not yet have complete control of the air and sea in the Philippine archipelago. In view of this situation by plans provide strong surface ship and carrier protection to our assault echelon during its movement through the Mindanao and Sulu seas, however.

I have some concern for the safety of follow up shipping after the withdrawal from those waters of my battleship cruiser and escort carrier forces, a withdrawal necessitated by their need for replenishment prior to operation H-1 29 December. In order to alleviate the threat of attack from the southwest against my lightly protected loc from Leyte to Ubique I feel it would be host

Helpful if you could undertake strong diversion within a day or two after my landing on 5 December and to repeat shortly after landing.

ACTION: F-1

[Address and Code Information]

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 6/8/94
ON DECEMBER 29, I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS ON THE PROBABILITY OF YOUR CONTAINING FOR A LIMITED TIME ENEMY AIR AND NAVAL FORCES IN THE SINGAPORE AREA WERE YOU TO STRIKE THE MALAY PENINSULA OR OTHER STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE WITHIN YOUR REACH.

MACARTHUR

COMINCH COPIES 1 THROUGH 6.
**TOP SECRET**

**DISPATCH**

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<td>CG ALASKAN DEPT COMMOPAC C</td>
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**FROM**

CINCPAC

**RELEASED BY**

CINCPAC

**DATE**

NOV 29 1944

**TO CODE**

29-634

**DECODED BY**

WOODWARD

**PARAPHRASED BY**

MONTGOMERY

**ROUTE BY**

MONTGOMERY

**INFORMATION**

CG ALASKAN DEPT COMMOPAC

CNO COMM 3RD FLT CINCSOESPAC

DECLASIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/8/44

**ACTION**

F-2

**ORIGINATOR**

(Use G. C. T.)

**IN OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT**

CINCPAC SENDS ACTION TO COMRAK ALASKAN DEPT AND COMMOPAC INFO TO CINCSOESPAC (ADV) CNO AND COM AND COMAND THIRD FLEET X

IN CONNECTION BANDING AND AS COVER FOR OPERATION K-1 AM

INITIATING RADIO TRAFFIC BUILDUP TO ALEUTIANS AREA SIMILAR

PLAN HUSBAND TO PEAK DECEMBER 13 WITH VOLUME ABOUT 85% OF REDLOCK. TARGET DATE DECEMBER 29. MAJOR COMMANDERS DAILY NOT INVOLVED TO BROADEN LATER. REQUEST ACTION ADDRESSES FOLLOW MY PATTERN MAINTAINING LOW VOLUME WHERE FLEET BROADCASTS INVOLVED

**INSTRUCTIONS**

E. O. 11627, Sec. 2(f) and (k) or (x)

OLD 1974

By SLR

**DATE**

JAN 1 1974
FROM CINCPOA ACTION COMMOPAC INFO COMIN WPDEFENSE COMMAND CINCPAC. RDO SANFRAN PASS INFO COMIN WPDEFENSE COMMAND. TO DATE, LIMIT TO FLETCHER INFO EUPAC.

DESIRED 2 DAY CONFERENCE AT PEARL HARBOR DURING WEEK 3-9 DECEMBER CONNECTION PLANS AND OPERATIONS NORTH PACIFIC.

DESIRED PRESENCE OF PLANS OFFICERS IN ADDITION TO VICE ADMIRAL FLETCHER AND LIEUTENANT GENERAL EUPAC. ADVISE ARRIVAL DATE.

THIS ANSWERS COMIN WDC-AEX 1198 NOT HELD OR NEEDED BY COMMOPAC.

COMINCH: COPIES #1 TO #8 INCLUSIVE.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
BY RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
SECRET DISPATCH

DRAfter: CTF 38

Recipient: COMAIRPAC

DATE: 28 November 1944

TOR CODE: 281803

RECEIVED: ELY

CHECKED: GERMAN

CODED BY: WHITTINGTON WHITTINGTON

Page 1 of 3

280800 NCR 6508

Originator fills in DATE AND TIME GROUP

By SLR

Date: 16/1/1974

(Use O.C.T.)

(CTF 38 SENDS ACTION COMAIRPAC AND INFO COM 3RD FLEET, COMINCH, COM 5TH FLEET, CINCPAC AND CNO(AIR))

SECRET

ENEMY SUICIDE ATTACK 25 NOVEMBER ON TASK GROUP 38.2 AND TASK GROUP 38.3 SHOWED COORDINATED SIMULTANEOUS APPROACH

BY SEVERAL 4 TO 8 PLANE GROUPS. APPROACH BEARINGS INDICATE PROBABILITY DIFFERENT TAKE OFF POINTS. RADAR DETECTION AT AVERAGE 40 MILES. ALL GROUPS SEEN BY RADAR WERE INTERCEPTED, AVERAGE 20 MILES. PROBABILITY THAT SOME APPROACHED TOO LOW FOR DETECTION BY PRESENT RADAR EQUIPMENT IN TIME TO INTERCEPT TOTAL OF 21 SHOT DOWN BY INTERCEPTOR FIGHTERS, HOWEVER, IMMEDIATE DISPERSAL AND EVASIVE TACTICS WHEN TALLYHOED PREVENTED 100 PER CENT KILL. THIS RESULTED IN SINGLES COMING THROUGH TO SUICIDE DIVE ON CARRIER DECKS. AA SHOT DOWN 10. THREE EVIDENTLY NOT HIT BEFORE DIVE INTO DECK. HANCOCK AA

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
**DISINTEGRATED PLANE LESS THAN 2000 FEET ABOVE DECK, FUSELAGE AND WING FALLING ON DECK, BOMB AND ENGINE A NEAR MISS ON PORT SIDE. 2 PLANES WHICH DIVED ON INTREPID CAME IN LOW AT LESS THAN 50 FEET THROUGH SCREEN. 2 ATTACKERS ON CABOT CAME IN AT SAME ALTITUDE, 1 HIT BY CABOT AA A NEAR MISS, OTHER DIVING INTO DECK. SINGLE PLANE ATTACKING ESSEX HIT BY AA CRASHED IN CATWALKS AND GUN SPONSORS PORT SIDE, AA NOT AS EFFECTIVE AS IT SHOULD BE, ESPECIALLY FROM SUPPORTING UNITS. ANALYSIS OF PREVIOUS ATTACKS FOLLOWED BY TASK FORCE INTERCEPTION PROBLEMS, DESIGNED TO DUPLICATE ENEMY TACTICS, RESULTED IN IMPROVED COORDINATED INTERCEPTION AND DEFENSE TECHNIQUES. FURTHER STUDY AND LARGE SCALE EXERCISES BY TASK FORCE BEING CONTINUED AS TIME ALLOWS. EXPERIENCE WITH ADVANCED RADAR PICKETS COVERED BY CAP INDICATES IMMEDIATE NEED FOR AT LEAST**

---

**TOP SECRET**

---

**DECLASSIFIED**

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/84
5 CL (PREFERABLY CLAA) EQUIPPED WITH SP RADAR SO THAT INTERCEPTIONS MAY BE MADE AT GREATER RANGE FROM Force.

GREATLY INCREASED NUMBER OF VF NEEDED TO INSURE 100 PERCENT KILL ON INTERCEPTIONS AND STILL SATISFY REQUIREMENTS OF VF SWEEP, STRIKES AND CONTINUOUS TARGET CAP. THE LATTER NOW APPEARS A NECESSITY TO KEEP ENEMY ATTACK UNITS GROUNDED. FIGHTER PERFORMANCE MUST BE IMPROVED TO INSURE CATCHING NANDINS WHO NOW OUTRUN INTERCEPTING FIGHTERS. LOW COVERAGE RADARS MUST BE DEVELOPED AND PRESENT EQUIPMENT IMPROVED.

NCR ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:

COMINCH(#1 THRU #8)......COG

OPO3(#9)...... NO FURTHER DISTRIBUTION UNTIL AUTHORIZED BY COMINCH.
CINCPOA SENDS TOP SECRET ACTION COMINCH INFO COMNAVFORCHINA FOR LEAVY DEPPOO 28TH AIR FORCE.

REF ARNOLD 281723 WHICH IS WARX 88829. FIVESOME AGREEMENT.

I CONCUR IN THE SELECTION OF OBJECTIVES AND TARGET DATES FOR THE SUPPORTING OPERATIONS OF THE 28TH BOMBER COMMAND.

COMINCH COPIES 1 THROUGH 8.

FILE: JAN 1 F 1974

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94
**Deadline**

**PRECEDENCE**

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**Originator Fill in Date and Time Group**

**TOP SECRET**

**PURSUANT OUR CONVERSATION THIS DATE FOLLOWING REPRESENTS MY VIEWS RELATIVE TO TROOP REQUIREMENT ICEBERG. I FEEL THAT BASED ON CURRENT INFORMATION PHASE ONE OF THE OPERATION CAN BE SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED WITH THE TROOPS SET FORTH IN CINCPAOAS JOINT STAFF STUDY. SUCCESS CAN BE MORE QUICKLY ATTAINED WITH LESS LOSS OF LIFE AND EQUIPMENT IF A FORCE MORE NEARLY APPROACHING THAT INCLUDED IN MY NOVEMBER 9 LETTER IS PROVIDED BUT THE OPERATION NEED NOT BE DEFERRED PENDING THE AVAILABILITY OF THE LATTER FIGURE.**

**ACtion**: F-1

**No. 1 Admiral**

**No. 2 File**

**No. 3F-1 or Chartroom**

**No. 4 Special**

**DECLASSIFIED**

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 1944.11.28
**UNIT DISPATCH**

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unless otherwise indicated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence and at administrative priority.

251615  NCR 3764

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G.C.T.)

GSEF SACSEA (BRITISH) REPEATED CINCPAC (ADM) COMINCH FROM CINCPAC.

R.O. 11682, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4, Official, May 5, 1972

By SLR  Date JAN 5 1974

NIMITZ TO FRASER. I WILL BE DELIGHTED TO HAVE YOU AS MY GUEST AT PEARL HARBOR IN MID DECEMBER OR WHENEVER YOU ARE ABLE TO COME. CONCERNING OPERATIONS IN THE EXISTING STRATEGICAL SITUATION I CONCUR STRONGLY IN YOUR IDEA THAT IF OPERATIONS OF YOUR FORCE AGAINST SUMATRA OBJECTIVES THIS WINTER IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN YOUR EARLY ARRIVAL IN PACIFIC. AM NOT IN CONFERENCE WITH COMINCH WHO FULLY SUPPORTS ABOVE VIEWS AND WISHES TO MENTION PROSPECTIVE OPERATIONS TO MALAY PENINSULA AS PROBLY REQUIRING CARRIER AND SUPPORT FIRED SUPPORT.

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3 F File or Chartroom. No. 4 SPECIAL.

GREAT SECREST

Handed only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 70, Navy Regulations.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/44
DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 11/19/94

TOP SECRET
ACTION
F-1

DISC: WSH. (ULTRA)

PAGE 1 OF 2
258759
NCR 16444

ORIGINATOR TELL IN DATE AND TIME GROUP (USE G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

PASS FOLLOWING TO ADMIRAL HINZT Which REPEATS 197544 ADDRESSED E.O. 19754

CINCEAC FROM CINCEAF (Eastern Fleet)

E. O. 11977, Sec. 3.D. and 3.D. or 3.D.
Oval Office, May 3, 1972
By SLR
Data JAN 6 1974

MY PRESENT ORDERS ARE TO GIVE 4 CARRIERS TO THE PACIFIC AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE. THIS WOULD MEAN LEAVING CEYLON ABOUT MID DECEMBER.

2. OWING TO RE-EQUIPMENT OF CARRIERS WITH AVENGERS THEY WILL NOT BE SUFFICIENTLY TRAINED BY MID DECEMBER TO CARRY OUT A STRIKE AT PALEMBANG.

3. THE WEATHER AT PALEMBANG MID DECEMBER IS UNFAVOURABLE BUT WILL HAVE IMPROVED BY THE FIRST WEEK OF JANUARY.

4. ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS ARE TO CARRY OUT: (A) A STRIKE AT BRANDAN OIL REFINERY WITH THE FIRST TWO CARRIERS READY AT END DECEMBER. (B) A REPEAT STRIKE WITH THE OTHER TWO CARRIERS AT BRANDAN EARLY IN JANUARY. (C) A FOUR CARRIER STRIKE AGAINST...
SECRET

DATE: 25 NOVEMBER 1944

FROM: COM 3RD FLIGHT

ACTION: DECERTICATE CINCSOWESPAC ADV GHQ INFO CINOPAC, CONTASKFORCE 77 COMFEAF. RDO MANUS PASS TO CINCSOWESPAC ADV GHQ.

(CINOPAC PASSED TO COMWESTSEAFRON AND COMINCH FOR INFO AS 255259).

UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED I AM STRIKING ENEMY SHIPPING IN SAMAR, VISAYAN AND SIBUYAN SEA AREAS WITH 2 TASK GROUPS ON 26 NOVEMBER.

DESIRE ALSO STRIKE AIRFIELDS IN PIQON AREA AS NECESSARY.

CINOPAC

ACTION:F-30

SLR

DECIMALIZED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/44
CONAIRPAC PASSED TO CNO FOR INFO AS 260807.

(COMAIR 7TH FLEET SENDS ACTION COM 7TH FLT. INFO COMAIRPAC AND COMAIR 7TH FLT LOGISTICS.)

THIS IS FIRST OF 5 ADDITIONAL ACORNS REQUIRED EXCELSIOR. REQUEST YOU ORDER LAND PLANE ACORN WITH FOLLOWING COMPONENTS FOR INSTALLATION OXYGEN: A3, A6, C6, C14, C15, C17. D9 LESS DRUMMED AVGAS AND AVLUB.

**NEW SUBJECT.**

ADD J7E TO ACORN 45.

RECEIVED SECRET, RECLASSIFIED TOP SECRET IN ACCORDANCE WITH CONTENT.

**RECLASSIFIED**

**NCR ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION.**

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12(#1)....C0G

COMINCH(#2-9)....30(#10)....OP03(#11)....BUPERS(#12)...

**DECLASIFIED**

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/74
DISPATCH

DRAFTER

EXT.

ADDRESSES

PRECEDENCE

Op Op Op

Op Op Op

FROM: CON 3RD FLT

RELEASED BY:

DATE: 26 NOV 1944

TOR CODEHND:

DECODED BY: HOFNER

PARAPHRASED BY: HOFNER

ROUTED BY: HOFNER

TO:

CINCSEMESPAC

CTF 3B

COMTHFLT

CINCPAC

OCMFEAF

PRIORITY

RUTINE

DEFERRED

BASEGRAM

PRIORITY

RUTINE

DEFERRED

BASEGRAM

243225

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME GROUP (USE G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

HONO INTERCEPT

THIS IS TOP SECRET. FROM CON 3RD FLT. RADIO CANUS PASS CINCSEMESPAC FOR ACTION. INFO CTF 3B COMTHFLT CINCPAC AND OCMFEAF.

DURING STRIKES 25 NOVEMBER ANTICIPATE STRIKING ENEMY CRUISERS REPORTED VICINITY BANTON ISLAND BY CTG 73.4 234811. WILL CONSIDER SUCH AGREEABLE UNLESS DISAPPROVED BY URGENT DISPATCH.

COMINCH: COPIES 1 TO 8 INCLUSIVE.

Classified

R. O. 11669, Sec. 3(D) and (SU) or (D)

OIC Inter, Nov. 4, 1972

By SLR

Date: JAN 1 1974

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 FLF OR CHARTROOM

No. 4 SPECIAL

TOP SECRET

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in article 16, Navy Regulations.

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/74

243225
**CONFIDENTIAL DISPATCH**

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<td></td>
<td>COMMANDER ALLIED AIR FORCES</td>
<td>2</td>
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TOR CODE WORDS: 1145

DECODED BY: BEAVLD

PARAPHRASED BY: KNAPP

ROUTE BY: KNAPP

**CONFIDENTIAL**

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DESIGNATED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

**CONFIDENTIAL**

(Check Below)

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

HINOULU INTERCEPT

TO SECRET: FROM 3HQ SWPA SQD MACARTHUR TO COMMANDER 3RD FLEET ACTION COMMANDER ALLIED AIR FORCES ACTION COMING GHQ FROM SUTHERLAND INFO CITE CX E2769.

REFER COMMANDER 3RD FLEET TOC 2314401. TO EFFECT CONCENTRATION OF EFFORT, COMMANDER ALLIED AIR FORCES WILL STRIKE LCASPI AND OTHER B Sector AIRFIELDS ON 25 NOVEMBER IN COORDINATION WITH 3RD FLEET AIR OPERATIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL COPIES 1 TO 6 INCLUSIVE.

SC I N N I

R O. 11622. Sec. 22(D) and 22(D) or (D) OGD Issue, May 2, 1972

By SLR Date JAN 1 1974

ACTION: F-30

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/84

3/10 OPC

2312522

OGPV 19-78

2312522

3/10 OPC
DISPATCH

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<td></td>
<td>ALL FLEET AND TASK FORCE COMMANDERS PACIFIC FLEET</td>
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CINCPAC SENDS ACTION ALL FLEET AND TASK FORCE COMMANDERS PACIFIC FLEET INFO CINCSFPA COMGENPOA COMINC COMGENAIPPOA. COMGENPOA INFO GIVE INFO TO COM 13TH ARMY.

ANY EMPLOYMENT OF STRATEGICAL AND TACTICAL DECEPTION PLANS WHICH MAY BE UTILIZED IN THE PACIFIC THEATER OF WAR REQUIRES SECURITY OF THE HIGHEST ORDER TO PERMIT ACHIEVEMENT AND FULL EXPLOITATION OF THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE INHERENT IN THIS MODE OF WARFARE. ALL PRACTICABLE STEPS SHALL BE TAKEN TO PREVENT REFERENCES BY RADIO OR PRESS TO THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH PLANS, THEIR EFFICACY IN CONNECTION WITH SPECIFIC OPERATIONS, OR THE DETAILS AND SECRET METHODS USED.

COMINC; COPIES 1 TO 8 INCLUSIVE.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
## Dispatch

**Drafted by**: ORLOMOR
**Released on**: NOVEMBER 23, 1944
**TOR Code**: 0356
**Decoded by**: LYNN
**Paraphrasd by**: KOTHLAN

### ADDENDUM

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### Action:

**F-30**

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**Page 1 of 2**
222219
NCR 1145

---

**ORLOMOR SENDS ACTION ADCHIPS PAC I SOCOM GUAM AND CONSERVPAC INFO ROC GUAM COM 12, CNO, COMCHIPSPAC AND COMFWDARE.**

**ESTABLISH LANDING BOAT REPLACEMENT POOL GUAM BY DATES INDICATED**

(A) 1 FEBRUARY 1945, 35 LCP (3) 135 LCP (L) 16 LCP (R). THIS IS A MINIMUM REQUIREMENT. DESIRE IF POSSIBLE INCREASE THIS MINIMUM BY MAXIMUM NUMBER BOATS FOR WHICH SHIPPIING CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE.

(B) COMMENCING MARCH 1945 AND MONTHLY THEREAFTER 45 LCP (3) 155 LCP (L) AND 2 LCP (R). COMCHIPSPAC SPEEDLETTER 900196 NOT TO ALL AND NOT NEEDED. SINCE NORMAL SHIPPIING FACILITIES ARE INSUFFICIENT FOR THIS NUMBER OF BOATS ALL POSSIBLE MEANS MUST BE UTILIZED TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN DESIRED LEVEL. CONSERVPAC AND ADCHIPS PAC TO INSURE THAT ALL AVAILABLE DECK SPACE ON SHIPS UNDER THEIR RESPECTIVE CONTROL IS UTILIZED AND THAT SHIPS RETURNING FROM THE MARIANAS TURN IN TO THE ORLOMOR ALL LANDING CRAFT PRIOR DEPARTURE.

---

**Special**: 316 PACIFIC
222219

---

**Declassified**
E.O. 12355, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/44
SHIPPING FACILITIES MAY NOT PERMIT ESTABLISHMENT OF TEMPORARY BOAT POOL LEYTE OF THE SIZE REQUESTED BY 25 JANUARY. CINCPAC HAS AGREED TO PROVIDE FULL COMPLEMENT OF BOATS FOR ALL TRANSPORTS LOADING IN LEYTE FOR ICEBERG. EVERY EFFORT HOWEVER WILL BE MADE BY CINCPAC TO PROVIDE AN ADDITIONAL RESERVE OF AS MANY BOATS IN LEYTE AS POSSIBLE FOR EMERGENCY REPLACEMENTS.
(CINCPOA SENDS. ACTION TO CINCSWA INFO COMPHIBSPAC COM 12 CNO COMSERV PAC, TOP SECRET) (COM 7TH FLT ALSO GETS INFO)

AM OF OPINION NEED EXISTS FOR ESTABLISHING REPLACEMENT BOAT POOL LEYTE TO PROVIDE BOATS TO PHIBSPAC ASSAULT SHIPS IF EMERGENCY ARISES PRIOR ICEBERG AND FOR REPLACING DAMAGED BOATS PRIOR TO SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS. AN OPTIMUM POOL OF 70 LCM3 250 LCVP 10 LCPL(L) 20 LCPL(R) BY APRIL IS DEEMED ADEQUATE. WILL AN ALLOCATION OF SPACE FOR APPROXIMATELY HALF OF THIS POOL ON SWPAC SUPPORT SHIPS FROM THE WEST COAST BE POSSIBLE FOR THIS PURPOSE. BELIEVE BALANCE OF BOATS CAN BE PROVIDED BY CENPAC ASSAULT AND SUPPORT SHIPPING FROM POOLS AT PEARL AND IN FORWARD AREAS. LANDING BOAT OFFICERS AND CREWS TO ASSIST IN MAINTAINING THE POOL CAN BE SUPPLIED IF DESIRED. YOUR COMMENT REQUESTED.

NCR ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION: *RECEIVED AS CINCPOA'S 231241 12(#1)...C0G COMINCH(#2-9)...23(#10)...30(#11)...CP056(#12)...39(#13)...

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/94
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<td>2324/21</td>
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<tr>
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<td>MCDougall</td>
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<tr>
<td>PARAPHRASED BY</td>
<td>FISHER</td>
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<td>MCCONough</td>
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<td>CINCPAOA, COMPHIBSPAC, COMAIRPAC, COMGENFMFPAC, CONSERVCPAC, COMINCH MAR CORPS</td>
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THIS IS TOP SECRET. CINCPAOA ORIGINATES. ACTION TO COMGENPOA COMPHIBSPAC COMAIRPAC COMGENFMFPAC CONSERVCPAC. INFO TO COMINCH MAR CORPS COMGENNAAPAO COM 5TH FLEET COM 5TH PHIBFOR CTG 94 CTG 95 COMGENAIRFMFPAC COMGEN 10TH ARMY CTG 99 CTG 99.1 CTG 99.2 CTG 99.3. RADIO GUADAL PASS COMGEN 3RD PHIB CORPS FOR INFO. CINCGOWESPAC NOT AN ADEE PASS TO COMGEN 24TH CORPS FOR INFO.

ON COMPLETION OF ASSAULT PHASE TCEBERG COMGEN 10TH ARMY WITH DESIGNATION CTG 99 WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR OCCUPATION AND DEVELOPMENT BUNKHOUSE. PRINCIPAL SUBORDINATES CTG 99 DESIGNATED AS FOLLOWS:

(A) COMMANDER NAVAL FORCES--CTG 99.1 REAR ADMIRAL (TO BE DESIGNATED)

(B) COMMANDER TACTICAL AIR FORCE--CTG 99.2--MAJ GENERAL

F. P. MULCHAY USMC
T & S

DISPATCH

DRAFTER
EXT.

ADDRESSES

PRECEDENCE

FROM
RELEASED BY
DATE
TOH CODEROOCH

DECODED BY
PARAPHRASED BY
EDITED BY

ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE
PRIORIY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED
BASEGRAM

INFORMATION
FOR ACTION

PAGE 2 OF 2
210735
NCR 9839

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP

(C) ISCOM LEGUMINOUS--CTG 99.3--MAJ GENERAL F. G. WALLACE
US ARMY.

COMMANDER NAVAL FORCES AND COMMANDER TACTICAL AIR FORCE
WILL REPORT TO COMGEN 10TH ARMY BY 20 NOVEMBER OR AS SOON
THEREAFTER AS PRACTICABLE.

COMAIRPAC NOMINATES MARINE OFFICER FOR DUTY AS AIR
DEFENSE COMMANDER.

NCR ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION

COMINC(#1-8)....LOG
MARCAPS(#9).....

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
PERSONAL FROM ADMIRAL KING TO FIRST SEA LORD.

1. Although I should prefer otherwise, in the light of your despatch of the 15th I accept title of Commander in Chief British Pacific Fleet for Admiral Fraser for purposes within the British Forces which you have outlined.

2. For operations with U.S. forces he or such other commander as may be designated will be assigned an appropriate title and number by the Fleet Commander under whom operating.

3. I agree that for administrative, logistic and other purposes it is desirable for British units to operate as one force when practicable.

4. I am unable to confirm a date for Admiral Fraser's visit to Admiral Nimitz but shall do so at an early date.

Sincerely yours,

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3F-1 OR CHARTBOOK

No. 4 SPECIAL

W. D. PACIFIC

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date
**DISPATCH**

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**IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW**

**Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP** (Use G. C. T.)

**YOUR 16233§ I CONCUR.**

COMINCH: COPIES 1 TO 8 INCL.

COMINCH PASSES TO NCR FOR FURTHER DISTRIBUTION TO BUPERS FOR INFO. (COPY §9)

**REMARKS**

R. O. 11653, Sec. (B) and (C) or (D)

OCCUL LETTER, Aug. 4, 1972

By SLR Date JAN 1 1974

**TOP-SECRET**

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94
**DECLASSIFIED**

**E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4**

**NLR 101**

**By RT, NARA, Date**

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## **Dispatch**

**Drafted by:** Admiral

**Address:** ADMIRALTY

**Released by:**

**Date:** 16 November 1944

**TOR Code:** 15/1

**Decoded by:** ALTHOFF

**Paraphrased by:** MONROE

**Routed by:** MONROE

**Address:** COMINCH

**Information:** BAD

**Precedence:**

1. PRIOR
2. ROUTINE
3. DEFERRED
4. BASEGRAM
5. PRIOR
6. ROUTINE
7. DEFERRED
8. BASEGRAM
9. PRIOR
10. ROUTINE
11. DEFERRED
12. BASEGRAM
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17. PRIOR
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49. PRIOR
50. ROUTINE
51. DEFERRED
52. BASEGRAM

**Page 1 of 3**

151902 NCR 3790

**Originator till in DATE AND TIME GROUP**

(Use G. C. T.)

**UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED, THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.**

**PART 1:** 151902 NCR 3816

**PART 2:** 151902 NCR 3825

**PART 3:** 151902 NCR 3790

---

**ECCLO:**

E. O. 11852, Sec. 3(A) or (B)

**GCL Letter, No.:** UN 1 6 1974

**By:** SLR

**Date:**

---

**FOR ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTIC PURPOSES AND TO RETAIN THE ENTITY AS A BALANCED FORCE IT IS DESIRABLE FOR BRITISH UNITS**

---

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/44
4. I think some misconception may have arisen due to the difference between the British and American interpretations of the title "commander in chief". Admiral Fraser will be commander in chief of the British fleet operating in the Pacific with its supporting organization both ashore and afloat. This title in no way implies that he has operational control of the area nor of any other forces in it but is warranted by British naval custom and by the size and importance of his command. It should not cause confusion or lead to misunderstanding regarding the commanders in chief of U.S. theatres of operations or the commanders of U.S. fleets.

5. The British fleet and its commander in chief will doubtless be...
GIVEN A CONVENIENT LOCAL TITLE AND NUMBER BY ADMIRAL NIMITZ AND I SUGGEST THAT THIS AND DETAILS OF COMMAND AS FOR EXAMPLE THE EMPLOYMENT OF CERTAIN UNITS UNDER VICE ADMIRAL KINCAID MIGHT BE SETTLED BY ADMIRAL FRASER AS MY REPRESENTATIVE WHEN DISCUSSING BASED ARRANGEMENTS AND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES WITH ADMIRAL NIMITZ AND GENERAL MACARTHUR.

6. AS REQUESTED FORCES WILL BE DIRECTED TO REPORT TO YOU THEIR ARRIVAL IN THE PACIFIC. I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT IT WILL BE PRACTICABLE FOR ADMIRAL FRASER TO PAY HIS VISIT TO ADMIRAL NIMITZ BEFORE THE FIRST UNITS ARRIVE AS MANY DETAILS WILL REQUIRE SETTLING IF ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN OPERATIONS IS NOT TO BE DELAYED.

2 COPIES TO ADMIRAL KING
SCR HAS NOT DELIVERED TO BAD
**DISPATCH**

**DRAFTER**: CINC EASTERN FLEET  
**RELEASED BY**:  
**DATE**: 17 NOVEMBER 1944  
**TOR CODENO**: 9547  
**DECODED BY**: HOFNER  
**PARAPHRASED BY**: HOFNER CHECKED BY ROBERTS  
**ROUTED BY**: FISHER DICTED BY HOFNER

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Under划线 indicates that this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence and as administrative.

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"CONFIDENTIAL. PERSONAL FOR ADMIRAL NIMITZ FROM ADMIRAL FRASER.  
IF YOU AGREE I WOULD MUCH LIKE TO HAVE CAPTAIN C J WHEELER, USN  
ACCOMPANY ME AS A MEMBER OF MY STAFF AND SENIOR CYPHER OFFICER  
UNITED STATES NAVAL LIAISON WITH BRITISH PACIFIC FLEET.  
(2) SUGGEST COMMANDER JOHN M LIETWILER, USN WHO HAS REPORTED AS  
RADIO INTELLIGENCE LIAISON OFFICER COLOMBO BE DESIGNATED FOR  
ADDITIONAL DUTY AS SENIOR UNITED STATES LIAISON OFFICER  
BRITISH EAST INDIES STATION WHICH DUAL DUTIES WERE SATISFACTORY  
COMBINED BY HIS PREDECESSOR."

**COMINCH(#1-B)....COU**

**BUPERS(#9)....**

**R. O. 11402, Sec. ND and (X) or (2)  
OIC letter, May 1, 1973**

By SLR  
JAN 16 1974

---

**TOP SECRET**

Handwritten note in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in article 79, Navy Regulations.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
**DISPATCH**

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**RELEASED BY**

**DATE**: 13 NOVEMBER 1944

**TOR CODEROOM**: 9613

**DECODED BY**: KURTZ

**PARAPHRASED BY**: SJOSTEN

**EDITED BY**: BENNETT

---

**CINCSPWA**

**PRIORITY**

**ROUTINE**

**DEFERRED**

**BASEGRAM**

---

**COMINCH**

**CINCPOA**

**COM 3RD FLEET**

---

**CINCPOA INFO COMINCH CINCPOA AND COM 3RD FLEET.**

---

**REFERENCES**

**CINCPOA 128985 NOT HELD.** FOR INFORMATION

**RAAF INTEND AERIAL MINING BRUNEI BAY WITH TARGET DATES 9TH, 15TH AND 16TH ALL NOVEMBER.** HAVE NO INFORMATION AS TO COMPLETION OPERATIONS ON 9TH. WILL ADVISE YOU WHEN KNOWN.

**COMINCH: COPIES 1 TO 8 INCL.**

---

**ACTION F-30**

---

**TOP SECRET**

---

**DECLASSIFIED**

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/44
Top Secret

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Unless otherwise indicated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence and as administrative.

Page 1 of 2

121737 NCR 47866

Originator fill in date and time group (Use G. C. T.)

For first sea lord.

I note your 11/146A, confirmed by your 12/1/77A, designates admiral Fraser as the "commander in chief of the British Pacific Fleet." This action sets up 2 naval commanders in chief in the Pacific, which is an action not carried out in any other naval area or theater of action, notably in the Mediterranean and in British home waters.

2. At Quebec the agreement was "that the method of employment of the British fleet in these main operations in the Pacific would be decided from time to time in accordance with the prevailing circumstances." The method of employment that appears to be contemplated by the command set-up of your despatch is, in my opinion, not workable.

R O 11572 Sec. ND and KD at (C) USAJeneral, May 5, 1973

No. 1 ADMIRAL No. 2 FILE

By SLIK Date JAN 13 1974

No. 3F-1 OR CHIEFDC No. 4 SPECIAL

Top Secret

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 78, Navy Regulations.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
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<td>NCR 47866</td>
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3. AS INDICATED IN MEMORANDUM TO ADMIRAL SOMERVILLE OF NOVEMBER 11TH, I CONTEMPLATE INITIAL EMPLOYMENT OF BRITISH FLEET UNITS UNDER VICE ADMIRAL KINKAID, THE ALLIED COMMANDER OF NAVAL FORCES IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA. SUBSEQUENTLY EMPLOYMENT TO BE UNDER ADMIRAL NIMITZ AND OR VICE ADMIRAL KINKAID AS OPERATIONS MAY INDICATE TO ACCOMPLISH THIS EMPLOYMENT I AGREE THAT A COMMANDER (NOT A COMMANDER IN CHIEF) OF THE BRITISH PACIFIC FLEET CAN BE SET UP IN EASTERN AUSTRALIA FROM WHICH BRITISH UNITS CAN PASS FOR OPERATIONAL CONTROL TO NIMITZ OR KINKAID WHEN AND AS THE USE OF FORWARD BASES CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE. WE HAVE NOT AS YET ARRANGED FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH FORWARD BASES. THE DESIGNATION OF ADMIRAL FRASER FOR THE DUTY AS GIVEN IN THIS PARAGRAPH IS WHOLLY ACCEPTABLE TO ME.

I AM TAKING UP WITH ADMIRAL NIMITZ THE QUESTION AS TO THE BEST TIME FOR ADMIRAL FRASER'S VISIT TO PEARL HARBOR.
TIGHT DISPATCH

DRAFTER CINCPOA
RELEASED BY
DATE 12 NOVEMBER 1944
TOR CODEBOOK 121314

DESTINATION
COM 3RD FLEET CINCSPAC
COM 7TH FLEET

ADDRESSEE
CINCPOA
CINCCH

PRECEDENCE PPRRRPPPP
ROUTINE 1
DEFERRED 2
BASEGRAM 3

FOR ACTION

INFORMATION

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFINED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

128565 NCR 338

ORIG CLEARANCE

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME GROUP

(Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(CINCPOA SENDS ACTION COM 3RD FLT AND CINCSPAC INFO COMINCH AND COM 7TH FLEET, TOP SECRET)

I AM IN GENERAL ACCORD WITH VIEWS EXPRESSED HALSEYS 11B249. REF HIS 11B466 CONCUR AFTER 15TH IF CINCSPAC FEELS THAT HE THEN HAS SUFFICIENT AIR STRENGTH IN LEYTE TO PERMIT FAST CARRIERS WITHDRAWAL AS FAR AS CELEBES SEA AND IF AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE INDICATES PROFITABLE NAVAL TARGETS THEN AT BRUNEI. IF GENERAL MACARTHUR AGREES ON DESIRABILITY BRUNEI STRIKE REQUEST HE INFORM HALSEY AND ME AND THAT HALSEY ARRANGE DETAILS DIRECTLY WITH CINCSPAC KEEPING ME ADVISED.

IN SUPPORTING MACARTHUR HALSEY IS DIRECTED TO GIVE FULL CONSIDERATION TO NECESSITY FOR PROVIDING SUITABLE REST FOR CREWS AND FOR MAINTAINING MATERIAL READINESS OF AIRCRAFT AND SHIPS OF ALL TYPES NOT ONLY FOR CURRENT OPERATIONS BUT FOR THE ENTIRE PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN AS WELL AS OTHER OPERATIONS INCLUDING DETACHMENT AND ICEBERG.

(COMINCH: COPIES 1 TO 8 INCLUSIVE)

No. 1 ADMIRAL
No. 2 FILE
No. 3F-I OR CHARTBOOK
No. 4 SPECIAL

TOP SECRET

308 Pacific
OPNAV 19-76

DECLASSIFIED
E. O.: 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 1/21/74

Liaison

CINCPOA

H. A. T. C. 128565

By NLR Date JAN 18 1974

CINCSPAC

128565

Confidential

CINCCH

M.O. 11844

Cold Letter, May 5, 1973

By NLR

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TOR CODEWORD: 113146

DECIMAL INDEX: 113146

SECRET

DATE: 11 NOVEMBER 1944

YOU HAVE NO DOUBT ALREADY BEEN INFORMED BY ADMIRAL SOMERVILLE OF THE STRENGTH AND COMPOSITION OF THE BRITISH FLEET WHICH WILL ARRIVE IN THE PACIFIC IN JANUARY AND BUILD UP DURING THE FIRST 6 MONTHS OF 1945. ADMIRAL FRASER, THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE BRITISH PACIFIC FLEET, WILL VISIT AUSTRALIA IN NEAR FUTURE TO DISCUSS ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS WITH AUSTRALIAN AUTHORITIES. TO MAKE THE BEST ARRANGEMENTS REGARDING A FORWARD BASE FOR HIS FLEET AND FOR OPERATING IN THE BEST WAY IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET, I SUGGEST THAT ADMIRAL FRASER SHOULD VISIT ADMIRAL NIMITZ ABOUT MID-DECEMBER AT PEAL HARBOUR AND DISCUSS ALL RELEVANT QUESTIONS. IF YOU AGREE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU WILL INFORM ADMIRAL NIMITZ OF THE STRENGTH AND BUILD UP OF THE BRITISH PACIFIC FLEET, AND ASK HIM IF ADMIRAL FRASER'S VISIT WILL BE CONVENIENT. I WILL THEN INSTRUCT ADMIRAL FRASER TO MAKE

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94
### PROJECT DISPATCH

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**INFORMATION:**

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**PAGE 2 OF 2**

113146A  NCR 15494

** retal OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW**

**Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)**

**Detaiied Ar rangements Direct With Admiral Nimitz.**

**COMMCH: COPIES 1 TO 8 INCLUSIVE.**

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**DECLASSIFIED**

JCS Memos 1-13-76

BY SE DATE JAN 18 1974

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**TOP SECRET**

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations.

113146A

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**DECLASSIFIED**

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
DISPATCH

FROM: COMAIRPAC

RELEASED BY:

DATE: 12 NOVEMBER 1944

TOR CODEBOOK: 32

DECODED BY:

PARAPHRASED BY:

ROUTED BY:

FOR ACTION:

ADDRESS:

PRECEDENCE:

COMAIR 7TH FLEET (LOGISTICS)

CNICOPA
COM 7TH FLEET
COMAIR 7TH FLEET
COMAIR WEST COAST
DABOP
ACORN TRADEX

PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED
BASEGRAM

OCC 15936

DISPATCH WITH OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW

MAILGRAM

SUBJECT IS SEAPLANE ACORN FOR STEAMROLLER, COM 7TH FLT 12330 SEPT AND 05/746 OCT AND MY 230114 SEPT. ACORN TENTATIVELY ASSIGNED IS NUMBER 45 WITH COMPOSITION INDICATED ENCL (A) MYER 001384 OF 19 OCT. REQUEST ADVISE IF COMPOSITION IS SATISFACTORY AND IF ETD W. COAST 1 FEB STILL APPLIES TO MEET ABOVE DEPARTURE DATE MATERIAL MUST BE DELIVERED TO ACORN AT HUENEME ABOUT 1 DEC FOR PROPER INVENTORYING ETC. ALSO REQUEST ADVICE IF YOU DESIRE CASU (2) TO MOVE FROM COAST WITH ACORN 45 TO SUPPORT 2 MARINES AT STEAMROLLER, REFERENCES NOT TO OR NEEDED BY ALL

ORIG DISTRIBUTION

30...COG (#1)
COMINCH(#2-9)...OP3(#10)...BUAR(#11)...12(#12)...OP50(#13)

No. 1 ADMIRAL
No. 2 FILE
No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM
No. 4 SPECIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date: 4/21/94

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date: 4/21/94
From: General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area, Hollando, New Guinea
To: War Department
No: UA 48358

7 November 1944

From CG USAFFE sgd MacArthur to AGWAR site UA 48358.

Subject is operational requirements for WHITEWASH support, reord WAR 56486, 2 November 44. This radio is in five parts:

Part 1. Request additional units committed to the Southwest Pacific Area as listed in part one of foregoing reference radio be shipped fully trained in indicated months of availability. Shipment of these units at earlier date in curtailed training status is not considered practicable.

Part 2. All of the substitutions proposed in part two of your radio are acceptable. Request units being substituted for those previously requested be shipped in accordance with indicated dates of availability and that authority be granted to convert the two triple A automatic weapons batteries (mobile) and one triple A gun battalion (mobile) into two Military Police Escort Guard companies and one Military Police Battalion (Zone of Interior) respectively upon arrival.

Part 3. Request authority to locally activate one ordnance battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment with attached medical under T/C and E 9 (-760 of 31 March 43 and four) Transportation Corps Port Battalion

OK-IN-6580 (7 Nov 44)

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area, Hollandia, New Guinea

No. UA 48388 7 November 1944

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachments with attached medical under T/0 and E 55-116 of 20 March 44. These units can be activated without the necessity of requisitioning additional fillers from the United States, adequate personnel being available locally for this purpose.

Part 4. January shipment of triple A units, equivalent in strength to seventeen port companies, with minimum essential equipment only, to be used as substitute for port companies and to be ultimately reorganized as such is satisfactory. Request authority be given to convert these triple A units upon arrival in the theater into seventeen port companies.

Part 5. Units expected to be ready for December shipment, including six ordnance bomb disposal squads, one Quartermaster Graves Registration Platoon, two triple A Automatic Weapons Batteries (mobile) and one triple A Gun Battalion (mobile) have been integrated in December priority list.

ACTION: Gen. Hull

INFO: JC/S
Gen. Arnold
Gen. Somervell
Adm. King
C of S

CM-IN-6580 (7 Nov 44) 1757Z by

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
ET DISPATCH

DRATER F-11

EXT-2559

TO: ADDRESSSES

FROM: COMINCH AND OHO

RELEASED BY: ADMIRAL E J KIN

DATE: NOVEMBER 7 1944

TOR CODED: 2825

DECODED: HOFNER/DORSEY

PARAPHRASED: KOTEN, CHECKED: howland

ROUTED: BY:

SUBJECT FOR ACTION: CINCPOA

CINCSPAC

COM 7TH FLEET

COS US NAVY

CG USAAF

ADMIRAL LEAHY

BAD

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

BASEGRAM

IF OPERATIONAL

CHECK Belden

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 1/3/94

#61745

NCR 47775

LAT\ER

FOLLOWING IS INTENDED BUILDUP OF BRITISH PACIFIC FLEET DURING THE 1ST HALF OF 1945. FLEET WILL BASE ON EASTERN AUSTRALIA TO ARRIVE PACIFIC IN JANUARY 2 BB, 4 CV, 6 CL, 34 DD. ADD IN MARCH 1 CV, 2 CL, 4 DD. ADD IN MAY 2 BB, 1 CV, 2 CL. ADD IN JULY 4 CVL, 6 CL, FURTHER DD TO A GRAND TOTAL OF 45. FOREGOING FLEET WILL BE SUPPORTED BY FLEET TRAIN AND SHALL CRAFT TO MAINTAIN ITS LINE OF

COMMUNICATIONS FROM EASTERN AUSTRALIA AND TO DEFEND ITS ADVANCED BASES. ABOVE IS SUBJECT TO SUCH ALTERATIONS AS FUTURE CIRCUMSTANCES MAY Dictate. FOREGOING FURNISHED BY ADMIRALTY FOR INFORMATION AND PLANNING PURPOSES. EMPLOYMENT AND COMMAND SETUP WILL BE FURNISHED LATER.

COMINCH COPIES 1 THROUGH 8,

F-341 DELIVER TO ADMIRAL LEAHY.

PASSED BY COMINCH TO NCR FOR FURTHER DISTRIBUTION TO

COS US NAVY (#9)....CG USAAF (#10)....BAD (#11)....

No. 1 ADMIRAL.

No. 2 FILE.

No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL.

TOP SECRET
DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Operations Division,
Pacific Section, WDOPD
OPD 321.2 T3 (4 Nov 44)
6454

4 November 1944

Commanding General
USAF Pacific Ocean Area
Fort Shafter, T. H.

Commander in Chief
Southwest Pacific Area
Hollindia, New Guinea

Number WARX 57406

For MacArthur for action and Richardson, pass to CINCPOA
For action, signed Marshall

Further study in an effort to meet operational requirements
since the dispatch of WARX 55033 of 30 October 1944 has
indicated the urgency of early implementation of paragraph
two of that message. It is therefore requested that con-
ference be held without delay and report made to the War
Department not later than November 10. Lacking recommenda-
tions from interested agencies will necessitate arbitrary
decision by the War Department on the matter. Navy concurs.

End

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By REP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

ORIGINATOR: OPD
INFORMATION: JO/S
Adm King
C of S
Gen Arnold
Adm Leahy
CM-OUT-57406 (4 Nov 44) 15092

COPY No. 47
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
**TOP SECRET**

**OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

**OP-12 L-1/LV**

**DRAFTER**

PORTER/NELSON EX. 5835

**ADDRESSSES**

ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESS

CINCPAC

CINCPAO

**PRECEDENCE**

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14. BASEGRAM

**FROM**

CNO

**RELEASED BY**

V ADM HORNE

**DATE**

NOVEMBER 4 1944

**TOK CODE#:**

1756/1951

**DECODED BY**

ELY/KOTEE

**PARAPHRASED BY**

KOTEE/ROWLAND

**ROUTED BY**

REALY/FODONUGH

**IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW**

☐

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**Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP**

(Use G. C. T.)

---

**REFERENCE**

BUDOCKS TOP SECRET LETTER TO CNO YD-P 8855 WITH ENCLOSURE

COPIES TO YOU. REQUEST COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATION AS TO PROBABLE NEED EMERGENCY BREAKWATER CONSTRUCTION FOR ENVISIONED OPERATIONS TAKING INTO ACCOUNT MANPOWER, MATERIAL, AND SHIPPING REQUIREMENTS.

---

**ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:**

OP-12(#1)....ORIG

COMINCH(#2-9)....OP(50(#10))....38(#11)....BUDOCKS(#12)....

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**INSTRUCTIONS**

EL GA 1355N 15096 W 10 130

Date JAN 18 1974

By NAR

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**DECLASSIFIED**

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/8/94

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(CINCPOA HAS ACTION AND PASSES INFO CON GENSUPSERV FMF PAC. COM 12 ORIGINATES. INFO ALSO CNO MARDEFQUART SAN FRAN MARDEF QUART.

NOVEMBER ALLOCATION OPERATIONAL VESSELS CENTPAC 64 PLUS CARRYOVER 2 1/2 FROM OCTOBER. YOUR PRESENT FIRM OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS EXACTLY 66 1/2 AS FOLLOWS: FORAGER ECHELON 39 1/2, FORAGER ZONE 9, STALEMATE ECHelon 1 ZONE 4, FLEET AMMUNITION 6, FLEET ISSUE PROVISIONS 6, FLEET FREIGHT 1, BASED ON ESTIMATED TOTAL WSA PRESENTERS NAVY NOVEMBER ALLOCATION WSA VESSELS PROBABLY WILL NOT EXCEED 85. ASSUMING NO ADDITIONAL OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS REMAINING 18 VESSELS ARE DIVIDED AS FOLLOWS: 8 ARE FIXED IN FRAY RUN BY DECEY OF VESSEL 4 TROOP SHIPS, 3 ASSIGNED GILBERTS MARSHALLS.

No. 1 ADMIRAL, No. 2 FILE, No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM, No. 4 SPECIAL.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 1/8/74
**DISPATCH**

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**PAGE 2 OF 3**

**Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use GMT)**

**SHIPMENT 12.5. REMAINING 3 ENTIRELY INADEQUATE FOR MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS SOVES PAC SOPAC AND HAWSEAFLON. LITTLE ASSISTANCE CAN BE EXPECTED FROM USS VESSELS AS MOST OF SPACE REQUIRED FOR HEAVY CHRISTMAS HAILS APPROX 500,000 BAGS AND OTHER HIGH PRIORITY MAINTENANCE ITEMS. FOLLOWING 2 CATEGORIES OF CARGO PRESENTLY ON HAND WEST COAST ARE CLASSED AS MAINTENANCE ALTHOUGH REQUIREMENTS AT DESTINATION ARE ACTUALLY OPERATIONAL. APPROX 24 SHIPLOADS MARINE CORPS CARGO REQUIRED IN HAWAII PRIOR 5 DEC FOR DETACHMENT STAGING. 6 VESSELS REQUIRED TO MOVE CARGO FOR FOLLOWING SEABEES ON NOVEMBER PRIORITY LIST. BATTALIONS 128, 38, 7, 30,34 SPECIAL. 1 VESSEL SEABEE REPLACEMENTS TO NOUMEA 2 VESSELS MARINE CORPS REHABILITATION FIRST MARDIV AND 3RD

---

**DECLASSIFIED**

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/24/94
CORPS REQUIRED RUSSELLS 1 DEC. IN ORDER MEET ABOVE REQUIREMENT AND IN VIEW LITTLE LIKELIHOOD ADDITIONAL PRESENTERS IT IS SUGGESTED SUFFICIENT CENTPAC ECHELON OR ZONE TONNAGE BE DEFERRED UNTIL DECEMBER AND FOREGOING OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS BE SCHEDULED IN SUBSTITUTION. THIS PLAN MAKES NO PROVISION FOR MOVING 210 AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLES AND 217 LANDING CRAFT REQUIRED SOPAC EARLY DECEMBER, SEE CINCPAC'S 010524, NOR ANY ASSISTANCE LARGE BACKLOG MAINTENANCE CARGO ALL AREAS.

AS RECEIVED, BEING SERVICED.

NCR ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION.

12(#1)... CIG
39(#4)... OP050(#71)... HRCABM(52)... NO. 4 SPECIAL

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 70, Navy Regulations.
DISPATCH

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<tr>
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UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DIFFERED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

338294 NCR 284

HONOR INTERCEPT

(COM 3RD FLT SENDS ACTION COM 7TH FLT INFO CINCSOWESPAC, COMTASKFOR 38, CTF 71, CTF 72, ALL TGC CF TF 38, CINCPAC INFO PASS INFO COMSUBPAC.)

REFERENCE HY 338338. OPERATION PULVERIZE. REQUEST LIFE GUARD SUBMARINES ON SEATON 5 TO 7 NOW EFORE AT SUBIC BAY AND LINGAYEN GULF. RF CERO OR OTHER SUBMARINE AVAILABLE (6 GROUPS MISSING) OR COPALONGA IN CASE SEAPLANE RESCUE THAT VICINITY IMPRacticABLE.

REFERENCE VHYUXS AND CALLS TO BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH COMAIRPAC SERIAL 001256 OF 26 SEPTEMBER 1944. ADVISE.

R O, 13 NOV 1944, and NO on 20

By ZL2 Date JAN 18 1974

* AS RECEIVED.

COMINCH COPIES 1 TO 6 INCLS.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

BY RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
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DISPATCH

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH Deferred PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

21233
NCR 741

 Origination till in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT.

FROM CINCPAO FOR ACTION COMGENPOA, COMPHIBSPAC, COMAIRPAC, COMCINCPAC, COMSERVPAC.

BRIG GEN ERNEST MOORE AIR CORPS DESIGNATED PROSPECTIVE AIR DEFENSE COMMANDER YORKMAN WITH DESIGNATION CTG 59.7. HE WILL REPORT BY 1 NOVEMBER OR SOON THEREAFTER AS PRACTICABLE TO CINCPAO FOR DUTY AND TO COMGEN EXPEDITIONARY TROOPS FOR ADDITIONAL DUTY CONNECTION PLANNING AND LOADING. COMMANDERS OF FIGHTER GROUPS AND AIR WARNING UNITS SHOULD BE ORDERED TO REPORT TO CTG 59.7 FOR PLANNING AND LOADING. THOSE NOT IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF CTG 59.7 REPORTING BY DISPATCH.

COMINCH COPIES 1 TO 8 INCLS.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94

Top Secret

Hand only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in article 76, Navy Regulations.
BATTLE PLAN "HALSEY" IN EVENT OF DAY ENGAGEMENT IN LEYTE GULF.

TG 34.5 OPERATE INDEPENDENTLY TO CONCENTRATE GUNFIRE ON ENEMY

IN CONJUNCTION WITH CTG 77.1. CTG 34.5 AND CTG 77.1 EACH

SEIZE ANY FAVORABLE OPPORTUNITY FOR TORPEDO ATTACK. ALL TASK

GROUP AND UNIT COMMANDERS GUARD 2642. IN CONDITION 1 ALL SHIPS

GUARD OTC FOX 371 KC'S. COM 3RD FLEET IN NEW JERSEY OTC WILL

COORDINATE AS NECESSARY. THIS PLAN WILL BE PLACED IN EFFECT BY

DESPATCH.

COMINCH COPIES 1 TO 8 INCLUSIVE.
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**RELEASED BY**: 1 NOVEMBER 1944

**TOR CODEWORD**: MONROE

**PARAPHRASED BY**: MCKEEL CHECKED BY POOLEY

**ROUTED BY**: MCKEEL

**U.S.S. NOVEMBER 1944**

COM 3RD FLEET SENDS TOPSECRET ACTION CINCSOWESPAC INFO CINCPAC COMTASKFOR 77. RDO. HONO PASSED TO COMINCH FOR INFO AS 1356.

FOR MACARTHUR.

I WILL BEEF UP YOUR SURFACE FORCES AT LEYTE IF NEEDED BUT THE FAST CARRIERS MUST NOT BE RISKED IN CLOSE FOR DEFENSIVE CAP JOB. I AM PRESUMING FROM OUR LONG ASSOCIATION THAT KENNEY IS BEING CALLED ON FOR HEROIC MEASURES. HALSEY.

COMINCH: COPIES 1 TO 8 INC.

**DECLASSIFIED**

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/74
### ACTION

**CTMOPAC** FROM **CINCPOA** INFO **COMINCH** AND **CNO COMGENPO** **COMGEN ALASKAN DEPT CINCSPAC** **COME 3RD FLEET COM 5TH FLEET COM 7TH FLEET JANGMCCEN ADAK. **TOPSEC.** **COMINCH** P ASS JOINT SECURITY CONTROL.

**PENDING DEVELOPMENT STRATEGICAL PLANS WHICH RADIO MANIPULATION WILL ENHANCE AS TO TIMING AND EFFICACY CINCPOA CONSIDERS LOCAL AREA AND THEATER MANIPULATED RADIO TRAFFIC ADVISABLE DURING MONTH NOVEMBER. LOCAL AREA AND THEATER COMMANDERS SHOULD CORRELATE AND MAINTAIN SUCH TRAFFIC LEVELS CONSIDERED BY THEM NECESSARY TO PROTECT AND CONCEAL THEIR CURRENT TACTICAL OPERATIONS. EXERCISE CARE THAT SUCH TRAFFIC DOES NOT SERVE TO OVERLOAD ACTIVE CIRCUITS IN CONTIGUOUS AREAS. PLEASE KEEP CINCPOA ADVISED PERIODICALLY BY DISPATCH LOCAL DIRECTIVES, TRAFFIC LEVELS, AND METHODS CONTROL. JCS 242913Z (WARX 51402), CNO 311217Z. JCS 311589Z NOT TO ALL. **CTMOPAC** DIRECTED COOPERATE COMGEN ALASKAN DEPARTMENT FOR MAINTENANCE JCS PLAN AD-JAPAN-44 AS

---

**DECLASSIFIED**
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94
REQUIRED BY LATTER. REQUEST ANY CURRENT HOLDERS CRYPTO KEY LIST
SPCSP-1 DESTROY BY BURNING AND RENDER TOPSEC DESTRUCTION REPORT
TO CNO COPY TO ME. RETAIN SPCSP-2.

COMINCH DELIVER TO JOINT SECURITY CONTROL.
COMINCH COPIES 1 THROUGH 9.
Damage inflicted to numerous Japanese naval units in recent battles in Philippines has made repair facilities of Singapore Naval Base an important target. It is desired therefore that you cancel Virginia and in lieu thereof attack the naval repair facilities of Singapore Naval Base. The size of the force should be as large as possible without being prejudicial to operations scheduled from forward area later in the month. If possible attack should be scheduled to take place approximately same date as planned for Virginia. Time of attack and method of attack are at your discretion. Advise your detailed plan at earliest.

End
4541

ORIGINATOR: Gen Arnold

INFORMATION: CG AAF (20th AF)
Gen Hull
Gen Bissell
Adm King
C of S

CM-OUT-55364 (31 Oct 44) 2253Z hrt

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter 53-72
MAY 22 1974

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/74

COPY No. 12
**TOP SECRET**

**DISPATCH**

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**COMIT 12TH\nDIPACD143VDOCKS SANFRAN\nCONSERV SOWESTPAC\nDABOP**

**Priority**
- ROUTINE
- DEFERRED
- BASIC

**Interpretation**
- COMIT 12TH\nDIPACD143VDOCKS SANFRAN\nCONSERV SOWESTPAC\nDABOP

**SUBJECT**

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED, THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

**1F OPERATIONAL**
- CHECK CLOTH

**ORIGINATOR DIRECT IN DATE AND TIME GROUP**

(USE G. C. T.)

**OR DURING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT**

(CON 7TH FLEET GIVES ACTION CHN)

**Garrish Phil.**

OBTRUSIVE WILL NOT BE OCCUPIED ON PRESENT SCHEDULED DATE. REQUEST ALL ITEMS BY 28B759* BE HELD IN RESERVE FOR SHIPMENT LATER DATE WHEN REQUESTED.

**TOP SECRET.**

RECEIVED SECRET. RECLASSIFIED TOP SECRET PER F341.

**ORIGINAL NCR DISTRIBUTION:**

- 35(#1) ACT
- COMINCH(#2-9) OP256(#10) BUDOCKS(#11) 2MP(#12)
- 2MP(#13) 12(#14)...

**NCR No.**

E. O. 12395, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

**No. 1 ADMIRAL.**

By AIR. No. 7 FIP. JAN 16-1974. NO. 37-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

**TOP SECRET**

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

30 October 1944

Commanding General
USAF India Burma Theater
New Delhi, India

Commanding General
USAF China Theater
Chungking, China

Commanding General
14th Air Force
Kunming, China

Commanding General
AAF India Burma Sector
Calcutta, India

Number: WARX 54909

For Sultan information Wedemeyer Chennault Stratemeyer from WDQBI signed ULIO reurad CRAX 18083 of 27 October.

Conference here with Navy reference requirement for CINCPOA to clarify original request as mentioned our WARX 49234 of 19 October indicates you should arrange revision of Navy needs directly with Miles acting on instructions from CINCPOA. Hears wire CFRAX 24634 of 21 October stated Miles now satisfied Navy needs are being met. Since WARX 49234 authorized you to make adjustments in JCS plan necessary in your discretion to fill Navy request, any further changes required should be negotiated with Miles.

ORIGINATOR: Gen Bissell

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold

CM-OUT-54909

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RFP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

DECLASSIFIED

COPY No. 12

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94
**TOP SECRET**

**DISPATCH**

**FROM:** CINCPOA  
**RELEASED BY:**  
**DATE:** OCT 29 1944  
**TO:** COMGENMFPAC  
**RECIPIENT:** MACORPS  
**PRIORITY:**  
**FOR ACTION:**  

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<td>COMGENMFPAC</td>
<td>MARCORS</td>
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**STAFF:**  
**¡DECEIVED BY:**  
- SUOSTEN  
- MONTGOMERY  

**PRIORITY:**  
**PRIORITY:**  
**FOR ACTION:**  

**NOTE:** THIS IS TO:  

FROM CINCPOA ACTION COMGENMFPAC INFO MARCORS  

URDIS 162931. LOGISTIC CONSIDERATIONS AT GUAM REQUIRE THAT POPULATION ON THE ISLAND AND TRAFFIC INTO AND OUT OF THE ISLAND BE KEPT TO THE MINIMUM. FOR THIS REASON AND IN VIEW OF FACT APPROX 2000 REPLACEMENTS ACCOMPANY EACH MARDIV IN ASSAULT THE NUMBER OF FOLLOW UP REPLACEMENTS IN GUAM FOR DETACHMENT AND ICEBERG WILL OF NECESSITY HAVE TO BE LIMITED TO APPROX 5000. THE BALANCE OFFERED BY MARCORS CAN BE HELD ON MAINLAND AND CALLED AS REQUIRED EITHER TO MAINTAIN 5000 REPLACEMENTS AT GUAM OR TO TARGET DIRECT OR TO SOPAC AFTER ICEBER. LATER WHEN THE LOGISTIC SITUATION AT GUAM IMPROVES CONSIDERATION CAN BE GIVEN TO INCREASING THE NUMBER OF REPLACEMENTS THERE FOR SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS.

THE PLAN TO TRANSFER 2 OF THE 1 JAN REPLACEMENT DRAFTS TO 2ND MARDIV SAIPAN IS NOT AFFECTED BY THE ABOVE.

ALL JAN DRAFTS SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN JAN PRIORITY LIST  

**DECLASSIFIED**  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/4/84
MCUMPS

20F2

20F2

293582

NCR 6272

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP

(Use G. C. T.)

NCR ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:

MACORPS(#1)....COO

COMMCH(#27049)....

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 6/1/74
**TOP SECRET**

**TRANSMISSION ORDER**

**FROM:** COM 2ND CARTASKFORPAC

**RELEASED BY:**

**DATE:** 28 OCTOBER 1944

**TO:** CINCPAC

**DECRYPTED BY:** SJOSTEN

**PARAFFINIZED BY:** SJOSTEN

**AUTHORIZED BY:** Bennett

**ACTION:** COM 1ST CARTASKFORPAC

**PRIORITY:**

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**NOTE:** This transmission is classified as **TOP SECRET** and will be transmitted with specified precedence and as administrative.

**TODAY** 271319

**NOR 5239**

**271319**

**CANCAL BY 232338**

**COMINC:** COPIES 1 TO 8 INCL.

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 1/18/94

**DISPATCH**

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**TOP SECRET**

**TRANSMISSION ORDER**

**FROM:** COM 2ND CARTASKFORPAC

**RELEASED BY:**

**DATE:** 28 OCTOBER 1944

**TO:** CINCPAC

**DECRYPTED BY:** SJOSTEN

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**ACTION:** COM 1ST CARTASKFORPAC

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**TODAY** 271319

**NOR 5239**

**271319**

**CANCAL BY 232338**

**COMINC:** COPIES 1 TO 8 INCL.

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**CLASSIFIED**

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 1/18/94
**TOP SECRET**

PERSONAL FROM FIRST SEA LORD.

YOUR 991449°. ALL FLEET CARRIERS IN EASTERN FLEET ARE AT PRESENT RE-EQUIPPED WITH AVENGER AIRCRAFT PREPARATORY TO THEIR TRANSFER IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO THE PACIFIC.

2. AS SOON AS THEY ARE AGAIN OPERATIONAL IT IS HOPED TO FIND AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A STRIKE WITH SPECIAL MOSQUITOES. SUCH AN OPERATION CANNOT BE COMBINED WITH A STRIKE AGAINST PALEMBANG.

3. I FULLY CONCUR THAT THE DESTRUCTION OF POL IN PALEMBANG WOULD HAVE AN IMPORTANT EFFECT ON ENEMY OPERATIONS IN PACIFIC. FAILING A SUITABLE TARGET FOR THE MOSQUITOES IT MAY BE ABLE TO ATTACK PALEMBANG WITH AVENGER AND I ALSO SUGGEST THAT YOUR 829 AIRCRAFT SHOULD REPEAT THEIR PREVIOUS ATTACK.

---

**TOP SECRET**

PUBLIC INFORMATION PER 310 PACIFIC DECLASSIFIED E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4 NLR 101 By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94
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*NOT HELD IN N.S.R.*

SCR HAS NOT DELIVERED TO CNO.

COMINCH: COPIES 1 TO 8 INCLUSIVE.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 1/1/94
CINCPOA SENDS ACTION CINCPOA INFO COMINCH.

THIS IS TO SECRET.

OCOCIR IN COMBINED CONFERENCE ON 3 NOVEMBER. URDIS 240725.
FOLLOWING MEMBERS BY STAFF WILL ARRIVE HOLLANDIA 2 NOVEMBER.
EAST LONGITUDE DATE: REAR ADM SHERMAN, MAJ BEN LEATY, CAPT
GARTER USN, CAPT IRWIN USN, COL FELLOWS USMC, COL HAYFORD USA,
ALSO LT COL TILLIVAN USA OF COMPOA STAFF.

COMINCHkopies 1 TO 8 INCLUSIVE.

RECEIVED
R Q 21552 Sec. (C) and (O) or (C)
Date S (Dec. 5, 1975)

By SLR
The JAN 10, 1944

No. 1 ADMIRAL
No. 2 FILE
No. 3F-1 CHARTBOOK
No. 4 SPECIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/64
FROM: COMNAVFORFRANCE
TO: COLINCH & CNO
NO: 24339 NAV 2772, 25 OCT 1944

FROM COMNAVFORFRANCE ACTION TO COLINCH AND CNO INFO TO COMNAVFR.

At his request Vice Admiral Fenard visited me this morning to present certain considerations pertaining to proposal made several weeks ago to Combined Chiefs of Staff that some French men of war be afforded opportunity to fight in Pacific campaign. He stated his authority to offer these views came from Minister of Marine and Chief French Naval Staff. He urged necessity for French naval units to share in Pacific combat experience in order share war burden and increase his Navy's self respect and morale and gain fighting experience. Suggested that as French divisions are now fighting under General Devers so his Navy asked for similar opportunity fight with our Pacific fleet. Stressed his Ministry's entire willingness any French ships should be individually placed under any American Task Force commander. Said their offer was not contingent upon retaining any tactical unity nor upon exercising any command functions and stated considerations individual rank would always be waived in our favor. He recalled French naval participation on this basis in both operations OVERLORD and ORLIE. Mentioned Rear Admiral Jaujard as probable administrative commander. Under no circumstances would such French naval participation if accepted be used by him in Washington as leverage to obtain place upon Combined Chiefs of Staff level.

This offer and attitude I consider genuine. Fenard is not self seeking man but sincere patriot. Jaujard served under me in Normandy assault in
exemplary fashion. No doubt French Naval Ministry feels anxious to assure the country of Navy's loyalty ability and revive naval interest at home where the predominant atmosphere is military. Two points worthy your consideration: if French naval units accepted are first desirability showing French flag in any naval forces which might assault former French possessions such as Indo China; second for home consumption it would be pleasing if whenever any press releases were authorized the French units could be described as a squadron since such word in French life has implications gratifying to national pride. Finally there is no doubt all French officers high and low hold our Navy in high esteem and would much prefer to be integrated into our task forces.
CONGENFMFPAC

25 OCTOBER 1944
242347
DORSEY

Baldwin

Baldwin

Baldwin

241951
NCR 1939

DUE CHANGES IN TARGET GARRISON REQUIREMENTS 3 BNS AA ARTY AND 3 BNS SEACOAST FMF PAC UNCOMMITTED PRESENT AND FUTURE PLANS, RECOMMEND DISBAND AT ONCE THIRD AND ELEVENTH AAA BNS IN SOPAC, FIFTEENTH AAA BN RETURNING FROM ROI-NAMUR, AND FIRST SECOND THIR D SEACOAST BNS DESIGNATED FOR CAUSEWAY. PERSONNEL URGENTLY NEEDED FOR REPLACEMENTS IN OTHER FMF PAC UNITS. FURTHER RECOMMEND SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH AAA BNS TINIAN BE RELIEVED BY ARMY UNITS. SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH AAA BNS TO BE DISBANDED UPON RELIEF. REMAINING NINE BNS BELIEVED ADEQUATE TO FULL FMF ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTY REQUIREMENTS.

REQUEST APPROVAL.

NCR ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:

MARCORPS(#1) CEMINCH(#2-9) 12(#10)....
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IF OPERATIONAL:

CHECK BELOW:

240725Z NCR 3563

ORIGINATOR TILL IN DATE AND TIME (Use G.C.T.)

OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT.

(RDO HONOLULU PASSED INFO TO COUCH AS 252225)

CONCUR IN CONFERENCE SUGGESTED IN SULTANS RADIO CRAX 16462, 21ST, SUBJECT TO CONCURRENCE CINCPAC, SUGGEST THAT THIS CONFERENCE BE COMBINED WITH PHILIPPINE BASE CONFERENCE BETWEEN SWPA AND PFA AT HOLLANDIA, TENTATIVELY SET FOR 1 NOVEMBER, WHICH SHOULD NOW BE DEFINITELY SET FOR 3 NOVEMBER (CX 1973).

IF THIS DATE IS CONCURRED IN, CHINA BURMA INDIA REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD ARRIVE ON THAT DATE.

REQUEST CONFIRMATION OF 3 NOVEMBER DATE BY CINCPAC AND COMGEN CHINA BURMA INDIA AND MEMBERS AND RANKS OF OFFICERS ATTENDING.

COUCH: COPIES 1 TO 8 INCLUSIVE.

E.O. 11356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 11/8/44

TOP SECRET

24G725Z

310 Pacific
To CINCPAC and COMGEN Alaska for action and CONNOR PAC CONJOINT and CINCSOWESPAC for information from Joint Security Control signed Bissell

Termination of HUSBAND as of October 31 as in CINCPAC 170148 NOR 6095 of 17 October is concurred in however maintenance of established appearance of Army forces in Aleutians is desirable. Pending development of specific plans for Aleutians it is desired to continue artificial traffic levels as in HUSBAND except for those which involve Central Pacific circuits. It is proposed that the officer in tactical command for Alaskan control after October 31 be COMGEN Alaskan Department and that CINCPAC direct CONNOR PAC to cooperate insofar as his traffic does not put a load on Central Pacific circuits.

ORIGINATOR: General Bissell (Joint Security Control)

CM-OUT-51402 (24 Oct 44)  Category: 2013Z

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/44

COPY No. 1

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

24-19728  SBN
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Date: 24 October 1944

COD Classification: Top Secret

THIS IS TOP SECRET.

(1) AFTER BEING SUBJECTED TO INCESSANT ATTACK ON THIS TASK GROUP FROM DIVERSE RACES FOR MORE THAN 48 HOURS, DURING WHICH IT "AS NECESSARY TO HANDLE VF AND VF ONLY AT TOP SPEED, THE FOLLOWING FACTS ARE AGAIN, AND YET AGAIN CONFIRMED AND REAFFIRMED.

(2) IN THIS KIND OF WAR SB2C NON-UTIL COMPLICATES PLANE HANDLING, AND OCCUPIES VITAL SPACE WHICH SHOULD GO TO INVALUABLE VF. IT IS URGENTLY RECOMMENDED THAT BY FLAT ORDER SB2C ON CV'S BE IMMEDIATELY REPLACED BY VF, CORSAIRS PREFERRED TO CATCH FRANS. USE SB2C PILOTS IF NECESSARY, 2 HOURS REQUIRED.

No. 1 ADMIRAL
No. 2 FILE
No. 3F-1 OR CHIEF HUMO NO. 4 SPECIAL

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date: 4/12/94
(3) THE ORIGINATOR KNOWS: A, THAT THE REQUISITE PLANES ARE AVAILABLE; B, THAT LOGISTICS OF UPRIGHT ARE FLEXIBLE AND READILY ADJUSTABLE; C, AND THAT TRAINING ALSO IS UNDERWAY, THOUGH TRAINING IS NO GREAT PROBLEM; AND FAILS TO APREHEND THEORY IN PERSISTENT OPPOSITION TO PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE.

(4) OUR PREPARATIONS HAVE HAD IN MIND HITTING THE ENEMY AT HIS SOURCE OF POWER. THE TIME IS NOW — NOT IN THE FUTURE.

(5) SUCCESSFUL HITTING CERTAIN IF SO.

(6) SEE MY ACTION REPORT OF 7 OCTOBER 1944 SERIAL #815.

COWINCHI: COPIES 1 TO 8 INCLUSIVE.

JAN 18 1974

By O.R.T.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/44
**DISPATCH**

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**FOR ACTION**

- CONGEN ARMY FORCES CHINA BURMA & INDIA
- CONCMCH
- CINCSOESPAC

**PRECEDENCE**

- PP
- ROUTINE
- DEFERRED
- BASEGRAM

**ADDRESSEES**

- CHINA BURMA & INDIA
- CONCMCH
- CINCSOESPAC

**ADDRESS**

21224G NCR 522

**ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME GROUP**

**CINCPAC SENDS ACTION CONGEN ARMY FORCES CHINA BURMA AND INDIA INFO CONCMCH AND CINCSOESPAC.**

CONCUR IN CONFERENCE PROPOSED BY YOUR CRAK 17402 TO ARRANGE FOR SUPPORT FROM CHINA BURMA INDIA AREA FOR PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS OPERATIONS.

**CLASSIFIED**

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/19/44

DECLASSIFIED
CINCPOA SENDS ACTION COMINCH. INFO HYDRO COMGENPOA. FOR WAR DEPT.

TOP SECRET.

THIS REFERS TO NAVAL GUNNERY CHARTS 1 TO 36,000 REPLYING TO WAR 48142 OF 18 OCTOBER. REQUIRE 200 YARD SQUARES BUT NO LETTERS; LAND AND WATER TINTS TO BE OMITTED; SHEET SIZE 35 BY 45 WET STRENGTH PAPER; 6 SETS COLOR PULLS AND 200 COPIES BY AIR BUT NO SURFACE SHIPMENT EXCEPT ON SPECIAL DEMAND, REQUEST YOU GIVE 1ST PRIORITY TO SOUTH-WEST FORMOSA COVERING SELECTED TARGETS ON PERIMETER ACCESSIBLE TO NAVAL BOMBARDMENT. PLEASE COORDINATE WITH HIGH PRIORITY ICEBERG WORK REQUESTED BY COMGENPOA RADIO

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**PAGE 2 OF 2  210116  NCR 9769**

Dated 20 October in which CINCPAO CONCURS. Reproduction materials and 200 copies Formosa charts to reach here 20 November. Request you check with Hydrographer relative his letter 27 September subject "Target Area Designation Charts" to clarify sheet size for which limiting width of 28 inches has been cancelled.

**ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:**

- ARMY(#1)....ACT
- COMINCH(#2-9)...28(#10)....

---

**No. 1 ADMIRAL, No. 2 FILE, No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM, No. 4 SPECIAL**

**TOP-SECRET**

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 70, Navy Regulations.
Deputy Commander
Twentieth Air Force
Hickam Field, T H

Number: WAR 50166

1. The dates proposed for San Antonio-1 and San Antonio-2 are accepted.

2. I feel strongly that significant result on this initial operation can be obtained only by concentrating the entire weight of the joint bombing effort against a single target area. I am equally convinced that this concentration must be directed against targets in the immediate 90.17 area. It is desired therefore that the primary target for the subject operations be 90.17 .357. Secondary targets should be port facilities at 90.17 and the last resort target, the Urban Area at 90.17.

3. To insure the maximum effect of the coordinated operation, the 20th Bomber Command is being directed to attack 90.36 .1627 on D plus 1 and D plus 3 under both the preferred and alternate plan. The alternate target for the 20th Bomber Command will be 90.3 .662. In case of weather interference, B 29's from China bases will attack these targets on the first succeeding day on which weather permits. Both of these attacks will be maximum efforts.

4. Detailed plan will be submitted through, and will be coordinated by, DEFCOMAF 20. It will be dispatched to arrive this headquarters not later than 1 November.

ORIGINATOR: GEN ARNOLD
INFORMATION: GEN HANDY, GEN BISSELL, ADM KING, C of S
CM-OUT-50166 (21 Oct 44) 1905Z vh

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/94
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

"IVI"
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

From: General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Hollandia, New Guinea
To: War Department
Radio, Noumea, New Caledonia
Radio, Lualalei, Oahu, T. H.
CG, South Pacific Base Command, New Caledonia
Rear Echelon, General Hdq. Southwest Pacific Area, Brisbane, Australia
CG US Army Services of Supply, General Hdq. Southwest Pacific Area, Brisbane, Australia
CG, Island Command, Saipan
CG, Army Air Forces, Southwest Pacific Area, Brisbane, Australia

No: CX 19753 20 October 1944

CX 19753 signed MacArthur from GHQ SWPA to Chief of Staff War Department, Commander in Chief Pacific Ocean Areas, Commander South Pacific Area, Commander Third Fleet, Commanding General South Pacific Base Command, Commander Allied Air Forces, Commander Allied Naval Forces, Commander Allied Land Forces. Rear Echelon GHQ SWPA pass to Commanding General, Sixth Army Commanding General Eighth Army. Commander First Australian Army passed Commanding General USAFFE Commanding General USASOS. This message has once been paraphrased

General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Advance Echelon opens ACCUMULATION 1200 hours zone 1 time 20th October.

General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area and Rear Echelon, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area remain at HENITCHE and AMATORY respectively.

ACTION: ASF
INFO: CG AAF, OPE, G-2, Adm King, Col Park, Log
CM-IN-18910 (20 Oct 44) 0958Z m/s

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/94
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**Page 1 of 2**

192225 NCR 9294

**Dispatch**

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**From CINCPAC**

**Date:** 20 OCT 1944

**To:** 1824

**Decoded by:** MCDougall

**Paraphrased by:** FISHER

**Routed by:** PIPP

**Transmitted:** JAN 18, 1944

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**SECRET FROM CINCPAC ACTION COMGENFMFPAC INFO COMINCH MARCORPS COMPHIBSPAC COMFWDAREA COMSOPAC CINCSWPA COMGENPOA.**

**Tentative Schedule Employment and Rehabilitation Major FMF Units is as follows:**

- **On completion detachment 5th Amphibious Corps Including Corps Troops 3rd and 4th Mardivs will be returned Guam for Rehabilitation and 5th Mardiv to Saipan.**

- **On completion Iceberg 3rd Amphibious Corps Including Corps Troops 1st 2nd and 6th Mardivs will be returned Guadal-Russells area for Rehabilitation unless Staging areas have become available in the Philippines.**

**URDIS 080013 NOT TO ALL. Not anticipated that major FMF units will be staged in Hawaiian area subsequent to mounting.**

---

**TOP SECRET**

Handwritten notes indicate that this dispatch should be transmitted with deferred precedence and at administrative.
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<th>PAGE 2 OF 2</th>
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<th>NCR 9294</th>
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**FOR DETACHMENT.**

**NCR ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:**

COMINCH(#1-8)......COG

MARCORPS(#9).....12(#10).....
CINCPAC TALKS TO CINCSONESPAC INFO COMINCH COMGENPOA CONGEN FMF PAC.

A BROAD OUTLINE REFERENCE YOUR 111356 AND MY 130958 OF FACILITIES DESIRABLE IN EXCELSIOR TO SUPPORT FUTURE OPERATIONS OF POA FORCES FOLLOWS: THE DESIRABLE TIMING OF AVAILABILITY OF THIS SUPPORT AND MOST ADVANTAGEOUS DIVISION OF FACILITIES BETWEEN ACCUMULATION AND WITNESS IS STILL UNDER STUDY AND WILL BE PRESENTED FOR DISCUSSION AT PENDING CONFERENCE.

SUMMARY OF POA NEEDS.

A. SUPPLY AND REPAIR FACILITIES SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT APPROXIMATELY ONE THIRD OF THE PACIFIC FLEET.

B. STAGING AREAS WITH SUPPLY AND REPAIR FACILITIES...
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT AND MOUNT OUT ONE CORPS OF THREE MARINE DIVISIONS (DEPOT AND SHOP TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT TO BE FURNISHED BY FISPAC).

C. STAGING AREAS AND SUPPLY AND REPAIR FACILITIES SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT AND MOUNT OUT 2 ARMD CORPS OF 3 DIVISIONS EACH.

D. STOCKAGE OF SUFFICIENT SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT TO MAINTAIN ABOVE MARINE AND ARMY UNITS ON A FUTURE MAJOR OBJECTIVE UNTIL THEIR DIRECT SUPPORT FROM THE UNITED STATES CAN BE ASSURED ESTIMATED TO REQUIRE 60 DAYS SUPPLY AFTER MOUNTING OUT.

E. HOSPITAL SUPPORT FOR RECEPTION AND TEMPORARY RETENTION OF CASUALTIES INCURRED IN OPERATION INVOLVING
A TOP SECRET DISPATCH

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PARaphRASEd:  
ROUTED BY:  

ADDRESSES  
ASTERISK (*) = URGENT ADDRESS  
PRECEDENCE:  
PRIORITY 1  
ROUTINE 2  
DEFERRED 3  
BASEGRAM 4  
PRIORITY 5  
ROUTINE 6  
DEFERRED 7  
BASEGRAM 8  
PRIORITY 9  
ROUTINE 10  
DEFERRED 11  
BASEGRAM 12  
PRIORITY 13  
ROUTINE 14  
DEFERRED 15  
BASEGRAM 16

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED, THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES 122215 NOR 8697 (Use S. C. T.)

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP

IN OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ABOVE FORCES.
THE EXTENT OF ASSISTANCE, IF ANY, WHICH YOU WILL NEED FROM PDA RESOURCES TO EFFECT THE AUGMENTATION OF YOUR FACILITIES NECESSARY TO PROVIDE THE ABOVE SUPPORT SHOULD ALSO BE EXPLORED AT THE PENDING CONFERENCE.

COMICN: COPIES 1 TO 8 INCLUSIVE.

E. O. 12345 Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/44
HONOLULU INTERCEPT

TO SECRET FROM CTF 77.

IN ADDITION TO THE H AND J HOUR BOMBING ATTACKS ON BEACH INSTALLATIONS (MY 080329) REQUEST FIGHTER SWEEPS WESTERN VISAYAS MINDANAO AIRFIELDS NORTH OF 8-45 DEGREES AS NECESSARY TO DESTROY ENEMY AIRCRAFT. STRIKE TROOPS REPORT TO COMMANDER RUPPERT AIRCRAFT CENTRAL PHILIPPINES VOICE CALL HALIFAX BE PRIMARY OF SAD-3 (4915 KCS) AND SECONDARY OF SAD-E-3 (140.58 KCS). CAUTION PILOTS THAT THERE IS POSSIBILITY US ARMY PLANES MAY BE STRIKING SAME AREA. SEE CINCSWPA 170939.

COMINCH: COPIES #1 TO #8 INCLUSIVE.
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**HONO INTERCEPT**

THIS IS TO SECRET FROM COM THIRD FLEET. ACTION CINCPAC INFO COM TASK FOR 38 CONTASKGROUP 36.1 COM 5TH FLT.

FOR STUDY AND PLANNING PURPOSES REQUEST EARLY DELIVERY OF TARGET DATA FOR POSSIBLE DECEMBER CARRIER OPERATIONS CHINA COAST FROM FOC CHOW SOUTH TO SAIGON. ON ASSUMPTION THAT YELLOW SEA WILL BE VULNERABLE TO CARRIER ATTACK EARLY NEXT YEAR TARGET DATA FOR THAT AREA SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE SOON TO COMMANDS CONCERNED.

REMARKS

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 18 JAN 1974

COMMON: COPIES 1 TO 8 INC.

ACTION: F-1

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**170148 NCR 6095**

**Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)**

BY DATE AND TIME GROUP (If necessary)

(CINCPOA SENDS ACTION COMNPAC COMGEN ALASKA INFO CNO COMGENPOA CINCSOWESPAC)

TOP SECRET

JAN CINCPOA ADK 250037 AND 2601022 SEPT, 142020 OCTOBER. NATURE OF DECEPTIVE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THIS HEADQUARTERS AND ALASKAN AREA ACTIVE SINCE NOVEMBER 1943 AND UNSUPPORTED BY ACTUAL ATTACK NOW CONSIDERED OBVIOUS.  

TO ENEMY. EXPLOITATION OF PAST ACTIVITY BY MAKING COMMUNICATIONS INCIDENT TO ACTUAL OPERATIONS RESEMBLE A REPETITION OF HUSBAND IS FAVORED. MAINTENANCE OF DECEPTIVE TRAFFIC THROUGH WINTER WOULD TAX MY FACILITIES NOW. OVERLOADED BY OPERATIONAL MATERIAL AND OFFERS NO APPARENT ADVANTAGE. PURPOSE OF PLAN HUSBAND IS CONSIDERED ACCOMPLISHED.

ACCORDINGLY PLAN HUSBAND AND RELATED ACTIVITY WILL TERMINATE OCTOBER 31. CONFERENCE PROPOSED IN THIRD REFERENCE CONSIDERED DESIRABLE PRIOR TO NORTHERN OFFENSIVE NOW INDEFINITE.

ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION: 20K(#1)....COG

ADD COMINC(#2-9)....ARMY(JOINT SECURITY CONTROL)(#10)....(PER '20K

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
From: COM 7TH FLT
Released by:

Date: 13 OCTOBER 1944

TO: CINCPAC

Decoded by Hartigan
Paraphrased by Hartigan
Edited by Hartigan

CINCPAC
CINCSUPA

Unless otherwise indicated, this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence and at administrative.

EXCEPT FOR PIERS, WHARVES, BUILDINGS, WATER SYSTEMS, MAGAZINES AND SIMILAR UNSALVAGEABLE INSTALLATIONS IN WIDELY SCATTERED LOCATIONS MOST USN FACILITIES AUSTRALIA ARE MOBILE AND PLANS CONTEMPLATED FORWARD MOVEMENT TO MEET FUTURE NEEDS ADVANCED AREAS. YOUR DIS 571415. ACUB HAS KNOWLEDGE OF USN INSTALLATIONS THROUGH LIAISON, SEVERAL FACILITIES HAVE ALREADY BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO AUSTRALIAN FORCES FOLLOWING FORWARD MOVEMENT USN MOBILE EQUIPMENT. THESE INCLUDE AIRPORT BUILDINGS, WATER SYSTEMS AND MINOR EQUIPMENT THURSDAY ISLAND, TOORUK, PORT STEPHEN, WAREHOUSES AND AT LEAST FOUR CARRIER AIRFIELDS WHICH WERE BUILT FOR USN IN SYDNEY AREA.

ACTION: F-1

DECLASSIFIED
**DISPATCH**

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**INFORMATION FOR ACTION**

- PRIORITY
- ROUTINE
- DEFERRED
- BASEGRAM

**UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.**

** дальнéйшая передача и рекомендаций касательно трансфер аэропортов в АВСТРАЛИЙСКУЮ ОБЩЕСТВО НА ЕЕ АВТОРОВ И ФАКТАМИ, КОТОРЫЕ МОГУТ БЫТЬ ВПЕЧАТЛЕНИЕ В ИЗУЧАЮЩИЕ СООБЩЕНИЯ ИЗ СИНДАКТ СИДНЕЯ И БРISBANE В ТОМ ВРЕМЕНИ. СОДЕРЖАТЕЛЬ ИЗУЧЕНИЯ И В ВЕРХОВЕСТНИХ КАМЕНИХ И ЗДАНИЯ ИЗ РЕСТАВРАЦИИ КАМЕННЫХ ОТ ПРЕИСУВАНИЯ ОТ НЕОТРЕДИРОВАННОЙ ПРОЕКТНОЙ ПЛАНИРОВКИ В РИВАРСКОЕ НАСТОЯЩЕЕ И СОДОВОЙ ПАРТНЕРСТВА КОМПАНИИ И СТОКХОУС К ПЕРЕДОВОЙ ОБЛАСТИ БУДЕТ ВСТУПАТЬ В ПЕРЕДАЧУ ИМПУЛЬСА ВАЧУРНОЙ КОМПАНИИ.

**FULL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING TRANSFER AIRFIELDS TO AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH HAS BEEN FORWARDED O.P.H.A.V. FACILITIES WHICH MAY BE TURNED OVER IN FUTURE INCLUDE MAGAZINES AT SYDNEY AND BRISBANE WITHIN 6 MONTHS. WAREHOUSES AND BUILDINGS AT REPAIR BASE CAMHS ABOUT 3 MONTHS AND STORE HOUSES IN VARIOUS CITIES AS THEY BECOME VACANT. FORWARD MOVEMENT BASE FACILITIES FROM REAR COMMISSIONED OVER A YEAR AGO AND IS A CONTINUING PROJECT. PLANS FOR REDEPLOYMENT REAR BOX FACILITIES TO FORWARD AREA BEING FORWARDED AIRMAILS, MACARTHUR CONTRACE.**

**AS RECEIVED**

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**DECLASSIFIED**

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/94

**HANDLE ONLY**

IN ACCORDANCE WITH "TOP SECRET" INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN ARTICLE 10, NAVY REGULATIONS.
From: CG US Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, Ft. Shafter T.H.
To: War Department
Nr: R 34818 10 October 1944

This is Top Secret Richardson POWAR action to WDCSA msg R 34818

That which follows is summary of information known here on current operational matters.

(1) CINCPPOA has indicated 24th Corps Artillery will move from GATEWAY to ACCUMULATION to release Marine Corps Artillery at a date after 1st November to be indicated by CINCSWPA.

(2) CINCPPOA has approved movement of the Rear Echelons of the 24th Corps, Corps Troops, 7th and 96th Divisions to ACCUMULATION in shipping to accompany 3rd and 4th Echelons of Garrison shipping.

(3) 24th Corps, Corps Troops, 7th and 96th Divisions have been released by CINCPPOA from operational control of CTP 36 and have been assigned to CINCSWPA for operational control during K-2 operation.

(4) Information received this date indicates 77th Division and attachments will remain Guam as area reserve

CM-IN-10041 (11 Oct 44)
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

"TOZ"

page 2

From: CG US Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, Ft. Shafter T.H.
Nr: R 34818 10 October 1944

for K-2 operation and if not used will rehabilitate New Caledonia. Rear Echelon 77th Division will be moved from Guadalcanal to New Caledonia by South Pacific Shipping at earliest practicable date.

(5) CINCPAC dispatch 050644 states preparation for CAUSEWAY operation has been deferred. FOA Forces will be employed in and will conduct operation detachment 20th January target date and operation ICEBERG 1st March target date. Copy of detachment Joint Staff study will be forwarded as soon as received in this Headquarters.

End

Corrected copy of CM-IN-9349 (10 Oct 44) General Handy

ACTION: General Handy

INFORMATION: General Arnold
General Bissell
Adm. King
CofS

CM-IN-10041 (11 Oct 44) 0917Z rb

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/44
From: CG, US Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, Ft Shafter TH
To: War Department
Nr. R 34818 10 October 1944

This is TOPSECRET Richardson POMAR action to
WDCSA msg R 34818.

That which follows is summary of information known
here on current operational matters.

(1) CINCPAC had indicated XXIV Corps Artillery
will move from GATEWAY to ACCUMULATION to release Marine Corps
Artillery at a date after 1 November to be indicated by
CINCSWPA.

(2) CINCPAC has approved movement of the rear
echelons of the XXIV Corps, Corps troops, 7th and 96th Di-
visions to ACCUMULATION * shipping to accompany 3rd and 4th
echelons of car pyon shipping.

(3) XXIV Corps, Corps troops, 7th and 96th Divisions
have been released by CINCPAC from operational control
do C 3 P 36 and have been assigned to CINCSWPA for operational
control during K-2 operation.

(4) Information received this date indicates 77th
Division and attachments will remain same as area reserve
for K-2 operation and if not * will rehabilitate New Cale-
donia. Rear echelons 77th Division will be moved from
Guadalcanal New Caledonia by South Pacific shipping at
earliest practicable date.

(5) CINCPAC dispatch * 57644 states preparation
for CAUSEWAY operation has been deferred. POA forbids will

CM-IN-9349 (10 Oct 44)
From: CG, US Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, Ft Shafter TH

Nr. R 34818

10 October 1944

be employed in end will conduct operation detachment 20 January target date and operation ICEBERG 1 March target date. Copy of detachment joint staff study will be forwarded as soon as received in this headquarters.

End

* Being serviced.

ACTION: GEN HANDY

INFO : GEN BISSELL
ADM KING
C OP S

CM-IN-9349 (10 Oct 44) 1200

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN 22-78724
### JP SECRET DISPATCH

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**SECRET**

PRELIMINARY WARNING ORDER.

INITIATE PREPARATIONS FOR OPERATION ICEBERG WITH TARGET DATE 8 MARCH EAST LONGITUDE IN ACCORDANCE CONCEPT CINCPOA.

JOINT STAFF STUDY NOW IN PREPARATION. OPERATION WILL BE COMMANDED BY ADM. R. A. SPRUANCE WITH VICE ADM R. K TURNER.

COMMANDING JOINT EXPEDITIONARY FORCES AND LT GEN S. B. BUCKNER COMMANDING ALL EXPEDITIONARY TROOPS. TROOPS TO MOUNT OUT FOR OPERATION INCLUDE AN ARMY CORPS OF 2 ARMY DIVISIONS AND AN AMPHIBIOUS CORPS OF 3 MARINE DIVISIONS. 1 ARMY DIV AND 1 MARINE DIV

HARDIV WILL BE HELD IN AREA RESERVE. CORPS AND DIVS ABOVE WILL HAVE NORMAL SUPPORTING TROOPS ALL TO BE DESIGNATED LATER.

---

**TOP SECRET**

By ND, JAN 18 1974

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM

No. 4 SPECIAL

310 Pacific

092300

DECCLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/74

COPY NO. 4
**JP SECRET DISPATCH**

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**IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW**

**PAGE 2 OF 2 092300 NCR 9771**

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**GARRISON TROOPS WILL CONSIST OF 2 ARMY DIVS (FROM ASSAULT FORCES) 6 AAA GUN BNS (ARMY) 3 AAA AW BNS (ARMY) 2 AAA S/L BNS (ARMY) 2 AA BNS (MAR) AND 3--155 MM SEA COAST BNS (ARMY)**

GARRISON AIRCRAFT WILL CONSIST OF 4 GROUPS VHFB, 2 SODS VHFB (N), 2 SODS VMB, 2 SODS VPB (HL), 1 SODR VD (ARMY), 1 SODR PHOTO RECON, 2 GRPS VBM (ARMY), 2 GRPS VBD (ARMY), 2 SODRS VPB (MS), 4 MARINE AW SODNS.

**ISLAND COMMANDER WILL BE ARMY AND CONGENPOA WILL PROVIDE NECESSARY SUPPLEMENTAL GARRISON FORCES NOT SPECIFICALLY INDICATED ABOVE. ADDITIONAL DETAILS TO COMPLETE WARNING ORDER WILL BE ISSUED BY LATER DESPATCH.**

**TOP SECRET**

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations.

**DECLASSIFIED**
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/76

**COPY NO. 092300**
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PAGE 1 OF 3

092200  NCR 9755

**TOP SECRET**

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**PAGE 2 OF 3**

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<td>JASCO'S, 2 AMP TRAC BNS. CORPS ARTY CONSISTING OF AN ARTY GRP HISTRS AND 2-155 MM &amp; H BNS. GARRISON TROOPS TO INCLUDE 3 AAA BNS REINFORCED (ARMY) AND 2-155 MM GUN CD BNS (ARMY). SHIPPING AVAILABLE ABOUT D-40. TROOPS TO BE MOUNTED MARIANAS: 1 AMTANK BN, 2 ANTRAC BNS, 2 TANK CO'S. SHIPPING AVAILABLE ABOUT D-12. 3RD MARDIV (REINFORCED) WILL BE HELD IN AREA RESERVE AT GUAM. 1 RCT (ARMY) WILL BE STAGED SAPAN ABOUT 1 JAN AND WILL PROCEED ON CALL TO WORKMAN FOR GARRISON DUTY. AFTER OPERATION 4TH AND 5TH MARDIVS WILL RETURN TO MARIANAS FOR REHABILITATION. GARRISON AIRCRAFT FOR WORKMAN: 3 GRPS VF (ARMY), 2 SQDNS VF (N) (ARMY), 1 GROUP VBH (ARMY), 1 AMG CD (ARMY) PLUS 1 ADDITIONAL SCR 527, 1 SQDN VMTB. ISLAND COMMANDER WILL BE ARMY AND COMGENPOA WILL PROVIDE NECESSARY SUPPLEMENTAL GARRISON FORCES NOT SPECIFICALLY.</td>
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**TOP SECRET**

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**DECLASSIFIED**

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/74
DISPATCH

DRFAFTER EXT. ADDRESSEES PRECEDENCE
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PAGE 3 OF 3 092200 NCR 9755

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP

IN OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

INDICATED ABOVE. CONGENPPOA CONGENFMFAC AND NAVY TYPE COMMANDERS CONCERNED SUBMIT BY 25 OCTOBER TO FULLEST EXTENT

PRACTICAL SPECIFIC DESIGNATIONS UNITS TO BE EMPLOYED DETACHMENT INCLUDING ASSAULT, DEFENSE, AVIATION, CONSTRUCTION

AND SERVICE UNITS. UNIT DESIGNATIONS NOT AVAILABLE 25 OCT, WILL BE SUBMITTED EARLIEST PRACTICABLE. CONGENPPOA IS REQUESTED TO NOMINATE A GENERAL OFFICER OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES AS ISLAND COMMANDER. ALL UNITS WILL BE FURNISHED INITIAL SUPPLIES

BY AGENCIES IN AREA FROM WHICH MOUNTED.

ONICIAL NCR DISTRIBUTION

COMinch($1-$8).....co0

MACORPS($9).....12($10).....OP03($11),....

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

TOP SECRET

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DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/64

092200
(COM 8TH FLEET SENDS ACTION COMINCH.)

FUTURE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS PROPOSED FOR THIS AREA WILL BE
UNDER BRITISH NAVAL COMMAND AND WILL REQUIRE ONLY ONE U.S.
NAVAL TASK FORCE COMMANDER. ACCORDINGLY CONSIDER REAR ADMIRAL
RODGERS AND STAFF OF AMPHIBIOUS GROUP 11 AND BISCAYNE AVAILABLE
FOR IMMEDIATE RETURN TO UNITED STATES. YOUR 21757 REFERS.
RECOMMEND THAT REAR ADMIRAL RODGERS AND ONE MEMBER STAFF RETURN
BY AIR FOR ADVANCE CONFERENCES BISCAYNE PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY
IN ORDER PERMIT EARLIEST INITIATION OF NECESSARY REPAIRS AND
ALTERATIONS. ADVISE.

COMINCH: COPIES 1 TO 8 INCLUSIVE.
**DISPATCH**

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ONCE ORPRACED SUCCESS Full DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH EXPENSED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

(CINCPAO SENDS ACTION CONGENPOA CONSERVPAC CONGENFHPAC, CONGENAEPPOA NOT AN ADEE) PASS INFO DEPCONEP 20TH AF ALSO INFO TO COMFWD AREA CENTPAC CONICHH ISCOM GUAN; COMAIRPAC ISCOM SAPAN

SECRET.

GROUND FORCE SUPPORT FACILITIES PRESCRIBED BY 202141 AUGUST WILL BE REQUIRED FOR SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS NOW BEING PLANNED AND IN PROSPECT, CHANGE IN STATUS OF FORMOSA CAUSEWAY DOES NOT ALTER INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN MY 202141 AUGUST.

ORIGINAL NCR DISTRIBUTION: BY ELR

COMICHH(#18).......COG

12(#9)........30(#10)........

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/94
GENERAL HQTRS. SDBPA

WAR DEPARTMENT

GOLLEN SAN FRAN POE

1 SIGNAL RADIO SECURITY SECTION ACUMULATION. (Leget)

4 QUARTERMASTER TRUCK COMPANIES BEWITCH (Holland)

1 SIGNAL RADIO DETACHMENT (MOBILE) ACUMULATION (Leget)

250 AVIATION RATINGS TEACUP (Manus)

6 TRANSPORTATION CORPS PORT COMPANIES BEWITCH (Holland)

200 WELDEERS AND VARIOUS SKILLS (ENGINEER PERSONNEL)

GELLULOID (Arco Bay)

1 QUARTERMASTER DEPOT SUPPLY COMPANY BEWITCH (Holland)

377 ARMY COMMUNICATION SERVICE PERSONNEL WASHSTAND (Holland)

2 ENGINEER MAINTENANCE COMPANIES ACUMULATION (Leget)

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 9/10/44
# 7 REDO Dispatch

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**FOR ACTION**

**INFORMATION**

**BY SLB.**

**JAN 15 1974**

**CX 19048**

**6 OCT 1944**

**NCR 17521**

Originator fill in DTE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

**ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT**

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**DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4 NLR 101**

By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/44.
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**4480 WELDERS AND SKILLED MECHANICS (ENGINEER PERSONNEL)**

1. HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT TO COMPOSITE BATTALION CELLULOID

2. PHILIPPINE SEA FRONTIER PERSONNEL BERITCH

3. 97TH SIGNAL SERVICE BATTALION DETACHMENT CELLULOID

4. GROUND FORCES REPLACEMENT PERSONNEL (NORMAL) ACCUMULATION

**2460 SERVICE FORCES REPLACEMENT PERSONNEL (NORMAL) ACCUMULATION**

1. AIR FORCES REPLACEMENT PERSONNEL (NORMAL) BERITCH

2. ACORN NUMBER 3% ACCUMULATION

**458 WELDERS AND VARIOUS SKILLS (ENGINEER PERSONNEL)**

1. SERVICE FORCES MAC CELLULOID

2. AIR FORCES MAC SCREWCH

3. HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT, TO COMPOSITE BATTALION CELLULOID

4. AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND PERSONNEL SCHOOLBOY

5. ARMY AIRWAYS COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM PERSONNEL WASHSTAND

---

**TOP SECRET**

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 70, Navy Regulations.
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REQUEST SHIPMENT OF FLEET HOSPITAL NUMBER 114 AND CUB
NUMBER 16, WITH EXCEPTION OF GD SPECIAL NUMBER 3 AND
NUMBER 29 RECEIVED U-44546 OF 23 SEPTEMBER '44 BE DEFERRED

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/94
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**Top Secret; Reclassified Top Secret in accordance with contents.**

**Original Distribution:**

39(1) . . . AOG
BUPERS(2) . . . CGX INCH(3-4) . . . 12(11) . . . OPSEC(12) . . .

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/44
# SECRET DISPATCH

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Unless otherwise indicated, this dispatch will be transmitted with (italicized) precedence and in administrative.

**SECRET**

CINCPOA GIVES ACTION COM 3RD FLEET AND INFO CTF 38.

CHANGE IN OBJECTIVES FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS MAKES IT ADVISABLE INFLECT LASTING DAMAGE ON INSTALLATIONS AND PORT FACILITIES IN FORMOSA.

PASSED BY RADIO HONG TO COMINCH FOR INFO AS JAN 1974.

COMINCH COPIES 1 THROUGH 6.

---

**DECLASSIFIED**

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/74
**DISPATCH**

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**Note:** UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

**Page 1 of 2**

CINC PAC SENDS ACTION 3RD FLEET COMSUBSPAC. INFO COM INCH CINC SOCPA COM 7TH FLEET CTF 71 CTF 72.

THIS ONE TOP SECRET.

CINC PAC ZONE NOTICE 35. REFER TO APPENDIX 4 TO CINC PAC ORDER 1.

FOLLOWING AREAS ARE RECLASSIFIED TEMPORARILY AS INDICATED ON STATED EAST LONGITUDE DATES IN OCTOBER USING ITEM (MINUS 9) TIME.

ALL DEPORT TO SUBMARINE PATROL ZONES UNLESS OTHERWISE SUBSEQUENTLY DIRECTED.

- FUELING AREA COKE IS AIR SURFACE ZONE 8TH AND 9TH.
- PARLOR IS JOINT ZONE 8TH, 9TH AND 10TH.
- NORTH 11-CE OF 125-455 E, CLOSET AND VESTIBULE OF 21-455 N IS AIR SURFACE ZONE 10TH AND 11TH.

**ACTION-30**

**D E C L A S S I F I E D**

E O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/4/74
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**NOTE:** UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AT ADMINISTRATIVE IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW.

**PAGE 2 OF 2**

**NCR 5759**

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COMINCH: COPIES 1 TO 8 INCLUSIVE

**MK**

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/75

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/75
COM 3RD FLEET

CINCPOA

PRIORITY

OCTOBER 2 1944

238

KOTEEN

KOTEEN HARTZELL

$21612

NCR 3948

OPERA

REFERENCE: FEBRUARY 18, 1974

PRIORITY

20TH AF

CINCPOA

CTF 38

REF: TO THIS AS COM 3RD FLEET $21612 ACTION CINCPOA INFO CINCPOA CTF 38, CINCPOA REENCYPHERS AND GIVES INFO COMINCH DEPUTY COMDR 20TH AF. CG AAF FOR PASS DEPUTY COMDR 20TH AF.

"TOP SECRET. REFER CINCPOA 311315 OF SEPTEMBER.

FURTHER STUDY AND CONFERENCE WITH CTF 38 INDICATES

PRACTICABILITY OF STRIKING ALL THE DIAPHRAGM AREA WITH CARRIER PLANES DURING ATTACKS OF 12 AND 13 OCTOBER.

CONSEQUENTLY DESIRE THAT 14TH AND 20TH AIR FORCES CONCENTRATE ON SUBLIME COAST DURING THOSE DAYS AND THAT ATTACKS ON OKAYAMA AS OUTLINED IN COMMANDER ARMY AIR FORCES 311915 BE CONDUCTED EITHER PRIOR TO OR AFTER DAYS OF CARRIER ATTACKS. REQUEST I BE KEPT ADVISED OF THEIR INTENTIONS.

COMINCH COPIES 1 THROUGH 8 REENCYPHERED AS $22146 BY CINCPOA FOR INFO COMINCH AND DEPUTY COMDR 20TH AF.

NO. 1 ADMIRAL

NO. 2 FILE

NO. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM

NO. 4 SPECIAL

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/8/44
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COM 3RD FLT SENDS ACTION COMBAT IV 2 INFO CTF 31 CINCPAC COM 7TH FLEET SUPERS COMHIGH.

CANCEL BY 200555. HAM KINGMAN DETACHED CARRY OUT ORDERS WITHOUT DELAY.

ACTION: F- D5

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/69

TOP SECRET

E21337

3/10 (Pacific)
**P SECRET DISPATCH**

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**COM 3RD FLEET SENDS VIA COM 7TH FLT ACTION COMBATDIV 2 INFO CTF 31 CINCPAC.**

**TOP SECRET**

**DELAY RELIEF OF RADM KINGHAM UNTIL After K2 OPERATION.**

**ORIGIN DISTRIBUTION:**

- BUPERS(1)
- CINCPAC

**NUMBER OF ADDRESSES:**

1

**NUMBER OF ASSOCIATIONS:**

1

**ORIGINATOR:**

(Use G. C. T.)

**TOP SECRET**

**DECLASSIFIED**

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/96
CINCPOA SENDS ACTION TO COM 28TH AF COMNAVGROUP CHINA FOR CHENNAULT. INFO COM3RDFLT COMINCH CINCSWPA.

3RD FLEET FAST CARRIER FORCES WILL STRIKE LEQUIMOUS 10 OCTOBER AND DIAPHRAGM 12 AND 13 OCTOBER. THIS FURNISHED YOU FOR INFORMATION AND POSSIBLE COORDINATION YOUR OPERATIONS.

7 COPIES TO F-341.
From: Advance Echelon, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Hollandia, New Guinea

To: War Department
CG, US Army Forces, China, Burma and India, Forward Echelon, Chungking, China
CG, 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur, India

No: CX 16384 26 Sept 1944


Commanding General US Forces China-Burma-India indicates following 14th Air Force capabilities to support ACCUMULATION operation and prior operations of Third Fleet:

A. Without the use of Kwelien-Luchow airfields, capabilities limited to strikes on air installations within 1000M radius Kunming airfield which includes Hongkong, Hainan and Gulf of Tonkin areas.

B. With Kwelien-Luchow bases available: one heavy bomb group can conduct intensified operations against shipping and air installations in the DIAPHRAGM area (restricted by lack of fighter cover); limited night attacks against shipping concentrations and port installations in WHITEMASH; long range offensive reconnaissance within 1000 miles Kwelien.

CM-IN-25095 (27 Sep 44)

ACTION: F-1

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 2 2 1974

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94
From: Advance Echelon, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Hollandia, New Guinea

Number: CX 18064

Date: 26 Sept 1944

Reference: Our CX 18297, TOO 240919Z, relating to our suggested strikes by 20th Air Force. In view of above capabilities of 14th Air Force, it is suggested that Commanding General US Forces in China-Burma-India be authorized by Commanding General US Army Air Forces to coordinate strikes by the 14th and 20th Air Force in support of SWPA and Third Fleet operations in the DIAPHRAGM area. Coordination of land based and carrier based aviation to be arranged directly between CINCPOA and Commanding General US Forces China-Burma-India. It is suggested that strikes by the 14th and 20th Air Forces be concentrated against hostile air installations in the DIAPHRAGM area and on hostile supporting air installations of the SUBLIME coast within range of DIAPHRAGM-northern WHITENASH areas. Strikes on the DIAPHRAGM area to precede and follow operation of the Third Fleet in the DIAPHRAGM area and during Third Fleet operations land based bombers switch to hostile airfields on SUBLIME coast.

ACTION: Gen Arnold

INFO: OPD

Gen Bissell

Adm King

C of S

CM-IN-25095 (27 Sep 44) 0917Z

DECLASSIFIED

JOE memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/44
From: CG, Advanced Echelon, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Hollandia, New Guinea

To: War Department
CG, US Army Forces in the Pacific Ocean Area,
Pt Shafter, TH

No: CX 18149 22 September 1944

From GHQ SWPA signed MacArthur to Chief of Staff
WAR action COMPOA pass to CINCPOA information CX 18149.

A. WARX 27648 dated 9 September is reference.
Summary of plan for K-2 operation, occupation of the LUBRIFICATE-LOGARITHM area is subject.

Plan provides for major amphibious assault from central bases, supported by 3rd Fleet, target date 20 October 1944, with X Corps (1st Cavalry and 24th Infantry Divisions) XXIV Corps (7th and 95th Infantry Divisions) and the 98th Ranger Battalion. Operation essentially in four phases as follows:

(A) Preliminary, D minus two and D minus one, seize islands at entrance to LUBRIFICATE to insure access for amphibious shipping.

(B) Major assault, D Day, seize the UNERTAKER-KILKENNY area of eastern ACCUMULATION and establish air elements for maintenance of local air superiority; seize control of MATCHABLE to permit access of light naval craft into EMERGENCY; establish control of LACUNA to permit access of light naval forces into WITCHCRAFT sea.

CM-IN-20722 (22 Sep 44)

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHF, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

DECORATED
310 Pacific

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/74

COPY NO.
From: CG, Advanced Echelon, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Hollandia, New Guinea

To: OX 18149

No: 22 September 1944

additional, 2 groups TC, 1 squadron photo, 1 squadron FB 4Y and 1 squadron combat map.

Staff study covering details of the operation is being forwarded.

End.

ACTION: JCS

WARN : ADM LEAHY
GEN ARNOLD
GEN HARDY
GEN BISSELL
ADM KING
C OF S

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

CM-IN-20722 (22 Sep 44) 1623Z mcs

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94
SECRET DISPATCH

DRAFT
FRG: CINCPOA
RELEASED BY:
Dated: 22 Sept 1944
Due Date: 34
Decoded By: MCDONAGG
Paraphrased By: DORSEY
Edited By: DORSEY

ADDRESSEES

COMINCH

RECEIVED

494-11335 (No. 595 and No. 611)

INITIAL ACTION

SECRET

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

CONFIDENTIAL

BASED ON

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

OR OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT.

(COMINCH IS ACTION ON THIS TOP SECRET FROM CINCPOA. RDO CANBERRA PASS INFO TO MACARTHUR STILWELL LEMAY. HARMON IS INFO TO CWO. WAX 32426. HARMON H&S IN ANOTHER SYSTEM)

25TH AIR FORCE ATTACKS ON AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION FACILITIES WHEREVER LOCATED WILL PROVIDE STRATEGIC SUPPORT FOR ALL OPERATIONS. DIRECT SUPPORT CAN BE PROVIDED BY:

A- DESTRUCTION OF OKAEMA AIRCRAFT FACTORY AND REPAIR DEPOT NEAR TAKAO. TARGET DATE ABOUT 14 OCTOBER SUGGESTED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ALLIED COMMAND'S EXPECTATION TO HAVE DISRUPTED ENEMY DEFENSES EXPECTED TO RESULT FROM EARLIER CARRIER ATTACKS ON NORTH PACIFIC. DATE WILL BE FURNISHED IF B29 ATTACK SCHEDULED.

B- COMPLETE PHOTOS COVERAGE OKINAWA.

C- DESTRUCTION HARBOR FACILITIES KEELUNG.

DESTRUCTION OF HARBOR INSTALLATIONS TAKAO NOT DESIRED AT THIS TIME.

No. 1 ADMIRAL
No. 2 FILE
No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM
No. 4 SPECIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/74
DISPATCH

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

212151  NCR 5693

TIME. SUGGEST DEPUTY CCMDR 29TH AIR FORCE BE AUTHORIZED TO CHANGE SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES ON CINCPOA REQUEST.

*AS RECEIVED

COMINC# COPIES 1 TO 8 INCLUSIVE.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94
From: Near Echelon, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Brisbane, Australia

To: War Department
G-2, U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific Areas Ft. Shafter, T. H.

No. C18103 21 September 1944

TOP SECRET to Chief of Staff War Department for action and to CONGENPOA pass to CINCPOA for information from MacArthur C18103.

Recent successes of our land based and carrier based air operations in PHILIPPINES and other intelligence giving evidence of reduced hostile air capabilities for defense point clearly to the feasibility of proceeding directly from LSTs to the main assault against Luzon, leaving the APPARI (Philippines) area to be secured at a later date, there being ample time to install air facilities there before the next move.

SNPA Plan is therefore being amended as follows: major amphibious assault from NEW GUINEA bases target date 20 December 1944, with Sixth Army, First Corps (6th and 43d Infantry Divisions) Fourteenth Corps (40th and 25th Infantry Divisions) Army troops (37th Infantry Division 11th airborne Division an Australian armored Brigade four United States Tank Battalions) operation essentially in three phases as follows:

A. Supported by the Pacific Fleet seize a beachhead in the LUZON area by amphibious assault of four divisions with one reserve division and armed brigade afloat followed by the establishment of close supporting air elements and minimum logistic facilities.

B. Overland campaign southward through the central plain of LUZON to seize Manila and establish base facilities required for support of further operations.

C. Consolidation operations to complete the occupation of LUZON.

Assault commitment 128,000 personnel and 207,000 dead weight tons.

Initial operation will require support by the full resources of the United States Pacific Fleet. In addition to strategic Naval and full carrier based airpots Southwest Pacific resources need augmentation by Naval assault shipping to lift five infantry divisions and 8,000 supporting troops from the NEW GUINEA axis; one armored brigade from AUSTRALIA. It is estimated that amphibious lift assigned Seventh Fleet will be fully committed to provide for approximately 64,000 supporting troops from the NEW GUINEA axis. Coordination with Pacific Ocean area is in progress.
For operations to precede entry into central LUSON contemplate seizure of airstrip area on southwest coast of LUSON to augment direct air support for central LUSON operation and to open a line of seaborne communications through the central PHILIPPINE area.

Staff study covering details of the central LUSON operation will be forwarded at an early date.

Exploitation of possible weakness and the combining of resources available in the Pacific makes possible the assault against LUSON within the time schedule previously projected for the LUST operation. It is anticipated that the central LUSON Plain can be cleared and MANILA occupied by February. This will permit of the launching of contemplated operations to the northward on the schedule now projected with the great advantage of LUSON bases and land-based air support. The LUSON operation will then be unnecessary and, particularly with a prior attack in MANILA, a direct move may be made on ATUCAN. Southwest Pacific Forces meanwhile will complete the liberation of PHILIPPINES, block SOUTH CHINA SEA and proceed to the reconquest of BURMA and NEI by attack from PHILIPPINES and western NEI GUINEA. It is considered that this campaign can be executed with great celerity and with minimum losses. An early dividend will be the recovery of important oil resources.

ACTION: GEN HANDY
INFO: JCS
ADM LEGACY
ADM ARTHUR
ADM KING
C OF S

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date
WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE  

From: Rear Echelon, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Brisbane, Australia  
To: War Department  
       CG, U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific Ocean Areas  
       Ft. Shafter, T. H.  

No. C18103  

21 September 1944  

Re: to Chief of Staff War Department for action and to CONGENPOA pass to CINCPPOA for information from MacArthur C18103.  

Recent successes of our land based and carrier based air operations in EXCELSIOR and other intelligence giving evidence of reduced hostile air capabilities for defense point clearly to the feasibility of proceeding directly from ACCUMULATION to the main assault against WHITENASH, leaving the OBTRUSIVE area to be secured at a later date, there being ample time to install air facilities there before the next move. MUSKETEER Plan is therefore being amended as follows: major amphibious assault from CENTRAL bases target date 20 December 1944 with Sixth Army, First Corps (6th and 43rd Infantry Divisions) Fourteenth Corps (40th and 25th Infantry Divisions) Army troops (37th Infantry Division 11th Airborne Division an Australian Armored Brigade four United States Tank Battalions) operation essentially in three phases as follows:  

A. Supported by the Pacific Fleet seize a beachhead in the SARTORIAL area by amphibious assault of four divisions with one reserve division and armored brigade afloat followed by the establishment of close supporting air elements and minimum logistic facilities.

CM-IN-19603 (21 Sep 44)  

[Signature]

310 Suga

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/1944
I

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
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From: Rear Echelon, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Brisbane, Australia
No. C18103 21 September 1944

B. Overland campaign southward through the central plain of WHITETWASH to seize STEAMROLLER and establish base facilities required for support of further operations.

C. Consolidation operations to complete the occupation of WHITETWASH.

Assault commitment 148,000 personnel and 207,000 dead weight tons.

Initial operation will require support by the full resources of the United States Pacific Fleet. In addition to strategic Naval and full carrier based airport Southwest Pacific resources need augmentation by Naval assault shipping to lift five infantry divisions and 8,000 supporting troops from the CENTRAL Axis; one armored brigade from SPAVIN. It is estimated that amphibious lift assigned Seventh Fleet will be fully committed to provide for approximately 64,000 supporting troops from the CENTRAL Axis. Coordination with Pacific Ocean Area is in progress.

For operations to precede entry into CENTRAL WHITETWASH contemplate seizure of airstroke area on southwest coast of UBIQUE to augment direct air support for CENTRAL WHITETWASH operation and to open a line of seaborne communications through the CENTRAL EXCELSIOR area.

Staff study covering details of the CENTRAL WHITETWASH Operation will be forwarded at an early date.

Exploitation of possible weakness and the combining of resources available in the Pacific makes possible the

CM-IN-19803 (21 Sep 44)

KALUAH

R. O. 11832, Sec 87I and 87I (2)

CM-18 Nov, 1 1942

By SLR

JAN 18-1974
From: Rear Echelon, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Brisbane, Australia

No. C18103 21 September 1944

assault against WHITEWASH within the time schedule previously projected for the ACCUMULATION Operation. It is anticipated that the CENTRAL WHITEWASH Plain can be cleared and STEAMROLLER occupied by February. This will permit of the launching of contemplated operations to the northward on the schedule now projected with the great advantage of WHITEWASH bases and land based air support. The DIAPHRAGM Operation will then be unnecessary and, particularly with a prior attack in SECLUSION, a direct move may be made on DIABOLIC. Southwest Pacific Forces meanwhile will complete the liberation of EXCELSIOR, block BUTTERFLY and proceed to the reconquest of BRIGANTINE and CRINOLINE by attack from EXCELSIOR and western CENTRAL. It is considered that this campaign can be executed with great celerity and with minimum losses. An early dividend will be the recovery of important oil resources.

ACTION: GEN HAN DY
INFO: JCS
ADM LEAHY
GEN ARNOLD
ADM KING
C OF S

CM-IN-19803 (21 Sep 44) 1608Z mcs

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94
WAR DEPARTMENT
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PRIORITY

From: Advanced Echelon, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Hollandia, New Guinea

To: War Department
    Commanding General Pacific Ocean Area, Fort Shafter TH CG, 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur, India

No: CX 18071
    20 September 1944

Chief of Staff War for action and to COMGENPOA pass to CINCPPOA and COMGEN 20th Air Force for information signed MacArthur CX 18071 WARX 27648 dated 9 September is reference.

Summary of plan for effective reduction of enemy air on WHITENASH in support of an attack on DIAPHRAGM by Pacific Ocean Areas Forces, if conducted prior to occupation of central WHITENASH, is subject.

Plan contemplates support by air action of land-based elements from central EXCELSCIN substantially as follows:

(A) Accumulation area, revised K 2 operation, offensive elements, three groups attack bombardment with escorts, effective approximately 5 December, ant two groups heavy bombardment, effective approximately 20 December.

(B) Southwestern UBIC, established by airborne-seaborne operation about 20 December, offensive element, one group attack bombardment from ACCUMULATION with P-51 escort, estimated effective approximately 15 January.

(C) Subsequent augmentation Air Forces in ACCUMULATION area soon as time and engineering resources permit and additional

CM-IN-18951 (20 Sep 44)
PRIORITY

From: Advanced Echelon General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Hollandia, New Guinea

No: CX 18071 20 September 1944

air units become available.

Effective dates:
(A) and (B)
above, are dependent upon one turn-around of Third Fleet assault shipping as part of K2.

Deployment of Air Forces in accumulation area is covered in detail in forth edition, staff study K2, being forwarded. Outline plan for operation into UBIQUE is in process and will be forwarded at an early date. Mende

End

ACTION: GEN HANDY

INFO: JCS
ADM LEAHY
GEN ARNOLD
GEN SISBELL
ADM KING
C OF S

CM-IN-18951 (20 Sep 44) 1944Z mcs

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/11/94
Commander in Chief,
Southwest Pacific Area,
Brisbane, Australia

Commander in Chief,
Pacific Ocean Area,
Pearl Harbor, I. H.

Number: WARX 27648

Book Message from Joint Chiefs of Staff to MacArthur
and Nimitz.

1. Pursuant to and in furtherance of the strategic concept
set forth in J. C. S. 713/4, the Commander in Chief,
Southwest Pacific Area (CINCSWPA) and Commander in Chief,
Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPAC) will conduct the operations
and submit the plans directed below. A firm decision as
to whether Luzon will be occupied before Formosa will be
made later.

2. CINCSWPA will:
   a. After conducting such preliminary operations as
      may be necessary:
      (1) Occupy the Leyte - Surigao area, target date 20
          December 1944.
      (2) Seize and develop bases and install forces in
          the Central Philippines necessary to:
          (a) Support a further advance directly to Formosa
              by Pacific Ocean areas (POA) forces, with target date 1
              March 1945, or alternatively,
          (b) Seize Luzon, target date 20 February 1945.

CM-OUT-27648 (9 Sep 44)
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(2) Th • OCO U 90 t 10 ftho nort~rn Pb1~1ppioeo f01 0 moving the Leyte • lgao operation, v t b tarfet tor th e as1D assault •g,1n.lt t..u&1 tona 20 PebrouarJ 9'5.

3. CINCPAC will:
   a. Furnish necessary fleet support and augment assault shipping for the Southwest Pacific operations directed in paragraph 2 a.
   
   b. Submit plans without delay for:
      (1) The occupation, development and defense of Formosa, including Amoy if necessary, target date 1 March 1945.
      
      (2) Support of the Luzon operation, target date 20 February 1945.

4. CINCPAC and CINCPAC will:
   a. Arrange for coordination and mutual support of the operations and plans directed above.
   
   b. Coordinate plans with the Commanding General, U.S. Forces, China - Burma - India, in order to obtain maximum support from the China - Burma - India Area.
   
   c. Coordinate with the Commanding General, 20th Air Force, to arrange for the conduct of supporting operations CM-OUT-27648 (9 Sep 44)
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING MESSAGE
Number: WAXX 27648  8 September 1944  Page 3

by that air force.

End.

ORIGINATOR: JG/3

INFORMATION: Adm. Leahy
Gen. Arnold
OPD
Gen. Bissell
Adm. King
C of S

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By NSF, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

CM-OUT-27648  (9 Sep 44)  0314Z by

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/74
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This is Top Secret.

Your 031959 requests that you be furnished by 050136:

(A) Objectives and target dates for conceived operations following Causeway and

(B) Acceptability by CINCPAO of a total of 25 air combat groups by December 1944 increasing to 76 such groups including supporting air force ground units by September 1945. You indicated need for such information in order to furnish CINCPAO numbers and types of units to be shipped POA so that he might reply to War Department query on subject. JCS 521/6 and JLPC 38/3 dated 12 August predict availability.

Limited time and information permit at present only general.

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/44

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STATEMENTS AS TO OPERATIONS BEYOND CAUSEWAY. THE REDEPLOYMENT OF ARMY AIR COMBAT GROUPS AND THEIR SUPPORTING GROUND UNITS MUST BE INTEGRATED WITH THE OVERALL OPERATIONAL ASPECTS. IT CAN NOT PROFITABLY BE CONSIDERED SEPARATELY FROM THE REDEPLOYMENT AND OPERATION OF OTHER FORCES. NECESSITY IS STRESSED FOR RETAINING AVAILABLE UNITS IN THE HOMELAND UNTIL THE THEATER IS READY TO RECEIVE AND USE THEM. THE FOREGOING COMMENTS SHOW THAT COMMITMENTS AS TO REDEPLOYMENT OF AIR GROUPS ARE INFEASIBLE UNTIL JCS DIRECTIVES PERMIT FIRMER PLANNING THAN IS NOW THE CASE.

FOR PLANNING PURPOSES TARGET DATE FOR CAUSEWAY IF 15 FEBRUARY BUT A FIRM DIRECTIVE HAS NOT BEEN RECEIVED AND THAT DATE IS SUBJECT TO RADICAL CHANGE. FOR PLANNING PURPOSE ASSUME AS A
CONCEPT OF SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS A SIMILAR OPERATION AGAINST THE MOUTH OF THE YANGTZE RIVER AREA WITH CONCURRENT OPERATIONS AGAINST OBJECTIVES IN NANPO SHOTO AND NANSEI SHOTO WITH TARGET DATE 60 DAYS AFTER COMPLETION CAUSEWAY. IN ADDITION FOR PLANNING PURPOSES ASSUME A CONCEPT OF SEIZURE OF A POSITION IN THE KURILES MOUNTING FROM ALASKAN POSITION WITH A TARGET DATE OF 15 MAY.

PLANS FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS ARE UNDER STUDY AND DEVELOPMENT AND COPIES OF TENTATIVE ONES WILL BE FORWARDED TO YOU AS THEY ARE ISSUED. PLEASE FURNISH ME WITH COPY OF YOUR REPLY TO COMGENPOA ON SUBJECT MATTER.

COMINC: COPIES #1 TO #8 INCLUSIVE.
From: CG, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Rear Echelon, Brisbane, Australia

To: War Department

Nr: CAX 11284

4 September 1944

TOPSEC to AGWAR for action and Commander Allied Air Forces for information CAX 11284 from GHQ SWPA signed MacArthur please pass copy of this radio to Major General Richard J. Marshall.

Your W-60777 dated 5 July 44 and my C-1693 dated 27 August 44, requirements for airborne MUSKETEER operations is subject.

Airborne operations included in MUSKETEER concept are:

A. 7 December 44 seizure of advanced fighter base in northwestern SILVERBAND and operation of two fighter groups for indefinite period by air supply. One RCT and one Parachute Battalion from GOSSIPONGER, total commitment about 7900 troops. Maintenance estimated at 94 plane loads per day for indefinite period.

Talal Island (N-F) WIV-117

B. O.S. 4 February 45 seizure of airradome facilities in Southwest USOOG and maintenance of two fighter groups for 10 to 15 days by air supply. Airborne Division and attached Services from ACCUMULATION, total airborne commitment about 12,000 troops. Maintenance estimated at 115 plane loads per day pending initiation of airborne supply.

C. 5-15 March 45, support of Eastern WHITEWASH operation

Laie Island WIV-3074

(4 Sept 44) Layon Island

CEL

E. O. 11162, Sec. 3(D) and 8(D) or D.G.O.

Ced Letter, May 1, 1974

By SLR Date Jan 18, 1974

Copy No. 48

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 1/11/1994
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SECRET "TOT"
PRIORITY

Page 2

From: CG, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area,
Rear Echelon, Brisbane, Australia

Nr: CAX 11284

by airborne landing west of mountains. Airborne Division
from ACCUMULATION. Total commitment about 8,500 troops.
Maintenance estimated at 50 plane loads per day for 5 to 10
days.

D. 20 March 44, support of southward advance through
Central WHITEWASH. Airborne Division from UBICUE. Total
commitment about 3,500 troops. Maintenance estimated at
50 plane loads per day for 5 to 10 days.

E. Subsequent exploitation operations throughout
EXCELSIOR area by Airborne commitment of reserves from
current bases as the tactical situation dictates.

Current Southwest Pacific Theater allocation of
Tactical Air Transport is five groups troop carrier groups (320
C-47's). Redeployment of troop carrier groups scheduled
under JCS 521/6 is not expected to be operational in theater
in time to implement the above operations.

Continuing requirement MURKETT operations is
estimated at 450 troop carrier aircraft for tactical
employment. The above is exclusive of resources of ATC
aviation which have allocation of 125 planes as compared with
an estimated continuing requirement of 200 for maintenance
of the line of communication.

Overall requirement for gliders is estimated at 800.

CM-IN 3074 (4 Sept 44)

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/44

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From: CG, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Rear Echelon, Brisbane, Australia

Nr: CAX 11284 4 September 1944

Requirement for long range bomber escort suitable for operations from hastily prepared air fields seized in operations listed under 2A, B and C above, is estimated at 4 Squadrons 7-51 type fighters. Confirmation of 2 Air Commando Groups and 2 Combat Cargo Groups tentatively allocated by your W-CO777 for arrival in this theater by 15 October is necessary for conduct of initial operations.

Contemplate employment of 2 Air Commando and 2 Combat Cargo Groups as a unit in northwestern SILVER SAND and UBICUE operations. Air Commando Groups perform escort functions from Northwestern SILVER SAND and UBICUE and Combat Cargo Group operations primary transport element, augmented as necessary, in Central WHITELASH operation.

Definite requirements for use of Air Commandos as self contained units exist in the INTERIOR and SILVER SAND areas including UNRESTING-TOOTHEBRUSH-FORERUNNER in the BACANG, and recovery of Philippine Territory and liberation of Philippines in areas initially by-passed.

Copies of staff studies outlining plans for Northwestern SILVER SAND and Southeast UNIONS operations are enroute to Washington with Major General Roger J Marshall, Deputy Chief of Staff this Headquarters. Staff studies for other Air Commando operations in INTERIOR and SILVER SAND are in preparation but have not yet been completed.

ACTION: Gen Handy
INFO: Gen MacFarland (JC/2) Gen Arnold Gen Bissell Adm King C of S

CM-IN 3074 (4 Sept 44) 09212 on

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Commander in Chief
Southwest Pacific Area
Brisbane, Australia

Commanding General
Alaskan Department
Advance C.F.
Adek, Alaska

Commanding General
Alaskan Department
Near Sckolon
Fort Richardson, Alaska

Commander in Chief
USAF Pacific Ocean Areas
Ft Shafter, T.H.

Commander
North Pacific

Number: WARX 89252

TO SEC for limits for action, to MacArthur, Fletcher, and
Edmonds for information from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

With reference CINCPOA top secret serial 000536 of July 15,
1944 and CINCPOA secret dispatch 1000 of August 20, 1944
Joint Chiefs of Staff approve report of conference regarding plan WEIZLOCK with deletion of subparagraph (D) of paragraph 4, since this item is covered by current directive and normal procedure.

End
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J.O.S. Regrading Memo 44-73

CM-OUT-83252 (29 Aug 44) By SC Date JAN 19 1934

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/44
From: Rear Echelon, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Brisbane, Australia

To: War Department

Nr: C 16693 27 August 1944

SECRET. To Chief of Staff War Department from MacArthur C 16693.

Detailed planning for projected operations has now reached an advanced stage that has produced factual data which, taken in conjunction with the latest information of enemy strength and dispositions, permits revision of the dates of operations contemplated. It is now proposed to execute the following major operations in localities and on the dates indicated below:

Seizure of Morotai Island, 15th September, one division plus one regimental combat team to protect western flank and provide land based air cover for advance to the northward;

Tulagi Islands, 15th October, one division less one regimental combat team, to protect western flank and to provide air bases for neutralization of Mindano and Western Visayas and a base for airborne operations;

Sarangani, 15th November, two divisions, to provide land based air support for Leyte operations;

Bonifacio, Mindano, 7th December, a purely airborne operation, one regimental combat team, one parachute
From: Rear Echelon, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Brisbane, Australia

Nr: C 169393 27 August 1944

battalion, to establish an airfield for fighter cover for aerial neutralization of the Western Visayas and Southern Luzon;

Leyte, 20th December, five divisions, to provide major air and logistic bases for operations to the northward;

Southern Mindoro, about 15th February 1945, one airborne division, one regimental combat team, part airborne, part waterborne, to provide air bases for air operations and to launch airborne operations into Central Luzon;

Aparri, 31st January 1945, two divisions, to establish air bases to cover amphibious and fleet movements between Luzon and Formosa;

Lingayen Gulf, 20th February 1945, one armored division and six infantry divisions, four in assault and two in follow up operations, to occupy Central Luzon.

Additional and subsequent operations in support of the campaign in Central Luzon are shown in the plan which will be furnished you. The execution of these operations will assure the completion of the reconquest of Luzon during the latter part of March.

Operations into Leyte, Aparri and Lingayen Gulf assume available amphibious lift in the Pacific and fleet support. Airborne operations into Bonifacio and Mindoro is planned assume availability at earliest practicable date of Air Commando Units.

COM-IN-24770 (27 Aug 44)
From: Rear Echelon, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Brisbane, Australia

Nr: C 16693 27 August 1944

A representative of this headquarters will depart for Washington about 29th August with draft copies of MUSKETEER, revised according to the foregoing. He will be prepared to discuss this theater's resources for the accomplishment of these operations and to present relatively small essential requirements.

End
From: Rear Echelon, GHQ, Southwest Pacific Area
Brisbane, Australia
To: War Department
No. CX 16299 18 August 1944

Warning order for GOSSIFMONGER follows:

Minor hostile forces of undetermined strength occupy GOSSIFMONGER. Southwest Pacific Forces covered by the 3rd Fleet will seize INVENTION in GOSSIFMONGER to establish air and naval facilities to support future operations in EXCELSIOR. Target date for G Day 15th October. Major troop units:

Philippine Group 32nd Division less 1 Regimental Combat Team, 8 Engineer Battalions.

Objectives for air garrison in the following priority:

By G plus 15, 2 Fighter Squadrons;
By G plus 30, additional 1 Fighter Group and 1 Fighter Squadron, 1 Night Fighter Squadron, 1 Medium Bomb Group;
By G plus 45, additional 1 Heavy Bomb Group (with facilities prepared for the use of 1 Troop Carrier Group if substituted for Heavy Bomb Group);

CM-IN-16434 (18 Aug 44)
From: Rear Echelon, GHQ, Southwest Pacific Area
Brisbane, Australia.

No. CX 16299 18 August 1944

By G plus 60, additional 1 Heavy Bomb Group.

ALAMO Force will prepare to seize by amphibious operation INVENTION, construct necessary air, port and
minor Naval facilities.

Allied Air Forces will prepare to support the operation in conjunction and in coordination with Naval Air;
install the necessary ground echelons for air garrisons and initiate preparations at GOSSIPMONGER for staging and
supporting airborne operations in EXCELSIOR of approximately 1 Regimental Combat Team 32nd Division and 1 Battalion
503rd Parachute Regiment.

Allied Naval Forces will prepare to support the operation by transporting and landing elements of the assault
and supporting forces and furnishing Naval protection therefore; provide motor torpedo boat operations in the
GOSSIPMONGER area by G plus 2 day and establish minor Naval forces as required; details relative to carrier based aviation
support and coordination between land and carrier based aircraft participating in the operations will be communicated to all concerned later.

Partial troop movement directive for concentration follows in separate radio. Combat instructions to amplify
the above will be issued later.

ACTION: Gen Handy
INFO: Gen Arnold, Adm. King
C of S
CM-TH-16434 (18 Aug 44) 14252 bem

DECLASSIFIED
JOE memo, 1-4-74
May 2 1974
By RHP, NLA, Date

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date
From: Rear Echelon General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Brisbane, Australia

To: War Department

No: C 15847 7 August 1944

To Chief of Staff War Department and MacArthur
C 15847 replying your WARX 76573 6th TOP SECRET.

It is deemed preferable to detail from Washington the three officers indicated.

End

ACTION: Gen McFarland

INFC: Adm Leahy, Gen Arnold, Gen Handy, Gen Bissell, Adm King, C of S

CM-IN-6250 (7 Aug 44) 13472 jb
Commander-In-Chief
Pacific Ocean Areas
Fort Shafter, T H

Commander-In-Chief
Southwest Pacific Area
Brisbane, Australia

Commanding General
USASP China, Burma, India
Theater Headquarters
New Delhi, India

Number: WARE 76573

To Nimitz, MacArthur, and Stilwell from The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Although considerable benefit has been derived from deception measures it is recognized that strategic and tactical considerations have precluded their maximum use in the Pacific area. Current developments in the campaign against Japan indicate the advisability of an early extension of such activities. Since time is insufficient for dissemination through normal channels of information as to methods, techniques and devices developed in the war against Germany, it is proposed, if you concur, to provide at an early date special training of about 30 days in Washington for your senior deception officers or, alternatively, to make available for assignment to your staff, on temporary duty of 60 to 90 days, a team of 3 officers trained in the development of planning and coordinated use of all strategic and tactical deception methods, techniques and devices. Such a team would include a representative of the Army, Navy and Army Air Forces and would have full knowledge of over-

CH-007-76573

(5 Aug 44) DECLASSIFIED J.C.S. Revising Wage 44-73

By SR Date JAN 18 1974

DECCLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
all and theater deception planning, the coordination of deception activities on inter-theater and interservice basis, and the most recent developments of devices, techniques and special tactical deception units together with the availability thereof. The names of officers concerned and approximate date of arrival in your theater will be furnished should you desire their assignment. Otherwise please indicate approximate date you could send your deception officers to U.S. for special training. Final arrangements will be made by Joint Security Control after theater requirements are known.

End

ORIGINATOR: Gen McFarland
INFORMATION: Adm. Leahy
Gen Arnold
Gen Handy
Gen Bissell
Adm. King
C of S

CM-OUT-76573 (6 Aug 44) 0013Z 1s
THE CONFERENCE AT MANHOLE ON 3 JULY DISCLOSED THE FACT THAT THE AMOUNT OF Assaulting SHIPping AVAILABLE WAS LESS THAN THAT ANTICIPATED TO BE IN THE PACIFIC FOR OPERATIONS TOWARD THE END OF THE YEAR. THIS NECESSITATES THE USE OF THE SAME AMPHIBIOUS EQUIPMENT IN ACCUMULATION AND IN WINDBAG WHICH REQUIRES A MODIFICATION IN TIMING. ACCUMULATION WILL FOLLOW WINDBAG BY ABOUT 35 DAYS RATHER THAN BY 27 DAYS AS ORIGINALLY PROJECTED.

THE FACT THAT THE FORCES LANDED AT WINDBAG MUST REMAIN THERERE 5 WEEKS BEFORE OPERATIONS AGAINST ACCUMULATION ARE INITIATED DEMANDS CLOSER AND MORE EFFECTIVE AND CONTINUOUS
LAND BASED AIR SUPPORT THAN IS POSSIBLE FROM INTERLUDE. THIS CONSIDERATION FORCES A RECONSIDERATION OF THE PLAN FOR THE OCCUPATION OF GOSSIPHONGER WHICH HAS BEEN ELIMINATED FROM THE ORIGINAL PLAN PRIMARILY FOR LOGISTIC REASONS. IT STILL GIVES, OF COURSE, THE ADDED ADVANTAGE OF PROVIDING MORE EFFECTIVE AIR SUPPORT IN CENTRAL EXCELSIOR AND SOUTHERN WHITEMASH FOR OPERATIONS INTO ACCUMULATION. EXTENSION OF CARRIER BASED SUPPORT CONTEMPLATED IN STALEMATE 2 TO COVER OPERATIONS INTO GOSSIPHONGER IS ASSUMED. FOR THIS REASON RENO 5 HAS BEEN MODIFIED BY THE ADDITION OF AN OPERATION INTO GOSSIPHONGER AND THE SCHEDULE OF OPERATIONS IS NOW PROJECTED AS FOLLOWS:

INTERLUDE, 15 SEPTEMBER SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH STALEMATE 2;
GOSSIPHONGER, 15 OCTOBER;

[Top Secret]

[Signature]

Date

[Stamp]

[Classification]

Page 2 of 3  CX 15229  23 JULY 1944  NOR 16801

[Handwritten Notes]

[Stamp]
**DISPATCH**

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UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

PAGE 2 OF 3  CX 15229  23 JULY 1944  NOR 16801

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP

(Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT.

WIMDAG, 15 NOVEMBER; AND

ACCOMULATION, 24 DECEMBER.

14608 IS CM-IN-622 (8 JULY 44)

CM-IN-19281 (23 JULY 44)

COMINCH COPIES 1 THROUGH 8.

CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY REQUIRES ADDITION OF LETTERS "IVI" TO CLASSIFICATION OF REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE.

RECEIVED BY HAND FROM ARMY.

K. O. 11570, (Sec. 3.3 and 3.4) or (T)

Date

JAN 18 1974

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM

No. 4 SPECIAL

TOP SECRET

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 70, Navy Regulations.

COPY No.

OPNAV 19-76

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date
From: Brisbane
To: WAR
No: C 3302 20 June 1943

Tentative plans outlined in your 4799 15th
(C 3302 Marshall from MacArthur) are disturbing
insofar as they affect operations in this theater.
The objective of Southwest Pacific and South Pacific
operations is the capture of Rabaul and any movements
specifically projected under the current JCS Directive
are merely preliminary thereto, designed to provide
a base of departure for converging attack and adequate
air support and flank protection for the final assault.
Preliminary movements should be followed at the earliest
possible date by the main attack on Rabaul. The
withdrawal of two divisions from this theater as indicated
in your message would preclude such action. The Marine
Division which is my only amphibious unit is scheduled
to take the attack on New Britain. It is anticipated
that the three available Australian Divisions will be
used up in the New Guinea phase with a strong possibility
that an American Division will have to be employed
there. For these reasons the withdrawal of one of my
battle hardened divisions should not be contemplated.
With regard to South Pacific detailed plans for Operation
B are not yet available but in my opinion the withdrawal
of one division will necessitate the most careful study
in order to determine whether it can be undertaken under
the circumstances contemplated by the JCS as set forth
in your message. Since March when the Elston plan was
prepared the enemy has considerably reinforced his
defenses. Our estimate of enemy ground strength in the
Northeastern area has been raised approximately 30,000

(CM-IN-13149 21 Jun 43)
with continued indications of further increases. The air strength in the Southwest Pacific area is estimated to have increased from 568 to 825 airplanes during May period. It is of course not possible to forecast accurately the strength of effectiveness of enemy reaction to our attack but it is believed that the withdrawal of the Marine Division will prevent our planned attack on New Britain. Moreover it is certain that the relief of a United States combat division from this area will result in profound political repercussions. A diversionary attack against the Marshalls would of course assist the main effort in this theater but the troops for the secondary attack should be drawn from the mainland rather than be subtracted from the main attack to an extent that may result in its collapse. It would seem to be wasteful of shipping to move troops from this forward area back to Hawaii. From a strategic viewpoint the withdrawal of troops from South and Southwest Pacific in order to implement an attack from Hawaii against the mandated islands would seem to indicate a complete reorientation. I am entirely in ignorance regarding the discussions and decisions of the recent Washington conference and request that I be advised in this respect insofar as it affects the broad concept of operations in this theater.

From a broad strategic viewpoint I am convinced that the best course of offensive action in the Pacific is a movement from Australia through New Guinea to Mindanao. This movement can be supported by land based aircraft which is utterly essential and will immediately cut the enemy lines from Japan to his conquered territory to the southward. By contrast a movement through the mandated islands will be a series of amphibious attacks with the support of carrier based aircraft against objectives defended by Naval units and ground troops supported by land based aviation. Midway stands as an example of the hazards of such operations. Moreover no vital strategic objective is reached until the series of amphibious frontal attacks succeed in reaching Mindanao. The factor upon which the old Orange plan were based have been greatly altered by the hostile conquest of Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies and by the availability of Australia as a base. There follows the answers to specific questions contained in your despatch:

(CH-IN-19149 21 Jun c.3)

K.O. 11653, Sec. 1(D) and 5(D) or (E)
OEO letter, May 1, 1972
By SLR

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/84

75
Question A Plans contemplate that Lao must be captured prior to proceeding with Operation B. This consideration necessary in order that full aviation support Southwest Pacific can be thrown into operation B. Sequence cannot accurately be determined pending determination reaction of Japanese to preceding operations.

Question B Composition task forces.

Operation 1: 2 Regimental combat teams, 158 Infantry, 112 Cavalry.

Operation 2: 4 Divisions, 7th Australian 9th Australian 6th Australian 1st Cavalry.

Operation 3: 2 Divisions, 1st Marine Division 32nd Division, reserve 24th Division, in rest area 41st Division.

Operation A: 1 Division 43rd Division. Advice from SOPAC not yet received as to composition of task forces for operations B and C.

Question C Estimated overwater equipment to be used as follows:

Operation 1-shore to shore equipment 4 APD's 17 LST's 20 LCI's 20 LCT's 5 APC's 7 LCM's 35 LCV's;

Operation 2-shore to shore equipment 10 LST's 16 LCI's 41 LCT's 17 APC's 92 LCM's 576 LCV's;

Operation 3-ship to shore and shore to shore equipment 4 APA's 13 LST's 15 LCI's 10 LCT's 106 LCM's 834 LCV's.

Operation A 4 APA's 2 AKA's 10 APD's 12 LST's 25 LCI's 35 LCT's 10 APC's.

For operations 2 and 3 figures based on estimated availability after deducting prospective losses and
commitments for maintenance supply in preceding operations. Information relative amphibious equipment for operations B and C not yet received from SOPAC. Estimated dates of commencement and completion as follows:

Operation 1 commence 20th June complete 15th August;

Operation 2 commence 1st September complete 30th December (capture of Lae area by 15th October);

Operation 3 commence 1st December complete 1st February;

Operation A commence 30th June complete 15th September;

Operation B commence 15th October complete 1st December

Operation C commence 1st December complete 15th January.

No Sig.

NOTE: Corrected copy of CH-IN-12647 (20 Jun 43) GPD.

ACTION: GPD

INFORMATION: Log

CH-IN-13149 (21 Jun 43) 15312 ems

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE
PRIORITY

From: CG, GHQ Southwest Pacific Area, Rear Echelon
Brisbane, Australia
To: War Department

From: GHQ SWPA sgd MacArthur to Chief of Staff War Department

Reference is made to Joint Chiefs of Staff directive contained radio WAXL 50007 received here 172135Z.

Due to logistic considerations it is not deemed feasible to advance target dates for scheduled operations. Our resources will be strained to the utmost to meet dates now fixed.

The Formosa Campaign differs radically from operations that have been executed thus far in the Pacific. It is my most earnest conviction that the proposal to bypass the Philippines and launch an attack across the Pacific directly against Formosa is unsound. That operation would have to be launched without appreciable support from land based aviation and be based upon the Hawaiian Islands at a distance of 5,000 miles. Assuming the success of FORAGER there will still be no bases West of Oahu along this line of advance. Under these conditions and with enemy solidly established in strength on Formosa, susceptible of rapid reinforcement from Japan or the mainland and with his Air Bases in a flanking position at effective range in Luzon, I do not believe the campaign would succeed. The hazards of failure would be unjustifiable when a conservative and certain line of action is open. The occupation of Luzon is essential in order to establish Air Forces and bases prior to the move on Formosa. Assault forces could then

18 June 1944

DECLASSIFIED

By RT, NARA, Date MAY 22 1974

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
be launched at short range with effective air support and with every assurance of success.

The proposal to bypass all other objectives and launch an attack directly on the mainland of Japan is in my opinion utterly unsound. There is available in the Pacific only enough shipping to lift about 7 divisions. That fact alone would preclude such an enterprise in the predictable future. Even with unlimited shipping I do not believe a direct assault without air support can possibly succeed.

Since the initiation of our advance the enemy has executed delaying actions within his out-post positions. Our successes in these operations must not mislead us into a suicidal direct assault without air support and with inadequate shipping and bases against heavily defended bastions of the enemy main position.

It is my opinion that purely military considerations demand the reoccupation of the Philippines in order to cut the enemy's communications to the South and to secure a base for our further advance. Even if this were not the case and unless military factors demanded another line of action, it would in my opinion be necessary to reoccupy the Philippines. Philippines in American Territory where our unsupported forces were destroyed by the enemy. Practically all of the 17,000,000 Filipinos remain loyal to the United States and are undergoing the greatest privation and suffering because we have not been able to support or aid them.

CM-YR-25050 (18 Jun 44)
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE
PRIORITY

From: CG, GHQ Southwest Pacific Area, Rear Echelon,
Brisbane, Australia

Mr: CX 13891

18 June 1944

We have a great national obligation to discharge. Moreover
if the United States should deliberately bypass the Philip-
pines, leaving our prisoners, nationals and loyal Filipinos
in enemy hands without an effort to retrieve them at earli-
est moment we would incur the gravest psychological reaction.
We would admit the truth of Japanese propaganda to the effect
that we had abandoned the Filipinos and would not shed
American blood to redeem them; we would undoubtedly incur
the open hostility of that people; we would probably suffer
such loss of prestige among all the peoples of the Far East
that it would adversely affect the United States for many
years. I feel also that a decision to eliminate the campaign
for the relief of the Filipinos, even under appreciable
military considerations, would cause extremely adverse re-
actions among the citizens of the United States. The
American people I am sure would acknowledge this obligation.

In this dispatch I have expressed my firm convictions
with a mere outline of the military factors that enter into
the problem. If serious consideration is being given to the
line of action indicated in paragraphs B and C of your radio,
I request that I be accorded the opportunity of personally
proceeding to Washington to present fully my views.

ACTION: JCS

INFO: Gen Arnold
       OPD
       Adm King
       C of S

CX-18-1565 (18 Jun 44) 2066 Zb

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RBP, NLR, Date

MAY 22 1974

COPY No. 35

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 16, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL BROWN

As you requested, this is a reminder for you to tell the President that the new target date for step No. 1 in the Southwest Pacific area operations is June 30 instead of June 15. You might also mention to him that the target date for step No. 2 in the operation is September 1.

For details of the above mentioned steps, your attention is invited to the attached memorandum.

Very respectfully,

Chest. Harmon
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

JAN 20 1974

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/46
INCOMING MESSAGE
PRIORITY

From: CG, Rear Echelon, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Brisbane, Australia
To: War Department
Nr: C 12909
25 May 1944

TOPSEC from MacArthur personal for General Marshall C 12909.

Morning of May 27th plan to land 41st Division less 1 combat team on Biak Island. This base 200 miles west of Wakde commands Geelvink Bay and western tip of New Guinea. Its seizure will strategically close the New Guinea campaign and Air Forces will then be concentrated forward to neutralise for Philippine advance.

No Sig

ACTION: Gen Handy

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
Col Park
Corf...
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

E. O. 11141 (Rev. 3-67) and 351 (N)
Confidential Information, 6-1972

By SLR
Date: JAN 20 1974

From: CG, Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, Brisbane, Australia.

To: War Department.

No: C-12287

8 May 1944.

From GHQ SWPA signed MacArthur to Chief of Staff
War Dept. C-12287. TOPSECRET.

Proposed plan for carrying out directive contained in
Para 35, your 5171, dated 12th March 1944. (for Joint Chiefs
of Staff, your N-33050, dated 5th May), as follows:

A. Exploit success of BEWITCH by advance into the
STICKATWORTH Area about 21st May, in order to obtain fight-
er fields, followed by seizure of HOBARTS about 1st June.
Purpose, more effective support of STALEMATE and operations
in Northwest. Principal element, 1 2/3's Divisions rein-
forced GDP.

B. Seize advance airrome facilities in Northern
HOBARTS about 1st August. Purpose, direct support of sub-
sequent operations in FEARSOME. Principal element, 1 Divi-
sion reinforced.

C. Seize of airrome facilities and neutralization
of hostile forces in FEARSOME about 15th September in coor-
dination with THUNDER. Purpose, provide flank protection
and land-based air support of SILVERSAND operation. Prin-
cipal element, 2 Divisions reinforced. Forces to be employ-
ed and timing are tentative depending on hostile disposi-
tions and developments of situation.

No Sig.

References are: CM-OUT-5137 (12 Mar 44) JCS
CM-OUT-33050 (6 May 44) JCS
CM-OUT-5137 (9 May 44) 0236Z mem
CM-OUT-6163 (9 May 44)

SECRET
COPY No. 33

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2 1994
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  

May 6, 1943,  

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HAMMOND:  

Plan of Operations for SoPac and SoWestPac theatres:

Western Axis  

1. Occupation of Woodlark and Kirawian Islands.  
2. Occupation of Lae, Salamaua, Pinneheaven, and Madang area.  
   (Operation "A" during "F" and "W")  
   (Operation "B" planned to follow operation "W")  
3. Occupation of Western New Britain.  
   (Operation "C" and operation "B" plus later phases of "F" may proceed simultaneously.)

Eastern Axis  

A. Infiltration into New Georgia and/or Isabel without commitment of major forces.  
B. Capture of Buka area.  
C. Occupation of Kiska and neutralization of Buka.  

Three task forces are planned:  
1. Through Solomons. (SoPac forces).  
2. Forces for Woodlark, Kiriwia, Western New Britain (SoPac and SoWestPac).  
3. New Guinea (SoWestPac).

For occupation of Woodlark and Kiriwia concurrent infiltration to both islands is planned, covered by SoWestPac air forces from Goodenough Island, and SoPac and SoWestPac air from Milne Bay.

SoPac will garrison Woodlark with 8,000 men, exclusive of air troops. SoPac also furnishes floating equipment to facilitate operations.
SoWesPac will garrison Kirigina with force of same strength.

The occupation of these two islands will be under a SoWesPac task force commander. SoWesPac air and naval forces will support the operation.

Target date is 15 June. Possible advance parties may be placed thereon at an earlier date.

[Signature]

JOHN KIEFFER
Captain, C.S.
Operations Division, WDQS
Policy Section, WDPD OPD
320.2 TS (25 Mar 44) NNH
March 25, 1944

Commander-in-Chief
Southwest Pacific Area
Brisbane, Australia

Commanding General
USAF in South Pacific Area
Noumea, New Caledonia

Commanding General
USAF in Central Pacific Area
Fort Shafter, T.H.

Number: WARX 14572

book message for MacArthur's action and information

to Harmon and Richardson from Marshall.

Redeployment of forces in the Pacific following operation
RECKLESS is subject, reference Para 6 WD 5171 dated March 12th
to CINC SWPA and WD 989 dated March 12th to COMGENCPAC for
Nimitz action repeated to Halsey from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved the conclusions
and recommendations outlined in JCS 713/5 concerning the re-
deployment of forces following operation RECKLESS and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff direct CINC SWPA and CINCPAC to make arrange-
ments as to availability for transfer of command and assistance
in the physical movement of forces. A copy of the staff study
on this subject (JCS 713/5) is being forwarded for your in-
formation and guidance by special officer courier.

ORIGINATOR: OPD

INFORMATION: General Somervell
General Arnold
Admiral King
Col Mathews

CM-CUT-14572 (26 Mar 44) 1552Z . #v

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101

BY RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94
OUTGOING MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

Operations Division, WDGS Southwest Pacific Th., WDOFD OPD 381 TS
(17 Mar 44) 72968 WLR

March 17, 1944

COMMANDEER IN CHIEF
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
BRISBANE, AUSTRALIA

NUMBER 5339

COMMANDING GENERAL
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES
CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA
FORT SHAFTER, T.H.

NUMBER 1100

Book message to MacArthur for action and Richardson pass to Nimitz for information from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Delay not beyond April 22nd acceptable to Joint Chiefs of Staff. This is in reply to your C-2852, March 14 TOP SEC. Desire every measure be taken to anticipate this date and that such Naval Forces and assault shipping as practicable be returned to CINCPOA control by May 5 and all prior to May 12 deadline

ORIGINATOR: OPD

INFORMATION: C of S
JC/8
Adm King
Gen Arnold
Gnl Mathewson

CM-OUT-7149 (17 Mar 44) 1820Z

SECRET

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

COPY No. 27
OUTGOING MESSAGE

TO: OPD 381 TS (16 Mar 44)
Operations Division, WDGS
Policy Section, WDOFD
2124 CPF Rm 38754

March 16, 1944

COMMANDER IN CHIEF
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
BRISBANE, AUSTRALIA

Number 5349

For MacArthur from Marshall.

On March 11 the British Chiefs of Staff advised US that in pursuance to provisional sextant approval of overall plan for defeat of Japan which serves as a basis for further investigation, Prime Minister is proposing to Mr. Curtin that there be sent to Australia small parties of administrative experts to study Australian potentialities as base for Southwest Pacific Operations. Proposal would advise Australian government that investigation would be purely exploratory and administrative implying no strategic decision or commitment.

Above for your information furnished.

ORIGINATOR: OPD

INFORMATION: Gen Somervell
Gen Arnold
JCS (Col McParland)
Col Mathewson
LG

CM-OUT-7273 (17 Mar 44) 2135Z amr

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date
From: Reer Echelon GHQ SWPA  
To: WAR  
No. 02852  
14 March 1944

From MacArthur to Chief of Staff War Department for Joint Chiefs of Staff. For info COMGENCENTPAC pass to CINCPAC and COMGENSOFPAC pass to Com Third Fleet 02852.

Local requirements make necessary D day RECKLESS operation be 22 April reference JCS 5171 dated 12th March. This would necessitate ultimate date return Pacific Fleet vessels Paragraph 3 (D) directive be extended to 12th May. Request approval.

No Sig

NOTE: 5171 is CM-OUT-5137 (12 Mar 44) JC/S

ACTION: JC/S

INFO:  Gen Handy  
Gen Arnold  
C of S  
Adm King

CM-IN-9774 (14 Mar 44) 1526Z  ejm
From: Rear Schenck (HQ SWPA)
To: WAR
No. 02852
14 March 1944

From MacArthur to Chief of Staff, WAR Department for Joint Chiefs of Staff. For info COMINT/MAC pacific to WINPAC and COMINT/OPAC pacific to Gen Reid, SWPA (02852).

Local requirements make necessary 7-day SWAC (AOC) preapproval. Be 22 April referent JCS 301 dated 14th March. This would necessitate ultimate date return pacific view. Fleet vessels Paragraphe 3 (D) directive be extended to 18th May. Request approval.

Gen Big

NOTE: 5171 is CH-062-5137 (22 March 1944) 30/S
ACTION: 30/S
INFO: Gen Handy
     Gen Arnold
     2 or 3
     ADM King.

CH-IN-9774 (14 March 1944) 1500

310 General
SECRET

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94

COPY No. 32
From: Rear Echelon CHQ SWPA
To: War
No: XC 2038
13 March, 1944

To COMSOPAC for action to CINCPOA, COMINCH and Chief of Staff War Department for information XC 2038:
War pass only to Chief of Staff War Dept all other addressees passed to via Naval channels.

In accord with instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff carried in radiogram 5171-12th operations instructions number 44/3 for the seizure and occupation of FOREARN area are revoked.

Emirau Island
Emirau Island

You will seize, occupy and defend BEEFSTEAK, establish therein air and light naval forces to assist in the air and naval blockade of CARDIGAN and in the neutralization of ANACONDA, continuing your present naval and air activities in neutralization of FOREARN and MEINSAHR. The BEEFSTEAK operation will be conducted with minimum ground combat forces at the earliest practicable date. Advise when the attack may be initiated and your outline plan.

5171 is CM-OUT-5137 (12 Mar 44) JCS No Sig

ACTION: GENERAL HANDY

INFORMATION: GENERAL ARNOLD

CC:

COL. MATHEWSON

CM-IN-8932
(13 March 44)
1332 Z

XCVRF

N. P. 11595, Sec. 5(B) and 5(D) or (F)
OCD letter, May 4, 1974

By SLR

Date

310

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date
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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

Joint Chiefs of Staff 7145
12 March 1944

CINC SWPA BRISBANE AUSTRALIA Number 5171
COMM CENTPAC Number 839

Book message for MacArthur and Richardson pass to Halsey from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Para. 1. With reference to our dispatch of March 9 (4785 to CINC SWPA, 729 to COMM CENTPAC) the Joint Chiefs of Staff have further decided that the most feasible approach to the Formosa-Luzon-China area is by way of Mariana-Guadalcanal-Palau-Mindanao area, and that the control of the Mariana-Guadalcanal-Palau area is essential to the projection of our forces into the former area, and their subsequent effective employment therefrom. Examination leads us to the decision that effective lodgement in the former area will be attained by the following main courses of action:

a. Cancellation of FORKATI. Complete the isolation of the Rabaul-Novl is area with the minimum consistent of forces.

b. Early completion of Manus occupation and development as an air and fleet base.

c. Occupation of Hollandia by CINC SWPA, target date April 15, 1944. The objective is the establishment of heavy bombardment aircraft for preliminary air bombardment of the Palau and neutralization of western New Guinea-Halmahera area.

d. Establish control of Mariana-Guadalcanal-Palau area by FAA forces-
   (1) By neutralization of Truk.
   (2) By occupation of the southern Mariana, target date June 15. The objective is to secure control of sea communications through the Central Pacific by isolating and neutralizing the Carolines and by the establishment of sea and air bases for operations against Japanese sea routes and long range air attacks against our home land.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS letter, 5-10-73
& OSD letter, 5-6-72
JAN 20 1974

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/15/1944
(3) Occupation of the Palaus by FOA forces, target date September 15. The objective is to extend the control of the eastern approaches to the Philippines and Formosa, and to establish a fleet and air base and forward staging area for the support of operations against Mindanao, Formosa and China.

2. Occupation of Mindanao by SOWESPAC forces, supported by the Pacific fleet, target date November 15. The objective is establishment of air forces to reduce and contain Japanese forces in the Philippines preparatory to a further advance to Formosa either directly or via Luzon, and to conduct air strikes against enemy installations in the N. E. I.

3. Occupation of Formosa, target date February 15, 1945, or occupation of Luzon should such operations prove necessary prior to the move on Formosa, target date February 15, 1945. Planning responsibilities as follows: Formosa-CINCPOA; Luzon-CINCPOA.

Para. 2. Action addresses submit to Joint Chiefs of Staff and to each other at earliest practicable date outline operation plans to support the foregoing concept.

Para. 3. We direct that CINCSWA:

a. Cancel FOREARM operation and complete the isolation of the Rabaul-Kavieng area with the minimum commitment of forces.

b. Expedite occupation and development of the Admiralties as a base for:

(1) SWPA air forces to complete the neutralization of Rabaul and Kavieng and assist in the neutralization of Truk and Palau.

(2) F0A air forces to assist in the neutralization of Truk and Palau.

(3) Units of the United States fleet as required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. Should additional air base facilities be required, Emirau and Manus should be occupied and developed for this purpose.
d. Occupy Hollandia, target date April 15. Forces available are those assigned your area plus Pacific Ocean area forces allocated for FORERUN-MERCANTILE, excluding those Marine units assigned for these operations, fast carrier groups and old battleships. All Pacific fleet APA, AKA, AGC, allocated for FORERUN-MERCANTILE-ABSTRACT will be returned to Guadalcanal or other designated SOPOC ports and released to CINCPAC not later than May 5.

Pacific Fleet combatant vessels including GARDEN 22 and 24 with screens will be released by you and returned to CINCPAC control not later than May 9.

g. Following Hollandia, with available forces conduct operations along New Guinea coast and such other operations as may be feasible in preparation for support of the Palau operation and the assault on Mindanao.

Para. 4. We direct that CINCPAC:

a. Institute and intensify to greatest practicable degree aerial bombardment of the Carolines from bases in Marshalls and Admiralties in order to hasten the neutralization of Taruk and the other islands of this group. Conduct carrier strikes against Marianas, Peleliu, Carolines, and other profitable targets.

b. Provide cover for the occupation of Hollandia and other operations in the Southwestern Pacific area.

c. Occupy the southern Marianas target date June 15, and establish land based aircraft, VLR bases and secondary naval facilities.

d. Occupy the Marianas-Palau line.

Para. 5. We direct that CINCPAC and CHINSPAC on their representatives confer and prepare plans for the coordinated and mutual support of the operations ordered in paragraphs 3 and 4.

Para. 6. With reference to the forces of the Southwest Pacific and Pacific Ocean area, a redeployment is now under way and completion will be expedited.

CM-OUT-5137 (12 Mar 44)
ORIGINATOR: JCS (Col McFarland)

INFORMATION: Gen Handy
Gen Arnold
Adm King
C of S
Colonel Mathewson

OK-OUT-5137 (12 Mar 44) 2116Z mos

DECLASSIFIED
JCS letter, 8-18-78
& OSD letter, 6-3-72

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
Recent seizure of a foothold in the Admiralties which will shortly be followed by complete occupation presents an immediate opportunity for rapid exploitation along the north coast of New Guinea. To this end I propose to make the Hollandia area instead of Buna Bay my next objective, capturing the airfields and base in that vicinity for further support of operations toward the Philippines. The enemy has concentrated the mass of his ground forces forward in the Madang-Wewak area, leaving relatively weak forces in the Hollandia Bay area. He is attempting to concentrate land based Air Forces in the area of western New Guinea and is developing additional fields in order to consolidate this area into a bulwark of air defense. Southwest Pacific land and air forces are disposed favorably to launch a 2 division reinforced assault against the objective. Preparations are being completed for the forearmed operation and this stronghold should fall quickly into our hands. Naval forces of the South and Southwest Pacific areas have established surface control of the Bismarck Sea and have been augmented for the forearmed-mercantile and Buna Bay operations, the latter tentatively scheduled for late April. I propose that the FORARM operation, proceeding in accordance with schedule, be followed between the 15th and 24th of April by an assault on Hollandia, using for the forearmed-Hollandia operations the means of the South and Southwest Pacific Areas as augmented for forearmed-mercantile and Buna Bay operations including
coverage. For this purpose it will be necessary to detain that part of the Naval reinforcements allocated from the Central Pacific to the South and Southwest Pacific for the foreseen merchantile but which were not included in the Hanana Bay allocation for a short additional period. It will also be necessary to continue the operation of the South Pacific force in the Theatre of the Southwest Pacific area until Hollande is secured. I request prompt approval. Admiral Halsey concurs.

Establishment of our forces in this area will have wide implications. It will hopelessly isolate some 40,000 of the enemy ground forces along the New Guinea coast, will close in our hands airfields from which our land based air forces can dominate the Vogelkop and hasten the advance westward by several months.

Hqng

ACTION: JG/3

INFORMATION: C of S
Adm King
Gen Arnold
Col Mathews, General Handy

ON-IN-3318 (5 Mar 44) 1550Z vh

By SIR Date JAN 20 1974

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/44
Joint Chiefs of Staff

March 2nd, 1944

CINC SUSA, BRISBANE AUSTRALIA

Number 4785

CONGEOCEPAC, PT SHAFFER TH

Number 729

Hand message for MacArthur and Richardson pass to Himitz from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In clarification paragraph 5 COS 417/2, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have decided that our first major objective in the war against Japan will be the vital Luzon-Faroes-China coast area. Strategy will be directed to attain this objective by the most direct and expeditious course possible. Directions of such strategy, including allocation of means, continues to be the function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As indicated in Paragraph 7 of COS 417/2 planning should be conducted on a basis which will permit flexibility in adjusting operations to the changing situation. To this end, plans should be prepared for all probable operations. Timely recommendations regarding the adjustment of succeeding operations to the changing situation will be required by Chiefs of Staff.

ORIGINATOR: JCS (Capt Rcyal, USN)

INFORMATION: ORD

C of S

General Arnold

Admiral King

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By HST, NLR, Date MAY 22, 1974

CM-OUT-682 (2 March 44) 1836Z 8Jv

COPY No. 35

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DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/84
MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL MATHEWS:

Subject: Schedule of Pacific Operations

This schedule has been approved "in principle" by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the President and Prime Minister. It should be considered as being a firm schedule for planning purposes, always taking into account the overriding priority of POINTBLANK and the statement that "nothing must be undertaken in any part of the world which hazards the success of these two operations" (OVERLORD and ANVIL).

F. H. ROBERTS,
Brigadier General, S.S.C.,
Chief, Strategy & Policy Group,
8. Operations in the Pacific

b. Central, South and South West Pacific. Operations will be conducted as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Dates</th>
<th>Central Pacific</th>
<th>Southwest Pacific</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-31 January 1944</td>
<td>Seizure of the Marshalls, including Eniwetok and Kusale.</td>
<td>Complete the seizure of Western New Britain; continue neutralization of Rabaul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 February 1944</td>
<td></td>
<td>Seizure of Hansa Bay area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 March 1944</td>
<td></td>
<td>Capture of Kavieng</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 April 1944</td>
<td></td>
<td>Seizure of Manus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 May 1944</td>
<td>Seizure of Ponape</td>
<td>Seizure of Hollandia (Humboldt Bay)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 June 1944</td>
<td></td>
<td>Initiate V.L.R. bombing of vital targets in the Netherlands East Indies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 July 1944</td>
<td>Seizure of Eastern Carolines (Truk area)</td>
<td>Advance to westward along north coast of New Guinea to include Vogelkop.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 August 44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 October 1944</td>
<td>Seizure of Guan and Japanese Mariana.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 December 1944</td>
<td>Initiate V.L.R. bombing of vital targets in Japanese &quot;Inner Zone&quot; from bases in the Marianas.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To MacArthur for action, to Nimitz and Halsey for information from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Harmon pass to Halsey, Richardson pass to Nimitz.

Quadrant decisions as set forth in CGS 319/5 insofar as they pertain to the war against Japan were projected only so far in the future as the situation permitted when the decisions were made. Until the defeat of Germany occurs, the Combined Chiefs of Staff have decided to push the war against Japan by maintaining unremitting pressure against her from every direction, subject to the availability of the means at our disposal. This pressure initiated by you in the Southwest Pacific and through Halsey in the South Pacific is now to be extended to the Central Pacific and to Burma. We hope to gain some advantage from operations in China, particularly air, in order to keep China in the war and to maintain constant pressure from that direction. A thrust from the North Pacific is also a possibility though at a much later date. The dispositions taken by the Japanese to meet our efforts will have considerable influence on the ultimate decision as to the main effort for the forces from the Pacific and Southwest Pacific areas. The important thing is constant pressure from all directions until means become available for the kill.

Although decision has not been made by the Chiefs of Staff covering operations in the Southwest Pacific beyond those set forth for the seizure of the Admiralty Islands, Bismarck Archipelago and the north coast of New Guinea as far west as Vogelkop, plans must be perfected for further operations beyond those phases. It appears that the next logical objective for the Southwest Pacific Forces is the seizure of Mindanao. However, it may be found practicable to make this effort from the Central Pacific or to concentrate our effort in a thrust farther north through the Bismas. Our rapid expansion and immediate availability of CM-002-630 thru 6X (2 Oct 43) DECORATED JCS memo, 1-4-44
By HHF, HSL, Date MAY 22 1944 COPY No.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date _/ \\ / _/
of Naval surface forces including carriers is giving us a decided advantage in Naval strength. Not to make full use of this would be a serious error. We must seek the best method and the most fruitful area in which to utilize this asset.

The significance of your impending discussions with the Australian Government is appreciated. We hope you will point out that our best chance of a quick defeat of the Japanese can only be obtained by applying the greatest possible effort with coordinated timing along each of the avenues of approach. Any let-down on the part of the Australians can only result in a drag on operations. It is of the greatest importance that they continue supporting you to the utmost.

In order to capitalize on any weakening in the Japanese resistance in your area, it appears of great importance that your plans for the reentry into the Philippines be perfected as quickly as possible. With the groundwork you have already laid there, you have an excellent chance of success in such an operation as soon after you reach Vogelkop as means become available, assuming that the Naval carrier offensive has made anticipated progress. These plans should be developed on 2 assumptions: let on the basis of a gradual build-up of the strength in SWPA generally at the present rate and 2nd, on the basis that the main effort will come in your area. Decision as to the ultimate plan to be adopted must necessarily be deferred.

No Sig

ORIGINATOR: OPD

INFORMATION: GEN STRONG
ADM KING
GEN ARNOLD
JCS (CAPT ROYAL)
ADM LEARY
LOG

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RSP, NLR, Date MAY 2 2 1974

CM-OUT-630 (2 Oct 43) 1459Z eja
CM-OUT-631
CM-OUT-632

COPY No. 2

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/74
From: Brisbane
To: WAR

No number. 30 August, 1943.

Commencement number 2 operation is 3 days later than (to Chief of Staff War Department from CINC ADV GHQ sgd MacArthur) tentative date my C 3302 June 20th last paragraph.

No Sig

FOOTNOTE: C-3302 is CM-IN-13149 (21 June 43) OPD

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: SGS

LOG

CM-IN-22896 (30 Aug 43) 1727Z fbb

E. O. 11142, Sec 3(6) and 4(3) of (8)

By DRR Date JAN 9 1974

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/74
SUGGESTIONS contained in your 5972 21st
contemplating capture of Wewak prior to Rabaul would
involve hazards rendering success doubtful. Our
plans for operations along north coast of New Guinea
do not contemplate original amphibious move directly
against Wewak because of its heavy garrison and other
difficulties but rather its initial isolation by cap-
ture of the comparatively lightly held locality west
of Wewak and the advance of our bomber line resulting
from cartwheel. (C 4183 to Chief of Staff War Depart-
ment from CINC SEPA sgd MacArthur) outline of this
plan and estimate of forces will be forwarded to you
shortly. This operation is certain to be opposed by
hostile Naval elements in full force and consequently
must be supported by our major fleet units. These
are now based at Espiritu Santo and Noumea, too remote
from the scene of action to permit of necessary support.
An adequate forward Naval base must be provided which
cannot be met in New Guinea because hazards of Viti
Strait would force major elements to sortie from
Solomon Sea by route eastward of New Britain thus
involving excessive distances. From point of view
of physical characteristics and strategic location

CM-IN-16419 (23 Jul 43)
Rabaul is the only locality which lends itself to the development of such a base and in consequence its capture is a prerequisite to a move in force along the north coast of New Guinea. It will also provide the facilities necessary for fleet support for subsequent operations.

No Sig.

FOOTNOTE: 5972 is CM-OUT-8604 (21 Jul 43) OPD

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: Gen Deane (CC/S)
Adm King
LOG

CM-IN-16419 (23 Jul 43) 1355Z eijv

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/45
Most feasible operations to immediately follow 

Cartwheel now appear to be the isolation of Rabaul by 

the seizure of Kavieng and Manus Island and an 

operation to capture Wewak (to MacArthur signed Harshall 

information copies to Richardson to pass to Nimitz, 

Farron to pass to Halsey) for Timing refer to Navy 

message number 202204 dated 20 July. If you concur 

in this concept, outline plans to cover these 

operations together with a detailed estimate of 

forces required. Including Naval Forces, are desired 

before 1 September for Joint Chiefs of Staff consideration.

Originator: OPD

Information: ADM. KING 

GEN. DEANE (CCS) 

LOG

CM-OUT-8604 (21 July 43) 23222Z mjc
CM-OUT-8605
CM-OUT-8606
Note: 1. Operation B (Ruine Faisi) to offer capture of Lae.

2. Operation 3 (Western New Guinea) commence before completion.
Present dispatch is in reply to your 501/22nd
from Arnold to Kenney for action and should be considered
(Personal for General Marshall from MacArthur C 3413)
in conjunction with my reply to your 4769 15th which was
transmitted in my C 3302 and with Halsey's comments
forwarded in my C 3364/22nd. One heavy bomber group
and one medium bomber group do not represent very appreciable
air strength when considered in relation to the masses of
air strength employed in other theaters but they comprise
a very high proportion of the total strength available
to this area, being 1/3 of the heavy bombers and 1/2 of
present strength and 1/3 of projected strength in medium.
The nature of operations involved in offensive movement in
this theater giving due consideration to the enemy's
composition strength dispositions and tenacious defense
together with the logistic problems imposed by local
geography demands more than normal air superiority.
Practically air supremacy is essential to success. With
my present strength this is problematic. The withdrawal
of 2 groups of bombers would in my opinion collapse the
offensive effort in the Southwest Pacific Area. In my
judgement the offensive against Rabaul should be considered
the main effort and it should not be nullified or weakened
by withdrawals to implement a secondary attack and troops
and equipment for the movement now under consideration in

CM-IN-15013 (24 June 43)
WASHINGTON should be drawn from rear areas. This will be equally appreciable in January or February. I believe we can anticipate continued strengthening of enemy defensive dispositions and must contemplate reinforcing rather than weaken forward areas as the action progresses.

No Sig

5011 is CM-OUT-9400 (22 June 43) General Arnold
476 is CM-OUT-6093 (15 June 43) OPD
C-3662 is CM-IN-12647 (20 June 43) OPD
C-3564 is CM-IN-13803 (22 June 43) OPD

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: SGS
GENERAL ARNOLD
LOG

CM-IN-15013 (24 June 43) 11532

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/74
Amplifying my 3302 20th there follows paraphrase of dispatch just received from Halsey (Marshall from MacArthur C 3364) "Major forces to be employed: Operation A 43rd Division and about 1/3 37th Division with 2 Raider Battalions, 2 Defense Battalions and Supporting Artillery supported by all available Naval units with submarines covering operations. Operation B 28th Division 3rd Mardiv 2 Raider Battalions 2 Defense Battalions 1 Antiaircraft Regiment supporting Artillery with all combat loaders and all available landing craft supported and covered by all available Naval units. Timing in accordance with CINC SOUTH PAC Directive. Details of operation against Soem and Buka have not yet been prepared since situation there cannot be foreseen at this time but it is believed that foregoing units less combat loaders can handle the situation. 2nd Mardiv and New Zealand Division plus other lesser units had been selected tentatively for operation against Rabaul in early 1944. Contemplated detachment 2nd Mardiv and all combat loaders will result in New Caledonia having no infantry garrison after about August as intend stage New Zealand Division to Guadalcanal as reserve. Will be severe strain on my logistics and will prevent relief in forward areas of any divisions suffering from battle and climatic casualties. We are thus allowed no leeway in time manpower or trans-
From: Brisbane
To: War

No. C 3364, 22 June 1943

Port for operation B. After withdrawal of 2nd MarDiv and the initiation of operation B all my Divisions including New Zealand Division will be stationed in Solomons with exception of 1 Division in Fiji. Harmon concurs.

No Sig

FOOTNOTE: 3302 in CM-IN-12847 (20 June 43) OPD

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: LOG

CM-IN-13605 (22 June 43) 0936Z flw

[Signature]

By NLR Date JAN 20 1974

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/94
WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
OUTGOING MESSAGE  
Operations Division  
Strategy & Policy Group  
DUE 381 SEC 6/14/43  

June 14, 1943  

CENT SWPA BRISBANE AUSTRALIA  
Number 4709  

CG SO PAC AREA (REAL SUBS)  
NEW Caledonia  
Number Rune 3591  

CG HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT  
Number 4802  

This message is from Joint Chiefs of Staff to CENTSWPA for action (Richardson and Harman pass to Hines and Halsey for information). Signed Marshall.

Present naval strength in Pacific with prospective reinforcements dictates increased tempo of operations against enemy in Pacific areas. Burma operations may require specific naval operations in November, but Joint Chiefs of Staff are not considering operations in Central Pacific based on following assumptions relating to Cartwheel:  

A-Operation 1 commences 15 June complete 1 August.  
B-Operation A commences 16 November complete 16 December.  
C-Operation B commences 1 November complete 10 November.  
D-Operation C commences 30 November complete 31 December.  
E-Operation 2 commences 1 December complete 1 March.

Tentative plans submitted by planning agencies contemplate employing 2nd MarDiv all combat loads and major part of Naval forces from South Pacific Area and 1st MarDiv from Southwest Pacific against Marshall from New or South Pacific Port about 15 November. Arrival of last 4 LSMs allocated to SOPAC will be delayed about 1 month in Fall and December is urgently needed for immediate planning purposes. An outline of operations in South and Southwest Pacific Areas giving dates that may affect present basis of planning for Central Pacific operations. It is recognized that it will probably be necessary as the successive operations develop to alter these dates accordingly. However, unless they are established now for planning purposes it is not practicable.

DECLASSIFIED  
JCS letter, 6/10/73  
& OSD letter, 8-3-72  
JAN 20 1974  

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/23/1944  

COPY No. 20
SECURITY CONTROL

to provide a structure for our operations throughout the Pacific and Far East.

Desire following specific information: A-will operation 2 not be commenced until after completion of operation 1. B-composition of Task Forces for each operation, with particular regard to designation of major Ground Force Units. C-what ship to shore and what shore to shore operations are contemplated with dates of commencement and completion and numbers and types of assault shipping and landing craft to be employed.

No Sig.

ORIGINATOR: OPD
INFORMATION: ADM/3/16

CM-OUT-5083 (15 June 43) 15582 03V
CM-OUT-3084
CM-OUT-3095

DECLASSIFIED
JCS letter, 6-13-43
& OSD letter, 6-3-43

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FOR THE EYES OF GENERAL MARSHALL ONLY

PRIORITY

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Brisbane
To: War

No. C-3134 June 12, 1943

Firm dates for operations, for Chief of Staff War Dept only sgd MacArthur, reference your radio 4656 May 11th, beyond operation 1 and operation A, refer to my radio C-2206 May 5th, cannot be given. (C-3134) Tentative dates for institution operation 2 in September lst. Tentative dates of operations beyond the capture of Lae Finschhafen Salamaua area in operation 2 and the sequence of other operations are no dependent on the degree of success attained and probable enemy reaction that an estimate of Estim is pure guess work. It is anticipated that operation B will follow the capture of the Lae Finschhafen Salamaua area. Later phases of operation 2, operation 3, and operation C will follow operation B.

H.O. 11352 Sec. 337 and 537 at (X)
Copy here, May 1, 1943

By NLR

Note: 4656 is CM-OUT-4580 (11 Jun 43) OPD
C 2206 is CM-IN-3409 (6 May 43) OPD
Action: OPD
Information: SGS, Gen. Deane (CC/S); Adm King
CM-IN-7367 (12 Jun 43) 1315Z vc

COPY No. 10

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date }
From: Brisbane
To: WAR

No. C 2206 May 5, 1943

General plan of campaign to accomplish Joint Chiefs of Staff directive radio 2407 March 29th, reference your 3416 April 3rd, is briefly as follows:

Operation the Western Axis occupation of Woodlark and Kiriwina Islands; operation A Eastern Axis infiltration into New Georgia and/or Ysabel Island without commitment of major forces; operation 2 Western Axis capture of; operation C Eastern Axis and operation 3 and later phasen of operation 2 Western Axis may proceed simultaneously. (Three Task Forces are planned for use 1 through the Solomons composed of South Pacific Forces; 1 to occupy Kiriwina and Woodlark Islands and Western New Britain composed of Southwest and South Pacific Forces; and a 3rd in New Guinea composed of Southwest Pacific Forces.) The general details of employment of forces in operations along Eastern Axis and in operations 2 and 3 Western Axis are essentially the same as plans which were presented by Staff Representatives at Washington. (Marshall from MacArthur C 2206) for the occupation of Kiriwina and Woodlark Islands a concurrent infiltration movement to both is planned covered by Southwest Pacific Air Forces from Goodenough Island and South and Southwest Pacific Air Forces from Milne Bay. Arrangements have been perfected with COMSOPAC to furnish an occupying garrison for Woodlark Island composed of approximately 8,000 men exclusive of air units. The South Pacific also furnishes floating equipment to facilitate the operations. A Southwest Pacific Garrison of similar strength is to supply occupying force for Kiriwina Island. The occupation of both islands is under a southwest Pacific Task Force Commander for coordination and control. Southwest Pacific

CM-IN-3409 (6 May 43)

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/44
Air and Naval Forces support the operation. Detailed planning is now in progress and June 15th is target date for the occupation, although some advance parties may be placed thereon at an earlier date.

No Sig

*Being Serviced.

Note: 2407 is CM-OUT-11091 (29 Mar 43) OPD
      3416 is CM-OUT-1108 (3 May 43) OPD

Action: OPD

Information: Gen. Deane
             Adm. King
             Adm. Lesby
             LOG

CM-IN-3409 (6 May 43)  0634Z  vc
From: Brisbane Australia
To: War
No. C-2206 May 5, 1943

Omission in line 8 should read as follows:

Lae Salamaus Finchhaven Madang Area; operation B Eastern Axis capture Buin Faisi Area; operation C Western Axis occupation Eastern New Britain; operation C Eastern Axis occupation Kieta and neutralization Buka. Sequence and timing subject to fluctuation of tactical circumstances. Planning purposes it is assumed operation A Eastern Axis will proceed during operations 1 and 2 (Western Axis; operation B Eastern Axis will follow occupation and consolidation of Lae;

Omission in line 10 should read as follows:

3 Task forces are planned for use: 1 through the Solomons composed of South Pacific Forces;

No Sig.

Supplementary copy of CM-IN-3409 (6 May 43) OPD
ACTION: OPD
INFORMATION: COL HAMMOND
GEN DEANE (CCS)
ADM KING
ADM LEAHY
LOG CM-IN-3654 (6 May 43) 1659Z mcs

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/94.
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INCOMING MESSAGE

CORRECTION

From: Brisbane
To: WAR

No. C-2206, May 5, 1943

The following is a correction to the Supplementary Copy. The correction is in the 3rd line of the supplementary copy.

Operation 3 Western Axis occupation Western New Britain;

No Sig

NOTE: See CM-IN-3654 (6 May 43) OPD.

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: General Deane (CCS)
Admiral King

CM-IN-4006 (7 May 43) 0325Z ems