

MR 310 "TORCH" (1). Sec. 1 - Army and Navy Planning messages.

(10 Aug 42 -- 8 Nov 42)

Map Room

Box 105

Folder 3

Date November 8, 1942

Time 8 AM Nov 7, 1942

From Algiers

To Handy

Number 781 Dated November 7, 1942

W.P.L.

For Leahy. Pierre Etienne Flandin recently arrived in Algeria called on me secretly this afternoon to say that he would be ready to participate in a French empire government in North Africa in combination with Herriot. To illustrate the comparative calm of the situation here Flandin who is well informed has not an inkling of Torch. He is convinced that the Germans may undertake an effort in the latter part of November and urges that if we have the means we arrive here first. He cited numerous German sources such as Abetz in justification. He is convinced that North Africa represents our only immediate possibility of arrival in Europe.

Cole

American Consul

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

November 8, 1942
EXECUTIVE
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WDGS

TO USFOR LONDON
No. R-2938

1. Brig. Gen. Deane.....✓
2. Comdr. McDowell.....
3. Lt. Col. Hammond.....✓

We have just received your review No. 2. This is for Commandeth from combined Chiefs of Staff. (FAN 17) regardless of the outcome of your negotiations with Kingpin, which may have already been completed, we wish you to know that the stand you have taken meets with our complete approval. Our only regret is that you have been forced to devote so much of your time to this purpose during a period when the weight of the responsibility for the conduct of the operation itself is so heavy.

ORIGINATOR: OPD
INFO. COPIES: SGS, ADM. KING, GEN DEANE (CC OF S),
LOG

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By Authority of JCS
Declassification Br.
By RA/DB Date AUG 21 1972

CM-OUT-2657 (11-8-42) 1916Z fjc

Adm. Leahy

COPY No.

13

12

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 8, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:
GENERAL MARSHALL:
ADMIRAL KING:

1. The Secretariat has been informed by the Chief U.S. Cable and Radio Censor (Captain H.K. Fenn, U.S.N.) that cable and radio traffic between this country and Vichy, Sweden, and Finland has been severed. The Censor added that exceptions would be made in the case of State Department and press traffic if the text of the despatches made such an exception appear desirable. He expected that, in the case of Sweden and Finland, the severance would be only temporary.

2. The Censor stated that the above action was taken with the approval of the State Department.

Dean
DEANE

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Declassification Br.
By RAH/DB Date AUG 21 1972



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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94


CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
Received at
WAR DEPARTMENT CODE CENTER

WHL

Date: November 8, 1942
Filed: 10:00 A. M., Nov. 7.

From: Algiers

To : Handy

No. : 778, November 7, 1942

Delivery of Presidential messages should be made at approximately
one am GMT November 8, that is two am Tunis time November 8
repeated to Leahy.

Cole

AMERICAN CONSUL


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~~SECRET~~

COPY

WAL

November 7, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER, U. S. NAVY:

Request that the following secret message be transmitted to Colonel Eddy in Tangier:

"Lucien Smadja of Tunis will identify himself to you by the name of Gaston repeat Gaston. This message relayed from Murphy. He has delivered one million francs to Doolittle in Tunis repeat one million francs. Request you open a credit for him in dollars at one two five francs per dollar repeat one two five, in other words, eight thousand dollars repeat eight thousand. He will have a colorless letter addressed to Secretary Schott. His purpose of being in Tangier is to purchase fishing nets for a textile committee in Tunis."

THOS. T. HANDY,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
by Authority Order
Sec. Army by TAG
per 720984

J. E. HULL,
Brig. General, G.S.C.,
Chief European Section
Theater Group, OPD, GS

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

November 7, 1942.

American Consul,
Algiers, Algeria.

This Message for Handy

SIG OYB-1

M-43

From Handy.

We have received your 777 and 779 both November 7 concerning changes you want Mayer to make in Presidential messages to Sultan and Resident General. Both messages were addressed to Mayer. We presume no repeat no mistake in address has been made and that messages were sent here in order that we effect necessary changes in basic communications. When delivery of five messages is completed report that fact in each case.

J. E. HULL,
Brig. General, G.S.C.,
Chief European Section
Theater Group, OFD, GS

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of Order Sec.

Army by TAG per 220984
By RAB, Date SEP 1 1972

~~SECRET~~

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

AXWAR 12
Filed 7/1524
RET

~~SECRET~~
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

CCWD
November 7
1648

INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: London
To: Agwar

No 4632 November 7th, 1942

Initially reviews (summaries) numbered consecutively "private Eisenhower to Marshall review number blank" will be sent daily. From Eisenhower to Marshall signed Smith. Reference number R dash two eight six nine. They will include appreciation enemys and own situation and our future intentions. You should furnish copies to President and combined Chiefs of Staff. Copies being furnished ~~Prime~~ Minister and British Chiefs of Staff.

Situation reports numbered consecutively "SITREP number blank" will be sent daily. They will give main outline of previous days events and will not refer to future intentions or to intelligence subjects.

No Sig

Note: R-2869 is CM-OUT-1986 (11-6-42) OPD.

Action Copy: OPD

Info. Copies: SGS

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CM-IN-2948 (11-7-42) 1827Z 0:38

~~SECRET~~

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT—OFFICIAL BUSINESS

SECURITY

WAG
OK

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Office of origin Fiscal Division, Fund Allocation and Date November 7, 1942.
(Division, branch, section, and symbol)

Control Section SPEFH Telephone 5386 EMF
(Originating office)

Classification ~~SECRET~~ Precedence URGENT
(Restricted—Confidential—Secret) (Delayed—Routine—Priority—Urgent)

To: COMMANDING GENERAL, EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (USFOR)

THE FOLLOWING RADIO FROM MURPHY AND THE DEPARTMENT'S REPLY THERETO IS FURNISHED FOR YOUR INFORMATION COLON QUOTE FRENCH ARE PRESSING ME TO INITIAL SOME FORM OF PROVISIONAL FINANCIAL ACCORD ESTABLISHING AT LEAST A TEMPORARY FRANC EQUIVALENT FOR DOLLAR STOP THEY URGE THAT POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL REASONS REQUIRE THAT WE RECOGNIZE THE OFFICIAL FRANC RATE AS ESTABLISHED BY THE TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT ROUNDED OUT TO A RATE OF FIFTY FRANCS PER DOLLAR OR TWO HUNDRED PER POUND STOP GENERAL CARTER HAS INDICATED THAT A DIFFERENT RATE WILL APPLY STOP I THINK THAT I SHOULD HAVE SOME DEFINITE INSTRUCTIONS IN THIS REGARD BECAUSE THE QUESTION WILL ARISE IMMEDIATELY AFTER TORCH UNQUOTE PAREN THE WAR DEPARTMENT'S REPLY FOLLOWS PAREN THE DECISION TO FIX RATE SEVENTY FIVE FRANCS TO THE DOLLAR DASH THREE HUNDRED TO THE POUND DASH AND FOUR DOLLARS TO POUND WAS AGREED UPON BY STATE COMMA WAR AND TREASURY DEPARTMENTS AFTER CONFERENCES WITH SIR FREDERICK PHILLIPS HERE AND WITH BRITISH AUTHORITIES LONDON STOP PAREN IN REPLYING CITE OUR SPEFH COMMA REFERENCE YOUR RADIO NO. SEVEN SIX SEVEN NOVEMBER FIVE PAREN SEVENTY FIVE TO DOLLAR APPEARS FAIR TO INHABITANTS AT THIS TIME STOP IT IS MUCH MORE FAVORABLE THAN RECENT OPEN MARKET RATE STOP

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(See Next Page)

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W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 1007
September 2, 1942

~~SECRET~~

16-52272-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT—OFFICIAL BUSINESS

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Office of origin Fiscal Division, Fund Allocation and Date November 7, 1942
(Division, branch, section, and symbol)
Control Section SPFM Telephone 5386 EMF
(Regulating office)
 Classification ~~SECRET~~ Precedence URGENT
(Deferred—Routine—Priority—Urgent)

To: COMMANDING GENERAL, EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (USFOR)

EXCHANGE OF RADIOS WITH EISENHOWER FOLLOWED EACH STEP IN NEGOTIATIONS STOP
 FINAL AGREEMENT AS TO RATES EXPRESSED IN FISCAL PROCLAMATION FINALLY PRE-
 PARED AND PRINTED IN LONDON AND NOW IN POSSESSION OF TASK FORCES STOP PROC-
 LAMATION WAS APPROVED HERE STOP PLAN CONTEMPLATES USE OF DOLLAR AND BMA
 NOTES EXCLUSIVELY ONLY AND UNTIL AN AGREEMENT WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND
 BANKING INSTITUTIONS IS REACHED FOR EXCLUSIVE USE LOCAL CURRENCY AS SOON
 AS FEASIBLE STOP RATE ESTABLISHED FOR INITIAL PHASE BY THE PROCLAMATION
 MAY BE CHANGED AS SOON AS APPROPRIATE AFTER LOCAL REPEAT LOCAL AUTHORITIES
 SATISFACTORY TO COMMANDER CAN ENTER INTO DEFINITE AGREEMENT WITH RESPECT
 TO CURRENCY TO BE SUPPLIED AGAINST DOLLAR CREDITS HERE STOP RATE TO BE
 ESTABLISHED BY AGREEMENT WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES MAY BE HIGHER OR LOWER
 THAN SEVENTY FIVE FRANCS TO DOLLAR DEPENDING UPON LOCAL CONDITIONS AND
 EXTERNAL CONSIDERATIONS AT THE TIME AGREEMENT IS NEGOTIATED

MARSHALL

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Operations Division, War Plans Section
 Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, SOS
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
 Chief of Finance

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 NLR 101
 By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

SECURITY

WAR DEPARTMENT—OFFICIAL BUSINESS

of with

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Office of origin: Fiscal Division, Fund Allocation and Date November 7, 1942
(Division, branch, section, and symbol)

Control Section SPBFN Telephone 5386 EMF
(Originating office)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~ Precedence URGENT
(Unclassified—Confidential—Secret) (Deferred—Routine—Priority—Urgent)

To: *Murphy*

THE DECISION TO FIX RATE SEVENTY FIVE FRANCS TO THE DOLLAR DASH THREE HUNDRED TO THE POUND DASH AND FOUR DOLLARS TO POUND WAS AGREED UPON BY STATE COMMA WAR AND TREASURY DEPARTMENTS AFTER CONFERENCES WITH SIR FREDERICK PHILLIPS HERE AND WITH BRITISH AUTHORITIES LONDON STOP SEVENTY FIVE TO DOLLAR APPEARS FAIR TO INHABITANTS AT THIS TIME STOP IT IS MUCH MORE FAVORABLE THAN RECENT OPEN MARKET RATE STOP EX-CHANGE OF RADIOS WITH EISENHOWER FOLLOWED EACH STEP IN NEGOTIATIONS STOP FINAL AGREEMENT AS TO RATES EXPRESSED IN FISCAL PROCLAMATION FINALLY PREPARED AND PRINTED IN LONDON AND NOW IN POSSESSION OF TASK FORCES STOP PROCLAMATION WAS APPROVED HERE STOP PLAN CONTEMPLATES USE OF DOLLAR AND BMA NOTES EXCLUSIVELY ONLY AND UNTIL AN AGREEMENT WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND BANKING INSTITUTIONS IS REACHED FOR EKLU-SIVE USE LOCAL CURRENCY AS SOON AS FEASIBLE STOP RATE ESTABLISHED FOR INITIAL PHASE BY THE PROCLAMATION MAY BE CHANGED AS SOON AS APPROPRIATE AFTER LOCAL REPEAT LOCAL AUTHORITIES SATISFACTORY TO COMMANDER CAN ENTER

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 NLR 101
 By RT, NARA, Date *4/13/94*

WAR DEPARTMENT—OFFICIAL BUSINESS

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Office of origin Fiscal Division, Fund Allocation and Date November 7, 1942
(Division, branch, section, and symbol)
 Control Section SPBFM Telephone 5386 EMF
(Originating office)
 Classification ~~SECRET~~ Precedence URGENT
(Restricted—Confidential—Secret) (Deferred—Routine—Priority—Urgent)

To:

INTO DEFINITE AGREEMENT WITH RESPECT TO CURRENCY TO BE SUPPLIED
 AGAINST DOLLAR CREDITS HERE STOP PAREN IN REPLYING CITE OUR
 SPBFM COMMA REFERENCE YOUR RADIO NO. SEVEN SIX SEVEN NOVEMBER
 FIVE PAREN RATE TO BE ESTABLISHED BY AGREEMENT WITH LOCAL AU-
 THORITIES MAY BE HIGHER OR LOWER THAN SEVENTY FIVE FRANCS TO DOL-
 LAR DEPENDING UPON LOCAL CONDITIONS AND EXTERNAL CONSIDERATIONS
 AT THE TIME AGREEMENT IS NEGOTIATED

MARSHALL

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 By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

Operations Division, WDCS
Limited Distribution
OUTGOING MESSAGE

NOVEMBER 7, 1942

TO: USFOR
LONDON

R-2927

This is a continuation of paraphrase of Hayes message to Secretary of State. (Signed Marshall) Foreign Minister was informed by me that if Spain allowed itself to be used by Axis then the complete responsibility of having attacked us would have to be borne by Spain as the Government of Spain had already been given our solemn promise not to violate Sovereignty of Spain. Also that Spanish government had not received a similar Axis assurance so far as I knew. A special plea was made by General Jordana for us to stay out of Oran and French Morocco regardless of what we believed. He said it would not be possible for Spain to stay out of the war if our troops entered that territory. If we did remain out of French Morocco and Oran he added Spain could stay neutral as it desires so ardently.

This conversation was intended to be a threat, in my opinion, that Spain will join Axis in war if we enter Oran or French Morocco. General Jordana spent the whole day Tuesday with Franco after my earlier talks with him when he had expressed his appreciation for the assurance given him by me on behalf of my Government. Franco's attitude in my opinion is reflected in Jordana's statement today. In view of the risk to Spain presented by United Nations Military activities in Northwest Africa and in my opinion Franco is trying by means of this implied threat to dissuade us from entering Northwest Africa. As to the implied threat in Jordana's statement I do not believe that he is necessarily prepared to carry it out. Nevertheless it is my opinion that we must reckon with the possibility in view of present circumstances that Spain may oppose by force any attempt by us to invade Oran or French Morocco. It was stated to me by the Foreign Minister that he had spoken yesterday morning to the British Ambassador similarly. I have not been informed by Sir Samuel Hoare of any conversation with the Foreign Minister so I have therefore not had an opportunity to discuss with the British Ambassador this latest development.

MARSHALL

Adm. Leahy

Originator: OFD

Info. Copies: GEN STRONG ADM LEAHY LOG

CM-OUT-2610 (11/8/42) ~~SECRET~~ 2327

9
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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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OUTGOING MESSAGE

Operations Division WDGS
European Section WDOED

Limited Distribution

NOVEMBER 7, 1942

TO: USFOR
LONDON

7 R-2928

Communication from Murphy in Algiers is paraphrased for your information. From Marshall to Eisenhower. Pierre Stienne Flandin arrived recently in Algeria. This afternoon he called on me secretly and said that in combination with Herriot he would be ready to participate in a French Empire Government in North Africa. Flandin is well informed but has no inkling of Torch. This illustrates the comparative calm of the situation here. Flandin is convinced that in the latter part of November the Germans may undertake an effort and urges that we arrive here 1st if we have the means. Numerous German sources such as Abetz were cited in justification. He is convinced that our only immediate possibility of arrival in Europe is represented by North Africa.

MARSHALL

Originator: OPD
Info. Copies: GEN STRONG
ADM LEAHY
LOG

2m. baby

CM-OUT-2609 (11/8/42) 06012 NOV

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
Received at
WAR DEPARTMENT CODE CENTER

Date: November 7, 1942
Filed: 7th/1730

WAL

From: ALGER

To: HANDY

No : 780, November 7, 1942

Please repeat following to Colonel Eddy Tangier Lucien Smadja
of Tunis who will identify himself to you as Gaston Repeat Gaston
Has delivered to Doolittle in Tunis one million francs repeat one million
francs and you are requested to open a credit for him in dollars
at one two five francs per dollar repeat one two five, that is dollars
eight thousand repeat eight thousand. He has a colorless letter
to Secretary Schott and will be in Tangier to purchase fishing nets
for Tunisian Textile Committee.

Cole
American Consul

██████████

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

AXWAR 27
filed 2016Z/7
fb

CCWD
Nov. 7, 1942
2031 Z

U R G E N T

WR

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of JCS
Declassification Ex.
By RACG Date AUG 21 1972

From: London

To: AGWAR

No. NAF 34 November 7, 1942

Communique number one and broadcasts.
Reference our four four four eight and our NAF
three three. From Eisenhower to Marshall signed
Smith. Should be released at zero one zero zero
Z GMT signed Smith eight November.

No Sig

Note: 4448 was CM-IN-1092 (11-3-42)OPD.
NAF 33 was CM-IN-2971 (11-7-42)CCS.

Action Copy: CCS

Info. Copies: OPD
SGS
Adm. King

CM-IN-3000 (11/7/42) 2048Z law

*Adm
Leahy*

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

AXWAR 114
filed 1622Z/7
LB

CCWD
Nov 7, 1942
1639Z

U R G E N T

From: London
To: Adjutant General
No. 99, November 7, 1942.

Kingpin and three staff officers now
ATO Gibraltar. From Eisenhower for Combined
Chiefs of Staff.

No Sig

Action Copy: CC of S
Info. Copies: OPD
SGS
Adm. King

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of JCS
Declassification Ex
By RT/RS Date AUG 21 1972

CM-1M-2901 (11-7-42) 1718Z ems

*New
Exams*
COPY No.

21

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER CCWD

AXWAR 24
filed 07/1900Z
LAS

November 7, 1942.

INCOMING MESSAGE

URGENT

From: London
To: Agwar

No Jan 102 November 7th, 1942.

Conference with Kingpin, Eisenhower and Clark still in progress. For Combined Chiefs of Staff repeat ABFOR. Kingpin will not broadcast statement until after he reaches French North Africa. Details for transporting him there not yet completed.

No Sig.

Action Copy: CC of S

Info. Copies: OPD
SGS
Adm. King

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By Authority of JCS

Declassification Br.

By RAA Date AUG 21 1972

CM-IN-2973 (11-7-42) 1931Z ems

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

AXWAR 20
Filed 1745Z/7
RRF

INCOMING MESSAGE

CCWD
Nov 7, 1942
1758Z

U R G E N T

From: London
To: AGWAR

No. 4635, November 7, 1942

Just received message this instant from Eisenhower states Kingpin and three Staff Officers have just reached Gibraltar. From Eisenhower for Marshall signed Smith. Impossible to get him to Africa tonight and we anticipate that he will issue a statement which will be broadcast via London. Arrangements have been made here to give first priority to handling this statement when it arrives. Present order of broadcasts is first Military Communique Number One, then President's broadcast, then Eisenhower statements. We are awaiting recommendation as to where Kingpin broadcast should be placed in this series.

No Sig

Action Copy: CCS
Info. Copies: OPD
 SGS
 Adm. King.

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By Authority of JCS
Declassification Branch
By RAH Date AUG 21 1972

CM-IN-2949 (11-7-42) 1829Z **OMN**

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

AXWAR 13
filed 1558/7
md

INCOMING MESSAGE

CCWD
November 7, 1942
1640 Z

U R G E N T

From: London
To: Agwar Washington

No. 98, November 7th, 1942

Kingpin now aboard Catalina and expected here at about five PM. From Commander in Chief to Combined Chiefs of Staff. There is no feasible way by which he can get to Africa tonight and I, therefore, anticipate that he will issue a statement which will necessarily be broadcast from London since there is no broadcasting equipment at this station. Request that communications personnel in London be instructed to give first priority to handling of such statement when and if it arrives, so that it may be broadcast in time to do some good. Further details after arrival of Kingpin.

No Sig

Action Copy: CC of S

Info. Copies: OPD
SGS
Adm. King

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By Authority of JCS

Declassification Br.

By REH/RS Date AUG 21 1972

CM-IN-2902 (11-7-42) 1720Z 928

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

ATWAB 11
Filed 7/16/92
2311

CCND
November 7, 1942
1522Z

WAL

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of JCS
Declassification Br.
By RAA Date AUG 21 1972

FROM: London
TO: AGNAB

NO 95 November 7, 1942

Review number one zero nine hundred hours Z follows. NAJ message from Eisenhower to combined Chiefs of Staff repeat ABFOR London. Enemy known to have discovered two convoys inside Mediterranean. American convoy near Azores, and KMF two still well to north west of Gibraltar. Combat loader carrying one American battalion combat team of the Eastern Assault Force was torpedoed about zero eight hundred hours Z November seven about three hundred miles east of Gibraltar. Details of incident not yet known but consider there is fair chance of ship remaining afloat, although it is definitely out of the operation. Believe personnel loss will be slight unless further attack is made on vessel. Tug with destroyer escort being sent to tow damaged vessel.

Have failed to establish radio contact with submarine that has been attempting to pick up Kingpin. We do not know whether Kingpin has embarked. We retain some hope that contact may be established during day. If we have no word by noon will instruct McGowan to urge Flaggpole to take temporary charge to French collaboration. We will be disappointed if plans involving Kingpin must be abandoned but will not allow this to influence operations.



CM-14-2900 (11/7/42) 1713Z ms

NOA 8

~~SECRET~~

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

No 93 November 7, 1942 From London to AGWAR

Page 2

Any unusual developments of the day will be promptly reported.


No Sig

ACTION COPY: CCS

INFO. COPY: OPD ADM KING

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of JCS
Declassification Br.
By RARR AUG 21 1972

DM-IP-2900 (11/7/42) 17187 mh



WGA 2 VW

~~SECRET~~

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

[REDACTED]

November 7, 1942.

American Consul,
Algiers, Algeria.

This Message for Murphy.

SIG 6YB-1

M-44

Please report which communication has been delivered to the Resident General at Rabat (From Leahy). The original version or the alternative version.

J. E. HULL,
Brig. General, G.S.C.,
Chief European Section
Theater Group, OPD, GS

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

AKWAR 21
Filed 1810Z/7
AMT

CCWD
Nov 7, 1942
1844Z

WAB

From: London
To: AGWAR

No #, November 7, 1942

Warning order. H hour confirmed November eight,
for East and Center naught one naught naught Z hours,
for West about naught four three naught hours. Acknow-
ledge urgent from Eisenhower for ABFOR.

0/100 gmt.
430 gmt.

No Sig

ACTION COPY: OPD

INFO. COPY: SGS CC of S ADM. KING

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/68)

Date- 8-24-71

Signature- *RAO*

CM-IN-2968 (11/7/42) 1909Z ms

CG of 8

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date *4/13/94*

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Operations Division, WDGS.
European Theater, WDOPD
XXX-A JEH

November 7, 1942

TO: USFOR
No R-2905

We have received your warning message giving H hour and D day your Jan 102 and your Jan 103 giving time for release of communique 1 for ABFOR and Commandeth. Communique 1 will be released in Washington at 0100 hours Z (GMT) 8 November as requested.

Originator: OPD

Info. Copies: SGS
Gen. Strong
Gen. Surles
CCS
Adm. King

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DOD DIR. 6200.9 (9/27/68)

Date- 8-24-71

Signature- *RHP*

CM-OUT-2350 (11/7/42) 2146Z law

Admiral Leahy

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WAZ

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

AXWAR 36
FILED 2341/7
BVC

CCWD
November 7, 1942
2359 Z

URGENT

From: London
To: AGWAR

No. JAN 107, November 7, 1942

Effective zero zero zero one hours Z Nov eight Allied Force Command Post Gibraltar will go on Z time and all references to time in messages originating here thereafter will be expressed in Z time. Eisenhower to Smith. Subordinate Forces have been informed and directed to conform. Notify all others concerned.

No Sig

Action Copy: OPD
Info. Copies: SGS
Gen. Strong
C C of S

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

CM-IN-3083 (11/8/42) 0020Z law

Date- 8-24-71
Signature- RHP

Adm
Leaky

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

AXWAR 35
filed 2230/7
DV

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

CCWD
Nov 7, 1942
2013 2

URGENT

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

From: London
To: Agwar
No. 4825 Nov 7, 1942

Date- 8-24-71

Signature- *RAF*

Release of following communique number one in London we are releasing to press text of President's message to French people, Text of General Eisenhovers broadcast (our four four eight four) text of pamphlets, text of both American and British declaration to French people (our four four eight five) for Operations and Surles signed Smith. On eight November twelve zero zero E we are releasing following statement on AFHQ "the troops engaged in liberating North Africa from the threat of Axis domination are under the unified command of an American officer, Lieutenant General Dwight D Eisenhower. Some months ago an Allied Force Headquarters was set up in London by direction of the combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington. General Eisenhower was designated Commander in Chief of the Allied Force and a Staff of British and American Officers was selected. When the threat of Axis invasion of North Africa became imminent General Eisenhower and his staff began making plans for the operation that is now underway. This unified command includes all land, sea, and Air Forces both British and American engaged in the operation. General Eisenhower has concurrently been in command of all American troops in the European Theater of Operations. The establishment of the

CM-IN-3079 (11/8/42)

adm. center

12

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: London
To: Agvar

No. 4625 Nov 7, 1942

Allied Force Headquarters has marked the beginning of the offensive phase of the War on the part of the United Nations. Unity of command in this theater has long been urged by both British and American leaders. That this command has for some time been a reality could not be released to the Public before the beginning of the present operation" Guidance to Editors being given by Minister of Information eight November fifteen zero zero Z concerning avoidance of term secondfrontalso Political considerations involved. Coordinated General Mc Clure. This guidance will be given in advance of first opportunity for Editorial comment after release of first communique.

No Sig

Note: 4484 is CM-IN-1803 (10-5-42).
4485 is CM-IN-2011 (11-5-42).

Action Copy: OPD

Info. Copies: SGS
Col. Fitzgerald
C C of S
Gen Strong

CM-IN-3079 (11/8/42) 0011Z law

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD DATE 09/27/00 (9/27/00)
Date- 8-24-71
Signature- *RAH*

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

AXWAR 31
2105Z/7th
efg

INCOMING MESSAGE

CCWD
November 7, 1942
2152Z

WFB

URGENT

From: London
To: AQWAR

No. 4637 Nov 7, 1942

French text of British first communique follows:
Signed Smith.

Le President des Etats Unis d'Amerique dans un discours radio diffuse et adresse aux Francais, a annonce l'arrivee de forces Americaines en Afrique Francaise du Nord.

M. Roosevelt a explique que la mission de ces forces consiste a liberer les territoires francais de la menace d'occupation par les puissances de l'axe. Il a declare que les nations unies font tout leur possible pour garantir un avenir sain aussi bien que la restitution des ideals, des libertes et de la democratie pour tout ceux qui ont vecu sous le tricolore.

Le President des Etats Unis a lance un appel a tous les Francais les invitant a concourir a l'execution de ce grand dessein.

Le gouvernement britannique se declare en complet accord avec la politique et avec les ideals exposes dans la declaration presidentielle.

L'action entreprise par les Etats Unis a l'entier appui et le plein concours du gouvernement britannique et les operations des forces americaines sont appuyees par des unites de la marine britannique et de la RAF.

Pour la France, le gouvernement britannique n'a qu'un seul desir, celui de hater le jour ou tous les Francais, ou qu'ils se trouvent, se donneront la main pour retablir l'indpendance et la grandeur de leur pays. For Operations Division for Security Control

CM-IN-3062 (11/7/42)

Adm Leahy

COPY No. 11

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Date- 8-24-71
Signature-

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

WAZ

No. 4637 from London

for Sherwood, OWI from Eisenhower signed Smith.

L'operation mise sur pied par les nations unies
en Afrique du nord constitue un pas decisif vers l'arrivee
de ce jour.

Action Copy: Gen. Strong

Info. Copies: OPD
SGS
CC of S
Col. Fitzgerald

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (4/27/68)

CM-IN-3062 (11/7/42) 2318Z 1aw

Date- 8-24-71

Signature- *RAH*

11

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AKWAR 23
filed 07/1842Z
LAB

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

November 7, 1942.
130Z

INCOMING MESSAGE

U R G E N T

From: London
To: Agwar

WAS

NAF 33 November 7th, 1942.

This is a warning only. Reference our four four four eight. D- day is eight November. H- hour is zero one zero zero Z for Eastern assault force and center task force and zero four three zero Z for Western task force GMT. Exact time for releasing of Presidents broadcast and communique number one will be transmitted later. From Eisenhower to Marshall signed Smith. This is a warning only.

No Sig.

Note: 4448 is CM-IN-1092 (11-3-42) OPD.

Action Copy: CC of S

Info. Copies: OPD
SGS
Adm. King.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/88)

Date: 8-24-71

Signature: *RHP*

CM-IN-2971 (11-7-42) 1922Z

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

AXWAR 26
filed 07/1958Z
LAS

INCOMING MESSAGE

NOVEMBER 7, 1942.
2006Z

U R G E N T

From: London
To: Agwar

0100Z / *OK Raw*

No Jan 103 November 7, 1942.

Release communique number one in Washington at
naught one naught naught hours Z eight November. From
Eisenhower to ABFOR. Release communique number one in
London and begin torch broadcasts in accordance with
your R two eight seven two of seven November acknowledge
urgent. Times given our message number one hundred are
all Z.

No Sig.

Note: R-2872 was CM-OUT-1973 (10-6-42)OPD.
WDCMC believes No. 100 to be CM-IN-2968 (11/7/42)OPD.

Action Copy: OPD

Info. Copies: SGS
Gen. Strong
Gen. Surles
CCS
Adm. King

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/56)

Date- 8-24-71

Signature- *RAH*

CM-IN-2993 (11/7/42) 2031Z law

*Admiral
Leahy.*

~~SECRET~~

11
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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

[REDACTED]

Date: November 7. 1942

Filed: 07 1655 Nov

From: Algiers
To : Handy
No. : November 7, #779 1942

WJL

From Murphy for Mayer in sixth paragraph message to Sultan
insert after words "arrival of American forces in your country"
following "in collaboration with forces of the protecting power."
Please confirm.

Cole
American Consul

Date: November 7, 1942

Filed: N F T

From: Algiers
To : Handy
No. : 777 November 7, 1942

WWS

Personal for Mayer from Murphy Presidential messages prepare alternate form of message to Resident General in event elimination Nogues. Form should be addressed merely to the Resident General without mentioning name. First paragraph could remain same. Second paragraph "There is convincing evidence that the axis intends to invade and conquer French Morocco. You I am sure, will resent their base designs and defend Morocco against our common enemy."

Last two paragraphs unchanged.

I am informed that General Berthouard plans to send certain officers to Nogues shortly before H hour. If he declines cooperation Berthouard may act in his place. In that event you will deliver messages to Berthouard. Confirm to Berthouard through King this understanding.

You should work closely with King and Reid in this matter.

Inform Russell.

H hour thus far unchanged consult King repeated to Leahy.

Cole

American Consul

[REDACTED]

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OPD 381 TH (11/7/42)
OUTGOING MESSAGE
European Theater WOPD

To Admiral Leahy

Nov 7, 1942

USFOR

No. R-2887

Authority for broadcast of French translation of Presidents messages referred to in your 4597 Nov 6 is not approved. These messages will be released here upon receipt of information that actual delivery has been made. Murphy has been instructed to report when delivery has been effected.

Referring to par (G) your 4588 Nov 6 you are not authorized to release anything concerning Presidents message to Franco and Carmona until released here regardless of time elapsed.

ORIG: OPD

INFO, COPY: GEN. STRONG GEN. DEANE(ADM, LEAHY)

*W.S.
945 pm
7 Nov*

CM-OUT-2233 (11/7/42) 1727Z MS
(Limited)

(Adm, Leahy)

COPY No. 11

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE
Special Instructions: A.S.G. J.D.G.S
European Theater, WDDPD
OPD 381 TH (11-7-42)

November 7, 1942

To: USFOR
LONDON

Number M-2888

Official English version President's broadcast reference your 4631 November 7 follows "Message to be delivered from" Aspidistra "to the French people by the President of the United States.

My friends, who suffer day and night, under the crushing yoke of the Nazis, I speak to you as one who was with your Army and Navy in France in 1918. I have held all my life the deepest friendship for the French people - for the entire French people. I retain and cherish the friendship of hundreds of French people in France and outside of France. I know your farms, your villages, and your cities. I know your soldiers, professors, and workmen. I know what a precious heritage of the French people are your homes, your culture, and the principles of democracy in France. I salute again and reiterate my faith in liberty, equality, and fraternity. No 2 nations exist which are more united by historic and mutually friendly ties than the people of France and the United States.

Americans, with the assistance of the United Nations, are striving for their own safe future as well as the restoration of the ideals, the liberties, and the democracy of all those who have lived under the Tricolor.

We come among you to replace the cruel invaders who would remove forever your rights of self government, your rights to religious freedom, and your rights to live your own lives in peace and security.

CM-OUT-2234 (11-7-42) 1727Z
(Limited)

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DOD DIR. #200.9 (9/27/82)

Date- 8-24-71

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

~~SECRET~~
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Page 2

November 7, 1942

"We come among you solely to defeat and rout your enemies. Have faith in our words. We do not want to cause you any harm.

"We assure you that once the menace of Germany and Italy is removed from you, we shall quit your territory at once.

"I am appealing to your realism, to your self interest and national ideals.

"Do not obstruct, I beg of you, this great purpose.

"Help us where you are able, my friends, and we shall see again the glorious day when liberty and peace shall reign again on earth.

"Vive La France Eternelle!"

ORIG: OPD

INFO, COPIES: GEN STRONG, GEN DEANE (Adm. Leahy)

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/50)

CM-OUT-2234 (11/7/42) 1727Z
(Limited)

bjm

Date- 8-24-71

Signature- *AKP*

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

AXWAR 1
Filed 0025/7
ACM

CCWD
Nov. 7, 1942
01:02 Z

W.S.

URGENT

From: London
To: AGWAR

No. 4597, November 6th, 1942.

Authority requested for broadcast of French translations of President's messages. Ref R dash two eight one eight. From Eisenhower to Marshall signed Smith. These messages to follow President's and Eisenhower's broadcast from UK.

No Sig

Footnote: No. R-2818 is CM-OUT-1512 (11-8-42) OPD

Action Copy: OPD

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (2/27/58)

Date- 8-24-71

Signature- *RHP*

CM-IN-2630 (11-7-42) 0205 Z mvs

[Handwritten initials]

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
Received at
WAR DEPARTMENT CODE CENTER

WAT

Date: Nov. 6 1942
Filed: 4:00 P. M.

From: Murphy
To : Handy
No. : 774 1942

(Reference is made to the Departments telegram of
November 5, #397:M37)

In principle messages will be delivered immediately after
E-hour on D-day. This may ohry because at Rabayn special
situation exists and Kingpin's representatives plan to
call on Nogues first about that time to give him an
opportunity. Our representative would make delivery
after their meeting. This is one of the reasons we want
Kingpin here at least twenty-four hours in advance.

Cole

[REDACTED]

November 6, 1942.

American Consul General,

Algiers, Algeria.

For Murphy.

M-59

WAZ

M-39

SIG-CYB-1

Amendments you suggest in message to Bey of Tunis and Resident General Esteva have been approved and basic documents changed accordingly. This refers to your 761 November 4 and 762 November 5. From Leahy.

J. E. HULL,
Brig. General, G.S.C.,
Chief European Section
Theater Group, OPD, GS

Comdr Freeman

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

November 6, 1942.

American Consul General,

Algiers, Algeria.

From Handy to Murphy.

M-40

17-40

SIG GYB-1

Sunday morning is the date tentatively set from Eisenhower to Marshall to Murphy. Arrangements have been made by Eisenhower to inform you through channels already known to you of any postponement of D day. This refers to your 669 November 5.

J. E. HULL.
Brig. General, G.S.C.,
Chief European Section
Theater Group, OPD, GS

Comdr. Treseman

64023

Nov. 6

PRESIDENT TO PRIME

Replying to your 186 November 6 I will issue my statement to the American press immediately upon receipt of information that landing of troops has commenced.

Eisenhower has been directed to inform us at once by cable and radio.

I am still of the opinion that release of Eisenhower's proposed leaflets would not be of assistance to the expedition but would on the contrary deter some of the French forces that are expected to join with us.

November 5, 1942

TO **SECRET**
COMMANDING GENERAL
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS *WJC*

Number R-2818

Advance notice of H hour of 24 hours is necessary in order that we can effect delivery of President's messages simultaneously. (Signed Marshall) From Murphy to OPD to Eisenhower for eyes of General Eisenhower only. It would be well if Eddy sent notifications to all of the 3 offices involved. Consul Mayer at Casablanca has been designated by me to deliver messages in Rabat to the Resident General. I hope that French translations can be broadcast on D day.

COPY

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

AXWAR 22
Filed 1700/5
GMR

INCOMING MESSAGE

CCWD
Nov 5, 1942
1759Z

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of JCS

Declassification Br.

By RHBB Date AUG 21 1972

From: London
To: AGWAR

No. NAF 30, November 5, 1942

On the morning of seven November British Ambassadors at Madrid and Lisbon will communicate to their American colleagues text of President's message to Franco and Carmona respectively and will concert arrangements for delivery of the American and British messages. Signed Esienhower for WDCPD reference your R two five six five October thirty my NAF twenty four October twenty eight. Necessary arrangements have been made here for informing USA and British representatives at what hour messages should be delivered. From Eisenhower. USA Representatives at Madrid and Lisbon will report delivery of messages by telegraphing in clear to State Department code word "JELLY" followed by time of delivery expressed in GMT.

No Sig

Note: R-2586 is CM-OUT-09918 (10/30/42)OPD.
NAF 24 is CM-IN-12001 (10-28-42)CCS.

Action Copy: CCS

Info. Copies: OPD, Cominch, Log.

CM -IN-2381 (11/6/42) 1352Z 1aw

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

TELEGRAM

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: PRIME

Nov. 5
[REDACTED]


Replying to your 185 of November 5 I am very apprehensive in regard to the adverse effect that any introduction of deGaulle into the Torch situation would have on our promising efforts to attack a large part of the French African forces to our expedition.

It is therefore considered inadvisable for you to give deGaulle any information in regard to Torch until subsequent to a successful landing, and you may then inform him that the American Command of an American expedition with my approval insisted on complete secrecy as a necessary safety precaution.

DeGaulle's announcement on Friday of a Governor General of Madagascar will not be of any assistance to Torch and it should be sufficient at the present time to maintain his prestige with his followers.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

November 5, 1942.


MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral Leahy ✓
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold

For your information the attached
cable was received this morning from
the representative of the C.S.S. in
Vichy.

Dean
DEANE

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of JCS
Declassification Branch
By PHG Date AUG 21 1980



COPY

November 3, 1942
Vichy

WHL

German troops in increasing numbers have been noticed by our operatives along or near the line of demarcation. This movement has been confirmed by friendly French officers. Lately a division has been formed and placed between Tours and Vierzon. This division is called "Ersatz" because it is composed of elements scattered here and there. It is highly mobile having a battalion of light tanks, less than a battalion of medium tanks and four regiments of motorcyclists. It is stated by agents that men and officers of this division have told people from divergent points, with whom they are lodging, that they are awaiting allied operations in Northwest Africa. This divisional mission is to move as rapidly as possible and assure possession of the Mediterranean coast for Axis as soon as allied landing is announced. I thought I should report this dope because it is persistent but I do not know how to evaluate it. In anticipation of such events I am making certain deposits of funds in hands that will carry on, since should such occur I intend to destroy my codes and head for Spain.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of FCS

Declassification Branch

By REWS Date AUG 21 1972

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
Received at
WAR DEPARTMENT CODE CENTER

Date: Nov. 5, 1942
Filed: 6:00 P. M.

From: Cole, American Consul

To : Handy 66

No. : 767 Nov. 5, 1942

For Leahy. French are pressing me to initial some form of provisional financial accord establishing at least a temporary franc equivalent for dollar. They urge that political and psychological reasons require that we recognize the Official Franc rate as established by the Tripartite Agreement rounded-out to a rate of fifty francs per dollar or two hundred per Pound. General Carter has indicated that a different rate will apply. I think that I should have some definite instructions in this regard because the question will arise immediately after Torch.

Cole

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
Received at
WAR DEPARTMENT CODE CENTER

Date: November 6, 1942
Filed: November 5, 1942

C
O
P
Y

From: Cole, American Consul, Algeria
To : General Handy
No. : 770, November 5, 1942

The following is order number one which Kingpin proposes to issue on D Day "Officers, non commissioned officers and soldiers of the Army of Africa: For two years you have scrupulously applied the conditions of the armistice notwithstanding the repeated violations committed by our adversaries.

Today Germany and Italy wish to occupy North Africa. America anticipates them and assures you of its loyal and disinterested support. We are prohibited from neglecting this unhopd for opportunity of recovery.

I resume my place of combat among you.

I ask your confidence and you have mine. We have only one devotion - France, one aim, - victory. Remember that the Army of Africa holds in its hands the destiny of France."

Cole American Consul

~~SECRET~~

November 5, 1942.

Consul General,
Algiers, Algeria.
For Murphy from Handy.

WFB

M-36

Inform Flagpole that his decision as to which of two methods to use outlined in your No. 35 November 4 must be governed by his judgement. (Signed Leahy). He must advise us at once so that we can inform Eisenhower as to what to expect. Eisenhower is prepared for any eventuality, but desires earnestly to avoid combat with French forces or any part thereof.

Inform Flagpole that arrangements are made to meet Kingpin night of 5/6 November at 11 p.m. Kingpin is being notified by Eisenhower.

J. E. HULL,
Brig. General, G.S.C.,
Chief European Section
Theater Group, OPD, GS

Comdr. Freeman

Printed in FRUS, 1942, II, 426,

SECRET

American Consul General,

Algiers, Algeria.

For Murphy.

M-38

SIG-GYB-1

M-38 For your information we have dispatched ten million francs to
Schow in Vichy with instructions to turn it over to Beaufort immediately.

J. E. HULL,
Brig. General, G.S.C.,
Chief European Section
Theater Group, OPD, GS

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
Received at
WAR DEPARTMENT CODE CENTER

Date: November 5, 1942
Filed: 10:00 P. M.

From: American Consul, Algiers
To : Handy
No. : 669 1942

Your M-34 Fifth. Please confirm my understanding to avoid possible error that tentative date is Sunday repeat Sunday morning.

Cc/c

American Consul

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
Received at
WAR DEPARTMENT CODE CENTER

Date: November 5, 1942
Filed: B F. M.

From: American Consul
To : Handy
No. : 768 1942

For Leahy. Admiral Darlan arrived Algiers in greatest secrecy by plane today. His son is in dying condition with no hope of recovery. Darlan's presence here on D-day might be embarrassing but it is believed he will depart before then.

Cole

American Consul

Printed in FRUS, 1942, II, 425.

[REDACTED]

November 5, 1942.

American Consul General,

Algiers, Algeria.

For Murphy.

M-37

WAZ

SIB-GYB-1

M-37

It is extremely important that you report promptly in each case when the five communications (Esteva, Bey of Tunis, Chatel, Nogues, Sultan) are delivered.

J. E. HULL,
Brig. General, Q.S.C.,
Chief European Section
Theater Group, OPD, GS

Date: November 5 1942

Filed: _____

From: Murphy

To : Bandy

No. : 763 November 5 1942

WAL

For Eisenhower suggest you send Kingpin following message on D day: "The President of The United States directs me to assure you that your appeal to the United States of America for its aid in your determination to defend Franch Africa against the Axis invader has not fallen on barren soil.

"The huge forces which the President is sending under my Command equipped with the most deadly weapons of modern warfare are at your disposition and no effort will be omitted likewise to equip the splendid men of the French Army and Navy in Africa in their upsurge toward freedom and victory."

COLE

Change suggested

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

Date

11/27/42

To:

Admiral Leahy

Subject:

For your information
Beane


CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
Received at
WAR DEPARTMENT CODE CENTER

Date: Nov. 5, 1942

Filed: _____

From: ALGIERS

To : HANDY

No. : 752 November 5, 1942

WAL

YOUR M4 18th I SUGGEST THAT IN MESSAGE TO RESIDENT GENERAL
ESTEVA TUNIS THE TITLE OF THE BEY OF TUNIS BE AMENDED TO
READ "HIGHNESS" INSTEAD OF "MAJESTY" UNLESS INSTRUCTED
TO THE CONTRARY NOTE WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH THAT AMEND.

COLE

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
Received at
WAR DEPARTMENT CODE CENTER

Date: Nov. 5, 1942

Filed: _____

From: ALGIERS

To : HANDY

No. : 762 November 5, 1942

WAL

YOUR M4 18th I SUGGEST THAT IN MESSAGE TO RESIDENT GENERAL
ESTEVA TUNIS THE TITLE OF THE BEY OF TUNIS BE AMENDED TO
READ "HIGHNESS" INSTEAD OF "MAJESTY" UNLESS INSTRUCTED
TO THE CONTRARY NOTE WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH THAT AMEND.

COLE

[REDACTED]

Date: November 4 1942

Filed: 1845 Z

From: ALGERIA

To : GENERAL HULL

No. : 764, November 4 1942

WRL

Your twenty ninth I should have twenty four hours notice of
H hour to effect delivery of President's messages simultaneously.
It would be well for Eddy to send notifications to three offices con-
cerned. I have designated Consul Mayer at Casablanca to make delivery
of messages to Resident General in Rabat. It is hoped to broadcast
locally French translations on D day.

Cole American Consul

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE November 5, 1942
0455 Z

CCWD
November 5, 1942
0455 Z

JB 1
filed 5/1239A
md

WAB

From: London
To: Agwar

No. 4485, November 4th, 1942

Here are the English and French texts of a joint American British Declaration asking the people of Metropolitan France to remain clam but on the alert. This Declaration is to be broadcast after the message from the President and my message, and then dropped as a leaflet with an appropriate introduction. For Operations Division for Security Control signed Eisenhower. This also has the approval of the British Government and Chiefs of Staff, OWI will need both versions.

"English text".

"Here is a spokesman of the United States Government and the British Government."

"The landing of the American Expeditionary Force in French North Africa is the first step towards the liberation of France. The object of the present operation is to destroy the German and Italian Forces in North Africa.

Our Forces arrive in French North Africa as friends. The day when the German and Italian threat shall no longer weigh on French Territories, they will leave. The sovereignty of France on French Territories remain unaffected.

We enter, today, into the offensive phase of the War of Liberation. This is the beginning.

General Eisenhower, Commander in Chief,

CM-IN-2011 (11/5/42)

~~SECRET~~

COPY No. 10

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

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DOD DIR. 6200.9 (9/27/89)

Date- 8-24-71
Signature- RHP

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Page 2 from: London to: Agwar
No. 4485, November 4th, 1942

of the American Expeditionary Force is appealing to the active cooperation of the French in North Africa. Nevertheless the moment has not yet come to appeal to the French Nation as a whole. For the moment we ask the French population in France itself (I repeat in France itself), to remain on the alert (I repeat to remain on the alert).

The hour of National uprising has not sounded. We have already promised you that we will warn you when this hour shall have come.

Today that moment is closer.

We will keep our promise." French text follows: "Voici un Porte Parole Du Gouvernement Des Etats Unis et Du Gouvernement Britannique."

"Le débarquement du Corps Expeditionnaire Americain en Afrique Francaise Du Nord constitue le premier pas vers la liberation de la France. L'objet de l'operation en cours, est d'aneantir les forces Italo Allemandes en Afrique Du Nord.

Nos forces arrivent en Afrique Francaise Du Nord en amis. Le jour ou la menace Italo Allemande ne pesera plus sur les territoires Francais, elles s'en iront. La souverainete de La France sur les territoires Francais reste entiere. Nous entrons aujourd'hui dans la phase offensive de la guerre de liberation. C'est le commencement.

Le General Eisenhower, Commandant En Chef Du Corps Expeditionnaire Americain, fait appel au concours actif Des Francais de L'Afrique Du Nord. Cependant le moment n'est pas encore venu de faire appel au peuple Francaise dans

CM-IN-2011 (11/5/42)

~~SECRET~~

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NLR-101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 8-24-71

Signature- RHP

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Page 3 from: London to: Agwar
No. 4485, November 4th, 1942

son ensemble. Pour l'instant nous demandons
a la population Francaise en France meme (je
dis en France meme) de rester sur l'expectative
(je dis de rester sur l'expectative).

L'heure de l'insurrection nationale n'a pas
encore sonnee. Nous avons deja promis de vous
prevenir quand cette heure viendrait.

Elle est aujourd'hui plus proche.

Nous tiendrons notre promesse.

No Sig

Action Copy: Gen. Strong

Info. Copies: OPD
Gen. Deane
Log

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 8200.9 (9/27/88)

Date- 8-24-71

Signature- *RHP*

CM-IN-2011 (11/8/42) 1932Z law

~~SECRET~~

COPY No.

10

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
Received at
WAR DEPARTMENT CODE CENTER

Date: NOVEMBER 6, 1942
Filed: 1840 Z

From: ALGERIA
To : GENERAL HULL
No. : 761, November 4 1942

I suggest the following amendments in the message to the
Bey of Tunis: his title should read QTN Highness QTN instead of
Majesty. In third paragraph insert the following after the phrase
QTN despatching to North Africa QTN dash, in collaboration with
the forces of France, QTN (unless instructed to the contrary note
will be transmitted with these amendments.)

Cole American Consul

W.H.G.

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM

To: Secretary of State
From: Vichy
Dated: November 4, 1942
No. 1618

Following is the substance of a telegram from
Vichy:

Vichy received a letter dated October 29 from the
Consul General at Marseille stating that he had been
unexpectedly visited by the brother of the person mentioned
in the Embassy's 682 of May 8. This person will be
referred to as "X". The brother desired to establish
the connection between the American Government and Mr. X
who was being closely watched by Gestapo agents and who
did not know of the brother's visit. It is stated that
Mr. X and the person mentioned in Embassy's 1444 of
November 16 greatly desired information concerning the
best method of serving their country. Full cooperation
will be given by both to the American and British military
authorities although they prefer the American. However
both desire assurances from America and England that the
military supplies and equipment considered necessary
will be available before any commitments are made by them.

An

An inquiry was made of the Consul General by the brother concerning the attitude of the American Government and the possible utilization of his services in the event that Mr. X should reach or attempt to reach the United States. The Consul General merely stated that the Embassy would be informed of this conversation. The Consul General was further informed by the brother that neither he nor Mr. X was in direct touch with the American Consul in Nice or Lyon.

In view of the explicit instructions sent to me through the Naval Attaché which warned against either direct or indirect contact with Mr. X, I immediately instructed Benton in a letter to avoid if possible any further interviews with the brother. If such interviews were unavoidable a negative attitude should be adopted. The Consul General has just informed me urgently and confidentially that Mr. X himself called at his residence at 2 p.m. on November 2. My letter was received at the same time. Mr. X stated to the Consul General that he believed the general situation to be developing in such a way that it might be necessary for him to leave France or Africa on the slightest notice. In view of this fact he asked the two following questions: If I consider it
advisable

advisable to leave France hurriedly it is possible that I may be able to do so in a submarine placed at my disposal by the French Admiralty but in order to take care of all contingencies I wish to know whether you can place at my disposal an airplane to take me and one or two assistants to Africa. If you are able to do so I wish to know how long it will take you to make the necessary arrangements after I have given you notice of my desire to leave. His second question was to ask what assistance could be given in connection with his desire that a party mostly composed of women including his wife leave at the same time but not with him. He suggested that this party might illegally cross the Spanish Frontier.

The Consul General informed Mr. X that he was unable to give him a plane or to assist him directly in any way but that certain of his friends might be able to help. The Consul General mentioned one man known to Mr. X who asked that he be approached. The Consul General informs me that he will limit his activities to conveying to Mr. X any message which the third person may send along unless specific instructions to the contrary are received. The general military situation was then discussed

discussed in detail by Mr. X and this information is being transmitted in a special telegram.

The Consul General has been placed in an awkward situation which has arisen through no fault of his own. It is understandable that he could not refuse to see Mr. X and I believe that there is no question of the Consul General's discretion. He will undoubtedly do everything possible to avoid embarrassing our Government. I intend to instruct him to try to arrange that any future plans shall be sent to Mr. X directly by the third person mentioned above and that they should not be routed through the Consul General.

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM

To: Secretary of State, Washington.

From: American Embassy, Vichy.

Dated: November 4, 8 p.m.

No. 1621.

██████████ FOR ATHERTON.

See my 1618, November 4, 5 p.m.

There follows the text of a memorandum covering an interview which took place on November 2 between the person mentioned in my 1618 and Consul General Benton at Marseille. The person concerned will be referred to as X in this telegram.

X made the following observations in a general discussion of the military and political situation:

1. The United Nations current situation looks very optimistic. Germany had not been able to obtain its objectives, the destruction of the Russian armies and the conquest of the Caucasus, due to the magnificent resistance of the Russians. The Germans would have to discontinue major operations on the Eastern Front now that winter is almost here.

Surprise was experienced by X himself at the Russian resistance during past months and he had told Laval last June that he expected the Germans to conquer the Caucasus, take Leningrad and Moscow, and establish themselves well on the Volga line before the arrival of cold weather. The situation would not have been too serious even if the Germans had been successful in these objectives. It was, therefore, all to the good and much better than could have been hoped for that they have not been

able

able to capture Leningrad, Moscow or the entire Caucasus region and had only penetrated to the Volga at a few points.

2. X stated that German losses had been tremendous and that up to the commencement of the struggle at Stalingrad they had lost almost 2,000,000 men killed. (2,500,000 was the estimate of Mr. Chopin, Secretary General of the Prefecture.)

In X's opinion the Germans up to the present have lost a total of 5,000,000 men killed, sufficiently wounded to keep them out of the war, prisoners and missing. He said that the German transportation system was breaking down and that men of 17 were now being called to the colors. On the other hand, Russia was only beginning to call 20 year old recruits.

3. According to X, German airplane production had dropped to 1,000 a month from a presumed peak of 2,500 planes. In reply to my inquiry whether he thought Germany could again increase production, he expressed the opinion that they might be able to do so to a very slight degree. On the other hand, our production and that of Great Britain was increasing by leaps and bounds every day. He placed Anglo-American plane production at 6,000 planes a month today.

4. In X's opinion the Germans know that they are beaten and that the latter half of 1943 would probably see the end of the war. He expected that the approaching winter months would be relatively quiet from the military point of view and that when, as he expected, the United Nations took the offensive next spring that offensive should be all-embracing, including powerful attacks by Russia, Anglo-American landings in numerous localities in France, attacks in Egypt against Rommel, uprisings in the occupied countries and round the clock aerial bombardments of German military objectives and cities on an intensive scale. He expected the latter would begin this winter with a view to reducing German stamina and morale.

5. X admitted that the internal situation in France was unsatisfactory and that the French people had a

hard

hard winter ahead of them. He did not expect Laval to remain in power long but was unable to guess concerning his successor. Rumors of a German occupation of all of France had come to his attention but such an occupation would require troops which Germany could not well afford with the result that this might be regarded as a last resort. Laval probably could not fulfill German demands for skilled labor and trouble might result if the Germans struck back by seizing skilled labor in the occupied zone. All things considered, the immediate future was very black for France. In his opinion the Germans did not wish a break between Vichy and the United States at this time. He apparently felt that the reason for this was a hope on the part of the Germans that the United States might prove a restraining force when matters went definitely against the Germans in France.

6. When our conversation turned to Laval, X commented that it was beyond his comprehension that a man of Laval's intelligence could continue to believe that the Germans would win the war. It was my understanding, I said in reply, that rather than a German victory Laval now believed in a compromise peace in which he would have a leading part and obtain real advantages for France. While he agreed that that might be a possible interpretation of his attitude, he stated that Laval quite definitely gave the impression, when he had last seen him apparently several months ago, that he not only desired but was convinced that the Germans would be completely victorious. In many ways, he went on to say, Laval was not clever; that he could neither read nor speak German and that all of his information about that country came to him ready-made through Otto Abetz, his only German friend. The German Foreign Office quite naturally wished to present everything about their country in the brightest colors. There was considerable difference of opinion and friction, X added, as he assumed we knew between the Gestapo and the German Wehrmach on the one hand and the German Foreign Office on the other. This was also true of the German Wehrmach and the Gestapo between themselves.

TUCK

COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
Received at
WAR DEPARTMENT CODE CENTER

WAZ

Date: November 5 1942
Filed: 4--5PM

From: Cole
To : Handy
No. : 759 1942

Your mike two six (*) first Kingpin advises that Colonel Beaufort repeat Beaufort will call on Schow in Vichy to arrange details finances.

Cole American Consul

(*) This is apparently Message M-27.

Distribution

Gen. Handy
Col. Young
Adm. Leahy
Col. Pierce (2)
European File

COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
Received at
WAR DEPARTMENT CODE CENTER

Date: November 5 1942
Filed: 1200/4

From: Cole
To : Handy
No. : 755 1942

General Juin Commander in French Africa asked me to call last evening. He said that he felt we should remain in closer liaison and has designated two officers of his staff for that purpose. The gist of his conversation was that he has orders to defend French Africa against all comers but that he hopes the provocation will come from the Germans. In that case he would ask our aid. But we should not make the mistake of attacking because he would be obliged to give orders to oppose our forces. I pointed out that this did not seem logical since Germany occupies most of France but that in any event if we ever came here in force we would naturally expect a French invitation. Juin said he had talked with Admiral Darlan regarding eventual American assistance. Darlan admitted his statement to Admiral Leahy in one nine four one regarding his desire that the United States talk to him when able to provide large scale assistance but he would not commit himself further at this time.

This morning Colonel Chretien Chief of Juin's G two called on me to confirm his superior's conversation and to state that they would be glad to receive a competent high ranking army officer for technical discussions regarding eventual Franco American military cooperation. I told him that I would be glad to convey the message.

Both General Juin and Colonel Chretien expressed misgivings regarding axis plans for this area but said that they did not look for immediate intervention. They also indicated no immediate anxiety regarding our plans.

Cole

Distribution

Gen. Handy
Col. Young
Adm. Leahy
Col. Pierce (2)
European File

Printed in FRUS, 1942, II, 425.

DISTRIBUTION

Gen. Handy
Col. Young
Adm. Leahy
Col. Pierce (2)
European File

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
Received at
WAR DEPARTMENT CODE CENTER

Date: November 5, 1942
Filed: 500P/Nov 4

From: Cole American Consul
To : General Hull for Handy
No. : 758 November 4, 1942

Your Mike one three twentieth for Eisenhower suggest that your broadcast for D Day be amended as follows: Insert at the beginning quotation the following is an important message from General Eisenhower Commanding General of the United States Forces now entering French North Africa in accordance with an invitation of the French High Command, after proof that Axis forces plan to invade French North Africa, addressed to the French land sea and air forces.

Amend second sentence paragraph five to read quotation consequently in accordance with the High French Command it is understood that save for threat on the part of our common enemy that you will - (then follows abc etc).

Omit section praepara* of paragraph five.

Amend last sentence paragraph six to read quotation follow carefully the directions I have given you and as a result bloodshed will be avoided. As authorized French men will explain to you we come as comrades in pursuit of the common fight against the oppressors of your country. Please acknowledge.

Cole American Consul

*This apparently refers to paragraph (E)

Operations Division, WDGS
European Section, WDOPD

November 5, 1942

73514 FL Room 2444

SECRET--By Cable

URGENT

~~UDDOBXDDDDDDX~~ Consul General, Algiers, Algeria. From Handy for Murphy.

M-54

TENTATIVE ASSAULT DATE YOUR SEVEN FIVE SEVEN PAREN FOR MURPHY FROM
MARSHALL PAREN SAME AS PREVIOUSLY GIVEN YOU PERIOD EXACT DATE WILL
DEPEND ON WEATHER AND OTHER CONDITIONS TO BE DECIDED UPON GROUND
BY COMMANDER IN CHIEF

WBR

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/88)

Date- 8-24-71

Signature- RHO

No distribution
except OPD
~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

J. E. HULL,
Brig. General, U.S.C.,
Chief European Section
Theater Group, OPD, GS

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
Received at
WAR DEPARTMENT CODE CENTER

Date: November 5, 1942
Filed: 4:00PM

From: Cole, American Consul

To : Handy

No. : 757 November 4, 1942

Your M 20 Twenty-seventh paragraph three in view of message received this morning from Kingpin regarding his decision to proceed North Africa I am informing Flagpole this afternoon on assault date and name of commander-in-chief. To avoid error please confirm assault date.

Cole, American Consul

DISTRIBUTION:

Gen. Handy
Col. Young
Adm. Leahy ✓
Col. Pierce (2)
European File

Printed in FRUS, 1942, II, 424

~~SECRET~~

November 4, 1942.

Consul General,
Algiers, Algeria.
From Handy for Murphy.

WAB

17-33 Through British SOE channels Eisenhower has sent you following message which we also relay to you. Both War Department and ourselves unable decipher your message beginning "KBGEX BOACP NVRCH". Arrangements have been made through British channels to pick up Kingpin on night 4-5 November or on following night if first attempt fails. Kingpin will be taken to Gibraltar and then to French North Africa where he will arrive by November 8. To avoid confusion, make no more arrangements with Kingpin on this matter. Will keep you informed.

Comdr. Rosenman

J. E. HULL,
Brig. General, G.S.C.,
Chief European Section
Theater Group, OPD, GS

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~~SECRET~~

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date *4/2/94*

[REDACTED]

Date: November 4 1942

Filed: 1712Z

From: Algiers

To : General Hull

No. : RE 35 2/34, Nov 4 1942

VIZ

Kingpin sends words this morning November fourth that he has decided to come over immediately. Submarine should call for him at rendezvous spot indicated my five seven seven November two five PM at eleven PM French time today November four. If this fails rendezvous scheduled same hour and place November five.

Cole

Sandra Threeman

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
Received at
WAR DEPARTMENT CODE CENTER

Date: November 4 1942
Filed: 1631 Z

From: Algiers
To : General Hull
No. : 35, November 4 1942

WHL

Your M two eight message conveyed to Flagpole who states that he will cooperate. Flagpole states that he is prepared to operate in one of two ways. One. He will seize command in Algiers --his superiors are Juin and Koeltz--. In that case he would require four days notice before Torch to make preparations. Two. If we are unwilling to give four days notice he will be unable to seize command. In that case we must be willing to risk combat resulting from orders given by General Juin but Flagpole will facilitate our entry to the best of his ability. In any case he asks that our forces debark at as many points in the Algiers and Oran Districts simultaneously as may be possible for particularly in the region of Sidiferruch. Flagpole suggests that he prefers number two because of element of surprise. Thus far no alarm here.

We hope that our messenger will return from Marseille today with decision of Kingpin. Flagpole believes Kingpin will decide to come on November five and inquired whether submarine would be at place described in my five seven seven Nov two five PM.

Cole American Consul

nted in FRUS, 1942, II, 424

AXWAR 13
1504Z/3
AEL

SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

CCP
NOV 3
1600 Z

P R I O R I T Y

From: London
To: AGWAR

No. 4448, November 3, 1942

To assure simultaneous release of broadcasts, communique number one, and messages AFEQ Rear Echelon will inform you as to D day and H hour when known. This will be in effect a warning to alert those concerned. On receipt of this information request you alert OWI. AFEQ will further inform you as to exact time for release of broadcasts, communique number one and messages. At this exact time it is requested that you instruct OWI to begin Torch broadcasting, instruct WDBPR to release communique number one, send cable message to Petain, and instruct USA Ambassador in Brazil to inform Brazilian government.

Eisenhower

Action Copy: OPD

Info. Copies: General Strong
Log

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CN-IN-1092 (11-3-42) 1718Z cms

COPY No. 13

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

November 3, 1942.

Consul General
Algiers, Algeria

This Message for Murphy

M-32

SIG GYB-1

REGISTERED PUBLICATIONS GIVEN TO YOU BY NAVY ON DEPARTURE
FROM HERE TO WIT Colon QTN CAST SAIL PREP TWO SIX THREE Paren
APPLE Paren ETC WERE INTENDED TO BE DELIVERED TO CLANDESTINE
RADIO STATIONS FOR COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THEM AND GIBRALTEER
Period IT SEEMS GIBRALTEER MAY NOT HAVE COPY OF THE CODE/THIS
SHOULD BE VERIFIED BY YOU BY OTHER COMMUNICATION CHANNELS WITH
GIBALTAR Period WESTERN TASK FORCE HAS SAME CODE Period THIS
CIPHER IS CONSIDERED MORE SECRET THAN THE ONE NOW BEING USED BY
CLANDESTINE RADIOS AND SHOULD BE EMPLOYED WHERE POSSIBLE BETWEEN
STATIONS HAVING COPIES OF SAME

Linda Reeman

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

November 8, 1942.

Consul General,
Algiers, Algeria.
To Murphy.

M-31 Through British secret channels Eisenhower reports receiving following message, certain words of which are not repeat not understood here but which we relay to you.

"KUL/SARRH on November second sent following message:

Air transport for five to eleven persons to Gibraltar requested by Kingpin who has decided to lead Dissidence in Afrique du Nord.

"Minerva" is code name for this operation, the necessity for which begins on the fourth.

Reconnaissance of suitable grounds is being made in the Crau area in anticipation of your acceptance. The operation will be directed personally by Sabre. Details of landing ground will follow tomorrow.

Submarine trip for Kingpin on fourth of November already planned by Americans in case above cannot be accomplished.

There will be a very hurried reaction by Germans in unoccupied area when events in North Africa occur.

Reply by first contact on box or Tuba W/T sets."

Eisenhower requests we relay this to you and states all possible arrangements are being made to implement request contained in above'

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

message and that he is keeping in close contact with British officials concerned. End Eisenhower's message.

The words Kul/Sabre, dissidence, orau, Minerva and Sabre are not repeat not understood here.

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- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

SECRET

Consul General,
Algiers, Algeria.
From Handy to Murphy.

M-30

SIG OTB-1

Murphy's message to Gibraltar undecipherable. Relayed to London undecipherable. Relayed again to War Department still undecipherable. No apparent indicators. Check two sixty six November second. Furnish indicators to Gibraltar and War Department. Eisenhower has been advised unable decipher here.

J. E. HULL,
Brig. General, G.S.C.,
Chief European Section
Theater Group, OPD, GS

**REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED**

Comdr. Roseman

SECRET

COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
Received at
WAR DEPARTMENT CODE CENTER

Date: November 3 1942
Filed: 5 P. M.

From: Cole
To : Handy
No. : 752 1942

Your MIKE 26 first Flagpole and Kingpin advised. Kingpin has already sent word that in event of Torch we should do everything to placate Spaniards in order to avoid winter campaign in rif thus losing time in march to Tunisia. Kingpin would even favor offering territorial concession up to River Ouergha repeat Ouergha but not as far as Seba repeat Seba.

Cole

Distribution

Gen. Handy
Col. Young
Adm. Leahy ✓
Col. Pierce (2)
European File

inted in FRUS, 1942, II, 423

COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
Received at
WAR DEPARTMENT CODE CENTER

Date: November 3 1942
Filed: 7 P. M.

From: COLE
To : HANDY
No. : 753 1942

Your MIKE 29 second Admiral Fenard has intervened with Vichy to expedite Arthur Reeds visa. I feel that Reed would be most useful in this area even after initial operation of Torch. I recommend that his assignment be maintained.

Cole

Distribution:

Gen. Handy
Col. Young
Adm. Leahy ✓
Col. Pierce (2)
European File

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

OPD 381 TH (11-2-42)
(Limited Distribution)
Operations Division, WDGS
European Theater, WDCPD
XXX-A

JEH

November 2, 1942

TO: C G
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

No R-2689

A message from the President states that he fully concurs in your recommendation to continue with the operation as planned. This refers to your 4372 and R 4373 both November 1 and is for the eyes of General Eisenhower only. The President suggests that perhaps you might make on his behalf a special appeal to Kingpin to conform.

The US Chiefs of Staff and Dill, acting for the British Chiefs of Staff, are in complete accord with your views on this matter.

A communication as follows has been dispatched to McGowan. "It is utterly impossible to arrange for delay of operation to which we are already committed. Therefore the decision of the President is that the operation will be carried out as now planned and that you will do your utmost to secure the understanding and cooperation of the French Officials with whom you are now in contact. You should explain to Flagpole that the extreme hazards involved in any leakage of our plans makes it impossible to give notice far in advance of the movement, even though we were assured, of full French cooperation. Point out to Flagpole that a premature disclosure, which is an inevitable possibility where so many people are involved, would jeopardize not only our plans but their hopes. Furthermore, Torch represents the only hope in the predictable future for the redemption of France and it involves a tremendous Naval, shipping, air, and troop

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

adm. Leahy

13

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

(Page 2)

Nov. 2, 1942

No. R-2689

concentration. It cannot be delayed. It must be executed. Therefore there can be no change in the plan as recommended by you.

You will not divulge the date or location of landings to anybody until authorized to do so by Eisenhower.

MARSHALL

Originator: OPD

Info. Copies: Adm. King
Gen. Strong
Gen. Denne
(For Adm. Leahy)

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CM-OUT-00356 (11/2/42) 1650Z 1aw

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AVAILABLE. EVERY TECHNICAL
EFFORT HAS BEEN TAKEN TO
INSURE LEGIBILITY.

[REDACTED]

WHL

NOV 2 1942

Consul General,
Algiers, Algeria.
To Murphy.

M-29

SIG 613-1

Unable so far to obtain French visa for Arthur G. Reed. Anticipate having visa now within few days. Reed is the man you requested to replace Gilbert as Vice Consul and Control Officer Casa. In view of delay in obtaining visa do you still desire Reed to come.

J. E. HULL,
Brig. General, G.S.C.,
Chief European Section
Theater Group, OPD, GS

Comdr. Freeman

[REDACTED]

COPY

November 2, 1942.

American Consul
Algiers, Algeria

This message for Murphy.

M-28

SIG GYB-1

Reference your seven four nine Personal for Leahy. *of Oct 31, in this folder*

It is utterly impossible to arrange for delay of operation to which we are already committed. Therefore the decision of the President is that the operation will be carried out as now planned and that you will do your utmost to secure the understanding and cooperation of the French officials with whom you are now in contact. You should explain to Flagpole that the extreme hazards involved in any leakage of our plans makes it impossible to give notice far in advance of the movement, even though we were assured, of full French cooperation. Point out to Flagpole that a premature disclosure, which is an inevitable possibility where so many people are involved, would jeopardize not only our plans but their hopes. Furthermore, TORCH represents the only hope in the predictable future for the redemption of France and it involves a tremendous Naval, shipping, air, and troop concentration. It cannot be delayed. It must be executed. Therefore there can be no change in the plan as recommended by you.

You will not repeat not divulge the date or location of landings to anybody until authorized to do so by Eisenhower.

J. E. HULL,
Brig. General, G.S.C.,
Chief European Section
Theater Group, OPD, GS

[See FRUS, 1942, II, 423]

For Admiral Leahy.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

Apr 2, 42

MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral Leahy

The enclosed messages from Eisenhower and Murphy were received during the night. They were forwarded to the President. I added the statement that I agree with Eisenhower's recommendation to proceed with the operation regardless of opposition but that I would consult with you and Admiral King immediately.

May I have your comment promptly since I anticipate a call from Hyde Park this morning? A similar communication is being sent to Admiral King.

W. H. Young
for
Chief of Staff

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By RT, NARA, Date *4/13/94*

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

November 2, 1942
1308 Z
COWD

AXWAR 4
filed 2/1220
md

WSP

P R I O R I T Y

From: London
To: Agwar

No. 4402, November 2nd, 1942

Message to Andrews for delivery to Admiral Godfrey reference your R two five eight two as follows: signed Eisenhower for Operations Division. A large American expeditionary force under my command has landed today in French North Africa.

As President Roosevelt has announced, this operation has been undertaken to forestall German and Italian plans to occupy French North Africa and use it as a base for military operations.

We come, we came in one nine one seven, to destroy our common enemy and liberate France from the invader. We shall leave the moment this task is accomplished. President Roosevelt has given solemn assurances that French sovereignty and rights in French North Africa remain intact.

We therefore hope that the French Civil Administration and the French Military, Naval and Air Forces in North Africa will join us in our common fight against the enemy, and that the day will soon come when you and the forces you command will in the name of France resume the fight by our side. Andrews should check with Admiral Harwood to insure proper

*Copy for
Admiral Leahy*

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

P R I O R I T Y

Page 2, from London, to Agwar, No. 4402
November 2nd, 1942

timing as to delivery. Harwood will deliver
British message on Signal from Admiralty here.

Eisenhower

Note: R-2582 is CM-OUT-10131 (10/30/42)OPD.

Action Copy: OPD

Info. Copies: SGS
Gen. Deane
(1 copy for Adm. Leahy)

CM-IN-00635 (11/2/42) 1444E

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INCOMING MESSAGE

AXWAR 19
FILED 2028/1
BVC

CCWD
November 1, 1942
2237 X

URGENT

From: London
To: AGWAR

No. 4373, November 1, 1942

Following message has just been received from McGowan: (for Secretary War Department General Staff for Marshall signed Eisenhower),

The Eisenhower Kingpin messenger returned last night from Marseilles reporting that it utterly impossible for Kingpin to depart until November twentieth at earliest. Flagpole supports this view.

I have had several hours heated discussions with Flagpole at end of which I am convinced we should yield on date.

I am telegraphing the President recommendation as I am convinced that Torch without favorable French High Command will be a catastrophe. The delay of two weeks unpleasant as it may be involving technical considerations of which I am ignorant is insignificant compared with result involving serious opposition of French Army to our landing.

Flagpole points out that no warning of our imminent attack was given him by Clark at conference of October twenty second which led him to believe that at least three or four weeks were available.

Our present proposition he suggests amounts to an ultimatum of hostile action. We must give Kingpin a reasonable time to prepare not merely his departure but French resistance in Northern France to designate his replacement which undoubtedly will be Delattre De Tassigny and arrange numerous details. These simply

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: London
To: AGWAR

No. 4372, November 1, 1942

PAGE 2

cannot be accomplished in four days.

Kingpin does not share opinion that Axis intervention in French North Africa is imminent. He believes desirable operation for us is a combined European and African operation in full cooperation between American and French Forces but he is willing to yield if we insist on African operation now, granted he is given a reasonable time to make his preparations.

I suggest your most serious consideration of this question as it seems to me that if you are to accept Kingpin as a partner he is entitled to three weeks notice. End of message. My comments will follow in another message soon.

Eisenhower

Action Copy: SGS

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CM-1N-00446 (11/2/42) 00312 cen

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

AXWAR 20
FILED 2130/1
BVC

CCWD
November 1, 1942
2313 Z

URGENT

From: London
To: AGWAR

No. R 4373, November 1, 1942

It is inconceivable that McGowan can recommend such a delay with his intimate knowledge of the operation and the present location of troops and convoys afloat. For Secretary War Department General Staff for Marshall signed Eisenhower. Reference my four three seven two. It is likewise inconceivable to me that our mere failure to concede to such demands as have been made would result in having the French North African Army meet us with serious opposition. Recommend the President advise McGowan immediately that his suggested action is utterly impossible in view of present advanced state of operation, and that we will proceed to execute this operation with more determination than ever. He should also be directed not to divulge on November fourth the exact date of the operation unless complete cooperation by Flagpole is assured. Submarine will remain available for the present. Will notify McGowan when it becomes necessary to withdraw it.

Eisenhower

FOOTNOTE: 4372 was CM-IN-00447 (11/1/42) SGS

Action Copy: SGS

CM-IN-00447 (11/2/42) 00312 WFO

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

AXWAR 18
2136Z/1st
efg

INCOMING MESSAGE CCWD
NOV 1, 1942
2238Z

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of JCS

From: London
To: AGWAR

Declassification Br.
By REACH Date AUG 21 1972

No. RAF 28 Nov 1, 1942

Arrangements for the handling of the Spanish by the British Government now stand as follows. This is in answer to R two five three three.

The line the British Ambassador at Madrid will take with the Spanish Government on and after D day, if, but only if, the Spanish raise the question of their aspirations in the French Zone, is that the matter is one between Spain and France which should be settled between those two countries at the appropriate moment and that meanwhile, the British Government have no intention of compromising the position of either party as a result of the present operations or in any other way. From Eisenhower to Combined Chiefs of Staff.

I have agreed with the British Government that the necessity for avoiding hostile Spanish action is so urgent that any advance to the Sebou line would have to be overlooked provided the Spaniards took no action to interfere with our military operations; no interference could, however, be tolerated with our vital lines of communication that run close to the Sebou line. It is not intended that the foregoing should be said to the Spaniards.

While the British Government feel it would do more harm than good to volunteer any statement or admonition to the Spanish Government which might raise the question of their aspirations in the French Zone, a telegram has been sent this morning to Sir S Hoare in the following sense as I suggested: The British Ambassador at Madrid has been told that recent information shows that the French are taking every precaution for the Defense of French Morocco against possible Spanish aggression, and that they should therefore be in a position successfully to deter the Spaniards. The Foreign office point out to the Ambassador that it would create a very difficult

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE Page 2

From: London
To: AGWAR No. NAF 28 Nov 1, 1942

situation for the American and British Governments if the French in North Africa appealed for help to the United Nations against the Spaniards on the basis of what is the declared United States intention of liberating and protecting French Territory in North Africa. The telegram states that the United States authorities are most anxious that everything possible be done by the British Ambassador in Madrid to dissuade the Spaniards from any rash action and that the British Government shares this view. The telegram continues that if the question is raised by the Spaniards when he makes his communication on D day, or if they give the Ambassador any indication or show any signs of making an early move against the French Zone, he should warn the Spaniards in friendly terms that he has every reason to believe that they will come up against strong French resistance and that the French would have called upon the United States Government for assistance on the grounds that we are conducting this operation for the liberation and protection of French Territory in North Africa. The Ambassador is instructed to say that neither the United States nor British Government would like to be involved in any difficulties with the Spaniards over this issue, and that we have no intention of compromising the position of either Spain or France, but by attacking the French Zone the Spanish Government would inevitably create for themselves serious complications with the United States and British Governments which they, like us, presumably wish to avoid. I request authority to instruct Hayes in the Presidents name through British Foreign Office codes to support this position.

In addition a personal telegram has been sent by Foreign office to Sir S Hoare instructing him if he sees any signs before D day of any Spanish advance into the French Zone of Morocco to stress the gravity with which the British Government would view such a move with out referring to the Torch operation, and endeavor to restrain the Spanish.

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By Authority of JCS

Declassification B.c.

By [Signature] Date AUG 21 1972

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Page 3

From: London
To: AGWAR No HAF 28 Nov 1, 1942

It seems important that when the British consul General at Tangier communicates with General Orgax on D day along the lines taken by the British Ambassador at Madrid to Franco, he should be reinforced on the American side. Therefore Childs should be brought into the Torch picture and instructed to communicate with Orgax simultaneously with the British Consul General. A message along similar lines to that delivered by our Ambassador at Madrid to Franco. Presumably in the case of Orgax, the message to be delivered by Childs should come from the Department of State rather than from the President. Childs should indicate however that the President has sent a personal message to Franco. The procedure for informing Childs of the nature of the President's message to Franco could be the same as followed for the American Ambassador at Madrid, namely, the Foreign office would telegraph the text two or three days before D day. Childs should be informed by you by telegraph, to expect a message through Gascoigne as set out in your R two five six five of October twenty nine.

Eisenhower.

R-2533 is CM-OUT-09539 (10/29/42) OPD
R-2565 is CM-OUT-09888 (10/29/42) OPD

Action Copy: CCS
Info. Copies: OPD
Adm. King
LOG

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By Authority of JCS
Declassification B.C.
By DAVE Date AUG 21 1972

CM-IN-00540 (11/2/42) 0457Z ce

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

OPD 381 TH(11-1-42)
(Limited Distribution)
Operations Division, WDGS.
European Section, WOPD
JEH

November 1, 1942

TO: C G
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

No R-2679

We have informed McGowan that we are making available immediately through our Military Attache in Bern Switzerland the 10,000,000 francs. Your 4327 October 31 for eyes of General Eisenhower only. Our message to McGowan requested he inform us identity Kingpins Finance Representative and details as to method of transfer Kingpins desired, whether in Switzerland direct from Legge, or at some point in France through Schow in Vichy.

MARSHALL

Originator: OPD
Info. Copies: Gen. Strong
Adm. Leahy

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CM-OUT-00233 (11/1/42) 1838Z law

Adm Leahy
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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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MDM 6
filed 1315Z/31
LB

INCOMING MESSAGE

Oct 31, 1942
1629Z

WAF

From: London
To: WAR

No. 4327, October 31, 1942.

I concur with McGowans proposal and suggest that immediate instructions be sent our Military Attache, Vichy, for acquisition of French France in Switzerland if available and distribution to Kingpins organization. For Operations Division. This is in reply to your R two five eight three. If time or security considerations prevent, notes could be acquired through Arragon (reliable American personally known to Admiral Leahy) of JP Morgan and Company, Chatel Guyon.

Eisenhower

Footnote: R-2583 is CM-OUT-10132 (10-30-42) OPD

Action: OPD

Information: General Strong
General Deane (For Admiral Leahy)

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CM-IN-13299 (10-31-42) 2055Z med

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By RT, NARA, Date *4/2/94*

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WAR DEPARTMENT
OPD 338 France (10/21/44) ED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE TO: General, W.D.G.S.
European Theater, OPD
October 31, 1944

Commanding General
European Theater of Operations

No. R-2671

Because of German and Italian efforts to detect our radio transmission (from McGowan for eyes of General Eisenhower only this paraphrased relay) Yankee will not be used for 2 days. Referring your October 29 via Durbar. Raichle due today. New equipment has not yet arrived and we have been overloading Yankee.

From his conversation with Clark, Flagpole clearly understands we are not planning to send troops to southern France in conjunction with special operation. The importance and great value of sending some artillery to Marseille is again emphasized by him. All of France will be occupied by the Axis immediately special operation takes place in Kings and Flagpoles opinions. According to them risks involved in sending cargos of anti-aircraft and antitank guns with ammunition in 2 escorts of cargo ships to Marseille in comparison with its importance to French army is insignificant. Resistance to the occupation of southern France by the French army is certain in Kingpins mind according to Flagpole. The resistance would be much more effective if they had this additional equipment. Such resistance would further guarantee success of the special operation by diverting Axis forces from that area. I do not wish to inform these people that we do not have the means to accomplish both operations. We must encourage them to believe that we have practically unlimited means.

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

Page 2

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Information has been given Flagpole that the special operation is imminent and set for early November as authorized by you. You should understand, according to Flagpole, that it is unwise for Kingpin to arrive here earlier than D minus 48 hours. Flagpole knows about submarine under command of Captain Wright. Flagpole said he thought it possible for Kingpin to arrange to depart by November 4th at the latest which I had urged. This is a rather close indication of date I realize but there appeared to be no other course in view of problem of getting Kingpin here in time. As soon as I have details concerning Kingpin's departure I will inform you. Please inform Durbar. We believe boat for off shore transfer will be provided by Kingpin's party.

It will be of interest to Clark to know that command of the Maison Blanche airport near Hamble has been assumed by Major Dartois

Marshall

Originator: OPD

Info. Copies: Gen. Strong
Gen. Deane
Adm. Leahy

CM-OUT-00175

(11/1/42)

0427E

cc

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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Classified Message
Received at
War Department Code Center

Date: November 2, 1942
Filed: Midnight, Oct. 31, 1942

From: ALGIERS
To: HANDY
No.: 749, October 31, 1942

Personal for Leahy to be communicated immediately. I must appeal urgently to President and yourself on following because of grave political factors involved and time element: On Oct. two two a secret conference was held between American and French officers in Algeria regarding Franco American cooperation for Torch. This conference was requested by French months ago ways and means of debarkation of American Forces in French North Africa in cooperation with French Army were discussed as also question whether General Andre Giraud would accept command French and eventually Allied Forces in area. Question of authoritative. French military leader is of essence. At conference no indication of our intentions regarding date of operation was supplied and French officers were left with impression that at least several weeks would intervene.

Confidential messenger was immediately despatched to France to inform Giraud who agreed in principle but Giraud is still ignorant of imminence of our intentions.

Messenger returned from France this evening bringing letter addressed to me by Giraud stating that American and French Armies in close liaison will assure final victory; also technical memorandum regarding Torch operation and his participation therein.

Messenger states positively that Giraud cannot depart from France by November four and Mast now fully supports this view. Latter points out after reflection that our proposition verges on the hostile because on October two two Clark gave no intimation of date of Torch but did suggest that approximately three weeks would be required between departure of first convoys and landing. Therefore he concludes that our notification to him on Oct. two nine as instructed to effect that action is imminent and submarine already on way for Giraud although French are as yet only allowed to guess date of operation amounts virtually to ultimatum.

Mast proposes that we demonstrate some confidence in Giraud if we wish him as a partner and at least be willing to give him a reasonable number of days to organize what he considers the more important part of the operation that is France.

~~SECRET~~

Printed in FRUS, 1942, II, 409-410

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4 -
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

~~SECRET~~

No. 749 from ALGIERS

Page 2

Mast and returned messenger who is a civilian with important contacts in French political and business world both insist that Giraud's departure later in November will be a natural outgrowth of a rapidly disintegrating political situation evolving in our favor and thus Giraud will not be considered dissident. Giraud has taken residence in Marseille.

I am convinced that with out French Army cooperation and the danger of its active opposition if we do not have French command with us that Torch may fail. I urgently recommend that it is not unreasonable that Giraud be given three weeks interval to perfect his metropolitan organization and arrange his departure with maximum advantage to us. Giraud is stated not to believe that Axis intervention is imminent and Mast asserts now that there is no indication of immediate Axis move. No one here doubts that Torch will lead to separation of Europe from Africa and total occupation of France. Therefore Giraud's decision is a grave one and we should go as far as we can to cooperate with him. Please reply by radio urgently.

Cole, American Consul

~~SECRET~~

Printed in ERUS, 1942, II, 409-410.

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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American Consul
Algiers, Algeria

This message for Murphy

M-27

SIG OYB-1

Inform Flagpole that ten million francs are being made available immediately through American Military Attache in Berns Switzerland for Kingpins organisation. Your 735, October 29. It is essential that we be advised identity and location of Kingpins Finance Officer or what steps Kingpin wants to take to get money into the hands of his agents. It can be handled through our Attache General Legge in Berns or through our Military Attache Colonel Schow in Vichy to whom Legge will transfer the money or Legge can transfer it direct to Kingpins representative either in Switzerland or in France. Expedite reply.

J. H. HULL,
Brig. General, G.S.C.,
Chief European Section
Theater Group, OPD, GS

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

OPD 336 France (10-31-42) ~~SECRET~~
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Signal Division, WDGS
European Section WEOFD

October 31, 1942. *WAB*

COMMANDING GENERAL
European Theater of Operations

No. R-2837

Communication has gone to McGowan requesting he advise Flagpols that we consider it highly desirable that French commanders receive instructions on D Day that incidents created by Spaniards should not be permitted to lead to retaliatory action by French until after consolidation of our forces on shore. From Marshall. Your 4149 October 28. McGowan also informed representations would be made to Franco by British on D Day. We question whether advisable to ask French not to take any action in case Spanish invade as this action by Spanish would quite probably throw entire French sympathy to us

MARSHALL

Originator: OPD

Info. Copies: Gen. Strong
Gen. Deane
(Adm. Leahy)

CM-OUT-10646 (10/31/42) 22222

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DOD DIR 1000.9 (9/27/88)

Date: 8-24-71

Signature: *RHP*
cen

Gen. Deane

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
Received at
WAR DEPARTMENT CODE CENTER

RC 19 RSF 61

Date: OCTOBER 31 1942
Filed: 1305 Z

WJZ

From: General Hull
To : Algiers
No. : None, October 31 1942

For Eisenhower Flagpole advises that Admiral Darlan in
latters confidential talk to assembled high ranking Army officers
in Algiers yesterday informed them that French Military Establish-
ment in Africa must hold itself in readiness to defend territory
against all comers but under score that in his opinion there is no
immediate threat or danger. Underscore.

Same source also states that special German and Italian ..
Armistice Commission Delegation just arrived here from Morocco are
on tour of inspection of Armistice Commission personnel. He says
Ziwy will leave here shortly for Tunis departing from there for
Europe on November four according to information conveyed by them
to French. In Flagpoles opinion we are safe at least until them.

Cole American Consul

Comdr. Truman

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
Received at
WAR DEPARTMENT CODE CENTER

Date: October 30, 1942

From: Algiers

To: General Hull

No.: RC 15 RES 58 October 30, 1942

For Eisenhower. Oct two nine midnight I have received the five signed communications from the President and I wish to comment on them and suggest several changes as soon as King Pins messenger now in Marseille arrives. He has been delayed for forty eight hours because of suspension of airplane service between Marseille and Algiers due to alleged presence of British battleforce in Mediterranean.

Message to Tognes may have to be changed because Noguez thus far refuses to take position and it may be necessary that he be sequestered on D day. In that case it is planned that he be replaced temporarily by General Bethouard commanding at Casablanca. Presidents message in that case would be amended to a less personal form and addressed simply to the Resident General without indication of persons name.

As Childs might be cut off from French Morocco thrclosing of Franco Spanish frontier I plan to have messages delivered by an officer from Casablanca. Cole in Algiers will deliver message to Chattel and Doolittle in Tunis the messages for Esteve and Bey.

Flagpole urges that no messages be delivered until after landings have been effected in order to profit by surprise as much as possible but after hearing from Kingpin tomorrow it is hoped I also plan to send you some suggestions regarding the phrasing of your proclamation as well as the text of a message to Kingpin replying to his appeal for American assistance.

Cole American Consul

[REDACTED]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
Received at
War Department Code Center

Date: October 31, 1942
Filed: NPT

MSB

From: ALGIERS
To : HANDY
No. : RC 36 OCTOBER 31, 1942

FOR EISENHOWER FLAGPOLE WOULD LIKE CLARK TO KNOW THAT FIRST OPERATION AGAINST BONE SHOULD TAKE PLACE AT HERBILL ON ABOUT ONE FIVE REPEAT ONE FIVE KILOMETERS NORTH WEST OF BONE. HE SAYS THERE WILL BE NO RESISTANCE AT THIS POINT. A DEBARKATION MAY BE MADE REGARDLESS OF WINTER WEATHER. THIS POINT COMMANDS ROAD CONNECTING BONE AND PHILIPPEVILLE. HE EMPHASIZES THAT PART OF BONE SHOULD BE TAKEN FROM REAR. COLONEL LOBBERT IN COMMAND OF GARRISON AT BONE IS IN FLAGPOLES CONFIDENCE AND WILL EXPECT AMERICAN TROOPS. IT WOULD SEEM ADVISABLE TO USE AT LEAST A SMALL UNIT OF AMERICAN TROOPS AT THAT POINT. FLAGPOLE ALSO WISHES CLARK TO KNOW THAT ALL ARRANGEMENTS PERFECTED FOR FRIENDLY RECEPTION AT SIDI BERRUCH AND ADJOINING BEACHES. BATTERY AND ALL DEFENDED POSITIONS AT THAT POINT FLAGPOLE STATES ARE WITH HIM AND HE HOPES THAT OUR FORCES WILL BE PARTICULARLY CAREFUL NOT TO START FIRING THERE. HE POINTS OUT THAT IT IS ALWAYS POSSIBLE THAT ON THE FRENCH SIDE AN EXCITED ARAB MIGHT ACCIDENTALLY DISCHARGE A RIFLE WHICH SHOULD BE IGNORED.

FLAGPOLE ALSO REFERS TO HIS CONVERSATION WITH CLARK AND HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT WE SHALL TRY TO SEND AMERICAN FORCE TO FLAGPOLES NINETEENTH DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS ON NORTHERN SIDE OF ALGIERS IF POSSIBLE BY DAWN ON DOG DAY.

-1-

[REDACTED]

Cond. Freeman

RC 36 FROM ALGIERS OCTOBER 31, 1942

PAGE TWO

FLAGPOLE ALSO WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COOPERATION IN OBTAINING ASSIGNMENT OF COLONEL CRANE FORMERLY MILITARY ATTACHE TOKYO AS LIAISON WITH FLAGPOLE.

FLAGPOLE INSISTS THAT AN EFFORT BE MADE TO SEND LIAISON OFFICERS DISCUSSED WITH CLARK (YOUR TWENTY NINTH). HE UNDERSTANDS THE RISK ENTAILED IN SENDING THEM IF NECESSARY WITH THE FIRST DELIVERY OF SMALL ARMS BUT SUGGEST THAT THIS POINT WE SHOULD BE WILLING TO ASSUME.

Cole

American Consul

C
O
P
Y

[REDACTED]
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
Received at
WAR DEPARTMENT CODE CENTER

Date: November 1, 1942
Filed: N F T

From: Algiers
To: Handy
No. : R C 30, October 31, 1942.

FOR EISENHOWER YOUR OCT TWO NINE VIA GIBRALTER I WILL REFRAIN FROM USING YANKEE FOR TWO DAYS DUE TO GERMAN AND ITALIAN EFFORTS TO DETECT OUR WIRELESS TRANSMISSION. WE HAVE BEEN OVERLOADING YANKEE AND OUR NEW EQUIPMENT HAS NOT YET ARRIVED HERE. RAICHLIE DUE HERE TODAY. FLAGPOLE CLEARLY UNDERSTANDS FROM HIS CONVERSATION WITH CLARK THAT WE DO NOT PLAN TO SEND EFFECTIVES TO SOUTHERN FRANCE COINCIDENT WITH TORCH. HE ASKS ME AGAIN TO INSIST WITH YOU ON THE IMPORTANCE AND GREAT VALUE OF SENDING SOME ARTILLERY TO MARSEILLE. IN KINGS AND HIS OPINION THE AXIS WILL OCCUPY ALL OF FRANCE IMMEDIATELY TORCH TAKES PLACE. THEY INSIST THAT THE RISK OF SENDING POSSIBLY TWO ESCORTED CARGO SHIPS WITH CARGOS OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT AND ANTI-TANK GUNS AND AMMUNITION TO MARSEILLE IS INSIGNIFICANT IN COMPARISON WITH ITS IMPORTANCE TO THE FRENCH ARMY. FLAGPOLE SAYS KINGPIN IS ASSURED THE FRENCH ARMY WILL OFFER RESISTANCE TO THE OCCUPATION OF SOUTHERN FRANCE. IF THEY HAVE THIS ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT THAT RESISTANCE WOULD BE GREATLY ENHANCED AND WOULD DIVERT AXIS EFFECTIVES AND MATERIAL FROM THE TORCH AREA THUS SUPPLYING FURTHER GUARANTEE OF ITS SUCCESS. YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THAT I DONT WISH TO INFORM THESE PEOPLE THAT OUR MEANS ARE TOO LIMITED FOR BOTH OPERATIONS AS WE MUST ENCOURAGE THEM IN THE BELIEF THAT OUR MEANS ARE PRACTICALLY UNLIMITED.

- 1 -

Comdr. Freeman

R C 30 FROM ALGIERS OCTOBER 31, 1942

PAGE TWO

IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR AUTHORIZATION FLAGPOLE HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT OPERATION IS IMMINENT AND SET FOR EARLY NOVEMBER. HE HAS ALSO BEEN INFORMED REGARDING SUBMARINE UNDER CAPTAIN WRIGHTS COMMAND. FLAGPOLE WISHES YOU TO UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS UNWISE FOR KINGPIN TO ARRIVE HERE LONGER THAN FORTY EIGHT HOURS BEFORE OPERATION. I URGED THAT KINGPIN ARRANGE TO DEPART NOVEMBER FOUR LATEST. FLAGPOLE SAID HE THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE. I REALIZE THAT ^{IT IS} THIS/RATHER CLOSE INDICATION OF DATE BUT AT THIS STAGE IN VIEW OF THE DELICATE BUSINESS OF GETTING KINGPIN OVER HERE THERE SEEMED NO OTHER COURSE. YOU WILL BE INFORMED OF DETAILS OF KINGPINS DEPARTURE AS SOON AS AVAILABLE. IT IS BELIEVED THAT HIS PARTY WILL PROVIDE BOAT FOR OFF SHORE TRANSFER. PLEASE INFORM GIBRALTAR.

COLE

AMERICAN CONSUL

- 2 -

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

[REDACTED]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
Received at
WAR DEPARTMENT CODE CENTER

Date: November 1, 1942

Filed: N F T

From: ALGIERS

To : HANDY

No. : NO NUMBER OCTOBER 31, 1942

FOR EISENHOWER CLARK WILL BE INTERESTED TO KNOW THAT MAJOR
DARTOIS HAS NOW ASSUMED COMMAND OF THE MAISON BLANCHE AIRPORT
NEAR ALGIERS.

COLE
AMERICAN CONSUL

Comdr Freeman

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT

OPD 311.23 ~~(10-30-42)~~ CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

OPERATIONS DIVISION, WDGS
European Theater, WOPD

October 30, 1942.

COMMANDING GENERAL
European Theater of Operations

No. R 2582

Both Admiral Leahy and I question the propriety of sending a message from the President to Admiral Godfrey in view of his subordinate position and the fact that he is now under British control. We concur with the view that the British Government should dispatch the message you indicate.

It is suggested that a message from you as Allied Commander might be dispatched to Admiral Godfrey through the US Commander in the Middle East. The propriety of such a message would not be questioned. Lieutenant General Frank M Andrews is now enroute to Middle East and is expected to arrive there about November 4 to assume command. He was informed concerning Torch prior to departure. From Marshall. The War Department will transmit such message as you may desire to send together with necessary instructions to Andrews. For Gen. Eisenhower's eyes alone. Information re Andrews is still confidential and has not been announced.

MARSHALL

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UNCLASSIFIED

Originator: OPD

Info. Copies: Gen. Deane
(Adm. Leahy)

CM-OUT-10131 (10/30/42) 1750Z cen



U.S. Army, War Department
European Theater of Operations

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

[REDACTED]
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
Received at
WAR DEPARTMENT CODE CENTER

Date: October 30, 1942

From: Algiers
To: General Hull
No: No number October 30, 1942.

Your M twenty three twenty ninth we will be able to obtain supplemental operator for Recca locally but if necessary it will no doubt be possible to smuggle Haggood in.

Cole American Consul

[REDACTED]

MIL

Censul General,
Algiers, Algeria.

For Murphy.

11-26

Please advise FLAGPOLE that we consider it highly desirable that French commanders be given instructions on D day that incidents on the part of the Spanish, however provocative, should not be permitted to lead to retaliatory action on the part of the French until after the consolidation of the American forces on shore.

From Leahy. Eisenhower is requesting British to make similar representations to Franco on D day.

J. E. HULL,
Brig. General, G.S.C.,
Chief European Section
Theater Group, OPD, GS

Comdr. Duesman

[REDACTED]

Printed in FRUS, 1942, II, 410.

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

SECRET

Consul General,
Algiers, Algeria.

For Murphy.

WHL

M-25 Relayed to you following message from Eisenhower. "Have you received the five signed communications from the President to local officials and personalities? If not have you assurances that you will receive them in ample time? Have you made arrangements to make delivery approximately at the same time in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco? This delivery should coincide with H dash hour as nearly as possible but in any event it must not be before H dash hour. How much advance notice of final H dash hour, which may vary with weather and other causes, will you require to affect delivery in all places? A signal can be sent to you by Eddy from Gibraltar when final H dash hour is known. Signed Eisenhower would communication be more certain if Eddy sent notification of Rabat delivery direct? This would go to Tangier if Child is to make it or to Casablanca if Russel is to do so."

J. E. HULL,
Brig. General, G.S.C.,
Chief European Section
Theater Group, OPD, GS

Copy for Commander Freseman, White House.

**REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED**

[REDACTED]

Date: OCTOBER 30, 1942

Filed: 4 PM OCT 29

From: ALGIERS

To : HANDY

No. : 736 OCTOBER 29, 1942

WRB

FOR EISENHOWER I AM INFORMED BY ONE OF KINGPINS STAFF OFFICERS THAT ONE CONSIDERATION LATTER HAS IN MIND CONNECTED WITH HIS EVENTUAL DEPARTURE IS THE FINANCING OF THE MILITARY GROUP WHICH WILL REMAIN IN FRANCE. CONTACT INQUIRES WHETHER I COULD PROVIDE NOW BANK OF FRANCE NOTES TEN MILLIONS TO BE DEPOSITED WITH KINGPINS ORGANIZATION IN FRANCE. THEY FEAR THAT AFTER RUPTURE GROUP MAY BE WITHOUT FUNDS INCIDENT TO CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN FRANCE. I SUGGEST THAT OUR MILITARY ATTACHE IN VICHY BE PROVIDED WITH THE ABOVE MENTIONED SUM WHICH COULD BE OBTAINED IN SWITZERLAND AND GIVEN TO KINGPINS ORGANIZATION BEFORE THE EVENTUAL DEPARTURE OF OUR EMBASSY STAFF FROM VICHY. PLEASE COMMENT.

COLE

AMERICAN CONSUL

Copy for Commander Freseman.

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

WAL

Robert D. Murphy,
Consul General,
Algiers, Algeria.

For Murphy.

M-23 On Tuesday November 3rd Norman Haggood will arrive by air from Lisbon as consular clerk in Tangier. He is relief operator for Rebeca. Impossible to obtain French visa here in time to enable him to proceed to final destination prior to D day. Eisenhower is advising you Haggood not repeat not available for job and Brown must do it alone. Felt here however that he may be of assistance and in case of necessity could be gotten through to destination by taking emergency measures. From Marshall. Return him to Gibraltar when need for him is over or have him join nearest unit after D dash day.

J. E. HULL,
Brig. General, G.S.C.,
Chief European Section
Theater Group, OPD, GS

Copy for Commander Freseman, White House.

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

WAC

Consul General,
Algiers, Algeria.

To Murphy.

M-24 Your query of October 29 regarding liaison officers for Algiers and Oran has been relayed to Eisenhower. We have been unable to get French visa for Delaney in time for him to arrive Casablanca prior to D day. He will remain here unless you have need for him after D day.

J. E. HULL,
Brig. General, G.S.C.,
Chief European Section
Theater Group, OPD, GS

COPY FOR COMMANDER FRESEMAN
[REDACTED]

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

SECRET

Robert D. Murphy,
Consul General,
Algiers, Algeria.

WES

To Murphy from Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD

M-22

SIG GYS-1

Substance of message from Eisenhower is as follows: Settle details of arms shipments direct with Gibraltar Yankee wireless. Twenty four hours watch will be kept by this set at Gibraltar. Confirmation of availability of ten radio sets will be sent you later. Marshall. Delivery will be made if possible by any means.

J. E. HULL,
Brig. General, G.S.C.,
Chief European Section
Theater Group, OPD, GS

Comdr Truman

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UNCLASSIFIED**

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
Received at
WAR DEPARTMENT CODE CENTER

Date: October 29 1942
Filed: _____

From: Algiers, Algeria
To : General Hull
No. : Unnumbered 1942

WAR

Have requested Atherton State Department
facilitate Norman Hapgoods departure. Suggest
someone call on Atherton to push matter.

Cole

[REDACTED]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
Received at
WAR DEPARTMENT CODE CENTER

Date: October 29, 1942

Filed: _____

From: Algiers, Algeria


To : General Hull

No. : _____ 1942

WAZ

For Eisenhower. I should like to remind Clark of Flagpoles suggestion for the assignment of one liaison officer each to Algiers and Oran as Consular clerks. When I left Washington General Hull was providing Delaney as a Consular clerk in Casablanca for same purpose but I am without news of his arrival. Please comment.

Cole

 *WSP*
Date October 29, 1942.

Filed 28/4:00 PM

From: ALGIERS

To: HANDY

No.: 829 OCTOBER 28, 1942

YOUR M ONE NINE TWENTY SEVENTH CAREFUL SEARCH MADE OF BRACH
BUT MUSETTE BAG NOR WRECKAGE OF CANOE NOT FOUND. CONTENTS
OF LETTERS NOT ESPECIALLY COMPROMISING AND THEY DID NOT RELATE
TO TORCH.

COLE
AMERICAN CONSUL

Copy for Commander Freseman



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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

AXVAR 17
Filed 281635z
EVA

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

CWD
October 28, 1942
1 930z

INCOMING MESSAGE

WDB

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of JCS

Declassification BC

By RAH/BJ Date AUG 21 1972

From: London

To: Agwar

No. NAF 25, October 28, 1942

British Foreign Office proposes to transmit a message to Admiral Godfroy Commanding French Squadron at Alexandria on D day. For Combined Chiefs of Staff. Text has been approved by Prime Minister. Message will be delivered to Godfroy by Admiral Harwood upon receipt of go ahead signal from this Headquarters.

Foreign Office believes that British message should be followed by a similar one on behalf of United States Government to be delivered by United States Minister in Cairo or by a senior United States Army or Navy Officer. I concur in that recommendation. If decision is made to send American message to Godfroy, I can arrange for go ahead signal to be given by this Headquarters to American Representative through British Admiralty and Admiral Harwood.

Text of message follows: "As the President of the United States has announced the Axis powers are planning to occupy French North Africa and to use this territory as a base for their military operations. The United Nations have therefore been compelled to forestall the Axis plans and a United States Expeditionary Force has accordingly landed today in great strength in French North Africa.

This action has the full support of his Majesty's Government who are at one with the United States Government as regards both the conduct and the purpose of the operations.

cc of S
7
WDB

~~SECRET~~

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

Page **INCOMING MESSAGE**

From: London

To: Agwar

No. NAF 25, October 28, 1942

It is the declared intention of the United Nations to respect French Sovereignty in Algeria and French administration in Morocco and Tunisia. No interference in existing French Civil Administration is contemplated and the forces which are being landed in these territories will be withdrawn as soon as the military need for their presence no longer exists.

It is the confident belief of the United Nations that the operation now in progress is the first great step towards the final liberation of France from the Axis powers. They therefore hope that the French Civil Administration and French Military forces in North Africa will now work actively side by side with them in the fight against the Axis and thus hasten the day of liberation of France.

The Mediterranean fleet, together with all the fleets of the Allied Navies, hope that, when circumstances allow, you and the ships of force X will resume the fight once more against the Axis forces. Meanwhile, they confidently expect that you will continue loyally to conform to the existing arrangements."

Eisenhower

Action Copy: CC of S

Info. Copies: OPD
Adm. King
LOG

CM-IN-12154 (10/29/42) 0154Z 1aw

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By Authority of JCS

Declassification Br.

By RMR Date AUG 21 1972

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
Received at
WAR DEPARTMENT CODE CENTER

Date: October 27, 1942
Filed: -----

From: ALGIERS
To : HANDY (FOR EISENHOWER)
No. : 727 OCTOBER 27, 1942

For Eisenhower I am asked by Flagpole to remind Clark of his understanding that five days advance notice of date of operation would be given. Also that when we enter into zone of alert that is when convoys depart that our friends be so informed. The reason for this he repeats is that Kingpin is in France virtually in charge of French General Staff and simply cannot liquidate everything in five minutes. Flagpole estimates that eight to ten days would be necessary for Kingpin to make his arrangements as he must contact before his departure many officers on active duty in France. Clark now fully realizes after his visit here the trying problem of communication and transport which slows down preliminary arrangements. Therefore we should be as liberal as possible in the matter of advance notice. Flagpole also again emphasized importance of bridgehead in Southern France saying our action to be effective would of necessity have to coincide with operation in North Africa.

COLE
AMERICAN CONSUL

Carole Freeman

[REDACTED]

Robert D. Murphy
Consul General
Algiers, Algeria.

WLB

For Murphy.

M-21

On suggestion of Holmes the second man to operate the Rebecca equipment was trained in U.K. and returned here. Experiencing considerable difficulty with State Department obtaining necessary papers and visa. Suggest you communicate the State Department through your normal channels, recommending action be taken to send Norman Haggood to you as his services urgently needed. Marshall.

Comdr. Freeman

3

October 27, 1942.

American Consulate,
Algiers, Algeria.

WHL

This message for Murphy

SIG OYB-1

M-20

Herewith is relay of message from Eisenhower. Message begins:

1. Commander-in-Chief has approved your draft letter to Kingpin subject to change in last paragraph. Second sentence which starts with "However, during the initial phases" and ends with "while the operation is in progress" has been deleted and the following substituted therefor: "However, during those phases of the operation that involve the landing, establishing the security of French North Africa, and providing the necessary bases, it is considered essential that the American Command and organization which has been set up with so much effort and difficulty for this special operation, should remain unchanged repeat unchanged. By the time this has been accomplished it is to be assumed that the French Forces, reinforced by the materiel support provided by the Allied Nations will be sufficiently strong to insure the complete security of French territory. Hereafter the primary interest of the American Commander lies in the use of the area as a base of further operations against the Axis, and the defense of French North Africa will be turned over to French Command." The rest of the letter remains unchanged.

2. I request urgently that you expedite news of Kingpin's decision.

If favorable, furnish complete details for his evacuation. This evacuation

Printed in FRUS, 1942, II, 406, [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

This message for Murphy

October 27, 1942.

must occur very soon. It is impossible for American submarine to arrive in time. I have therefore arranged for British submarine, under American command, to stand by at Gibraltar and proceed on short notice when orders are received from me.

3. Assuming that agreements reached at our conference are confirmed and that you remain convinced of integrity of individuals, you are authorized to notify Kingpin or Flagpole on November 4 of the assault date and of the name of the Commander-in-Chief. Flagpole is acceptable as ^ADeputy to Commander-in-Chief, whether or not Kingpin accepts invitation.

4. In event of postponement of assault date, plans are being prepared to insure that you will be notified.

Message ends here.

MARSHALL

J. E. HULL,
Brig. General, G.S.C.,
Chief European Section
Theater Group, OPD, GS

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

October 26, 1942.

Mr. Robert L. Murphy,
American Consul General,
Algiers, Algeria.

For Murphy from Handy.

M-18

Word received Clark returned safely. Your 723 relayed to
Eisenhower.

MARSHALL

J. E. HULL,
Brig. General, G.S.C.,
Chief European Section
Theater Group, OFD, GS

[REDACTED]

Copy for Commander Freseman

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

SECRET

Consul General
Algiers, Algeria

To Murphy coming from Randy

M-17
SIG OYB-1

LETTERS HANDED TO JULIUS BY YOU WERE LOST WHEN CANOE
HE WAS IN BROKE UP PERIOD WEIGHTED MUSNETTE BAG CONTAINING
LETTERS MAY HAVE FALLEN OUT PERIOD MARSHALL PERIOD CANOE
MAY DRIFT TO SHORE PERIOD BEACH SHOULD BE SEARCHED
IMMEDIATELY

HULL

ST ST HULL,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
Chief European Staff
Theater Group, 1950-52

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Copy for Commander Freseman

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
Received at
WAR DEPARTMENT CODE CENTER

Date: OCTOBER 26 1942
Filed: 3 PM

From: MURPHY
To: HANDY
No. : 725 1942

WHS

For Eisenhower Messenger sent to France after Flagpoles meeting with Clark CMNHU reports that Kingpin agrees in principle to our proposition. He asks that we continue study of his idea of establishing a bridgehead in Southern France. I am also informed under promise that it is for my personal information only and not as yet for communication to you that Kingpin will be willing to come to Africa for the operation. The reason for the stricture on communication to you of this information is that messenger left here last Friday morning by plane before I was able to give him the text of the letter of proposal approve by Clark and myself in agreement with Flagpole. Therefore, Kingpin did not have before him this text but merely an oral account of the morning meeting between Clark and Flagpole. On that preliminary basis he agrees subject to consideration of the text which should be delivered to him this morning by a second messenger.

COLE

Condé Preseman

~~SECRET~~
Printed in FRUS, 1942, II, 405

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

SECRET

OPD 381 TH (10-26-42) WAR DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS DIVISION
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER WDGS
European Section WDOPT

OUTGOING MESSAGE

October 26, 1942

COMMANDING GENERAL
European Theater of Operations
London, England

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

No. R-2416

Message just received from McGowan follows: The meeting with Clark and party has galvanized the local element and inspired real hope on their part that timely American aid is not an illusion.

A supply of small arms has been foremost in our discussions since the meeting as these deliveries entail risk of accidental disclosure.

Believing that American intervention was still fairly remote group was inclined to postpone delivery date. Now they realize there is no time to lose and I shall suggest shortly several points on the Algerian Coast where these deliveries may be made, with an indication of quantities.

Plan to occupy fort and city of Algiers would also be implemented if I could be supplied with 10 portable radio telephones similar to the radio telephone left with me by British Submarine Officer accompanying Clark. It is model (*) 3217 W/T set type 67. Group plans to cut all telephone communications 2 hours before H hour. They want radio telephones to communicate instructions to different elements over metropolitan area. Can these be sent at once from Gibraltar?

I sincerely hope Clark and party arrived safely. Please inform Clark that police incident which marred end of visit turned out to be innocuous. It resulted from over zealousness of local police official no embarrassing consequences for us are apparent but our friends ask that Clark be informed they regret exceedingly that he and his party were discommoded. End of message first word describing above radio telephone garbled. Came in as QTNA or WUYU. This is being serviced.

We are notifying McGowan above message relayed to you and that Clarks party returned safely

Action Copy: OPD
Info. Copies: Adm Leahy
Gen. Strong
CM-OUT-08745 (10/26/42) 1805z cen

MARSHALL

admiral Leahy

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
OPD 381 TH (10/26/42) CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Operations Division, WDGS
Washington, D.C. WDOFD
October 26, 1942

The Commanding General
European Theater of Operations

No. R-2435

The proposal made by the British Foreign Secretary with respect to the delivery of the President's message to General Franco and General Carmona as outlined in your RAF 23 October 25, 1942 is approved by the President. This is for General Eisenhower. We will transmit the exact text of the 2 communications to you in separate messages with the understanding that they will be sent by the British Foreign Office to the British Ambassadors at Madrid and Lisbon who in turn will transmit them to the American Ambassador in Madrid and the American Minister in Lisbon for delivery to the parties concerned. It is also understood that you will arrange for a suitable go ahead signal to insure delivery at the proper time.

Information is desired as to whether British codes will be compromised should the President release an exact copy of these communications to the press after they have been delivered to the heads of the Spanish and Portuguese governments

Marshall

Originator: OPD

Info. Copies: Adm. Leahy
Gen. Deane

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

CM-OUT-08876
Limited

(10/26/42)

2308Z

cc

Adm.
Sheahy

~~SECRET~~
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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

[REDACTED]

Date October 25, 1942

Filed 9:30 PM

From MURPHY
To HANDY
No 723, October 25, 1942

WAZ

For Eisenhower the meeting with Clark and party has galvanized the local element and inspired real hope on their part that timely American aid is not an illusion.

A supply of small arms has been foremost in our discussions since the meeting as these deliveries entail risk of accidental disclosure. Believing that American intervention was still fairly remote group was inclined to postpone delivery date. Now they realize there is no time to lose and I shall suggest shortly several points on the Algerian Coast where these deliveries may be made, with an indication of quantities.

Plan to occupy Fort and City of Algiers would also be implemented if I could be supplied with ten portable radio telephones similar to the radio telephone left with me by British submarine officer accompanying Clark. It is model (*) three two one seven W slant T set type six seven. Group plans to cut all telephone communications two hours before H hour. They want radio telephones to communicate instructions to different elements over metropolitan area. Can these be sent at once from Gibraltar.

[REDACTED]

Page 2.

From: Murphy

To: Handy

No. 723, October 25, 1942

I sincerely hope Clark and party arrived safely. Please inform Clark that police incident which marred end of visit turned out to be innocuous. It resulted from over-zealousness of local police official no embarrassing consequences for us are apparent but our friends ask that Clark be informed they regret exceedingly that he and his party were discommoded.

Cole, American Consul

* Came QZMA OR WUYU. This is being serviced.
CCWD

~~SECRET~~

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CODE CENTER

Date October 23, 1942

Time 1005

From Algiers

To General Hull

Number _____ Dated October 23, 1942

Clark party departed from rendezvous place at 5:20 A.M.
October 23. Departure delayed due to heavy surf and
effected only with greatest difficulty and risk.

Cole, American Consul

Comdr Treuman

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

AKWAR 24
221710Z
CE

October 22, 1942
CCWD
2113Z

*23 Oct.
President has
been
seen
WAZ*

From: London

To: AGWAR

#NAF 20, October 22, 1942

The British Government propose to issue a statement on the opening of Torch in support of the President's broadcast to Franch and French North Africa. For ~~Combined~~ Chiefs of Staff. The text follows:

"In a broadcast to Frenchmen the President of the United States of America has announced the arrival of American Forces in French Africa.

He has explained that their purpose is to free French Territory from the threat of occupation by the Axis and that the United Nations are striving not only for their own safe future but also for the restoration of the ideals, the liberties and the democracy of all those who have lived under the Tricolor.

He has issued an appeal to all Frenchmen to help towards the execution of this great purpose and to hasten the day of peace.

His Majesty's Government subscribe in full to the policy and the ideals of the President's statement.

The United States action is undertaken with the

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By RDW Date AUG 21 1972

*CC of 8
7*

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

Page Two
#NAF 20

From: London

full support and cooperation of His Majestys Government.

His Majestys Government have but one desire in relation to France, and that is to hasten the day when Frenchmen everywhere will join together to restore the independence and greatness of France.

The operation initiated by the United Nations in North Africa marks a step forward towards that day."

Eisenhower

Action Copy: CC of S

Info. Copies: OPD
COMINCH
Log

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By RH/RS AUG 21 1972

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CODE CENTER

Date October 21, 1942
Time 1335Z

From Algiers, Algeria

To General Hull

Number _____ Dated October 21, 1942

In accordance with my six seven zero October
fourteen and six eight two October sixteen and
your three two two October seventeen our party
waited throughout Tuesday night at appointed
place with signal showing from eleven P.M. to
six A.M. visibility and weather perfect. In
absence of other instructions we shall repeat
this procedure Thursday October twenty second

WSTB

Cole, American Consul

Copy for Commander Freseman.

WAR DEPARTMENT

CODE CENTER

Date October 21, 1942

Time 1534Z

From Algiers

To General Hull

Number _____ Dated October 21, 1942

WAL

King has received a message for me from the Director of Public Security in French Morocco to the effect that the French authorities intercepted a message said to have been sent by the German Consul General in Casablanca to Berlin October 17 urging Germany occupation of French Morocco on the ground that collaboration on with the local authorities is impossible.

Cole, American Consul

Copy for Commander Freseman

WAR DEPARTMENT
CODE CENTER

WTC

Date OCTOBER 21, 1942

TIME 5:22 PM

From ALGERIA


To GENERAL HULL

Number 707 Dated OCTOBER 21, 1942

DISREGARD MY SEVEN ZERO THREE OCTOBER TWO ONE NINE AM SENT
BEFORE RECEIPT OF YOUR THREE THREE NINE OCTOBER TWO ZERO
SIX PM. CONFIRM TO CLARK THAT OUR PARTY WILL AWAIT AT HOUSE
OF RENDESVOUS FROM TWO ONE ZERO ZERO HOURS OCTOBER TWO ONE
UNTIL DAWN OCTOBER TWO TWO

COLE
AMERICAN CONSUL

COPY


WAR DEPARTMENT

FCH

CODE CENTER

Date October 20, 1942

Time 200230Z

From Algiers, Algeria

To Secretary of State for War Department

Number 700 Dated October 20, 1942

For Carter reference our conversation regarding treasury license for the transfer from blocked currency account to gold of five million ninety eight thousand dollars credit to The State Bank of Morocco with the French American Banking Corporation. After my conversation with the Director General of The State Bank of Morocco I recommend that favorable action be taken by the treasury department.

It is understood that Bank's representative in New York, Maurice Boyer will renew application for licenses to Treasury Department.

COLE

"COPY FOR COMMANDER FREEMAN"


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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CODE CENTER

RC1 RFS22 Date October 20, 1942
ech Time 202000Z
From Algiers Algeria
To Secretary of State for War Department
Number Dated October 20, 1942

Secret. I have had two confidential visits from Major Dorange the personal aid of General Juin Commanding in French Africa. He called at his request to inform me that Juin is Exercised over the grave possibility of an Axis provocation in Tunisia. In brief he wished to know what our attitude would be in event French authorities should request American aid to meet eventual Axis aggression. The officer said among other things that with the consolidation of the German position on the Volga it would soon be possible for the Germans to release aviation and other material and effectives for operations in the Mediteranean; That Kesselring disposes at present of approximately twelve hundred planes in the Mediterranean area; That Rommel would not be able to undertake an offensive before December First because he is encountering not only great transport difficulties but also because of the limitations of port facilities in Libya *s here Tripoli, Tobruk, and Benghazi offer but meagre possibilities, that the temptation of the Tunisia ports of Bizerta, Sousse and Sfax assumes ever greater proportions, there is evidence that the Axis is pushing the Arab element in Tunisia to a point where disorders may occur

Printed in FRUS, 1942, II, 398-400

Cindi Freeman

Page two from Algiers R01 RFS22

which would provide Axis necessary pretext to intervene and occupy Tunisian ports.

Officer said that Juin's orders are to resist and that he intended to do so, but that he doubted whether some elements in Vichy would back him. He believed that Darlan would. Juin will discuss these matters in Algiers next week with Darlan.

Juin's purpose according to his aide was discreetly to inquire what the American attitude would be in such an eventuality, would be willing and able to support the French authorities in North Africa if they undertook resistance and particularly whether we should be able to send aviation rapidly. He inquired also whether I had the necessary authorization to conduct preliminary conversations.

I replied that I had such authority and I referred to the president's announced policy regarding France. I also referred to Darlan's suggestion made to Admiral Leahy to the effect that when the United States would be able to send five hundred thousand men and several thousand tanks and planes to Marseille, to talk to him. I said that while I did not pretend to be in the secret of our General Staff I felt reasonably sure that we now are able to do such without specifying any limitation of time necessary for such an operation. The officer said that General Juin felt that an accord in principle should be ^{esyeels} reached with us, but that everyone dreaded the danger of a leak and immediate reaction by the Axis before we would be ready to move. According to the

ed FRUS, #42, II, 398-400

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Page three from Algiers RCL RFS22

officer General Juin will suggest to Darlan that either Juin or Nogues be authorized to negotiate with me and also authorized to act immediately and without qualifications in case of an Axis provocation. In the officers opinion Darlan would in latter come to North Africa.

In this same connection I believe we should not overlook the memorandum which Darlan is supposed to have initialed in one June four one approving the use of Tunisian bases which was opposed by Weygand and not approved by Petain. That memorandum is supposed to be in German hands. I took pains to make it clear that Darlan should be informed that Juin and not I took the initiative because I feel that with Darlan we should be cautious and avoid appearance that we wish to precipitate matters here. I have refrained from personal discussion with Juin, but his aide suggested it might be necessary during the next few days and I shall probably talk with him after he has seen Darlan if the letters visit takes place. Darlans son has just fallen ill of infantile paralysis and is in an Algiers hospital. Inform Leahy, Clebedor

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inted in FRUS, 1942, II, 392-400

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

SECRET

Mr. Robert D. Murphy
Consul General
Algiers, Algeria

For Murphy from Handy

SIG 07B-1

M-15 your unnumbered message October 21, we repeat information given you in our number M-14 this date Clark enroute for rendezvous Wednesday night October 21/22. If you fail to make contact Wednesday night repeat rendezvous Thursday night October 22/23. Marshall. Please acknowledge.

WA

J. E. HULL,
Brig. General, G.S.C.,
Chief European Section
Theater Group, GFD, GS

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Comdr Freeman

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

W.H.L.

AXWAR 9
filed 1500Z/20
LB

Oct 20, 1942
1341Z

OCT 20 1942

P R I O R I T Y



From: London
To: AGWAR

No. 3833, October 20, 1942.

MSG.

British Ambassador at Madrid has emphasized the value of Brazilian support for the operation. For General Marshall. He has been told that security considerations prevent any communication being made to the Brazilian Government in advance. British Foreign Secretary suggests that it would be useful if some token Brazilian Liaison Mission could be rushed to my Headquarters as soon as possible after operations commence and if Brazilian Ambassadors at Madrid and Lisbon could be instructed to follow up and support the representations made to the Spanish and Portuguese Governments by the American and British Representatives on D dash Day.

I do not concur that a Brazilian Liaison Mission should be attached to my Headquarters. I feel that such a gesture would have little if any influence on Spanish attitude and the Mission would in any event only arrive after critical early days in which presumably Spanish policy will be determined. Such a step might also prove unwelcome to the French and it would certainly open the doors for requests to send similar Missions from our other Latin American Allies. It would also probably arouse some resentment on part of latter, that they did not receive an invitation to send

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INCOMING MESSAGE

No. 3833, Oct/20/42 From: London Page TWO

a Mission simultaneusly with Brazil.

I do concur that through our Ambassador at Rio, an effort be made around D dash one to have strong message sent by President Vargas to the Spanish and Portugese Governments on D dash Day, expressing full approval of the operation and emphasizing its importance in forestalling Axis threat to Western Hemisphere. Similar steps might be taken at other Latin American Capitals, depending on chances of success and state of their relations.

Eisenhower

Action Copy: OPD

Info Copies: SGS
General Patton
Log
General Strong

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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Mr. Robert D. Murphy
Consul General
Algiers, Algeria

SIG CYS-1

M-16 Present rate temporary only. Represents compromise several views. Prompt arrangement with our friends will make possible adjustment of rate satisfactory to all concerned. Attitude here will be guided largely by your recommendations, local conditions and desire to satisfy local people. Any change should be made earliest practicable date. Have made necessary representations to treasury regarding license for transfer blocked currency account.

Carter. Marshall.

WAL

Comdr. Roseman

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MR ROBERT D MURPHY

CONSUL GENERAL

ALGIERS ALGERIA

FOR MURPHY FROM HANDY

SIG GYB-1

M-14 IN MESSAGE EISENHOWER REQUESTS YOUR PARTY BE READY FOR RENDEZVOUS ALL NIGHT OCTOBER TWENTY ONE SLANT TWENTY TWO AND REPEAT RENDEZVOUS FOLLOWING NIGHT IF NECESSARY Period IN YOUR MESSAGE OF OCTOBER FIFTEEN YOU SUGGESTED MEETING FOR NIGHT OF OCTOBER TWENTY ONE SLANT TWENTY TWO Period PLANS HAVE BEEN BASED ON THIS DATE AND CLARK HAS DEPARTED FROM GIBRALTAR FOR RENDEZVOUS Period WE RELAYED YOUR MESSAGE OF OCTOBER NINETEEN TO EISENHOWER WHO REPORTS HE DID NOT RECEIVE IT DIRECT FROM YOU PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE

MARSHALL

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~~SECRET~~

Robert D. Murphy
Consul General
Algiers, Algeria

For Murphy from Handy. M 13 SIG OYE-1

The following is a summary of the broadcast which General Eisenhower is arranging to be carried by new secret high powered station immediately following the President's proclamation at 11 hour D-Day and to be repeated at intervals throughout D Day. Eisenhower requests that you have this broadcast made also from local stations in North Africa as they become available to us. Outline of broadcast by General Eisenhower:

The following is an important message from General Eisenhower, Commanding General of the United States forces now entering French North Africa, to the French land, sea and air forces:

1. The forces under my command come as your friends and not your enemies. We have no wish to fight against Frenchmen and we have no designs on you or your country.
2. Our only objective is to fight your and our enemies, the Germans and Italians, and to assist in the liberation of France.
3. I have therefore given orders to the forces under my command that they will take no offensive action against you unless you first take definite hostile action against us.
4. We want you to help us. I have therefore instructed the forces under my command that the following signals will be taken to mean that you are willing to do so:

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Remain in your normal stations and display.

By day - the French Tricolor with United States flag
or failing that two tricolors one above the other.

By night - searchlight beams held vertically.

5. We are compelled to take certain precautions for our own security. Carry out therefore the following instructions, since we shall have no alternative but to consider failure to do so as indicating hostile intent:

- (A) Do not move any warships or merchant vessels.
- (B) Do not attempt to scuttle any ships.
- (C) Do not man coast defense batteries and other defensive installations.
- (D) Keep all aircraft on the ground and in their normal places.
- (E) Follow any instructions which a commander of any unit under my command may give you.

6. I repeat - we come as your friends and not your enemies and we will not fire the first shot. Follow carefully the directions I have given you and as a result bloodshed will be avoided and we shall welcome you as comrades in the fight against the oppressors of your country."

Acknowledge receipt. Marshall

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~~SECRET~~

Mr. Robert D. Murphy
Consul General
Algiers Algeria

October 20, 1942

From Handy to Murphy

WAT

SIG OYB-1

M-12

Party of General Clark transferred to submarine at Gibraltar at 2300 hours 2 October 19. Rendezvous will take place as scheduled Wednesday night October 21/22. Your party should be at house of rendezvous from 2100 hours 2 October 21 until dawn October 22. If weather prevents meeting implement alternative plan covered in my M-9, advising Clark via Gibraltar. If alternative plan to meet at sea fails Clark will again attempt landing at house on beach on night of October 22/23 between 2100 hours 2 and dawn October 23. Acknowledge receipt of this message.

MARSHALL

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J. E. HULL,
Brig. General, G.S.C.,
Chief European Section
Theater Group, OPD, GS

Handwritten signature

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

~~SECRET~~

MR ROBERT D MURPHY
CONSUL GENERAL
ALGIERE ALGERIA

FOR MURPHY FROM HANDY

11/53

SIGGY B-1

M 11 FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS MADE IN AGREEMENT WITH BRITISH PROVIDE
FOR USE OF SPECIAL CURRENCY AND USE OF LOCAL CURRENCY WILL BE RESORTED TO
ONLY IN CASE OF EMERGENCY UNTIL STABILIZATION CAN BE EFFECTED Period
THIS REFERS TO YOUR MESSAGE OF OCTOBER FIFTEENTH SIGNED COLE Period
SUFFICIENT LOCAL CURRENCY TO MEET EMERGENCIES IS ALREADY ON HAND Period
FOR SECURITY REASONS NO REPEAT NO LARGE SCALE PURCHASES OF LOCAL CURRENCY
WILL BE MADE

MARSHALL

J. E. HULL,
Brig. General, G.S.C.,
Chief European Section
Theater Group, OPD, GS

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~~SECRET~~

MR ROBERT D MURPHY
CONSUL GENERAL
ALGIERS ALGERIA

FOR MURPHY FROM HANDY

SIGGY B-1

M 10 CLARK GROUP EXPECT TO REACH GIBRALTAR BY AIR ONE FIVE
ZERO ZERO HOURS 2 OCTOBER NINETEEN

1500 Z / 19M

MARSHALL

WAG

J. E. HULL,
Brig. General, G.S.C.,
Chief European Section
Theater Group, OPD, GS

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~~SECRET~~

Mr. Robert D. Murphy,
Consul General,
Algiers, Algeria.

No ME
//

WJZ

From Handy for Murphy.

SIGGY B-1

Copies to Murphy and Eisenhower. This is reply to Murphy's message of 15 October. Inform your contact we also have information that Germany contemplates occupation of African Colonies and it is our opinion that Darlan should resist aggression by Axis with Army and Navy in which event America will provide at once large scale military, material, and economic aid in the colonies.

Inform Giraud's contact that question of command of French Army and Navy should be settled by Frenchmen and that America will undertake a large scale operation immediately upon resistance by French to Axis invasion of the Colonies.

Proposal that officers of American Staff visit Algeria has already been approved by Eisenhower details will be cabled by Marshall.

In regard to the General's departure via submarine it is considered that airplane passage is preferable, less subject to interruption, and more easily arranged. Leahy

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WAR DEPARTMENT

CODE CENTER

Date 10-20

Time 1725

From Algiers

To Sec. of State Washn.

Number 683 Dated 10-19

Local group make two suggestions (1 25 letters) which should accompany Torch.

(1) Consideration should be given to making available phonographic apparatus and equipment for the registration of phonograph records in the French and Arabic languages. Group here feel that work should be commenced as soon as possible under their supervision. Would equipment of this sort be available which would be too bulky for us to import by diplomatic pouch.

(2) Local group also suggest that copies of leaflets which are intended for distribution by plane or otherwise should be submitted to the EM as early as possible for editing and for their suggestions having in mind their knowledge of local conditions.

I feel both of these recommendations are worthy of prompt consideration.

Cole, American Consul.

Andre Brezman

WAZ

Date October 20, 1942

Time 1117-Z

From ALGERIA

To GENERAL HULL

Number RC-23 RF-23 Dated OCTOBER 19, 1942

Weather conditions are perfect and forecast favorable. As alternative plan after discussing with our friends here it is suggested that if weather during night of October 20-21 proves adverse that landing be delayed forty-eight (48) hours. Conference aboard submarine or surface vessel is considered not practicable. We will expect party at any hour during night of October 20-21 up to five o'clock in the morning. If not arrived by that hour we will understand that landing is delayed forty-eight (48) hours and that arrival will then be scheduled during night of 22-23. Our friends hope that landing with prevailing weather will be possible according to basic plan because they feel any delay augments risk. Repeated to London but unable to repeat to Gibraltar because we have no available radio frequency until noon October 20.

OOLE

AMERICAN CONSUL

Commander Freseman

~~SECRET~~
WAR DEPARTMENT
CODE CENTER

Date 10-20

Time _____

From ALGER ALGERIA

To SEC STATE WASHN.

Number 694

Dated 10-19

VICE CONSUL REID LEARNS FROM GOOD SOURCE AT CASABLANCA OF
THE INTERCEPTION OF A MESSAGE FROM GERMAN ARMISTICE COMMISSION
RECOMMENDING THE IMMEDIATE OCCUPATION OF FRENCH MOROCCO AND
ESTIMATING THAT FOUR ARMORED DIVISIONS WOULD BE REQUIRED
FOR THE TASK PRD THIS IS ALONG THE LINES OF OTHER MESSAGES
SAID TO HAVE BEEN SENT BY THE GERMAN CONSUL GENERAL AT
CASABLANCA URGING GERMAN MILITARY INTERVENTION IN FRENCH
MOROCCO

COLE AMERICAN CONSUL

Printed in FRUS, 1942, 398

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OPD 381 TH (10-19-42)
(Limited Distribution)

OUTGOING MESSAGE

File

Operations Division, WDGS
European Theater, WDOPD

October 19, 1942.

WAL

PRIORITY

COMMANDING GENERAL
European Theater of Operations

No. R-2121

The proposal made in your 3646 October 16, 1942 is regard to context of leaflets to be dropped when British arrive in the area is not approved by the President. He is of the firm belief that the least publicity possible should be given to this angle and that to drop the leaflets you describe would only result in advertising to people of the area a fact unknown to many. It will be necessary of course to explain the presence of British troops. The President believes this can best be done at the time by an announcement by you to the local officials with which you may be dealing to the effect that the British are assisting and supporting the Americans without reference to British strength, and that emphasis should be placed on the point that the ultimate objective of both the British and ourselves is to defeat the Axis Forces

MARSHALL

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Originator: OPD

Info. Copies: Gen Deane
(for Adm Leahy)

CM-OUT-05999 (10/19/42) 1757Z cen

*Gen. Deane
Adm. Leahy*

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WAR DEPARTMENT

CODE CENTER

RECEIVED

Date October 16, 1942

Time 8:30 PM

From MURPHY

To HANDY

Number 688

Dated OCTOBER 16, 3 PM

YOUR THREE TWO THREE OCTOBER ONE SEVEN NINE PM ROUNDS
WHO IS NOW IN TANGIER ENROUTE TO LISBON IS BEING INSTRUCTED TO
PROCEED VIA GIBRALTAR

WAS

COLE

COPY

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT

CODE CENTER

RECEIVED

Date _____

Time _____

From MURPHY _____

To HARDY _____

Number 889

Dated OCTOBER 18, 4 PM

(General Carter)

PLEASE INFORM CARRIER THAT I HAVE HAD SEVERAL CONVERSATIONS

WITH OUR FRIENDS HERE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE EVENTUAL RATE OF EXCHANGE TO BE ESTABLISHED TEMPORARILY IN THE EVENT OF TORON PRD THEY URGE THAT FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL REASONS WE ADOPT TEMPORARY RATE OF FIFTY MOROGGAN FRANCS OR FIFTY ALGERIAN FRANCS PER DOLLAR SUBSEQUENTLY ADJUSTING THE RATE TO MEET PRICE LEVELS AS THEY ARE STABILIZED PD THEY FEEL THAT WE SHOULD DO WHAT WE CAN TO CUSHION THE FIRST BLOW TO FRENCH SENSIBILITIES WHICH IN MANY INSTANCES WILL BE SHOCKED BY THE OPERATION PD THE RECOGNITION OF US OF WHAT AMOUNTS TO THE OFFICIAL RATE OF EXCHANGE THEY BELIEVE WOULD SWING MANY PEOPLE IN OUR FAVOR PD THEY POINT TO WHAT THEY UNDERSTAND WAS BRITISH POLICY IN EQUATORIAL AFRICA RECOGNIZING THE OFFICIAL FRANCO RATE AS A GOOD PRECEDENT AND MENTION THE RESENTMENT CAUSED BY THE ESTABLISHMENT BY THE GERMANS IN ONE NINE FOUR ZERO OF THE RATE OF TWENTY FRANCS PER REICHSMARK IN THE OCCUPIED ZONE WHEREAS BELGIUM RECEIVED THE RATE OF TEN FRANCS PER MARK PD THEY ALSO ARGUE THAT THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF THIS AREA SEPARATED FROM ITS EUROPEAN LIABILITIES IS SOUND AND THEY HOPE WILL BE SUPPORTED WITH GOLD NOW IN THIS COUNTRY

General Carter has been furnished a copy of message. COLE

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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AXWAR 16
Filed 17/1155z
HET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

CCWD
October 17
1200Z

INCOMING MESSAGE

URGENT

From: London
To: Agwar

No 3704 October 17th, 1942

Because of pressure of time this short message is sent as a preliminary to a longer reply to your R dash two zero one five and related radios. For eyes of General Marshall only. Agree with four Staff Officers will leave here by air for requested conference in affected area as quickly as weather permits, preferably no later than Sunday evening, local time. Lt Col McGowan should be instructed to get a message to him at Gibraltar as to details of projected meeting. To assure absolute secrecy consider it best for Murphy to send answer to United States for relay here and from here to Gibraltar. Only alternative would appear to be by trusted courier direct to Gibraltar with verbal message only. Extremely desirous that conference be limited if possible to twentyfour instead of fortyeight hours.

Eisenhower

#R-2015 is CM-OUT-05209 (10/16/42) OPD

Action Copy: Gen. Marshall

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CM-IN-07230

(10/17/42)

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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COPY No. 7

For Admiral Leahy

~~SECRET~~

October 17, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of State:

Please send following message to
Embassy, Vichy and Legation, Berne:

QUOTE IT IS DESIRED THAT YOU HAVE NO
CONTACTS OR NEGOTIATIONS WITH GENERAL GIRAUD
UNQUOTE

It is desired that the above
despatch be sent in military or naval cipher to the
addressees.

By direction of the President:

Chief of Staff.

[See FRUS, 1942, II, 397]

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Limited Distribution
OPD 336 France (10-16-42)
Operations Division, WDGS,
European Section, WDOFD
KXX-A

October 16, 1942

TO: C G
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

No R-2015

The following paraphrase of message from Lt. Col. McGowan is relayed to you. This is from Marshall and for the eyes of Eisenhower alone. Beginning message: Upon my arrival in Algiers, I received from Col. Chretien (Head of G-2 in French Africa) a request for a secret interview which took place at an isolated spot some miles from Algiers this evening. This meeting was in the presence of 2 members of the Robin Hood Group with whom I have been in contact for several months. The PGE Officer informed me that Admiral Darlans representative had instructed him to contact me upon my return from the United States, in order to give me information to the effect that the French Government has been informed by both German and Japanese sources that the US is planning early military operations against Dakar and/or Casablanca. The French Government has been urged to take every precaution against such an operation. It appears that this suggestion may constitute a pretext for the Axis occupation of French North Africa. Germany has made several small concessions to strengthen the French North African military establishments, particularly Dakar. However, these are really insignificant. The PGE French General Staff are convinced of imminent Axis aggression against French North Africa. The Germans appear determined to settle the Western Mediterranean issue during the coming weeks, and will have the use of bases on the Spanish mainland and in Spanish Morocco for this purpose. Gibraltar is under constant surveillance. The French believe that the Germans will have at least 8 days warning of an American or Anglo-American action. They also believe that information leaks are coming from England as was the case

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

(Page 2)

OUTGOING MESSAGE

To: CG, European Theater of Operations.
No: R-2015

in the Dieppe raid. The PCH contact made no effort to question me regarding American intentions, which was a great surprise to me. This contact stated that the political situation in France is extremely delicate and that a collapse may be expected in as little as 10 days. In any event, the Germans are expected to move before November 1st. In the French opinion, definite action is not a question of weeks but of days. Accordingly, Darlan is faced with a decision to make. It appears he will be willing to come to Africa and bring with him the French fleet if he, as Commander-in-Chief of the French Armed Forces can be assured of US ability and willingness to supply large-scale aid, both material and economic. With such an indication, there is strong possibility that Darlan would cooperate, in which case the military and naval forces in French Africa will undoubtedly obey his command. The reliability and sincerity of the contact is not questioned. The contact also mentioned that any negotiations carried on by US with them would have to be done in Algiers, as the German Gestapo at Vichy renders effective conversations there impossible. The contact also discussed at length the matter of French military weakness in North Africa due to the lack of equipment and supplies. However, he stated that as many as half a million men could be raised, but that the lack of sufficient equipment and supplies would not make it possible for them to render serious resistance to an Axis attack without our prompt aid. The contact feels that Laval is capable of an accord with the Germans along the lines of accord with Japan in Indo China if such is not already the case.

Subsequent to my conversations with General Nogues in Morocco last week, the head of the French G-2 in Morocco was sent to me for the sole purpose of advising me that I may possibly receive a message from Darlan in Algiers. There is no question but that the situation in French North Africa is moving fast. Information indicates that the Axis have massed about 100,000 troops along the Tunisian Frontier and have made extensive plans for aviation attacks. There is also unquestionably an inside

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

(Page 3)

OUTGOING MESSAGE

To: CG, European Theater of Operations.
No: R-2015

German Organization in French Africa that has been equipped with arms and a communication system of approximately 30 clandestine radiow. The communication plan also contemplates the seizure of key points and cooperation with partipopulaire groups and natives.

Present information also indicates that the Germans are intervening in the Administration of French Morocco. German Customs Officers and the Armistice Commission maintain surveillance of the Casablanca Port so that nothing may be moved without German authorization.

The French recently intercepted at Casablanca 2 messages from the Consul General Auer to Berlin, warning them of an imminent American attack.

Please advise me at once as to the limits I may go in replying to Darlan's representative, who desires to know (1) are we willing to cooperate with Darlan and (2) if so, will we be able to do so quickly and on a large-scale here and/or in Europe.

I recommend that we encourage Darlan on the basis of securing his eventual cooperation with Giraud, about whom I will telegraph encouraging news tomorrow. Darlan is expected here next week. Inform Leahy and Eisenhower. End of first message. Comments: General Strong is somewhat skeptical as to Darlan and believes he cannot be trusted. We are endeavoring to clarify German and Italian intentions and will keep you informed. Second message follows immediately.

MARSHALL

Originator: OPD

Info. Copies: Adm. Leahy

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

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OPD 336 France (10-16-42)
Operations Division, WDGS
European Section, WDOFP
XXX-A

Full

October 16, 1942

TO: C G
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

Re R-2014

McGowan's second message is paraphrased herewith
(for eyes of General Eisenhower only):

As directed by the President on September 22, 1942,
the desired message was transmitted to General Mast who
was asked:

1. His personal reactions (which were very favor-
able although he expressed genuine alarm over:)

A. Imminent possibility of invasion of area by
Axis. B. Delicate French political situation. C.
Whether we are prepared now to undertake a large scale
operation.

2. To transmit this information to General Giraud
immediately.

General Mast stated that Giraud desires that he
be dealt with instead of Darlan, who he feels cannot be
trusted, but is merely desirous of climbing on the band
wagon. A request was made for an expression of unity of
French Forces (Army and Navy), of whom Darlan is Commander-
in-Chief. The French fleet is important in that the
Admiral controls ports and coastal batteries in French
North Africa. Mast stated that the Army is loyal to and
will be commanded by Giraud instead of Darlan; also,
that the Navy in French North Africa would go along with
the Army. I urged that success of the operation depends
upon the working of the French Forces with us. With
regard to Mast, he inquired as to our ability to undertake

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

(Page 2)

Oct. 16, 1942

To: CG, European Theater of Operations
No: R-2014

OUTGOING MESSAGE

a large scale operation now. He was assured that we were prepared. He desired to know whether we could react immediately if the Axis attacks in advance of our operation. I told him that I felt confident that we could by air, but that the answer to this is a technical problem of which I am not competent to answer.

Mast requested immediate despatch of 3 American Officers from Eisenhower's Staff to meet a similar number of French Officers on October 21st, 1942, at a point 150 kilometers West of Algiers. 1 of these officers is to be a General Officer. Mast urges that these officers be selected immediately and sent to Gibraltar to wait full details as to the manner and hour of their reception which will be telegraphed. The officers selected should include 1 officer competent for operations, 1 officer for material, 1 for debarkation and 1 Naval officer. Their arrival should be by submarine at night, for a stay of 48 hours in a private house.

Mast stated there is an urgent need for small arms, especially grenades and submachine guns. I informed him and his subordinate group leaders that we have been waiting for some time for their designation of the time and place, and that time is limited because of the moon. Their explanation was that they had been waiting for my return from the United States. They will supply the necessary data relative to the first delivery of this equipment by late tonight. General Mast reiterated his gravest concern over the Algiers situation which is menaced by the possibility of early Axis operations. He said that information indicates German operatives bearing French passports have been arriving and that according to a reliable report the Germans were recently given 500 blank French passports intended for use in this area.

According to Mast, Americans in the area must be ready to protect themselves against physical attacks by Axis Agents.

Based upon information received from the visit to Giraud yesterday by Mast's Representative Mast suggests

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

(Page 3)

Oct. 18, 1942

OUTGOING MESSAGE

To: CG, European Theater of Operations
Re: R-2014

possibility of incorporating in Torch operation the occupation of some part of Unoccupied France by the French Army - if they can be supplied by United States. According to Mast this idea is dear to Giraud since he has worked hard during the past 4 months on a plan for combined action next Spring in Europe and Africa. He appreciates urgency of earlier action and urges consideration of possibility of including in the Torch operation a plan to establish a Bridgehead in France before the Axis have a chance to organize that area.

Mast raised a question relative to the operation which I have dreaded because of French susceptibilities. After a long discussion he proposed a Unified Command under which Eisenhower would retain complete command of American Forces. Mast emphasized that since the French know the details of the Terrain, French Command is necessary to enable our forces to quickly move through French North Africa to contact the enemy. Mast again emphasizes the massing of Axis Forces on the Tunisia Frontier estimating that they may number up to 250,000.

Remainder of second message will be sent when decoded.

Comment: From the information available here, it would seem to be advisable to dispatch the group of officers from your Staff by submarine if possible as this may result in confirming to your satisfaction the French proposals. However the decision rests with you. 2 additional messages from McGowan are now being decoded and will be transmitted to you as promptly as possible.

MARNEALL

Originator: OPD

Info. Copies: Gen. Patton
Gen. Strong
Adm. Leahy

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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Admiral Leahy

WAR DEPARTMENT
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OUTGOING MESSAGE

WDD Form 10 (Rev. 10-16-42)
(Limited Distribution)
Operations Division, WDGCS
European Section, WDDPD

October 16, 1942

TO: C G
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

No R-2032

Last sentence of second message this Headquarters under date of October 16 should be amended to read "Mast referred to the massing of Axis Forces on the Tunisian Frontier" second message continues: He estimated that up to 250,000 Italian troops are now on the French Italian Frontier. I suggested that the matter of command was technical rather than political, but Mast strongly insisted that it is political which must be settled in advance. It is advisable to suggest formula on which this delicate point may be settled, which will leave the command effectively in Eisenhower's hands, but still permit French to regard operation as theirs while requiring them to provide us with maximum aid. Mast asserts we can gain entry practically without firing a shot through Girauds Command. Mast also stated that Giraud insists that Embassy at Vichy, Legation in Bern and other possible contacts be issued instructions that negotiations with Giraud will be routed through other channels, since Giraud wishes to continue his contacts with US through Mast in Algiers for reasons of safety. The question of Girauds departure from France was also given some consideration. It is opinion of Mast and his advisors that we should provide an American submarine to pick up Giraud and his party at night at point somewhere on the French Mediterranean Coast. They consider departure by plane only as last resort.

Detailed information relative to departure by submarine will be supplied later. Request advice as to whether I can say this is possible. End of second message. For General Eisenhower's eyes alone.

MARSHALL

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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(Page 2) **OUTGOING MESSAGE**, 1942

To: CG, European Theater of Operations
No: R-2032

Originator: OPD

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CM-OOT-05375 (10/17/42) 0012Z 1aw

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT

CODE CENTER

Date: OCTOBER 16

Time:

From: American Consul

To:

Number:

Dated: October 15

Naval Attache Tangier advised October 4 that Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered discontinuance purchase local currency against credit established by Donovan. This came at a moment we were committed here for the purchase of five million Algerian francs against dollar credit in The United States. The reason given regarding political trouble originating in Portugal is not understood. May I have prompt advice concerning what method you propose for preliminary financing.

Cole American Consul

FROM: LEAHY
TO: MURPHY

Information to Eisenhower.

Replying to your message of 15 October. Inform your contact we also have information that Germany contemplates occupation of African Colonies and it is our opinion that Darlan should resist aggression by Axis with Army and Navy in which event America will provide at once large scale military, material, and economic, aid in the colonies.

Inform Giraud's contact that question of command of French Army and Navy should be settled by Frenchmen and that America will undertake a large scale operation immediately upon resistance by French to Axis invasion of the Colonies.

Proposal that officers of American Staff visit Algeria has already been approved by Eisenhower details will be cabled by Marshall.

In regard to the General's departure via submarine it is considered that airplane passage is preferable, less subject to interruption, and more easily arranged.

Printed in FRUS, 1942, II, 397

~~SECRET~~

15 Oct 42

For Leahy. In accordance with the President's directive of September 22 I conveyed the message to General Mast. I inquired whether he would be willing to transmit at once the information to General Giraud and also whether he would comment personally. His reaction was more favorable than I dared hope for the reasons that (1) he expressed genuine alarm over imminent Axis intentions to invade this area and (2) regarding the fragile political situation in France. Mast also told me bluntly that Giraud contemplates that we deal with him and not with Darlan. Mast has learned that Darlan is seeking to climb on the band wagon but in his opinion Darlan could not be trusted. I replied that we hoped that the French would demonstrate some unity, that Darlan is Commander-in-Chief of French armed forces, that French fleet has its importance and that the Admiralty commands the ports and coastal batteries in French North Africa. Mast retorted that Giraud will command the Army which is loyal to him and not to Darlan and that the Navy in French North Africa would fall in line with the Army. I urged that success of the operation is the cardinal point and that we want the French to consolidate with us.

Mast's principal concern is whether we are able to undertake a large scale operation now. I assured him that we are. He then inquired if the Axis attacks in advance of our plans whether we would react immediately and I said I felt confident we would by air but the rest is a technical problem for which I am not competent.

Mast then insisted that we despatch immediately because time presses five American officers from Eisenhower's staff including a general officer to meet equivalent French officers at a point on the Algerian coast 150 kilometers west of Algiers on October 21. Full details regarding reception, hour and facilities will be telegraphed but he urges that men be selected immediately and be sent to Gibraltar. Officers should include following: 1 officer competent for operations, one for material, one for debarkation, and one Naval officer. They should arrive by submarine at night and will be received and housed in a private property. A stay of 48 hours is contemplated.

Mast also stated that urgent need of small arms especially submachine guns and grenades. This has been also subject of discussion with his subordinate group leaders. I informed them with emphasis that we have been waiting for days for their indication of places and time and that time is limited because of moon. They explained that they were awaiting my return from the United States. They promised to supply data for first deliveries by tonight late.

Mast stated gravest concern over Algiers situation which is menaced by early Axis action. He said there is evidence of arrival of German

Printed in FRUS, 1942, II, 394-396

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 By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

SS operatives bearing French passports and according to one reliable report Germans were recently given 500 blank French passports intended for use in this area. Mast warned me that American representatives in this area should be prepared to protect themselves against physical attack by Axis agents. I am also requested by Mast whose representatives returned yesterday from visit to Giraud so suggest to you the possibility that in the Torch operation some part of unoccupied France might be held by French Army if latter could be supplied by U.S. Mast said this idea is dear to Giraud's heart and that latter has worked hard during past 4 months on a plan for combined action next spring in Europe and Africa. He appreciates the compelling reasons for earlier action but urges that you consider the possibility of including in Torch a plan of establishing a bridgehead in southern France before the Axis has the chance of organizing that area.

Then question which Mast raised is that of the command of Torch. This is question I have dreaded because of French susceptibilities. After long discussion he proposed the formula of a unified command under which Eisenhower would retain complete command of American forces. In this connection Mast emphasized that French command knowing all details of terrain would be necessary to enable our forces quickly to move through French North Africa to contact the enemy. Mast also referred to the massing of Axis forces on the Tunisian frontier and added that 250,000 Italian troops are lined up on the Italo-French frontier. I suggested this was a technical rather than a political matter but Mast stoutly insisted that it is a political point which must be settled in advance. Are you able to suggest a happy formula for this delicate point which would leave the command effectively with Eisenhower but permit the French to regard the operation as theirs and require them to lend us their maximum aid. Mast asserts that Giraud's command will give us entry practically without firing a shot.

Also Mast states Giraud insists that embassy at Vichy, legation in Bern and other possible contacts be instructed that negotiations with Giraud are being channelized elsewhere. Giraud wishes to continue contact with U.S. via Mast in Algiers for reasons of safety.

Giraud's departure from France was also discussed. Mast and his advisers believe that we should provide an American submarine to pick up Giraud and his party at night at a point on the French Mediterranean coast. Detailed information on this point will be supplied. They prefer to regard departure by plane only as a last resort. May I say that this is possible. Please inform Eisenhower.

Cole American Consul 739 a.m. Oct. 15th.

Printed in FRUS, II, 394-396

~~SECRET~~

ca 15 Oct 42 (?)

On arrival in Algiers I received urgent request for secret interview from Colonel Chretien who is head of G-2 in French Africa. I met him at an isolated place some miles from Algiers this evening in the presence of two members of Robin Hood Group with whom I have been in contact for several months. PGH officer informed me in strictest secrecy that during recent visit to Vichy he had received instructions from Admiral Darlans immediate entourage to contact me on my return for following stated reason:

French Government has been informed by both German and Japanese sources that United States is planning early military operations against Dakar and/or Casablanca and has been urged to take every precaution. Contact agreed at my suggestion that this may constitute pretext for Axis occupation of French North Africa. The Germans have made some small concessions to strengthen French military establishments in French Africa particularly Dakar but these are really insignificant. PGH French General Staff are convinced of impending German aggression against French Africa. Darlan believes in German determination and plan to settle western Mediterranean issue during coming weeks and that Germans will have use of bases on Spanish mainland and Spanish Morocco. Vigilant surveillance of Gibraltar is maintained. In French opinion Germans will have at least 8 days warning of an American or Anglo-American action. They believe information leaks through from England as in the case of Dieppe. PGH contact to my surprise made no effort to question me regarding American intentions. He stated that the political situation in France is extremely fragile and that it may collapse in as little as 10 days; that Darlan's entourage are convinced that the German move will occur in any event before November 1. He said it is not in French opinion a question of weeks but of days. Under these circumstances Darlan, he said is faced with a decision. If Darlan, he continued, could be informed that should he as Commander-in-Chief of French armed forces decide to come to Africa entraining with him the French fleet that the U.S. would be willing able to supply immediate large scale aid - effective material and economic supply - there is strong possibility that Darlan would undertake such cooperation. If he did the military and naval forces in French Africa would undoubtedly obey his command.

This is obviously of the greatest importance and my French friends and I are convinced of reliability and sincerity of contact who stated that negotiations with us would be carried on in Algiers as German Gestapo in Vichy rendered conversations impossible there.

Officer went into long expose of French military weakness in North Africa due to lack of equipment and supply but said they could raise as much as a half million men.

The French Military _____ he stated that due to lack of sufficient equipment and supplies they will be unable to make serious resistance to

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

an Axis attack without our immediate aid and that Laval is capable of an accord with the Germans along the lines of accord with Japan regarding Indo China if this not already the fact.

It should be noted also that subsequent to my conversations with General Nogues in Morocco last week Nogues sent to me head of the French G-2 in Morocco for the sole purpose of informing me that I would possibly receive a message from Darlan in Algiers.

There is no doubt that the situation in French North Africa is moving fast. I learn that Axis have massed about one hundred thousand troops along the Tunisian frontier and French G-2 have information they say that extensive German plans for aviation attack have been perfected. They say there is no doubt of an important German inside organization in French North Africa equipped with arms and means of communication including a network of thirty clandestine radio transmitters with a plan to seize key points working with partipopulaire groups and natives. German intervention in French Moroccan administration is indubitable according to information gathered during my conversations with several officials in French Morocco. German customs officers and armistice commission maintain vigilant surveillance of port of Casablanca where not a ship nor a pound of merchandise may move without German authorization. At that place French recently intercepted two messages from consul general Auer to Berlin warning latter of imminent American attack. Please inform me at once how far I may go in replying to Darlan's representative who in effect asks: (1) would we be willing to cooperate with Darlan and (2) if so, are we able to do so quickly on a large scale here and/or Europe. I urge that we encourage Darlan and believe this would be reconciliable with eventual cooperation with Giraud about whom I shall telegraph encouraging news tomorrow. Darlan is expected here next week. Inform Leahy and Eisenhower.

COLE

08T 15 PM

08T 15 PM

WAR DEPARTMENT
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OUTGOING MESSAGE

(Limited Distribution)
Operations Division, WDCS
European Theater, WDOFD



MSG CTR.

MSG CTR.

October 15, 1942

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TO: C G
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
NO 2-1979

CY NO	TO
1	Ac/s. OPD
2	Ch. Thr. Gp.
3	Ch. S. & P. Gp.
4&5	Ch. Europ'n Sec.
6	Msg. Ctr. File

After a brief statement introducing the speaker the recorded voice of the President will announce in French the following. This is for the eyes of General Eisenhower only and refers to your 3495 October 13. My friends equally in French Africa as in that part governed by my old friend Marshall Petain and in that part which suffers day and night under the brutality of Nazism.

"I speak to you as one who was with your Army and Navy in France in 1918 - as one who has long been an admirer of the French people, and as one who retains hundreds of personal friends in France. I know your farms and your towns and your cities. I know your soldiers and teachers and workmen. I know what a precious heritage of the French people are your homes, your cultures, and your processes of true democracy. I still believe in liberty, equality, fraternity.

"No nation is more closely bound by historic ties and deep affection to the people of France and their friends than the United States of America.

"Americans are striving not only for their own safe future, but also for the restoration of the ideals, the liberties, and the democracy of all those who have lived under the tricolor.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/68)

Date- 8-24-71

Signature- *[Handwritten Signature]*
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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

(Page 2) **OUTGOING MESSAGE** 942

No. R-1979

"We come among you to save you from conquerors who would remove forever your rights of self government, your rights to religious freedom, and your rights to live your own lives in peace.

"We come among you solely to destroy your enemies and not to harm you.

"We come among you with the assurance that we will leave just as soon as the menace of Germany and Italy is removed from you.

"I am appealing to your sense of realism, self interest, and ideals.

"Do not obstruct this great purpose.

"Help us and the day of a world of peace will be hastened." Duplicate recordings in French will be forwarded by different couriers as soon as available. You will be informed further on this and also when to expect copies of messages to the officials in Vichy and in the area.

MARSHALL

Originator: OPD

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/59)

Date- 8-24-71

Signature- *RAH*

CM-OUT-04949 (10/15/42) 2228E law

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

AXWAR 11
1528Z/13
VEW

INCOMING MESSAGE

CCWD
Oct. 13
1716 Z

WHL

From: London
To: AGWAR

No. 3495, Oct. 13, 1942

This message contains an outline of the procedure to be followed on D day in distributing leaflets and in handling the Presidents Broadcast to the Torch Area. For Operations DIVISION and Patton.

A leaflet containing the Presidents message to the people of North Africa issued in the name of the Commander in Chief of "American Expeditionary Force" will be dropped by planes from Gibraltar at approximately the H hour of the first attack on D day over Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers. This leaflet was completed by printer today. It contains a color imprint of the United States Flag and the Presidents photograph.

I am also preparing a second leaflet to be submitted to you for approval, the purpose of which is to forestall an impression on the part of the French people that they are being double crossed by the use of British troops in the immediate follow up at Algiers. This leaflet, if approved by you, will be dropped in Algiers and the area to the East to coincide with the entrance of British troops. It will explain the presence of British troops in that area. Murphy and Doolittle should be instructed to give similar explanations to French Officials in Algiers and Tunis.

NO

I recommend that the Presidents declaration to the people of North Africa be transcribed in his own voice in French and the records shipped here so as to arrive not later than November first. I consider it extremely important that no reference be made in the Presidents broadcast to the specific areas where landings will take place. The text of the Broadcast should be cabled

**REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED**

*General
Beane*

12

COPY No.

~~SECRET~~

Printed in Papers of D.P. Eisenhower, 614-615

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

SECRET

**WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER**

From: **INCOMING MESSAGE**
To:

No. 3495, Oct. 13, 1942

here at the earliest practicable date for our guidance and in order that it may be reproduced in leaflet form here for distribution on D day. Request you inform me on what date the text may be expected will be ready by that time, and which can reach all of French North Africa.

It is proposed that the Presidents Broadcast declaration will be made commencing at approximately the first H hour on D day and be continued at frequent intervals throughout D day and succeeding days if necessary.

The exact hour of the Presidents broadcast and the exact hour for the dropping of the leaflets over each area will be determined by me, based on conditions existing at the time.

I should also like to have the text of the Presidents messages to the French officials in North Africa and in Vichy, the Sultan of Morocco and to the Bey of Tunis as soon as they are available.

Copies of the printed official proclamations signed by the Commander in Chief, the Ordinances to accompany these proclamations, the leaflets to be distributed by plane on D day and the booklet on North Africa will be sent to you by courier leaving today or tomorrow. Sufficient copies of each will be included for Western Task Force. A detailed cable will be sent to you concerning this shipment.

Eisenhower

ACTION: OPD

INFO. COPIES: GEN PATTON, LOG

CM-IN-05515 (10/13/42) 2237Z bjm

**REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED**

~~SECRET~~

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAL

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM: American Consul, Casablanca, Morocco
TO: Secretary of State, Washington, D.C.
DATED: October 8, 1942
NO. 799

The following is from Murphy.

It would be exceedingly helpful if immediate assurances of favorable action could be given by BEW and the competent British authorities concerning the following French requests:

1. The 1,000 tons of Portuguese colophony (rosin). This subject was discussed with Cass Canfield and Wyndham White. The French authorities still believe that authorization to ship this article to North Africa is withheld by the British only because of American objection. Kindly telegraph whether reconsideration by the British authorities has now been completed.
2. The French understand likewise that American authorities object to the shipment of 16 tons of cotton thread from Portugal to French North Africa under the Luso-Moroccan barter agreement. Kindly telegraph status of this item for which I recommend approval.
3. The French make inquiry whether the British blockade authorities are now prepared to approve shipments of 50,000 pairs of shoes from Portugal, as provided by the protocol of July 24 to Luso-Moroccan accord, during the second half of 1942. Please comment.
4. It is understood that the British authorities have consented to the shipment from Spain to Portugal of 2,300 tons of cotton linters for conversion into rayon after which 3,000 tons are to be delivered to Spain in compensation and the balance to Morocco. The French request that a portion of the balance be allotted to Algeria and Tunisia and that immediate permission be granted to ship one ton of linters from Portugal to Spain for industrial experimentation. I urge the approval of these reasonable requests.

*See memo
10/10/42
Proposed by
WAL*

OK

*BEW
official
action
taken*

*BEW will
reply*

-2-

5. I should likewise appreciate the Department's comment on the status of the shipment of Spanish pyrites to Morocco. Do the British contemplate favorable action?

Will you please transmit a copy of this telegram to Admiral Leahy.

Copy sent to Algiers.

RUSSELL

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

September 16, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECURITY CONTROL, JOINT U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Subject: Cover Plan.

At a conference held in Admiral Leahy's office on September 15, the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff rejected the latest proposed Cover Plan as being too complicated and involved. They instructed the secretaries to inform you that they desired you to submit a simpler plan along the following lines:

1. They suggested that action be taken to change the code name of the present TORCH Plan and to consider assigning to it a group of easily pronounced and remembered code names which may be used interchangeably.
2. Prepare a directive from the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff to the Joint Staff Planners directing the preparation of a plan for the capture of the Dodecanese and the invasion of Syria via the Red Sea.
3. Prepare a cover plan, for the plan directed in paragraph 2 above, which would involve sending forces now assembling on the East Coast to the Caribbean Islands in the late Fall for maneuvers.
4. The above plan should be presented through the Joint Staff Planners for the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Your proposals should be presented in sufficient detail to show generally how they would be carried out, who would be involved in their preparation, and what purposes would be served. Your recommendations should show how deception will

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By Authority of JCS

Declassification B.
By RAB Date AUG 21 1972

~~SECRET~~

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

~~SECRET~~

be accomplished and might well include some suggested procedures such as sending selected staff officers from General Patton's staff to the Caribbean Islands to actually make preparations for the proposed exercise, procedures which could be followed to accomplish deception of those now engaged in planning the TORCH Operation without interfering with the effectiveness of their work, how certain desirable leakages of information may be achieved, and other devices which you might propose.

J. R. DEANE,

L. R. McDOWELL,

Joint Secretariat.

Distribution:

General Strong
Captain Dyer
Admiral Cooke
General Wedemeyer
Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Deane
Comdr. McDowell

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Declassification Ex.

By RAH/PL Date AUG 21 1972

-2-

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

COPY FOR SECRETARY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

From: London
To: The President of the United States.

September 5, 1942.

~~Most Secret~~: Number one four four. From Former Naval Person to President. Your number one eight three.

1. We agree to the military layout as you propose it. We have plenty of troops highly trained for landing. If convenient, they can wear your uniform. They will be proud to do so. Shipping will be all right.

2. I have just had your number one eight-four and it is evident that you too have skinned yourselves to the bone. Unless we suffer serious losses in P Q we consider that Naval forces now jointly to be provided justify us in going full speed ahead with starting the operation.

3. I am sending Admiral Ramsay with the agreement of General Eisenhower over at once to furnish Admiral Cunningham with the means of going into Naval details with you. It is imperative now to drive straight ahead and save every hour. In this way alone shall we realize your strategic design and the only hope of doing anything that really counts this year.

4. We strongly endorse the request which we understand Eisenhower has already made to Marshall that the force you are releasing from Casablanca may be sent over here complete with its regimental combat team. Kindest regards.

Prime.

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

AXWAR 5
filed 1238p/5
sf

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

CCWD
September 5
1302Z

INCOMING MESSAGE

WAL

U R G E N T XXXA

From: London
To: AGWAR

No. 1813 September 5, 1942

Have just returned from Chiefs of Staff meeting where it was agreed that recommendation would be made to former Naval person to accept latest message from President without qualification. For Chief Operations Division. All planning is going ahead on basis of latest agreements but I am counting on the additional Regimental Combat Team from the US.

Stratoliner leaves this evening (Saturday) with following officers coming to Washington to confer on certain details of Torch operation: Admiral Ramsey and two staff officers; Admiral Bierl; Lt Colonel Stokes; Lt Cdr De Costabadie, RN; and Major Henriques. The last two officers names are specialists loaned to me by Admiral Mountbatten and have done much work on Casablanca Affair. I am sending them in the belief that they will be of vast help to Patton. He may keep them as long as he likes. In the unlikely event that he would find them of no use to him, he can send me a message and I will get them back at once.

Eisenhower

ACTION COPY: OPD

INFO. COPY: GEN PATTON LOG SGS

Printed in Papers of DDEisenhower, 541

CM-IN-1919 (9/5/42) 1350Z

~~SECRET~~

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13

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

Admiral Leahy:

Please read attached
message just received
from Eisenhower. The
last par. is not important
to you at the moment.

Apparently the delay
in the President's reply
will cause some embarrassment.
S.B.M.

SECRET
CLASSIFIED BY: [illegible]
DATE: [illegible]

AXWAR 10
filed 130P/4
AEL

~~SECRET~~
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

CCWD
Sept 4
1346 Z

URGENT XXX-A

From: London
To: AGWAR

No. 1789, September 4, 1942

To Chief Operations Division. I believe that if your number R three six eight is sent by the President to the Former Naval Person substantially as written we will produce at once a firm plan subject only to final determination that the Naval Support is decently adequate. In this connection please convey to Chief of Staff my conviction that British have cooperated to the fullest possible extent, both in the government and in all three services. I could not ask for greater consideration or greater determination to meet my desires and plans, and the British readiness to accept risks in order to provide me with everything they can scrape together has been admirable.

I am extremely hopeful that the President dispatched the recommended message promptly so that the question of my visit to Washington will be settled at once. It is not easy for me to deny the Former Naval Person something that appears to him to require only minor sacrifice on my part. My effort has been to build up here complete confidence in American Forces and Commanders, and in their readiness to cooperate to the utmost. To this end I make myself and require subordinates to be available for any type of conference or duty at any hour and I feel that our efforts have been measurably successful. I do not repeat nor desire to give British intimation of type of reply I think they will receive because if there should be some radically different idea expressed in Presidents message they might infer that confusion exists within our own councils. While from a personal viewpoint nothing could please me more than

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~~SECRET~~

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

~~SECRET~~
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Page 2. No. 1789, Sept 4, from London

||| a day in Washington I know that the place for me at this moment is right here. If the Presidents answer will only reach here before noon your time today I will be in the clear.

The following paragraph represents my earnest personal recommendations regarding the combat loaders for five thousand men referred to in your R three six eight. In despatching these ships to the U K it is requested that one complete regimental combat team reasonably trained amphibiously be sent in them for use inside the Mediterranean. Accomplishment of this will be worth a very considerable effort and sacrifice. Its first effect will be to give me a desperately needed flexibility in preparing here a large American force for combat. Next it will give us a better trained force for the Algiers Operation. It will relieve the pressure on the skimpy facilities we have for amphibious training which are so meager that present prospect is we will have to use one regimental team of the First Division in the assault with no repeat no training whatsoever. Moreover, approval of this request will probably save us a few days in fixing the date of assault. While I am aware that fulfillment of this request may compel you to resort to expedients, General Clark and I are confident that the beneficial effects on our preparation will be far out of proportion to size of the force and I therefore feel justified in asking you to approve if at all possible. The regimental combat team, loaded for battle and with ten units of fire and sixty days of other supplies should reach this country no later than October tenth. In addition to the service units previously requested for Oran (reference my one seven zero five), service units will be required to support this additional regimental combat team. Details will be cabled upon confirmation of your decision to make this additional force available. Please expedite reply because on this point depends many other features of our planning.

Eisenhower

FOOTNOTE: R-368 is CM-OUT-1354 (9/4/42) OPD. 1705 is CM-IN-0337 (9/1/42) OPD

ACTION COPY: OPD

INFO. COPY: SGS GEN PATTON LOG

CM-IN-1375 (9/4/42) 1453Z

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7
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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

565
~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

XXX-A Priority
URGENT

C/S
September 3, 1942

To, USFOR
LONDON

WDOPD

Number R-368

For the eyes of General Eisenhower only. The following has been submitted to the President as a reply to the Prime Ministers message September 3rd: "Replying to your 144, I am willing to reduce the Casa Blanca Force by the number of combat loaders capable of carrying a force of 1 regimental combat team approximately 5,000 men. Since a similar reduction was made in original Oran Assault Force this releases a total of British and U. S. combat loaders for some 10,000 men for use at Algiers. As that locality has been estimated as the softest spot, this combat loaded force may be found sufficient with whatever else it is found possible to improvise.

"I do not see advantage of Eisenhower or Clark coming over at this time. I know they have heavy and pressing responsibilities in organizing slowly-arriving American Forces and I am sure we have a full understanding of their viewpoint. Furthermore, I do want to see Eisenhower later on before final takeoff and 2 trips appear out of the question. We would be glad to see Ramsay and Mountbatten if you wish to send them, but I do not desire that their visit shall cause any delay in reaching a final decision.

"I hope to cable you tomorrow a list of U. S. Naval craft which can be made available for the operation."

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Page 2

Number R-368

September 3, 1942

Reference your number A 1772 and number 1777 September 3rd. In the President's reply yesterday, reference followup troops at Algiers which left some doubt in your mind as to exact content, the 10,000 U. S. troops referred to represented what we considered the total American contribution to the assault echelon. Other assault troops would have to be British and the followup troops would be British or American from the UK as arranged by you.

MARSHALL

Originator: OPD
Info. Copies: LOG
Secret File

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UNCLASSIFIED

CM-OUT-1354 (9-4-42) 0028 Z

~~SECRET~~
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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

XIX-A Priority
URGENT

C/S
September 3, 1942

To USFOR
LONDON

WDOPD

Number R-368

For the eyes of General Eisenhower only. The following has been submitted to the President as a reply to the Prime Ministers message September 3rd: "Replying to your 144, I am willing to reduce the Casa Blanca Force by the number of combat loaders capable of carrying a force of 1 regimental combat team approximately 5,000 men. Since a similar reduction was made in original Oran Assault Force this releases a total of British and U. S. combat loaders for some 10,000 men for use at Algiers. As that locality has been estimated as the softest spot, this combat loaded force may be found sufficient with whatever else it is found possible to improvise.

"I do not see advantage of Eisenhower or Clark coming over at this time. I know they have heavy and pressing responsibilities in organizing slowly-arriving American Forces and I am sure we have a full understanding of their viewpoint. Furthermore, I do want to see Eisenhower later on before final takeoff and 2 trips appear out of the question. We would be glad to see Ramsay and Mountbatten if you wish to send them, but I do not desire that their visit shall cause any delay in reaching a final decision.

"I hope to cable you tomorrow a list of U. S. Naval craft which can be made available for the operation."

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~~SECRET~~

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Page 2

Number R-368

September 3, 1943

Reference your number A 1772 and number 1777 September 3rd. In the President's reply yesterday, reference followup troops at Algiers which left some doubt in your mind as to exact content, the 10,000 U. S. troops referred to represented what we considered the total American contribution to the assault echelon. Other assault troops would have to be British and the followup troops would be British or American from the UK as arranged by you.

MARSHALL

Originator: OPD
Info. Copies: LOG
Secret File

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UNCLASSIFIED

CM-OUT-1354 (9-4-42) 0028 Z

~~SECRET~~

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

AXWAR 6
243p/3
EWS

~~SECRET~~
INCOMING MESSAGE

CGWD
1519z
Sept 3

URGENT

From Gen. Eisenhower
To Gen. Marshall
Date
Message

*File
Torch*

From London
To AGWAR

No 1759 Sept 3, 1942

Following receipt of President's message British Chiefs of Staff requested General Clark and myself to attend meeting this morning. For eyes of General Marshall only. The British Chiefs of Staff suggested, apparently under instructions from the former Naval person, that I come immediately to Washington accompanied by Admiral Ramsay and Lord Louis Mountbatten. I am not rpt not at all certain as to the exact purpose of the visit but I informed them that if they felt it necessary I was prepared to come at once, subject to your approval. Personally I feel that what is now needed is complete unification of idea among the Chiefs of Staff and on the highest levels and that if a visit to the U S is now indicated it should be made by someone qualified to speak for the British rather than by one who at best could act as intermediary only. Moreover I very much hope that final decision does not repeat not have to be postponed pending the completion of a trans Atlantic journey by anyone. However if you feel that anything is to be accomplished by either Clark or myself making the visit one of us will leave as soon as possible with British officers as above indicated. I earnestly hope that any business either of us may have to accomplish there can be completed in not to exceed fortyeight hours since there is too much to do here to remain away for any considerable length of time. An additional telegram on various points will be sent to you this afternoon. In the meantime I request the earliest possible answer to this message.

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

Eisenhower

ACTION: Gen. Marshall

CM-IN-1002 (9/3/42) 16132

*Tel to E
while plan being by Pres has not
been formally app Eisenhower King
will need with al
be pardoned*

(Eisenhower message printed in Papers of DDE, 522-529)

SECRET

September 3, 1942

From: General Marshall
To : General Eisenhower

Reference your 1759, September 3rd. For the eyes of General Eisenhower only. I am in agreement with your statement that what is needed is a complete unification of ideas among the Chiefs of Staff and on the highest levels. There appears to be no sound purpose in anyone coming to the U. S. unless he has authority to make an immediate final decision for the British. The suggested visit of yourself, Admiral Ramsey and Lord Mountbatten would not, it is believed, serve this purpose, and would most probably result in too costly a delay. After you have been told the purpose of the visit should you then think it desirable for you to make the trip you are at liberty to do so.

REGRADED
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~~SECRET~~

JCS
JRD

September 3, 1942.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached is an exchange of messages between General Eisenhower and General Marshall, which are sent to you for your information.

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy.

2 Incls.

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

Distribution:
Admiral Leahy ✓
General Marshall
Comdr. McDowell
CCS Records
Stayback

mef

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

From: General Eisenhower.

To: General Marshall.

September 3, 1942.

Message

No 1759 Following receipt of Presidents message British Chiefs of Staff requested General Clark and myself to attend meeting this morning. For eyes of General Marshall only. The British Chiefs of Staff suggested, apparently under instructions from the former Naval person, that I come immediately to Washington accompanied by Admiral Ramaay and Lord Louis Mountbatten. I am not rpt not at all certain as to the exact purpose of the visit but I informed them that if they felt it necessary I was prepared to come at once, subject to your approval. Personally I feel that what is now needed is complete unification of idea among the Chiefs of Staff and on the highest levels and that if a visit to the U S is now indicated it should be made by someone qualified to speak for the British rather than by one who at best could act as intermediary only. Moreover I very much hope that final decision does not repeat not have to be postponed pending the completion of a trans Atlantic journey by anyone. However if you feel that anything is to be accomplished by either Clark or myself making the visit one of us will leave as soon as possible with British officers as above indicated. I earnestly hope that any business either of us may have to accomplish there can be completed in not to exceed fortyeight hours since there is too much to do here to remain away for any considerable length of time. An additional telegram on various points will be sent to you this afternoon. In the meantime I request the earliest possible answer to this message.

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~~SECRET~~

Printed in Papers of DDEisenhower, 528-529

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

SECRET

From: General Marshall
To : General Eisenhower

September 3, 1942

Reference your 1759, September 3rd. For the eyes of General Eisenhower only. I am in agreement with your statement that what is needed is a complete unification of ideas among the Chiefs of Staff and on the highest levels. There appears to be no sound purpose in anyone coming to the U. S. unless he has authority to make an immediate final decision for the British. The suggested visit of yourself, Admiral Ramsey and Lord Mountbatten would not, it is believed, serve this purpose, and would most probably result in too costly a delay. After you have been told the purpose of the visit should you then think it desirable for you to make the trip you are at liberty to do so.

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

[REDACTED]

September 2, 1942.

M-E-M-O-R-A-N-D-U-M

The following information is received in conference this date from a highly competent source _____ recently arrived from North Africa.

General Juin, Commander of French Armies in North Africa, is friendly to the Allied cause but he cannot be expected to take any favorable action that is not authorized by the French Government..

General Barrau, Commanding in West Africa, is considered very friendly and he may be of assistance.

Nogues, Resident General in Morocco, is not expected to be of any use to us and is expected to comply, insofar as he finds it possible, with orders received from Vichy.

Admiral Esteva, Resident General in Tunisia, while hopeful of Allied success in the war, will carry out any orders received from Darlan.

General Chatel, Governor General of Algeria, is exceedingly friendly to the Allied cause and may be of assistance to us.

Vice Admiral Fenard, Secretary General of North Africa, probably will be of value to an Allied effort if properly approached and if he is satisfied that French sovereignty in the colonies will be maintained.

Admiral Micheliar, Commander-in-Chief at Casablanca, may very possibly be friendly to any American effort.

Our source of information believes that, if instructed to do so, he can safely approach some reliable French officers who, with a skeleton organization already in existence, will endeavor to align a large part of the French Army with an American effort. It will be necessary that assurances be given by competent authority that the administration of the colonies will remain in French hands.

There are at the present time about 110,000 French troops in Morocco, scattered about in a large number of comparatively small groups, from which with the present lack of transportation


MEMORANDUM ----- 2

(Cont'd)

facilities, it would be an exceedingly difficult and slow accomplishment to concentrate them into larger groups.

There are at the present time not more than 180 Germans in Morocco.

The French Navy, now largely concentrated in Toulon, may be expected to carry out any orders received from the Minister of National Defense.

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

WZ

INCOMING MESSAGE

AXWAR 21
filed 1047P/1
fb

CCWD
September 2, 1942
0126 Z

From: London

To: AGWAR

No. 1723 September 1, 1942

This message is to Chief Operations Division with request it be brought personal attention Chief of Staff. Following is gist of cable reputedly dispatched from Syria by De Gaulle to his London Hqrs, and seen by Colonel Fechet, AMA "The Americans have planned a landing in North Africa. In conjunction with this landing the British were to attack Dakar. Vichy knew all about this and has kept the Germans informed of the plan. Vichy has been deceiving the Americans through Nogues and Boisson as they previously deceived the British through Dentz. In North Africa the Americans pretended that they were acting in accord with General De Gaulles Comite Nationale and so got the support of General De Gaulles supporters in North Africa. This was not the case at all, instead the Americans delayed communications between General De Gaulles agents in North Africa and his headquarters in London so that the real truth would not be known to the De Gaulle partisans in North Africa. In case of an American landing in North Africa, Marshall Petain will order all French forces to resist aggression. The entire French Army, Air Force and Fleet will obey the orders. Undoubtedly Germany will take advantage of this situation to intervene under color of protecting the French Empire. Laval will not declare war at once but will hold out in the hope of blackmailing from Germany a little help regarding prisoners of war and food. The idea of the Americans at first was to invade Europe this year, they then needed the help of

Printed in DDE, 522-523

SJS

~~SECRET~~

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

Page 2 From: London To: AGWAR No. 1723 September 1, 1942

the Free French and so opened negotiations with the Free French in London. Now they have resumed their former attitude of standoffishness toward the Free French."

Two days ago Colonel Lombard came to my office stating that from four sources namely Vichy, Gibraltar, Tangier, and Washington, the fighting French here have been informed of an imminent attack in North Africa and stated that active opposition would be encountered unless there could be identified with this operation the name of a prominent Frenchman.

Colonel Eddy Cip N. A. Tangier, advises me concerning the three Frenchmen mentioned in this cable that (A) Nogues has been "Written off the books, no longer used, Vernal and Pro Laval" (B) Boisson is at Dakar and so far as Eddy knows has not been contacted by the Americans in the last two years (C) Dentz has likewise not been contacted by our people and his lack of trustworthiness is well known to the British. He states that none of De Gaulles supporters in North Africa was approached so far as he knows.

The above information coupled with that furnished in my number twelve eight four of August nineteen indicates that the countries bordering the Mediterranean have definite suspicion and perhaps some knowledge of an imminent attack. The serious potentialities of such a situation are obvious. The whole matter implies a failure in our efforts to prevent leakage involving the most secret subjects and suggests the adoption of corrective measures.

Eisenhower

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

Civilt Coop

3. I am willing to rush explanation of Br Troops in Algeria by telling French that they are not intended to remain in French territory but their object is primarily to make note of traps from the rear.

Because this info I think it vital that Sole resp be placed with Am's with all Fr mil + civ author's

As you + I decided long ago we were to handle the Fr in Africa while you were to handle the situation in Spain.

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AJ

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE August 31, 1942
2036 Z

CCWD

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From: London
To : AGWAR

No. 1687, August 31, 1942

General Clark and I have just returned from meeting with British Chiefs of Staff at which was discussed in great detail the message received this afternoon by the PRIME MINISTER FROM THE PRESIDENT. This message was Chief Operations Division. *Para # 180.*

The Chief points that occasioned the concern of the British Chiefs of Staff were the omission of Algiers from the original attack and the fact that the assault proposed by the President disposes at least half its strength of a coast where possibilities of landing are dependent entirely upon the weather with the probability that four out of five days will be unsuitable for landing. Consequently while the British Chiefs of Staff completely share the American opinion as to the importance of Casablanca and the opening of an auxiliary line of communications, they believe that the Casablanca attack should be one that, if possible, should be made on invitation and at all events should not repeat not play too great a part in the first display of overwhelming tactical power.

AUG 31 42 PM



OPD
MSG. CTR.

As a counter proposal I believe the British Chiefs of Staff will suggest something about as follows to the Prime Minister: That the British provide all escorting, supporting and other Naval craft possible to the United States with the request that the two main American attacks be made at Algiers and Oran and with a smaller U S force ready to attack simultaneously at Casablanca. By eliminating the Bone and Philippeville attacks from the present plan, some additional escorting vessels and combat loaders will become available. The British could dispatch to the United States a few combat loaders to assist in making up the Casablanca force under the general plan just described. It is clear however that to provide the necessary Naval strength for giving reasonable

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INCOMING MESSAGE

No. 1687, August 31, 1942 (Page 2) From: London

protection to the Casablanca attack, even on relatively small scale, the U S will have to produce additional strength to that used by the U S Naval Planners here in making their calculations. I believe that the reply to the President will present in detail the exact amount of Naval force, including combat loaders, that can be made available to the Americans for the attack. Another suggestion made at the conference was that a British Division might be placed in American uniforms but this was finally rejected as involving risk of laying ourselves open to the charge of bad faith. As indicated in a telegram dispatched earlier today, there is no hope of the First Division being able to take part in a major expedition from the UK to attack before October thirtieth. This is absolutely the most optimistic date upon which we can calculate.

General Clark and I both believe that every possible chance of including Algiers in the first attack could be explored but we repeat our conviction that this can be done only with some additional Naval strength from the United States, which prior investigation has indicated could not be forthcoming.

Eisenhower

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August 30, 1942

PRIORITY

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON PERSONAL AND

~~SECRET~~ NO. 181.

/ I WILL LET YOU KNOW BY TUESDAY IN REGARD TO YOUR
NUMBER 140. I AM IN FULL ACCORD WITH THE DESIRABILITY
OF IT AND WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO DOVETAIL IT INTO THE
OTHER OPERATIONS.

ALSO WE ARE WORKING ON THE PERSIAN RAILWAY PROBLEM
AND I WILL ADVISE YOU.

ROOSEVELT

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BY AUTHORITY OF A.C.O.F.S., OPD

WAR DEPARTMENT
War Department General Staff
Operations Division
Washington

8/28/42 Date *fel* Initials

August 28, 1942

Felt

XXX-A

MEMORANDUM TO THE WAR DEPARTMENT CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER:

Subject: Personal Message for Gen. Eisenhower

The Chief of Staff directs that the following secret message in code be transmitted to USFOR, London, by the most expeditious means possible consistent with secrecy: WDOPD:

FOR GENERAL EISENHOWER'S EYES ONLY PERIOD THIS MESSAGE IS FOR YOUR PRIVATE INFORMATION AND IS NOT TO BE DISCLOSED TO ANYONE OTHER THAN SELECTED U S MEMBERS OF YOUR STAFF UNTIL THE PRESIDENT HAS COMMUNICATED HIS DECISION AS INDICATED HEREIN TO THE PRIME MINISTER PERIOD PARA I HAVE JUST COMPLETED A CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT PERIOD HE IS INFORMING THE PRIME MINISTER THAT REPLY WILL BE MADE TO HIS TORCH MESSAGES IN A FEW DAYS COMMA PROBABLY MONDAY PERIOD THE PRESIDENT APPEARS TO HAVE DEFINITELY REPEAT DEFINITELY DECIDED THAT THE INITIAL OPERATION MUST BE A PURELY AMERICAN ONE EXCEPT FOR BRITISH NAVAL FORCES COMMA AIR FORCES AND SHIPPING COMMA INCLUDING COMBAT LOADERS PERIOD PRESUMABLY THE OPERATION WOULD NECESSARILY BE RESTRICTED TO ORAN AND CASABLANCA PERIOD BRITISH TROOPS ARE NOT TO COME IN UNTIL AT LEAST A WEEK AFTER OUR LANDINGS PERIOD THE PRESIDENT BELIEVES THAT IF HE HAS A WEEK AFTER WE LAND HE CAN ARRANGE MATTERS WITH THE FRENCH SO THAT THERE WILL BE NO COMPLICATIONS TO LANDINGS OF BRITISH TROOPS

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By RT, NARA, Date *4/13/94*

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LATER PERIOD HE FEELS THAT JOINT LANDINGS EVEN THOUGH LED BY AMERICAN TROOPS WILL NOT SUFFICE PERIOD THE PRESIDENT IS APPARENTLY UNWILLING TO ACCEPT THE HAZARDS OF A SINGLE LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS THROUGH GIBRALTAR PERIOD HE DOES NOT ACCEPT THE BRITISH ARGUMENT THAT THE ACTION INDICATED WILL MEAN THE LOSS OF TUNISIA AND POSSIBLY ALGIERS TO THE GERMANS PERIOD HE ALSO IS IMPRESSED WITH THE NECESSITY FROM THE U.S. VIEWPOINT FOR THE SAFEGUARDING OF THE SOUTH ATLANTIC PERIOD THIS CONSIDERATION SHOULD NOT AT ANY TIME BE COMMUNICATED TO THE BRITISH PERIOD THE PRESIDENT IS CONVINCED THAT NAVAL RESOURCES ARE NOT REPEAT NOT SUFFICIENT FOR THE SUPPORT OF MORE THAN TWO LANDINGS PERIOD THE PRESIDENT PICTURES THE LANDING OF SOME EIGHTY THOUSAND MEN IN THE TWO ASSAULT CONVOYS AND THINKS SUCH A NUMBER WOULD BE NECESSARY TO HIS POLITICAL PURPOSES PERIOD PARA I AM CONVINCED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS FULLY MADE UP HIS MIND AS OUTLINED ABOVE AND THAT HE INTENDS TO DICTATE THAT PROCEDURE PERIOD PARA THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO FOREWARN AND TO ALLOW YOU TO DO SUCH ADVANCE PLANNING AS IS PRACTICABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES PERIOD I CAUTION YOU AGAIN THAT ALL THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN MUST BE COMMUNICATED ONLY TO SELECTED U S MEMBERS OF YOUR STAFF UNTIL THE PRESIDENT ACTUALLY TAKES THE DECISION AND COMMUNICATES

- 2 -

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~~SECRET~~

IT TO THE PRIME MINISTER PERIOD PARA MY FIRST IMPRESSION IS
THAT THE ORAN FORCE WILL HAVE TO BE MADE UP IN THE MAIN FROM
AMERICAN TROOPS NOW IN THE BRITISH ISLES AND TRANSPORTED BY
BRITISH COMBAT LOADERS PERIOD THE PATTON FORCE AUGMENTED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE AVAILABILITY OF COMBAT LOADERS AND OTHER
SHIPPING WILL FURNISH THE CASABLANCA FORCE PERIOD THE BRITISH AIR
AND NAVAL FORCES PROVIDED BY YOUR OUTLINE PLAN WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE
REQUIRED PERIOD PARA I AM PREPARING A DRAFT OF A MESSAGE FROM
THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER FOR SUBMISSION TO THE PRESIDENT
TOMORROW COMMA AUGUST TWENTY NINE THOUGH HE PROPOSED PREPARING
HIS OWN DRAFT AND DID NOT REQUEST ONE FROM ME PERIOD I WOULD
WELCOME YOUR COMMENTS IMMEDIATELY COMMA PARTICULARLY AS TO THE
EARLIEST DATE THE OPERATION AS INDICATED HEREIN CAN BE LAUNCHED
AND YOUR ROUGH ESTIMATE OF WHAT THE BRITISH MIGHT DO IN THE WAY
OF UTILIZING ALL THE COMBAT LOADERS AND THE NECESSARY ESCORTS TO
MAKE THE SECOND MOVE COMMA THAT TO THE EAST OF ORAN

MARSHALL

THOS. T. HANDY,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON
August 27, 1942

Torch WFL

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. LEAHY:

Subject: Alternative Plans for TORCH.

1. With the means at present available, two alternatives are possible. These are:

(a) To attack on October 15th along the north coast of Africa, with main landings at Oran and Algiers, a small subsidiary landing at Bone, and possibly another small subsidiary landing at Philippeville.

(b) To abandon the landings at Algiers, Bone, and Philippeville, and to attack with means available on October 15th at Oran on the north coast and Casa Blanca on the west coast.

Alternate directive just proposed by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

2. The British Chiefs of Staff have not replied to our proposal for the second alternative mentioned above. They are apprehensive about the first alternative, which they originally proposed, since they now think it will take too long to build up through available ports. They have suggested, through General Eisenhower, a third possibility, which is:

(a) Delay the operation until November 7th, provided the U. S. Navy is able to provide sufficient additional strength above that already allocated to permit simultaneous landings on the north coast at Oran, Algiers, and Bone, and on the west coast at Casa Blanca.



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By APK/ks Date AUG 21 1972

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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Admiral King says it is impossible to provide any additional American naval support. There appears to be a possibility of additional naval support

This is a return to the original London plan, and is predicated entirely on an affirmative answer by the Navy to the question, "Can the additional U. S. naval strength be provided?" Apparently an estimate of the additional naval strength required was to have been sent to the U. S. by Admiral Bieri.

3. The Prime Minister proposes a fourth alternative, which is:

- (a) Direct General Eisenhower to attack on October 14th with the means available, at whatever places he may decide upon.

The actual result of this proposal would be to leave the decision as to the location of attack to the Prime Minister, as General Eisenhower would be placed under terrific pressure from the Prime Minister through the British Chiefs of Staff, whom the Prime Minister dominates, with only such support as we could give him at long range. He might be confronted with the alternative of accepting what the Prime Minister wanted or of refusing to subordinate his military judgment, and thereby becoming persona non grata to such an extent that he could not carry out his mission.

from the British Staff's view on the unknown decision

SMITH

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By RAE Date AUG 21 1972

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

COPY

From: London, England
To: AGWAR

No. 1559, August 27, 1942.

Replying to your R432 (Request for immediate notification of British reactions to proposed new - Casa Blanca - directive and Eisenhower's possible plans). Last night I asked Churchill to have British Chiefs of Staff reply to United States Joint Chiefs of Staff immediately. Churchill sent his wire to Roosevelt prior to receipt by him of United States proposed directive.

Delays involved in building up in United Kingdom exclusive United States force to attack Oran as reported in my #151 are occasioned by improvising organizations of various kinds, amphibious training of additional troops and securing certain auxiliary and service units from United States. In the outline plan as submitted, with Philippville added, only two United States combat teams plus Ranger Battalion had to be provided from here for the attacks east of Oran, with all service, base and supporting troops provided by United Kingdom. The bulk of the United States Oran force would have come from United States. This accounts for the delay in attempting to make all United States attacks at Casa Blanca and Oran simultaneously.

With respect to proposal by Churchill concerning terms of directive, it is my impression that having seen outline plan that I prepared under original directive, he has jumped to the conclusion that unless prevented by special instructions, I would attack at least as far east as Bone. It is possible that for this reason he now wants to take everything out of the directive except attack quickly because he definitely wants to attack at earliest possible date and as far east as possible. I explained to him that two conceptions are involved, one a purely political gamble, the other a combination gamble with some regard for obvious tactical considerations although disregarding prospects of early strategic results. The former conception urges an east shift, the latter a drawing back of the attack to the west. I felt he paid little attention to this statement but he is anxious to make the attack appear as big as possible. What I really believe he favors is the attack as given in the outline plan plus a feint at Casa Blanca which could be turned into an issue if the force were invited in by France due to influence of Mediterranean attack. It is possible such a feint might be managed if the first follow-up convoy from United States could arrive off Casa Blanca on D+day.

- 1 -

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

The British Chiefs of Staff reaction to the proposal by United States Joint Chiefs of Staff as given me informally by Ismay, is one of considerable doubt and puzzlement. They say "It doesn't accomplish anything. What is the reason for going at all if we don't gain Tunisia? We cannot get Tunisia unless we do it quickly and attack as far east as Bone."

It is clear that differences of opinion as to concepts must be disposed of by definite language in the final directive. If the directive should contain nothing more than is now proposed by Churchill he would assume that these differences no longer exist and would expect every move to conform to his own extreme confidence that Spain will do nothing, French resistance will be negligible and Germany's reaction will be encountered only through Tunis. These opinions, which are in the political more than the military field, apparently do not agree with those of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and United States Government. Many British and Americans here likewise disagree with these views. In any event in conducting this campaign I must be assured that the basic features of operations conform to the general concepts of my own Chief.

Eisenhower

CM-IN-10397
WD R-132

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MSB

To: Joint Staff Mission

From: Chiefs of Staff

Dated: 27th August, 1942.

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JCS MEMO, 1-17-73
BY RT, DATE MAY 22 1974

IMMEDIATE

Following from Chiefs of Staff

C.O.S. W 265.

We have studied the new draft directive for TORCH suggested in J.S.M. 365. *(Casa Blanca Plan)*

2. We recognise that the limited operations now contemplated by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff may be less risky than the more extended operations envisaged when the original directive to the Allied Commander-in-Chief was agreed upon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Nevertheless we see the following overwhelming objections to it -

- (i) Capture of safe base in Morocco and subsequent advance eastward will be so slow as to allow Germans to reach Tunisia in force before us. New ultimate objective would thus never be achieved. All hopes of re-opening the Mediterranean would disappear and the Germans could hold or defeat us in North Africa without the necessity of going through Spain.
- (ii) Surf conditions may rule out a landing at Casablanca 4 days out of 5. If we stake half of our effort on this as proposed by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, and weather makes the assault impossible the whole enterprise

will be abortive.

3. We submit that the above arguments are conclusive and we most strongly urge that the original conception of the operations, as laid down in the directive, which was given to the Allied Commander-in-Chief on the 14th August and upon which all his plans are based, should be allowed to stand in its integrity. Apart from other considerations, any radical alteration at this stage will inevitably mean delay which we must avoid like the plague.

4. We feel that, within this framework, the objectives to be assaulted and the strength of these assaults must be left largely to the Allied Commander-in-Chief. But our broad views are as follows.

- (i) It is absolutely essential that Algiers should be one of the first objectives. It is the seat of administration, the best port, and the centre of sentiment favourable to our cause.
- (ii) The simultaneous capture of Oran is also essential, since we cannot afford to leave unoccupied a naval base on our line of communication.
- (iii) We must do our best, if we are to be sure of forestalling the Germans, to get to Tunis within four or five weeks of the first assault. To achieve this we should take great risks. The plan should therefore include assaults at places as far east as Bone and Philippeville.
- (iv) A landing at Casablanca is a very desirable feature of the plan if it can be done without prejudice to the rest of the operations. The advantages are self-evident. This landing should preferably be simultaneous

with the other assaults, but if this is not practicable, as soon as possible afterwards. A Casablanca attack of the strength originally contemplated could not take place until some considerable time after the original assaults and it would involve additional naval forces from the U.S.A. The estimate of these forces given to us by the Allied Commander-in-Chief will be sent in our immediately following telegram. We press strongly that these forces should be made available.

5. If a full scale attack on Casablanca is ruled out either by lack of resources or by the uncertain weather conditions, we think, and the Allied Commander-in-Chief has recorded a similar opinion, that there is much to be said for a strong threat or feint. This diversion would be helpful in two ways -

- (i) By assisting to create an impression of overwhelming assault, and
- (ii) For actual use either to occupy the west coast or to move into the Mediterranean as a reserve for the other attacks.

6. Should the United States Chiefs of Staff dissent from the idea of a feint and require a full-scale attack on Casablanca, this could be done in two ways -

- (i) By the immediate provision of the necessary naval forces by the U.S.A., or
- (ii) By using the naval forces employed on the assaults within the Mediterranean after those operations have been completed.

7. Please place the above views before the U.S. Chiefs of Staff at once.

T.O.O. 1405Z/27

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H. R.

COMINCH FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

August 26, 1942

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By Authority

ART 0445,

DANAVINST 5570.1C BY DP

By RHOE Det OCT 12 1972

Memorandum for the President

Via: Admiral Leahy

Subject: Implementation of TORCH and of NORTH RUSSIA Convoys -
Simultaneously - during September-October 1942.

Reference: Your oral instructions of August 20th (P.M.).

1. The matter of implementing both TORCH and the NORTH RUSSIA Convoys - simultaneously - during September-October 1942 has been duly "explored" in accordance with your instructions, in order to develop what reductions and/or cessations would ensue with respect to convoys in the Western Atlantic Area (west of 25° W.).

2. The requirements as to simultaneous implementation of TORCH and of NORTH RUSSIA Convoys can be met - with the exception of 10 DD (5 new, 5 old) - if the following premises are accepted:

- (a) North Atlantic trade convoys and the Iceland shuttle will continue as before, since ships must go to the UK, and must be kept running to Iceland to join PQ Convoys there.
- (b) South Atlantic Task Force is reduced to three old light cruisers. This will result in virtual isolation of Brazil, and very heavy losses in shipping on routes to the Near East, Persian Gulf and India, as well as in the heavy traffic which Great Britain proposes to divert from the West African route to our waters.
- (c) Panama Canal Area loses all destroyers. This weakens the defense of the Canal and may result in heavy losses in traffic between U. S. and Panama.
- (d) Service Force convoys must be discontinued. These now supply Caribbean Bases (Army and Navy), Bermuda (civilian, as well as Army and Navy needs) and

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August 26, 1942

Memorandum for the President

Via Admiral Leahy

Subject: Implementation of TORCH and of NORTH RUSSIA Convoys -
Simultaneously - during September-October 1942.

Iceland. Fuel and provisions probably can be moved to Iceland in trade convoys and by independent sailings, but ship losses will be high.

- (e) It will be impossible to escort routine Army Caribbean convoys or any special Army movements.
- (f) Coastal and Caribbean convoys will be kept in operation with reduced escorts. These have to be kept running to move oil, bauxite and other vital cargoes. Reduction in escort forces will be as follows:

EASTERN FRONTIER loses 11 DD
GULF FRONTIER. No loss. Retains 2
Sound School DD.
CARIBBEAN FRONTIER loses 8 DD.
PANAMA FRONTIER loses 5 DD.

E. J. KING.

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OPNAVINST 5510.1C BY OP
By RH/RG on OCT 12 1972

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CCWD
Aug. 26
1923 Z

XXX A
U R G E N T

From: London
To: AGWAR

No. 1511, Aug. 26, 1942

Your number R one hundred received. Learned informally today that British Chiefs of Staff have your official proposal. For General Marshall. They may possibly call me for conference later in the day.

Last night General Clark and I had long conversation with former Naval person and will have another either Thursday or Friday night. The following represents the gist of comments and views expressed by him.

During his recent visit to an Allied Capital he explained the reasons for his rejection of Sledgehammer, but apparently without completely convincing his hearer of the military soundness of his views. He then outlined Torch to his hearer as it was understood when you were here and awakened great interest in this proposition. Before the former Naval person terminated his visit to that Capital he was told "May God prosper that operation." There is no question that, through these conversations, the former Naval person feels completely committed to launching Torch at the earliest possible date, on as grand a scale as possible and with ambitious objectives. Our conversation next centered around the tactical features of the operation. He clearly understands that the situation with regard to available Naval resources and overall possibilities is vastly different from what you had assumed it would be when, on July twenty fourth, you agreed to the Torch operation. I told him that as examination by my group had brought these differences to light, they had been presented both to Washington and London and that reactions in the two staffs were probably not completely identical. I told him that the outline plan submitted by me with the limited resources avail-

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Page 2, No. 1511, August 26, 1942.

able was designed to make the best possible effort at attaining the original objectives prescribed by the two Governments, and that it was for higher authority to state whether or not the original directive was still applicable. In general I outlined for him the situation along the lines given in my letter to the combined Chiefs of Staff. I stated that it was entirely possible that the American Government might consider a more restricted directive and a tactical operation involving a lower degree of risk to be indicated in the circumstances. Moreover I stated that the operation was so heavily dependent upon political factors, which would have to be evaluated by higher authority, that strictly military calculations such as I was in position to present could probably not be the deciding considerations.

He apparently comprehends all the difficulties of the situation and is quite clear in his mind that conditions are not identical with your understanding of them on July twenty fourth. He is however extremely anxious to attack at the earliest possible date, with the strongest force we can muster and with ambitious objectives. Very definitely he looks upon Tunisia as the vital territorial objective of the operation. He thoroughly believes that we must attack along the broadest possible front in the Mediterranean and as far to the eastward as is humanly possible so as to have at least a fighting chance of gaining Tunisia. At a late hour he called to the conference both the First Sea Lord and the Chiefs of Combined Operations to whom he gave urgent instructions looking forward the cutting down of the time element in preparation and shipping of British troops so as to attain a date of middle of October at the very latest. He earnestly desires to fix a firm date now and for both Governments to determine to attack on that date with the maximum force they can make available. The importance of fixing a firm date as quickly as possible is obvious. All schedules of preparation, including the suspending of U S air and other activity in this theater in order to pack up equipment and prepare personnel and supplies for shipment, are involved. We do not desire to stop training, especially air training, before we are compelled to do so, but on the other hand it is essential that

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Page 3, No. 1511, August 26, 1942.

we be instantly ready to move whenever ordered.

To attain speed, the former naval person stated that he was going to suspend blackout regulations at certain ports so as to permit night and day loading. To attain the greatest possible naval strength he is determined to bring back to this region every available piece of equipment. For example, he stated to the First Sea Lord that in view of the fact that the U S Navy was so heavily engaging the enemy in the Pacific, he was perfectly prepared to strip the Indian Ocean, even to the extent of laying up certain vessels that might be left without proper auxiliary and escorting ships.

He is putting his tremendous energies and enthusiasm behind the project for attacking by the middle of October. It is my belief, based entirely on his conversation last night, that he may probably answer the proposal of the U S Chiefs of Staff by jumping in a plane and coming to Washington. His purpose would be to urge the attack by October fifteenth with utmost in force that the two nations could produce and with the scale of attack inside the Mediterranean no less in scope than that suggested in outline plan plus an assault on Philippeville.

New subject. As stated in my radio yesterday it would be practicable to prepare an American contingent in the U K to attack at Oran by November first to fifth. It will be noted that this attack would take longer to mount than would be the case if the force from here were largely British. The reduced scale attack suggested in the outline plan was calculated as possible by October fifteenth dash twentieth from here and by October fourteen from the U S. No matter what decisions are arrived at by the combined Chiefs of Staff concerning direction and location of attack, I believe it important to do the job as early as possible.

Handy departing today.

Eisenhower

R-100 is CM-OUT-7858 (8/25/42) OPD
WDCMC believes other reference to be CM-IN-9354 (8/25/42) OPD
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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

CCWD
Aug 25
1602 Z

WSP

URGENT XXXA

From: London
To: AGWAR

No. 1480, August 25, 1942

Referring to your number R eighty four (for General Marshall) my comments on proposed directive are as follows:

The proposed plan will provide maximum possible degree of security for the communications of the attacking force. Initially about one half only of the command will be dependent upon the Gibraltar line and eventually even this part should be able to depend partially on the road and rail lines joining Casablanca to the Mediterranean Coastline. In addition the plan contemplates the building up of forces on the southwest of Spanish Morocco, which is the only feasible direction from which to make a land attack against that province. When successful it will deny to hostile use an important section of this coastline. Principal disadvantages are: (a) it violates French neutrality without bringing forward such an overwhelming show of force that French acquiescence can be considered likely. (b) It attacks the most strongly fortified and held portions of French holdings in North Africa. (c) Half the whole force is committed against the Atlantic Coastline where probabilities are against finding favorable weather on any pre selected day. Continuous reports on this point fail to reveal any encouragement. (d) Possibly more important than any of the above is the forcing of at least one more country, and possibly two, into the ranks of our active enemies while it sets up no obtainable objective to balance either those risks, or the possibility of tactical defeat and the inevitable costs in Naval, Ground, and Air strength and shipping. Though we may successfully occupy Casablanca and Oran and deny this section of the continent to the enemy, all calculations are flatly against resulting chances to capture Tunisia

Admiral Leahy

15

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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Page 2

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: LONDON
To: AGWAR

No. 1480, August 25, 1942

either initially or eventually. Once we have violated French neutrality the Axis will certainly occupy the great Tunisian elbow, at which point the enemy can build up forces far more rapidly than we can in Morocco or Algiers. Direct risks of destruction of the attacking force are much lower under the proposed plan than in the one as now outlined and submitted to the combined Chiefs of Staff, but broad strategic risks are equally great and under the new proposal we do not have a gambling chance to achieve greatly worth while strategic purpose. This is the particular objection that I believe the British Chiefs of Staff will urge most strongly when you inform them of this plan.

The conclusion as given below in this paragraph I based upon the assumption that the combined Navies cannot find the means to support a Casablanca attack, even at reduced strength, simultaneously with those planned inside the Mediterranean between Oran and Bone. It is also assumed that you have rejected the idea of Middle East reinforcement as a second choice for U S operations. My conclusion is: that if the primary purpose from the viewpoint of the U S is to engage US ground forces at an early date and for restricted purposes only while minimizing risks of disaster, the general outline of your proposal should be adopted in preference to the one proposed by me. On the other hand if the real purpose is to take a great tactical risk in the hope of gaining a worth while objective, we should attack somewhat as suggested in the outline plan submitted to the C C S.

Problems involved in projected use of first and part of Third Fourth Divisions are under study. So far I can say little more than that some time between November first and fifth appears to be earliest possible date. Other features will be reported to you as quickly as possible.

Eisenhower

Footnote: No. R 84 (CM-OUT-7500 8-4-42) OPD

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CCWD
August 25, 1942
1732 Z

INCOMING MESSAGE

WLS

U R G E N T

From: London
To: Agvar Washington

No. 1497, August 25th, 1942

In continuation of my number one four eight zero this morning, I consider employment of First Division with parts of the Thirty Fourth Division and First Armored Division at Oran using British Ships to be practicable. For General Marshall. This has not been taken up with British. The first follow up from here should be by the remainder of the Thirty Fourth Division and the First Armored Division. Additional amphibious training for the First Infantry Division will be necessary. This training program, with British assistance in providing landing craft, can be completed in time for an attack by five November. This presupposes no unforeseen delay in equipping the First Division. Additional to above General Handy will bring back with him list of service troops not now available or to be available in U K, but which must accompany Oran contingent from U K. These units, with all equipment, must be in U K at least forty days prior to date of attack. Later followup forces for Oran may be British. Pattons original force, substantially as initially constituted for Oran, could be used at Casablanca. Limited United States air forces in this theater not repeat not adequate for support of attacks at both Oran and Casablanca without assistance from the RAF. Investigation of the port facilities of the ports impose limits on number vessels which can be accommodated with protection from weather and enemy action at Oran and Casablanca. Preliminary estimates indicate that in addition to accommodating necessary Naval escort vessels and auxiliaries twenty five cargo vessels may be accommodated at one time in Oran and fourteen in Casablanca. These numbers, related to clearance capacities of ports

Adm. Leahy

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INCOMING MESSAGE

Page 2 from: London to Agwar No. 1487

U R G E N T

and stores capacity of ships, determine convoy intervals for full utilization capacities of ports. Therefore, present calculations indicate interval between cargo convoys should not repeat not exceed twenty five and fourteen days for Oran and Casablanca respectively for full use ports capacities. Matter of practicability furnishing escorts is involved. Provided these convoy intervals are accepted, it is estimated that three four zero zero wt tons cargo can be cleared from each port daily during first month increasing subsequently as ports are improved.

Eisenhower

1480 (CM-IN-9526 8/25/42) OPD

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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OUTGOING MESSAGE

August 25, 1942

WST

To LIEUT. GENERAL D D EISENHOWER
COMMANDING GENERAL
EUROPEAN THEATER LONDON ENGLAND

No. R-100

XXX-A

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff this evening turned over to the British Mission here for transmission to the British C.O.S. the proposed directive, quoted in my radio of August 24th. They considered your messages numbers 1480 and 1487 and Handy's 1478. Admiral King states the Navy will not be able to provide the additional escort required to extend your present outline plan as indicated in the 2nd and 3rd paragraphs of your 1465. They also feel that the operation as now outlined imposes too great a hazard especially considering the extreme seriousness of the effect on the peoples of occupied Europe, India and China of a U.S. failure in its first major operation.

There would appear to be no prospect of withdrawing U.S. Naval craft from the Pacific. At the present moment a large Japanese Naval Force is attacking our lodgment in the Solomon Islands and is engaged in heavy air action with our fleet. The action will probably involve inevitable attritions but as yet the apparent advantages are all on our side.

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff are not favorably disposed towards the movement of approximately an Army Corps to the Middle East as recommended by Handy in his message above referred to.

Keep US advised as to British detailed reactions and the possibilities of the readjustment of your plans.

Notify Handy to return to the U.S. by the first available transport.

Marshall

ORIGINATOR: OPD

INFO. COPIES: LOG, ADM. LEAHY, ADM KING, GEN. PATTON

CM-OUT-7858 (8-25-42) 2218Z

Admiral Leahy

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CSWD
August 25,
1343

WKS

URGENT

From: London
To: Agwar

No 1478 August 25th, 1942

I have read your R eightyfour to General Eisenhower, for General Marshall from Handy. The directive you propose to submit to the president contemplates generally the third course of action advocated in my one four one seven August twentytwo. My views remain as given in that message. If, and only if, neither the first nor the second course of action can be adopted, should the third be accepted. Query I state this realizing fully that the operation will very probably not result in our securing the North coast of Africa as far as Tunisia. The first course of action listed in my one four one seven is essentially that proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff to Eisenhower yesterday, Monday. He informed you of it in his one four six five sent last night. If suitable naval forces can possibly be provided it should be carried out. I doubt British acceptance of the directive you propose principally because they believe the Germans will occupy Tunisia before we can unless we land as far east as Bone.

Do you want me to remain here until Torch becomes more definite? Eisenhower feels that this is desirable. Handy.

Eisenhower

Footnote: No. R 84 (CM-OUT-7500 8-24-42) OPD
No. 1417 (CM-IN-8444 8-3-42) OPD

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August 24, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WAR DEPARTMENT CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER:

Subject: Outline Plan.

The Chief of Staff directs that a secret message as follows be sent by the most expeditious means possible consistent with secrecy to USFOR, London: WDOFD:

FOR GENERAL EISENHOWERS EYE ONLY STOP FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF YOUR COMMENTS TO COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF ON OUTLINE PLAN COMMA THE U S CHIEFS OF STAFF PROPOSE TO SUBMIT THE FOLLOWING REVISED DIRECTIVE TO THE PRESIDENT TOMORROW TUESDAY FOR HIS APPROVAL PRIOR TO SUBMITTING IT TO BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF THROUGH THEIR JOINT STAFF MISSION COLON QUOTE THE TORCH OPERATION AS ORIGINALLY CONCEIVED INVOLVES SIMULTANEOUS LANDINGS AT SEVERAL POINTS ALONG THE NORTH AND NORTHWEST COASTS OF AFRICA COMMA THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE BEING THE COMPLETE MILITARY DOMINATION OF NORTH AFRICA FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE RED SEA PERIOD THE INFORMATION NOW AVAILABLE AS TO TROOPS COMMA PLANES COMMA SHIPS COMMA ESCORTS AND NAVAL SUPPORT COMMA INDICATES THAT IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK ON THE WEST COAST SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN COMMA AND THAT THE OPERATIONS ON THE NORTH COAST MUST BE CONDUCTED WITH VERY LIMITED FORCES AND EXTREMELY LIMITED AIR SUPPORT COMMA TOGETHER WITH THE HAZARDS INVOLVED IN KEEPING OPEN THE WESTERN ENTRANCE TO THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE VITAL STAGING FLYING FIELD AT GIBRALTER PERIOD PARA IT THEREFORE HAS BECOME NECESSARY COMMA IN OUR OPINION COMMA TO PREPARE A NEW DIRECTIVE OUTLINING OBJECTIVES COMMENSURATE WITH

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THE LIMITED MILITARY FORCES AVAILABLE PERIOD THE FOLLOWING IS A PROPOSED MODIFICATION OF THE PRESENT DIRECTIVE COLON PARA THE OPERATION WILL BE CONDUCTED AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE WITH A VIEW TO ACCOMPLISHING AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE THE FOLLOWING INITIAL COMMA INTERMEDIATE AND ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES COLON PAREN ONE PAREN ESTABLISHMENT OF MUTUALLY SUPPORTING LODGEMENTS IN THE AGIDIR DASH MARRAKECH DASH CASABLANCA DASH RABAT DASH FEZ AREA IN FRENCH MOROCCO AND IN THE ORAN DASH MOSTAGANEM DASH MASCARA AREA IN ALGERIA PERIOD PAREN TWO PAREN RAPID EXPLOITATION IN ORDER TO ACQUIRE COMPLETE CONTROL OF THE AREA INCLUDING FRENCH MOROCCO COMMA SPANISH MOROCCO PAREN IF THE SITUATION REQUIRES PAREN AND WESTERN ALGERIA COMMA TO FACILITATE THE EXTENSION OF EFFECTIVE AIR AND GROUND OPERATIONS TO THE EASTWARD PERIOD PAREN THREE PAREN COMBINED AIR COMMA GROUND AND SEA OPERATIONS WITH A VIEW TO INSURING COMPLETE CONTROL BY THE UNITED NATIONS OF THE ENTIRE NORTH AFRICAN AREA FROM RIO DE ORO TO TUNISIA INCLUSIVE COMMA AND TO FACILITATE AIR OPERATIONS AGAINST THE ENEMYS FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA PERIOD UNQUOTE PARA RADIO IMMEDIATELY YOUR VIEWS AS TO PROPOSED DIRECTIVE PERIOD PARA GIVE US YOUR VIEWS ON PRACTICABILITY OF UTILIZING FIRST DIVISION AND PART OF THE THIRTY FOURTY DIVISION IN BRITISH SHIPS AT ORAN COMMA POSSIBLY FOLLOWED UP BY BRITISH FORCE AND AT SAME TIME UTILIZING ALL OR MOST OF ORIGINAL U S ORAN FORCE ON WEST COAST OF AFRICA PERIOD LATTER MIGHT BE COMMANDED BY FREDENDALL WHO IS FAMILIAR WITH PROJECT PERIOD PARA THE FOREGOING HAS IN MIND UTILIZING MOST OF BRITISH

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COMBAT LOADERS AND SO FAR AS POSSIBLE MAKING ALL FORCES EXCEPT
NAVAL IN INITIAL ENTERPRISE PURELY U S PERIOD ALSO IT ASSUMES
THE NECESSARY DELAY TO EQUIP THE FIRST DIVISION

MARSHALL

ST. CLAIR STREETT,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

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WAR-DEPARTMENT
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

To be delivered to
Admiral Leahy by
Gen. Smith personally.

SCM

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

August 24, 1942.

File

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Torch Operation.

In light of recent developments, some revision is necessary in our memorandum of August 20, 1942. In general, these developments have made no material change in the overall strength of forces employed, scope of objective, and location of attack. They have, however, enabled us to clear some of the confusion which surrounded certain elements of the plan, especially with respect to the initial assault and air support. The initial Oran assault combat force has been reduced by about ten thousand (10,000) and will approximate twenty-five thousand (25,000) men, and the "follow up" convoy will not arrive until D+17 instead of D+4 and will be 25,000 combat troops instead of 35,000.

One additional chart is here attached, giving a summary of the latest plan.

Initial Assault

More data regarding port facilities available, and the rate of the progress being made in conversion of combat loaders, has determined that the assaulting force at Oran should be transported in one convoy instead of in two as previously planned. This one convoy, composed for the most part of combat loaders, will land approximately forty-one thousand (41,000) troops, of which twenty-five thousand (25,000) will be combat units, while the remainder will be the necessary service personnel for operating ports and captured air fields, and for supplying troops already ashore. Not until D+17 will a second troop convoy arrive. This second convoy will carry approximately thirty thousand (30,000) men, of which 5,000 will be service troops.

Air Support

Some revision has been made in the number of carriers to be used. At Oran the Ranger and two (2) AVG's will be employed, and at Algiers and Bone, one (1) CV, one (1) Old Carrier, and two (2) AVG's. In addition, one (1) CV will accompany

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
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naval force "H" with the mission of covering the Vichy and Italian fleets and furnishing fighter support for the Bone assault. If available, one additional carrier, the Angus, will be used for ferrying planes to the other CV's and protecting convoys.

Army air support after the initial landing will be provided by one thousand eighty-six (1,086) aircraft of all types by D+50, of which seven hundred forty-eight (748) will be American and four hundred thirty-eight (438) British. This aircraft will be brought in principally by air, after fields have been captured. In addition to the one thousand eighty-six (1,086), the British will hold available on call from UK, thirty-six (36) medium and seventy-two (72) heavy bombers.

Logistics

Further logistical studies indicate that a cargo convoy of thirty-five (35) slow ships must arrive on D+6, with a second all-cargo convoy of thirty-eight (38) ships shortly after D+30.


Chief of Staff.

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FIGURE IVa

PLAN AS GIVEN BY GEN. EISENHOWER'S CABLE OF AUG. 22, 1942





FIGURE IVb

SHORTAGES - PLAN IVa AS COMPARED WITH PLAN II



Same LEGEND as for Plan III a

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6	Gen. Staff Adm. Coak
7	Chief of Staff
10	Col. Upstar
12	Gen. Patton RAN. LEAHY

From: London, Eng
To: AGWAR

No. 1465, August 24th, 1942.

I have just returned from a conference with the British Chiefs of Staff concerning the outline plan and the letter I submitted to the combined Chiefs of Staff in connection therewith. The contents of that letter were transmitted to you by General Handy today. For General Marshall and OPD.

The British Chiefs of Staff now show great concern in the weakness of the initial attack, the slowness in build up due to scarcity of ports, and the danger to communications via Gibraltar. They have revived a great interest in the possibilities of making a simultaneous attack at Casablanca, originally eliminated primarily because of lack of naval support.

The First Sea Lord read an extract from a statement made by the President at a recent White House conference at which Admiral King, General Burns, Mr. Hopkins and others were present. The purport of this statement was that the Torch operation and the Russian convoys were the two highest priority tasks for employment of United States Forces and that all else had to give way in their favor. Based upon this statement, the British Chiefs of Staff seem to consider that the United States Navy may be able to find additional escorting and supporting vessels so that the Casablanca attack might be staged along with those planned inside. Today we found that it would be

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Page 2, No. 1462, From London, August 24, 1942.

necessary to add to other assaults inside the Mediterranean an attack at Philippeville so as to gain necessary port capacity for a rapid advance against Tunisia.

Admiral Bieri and the United States Navy planners used for planning purposes a certain amount of United States Naval Force, concerning which Captain Thomas, now in Washington, can provide details. It appears that any naval support provided for Casablanca operation would have to come exclusively from the United States and must be in addition to that already calculated as necessary for supporting the attack at Oran. The First Sea Lord says that all available British strength is committed to this operation. Admiral Stark and Admiral Bieri were both at conference but could provide no information of any kind upon possible availability of additional United States Navy strength. Admiral Bieri had previously informed me that even the amounts contemplated by the planners for use inside the Mediterranean would possibly have to be reduced.

In effect, what the British Staff now wants me to do is to return to the initial outline plan submitted to them and which they rejected on the basis of date (November seven) and because of lack of naval support. The British Staff now feels that the date is not so important as the production of an initial strength in the attack which will tend to overpower resistance and will more quickly open up an auxiliary land line of communications. The weather factor on the Atlantic coast is still considered a difficult one but they believe that even this should be disregarded if available means will allow us to make the more expanded attack.

Examination of time and training factors, when considered in connection with present location of combat loading ships and information provided in your number three one three nine dated August ninth, indicates that the only feasible plan for executing American attacks on both Casablanca and Oran would be as follows: First - General Patton's force to be organized into two task forces with combat loaders divided about equally between the two with at least two regimental combat teams and one regiment of armored force combat loaded in each force. Remainder

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

Page 3, No. 1465, From London, August 24th, 1942.

of each force to be unit loaded. Total strength of each force one infantry division reinforced by one regiment of armor and necessary antitank, antiaircraft, certain air elements and base forces.

Second - The whole force could be brought over in a single convoy which would split outside straits with one part going to each port.

Third - That part of the first division that is not required by British in assault would be unit loaded here and form a floating reserve to be used at either Casablanca or Oran as circumstances may dictate.

In order to get ahead with planning, it is therefore necessary to have early answer to the following question: Is it possible for the United States Navy to produce, in addition to that already calculated by the Navy planners as being available in the Atlantic: sufficient strength to give reasonable naval support to an attack at Casablanca about November seventh? In this connection we will forward tomorrow Admiral Bieris detailed estimate on additional amounts required. Provided the answer is in the affirmative, it is understood that the entire expedition could sail from the United States in time to reach the West African Coast on or about November seven.

The whole assault plan would contemplate the use of three U S inf divisions (two from the U S and the first division from U K) and two British divisions, all reinforced by armored units except for U S first division which would provide two assault regiments for British and the remainder would be in floating reserve. Air, antiair and antitank as contemplated in current outline plan.

I understand that the British Chiefs of Staff will promptly communicate with you through their mission in Washington. For your information, the First Sea Lord stated that to support this operation, Great Britain had suspended certain convoys entirely and had reduced every-

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Page 4, No. 1485, From London, August 24th, 1942.

where else to the bare minimum and had even brought back from the Indian Ocean two carriers which they consider necessary in that region. They state that in all their dispositions and plans they are making this effort of first priority in disposal of available means of all kinds.

I informed the British Chiefs of Staff that all my information was to the effect that the situation in the Pacific would allow no United States Naval withdrawals from that region and that investigations of the kind they suggest would probably produce no useful result. However, they so strongly feel that the success of the entire venture depends upon creating in North Africa an impression of overwhelming attack that, encouraged by the President's statement above cited, they believe that something additional might be done. They gave me no repeat no indication of their attitude in the event that no repeat no additional naval support can be provided.

It has become apparent to me that, even as now planned, the assault cannot be made before October twentieth at earliest or probably not before October twenty seventh.

Eisenhower

FOOTNOTE: WD 3139 (CM-OUT-2772 8-9-42) OPD.

ACTION: OPD

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H. S. F.*

COPY NO. 13

*Copy made and
given to Ben Smith
August 25, 1942
1977*

To: Joint Staff Mission
From: Chiefs of Staff
Dated: 23rd August, 1942.

IMPORTANT

C.O.S.(W)262.

From Gen Eisenhower

Following for Combined Chiefs of Staff and Joint Staff Mission.

Following comments by General Eisenhower on Outline Plan have been submitted to Combined Chiefs of Staff. Begins.

1. With reference to the Outline Plan for operation TORCH, which I submitted to you yesterday I consider it advisable to invite your attention to important considerations that have come to light as a result of the intensive investigations that have been conducted recently under my supervision. It is possible that some of these matters may not heretofore have been noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
2. The conclusions herein presented are based largely upon opinions of and examinations made by my principal subordinates. While certain of these conclusions are of a discouraging nature I want to make it clear to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the submission of this letter does not indicate any unreadiness on my part or that of any(?) of my subordinates to undertake this operation determinedly and wholeheartedly. I desire, here, to express to the Combined Chiefs of Staff my entire satisfaction with the designations to principal command and staff positions that have been made by the two Governments.
3. It is my opinion that this expedition which as now planned is believed to contemplate the most effective use of the Ground, Air and Naval assets that have been indicated as available, is not sufficiently powerful to accomplish against the potential opposition in the general theater the purpose prescribed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. If we should encounter determined resistance from the French Forces there would be little hope of gaining Tunisia ahead of Axis troops which could then be built up more rapidly than our own. If the Spanish army should be employed against us in the early weeks of the operation our communications would be in great jeopardy while the instant elimination of Gibraltar as an Air and Naval base would in itself create a difficulty of the most serious kind. This means that the chances for success of the expedition at its presently estimated strength must depend more upon political attitudes and reactions in Northern Africa than upon strictly military factors. In this connection the apparent inability of the Combined Navies to provide escorts for an attack at Casablanca along with those planned inside

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

the Mediterranean has distinctly decreased the opportunity for creating throughout North Africa the impression of overwhelming attack, so essential to producing a readiness to accept allied occupation without material resistance.

4. The most favorable situation that we can reasonably hope to find in Northern Africa is continued neutrality on the part of the Spanish and submission on the part of the French. Under these conditions the expedition assuming that initial and follow-up forces arrive as planned should succeed. Positive French assistance can scarcely be anticipated in view of the tremendous pressure that the enemy can exert in France on the friends, families and interests of the North African inhabitants. Moreover, it would appear that once French territory has been invaded by us whatever military assets remain to French in Europe will become almost instantly available to the Germans.
 5. There is no need to dwell upon the inescapable costs of this expedition measured in terms of its adverse effects on other allied ventures throughout the world. However it is obvious that both Governments will necessarily regard this venture as a military obligation of first priority with the certainty that every other theater will have to be cut to the bone in order to provide the strength necessary to attain the prescribed object. This situation will persist for a number of months no matter what the degree of initial success.
 6. My naval advisors have expressed grave doubts as to the ability of the Combined Navies to provide the continuous escorting and covering resources that will be essential up until the moment of final victory in this region. They believe that additional losses, commitments throughout the world and increased enemy reaction, particularly by air and submarine will make the naval aspects of this operation one of increasing hazard and difficulty. Even the initial assault will not have the naval support either in carriers or in other types that it should have.
 7. Finally, it must be pointed out that no matter what the initial success of the operation nor what the degree of welcome experienced from the Spanish and French forces in Africa there will always remain the threatening possibility of Axis reaction through the Iberian Peninsula. When and if sufficient Axis forces are released from the Russian theater to be available for a deliberate campaign in that direction there would appear to be little that the Allies could do to escape the inevitable effects of an Axis occupation of Spain. The closing of the door in rear even of a rather victorious army in North Africa is a possibility which must not be overlooked.
 8. As an expression of personal opinion I believe that if the two Governments could find the Naval, Air and Ground forces with the shipping to carry out simultaneously with the attack planned inside the Mediterranean a strong assault at Casablanca the chances for success would be greatly increased. The advantages to be gained would be in reducing the hazard of either Spanish or French hostile reaction, more quickly establishing an auxiliary line of communications by land, and in increasing the port capacity of the occupied zone such simultaneous attacks could not be made before 7th November at the earliest."
- Ends.

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Heads of Missions
Brigadier Dykes.

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

T.O.O. 1815Z/23

MAY 22 1974

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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AXWAR 8
Filed 810P/22
rlw

INCOMING MESSAGE ^{CCWD} August 22, 1942

URGENT

From: London
To: AGWAR

From General Handy -

Number 1417, August 22, 1942

Since my arrival Thursday morning I have consulted Eisenhower and Clark and their Staffs, Doolittle and Bierl (Navy), and General Anderson and Admiral Ramsay, the British Task Force Commanders. For General Marshall from Handy.

I find all of them energetically and wholeheartedly preparing for the contemplated operation. However, I also find that as a result of the intensive investigation made by Commanders and Staffs, there is a practical unanimity of opinion among U S Officers that the operation is dependent for success upon the favorable outcome of so many uncertain factors as to make our chances considerably less than fifty percent. Everything that I have developed here tends to confirm the views held in the War Department. The existing plan, in view of the directive under which drawn, makes the best use of apparently available assets.

The Casablanca attack was thrown out for two principal reasons - lack of sufficient Naval support and surf conditions that make a landing at the time contemplated very uncertain. Also, occupation of Casablanca does not directly help the objective of the operation - the control of the North African Coast. Other factors that affected the Casablanca decision were the poor communications to Oran and the strength of the Casablanca defenses.

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UNCLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER AUGUST 22, 1942

From: London To: AGWAR No. 1417

AXWAR 8

Page 2

INCOMING MESSAGE

Bieri thinks that the Naval Forces now set up can support an operation against Casablanca and one inside the Mediterranean, provided that landing is made at only one place in the Mediterranean. Some of the British Army feel that Naval support can be furnished if both Navies exert a maximum effort. Due to surf conditions, landings on the West Coast may be subject to long delays. It should be noted, however, that unfavorable conditions may also be encountered in the Mediterranean. Admiral Ramsay estimates that fifteen out of thirty days probably would be suitable in the Mediterranean, while at Casablanca there would be only about seven out of thirty with much less chance of consecutive favorable days.

After a study of the outline plan and a consideration of the views of all the Officers consulted, my opinions are as follows: (1) The operation as now set up is, from a strictly military viewpoint, unsound, principally because its success is dependent upon four uncertain factors. An unfavorable result of any one of these can cause initial or eventual failure. These are: Spain will remain neutral and take no action against US. The French will not resist our attack wholeheartedly. The Germans will not move through Spain until we are fully established. The Germans and Italians will not act quickly and strongly enough from the East to prevent our seizing and holding Tunisia. (2) The strategic aspects of the operations have been discussed since the incidence of Gymnast and need not be repeated here. (3) The following factors, in addition to those previously mentioned, are particularly unfavorable. U S Air and Ground Troops will have had no training together. To depend on carrier borne air against land based is to disregard rpt disregard the Midway lesson. The assemblage of

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AXWAR 8

URGENT 22 APR 1942
From: ~~SECRET~~ INCOMING MESSAGE

Page 3

fighters at Gibraltar and dependence on that one field ignores our costly experiences whenever we have lacked dispersion. (4) I am convinced that few, if any, of the U S officers familiar with this operation, really believe that as now planned it is sound or has a reasonable chance of success. I believe that a similar belief is held but seldom expressed, by some of the British. I am also convinced that the Officers charged with the planning and execution of the operation are determined to put it over. They are exerting every effort to make it a success and they can make it go if any one can do so. With the leadership designated and with every break for us, the operation can be successful. Doolittle says: " Its the kind I like. Its one hundred percent strategically and tactically unsound, so that man who can put it over is a miracle man." (5) My conclusion is that Torch as now set upon involves an unjustifiable hazard and should be abandoned entirely or revised and directed toward a less ambitious objective.

I believe that the soundest action would be a diversion to the original sledgehammer - roundup plan. The next most advantageous action would be for the US to turn to the Pacific. Both of these are considered impracticable - the former due to British opposition, the latter due to the President's directive.

Considering all the information I have been able to obtain, the decisions made, and the work already accomplished, my recommendations, in order of priority, are:

First. Exert every effort to secure all the Naval air and ground forces necessary to execute Torch as

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
URGENT August 22, 1942

AXWAR 8

From: [redacted]

AGWAR

Page 4

INCOMING MESSAGE

understood by you at the time you agreed to the proposition. Time, about November seven. If this cannot be done then:

Second. Divert the bulk of the Patton US Force to the Middle East. Forces sailing October one would be in action this year and thus comply with the President's desires.

Third. Revise the existing directive by limiting the purpose and provide for the U S Task Force to land on the West Coast and the British Task Forces (with U S Troops attached) to land in the Mediterranean. The original date of November seven, proposed by you and Admiral King, is better in my opinion than the date now accepted, principally because it would enable the U S to put larger and better trained Forces in the initial landings. The revised plan would give us a second line of communication which, although poor is not subject to the hazards of the straits. It would satisfy the President's directive but probably would not result in our securing the North Coast of Africa nor opening the Mediterranean. The delays and dangers due to surf conditions must be accepted. I prefer the hazard of the surf to that of the closing of the straits. The operation would have a reasonable chance of tactical success and would not present the possibilities of the major debacle that might well result from the present Torch.

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AXWAR 8

URGENT August 22, 1942
From London AG
INCOMING MESSAGE

Page 5

Eisenhower and Clark have read and concurred in this message, except that they believe that if Spanish and French acquiescence can be reasonably anticipated, we should go ahead on the present basis at the earliest possible date.

Eisenhower

ACTION: GEN. MARSHALL

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August 20, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Torch Operation.

The detailed plans are being developed in London and as yet we have not a clear picture of the operation which can be mounted. The general outline of the initial detailed plan was sent to us by courier. While it was en route material changes were made in the plan in England and only roughly indicated to us by radio. This has resulted in a temporary confusion as to exactly what can be done, which should be cleared up during the course of the next three days. General Handy, the Chief of Operations for the War Department, arrived in London yesterday to clear up various points and I have not yet heard from him.

In brief the original concept has been seriously modified by deficiencies in aircraft carriers, combat loaders and naval supporting craft. The recent loss of carriers in the Malta convoy alone has directly affected our planning.

Furthermore our best trained division for landing operations, the 1st Division, apparently will be barred from the initial operation because of the grounding of a ship carrying its artillery weapons in Halifax Harbor. This necessitates employing troops of the 34th Division now in Ireland who have not been particularly trained for such an operation and lack the high general standard of efficiency of the 1st Division.

For your information, and for a simplified portrayal of the development of the project, there are attached four charts to illustrate graphically material alterations (reductions) in our plans. The abandonment of an initial landing at Casa Blanca has been forced on us. While we hope to find it possible to approach Casa Blanca both with land forces from Oran and from the sea within a month after the initiation of Torch, we will be confronted with the dangers inherent in a line of communications, via the Gibraltar entrance to the Mediterranean.

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Present Plans

All our efforts at the present time are concentrated on a sailing date from the United States of October 1st. Plans contemplate simultaneous landings at Oran, Algiers and Bone, with the immediate objective of seizing airfields and ports and establishing lines of communication for a further advance towards Tunisia, and Casa Blanca. The United States will be responsible for the attack on Oran, and the British for that on Algiers and Bone.

Ground Forces

It has been found that available shipping will only permit an initial landing by 35,000 U.S. troops at Oran and 12,000 British and U.S. troops at Algiers and Bone. We may find that the British will be able to muster some additional troop carriers (not combat loaders but suitably equipped to handle heavy troop equipment which can be transferred to smaller boats for landing on beaches).

Eventually a total of 13 divisions are to be landed of which 6 will be British and 7 American. The U.S. force will consist of 2 armored divisions and 5 triangular divisions. 9+4

Initial Assault

Plan contemplates landing the initial assault at Oran from two separate convoys, the first of 35,000 to be combat loaded, to be followed four days later by a force of similar strength, but convoy loaded. The composition of the first convoy from Britain is not yet known. Combat loaders are available for 12,000 men. Our Ranger Battalion is to lead the assault at Bone. The troops of the 1st or 34th Division will lead the assault at Algiers.

Air Support

The initial air support will be provided from carriers. We had originally planned for the use of three large carriers in the Casa Blanca operation but apparently we will be reduced to the Ranger and one Long Island type converted carrier for the operation at Oran (100 aircraft). For the operation at Algiers and Bone there will be available 1 CV and 3 AVG's (93 aircraft). A small British carrier will be available with a Naval covering force to the eastward of Bone.

Army air support will be moved into the theater as rapidly as possible. The U.S. Torch Air Force is being built up in England of the following units:

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2 Heavy Bombardment Groups
3 Medium Bombardment Groups
1 Light Bombardment Group
1 Reconnaissance Squadron
2 Spitfire Groups
2 P-38 Groups.

All except the Spitfire groups can be flown from the United Kingdom to Algeria via Gibraltar. Just how the Spitfires are to be put in Africa we do not yet know.

Naval Support and Escorts

There is sufficient U.S. and British naval surface craft to support the contemplated landings. The U.S. Navy will escort the initial convoy from the U.S. and succeeding convoys at the approximate rate of two per month.

Logistics

The build-up of U.S. and British forces must be pushed with the greatest possible rapidity. The limiting factors will be hostile action against convoys entering the Mediterranean and port capacities. Oran can receive 4,000 long tons daily, Algiers 5,000, and Bone 2500. This will permit the passage through these ports of approximately four divisions per month. The seizure of the port of Casa Blanca with its capacity of 8300 tons per day will be urgently necessary. It is estimated that if Casa Blanca can be opened to our traffic within five weeks, seven U.S. divisions can be landed in Africa by D+123.

(Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL

Chief of Staff.

Incls.

Distribution:

Copies to: Admiral Leahy ✓
Admiral King
General Deane

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SECRET

EFFECT OF VARIOUS SAILING DATES ON AVAILABLE US CARRIERS, AP's, AK's, XAP's

COMBAT LOADERS AVAILABLE



TROOP LIFT



CARRIERS AVAILABLE & INTENDED FOR ATLANTIC



TRAINING OF COMBAT LOADED COMBAT TEAMS

1 Only two divisions in the U.S., the 3rd and 9th, have had any of this training and, because of the shortage of combat loading ships, they are partially trained at present.

2 In addition essential equipment may not be available to the 1st Division in the UK in time to make the October 10th date.

Consequently, one regimental combat team of the 34th Division must be trained for this date of landing. If October 30 were adopted, two regimental combat teams of the 1st Division could be allotted the initial convoy from U.K. as originally planned.

SHORTAGE - AP's & AK's




SHORTAGE - TROOP LIFT



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
SECRET PLAN IIIa

PLAN AS REVISED BECAUSE OF SHORTAGE OF NAVAL CARRIERS



PLAN III b

SHORTAGES- PLAN III AS COMPARED WITH PLAN II



SECRET

LEGEND	
I US DIV	US LAND BASED AIRCRAFT
I BR DIV	BR LAND BASED AIRCRAFT
CARRIER AIRCRAFT	US COMBAT LOADED RGT CBT TEAM
	BR COMBAT LOADED RGT CBT TEAM

SECRET PLAN II

PLAN AS RECOMMENDED by
CG ETO IN LETTER OF AUGUST 9, 1942

CASABLANCA LANDING



MEDITERRANEAN LANDING



LAND BASED AIRCRAFT



LEGEND			
I US DIV		US LAND BASED AIRCRAFT	
I BR DIV		BR LAND BASED AIRCRAFT	
		CARRIER AIRCRAFT	
			US COMBAT LOADED REGT CBT TEAM
			BR COMBAT LOADED REGT CBT TEAM

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
SECRET PLAN I

PLAN AS ORIGINALLY SUGGESTED
JULY 30, 1942 by CG ETO (EISENHOWER)

CASABLANCA LANDING



MEDITERRANEAN LANDING



LAND BASED AIRCRAFT



THE PORTION TO BE COMBAT LOADED NOT INDICATED

LEGEND	
1 US DIV	US LAND BASED AIRCRAFT
1 BR DIV	BR LAND BASED AIRCRAFT
	CARRIER AIRCRAFT

SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

Date

18 August

To:

Subject:

General Handy is now
in London discussing
details of Torch -

Marshall is of opinion
that earliest date of
sailing from America
is October 10.

Delay caused by shortage
of carriers + grounding of
ship in Halifax with equipment
attached for Army amphibious
division -

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WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

August 17, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. LEAHY, ✓
ADMIRAL E. J. KING:

Subject: TORCH.

August 14th I sent a radio to General Eisenhower in London (in response to his to me of August 13th - copy attached) directing him to submit his and General Patton's frank estimate, without regard to directives, of the operation as outlined, its chances for success, etc.

The following is his reply. The Clark referred to is Major General Mark W. Clark now acting as his Deputy, and Patton is Major General George S. Patton who was to command the Casa Blanca Force and now is to command the Oran Force.

"The views expressed in this cable are the unanimous opinions of myself, General Patton and General Clark.

"Tentative and unofficial details of contemplated British carrier-borne air support are as follows:

"In the covering force east of Gibraltar, one carrier with twenty fighters and twenty torpedo planes; at Algiers in direct support, sixty-six fighters and eighteen torpedo planes. In addition to above one old carrier with thirteen planes may possibly be available.

"The following are the particular factors that bear directly upon the degree of hazard inherent in this operation:

"(A) The sufficiency of carrier-borne air support during initial stages. The operational strength of the French Air Force in Africa is about 500 planes. Neither the bombers nor the fighters are of the most modern type, but the fighters are superior in performance to the Naval types on carriers. Consequently, if the French make determined and unified resistance to



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the initial landing, particularly by concentrating the bulk of their air against either of the major ports, they can seriously interfere with, if not prevent, a landing at that point. The total carrier-borne fighter strength (counting on 100 U.S. fighters on Ranger and auxiliary) will apparently be about 166 planes in actual support of the landings. Only twenty to thirty will be with the Naval covering forces to the eastward. These fighters will be under the usual handicaps of carrier based aircraft when operating against land based planes.

"(B) Efficiency of Gibraltar as an erection point for fighter aircraft to be used after landing fields have been secured. Since Gibraltar is the only port available to the Allies in that region, the rapid transfer of fighter craft to captured airdromes will be largely dependent upon our ability to set up at Gibraltar a reasonable number for immediate operations and a flow thereafter of at least thirty planes per day. The vulnerability of Gibraltar, especially to interference by Spanish forces, is obvious. If the Spaniards should take hostile action against us immediately upon the beginning of landing operations, it would be practically impossible to secure any land based fighter craft for use in northern Africa for a period of some days.

"(C) Another critical factor affecting the air will be the state of the weather. It is planned to transfer by flying to captured airdromes in north Africa the American units now in Great Britain except the Spitfire groups. These last will necessarily be shipped and set up at Gibraltar or on captured airdromes. A spell of bad weather would so weaken the anticipated air support in the early stages of the operation as to constitute another definite hazard to success.

"(D) The character of resistance of the French Army. In the region now are some fourteen French Divisions rather poorly equipped but presumably with a fair degree of training and with the benefit of professional leadership. If this army should act as a unit in contesting the invasion, it could, in view of the slowness with which Allied forces can be accumulated at the two main ports, so delay and hamper operations that the real object of the expedition could not be achieved, namely the seizing control of the

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north shore of Africa before it can be substantially reinforced by the Axis.

"(E) The attitude of the Spanish Army. While there have been no indications to date that the Spaniards would take sides in the war as a result of this particular operation, this contingency must be looked on as a possibility, particularly if Germany should make a definite move toward entering Spain. In any event, Spain's entry would instantly entail the loss of Gibraltar as a landing field and would prevent our use of the Straits of Gibraltar until effective action could be taken by the Allies. In view of available resources, it would appear doubtful that such effective action is without our capabilities.

"(F) The possibility that the German air forces now in western Europe may rapidly enter Spain and operate against our line of communications. This would not be an easy operation for the Germans except with the full acquiescence and support of Spain. Gasoline, bombs and lubricants do not exist at the Spanish air fields and the transfer to the country of ground and maintenance crews and supplies would require considerable time. Certain facts that bear upon the likelihood of such enemy action are: first, that Germany already has excellent landing fields in Sicily, from which their long-range aircraft can operate without going to the trouble of establishing new bases; secondly, the advantages to Germany of occupying the Iberian Peninsula in force have always existed. The fact that Germany has made no noticeable move in this direction, even under the conditions lately existing when substantial portions of British Naval strength have been inside the Mediterranean, is at least some evidence that the enemy does not consider this any easy operation.

"(G) Other factors that we have considered in arriving at the conclusion given below are the experiences of the recent Malta convoy and the assumption that Allied Naval losses within the past ten days have been considerable. The Malta convoy did not come under air attack until it was practically south of Sardinia and its difficulties west of that point were from submarine action.

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
"Based on all the above, we consider that the operation has more than fair chances of success provided Spain stays absolutely neutral and the French Forces either offer only token resistance or are so badly divided by internal dissension and by Allied political maneuvering that effective resistance will be negligible. It is our opinion that Spain will stay neutral, at least during the early stages of the operation, provided we are successful in maintaining profound secrecy in connection with our intentions. She has done so in the past when similar large convoys passed through the Straits. We believe, on the other hand, that we will encounter very considerable resistance from certain sections of the French Forces. We believe the area in which the French will be most favorable to us is around Algiers with the areas in which we will probably encounter resistance those between Oran and Casa Blanca and near Tunis.

"We believe that the chances of effecting initial landings are better than even but that the chances of overall success in the operation, including the capture of Tunis before it can be reinforced by the Axis, are considerably less than fifty percent. This takes into account the great difficulty surrounding the building up of a land based air force, the low capacity of ports and consequent slowness in building up of land forces, the very poor character of the long line of communications from Casa Blanca to Oran and finally the uncertainty of the French attitude.

"Further eventualities which might involve a change in Spanish attitude as well as increasing Naval and shipping difficulties and consequent slowing up in our reinforcements, are difficult to evaluate. Any sign of failure at this stage and a delay of reinforcements to arrive might be seized upon by the Axis as a reason for coming into Spain, and if Spain should then enter the war the results would be most serious."

I propose that this matter be formally considered at the meeting of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff tomorrow, Tuesday.

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Chief of Staff.

Incl.
Radio of Aug. 13th.
Cpy #16

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INCOMING MESSAGE

CSWD
August 13, 1942
1828 Z

FORM 4
11/22/40
13/450P

URGENT

From: London
To : AGWAR

No Number, August 13, 1942

British Chiefs of Staff have just returned to me their comments on the outlined plan submitted to them two days ago. This message for General Handy, Operations Division, with request that it be brought promptly to the attention of the Chief of Staff. The British have now secured sufficient statistical data on the availability of Naval airplane carriers and escorting craft to assert that simultaneous operations at two principal ports inside and at Casablanca cannot repeat not be adequately supported. The U S Naval Staff Mission now in London definitely concurs in this statement. Naval authorities say that no matter to what date in nineteen forty two the attack might be postponed all three points cannot be assaulted simultaneously. This information definitely alters original conception of plan and forces adoption of an alternative.

In view of the basic mission prescribed by the combined Chiefs of Staff, it is obvious that initial attacks must be extended to the most easterly point permitted by possibilities of air coverage. Even from such a position it will require the utmost exertion and ready acceptance of hazards in order to gain Tunis before it can be reinforced. If Axis forces ever beat us to that place, their later capabilities for building up strength will far exceed our own and will reduce the campaign to another futile and costly defensive venture. Assuming accuracy of Naval statement this situation clearly calls for deferment of the Casablanca attack.

I am fully alive to the added risks thus incurred, particularly in the delay in building up in the western end of the theater a striking force for the protection of communications against possible interference by Spanish land troops and coast artillery. Also I realize that any delay in securing land communications makes us more vulnerable to air attack. But these risks must be accepted if we are to have the best chance of executing the assigned mission. If simultaneous attack is impossible it seems obvious that there is no point in holding

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

No Number, August 13, 1942 (Page 2) From: London

up the inside attack beyond the date that proper preparations for its execution can be completed. To the contrary, we now have, in addition to all other reasons previously cited, the added consideration that Naval limitations will retard progress in building up of necessary forces, since escorting vessels used originally will have the duty also of protecting later convoys. Also from mid October onward the Axis capabilities for effective opposition will rapidly increase because of ability to withdraw troops from Russia.

Under these conditions and in order to achieve the greatest possible degree of security while still holding to the main object of the expedition, I propose to act as follows: ~~to make the inside attack about as outlined in former communications except that forces at Oran will be under U S Command and comprise a small expedition coming directly from the U S. Date to be as soon after October seventh as possible. The actual date would be fixed by the time required to prepare the American expedition as outlined below and transfer it to the Gibraltar area. Immediately after the initial attack to concentrate on the development of air fields and the building up of U S Air Forces around Oran to cover the critical point on our line of communications and to support an early advance toward Casablanca. Most of the fighting equipment of the Eighth Air Force would be flown to these fields. In the meantime the Algiers Force would push rapidly Eastward. After initial assault to have the next convoy from the United States, largely composed of armored units, follow rapidly into Oran and from there strike toward the rear to open up communications and seize Casablanca, or alternatively a part of the convoy could, if the political situation had developed favorably, go directly into Casablanca. This would permit working on the line of communication from both ends. In this connection, it must be noted that Casablanca can in no case be of supporting value to forces in Mediterranean until the line of communications to the front has been opened.~~

It is my hope that ways and means will be found to reduce the time interval between the initial attack and the arrival of the next convoy from the U S. Supplementing all the above, it is my intention to have the remaining U S Forces in Great Britain initiate immediately training, organization and replacement programs to fit them for employment as reserves on short notice. However, the stark necessity of later sending more U S troops to the U K makes it unwise to take out of this country more U S troops than are necessary. We will merely become involved in double shipping problems.

16

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

No Number, August 13, 1942

(Page 3)

From: London

From information furnished us by the War Department, it appears possible that others might be shipped from the U S, in late September, a force of approximately the following: one amphibiously trained division plus one regimental combat team reinforced by one composite light armored force of about one regiment, together with auxiliary troops and including part of the Ground Echelons required for the American Torch Air Force. Three Infantry regiments and the armored regiment to be ~~combr~~ loaded. This expedition is much smaller than that initially set up for Casablanca operation and we therefore hope that the November seventh date originally estimated can be set up at least to October fifteenth to twentieth. Request earliest practicable answer to this possibility since it affects determination of time of whole attack and overall plan for the operation. When is earliest date such force could reach Gibraltar? Assuming that the above described force sailed from U S in late September what would be earliest date that the next convoy of approximately one armored division and usual auxiliaries could sail? Possibilities of Naval escort must be included in estimate.

The above plan does not contemplate use in assault Echelon of U S Infantry now in Great Britain except for two regimental combat teams to lead British attack at Algiers. This is because the expedition, due to Naval reasons and possibilities of coordination, must sail from one spot. The remainder of the First U S Division would enter the theater at earliest possible date.

The planning staffs are still working on complicated problems involved in changes in the late August and September shipments. However, it seems obvious that we should not repeat not count on the fifty four forty movement of the Forty Fifth Division at this time, and our later telegram on this subject will so recommend.

Please explain to the Chief of Staff that General Patton, General Clark, the U S Naval advisers and my own Planning Staff all agree that the modified plan, as above outlined, represents the maximum degree of security, coupled with reasonable opportunity for attaining prescribed objectives, that can be developed out of the means and assets now in prospect. I am sending by pouch mail today a copy of the original rough plan and of comments of British Chiefs of Staff. Further details on this modified plan will follow shortly but hope Chief of Staff will ap-

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INCOMING MESSAGE

No Number, August 13, 1942 (Page 4) From: London

prove in principle on light of conditions described. The British are pressing for earliest possible attack inside the Mediterranean and I repeat that since Casablanca affair must be deferred in view of Naval picture presented to me by U S and U K authorities, I desire to make the attack as early as the American force described above can reach here.

Eisenhower

Action Copy: OPD

Info. Copies: SGS

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Meeting of JCS. 11 August

[REDACTED]

11 August 42

Message for USFOR, London:

U. S. Chiefs of Staff approve appointment General Clark as Deputy Commander-in-Chief. This message is for eyes of General Eisenhower only. Inform Clark.

The outline plan you indicate in your 1027 of August 10th appears sound. I agree with you that the element of time is of vital importance. However, in an operation of this kind adequate preparation is essential to success.

Our opinion is that for the present you must continue as Commander, ETO, as well as Commander-in-Chief. Your concept as to the organization of the command once Torch is placed in execution is desired. Do you plan to move your own Headquarters into the new area and if so at what stage of the operations? What organization under such a contingency do you recommend for the control of forces remaining in the UK.

With Clark on Torch planning, who is working on Sledgehammer and Roundup? It must be constantly borne in mind that we must be prepared to execute Sledgehammer should the proper conditions arise and that for Roundup, planning and such preparations as are feasible without interference with Torch must for the present be continued.

McNaney

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

U-R-G-R-E-T

From: London
To: Agwar Washington DC

No. 1027, August 10th, 1942

Rough outline plan presented informally to British Chiefs of Staff this morning for preliminary comment, pending formal submission to combined Chiefs of Staff. This message is for eyes of General Marshall only. It contemplates first flight of approximately five Divisions of which eleven Regimental Combat Teams are to be used as assault units. Approximately simultaneous attacks on West and North Coasts with date of initiation now calculated at early November, but to be in advance thereof, if possible. The element of time is of such transcendent importance that every day that can be saved will add definitely to chances for success.

Because of urgent necessity for placing a Senior Officer in direct charge of all torch planning, I took up with British Chiefs of Staff this morning the matter of tentatively authorizing General Clark, on my authority, to act as Deputy Supreme Commander. They were in complete accord with the necessity for such a move and with Clark as the choice for the position. Accordingly, I am directing him, as my personal representative, to take immediate charge of this work in addition to his other duties. Actually, General Clark's time will be almost exclusively devoted to this planning, but considerations of secrecy and security compel us in all such cases to maintain existing titles and positions. I also informed the British Chiefs of Staff that I intended to seek the approval of the United States Chiefs of Staff to retaining Clark permanently as Deputy Supreme Commander. The volume of planning necessarily to be conducted by ground, air, sea and administrative staffs is such that only an able and Senior Officer, constantly devoting his full attention to this work, can secure the necessary coordination progress.

Am glad to note your decision reference announcement of Torch Commander. Absolutely essential that such policy be rigidly enforced and all orders, directives and assignments be made on most secret basis and communicated only to those individuals that must be informed.

During General Patton's visit here, we expect to get his base organization largely organized. Key individuals will be picked from experienced personnel in our SOS. Extent to which base units can be transferred to Patton will be determined.

Marshall
Representatives of Admiral King arrived in London today. They should be able to clear up many perplexing points with respect to contributions to be made by each Country to Naval problems of assault and succeeding operations.

Colonel Eddy of U. S. Marines will arrive Washington this week. He possesses much information that will be valuable to U.S. Chiefs of Staff. It appears to me important that he return, through here, to his post in Tangiers at earliest possible moment.

Eisenhower.

Action Copy: Gen. Marshall

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[REDACTED]