To: War Department
Nr: 24434
Date: 8 March 1945

To MILID serial number 24434 signed Tindall.

Peace feelers from Ribbentrop relayed to Swedish shipping man Carlson by German Embassy staff member at Stockholm. According report Germany would stop fighting provided 1939 borders could be retained. In addition Germany would suggest formation alliance against Russia. Carlson expressed to emissary amazement such terms could be thought possible of acceptance. When quizzed as to position German leaders messenger gave opinion they would have to remain in power for present to avoid further chaos but that eventually they would be done away with.

End

ACTION: G-2
INFORMATION: CG AAF, OPD, Col Park, Log

CM-IN-8891 (9 Mar 45) DTG 081135Z bjm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 5(D) or (F)
OSD letter, May 1, 1972
By DBS Date MAY 22, 1973

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

COPY No. 42
From: CG, US Army Forces, Rumania
To: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
No: M 218 1 January 1945
Ref: M 218 APED reenlistment for AGWAR action OPD

As an example of the lax and indifferent attitude toward Armistice obligations which prevails in certain echelons of the Government Service the following incident will be of interest:

It has been discovered by the press that 107 persons under detention and awaiting trial as pro-Fascists has been released temporarily to permit them to spend the holidays with their families.

It should be noted however that when this report reached General Badescu, the Prime Minister, he at once caused the dismissal and arrest of the officials responsible. Moreover he has announced that 1200 additional persons suspected of being Axis sympathizers or war criminals are to be arrested within the next day or two.

This bears out our general impression that although Government Ministers themselves are generally conscious of their obligations nevertheless a thorough house cleaning in the lower Government echelons is badly needed.

End

Note: Message received by AGWAR as retransmission by the
addresses under DTO 01/1705A.

ACTION: OPD

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/44
from: CO, US Army Forces, Romania
To: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta
M: M 211 31 December 1944

Ref no M 211 to AGWAR for action OPD, General Hull G-2, MIS info McHorney, Caserta from Schuyler Rumania.

In a recent conversation with General Vinogradov he expressed the following opinions relative present condition in Rumania:

(A) The present Rumanian Government appears to be making sincere efforts to carry out armistice terms. Most and probably all the ministers are cooperating well with Armistice Commission. However many positions in lower government echelons are held by pro-Fascist or incompetents who are interested solely in personal gain. These men are still causing delays and misunderstandings. Government will continue to operate inefficiently unless and until a thorough house cleaning is undertaken.

(B) Under General Radescu's strong leadership the present government has excellent control over the country within 50 to 10 miles from Bucharest. Beyond that limit however the government's control is very weak in places non-existent. Vinogradov has many facts which substantiate this view.

(C) The government is still delaying final agreement on certain reparations payments notably in matter of horses and locomotives. If this drag on much longer serious pressure must be applied.
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

Nr: M 211

31 December 1944

(D) It is a fact at certain sections of the country and particularly Bucharest face serious shortages in bread, wood, and oil within next few weeks. However this is strictly a Romanian problem and control commission will not become involved. Sufficient materials and transport are on hand. Shortages are due to lack of proper organization to insure efficient operation.

I concur in the above opinions except that I doubt availability of sufficient transport to effect desired distribution of food and fuel. Rumanians emphatically deny that they have enough trucks, railway cars or locomotives. They admit improper organization but blame this on Russians who are still in general control of rail lines through the nation. Distance of 30 miles mentioned above is quoted exactly as received.

End

Note: Message received by AGWAR as retransmission from the addressee under DTG 301630B.

ACTION: OPD

INFO: C c/S; Adm Leahy; CG AAF; G-2; GAD; Adm King; Mr McCloy; C of S

CN-IN-671 (1 Jan 45) DTG 312040A
From: Allied Force Headquarters Caserta Italy
To : War Department
Mr : M 151 9 Dec 44

Ref no M 151 AFHQ pass to OPD War Department Washn DC attn General Hull info General McNarney from Schuyler, Roumania.

This is a reencipherment by CRYPTO AFHQ of message filed 081830B. Following is text of speech by Sachinsky at a dinner 6th Dec 44 given by Mayor of Bucharest, General Dobrovski to members of new cabinet and representatives of Armistice Commission.

"I have listened with pleasure to the words addressed to me by General Dombrovski Mayor of Bucharest, and I am glad that as the delegate of my Government I have been able to participate in the efforts used during this month; both by Roumania and by the Soviet Union, for the fulfillment of the Armistice Convention.

It can be said that during the month I have spent in Bucharest, real progress has been made regarding the carrying out of the Armistice terms, although there are still some questions which have to be discussed.

I wish to express the hope that in future the relations between the 2 countries will continue to improve and that the Roumanian Government, supported by the Democratic forces of Roumania, will succeed in uniting the
From:  Allied Force Headquarters Caserta Italy

Nr:  M 151  9 Dec 44

Roumanian people around the problem of fulfilling the Armistice signed on September 12th which has opened the way to a rapprochement between Roumania and the United Nations.

I foresee a favorable omen for the future in the fact that the natural coolness which characterizes the relations between countries which have recently been at war with each other, and which at the beginning hampered out mutual relations, is beginning to disappear, giving place to warmer sentiments, which are beginning to take shape."

There is a general feeling in circles here that Roumania has weathered a severe crisis and that the future now looks much brighter.

End

ACTION: OPD

INFO:  JCS
ADM LEAHY
CG AAF
G-2
CAD
ADM KING
C OF S

CM-IN-8985 (9 Dec 44) 1720Z mcs

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
To: War Department
Nr: M 133

5 December 1944

This is reencipherment by AFHQ of message filed 041923B. M 133 from Schuyler Roumania info CG US Army Forces AFHQ OPNAV DNI. To Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington DC.

Following are principal points of difference between Roumania and Russia relative administration of armistice terms as presented by Redulescu, President of Rumanian Commission for execution of the armistice.

First. Russia has insisted on 1938 prices as basis for indemnity specified Paragraph 11, armistice agreement. Rumanians contend that this more than doubles the indemnity they expected to pay but have agreed subject to proviso that particular 1938 prices be mutually examined and fairly fixed.

Second, Rumanians insist that the materials requisitioned in payment of the indemnity specified Paragraph 11 be delivered at such times and in such manner as will result in least interference with normal production. They assert that thereto more Russians have expropriated property directly without reference to an orderly plan or the effect of such expropriation in the normal production processes.
Third, Russians have been requested to restore all railways to their normal gauge. Russians have favorably considered this with the understanding that they will be accorded one broad gauge railroad to the front.

Fourth, Rumanians consider it vital that Russia requisition under article 10 armistice agreement no more than absolutely necessary to maintain their forces in Rumania. Otherwise the Rumanians are apprehensive of their ability to make the payments required by article 11.

Fifth, Rumanians deny that article 7 armistice agreement permits seizure as war trophies of oil pipe tubing and casing procedure from Germany and stored in Rumanian fields.

Sixth, Rumania has requested that Russian troops quartered in Rumania be limited to those in transit status and that no troops be permanently billeted there. Russia has recently asked to quarter three divisions in this country and these troops are already moving. Although asked, the Russians have not indicated the duration of their stay.

Seventh, Rumanians dispute Russian construction of expression "Sundry machinery" in article 11. Rumania
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
Nr: M 133 5 December 1944

Maintains that this does not authorize the taking or dismantling of entire factories and that contrary construction will cripple Rumanian production. In illustration Russia has already asked for dismantling of Malaza Tube Factory; the only one of its kind in Rumania and this largest in Europe.

Eighth, Rumania has asked that their civil officials be permitted to enter and function in Moldavia, northern Transylvania and Constanța and the Rumanians are entirely without information concerning the situation there and fear the complete disorganization of their administrative organization.

Ninth, Rumanians claim the taking of their fleets as unauthorized by armistice terms. Rumanians felt that unless their position in the foregoing respects is considered favorable a breakdown in their economy will result. They point to inflationary prices and continued decline of LEI as evidence that deterioration has already commenced. All controversial points are being studied to arrive at an independent point of view.

It is nevertheless considered desirable to advise you beforehand of the nature of the problems before the Allied Control Commission.

* Being serviced

ACTION: JQ/3
INFO: Admiral Leahy, CG AAP, OPD, G-2, CAD, Admiral King, Mr McCloy, C of S

CM-IN-5263 (5 Dec 44) 23502 m/m

DECLASSIFIED
JCS LETTER, 7-8-72
BY DSB, DATE
MAY 22, 1973
TOP SECRET DISPATCH

FROM SCHUYLER RUMANIA

RELEASED BY

DATE 5 DECEMBER 1944

TOR CODEBOOK 050705

DECODED BY WALP

PARAPHRASED BY BALDWIN CHECKED BY BALDWIN

ROUTED BY BALDWIN DITTED BY BALDWIN

TO JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

ASSESSES COMGEN US ARMY FORCES AFHQ CNO

PRECEDENCE

URGENT

PAGE 1 OF 2 041923B NCR 3526

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(CONTROL SECRET REF M 132 TO JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON D.C. INFORMATION C GENERAL US ARMY FORCES AFHQ. OPNAV (DNI) FROM SCHUYLER RUMANIA. THIS IS REENCIPHERMENT BY CRYPTO AFHQ OF MESSAGE FILED 041923B)

UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF ARMISTICE AGREEMENT RUMANIA IS REQUIRED TO DELIVER VARIOUS MATERIALS INCLUDING "SUNDAY MACHINERY" IN PAYMENT OF FIXED WAR INDEMNITY. RUSSIROIS INTERPRETING THE QUOTED PHRASE TO INCLUDE ENTIRE FACTORIES AND IN PURSUANCE OF THIS POLICY HAS DEMANDED DELIVER OF ALL MACHINERY EQUIPMENT AND ACCESSORIES OF THE MALAZA TUBE FACTORY. THIS FACTORY MANUFACTURES TUBING UTILIZED IN THE DRILLING OF OIL WELLS AND IS REPORTED TO BE THE ONLY ONE OF ITS KIND IN RUMANIA AND THE THIRD LARGEST IN EUROPE. IT IS ALSO REPORTED THAT SEIZURE OF THE FACTORY WOULD SERIOUSLY AFFECT RUMANIA'S OIL PRODUCTION. THIS APPEARS REASONABLE IN VIEW OF RUSSIAN EXPROPRIATION OF SUPPLIES

DECLASSIFIED

No. 1 ADMIRAL, No. 2 FILE, No. 3F-1 ON DISENTANGLEMENT
OSD letter, May 1, 1972

TOP SECRET

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations.

COPY NO. 10

OPNAV 19-78

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/74
Of tubing now on hand and of the current absence of imports of these supplies. Owner Malaza asserts that American capital is invested in company but this has not been confirmed. Russians have so far refused all compromises based on assigning to them a portion of plant production. It is possible that Russians are determined to take plant in consideration of Malaza's record of German collaboration.

*RECEIVED AS 050425A

RECEIVED SECRET, RAISED TO TOPSEC ACCORDING TO CONTENT.

NCR ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:

16(#1)....COG

COMINCH(#2-9)....NAVAIDE(#10-11)...

(Army has distributed to Joint Chiefs of Staff)
CLASSEIFY CONTROL SECRET

TO JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, WASHINGTON, DC

CG USAF AFHQ CNO(DN1)

RECEIVED DECRYPTED BY CRYPTO AFHQ

AS 052000X.

FOLLOWING ARE PRINCIPAL POINTS OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
RUMANIA AND RUSSIA RELATIVE ADMINISTRATION OF ARMISTICE
TERMS AS PRESENTED BY RADOUESCU, PRESIDENT OF RUMANIA,
COMMISSION FOR EXECUTION OF THE ARMISTICE.

FIRST, RUSSIA HAS INSISTED ON 1938 PRICES AS BASIS FOR
INDEMNITY SPECIFIED PARAGRAPH 11 ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.
RUMANIANS CONTEND THAT THIS MORE THAN DOUBLES THE
THEY EXPECTED TO PAY BUT HAVE AGREED SUBJECT TO PROVIDE
THAT PARTICULAR 1938 PRICES BE MUTUALLY EXAMINED AND
FAIRLY FIXED.

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 74 (c) NAVREC.)

DUPL

3.78

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
SECOND, RUMANIANS INSIST THAT THE MATERIALS REQUISITIONED IN PAYMENT OF THE INDEMNITY SPECIFIED PARAGRAPH 11 BE DELIVERED AT SUCH TIME AND IN SUCH MANNER AS WILL RESULT IN LEAST INTERFERENCE WITH NORMAL PRODUCTION. THEY ASSERT THAT THEREFORE RUSSIANS HAVE EXPROPRIATED PROPERTY DIRECTLY WITHOUT REFERENCE TO AN ORDERLY PLAN OR THE EFFECT OF SUCH EXPROPRIATION IN THE NORMAL PRODUCTION PROCESSES.

THIRD, RUSSIANS HAVE BEEN REQUESTED TO RESTORE TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES OF THE COUNTRY AND NARROW ALL RAILWAYS TO THEIR NORMAL GAUGE. RUSSIANS HAVE FAVORABLY CONSIDERED THIS WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THEY WILL BE ACCORDER ONE BROAD GAUGE RAILROAD TO THE FRONT.

FOURTH, RUMANIANS CONSIDER IT VITAL THAT RUSSIA REQUISITION UNDER ARTICLE 10 ARMISTICE AGREEMENT NO MORE THAN ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN THEIR FORCES IN RUMANIA. OTHERWISE THE RUMANIANS ARE APPREHENSIVE OF THEIR ABILITY TO MAKE THE PAYMENTS REQUIRED BY ARTICLE 11.

FIFTH, RUMANIANS DENY THAT ARTICLE 7 ARMISTICE AGREEMENT PERMITS SEIZURE AS WAR TROPHIES OF OUR PIPE TUBING AND CASING PROCEDURE FROM GERMANY AND STORED IN RUMANIAN FIELDS.

SIXTH, RUMANIA HAS REQUESTED THAT RUSSIAN TROOPS QUARTERED IN RUMANIA BE LIMITED TO THOSE IN TRANSIT STATUS AND THAT NO TROOPS BE PERMANENTLY BILLETED HERE. RUSSIA HAS RECENTLY ASKED...
TO QUARTER 3 DIVISIONS IN THIS COUNTRY AND THESE TROOPS ARE ALREADY MOVING. ALTHOUGH ASKED THE RUSSIANS HAVE NOT INDICATED THE DURATION OF THEIR STAY.

SEVENTH, ROMANIA DISPUTES RUSSIAN CONSTRUCTION OF EXPRESSION "SUNDRY MACHINERY" IN ARTICLE 11. ROMANIA MAINTAINS THAT THIS DOES NOT AUTHORIZE THE TAKING OR DISMANTLING OF ENTIRE FACTORIES AND THAT CONTRARY CONSTRUCTION WILL CRIPPLE ROMANIAN PRODUCTION. IN ILLUSTRATION RUSSIA HAS ALREADY ASKED FOR DISMANTLING OF MALAZA TUBE FACTORY, THE ONLY ONE OF ITS KIND IN ROMANIA AND THIS LARGEST IN EUROPE.

EIGHTH, ROMANIA HAS ASKED THAT THEIR CIVIL OFFICIALS BE PERMITTED TO ENTER AND FUNCTION IN MOLDAVIA NORTHERN TRANSYLVANIA AND CONSTANTA AND THE ROMANIA ARE ENTIRELY WITHOUT INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SITUATION THERE AND FEAR THE COMPLETE DISORGANIZATION OF THEIR ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION.

NINTH, ROMANIA CLAIMS THE TAKING OF THEIR FLEETS AS UNAUTHORIZED BY ARMISTICE TERMS. ROMANIA FELT THAT UNLESS THEIR POSITION IN THE FOREGOING RESPECTS IS CONSIDERED FAVORABLE A BREAKDOWN IN THEIR ECONOMY WILL RESULT. THEY POINT TO INFLATIONARY PRICES AND CONTINUED DECLINE OF LEI AS EVIDENCE THAT DETERiorATION HAS ALREADY COMMENCED. ALL CONTROVERSIAL POINTS ARE BEING STUDIED TO ARRIVE AT AN INDEPENDENT POINT OF VIEWS. IT IS NEVER THELESS CONSIDERED DESIRABLE TO ADVISE YOU
BEFOREHAND OF THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEMS BEFORE THE ALLIED
CONTROL COMMISSION.
TOPSEC book message to Wilson for action, to SHAEF Versailles for Eisenhower, and to Central District United Kingdom Base Section London pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information, FAN 457 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Planning for U.S. Military Government participation in tripartite occupation of Austria, reference NAF 811 and FAN 446, is authorized on the basis that (1) a token force of one U.S. division under U.S. command may be employed in the tripartite occupation of Vienna with the understanding that the minimum strength of the U.S. force to be employed there will not be less than the equivalent of a regimental combat team, reinforced as required; (2) U.S. force will not be used in the occupation of Austria outside of the tripartite area of Vienna Gau.

End.

ORIGINATOR: CCS
INFORMATION: Adm Leahy
             Gen Arnold
             Adm King
             Gen Bissell
             OPD

Date: Jan 12 1972
Signature: RAH

COPY No. 33

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
To: War Department
CG, United Kingdom Base Section, London, England
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, Main, Versailles, France

No: FX 49352
7 November 1944

This is NAF 811. FX 49352 to AGWAR for CCS and to Central District UK Base Section London, for British Chiefs of Staff repeated SHAEF for information. Signed Wilson cite FHGCT TOP SECRET.

1. Subject is United States occupational ground force garrison for Vienna. The following information is pertinent:

A. Information received from SHAEF in early September indicated that SHAEF considered that the United States garrison in Vienna should be of the order of one battalion.

B. FAN 411 states that the United States policy is that United States personnel will participate equally at national level with USSR and Great Britain in tripartite control of Austria with the understanding that the United States occupational forces will be on a token basis similar to the size of the United States force planned for Berlin.

C. A SHAEF TALISMAN planning paper (not yet approved) provides for a United States occupational force in Berlin of one division.

CM-IN-6807 (7 Nov 44) 2359Z

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED

Date: JAN 12 1972
Signature: RHF

COPY NO. 33

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
No: FX 49352 7 November 1944

2. In view of the above, is it desired that this theatre plan on the use of one United States division for post-hostility occupation of Vienna?

In any case I am of the opinion that one battalion is an insufficient United States garrison for Vienna. I recommend that the minimum force authorized for this purpose should be a regimental combat team.

End

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED JCS 29-71
Date: JAN 12 1972
Signature: ROP

ACTION: CC/S
INFO: General Arnold, General Hull, Admiral Leahy, General Bissell, Admiral King, C of S.

CM-IN-6807 (7 Nov 44) 2359Z m/m

TOP SECRET

COPY NO. 33

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/94
To: War Department
Nr: 69634

4 November 1944
Hildring from Meyer sr nr 69634

Answers your questions in cable 56950 dated 3rd Nov contained by number 69631 dated 3rd Nov to Secretary, JCS. Reference also made concurrent State Dept cable COMEOA 122 sent 3rd Nov to SECSTATE. Action has not been taken on control machinery as anticipated.

If text proposal stated in my cable number 69554 dated 28th Oct is not satisfactory it essential to receive JCS instructions prior to noon London time Monday 6th Nov.

End

Note: 69631 is CM-IN-3190 (4 Nov 44) JC/S
69554 is CM-IN-26870 (28 Oct 44) JC/S

ACTION: Gen Hildring
INFO: JC/S Gen Strong
Adm Leahy Adm King
Gen Arnold Mr McCloy
OPD C of S
Gen Bissell

CM-IN-3857 (4 Nov 44)

370 Germany

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSED
E. O. 11662, Sec. 2 (B) and 5 (D) or (E)
By DBS Date MAY 23 1973
NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
Civil Affairs Division
Lt. Greaves, 6198
4 November 1944

Military Attache
American Embassy
London, England

Number: WAR 57830

To Peabody for Meyer from Hilldring.

Subject is text of proposal on intelligence. In answer to your cable number 69634 dated 4 November 1944, it is not possible to obtain JCS action on this matter in time for the proposed meeting of EAC on Monday 6 November. Matter was not submitted to JCS earlier in view your cable number 69567 dated 30 October 1944 stating that it was your intention to present text at EAC meeting on 30 October 1944 at which meeting you expected final action to be taken on control machinery. The matter is now being presented to JCS for consideration. In the meantime, War Department comment on the text of the proposal as set forth in your cable number 69554 dated 28 October 1944 is that the proposed text appears to be satisfactory from a military viewpoint. It is highly desirable, however, that agreement on intelligence take place at the same time as agreement on control machinery. It must be understood that approval of the text contained in your cable number 69554 does not constitute approval of the form of the Control Council or of the Protocol on control machinery which have not yet been considered.

End

ORIGINATOR: Gen Hilldring

INFORMATION: Gen Strong Gen Hull
JC/S Gen Bissell
Adm Leahy Adm King
Gen Arnold Mr. McCloy

CM-OUT-57830 (5 Nov 44) 0003Z hrt
To: War Department.
Nr: 69626 3 November 1944.

To Arnold for Kuter from Williamson sr nr 69626.

Negotiations before EAC limited.
A. Occupied enemy territory.

B. Post hostilities period and particularly period following termination of SHAPE control and assumption control by tripartite authority. Hence becomes increasingly imperative early direct agreement be reached with Soviets covering exchange and mutual necessary intelligence information particularly technological developments which may be uncovered all liberated areas at any time and in occupied enemy territory both prior cessation hostilities and assumption control by tripartite authority. Combined Chiefs of Staff instructions to Chiefs of British and United States missions Moscow contained WAR X 86963 initiated action reach agreement along these lines although agreement sought apparently limited material found within Germany and only by inference appears cover similar action on discoveries outside Germany. Suggest broadening these direct negotiations indicated above and request this office be kept informed progress discussions to facilitate similar negotiations here for period tripartite control of occupied enemy territory.

New subject additionally request detailed minutes and pertinent papers current civil aeronautical meetings Chicago for guidance EAC discussions respect to aeronautical

CM-IN-3096 (3 Nov 44)
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

"IVI"
PRIORITY

Page-2-


Nr: 69626 3 November 1944.

arrangements occupied enemy territory including former sat-
ellite. Peabody.

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leamy O-2
CG AAF Adm King
OPD

CM-IN-3096 (3 Nov 44) 2353Z bjm

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD Letter, May 1, 1972
By DBS Date MAY 22 1973

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

COPY NO. 40
From: US Military Attache, London
To: War Department
 Nr: 69631 3 November 1944
 Secretary Joint Chiefs of Staff from Meyer snr
 Reference cables 69554 and 69567 also WAR 54449.

Subject, these cables Tripartite Coordinating Intelligence Committee. Due unforeseen delays subject matter has not yet been presented European Advisory Commission but may come up consideration meeting Monday 6 November.

Attention invited COME A 122 same subject sent today State Dept requesting approval to proposed Tripartite exchange letters creating Tripartite coordinating committee.

Peabody

69554 is CM-IN-26870 (28 Oct 44) JC/S
69567 is CM-IN-26414 (30 Oct 44) JC/S E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 8(D) or (R)
ORD letter, May 1, 1972

ACTION: JC/S

By DBS Data MAY 22 1973

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy Gen Bull Gen Hildring Mr McCoy
Gen Arnold Gen Bissell Adm King CofS

CM-IN-3190 (4 Nov 44 ) 01542 bjm
Civil Affairs Division
74698
2 November 1944

Military Attache
American Embassy
London, England

Number: WAR 56950

To Peabody for Meyer from Hilldring.

Subject is control machinery for Germany. Has final action been taken on control machinery as anticipated in your cable number 69567 dated 30 October 1944? In any event, do you still wish JCS to give consideration at this time to text of proposal stated in your cable number 69554 of 28 October 1944, or do you prefer that action by JCS be deferred until the complete EAC documents on control machinery are referred for consideration to them?

End

ORIGINATOR: Gen. Hilldring
INFORMATION: JC/S
Adm. Leahy
Gen. Arnold
Gen. Hull
Gen. Bissell
Gen. Strong
Adm. King
Mr. McCloy
Cofs

CH-OUT-56950 (3 Nov 44) 2130Z es

370 Germany

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(F) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 4, 1972
By DEBS Date MAY 2 9 72
OP SECRET DISPATCH

FROM: NAVAL ATTACHE MOSCOW
RELEASED BY: 26 OCTOBER 1944
TOR CODEN: 1711
DECODED BY: HAYSEN
PARAPHRASED BY: HOFNER
ROUTED BY: HOFNER

ADDRESSEES: CONINCH

PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY 2

FOR ACTION: RELIESE IY

DOCUMENT NO: 261359

DECLASSIFIED:
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By Rt., NARA, Date: 4/13/64

261359

CONINCH: COPIES 1 TO 6 INCLUSIVE.

*RECEIVED AS 261328 NCR 5559

DECLASSIFIED: 261359
From: US Military Attaché Ankara Turkey
To: War Department
Nr: 467 19 October 1944

Number MILID 467 AMSME 1143.

Refused to accept new Hungarian Nazi Government
Hungarian Minister here. Contacted American Russian British
Ambassadors here through Swedish Minister stated he
considered Horthy had been ousted by force and said he
would recognize successors. Also presented Horthy request
for Armistice which already in Moscow has been transmitted.

End.

ACTION: G-2
INFO: CG AAF
LOG

CM-IN-18180 (19 Oct 44) 17172 nos

DECLASSIFIED
E.O.11652, Sec. 3(E) and 6(D) or (B)
OSD letter, May 4, 1972
By DBS Date MAY 22 1973

COPY NO. 42

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: US, Military Attaché, Ankara, Turkey

To: War Department
CG, US Army Forces in Middle East, Cairo, Egypt 1137
AMSME 1137, MILID 464

17 October 1944

Because Armistice negotiations are in Moscow, Russia is now in minds of Bulgarians responsible for terms. Harsh terms would tend to lessen Russian popularity and curb spread of Communism. Mild terms apparently to Russian interest as would increase hold on Bulgarian people.

End

ACTION: G-2
INFORMATION: CG AAF

CM-IN-16455 (18 Oct 44) 0157Z bjm

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 1, 1972
By DBS Date MAY 22 1973

COPY NO.
Announcement from Sofia that Bulgars had received letter from Russian, British, and American Governments demanding they evacuate occupied territory and saying Bulgaria would comply was surprise to Ambassadors here.

Letter evidently from other sources than local diplomats who still uncertain whether they are to conduct negotiations.

Another thing which has been delaying armistice parleys is question of who will sign according our counsellor. Says Russians want Marshal Tolbukhin alone to sign for all Allies while British and Americans want Wilson also to sign. Apparently matter of prestige involved.

End

ACTION: G-2
INFO: CG-AAF, OPD, C of S

CM-IN-11985 (13 Oct 44) 0315Z wg

370

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
Combined Chiefs of Staff
77500
6 October 1944

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main Echelon
Versailles, France

Commanding General
United Kingdom Base Section
London, England

Number: WARX 42577

Book message to SHAEF Versailles for Eisenhower for action, to Central District United Kingdom Base Section London pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information, FAC5 94 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

In reply to SCAF 84, FAC5 53 is amended to permit the continuation of the present practice as outlined in SCAF 84 and the adoption of a similar practice in respect of Belgium and the Netherlands.

End

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

CM-OUT-42577 (6 oct 44) 2157Z es

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

Copy No. 32
Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Main Echelon
London, England

Commanding General
United Kingdom Base Section
London, England

Headquarters, Communications Zone
European Theater of Operations
Main Echelon
Paris, France

Number: WARX 41836

TOPSEC book message to SHAEF London for Eisenhower for action, to Central District United Kingdom Base Section London pass to British Chiefs of Staff, and to Hq Com Zone ETO Main Paris for information FACS 92 from Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Language of FACS 63 is amended to read as follows:

"In view of necessity for King of Belgians to be liberated and to rejoin his ministers at the earliest possible moment, you should prepare now an order for the release of the King and the royal family which order should be handed to the German authorities as soon as the instrument of surrender has been signed."

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
OPD

End
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Log

CM-OUT-41836 (5 Oct 44) 1941

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
OP SECRET DISPATCH

FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW

RELEASED BY

DATE OCT 5, 1944

TOR CODEBOOK 1159

DECODED BY CHEFSMAN

PARAPHRASED BY BENNETT

CHECKED BY JOSTEN

ROUTED BY

COMINCH

PRIORITY

RECEIVED

FULIY COPIED TO COMINCH FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW.

RAIM ARCHER BRITISH NAVAL MISSION HEAD HAS RECEIVED FULL COPY OF NAVAL TERMS TO GERMANY WHICH TO BE ISSUED UPON SIGNING OF SURRENDER INSTRUMENT. TERMS CONCEIVED IN ADMIRALTY AND UNDERSTOOD TO HAVE BEEN SEEN BY COMINCH AND CONSIDERED ADEQUATE BUT UNDERSTAND FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS COMING TO ME BEFORE WE MAKE JOINT PRESENTATION TO SOVIETS. IF DESIRED THAT THIS SUBJECT BE DISCUSSED WITH AMBASSADOR BEFORE PRESENTATION REQUEST EARLY TRANSMITTAL OF ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS AS HE DEPARTING WITHIN A WEEK FOR US VISIT.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NAR, Date 4/12/94
From: US Military Attache, Berne, Switzerland
To: War Department
Nr: 1804  30 September 1944
Nr 1804

Underdate 25 Sept letter arrived by courier Bern
29 Sept hand writing Hennyey for 2347. "We are distressed
that there is no way to communicate with Naday, Rome.
Situation becoming more critical because German troops
falling back in Hungary behind Hungarian troops. Distressed
that Anglo-Saxons not giving least encouragement. Urge
you act quickly as our only desire is to obtain Armistice".

2347 replied by radio asking if desired he proceed
Rome.

29 Sept 20 hours 2347 received radio from Voros and
Hennyey notifying that Naday would proceed at once Bern
to communicate by his channel.

Will keep you informed.

Legge

ACTION: G-2
INFORMATION: CG AAF OPD
CM-IN-817 (1 Oct 44) 2332Z bjm

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (K)
OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS
Date: MAY 22 1973

370

42

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
Joint Chiefs of Staff 77500
29 September 1944

Commanding General,
Allied Force Headquarters,
Caserta, Italy

Number: WAR 38740

From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Devers.

Principle has been accepted by Joint Chiefs of Staff that control of Rumanian surrender will be with Soviet High Command. This control will include direction of proposed Allied Control Commission.

Because the interests of the United States in Rumania are of relatively less importance than those of U.K. or U.S.S.R., it is believed that military representation on the Control Commission should be few in number and not necessarily of rank equal to that of representatives of other governments concerned. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have informed Department of State that initially such military representation will consist of 3 Army officers in the grade of Colonel or Lieutenant Colonel, (1 Air Corps) and 1 Naval officer in the grade of Captain or Commander; to be assisted by the necessary clerical, enlisted, and other administrative personnel.

Reference your FX-88499 of 27 August. You will be further advised when decisions are reached regarding other satellites.

End.

ORIGINATOR: Joint Chiefs of Staff

INFORMATION: Adm. Leahy, CG AAF, OPD, G-2, CCAC, Adm. King C of S

CM-OUT-38740 (29 Sep 44) 21182 by

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 2 3 1974

COPY No. 40

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
Combined Chiefs of Staff
77500
25 September, 1944

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Forward Echelon
Versailles, France

Headquarters, Communications Zone
European Theater of Operations
Main Echelon
Paris, France

Commanding General
United Kingdom Base Section
London, England

Number: WARX 36250

Book Message to SHAEF Paris for Eisenhower for action, to
Central District United Kingdom Base Section London pass to
British Chiefs of Staff and Headquarters Communications Zone
Main for information, FAC's 87 from the Combined Chiefs of
Staff.

Proposal contained in paragraph 4 of SCAF 85 respecting
participation of French Forces in Military Government of Ger-
many during the period of your command is approved.

End.

ORIGINATOR: CCS

INFORMATION: Adm. Leahy, CGAAF, OPD, Gen. Bissell, Adm. King,
Gen. Hilldring, C of S.

CM-OUT- 36250 (25 Sept 44) 2149Z wk
DIRECTOR CHINESE INTELLIGENCE REQUESTED MY PRESENCE THIS MORNING TO IMPART FOLLOWING WHICH HE STATES GIVING ME ONLY. RUSSIAN JAPANESE PACT CONCLUDED PROVIDES:

1. FOR MUTUAL EVACUATION MANCHURIAN BORDER FOR DISTANCE 30 MILES BOTH SIDES BY ARMED FORCES

2. VLADIVOSTOK SIMILAR BASES NOT TO BE USED BY 3RD PARTY

3. MUTUAL EXCHANGE OF GOODS JAPANESE TO RECEIVE GASOLINE METALS SOVIET TO RECEIVE CLOTH FOOD STUFFS.

4. FISHERY AGREEMENT WILL BE RENEWED.

COMMENT SOURCE OF FOREGOING GIVEN IN STRICT CONFIDENCE AS MINISTER OF WAR WHO RECEIVED THESE

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/74

OPNAV-NCR-12 A 33052

230 20
370
FROM HIGHLY PLACED BANKING CIRCLES. CANNOT EVALUATE EXCEPT LATTER USUALLY WELL INFORMED WITH GOOD CONNECTIONS INCLUDING WIRELESS SETS IN OCCUPIED AREAS. SOME TIME AGO SIMILAR REPORT RECEIVED BY CHINESE FROM SWITZERLAND.

16...ACT

COMMICH...2PG...NAVY...2F-0P...CNO...FILE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
Commanding General
Allied Force Headquarters
Caserta, Italy

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
Rear Echelon
London, England

Commanding General
United Kingdom Base Section
London, England

Number WARX 34376

TOPSEC book message to Wilson for action, SHAPE London
for Eisenhower, Central District United Kingdom Base
Section London pass to British Chiefs of Staff and Head-
quarters Communication Zone Main for information. This
is FAN 426 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff in reply
to NAF 776.

Because of the recent change in relations between
the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, Soviet Union's approval
of armistice terms is now required and Soviet Union has
indicated a desire to modify original terms. Consequently,
European Advisory Commission discussion of the terms has
been resumed. Upon the formulation of these terms in
European Advisory Commission, it is anticipated that
negotiations with Bulgaria will be resumed, but place and
time of resumption have not yet been determined. Soviet
Union has already indicated that they would prefer negotia-
tions to take place in Moscow or Ankara. You will be kept
informed of developments, including information concerning

CM-OUT-34376 (21 Sep 44)
persons other than yourself who may be designated to sign on behalf of their respective governments when decisions on these points are made.

End.

Date- JAN 12 1942

Signature- RH

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm. Leahy
Gen. Arnold
OPD
Gen. Bissell
Gen. Hildring
Adm. King
CofS

CM-OUT-34376 (21 Sep 44) 2313Z mk

COPY No.

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
From: US Military Attaché Ankara, Turkey.

To: CG US Army Forces in the Middle East, Cairo, Egypt.

20 September 1944.

Location for negotiations of Bulgarian Armistic still unsettled. Our Ambassador thinks British in this Bulgarian matter are playing with fire and that Russians soon are likely to slap them down. Have just heard that Dimitrov whose arrival in Turkey I had previously indicated is just Ankara Wednesday reaching.

End.

ACTION: GEN BISSELL

INFO: GEN ARNOLD

CM-IN-18949 (20 Sep 44) 1939Z mos

DECLASIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 5(D) or (K)

OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By DBS

Date: MAY 22, 1973

COPY NO.

370

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
Still Seeking an Out:
Hitler and Jap Peace Feeler
Reported Sent to Russia

STOCKHOLM, Sept. 17 (Reuter) — The newspaper sprayed a dispatch
reportedly emanating from Berlin, said today that Adolf Hit-
ler extended a peace offer to Rus-sia recently through Japan.

The offer was asserted to have been drafted during Ambassador
Stalin's recent visit to Hitler's
headquarters, and it reportedly
included a German renunciation
of all German interests east of the
1732 demarcation line in Poland.

Germany, the report said, also
an obvious propaganda move.
15 September 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Miss Tully:

Attached is memorandum to the President concerning a matter of urgency. It would be appreciated if you would bring this to his attention at once, since we believe it is the first report direct from Rumania relating to the terms offered Rumania by Russia.

Sincerely,

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
15 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is message just received relating to Russia's terms to Rumania. This was received through our intelligence representative in Bucharest.

Because of the urgency of the matter, we have submitted the message in exactly the form in which it was received.

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of

CIA 006687
By SR Date MAY 9 1975
The following message is "URGENT".

On the evening of September 12, the Romanian Undersecretary of State for National Economy, Georgescu, advised our Bucharest representative that the last armistice conditions from Moscow had been received by the Romanian Government. Georgescu added that the government is dumbfounded and confused by certain of the armistice terms and that the following terms were especially offensive:

1. All means of communication, all the merchant marine, all utilities, all industries, all factories, and all storage depots will be controlled by the Russians and will be subject to Russian use during the period of occupation.

2. The Russians will control all publicity and propaganda including the press, radio and public spectacles. The political and economic life of Roumania will be completely paralyzed by the list of these provisions and the intellectual and spiritual life will likewise be stifled by provision number 2.

Georgescu stated that what is most incomprehensible is the fact that they are far more severe and cannot even be compared with the terms which the 3 Allied Nations proposed to the Romanian Government in Cairo and later as well. At the present time the Romanian Government is composed for the most part of persons who have been pro-Allyd and working in the interests of the Allies for many months. Some have spent time in prison because of their pro-Allyd activities and sentiments. Others have been constantly in danger of imprisonment. Our informant added that the conditions are worse than might have been expected under the terms of unconditional surrender and that the
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

CASERTA, ITALY

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

RECEIVED

The present government has no choice but to conclude that it has been abandoned and undercuts so that it will fall. Since the Romanian government cannot accept the conditions offered, its only alternative would seem to be resignation and it is certain that no other party or group of parties, representative to any degree of the Romanian people, would accept to govern under these terms. No exception is being taken to the 3,000,000 head of cattle but it is not known how the 100,000,000 Indorey but it is not known how the sum can be raised since there is a provision in the armistice terms that all industries in Romania will be subject to control by Russia. The fact which most immediately concerns the Government is the demand that the Romanian Government supply and support the Russian Army on Romanian territory since this obligation is undefined and open with consequence that cannot obviously be predicted. The Russian military authorities have already demanded the prompt delivery of:

1. More than 2,500,000 tons of grain
2. 1,700,000 head of cattle
3. 10,000 horses
4. Quantities of potatoes, vegetables and cigarettes.

All the above is estimated to value 200,000,000,000 leu. The Romanian Government has answered these demands within the statement that they are above the economic possibilities of the Romanian economy. It should be noted that the Russian military authorities are not demanding petroleum products since they have already assumed control over production and refining and are taking care they want without making a formal request.

The provision which demands that 12 Romanian divisions join the Russian Armies is acceptable as are several other conditions of the armistice. The Government wishes to continue actively in its prosecution of the war against Hungary and Germany at least to the extent of the recognized Romanian boundary, including the Transylvanian area. After the Government had been advised that the armistice had been signed, Georgescu was contacted once more. This was on September 13. All he said was that the armistice contained the terms outlined above and he had nothing further to say on the matter. Maniu, according to Georgescu, did wish to consider the terms at length before making any formal statement.

TOR: 9/14/44 9:57 p.m.
From: US Military Mission in Moscow
To: War Department
Nr: M20845 5 Sept 1944

For Joint Chiefs of Staff from Deane M20845

State Department has informed Ambassador that armistice terms for Rumania are awaiting action by Joint Chiefs of Staff. He had a meeting yesterday with British and Soviet representatives where British amendments to armistice terms were redrafted in accordance with conclusions reached. The modifications were reported to the State Department by Mr. Harriman in his number 3294 of 4 September.

This morning Mr. Harriman has sent a message to the State Department, number 3299, indicating that both US State and War Department representatives in Moscow believe that terms as now drafted include approximately all of the points previously emphasized in State Department instructions, and that where the provisions of the present draft are not fully satisfactory, or in case new matters arise, the document provides adequate machinery for subsequent discussion and decision.

My personal view is that the important thing from the military aspect is to get the military situation in Rumania clarified vis-a-vis the Red Army and the Rumanian forces. This can only be done by the conclusion of an armistice. I therefore urgently recommend that you request the State Department without delay to authorize Mr. Harriman...
From: US Military Mission in Moscow

To: M 20845

5 Sept 1944

Subject: Proposal to Agree to Approval of the Armistice Terms

man to agree to approval of the armistice terms in their present form and to give him discretion as to the inclusion of such modifications as you or the State Department may suggest in order that the armistice can be submitted to the Rumanians Wednesday night, September 6, in accordance with present desires of the Soviet government.

End

ACTION: JCS

DECLASSIFIED

MAY 23 1974

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: US Military Attache, Ankara, Turkey
To: War Department
CG, US Army Forces in the Middle East, Cairo, Egypt 990
31 August 1944

Number MILID 358 AMSME 990

Reply of Bulgaria to Anglo American terms sent here and last week believed taken to Cairo by Mouchanov and according Minister Balufanov is authorized to treat for Bulgaria. Supposed to be acceptance.

Final terms will be settled at Cairo and Greek and Yugoslav governments will be consulted before any armistice signed. Russians supporting Allies in all that concerns Bulgarian negotiations according our ambassador. He said "Presumption" was there would be no change in prewar Bulgar boundaries although Bulgaria had "mentioned" matter of Aegean ports.

End

ACTION: G-2
INFO: CGAAF OPD Gov Park Log

CM-IN-512 (1 Sep 44) 1054Z bem

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In connection with the current negotiations looking toward the withdrawal of Rumania from the war the Department has prepared a chronological summary of the pertinent events, which may be useful as a matter of reference. A copy of it is enclosed. The more detailed accounts are of course on record in the series of communications to the Joint Chiefs covering the important developments as they occurred.

As a matter of rather particular interest, in connection with the events in Rumania of the last few days, reports have today been received indicating that the sudden action leading to the overthrow of the Antonescu Government, as reported in the press as occurring on August 23, was actually planned to take place today, the 26th. It appears that King Mihai grasped an unexpected opportunity to arrest Marshal Antonescu and his entire Government in the Palace.

Having planned the action for August 26, the King had instructed the Rumanian Minister to Turkey to direct Prince Stirbey to ask General Wilson "in conformity with his promise" to order a massive bombardment on that day, of certain specified objectives in Rumania and Hungary. A subsequent message requested that, since events had been precipitated, this operation be carried out at once, that three airborne brigades be landed near Bucharest, and that automatic arms and anti-tank guns be supplied.

Copies of the pertinent telegrams reporting these events are enclosed.

Mr. Harriman's telegram no. 3159 of August 26, addressed to the President and the Secretary, concerning the Soviet proposal for armistice terms for Rumania, has been communicated separately to the White House.

Enclosures:

As stated.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT LIBRARY

JAN 12 1972
Cairo
Dated August 25, 1944
Rec'd 10 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

YUGOS
136, August 25, 10 a.m.

Message from King Michael of Stirbey received by Gretzianu 8:30 p.m. Wednesday, 23rd, shortly before proclamation of break with Axis states that in view of decisive action which will take place in Rumania on Saturday August 26 he requests, in conformity with promise of General Wilson a massive bombardment of numerous specified places in Rumania and Hungary. (Repeated to Murphy as number 16 and to Moscow).

This message, which was received here and sent to AFRQ Caserta yesterday, makes it appear that Rumanian break was planned for tomorrow and that events forced prior action.

De Chaastelain and two Rumanian staff officers reached Ankara yesterday.

SHANTZ
SECRET

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone....

Secretary of State,
Washington

MOST IMMEDIATE
YUGOS

140 August 25, 8 p.m.

Direct message from Mafi to British here dated today states that although the Romanian Government informed the German Army they would not attack them but would allow them free passage, the German Army attacked and bombed Bucharest savagely, completely destroying the Royal Palace. Message says that German Air Force is concentrated at Cetapone airdrome, and asks urgently for 250 Allied fighters which can use the airdromes at Cmaieva and Targul Jiu which are in Romanian hands. (Repeated to Murphy as number 20 and to Moscow). It adds that "attack on Bucharest was made from close at hand and continued all day and prevents all activity whatsoever."

SHANTZ

Cairo

Dated August 25, 1944.

Rec'd 3 p.m.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Cairo

Dated August 25, 1944

Rec'd 2:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

Immediate

YUGOS

139, August 25, 3 p.m.

British message from de Chastelain yesterday states that credit for Rumanian changeover goes to King who planned it for tomorrow but grasped unexpected opportunity to arrest Marshal Antonescu and entire Government in Palace. King, claiming to have laid basis of scheme in February, was dissatisfied at persistent delays of political leaders.

Entire ex-Government under guard in Palace and all military commanders ordered to resist all acts of German aggression.

Repeated to Murphy as No. 17, London as 6 and to Moscow.

Rumanian units being concentrated in Bucharest area. King again asks if three airborne brigades could be landed near Bucharest and requests urgent supplies automatic arms and antitank guns.

When Chastelain left Bucharest at 8 a.m. yesterday popular feeling strongly favored immediate action against Germans who had occupied, but under threat of armed action had agreed to leave, Giurgiu, Galats and Torda post and telephone offices and Bucharest Ploesti road at Otopedr.

SHANTZ

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DECLASSIFIED JAN 2 1972

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/94
SECRET

Cairo
Dated August 25, 1944.
Rec'd 1:36 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

MOST IMMEDIATE

YUGOS

139, August 26, 5 p.m.

Gretzescu yesterday gave British a message he received from Niculescu-Buzesti instructing him in name of King to inform British, American and Soviet Governments that on August 23 the King dismissed the Government of Marshal Antonescu and named General Sanatescu Premier of a Government of National Union including the leaders of four parties comprising the National Democratic bloc and Grigore Niculescu-Buzesti as Foreign Minister. (Repeated to Murphy as No. 18, to London as No. 7, to Moscow and to Ankara.)

Message adds that the new Government intends to sign armistice at once and asks that, since events planned for Twenty-sixth took place on the Twenty-third, the bombing requested for tomorrow (see my YUGOS 136) be done immediately.

SHANTZ

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED JAN 12 1972
MEMORANDUM
August 26, 1944.

CHRONOLOGICAL SURVEY OF EVENTS REGARDING
ROMANIAN PEACE EFFORTS

NOVEMBER--DECEMBER 1944

ANTONESCU GOVERNMENT FEELERS - Madrid's 3671 December 16th and
Memorandum from British Embassy at Washington reported that M. Pan-
gal and Romanian Minister, Căscioare, in Lisbon and Romanian First
Secretary Madrid claimed to represent Mihai Antonescu and that the
Romanian Government was prepared to surrender unconditionally upon
arrival Anglo-American troops in Balkans. Bern's 7566 December 2
reported similar views expressed by Don Gebescu, Romanian Consul
General.

MANIU AND KING - Stockholm's 4166 December 28 reported efforts of
Maniu and King to establish contacts with Anglo-Americans through
Romanian Counselor of Legation, Doce, and/or Nicolescu Busesti, of
Romanian Foreign Office. Some Russian interest shown but nothing
developed.

FEBRUARY 1944

MANIU AND OPPOSITION - By February, Soviet Russia, Great Britain
and United States agreed to inform Maniu that no purpose would be
served if they sent out a representative unless he was authorised
to sign terms of unconditional surrender on behalf of Government
or at least to discuss details leading to overthrow of Government
and surrender. The three powers were agreed that the feelers from
Lisbon, Bern and Madrid were not to be taken seriously.

Maniu was finally informed that Soviet, British and American
representatives would meet his representative at Cairo for discussion
operational details for overthrow of Antonescu Government.

MARCH 1944

PRINCE BARBU STIRBAY - Cairo's 1796 March 4 indicated that Prince
Stirbey was Maniu's emissary and that he had arrived in Ankara.
Purposes of mission leaked in Press stories, causing Maniu to send
urgent message to Allies through his Stockholm representative re-
questing silencing of the press stories which had already endangered
opposition's plans and aroused German suspicion.

CAIRO DISCUSSIONS - MacVeagh's Telegram, March 17th, reported sub-
stance of first conversations with Stirbey.

London's reaction to Stirbey's proposals was one of surprise and
satisfaction, warranting continuation conversations.
Washington's reaction, both State Department and Joint Chiefs, pleased. Joint Chiefs suggested Allied air support might be given.

Moscow's reaction, as expressed by Novikov and Molotov, was rather cold. Didn't believe talks could lead to positive results. Considered Maniu tool of Antonescu.

The Occupation of Hungary, March 19 to 20, and summoning of the Antonescu to Germany accelerated events and caused General Wilson to despatch urgent message to Antonescu, without prior consultation with American and Soviet representatives, to effect that Antonescu should not go to Hitler, which would be considered as evidence further Romanian collaboration. He should surrender to three Allied immediately.

Moscow was annoyed that Wilson acted without consulting them.

By March 27, however, Moscow decided to take action and proposed that General Wilson's statement be supplemented by following message to Antonescu:

1. Soviet Government ready to establish contact with Antonescu.

2. Antonescu should order troops in contact with Soviet troops to surrender. If this carried out in Crimea or Dniester area, Soviet Commander would undertake to send surrendered troops to Pruth to be returned to Antonescu for organization by Romanian Government to resist German troops.

3. Direct contact between Soviet and Romanian High Command for settlement problems mutual military action against Germans. Antonescu should appoint person or give authority to surrendered Romanian General in Russia.

The foregoing was communicated to Maniu by Lord Moyne March 27. On same day Maniu telegraphed that the Antonescu had returned from Germany; that he was as yet uninformed regarding decisions taken; that the occupation of Rumania had apparently been postponed; and that if Antonescu did not break with Germans, Maniu, with consent of King, had decided to overthrow Antonescu. He envisaged possibility of organised resistance to Germans in the Banat and Oltonia, where, if necessary they could retreat into Yugoslavia.

REACTION JOINT CHIEFS - The Joint Chiefs raise no objection to Stirbey's four points; they stress:

1. Importance Rumania's immediate surrender.

2. Suggest
2. Suggest Allies may be able aid resistance with air bombardments.

3. Feel Russians should be given full power carry out surrender, unimpeded by less relevant political consideration, such as token Allied representation.

March 28. Telegram from British Minister Resident to Mr. Eden revealed that Rumanian Military Attaché at Ankara approached British M.A. with following message from Marshal Antonescu:

1. If Germany presents written demands can Antonescu count on

a) Air-borne assistance from Allies.

b) Helpful policy declaration re Transylvania and/or Atlantic Charter to help Marshal work up Rumanian will to fight.

2. Rumanian Army has 7 divisions in Crimea, 3 on Dniester front and 5 near reorganization. Remaining 15 divisions secretly mobilizing, lack heavy armament.

3. If he decides to resist, he will retreat to Yugoslavia if hard pressed and cooperate with Tito and Allies.

4. Ploesti is completely in control of Germans.

British M.A. at Ankara was instructed to inform Rumanian M.A. of Moscow's message of March 26th. If agreed British GHQ suggested further reply be sent to effect that:

1. Allies would bomb targets indicated by Romanians.

2. Question of declaration would be considered.

Mr. Eden's telegram March 28 to Cairo revealed that British Government concurred with Joint Chiefs that Anglo-American representation at surrender of Rumanian troops unimportant if Soviet Government accepts surrender on behalf of all three Allies and consult Anglo-Americans in advance on Armistice terms.

March 29, Stirbey sent message to Maniu advising him that Soviet terms to Antonescu applied to Maniu and he advised Maniu to take immediate action if Antonescu failed to do so.

April 1st Soviet Embassy presented Department with copy of proposed statement to Rumania to effect that

1. Soviet
1. Soviet Government had no territorial claim beyond the
    front.

2. Soviet Government did not aim to change existing social
    regime of Romania.

Ankara reported April 1st that Marshal Antonescu promised
Hitler 1,500,000 soldiers, 500,000 for Galata - Focsani - Odosisti
Line, 700,000 as needed. Hitler reported promised adequate armament
and support for return of Transylvania.

April 1st Cairo's Yugos S reported:

1. General Wilson advised Maniu take action suggested by
   Russians.

2. Allies prepared to make powerful air attacks on targets
   suggested by Maniu.

3. A message from Maniu dated March 31st stated Antonescu won
   over to Allies "in principle" awaiting repetition Soviet conditions
   through Cretzianu.

4. Cairo's Yugos S0 reported that Lord Koyne sent message to
   Antonescu drawing attention to Molotov statement and demanding im-
   mediate reply of acceptance Soviet proposals.

April 3 London's 2994 reported British Foreign Office sur-
prised and puzzled over Russian willingness to play with Maniu or
Antonescu.

Speculating on future course of events British F.O. thought
King Michael would dismiss Antonescu and appoint Maniu who would
surrender to Allies.

Cairo's Yugos S1, April 5, reported that Stirbey had cabled
Maniu that if he did not take immediate action, he would assume
that his mission was terminated.

April 5, copy of telegram dated March 31, from Cairo to London
indicated that Moscow was prepared to return all of Transylvania to
Rumania.

Stockholm's 1114, April 5 reported that Duca had received re-
quest to ascertain possibilities of sending Rumanian representative
by plane to Moscow.

Russian Armistice Terms

Cairo's Yugos S4, April 5, informed Department that Novikov had
presented MacVeagh and Lord Koyne with following armistice terms for

Rumania:
Rumania:

1. Romanian divisions in Crimea, Odessa and Kishinev must surrender to Red Army or attack Germans in rear, cooperating with Russians. If this done Russians will re-equip Romanians and place them at disposition of Antonescu and Maniu.

2. Soviet minimum conditions are:

   (a) rupture with Germans and cooperation with Russians;

   (b) re-establishment of Romanian-Soviet frontier agreed to 1940;

   (c) indemnity for losses caused Russians by hostilities and occupation of Soviet territory;

   (d) repatriation Soviet and Allied prisoners and internees.

   These minimum conditions can be changed for the worse if not accepted.

3. Soviet Government does not demand occupation Rumanian territory for duration of war but unrestricted freedom of movement Soviet and Allied troops if necessary. Rumanian Government must contribute with all its means of communication on land, water and in air.

4. Soviet Government considers Vienna award unjust and is ready to conduct operation in common with Rumania for restoration to Rumania of all of Transylvania or major part thereof.

5. Rumania may have political representative for political questions with Russians.

Department's reaction.

1. Terms essentially Russian, not allied or tripartite and represent departure from unconditional surrender principle.

2. Russian proposals differ considerably from those prepared by Department and submitted to European Advisory Commission.

3. Terms are at variance with American view on territorial question of Bessarabia, Bukovina and Transylvania.

4. We do not favor Rumanian occupation of Hungarian territory or disputed Transylvania territory.

Joint Chiefs' Reaction.

Our
Our Government should give full assent to military provisions and hoped our Government could find basis of agreement on political provisions.

British reaction.

Churchill's message of April 9 to Molotov indicated British acceptance of Russian terms, if Clause 4 could be amended to conclude "subject to confirmation at the peace settlement". This referred to Transylvania.

The British also expressed concern that Clause 5 would not preclude British and American political representatives just as Soviets enjoyed in Italy.

Department's Yugos 23 of April 11.

Cairo authorized MacVeagh to inform Novikov that our Government agreed to armistice terms as amended by Mr. Churchill's suggestions.

The Soviets agreed to the proposed changes and the terms were transmitted through DC on April 14th for transmission to Antonescu and Maniu.

Maniu Government in Moldavia

Cairo's Yugos 92 April 16 reported Russian approval of its terms to apply to Maniu, if he set up opposition Government in Russian occupied Moldavia. This idea was proposed by Stirbeu.

APRIL 1944

Allied Armistice Terms Sent - Cairo, on April 14, reported the Allied armistice terms were sent to both Maniu and Marshal Antonescu.

Proposed Strong Messages to the Romanians - The receipt of armistice terms from Maniu were reported by Cairo on April 17, wherein he requested two airborne divisions from the Middle East. The Allied delegates considered sending strong statements to Marshal Antonescu and Maniu, giving the former a time limit to accept Allied terms and demanding from the latter his final attitude toward these terms.

Department Reaction to Plan for Maniu Regime in Russian-held Territory—The Department told Cairo on April 18 it had no objection to Maniu establishing an opposition government in Moldavia, but believed this would make difficult the operation of Articles 1 and 2 of the Soviet terms. The other Articles could be accorded him. The American position of deferring boundary settlements until the close of the war was repeated.
Department Approves Proposed Message to Maniu - On April 20 the message to Maniu as reported by Cairo on April 17 was approved, but it was objected that the Antonescu message wording was illogical, making him a co-belligerent commander if he accepted and a war criminal if he refused.

Stirbey Asks Maniu to Act - Stirbey personally appealed to Maniu for action, said Cairo on April 22. Maniu acknowledged the Soviet armistice terms, together with "suggestions" sent by him via Ankara as a basis for negotiations.

American and Soviet Position on Bessarabia - Stirbey was granted permission to propose to Maniu an opposition government in Russian-held Moldavia, said Cairo on April 24.

A Russian inquiry if the Department's statement on territorial questions on April 18 applied to Bessarabia, was answered by repeating the American policy of deferring boundary problems until the war's close. Since the United States had agreed to the Russian armistice terms, the Soviet Government stated its understanding that the United States accepted its position on Bessarabia. The Soviets added the Molotov declaration upon Romania's frontiers was applicable in determining Maniu's future territorial jurisdiction.

Messages to Maniu and Antonescu - On April 27 Cairo reported the proposed message to Marshal Antonescu had been changed in accordance with the Department's cable of April 20. The Maniu message was delayed until Soviet approval of the text was received.

MAY 1944

Maniu Message Sent - New Envoy - The Maniu message was sent on May 1, said Cairo, as from delegates of the three Allied powers. The ultimatum in the message to Antonescu expired. The Allies agreed to receive Visicuans as Maniu's extra delegate.

Russian Suspicion of British - Cairo reported May 4 a Molotov suggestion to the British Ambassador at Moscow that negotiations were being delayed because the British mission in Romania worked with Marshal Antonescu under an agreement whose terms were unknown. He asked for an explanation, and in Cairo the British explained to the Americans and Russians the communications media to Romania, which they had been operating.

Second Envoy's Arrival and New Action Details - On May 5 Cairo reported that Visicuans, the second Maniu envoy, had arrived. He stated that, because of German troop distributions, any Romanian action had been greatly endangered. Maniu asked for full Allied directions. Maniu was to be told to send an officer to the Russian lines for joint military planning.

Maniu
Maniu Told to Act with Russians — Details of means by which Maniu's military emissary could meet the Russians were sent, said Cairo on May 29.

JUNE 1944

Assurances Desired by Maniu — Reported by Cairo's June 1 as follows:

1. Only Romanian administration in all occupied territory;

2. No Allied occupation of non-operational zones in Romania, including Bucharest;

3. The new regime to be given the German-seized National Bank of Romania Funds;

4. Release of frozen government funds from the United States and Great Britain;

5. Return all Transylvania to Romania.

Proposed Message to Maniu — The Department assented on June 3 to a Cairo request of June 1 that Maniu be informed that he should follow the previous advice and contact the Red Army. Further negotiations were considered useless.

Maniu to Elaborate Means to Implement Armistice — A Cairo cable of June 12 said Maniu would shortly submit means to implement the armistice. He wished lenient application of their terms. This disturbed the Allied delegates.

Maniu Peace and Military Proposals — Maniu continued unwilling to contact the Russians directly, reported Cairo on June 29. The Maniu plan provided:

1. The present regime to be supplanted coincident with the armistice and a heavy Russian offensive;

2. An Allied bombardment of communications in Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary;

3. Three Allied air-bornes brigades and two thousand para-troops of any Allied nationality;

4. The signed armistice at Cairo to be announced when the government changes and a Romanian statement is issued withdrawing from the Axis.

In the light of the above, Maniu asked for any modifications that could be made in the Allied terms.

JULY 1944
American Reaction to Maniu Plan - Department on July 6 told Cairo the Soviet Government would decide the military acceptance of Maniu's plan. This view was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who stated they were unable to furnish American troops, but that the requested bombing would be done.

Another Rumanian Message - Cairo on July 12 said a message from the Rumanians asked for prompt Allied action, in view of the interspersal of German with Rumanian troops. They pleaded for cessation of Allied bombing until the plan went into effect.

No Soviet Reaction - By the end of July 20 no Soviet reaction to the Maniu plan had been received.
Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Force
London, England

Number WAR 85219

TOPSEC to SHAEF London for Eisenhower, FACS 63 from the
Combined Chiefs of Staff.

In view of necessity for King of Belgians to be liberated
and to rejoin his ministers at the earliest possible moment,
you should prepare now an order for the King's release,
which should be handed to the German authorities as soon as
the instrument of surrender has been signed.

End
ABOUT 13 AUGUST VON PAPEN RELIABLY REPORTED SAYING TO VICHY AMBASSADOR BERGERY IN PRESENCE OF A TURK THAT HE HOPED ANGLOSAXONS WOULD OFFER TERMS SHE COULD ACCEPT SO SHE WOULD NOT HAVE TO COME UNDERSTANDING WITH RUSSIA ON LATTERS TERMS. I ASKED ANOTHER TURK WHO WAS DINING WITH VICHY AMBASSADOR 18 AUGUST TO SOUND HIM OUT ON THAT SUBJECT. AMBASSADOR RESPONDED FREELY TO QUESTIONS AND GAVE IMPRESSION BEING SINCERE.

FOLLOWING ARE HIS STATEMENTS IN BRIEF:

"HITLER ANXIOUS FOR UNDERSTANDING WITH STALIN BUT THEY HAVE DOUBLE CROSSED EACH OTHER SO OFTEN NEITHER CAN TRUST OTHER.

ANGLOSAXONS FEAR SEPARATE PEACE WHICH WOULD BE
DISASTROUS FOR THEM BUT UNFORTUNATELY IT PROBABLY WON'T HAPPEN.

NOT YET READY ADMIT GERMAN ARMY DEFEATED BUT IT MAY BE DESTROYED UNLESS AGREEMENT ARRIVED AT WITH ANGLOSAXONS OR RUSSIANS.

RUSSIAN DOMINATION EUROPE WOULD BE DISASTROUS."

16...ACT

COMINCH...29G...13...NAVAIDE...270P...CNO...

FILE

CONFIDENTIAL
To: War Department

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, London, England

No. FWD 12936 17 August 1944

FWD 12936. TOPSECRET. To AOWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower cite SHOOG. This is SCAP number 65.

With the rapid development of events, we may be faced with the occupation of Germany sooner than we had previously expected and we are preparing plans to meet that situation when it arises in our planning.

All we can do now is to approach this problem on a purely military basis and our planning contemplates a rapid follow-up of defeated German forces by direct pressure on the basis of the present deployment of our Armies; that is, with Twenty-First Army Group on the left, Twelfth Army Group in the center and the Southern Army Group now advancing from the Mediterranean on the right. Unless we receive instructions to the contrary, we assume that this solution is acceptable. As a matter of fact, this is the only basis of planning available to us, considering our present deployment, the situation which may confront us, and the absence of certain basic decisions as to zones of occupation.

ACTION: CC/S
INFO: Adv Leashy Gen Arnold OGD Gen Bissell Adv King C of S
CM-IN-15509 (17 Aug 44) 16022 bem

371

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: US Military Attache, Lisbon, Spain
To: War Department
Nr: 315 26th June 1944
For Bissell 315

Madrid contact of French nationality B2 temporarily in Lisbon informs me having received urgent message from German in Madrid and Karl Gerd Bunghard. Message conveyed that Germans now ready receive from US Desiderate as to German personalities with whom peace proposals could be discussed.

On closer questioning, source revealed that this message is aftermath of conversations he had with Lt Col Stephens roughly 2 months ago at which time latter declared to source that under no circumstances would US have discussions with any representative of present German regime or party but he is said to have intimated that contact with military might been visaged. In this connection name of Rundstedt is reported to have been mentioned.

Source reports Bunghard is member of German French Armistice Commission and was closely associated with Gen Runsteiger. He is lawyer by profession of Rhenish family married French woman. Noncommittal throughout, I declared to source that I am unauthorized to make any comment whatever. Have reported incident to Ambassador.

O N COMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

DECLASSIFIED
From: US Military Attache, Lisbon, Spain
Nr: 315 26th June 1944

My evaluation would expect further demarches of this sort emanating from even military since veritable 2 front war is facing them now. This dreaded state of affairs is definite proof to German generals that professionally defeat is unavoidable.

Solborg.

ACTION: O-2
INFO: OPD
Col. Park
Log

CM-IN-21542 (26 Jun 44) 19372 vhm

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(j) and 8(3) or (5)
OSD letter, May 1, 1972
By DSS Date: MAY 22, 1973

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date
From: US Military Attache, Ankara Turkey
To: War Department
CG US Army Forces in the Middle East, Cairo, Egypt

20 April, 1944

MILID number 119, AMSME 735.

Ambassador of Turkey to Rumania recently arrived in Turkey reported by source C2 have verified fact that Germans in December asked Turks to communicate peace proposal to Americans and British. This tends to confirm our report 8659 of 31st December under IG 3850 concerning which we had previous doubts. Envoy also hints he had other peace proposals to submit to his foreign office now.

Said to have stated that in Bucharest on Dec 19th Von Killinger German Plenipotentiary in full dress handed him document containing German peace proposals asking that they be communicated to British and Americans but not to Russians. Proposals included abandonment by Germany of Air Force, Navy and Merchant Marine and withdrawal of German troops from occupied territories including Czech protectorate.

Turk submitted document to foreign office but other than acknowledgement of receipt says he got no reply.

Foreign Minister did not communicate proposals to either British or Americans according story feeling it was attempt to separate United Nations.

CM-IN-14829 (20 Apr 44)
From: US Military Attache, Ankara Turkey
20 April, 1944

At time our Ambassador commented on report saying he did not credit it because he thought Turks would like to act as intermediary. The request that Russians be not informed was not know at that time.

NoSig.

ACTION: G-2
INFO: CG AAF
CIF
Col Park Log

CM-IN-14829 (20 Apr 44) 2104Z bom
From: U. S. Military Attaché, Stockholm, Sweden
To: War Department
Number 268, 17 April 1944

When Russo-Finn peace negotiations were started in February, the Minister advised that Washington was being kept currently informed by London and Moscow. It, therefore, appeared discreet not to probe the many rumors in circulation regarding the ensuing political activities nor have I reported along this line. However, the military situation at the moment so influences the complete peace situation that a current general summary as viewed from here appears warranted. As long as the Germans are capable of occupying all of Finland, the Finns must fight either the Russians or the Germans. To create the condition for Russo-Finn peace, the German threat of occupation must be removed. Russia wants peace with the indigestible Finns as a practical measure. Kollantay plumbs for peace with old friends including number 147 and Axel Johnsson. Number 44 reflects the same attitude. The trend in Finland is likewise for peace. The principal hindrance at this time is the German capability of invasion from the south for which Nazi forces are reported assembled in Estonia.

Number 136 states that many Finnish General Staff officers shared his disappointment when the Russians were checked at Narva. With Finland exposed on the south to German invasion, the prospects for Russian peace look uninviting. With the Russians in Riga, the whole outlook changes; the Finnish complacency enjoyed by faith in their
From: U.S. Military Attache, Stockholm, Sweden  
Number 268, 17 April 1944

present battle positions fades and with it, the pro-German elements and stubborn diehards who prefer to fight the Russians. It, therefore, appears that the present negotiations should be prolonged until the moment when the Russians control the Gulf of Finland and Eastern Baltic Sea. The conditions necessary for a practical peace will then be satisfied.

Rayens

ACTION: G-2
INFO: OPD
Colonel Park
Log

CM-IN-12983 (18 Apr 44) 1201Z med
From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

To: War Department

Nr: S-50325, 13th April 1944

From SHAEF to AGWAR S-50325 for Marshall personal for Secretary of State from Stettinius signed Eisenhower cite PHPOA.

Conversing this morning with General Eisenhower and General Smith they raised with me and expressed the considered opinion that the term "Unconditional surrender" should be clarified by announcing the principles on which the treatment of a defeated Germany would be based. This seemed to them highly desirable in view of the accumulated evidence that German propaganda is interpreting the words "Unconditional surrender" to strengthen the morale of the German Army and people. In order to offset this the Generals thought it very necessary to create, if possible, through our own propaganda:

A. A mood of acceptance of unconditional surrender in the German Army such as would make possible a collapse of resistance similar to that which took place in Tunisia; and

B. To create a mood in the German General Staff as a result of which necessary political steps might be undertaken by a German Badoglio for unconditional surrender.

It was suggested that the following trend of propaganda would be of great use as far as possible in advance of D day:

A. Tri-Party American-Anglo-Russian statement to define unconditional surrender and the guarantee of pro *
* law and order;

CM-IN-9472 (13 Apr 44)
From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England
Nr: S-50325, 13th April 1944

B. A summary of Anglo American principles upon
which the Anglo American Military Government will be
conducted. The Anglo American statement might be followed
by a political directive which would include:

Para 1. Methods of demilitarization;
Para 2. Purge of Nazis from the government machine;
Para 3. Seizure of war criminals;
Para 4. Orderly transfers of population;
Para 5. Restoration of religious and trade unions
freedom.

C. Once we have a bridgehead the Commander in Chief
should make a statement calling for surrender and at the
same time recapitulate the terms of other declarations.

It was said that a period of at least 4 weeks would
be necessary to make effective these declarations in the
minds of the German people.

General Smith rather than General Eisenhower felt
that governmental statements must be followed, at the
appropriate time, by a declaration from the Supreme Com-
mander to the German Commander in the west, which would
presumably not be made until after the bridgehead is well
established and the west wall broken. This in General
Smith's opinion would be the psychological moment for the
call to surrender, reciting in soldierly language, the
principal points of the Tri-Party declarations and the
principles of the Anglo American Military Government.

General Smith expressed the opinion that from all
available evidence, in default of such declarations, it
would be impossible to exploit the crisis in the German
Army which will undoubtedly arise immediately after a
successful Allied landing.

For your information the British political officer at SHAEF has been asked to express these views to the Foreign Office. It would be most helpful if the General could have your reaction as soon as possible which I suggest you send through Phillips. Phillips is in hearty accord with the views expressed. Assume you will wish to review with Mister Stimson the matter.

No Sig

* Being serviced.

ACTION: Gen Bissell (For State Department)

INFO: OPD

Col. Park
Gen. Hilldring
C of S

CM-IN-9472 (13 Apr 44) 2131Z vh

DECLASSIFIED

January 12, 1972

The making of an exact copy of this message is forbidden.
To: War Department
No. S-50325 13th April 1944

From SHAEF to AGWAR S-50325 for Marshall personal
for Secretary of State from Stettinius signed Eisenhower
cite PHPOA.

(Please insert the following in last line of
page 1)

Promotion of law and order.

No Sig

NOTE: Supp Copy of CM-IN-9472 (13 Apr 44) Gen Bissell
ACTION: Gen Bissell (For State Dept)
INFO: OPD Col. Park Gen Hildring C of S
CM-IN-9628 (14 Apr 44) 0139Z VH JAN 12 1944

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
MILITARY ATTACHE,
AMERICAN EMBASSY,
LONDON, ENGLAND.

NUMBER: WAR 21061

TO PEABODY FOR WICHERHAM FROM HILDRING.

INSTRUMENT AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF UNCONDITIONAL
SURRENDER FOR GERMANY. FOR YOUR INFORMATION JCS 623/7
HAS BEEN APPROVED BY JCS, WHO RECOMMENDED ON 8 APRIL 1944
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE THAT THE VIEWS, AS THUS APPROVED,
BE TRANSMITTED TO US REPRESENTATIVE ON THE EUROPEAN ADVISORY
COMMISSION FOR HIS INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE.

ORIGINATOR: GEN HILDRING

INFORMATION: JCS
OPD
MR McCLOY
LOG

CM-OUT-21061 (10 APR 44) 2007Z MOS BY DBS DATE MAY 3 1973

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/11/94
Combined Chiefs of Staff
71469

April 6, 1944

Allied Force Headquarters
Algiers, Algeria

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Commanding General
US Army Forces
European Theater of Operations
London, England

Number WARX 19549

For Wilson, FREEDOM Algiers, ETUSA pass to the British Chiefs of Staff, FAN 352, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff

MEDCOS 49 and 61 are the references. Events in Bulgaria do not seem to be moving with the speed which appeared likely a month ago. Subject of Bulgarian terms is therefore no longer of same urgency as at time of MEDCOS 49.

At the Moscow Conference the British, American, and Soviet Governments agreed that subject should be discussed at European Advisory Commission.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff will therefore defer consideration of terms in MEDCOS 49 pending decision by the European Advisory Commission.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

ORIGINATOR: CCS

INFORMATION: GEN ARNOLD
GEN BISSELL
ADM KING
COL PARK

CM-OUT-19549 (6 Apr 44) 2035Z 1cm

COPY No. 40

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

4/8/94
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: US Military Attache, Ankara
To: War Department
No: 74 1 April 1944

Within recent days Rumanians are reported by
source B2 to have receded from former stand re Russia
and as now being desirous of surrendering to Russians
British and US. Understand their Diplomats are again
attempting to approach those of United Nations here.
Possible they may offer unconditional surrender
but more probable they still hold out for certain stip-
ulations. Have report B2 that they maneuvering to see
if Turk Foreign Office willing to help them.

Recent Russian offensive reported to have caused
top Rumanians to despair of stopping Russians and
created despondency and near panic in political and
military circles. Trend toward attempting reach under-
standing with Russia explained as follows: Absence of
Russian menaces toward Rumania and relatively mild terms
offered Finland gave them some hope Rumania will not be
too harshly treated by Russians. They imagine Russia
might offer reasonable terms in order to impress Britain
and America with fact that Balkan and Eastern European
countries receive them with open arms. They wish to
sound out Russians to learn whether upper classes and Intelligentsia will be liquidated.

As local Rumanians see it, Greece all Balkans and
all Europe east of general line Trieste Vienna Prague
Danzig will either be part of Soviet Union or dominated
at least by Moscow.
Rumanians hope Russians dislike Hungary more than Rumania hence will help Rumania get Transylvania back.

While Rumanians are maneuvering to get out of War they are publicly trying (see our number 63 for impression recently made on Finnish WA) to create impression of determined solidarity with Germany against Russia. This is illusion but Rumanians can always try to play it that way if their political reconnaissance leads them to conclude Russians would treat them personally and their class in intolerable fashion.

Neither Rumanian or Bulgaria is trusted at all by Germans according B2 Italian source.

Tindall

ACTION: G-2

INFO: CG AAF
OPD
Col Park
Log
From: US Military Attaché, Ankara
To: War Department
No: 75 1 April 1944

To MILID. Number 75.

New demarches suggesting surrender to United Nations being made by Romanian Legation here.

Tindall

ACTION: O-2
INFO: CG AAF
     OPD
     Colonel Park
     Log

CM-IN-901 (2 Apr 44) 03372 med

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 5(D) or (P)
OSD Letter, May 1, 1973

By DBS  Date: MAY 9 1974

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
From: U.S. MA Ankara, Turkey
To: War Department
CG U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East No. 4
Cairo, Egypt.

20 March, 1944
From Tindall Ankara.

Written by Turk deputy in semiofficial ULUS following theory is of interest.

Did Stirbey set out from Roumania without knowledge and consent of Germans? Difficult to believe this because Roumania under rigid discipline of Gestapo. Consequently Germans must see benefit for themselves in Roumania demarches for separate peace. In terms attributed to Stirbey reference made to joint occupation Roumania. This destined to stir up bad feeling between Allies.

Further demand Transylvania be taken from Hungary may bring closer cooperation between Hungary and Germany which needs Hungarian Army.

If Allies demand unconditional surrender Roumania this too will serve German interests in different way.
since impossible for small Axis partners withdrew from war, Germans must have calculated that demarches for separate peace by these countries would not harm German interests but prove beneficial.

Note that above theory rests on assumption Germans knew not only that Stirbey was coming to Turkey but why.

No Sig.

Corrected copy of CM-IN-14470 (20 Mar 44) G-2

ACTION: G-2
INFO: OPD
CG AAF
Col Mathewson
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: Algiers
To: WAR
No. W9141/2730 • NAF 575 2 January 1944

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff rptd
USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff Mideast from APOH
BNAP signed Eisenhower cite PHOT W9141/2730 021530.
This is my NAF 575.

Para 1. Following is paraphrase of Mideast message
0/54135 dated 31 Dec from OSS to Freedom for Eisenhower.

"Para 1. Recently showed OSS Cairo by General
Donovan, head OSS, was a memorandum proposing to negotiate
withdrawal of Bulgaria from War through Kuyumjiski
former Bulgarian banker by using his acquaintance
in court, Government and Army Circles.

Para 2. Political advisers Mideast consider
most unwise since certain elements Bulgaria, organizing
active resistance to regime, would be alienated by
attempt removal Bulgaria from War by proposed method.
Present non representative Government unlikely survive
Bulgaria collapse. Since we demand unconditional surrender
such negotiations much more likely delay rather than
accelerate collapse.

Para 3. Understand mission under Kuyumjiski now
in Istanbul. Under new directive you are responsible for
subversive activities Bulgaria. In view paragraph 2 above
suggest all action this matter be suspended until all
concerned have considered fully. Your instructions
appreciated.

Para 4. Political question not discussed with OSS
Cairo as understand OSS Istanbul still operates on Washington
directives."

OM-IN-1104 (2 Jan 44)

370 Bulgaria

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Algiers
To: WAR
No. W9141/22730 NAP 575
2 January 1944

Para 2. Whilst appreciating that every suitable course leading to removal of Bulgaria from the War should be pursued, it is requested that this Hq be consulted and kept informed concerning any negotiations conducted with individuals or Governments falling within its sphere of responsibility. It is requested that you so instruct General Donovan if he is in fact conducting such negotiations.

Para 3. Our recommendations will follow shortly.

No sig

ACTION: CC/S (Capt Royal USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Strong
Gen Arnold
Adm King
LOG

CM-IN-1104. (2 Jan 44) 2250Z eJm MAY 22 1973

DECLASSIFIED
JCS LETTER 7-2-73
BY DES. DATE

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94
DAD
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (NCA)

Moscow
Dated October 23, 1943
Rec'd 2:20 a.m., 24th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

U.S. URGENT
1703, October 23, 1 p.m.

The Embassy has received a note from the Foreign Office stating that recently negotiations have taken place between the Soviet Government and the Czechoslovak Government concerning the conclusion of a Treaty of Friendship Mutual Assistance and Post War Cooperation. Both Governments have agreed to the draft of the treaty. The Foreign Office has provided the Embassy with a copy of the draft treaty the terms of which will be communicated to the Department as soon as the translation is completed.

HARRIMAN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

370
WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

June 21, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Secret Demobilization Studies.

I wish to bring to your attention certain work on the above subject that has been going on in the War Department since last November, not because it has been completed, but because I fear one of the usual leaks into the press which might give you concern if not irritation. The purpose of this memorandum is merely to bring the matter to your attention so that you will know what is going on. I have talked this over with the Secretary of War and he agrees with me that such a note as this appears desirable.

Last November I selected a retired officer with a very broad comprehension of military requirements and had him secretly consider some major factors from the purely military point of view that would inevitably be concerned in the demobilization of the Army. Later I had the result of his views considered by the G-3 section of the War Department in order to consider some of the broad matters of policy involved.

As practically every detail concerned with policies immediately involved matters of shipping, material, transportation, etc., under the control of the Army Service Forces, for convenience I had a select board secretly organized under General Somervell to survey the various military involvements.

My desire was to determine as nearly as practicable what would probably be the broad policy so far as military requirements are concerned of the demobilization and after this had been whipped into fair shape to have the Secretary of War take up the matter with you. In this way I hope to reach a point where we would be ready whenever you so directed to submit this data to whatever civilian agencies were coordinated to meet the general problem.

In all of this I insisted on the utmost secrecy for several reasons.

First, to avoid publicity which would lead to a relaxation of the war effort.

Second, to avoid the inevitable tidal wave of proposals and debates which are bound to be concerned with the great problems immediately concerned with the demobilization policy.
Third, to have at least the nucleus of the military requirements in a fair state of preparation before the larger aspects of the demobilization questions were undertaken.

My purpose in submitting this memorandum is merely to tell you what is going on. Admiral Leahy is familiar with all of the foregoing.

Chief of Staff.

Date: JAN 12 1972

Signature: [Signature]
A SOURCE WITH RATING B-2 REPORTS THAT TURKISH PRIME MINISTER TOLD BRITISH AMBASSADOR MAY 9TH THAT HITLER HAS PREVENTED MUSSOLINI FROM MAKING SEPARATE PEACE WITH RUSSIA.

16...ACT

COMDC...10/11...20G...NAVAIDE...200P...FEE

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
THE CZECH REPRESENTATIVE ANKARA CLAIMS TO HAVE RELIABLE INFORMATION FROM MOSCOW THAT ARGUT 2 DAY THE JAPANESE AMBASSADORS AT MOSCOW AND VICHY APPROACHED RUSSIANS ON BEHALF GERMANY REGARDING SEPARATE PEACE.

16...ACT

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 75 (4) NAVREGS.)
GENERAL OSHIMA, THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR TO GERMANY IS NOW IN USSR ENROUTE TO JAPAN. WHILE AT TEMPORARY SOVIET CAPITOL HE HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN NEGOTIATIONS LOOKING TOWARD THE SIGNING OF A NON AGGRESSION PACT BETWEEN THE USSR AND JAPAN. THESE TALKS AT THE MOMENT ARE REPORTED TO HAVE ACHIEVED APPROXIMATELY 80 PER CENT AGREEMENT. OSHIMAIS FURTHER REPORTED TO HAVE REPRESENTED A 3 POINT PEACE PROPOSAL TO THE SOVIET FROM GERMANY. THE 1ST POINT WHICH DEALD WITH THE USSR SUPPLYING FOODSTUFFS GASOLINE, ETC TO THE GERMANS ACCEPTABLE AS THE GERMANS AGREE TO EVACUATE THE UKRAIN. THE OTHER POINTS WHICH DEALD WITH SESSION OF BALKAN TERRITORY AND SOVIET NON INTERFERENCE IN THE BALKAN STATES ARE REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN UNACCEPTABLE TO THE USSR.

SECRET
CHINESE INTEREST SOVIET INTENTIONS INCREASING.

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