

Map Room
Box 104
Folder 6

MR 310, Sec. 1 -- RANKIN (Invasion plans, offensive, etc)

1943 - 1945

*(i.e. An emergency return
to continent of Europe
before D-Day for invasion of
Normandy)*

TOP SECRET DISPATCH

DRAFTER	F-12	EXT.	3797	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	COMINCH AND CNO			ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1
RELEASED BY	R S EDWARDS	FOR ACTION	✓	COMMANDER 8TH FLEET	PRIORITY
DATE	6 FEB 1945				ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM	1327				DEFERRED
DECODED BY					BASEGRAM
PARAPHRASED BY	D SMITH	FOR INFORMATION	✓	E. O. 12862, Sec. 3(C) and 3(D) or (E) CED Instr. May. 3, 1972	PRIORITY
BY	CHEKED BY LEMIHAN				ROUTINE
ROUTED BY	DITTOED BY D SMITH				DEFERRED
				By SLR Date JAN 15 1974	BASEGRAM
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.					IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
PAGE 1 OF 2		091310		NCR 40338	<input type="checkbox"/>
Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP					(Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

SACMED IS CHARGED WITH PLANNING AND CARRYING OUT INITIAL OCCUPATION OF AUSTRIA UNDER RANKIN-20 CONDITIONS AND WITH PREPARATION OF PLAN FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRIA DURING POST SURRENDER PERIOD UNTIL TRIPARTITE CONTROL COMMISSION IS ESTABLISHED IN VIENNA WHICH IN US AND BRITISH VIEW SHOULD BE DONE AS SOON AS VIENNA IS OCCUPIED. JCS 1169/2 AND 1169/5 COPIES NOW ENROUTE TO YOU CHARGE COMCOM MTOUSA WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR PLANNING OF AND PREPARATION FOR UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN FIRST THE CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION OF AUSTRIA ON TRIPARTITE CONTROL COUNCIL IN VIENNA SECOND THE ADMINISTRATION OF US PORTION OF VIENNA QAU THIRD THE ADMINISTRATION OF ALL PORTIONS OF AUSTRIAN TERRITORY WHICH MAY SUBSEQUENTLY BE ASSIGNED TO U.S. FOR OCCUPATION AND CONTROL. CG MTOUSA IS AUTHORIZED TO MAKE

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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310 Rankin

091310

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3

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

~~TOP SECRET~~ **DISPATCH**

DRAFTEE	EXT.	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE	
FROM COMINCH & CNO		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	1	
RELEASED BY _____		FOR ACTION	PRIORITY 2	
DATE _____			ROUTINE 3	
TOR CODEROOM _____			DEFERRED 4	
			BASEGRAM 5	
DECODED BY _____				6
PARAPHRASED BY _____	CHECKED BY _____		INFORMATION	PRIORITY 9
BY _____	BY _____			ROUTINE 10
ROUTED BY _____	DITTOED BY _____	DEFERRED 11		
			BASEGRAM 12	
			13	
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PAGE 2 OF 2	091310	NCR 4033B	<input type="checkbox"/>	

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ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

WORKING ARRANGEMENTS WITH CG ETUSA, EAC LONDON, SACMED AND US MILITARY MISSION TO MOSCOW AS NECESSARY TO FULFILL HIS RESPONSIBILITIES. YOUR 051046 REFERS. DETAILS OF DISARMAMENT AND DEMILITARIZATION NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION IN EAC BUT YOU MAY ASSUME FOR PLANNING PURPOSES THAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR CARRYING OUT DIRECTIVES WILL INITIALLY VEST WITH SACMED AND LATER WITH TRIPARTITE COMMISSION WORKING THROUGH CHANNELS OF COMMAND OF OCCUPYING FORCES.

E. O. 11652, Sec. (C) and (D) or (E)
 OSD Letter, May, 4, 1972
 By SLR Date JAN 15 1974

COMINCH: COPIES 1 TO 8 INCLUSIVE.

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 NLR 101
 By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

██████████
IMPORTANT

From Chiefs of Staff
To: SHAEP Main Rpt: Joint Staff Mission.
Nr: OZ 490 18 January 1945

Following for General Eisenhower from British Chiefs of Staff.

Foreign Office have requested a re-examination of the question of the occupation of Norway in the event of the German collapse, and have suggested that it may be necessary to give the Norwegian Government warning that we shall be unable to maintain a force ready to go into Norway immediately on the German collapse

Understand that you anticipate a time lag of four to six weeks between order to mount Apostle 1 and arrival of main Allied force in south Norway and that Norwegian Military Mission are aware of this estimate. On other hand Norwegians may not realize that forces for Apostle 2 would not be made available until conditions on the mainland of Europe permitted their release.

We request your comment on the suggestion that Foreign Office should pass information in paragraph 2, above officially to the Norwegian Government and, in particular, whether this would be detrimental to present of projected deception plans and the security of your order of battle in Europe.

End

ACTION: CCS
INFO : GEN ARNOLD, GEN HULL, GEN BISSELL, C OF S

CM-IN-18520 (19 Jan 45) DTG 182205Z mcs

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██████████
12-1-71
RHP

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344 January
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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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JCS 34-71

12-1-71
Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main Echelon
Versailles, France

Combined Chiefs of Staff
77500

11 October 1944

Commanding General
United Kingdom Base Section
London, England

Number: WARX 44939

TOPSEC book message to SHAEF Versailles for Eisenhower for action to Central District United Kingdom Base Section, London pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information, FACS 96 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The reference is SCAP 101.

1. U S and British Missions in Moscow have reported that Russian General Staff have made no reply to their written approach on the subject of coordinating your plans with those of the Russians for following up German withdrawal from Norway. They have, however, been informally told that Soviets have no plans for occupation of Norway and therefore cannot discuss the matter.

2. Missions in Moscow have now been instructed that on the assumption that Russians have no plans for the occupation of Norway the Combined Chiefs of Staff consider all that is necessary has been done and the Russians can have no grievance if and when we carry out our plans.

3. Missions have been told not to press Russians to discuss matter nor to communicate our plans in writing to them. If however, Soviet General Staff later accept the invitation to mutual discussions they are to act on their original instructions.

4. Pending any further indications from the Russians, you should plan on the basis that Russians do not intend to occupy any part of Norway.

End.

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy, Gen Arnold, OPD, Gen Bissell, Adm King
C of S.

CM-OUT-44939 (11 Oct 44) 2117Z m/m

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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[REDACTED] -IVI

PRIORITY

WZ

[REDACTED]

From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main Versailles France

To: War Department
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces
Near London England

Nr: S 61221 SOAF 101 7 October 1944

Reference FAGS 67. S 61221 to AGWAR for Combined
Chiefs of Staff from SHAEF Main signed Eisenhower cite
SHGCT TOP SECRET.

Grateful any information regarding progress of
conversations between United States and British Missions in
Moscow and Soviet General Staff on subject of concerting
plans for occupation of Norway. Early information would be
of assistance in placing our planning on a firm basis.

End

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ACTION: CC/S

INFO: Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
CPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
C of S

Date- 12-1-71

Signature- RHO

CM-IN-6869 (7 Oct 44) 1924Z

pa

[REDACTED]

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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[REDACTED] TOT

From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia

To: War Department

Nr: M 21289

5 October 1944

[REDACTED] For Combined Chiefs of Staff from Deane and Burrows
M 21289

In our letter of September 8th addressed to Army General Antonov, Deputy Chief of the Red Army General Staff, we asked for an appointment with Marshal Vasilevsky or with him for the purpose of discussing the coordination of British-American-Soviet plans regarding the occupation of Norway.

We said, in part, "We have been authorized to present to you the views of the British-American Chiefs of Staff on this subject, which they consider to be one of immediate importance."

We shall therefore comply with Paragraph 1 of WARX 41169 of 5th October.

End

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
Gen Handy
Gen Bissell
Adm King
CofS

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

CM-IN-5163 (6 Oct 44) 0118Z bjm
[REDACTED]

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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~~SECRET~~

Combined Chiefs of Staff
77500

4 October 1944

Commanding General
US Military Mission to USSR
Moscow, Russia

Central District
United Kingdom Base Section
London, England

Number: WARX 41169

TOPSEC book message to Generals Deane and Burrows for action, to Central District United Kingdom Base Section London pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

MIL 1873 is the reference.

1. We presume that in your letter of 8 September to Soviet General Staff you made it clear that you were willing to disclose our Rankin Norway plans to the Russians in discussion. On this understanding and on the assumption that the Russians have no plans for Norway we consider that all that is necessary has been done and the Russians can have no grievance if and when we carry out our plans. You should not, therefore, press the Russians to discuss the matter if they are unwilling nor should you communicate our plans to the Russians in writing.

2. If however, your letter could be interpreted by Soviet General Staff as an attempt to obtain information without ourselves imparting equivalent information, you should send a further letter to the Soviet General Staff correcting this impression.

CM-OUT-41169

(4 Oct 44)

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J.C.S. Regrading Memo 44-73

By SR Date JAN 15 1974

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

WARX #1169

Page 2

3. If later the Soviet General Staff reply formally to your letter accepting our invitation to mutual discussions you should act on your original instructions contained in WARX 89077. If they refuse discussions you need take no further action.

4. You will be sent further instructions on any approach which you should make to the Soviet General Staff when our re-entry into Norway becomes imminent.

End

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
Gen Handy
Gen Bissell
Adm King
C of S

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J.C.S. Downgrading Memo 44-73
By SR Date JAN 15 1974

CM-OUT-41169

(4 Oct 44)

1837Z

aj

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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[REDACTED] - IVI

PRIORITY

From: OCTAGON

To: War Department
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England
Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

Nr: OCTAGON 40, FAN 418, 16 September 1944

TOPSEC OCTAGON 40 to Wilson for action, SHAEF London
for Eisenhower, AGWAR for info, FAN 418 from the Combined
Chiefs of Staff.

Para 1. Your planning for RANKIN in the Mediterranean
Theatre of Operations should proceed on the following basis.

Areas of occupation.

Para 2. You should plan to seize immediate control
of countries in the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations as
follows:

- A. Austria with four divisions and small tactical
air force. Instructions have already been issued in FAN
410 and FAN 411.
- B. Greece with approximately a division of British
troops and small air forces. Instructions have already been
issued in FAN 409.
- C. The Dodecanese with approximately 2400 men.
- D. Vevezia Giulia with approximately one division.

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Date-12-1-71 33

Signature: [REDACTED]

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Page 2

From: OCTAGON
Nr: OCTAGON 40, FAN 418, 16 September 1944

Para 3. It is not intended that you should station forces in Yugoslavia or Albania beyond guards which may be required in connection with distribution of supplies. No immediate action by you will be required in Hungary or Roumania.

Para 4. It is not the present intention to send any British troops to Bulgaria.

Para 5. It is intended in due course to offer British naval assistance in the administration of the Danube and in particular in the clearance of mines. On no account however will any British naval forces enter the Danube except after prior agreement with the Russians.

Availability of forces.

Para 6. In estimating what forces are available for the above operations, you should bear the following considerations in mind:

A. As stated in COSMED 127, United States Forces will be withdrawn as soon as practicable after the cessation of hostilities.

B. It will probably be the policy to withdraw Dominion Forces as early as possible after the defeat of Germany for repatriation at an early date. Pending repatriation they should not be employed on occupational duties in Austria, Greece or Dodecanese or for internal security duties in Middle East until after discussion with Dominion Governments,

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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Page 3

From: OCTAGON
Nr: OCTAGON 40, PAN 418, 16 September 1944

which is being initiated forthwith.

C. The four British Indian Divisions in your command will be withdrawn as early as possible and should not be used for RANKIN operations.

D. French and Italian Divisions will not be used.

E. The internal security commitment in the Middle East after the defeat of Germany will require three divisions from forces at present in the Mediterranean and Middle East.

Para 7. After making allowance for the above considerations, we calculate that you should have sufficient forces to meet the commitments in paragraph two above and still retain a small reserve for contingencies.

Para 8. All the above applies to RANKIN only, i.e. the immediate seizure of control in enemy and enemy occupied territories. Direction upon the final occupation of Europe after the establishment of control will be issued later.

ACTION: CC/S
INFO: Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
C of S

End
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Date-

Signature-

CM-IN-15355 (16 Sep 44)

2244Z bem

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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J [REDACTED] "TOT" *MS* [REDACTED]

From: US Military Mission Moscow, Russia

To: War Department

No. M 20950

13 September 1944

AGWAR, Washington, for Joint Chiefs of Staff from
Deane M 20950.

Archer and I have requested appointment with Marshal Vasilievski or his Deputy, General Antonov, to discuss question of occupation of Norway. We have urged that the Norwegian Military Attache be included in the discussion.

Tonight I was informed by a representative of the General Staff that the Red Army General Staff does not have any plans or intentions for the occupation of Norway and therefore did not feel they should participate in discussions on the subject. I told the General Staff Representative that Archer and I would like to have an opportunity to discuss this matter with the Chief of Staff in order that we could present the views of the British-American Chiefs of Staff. I said that of course if the Red Army was prepared to reply to our letter in writing stating that they had no intention of occupying Norway under any circumstances, then the question would become simply one for settlement by the British, American, and Norwegian Authorities. The representative then said he thought the question was one to be raised in diplomatic, rather than military circles, but he agreed to present the case to Marshal Vasilievski or General Antonov with a view to our having an early appointment with either of them to discuss the subject.

End

ACTION: JC/S

INFORMATION: Gen. Arnold, Gen. Bissell, OPD, Adm. King
CofS

CM-IN-12712 (14 Sep 44) 0936Z mk

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date
48 MAY 22 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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[REDACTED] "TOT"
PRIORITY

[Handwritten signature]
From: OCTAGON
To: War Department
Re: OCTAGON 14 [REDACTED] 12 September 1944

OCTAGON 14 [REDACTED] action for General Deane repeated
info for War Dept from Joint Chiefs of Staff.

British Chiefs of Staff agree that it is undesirable
to postpone any longer the discussion of the occupation of
Norway under "RANKIN" conditions and the Foreign Office has
sent Ambassador a political background to explain to Brinck-
man. You should now open conversations outlined in WAR 89077
of 30 August.

It is important that you communicate to the Soviets
the fact that the plans for occupying Norway under "RANKIN"
were prepared some time ago, that you may dispel any possible
Soviet suspicion that they have been recently improvised to
counter possible entry of Soviet Forces into northern Norway.

End.

FOOTNOTE: This message has been sent to Moscow

ACTION: Joint Chiefs of Staff

INFO: Adm Leahy, Gen Arnold, OPD, Gen Bissell, Adm King,
C of S

CM-IN-11052 (12 Sep 44) 21177 ekk

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date **MAY 22 1974** ²³

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WARX 29538

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- (a) To furnish means of communication with local resistance leaders and civil authorities.
- (b) To assist in preventing civil war and excesses by the populace especially partisans.
- (c) To furnish local information regarding ports, airfields, road, rail and telecommunications, also to observe and give information on demolitions especially at ports, and all booby traps or other impediments left by the enemy.
- (d) To assist in preventing destruction of, and arranging repairs to, naval, air and communications facilities mentioned in sub-paragraph (c) above, also of public utilities, supply and petrol dumps and all transports.
- (e) To provide additional information to recognized counter-intelligence authorities regarding undesirable and dangerous elements.
- (f) To assist in the dissemination and enforcement of Allied military commanders' instructions in regard to the restoration and maintenance of law and order, resumption of normal work, standstill of displaced persons, etc.
- (g) To assist in the recovery of escaping Allied prisoners of war.
- (h) Similarly to prevent the escape of German or collaborationist officials.
- (i) To preserve records useful to the occupying forces (e.g. Gestapo Archives) and material of technical intelligence value.

CN-OUT-29538

(13 Sep 44)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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WARX 29538

Page 8

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- (j) To assist in furnishing labour, guides and interpreters as required to fulfil the various tasks above.
3. Then it would be the responsibility of the local military commander to ensure that the activities of all SOE personnel and Special Operations personnel of OSS are properly co-ordinated with the policy of the occupational forces and in particular with the functions of the Civil Affairs officers and security representatives.
4. In those European countries to which occupational forces are not sent all SOE personnel and Special Operations personnel of OSS should, pending the arrival of an Allied mission or civil agencies such as relief organizations take action on the lines of paragraph 2 (b), (d), (f) and (g) above. This should be co-ordinated by the senior SOE/OSS (SO) officer in the country under the direction of SHAEF or SACMED as appropriate. On the arrival of Allied missions or civil organizations all SOE personnel and Special Operations personnel of OSS should gain immediate contact with a view to giving assistance on the lines of paragraphs 2 (a), (c) and (e) above.
5. In RANKIN "c" all SOE personnel and Special Operations personnel of OSS must be prepared as an important additional role to assist in conveying to the enemy detachments in all countries the orders of the theatre commander relating to compliance with the instrument of surrender.
6. In all cases all SOE personnel and Special Operations personnel of OSS should be instructed to avoid becoming involved in local politics, frontier disputes, etc.
7. Detailed instructions to all SOE personnel and Special Operations personnel of OSS in each particular country will be drawn up by the theatre commander as the situation demands and will take full account of the circumstances pre-

ON-OUT-29538

(13 Sep 44)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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WARX 29538

Page 4

~~TOP SECRET~~

vailing in each country.

8. In the circumstances contemplated there should be no change in the present channels of operational and administrative control of all SOE personnel and Special Operations personnel of OSS.

End

ORIGINATOR: CCS

INFORMATION: Adm Leshy
Gen Arnold
Gen Handy
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Log

CM-OUT-29538

(13 Sep 44)

0230Z hrt

[REDACTED]

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

[REDACTED]
WAR DEPARTMENT
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[REDACTED]
PRIORITY

Joint Chief of Staff 3319

12 September 1944

USMILMIS to the USSR,
Moscow, Russia

War Department
Washington, D.C.

Nr. OCTAGON 14

[REDACTED] for General Deane from Joint Chiefs of Staff.

British Chiefs of Staff agree that it is undesirable to postpone any longer the discussion of the occupation of Norway under "RANKIN" conditions and the foreign office has sent Ambassador a political background to explain to Brinckman. You should now open conversations outlined in WAR 89077 of 30 August.

It is important that you communicate to the Soviets the fact that the plans for occupying Norway under "RANKIN" were prepared some time ago, that you may dispel any possible Soviet suspicion that they have been recently improvised to counter possible entry of Soviet forces into Northern Norway.

End

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

CONFERENCE DISTRIBUTION:

ORIGINATOR: JC/S

INFO: Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral King,
General Arnold.

OCTAGON-OUT-14 (12 Sept 44) 1858Z

efb

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[REDACTED]
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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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OUTGOING MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff
77500

8 September 1944

Commanding General
Allied Force Headquarters
Caserta, Italy

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Force
Main Echelon
London, England

Commanding General
European Theater of Operations
U. S. Army (Rear Echelon)
London, England

Number WARK 27529

TOPSEC to Wilson for action, Eisenhower for information,
ETOUSA pass the British Chiefs of Staff for information.
This message is FAH 410 to Wilson and FACS 73 to Eisenhower
from Combined Chiefs of Staff.

NAF 749 and SCAF 60 are the references.

You will be responsible for planning and carrying
out initial occupation of Austria under Rankin "C"
conditions.

For planning purposes only you may assume that you
will have at your disposal four British divisions now in
the Mediterranean and a small tactical air force. It is
important you should not regard this as more than a planning
figure, since it might well be influenced by your other
obligations, or by the conditions prevailing in Austria
at the time of surrender. In any case, it should be

CM-OUT-27529 (9 Sept 44)

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JCS 29-71

JCS 34-71

Date-12-1-71

Signature: RHP

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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Number WARK 27529

Page -2-

possible progressively to reduce your force as disarming and disposal of enemy forces progress and conditions become stabilized.

Your tasks will be: (A) To ensure the enforcement of the surrender terms. (B) Initially to conduct the Military Government of Austria subject to any future agreement between Allied governments. (C) To organize and train the civil affairs personnel and move them into Austria along with the occupying forces.

The foregoing is subject to adjustment if it later appears that Russian forces are likely to enter Austria before or at the same time as forces from your command.

Responsibility for higher policy planning will be vested in the European Advisory Commission and such nucleus control commission for Austria as may be established in London. You will receive further directions concerning the coordination of your activities with those of the nucleus control commission and the extent to which you will make use of its personnel.

SCAEF therefore is no longer responsible for planning for Austria.

For SCAEF only. You should not disperse personnel and material now collected at SHAEF for Austria until other arrangements can be made under the Tripartite Planning Commission in London, referred to in paragraph 5 above.

End.

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm. Leahy, Gen. Arnold, Gen. Handy,
Gen. Bissell, Gen. Hildring, Adm. King
Cofs

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff
77500

8 September 1944

Commanding General
Allied Force Headquarters
Caserta, Italy

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main Echelon
London, England

Commanding General
European Theater of Operations
United States Army, (Rear Echelon)
London, England

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FC S 34-71

Date- 12-1-71

Signature- RHO

Number: WARX 27527

TOPSEC to Wilson for action, to Eisenhower for information, and ETOUSA London pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information. This message is FAN 411 to Wilson and FACS 74 to Eisenhower from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

1. The governments of the U. S., U. K., and U. S. S. R. have at present under consideration proposals for the Military Government of Austria in the post-surrender period. It is possible that Rankin "C" conditions may obtain in Austria before you have received a directive containing policies agreed upon by the 3 governments. In view of this contingency, you are now directed to prepare a plan for the Military Government of Austria.
2. As a basis for planning until further material is made available by tripartite planners in London, you should work on the pre-surrender directive for Germany and Austria issued to SCAEF in C.C.S. 551 and C.C.S. 551/2, of which papers copies are being forwarded to you separately. The financial guide in C.C.S. 551/2 does not apply to Austria. A financial

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(9 Sep 44)

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

Page 2

8 September 1944

Number: WARX 27527

guide on Austria will be transmitted to you separately.

3. You will also assume as a basis for planning that:

- a. In the period immediately following the cessation of hostilities, you will have the Supreme authority in those parts of Austria occupied by forces under your command. You will exercise control of the administration through your civil affairs organization.
- b. In the subsequent period of tripartite central military government, Supreme authority will be transferred to a tripartite Allied Commission in Vienna. Initially, this Allied Commission will be military and will consist of the 3 Allied Commanders. As soon as any department of an acceptable central Austrian administration has been sufficiently established, that department should take over its particular function in Austria and the Allied Commission would then work through it.
- c. Ultimately, when an Austrian Government acceptable to the 3 powers is established, it may progressively take over functions performed by the Allied Commission which will retain only indirect control.
- d. The tripartite planning organization which it is hoped to be set up in London will be responsible for the planning of control by Military Government at the national level. The American and British groups of this organization are being assembled. Pending Russian concurrence to the setting up of this tripartite organization and provision of the Russian group, the American and British groups will proceed with this

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Page 3

8 September 1944

Number: WARX 27527

work and will prepare combined plans for the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This paragraph is subject to any subsequent instructions that may be issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

- e. The frontiers of Austria should be taken as those of 31 December 1937.
 - f. A clear administrative separation of Austria from Germany should be effected as soon as possible.
 - g. In the period immediately following the cessation of hostilities and subject to the absolute power over the whole of Austria vested in the 3 powers by the unconditional surrender of Germany and pending the arrival of Russian forces Supreme authority in Austria will be vested in and will be exercised by you as the Commander in Chief of the occupation forces.
 - h. In the subsequent period of tripartite central military government the control of Austria at the center will be on a tripartite basis irrespective of nationality and relative strength of the occupying forces.
4. a. With respect to U.S. participation in Austria, the U.S. policy is that U.S. personnel will participate equally at the national level with U.S.S.R. and Great Britain in a tripartite control of Austria with the understanding that the U.S. occupational forces will be on a token basis similar to the size of the force planned for Berlin.
- b. The British intention is that all British Civil Affairs personnel now attached to Allied Military

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8 September 1944

Number: WARX 27527

Government and Allied Control Commission in Italy, and with Civil Affairs Middle East less those in settled British Military Administrations should be pooled and redistributed as necessary to meet the requirements of control in Italy and in Austria and for British Military Administration in the Dodecanese and for the Balkans. In the event of a shortage or surplus of British Civil Affairs personnel after meeting such requirements you should notify the War Office.

5. With reference to paragraph 1 of NAF 749 you will receive instructions separately.
6. Political, financial, economic and relief guides will be transmitted to you at a latter date.

End

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JCS 34-71

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

Date- 12-1-71

INFORMATION: Adm. Leahy
Gen. Arnold
Gen. Handy
Gen. Bissell
Gen. Hilldring
Adm. King
CofS

Signature- RHP

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(9 Sep 44)

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[REDACTED] "TOT"

PRIORITY

From: US Military Attache, Moscow, Russia
To: War Department
No: M20828 4 Sept 1944
M 20828 For Secretary Joint Chiefs of Staff from
Deane.

On 31 August I received message number WARK 89077 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff regarding the approach to the Soviets on the occupation of Norway. In the address it stated that action was to be taken by me and by Burrows personally upon his return. In view of the fact that General Burrows is not to return to Moscow until September 13, I suggested to Admiral Archer, who is replacing him here, that authority be obtained for him and me to make an immediate approach, but he thought it best, in view of the instructions, to await General Burrows return. While he was ready to request Burrows to expedite his return, he did not advise that this be done.

In view of the present situation in Finland, the question of Norway becomes a matter of increasing importance. Request instructions as to whether I should insist on putting the matter before the Soviet government prior to Burrow's return on September 13.

End

ACTION: JCS

INFO : Adm Leahy, Gen Arnold, Gen Handy, Gen Bissell,
Adm King, C of S

CM-IN-3311 (4 Sep 44) 1642Z ejm

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHF, NLR, Date

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

310 Rankin

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██████████ "IVI"
PRIORITY

From: CG Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy.
To : War Department
CG US Army Forces in the Middle East, Cairo, Egypt.
CG US Army Forces in the European Theater of
Operations Rear Echelon, London, England.
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England.
Nr : FX 92210 4 Sept 44

FX 92210 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff info
USFOR information British Chiefs of Staff info SHAEF USAFIME
for Sadler signed Wilson cite FHGG this is RAF 772. Ref-
erence COS (W) 289. Top Secret.

Para 1. It is assumed that you have under con-
sideration the proposal by the British Joint Staff Mission
for approval of draft directives to SACMED contained in
message from AMSSO of 29 August. This is to give certain
supplementary information.

Para 2. As indicated in paragraph 5 of the proposed
directive, a British Force Commander will be named whose
primary task, after securing the Athens area, will be to
establish and maintain law and order in that area and thereby
facilitate the establishment of the Greek Government at
Athens, in order to make possible the introduction and
distribution of relief supplies. It will also be his task,
when adequate forces have been introduced, to accept or
effect the surrender of all German forces in Greece and to

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Date- 12-1-71

Signature- RHP

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[REDACTED] "IVI"

PRIORITY

Page 2

From: CG Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy.

Nr : FX 92210 : 4 Sept 44

enforce the armistice terms. It is proposed that Military Liaison (Greece) will come under the command of the British Force commander.

Para 3. For the purpose of commanding Military Liaison (Greece) it is contemplated that the British Force Commander will be an Allied commander for relief and rehabilitation essential to relief in Greece. He will thus occupy a position similar to that provided for "Commander Middle East for Balkan relief and rehabilitation in Greece, Yugoslavia and Albania", referred to in FAN 394. It is further contemplated that the British Force Commander will have as deputy commander, for the purposes of relief and rehabilitation only, Brig Gen Sadler USA, who will occupy this position in addition to his duties as deputy Commander Military Headquarters (Balkans).

Para 4. The directive to the British Force Commander will contain a provision for him to receive policy directives from Military Headquarters (Balkans) on all matters connected with relief and rehabilitation essential to relief.

Para 5. In the course of operational planning the British Force Commander in preparing certain proclamations. The character of these proclamations depend in a number of

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[REDACTED] "IVI"

PRIORITY

[REDACTED]
Page 3

From: CG Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy.

Nr : FX 92210

4 Sept 44

basic respects upon whether or not an agreement with the Greek Government will have been entered into at the time of the operation and upon the terms of any such agreement. Unless I am otherwise informed forthwith I will instruct the British Force Commander to prepare his proclamations on the assumption that no such agreement will then exist.

Para 6. I note that in the chart "Chain of Command" accompanying a memorandum dtd 16 August to me from the Combined Chiefs of Staff the word "Allied" has been omitted from Military Hq (Balkans) and from the Military Liaison Hq for the 3 countries. Since the Commander of the Task force going to Greece will be in command of several nationalities, including British, Greek and American, I feel that he must be described as an Allied commander and I so propose to describe him in the proclamations which are being prepared.

Para 7. In the light of the rapid developments of the situation I must proceed with planning and propose to do so along the lines indicated above. Your approval of the revised chain of command and guidance in respect of the other matters above mentioned is urgently requested.

End

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Adm. Leahy, Gen. Arnold, OPD, Gen. Bissell, Gen. Hilldring, Adm. King, C of S

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Date- 12-1-71

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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OUTGOING MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff
77500

30 August 1944

Commanding General
European Theater of Operations
United States Army (Rear Echelon)
London, England

U S Military Mission
Moscow, Russia

Number: WARX 89204

TOPSEC to Generals Deane and Brocas Burrows for action personally on return, repeated to FTOUSA for British Chiefs of Staff for information, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

In connection with our immediately preceding signal, following is background for your personal information only.

1. No agreement exists with the Russians acknowledging that Norway is a British/American sphere of operations. Although it is to our advantage for the Russians to harass a German withdrawal as we have insufficient forces to do this ourselves our long term requirement is to ensure that they should not permanently occupy Norwegian territory in view of potential threat to North Atlantic trade routes, Iceland and the northern approaches to the North Sea. Our purpose must be therefore to avoid any clash with the Russians in Norway and yet to safeguard our long term interests.

2. Combined Chiefs of Staff have no evidence that the Russians intend to establish themselves in Finmark but it is felt that it would be desirable to arrange as far as possible for a joint occupation by Russian, Norwegian and British forces rather than by a purely Russian force. Nevertheless, if the Russians enter Norway during the course of operations against

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By SR Date JAN 15 1974

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

WARX 89204

30 August 1944

Page 1

~~SECRET~~

the Germans it is considered undesirable for us to intervene since a Russian/Norwegian civil affairs agreement has been concluded which covers this contingency.

End

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
Gen Handy
Gen Bissell
Adm King
C of S

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By SR Date JAN 15 1971

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff
77500

30 August 1944

Commanding General
European Theater of Operations
United States Army (Rear Echelon)
London, England

U S Military Mission
Moscow, Russia

Number: WARX 89077

TOPSEC to Generals Deane and Brocas Burrows for action personally on return, repeated to ETOUSA for British Chiefs of Staff for information, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Occupation of Norway under RANKIN conditions is subject.

1. Combined Chiefs of Staff consider it advisable to open early military conversations with Soviet General Staff through you.
2. You should bear in mind that our object is to re-establish the legal Norwegian Government in full control as early as possible after the German withdrawal.
3. Plans for occupying Norway under RANKIN B and C conditions are as follows:

(1) RANKIN B (Organized German withdrawal from Norway)

To occupy in initial stages any two of following:

- (a) Finmark (Hammerfest and Kirkenes).
- (b) Tromso or Narvik.
- (c) Trondheim.

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By SR Date JAN 15 1974

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WARX 89077

30 August 1944

Page Two

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Subsequently Stavanger and Bergen, Christiansund (S) and Oslo would be occupied as forces became available.

(2) RANKIN C (German unconditional surrender and cessation of organized resistance in northwest Europe.)

To occupy first southern Norway and then send, if required, a force with a Norwegian detachment to eastern Finmark. Norwegians, however, are anxious for Finmark to be reoccupied as soon as possible. It might therefore be desirable to send to Finmark area Norwegian warship with some Norwegian troops immediately after RANKIN C conditions arise. SCAEF is being instructed to consider the possibility of this.

4. It should be made clear to Soviets that since above plans for RANKIN B depend on the method of German withdrawal they are provisional. Soviets should be informed that we appreciate that they may already have plans for following up a German withdrawal through Finmark. You should therefore invite Soviets to concert their plans with ours using the following points as basis:

- (A) Necessity for harassing enemy during his withdrawal;
- (B) Advantages of stimulating Norwegian resistance by sending in Norwegian forces as early as possible;
- (C) Desirability of establishing a naval base in northern Norway for escorts protecting convoys to Russia.

5. You should ask the Soviets if they have any objection to participation by Norwegian Military Attache in your conversations.

End

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WARX 89077

30 August 1944

Page Three

~~SECRET~~

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
Gen Handy
Gen Bissell
C of S

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(30 Aug 44)

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Combined Chiefs of Staff
77500

30 August 1944

~~TOP SECRET~~

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Number: WAR 89053

TOPSEC to SHAEF London for Eisenhower, FACS 67 from the Combined
Chiefs of Staff

Occupation of Norway under Rankin conditions is subject.

1. Combined Chiefs of Staff have instructed U.S. and British Military Missions to Moscow to initiate conversations with Soviet General Staff and to invite Soviets to concert Russian plans for following up German withdrawal through Norway with your plans for occupying Norway under Rankin conditions.
2. In view of Norwegian anxiety that Finnmark should be reoccupied as early as possible you should consider despatch of a Norwegian warship with token force of Norwegian troops, if available, to Finnmark as early as possible under Rankin C conditions if situation permits.
3. In absence of prior agreement with Soviets no forces other than Norwegian should be sent to any area of Norway entered by Soviets in course of their operations against Germans.
4. You should now inform Norwegian military authorities of your plans for taking advantage of Rankin B conditions in Norway.

End

ORIGINATOR : CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm. Leahy, Gen Arnold, OPD, Gen Bissell, Adm. King,
Gen Hilldring, Log

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PRIORITY

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy.
To: War Department
CG, U.S. Army Forces in Middle East, Cairo, Egypt.
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England.
CG, U.S. Army Forces in European Theater of Operations,
London, England.
Nr: FX 81211 10 August 1944

FX 81211 action to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff
and to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff repeated SHAEF and
Mideast for information, signed Wilson cite FHCOS. This is
MAP 759

1. I consider that for the following operational
and administrative reasons it is essential that commander,
AM HQ (Balkans) and his staff should move from Cairo to Naples
as soon as possible.

A. General Hughes is my adviser on relief and
rehabilitation matters in the Balkans during the period in
which these are a military responsibility, and he must there-
fore be located near my headquarters.

B. Overall relief planning for the military
phase must be closely co-ordinated with outline planning
for Rankin conditions in the Balkans, which will be under-
taken by this headquarters as soon as the appropriate direct-
ives have been received.

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Date- 12-1-71

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PRIORITY

Page 2

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy.

Nr: FX 81211

10 August 1944

C. Such operational forces as may be required in Greece must be despatched from ports in the heel of Italy. While the planning of the naval side of this operation can and should continue to be carried out on behalf of Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, by Folem, at Alexandria, it is essential that the ground and air planning should be carried out here, and that the co-ordination of military relief measures with occupational plans should be effected here.

D. There will be substantial advantages in close and continuous liaison between AM HQ (Balkans) and the G-5 section of this headquarters, which has dealt with problems in Italy akin in many ways to those which may be expected to arise in the Balkans.

E. The AML Country Sections for Yugoslavia and Albania are at present en-route for Bari.

2. It is intended that the EBL Country Section for Greece shall remain in Cairo, where alone the necessary close contact with the Greek Government and the Allied embassies to Greece can be maintained. This section, however, would continue to operate under AM HQ (Balkans).

3. While there are admittedly disadvantages in the physical separation of AM HQ (Balkans) and the operating echelons of UNRRA, in my view these are heavily outweighed by the considerations set forth in Para 1. The military aspects of relief must be paramount in the initial stages

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PRIORITY

Page 3

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy.

Nr: FX 81211

10 August 1944

under Rankin conditions. In any case these disadvantages are largely offset by the presence at AFHQ of Governor Cochran, the representative of UNRRA for the Mediterranean Theater.

4. It is estimated that the move of AM HQ (Balkans) from Cairo to AFHQ could be completed within three weeks from the issue of the executive order.

5. Commander-in-Chief, Middle East and Commanding General USAFIME concur in the move of AMHQ (Balkans) and of the Yugoslav and Albanian Country Sections. The position of the Greek Country Section is still under discussion.

6. Unless you see objections I intend to issue the executive order for the move of AM HQ (Balkans) on 17th August.

7. A further most important point is that lack of reply to this headquarters letter of 28th April has hitherto made it impossible to give formal consideration here to plans for relief and rehabilitation in these territories, or to consider questions on which AMHQ (Balkans) requires guidance point is now urgent that directives should be given and plans finalized. The immediate issue of an interim directive is therefore requested authorizing this headquarters for planning purposes, pending final clarification of the position, to recognize the "de facto" position of AMHQ (Balkans) integrated Anglo-American headquarters with functions limited to those described in my letter of 28th April.

CM-IN-9279

(10 Aug 44)

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Date- 12-1-71

Signature- RHP

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PRIORITY

Page 4

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy.

Nr: FX 81211

10 August 1944

8. A proposal to bring AMHQ (Balkans) directly under command of AFHQ is now being considered here. When the official agreement of USAFIME and Mideast has been obtained this proposal will be submitted for your formal approval. Meanwhile the information may assist you in giving the interim directive requested in Para 7 above.

End

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JCS 29-71

ACTION: CC/S

Date-12-1-71

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy
CG AAF
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
LOG

Signature- RHO

CM-IN-9279

(10 Aug 44)

2312Z hrt

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET
TOP SECRET

4 August 1944

From: Wilson cite FHCOS
To: War Cabinet Offices for
British Chiefs of Staff
Info: Joint Staff Mission for
U.S. Chiefs of Staff,
SHAEP and SOMPO.

MEDCOS 143

1. It is desirable to establish uniform general policy covering action of SOE/OSS (SO) personnel in occupied European countries when RANKIN B or C conditions arise. Recommendations are given below. The C.C.S. might be asked to issue an appropriate directive in the light of any comments you and SHAEP may wish to make.
2. In those occupied European countries in which RANKIN B or C conditions arise and to which Allied military occupational forces are sent all SOE/OSS (SO) personnel should immediately contact the Hq of the occupational forces and should be prepared to carry out such of the following roles as may be directed.

- (A) To furnish means of communication with local resistance leaders and civil authorities.
- (B) To assist in preventing civil war and excesses by the populace especially partisans.
- (C) To furnish local information regarding topography road rail and telegraphic communications.
- (D) To assist in preventing destruction and in arranging repairs of communications referred to in (C) preceding.

GH-11-6P:8 (7 Aug 44)

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By Authority of JCS memo 8-7-74;
CIA 000087
By SR Date MAY 9 1975

310 Rankin

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MEDCOS 143

7 August 1944

Page two

(E) To provide additional information regarding undesirable and dangerous elements.

(F) To assist in the dissemination of Allied propaganda and Allied military commanders instructions in regard to the restoration and maintenance of law and order, resumption of normal work, etcetera.

(G) To assist in the recovery of escaping Allied prisoners of war.

3. There it would be the responsibility of the local military commander to ensure that the activities of SOE/OSS (SO) personnel are properly coordinated with the functions of the Civil Affairs officers and security representatives attached to the occupational forces.

4. In those European countries to which occupational forces are not sent SOE/OSS (SO) personnel should, pending the arrival of any Allied missions or civil agencies such as relief organizations take action on the lines of paras. 2 B, D, F, and G above. This should be coordinated by the senior SOE/OSS (SO) officer in the country under the direction of SHAEF or SACMED as appropriate. On the arrival of Allied missions or civil organizations SOE/OSS (SO) personnel should gain immediate contact with a view to giving assistance on the lines of paras. 2 A, C, and E above.

5. In RANKIN "C" SOE/OSS (SO) personnel must be prepared as an important additional role to assist in conveying to enemy detachments in all countries the orders of the Theatre Commander relating to the carrying out of the armistice terms.

6. In all cases SOE/OSS (SO) personnel should be instructed to avoid becoming involved in local politics, frontier disputes, etc.

CM-IN-6298 (7 Aug 44)

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MEDCCW 143

7 August 1944

Page three

7. Detailed instructions to SOE/OSS (SO) personnel in each particular country will be drawn up by the Theatre Commander as the situation demands and will take full account of the circumstances prevailing in each country.

8. In the circumstances contemplated there should be no change in the present channels of operational and administrative control of SOE/OSS (SO) personnel.

End

T.O.O. 042030B

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Log

GW-IN-6298 (7 Aug 44) 1613Z jb

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CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY REQUIRES ADDITION OF
LETTERS "VI" TO CLASSIFICATION OF REPLY TO
THIS MESSAGE.

[REDACTED]
URGENT

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy.

To: War Department.

Nr: FX 76827

29 July 1944

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated
USFOR information British Chiefs of Staff. TOP SECRET.
Repeated SHAEF signed Wilson cite FHGO this is NAF 749
from AFHQ to AGWAR for action and for information to USFOR
SHAEF. FX 76827.

Look at FAN 377.

1. In the event of RANKIN C conditions suddenly
obtaining, I propose to occupy Austria with four British
Divisions. I have agreed this with SHAEF.
2. In such circumstances it will be necessary to
administer military government in Austria whether or not
proposals as indicated in para 3 of FAN 377 have been
finally considered and decisions reached.
3. May I have immediate guidance as to the extent
and form of and political direction for military government that
I am to administer in such circumstances, together with an
indication of the nationality and source of supply of the
necessary civil affairs personnel..

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JCS 29-71

CM-IN-6569 (8 Aug 44)

Date- 12-1-71

[REDACTED]
Signature- RHP

310 Rankin

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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URGENT

Page 2

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy.

Nr: FX 76827

7 August 1944

4. If it is impossible to give me such guidance
may I be given a free hand to make whatever emergency and
improvised arrangements as are necessary and possible.

End

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JCS 29-71

Date-12-1-71

Signature-*RHO*

*Delayed due to service.

FAN 377 is CM-OUT-59539 (3 Jul 44) CC/S
ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy Gen Hilldring
Gen Arnold Adm King
CPD Log
Gen Bissell

CM-IN-6569 (8 Aug 44) 0038Z bjm

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

[REDACTED]
WAR DEPARTMENT
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OUTGOING MESSAGE
[REDACTED]

Combined Chiefs of Staff
77500

14 July 1944

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Number: WAR 65411

[REDACTED] to SHAEF London for Eisenhower, FACS 47 from the
Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Para 1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have noted your
estimate of the shipping required to mount and support
RANKIN "B" operations for Norway.

Para 2. You should plan on furnishing the necessary
shipping from the OVERLORD combined pool of vessels
available to you in U.K. waters. Replacement of vessels
diverted from OVERLORD may be requested from the Combined
Chiefs of Staff if OVERLORD conditions at the time neces-
sitate such replacement.

Para 3. The representatives of combined shipping auth-
orities in London will be requested to prepare to accomplish
such diversion from OVERLORD on call from you.

End.

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: Gen. Arnold
Gen. Bissell
Adm. King
Adm. Leahy
OPD
C of S

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

CM-OUT-65411

(15 Jul 44)

1417Z

ejv

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
310 Rankin
42
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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

[REDACTED]
WAR DEPARTMENT
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OUTGOING MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff
71469

19 June 1944

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Number: WAR-53045

TOPSEC to SHAEF London for Eisenhower, FACS 41 from the
Combined Chiefs of Staff.

We direct that you keep up to date your outline plans for
action should German forces withdraw from any part of north-
west Europe, on the understanding that the occupation of
any countries from which German forces do withdraw shall
not prejudice the continuance of OVERLORD operations.

For planning purposes the stages of occupation are summarized
as follows:

Stage 1. The establishment of tactical air forces in
low countries and France, to prevent resurgence of
opposition and to support land forces.

Stage 2. The occupation with land forces of a barrier
zone to prevent German forces returning home and to
establish bases for deeper penetration. The barrier
zone on the west is the Rhine-Dutch frontier-Kiel Can-
al.

Stage 3. The occupation of strategic areas for enforce-
ing surrender terms and establishing a firm control.

Prepare your plans on the assumption that shipping priority
will be assigned to meet the requirements of the occupation
of northwest Europe until the completion of that part of

CM-OUT-53045 (19 Jun 44)

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Date- 12-7-71

Signature- RHP

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Number: WAR-53045

19 June 1944

Page 2

stage 2, wherein forces occupy the barrier zone but excluding the later part of stage 2, wherein bases are established for deeper penetration; and that thereafter shipping priority will shift to meeting the requirements of the war against Japan.

End

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JCS 34-71

Date- 12-1-71

Signature- RHP

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION:

Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Col Park
Log

CM-OUT-53045

(19 Jun 44)

2207Z

met

37

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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[REDACTED]

Civil Affairs Division
By: Operations Division, WDGS
European Section, WDOPD
Lt Bruno, 6198
OPD 311.23 CAD (21 Apr 44)

April 21, 1944

U. S. Military Attache
American Embassy
London, England

Number: WAR 26686

To Peabody for Wickersham from Hilldring.

Disposition of German resources after surrender. It is contemplated that matters dealing with the disposition of German resources, including foodstuffs, after surrender will be resolved by the US, UK, USSR authorities having supreme administrative control of Germany. The entire problem is being considered in JCS 786, March 25, 1944, copy of which has been dispatched to General Wickersham.

No Sig

ORIGINATOR: CAD
INFORMATION: OPD
Q-2
Mr McCloy
Log

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter, D-6-72

MAY 22 1974

CM-OUT-26686 (22 Apr 44) 1934Z

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ejm JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 22 1974

36
Cal Park

310 Rankin

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

March 29, 1944

To: British Chiefs of Staff
Joint Staff Mission for
US Joint Chiefs of Staff

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DECLASSIFIED
SM 522-71

Info: Hq MAAF
CINCPAC Med Naples
Mideast

Date-12-2-71

From: REEDOM signed Wilson cite FHGCT

Signature-RAF

Number: P24917

MEDCOS 79

Under present directive AFHQ is responsible for operations in certain specified areas including Hungary, Roumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania and Greece. If case B or C RANKIN occurs, it is presumed that AFHQ will be responsible for appropriate action in each country mentioned. A clear directive is urgently needed regarding these countries should RANKIN conditions occur, especially RANKIN C, in order to facilitate planning. From letter dated 9 May from War Department Operations Division it is assumed that no US Forces will be allowed in Balkan countries other than some 25 officers.

We assume that Balkan countries for present purposes are to be considered as Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece.

Delineation of boundaries of zones of responsibility vis-a-vis Russia urgently necessary. In this connection lacking instruction to the contrary we do not propose to occupy Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia except as may be necessary to insure distribution of supplies. If an agreement with Russia can be reached request your concurrence to assuming for planning purposes that under RANKIN C Russia will occupy Roumania and that part of Hungary north and east of the Danube and that AFHQ will be responsible for occupation of Bulgaria and that

CM-IN 22547 (31 Mar 44)

310 Rankin

32

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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MEDCOS 79

March 29, 1944

Page 2

part of Hungary lying south and west of the Danube.

No sig

Time of Origin 291715A

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DECLASSIFIED
SM 522-71

Date- 12-1-71

Signature- RHP

ACTION: CC/3

INFORMATION: General Arnold
General Handy
General Bissell
Admiral King
Colonel Parlo ✓
Log

CN-IN 22547 (31 Mar 44)

1948Z

1br

32

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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White House

P R I O R I T Y
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y
T O P S E C R E T

From: CG Allied Force HQ Algiers Algeria

To : War Department

Nr : F23855 271700 27 March 1944

F23855 271700 to AGWAR OPD, Troopers from 5 for info HQ MAAF Caserta, Mideast AAI from AFHQ signed Wilson cite FHGCT. TOPSEC-BIGOT ANVIL weekly planning telegram number 29.

1. Rankin. In light of recent developments in Balkans Rankin planning is being advanced as fas as possible.
2. Planning. Procedure to be followed in planning in conjunction with SHAEF has been considered. It was decided that Brigadier Thompson and members of the 3 services planners should go to UK for discussions. SHAEF have concurred.
3. Adriatic. Force 266 have been reinforced by 1 Inf Bn and a PG Bty from 56 Br Inf Div for defense Vis to release Commandos to harass enemy withdrawing from Dalmatin Islands. Study of future ops across Adriatic continues.

No Sig

Corrected copy of CM-IN-19731 (28 Mar 44) OPD

ACTION: OPD

INFO : CCS

Col Mathewson
Gen Arnold
Log

DECLASSIFIED
JCS LETTER, 7-5-72
BY *OR*, DATE

CM-IN-19913 (28 Mar 44) 1310Z mcs

JAN 15 1974

310 Rankin

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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INCOMING MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET
P R I O R I T Y

From: CG Allied Force Headquarters, Algeria
To: War Department
No. F 23855, 27 March, 1944.

F 23855 27170 * R to AGWAR (OPD). Troopers from 5 for info HQ MAAF Caserta, Mideast, AAI from AFHQ signed Wilson cite PRGCT. Top Secret BIGOT ANVIL. Weekly planning telegram number 29.

1. Rankin. In light of recent developments in Belkna. Rankin planning is being advanced as far as possible.
2. Planning. Procedure to be followed in planning in conjunction with SHAEP has been considered. It was decided that Brigadier Thompson and members of the 3 services planners should go to UK for discussions. SHAEP have concurred.
3. Adriatic. Force 266 have been reinforced by 1 Inf Bn and a Pd Bty from 56 Br Inf Div for defense Vis UD* release commandos to harass enemy withdrawing from Dalmatian Islands. Study of future ops across Adriatic continues.

No Sig

* Being Serviced.

ACTION: OPD
INFORMATION: CC/3
 GEN. ARNOLD
 COL. MATHEWSON
 LOG

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JCS LETTER 7-3-72
BY SR DATE JAN 15 1974

CM-IN-19731 (28 Mar 44) 0500Z Ong

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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From: Chiefs of Staff
To: A.F.H.Q.
Information: Joint Staff Mission
Dated: 16th March 1944

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DECLASSIFIED
SM 522-71

COSMED 63

Date- 12-1-71

Following from Chiefs of Staff.
Reference MEDCOS 36.

Signature- *RAF*

1. Boundary of Nato was fixed mainly for administrative reasons and does not imply extension of the area for which you are operationally responsible.

2. Land areas in which you are responsible for operations are - French and Spanish Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Turkey, Roumania, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Albania, Italy, Gibraltar (for certain operations) and Mediterranean Islands, except Cyprus and Malta. You will note that this defines your southern operational boundary in relation to French West Africa.

3. You are also responsible for rendering certain assistance to SCAEF and for plans outside this area in the following two eventualities:

(A) For launching any operations that may be ordered against S France and for control of the forces engaged until such time as they pass under control of SCAEF.

ch. Eisenhower
(B) If RANKIN conditions arise, for assisting SCAEF in occupation of Germany and Austria and the liberation of France.

4. Your area of operational responsibility will remain as defined in paragraph 2 above, subject to such temporary adjustment as may be agreed with SCAEF for operations against S France and RANKIN.

Time of Origin 161250Z

ACTION: CCS

INFORMATION: OPD GEN. BISSELL—GEN. ARNOLD SGS
ADM. KING COL. MATHEWSON LOG

CM-IN-11305 (16 Mar 44) _____ing

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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DM
SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL
P R I O R I T Y

From: Algiers
To: WAR

Nr: W2818/52252 16 February 1944

White House
From AFHQ to AGWAR (OPD) Troopers (for M05) info mid east ACPM W2818/52252 161115 BIGOT ANVIL. Weekly planning telegram number 23.

1. The revision of Clark Darlan agreement. Joint planning staff are engaged in collaboration with representatives of the American Ambassador and British Minister, in revising certain clauses of the Clark Darlan agreement. The retention of such rights as are necessary to Allied CINC is being insured but the intention is to cease employing phrasing which is applicable to armistice terms imposed upon a defeated nation rather than to an agreement with an active ally in the war.
2. 4 Lagosta. Reference weekly planning telegram 22 paragraph 3. Examination has shown that occupation Lagosta under present conditions would be undesirable.
3. Rankin. Draft outline plan for Rankin operations in Southern France prepared and under examination. Telegraphic correspondence being conducted on planning level with SHAEP regarding boundaries for planning purposes between SHAEP and AFHQ in France and Germany. Action to be taken in Balkans under Rankin conditions is also under study.
4. Elba. Plan in course of preparation for seizure Elba should conditions make such action desirable.

No Sig

ACTION: OPD
INFORMATION: GEN. ARNOLD
CC/S (CAPT. ROYAL, USN)
WHITE HOUSE
LOG

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DGS LETTER, 7-6-72
BY *SR*, DATE JAN 15 1974

CM-IN-11227 (16 Feb 44) 1818Z - eng

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24-53394ABC

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date *4/2/94*

FROM WD INCOMING CM-IN-10459 MEDCOS NO.2
FILED: 310 ANVIL
DATE: 16 January 1944

Index Number

Date- 12-1-71

Signature- RHP

INDEX SHEET

**HQOT
MOST SECRET**

"I have been informally advised that the possibility of increasing the OVERLORD assault at the expense of ANVIL has been proposed. The reasons for this are clearly understood. In order that an early decision in this regard may be reached, it is believed expedient to inform you as to what is considered to be the minimum requirements of this theater in assault shipping and craft under the proposal.

If an actual assault against Southern France is to be undertaken, it must be undertaken by a force of no less than 2 divisions plus craft for this lift (?which) were allotted to this theatre by SEXTANT. Hence if the operation is to be undertaken as indicated in outline plan ANVIL, a copy of which has been furnished you, the SEXTANT allocation cannot be reduced.

If operation ANVIL is to (?consist) of a threat which will be launched against the coast of France only in the event reduced German resistance warrants as indicated in NAF 492, a copy of which has been furnished you, a minimum lift of one division is required. In addition, if the Mediterranean Theatre is to undertake operations against Southern France under cases A or B RANKIN as previously discussed with COSSAC a minimum lift of one division is required. If assault shipping and craft are to be available to assist the land battle in Italy by coast hopping operations or by an attack against one flank reasonably close to the land battle an assault lift of one division is required.

Experience on this theatre has shown that the average amount of assault shipping and craft to be on station to insure sufficient serviceable craft to land one division shore to shore at assault scales with a high rate of discharge consists of 46 LST, 50 LCT and 75 LCI(L). The serviceability factor and an allowance for losses have been considered in the total figures quoted. Hence these numbers are considered to be the (?minimum) that should be left in the Mediterranean Theatre under all circumstances. However weather conditions will probably not permit the excess LCT now in this theatre to reach the United Kingdom in time for OVERLORD. If this excess number of LCT remains in this theatre, vis 62, they can be used for vehicle lift, in which case the total number of LST required can possibly be reduced proportionately to 37.

It is requested that this information be transmitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Show classification number and date of communication on first line, drop two spaces, show source of communication and to whom addressed, then drop two spaces again and give a brief synopsis of subject matter sufficient to identify the document.

310 Rankin

WAR DEPARTMENT
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OUTGOING MESSAGE
CONTROL

SECURITY
CONTROL

Combined Chiefs of Staff

January 7, 1944

CG,
FREEDOM, ALGIERS

Number 6672

USFOR LONDON ENGLAND

Number R-7823

TO EISENHOWER, FREEDOM ALGIERS PAN 318, FROM THE COMBINED
CHIEFS OF STAFF

Para 1. It has been decided that COSSAC shall be
responsible for the coordination of planning for operation
RANKIN.

Para 2. The 3 possible conditions under which such a
return to the continent may take place are: Case A.
A substantial weakening of the strength and morale of the
German Armed Forces. Case B. A German withdrawal from the
occupied countries. Case C. The unconditional surrender of
Germany and the cessation of organized armed resistance.

Para 3. The Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Theater, will,
at the request of COSSAC, prepare plans for such participation
as may be possible with the forces at his disposal in each
of the 3 cases outlined above and will be responsible for
the preparation of plans for the occupation of areas of
Europe which are outside COSSAC'S responsibility.

Para 4. The object of operation RANKIN, Case C, is to
establish land and air forces in strategic areas on the
continent from which they can exercise control over the
remnants of enemy armed forces and industrial organization
and from which in addition they can assist in the rehabilitation
of the liberated countries.

Para 5. When situation for RANKIN, Case C, arises the
priorities of occupation will depend on the form which the
disintegration takes. You will be informed as far as
possible of the places which should be occupied as a matter
of urgency. In the meantime, you should make your plans
and preparations on the following likely priorities: (A)
Provision of assistance required by COSSAC for: (1)
Occupation of Germany and Austria (2) Liberation of France.

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CM-OUT-2756

(8 Jan 44)

DECLASSIFIED JCS 29-71

310 Rankin

4-37
White House
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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

U.S. WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

January 7, 1944

Book Message

Page 2.

SECURITY CONTROL

(B) Occupation of North Italy and the Balkans.

Para 6. Above plans will assume use of all forces in the Mediterranean except those which are laid down by the British Chiefs of Staff from time to time as being required for internal security and operations of the Middle East Base.

Para 7. The general zones of responsibility and the boundaries between COSSAC, Russian Forces and the Allied Forces in the Mediterranean cannot be defined until an agreement on this question has been reached by the Governments of the United Kingdom, US and USSR. When such agreement has been reached our precise instructions will be forwarded. Meanwhile you should work in close collaboration with COSSAC who will inform you of the areas for which he may wish you to assume responsibility for planning. We are also sending you as a general guide for initial planning a staff study of key points in the various European countries which it would be desirable to occupy in order to establish control.

ORIGINATOR: CC/S CAPT. ROYAL, USN

INFORMATION: GEN STRONG
GEN ARNOLD
C of S
ADM KING
WHITE HOUSE
OPD

CM-OUT-2756

(8 Jan 44)

0327Z

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JCS 29-71

Date-12-1-71

Signature-RAH

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94