



("MURPHY") (1) Sec. 1 - Miscellaneous dispatches on plans for invasion of Sicily.

1943

dispatches on actual invasion, see "300 Sicily."

100-111111 ("MURPHY") (1) Sec. 1 - Miscellaneous dispatches on plans for invasion of Sicily.

(1943)

Map Room  
Box 104  
Folder 7



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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

**SECURITY CONTROL**

CCMB  
Apr 15 1943  
1527Z

YQF 3 34  
Filed 1448A/15  
BAR

P R I O R I T Y

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers  
To: War

In reply cite: 4248, April 15, 1943

Misunderstanding appears exist over SIGABA requirements as indicated your Fortune 100 BIGOT-HUSKY. For SPS15 and SPSE0 signed Eisenhower cite FHSIG. Converters in our message January 13 were for immediate requirements and were issued upon receipt. Those in our letter March 12 are to meet Northwest African Air Forces requirements under new organization and are in addition to any previously requisitioned or received. Twenty requisitioned our 8103 March 21 were as stated for use at headquarters other than strictly USA during HUSKY. They will be operated by detachments Cryptographic Pool recently arrived which will be attached certain combined and British Hq.

Reconsideration decision on issue to Air Force wings urgently requested. Experience here proven SIGABA must be held by wing hq if requirements of security and speed in air operations are to be met. On this basis instead of 2 additional as indicated your Fortune 100, 12 should be sent to meet all requirements.

No Sig

8103 in CH-IN-11338 (21 Mar 43) GEN. SOMERVELL

ACTION: GEN. SOMERVELL  
INFORMATION: OPD  
GEN. DEANE (CC/S)

DECLASSIFIED  
JCS LETTER, 7-5-72  
BY SAC, DATE JAN 14 1974

CH-IN-8899 (15 Apr 43) 1905Z cen

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

**SECURITY  
CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

Operations Division WDGS  
European No. African Section  
WDOPD OPD 311.23 Sec (4-15-43)  
CBF

April 15, 1943

FORTUNE ALGIERS

Number 107

BIGOT HUSKY necessary clarification (Marshall to  
Eisenhower cite FHSUP) of your BIGOT HUSKY 3435 of 12th  
April. Does C 2 mean class 2? Does loco monthly mean  
line of communication monthly. Answer requested.

No Sig

ORIGINATOR: OPD

INFORMATION: GENERAL SOMERVELL  
GENERAL DEANE (CC/S)

CM-OUT-6405 (16 Apr 43) 0001Z med

RECEIVED  
E. O. 12812 (1973) and (D) or (S)

JAN 14 1974

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# OUTGOING MESSAGE

**SECURITY CONTROL**

Operations Division WDGS  
European-North African Section  
WDOPD HGS OPD 560 Sec (4-15-43)

April 15, 1943

SECURITY CONTROL

FORNUNE ALGIERS

Number 104

Amplifying teleprinter conversations re British assistance in providing landing craft for deficit in your requirements in as much as Navy can make no more available (Bigot Eisenhower from Marshall) British CS have informed CCS that HUSKY will receive absolute top priority and they propose to provide you with following: Up to 5 LSI (S), 8 LST (2), 49 LCI (L), 6 LCS (3) and up to 43 LCT (3) and (4). In other words 67 out of 68 British LST (2) and 145 out of 149 British LCI (L) will be in the operation.

No Sig

ORIGINATOR: OPD  
INFORMATION: GEN DEAVE (CC/S)  
ADM KING

CM-OUT-6401 (15 Apr 43)

2311Z

ved

EX-100 (REV. 1-1-43) and 5(D) or (E)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 3, 1942

By SLR

Date

JAN 14 1974

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
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**INCOMING MESSAGE**  
SECURITY CONTROL

**SECURITY CONTROL**

April 15, 1943

From A.F.H.Q. Algiers

To US War Dept: For Combined Chiefs of Staff  
rptd USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff  
Middle East for Cs in C. Fortune.

No AG 4025 April 14, 1943

HUSKY.

B I G O T

Signed Eisenhower. Cite FHGCT.

This is my NAF 209.

Reference FAN 116 (NOT addressed Middle East)

I agree.

FAN 116 is CM-OUT-5307 (13 Apr 43) CCS

Action: CCS

- Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

Information: OPD  
Gen. Strong  
Gen. Arnold  
Adm. King  
LOG

DECLASSIFIED JCS 29-71

11-24-71

RHP

CM-IN-8969 (15 Apr 43) 2107Z ce

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

April 13, 1943

From: A.F.H.Q. Algiers

To: U. S. War Dept.  
War Office London  
rptd Fortune  
Middle East

No: AG3911 Apr. 13

HUSKY.

B I G O T

Signed EISENHOWER. DQ G (M) Section No \*

The following hospital ships and hospital carriers are required for operation HUSKY. 8 Hospital Ships and (?6) carriers. All these ships and carriers are required to be in the MEDITERRANEAN by Husky D minus three day. Please confirm that the total requirement can be met from Combined United States and British resources.

Agreed.

\* Corrupt group.

ACTION: GEN DEANE FOR CCS

INFORMATION: GEN SOMERVELL  
LOG

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

CM-IN-8360 (14 Apr 43)

1944Z

ved 3

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

Combined Chiefs of Staff

April 13, 1943

CG FORTUNE ALGIERS

Number 94

BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF  
USFOR LONDON ENGLAND

Number R-7552

Acting on NAF 206 the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the selection of a D-date under favorable moon conditions in early July.

For Eisenhower Fortune Algiers and USFOR London for British Chiefs of Staff, FAN 116, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

It is suggested that hereafter D-date itself be designated in messages between your theater and the US and UK by referring to July 1 as Y and designating D-date to be Y-numeral. Example: July 3rd would be Y plus 2.

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DECLASSIFIED JCS 29-71

11-24-71

RFP

ORIGINATOR: CCS

INFORMATION: OPD  
ADM KING  
GEN ARNOLD  
GEN STRONG  
LOG

CM-OUT-5307 (13 Apr 43) 2128Z mcs  
CM-OUT-5308

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

311/2/2/2/2

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

April 15, 1943

SECURITY CONTROL

From FHSUP  
To AGWAR  
Rptd War Office  
NO 3435 of 12 April

Cite FHSUP. Signed Eisenhower.

BIGOT. HUSKY.

Additional C2 requirements of approx 21,650 tons all loco monthly for D to D plus 30 and D plus 30 to D plus 60 to meet new commitments breakdown for ports as follows.  
LADBROKE 3600 FUSTIAN 6700 GLUTTON 2350 MALICIOUS 9000.  
Subsequent requirements will be forwarded when available

Action: OPD

Information: Gen. Deane (CC/S)  
Gen. Somervell

DECLASSIFIED  
DCS LETTER, 7-5-72  
BY SK, DATE JAN 14 1974

CM-IN-8959 (15 Apr 43) 2046Z ce

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*Prof Room*

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*310 Husky*

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

YQV  
1538/12  
BMS

0059  
April 13

SECURITY CONTROL

Priority

From: Algiers  
To: AGWAR & USFOR London  
No: 3481  
In Reply Cite: NAF 208 April 12, 1943

Operation Husky will be prosecuted with all the means at our disposal. To AGWAR for Joint Chiefs of Staff and to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower, Bigot, Reference Fortune 84. This is NAF 208. While we believe it our duty to give our considered and agreed opinion of relative changes under conditions as stated in our previous messages, there is no thought here except to carry out our orders to the ultimate limit our ability.

No Sig

84 is CM-OUT-3976 (2 Apr 43) JCS

Action: Gen Deane JC/S

Information: OPD  
Gen. Strong  
Gen. Arnold  
Adm. King  
LOG

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DECLASSIFIED SM 522-71

Date- 11-24-71

Signature- RAB

CM-IN-7301 (13 Apr 43) 0234Z ce

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14

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

**SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

From: G-3 A  
To: U.S. War Dept: Washington  
War Office London  
Admiralty London  
Air Ministry London  
U.S. Navy Dept Washington:

SECURITY CONTROL

**SECURITY CONTROL**

No: 3319 11 Apr.

HUSKY BIGOT

From FORTUNE. Cite F H G C T.

Allied Commander in Chief has forwarded his approved outline plan to Combined Chiefs of Staff in N A F 207 following amplification is sent you for information and any necessary action. Complete copies of outline plan follow by Officer Courier.

Para 2. Parachute attacks at dusk or in darkness on D Minus one behind beaches at ACID, CENT and DIME, each by equivalent of one British Parachute Brigade.

Para 3. Seaborne assaults about 2 hours prior to First Light on D Day at ACID, BARK, CENT and DIME.

Para 4. ACID assault will be carried out by One Infantry Division reinforced by one tank battalion, on a 2 Bde front assisted by one Commando over beaches 44 and 46, all ship to shore ex Middle East and by one Infantry Division on a one Bde front assisted by one Commando over beaches 47 and 48 all ship to shore ex U K. Initial objective LADBROKE and GLUTTON exploiting towards FUSTIAN.

Para 5. BARK assault will be carried out by a Bde Gp ship to shore from Middle East. Initial objective RATAPLAN Airfield.

Para 6. CENT assault will be carried out by One Infantry Division and One Armd Regt both ship to shore ex Middle East. Initial objective QUEEN BEE Airfield.

Para 7. <sup>DIME</sup> BERT assault will be carried out by One British Infantry Division and One Armoured Regt shore to shore from LAURAGH - HASHISH. Initial objective HOMESPUN airfield.

Para 8. Parachute attack at dusk or in darkness on night D Plus one/ plus two behind beaches at ENSA by one US parachute regt.

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JCS LETTER, 7-5-72  
BY *SK*, DATE JAN 14 1974

CM-IN-7047 (12 Apr 43)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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Number 3319

~~INCOMING MESSAGE~~

~~SECURITY CONTROL~~

Para 9. Seaborne assault about 2 hours prior to first light on D Plus two at ENSA on a front of one and a half RCT by 1st US Infantry Division reinforced by one Armd Combat Command from Second Armd Div under Command Third Div. Objective Airfield at INVINCIBLE and FLITTON.

Para 10. Parachute attack at dusk or in darkness NOT (NOT) before night D Plus 4/plus 5 behind beaches at GROG by one US Parachute regt, provided lift is still available.

Para 11. Seaborne assaults about 2 hours before first light at FISH, GORG and HOOK NOT (NOT) before D Plus 5.

Para 12. GROG and HOOK will be carried out by 45 Div reinforced by one RCT from 36 Div under command of 45 Div assisted by One Ranger Bn. This force will assault at HOOK on a front of 2 RCT and at GROG on a front of one RCT. Initial objective of force is MALICIOUS Port and airfield.

Para 13. FISH assault will be carried out by 36 Inf Div (less 1 RCT) reinforced by 1 Armd Combat Command from 2 Armd Div under command of 36 Div assisted by 1 Ranger Bn. Force will assault at FISH on a front of 1 RCT. Role of force protection of right flank of GROG and HOOK Force and exploit South to join up with ENSA Force.

Para 14. Following will be held as immediate reserve, NOT (NOT) assault loaded, under Eastern Task Force:

- A. One British Infantry Division in Finance
- B. Tank Bde ex 13 British Division in North African Port.

Para 15. Following will be held as reserves, NOT (NOT) assault loaded, to assist in exploitation and reduction of HORRIFIED.

- A. Eastern Task Force 1 British Infantry Div from North Africa.
- B. Western Task Force 1 US Infantry Division from North Africa.
- C. The portions of the Airborne Divisions NOT (NOT) participating in initial assaults will form additional Task Force reserves.

DECLASSIFIED  
JCS LETTER, 7-5-72  
BY SR, DATE JAN 14 1974

Footnote: NAF 207 is CM-IN-6513 (11 Apr 43) CCS

ACTION: CCS

INFORMATION: OPD, GEN STRONG, GEN ARNOLD, SGS, ADM. KING

CM-IN-7047 (12 Apr 43)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

YQV A41  
Filed 1250/11  
ACM

CCWD  
Apr. 11 1943  
1448 Z

SECURITY CONTROL

U R G E N T

From: Algiers  
To: War  
USFOR London (Information)

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11-24-71 RHP

No. 3211

In Reply Cite: NAF 207, April 11, 1943.

All suggestions put forward by the British Chiefs of Staff in COS. BIGOT HUSKY. (W) 546 have been examined carefully. To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff rptd USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff. Signed Eisenhower. This is my EAF number 207. BIGOT HUSKY. On consideration of all factors, the outline plan as under has been adopted.

2. All seaborne assaults will take place about 2 hours prior to flight. Where parachute attacks are shown, these will take place at dusk or in darkness the night previous to the seaborne attack.

3. Acid <sup>Avola</sup> assault will be carried out by 1 infantry division ex Mideast and by 1 infantry division UK, assisted by 1 British Parachute Brigade. Initial objective, Ladbroke and Glutton, exploiting towards Fustian. - Catania

4. Bark <sup>Pachino</sup> assault will be carried out by a Brigade Group ex Mideast. Initial objective, Ratsplan Airfield. (Pachino)

5. Cent <sup>Pozallo</sup> assault will be carried out by 1

CM-IN-6513 (11 Apr 43)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

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DECLASSIFIED JCS 29-71

11-24-71

From: Algiers  
To: War  
USFOR London (Information)

No. 3211

In Reply Cite: NAF 207, April 11, 1943. Page 2

infantry division ex Mideast, assisted by 1 British Parachute Brigade. Initial objective, Queen Bee Airfield.

*Gela*

6. Dime assault will be carried out by 1 British Infantry Division shore to shore ex Lauragh-Hashish, assisted by 1 British Parachute Brigade. Initial objective, Homespun Airfield.

7. All the above seaborne assaults take place on D day.

*Sciacca*

8. Ensa assault will be carried out by a strengthened US Infantry Division ex North Africa, assisted by 1 US Parachute Regiment. Initial objective, airfields at Invincible and Flitton.

*Sciacca*

9. The above seaborne assault will take place on D plus 2.

*Trappeto Carini Bay*

10. Grog and Hook assaults will be carried out by 1 strengthened US Division ex North Africa, assisted by 1 US Parachute Regiment.

*Castellonax*

11. Fish assault will be carried out by 1 US Infantry Division of which 1 RCT will be replaced by an ACC ex North Africa. Tasks, protection of right flank of Grog and Hook, and to join up with Ensa Force.

12. The seaborne assaults in 10 and 11 will take place not before D plus 5.

13. One British Infantry Division, not assault loaded, will be held as an immediate reserve in Finance and 1 British Army Tank Brigade in a convenient port.

CM-IN-6513 (11 Apr 43)

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY  
CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers  
To: War  
USFOR LONDON (Information)  
No. 3211  
In Reply Cite: NAF 207, April 11, 1943, Page 3.

14. One British Infantry Division and 1 US  
Infantry Division will be held as reserves in  
North Africa.

No Sig

2 Omission, being serviced.

ACTION: GEN DEANE (CC/S)

INFORMATION: OPD  
GEN STRONG  
GEN ARNOLD  
ADM KING  
LOG

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DECLASSIFIED JCS 29-71  
11-24-71  
RHP

CM-IN-6513 (11 Apr 43)

1749Z

bjm

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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YQV A 41  
Filed 1250A/11  
amr

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**  
APR 11 1943  
1238Z

SECURITY CONTROL

URGENT

SUPPLEMENTARY CORRECTION

From: Algiers  
To: War  
USFOR London (Info)

In reply cite: 3211, April 11, 1943

Insert the following where message was garbled:

All seaborne assaults will take place about  
two hours prior to first light.

No Sig

Supplemental correction to CM-IN-6513 (4/11/43) CC/S

Action: Gen. Deane (CC/S)

Information: OPD  
Gen. Strong  
Adm. King  
Gen. Arnold

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100 D.M. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 11-24-71

Signature- RAB

CM-IN-6599 (11 Apr 43) 2138Z ce

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
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INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY  
CONTROL

YQV8 77  
Filed 10/1929Z  
AR

CCWD  
April 10  
1852Z

SECURITY CONTROL

URGENT

From: Algiers  
To: FAR (action)  
USFOR London (information)

In reply cite: No. 3071, April 10, 1943

As stated in my NAF 186, BIGOT-HUSKY, the most favorable assault period occurs 10th-14th June and similar period in July. (To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff rptd USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff, signed Eisenhower) HUSKY BIGOT. This is my NAF number 206 in answer to FAN 98. It is impossible to achieve the June date, but unless anything unforeseen occurs I consider that preparations should permit an assault during the 2nd quarter of the July moon.

No Sig

NAF 186 is CM-IN-12554 (24 Mar 43) CCS  
FAN 98 is CM-OUT-6893 (19 Feb 43) CCS

Action: Gen. Deane (CC/S)

Information: OPD  
Gen. Strong  
Gen. Arnold  
LOG

CM-IN-5964 (10 Apr 43) 1958Z ce

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11-24-71  
RAH

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310 Husky

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

YQV B 85  
9/1900Z  
alt

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

CCWD  
4-9-43  
2850Z  
**SECURITY CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers  
To: WAR

In reply cite: 2850, April 9, 1943

Imperative that wings in Northwest African Air Force hold SIGABA. For SPSIS signed Eisenhower reur 5345 cite FHSIG. Several wings now hold and issue to others is contemplated.

Letter dated 12 March referred in our 1273 was requisition for following for NAAF: 12 SIGABA 12 SIGIVI 12 SIGEXE 6 Tandem cables. Enclosure to letter showed location all SIGABA now in theater.

No Sig

FOOTNOTE: 1273 is CM-IN-2631 (4-5-43) GEN SOMERVELL  
5345 is CM-OUT-2150 (4-6-43) ASF CSO (SSS)

ACTION: GEN SOMERVELL

INFORMATION: OPD  
GEN DEANE (CC/S)

CM-IN-5638 (10 Apr 43) 0543Z flw

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JCS LETTER, 7-5-72  
BY SR, DATE JAN 14 1974

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310. *Husky*  
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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

**WAR DEPARTMENT  
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OUTGOING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY  
CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

Joint Chiefs of Staff

April 9, 1943

CG FREEDOM ALGIERS

Number 5656

USFOR LONDON ENGLAND  
FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

Number R-7464

The Joint Chiefs of Staff heartily concur in the views expressed by the British Chiefs of Staff in their COS (W) 566 (for Eisenhower Freedom Algiers, and USFOR London for British Chiefs of Staff from the Joint Chiefs of Staff) dated April 7th copy of which was sent to you.

No Sig

ORIGINATOR: JCS

INFORMATION: OPD

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**DECLASSIFIED**

JCS SM 522-71

Date- DEC 8 1971

Signature- *RAH*

CM-OUT-3974  
IM-OUT-3975

(10 Apr 43)

0030Z

ved

*W. J. Brown*  
COPY No. 11

*Header*  
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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECURITY  
CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

Joint Chiefs of Staff

April 9, 1943

COMMANDING GENERAL  
NORTH AFRICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS  
FREEDOM

Number 5615

BIGOT Joint U S Chiefs of Staff have withdrawn from further participation in Loran installation for Husky. For Eisenhower from Joint Chiefs of Staff. British Chiefs of Staff informed. Consideration will be given to Mediterranean Loran installation later. Navy Loran experts should be returned.

No Sig

ORIGINATOR: JC/S  
INFORMATION: GEN SOMERVELL  
OPD  
GEN STRONG  
GEN ARNOLD

CM-OUT-3717 (9 Apr 43) 1840Z bjm

DECLASSIFIED  
JCS letter, 9-18-73  
& OSD letter, 5-3-72  
JAN 15 1974

*map room*

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*310 Herndon*

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
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**OUTGOING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY  
CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

Joint Chiefs of Staff

April 9, 1943

COMMANDING GENERAL FORTUNE, ALGIERS

Number 84

USFOR LONDON FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF  
USFOR LONDON ENGLAND

Number R-7463

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in complete agreement with the views expressed in the following paraphrase of a message received from the British Chiefs of Staff which was their COS (W) 567 dated April 8 to the Joint Staff Mission Washington. For Eisenhower Fortune Algiers, and USFOR London for British Chiefs of Staff from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Commence paraphrase

Para 1: The British Chiefs of Staff are opposed resolutely to the idea that if Husky land contains more than 2 German divisions, strength not specified, the operation has small chance of success. Reference NAF 201. Such view really implies that United Nations Forces cannot take on Germans in combined operations without being able to attack with complete superiority everywhere.

Para 2: We have always known the hazards of operations Cross-Channel which have been proposed against a shore line bristling with defensive works, occupied by German troops supported in rear by a great many Mobile German divisions, but we feel that these hazards far outweigh those to be encountered in Husky with its relatively undefended shore line manned by Italians primarily.

Para 3: For instance the frontal attack referred to in para 2 of NAF 201 will be in fact a series of attacks made at many points, with some of them widely separated. The Germans will be limited in numbers and cannot defend the entire coast line nor can they counter-attack in any strength simultaneously at all points. Some of our landings will succeed and should be exploited.

Para 4: Past experience does not justify the belief that strategical surprise will be forfeited since this implies the complete failure of all our cover and deception plans. With reference to tactical surprise the enemy can hardly be expected to know the exact day, hour, and beaches, at which our landings will take place.

Para 5: Relative strengths by divisions give misleading

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

310 Husky

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SECURITY CONTROL

**SECURITY  
CONTROL**

Page two

April 9, 1943

picture when compared. For instance 3 Italian divisions in Husky land are said to have only 8,000 combat troops each. It is the estimated number of German combat troops and not the number of their divisions that will have an affect on the degree of resistance which we must overcome.

Para 6: To some extent there is reassurance in the statement contained in para 5 of NAF 201 that the preparations and plans for Husky are being pressed with the greatest vigor. We feel it necessary to record our view however that abandonment of Husky at any time, wholly because of the number of Germans in Husky land had reached a small predetermined fraction of United Nations strength, could not be thought of. End of paraphrase

No Sig

ORIGINATOR: JCS

INFORMATION: OPD  
LOG

CM-OUT-3976 (10 Apr 43) 0031Z  
CM-OUT-3977 (10 Apr 43) 0031Z Jb

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Date- DEC 8 1971

Signature- RHP

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**SECURITY CONTROL**  
APR 9 1943  
14168

YQVB14  
Filed 08/2215A  
ecm

SECURITY CONTROL  
P R I O R I T Y

DECLASSIFIED  
JCS LETTER, 7-5-72  
BY *SK*, DATE

JAN 14 1974

From: Algiers  
To: War-USFOR (Info)

In reply cite: 2641 April 8, 1943

My NAF 193 of 29 March '43 set out the personnel and vehicles it will be necessary to transport in each assault and first follow up convoy. To AGWAR rptd USFOR. Signed Eisenhower. HUSKY BIGOT. Cite FBGCT reference your Fortune 62 of 3 April '43, not addressed USFOR. It also indicated that the combat loaders and shore to shore craft allotted are insufficient to transport these forces to MORRIFIED. It therefore follows that additional personnel ships and MT/store ships are necessary for the operation if forces are to be landed at the strength and rate required for success. The majority of these additional personnel and MT/store ships will require to be loaded in North African ports but I understand that their provision and nomination will be arranged by you with the War Shipping Administration. A detail of requirements is set out in paras 9th to 17th below.

2. Your FAN 112 of 27 March '43 stated that 10 additional LST and 10 additional LCT would be available for HUSKY. My NAF 193 of 29 March '43 therefore assumed that 78 LST 110 LCT and 10 LCI (L) would be available for the operation. Your Fortune 62 of 3 April '43 states that 76 LST 100 LCT and 90 LCI (L) will be available. Estimates contained in this cable are therefore based on 76 LST 100 LCT and 90 LCI (L) being available but this reduction will slow down the rate of landing.

3. Your planning estimate of 200 personnel spaces per LST is accepted but it must be emphasized that the transportation of vehicles is the limiting factor and you have not referred in para 3 of your Fortune 62 to para 2 of my NAF 193 which indicates the loss of vehicle space in shore to shore craft caused by the carriage of tanks. You

CN-IN-5141

(9 Apr ~~SECRET~~)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

310 Hunsley

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From: Algiers, SECURITY DEPARTMENT  
To: War-USFCK (Info) CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
In repl of CM-IN-5141 8

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

have not stated the vehicle carrying capacity of the special convoy of combat loaders referred to in para 4-B of your Fortune 62. I have therefore assumed the following vehicle capacity figures for the purposes of this cable APA 105 XAPA 100 AKA 200 MT/store 125.

4. Acting on your advice I accept for planning purposes your estimate that 90% of shore to shore landing ships and craft allotted to HUSKY will be operational when required for assaults and estimates contained in this cable are based on 90%. I must emphasize that although this figure includes training losses and routine defects it does not include possible losses due to enemy action prior to embarkation. US Naval opinion here agrees 80% provides an adequate factor of safety.

5. I require assault at HOOK on D plus 5 day to be carried out by 2 RCTS 45 Division followed in by supporting arms tank battalion and Air Corps with a follow up convoy 3 days later bringing balance of 45 Division less one RCT together with additional supporting arms and Air Corps.

6. The assault at GROG on D plus 5 day will be carried out by one RCT 45 Division followed in by one RCT 36 Division and supporting arms with a follow up convoy 3 days later bringing additional personnel and vehicles of these 2 RCTS and Air Corps.

7. In order to avoid transshipping equipment and vehicles of 45 Division and the supporting arms assigned to 45 Division coming from USA I most urgently request that the forces concerned with their equipment and vehicles be loaded in US in the ships in which they will finally sail for the operation.

8. My estimate of the forces required for HOOK assault and first follow up convoys to be loaded in USA in ships in which they will finally sail for the operation is as follows:

CM-IN-5141 (9 Apr 43)

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UNIT	PERSONNEL	VEHICLES
45 Division less 1 RCT	11014	1586
1 Engineer Shore Regt	2085	235
1 Signal Co and Det	220	69
1 Tank Bn	768	45 and 54 tanks
1 AA Bn AW SM	755	100
1 CWS Bn	972	249
1 AA Bn AW MOB	807	208
1 TD Bn	898	267
1 AA Bn Gun	841	190
Naval Port Party	<u>750</u>	<u>70</u>
TOTAL	19110	3019 and 54 tanks

**SECURITY CONTROL**

9. My estimate of the shipping required to be loaded in USA to transport forces in 8th paragraph is as follows: 1 Hq ship 5 APA ships 5 XAPA 3 AKA ships 8 MT/store 10 LST. The above ships provide a lift of 16015 personnel 3050 vehicles and 54 tanks which leaves a balance of 3095 personnel to be dispatched to North Africa by UG convoy. This personnel will cross from North Africa to HOOK by shore to shore craft with first follow up.

10. The remaining forces required for HOOK assault and first follow up convoys to be loaded in North Africa for the operation is as follows:

UNIT	PERSONNEL	VEHICLES
1 Ranger Bn	473	12
1 Beach Group	2100	218
Air Corps	<u>2271</u>	<u>439</u>
TOTAL	4844	669

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11. The forces in 10th paragraph will require 3 LST 2 LCI (L) 1 personnel ship and 3 MT/store ships. Balance will

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(9 Apr 43)

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From: Algiers  
To: War-USFOR Classified MESSAGE CENTER  
In reply cite: 2641, Apr 1-8, 1943

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

be carried in shore to shore craft available for follow up except Ranger Bn for which I assume old destroyers referred to in para 9 of your Fortune 62 of 3 April are suitable.

12. My estimate of total forces required for GROG assault on D plus 5 together with first follow up on D plus 8 is 13400 personnel 1890 vehicles. Out of the above total one RCT 45 Div will come from US combat loaded estimated strength 4500 personnel 630 vehicles and will require following shipping to be loaded in US for the operation 2 APA ships 1 XAPA ship 2 AKA ships. The above ships provide an estimated lift of 4425 personnel 710 vehicles. The balance of personnel and vehicles for GROG comprising one RCT 36 Div supporting arms and Air Corps require to be loaded in North Africa in two personnel ships 9 MT/store ships and shore to shore craft.

13. The assault at FISH on D plus 5 day will be carried out by one RCT 36 Div from combat loaders referred to in para 4-B of your Fortune 62 dated 3 April followed in by remaining RCT 36 Div and supporting arms in one MT/store ship and shore to shore craft. Follow up convoy 3 days later in MT/store ships and shore to shore craft will bring balance of 36 Div less one RCT together with additional supporting arms. All forces for FISH will be mounted from North Africa. Ranger Bn will require an old destroyer.

14. The 3 div assault at ENSA on D plus 2 day and follow up 3 days later are at present planned to be carried out entirely in shore to shore craft with one Hq ship. As already explained reasons of surprise and length of passage make it most desirable for assaulting RCT at ENSA to be carried in combat loaders. Can combat loaders be provided to transport a fifth RCT with a consequent reduction in requirements for other classes of shipping.

15. A recapitulation of shipping and craft required for ERCA destination employing combat loaders and shore to shore craft allotted in your Fortune 62 of 3 April is as follows:

1. ENSA

1 Hq ship 46 LST 100 LCT 62 LCI (L)

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JCS LETTER, 7-8-72  
BY SA, DATE JAN 14 1974

2. FISH

3 APA (includes 1 Hq ship) 3 XAPA 2 AKA 17 LST  
13 LCI (L) 12 MT/store ships and 1 old destroyer

CM-IN-5141

(9 Apr 43)

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From: Algiers WAR DEPARTMENT  
To: War-USFO CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
In reply cite: 2641 April 8, 1943

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

all to be loaded in North Africa.

3. GROG

2 APA 1 XAPA 2 AKA to be loaded in USA for the operation, 13 LCI (L) 2 personnel ships 9 MT/store ships to be loaded in North Africa.

4. HOOK

1 Hq ship 5 APA 5 XAPA 3 AKA 10 LST 8 MT/store ships to be loaded in USA for the operation. One personnel ship 3 MT/store ships 3 LST 2 LCI (L) and one old destroyer to be loaded in North Africa.

5. TOTAL

2 Hq ships, 10 APA (includes 1 Hq ship), 9 XAPA 7 AKA, 76 LST, 100 LCT, 90 LCI (L), 3 personnel ships, 32 MT/store ships and old destroyers for 2 Ranger Bns.

16. To carry out the loading plan outlined in 15th paragraph I require in addition to Fortune 62 allotments a total of 8 MT/store ships to be loaded in USA and 3 personnel ships and 24 MT/store ships to be loaded in North Africa.

17. To obtain a proper rate of discharge over the beaches restoration of the 2 LST and 10 LCT referred to in para 2 above is required. Such restoration and allotment of combat loaders mentioned in 14th and para 1 of NAF 199 would correspondingly reduce the requirement in 16th.

18. I must point out that failure to meet these requirements for shipping means reducing the forces and their vehicles participating in this operation below what I consider the minimum required.

19. Request that operation and shipping personnel necessary to settle any questions arising out of this telegram be present for a teletypewriter conversation with AFHQ at 1500 hours Z on Sunday April 11 when staff here will call you up and be prepared to answer any points which are not understood.

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CM-IN-5141 (9 Apr 43)

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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

From: Algiers  
To: War-USFOR (Info)  
In reply cite: 2641 April 8, 1943

Page 6

Footnote: Fortune 62 is CM-OUT-1441 (4/3/43) OPD  
NAF 193 is CM-IN-16162 (3/30/43) CCS  
FAN 112 is CM-OUT-10252 (3/27/43) JCS  
NAF 199 is CM-IN-3556 (4/6/43) CCS

Action: OPD

Information: Gen. Deane (CC/S)  
Gen. Somervell  
LOG

CM-IN-5141 (9 Apr 43) 1214Z ce

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JCS LETTER, 7-5-72  
BY SK, DATE JAN 14 1974

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**OUTGOING MESSAGE**

Operations Division  
Combined Subjects Section  
CFP

**SECURITY  
CONTROL**

April 8, 1943

SECURITY CONTROL

COMMANDING GENERAL  
NORTH AFRICAN THEATRE OF OPERATIONS

Number 5556

BIGOT Joint U S Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the reasons contained your radiogram 815 dated April 1st 1943, Marshall for Eisenhower, and concurred in your conclusion that use of Loran as navigational aid for Husky is not justifiable at this time. Above for your information only. British Chiefs of Staff have been so advised

ORIGINATOR: OPD

INFORMATION: JC/S  
LOG

CM-OUT-3366 (8 Apr 43) 2138Z cen

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GED letter, May, 1, 1974

By SLL

Date

JAN 14 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

310 New York

To: Joint Staff Mission

From: Chiefs of Staff.

Dated: 8th April, 1943.

BIGOT

~~██████████~~

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IMMEDIATE

Following for Combined Chiefs of Staff from  
Chiefs of Staff C.O.S.(W) 567.

Reference NAF 201.

1. We are resolutely opposed to the view that if the garrison of HUSKY contains more than two German divisions of unspecified strength the operation has little prospect of success. In effect such a view implies that we cannot take on Germans in a combined operation unless we can attack in overwhelming superiority at all points.
2. We have never been under any illusions as to the hazards of cross-channel operations which have been advocated against a coastline bristling with a highly developed coast defence system, manned by Germans and backed by a large number of mobile German divisions, but in our opinion these hazards are much greater than those entailed in HUSKY with its comparatively undefended coastline manned primarily by Italians.
3. For example the frontal attack referred to in paragraph 2 will in fact be a series of attacks delivered at many points, some of them widely separated. The limited number of Germans cannot be waiting to receive us everywhere nor can they counter-attack in strength at all points simultaneously. Some of the landings should succeed and must be exploited.
4. Again to count on forfeiture of strategical surprise implies the complete failure of all our cover and deception plans. This seems hardly justified on past experience. As to tactical surprise the enemy can hardly know the selected day and hour and the exact beaches at which the landings will take place.
5. Finally the comparison of relative strengths by divisions is misleading. For example the three Italian divisions now in HUSKY are said to have no more than 8,000 combatants each. It is the estimated number of combatant German soldiers not the number of German divisions that will affect the degree of resistance to be overcome.
6. We are reassured to some extent that the statement in Paragraph 5 that the planning and preparations are going forward with the utmost vigour but we feel bound to record our view that abandonment of the operation at any stage solely because the number of Germans in HUSKY-land had reached a small predetermined fraction of our own strength would be unthinkable.

T.O.O. 082355Z

Distribution

Restricted  
U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

311 *Husky*

YQVB73  
1651/7  
BMS

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**  
APR 7 1943

Priority  
SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers  
To: War  
USFOR

In Reply Cite: 2274 April 7, 1943

The view held by our planners, Bigot Husky. That the operation offers scant promise of success if the region contained substantial well armed and fully organized German ground troops is concurred in by Admiral Cunningham, General Alexander, and myself. To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower. Bigot Husky. This is NAF number 201. Reference COS (W) 546, paragraph 7. By the term substantial forces is meant more than 2 German Divisions. This was indicated in JP (43) 7 (final) paragraph 4. The foregoing was paragraph 1 of this message.

Para 2. I must point out that the assault contemplated must be frontal one with a virtual absence of either strategic or tactical surprise, made by a total of some 9 Divisions against a maximum enemy force of 8 divisions, apart from many static battalions. While such a frontal assault should succeed against the Italians, I do not consider hopeful the chances of success against a garrison comprising a high proportion of German formations.

Para 3. Opinion is based on (A) if German troops preponderate, the land forces in the region will be under German Command, with a consequent stronger will and capacity to resist than might be the case under Italian Command, (B). It is probable that German formations will be retained as a mobile reserve for counter attack when it is seen where our forces are landing.

CM-IN-4141 (7 Apr 43)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

310 Husky

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INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

from Algiers 2274

Page 2

Para 4. I consider that the dangerous periods will be between D day and D day plus 2 during which time immediate counter attack may take place, and between D plus 3 and D plus 6, when the Commander of the Garrison will have appreciated where our landings are and their strength, and will be able to commit his central reserves to a deliberate counter attack.

Para 5. The above statement of opinion does not affect the intensity of our planning and preparation which are going forward with the utmost vigor.

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ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD  
GEN. STRONG  
ADM. KING  
GEN. ARNOLD  
LOG

CM-IN-4141 (7 Apr 43) 2308Z cen

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

April 6, 1944

SECURITY  
CONTROL

From: FREEDOM, G-3

To: TROOPERS rptd AGWAR

Number 2015 Signed EISENHOWER cite FBGCT.

General Alexander considers that operations by airborne divisions essential for success of HUSKY therefore imperative that everything be done to make these divisions efficient. After discussion with General Browning and Staff, request urgent consideration be given to following measures. As pointed out in my Signal 9034 March 24 realize that in making these recommendations requirements for other commitments will have to be considered and that practical and other considerations may make entire fulfilment not possible.

1. AGWAR cable Fortune 39 (FAN 111) of 27 March in reply to my 6932 MAF 179 dated 16 March stated that the maximum troop carrying airplanes available to this theatre by June 15 will be 400. We are still therefore 100 short of requirements. AGWAR suggests that British provide for deficiency from 138 Troop carrier planes which they state would have been delivered to them by June 1st. Recommend this deficiency be made up in part by loan of 38 Wing of 3 squadrons equipped with Aibemaries and Halifaxes. Appreciate 38 Wing yet to be rearmed these types but it should arrive here by June 21 or thereabouts. Small advance of key personnel to arrive about June 10th. Squadrons to bring with them additional key maintenance personnel and range of spares to keep them going for approximately 1 month. Advantages of using 38 Wing are: (a) Provides extra transport aircraft capable of carrying and tugging. (b) Crews are fully trained in night flying. 2. Nucleus of 38 Wing Staff to arrive about May 15 to assist in actual operational preparations and control. 3. 36 horse gliders to be towed out by July 1st. Appreciate difficulties flying, organization, and dispatching aspects, and need for experienced tug pilots. Great advantage horses is that they carry a tactical load and fighting force and provide mobile artillery in single load. 4. 1 balloon with winch and crew to be sent here for parachute training at earliest possible moment. Not essential but would certainly help training. 5. 120 British Glider crews to be sent out for training with British troops and American-craft as soon as possible.

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BY SR , DATE

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CM-IN-4060 (7 Apr 43)

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**SECURITY CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

PAGE 2

Number 2015

April 6, 1943

NAF 179 CM-IN-8547 (17 Mar 43) CC/S  
FAN 111 CM-OUT-10251 (27 Mar 43) CC/S

ACTION: GEN DEANE CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD  
GEN STRONG  
GEN ARNOLD  
ADM KING  
LOG

CM-IN-4060 (7 Apr 43) 1922Z mcs


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BY *SR* . DATE JAN 14 1974

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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**  
APR 11 1943  
0414

YQVB53  
Filed 05/1829A  
ecm

SECURITY CONTROL

CORRECTED COPY

From: Algiers  
To: War

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NOV 24 1971

In reply cite: 1805 April 5, 1943

It is proposed to avoid towing WCV rpt LCV (P) by carrying them inboard. Reference your FAN 113. Following craft speeds in knots are considered conservative for planning purposes: LST 10, LCT 8, LCI (L) 12 1/2. Only known possibility of improving speed of assault is by transporting leading RCT ship to shore in combat loaders. This could be accomplished only if combat loaders for an additional RCT, making five combat loaded RCT in all, can be provided in addition to the shipping set out in Fortune 62 April 3rd.

*Husky*

4. (A) and (B). To AGWAR for Joint Chiefs of Staff rptd USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff. Signed Eisenhower. This is my NAF number 199. BUSKY BIGOT. Cite FHGCT.

2. Impossible to meet both requirements of dropping parachutists by moonlight and of landing first assault forces in darkness without having latter at sea in moonlight. This is objectionable but not considered unacceptable for the following reasons:

1. Hoped our air effort will reduce number of enemy air forces available for convoy attacks.

2. Landing craft do not furnish as good a target for altitude bombing as ships of which a large convoy will simultaneously be

CM-IN-3878 (7 Apr [redacted])

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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SECURITY CONTROL

Page 2

From: Algiers WAR DEPARTMENT  
To: War CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
In reply to: 1805 April 5, 1942

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

be proceeding north from Chimpanzee.

3. Low attack and torpedo bombing all bring enemy into range of AA guns on the landing craft.

3. Landing craft convoys remain on course similar to that travelled by previous British convoys to Finance long enough to avoid revelation of final destination before dusk.

4. Enemy RDF and ASV reconnaissance will probably reveal location of convoys regardless of visibility.

no sig

FOOTNOTE: Corrected copy of CM-IN-3556 (4-6-43) CCS

ACTION: CCS

INFORMATION: ADM. KING  
GEN. ARNOLD  
GEN. STRONG  
OPD

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RHP

CM-IN-8878 (7 Apr 43) 1134Z flw

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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SECURITY CONTROL  
APR 11 1943  
1907

YQV C 31  
1828Z/5th  
efg

U R G E N T

From: Algiers SECURITY CONTROL  
To: WAR

In Reply Cite: 1804 April 5, 1943

Operational plan undergoing changes. Bigot-Husky. Since decision to include ENSA assault in Hq Force 343 mission. Maintenance project also being redrawn by Fortune. Tentative maintenance project has been issued to Hq Force 343 covering broad policies. Since operation Husky is within territorial limits of this theater CG SOS NATOUSA will be only authority calling on USA for supply. Reference our 8694, your Fortune 48, your Fortune 58 and our 1653. Bigot Husky action AGWAR cite HEGDS 87 P signed Eisenhower. Until Hq Force 343 is given the final directive it will be impossible to indicate detailed troop list and units in combat loaded vessels from USA. Plan still provides for 45th Division to bring 14 days maintenance, 7 days reserve and 7 units of fire. Until Hq Force 343 has completed its planning no additions to normal TBA equipment other than requests already sent AGWAR direct or by SOS NATOUSA are contemplated. G-4 plan still provides that equipment and supplies in theater or due here on UGS 8, 8 A and 9 must suffice for the initial operation.

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JCS LETTER, 7-8-72  
BY cl, DATE JAN 14 1974

No Sig.

NOTE: Fortune 58 is CM-OUT-888 (2 Apr 43) OPD.  
Fortune 48 is CM-OUT-11695 (30 Mar 43) OPD.  
8694 is CM-IN-14798 (27 Mar 43) OPD.  
WDCMC unable to identify reference 1653.

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: General Arnold, General Deane (CCS),  
General Somervell, Log.

CM-IN-3033 (5 Apr 43) ~~SECRET~~ oms

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

*Husky*

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**OUTGOING MESSAGE**

Signal Operating Services  
Office of the Chief Signal Officer

**SECURITY  
CONTROL**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

April 5, 1943

**COMMANDING GENERAL  
FREEDOM ALGIERS**

Number 5298

Meeting CCB to discuss cable plan BIGOT HUSKY your  
1515 April 4 from Stoner for Matejka has been deferred  
until receipt further notice from your Headquarters.

**ORIGINATOR: GEN SOMERVELL**

**INFORMATION: OPD  
CC/S GEN DEANE  
LOG**

**CM-OUT-1837 (5 Apr 43) 1615Z mcs**

**SECRET**

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (C)

OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLL

Date JAN 14 1974

*Joseph R. ...*  
16

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

310 *Huster*

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

YQV C 39  
1407Z/ 3rd  
efg

April 1, 1943  
1508Z

**SECURITY CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers  
To: WAR

In Reply Cite: 1273 April 3, 1943

Understanding here on question of rotors (to AGWAR from Freedom) as follows Bigot-Husky. For SPSIS signed Eisenhower cite FHSIG. Please confirm or correct:

First. SIGUQU will replace SIGEXE for communication to War and other Hq without this theater. These rotors will provide a world-wide common means of communication between Hq authorized direct extra theater communication.

Second. SIGCOVE replaces SIGOSO 1st May for use system 49 otherwise no change in policy.

Third. An additional set of rotors will be provided this theater for exclusive internal use which rotors will be used during Husky and none of which have yet been received.

Fourth. SIGEXE and SIGOSO will no longer be used for any communication.

Para 2. Assuming above understanding correct 33 sets SIGUQU now on hand sufficient. Thirty four sets SIGCOVE being supplied also sufficient. Of special theater sets of rotors total of 102 sets required. This will equip all SIGABA now on hand plus those ordered our msg 8103 plus those ordered for Air Force by our letter dated 12 March. It does not include units yet to arrive for Husky who should receive issue prior departure USA.

(CM-IN-2631 5 Apr 43)

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JCS LETTER, 7-5-72  
BY SP . DATE JAN 14 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

210 Husky

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

From: Algiers  
To: **INCOMING MESSAGE CONTROL**  
In Reply Cite: 1273 April 3, 1943 SECURITY CONTROL

**SECURITY CONTROL**

Para 3. In our question 3 in msg 8472 joint instead of combined was meant. Your answer indicated US Navy was equipped with joint key. Request 500 copies joint key issued Navy for Husky be supplied for issue air and ground units here.

Para 4. It is understood SIGABA will under no circumstances be carried forward of division or wing Hq during Husky operation

No Sig.

NOTE: 8103 is CM-IN-11338 (21 Mar 43) General Somervell.

ACTION: General Somervell

INFORMATION: OPD  
General Deane (CCS)

CM-IN-2631 (5 Apr 43) 0318Z ems

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JCS LETTER, 7-8-72  
BY *SL*, DATE JAN 14 1974

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

SECURITY CONTROL

**OUTGOING MESSAGE****SECURITY  
CONTROL**Operations Division WDGS  
European Theater WDOPD  
OPD 045 Sec(4-3-43)  
April 3, 1943

FORTUNE ALGIERS

Number 82

USFOR LONDON ENGLAND

Number 3-7250

Landing craft other than those previously allocated not available. Revised estimate of these total 76 LST, 100 LCT, and 90 LCI (L). (This is Bigot Husky reply to your 129, 29 March 43 to Eisenhower for FHGCT information copy sent USFOR under Security Control for British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower. Pass to CINCMED and COMNAVNAV)

Para 2 Training losses are at variance with US Navy experience for these larger craft and considering maintenance facilities in theater 5% loss considered more accurate and 10% should allow adequate safety factor. Battle losses 30% accepted.

Para 3 Careful restudy capacity versus requirements confirms figures in Fan 112, 27 March as to landing craft. LST will sleep about 200 men, hence capacity underrated.

Para 4 Plan has been evolved making provision for lifting an additional RCT and possibly Ranger Bns (your 129 para 11 and 13) by adding ships and rearranging transport groups as follows: (A) 45th Division Group-7APA, 6 XAP 5 AKL. Total troop lift these ships adequate for lifting division, plus attached units (less Tank Bn, Tank Destroyer Bn and CA AA Gun Bn, which because of heavy equipment, are being loaded and sent in UGS 8 in 10 LSTS-with overflow of equipment and personnel in other vessels in UGF 8 and UGS 8) and Navy personnel-special technical groups and beach parties.

(B) Special convoy of combat loaders (to train RCT in area refer para 11 your 129) leaving about 10 May with 3 APA (averaging 1200 spaces) 3 XAPA (2 each about 2100 and 1 about 1200 spaces) and 2 AKL (150). These ships (about 10,000 spaces) on their voyage to North Africa, will be convoy

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(CM-OUT-1441)  
CM-OUT-1442

(3 Apr 43)

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (G)  
OSD letter, May, 4, 1973

By SLR

Date JAN 14 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

loaded with units on transport. Assume you can accommodate this ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ **CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER**

Para 5 If you will have about 25,000 spaces in landing craft (including those as above) (assuming that craft are maintained, allocated and utilized to full rated capacity) plus about 33000 spaces (sufficient for 1 division plus 1 RCT) in combat loaders which should allow cushion above total assault requirements.

Para 6 It is recognized that space wastage necessarily develops when assault units are fitted into ships but no other combat loaders nor landing craft can be made available.

Para 7 Your reference to additional personnel ships, Mt Stores ships are not fully understood. Please clarify.

Para 8 Navy can furnish 2 division headquarters ships. Plus 1 of the small APA of special combat loader group (see para 4 B) which will have equipment for use as headquarter ship.

Para 9 Can you use 2 of the smaller ships in special combat loaders group listed in 4 B for Ranger Bns. Navy also have plans to send 3 old destroyers. (Refer para 13 your 129)

Para 10 Your messages have dealt primarily with requirements of Western Task Force. It is presumed you have fully explored possibility of obtaining additional amphibious and other needed shipping from British sources.

No Sig

ORIGINATOR: OPD

INFORMATION: OPD (GEN MIDDLETON)  
GEN SOMERVELL (ASF-TRANS GEN WYLIE)  
GEN DEANE (CCS)  
ADM KING  
LOG

CM-OUT-1441  
CM-OUT-1442

(3 Apr 43)

22032

sb

~~SECRET~~  
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 5(D) or (C)

OSD Letter, May 1, 1978

Date

JAN 14 1974

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Freedom, Algiers CORRECTED COPY

To: AGWAR ( B A S please pass).

Number 815, April 1, 1943

AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff (NAF 198). USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff from FHSIG signed Eisenhower.

Para 1. Husky. Proposal to use Loran abandoned for following reasons according to information available here.

Sub para A. Bigot - Husky navigation requirement is high degree of accuracy at comparatively short ranges. Accuracy of Loran appear no greater than that of navigation to be expected in Mediterranean in summer.

Sub Para B. Charts cannot be latticed until siting of transmitter is settled. This cannot be done until after capture of Tunisia. Therefore it is unlikely sheets could be latticed and distributed to all forces in time.

Sub para C. Little effective training use and maintenance of apparatus can be carried out until transmitters erected and operating. Therefore probable that operators will be inexperienced and serviceability low. With inexperienced operators accuracy may well be reduced below that of normal navigation and element of doubt is added.

Sub para D. USAF do not intend to use equipment to transport aircraft. Difficulties of fitting and training.

Sub para E. Understand that long range capabilities of Loran required in other Theatres. In view of this and foregoing reasons it was decided unjustifiable to ask for Loran for Husky but to supplement normal navigation with mark submarines and special buoys.

If as a result of better information available in USA and it is considered objections are invalid use of Loran would be welcomed provided its performance and reliability is assured and that requisite number of receivers (66 in all) is available.

Technical assistance for fitting and instructors for training would be required.

(CM-IN-1095 2 Apr 43)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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SECURITY CONTROL  
**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY  
CONTROL**

Page 2

April 1, 1943

NOTE: Corrected copy of CM-IN-1055 (2 Apr 43) CCS.

ACTION: CCS

INFORMATION: OPD  
General Strong  
Admiral King  
General Arnold

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NOV 24 1971  
RAH

CM-IN-1095 (2 Apr 43) 1638Z ems

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

From: Freedom, Algiers SECURITY CONTROL

To: AGWAR

Number 815, April 1st, 1943

Para 1. Husky. Proposal to use Loran abandoned for following reasons according to information available here.

Sub Para A. Bigot - Husky navigation requirement is high degree of accuracy at comparatively short ranges. Accuracy of Loran appear no greater than that of navigation to be expected in Mediterranean in summer.

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Sub Para D. USAF do not intend to use equipment to transport aircraft. Difficulties of fitting and training.

Sub Para E. Understand that long range capabilities of Loran required in other Theatres. In view of this and foregoing reasons it was decided unjustifiable to ask for Loran for Husky but to supplement normal navigation with mark submarines and special buoys.

If as a result of better information available in USA and it is considered objections are invalid use of Loran would be welcomed provided its performance and reliability is assured and that requisite number of receivers (66 in all) is available.

Technical assistance for fitting and instructors for training would be required.

ACTION: CCS

INFORMATION: OPD, General Strong, Admiral King,  
General Arnold, Log.

CM-IN-1055 (2 Apr 43) 15017 [redacted] ems

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SECURITY  
CONTROL

YQV  
1322A/1  
EW

CCWA  
Apr 1 1943  
1429

Priority

From: Algiers  
To: War

In Reply Cite: 748 April 1 1943

Confirmed that Freedom 129 of March 29 1829 Z  
(to USFOR info AGWAR Fortune from Freedom Algiers)  
is NAF 193. To USFOR repeated AGWAR and Fortune,  
signed Eisenhower. HUSKY BIGOT. Cite FHGCT. Ref  
your 2313 of 31 March.

Nosig

ACTION: CCS

INFORMATION: OPD  
General Strong  
Admiral King  
General Arnold

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RAH

CM-IN-433 (1 Apr 43) 1623Z ems

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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**OUTGOING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY  
CONTROL**

Operations Division, WDGS  
European Section WDOPD  
OPD 400 Sec (3-30-43) CPS

SECURITY CONTROL

March 30, 1943

FORTUNE ALGIERS

Number 48

General plan Bigot for maintenance of operations Husky is approved (Eisenhower from Marshall) reference your 8694 March 27. Comments follow: (1) It is imperative that you submit detailed G-4 plan at earliest possible date in order that we may proceed with logical detailed planning for our maintenance responsibility. The plan must list your requirements over and above TBA equipment for this operation. (2) Reference Para 7, after forces have been landed and brought to scale, the responsibility for maintenance of the Eastern Task Force will rest with the Middle East on demand of Fortune. For those requirements which cannot be met from supplies available in Middle East will it be necessary for shipment to be made from United Kingdom to Middle East either via Cape or Mediterranean and then transhipped to destination, or will shipment be direct to destination from United Kingdom? In view of critical shortage of shipping is it necessary that the Eastern Task Force be maintained via Middle East (3) Have you established a date upon which supply for all sub forces will become AFHQ responsibility.

No Sig.

ORIGINATOR: OPD

INFORMATION:

GEN SOMERVELL  
GEN SENGOLD  
GEN DEANE  
JCG

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E. O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
- OGD letter, May, 1, 1972

By SLR

Date JAN 14 1974

CA-DUT-11695 (30 Mar 43) 2230Z

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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

YQV B 23  
Filed 1446Z/30  
amr

**SECURITY CONTROL**

2ND  
Mar 30 1943  
1055Z

P R I O R I T Y

From: Algiers  
To: War SECURITY CONTROL  
USFOR (Info)

In reply cite: 276, March 30, 1943

In paragraph 10 NAF 193 5th word from end should read LCTS and not LSTS. This is my NAF number 197. Signed Eisenhower. HUSKY BIGOT. To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff rptd USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff rptd Fortune.

No Sig

Action: Gen. Deane CC/S

Information: OPD  
Gen. Strong  
Adm. King  
Gen. Arnold

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NOV 24 1971

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CM-IN-16342 (30 Mar 43) 1057Z vc

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
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INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

YQV B 2  
29/1829Z  
alt

SECURITY CONTROL

P R I O R I T Y

From: Algiers  
To: WAR  
USFOR (info)

In reply cite: 129, March 29, 1943

1. Our estimate of 20 percent of shore to shore craft not being operational on assault date due to training and other causes is based on experience and considered a minimum. Reference FAN 112 of 27 March. To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff rptd USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff, Fortune. Signed Eisenhower. BIGOT HUSKY. Cite FRGCT. We also estimate that 30 percent of shore to shore craft used in the assault will become casualties and not be available for first follow up three days later.

2. Your figure of 975 vehicles for 100 LCTS allows a reduction of only 25 vehicles to compensate for the carriage of tanks. 412 tanks are included in Western Task Force assaults and we estimate an LCT carries 10 vehicles or 6 tanks and LST carries 50 vehicles or 22 tanks and 20 vehicles.

3. Your estimates are based on overall figures and do not make allowance for breakdown to actual assaults.

4. The very large vehicle deficit in the first follow up required to arrive 3 days after assaults if accepted would most seriously affect mobility.

5. The following detail of shipping requirements is based on plan described in Freedom 7892 of 20 March. Western Task Force requirements for ships and shore to shore craft will not change if a means is found of mounting and additional division for Eastern Task Force and thus re-

CM-IN-16162

(30 Mar 43)

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1310 Handley

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
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# INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY  
CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers  
To: WAR  
USFOR (Info)

In reply cite: 129, March 29th, 1943. Page 2

storing Western Task Force ENSA assault.

6. Figures for forces requiring to be transported vary slightly from para 2 of 7645 of 19 March and are as follows read (A) personnel (B) vehicles (C) tanks. Dime assault (A) 18742 (B) 2047 (C) 54. First followup (A) N 6464 (B) 1808 (C) Nil. Total (A) 25206 (B) 3855 (C) 54. FISH assault (A) 14615 (B) 1681 (C) 172. First followup (A) 6482 (B) 1825 (C) 12. Total (A) 21097 (B) 3506 (C) 184. GROG assault (A) 14615 (B) 1791 (C) 108. First follow up (A) 3539 (B) 990 (C) 12. Total (A) 18154 (B) 2781 (C) 120. HOOK assault (A) 16942 (B) 1937 (C) 54. First followup (A) 712 (B) 1827 (C) Nil. Total (A) 24063 (B) 3764 (C) 54. Grand total (A) 88520 (B) 13906 (C) 412.

7. Ship capacity calculations have been based on appendix R to JP (43) 7 (final) except that Mt store ships have been assumed to lift 125 vehicles AP ships 1500 personnel 105 vehicles XAP ships 1125 personnel 100 vehicles AK ships 160 personnel 200 vehicles.

8. Based on no additional shore to shore craft being available beyond 78 LST 110 LCT 90 LCI (L) shipping requirements will be as follows. (A) DIME assault 33 LST 110 LCT 76 LCI (L) First follow up turn round of all LST and LCT together with 10 only LCI (L). Second follow up 3 days later 6 only LSTS. (B) FISH assault 3 APA 2 AKA MT store ships 2 personnel ships 25 LST 14 LCI (L). First follow up turn round of LSTS and LCI (L) together with additional 9 MT store ships and 13 LCI (L) released from DIME. (C) GROG assault 3 APA 3 XAPA 2 AKA 5 MT store ships 2 personnel ships 6 LST first follow up turn round of LSTS together with additional 7 MT store ships and 14 LCI (L) released from DIME. (D) HOOK assault 3 APA 4 XAPA 2 AKA 3 MT store ships 2 personnel ships 14 LSD. First follow up turned round of LSTS together with additional 11 MT store ships 2 personnel ships and remain-

CN-IN-16162

(30 Mar 43)

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

# INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

**SECURITY  
CONTROL**

From: Algiers  
To: WAR  
USFOR (Info)

In reply cite: 129, March 29th, 1943.

Page 3

ing and remaining 5 LCI (L) released after DIME assault.  
(E) total requirement to cover Western Task Force assaults  
and first follow up convoys 9 APA 7 XAPA 6 AKA 37 MT  
store ships 8 personnel ships 78 LST 110 LCT 90 LCI (L).

9. If a further 31 LST can be provided no MT store ships  
will be required in the assault and only 20 MT store ships  
will be required in first follow up effecting a saving of  
17 MT store ships.

10. If it is impossible to provide 3 additional these  
additional 31 LST the rate of landing of vehicles will  
be too slow unless 4 LCMS can be carried in each of the 10 MT  
store ships employed in assaults or additional LSTS are pro-  
vided in lieu.

11. Except in case of DIME assaulting RCTS will be car-  
ried in combat loaders as follows: FISH 1 RCT 38 Div GROG  
1. RCT 45 Div HOOK 1 RCT 45 Div. Tactical considerations  
require that HOOK assault be carried out by 2 RCTS. NAF  
185 of 23 March para 10 refers. Can additional combat load-  
ers 3 APA ships 2 AKA ships be provided for this purpose  
with consequent reduction in other classes of shipping  
stated in 8th (D) as being required to transport HOOK  
force.

12. Shall require 3 Divisional Headquarter ships  
additional to requirements stated in 8th.

13. Although personnel lift for the 2 Ranger  
Battalions to be landed 1 near FISH and 1 near HOOK  
have been included in the figures in paras 6 and 8,  
tactical use requires these units each to have their  
own small ships which can hoist LCV (P). Request 2  
suitable ships be dispatched to this theater as early as  
possible to permit training.

CM-IN-18162 (20 Mar 43)

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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

SECURITY CONTROL

**SECURITY  
CONTROL**

From: Algiers  
To: WAR  
USFOR (Info)

In reply cite: 129, March 29th, 1943.

Page 4

14. Separate message on points raised in COS (W)  
546 follows.

No Sig

7892 is CM-IN-11106 (21 Mar 43) CCS  
FAN 112 is CM-OUT-10252 (27 Mar 43) JC/S  
NAF 185 is CM-IN-12464 (23 Mar 43) CCS

Action: Gen Deane (CC/S)

Information: OPD  
Gen. Strong  
Sec. Gen. Staff  
Adm. King  
Gen. Arnold  
LOG

CM-IN-16162 (30 Mar 43) 1149Z ce

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BY SK, DATE JAN 14 1974

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

FROM: A.F.H.Q. Algiers. G4  
TO: U.S.W.D. War Office London rptd Middle East

No. 8694

HUSKY B I G O T  
Cite FHGDS 19E signed Eisenhower.

Policy for maintenance operation HUSKY as agreed by Middle East contained in following cable. Request approval. Paper follows airmail. Text begins.

Part I PRINCIPLES.

1. Although responsibility co-ordinating general administrative planning rests with FORTUNE, assessment of stores required for assault and build up to scale, and for their phasing, is responsibility Commander each Task Force.

2. Until planning has reached stage at which Task Force Commanders can formulate firm demands, it is responsibility Fortune to draw attention special needs for Force. Statement these special needs will then be given Middle East and A.F.H.Q. Algiers so that action may be taken, when possible, to have sufficient stocks available in theatre to meet demands from Task Force when received.

3. Initial maintenance requirements of components of Task Forces will be provided at their points of embarkation. Thereafter maintenance of all British elements of E T F responsibility of Middle East and maintenance W T F responsibility A.F.H.Q. Algiers. If USA units included ETF they will be maintained under A.F.H.Q. Algiers arrangements.

Part 2. Assault Loading and Initial Maintenance less Air Force.

4. ETF. Responsibility for meeting demands made by Fortune and by Task Force Commander for all forces (excluding Air Forces) and Naval Shore parties will be Middle East if mounted from M. East; mounted from North African theatre, A.F.H.Q. for British Units and S O S, NATOUSA for USA Units; War Office if mounted from U Kingdom.

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JCS LETTER, 7-5-72  
BY SP, DATE JAN 14 1974

CM-IN-14798

(27 March 43)

as

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*30 Husky*

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

~~SECRET~~

Number 8694

WAR DEPARTMENT 27 March 43  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

# INCOMING MESSAGE

**SECURITY CONTROL**

10. Requirements met as follows

(a) Air Forces under Command Air Task Force Commanders through Army Task Force channels.

(b) Other Air Forces under command NAAF: through Normal channels established for Air Force operating from Northwest Africa.

(c) Air Forces located Middle East: under arrangements made by R A F Middle East.

## Part 5. Procedure for Demands.

11. E T F. Demands for initial requirements of British Formations and units from 1st Army passed to A.F. H.Q. by Fortune. Demands for initial requirements of Formations and Units from U Kingdom passed to War Office as directed by Middle East. Other Demands passed direct to Middle East. Demands for U S A Units mounted from North African theatre passed direct to S O S Natoua.

12. W T F. Demands will be passed direct to S O S, Natoua.

13. Where special stores required for special tasks, which cannot (cannot) be dealt with by either of Task Forces. Demands placed upon A.F.H.Q. by Fortune who, on placing demands, will state troops for which demands are made and scales of demands.

## Part 6 Co-ordination.

14. Daily executive planning meeting held at A.F.H.Q. and attended by representatives Fortune will be clearing house for transacting business between Fortune, A.F.H.Q., Natoua, and NAAF.

15. This paper has been agreed Middle East. Text ends. Policy in this telegram now governs Fortune planning, and Fortune telegram Q/0013 Mar 13 will be amended accordingly.

Action: OPD

Information: Gen Strong  
Gen Arnold  
Gen Somervell  
Gen Deane (CC/S)

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JCS LETTER, 7-5-72  
BY SR . DATE

JAN 14 1974

CM-IN-14798 (27 March 43) 2209Z as

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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Number 8694

WAR DEPARTMENT (27 March)  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

5. ~~W T F~~ ~~of S. Africa~~ ~~responsible for all forces (excluding Air Forces) and Naval Shore parties mounted from North African Theatre: S O S, U S A responsible for meeting demands all forces (excluding Air Forces) and Naval Shore parties mounted from U States.~~

Part 3. Continued Maintenance less Air Forces.

6. During period of build up to approved scale equipment and reserve holdings, responsibility for ensuring that requirements under these headings are included in tonnages allotted to available shipping rests with Task Force Commanders. Responsibility for meeting Commanders demands as stated paras 4 and 5.

7. After forces have been landed and brought to scale in equipment and reserves, responsibility for maintenance of Eastern and Western Task Forces will rest with Middle East and A.F.H.Q. in their respective spheres, on demand by Fortune.

Part 4. Air Forces. Equipment of Air Force Supply.

8. Initial requirements \* by command furnishing unit.

9. Subsequent requirements of units met through stores holding unit demand requirements as follows:-

(a) Units ~~E T F~~: by base maintenance unit Tripoli area.

(b) Units ~~W T F~~: under arrangements made by NAAF: movement in conjunction with A.F.H.Q.

(c) In event any unit of either Task Force being attached to the other, detached unit will draw requirements from source supplying new area. If organization in new area unable meet demands, due difference in type, it will be responsible for forwarding such demands to alternative source supply

(d) Units based in Malta: by demand through existing channel.

(e) Units based in Tunisia/Algeria: by demand on Northwest African Air Service Command.

(f) Units in Middle East: through normal channels. Supplies from Army sources

CM-IN-14798

(27 March 43)

as

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BY ~~SR~~ .DATE

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SECURITY CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

CG  
FORTUNE ALGIERS

Number 45

BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF  
USFOR LONDON ENGLAND

Number R-7024

Comments on some aspects as to timing of operations as set out in your 8421 March 23rd NAF 185 BIGOT Joint Chiefs of Staff to Eisenhower and your 8698 March 23rd NAF 186 follow.

Lsts towing landing barges have a speed of not more than 6 and 1/2 knots. Lsts have a speed of about 7 knots, and in tow about 8 knots. Time of movement from Cape Bon to Sciacca would be about 12 hours and from Cape Bon to Gela about 20 hours.

If timing is arranged to permit landing of paratroops about 2300, amphibious forces must arrive off beaches about 1 hour after midnight. Forces would thus be moving under good light conditions and would therefore be continuously exposed to air attack. While our aircraft can provide a measure of protection during daylight they will not be able to do so by moonlight. For Eisenhower Fortune Algiers, FAN 113, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Enemy observation of advancing amphibious craft and his knowledge of paratroop landings will alert his forces and afford him opportunity to deploy forces for the defense of beaches where landings are practicable.

Your comments are requested.

No Sig

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NOV 24 1971

RAP

ORIGINATOR: GEN DEANE (JCS)

INFORMATION: OPD, ADM KING, GEN ARNOLD, GEN STRONG, LOG

CM-OUT-10708 (28 Mar 43) 0028Z new  
CM-OUT-10709 (28 Mar 43) 0028Z new

11

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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**OUTGOING MESSAGE**

Joint Chiefs of Staff

March 27, 1943

**SECURITY  
CONTROL**

COMMANDING GENERAL  
FORTUNE ALGIERS

Number 42

Joint Chiefs of Staff have message from British Chiefs of Staff number COS (W) 548 in which they question for your reasons for and the wisdom of abandoning the use of Loran apparatus in Husky. For Eisenhower Fortune Algiers from The Joint Chiefs of Staff. Your reasons for recommendation contained in NAF 190 are desired in more detail.

ORIGINATOR: GEN DEANE (JCS)  
INFORMATION: OPD  
GEN ARNOLD  
GEN STRONG  
LOG  
ADM KING

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JCS 29-71  
JCS 5M 522-71

Date- DEC 6 1971

Signature- *RAH*

CM-OUT- 10573

(27 March 43)

2020Z as

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

YQVC 20  
271207Z  
spl

March 27  
3102

URGENT

From: Algiers SECURITY CONTROL  
To: USFOR London (action)  
WAR (information)

In Reply Cite: 9544 March 27, 1943

Hereafter I make reference to your para 2 A. BIGOT HUSKY. Prospects of clearing Tunisia by April 30 are too uncertain to justify considering passing convoys through Mediterranean in May. Reference 2208 from British Chiefs of Staff GSPOR, to USFOR, for British Chiefs of Staff repeat to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower. This is NAF 192. BIGOT HUSKY it is considered that special convoys can be passed through the Mediterranean within one month of clearing Tunisia.

Para 2 B. Consider that there is a reasonable prospect of passing regular through maintenance convoys in early August and that it is justified to plan on that presumption.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 22 1974

No Sig.

NOTE: WDCMC unable to identify reference.

ACTION: CCS

INFORMATION: OPD, General Strong,  
Admiral King, General  
Arnold, Log

CM-IN-14607 (27 Mar 1943) [redacted] ems

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

YQV C 13  
0923Z/26th  
efg

ACM  
March 26, 1943  
1230Z

SECURITY CONTROL

P R I O R I T Y

From: Algiers  
To: WAR - ( Info to London USFOR )

In Reply Cite: NAF 189 March 26, 1943

No. 9237

\* Outlined (Bigot) NAF 185 not yet firm as examination mentioned last para NAF 182, to determine whether possible employ another division within present shipping and craft allotment, still in progress. To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff rptd USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower. Cite FEGCT. Busky Bigot. This is my NAF number 189. Chances of success will be so appreciably increased if another British Division can be landed in Fustian-Federal area and 3rd US Division restored to original invincible objective, that every method of over coming difficulties being thoroughly explored.

Para 2. Will wire final plan as soon as firm, probably about 1st April, meanwhile, reference AGWAR 4522 March 24th, request you telegraph any comments you may wish to make on NAF 185 outline plan forthwith because time does not allow for submission of written plan.

No Sig.

\* Omission, being serviced.

DECLASSIFIED

WDCC.

JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

Note: NAF 185 is CM-IN-12464 (3-23-43)CC/S  
NAF 182 is CM-IN-11106 (3-21-43)CC/S

Action: CC/S

Information: OPD, Gen. Strong, Adm. King, Gen. Arnold, Log  
COPY No. 10

CM-IN-13965 (26 Mar 43) 14292 11W  
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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

C13  
ed 0923Z/26

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

SUPPLEMENTARY COPY

PRIORITY

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers  
To: War  
USFOR London (Information)

In Reply Cite: 9237, March 26, 1943

Insert at beginning of message:

Plan outlined (Bigot) NAF 185 not yet firm as examination mentioned last para NAF 182, to determine whether possible employ another division within present shipping and craft allotment, still in progress.

Supplementary copy of CM-IN-13965 (26 Mar 43) CC/S, which is NAF 189

ACTION: CC/S  
INFORMATION: OPD  
GEN. STRONG  
GEN. ARNOLD  
ADM. KING

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

CM-IN-14183 (26 Mar 43) 2128Z cen

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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**OUTGOING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY  
CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

Combined Chiefs of Staff

March 26, 1943

COMMANDING GENERAL  
FORTUNE, ALGIEFS

Number 39

BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF  
USFOR LONDON ENGLAND

Number R-6995

British are making arrangements to provide the 5 Wellington Squadrons for the limited period of D minus 25/15 for 6 weeks and Beaufighter requirements can be met and action is already in hand (to Eisenhower Fortune Algiers, FAN 111, from Combined Chiefs of Staff).

Limit U.S. capabilities 400 troop carrier aircraft prior to July 1st. The 3 groups now in U.S. and scheduled for your theater complete training with 82nd Airborne Division about April 15th should not require extensive additional training 20th Fighter Group less aircraft and crews can be made available now but aircraft and crews will come out of your reserve P 38 aircraft and crews. Reference your 179 March 16. Air Echelon of 2 heavy bomb groups is still under consideration. Air Echelons of 2 night fighter squadrons enroute U.K. by boat. 2 additional squadrons, available for shipment in April. All will require 60 day period of training in U.K. using British equipment and Beaufighters before being usable.

No Sig

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NOV 24 1971

RHP

ORIGINATOR: CCS

INFORMATION: OPD  
ADM KING  
GEN ARNOLD  
GEN STRONG  
LOG

CM-OUT-10251 (27 Mar 43)  
CM-OUT-10256 (27 Mar 43)

0026Z  
0037Z

bjm

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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**OUTGOING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

March 26, 1943

COMMANDING GENERAL  
FORTUNE, ALGIERS

Number 38

Deficit in lift required for assault US effort Husky as set out in your 7645 March 19, your 7892 March 20 NAF 182 and your 8421 March 23 NAF 185 (Bigot Marshall to Eisenhower) can be reduced if War Department estimates are used in calculating lift of LSTS at 200 men and 50 vehicles, and an estimate of 10% loss of craft in training instead of 20% is used. In addition to the above 10 additional LST and LCT 5's will be available. The lift in the combat loaders of the 45th Division can also be increased over your estimate by the latest figures of actual lift of these vessels. To Eisenhower, Fortune Algiers RAM 112, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Our calculations are as follows read in 3 columns:

(A) Vessel	(B) Troop Lift	(C) Vehicle Lift
68 LSTS	13,600	3,400
90 LCI (L)	18,000	Nil
100 LCT-5	3,000	975
<b>Total</b>	<b>34,600</b>	<b>4,375</b>
Less 10% loss	3,460	438
<b>Total Assault Lift on Landing Craft</b>	<b>31,140</b>	<b>3,937</b>
Combat Loaders (including 500 spaces in Headquarters ships)	27,788	3,000
10 new LSTS	2,000	500
10 new LCT-5	300	100
<b>Total Assault Lift in Transport</b>	<b>30,088</b>	<b>3,600</b>
<b>Total Assault Lift</b>	<b>61,228</b>	<b>7,537</b>
<b>Assault Deficit</b>	<b>4,576</b>	<b>309</b>

(CM-OUT-10252 27 Mar 43)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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**OUTGOING MESSAGE**

March 26, 1943

**SECURITY  
CONTROL**

Page 2

Calculations continued:

(A) <u>Let Follow Up Deficit</u>	(B) <u>Troop Lift</u>	(C) <u>Vehicle Lift</u>
	Nil	2,908

This troop deficit can be eliminated if 2 ships in UGF 3, Punston and O'Hara, now equipped with davits are used as additional troop ships. They would not have Navy crews.

Summarizing the above, there are sufficient landing craft and combat loaders according to our computations, to provide lift for the following major units and supporting troops: 3rd Division, 45th Division, 36th Division, 1 CC 2nd Armored Division, 2 Ranger Battalions, total approximate 65,804.

45th Division Sub Task Force now includes 23,801 troops plus about 1,000 Navy personnel beach parties. Extra spaces may be filled with troop casualties.

Information not yet available from UK as to whether or not additional amphibious landing craft can be made available.

Your comments both on this message and on the points raised in the British Chiefs of Staff COS (W) 546 are desired.

No Sig

ORIGINATOR: JC/S

INFORMATION: OPD  
Admiral King

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CM-OUT-10252 (27 Mar 43) 0026Z ems

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

YQVC 35  
Filed 1544Z/26  
ah

March 25 1943  
1824Z

P R I O R I T Y

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers  
To: WAR & USFOR  
No: 9345.

In Reply Cite: NAF 190, March 26, 1943

After investigation (to AGWAR USFOR from Freedom Algiers) with Commander Harding not considered Loran System will produce sufficiently accurate results to justify use in HUSKY in view of its urgent need elsewhere. BIGOT HUSKY reference my 4145 AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff USFOR pass to British Chiefs of Staff from Eisenhower cite FHSIG NAF 190. Recommend installation of Loran System in Mediterranean be considered as part of future program.

No Sig.

4145 is CM-IN-1595 (4 Mar 43) CC/S  
which is NAF 165

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NOV 24 1971

*RHP*

ACTION: CC/S  
INFORMATION: OFD  
GEN. STRONG  
GEN. ARNOLD  
ADM. KING  
LOG

CM-IN-14148 (26 Mar 43) 2031Z cen

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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YQV B 62  
Filed 1406Z/2  
amr

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

P R I O R I T Y

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers  
To: War

In reply cite: 9070, March 25, 1943

Prompt attachment requested of Troop Carrier Wing Officer to Headquarters Force 141 here. To AGWAR for C of S OPD signed Eisenhower. Cite FHGCT. HUSKY BIGOT. Reference your 3332 March 5. Should come from wing which will furnish air transport for HUSKY airborne troops.

Ref. 3332 CM-OUT-1868 (5 Mar 43) OPD No Sig

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: GEN. DEANE (CC/S)  
GEN. STRONG  
GEN. ARNOLD  
LOG

CM-IN-13560 (25 Mar 43) 2045Z cen

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JCS LETTER, 7-8-72  
BY SK , DATE JAN 14 1974

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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250334Z  
HH

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

U R G E N T

From: Aigiers SECURITY CONTROL  
To: War

In Reply Cite: 8988 March 25, 1943.

USFOR 2218 reference March 24 in my NAF 186, time for parachute drop in moonlight should read 2230 (repeat 2230) hours and not 2030. To USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff rptd AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff. Bigot Husky. Signed Eisenhower. Cite FHGCT. My NAF 188 is this.

No Sig.

NAF #186 is CM-IN-12554 (3/24/43) CC/S

Action: CC/S

Information: OPD  
Gen. Strong  
Adm. King  
Gen. Arnold

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NOV 24 1971

*RAH*

CM-IN-13269 (25 Mar 43) 0550Z ce

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

*310 Husky*

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Date- 11-24-71

Signature- RHP

*The New Yorker*  
*White House* COPY NO 23

To: Joint Staff Mission  
Repeated: General Eisenhower  
From: Chiefs of Staff  
Dated: 25th March, 1943.

BIGOT

IMMEDIATE

Following from Chiefs of Staff C.O.S.(W) 546  
for Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Reference NAF 182, 185 and 186.

After a careful examination of the revised  
plan we are very strongly opposed to the idea of  
cancelling the assault at ENSA repeat ENSA. The purpose  
of this assault is to secure an airfield from which  
fighter cover can be provided for an attack on Palermo  
on D plus 2 repeat D plus 2. It would in our judgment be  
very wrong to leave this port of entry open to the enemy  
for a moment longer than this and it would also be  
disadvantageous to leave the Air Forces in Western Sicily  
free to operate against the Eastern Task Force.

2. If therefore General Eisenhower adheres to the  
view that the south-east assaults must be strengthened an  
additional division must be provided for him by hook or  
by crook.

3. There seem to be four ways in which this might  
be done, viz:

- (A) A British division from North Africa
- (B) A United States Division from North Africa
- (C) A United States division from America
- (D) A British division from the United Kingdom.

4. Courses (A) and (B) are in our view the best  
solution but they both depend upon (1) whether port  
facilities would be available for mounting yet another

-1-

310 Husky

division from North Africa, and (ii) whether the additional shipping and landing craft can be supplied.

We suggest that General Eisenhower should be asked for his views on (i) above and for his absolutely minimum requirements under (ii) above, after every expedient and economy has been explored.

5. Should courses (A) and (B) both prove impracticable we should have to fall back on (C) or (D). In either case the necessary combat loaders would have to be American. In the case of (D) these ships would have to arrive in the United Kingdom by 15th May. We estimate that courses (A) (B) and (D) would each involve 12 additional escorts and that course (C) would involve 5 additional escorts.

6. For the reasons stated in NAF 186 we agree that the target date for the assault should be between 8th and 12th July. This will mean that there will be near full moon conditions for the Palermo assaults and during the period of discharge of vessels lying off the beaches. It will also mean that the navigation advantages to be derived from an early morning moon will not be present. Doubtless both these points have been considered.

7. We are greatly disturbed by and cannot agree with the statement in Paragraph 5 of NAF 182 that if substantial German ground troops should be placed in region prior to attack the whole operation would become impossible.

T.O.O. 1920z/25

Distribution.

Restricted  
U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

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Date- 11-24-71

Signature- RHP

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**OUTGOING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY  
CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

Operations Division WOGS  
European Section WDOPE  
OPD 381 Sec (3-24-43)

March 24, 1943

COMMANDING GENERAL  
NORTH AFRICAN THEATRE OF OPERATIONS  
FREEDOM, ALGIERS

Number 4522

We are studying the outlined plan given by your 9421 BIGOT March 23. From Marshall to Eisenhower. We are awaiting your written outline plan before communicating further on this subject. Query. Should CG 45 Division visit your Headquarters or can he be given full information here?

No Sig

ORIGINATOR: OPD

INFORMATION: LOG

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 8(E) and 8(D) or (C)

OPD Letter, May 3, 1972

By SLLC Date JAN 14 1974

CM-OUT-9212 (24 Mar 43) 2217Z med

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

YQV B 76  
232046Z  
CE

URGENT

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers  
To: USFOR (Action)  
WAR (Informational)

In Reply Cite: 8698, March 23, 1943

Favorable moon. Governed primarily by method of employment airborne troops, your 2198 of Mar 2311 33Z, Husky Bigot, signed Eisenhower cite FHGCT, for action to USFOR British Chiefs of Staff rpt AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff, NAF 186, these are to be used on large scale to land behind beach defenses in order to soften defenses before frontal assault from seaward. They must have moonlight for drop and thereafter require about four hours in which to develop their attack. Best time for seaborne assault is in darkness 2 hours before dawn; that is about 0230 hours, giving time for parachute drop in moonlight 2030 hours. Most favorable moon in these circumstances will be moon in second quarter, which occurs 10-14 June and similar period in July.

*Corrected to 2330 by letter 4/2/44*

No Sig

Reference believed in error.

ACTION: GEN. DRANE (CCS)  
INFORMATION: OPD  
ADM. KING  
GEN. ARNOLD  
GEN. STRONG

DECLASSIFIED  
J.C.S. Regrading Memo 29-71  
By SR Date JAN 14 1974

**SECRET**

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*310 Husky*

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

YQVB 25  
filed 0802Z/23  
LE

CCWD  
Mar 23, 1943  
1509Z

P R I O R I T Y

SECURITY CONTROL

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From: Algiers  
To: WAR (action)  
USFOR(Info)

Date- 11-24-71

Signature- RHP

In Reply Cite: 8421, March 23, 1943.

In continuation of my NAF 182, the outline plan approved by me, on which action is going forward, is as follows. This plan is based on assumption that no further landing craft can be provided. This is my NAF 185 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff rptd USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff, signed Eisenhower. Cite FNGCT, BIGOT HUSKY, First. Parachute attacks at dusk or in darkness on D minus 1 behind beaches at Acid and Cent, each by 1 British Parachute Brigade, and at Dime by US Parachute Regiment. Second. Seaborne assaults about 2 hours prior to first light on D day at Acid, Bark, Cent and Dime. Third. Acid assaults will be carried out by 5 Division on 2 Brigade front and 56 Division on 1 Brigade front, assisted by 2 Commandos, all ship to shore. Mideast. Initial objective of 5 Division Ladbroke and Glutton exploiting towards Fustian. Role of 56 division protection c<sup>o</sup> Beachhead and left flank of advance of 5 Division. 4. Bark assault will be carried out by a brigade group ship to shore from mideast. Initial objective Rataplan Airfield. 5. Cent assault will be carried out by 1 British Infantry Division and 1 armored regiment from 18th Army Group shore to shore from Lauragh Area. Initial objective Queen Bee Airfield. 6. lima assault will be carried out by 3rd US Infantry Division and 1 armored battalion shore to shore from Laindon-Agouti. Initial objective Homespun Airfield. 7. Seaborne assault about 2 hours prior to 1st light not before D plus 3 at \*KRLT on a 2 Brigade front by British 3rd Division (now model) reinforced by 1 additional infantry brigade group and 2 Commandos. Objective Fustian Port and Airfield. 8. Assaults

CM-IN-12464 (23 [redacted])

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

310 *Handwritten*

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**INCOMING MESSAGE**  
P R I O R I T Y

SECURITY CONTROL

**SECURITY  
CONTROL**

From: Algiers  
To: WAR (Action)  
USFOR (Info)

In reply cite: 8421, March 23, 1943.

Page 2

at Ensa are cancelled. 9. Seaborne assaults about 2 hours before 1st light at Fish, Grog and Hook. There will be no fixed dates for these assaults, which would be ordered at such a time as adequate fighter support could be insured from the southeast and after the island had been softened by the operations in the southeast and our successful air action. 10. Grog and Hook assaults will be carried out by 45th US Infantry Division reinforced by 1 RCT from 36th Division under command of 45th Division assisted by 1 Ranger Battalion. This force will assault at Hook on a front of 2 RCTS (for 1 of which additional combat loaders will be required, unless the undesirable expedient suggested in para 12 below is adopted), and at Grog on a front of 1 RCT. Initial objective of force is Malicious Port and Airfield. 11. Fish assault will be carried out by 36th US Infantry Division (less 1 RCT), reinforced by 1 armored combat command from 2nd US Armored Division under command of 36th Division, assisted by 1 ranger battalion. Force will assault at Fish on a front of 1 RCT. Role of force protection of right flank of Grog and Hook force during advance on Malicious. 12. Length of passage and surprise requires that leading RCTS of Fish, Grog and Hook assaults all be carried out ship to shore. In order to achieve this (unless combat loaders for a 4th RCT can be provided) it will be necessary to disembark in North Africa 1 RCT of 45th Division, and replace by 1 RCT 36th Division to lead in Fish force assault. 13. From above it will be seen that either 45th Division or additional combat loaders must arrive in North Africa in time to allow 1 RCTY of 36th Division to rehearse and to be loaded for the Fish assault. 14. Following will be held as reserves, not assault loaded, to assist in exploitation and reduction of the island:-(A) Eastern Task Force. 1 infantry brigade group at Finance (from Finance Garrison). 1 British Infantry Division from 18th Army Group (D plus 28). (B) Western Task Force. 1 US Infantry Division from North Africa (D plus 28), of which 1 RCT will be set up as reserve from D day. (C) the portions of the airborne divisions not participating in D day assaults will form an additional

CM-IN-12464 (23 [REDACTED])

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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**INCOMING MESSAGE**  
P R I O R I T Y

**SECURITY CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers  
To: WAR (Action)  
USFOR (Info)

In reply cite: 8421, March 23, 1943. Page 3

reserve. 15. US Naval escorts and craft allotted to Ensa will now be required for Dime. 16. The additional combat loaders in 10th and 13th form part of the shipping required for the deficit in lift stated in my number 7645 dated 19th March. 17. Written outline plan being forwarded for your information by hand of officer.

No Sig

182 is CM-IN-11108 (21 Mar 43) CCS  
7645 is CM-IN-10379 (20 Mar 43) GEN. SOMERVELL

Franklin D. Roosevelt Lt. ---

DECLASSIFIED SM522-71

ACTION: GEN. DEANE (CC/S)

Date-11-24-71

INFORMATION: OPD  
ADM. KING  
GEN. STRONG  
GEN. ARNOLD  
LOG

Signature- RHO

CM-IN-12464 (23 Mar 43) 2152Z cen

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
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YQV B 23  
filed 0802Z/23  
rh

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

March 24 1943  
0938 Z

**SECURITY CONTROL**

P R I O R I T Y  
S U P P L E M E N T A R Y  
C O R R E C T I O N

From: Algiers SECURITY CONTROL  
To: WAR  
USFOR (info)  
No. 8421  
In Reply Cite: NAF 185 March 23, 1943

Please insert the following at omission:

"Seaborne assault about 2 hours prior to first  
light not before D plus 3 at Kilt on a 2 Brigade  
front by British 3rd Division".

No Sig

Footnote: Supplementary correction to CM-IN-12464  
(23 Mar 43) CC/S

Action: CC/S

Information: OPD  
Adm King  
Gen Strong  
Gen Arnold  
LOG

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NOV 24 1971

RHP

CM-IN-12913 (24 Mar 43) 1702Z vc

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

310 Haskins

*The Map Room  
The White House*

COPY NO. 26

To: Joint Staff Mission  
From: Chiefs of Staff  
Dated: 23rd March, 1943

**[REDACTED]**

BIGOT.  
MOST IMMEDIATE.  
OZ 836.

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DECLASSIFIED SMS22-71  
Date- 11-24-71  
Signature- *RHP*

Following is repetition for Joint Staff Mission of Etouss's No. 2198 to General Eisenhower dated March 23.

BEGINS.

Following from Chiefs of Staff. The important points raised in your NAF 162 are being urgently studied and our comments will be communicated as soon as possible. In the meanwhile we must clear up one point at once.

2. At all our discussions at ANFA it was believed that the favourable moon period for the HUSKY assault was the last quarter. The provisional dates selected were June 24 or July 22 and all our preparations at this end have been based on understanding that June 24 is the earliest possible date.
  3. Your plan now appears to be based on carrying out the assault in the first quarter and June 10 and July 10 are specifically mentioned.
  4. Can you confirm this change and give brief reasons.
  5. Please reply most immediate if possible today.
- ENDS.

T.O.O. 1140Z/23

Distribution  
Restricted  
U.S. Chiefs of Staff

*3/3 [unclear]*

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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YQY B 14  
1145Z/21st  
efg

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

MAR 21 1943  
1145Z

SECURITY CONTROL

P R I O R I T Y

From: Algiers  
To: WAR

In Reply Cite: 8034 March 21, 1943

Cargo ships (BIGOT Husky. AGWAR pass to COMINCH for action from COMNAVNAW. Nob Oran deliver to COMAMPFORNAW for info. CINCAF number 7645 of March 19 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff) allocated for Husky should be provided with maximum number LCM (3) that existing boom capacity and deck space will permit. LCM (3) should be of latest type with 800 gallon capacity fuel tanks filled prior to sailing. Personnel ships allocated should be provided with maximum number personnel landing craft that existing boom capacity, davits and deck space will permit. U S Navy boat crews. Repair personnel. Spare parts and lubricating oil should be provided each ship to meet requirements. CINC Med informed. All merchant vessels British or United States will require U S Navy Liaison Officer, Radiomen and Signalmen.

No Sig.

Footnote: No. 7645 is CM-IN-10379 (20 Mar 43) Gen. Somervell

Action: Admiral King

Information: OPD  
General Deane (CC/B)  
General Somervell  
LOG

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JCS LETTER 7-5-72  
BY SR . DATE JAN 14 1974

CM-IN-11240 (21 Mar 43) 1559 Z mvs

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

*80 Husky*

*Wesley Rouse*

~~SECRET~~  
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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**  
WACC  
March 21 1943  
1807Z

YQVB35  
Filed 21/1536Z  
ecm

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers  
To: War

In reply cite: 8103 March 21, 1943

Other than strictly USA Headquarters requirements for SIGABA in accordance BIGOT-HUSKY CCE policy are as follows: 20 SGRINO complete with SIGABA, SIGEXE and SIGIVI, 6 SIGCOVE, 9 tandem cables, 6 power units PE 75. For SPSIS signed Eisenhower cite FHSIG. All above equipment will be in custody USA cryptographic personnel during operation. All above equipment should be shipped Chief Signal Officer AFHQ Algiers to arrive not later than May first. Advise this Hq when and how shipped and how marked. It is assumed all USA Div Sig companies and Sig Bns will be equipped with necessary SIGABA equipment prior departure USA. This hq not planning supply such units. Special systems similar to 14 and 70 should be provided for exclusive HUSKY use. Recommend you prepare and supply systems informing this hq what units have been supplied prior embarkation from USA and furnishing quantity to supply units here. At least 30 copies each will be required for distribution here.

no sig

ACTION: GEN. SOMERVELL  
INFORMATION: OPD  
GEN. DEANE (CC/S)

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JCS LETTER 7-5-72  
BY SR . DATE JAN 14 1974

CM-IN-11338 (21 Mar 1943) ~~SECRET~~ cen

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

310 Husky

*Prof Room*

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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

YQV B 17  
filed 21/1147Z  
VH

SCWD  
Mar 21, 1943  
1532Z

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers  
To: War

In Reply Cite 8035 Mar 21, 1943

On basis of present (BIGOT HUSKY, Ultra secret, AGWAR pass to COMINCH and COMAMPFORLANT for action from COMNAVNAW, NOB Oran deliver to COMAMPFORNAW and COMCRABNAW for info, Aidac) incomplete development HUSKY plans expect task organization Western Naval Task Force may be about as follows. Group A Rear Admiral Hall with 3rd Division in LST-LCI-LCT attack south coast Horrified D day. Group B Rear Admiral Conolly with 36th less 1 RCT embarked in landing craft Templar area D plus 5. Group C Rear Admiral Kirk with 45th Division in combat loaders plus 1 RCT of 36th in landing craft attacking with 2 RCT of 45th in Galore area remaining 2 RCT 1 each from 36th and 45th in Caribou area all D plus 5.

Inclusion 1 RCT of 36th Division with 45th makes it essential that force from USA arrive Fascist earliest date for conferences distribution final plans and such rehearsals and exercise as may be practicable.

Request information earliest probable arrival AMPHFORLANT and supporting units.

DD, CL and CA should be given all possible training in gunfire support.

No Sig

Reference not identified in WDCMC

ACTION: ADM KING  
INFORMATION: OPD  
GEN. DEANE (CC/S)  
LOG

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JCS LETTER, 7-5-72  
BY SZ . DATE JAN 14 1977 *ref Room*

CM-IN-11439 (21 Mar 43) 2329Z bjm COPY No. 14  
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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

YQV B 20  
filed 21/1143  
VH

OCW  
Mar 21 1943  
1552Z

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers  
To: War

In Reply Cite 8033 Mar 21, 1943

Likewise BIGOT HUSKY, AGWAR deliver to COMINCH for action, COMINCH Pass to COMAMPFORLANT also for action and to Bupers, VOPNAV for info, from COMNAVNAV. Nob Oran Pass to COMAMPFORNAV for info. Request beach part battalions COMAMPFORNAV 281430 February if not already enroute be sent forward in next departing fast convoy, CINC MED has for information, essential that joint training with shore parties commence earliest practicable date.

No Sig

ACTION: ADM KING

INFORMATION: OPD  
GEN. DEANE (CC/S)  
LOG

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JCS LETTER, 7-5-78  
BY SR . DATE JAN 14 1974

CM-IN-11438 (21 Mar 43)

2328Z

bjm

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

310 Husky

*W. J. Deane*

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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

YQVB 54  
filed 1630Z/20  
fb

March 21, 1943  
0259 Z

P R I O R I T Y

SECURITY CONTROL

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Date- 11-24-71

Signature- RHP

From: Algiers

To: WAR

No. 7892

In Reply Cite: NAF 182 March 20, 1943

*Entire*

Continued study of the Husky outline plan has convinced General Alexander and General Montgomery that the forces planned for the Eastern Task Force are too weak to attain essential immediate objectives. BIGOT. To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower. NAF number 182. These objectives include certainty of capture of Catania airfields, capture of Augusta and Syracuse, and taking of Gela and neighbouring airfields. Recent reconnaissances have shown that the airfield near Gela is one of the most highly developed in the entire country. In addition to the above, the Air Chief Marshal states that the airfield at Pacjino must be seized at once. To insure reasonable expectation of success in the vital southeastern area Generals Alexander and Montgomery are convinced that an additional division is necessary. Since we have been informed that the 2 Governments have already allocated to this enterprise every ship and landing craft available, the only possible answer with shipping and/or landing craft now available lies in giving to one of the allocated American divisions the mission of capturing Gela airfields and sideslipping the British forces to the eastward. This means the elimination of the

CM-IN-11106

(21 Mar 43)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

318 Kuchner

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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

From: ~~AFRICA~~  
To: WAR  
No. 7892

In Reply Cite: NAF 182 Mar 20, 1943

SECURITY CONTROL

Southwestern attack and this American division would come under the operational control of the Eastern Task Force Commander.

It will be necessary to capture the port of Palermo. The American division originally assigned to the southwestern assault was to capture the airfields from which to assist the attack on Palermo. The new conception would be to take out the greatest possible insurance for the rapid capture of the southwestern end to include the line Catania-Gela, from which area long range fighter support could be given to the attack at Palermo. Therefore no fixed date for the Palermo attack would be set and this attack would take place at such time as this fighter support could be insured.

*Should read  
SOUTHEASTERN  
for collection  
#7892-CM-14  
16250*

There are many objections to the change proposed. One of these objectors is that the two American Divisions, scheduled for seizing Palermo, must be ready to attack from about D plus 3 onward. The result might be that this shipping may have to lie in North African ports for a matter of 4 or 5 days or more with personnel, at least on the large ships, unable to debark. Another is that the difficulties of the Palermo attack will be increased because of the absence of the threat in the southwest. The salient fact remains that without Catania and Gela airfields, the whole plan becomes abortive and all later attacks, even if initially partially successful, would merely lead us into difficulties which could not be overcome. However it is very doubtful that even partial success in landings in the west could be achieved if the southeastern assaults were repulsed. Moreover, success in the south east will materially help, at least from the air angle, the attack at Palermo, whereas complete success in the west is futile unless we have Catania and Gela.

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So long as there cannot be produced the necessary craft for loading an additional British division out of Tunisia, I see no recourse except

CK-IN-11106

(21-4041)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

From: [REDACTED]  
To: WAR  
No. 7892

In Reply Cite: NAF 182 Mar 20, 1943

SECURITY CONTROL

that of accepting the recommendations of General Alexander.

There is unanimous agreement among all Commanders as to the correctness of the statement made in the initial planning paper to the effect that if substantial German ground troops should be placed in the region prior to the attacks, the chances for success become practically nil and the project should be abandoned.

The favorable June moon is about the 10th of the month. There is unanimous agreement that the expedition cannot be properly mounted as planned by that date. The next favorable moon is about July 10th and unless we presuppose and unexpected and almost immediate collapse of the Tunisian resistance, it currently appears impossible to make the assault prior to that date.

At one time we had considered trading certain types of shipping between the Western and Eastern Task Forces. That idea has been abandoned because of the lack of time in which to accomplish it, as well as by reason of other serious difficulties.

All agree that we should not contemplate going into this operation with a paratroop lift of less than 3 British Brigades or United States Regiments.

To summarize all above: The provision of shipping or suitable shore to shore landing craft for an additional division would greatly strengthen overall chances of success. This is the only reasonable answer and would change a decidedly risky venture into an operation with reasonable chance for success. We now understand that this is probably not possible. I therefore have been forced to decide that the greatest chance for success lies in making the strongest possible attack to insure the capture of the vital southeastern corner and to depend upon the air support that will quickly be developed from that area for capturing the Port of

CM-IN-11106

(21-Mar-43)

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
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SECURITY CONTROL

From: [REDACTED]  
To: WAR  
No. 7892  
In Reply Cite: NAF 182 Mar 20, 1943

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

Palermo, which must be in our hands at an early date. The southwestern attack will therefore be eliminated. If any slightest chance exists for providing additional lift in shore to shore landing craft I urgently request such information without delay.

We are continuing to explore every possible expedient to endeavor to find some way in which we can by successive use of the ships and landing craft now allocated to us, strengthen the attack by adding the additional division necessary.

No Sig

Action: CCS

Information: OPD  
Gen. Strong  
Gen. Arnold  
Adm. King  
LOG

CM-IN-11106 (21 Mar 43) 0732Z ce

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Date- 11-24-71

Signature- RHO

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YQV B 34  
Filed 1128/20  
amr

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

2000  
MAR 20 1943  
1440Z

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers  
To: War

In reply cite: 801 March 20, 1943

BIGOT HUSKY from COMNAVNAV AGWAR deliver to COMINCH for action and info VOPNAV ex reference estimate of shipping requirements prepared by staff planners allied forces submitted in CINCAF despatch 7645 to Combined Chiefs of Staff. Reported shipping deficiency appears to be due to increase in personnel and vehicles over numbers originally considered and to allowances for casualties. Recommend subject information be furnished COMAMPHORLANT.

No Sig

7645 is CM-IN-10379 (20 Mar 43) GEN. SOMERVELL

ACTION: GEN. SOMERVELL

INFORMATION: OPD  
GEN. DEANE (CC/8)  
ADM. KING

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JCS LETTER, 7-5-72  
BY SK , DATE JAN 14 1974

CM-IN-10765 (20 Mar 43) 2000Z cen

*Prof Rom  
25*

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

*30 Husky*

YQV  
filed 20/1630Z  
VH

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INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

S U P P L E M E N T A L   C O R R E C T I O N

From: Algiers  
To: War

In Reply Cite 7892 Mar 20, 1943 [NAF 182]

Correction paragraph 2:

The new conception would be to take out the greatest possible insurance for the rapid capture of the Southeastern end to include the line Catania-Gela, from which area long range fighter support could be given to the attack at Palermo.

*This word in the  
change - Original  
reads "Southwestern"  
I make change on file copy - Graham*

No Sig

Supplemental correction of CM-IN-11106 (21 Mar 43) CCS

ACTION: CCS

INFORMATION: OPD  
GEN STRONG  
GEN ARNOLD  
ADM KING

[NAF 182 printed in Papers of Dwight Eisenhower, War Years, II, 1045-1047]

CM-IN-16250 (30 Mar 43) 1634Z mcs

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

310 Hushy

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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OUTGOING MESSAGE

March 19, 1943

SECURITY  
CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

COMMANDING GENERAL  
FREEDOM ALGIERS

Number 4205

USFOR LONDON FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF  
USFOR LONDON ENGLAND

Number R-6774

Your proposed procedure (reference MAP 178) to submit requisitions for needs for Husky site Bigot from United States production direct to United States War and Navy Departments and similarly for requisitions to British Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry for United Kingdom production satisfactory provided requirements for standard items of organizational equipment are broken down between United States and United Kingdom. For Eisenhower Freedom Algiers, FAN 110, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Material other than organizational equipment, such as special construction equipment need not be broken down. Priority will be granted as far as practicable. However, definite decisions relative to assignment can be made only as your specific requirements are stated. Prompt submission of your G-4 plan including all requirements and available stocks would facilitate action.

No Sig

ORIGINATOR: OC/S  
INFORMATION: OPD  
ADM KING  
GEN ARNOLD  
GEN BYRONG  
LOG

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NOV 24 1971  
RHP

CM-OUT-7112  
CM-OUT-7113

(19 March 43) 1834Z

as

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

310 News Agency

YQV C 26  
17/1620Z  
81t

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

From: Algiers SECURITY CONTROL  
To: WAR

In reply cite: 7209, March 17, 1943

BIGOT outline plan referred to in our BIGOT 4962 of March 8, 1943, referring to your 3747 citing formation of Civil Affairs Division, is nearing completion and will be forwarded to you in the near future. (To AGWAR from Freedom Algiers) (BIGOT Husky For Marshall signed Eisenhower cite FELIA). Civil Affairs Section, Allied Force Headquarters, has already submitted full information concerning our existed organization for North Africa which is in accordance with your R 3441 and R 3745. In the light of foregoing I do not believe it necessary to create a separate staff section for civil affairs at this time.

No Sig

NOTE: 4962 is CM-IN-3718 (8 Mar 43) OPD  
3747 is CM-OUT-4299 (12 Mar 43) CAD  
R-3745 is CM-OUT-9420 (29 Nov 42) OPD  
3441 is CM-OUT-7135 (22 Nov 42) OPD.

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: General Deane (JCS)  
CAD  
Log

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JCS LETTER, 7-5-72  
BY SE, DATE

JAN 14 1974

CM-IN-9196 (18 Mar 43) 0610Z oms

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

*Plan for assault of Sicily -*

*310 Head Copy*

*Map Room  
10*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

- Her requirements  
Herby: L
- a) 100 more transport  
planes
  - b) One extra group  
F-58 (fighters)
  - c) One extra group  
B-24 or 2 groups  
B-17
  - d) Add Wellington  
squadrons

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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

LLW-3 Nr 13  
filed 16/1357Z  
dm

SECURITY CONTROL

GROUP  
Mar 16

PRIORITY

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NOV 24 1971  
RAH

From: Algiers  
To: USFOR  
War

In Reply Cite: NAF 179 March 16, 1943  
No. 6932

Modified outline para 1. Plan for HUSKY was considered by myself, Deputy CINC, Naval and Air CINCS on 13 March. We have approved it in principle and a cable outlining the plan is being forwarded to you as soon as possible. To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower. Cite FRGCT. BIGOT HUSKY. This is my NAF number 179. Naval and Army requirements not yet clarified but Air CINC Mediterranean Air Command has represented to me that immediate steps be taken to obtain additional air units required to implement the new outline plan. They are as follows:

Paratroop transport aircraft. Paratroop operation is considered absolutely essential to initial beach assaults of both task forces. 100 additional Douglas C-47 above the figure of 400 quoted in your telegram AGWAR number 3332 dated March 5th are needed to lift as one operation the full total of 3 British Paratroop Brigades for the opening assault on D day. Additional aircraft are not needed until 21 days before the operations but pilots and navigators who will fly them in HUSKY must be here early April in order to undergo full 2 months specialized training. Crews for whole 500 aircraft must be fully trained in night flying and aircraft modified to operate with British and US paratroops before arriving here. Whole success of paratroop operation may

CM-IN-9809

(19 Mar 43)

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

310 Hanby

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Algiers

To: USFOR

War

In Reply Cite: NAF 179 March 16, 1943

SECURITY  
CONTROL

be jeopardized unless very high standard of training amongst transport air crews is attained.

3. Twin engined fighters day. Apart from Beau-fighter Squadrons which are unsuitable for day bombers escort, we have 3 groups P-38 in N W Africa. In our plan present P-38 strength will be almost entirely employed on day escort for bomber squadrons already here. I am asking for additional heavy day bombers (see para 4) and require extra group P-38 to provide escorts. This P-38 increase will also strengthen number of fighter aircraft capable of affording air protection to Western Task Force during transit from Tunisian bases.

4. Heavy bombers day. We have now 2 groups B 24 in the Middle East and 4 groups B-17 in Northwest Africa. Estimate maximum effort of this force about 150 sorties daily. This will be inadequate for the maintenance of a sustained effort in reasonable strength on his airdromes and other main objectives particularly as the enemy may operate his main bomber force from Italy and Sardinia thus widening the zones to be covered by our bombers. If we are to obtain the neutralization of enemy air forces essential to the success of this operation (see also para 2 of JP (43) 7) the temporary addition of 2 groups to the strength of the heavy day striking force is needed. The groups should comprise either 1 B -24 and 1 B-17 or alternatively 2 B-17's and they are required for the period of D minus 21 to D plus 21.

5. Night bombers. There are in this theatre 5 Wellington bomber, 1 Liberator and 1 Halifax Squadrons with which we may achieve a total of 75 Wellingtons and 20 heavy bomber sorties per night. This is quite inadequate as it is essential to maintain pressure on enemy by night as well as by day. Possibility of employing US medium bombers by night has been examined, but these aircraft will be needed for main day striking force on south east of Sicily. Consider at least 5 additional Wellington squadrons will be required here by D minus 21/15

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**SECURITY  
CONTROL**

From: Algiers  
To: USFOR - WAR  
In Reply Cite: NAF 179      March 16, 1943

for approximately 6 weeks. These preferred to heavy types on account of ease of maintenance.

6. Night fighters. Sufficient fighters will be available provided Beaufighter squadron now held in UK against this theatre be dispatched forthwith and formation of 4 US night fighter squadrons completed without delay.

7. The fact that all our aircraft have to fly over the sea to and from their objectives, will lead to considerable increase in existing air-sea rescue organization. Requirements in this respect have not yet been finally established. Best American and British Air Sea Rescue Units will be needed. I will communicate further on this matter as soon as our proposals are fixed.

NO Sig

Footnote: Corrected copy of CM-IN-8547 (17 Mar 43) CCS

ACTION: GEN. DEANE (CCS)

INFO: OPD  
ADM. KING  
GEN. ARNOLD  
GEN. STRONG

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CM-IN-9809      (19 Mar 43)      0249Z      : mjc

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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

YQV C2  
Filed 13/030z  
esf

CCWD  
Mar 14, 1943  
0435Z

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers  
To: USFOR and War

In Reply Cite: 6402, March 13, 1943

Planning BIGOT for HUSKY develops problem regarding supply of critical equipment deserving early consideration. (AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff NAF 178 USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff from FHSIG signed Eisenhower.) To insure success this combined operation the best equipment available in either nation should be used by forces of both nations and this equipment should be furnished for this operation regardless of previous allocations of production to either nation. Signal equipment is taken for example. British have no equipment equal in performance to USA switchboard TC 1, SCR-299 and SCR-211 while USA has no adequate substitutes for British S plus D and various carrier equipment all of which are indispensable to wire communication. In a command such as AFHQ and 141 Group it is impossible to differentiate between British and USA needs since the headquarters and commands are combined and signal channels once established are commonly employed by both. This prevents submission of demands to War Department for USA needs only and to War Office for British needs. Consequently requirements these and other similar items represent needs of both nations and unless previous allocations are reconsidered and available production is pooled neither nation will probably be able to meet essential needs in time. As plans progress and requisitions for equipment

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CM-IN-7265 (14 Mar 43)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

310 Handy

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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

From: Algiers  
To: USFOR and War  
In Reply Cite: 6402, March 13, 1943

and supplies are presented it is urged that all available production whether earmarked for British or USA purposes be considered available for this operation before needs are left unfilled. Coordination in this respect by Washington and London Munitions Assignment Boards only appears possible. Can this action be taken?

No Sig.

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD  
GEN STRONG  
GEN ARNOLD  
ADM KING  
LOG

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Date- 11-24-71  
Signature- RHO

CM-IN-7265 (14 Mar 43)

1633Z

bjm

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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**EYES ONLY**

YQVB 77  
Filed 12/1817Z  
AR

CCWD  
March 12  
2101Z

[Printed in Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, War Years, II, 1033]

FOR GENERAL MARSHALL'S EYES ONLY

U R G E N T

From: Algiers  
To: AGWAR

In reply cite: No. 6164, March 12, 1943

Every indication is that, Bigot, Husky is going to be a difficult and hazardous operation. Progressively our daily planning reveals the seriousness of the obstacles to be overcome and constantly emphasizes the absolute necessity for mounting the attack in the best possible condition with all details complete as to equipment and supply. This is emphasized by the fact that we must expect heavy losses in the initial stages. (Personal from Eisenhower to Marshall for his eyes only. Added AGWAR signed Eisenhower cite FHGCT.) An examination of our requirements shows that the cargo shipping set up by Somervell is 30 ships short of what is needed now allowing nothing for unforeseen items. I have cabled him an analysis of the situation and requested an additional 30 ships in UGS 8 A or UGS 8. Magruder sent over by Somervell agrees as to necessity. Lacking these ships I would be forced to adopt all the following measures:

- A. Reduce maintenance supplies to a dangerously low level.
- B. Reduce shipments of cased gasoline below what is considered minimum requirements to assure flexibility of distribution and dispersal of storage.
- C. Eliminate shipments of existing backlog of TBA for units now in theater and cut TBA of units earmarked for Husky yet to come. In this connection, I have considered but do not deem it feasible (CM-IN-6282 12 Mar 43)

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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**EYES ONLY**

From: Algiers  
To: AGWAR  
In reply cite: No. 6164, March 12, 1943

to cancel 25,000 tons of French rearmament shipments in UGS 8 and UGS 8 A. I am committed to these shipments in agreement with Giraud and cancellation would lay me and the Allied governments open to a charge of bad faith. The effect on the whole French movement would be bad. In any case the reduction would provide less than 1/10th of the requirement. The effects of A, B and C can not now accurately be foreseen but their potential is obvious. I sincerely hope that all or at least the major portion of this additional shipping can be found and that I may receive early notification.

No Sig

ACTION: General Marshall

[Printed in Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, War Years, 1953]

CM-IN-6282 (12 Mar 43) 2226Z ems

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

YQV NR C23  
11/1836Z  
MC

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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

CORRECTED COPY

From: Algiers  
To: War SECURITY CONTROL

In Reply Cite: 5853 March 11, 1943

Bigot. Confirmed reference Troopers 593504 March 10 ( FUSKY cite FHGCT, to TROOPERS for is ( O) rptd AGWAR, MIDEAST, 1 Armored Corps. Signed Eisenhower from Freedom 5853 11 ( 11 ) March 11) that my 2708 Feb 24 and 141 Force 4436 March 4 para 3 still hold good.

No Sig

NOTE: Corrected copy of CM-IN-6071 (12 Mar 43) General Strong.

ACTION: General Strong

INFORMATION: OPD  
General Deane (CCS)

CM-IN-6289 (12 Mar 43) 2245Z

ems

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JCS LETTER, 7-5-72  
BY SK . DATE

JAN 14 1974

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*3/11 Hensley*

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SECURITY CONTROL **OUTGOING MESSAGE** Joint Chiefs of Staff

March 10, 1943

COMMANDING GENERAL  
FORTUNE ALGIERS

Number 6

It is the opinion of the US Government that the Government of Husky should be a Joint Anglo-American responsibility, under the control of the Commander in Chief Allied Forces, for both planning and administration, and that there should be no "senior partner" in the Joint government. This in response to your number 4952 of March 7 Rigot.

For Eisenhower Fortune Algiers from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition to the preceding paragraph it is believed that our number 2146 of February 11 adequately expresses the desires of the United States Government in this matter.

ORIGINATOR: GEN DEANE (JCS) 1 for Adm Leaby

INFO: OPD  
ADM KING  
GEN ARNOLD  
LOG

CM-OUT-3656

(10 Mar 43)

2132Z

wro

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
JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

YQVB 63  
filed 9/1901Z  
VH



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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**  
COPY  
Mar 9, 1943  
22200

P R I O R I T Y

From: Algiers  
To: War

SECURITY CONTROL

No. 5377

In Reply Cite NAF 175 Mar 9, 1943

BIGOT.

Your 57763 SD 2 C of 5 March, (Husky Action Troopers information AGWAR from G-3 section AFHQ 5377 NAF 175 9 March nil personal from Eisenhower for CIGS). Personnel bids for WS 29 approximately 32000. If Husky date is to be met imperative adequate shipping space be allotted to fulfil present commitments and allow early enough arrival units which must be here in sufficient time to train for projected operations (for Combined Chiefs of Staff, signed Eisenhower, cite FHGCT) a similar request has been placed on AGWAR who have increased shipments up to mid May by a total of 42000.

No Sig

ACTION: CCS

INFORMATION: OPD  
General Strong  
Admiral King  
General Arnold  
Log

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NOV 24 1971  
RHP

CH-IN-4678 (10 Mar 43) 0253Z ems



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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

YQVB34  
Filed 08/1130Z  
ecm

WDOC  
March 8, 1943  
1625Z

OPERATIONAL  
PRIORITY

From: Algiers SECURITY CONTROL  
To: War

In reply cite: 5068 March 8, 1943

Freedom have been asked to provide following special stores and equipment for each British and US Div being mounted from NA. Bigot HUSKY. Request similar provision be made by AGWAR for 45 US Div by Troopers for 3 British Div by Mideast for 5 and 56 British Divs.

1st. One per man of the following items. Mae Wests. Water bottle sterilizing outfits. Standard mosquito nets. Container for anti-mosquito cream. Mess tin ration plus 100% reserve. Emergency ration plus 50% reserve. 2nd. Per 1000 men per month. Pyrethium powder 50 lbs. Fly swatters 3. Fly papers 60 sheets. Anti-mosquito cream 375 lbs. Flysol or anti-mosquito spray 140 gals. Malarial 180 gals. Paris green 112 lbs. Suppressiv Quinine 43 lbs. Suppressiv Mepacrine 2570 grammes. An-corbic acid tablets 8000. Antilice number 63 powder 200 lbs. 3rd. Per 100 men. Bush nets 40. Tents bi-toune mosquito proofed 40. Tents shelter mosquito proofed 40. Veils and gauntlets 10. Flit guns 12. Mamey hand sprayers 2. Five gal water containers 500. Compo rations 2000. 4th. Miscellaneous. Water proofing for every vehicle and tank. Anti plague vaccine 4000 doses per civ. Flysol handsprays 1 per company or equivalent subunit. Auto minor water purifying units 2 per div. 5th. Suppressiv treatment Mepacrine 0.1 grammes per man per day for 6 days per week till end of November commencing 1 week before arrival. 6th. Smoke generators for assault of each div. Scale is being worked out and will be telegraphed. Demand for this item will be

(CM-IN-4092 8 Mar 43)

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JCS LETTER, 7-5-72  
BY SR, DATE

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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Page 2

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

SECURITY CONTROL

**SECURITY CONTROL**

From: Algiers

To: War

In reply cite: 5068 March 8, 1943

heavy. 7th. Mines and booby traps. Antitank mines 60,000. Antipersonnel mines (Amen) 10,000. Hawkins number 75 granades 40,000. Booby trap mechanisms push 8000 pull 8000 release 4000 antipersonnel 5000. 8th. Following equipment in addition to normal scale. Stretchers ambulance Mark 2 50 per fd amb 25 per light fd amb 100 per CCS 600 per gen hosp 400 per div for reserve. Blankets 250 per fd amb 150 per lt fd amb 300 per CCS 200 per gen hosp 720 per motor amb convoy 1200 per div for reserve. Warmers stomach with covers 6 per unit medical officer one per amb of motor amb convoy 36 per fd amb. Splints knee thomas complete with footpieces and bars suspension 20 per CCS 30 per General Hospital. Sulphanilamide powder 1 pound per unit medical officer 15 pounds per division for reserve. Sulphanilamide tablets 500 per unit medical officer. Panniers bacteriological 2 per CCS. Sulphaguanadine 3000 tablets per CCS. Condoms 250 gross per div for reserve. Ninth. Supplies of following. Tetrachlorethylene. Oil of Chenopodium. Neostam. Carbon Tetrachloride. Plasmaquibe. Tenth. Requested that standard and bush mosquito nets are coloured if possible. Eleventh. Consider reserves of all foregoing on overall basis of 10% (excluding items for which reserves are specifically asked above) should also be brought unless this is precluded by shipping consideration. Twelfth. Demand for 20 days Compo ration has been made after full consideration of all the circumstances of the operation and request it be met if possible including despatch of additional quantities to Middle East to bring 5 and 56 Divisions up to this scale. Thirteenth. Arrangements have been made to include RAF requirements in stores being ordered for divisions mounted from North Africa.

No Sig

ACTION: General Somervell

INFORMATION: OPD  
General Deane (CCS)

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JCS LETTER, 7-5-72  
BY SA, DATE JAN 14 1974

CM-IN-4092 (8 Mar 43) 2119Z ems

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YQVB 62  
Filed 1910Z/7  
rlw

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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

PRIORITY

From: Algiers  
To: War

In Reply Cite: 4962, March 7, 1943

London has (Bigot) replied to MacMillan's message to the Prime Minister reference my Bigots 9682 and 9860 as follows: (for Joint Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower cite FELIA BIGOT HUSKY).

"1. His Majesty's Government's views have now been received. They consider that the question falls into 2 parts:

A Administrative arrangements.

B Policy governing administration of territory when captured.

2. On subparagraph A the proposals in BIGOT number 9861 imply 2 different functions:

1 Arrangements for the preliminary stage of planning the political side of the operations.

2 Character of administration to be set up in the territory when it has been captured.

3. On subparagraph A (1) His Majesty's Government consider that planning should be in the hands of a joint Anglo-American body in Algiers. On subparagraph A (2) they consider that the arrangements for the civil government, as between United States and British authorities, should be similar to the position now prevailing in North Africa as regards the conduct of civil affairs, but with the respective roles of the United States and

CM-IN-3718 (8 Mar 43)

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BY *SE*, DATE

JAN 15 1974

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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From: Algiers

To:

In Reply, Cite:

Page 1

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

British reversed, namely, Anglo-American direction of civil affairs with Britain as senior partner and operating according to British principles and administration.

4. Before this is put to the President and General Marshall, His Majesty's Government would like to be sure that General Eisenhower agreed.

5. As regards subparagraph B, the policy to be adopted towards the Italian people, HM Government agree that at least as a basis for planning, Washington's view should be accepted, namely that a benevolent policy shall be adopted towards the civilian population of the occupied territory so far as is consistent with military objectives, remembering however that active or violent Fascist leaders or declared pro-German partisans should be arrested and removed from the area.

It may however be necessary to reconsider this policy nearer the time of the operations."

I have informed MacMillan that this is a matter for decision between the 2 governments and the Combined Chiefs of Staff and declined the invitation to comment.

I believe it to be essential that the military government for Husky be a joint Anglo-American responsibility. I believe that we should take this opportunity to emphasize Allied unity and that so doing will have political and even military advantages in dealing with the Italian population and later elsewhere. For either government to assume primary responsibility could invite undesirable speculation with regard to imperialistic intentions which would be exploited by enemy propaganda.

In compliance with SIGOT 2146, I am having prepared an outline plan and chart for joint Allied military government of Husky. The framework is that of the organization developed and proved efficient by the British through experience in Italian territories in the middle east and in Tripolitania, with adaptations to conditions in HUSKY and by reason of joint Allied responsibility.

CM-IN-3718 (8 Mar 43)

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BY 22, DATE

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From: Algiers  
To:  
In Reply Cite: 4002, March 7, 1943

SECURITY CONTROL

The British system, which has been studied by Holmes following an investigation in Tripolitania, like our own is developed from the rules annexed to the Hague Convention, and is entirely compatible with the directives contained in the United States manual on military government (FM 27-5). The outline plan will be completed in the near future and forwarded as directed.

No Sig

Footnote: BIGOT 9682 is CM-IN-4174 (2-8-43) SGS  
9860 is CM-IN-4618 (3-9-43)SGS  
2146 is CM-OUT-3847 (2-11-43)OPD

ACTION: OPD

INFO: GENERAL DEANE (JC/S)  
LOG

CM-IN-3718 (8 Mar 43) 0341Z med

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YQVB46  
Filed 06/1745Z  
jr

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INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

1943

*Hold  
for President*

From: Algiers  
To : War  
No. 4804  
In Reply Cite: NAF169: March 6, 1943

SECURITY CONTROL

Appointments of Commanders for HUSKY Naval and Air Task Forces follow: (Husky Bigot cite PRGCT. Signed Eisenhower. This is NAF number 169. Message to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff, for information Troopers for British Chiefs of Staff, reference CCS 171/2/D23 January)

1 Still awaiting a nomination for Naval Commander Western Task Force, Naval Commander Eastern Task Force is Admiral Ramsay.

Major General Spatz is Air Commander North West African Air Forces controlling all air forces in north west Africa supporting HUSKY, Air Marshal Coningham is commander North West African tactical air forces commanding air forces supporting both task forces, with Air Vice Marshal Broadhurst and Colonel Williams under him affiliated to Eastern and Western Task Forces respectively as lower formation commanders. Air Vice Marshal Park is commanding air forces operating from Malta, Air Chief Marshal Douglas is commanding air forces operating from Mideast, Air Vice Marshal Lloyd

CM-IN-3355 (7 Mar 43)

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*310 Husky*

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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

From: Algiers  
To : War

SECURITY CONTROL

In Reply Cite: 4804 March 6, 1943

( is commanding north west African coastal air forces, Major General Doolittle is commanding North West African strategic air forces. )

No Sig.

Action: CCS (Gen. Deane)

Information: OPD  
Adm. King  
Gen. Arnold  
Gen. Strong  
LOG

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LLW3 13  
Filed 06/1759Z  
jr

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**  
SECURITY CONTROL  
MAY 19 1943  
2731

From: Algiers  
To: War SECURITY CONTROL .

In Reply Cite: 4809 March 6, 1943

Mediterranean Air Command has placed 1  
squadron C 47 (13 aircraft) at disposal mid-east from  
7 March for training British Parachute Brigade.  
BIGOT HUSKY. Cite FHGCT. To USFOR for British  
Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower rptd AGWAR for  
Combined Chiefs of Staff. NYX ref para 4 USFOR 1907 26  
Feb.

No Sig.

Reference not in WDCMC

Action: CCS

Information: OPD

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JCS LETTER, 7-5-72  
BY SK, DATE JAN 14 1974

CM-IN-3364 (7 Mar 43) 1311Z ce

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YQVC 44  
Filed 1721Z/5  
rlw

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

PRIORITY

From: Algiers SECURITY CONTROL  
To: War

In Reply Cite: 4590, March 5, 1943

Confirmation requested that 38th Division will (to AGWAR from Freedom) embark reinforced to same scale as listed for 45th Division in your 1898 of 6th February. Addsd Marshall signed Eisenhower cite FHOCT Bigot - Husky. Report any additions or deductions from 45th Division scale.

No Sig

Action: OPD

Information: Gen. Deane (CC/S)  
LOG

DECLASSIFIED  
JCS LETTER, 7-5-72  
BY CC, DATE JAN 14 1974

CM-IN-2478 (5 Mar 43) 2226Z ce

COPY No. *10*

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*310 Husky*

DECLASSIFIED  
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

# OUTGOING MESSAGE

Operations Division WDGS  
European Section WDOFD  
OPD 353 Sec (3-5-43)

March 5, 1943

**SECURITY  
CONTROL**

COMMANDING GENERAL  
NORTE AFRICAN T OF O  
FREEDOM

Number 3332

*New at Ft. Bragg N.C.*  
Training of 82nd Airborne Division is scheduled for completion April 15th. 61st, 313th and 314th Troop Carrier Groups now training with 82nd Division and 32nd Hq and Hq Squadron Troop Carrier Wing are available for assignment North Africa after completion aforementioned training. Air echelons consisting of 52 airplanes per group with complete crews will move by air. Sufficient replacement aircraft to bring the 4 troop carrier groups now in your theater and in Middle East to full strength plus 10% replacements for 7 groups will be delivered your theater by D day. This will give you a total of 400 troop carrier airplanes. Bigot for Eisenhower from CCS. This is Fan 103.

Now at ports awaiting shipping space are 100 each 15 place gliders; 400 additional will be ready for shipment by March 21st; and March and April production will provide 200 additional gliders at rate of 100 per month making a total of 700 gliders available for shipment your theater prior to May 1st. Trained crews are available to man above gliders.

Foregoing is limit of US capabilities prior to May 1st. Any assistance to British (reference T.O.O. 16302/26) must come from above means. The date when the 316th Troop Carrier Group now assigned to Middle East can be made available to you is a matter for decision of AOCINC Mediterranean.

Priority of shipping space for all of the above (less flight echelon transport aircraft) is requested on the basis that all of your requirements for personnel and cargo shipments from US can be met. Tentative convoy schedule will be furnished you by radio either this date or tomorrow.

No Sig

ORIGINATOR: OPD

INFO: GEN STRONG  
GEN ARNOLD  
CCS (GEN DEANE)

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LCG

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NOV 24 1971

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

LLW-3  
03/0156Z  
HH

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL  
MAY 1943  
0800

From: Algiers  
To: War

SECURITY CONTROL

No. 4192

In Reply Cite: WAF 186 March 4, 1943.

Bigot command post for operation HUSKY is to be established at Bizerta (Secret-HUSKY-Bigot to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff rpld Troopers for British Chiefs of Staff, Mideast, Malta from G-3 section AFHQ 4192 NAF 186 3 March NIL signed Eisenhower cite FHGCT this is my NAF number 100 as insurance against situation in which necessary installations Bizerta not ready in time, propose Alternate Command Post with minimum essential facilities be set up at Malta.

Detailed technical examination being made and request for necessary equipment will follow shortly.

Necessary development of installations at Malta will be started at once on assumption that British Chiefs of Staff agree.

No Sig.

ACTION: Gen Deane (CCS)

INFORMATION: OPD, General Strong, Admiral King, General Arnold, Log

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NOV 24 1971  
RAH

CM-IN-1842 (4 Mar 43) 1500Z ems

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

~~SECRET~~  
WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

AX 3  
Filed 4/0906Z  
AR

CCWO  
March 4  
1203Z

URGENT

From: Algiers  
To: War (action)  
USFOR (information)

SECURITY CONTROL

No. 4229, March 4, 1943

Absence of repair facilities for large number of LCI (L) LST and LCT (action AGWAR Combined Chiefs of Staff information British Chiefs of Staff from Freedom) coming to this theater is causing great anxiety. For Marshall and Somervell signed Eisenhower cite FHSGS, NAF 167, BIGOT Husky. Even minor repairs such as changing propellers will necessitate dry docking or hauling up on slipway.

British Admiralty on 26 January 1st asked for 5 small docks of a standard US design for this theater. This number has since been increased to 12 and British have since asked for a further 26. BAD Washington has details. No indication has yet been given as to possibility of supply.

Shipping space is great difficulty but by using prefabricated material and sending plant and skilled personnel here problem can and must be solved. British requirement for this theater of 12 must be met by 1st May. US requirements have been taken care of.

No Sig

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD, General Arnold,  
General Somervell,  
Admiral King, Log.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

CM-IN-1811 (4 Mar ~~SECRET~~) <sup>ems</sup>

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

YOV C5  
filed 2217Z/2  
BM

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

From Algiers  
To: War

In reply cite: No. 3972, March 3rd, 1943.

BIGOT. A combined planning headquarters known as Headquarters Force 141 has now been set up at Algiers to plan operation HUSKY under the supervision of the Joint Commanders. (Husky. To Hideast and Malta rptd AGWAR and Troopers for information only. 3972. 2 Mar. Nil. Signed Eisenhower. Cite FBGCT Signals and correspondence for the Naval Commander should continue to be addressed to the C in C Mediterranean at Algiers. Signals and correspondence for the Army should be addressed to Headquarters Force 141 The telegraphic address is Fortune, Algiers and all messages concerning HUSKY which involve matters of operational or administrative policy should either be addressed or repeated to Fortune, Algiers, in addition to any other distribution given Signals and correspondence for the Air Staff should be addressed to Air C in C Mediterranean Air Command.

2. Headquarters Western Task Force will be known as Headquarters Force 343 and will probably be located in vicinity Oran \*De KYOTUY W DR Headquarters Eastern Task Force will be known as Headquarters Force 545 and will be located initially at Cairo.

No Sig

\* This message is being serviced.

ACTION: OPD  
INFO: GENERAL DEANE (CC/S) NAVY GENERAL ARNOLD  
LOG

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JCS LETTER, 7-5-72  
BY SR, DATE

JAN 14 1974

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

CD 77  
filed 3/2325Z  
dm

CCW  
M  
0107

PRIORITY

From: Algiers                      SECURITY CONTROL  
To:    AGWAR  
      USFOR

No. 4145    March 3, 1943  
In Reply Cite: NAF 165

BIGOT in operations Basky AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff USFOR pass to British Chiefs of Staff from Eisenhower cite FHSIG NAF 165 every navigational assistance will be required to insure arrival of assault ships and craft at correct place. It appears that use of Loran system will be most effective for this purpose. Request necessary equipment and technical assistance be furnished to set up an adequate system for the operation. Estimate of number of receivers required will be forwarded. Brief description including frequencies and capabilities will be helpful.

No Sig

Action: CC/S

Information: OPD  
              Adm. King  
              Gen. Strong  
              Gen. Arnold  
              LOG

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NOV 24 1971  
RAB

CM-IN-1595            (4 Mar 43)            0241Z            cc

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

A49B73  
021730Z  
spl

SECURITY CONTROL

Mar  
1015Z

PRIORITY

From: Algiers.  
To: WAR  
No 3971  
In Reply Cite. NAF 164 Mar 2, 1943

No reply yet received to NAF 152. This is my NAF 164. To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower. BIGOT HUSKY. Cite FHGCT. British comments in COS (W) 499 received. Planning being held up for lack necessary information. Preliminary examination shows chances of success materially reduced unless requirements already stated are fulfilled. Therefore request early information airborne forces and transport aircraft be provided.

NO Sig.

Action: CCS (General Deane)

Information: OPD  
General Strong  
Admiral King  
General Arnold  
LOG

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Date- NOV 24 1971

Signature- *RAB*

CM-IN-887 (2 Mar 43) 2145 Z mvs

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

*Adm Leahy OK*

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

YQVB90  
2026/1  
BMS

COMM  
2214  
March

SECURITY CONTROL

Priority

*Tell Ad Leahy  
President wishes  
to be shown  
answer before  
it is released.*

From: Algiers  
To: War

No: 3800 March 1 1943  
(in reply cite NAF 163)

Planning for Husky has now reached stage at which it is necessary to develop plans for propaganda and psychological warfare designed to assist operation. These plans must clearly be in accordance with policy to be adopted in US and UK as propaganda machinery here is only small part of the whole. For Combined Chiefs of Staff from Eisenhower BIGOT cite FHGCT this is my NAF number 163. I shall need broad directive from you under 2 main heads: small a. Policy after assault has taken place. This would indicate whether use of threats or promises or both is in line with policy of US and British Governments and is likely to obtain best results. Small b. Policy from now until assault. Our propaganda is at present based upon directives issued periodically by PWE and OWI, but wish to be sure that these take into account requirements of small a above and are in line with cover plan when finally approved.

*OK WS*

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Date-11-24-71

Signature- RHP

Action: General Deane (CC/S) No Sig

Information: OPD  
General Strong  
Admiral King  
General Arnold  
LOG

*File WS  
map  
Room*

CM-IN-488 (2 Mar 43) 0154 Z mvs

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

YQV B 58  
1811Z/27th  
efg

Feb 27 1943  
21617

**SECURITY CONTROL**

**P R I O R I T Y**

From: Algiers  
To: WAR

No. 3403 Feb 27, 1943

The Special Service Force of US and (Bigou) Canadians requested re our 8531 of 2nd February is urgently required for HUSKY, BIGOT, cite FRGCT signed Eisenhower. In view of your 1845 of 4 February plans have progressed based on employment of that force. Request reconsideration of your decision (your radio No. 2749 of 23 Feb) as only other source of troops of this nature is the 1 Ranger Battalion in North Africa. Plan requires equivalent of 4 Battalions.

No Sig.

Footnote: No. 8531 is CM-IN 988 (2 Feb 43) OPD  
No. 2749 is CM OUT-8148 (23 Feb 43) OPD  
No. 1845 is CM-OUT-1363 (4 Feb 43) OPD

Action: OPD

Information: LOG

CM-IN-14176 (28 Feb 43) 0013 Z **SVS**

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JCS LETTER, 7-5-72  
BY **SR**, DATE

JAN 14 1974

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*310 Husky*

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date *4/13/94*

~~SECRET~~

LLW-3 NR 18  
filed 241401z  
JK

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

CCWD  
FEB 24 1943

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

FROM: LONDON SECURITY CONTROL  
TO: WAR  
Nr. 2708 February 24, 1943

1. Bigot. Propose that intelligence for Husky should be provided as follows. A. Forces mounted in North Africa and Mideast to be supplied from here through Force 141 for General Intelligence and MEIU will be expected to help AFHQ in production of air photographs mosaics and models. B. Forces mounted in UK by I S (O) and USFOR. C.. Forces from USA by Washington and London if required. Presume negatives of all sorties will be sent Washington since we cannot provide. USFOR AGWAR from G2 Freedom signed Eisenhower cite FHGBI.

2. Do you concur since 141 Force wish to issue instructions early on this.

3. London and Washington will get copies of all intelligence except photographs models and mosaics issued by 141 Force.

4. Interpretation reports photographs and mosaics should continue to be sent to AFHQ by CIU Medmenham in accordance with existing arrangements and UK may be required to assist in production of models for this theater

NO SIG

DECLASSIFIED  
JCS LETTER, 7-5-72  
BY SP, DATE JAN 14 1974

Action: OPD

Information: Gen. Strong, Gen. Deane (CC/S)

CM-IN-12692 (25 Feb 43) 0825Z ce

*Handwritten:* Insp Room  
11

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*Handwritten:* Husky

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

COPY NO. 24

To: Joint Staff Mission  
From: Chiefs of Staff  
Dated: 20th February, 1943

~~TOP SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

OZ506

BIGOT

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DECLASSIFIED SM522-71

Date- 11-24-71

Signature- RAP

Following is repetition of ETOUSA's No. 1821,  
T.O.O. Feb. 201258Z, to General Eisenhower.  
BEGINS. Following from Chiefs of Staff.

Reference your Freedom No. 1409 of 17th February  
to ETOUSA and War Department.

1. We do not agree with paragraph 1. Spitfires with long range tanks have an operating radius of about 180 miles. Palermo is thus within reach of fighter cover based at Pantelleria.
2. We therefore think that this island could play an important part in HUSKY and that the possibility of capture should be very carefully studied. ENDS.

T.O.O. 1320Z/20

DISTRIBUTION

Restricted

U.S. Chiefs of Staff

311 Husky

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**OUTGOING MESSAGE**

Security Control

**SECURITY  
CONTROL**

Combined Chiefs of Staff

February 19, 1943

CG FREEDOM ALGIERS

Number 2574

USFOR LONDON FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

Number R-6005

Combined Chiefs of Staff have decided that favorable June moon period must remain Target date for Husky and all preparations must be pushed with greatest vigor to achieve this date. For Eisenhower Freedom Algiers, FAN 98, From the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

You are to report to Combined Chiefs of Staff on 10th April how your preparations have gone forward. Should, on this date, June period appear to you to be impracticable you will report earliest possible date which can be accomplished

No Sig

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Date- 11-24-71

Signature- RHP

ORIGINATOR: C/CS

INFORMATION: OPD  
General Strong  
General Arnold  
Admiral King

CM-OUT-6893 (19 Feb 43) 21242 vd  
CM-OUT-6894

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

A29YQVC 16  
2130/19  
EW

CCWA  
Feb 26 1943  
1201

SECURITY CONTROL

Urgent

From: Algiers  
To: War

No. 1352 Feb 19 1943

Early clarification (secret BIGOT) airborne forces and transport aircraft situation necessary for development Husky Plan. Outline plan envisages use 5 parachute regiments (British Brigades) of which 3 regiments are dropped simultaneously on D plus 3. Use of glider elements of airborne division now under examination. For Combined Chiefs of Staff, repeated USFOR for British C O and middle east for CIN. Signed Eisenhower. This is my NAF number 152. BIGOT. Cite FHGCT. (From Freedom 1852).

Paragraph 2.

a. American units available or set up are 1 Bn 509th Parachute Regiment now in theater and 82nd Airborne Div now in US.

Para.

b. British units are understood to be first.

Para. BDE now in Tunisia, 1 BDE forming in Mid-east and possibly 2 BDES from UK

Paragraph 3. Units already here will require replacements, reequipment and retraining. Training resources in Mideast sever training of Mideast BDE. State of training of units in US and UK unknown.

CM-IN-13453. (26 Feb 43)

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JCS 29-71

Date- DEC 6 1971

Signature- RHP  
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310 Husky

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers  
To: War  
No. Feb 19 1943  
(1852)

page 2

**SECURITY  
CONTROL**

Paragraph 4. Assuming 20 men with equipment per plane, estimate 6 groups (312 aircraft) required for 3 regiments to be dropped simultaneously on D plus 3. Allowing for 75 percent serviceability and for rehearsal and D day losses considers 40 percent reserve, or 2 additional groups necessary, making total of 8 groups. This makes no allowance for requirements of Glider element of 82nd airborne division.

Paragraph 5. At present in theater are 3 groups. AGWAR telegram 1898 of 6 Feb indicates that 2 groups can be sent here from US about 15 April and possible a third withdrawn from training in US or from Mideast.

Paragraph 6. If all aircraft in para 5 can be made available there will still be a shortage of 2 groups.

Paragraph 7. Consider that employment 5 parachute BDES is essential part of present outline plan. If Allied resources will not meet requirements stated above effect on plan and chances of success must be examined without delay. Request therefore firm data regarding provision of airborne and transport units and state of training of those now in US and UK.

Nosig

Action: CCS

Information: OPD, General Arnold, General Strong,  
Admiral King, LOG

CM-IN-13453 (26 Feb 43) 1415 Z mvs

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Date- DEC 6 1971

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

YQV2 Nr 34  
Filed 17/1617 Z  
ecm

WDC  
February 17, 1943  
1924Z

**FOR EYES ONLY  
URGENT**

*More HUSKY  
info.*

From: Algiers  
To: War

No. 1400 February 17, 1943

Sent to AGENT was the following and is repeated for your information. From SMILE to ADEPT FOR EYES ONLY. BIGOT. "Extreme importance of launching HUSKY at earliest date possible is fully recognized. Your telegram of 13 February and my NAF 144. It is unusual for me to be in a position of counselling patience since I am always burning with a desire to speed up the pace of winning. My directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff and indeed the factors outlined in your telegram had impelled me to examine most thoroughly every expedient and device which when adopted would allow this operation to take place in June.

Quite apart from the time taken to clear Tunisia, which as I have frequently reported involves a major operation, the date is governed by the schedule of arrival of landing craft given separately by the British and American Chiefs of Staff. This alone will make it impossible to complete the minimum combined training of the various elements of assault forces in time for the June date.

I do not of course advise delay in the date of the operation solely in order to insure that every detail may be perfect. There is clearly a need to take risks; it is only a matter of what is acceptable. Experience in TORCH (when our landings were against little or no opposition) strengthens my opinion that a high degree of combined training will be absolutely essential in the face of the opposition to be expected in operation HUSKY. The limitation of training opportunity to that we had preceding TORCH would in this case lead to major military disaster. My opinion appears to be confirmed by that of Combined Chiefs of Staff who agreed that nothing should interfere with the integrity of the operation.

CM-IN-8809 (17 Feb 43)

~~SECRET~~

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JCS LETTER, 7-5-72  
BY *[initials]* DATE COPY No. 12  
JAN 14 1974

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

*310 Kennedy*

~~SECRET~~

Page 2

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

From: Algeria  
To: **INCOMING MESSAGE CONTROL**  
No. 1400 February 17, 1943

**SECURITY CONTROL**

This degree of training cannot be attained by the early date and I must therefore adhere to my view that an assault in June is unlikely to succeed.

With regard to the date of the completion of the Tunisian campaign I have as yet no information to show that the 8th Army will be able to advance in strength earlier than the date originally given -15 March. Alexander will be able to confirm this when he arrives today. In Tunisia the necessity for replacement of French by American and British units has resulted in all available transportation facilities being employed in current movement and maintenance and has exposed us to the reverses we have suffered in the Southern Sector. This has also prevented the accumulation, for which I had hoped, of the large quantity of ammunition and petrol necessary for the resumption of the offensive on the scale now essential. I am therefore doubtful whether we can count upon the final destruction of the Axis Forces before the end of April. You can be assured that Alexander and I will do it before then if it is possible. On the other hand we must be prepared for hard and bitter fighting and the end may not come as soon as we hope.

Provided this battle is not unduly prolonged the date of HUSKY will depend primarily upon the time required for training and preparation of the various forces. I consider that this time cannot be further reduced. These conclusions have been presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff".

no sig

Footnote: NAF 144 is CM-IN-3596 (2-11-43) CC/S

Action: General Marshall

CM-IN-8809 (17 Feb 43) 2212 Z MVS

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JCS LETTER, 7-5-72  
BY SA . DATE

JAN 14 1974

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

YQV 2 NR 29  
14/1519Z  
alt

~~SECRET~~  
WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

P R I O R I T Y

From: Algiers  
To: AGWAR

No. 857, February 14, 1943

1. Do not consider desirable to set June date as target. Reference your number 2231 of 13 Feb (for Marshall from Eisenhower) BIGOT. Planning, training and movement schedules have to be worked out now leading up to target date. Result of setting early date will be that training schedules will be cut below the time required for proper training. A later postponement will throw the schedule out of gear. It will also not allow the extra time to be spent nearly so profitably as would be the case if we can now make a proper training and preparation plan to cover the whole period.

2. Moreover, we have to plan the operation on the basis of the resources which will be available in the theater by the target date. Postponement by a month will necessitate alterations in detailed plans to take account of additional convoy. This will result in less efficient planning than if earlier date is now definitely ruled out.

3. Degree of training in mountainous country essential for all divisions taking part owing to nature of terrain in Husky.

4. See no possibility of being able to adjust shipping schedules to meet earlier date, which will

CM-IN-7400 (25 Feb 43)

DECLASSIFIED  
JCS LETTER, 7-5-72  
BY SR, DATE JAN 15 1974

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY  
CONTROL

From: Algiers  
To: AGWAR

No 857, February 14, 1943

not permit shipment of TBA and other necessary  
operational equipment and balancing of supplies re-  
quired to support operation Husky until arrival  
maintenance convoys from US.

NoSig

Footnote: 2231 is CM-OUT-4491 (13 Feb 43) SGS

ACTION: SGS

INFO: OPD  
LOG

CM-IN-7400 (15 Feb 43)

0203Z mjc

DECLASSIFIED  
JCS LETTER, 7-5-72  
BY *ER*, DATE JAN 15 1974

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NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

YQV 2 Nr 21  
Filed 141553Z  
eva

CCWD  
February 14, 1943  
1743Z

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers  
To: AGWAR

No. 798, February 14, 1943

Request from Board of Economic Warfare (BIGOT signed C in C) all available information consistent with security for use of Civil Affairs in planning for HUSKY,

No Sig

ACTION: OPD

INFO: GEN. DEANE (CC/S)  
JSC  
LOG

CM-IN-7405 (15 Feb 43) 0225Z mjc

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JCS LETTER, 7-5-72  
BY *SK* . DATE, JAN 15 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

*311 Security*

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**OUTGOING MESSAGE**

SECURITY CONTROL

Chief of Staff

February 11, 1943

**SECURITY  
CONTROL**

COMMANDING GENERAL  
FREEDOM, ALGIERS

Number 2146

The President approves in principle your recommendation for a joint Anglo-American military government for Husky contained in your 9682 of February 8th. It is suggested that this Government might be composed of 1 British and 1 American officer. (From Marshall to Eisenhower Freedom Agiers).

It should for reasons of military necessity be under your control as supreme Commander of the Allied Forces.

It is considered desirable that a benevolent policy be adopted toward the civil population of occupied territory in so far as is consistent with military objectives, remembering, however, that active or violent Fascist leaders or declared pro-German partisans should be arrested and removed from the area.

Please send at the earliest practicable date a chart and an outline of your proposed joint Anglo-American military government for our examination and approval.

ORIGINATOR: OPD

INFORMATION: OCS (General Deane)  
Log

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 205 and 207 or (E)  
GPO : 1974

By *ELL* JAN 15 1974

CM-OUT-3847 (11 Feb 43) 2219Z ~~one~~

*map*  
*Room*  
*White. [unclear]*

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YQV 2 nr 6  
filed 11/2108Z  
VH

Feb 11, 1943

SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

URGENT

From: Algiers  
To: War

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11-24-71  
RHO

No. 325 Feb 11, 1943

*More details on "HUSKY" plan*

(This is NAF 144 for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated British Chiefs of Staff from Eisenhower. Cite FBGCT. BIGOT) As instructed by CCS 171/2/D dated 23 January 1943 as amended by AGWAR cable number 1767 dated 022325Z the most detailed examination possible at this time has been made to see whether it would be practicable to carry out Husky during favorable June moon period on the assumption that the battle for Tunisia has been concluded by 30th April 1943. AGWAR cables nos 1898 dated 060313Z and 1899 dated 060232Z and USFOR cable number 1666 dated 101635Z have been taken into consideration. The following are my conclusions.

Eastern Task Force Assault

FIRST. Fifth and Fifty Sixth Divs.

I note that British Chiefs of Staff consider that 5th and 56th Divs from Middle East could be ready in time. Examination here shows this to be doubtful since:

- a. Overseas assault force does not arrive until 5th May. Brigade Group training 56th Divisions cannot start until then, requires 6 weeks and cannot therefore be completed until 14 June.
- b. Thereafter 4 weeks required for loading and final rehearsal.
- c. Craft for MT and personnel ships which arrive in theater on 1 June will not be operationally fit until 15 June. Fifteen LCT will not be operationally fit before 29 June. LCT (L) not expected Malta before 14 June and not anticipated operationally fit before 29 June.

CM-IN-5999 (12 Feb 43)

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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

From: Algiers  
To: War

Page 2

No. 325 Feb 11, 1943

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These factors give assault date about 15 July:  
Earlier date can be achieved only by cutting into  
period required for training and rehearsal and  
accepting a lesser degree of efficiency in the  
assault.

SECOND. Division from UK for D plus 3 assault could be ready in time.

THIRD. First Division from Tunisia. Possibility of meeting June date dependent mainly upon state of division after conclusion Tunisian campaign. If casualties to personnel and equipment not too heavy should be possible to do so. Mounting in Tunisian ports presents considerable problems. Tunis and Bizerta and ports further West required for US assault, leaving only Sousse and Sfax for First Division. Only method of mounting assault First Division from North Africa appears to be:

- a. Four LCI (M) from Bizerta.
- b. About 20 LCI (L) and 12 LST from Sousse and Sfax.
- c. Bulk of vehicles and stores for remainder of Division from Algiers which will also be required for US assault.

This method involves cross movements of US and British forces from western training areas and Tunisia and very wide dispersion of First Division immediately prior to the assault. It is considered dangerously complicated and will also react on the rapid deployment and buildup of air forces which are dependent on fullest possible use of land transportation facilities East of Constantine. I must also insist on immediate movement back to Morocco of 2 American Divisions which I consider lowest garrison which should be maintained there. This will further complicate transportation problem. None of these difficulties insuperable and necessary preparations could probably be carried out in time if implications on efficiency of operation are accepted. Movement to other ports from Benghazi westward would add to time involved and would make June assault date impossible to meet.

CM-IN-5999 (12 Feb 43)

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# INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers  
To: WAR

Page

No. 325, February 11, 1943

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## Western Task Force Assault

**FOURTH.** Although much valuable preliminary training can be started on 1st March training of complete RCT SF Third US Division unlikely to start until early April owing to lack of craft and will require up to 6 weeks ending about 1st June. In addition a proportion of armored units must be trained. Movement to ports, loading and final rehearsal will require 4 weeks which produces earliest assault date early July. These dates are based on the assumption that landing craft will arrive in theater with fully trained crews.

**FIFTH.** 36th Division can not be accepted in this theater on UG 7 as it is essential to provide service units and equipment for Tunisian battle. It is not certain that Tunisian battle will have ended by 13th April and am firmly of opinion that preparations for Husky must not be permitted to interfere with our ability to finish the Tunisian campaign. It is essential to bring into the theater first the service units and equipment and supplies for Tunisia and the additions required for the initial stages of Husky before the Husky forces assemble. A study is being made to determine:

- a. What cuts can be accepted in planned troop shipments without affecting Tunisia battle.
- b. What troops, AA, Signals and service units must be retained in North Africa on completion Tunisian campaign.
- c. What troop basis is required for Husky?

Results of this study will disclose how much must come from USA and how soon it can be shipped. Indications already are:

1. That considerable AA, Signals and service units will be required from USA.
2. That 36th Division certainly can not be accepted before UG 8 at earliest without displacing service troops essential to the administration of both Tunisian and Husky forces.

CM-IN-5999 (12 FEBRUARY 1943)

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To: WAR

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

No. 325, February 11, 1943

The cumulative effect of this is that assault can not take place in June.

SIXTH. Preparation and passage of 45th Division does not materially affect date.

Air Aspect

SEVENTH. Following is repetition of discussion of air factor given in my 9312 of 6 Feb to British Chiefs of Staff. "Time taken to deploy and prepare airfields after Tunisian battle is concluded is dependent upon:

- a. Establishment of airfields which again is dependent mainly upon transportation forward of plant and supplies and build up of maintenance organization.
- b. Time taken to build up reserves of aircraft and crews to replace wastage after completion Tunisian campaign. Will require 50 percent reserves bomber striking force and 100 percent reserves fighters.

None of these factors can at present be accurately assessed but will take from 6 to 10 weeks, bearing in mind necessity for clearance of battlefield and withdrawal of troops from Tunisia to allow of maintenance of air battle. Thereafter period of 4 weeks may be necessary for air operations before assault is launched."

It is possible that favorable development of air battle may enable the preliminary period of 4 weeks to be reduced, but establishment of air supremacy is so vital to success of assault that it is dangerous to assume now that this will be so and that air situation will permit assault in June.

Conclusion

I therefore consider that owing to lack of time for training and preparation a June assault is unlikely to succeed.

M No Sig

Footnote: No. 1767 is CM-OUT-590 (2 Feb 43) Gen Deane (JCS)  
No. 1898 is CM-OUT-1779 (5 Feb 43) OPD  
No. 1899 is CM-OUT-1780 (5 Feb 43) OPD

Action: CCS

Information: OPE [REDACTED] Arnold, General [REDACTED] LOG  
Admiral King

CM-IN-5995 (12 Feb 43) 0810 2 mvs

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## OUTGOING MESSAGE

Number 1898

Page 2

February 5, 1943

Part 5. Landing craft. Following schedule of shipments of landing craft by special convoys has been set up by Navy. Dates given are arrival dates in theatre. March 7, 6 LST, 6 LCT-5, 24 LCI (L); April 5, 10 LST, 10 LCT-5, 20 LCI (L); April 20, 28 LST, 28 LCT-5, 20 LCI (L); May 5, 24 LST, 24 LCT-5, 26 LCI (L);

There are now 16 LCT-5 in the Mediterranean enroute, and the remaining 16 to bring the total to 100 will be sent to the area as cargo.

Naval escorts and naval gunfire support ships for the operation will be scheduled at a later date.

Navy considers that the favorable June moon. Can be delayed as late as July 4. Pass information in parts 4 and 5 to Cunningham. Convoy arrangements will follow in separate message. Please acknowledge.

ORIGINATOR: OPD

INFORMATION: ADM KING  
ADM LEAHY  
LOG

CM-OUT-1772 (5 Feb 43) 2319Z vc

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By SLI:                      JAN 15 1974

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## INCOMING MESSAGE

YQV 1 Nr 32  
1418Z/4th  
efg

CCWD  
Feb 4, 1943  
1603Z

FOR THE EYES OF GENERAL MARSHALL ONLY

P R I O R I T Y

From: Algiers  
To: WAR

No. 8885 Feb 4, 1943

Preliminary examination outline plan Husky leads following conclusions regarding ground forces for American assault. To AGWAR for the eyes of General Marshall only signed Eisenhower.

Para 1. Of 3 Infantry Divisions required for assault, only 1 can be found from North Africa (3rd Inf Div). Remaining 2 must be provided from US. Presume these will be 45th and 36th Divisions. Follow up division can be found from North Africa. Bigot.

Para 2. Contemplate 45th and assault division furnished from this theater will be employed shore to shore. Forty Fifth must therefore be brought to North Africa for rehearsals prior to assault. Will give up 4th Motorized Division in order to free shipping for 45th but cannot accept any other interference with convoy schedule as set up at present. (This item also answers your 1812 February 4th). Thirty Sixth must complete training in US and sail combat loaded directly to assault.

Para 3. Owing to nature terrain all divisions in assault should receive 3 weeks training in mountainous country with present equipment in addition to amphibious training. Forty Fifth and 36th Divs should complete both types of training in US before departure. Hope it will be possible to do this without entailing appreciable delay.

CM-IN-2008 (4 Feb 43)

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**INCOMING MESSAGE** 2

From: Algiers  
To: WAR No. 8885 Feb 4, 1943

Para 4. Full troop list will take considerable time to complete, but additional antiaircraft, signal and service units will certainly be required. Essential all units dispatched complete to TBA except for any reductions decided on for operational reasons.

Para 5. Number parachute battalions required and decision on dispatch airborne division will depend largely upon number of transport aircraft which can be made available and on possibility of dispatch of gliders. Understand War Department studying these questions.

Para 6. Taking above factors in account, indicate approximate dates by which 45th Div can arrive North Africa and 36th be ready loaded to leave US. It would help understanding here of position in US if in addition to indicating dates you state calculations by which dates estimated. This information required early as part of examination earliest assault date.

Para 7. Propose Commander Western Task Force proceed to US at suitable time in order to coordinate Husky plans with commanders 36th and 45th Divs.

No Sig.

FOOTNOTE: 1812 is CM-OUT-1009 (2-4-43) OPD

ACTION: GENERAL MARSHALL

CM-IN-2008 (4 Feb 43) 1912Z med

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## OUTGOING MESSAGE

Joint Chiefs of Staff

February 2, 1943

CG, FREEDOM ALGIERS

Number 1767

USFOR LONDON ENGLAND

Number R-5582

With regard to 3 weeks intensive study for purpose of determining June or July date for mounting Husky Joint Chiefs of Staff have proposed following procedure to Combined Chiefs of Staff:

1. US Staff planners will furnish you on February 5th data as to availability of US resources. British Staff planners have been requested to furnish similar data reference British resources on same date or as soon thereafter as practicable.

2. Based on these data and on your own estimates your recommendation as to June or July date is desired in time for consideration by Combined Chiefs of Staff at meeting Friday February 12th.

For Eisenhower Freedom Algiers from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If British Chiefs of Staff do not concur in this procedure you will be advised. Meanwhile it is desired you follow line of action indicated above.

ORIGINATOR: GEN DEANE(JCS)

INFORMATION: OPD  
ADM KING  
LOG

Col-OUT-590 (2 Feb 43) 2315Z

Col-OUT-591 (2 Feb 43) 2315Z bjm

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JCS memo, 1-4-74  
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

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