Southern France

November 1943--April 1944

Map Room
Box 105

Folder 1
From: Allied Force Headquarters Algiers Algeria
To: War Department
No: F 33599 17th April 1944

Second and final cipher part of Freedom message
F 33599 TH 1744.

BIGOT ANVIL TOPSEC. Russian High Command immediately
with a view to obtaining their agreement for attachment of
Allied Air Liaison Officer to Southern group of Russian
Armies to coordinate the employment of our strategic bomber
force. CCOS have approved and sent message to Moscow Mission
in that interest.

6 General

A. In order to increase threat to South of
France and to provide trained reserve for
future amphibious operations, 91st US INF
Div has been diverted to Arzew for training
under guidance of invasion training centre.

B. Similarly first DMI (49 set) will if poss-
ible be given amphibious training at Salerno
on completion of move to Italy.

ACTION: OPD
INFORMATION: CC/S
Gen Arnold
CofS
CM-IN-12607 (17 Apr 44) 2338Z bjm

3/10 April

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FROM: CO, Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

TO: War Department

NO: F33599 17 April 1944

AGWAR OFD, Troopers MO 5 rptd Eq MAAP Casablanca, Mid East, AAI from Freedom signed Wilson site PHGOT F33599 17 1700. BIGOT, ANVIL TOP SEC.

Weekly planning telegram number 32.

Para 1. ANVIL.

Force 163 has been informed that ANVIL cannot be launched prior to mid July. Force 163 is redrafting plans accordingly.

Para 2.

Brassard. Reference para 4 of weekly planning telegram 31. Force 255 has been set up to plan and command this operation when launched. Ground forces in operation. Brassard will be French.

Para 3.

Planning liaison. Chairman JPS returning to APEQ

CM-IN-12596 (17 Apr 44)

DECLASSIFIED
JCS LETTER 7-0-72
BY 5K . DATE

JAN 25 1974

COPY No.

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94
From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria
No: F33599 17 April 1944

leaving one representative to continue discussions in London.

Para 4.

JPS presently studying:

Subpara A. MTO strategy for summer 1944. Overall outline plan for initial OVERLORD period now completed. Detailed planning continues.

Subpara B. Effect on Mediterranean strategy of various possible developments in Balkans.

Para 5.

Russia. In view of recent Russian advances in Southeast Europe, SAC has recommended that the CCOS approach.

End of first cipher part second part follows.

No Sig

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: CC/S
Gen Arnold
ColS

CM-IN-12596 (17 Apr 44) 2329Z bm
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

General Marshall has directed me to forward you the attached interchange of communications between himself and the Prime Minister, along with a message from General Eisenhower. Admiral King and General Arnold concurred in his message to the Prime Minister.

FRANK MCCARTHY
Colonel, General Staff Corps
Secretary, General Staff

Encl. CH-OUT-22810
CH-224-8712
Msg. to GS fr FM

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
Prime Minister to Field Marshal Dill for General Marshall.

Personal and Meet-Secret.

1. Although the fighting at the bridgehead and on the Cassino front has brought many disappointments you will, I trust, recognize that at least 8 extra German Divisions have been brought into Italy down to the South of Rome and heavily shelled there. If at Teheran we had been told that the ANVIL there suggested would detach 8 Divisions from the German front against OVERLORD we should have rejoiced. BONIFACE shows that Hitler has been saying that his deficits in South Russia are due to the treacherous Badoglio collapse of Italy which has involved 35 German Divisions. At any rate I believe that our action in Italy has played a large part in rendering possible the immensely important advances made in South Russia which as a further benefit are convulsing the satellites.

2. I have not hitherto intervened in the intricate and lengthy correspondence which has been proceeding between the United States and British Chiefs of Staff about ANVIL. 7 German Divisions with 2 in reserve equals 9, have already been assigned to the defence of the Riviera front. I do not believe an advance up the Rhone Valley is practicable in any period which will influence our main operations this summer. On the contrary I am sure the German General in the West will concentrate on winning his battle there and will fight merely delaying actions in Southern France. Were we to succeed in landing by some variant of ANVIL it would be better to move Westwards towards Bordeaux than Northwards up the Rhone Valley. In either case a two-division assault supported by 8 follow-up divisions mostly French would be good so far as it went but could not go far enough in time to sway the main battle. The fact, however, that 9 enemy divisions have been assigned to the Riviera defence and that 25 are now in Italy of which 18 are south of Rome, a total of 34 divisions, acquires the Mediterranean armies of not playing their part.

3. I gather from the correspondence between the two staffs that we are all agreed upon priority for joining the main army with the bridgehead army. Naturally we are all grieved that the opening date of this battle must be postponed till 14th May. General Alexander has arrived home and has convinced us that an all-out sustained major offensive cannot be launched earlier. Moreover the timing of this great battle in the south will accord harmoniously with the date of OVERLORD. All available forces, British, American and Allied will be in heavy action on both fronts simultaneously.

4. At the moment my own position is as follows. We should above all defeat the German Army south of Rome and join our own armies. Nothing should be grudged for this. We cannot tell how either the Allied or enemy armies will emerge from the battle until the battle has been fought. It may be that the enemy will be thrown into disorder and that great opportunities of exploitation may be open. Or we may be checked and the enemy may continue to hold his positions south of Rome against with his existing forces. On the other hand he may seek to withdraw some of his divisions to the main battle in France. It seems to me we must have plans and preparations to take advantage of the above possibilities.
5. Regarding ANVIL hereinafter called ANVIL 2, I believe that whatever happens on the mainland of Italy the enemy forces now detached to the Riviera can in the meanwhile be fastened there by feints and threats. One thing that alarms me, however, is lest our directive to General Wilson should make him fall between 2 stools. This would mean that we should be denied the exploitation of any victory gained south of Rome (and victories are wonderful things) or the power to pin down German divisions in Italy and yet on the other hand not be able to make a major operation out of ANVIL.

6. Taking paragraph 6 of OCS. 465/19 I agree with the first proposition but do not think the second proposition can be judged until we see the result of the battle. For instance I would not now repetition now rule out either a vigorous pursuit northward of the beaten enemy nor an amphibious catsclaw higher up to detain him or cut him off. I should have thought we could contrive plans and preparations to render possible either this or ANVIL in one form or another. After all the power to put men into ships is one thing and question where to disembark them is another.

7. I am sorry that we are not to have the additional landing craft you thought of deducting from the Pacific effort. We should all like to seem them in the Mediterranean. But if you judge there is too much vagueness and option to justify their employment there so must it be. The consequence will be to reduce all amphibious possibilities to a one-division scale.

8. Finally I repeat that if we can keep 34 German divisions in the western Mediterranean theatre the forces there will have made an immense contribution to OVERLORD. I have hardened very much upon OVERLORD and am further fortified by the evident confidence of EISENHOWER, Brooks and Montgomery.

9. When you have reflected on the above I ask you to consider the following formula:

(1) The prime duty of all the forces in the Mediterranean is to pin down as many German divisions as possible away from OVERLORD.

(2) Secondly to achieve the above we must give the highest priority to operations to join the Anzio bridgehead and the main front meanwhile making such preparations for ANVIL 2 as are practicable in consonance therewith.

(3) Thirdly after joining the bridgehead we must survey the situation arising from the results of the battle in Italy as well as the first results of OVERLORD and the dispositions of the enemy.

(4) Fourthly, we must then decide whether to go all out for ANVIL or exploit the results of victory in Italy. It must be recognized that this option will not exist unless the L.S.T's from the Pacific are assigned now to the Mediterranean.

10. Every good wish to you, King and Arnold. How I wish we were all together, but I trust we shall be reassembled before the supreme struggle begins.
Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Number: WAR 22810

for General Eisenhower’s eyes only from General Marshall.

Please deliver the following message from General Marshall to the Prime Minister:

"I have been delaying answer to your 021895 until the receipt of the proposed directive from your COS. I now learn from Dill that in all probability no directive will be proposed until an answer from me has been made to your personal message.

We appear to be agreed in principle but quite evidently not as to method. If we are to have any option as to what we can do when the time comes preparations for ANVIL must be made now even though they may be at the partial expense of future operations in Italy after the beachhead has been joined to the main line. Unless this has been done, in our view there will be no option, whereas if preparations for an ANVIL are made Wilson will have an amphibious force available to carry out another and perhaps a less difficult amphibious operation than ANVIL should the circumstances at the time make the latter appear inexpedient.

Furthermore, the urgency of our need for these landing craft in the Pacific at this particular period is very great. We have established a momentum in that theater and possess a decisive superiority in naval and aircraft and also an adequate force of ground troops. It is an exceedingly serious matter to hamstring this force, as it were, through the lack of the landing craft to implement its operations. This would result in the loss of the acquired momentum which means so much toward shortening the period of the war in the Pacific."
This sacrifice in the Pacific can be justified only with the assurance that we are to have an operation in the effectiveness of which we have complete faith."
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

URGENT
GENERAL MARSHALL'S EYES ONLY

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

To: War Department

Nr: S-50310, 12th April 1944

S-50310 from UNITY to AGWAR personal from Eisenhower to General Marshall for eyes only.

On April 3rd I saw a telegram from the British Chiefs of Staff to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff on the subject of mounting ANVIL. Having heard nothing further on this subject I assumed that that telegram, which was couched in the form of a proposed directive to Wilson, had become the basis of a general agreement and that we could count upon the additional lift of 26 LST's and 46 LCI(L)'s becoming available in the Mediterranean. Only today I learned that since that time this matter had been the subject of further radio correspondence and that the views of the two Chief of Staff groups were so divergent that the U.S. Chiefs have decided to send this equipment on to the Pacific.

I earnestly hope that this decision is not irrevocable and that by further exploration of the subject the British Chiefs of Staff may find it possible to accept the American viewpoint.

I thoroughly agree with you that it would always be possible to divert from a planned and prepared ANVIL to support an operation on the Italian mainland while a reverse movement of this nature would not be practicable.

I also agree that unless firm decisions and actual preparations are immediately undertaken it will not be possible to mount ANVIL in July.

CM-IN-8712 (12 Apr 44)

[Printed in Papers of Dwight Eisenhower, War Years, III, 1818-1919]

310 AMINT

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DECLASSIFIED
EO 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 8/3/94
If the reluctance of the British Chiefs of Staff to give Wilson a firm directive is based upon a fear that his necessary operations in joining the bridgehead with the main front might be prejudiced, what would you think of committing the ANVIL assault to the French Divisions still in Africa. The ground command for ANVIL could be given to a good French General who would be under the complete control of Wilson because of his dependence upon the Allies for air, naval and maintenance support. This plan would, I believe, be seized upon by the French and would certainly offer a minimum of interference with the fierce battling that must ensue before the 2 Italian fronts are joined up. This battling may leave American Divisions temporarily incapable of further offensive action.

In any event I hope that efforts will continue in order to bring the views of the British Chiefs of Staff sufficiently in line with your own so that the additional lift that is going to be so badly needed in the European theater this summer can be agreed upon by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. It is obvious that the next few months in the European theaters will be critical and momentous ones and we very badly need the strength both here and in the Mediterranean to exert our full force against the German during that period.

I realize how great a sacrifice the U.S. Chiefs of Staff were offering to make by providing these landing craft. I clearly understand that it is not in my province to attempt to intervene in Chief of Staff discussions and decisions. But the issues at stake are so great that I felt I should submit to you personally my earnest conviction that no stone should be left unturned in order to achieve an understanding that will allow us to have this additional strength.

CM-IN-5712 (12 Apr 44)

[Printed in Papers of Dwight Eisenhower, War Years, III, 1916-1919]
From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces
       London, England
To:    S-50310, 12th April 1944

I go North this evening but will be back Saturday morning.

No Sig

ACTION: Gen Handy
INFO: C of 3

[Printed in Papers of Dwight Eisenhower, War Years, III, 1918-1919]
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

April 11, 1944

FROM: FREEDOM
TO: Air Ministry for British Chiefs of Staff
INFO: BRITMAN Washington for United States Joint Chiefs of Staff H.Q. M.A.A.F.

BEGOT

Signed Wilson Cite FGEM.
F-30958 11th April, 1944.
Reference COMED 86. This is MEDCOS 88.

1. Unless full April allocation as requested in my
F-22458 of 24th March is provided planned movement of formations to Italy will be artificially interrupted during last 10 days of April. Continuous flow of formations to Italy during April is essential for the next all-out offensive planned for 10th May.

2. Position now is that unless this authority given
M.T. ships which would be required for loading from 20th
April onwards must be released from this theatre. Authority for their retention after discharge in Italy must be receive
by 14th April on which date instructions for division East
wards or Westwards from Augusta will have to be given. If
this decision delayed after 14th April flow of formations
and units to Italy will be sharply checked because ships will
not be available.

3. Apart from operational necessity this artificial
checking of flow for last 10 days of April followed by
starting in May with whatever May sailings are authorized
is undesirable. Urgently request therefore authority for
full numbers of sailings April for which ships are now avail-
able in Mediterranean.

CM-IN-3494 (12 Apr 44) DECLASSIFIED
DECIL1ASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By BIP, NLR, Date
MAY 2 2 1974

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

COPY No. 34
4. Assuming full Apr-11 shipping allocation made AAI requirements will be complete less 2 Armored B-Brigade and 21 Army Tank B-Brigade and certain Ancillary units becoming available after end Apr-11.

5. Forecast of May requirements were given in our signal F(0) 28026 of 5th Apr-11 to TROOPERS which on assumption our full Apr-11 requirements were met requested 125 sailings in the month. To meet the additional requirement of producing a positive threat as requested in para F (B) of COSMED 86 a further 10 M.T. ship sailings will be required. It is proposed to use these ships and also the combat loaders available in this theatre for the actual movement of vehicles to Italy simulating by this movement the launching of an operation against Southern France. To enable this to be done our build up plans for Italy have been adjusted and the movement of vehicles involved to implement this positive threat will be in addition to what had previously been planned for movement to Italy.

6. Our total cargo shipping requirements for May are the above 125 ship sailings.

7. Forecasts for June and July must necessarily be provisional but omitting ANVIL or other Amphibious operations which we may be required to mount and also omitting any additional commitments which may arise as a result of RANKIN, conditions occurring in the Balkans or elsewhere, our estimates for cargo shipping on present information are 60 sailings in June and 30 in July.

8. Information required by your para 3 is subject of further signal.

111945B
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE
April 10, 1944

From: APHQ Algiers
To: AGMAR (OPD) War Office (NO 5)
Rpt'd Hq MACP Caserta
Middle East AAI

Number: F30463

BIGOT ANVIL

Signed Wilson cite PHGOT.

Weekly planning telegram number 31.

1. ANVIL tentative outline plans for action of ground and air in ANVIL are still under review by APHQ.

2. OVERLORD. JPS are reviewing the factors affecting the Mediterranean Theater with a view to ensuring that the best use is made of all theater resources in support of OVERLORD.


4. Elba. Supreme Commander has decided operation against Elba should be prepared in all respects with target date of May 25. Intention being that operation should be suitable for launching any time from that date onwards if situation favorable and diversion of effort from main front can be accepted. Initial planning will be carried out at APHQ detailed planning will be completed in Corsica. Ground Force Naval and Air Commanders are being appointed for the operation the former being General Martin present C in C French Forces Corsica.


No sig

Time of Origin 101845B

ACTION: OPD
INFO: CC/S, General Arnold, Gen Bissell, Adm King, Cofs
CM-IN-7677 (11 Apr 44) 1756Z

DECLASSIFIED
JCS Ltr. 76-72
BY SR . DATE JAN 25 1974

3/0 Anvil

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/94

COPY No.
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Chiefs of Staff
To: Joint Staff Mission
Dated: 7th April, 1944
Number: C.O.S. (W) 1266.

Reference J.S.M. 1620. Following from Chiefs of Staff:

We have always been appreciative of the motives which led the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to suggest providing from the Pacific the resources required to make possible a two-divisional ANVIL assault and we fully realise their anxiety lest in planning for more than one contingency we may in the event be unable to take the most effective action towards the achievement of our desired object. Nevertheless we deeply regret that we still appear to be at variance with the U.S. Chiefs of Staff on this subject and we feel bound to ask that they should once more reconsider the situation in the light of the following arguments which we have evidently so far failed to explain or emphasise sufficiently.

2. We entirely agree that General Wilson should be told to press on vigorously with plans for an ANVIL on 10th July. If however he is instructed to make preparations for an ANVIL on that date we think this will involve two serious dangers. The first is that his freedom of action in fighting the campaign will be hampered by the belief that he is committed to the withdrawal of certain forces by certain dates possibly even before the bridgehead can be joined. The second danger is that if in fact our only plan is to withdraw a number of divisions for ANVIL as soon as the bridgehead is joined this may under certain conditions give the Germans just the opportunity which they would like to withdraw forces without even having to give ground; for instance if the bridgehead were joined in early June and the forces for ANVIL were then withdrawn there would then be at least 6 weeks of virtual stalemate and paralysis in the Mediterranean just at the most critical time for OVERLORD.

3. In our view everything will turn on whether the Germans decide to fight it out in southern Italy after the bridgehead is joined or whether, they will then withdraw forces and retire. If they adopt the former course preparations for

OK-IN-4979 (7 Apr 44)

310 ANVIL

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO, 1-7-74
ST RT, DATE MAY 22 1974
COPY No. 29

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Chiefs of Staff  
To: Joint Staff Mission  
Number: (W) 1266.

Dated: 7th April, 1944

ANVIL will play into their hands because they can fight it out and withdraw forces at the same time. If on the other hand the Germans do withdraw their forces and retire then ANVIL may well be the best thing to do or though it seems to us quite possible that a full-out offensive might not only secure a considerable victory but might also render the intended German withdrawal impracticable without disaster. At the present time there is no information on which we can rely to indicate which course the Germans will take. We therefore think it only prudent to retain on option until the latest possible date. We do not believe that by holding out to General Wilson the prospect of a full-out offensive in Italy as something which he should have always in the front of his mind we should in any way detract from the thoroughness of planning for ANVIL or of those preparations which can be made without prejudice to the option.

4. We therefore earnestly hope that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff will agree to the wording of the directive in C.O.3. (W) 1258 which ensures that ANVIL will be undertaken if when the time comes it seems to the Combined Chiefs of Staff to be the best means of helping OVERLORD but at the same time envisages at least as an equal possibility that continuation of a full-out offensive in southern Italy may in fact appear later to be preferable as a means of helping OVERLORD.

T.O.O. 0711402

ACTION: COS

INFO: Gen Arnold  
Gen Bissell  
Adm King  
Col Park  
C of S

CM-IN-4879 (7 Apr 44) 15575, mcs

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
NLR 101

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
TO: WAR CABINET OFFICES
FROM: JOINT STAFF MISSION
NUMBER: J.S.M. 1607

At their meeting today the C.C.S. agreed to send the following message to A.C. IN. C.MED.

BEGIN:
The decision that ANVIL will not take place before July demands a review of shipping requirements in the Mediterranean theatre in the light of this decision. The importance of rigid economy of shipping during the next three months is emphasized.

2. Please submit revised shipping requirements for April, May and June and report, as a matter of urgency, how many of the 100 additional sailings in April requested in MEDCOS 62 in support of operations in Italy will now be required.

ENDS:

2. Please arrange onward transmission and ensure that A.C. IN C.MED. has necessary background. Should you consider, for reasons of which we are not aware, that any alteration in above signal should be made please refer back before despatch.

T.O.O. 3122012

Footnote: MEDCOS 62 is CM-IN-3989 (6 Mar 44) 00/3

ACTION: 00/3

INFO: Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Col Park
Gen Somervell
C of S

CM-IN-424 (1 Apr 44) 1507Z mmd

3/10 April

SECRET

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

DECLASSIFIED

COPY No.
To: Joint Staff Mission
From: Chiefs of Staff

March 28, 1944

1. There is general agreement that the primary object of all operations in the Mediterranean Theatre is to assist OVERLORD by containing as many German forces as possible. This, therefore, should be the governing consideration in any directive issued to General Wilson. The greater the resources available to him particularly amphibious resources with a substantial follow-up the more effectively will he be able to fulfill his mission whether it takes the form of ANVIL or of an amphibious operation in conjunction with the main battle in Italy. We, therefore, warmly welcome the offer of the United States Chiefs of Staff to make available from U. S. resources 26 LSTs and 40 LCI(L)s to arrive during the month of June.

2. We entirely agree with the United States Chiefs of Staff that we must not be caught unprepared to meet the possibility of the Germans holding our armies in Italy by the delaying action of small forces while they move considerable forces from there to the OVERLORD Theatre. We must, therefore, be prepared to undertake an operation of the nature of ANVIL as a diversion to assist OVERLORD.

3. We must however also be prepared to meet the eventuality of the Germans deciding to fight to the limit for Rome and north of Rome not because we think it essential to capture Rome for Rome's sake (although this would be a big political prize), nor because we wish to have the Rome-Ancona Florence airfields (although these would considerably extend the range of our fighter escorts into Germany). The governing military consideration is that we should contain in whatever place and by whatever means seems best, the maximum German forces away...
from OVERLORD.

4. We, therefore, think that General Wilson should be instructed not only to be prepared to launch an ANVIL say in July but also to prepare plans which will enable him to contain and destroy the maximum number of German forces in Italy if the Germans should decide to continue to fight it out there.

5. To sum up, we agree that an assault on the south coast of France should be postponed not cancelled and that plans for the July date should be pressed forward but in view of the various alternative courses of action open to the Germans we do not feel able at this time to express a firm intention of mounting it for that date regardless of the conditions which may supervene between now and then.

We may indeed find when the time comes that ANVIL is the card to play. Alternatively it may pay us better to press the battle in Italy to the limit in which case the possession of an amphibious lift of 2 divisions will be of immense value to General Wilson. It will be time enough in early June to review the whole problem, and to decide which of the various plans that General Wilson has prepared best meets the situation then existing. We sincerely hope that the United States C.O.S. will be with us in England at about that time and we will be able to take the decision together.

6. We take it that whatever final decision may be reached in respect of the directive to General Wilson, there is no disagreement as to the necessity for providing the additional landing craft etc., for OVERLORD. This is the supreme operation and we hope that the movement of landing craft, etc., will start as soon as possible. As, however, this withdrawal may affect the maintenance of the Anzio Bridgehead, we are referring this question to General Wilson and are asking him if it is practicable to release landing craft from the Bridgehead earlier than the previous estimate.
7. **Diversion of Fighter Aircraft. Reference JSM 1593, Para 5 (c).** While we agree to the proposed move of the 7 British Spitfire Squadrons from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom, we cannot agree to the withdrawal to this country of the 3 United States fighter groups. We gave our reasons in COS(W) 1584 to which the United States C.O.S. have not replied and nothing has since transpired to modify our views therein expressed.

8. **Directive to General Wilson.** We suggest that the preparation of a directive to General Wilson should await a settlement of the above questions. As soon as this is reached we will submit a draft to the United States Chiefs of Staff. We are, however, unable to trace the authority for the statement in Para 3 (1) of the Appendix to JSM 1593 to the effect that General Eisenhower shall coordinate operations from the Mediterranean Theatre designed to assist OVERLORD. This is not in accord with Paragraph 7 of General Eisenhower's directive. (See FACS 7).

*Time of Origin: 281225Z*

**FOOTNOTE:** FACS 7 is CM-OUT-5446 (12 February 44) CC/S
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE
URGENT

From: Supreme Hq. Allied Expeditionary Forces, London
      England

To: War Department

No. B 320  21 March, 1944

Personal for General Marshall from Eisenhower cite SHCOS. Top secret HUOT.

I will be asked to meet with the British Chiefs of Staff tomorrow on the final question of ANVIL. I have been giving constant thought to this subject together with the Staff and several Commanders during the past month. While I have no recent appreciation from General Wilson, yet I intend to present the following based on our own careful study and earnest conviction. "To the Secretary, British Chiefs of Staff.

Para 1. At the conference on February 23rd, it was recommended and agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the decision with respect to operation ANVIL would be made on or about March 20th.

Para 2. It is now the firm opinion of the Supreme Commander that ANVIL, as originally visualized, is no longer a possibility, either from the standpoint of time in which to make the necessary preparations, or in probable availability of fresh and effective troops at the required date.

Para 3. Accordingly, the Supreme Commander desires to bring to the attention of the Combined Chiefs of Staff the fact that during the past month detailed planning confirms that the landing ships and craft at present allocated to OVERLORD are barely sufficient to carry out the operation.
even assuming the ships and craft arrive at planned dates, thereafter suffer no losses through enemy or other action, and the planned serviceability percentages are attained. The present allocation allows no margin of any sort, and, indeed, in the case of LST's, is short of the minimum on which we have been planning. Moreover, it entails an undesirable rigidity of tactical plan.

Para 4. This fact has been constantly realized, and the Supreme Commander has been willing to accept the situation only so long as he felt reasonably sure of a strong and simultaneous ANVIL. With cancellation of a simultaneous ANVIL he considers it essential to strengthen OVERLORD and also to increase the flexibility of the buildup during the early critical days. Our present loading schedule utilizes all allocated LST's on the first three tides, and since the LST turn-around is 3 days, we will have no LST's reaching the beaches after the morning of D plus 1 until the morning of D plus 4.

Para 5. The Supreme Commander, accordingly, is of the opinion that all serviceable landing ships and craft presently allocated to the Mediterranean and above those necessary to furnish ship to shore lift for 1 division should be re-allocated to OVERLORD.

Para 6. Although convinced that ANVIL as at present conceived is no longer possible, the Supreme Commander feels that the abandonment of this project must not lessen our intention of operating offensively in the Mediterranean, initially in Italy and extending from there into France as rapidly as we can. He believes that the forces in the Mediterranean must constantly look for every expedition, including threat and feint, to contain the maximum possible enemy forces in that region.
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Page 1

From: Supreme Hq. Allied Expeditionary Forces, London
      England

No. 3190 B 320 21 March, 1944

Para 7. The Supreme Commander accordingly recommends:

A. That the decision be made to abandon ANVIL in its present
   conception of a 2 division assault building
   up to 10 divisions, and that a directive for operations in
   lieu thereof, similar to the attached, be transmitted to the
   Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean theater.

B. That there be withdrawn from the Mediterranean
   the following craft and ships for re-allocation to operation
   OVERLORD: 26 LST, 40 LCI (L), 1 LSH (the BULolo), 1 LSE,
   1 LSD. The above ships and craft to arrive in the UK by
   50th April.

Following is directive referred to in Para 7 A.
SHABFR/17101/OPS. Proposed directive from the Combined
Chiefs of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean
Theater. General.

Para 1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have previous-
ly directed that the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary
Force, shall coordinate operations from the Mediterranean
Theater designed to assist OVERLORD.

Objec. Para 2. To give the greatest possible assistance
   to OVERLORD by containing the maximum enemy forces away
   from the OVERLORD lodgement area.

Method. Para 3. The highest possible tempo of
   offensive action must be maintained. Your plans will include
   the mounting of a positive threat against the South of
   France or the Ligurian coast with provisions for taking
   immediate advantage of RAMEKIN conditions should they occur.

Timing of a threat. Para 4. The positive threat
   should be fully developed by OVERLORD D minus 5 and fully
   maintained for as long as possible after D day. The process
   of building up the threat should not start before D minus
   31.

CM-IN-15429 (22 Mar 44) COPY No. 24

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Page 4.

From: Supreme Hq. Allied Expeditionary Forces, London England
No. B 320 21 March, 1944

Command and control BAKING. Para 5. Subject to
general direction by Supreme Commander, Allied Expedition-
ary Force, you will continue to exercise operational con-
trol over your forces after landing until Supreme Commander,
Allied Expeditionary Force, can assume this responsibility.

Para 6. You should recommend an area in which you
wish to assume operational, administrative and civil affairs
responsibility in the SHAPE sphere.

Para 7. You should make recommendations if you wish
the area of your responsibility for SOE/SE responsibilities
altered.

Para 8. On receipt of your recommendations referred
to in paragraphs 6 and 7 preceding, instructions in respect
to SHAPE coordination of operational, administrative, civil
affairs and SOE/SE matters will be transmitted to you.

ACTION: Gen Handy

INFO: JQ/S
Gen Arnold
Adm King
Col Mathewson
C of S

CM-IN-15429 (22 Mar 44) 0410Z es

[Printed in Papers of Dwight Eisenhower, War Years, III, 1776-1778]

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/44

COPY No. 24
WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

URGENT

FROM: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers

To: War Department British Army Staff Unnumbered

21st March 1944

BIGOT ANVIL. To Air Ministry for British Chiefs of Staff repeated Britman Washington for U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff repeated Unity London for information signed Wilson cite PH306. This is [REDACTED].

My personal appreciation of the present situation which I have discussed with Alexander and Baker is as follows:

1. The situation in Italy.

The results of the Cassino battle as they can be foreseen now are that Alexander should succeed in securing Cassino and bridgehead over the Rapido and the ground won provide an adequate jumping-off ground for a further offensive, but leaving the Gustav Line still unbroken. Regrouping and preparation for a fresh offensive to complete the rupture of this line and then break and clean up the Adolf Hitler Line will take considerable time. General Alexander estimates that preparations can not be implemented before 15th April. He adds it is absolutely essential that we should concentrate our efforts on the battle in Italy until the bridgehead and main front are joined. It would in fact be militarily impracticable to pursue any further course.

Offensive due to start on 15th April will be faced with a formidable task, but I am confident that by this date the effect of our offensive against his communications will be beginning to tell and that this factor, combined with the weight of our attacks on the main front and from the bridgehead,

3/10 April

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/44

DECLASSIFIED 58522-71
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers
No: 67624, 21st March 1944

will force him to give way. But no rapid advance can be anticipated. The country is difficult, the enemy has had ample time to prepare his demolitions and there are no grounds for supposing that he will not fight hard every yard of the way.

I consider therefore that it would be quite un-sound to count upon a junction of the bridgehead on the main front before 15th May at the earliest.

2. The capture of Rome.

In my view, on broad strategical, political and moral grounds, the capture of Rome is an essential part of the campaign in Italy. The Germans will fight hard and be prepared to use considerable forces to keep it, and we can best serve the internal strategical interest by forcing them to do so. Moreover, the capture of Rome will give us additional airfields as well as control of the communications which are necessary for a further advance.

It is believed that the enemy is preparing a line to cover Rome, even though we may have succeeded in joining hands with the bridgehead. We are not able to prevent him from occupying such a line by the operations which will culminate in joining up the main front with the bridgehead. Should he do so, all available forces will be required to break through it.

But the enemy will undoubtedly be weakened by these operations, and he will be under still greater strain as a result of air attacks on his communications.

Unless therefore the enemy moves further divisions into Italy, have every confidence that I should be able to capture Rome within a month of effecting a junction with the bridgehead. The effect of such a success, in the early stages
of OVERLORD, would, in my opinion, be very great.

I am therefore strongly opposed to the withdrawal of forces, particularly Air Forces, for other purposes, until the capture of Rome has been effected.


After capture of Rome, my next problem is the most probable method of carrying out my main task of helping OVERLORD to the maximum capacity. The following alternatives present themselves:

A. ANVIL.

B. Full scale offensive in Italy combined with an amphibious "end run" assault wherever the enemy line may be.

C. Landings either in the Gulf of Genoa or in the Po Valley.

D. A landing in Istria.

In respect of A.

The time factor in mounting ANVIL, in relation to the withdrawal of forces from the battle in Italy, is set out on paper P/137 (final), copies of which have been transmitted to both the British and US Chiefs of Staff. The shortest possible interval between the date of effecting the junction with the bridgehead and the date of the launching of ANVIL would be about 10 weeks, if ANVIL is to have priority over all other operations, i.e., assuming the junction to be effected by the 15th May, we could launch ANVIL sometime late in July.
The value of this operation must depend on its containing an offensive value. The former is influenced by the fact that the enemy is nervous of attack along the whole Mediterranean coast line. Once ANVIL is launched, it will be obvious to him that it is our one major effort, at the expense of the battle in Italy, and that he could safely concentrate forces from both that country and his coast-watching divisions in southern France to meet it. The necessity for his withdrawing forces from northern France would not arise.

The offensive value of ANVIL must depend on the thrust and rate of advance that can follow up the landing. It is unlikely that the enemy would be forced to detach forces for northern France until Lyon threatened. Before this can be achieved, Toulon and Marseilles would have to be taken and developed. The strength of the defences compel any landing to take place at some distance from either port. With the defensive nature of the terrain, and the limitation of the assault forces to 2 divisions with a slow buildup to 10 divisions, the chances of capture of either are remote. Should a port not be in our hands before the weather breaks, the maintenance of our forces on the beaches would become precarious.

In respect to B.

A full-scale offensive in Italy with an "end run" would ensure that our sea, land, and air forces are concentrated on that battlefield. Our enemy would be forced to watch his coast and also retain his divisions in Italy. The operation would be within the capacity of limited resources in landing craft and shipping. The disadvantages are that between Rome and the Fima-Rimini Line the advance will be slow. Maintenance would be limited to some 8 divisions and build up for a concentrated attack would take time. The vanning strength to be expected in British, Dominion, Indian, and Polish Divisions will
cause a serious reduction in our over all numbers in Italy from either an offensive or defensive aspect. Continuous operations without allowing divisions to refit as in past must be avoided.

Whether C or D would be possible depends on the situation when we reach the Pisa-Rimini Line, but it would appear that plan B, transferring the weight of attack to the east to break through that line, taking advantage of the grain of terrain, offers advantages over them.

4. In assessing the merits of A and B, I do not consider that ANVIL, with limited resources likely to be available, would have any effect on drawing enemy forces away from OVERLORD. Rather, once he appreciated its limited potentialities and the fact that our forces were divided, to the restriction of our operations in Italy, he would be able to withdraw forces from the Mediterranean Front to reinforce northern France. When taken in conjunction with the time factor, we cannot contemplate a failure at this stage of the war, and it is no use shutting our eyes to the risk this operation entails. It should therefore not take place except under conditions resembling closely to RANZIE.

To continue the offensive in Italy should have the effect of retaining at least the present number of enemy divisions with the possibility of destroying some of his forces. It will enable the fullest use to be made of our Strategical bombers with long-range fighter cover to assist OVERLORD and at the same time lets in a concentrated Tactical Air Force for the land battle. This course is recommended in preference to ANVIL.

5. In order to ensure that the enemy is kept in a state of alertness on his southern sea board, it will be necessary to stage a series of threats, which should include
a feint attack against the French coast with the maximum shipping and landing craft available. In addition, there would be minor operations against islands such as Elba, Corfu and other islands on the Dalmation Coast.

Other plans would include the intensification of subversive activities and support of the Partisans in the Balkans and Greece. The German anxiety as to the intentions of Bulgaria and Roumania will be intensified by attacks combined with bombing, when it would not prejudice POINTBLANK or OVERLORD.

6. I request therefore, that I may be given a directive as under:

A. To carry through the battle in Italy to include the capture of Rome and its airfields;

B. Thereafter to concentrate on intensive operations up the mainland of Italy and to be allotted the assault lift of 1 division plus a shore to shore basis for this purpose;

C. To cancel the present ANVIL operation forthwith and to prepare for a landing on the south coast of France under approximate HANKIN conditions;

D. To be allotted the resources to carry out any commando operations and feints which I may wish to implement.

ACTION: CC/S
INFO: Gen Arnold OPD Gen Bissell Adm King Col Mathewson C or
CM-IN-15567 (22 Mar 44) 07132 es

Date: DEC 7 1971

Signature: 

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/44
WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE
March 18, 1944

TOP SECRET

To: HQ. MAAF

RPTD: JOINT STAFF MISSION

FROM: CHIEFS OF STAFF

REFERENCE MEDCOS 70.

We feel that we must ask you to furnish us, by not later than a.m. 19th March, with your appreciation of the existing situation as you see it as Supreme Allied Commander-in-Chief, together with your views as to the practicable operation which could be carried out in your theater and which would be most helpful to OVERLORD.

Deferment of decision until outcome of present battle is known may mean that present state of uncertainty will prevail indefinitely. This is not only unsatisfactory to you but also to General Eisenhower, and we cannot expect him to accept further delay in making decisions which will have such an important effect on OVERLORD.

ACTION: CC/S

INFO: OPD
Gen Bissell
Gen Arnold
Adm King
Col Mathewson
Log

MEDCOS 70 is CM-IN-12229 (17 Mar 44) CC/S

CM-IN-13205 (19 Mar 44) 03252 es

3/0 Anvil

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date } 4/3/97

COPY No. 29
OUTGOING MESSAGE

Comind Chiefs of Staff
71469
March 17, 1944

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
ALGIERS

COMMANDING GENERAL
UNITED STATES FORCES IN THE
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
LONDON ENGLAND

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
LONDON ENGLAND

Number 2461

For Wilson Freedom Algiers, FAN 349, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff

Progress report on operations in the Mediterranean theater.

In view of the uncertainty regarding ANVIL, and the heavy fighting in progress in Italy it is felt that the progress report on operations in the Mediterranean, for submission to

Moscow, should be very general. It should include:

Para 1. A brief appreciation of the situation regarding actual operations in progress;

Para 2. Notes on the buildup of formations;

Para 3. In very general terms, progress in preparations for other operations;

Para 4. A brief note of buildup of administrative troops and of material resources;

Para 5. Major air raids against Balkan targets.

In principle, details should be avoided. A brief telegraphed report is all that is required.

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: OFD Adm King Gen Bissell Gen Arnold
Col Mathewson Log

CH-OUT-7127 (17 March) cc es

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/1944
From: A.F.H.Q. Algiers
To: Agyan (OPD) (B.A.S.W. Pass)
War Office (H.O.5.)
rptd Middle East AAI
HQ MAAF
Caserta (Fairbanks pass)

No: W5151/64460 14 Mar:

RIGOF

ANVIL

Signed Wilson cite RHQ.
Weekly planning telegram number 27.

Para One. Future Ops. JPS making preliminary study of following possible operations:

subpara A. Amphibious operation FIUME area designed to hold German Formations in Balkans.

subpara B. Amphibious operation VENICE area designed to prevent German withdrawal from Italy. No firm planning is however possible until information becomes available as to Amphibious resources which would remain in this theatre in the event of ANVIL NOT being carried out.

Para Two. ADRIATIC.

subpara A. Supreme Commander has approved chain of planning and command for small operations across ADRIATIC which will now be APHQ to Adv force 133 to 2 88 Rde to Unit.

subpara B. JPS are undertaking examination suitable sites to land supplies by sea in conjunction with TITO operation to

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secure bridgehead, duration of operation limited to 48 hours.

Para Three. ANVIL.

subpara A. Supreme Commander briefed General GIRAUD on ANVIL on 7 March 1944. Question of French command for operations has been raised by Giraud.

subpara B. Directives have been issued to Force Commanders, C in C Med and Air C in C MAAP. Outline plan to be submitted by 1st April.

Para Four. Armistice Terms. Redraft prepared in accordance with COS(W) 1192 NOT to Middle East or AAI. We are now awaiting information regarding US Chiefs of Staff view on COS(W) 1192 before taking further action submit revised terms.

Para Five. ZEPPELIN. Stage two as amended has now been approved and is being implemented.

T.O.O. 141015A

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: GEN ARNOLD

COL MATHIESON

LOG

CH-IN-10593 (15 Mar 44) 1821Z 1cm

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: A.F.H.Q. Algiers
To: Agwar (OPD) (B.A.S.W. Pass)
     War Office (M.O.S.)
     rptd Middle East AAI
     HQ MAAP
     Caserta (Fairbanks pass)

No: W5151/64460  14 Mar:

BIGHT

Signed Wilson cite BIGHT.
Weekly planning telegram number 27.
Para One. Future Ops. JPS making preliminary study of following possible operations:

subpara A. Amphibious operation PIUMA area designed to hold German Formations in Balkans.

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CH-IN-10593  (15 Mar 44)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
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subpara B. Directives have been issued to Force Commanders, C in C Med and Air C in C MAAP. Outline plan to be submitted by 1st April.

Para Four. Armistice Terms. Redraft prepared in accordance with COS(W) 1191 NOT to Middle East or AAI. We are now awaiting information regarding US Chiefs of Staff view on COS(W) 1191 before taking further action submit revised terms.

Para Five. ZEPPELIN. Stage two as amended has now been approved and is being implemented.

T.O.O. 141015A

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: GEN ARNOLD
CC/S
COL MATHEWSON
LOG

ON-IN-10593 (15 Mar 44) 1821Z 1cm

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JCS LETTER, 7-678
BY S/S, DATE
JAN 25 1974
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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/74
WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: Algiers
To: War
No. W4532/61321, 7 March 1944

051600 from APHQ W4532/61321 action AGWAR OPD Troopers for M05 info Mid-east AOMP signed Wilson cite PHICT weekly planning telegram number 25.

1. Major General Patch has been nominated Commander of ANVIL BIGG) ground forces Vise Lieut General Clarke. Planning for ANVIL is now proceeding on a firm basis in the light of recent decisions and developments.

2. Major General Hull USA and Rear Admiral Cooke USN visited APHQ to discuss ANVIL and establish closer liaison between APHQ and US Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. The Commander in Chief intends shortly to brief General (ANVIL) De Gaulle and General Giraud on. No Sig

ACTION: General Handy
INFORMATION: General Arnold
SOS
CO/3 (Captain Royal USN)
Admiral King
Colonel Mathewson
Log
CM-IN-4797 (7 Mar 44)
21122 med

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E.O. 12335, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/44
From: Algiers  
To: War  
No. W4492/61191, 7 March 1944  
Part 2 and last of W4492/61191 from FREEDOM 0710 0  
B2OCT.  
A. B. O. D. E. F.  
160.

6. On basis of 150 vehicles each ship and assuming movement commitments as in Paragraph 3 following would be analysis of MT ship sailings.

A. March. 69 from North Africa to Italy 35 from Middle East to Italy 6 from North Africa to Corsica.

B. April. 52 from North Africa to Italy 51 from Middle East to Italy 12 from North Africa to Corsica.

7. LTS available in the Mediterranean will be fully employed in support of Anzio bridgehead and for movement of Air Forces to Corsica. Only those returning to Naples after refit at Bizerte will be available to assist movement to Italy.

8. If it is not possible to meet our March requirements owing to the non-availability cargo shipping in the Mediterranean it is requested that any deficiency be made good in April. This additional shipping can be handled in Mediterranean ports during the month.

CN-IN-4767 (7 Mar 44)
From: Algiers
To: War
No. W4492/61191, 7 March 1944

9. For the movement of personnel we are relying on the continued availability up to the end of April of the following lifts in the 2 fast groups.

A. Western Group 23000
B. Eastern Group 26000.

Composition of these groups will as far as practicable be adjusted to meet the detailed priority of formation moves. 5 HSF and 4 XIF convoys will be possible during March and April. Further personnel lift will be available by use of local personnel shipping and Naval opportunities. These means together with MT shipping account for all but 30,000 of the total commitment of 276,000. We are still investigating ways of meeting this deficiency and will signal further when more detailed plan has been made. In the meantime would be grateful for any information which might assist in meeting this commitment.

10. This signal is concerned solely with the allocation of sailings required for internal Mediterranean movement during March and April. It does not include any requirements for the ANVIL assault and follow-up convoys as shipping for these convoys will not sail until May at the earliest.

11. For Troopers agreed Hoopers who with PSTO will signal separately.

ACTION: CC/S (Captain Royal USN)
INFORMATION: OPD, General Bissell, General Arnold, General Somervell, Colonel Mathewson, Admiral King

CM-IN-4767 (7 Mar 44) 2020Z mod

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JCR 9 FEB 75 72
BY STG
DATE JAN 25 1974

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OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: Algiers
To: War
No. W4492/61191, 7 March 1944

W4492/61191 action AGWAR, Troopers information HQ MAAP J 071000 from FREEDOM 9-4 Movements signed Wilson cite FROMM BUFO.

1. Further to NEDGUS 62, Para 8. Additional allocation of dry cargo tonnage requested is required for movement of formations to Italy and for certain movement to Corsica.

2. Precise order in which formations will move to Italy is not yet established. Following figures are therefore provisional and liable to change when priorities are determined.

3. Following are projected movement commitments in March and April. Totals include formations, auxiliary units, Air Forces, and US, British and French reinforcements. Read in 5 columns:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>95,000</td>
<td>10,800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>42,800</td>
<td>5,200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>75,200</td>
<td>7,800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>7,600</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March &amp; April</td>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>Corsica</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
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CM-IN-4690 (7 Mar 44) DECLASSIFIED SM522-71

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date _4/13/94_
From: Algiers
To: War
No. W4492/6191, 7 March 1944.

Total personnel 276,000,
Vehicles 34,400.

4. Of the above totals for March it is planned to move on present allocation of shipping (including LSTs returning to Naples from Bizerta after refitting) 68,000 personnel and 9,000 vehicles from North Africa and 38,000 personnel and 2400 vehicles from Middle East.

5. Analysis of dry cargo tonnage requirements is as follows:

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<th>F.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Month</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>180</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

End Part 1, Part 2 follows.

ACTION: Oo/S (Capt. Royal, USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Bissell
Gen Arnold
Gen E. M. Reckless
Col Mathewson
Admiral King

CM-IN-4690 (7 Mar 44)

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SM 522-21
18512 cw
Date-1871
Signature-12356
No Sig.
To: BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

From: FREEDOM

Number: MEDCOS 62

This signal supersedes MEDCOS 59 and our W3560/26689 of 25th February and answers AGWAR signal 1086 of 1 March and Troopers' signal 71723 DQ61 (N) of 26 February.

2. Policy given in CGSHAE 43 direct that overriding priority is to be given to the campaign in Italy. My first action in the present situation must be to reinforce AGWAR as rapidly as possible with the forces available to this theatre.

3. In order to obtain an early conclusion to this phase of Mediterranean operations it is necessary for me to ask you for additional shipping.

4. Following formations are already planned to move to Italy. Balance of 6 ARMD. DIV. balance of 8 ARM. DIV. and 14 Mtn. Div. balance of 5 INF. Div. in addition the following formations can be made available 85 U.S. Div., 10 Mtn. Div., 2 Inf. Div., and 6 ARMD. Div. and 10 South African Indian Div. in exchange for a tired division from Italy. A similar exchange may be effected by moving 85 U.S. Div. to Italy in relief of a tired U.S. division.

5. Allowing for the movement of ancillary units and replacement vehicles necessary to support these formations and also for certain movement to and from Corsica it is provisionally estimated that some 276,000 personnel and 34,000 vehicles have to be moved to Italy and Corsica.

6. It is considered that of this total 225,000 personnel can be shipped in personnel shipping which it is estimated will be available in the Mediterranean in March and April and by existing naval opportunities. A further 21,000 personnel can be lifted in cargo shipping if our allocation of cargo shipping is increased as requested in Para. 7. Balance of some 30,000 personnel will still require to be moved for which additional shipping may be necessary.

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7. The SEXTANT allocation of cargo shipping of 140 sailings in March and 60 sailings in April will enable approximately 11,000 vehicles and 2,000 vehicles to be moved in these months respectively. It is provisionally estimated that a further 40 sailings in March and 100 sailings in April giving a total lift of 21,000 vehicles will be required.

8. Further signal to AGWAR and Troopers follows giving a more detailed analysis of our shipping requirements.

9. These additional sailings are required for support of operations in Italy and certain movements to and from Corsica. They are not covered by shipping allocations for the ANVIL assault if decided upon and follow up convoys. ANVIL allocations have been made for May and at the earliest ANVIL ships will not be required to begin loading until about 1st May. However any ships earmarked for the ANVIL assault and immediate follow up convoy which have been accumulated in the Mediterranean before 1st May could of course be available cover some of the additional sailings required for the movement of vehicles to Italy.

10. 9 DIC may be used as an ANVIL follow up formation. If before this formation has begun to move to Italy a decision is made to mount ANVIL a slight reduction to these additional shipping requirements can be accepted.

11. I must emphasize that the success of operations in Italy depends very largely on the speed with which the forces for Italy can be built up. This can only be assured if additional shipping is provided in March and April. Measures necessary to provide this shipping may it is appreciated take time to work out but to enable me to make my plans I would be grateful for my request to be approved authorizing the required additional shipping allocations.

T.O.O. 252015Z

ACTION: CCS

INFORMATION: OPD, Gen Bissell, Gen Arnold, Col Mathewson, Adm King, Gen Somervell, Log

CM-IN-3989 (6 Mar 44) 1805Z 1020Z

COPY No. 34

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SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE
SECURITY CONTROL
March 2, 1944
FROM: AFHQ (SIGNED WILSON)
      012 01F7P7
ACTION: AGWAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
INFORM: USFOR FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF (AMSSO PASS).
BICGT ANVIL
Number W4079/58957
Estimated evacuation of casualties for operation ANVIL will require 8 hospital ships as assembled in the Mediterranean prior to the operation for evacuation for first 30 days. 4 will be required for period D plus 30 to D plus 60 and 3 from period D plus 60 to D plus 90. Request is based on average ship capacity of 275 litter cases and 190 walking cases.
T.O.O. 021130

ACTION: CC/S
INFORMATION: OPD, Gen Somervell, C of S, Gen Arnold, Adm King

CM-IN-1382 (2 March 44) 21392 mmd

DECLASSIFIED
JCS LETTER 7-6-72
DECLASSIFIED
JCS LETTER 7-6-72
JAN 30 1974

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

18
From: FREEDOM
To: BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF
      J.S.M. Washington for U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and to HQMAFP

Dated: 1 March, 1944

BICOT

MEDCO3.57  For information, Signed Wilson. Cite PHSGS. Herewith repetition our 011413A X1619 YO439. Machine error regretted. BEGINS.

1. Measures proposed in OZ 1130 not agreeable to this theatre. Result would be:

   (A) We should be exchanging 26 LST fitted with 6 davits for equivalent number fitted with only two davits. This would seriously affect operation ANVIL in that it would greatly reduce our ability to land troops from them in LQVPS.

   (B) We should also suffer a net loss of 26 LCT's (deck loads) which again would seriously affect ANVIL assault and buildup. Must point out that our ability to land vehicles from M.T. ships will be in proportion to the number of LCT.

   (C) During April and May 13 of the first 26 British LST must be refitted and would be a net loss to the Anzio Bridgehead if that was not joined by main front by mid-April.

2. Strongly urge that solution be found as recommended in my MEDCO3 48.

   T.O.O. 011330A

   CM-IN-1144  (2 Mar 44)

3. 10 Ann

T.0. 011330A

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
Footnote:  MEDCOSS 48 is CM-IN-335  (1 Mar 44) CC/5

ACTION:  CC/5

INFORMATION:  OPD  
General Bissell  
General Arnold  
O of S  
Admiral King  
Colonel Mathewson

CM-IN-1144 (2 Mar 44) 1419Z  med
From: AFGHQ ALOIERS
To: AGWAR FOR OPD
       WAR OFFICE FOR NO 5
       MIDDLE EAST ACFP
Number: W 3926/55028 February 29, 1944

BIGOT

Signed Wilson cite FROGOT

MOST SECRET - - ANVIL - - BIGOT

Weekly planning telegram number 26.

1. Bulgaria. Draft Armistice terms for Bulgaria
   have been prepared by JPS setting out military require-
   ments of this theatre. Every examination regarding
   possible action in connection with Bulgaria and Roumania
   shows the imperative need for military discussion with
   the Russians if we are to reap full benefit of any attempt
   by these countries to get out of War.

2. VIS JPS have examined the probable commitment
   which would be involved in recapturing VIS in the event
   of that Island being captured by Germans. JP conclusions
   are that such an operation by us would require Forces
   of order of 1 Brigade group for amphibious assault and most
   of 1 airborne brigade group.

3. ANVIL. Full examination is being made of possibili-
   ties of mounting ANVIL subsequent to securing of Rome even
   if ANVIL would thus be well after OVERLORD. In general,
   the time factor is that we might expect to land ANVIL 9 weeks
   after the First Division is withdrawn from the battle in

CH-IN-478 (1 Mar 44)
Italy for refitting and amphibious training. This planning being conducted in light visit General Bull, who informed that ANVIL considered very valuable even much after OVERLORD and that assault lift for 2 divisions likely to be left this theatre even if ANVIL not launched concurrently OVERLORD.

4. NOAHS ARK. Desirability of going slow on implementation provision for NOAHS ARK under examination by JPS on strategical grounds, in view other conflicting claims, of high strategical priority, for special operation sorties.

T O O 291330A

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: O of S
CC/S (Captain Royal USN) General Arnold

CM-IN-478 (1 Mar 44) 1640Z med
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

February 28, 1944

FROM: A.F.H.Q.
TO: BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF
INFO: J.S.M. FOR U.S. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Number MEDCCS 46

From Wilson.

ANVIL. Following is summary of a directive issued by me to General Alexander on 25th February.

1. Operations in Italy form only part of whole Mediterranean plan for keeping forces away from OVERLORD. The whole plan cannot be made until our final directive is received and our final sea, land and air resources are known.

2. Operations in Italy must be conditioned mainly by the air factor. My general plan for Italy is to use the air to deprive the enemy of the ability either to maintain his present positions or to withdraw his divisions out of Italy in time for OVERLORD.

3. You can be assured of fullest co-operation of the Tactical Air Force supported when really essential by heavy bombers in the operations in the immediate future in the Anzio and Cassino sectors. But subject always to POINTBLANK the primary task of the air forces in Italy must be to make it impossible for the enemy to maintain a powerful array on the Rome line. With luck and good weather it is not unreasonable to expect that the MAAP bombing plan just initiated to this end will make itself felt by the end of April. That effort should be to compel the enemy to withdraw to the Pisa-Rimini line.

CM-IN-20198 (29 Feb 44)

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SM522-71

Date- DEC 7 1971

Signature- RAP

COPY No. 26-5359443 1000

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/44
4. The complement to this air plan is that the land forces should continue offensive operations against the enemy to the maximum possible extent and with no pause appreciable to the enemy. This affords the best chance of keeping the enemy tied down and quickening the effect of the interference with his communication. When the withdrawal starts we shall follow him up as actively as our resources and his demolitions will permit.

5. You should therefore base your plans on regrouping to continue limited offensives designed first to enlarge the Bridgehead to free Anzio Fort from shellfire and second to kill Germans and force them to expend ammunition on the main front making the maximum use of our superiority in weight of metal.

6. Naval considerations will not admit of any amphibious operations except on the very smallest scale until one month after the Anzio Bridgehead has been relieved and the use of landing ships and craft for army supplies has been discontinued. Planning for operations from the beachhead must not be based upon an estimate greater than 2,500 tons per day.

7. With the exception of 46th Inf. Div. no troops will be taken away from your command until a junction with bridgehead has been effected. In addition to the present planned build-up into Italy, you can have 85th Div. (U.S.) by mid-April.

8. Looking to the more distant future the destruction of the enemy’s major railway facilities in North Italy should, in itself, at least greatly increase his difficulties in withdrawing divisions to meet OVERLORD and would be a most valuable contribution to ANVIL. In addition opportunities from now on will be seized to bomb Balkan targets by day and night whenever weather is unsuitable for POINTBLANK or attacks on railway plan. Air action in the Balkans will have to be supplemented by the

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intensification of areas of subversive activities and support of Tito and by airborne and seaborne raids on the maximum scale that our resources will allow. These are considerations which will affect the final Mediterranean plan but this plan cannot be completed until I receive my final directive on ANVIL.

9. Meanwhile your present task is to link up the Bridgehead and to take Rome. I should like you, in conjunction with Commanding General Tactical Air Force, to make your plans in the light of the considerations in this telegram.

T.O.O. 282208A

ACTION: CCS

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Bissell
Gen Arnold
Sec. Gen. Staff
Adm King
LOG

CM-IN-20198 (29 Feb 44) 15332 mmd
FROM: Chiefs of Staff
TO: APHQ
REPEATED: JSM Washington
Following from Chiefs of Staff COSMED 43

1. Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed and President and
Prime Minister have approved that Mediterranean plans should
be governed by following policy:

   (i) The campaign in Italy must until further orders have
       overriding priority over all existing and future operations
       in the Mediterranean and will have first call on all re-
       sources land sea and air in that theatre.

   (ii) Subject to (i) above the Allied C.-in-C. Mediter-
       ranean Theatre should prepare alternative plans and make
       such preparations as can be undertaken without prejudice
       to operations in Italy for amphibious operations in the
       Mediterranean with the object of contributing to OVERLORD
       by containing and engaging the maximum number of enemy
       forces. The first of these alternatives should be ANVIL
       on approximately the scale and date originally contem-
       plated, i.e. a 2 division assault building up about 10
       divisions to be launched shortly after OVERLORD. Full
       consideration will be given to the maximum use of French
       forces.

   (iii) The Allied C.-in-C. Mediterranean Theatre should
       for the present base these plans on the assumption that
       the assault shipping and landing craft at present allocated
       to him will be at his disposal with following exceptions:

   CM-IN-18714 (27 Feb 44)
(a) 20 LST's to consist of as many British LST's as possible, the balance being U.S. and 21 British LCI (L)'s are reallocated from ANVIL to OVERLORD and will sail for UK on or about April 1st after having been refitted.

(b) 6 US AKA's are reallocated from OVERLORD to ANVIL.

(iv) The arrangements set out in (ii) and (iii) above will be reviewed on March 29th in light of situation then existing in Italy. Unless, as a result of this review it is then decided that ANVIL on scale and date quoted in (ii) above is practicable, such landing craft (over and above a 1 division ship-to-shore lift) as can profitably be employed in OVERLORD will forthwith be withdrawn from Mediterranean. The Allied C.-in-C. Mediterranean will then revise plans prepared under (ii) above on basis of assault lift remaining in Mediterranean.
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

FOR GENERAL MARSHALL'S EYES ONLY
URGENT
SECURITY CONTROL

From: ETCUSA
To: War
No: W 11674, 22nd February 1944

Marshall eyes only signed Eisenhower.

I think your 153 represents the best decision that can be made under current circumstances. While prospects for ANVIL in the hopes for strength of a 2 division assault and a total strength of at least 10 divisions, seem to me to have deteriorated in past 10 days, I still believe we should preserve for some time sufficient flexibility as to insure as far as we can against a possible stagnation in the Mediterranean situation at the time of OVERLORD with only a portion of our troops there engaged against the enemy. I am strengthened in the belief that we should retain some flexibility because of the fact that if review in latter part of March should indicate that ANVIL is not feasible, we could still reinforce our means of buildup in OVERLORD from equipment in the Mediterranean. We must not lose the initiative in the Mediterranean at the very time when we will need it most. However, the orders to the Mediterranean Theater should positively state that ANVIL planning is not to interfere with the current battle. These orders should be most emphatic.

We are having a meeting with the British Chiefs of Staff this morning so as to settle this matter. In my opinion it should be reviewed again in sufficient time so that if it becomes apparent there is no hope for ANVIL as now conceived the movement of equipment additional to that already agreed could start by April 1st.

In this connection and reference message from the President contained in your number 154, I suggest that the

CM-IN-15721 (22 Feb 44)

[Printed in Papers of Dwight Eisenhower, War Years, III, 1744-1745] 310  Ann R

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/64

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third power should be informed that ANVIL is of course contingent upon the necessary degree of early success in the present Italian campaign but that in any event our operations in the Mediterranean Theater will be conducted on such a basis as to employ the bulk of our troops offensively. If this notification were given now we would have in advance the necessary flexibility in decision when the time comes.

With respect to possibility of doing anything concrete toward ANVIL in the Mediterranean while the present battle is going on we must face facts as they are. The present battle demands every available resource. While 2 experienced American divisions are out or coming out of the line for a period of rehabilitation the prospects grow stronger that they will have to reenter the same battle within a few weeks. However in the meantime they are getting ready to fight again and if the situation should suddenly turn in our favor and they should not be needed again in Italy their additional training for ANVIL could be quickly accomplished. What we must have definitely in sight eventually is a total strength of some 10 to 12 divisions to push into south France after the opening is made. If incessant battling in Italy should continue to absorb the great bulk of total United Nations resources there, then, as you mentioned in a letter to me, the situation automatically resolves itself.

No Sig

ACTION: JO/3 (CAPT. ROYAL, USN)
INFORMATION: OPD GEN. BISSELL GEN. ARNOLD CoFS
ADM. KING WHITE HOUSE

CM-IN-15721 (22 Feb 44) 20112 eng

[Printed in Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, War Years, III, 1944-1945]
5 February 1944

A revision has been made in the French re-arming program based on requirements for ANVIL. The program now includes equipping of 6 Infantry Divisions and 4 Armored Divisions.

Six Infantry Divisions and 4 Armored Divisions have been retained in the program. Equipment for the last of the 4 Armored Divisions, except that which has already been shipped or may be requested by AFHQ, is deferred indefinitely.

A detailed list on the units involved in the program is contained in NAF 597 of 4 February.
From: Algiers.
To: WAR

This is NAF no. 597, Added AGWAR for CCS. Info USFOR for BOS. Signed Wilson cite PHOC. BIGOT ANVIL.

1. Following are recommended revisions in the French reinforcement program reference your 42180 of 26th January. Revisions are based on units required for ANVIL which the French can organise with qualified manpower available to them. Amendments to the present program follow:

A. Units to be deleted:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>T/C</th>
<th>Number of units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Divisions</td>
<td>7 (modified)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tank Destroyer BN</td>
<td>18-25</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery Regt.</td>
<td>6-51</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155mm Gun</td>
<td>44-12</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq and Hq Btry AA Op</td>
<td>44-135</td>
<td>4, (Less 1 S/L Btry or 1 BN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Searchlight BN</td>
<td>44-15</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90mm AA BN</td>
<td>44-15</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal BN Army Corps</td>
<td>11-15</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal Photo Co</td>
<td>11-37</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM-IN-2944 (4 Feb 44)</td>
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310 April
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<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
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<tr>
<td>Signal Port Co,</td>
<td>11-327</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eng Shore Bn,</td>
<td>5-521-3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eng Combat Regt,</td>
<td>5-171</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ord MM Co,</td>
<td>9-7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ord MM Auto Co,</td>
<td>9-127</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ord HM Co,</td>
<td>9-9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ord HM Tank Co,</td>
<td>9-37</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ord AA Repair Co,</td>
<td>9-217</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ord Evac Co,</td>
<td>Special</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq and Hq Det Ord Bn,</td>
<td>9-76</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qm Truck Bn,</td>
<td>10-55</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qm Gas Supply Bn,</td>
<td>10-75</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qm Refrigeration Co,</td>
<td>10-217</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Bn,</td>
<td>8-15</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance Bn,</td>
<td>6-315</td>
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</tbody>
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### SECURITY CONTROL

**From:** Algiers  
**To:** W  
**WAR No.:** W-1847/47163  
**4 Feb. 1944.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field Hosp.</td>
<td>8-510</td>
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B. Units to be added, read in 3 columns:

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<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Smoke</td>
<td>3-267</td>
<td>3;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Generating Co.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Engineer Maint Co.</td>
<td>5-157</td>
<td>1;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer Water Supply Co.</td>
<td>5-67</td>
<td>1;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer Depot Co.</td>
<td>5-47</td>
<td>2;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Engineer Topo Co.</td>
<td>5-167</td>
<td>1;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer Bn (sep)</td>
<td>5-35</td>
<td>1;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer Petroleum Dist Co.</td>
<td>5-327</td>
<td>1;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq and Hq Btry, Corps Arty</td>
<td>6-50-1</td>
<td>2;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Arty Observ Bn.</td>
<td>6-75</td>
<td>2;</td>
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</table>

OM-IN-2944 (4 Feb 44)
SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers.
To: WAR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>T/O</td>
<td>Number of Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Arty Bn, 155 MMB</td>
<td>6-35</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Arty Bn, 8 inch H</td>
<td>6-65</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Depot Supply</td>
<td>8-661</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ord Depot Co</td>
<td>9-57</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ord Auto Maint Bn</td>
<td>9-325</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ord Vehicle Assembly Co</td>
<td>9-348</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qm Base Depot Eq Co</td>
<td>10-520-1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qm Fueling and Bath</td>
<td>10-257</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Hosp</td>
<td>8-530</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal Const Co</td>
<td>11-27</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. The following units are not in program but are now being employed or are set up for employment. Continued maintenance from French sources is not possible. Therefore it is recommended that they be added to rearma-
ment program for maintenance only. Nearest corresponding T/O is indicated in parenthesis:

4 Groups Sabre (4 Infantry Regts T/O 7-11);

CM-IN-2944 (4 Feb 44)

Page 4/4

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/44

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From: Algiers.  
To: WAR  
No. W-1847/47163  
Page 5  
4 Feb. 1944.

1 Brigade of Spahis (1 Cavalry Regt 2-11);
8 Mule Pack Cos  (16 Pack Cos 10-118);
1 Commando Battalion (1 Inf Bn 7-15);
1 Shock Battalion (1 Inf Bn 7-15);
2.

6 Infantry Divisions and 4 Armored Divisions have been retained in the program. Equipment for the last of the 4 Armored Divisions, except that which has already been shipped or may be requested by APHQ is deferred indefinitely.

3.

This cable will be confirmed giving details in air mail letter.

No Sig.

8180 is CM-OUT-10461 (26 Jan 44) OPD

ACTION: COS
INFORMATION: OPD
GEN STRONG
GEN ARNOLD
WHITE HOUSE
ADM KING
GEN DONELSON
LOG

CM-IN-2944 (4 Feb 44) 2312Z

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JCS 29-71
Date - DEC 7 1971
Signature - 

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/94
February 2, 1944

TO: BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF REPEATED: J.S.M. WASHINGTON
FOR U.S. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

INFO: M.A.A.P. ADVANCED

FROM: A.F.H.Q. SIGNED WILSON

BIGOT ANVIL

MEDECO 25

A. At my request Air Marshal Slessor has prepared the following review of air resources in this theatre.

1. The commitments of the Allies Air Forces this year are as follows.

a. Strategic bombing of POINTBLANK targets which involves a requirement for long range fighter escorts assessed by Air Commander in Chief as 21 squadrons (at 25) for a target force of 21 heavy groups.

b. Tactical support of the armies in Italy.

c. Air defense of sea communications ports, important airfield areas etc. behind the Army boundaries.

d. ANVIL.

e. HARDTROOP.

2. The limiting factor is single-seater fighter and fighter bombers. If we have enough of these,

CM-IN-1490 (3 Feb 44)
we can meet our commitments in other classes though we may fall short of ideal in certain respects. But a shortage of SEF will be fatal to any plan.

A general review of our resources in all classes in relation to our commitments in progress but will take time. I have, however, gone at some detail into the fighter position (excluding Beaufighters) and my conclusions are set out in paras. 12 through 14 below.

3. These conclusions are based on the following assumptions.

A. That one group (80) P-40 Fighter-Bombers and one group P-39 SEF of the USAAF are withdrawn from the theatre some time before ANVIL D Day 

B. That no further withdrawal of fighter units is required of us.

4. On these assumptions (A) we shall have in the theatre on 1st May a total of 40 squadrons of U.S. fighters, 45 of British and 7 of French.

(Note. The British include RRAF but exclude one squadron of Rocket Hurricanes) total 92.

(B) The U.S. fighters will include 13 squadrons of long range fighters (9 P-38 and 9 P-47). The British include 39 squadrons of Spitfires, 3 of P-51 (a long range SEF) and 3 of P-40 fighter-bombers.

5. Defense of convoys, port and back areas throughout the entire Mediterranean theatre involves a minimum of 11 Spitfire Squadrons British; 3
Spitfire, 3 P-39, 1 P-40 Squadrons French; 3 Spitfire, 7 P-39 Squadrons American; total 28 squadrons.

6. Tactical support of the armies in Italy. 8 Spitfire and 3 P-40 Squadrons British. (Note. The fighters in Corsica will be within easy range of Northern Italy. There will be 8 fighter squadrons of Coastal Command in it all behind the line and in addition there will be at least 9 U.S. escort fighter squadrons in the Foggia Area. So Italy is well covered.)

7. HARDWOOD. Involves the dispatch of 12 British Spitfire Squadrons to Turkey. It also involves handing over 108 Spitfires to the Turks from our resources.

9. ANVIL. The planning staff have worked on the assumption that the following force will be required for ANVIL on the basis of a Two Division assault. U.S. 3 Spitfires (plus 3 transferred from Coastal included in 5 above); 9 P-47 3 long range fighters; 6 A-36 fighter bombers; 3 P-40 fighter bombers British Spitfires, total 25 squadrons (plus 3) leaving available 9 P-38 long range U.S., 4 British Spitfires, 3 British P-51.
10. **POINTBLANK** escorts. If the figures in 9 above are accepted it means that by using the 3 British P-51 Squadrons the 15 Air Force could have the equivalent of about 10 1/2 U.S. squadrons for escort duties instead of the 21 considered desirable and there would be a reserve of 4 British Spitfire Squadrons.

11. But I am by no means satisfied that the force in 9 above is adequate for the cover and particularly for the close support of a 2 division assault against the strongly defended coast of Southern France and the subsequent buildup. The estimate was admittedly based on what then appeared likely to be available. We cannot afford to let this operation fail. If it is reduced to a one day divisional assault it will need if it is to have a chance of success more not less air support and I do not consider the present allocation of fighters provides really adequate fighter cover or fighter-bomber support to make sure of success in this difficult operation should the enemy elect to oppose it at all seriously.

12. Consider therefore that the AVIIL allocation should be increased at least by the 4 Spitfire and 3 P-51 Squadrons (British) leaving at most the 9 P-38 Squadrons to escort the 15 Air Force.

13. On the above showing we could in fact just spare 12 Spitfire Squadrons for HARDWOOD although

(A) The 15 Air Force will fall short of its stated requirements by some 60 percent and
(B) We shall have virtually every single fighter squadron in the Mediterranean committed and therefore nothing in hand to meet unforeseen contingencies.

13. 12 (A) above I do not think is serious. At the time of ANYMIL the 15 Air Force will be mainly employed on ANYMIL targets and fighter opposition on a really serious scale is improbable.

14. 12 (B) I dislike. This allocation looks all right on paper and on the face of it we should have ample strength taking account the scale of German opposition to be expected throughout the Mediterranean Area. But commitments are liable to breed commitments and I believe the soundest course is to cancel HARDTHOOD which by releasing 12 Spitfire Squadrons would enable us to release some P-47 from ANYMIL to escort the 15 Air Force to have some reserve in hand or alternatively to release a few squadrons for OVERLORD if considered essential. I cannot believe it wise to look up a valuable force of 12 Spitfire Squadrons for a commitment which seems increasingly improbable to materialize which if it does materialize may well lead us into additional commitments which we cannot afford which seems unlikely to influence German strategy to any material extent and which may prejudice (even in small degree) the success of the vitally important operations against the north and south of France and against the interior of Germany.

B. I am fully in agreement with views expressed above and in connection with para 30 I must emphasize that we have not the air resources to
undertake an ANVIL operation and an offensive in Italy simultaneously. This summary has not been seen by General Eaker, who is at Caserta, but he has received a copy and has been asked to signal his comments to you direct.

Time of Origin 021200Z

ACTION: CCS Capt Royal USH
INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Strong
Gen Arnold
Adm King
White House
LOG

(Date)

Signature

DECLASSIFIED
SM 522-71
DEC 7 1971

COPY No. 25

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
To: Chiefs of Staff

Repeated: J.S.M. Washington for U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff

Fairbanks

From: A.P.H.Q

Dated: 29 January 1944

This is MDCCOS 24 in reply to COMNED 10 and 11.

1. Examinations show that build up for ANVIL will be reduced to following rate. Compare section three Annex J of ANVIL in your (ENCODE) soon. Plan A. sub-paragraph A - two divisions plus one RCT ashore D day.

Sub-paragraph B - four divisions ashore by D plus three at twenty five thousand men and four thousand vehicles per division.

Sub-paragraph C - five divisions ashore by D plus twelve.

Sub-paragraph D - nine divisions ashore by D plus ninety at forty five thousand men and eight thousand vehicles per division.

Plan B. Subparagraph A. Three divisions ashore on D day.

Sub-paragraph B - four divisions and one RCT by D plus three at twenty five thousand men and four thousand vehicles per division.

Sub-paragraph C - six divisions ashore by D plus twelve.

Sub-paragraph D - nine divisions ashore by D plus eighty at forty five thousand men and eight thousand vehicles per division.

CM-IN-20286 (30 Jan 44)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
2. The Tenth Division referred to in the original Annex J is not shown in above calculations since shipping is only allotted for ninety days by which time only nine divisions can be landed.

3. It is considered that proposed allocation of ships can be handled satisfactorily.

4. Possibility of operation being successful against estimated capacity of enemy build-up as given in ANVIL appreciation is considerably reduced, particularly in Plan A. Plan A should not be launched in Rade D'Hyeres area if enemy build up remains as at present estimate. It is considered that Plan B would still have reasonable chance of getting firmly established, but chances of capturing Toulon or Marseilles early are materially reduced.

5. In view of the above wish to emphasize necessity of provision of scale of MT/Stores shipping as asked for in MAP 57, provided it can be made available from a source having lower operational priority than OVERLORD, and on the assumption that assault shipping and craft for a lift of at least 2 divisions are provided.

6. MT ships for preloading should be assembled ready for final loading in the North African theater not later than 1st April, 1944. Personnel shipping (exclusive of LSI and XAF) should arrive in this theater available for loading not later than 20th April.

* Corrupt groups.

T.O.O. 29172232
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION: CC/S

CM-IN-20286 (30 Jan 44) 1855Z med

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/44
To: AFHQ Freedom

From: British COS

BIGOT

COSMED 10

In our immediately following telegram we are forwarding an alternative programme proposed by Combined Military Transportation Committee as to the planning basis for the allocation of go go shipping for ANVIL on the basis of your plan already submitted. From a preliminary examination made here it looks as if the proposed allocation will result in a slower rate of build-up in consequence affecting your chances of success.

You will no doubt comment on this point in your reply, and also on your ability to handle this large number of vessels.

ORIGINATOR: CC/S (Cpt Royal USN)  DECLASSIFIED

INFORMATION: OPD

Adm King

Gen Arnold

Gen Strong

White House

Log

CM-OUT-9923 (25 Jan 44)  2030Z bjm

Date- DEC 7 1971

Signature- RAH

310 ANVIL

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94
TO: BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF
RPTD: J.S.M. WASHINGTON FOR U.S. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
FOR INFORMATION MAAP ADVANCE,
MIDWEST FOR AIR MARSHAL SLESSOR.
FROM: FREEDOM SIGNED WILSON
DATED: FEBRUARY 2, 1944.

MEDCOS 26

The final sentence of paragraph 6 of COSMED 15 still leaves us in the unsatisfactory position of being faced with an indefinite commitment which will look up 12 Spitfire Squadrons and 188 Spitfires for the Turks. This new development in no way alters the views expressed in MEDCOS 25. Furthermore, the withdrawal of Lindell's Mission postpones any prospect of Turkish intervention for an indefinite period, and raises the practical issue of planning referred to in paragraph 3 and paragraph 6 of my MEDCOS 8. It is quite clear that if any form of HARDIHOOD is to remain as a possibility it must be on a different basis to Plan 437. In particular it will not be practicable send in seven fighter squadrons within 48 hours of the Turks declaring war if troop carrier air-craft withdrawn to prepare for AVIL. In all the circumstances, even if ultimate intention to bring Turkey into war remains, suggest that date on which the end is to be achieved should be definitely postponed until Autumn.

T.O.O. 022005Z

FOOTNOTE: COSMED 15 is CM-IN-69 (1 Feb 44) COS. MEDCOS 25 is CM-IN-1490 (3 Feb 44) COS.

ACTION: CC/3


CM-IN-1946 (3 Feb 44) 1637Z

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By TR, NARA, Date 4/13/94

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN 24-3299420-35000
Following is text of signal COSMED 11:

1. Your HAP 574 has been studied by combined shipping authorities.

2. Great concern is felt over your requirement for such a large number of MT ships during the first 30 days of ANVIL. Combined shipping programs have been set up in accordance with the distribution of resources outlined at the SEXTANT conference, and an increase of over one hundred percent in the allowance made for the first month of ANVIL will cause serious derangement of shipping schedules.

3. The most critical requirement from the point of view of shipping is the provision of MT ships for preloading. Our investigations indicate that adjustments may be possible to meet a program on the following approximate order:
   - First 30 days—100 MT ships to be available in the Mediterranean for preloading. 105 additional ships to be available for loading during the remainder of the 30 day period.
   - Second 30 days—120 MT ships.
   - Third 30 days—53 MT ships.

4. This program assumes retainments for maintenance of forces in Italy on the same scale as determined at SEXTANT.

CM-04T-9915 (25 Jan 44)
Reductions in your maintenance requirements for internal Mediterranean movement could be applied to increase the above program.

5. We suggest that your plan be reviewed in the light of paragraphs 3 and 4 and that a report be made as to the implications of such a shipping allotment on the proposed operation.

6. In view of its possible effect on your cargo shipping estimates, the following preliminary information can be given with respect to port personnel. Sufficient personnel will be made available to permit the organization of the necessary number of port units. The desired number of trained port units will not be available for shipment from the U.S. for ANVIL. Details will be covered in separate communications.

7. The following information is furnished with regard to troop lift. The bulk of the MT ships provided will be of the U.S. Liberty type. Between 70 and 80 will be fitted to carry at least 500 troops on trans-Atlantic voyages. If a further review of your plans in the light of the above data shows that personnel shipping requirements for ANVIL can be reduced, the position of the OVERLORD buildup program will be strengthened.

8. We should be informed as soon as possible of the latest date personnel shipping should arrive in the Mediterranean. Also, latest date by which MT shipping required for preloading should be assembled in theater.

ORIGINATOR: CC/S (CAPT ROYAL USN)  Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
INFORMATION: DECLASSIFIED

SM 522-71

DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/44
NLR 101

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

COPY No. 21

11-16-4427-1
To: Air Ministry for Chiefs of Staff
Rptd: Britman Washington for U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff
From: A.P.H.Q.

Dated: 15th January 1944.

BIGOT
MOST SECRET
IMMEDIATE

29325 signed Wilson cite FGOT 151850.

I have been informally advised that the possibility of
increasing the OVERLORD assault at the expense of ANVIL has been
proposed. The reasons for this are clearly understood. In
order that an early decision in this regard may be reached, it is
believed expedient to inform you as to what is considered to be
the minimum requirements of this theatre in assault shipping and
craft under the proposal.

2. If an actual assault against Southern France is to be
undertaken, it must be undertaken by a force of no less than 2
divisions plus craft for this lift (which) were allotted to this
theatre by SEXTANT. Hence if the operation is to be undertaken
as indicated in outline plan ANVIL, a copy of which has been
furnished you, the SEXTANT allocation cannot be reduced.

3. If operation ANVIL is to (consist) of a threat which will
be launched against the coast of France only in the event reduced
German resistance warrants as indicated in NAF 492, a copy of
which has been furnished you, a minimum lift of one division is
required. In addition, if the Mediterranean Theatre is to
undertake operations against Southern France under cases A or
B-RANKIN as previously discussed with COSSAC a minimum lift of
one division is required. If assault shipping and craft are
to be available to assist the land battle in Italy by coast hopping
operations or by an attack against one flank reasonably close
to the land battle an assault lift of one division is required.

4. Experience on this theatre has shown that the average
amount of assault shipping and craft to be on stand to insure
sufficient serviceable craft to land one division ashore to
shore at assault scales with a high rate of discharge consists

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 6/21/44
of 46 LST, 50 LCT and 75 LCI(L). The serviceability factor and an allowance for losses have been considered in the total figures quoted. Hence these numbers are considered to be the (minimum?) that should be left in the Mediterranean Theatre under all circumstances. However weather conditions will probably not permit the excess LCT now in this theatre to reach the United Kingdom in time for OVERLORD. If this excess number of LCT remains in this theatre, viz 62, they can be used for vehicle lift, in which case the total number of LST required can possibly be reduced proportionately to 37.

5. It is requested that this information be transmitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

ACTION: CG/S (CAPT. ROYAL, USN)

INFORMATION: GEN. STRONG
GEN. ARNOLD
ADM. KING
WHITE HOUSE
LOG

CM-IN-10459 (16 Jan 44) 19192 ong
To: Joint Staff Mission
From: Chiefs of Staff
Dated: 12th January, 1944.

BICOT

IMPORTANT

C.G.S. (W) 1063

Following is text of Algiers telegram No. 26743 for information J.S.H. and U.S. C.O.S.

BEGIN. BICOT. Ref. FAN 283. (ALBUE - (997) 68) ANVIL outline plan transmitted to you by General Eisenhower in my opinion meets terms of SECTANT directive contained in FAN 283.

It has my approval as C-in-C Allied Forces, subject to such change in proposed place of landing and other points which may arise during the phase of detailed planning by Commander appointed to carry out operation. ENDS.

[signature]

T.O.O. 122110Z

DISTRIBUTION

U.S. C.O.S. (7)

DECLASSIFIED

SM522-71

Date: DEC 7 1971

Signature: R.H.P.
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

From: AFRIC in North Africa
To: AGWAR
Nr. W 9468/24767, NAF 579, 6 January 1944

Cite FBGOT signed Eisenhower from Freedom 061500
AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff USFOR for British Chiefs
of Staff and COSSAC, 15th Army Group 5th Army (for General
Clark only) Middle for CINC W9468/24767 FBGOT. This is my
NAF 579.

BIGOT. Planning Headquarters for ANYTL designated
as Force 163 opens Algiers 12th January. All correspondence
by courier or mail should be addressed to Headquarters Force
163 APO 512. Telegraph address is Fortune Algiers.

No Sig

ACTION: CC/s (Capt. Royal USNH)
INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Strong
Gen Somervell
White House
Gen Arnold
Adm King

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DECLASSIFIED
SM 522-71

Date - DEC 7 1971
Signature - RAH

310 Anvil
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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 14/10/94

24-533944BC
INDEX SHEET

* * * * * Operation ANVIL. Expected that Force planning will begin on or about January 10. Combined Chiefs of Staff have been requested to replace one US Infantry Division ex USA by an Airborne Division, for emergency build up by air of ANVIL bridgehead should this prove necessary.

* * * * *
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING MESSAGE
SECURITY CONTROL

Combined Chiefs of Staff
71469
January 5, 1944

CG NATO FREEDOM
CG ETO US FOR LONDON ENGLAND
For: Eisenhower Freedom Algiers FAN 316, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff

Appreciation and BIOGFT outline plan for ANVIL Sections 1, 2 and 3, in pouch Number 1358, received January 5, 1944.

ORIGINATOR: CC/S (Capt Royal USN)
INFORMATION: OPD
Adm: King,
Gen: Arnold
Gen: Strong

CM-OUT-1632 (5 Jan 44) 2110Z vd

DECLASSIFIED
JCS 29-71
Date- DEC 7 1971
Signature- RH"
INDEX SHEET

NAF 577

BIGOT. Commander in Chiefs met at Tunis today to consider
certain new factors connected with SHINGLE revealed by further plan-
ning since Christmas. * * * * * *

* * * * * * Maintaining forces landed will be dependent on weather
and craft then available. The withdrawal of forces landed should be
possible if personnel only are withdrawn and all equipment left behind.
This must inevitably lead to considerable losses in personnel and
probably some of the craft required for ANVIL.
It has been decided after careful review of all factors involved that the time, the provision of landing craft and service units to launch the operation, the movement of air forces to Corsica to support ANVIL and the requirements of the Main Battle in Italy preclude the possibility of launching HERCULES without running unwarranted risks of prejudicing the success of ANVIL. Accordingly it has been decided that operation HERCULES would be postponed indefinitely.
**WAR DEPARTMENT**
**CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER**
**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**URGENT**

**SECURITY CONTROL**

From: Algiers  
To: War  

Date: Dec 7, 1943

**Signature: RHF**

**Date and Number:** W-8790/20705

**To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff report for British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower Cite PROCT. BIGHT.**

Our outline plan for a two division assault in **ANVIL** has been based on figures of craft given in the following table, which will permit 7 ROTS with some tanks to be put ashore on D Day. Figures do not include:

A Small number of badly damaged craft which are unlikely to be of any further operational use;

B. Any of the LCT in the Levant, for even if they are not required for HERCULES they are of very low operational value and it would not be possible to bring them to Western Mediterranean. Read in 6 columns, (A) type, (B) nationality, (D) remaining in Mediterranean after operation, (E) craft have left, (D) to come from Ibida, (E) to come from US, (F) total:

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**Declassified Document**

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44

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2. We estimate serviceability as being LST 70, LCT 82, LOI (L) 110.

3. Both planes have been based on the following special shipping: 3 XAF, 9 LSI (L), 1 LSI (M), 1 LSI (H), 1 LSC, 1 LSG.

4. The outline plan for a three Division assault requires an additional 15 LST and 15 LCT, which will permit 9 RCTs with some tanks to be put ashore on D Day, as opposed to 7 in the 2 divisional assault. This will do much to obviate the acute maintenance difficulties which arise in a cramped bridgehead and will go far to insure its security.

5. This information is given with a view to enabling you to assess requirements. The outline plan has not yet been approved by General Wilson nor has it been coordinated with COSSAC staff. It is, therefore, not firm. I consider that firm recommendations cannot be submitted to you until General Wilson and I, in our new capacities, have been able to study our plans.

ACTION: CC/S (Capt. Royal USN)  
INFORMATION: OPD  
Gen Strong  
Adm King  
Gen Arnold  
LOG  
CM-IN-17889 (29 Dec 43) 16322 Jb  

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FRS 29-7  
Date: DEC 7 1971  
Signature: BAP  
COPY No.  
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24-55394828C0
INDEX SHEET

BIGOT. Weekly planning telegram number 16.

* * * * * * * At same conference it was decided that HERCULES would be postponed indefinitely as the mounting of this operation would detract from main battle in Italy and would be running grave risk of prejudicing success of ANVIL.

Construction work in Corsica to accommodate necessary air forces for ANVIL being given highest priority consistent with requirements for SHINGLE. All LST in Theater will be requested for SHINGLE. The withdrawal of LST for the Corsica build up will be compensated by an increased allotment once SHINGLE is over. * * * * * * *

W. D., A. C. O., Form No. 0422
May 1943

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
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CNO SAYS TO COMINCH SENDS FOR ACTION.

THIS IS HICOM. BIGOT ANVIL.

OPERATION ANVIL WHICH I WILL COMMAND WILL CONSIST OF 3 TASK FORCES 2 OF WHICH WILL BE COMMAND BY UNITED STATES NAVAL FLAG OFFICERS. REAR ADMIRAL DAVIDSON WILL COMMAND 1 FORCE. REQUEST 1 ACC IN ADDITION TO ACC-5 NOW BEING ASSIGNED FOR THIS COMMAND. COMINCH CNO 244105 REFERS.

LIGHT FLAGSHIP NOT CONSIDERED SUITABLE DUE TO LACK OF ACCOMMODATIONS AND INADEQUATE COMMUNICATION FACILITIES AND TO SEPARATE EMPLOYMENT IN COMBATANT SUPPORT DUTIES.

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

ACTION: F-30

SEALEd

Make original on 27/7/47.

27/11/47

310 AM

DECLASSIFIED
HICOM, URDIS 211498.

A. MYDIS 122126 OCTOBER REMAINS EFFECTIVE IN THAT NORTH AFRICA CONTINUES TO BE CONSIDERED A BACK AREA. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AFFECT ITS STATUS ONLY TO EXTENT REQUIRED BY ITS USE AS A TRAINING STAGING AND SUPPORT AREA FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS.

B. INDEFINITE RETENTION ALL SHIPS LISTED MYDIS 152166 OCTOBER AND 111934 NOVEMBER NOT AUTHORIZED AT THIS TIME. NO DEFINITE ANVIL PLAN IS AVAILABLE YET AND BALANCED DIVISION TOTAL RESOURCES BETWEEN ANVIL AND OVERLORD HAS NOT BEEN REACHED, SINCE LATTER HAS FIRST PRIORITY YOU MUST REMAIN PREPARED TO RELEASE UNITS PREVIOUSLY EARMARKED FOR TRANSFER.
**UNLESS SPECIFIC EXEMPTION FROM EXTANT DIRECTIVES IS MADE**

AS HAS ALREADY BEEN DONE FOR CERTAIN LANDING CRAFT. LAST 3 PC IN HYDIS 152196 OCTOBER BEING DIVERTED UK NOW.

**C. TRANSFER OF UNITS RECOMMENDED BY YOU TO FRENCH IS BEING PROCESSED ON CCS LEVEL ON BASIS THAT ALL REMAIN UNDER ALLIED OPERATIONAL CONTROL AND THAT REPLACEMENT BY OTHER US UNITS IS NOT REQUIRED. YOU WILL BE FURTHER ADVISED.**

**D. EARLIEST PRACTICABLE GIVE ME REASSESSMENT BY-TYPES YOUR REQUIREMENTS FOR START THROUGH JUNE.**

---

**DECLASSIFIED**

Date: DEC 7 1971

Signature: [Handwritten]

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**DECLASSIFIED**

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date: 4/2/94
INDEX SHEET

FAN 286

* * * * The following is quoted from the approved report of the Sextant Conference, CCS 426/1, paragraph 24:

"We have agreed to delay major amphibious operations in the Bay of Bengal until after the next Monsoon and divert the landing craft now assigned to Buccaneer to operation ANVIL and OVERLORD."
INCOMING MESSAGE
SECURITY CONTROL

FROM: A.F.H.Q. Algiers
TO: U.S.W.D. for O.PD
     War Office M.O.4.
     rptd Middle East
NO: W8256/17577 21 Dec:

MSS GECT:

Signed Eisenhower cite PHGCT.
Weekly planning telegram number 15.

Para 1. Draft appreciation for ANVIL has been discussed
fully by Joint Planning Staff and separation of outline plan
continues. It is hoped the plan will reach London in last few
days of this year for coordination with Cassac prior to despatch
Washington.

Para 2. Tentative schedules have been prepared for
withdrawal formations from Italian battle for refitting and
ambibios training prior to ANVIL assault. Appears that
first of these Divisions must be withdrawn by 6 February.
Build up schedule will maintain 15th Army Group at level of
15 Infantry Divs and up to 3 Arm Divs.

Para 3. Pending receipt of CCS directive broad
examination being made of possible courses of action by
Mediterranean forces under various RANKIN conditions.

Para 4. HERCULES. A owing largely to logistic difficulties
in connection with establishment of Air Forces, earliest date
for which Middle East can plan to mount HERCULES assault is
22 March. This date is subject to postponement by various
factors, including weather. It is necessary, however, that
draft for ANVIL should leave ALEX for Western Mediterranean not
later that one month before D Day of that operation. B on the
time factor alone, therefore, it is doubtful if we can stage
HERCULES unless OVERLORD ANVIL have to be postponed for some
reason. We cannot afford to take risks as regards our ability to
launch ANVIL on date required in conjunction with OVERLORD.
6 planning is however proceeding for HERCULES and initial steps,

SECURITY CONTROL

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/94
such as movement of British Fourth Division to Middle East, have been taken in the hopes that a combination of circumstances may arise which will enable us to stage the operation.

Para 5. **SHINGLE**. Fifteenth Army Group advises there is no possibility of mounting SHINGLE by 15 January. Possible modified amphibious operation after that date is being examined.

End run in Italy.

**ACTION:** OPD

**INFORMATION:** CC/3 (CAPT. ROYAL, USN) Log

CM-IN-14459 (23 Dec 43) 1240Z eng

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DECLASSIFIED
JCS LETTER, 7-3-72
BY DATE JAN 29 1974

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/94
Executive Office, Operations Div  
December 19, 1943  

CINC ALLIED FORCES  
FREEDOM ALGIERS  
Number 5287  
From Marshall to Eisenhower reference NAP 550  
Your request that 7th Army Headquarters remain in  
Mediterranean theater for ANVIL approved. We assume  
that you still desire additional Army Corps Headquarters  
previously authorized. Please confirm  

ORIGINATOR: OPD  
INFORMATION: C/3-Capt Royal USN  
Adm Leahy  
Adm King  
Gen Arnold  
Log  

CM-OUT-7503 (19 Dec 43) 2136Z es  

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN  

DECLASSIFIED  
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/8/94
EXCERPT FROM WAR DEPARTMENT OUTGOING MESSAGE OF DECEMBER 18, 1943, (CM-OUT-7578, FILED "310 OVERLORD").

FIN 210

********The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed:

A. That for shipping and other reasons

B. That as a general policy:

1. A French Force should participate in ANVIL and only a Token Force in OVERLORD.

2. It will probably be best to undertake the ANVIL operation with U.S. Forces with French participation, and to continue the campaign in Italy with British Forces.
From: Algiers
To: War
No. W7875/15390, NAF 552, 17 December 1943

This is my NAF 552 to AGWAR for Combined
Chief's of Staff repeated USFOR for British Chief's
of Staff, signed Eisenhower, cite PHQOT.

BIGOT.

1. Outline plan operation ANVIL nearing com-
pletion. It will be coordinated with C OSSAC and then
forwarded to you. Planning is based on eventual build
up of 10 Divisions, including 8 Infantry and 2 Armo red.
Appreciations on which plan is based point definitely
to a compelling need for a heavier assault force. The
necessity for an initial broad and deep beachhead to
accept at least 2 additional Divisions with necessary
scale of supporting troops in a rapid follow up, and
the great advantage to accrue by firmly establishing
strong forces ashore rapidly to cover our later re-
latively slow build up, before the Germans can react
in strength make it imperative that ANVIL Assault be
launched by a force of 3 Divisions if craft can be
made available from any source having a priority on
resources lower than ANVIL. Accordingly it is urgently
requested that craft for a 3 Division assault be made
available for ANVIL if it is at all possible to do so.
Early reply is requested since detailed planning should
be initiated by 1 January.
SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

From: Algiers
To: War
No. W7875/15390, NAF 552, 17 December 1943

2. Preliminary study indicates that some shipping in addition to that allocated at Cairo will be reduced. This is being examined in detail and a later message will be sent on this subject.

3. The movement of Air Forces into Corsica to support ANVIL and the staging of at least 1 Division in Corsica to afford more rapid build up will make a heavy call on landing craft now in Mediterranean, observing that major overhauls for all must be fitted in before ANVIL. Subject to detailed examination it should however, prove possible to augment the craft Ex Buceaneer sufficiently to make up an assault of 1 Division for HERCULES.

4. The status of the 4th British Division makes it impossible for that Division to be ready before 22 March. The 4th British Division is now under orders for movement to the DELTA for employment in HERCULES should final decision be to mount that operation. 1 Brigade group and the Gibraltar Brigade Gp are scheduled for arrival about 22 December, the remainder of the Division about 30 December, however, 2 truck companies, about 600 men, may not arrive Mideast until about 7 January.

5. A separate message covering our requirements for additional administrative units will be sent in the near future.

No Sig.

ACTION: CO/S (Captain Royal USN)
INFORMATION: OPD
General Strong
General Arnold
Admiral King
Log

CH-IN-11026 (17 Dec 43) 2248Z med

DECLASSIFIED
J.O.S. Regrading Memo 29-71
By S/R Dated JAN 30 1974

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Algiers  
To: War  
No. W-7757  16 December 1943

This is [map 550]. Added AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff rptd USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff. Signed Eisenhower. Cite PHQCT. BICOT ANYVI.

Instead of a threat as formerly envisaged which would land only in the event of little opposition, ANVIL has become an operation of major proportion. Hence an experienced Army headquarters is necessary to plan and conduct the operation. The French high command have no such headquarters owing to the lack of qualified personnel. The operation will probably include a corps or 3 American Divisions, 2 of which will probably be employed in the assault. Detailed planning must be initiated by 1st January. Headquarters 7th Army is only qualified headquarters available. For these reasons urgently request that 7th Army Headquarters remain in this theater.

ACTION: CCS (CAPT ROYAL USN)  
No Sig

INFORMATION: QPD  
GEN STRONG  
GEN ARNOLD  
ADM KNOX  
LOG

CM-IN-10197 (16 Dec 43) 1740Z mos

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94
** * * * Weekly planning telegram number 14.

Draft of ANVIL outline plan nearing completion. JPS will consider it next few days.

Feasibility of HERCULES under urgent examination. Question hinges largely on timing date i.e. earliest Middle East can launch assault via a vs latest date by which craft can be employed and still return in time for ANVIL.
INDEX SHEET

* * * * * * Weekly Planning telegram number 13.
* * * * * Operation ANVIL is under discussion with planners
at Cairo. Operation cannot be mounted simultaneously with SHINGLE.
In assessing your resources you should assume that your forces have reached the Pisa-Rimini line and that as strong pressure as possible is maintained, consistent with the forces required for ANVIL; also that Mediterranean forces will not be engaged in offensive operations elsewhere.
A study of an operation against Southern France indicates that such an operation is, from the standpoint of availability of troops, shipping, landing craft, naval and air support, feasible without interference with OVERLORD under the assumption that no operations are undertaken in the Eastern Mediterranean which would draw any forces from Italy or from the North African Theater.

The operation would consist of a two division assault in the Toulon-Marseilles area with a follow-up to a total of ten divisions. It would be designed to advance up the Rhone Valley to Lyon and effect a junction with cross-Channel forces.

A date from three weeks to not more than a month prior to an OVERLORD is believed to be essential. Otherwise the Germans would be able to concentrate against the Southern France attack, defeat it and then turn and concentrate against OVERLORD with a target date for OVERLORD from May 1 to 15 the target for Southern France would fall between April 1 and April 24.

Attached hereto are an outline of the operations, notes on the availability and adequacy of ground forces including service forces, shipping, assault shipping and naval craft, and air forces.
DRAFT

OPERATIONS AGAINST SOUTHERN FRANCE

A plan has previously been drawn for operations against Southern France to support OVERLORD. The assumptions upon which it is based differ from those now proposed as follows:

(1) That we would be established in the Po Valley early in 1944 instead of stopping north of Rome, and (2) that the target date was to be 1 May 1944 instead of 15 March as now planned.

This plan has been used as a basis for examination of the feasibility of an operation against Southern France on the 15th of March. An outline of the plan follows:

Scope

An amphibious operation, ship to shore, against the Marseilles-Toulon coast, supported by air force operations from Italy, Sardinia and Corsica, initial fighter support to be carrier based.

Phases

Phase 1. Air forces from bases in Northern Italy, Corsica and Sardinia to neutralize enemy air in Southern France and interdict communications north and west of the lower Rhone Valley.

Phase 2. Amphibious assault with two reinforced amphibious divisions utilizing airborne units to limit of available lift to seize the airstromes east of Toulon and the beach of Hyeres.

Phase 3. Seize Toulon and utilize the port to bring in an additional two infantry divisions, service elements and supplies. Seize Cannes and Nice. Close the Italian-French frontier.


Phase 5. Advance on Lyon. Consolidate the Rhone Valley and effect a junction with cross-Channel forces in preparation for the invasion of Germany.
Troop Requirements

**Ground Forces.** Ten divisions including 2 amphibious, 4 infantry, 2 airborne, 2 armored. It is intended French forces will participate fully in the operation.

**Air Forces.** Heavy bomber support from Strategic Air Force. Six medium bomber groups, 5 light bomber groups, 2 reconnaissance groups, 12 fighter groups single-engine, 1 fighter group twin-engine, 6 service groups.

**Logistics**

Mediterranean ports from Sete on the west to Toulon on the east will be used. Maximum use to be made of the Rhone. Port import capacity is a controlling factor. Port capacities of Southern France are as follows, shown as initial and final:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Port</th>
<th>Initial</th>
<th>Final</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sete</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>5,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port du Buc</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>2,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marseilles</td>
<td>14,400</td>
<td>51,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toulon</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>4,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Germans will have the same railway, naval and highway facilities as the United Nations employ in the reverse direction. Less destruction of communications can be expected along the lines available to the enemy than to those of the United Nations. The system will support up to 3,400,000 troops.

**Ground Forces**

**Divisions in Mediterranean**

**Available 1 November 1943**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>British</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>French Native</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19 (2 Polish)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5 (1 FF)</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[declassified]
Garrison Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>British</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>French</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sicily and Southern Italy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sardinia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corsica</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa, Palestine, Syria, and Cyprus</td>
<td>2 (Note 1)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy (Note 2)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note 1) Garrison commitment in North Africa to be filled by French Divisions in training.

(Note 2) Eisenhower states that 370,000 Italian troops are now cooperating with Allied Forces. Status is unknown. Some of these might be used to reduce garrison requirements particularly on Italian mainland.

Balance Operationally Available 1 November 1943

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>British</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>French</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

British divisions do not include some 14 Independent Brigades, equivalent to 4 2/3 Divisions, but which have no supporting troops. These Brigades will assist in garrison commitments.

Additions

After 1 November 1943, six further French Divisions will become available (if total of 11 are equipped and organized) by June 1944. Considering garrison requirements in North Africa not more than 2 additional French Divisions can be considered available for operations.

There are 2 U.S. Divisions now moving to North Africa. They will close in January 1944, and may be considered operationally available by 15 March to 1 April.
With above additions there should be a maximum of 24
Allied Divisions available.

Types of Divisions
The plan calls for -
2 Amphibian Divisions (Infantry)
4 Infantry Divisions
2 Armored Divisions
2 Airborne Divisions

All the above are available except the Airborne Divisions.
Eisenhower will have in the Mediterranean:
1 Brigade of the British Airborne Division
The Special Service Force,
or the equivalent of 2/3 of an Airborne Division.
If more Airborne troops are needed, consideration
should be given to movement of these troops direct
from U. K. where 4 Divisions (2 British and 2 U. S.
will be available.

Conclusions: The required Divisions of proper types can
be made available for the operation.

Service Troops

Though sufficient service troops should be available in
the Mediterranean theater, both in type and number, there will
be some shortages in port operating personnel which will be
needed to maintain current operations in Italy and to operate
the bases in North Africa both for the Italian operations and
for those in the south of France. It is estimated that this
deficiency can be supplied by furnishing not to exceed an
additional 25,000 service troops.
Conclusions: The required ground troops, divisions and service troops of proper type can be made available for the operation.

Shipping

With the exception of the 25,000 service troops to which reference has been made, the troops required for the operation will be available in North Africa. Hence, the only shipping required will be that necessary for the assault and for the movement of the follow-up units from North Africa and Italy. Owing to the short voyage, this movement can be made in fast cargo ships. The additional service troops can only be supplied from the United States and at a cost to BOLERO of delaying the arrival of that number of troops by about ten days. This should not be serious. It is quite probable that this movement can be effected in the same manner as the movement of the two new divisions to North Africa and thus avoid reducing the BOLERO movement.

Ports and Lines of Communication in France

Adequate railway, road and inland waterway facilities exist in France to move any number of troops which can be landed and maintained over the beaches and through the ports. The limitation will lie in the capacity of the ports to receive and clear cargo. As this movement should be in the nature of a surprise, it may be safely assumed that the ports will not have been destroyed to anything like the extent that those in Italy were destroyed. It is safe to assume that by D plus 30 it will be possible to land 300,000 and to maintain this number as well as the required build-up during the following month.

Supply

Sufficient supplies can be made available to support the operation.
Air Forces

Adequate combat aircraft for the support of this operation will exist in the theater as of 1 April.

A deficiency of transport aircraft, however, will exist inasmuch as only 3 troop carrier groups or 156 airplanes will be available with the requirement to give lift to two airborne divisions.

Requirements for this operation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>RAF Squadrons</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heavy bombardment support from Strategic Air Force.</td>
<td>6 groups</td>
<td>787</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium bombardment</td>
<td>5 groups</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light bombardment</td>
<td>3 groups</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
<td>2 groups</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter, single engine</td>
<td>12 groups</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter, twin engine</td>
<td>1 group</td>
<td>156</td>
<td></td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the theater as of 1 April there will be:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>USAAF Groups</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>RAF Squadrons</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2,293</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1,269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy bombardment</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium bombardment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light bombardment</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>156</td>
<td></td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grand Total: 3,552

Data are not available to support a statement that continual cover to the assault vessels can be maintained. However, it is believed that fighter aircraft with wing tanks will be able to furnish this protection because the distance from Corsica to Marseilles is shorter than that from Sicily to Salerno and adequate cover was maintained over Salerno.
Conclusion: Adequate air support can be furnished for the operation while making proper provision for support of the forces operating in Italy. Additional transport aircraft will have to be furnished if it is desired to drop an entire airborne division simultaneously.

Assault Shipping and Naval Craft

It is estimated there can be made available enough landing craft to move two assault divisions by short haul from Corsica and Sardinia to Southern France under favorable weather conditions without interference with planned transfer to OVERLORD. Present plans contemplate there will be available in the Mediterranean:

32 LST
103 LCI
231 LCT

These numbers can probably be somewhat augmented at the expense of landing craft assigned to training activities.

In addition to the above types, it will probably be necessary to make some adjustment between the Southern France operation and OVERLORD in the matter of APA's and AKA's.

No adequate estimate can be made at this time as to naval combat craft, but if the Southern France operation precedes OVERLORD by three weeks it is believed that the necessary naval support can be made available.
RHODES OPERATION

No detailed study of the operation against Rhodes was made inasmuch as it would be on a smaller scale than the operation against Southern France. Obviously if the operation against Southern France can be undertaken, that against Rhodes could also be mounted. However, the requirements for Rhodes are such that both of these operations could not be carried out.

It should be noted that the requirements for the operation against Southern France will require all of the landing craft available in the Mediterranean. Though either operation would entail the loss of all landing craft to Italian operations for a time, it is of importance to remember that the operations in Northern Italy, Southern France and OVERLORD are mutually supporting and attacks at any one place will withdraw German pressure on the others. In the case of Rhodes, however, the landing craft will be absent from Italy for a longer period, and as the operation is eccentric and widely separated from the other points of attack it can lend them no support.
1. LIMITATIONS:

Amphibious craft available will limit assault force to one division. Buildup will be slow until port is taken.

2. STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS:

It is believed unsound to decide now that southern France will be best area in which to create diversion. Southern France, Italy and Balkans should be considered as a single belt through which German forces may be moved from one area to another.

By OVERLORD target date, German forces in Italy may hold strong Pisa-Rimini Line. In this case an amphibious turning movement combined with frontal assault on this position might be of greater help to OVERLORD than an isolated operation against southern France.

Or, if by spring Germans have withdrawn to line of the Alps, operation eastward into Balkans, drawing forces away from France, may give greater help to OVERLORD.

Timing will require careful examination, since threat to southern France may draw additional forces into France rather than divert German strength confronting OVERLORD.

Therefore it is recommended that assault on southern France be regarded as but one of the various opportunities. However, holding French forces ready for operation will in itself constitute threat.

Should the coming months indicate an amphibious assault against southern France to be the best use of Mediterranean forces, considerations and recommendations for such an operation are presented below:

3. OPERATIONS AGAINST SOUTHERN FRANCE:

The form this operation takes will be influenced by our progress in Italy where one of two conditions will exist:

(a) Either the German forces will be established on or south of the line Pisa-Rimini, in which case any operation against southern France must necessarily be entirely amphibious in character;

(b) Or, we shall be in possession of the north Italian plains, in which case the operation is likely to consist of an amphibious assault combined with land advance along coastal strip.
4. TIMING:

Any landing in southern France must be subsequent to the landing in the north. This follows from the fact that Patriot elements in France are expected to rise immediately any force is landed and an uprising prior to the main north coast landings would be premature and possibly abortive.

In view of small size of landing force, the Mediterranean diversion can be expected under condition (a) above to render greater assistance to OVERLORD if held temporarily as a threat rather than treated as a D day landing (D day for OVERLORD). The force should be landed however as soon as situation permits.

Port must be seized as soon as possible. Considering all factors, it is recommended Toulon be seized before Marseilles.

Under condition (b) it is believed more German forces can be contained from this position by actually mounting the attack than by threat. This would be combination land advance and amphibious assault. Three divisions could move overland, with one division in amphibious force. Under this plan buildup will be more rapid.

5. CONSIDERATIONS COMMON TO PLANS "A" AND "B":

Objectives: seize Toulon-Marseilles area to permit buildup of forces. Thereafter exploit northwards.

Air. Between now and D-day employment of our air forces will be determined by requirements of combined bomber offensive and of Mediterranean Theatre. A very considerable weight of effort by our air forces will support southern France landings. Fighters will be based on Corsica.

Naval. No problem in providing necessary naval covering forces except possibly carriers.

Army. It is desirable that nucleus of forces be US or British. However since it may not be feasible to release them from Italian front, certain French Units are receiving amphibious training. Bulk of buildup forces will be French.

Command. During phase when troops are establishing themselves ashore land forces should remain under command North African Theatre. Thereafter command will pass to SAC OVERLORD. Air command should receive further study.

Civil Affairs. Plans for civil affairs administration of all French territory whether occupied from northwest or south must be closely coordinated and should issue from London.
NAF 492, 10-29-43, is printed in Papers of Dwight D.
Eisenhower, War Years, III, 1536-1544.