NAVAL MESSAGE / NAVY DEPARTMENT

FROM: (ALUSHA KECK)

RECEIVED BY:

DATE: 29 DEC 43

TOR CODE: 156/29

DECODED BY: SOMERTON

PARAPHRASED BY: HAMILTON

ROUTED BY:

SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR ACTION: CNC

PRIORITY: NSA WASHN

ROUTINE: DEFERRED

DECODED BY: NSA WASHN

INFORMATION: SECRETARY OF STATE

PRIORITY: DEFERRED

ROUTINE: DEFERRED

DECODED BY: NSA WASHN

IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW:

28174 NCR 4284

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

INFO SECRETARY FROM HARRITAN: ACTIVITY SOMERTON NSA SIGNED SPREADING

A MESSAGE I RECEIVED TODAY INDICATES THAT DISCHARGING OF NORTHERN SURVEYS IS PROCEEDING AT A RATE WHICH WILL REQUIRE THAT JR-56A BE DELAYED ABOUT 30 DAYS IF CONGESTION OF SHIPS IN PORT IS TO BE AVOIDED. I HAVE INFORMED KRUTIKOV THAT THE SITUATION WILL BE CLARIFIED WHEN JR-558 ARRIVES THE LAST OF THIS MONTH AND THAT AT THAT TIME IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR E TO SUBMIT A RECOMMENDATION TO THE USA AS TO WHETHER OR NOT JR-56A SHOULD BE DELAYED. THIS WILL GIVE KRUTIKOV AN OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE SUCH CORRECTIVE MEASURES AS ARE POSSIBLE AND

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

Regraded Unclassified
I SHALL SUBMIT A RECOMMENDATION TO YOU
ASSOCIATION IN ABOUT A WEEK.

FA37(ASR)......CT

COURT-CONV. NAVY DEP...ONG...STATE
DEPT.....

SECRET

Make original copy to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
OPNAV-NCR-15
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: FRANKEL - WSA MURMANSK
RELEASED BY:
DATE: 25 DEC 1943
TOR CODEROOM: 241943
DECODED BY: KIRKBRIDE
PARAPHRASED BY: PARKER
ROUTED BY: SGBEL

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRIORITY AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

H ave never suggested delay JW55B but still suggest postponement 56A MOSCOW 211516 MURMANSK 17/45.

MURMANSK has 15 ships of 55A of which only 4 along side to discharge. on arrival here of at least 12 and possibly all of 55B on 28th a conservative estimate of 145,000 TONS must be discharged by 29 January the scheduled arrival time 56A. This means average discharge must exceed 500 TONS counting from arrival date each ship. Since half these loaded ships will wait at anchor several days and time and berths are required for loadings out bound cargo and ballast consider this figure unattainable.

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NSR-15

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/49

Regraded Unclassified
COMMENTING VARIOUS POINTS.

A. DELAY OF 1 DAY IN SAILING ENABLED 3 SHIPS SAIL WHICH OTHERWISE NOT READY.

B. FOREIGN TRADE WILL NOT GIVE PORT CLEARANCE FIGURES BUT PLACES ATTAINABLE FIGURE AT 4,500 FOR INCOMING AND 1500 FOR OUTBOUND CARGO.

C. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RATE ATTAINED AND THAT NECESSARY IS 50 PERCENT PLUS.

D. AGREE NO REASON CHANGE SCHEDULE THIS GROUP.

E. PREVIOUS ESTIMATE QUITE OPTIMISTIC.

F. NO EVIDENCE TO CONTRARY.

CONSIDER MOST DESIRABLE CONTINUE LOADING PORT CAPABILITIES BY COMFORTABLE MARGIN BUT OBJECT TO

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-SNR-15
POINTLESS CONGESTION / ARDOR AND THE VICE COMMISSAR CAN UNDERSTAND THE PERIOD OF RECOMMENDED POSTPONEMENT WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE RESULTS ACHIEVED BY THE PORT.

FX37...C0G
C0W1NC0...16...39...CND...NAXAIDE...
Based on experience today USA believes a considerably smaller increase will meet all requirements. Further states Soviet authorities accept responsibility and will meet situation. (2) Krutikov particularly requested those responsible for convoys be informed that everything necessary will be done to insure prompt turn around JW 55A and that JW 55B should come into port according to schedule. He said "I see no reason to even discuss the possibility of delaying JWB convoy."

(E) Regarding NR ships that can be taken care of at white seaports during ice season he said not prepared to reply or discuss the time. But would investigate and reply.

(F) View foregoing and necessity bringing in maximum cargo to northern ports. It is recommended nothing...

SECRET
BE DONE DELAY IN 585 PENDING FURTHER CHECK WITH FRANKEL.

(G) OF INTEREST WAS KRUTIKOV'S REPLY TO MY EXPRESSED.

HOPE THAT ADEQUATE STEPS HAD BEEN TAKEN TO PREVENT

BOMBING OF PORTS SAID THAT SINCE LAST YEAR AA DEFENSE

CAN BE REDUCED BY DECREASED FURTHER SAID GERMEN AIRFIELDS

IN THIS RANGE HAVE BEEN BOMBED CONSISTENTLY TO MINIMIZE
THEIR ACTIVITY AND THAT WHILE THERE HAD BEEN FAVORABLE
WEATHER FOR BOMBING NO ATTACKS.

MADE

FRANKEL SUMMIT SUGGESTION.

FX37...ACT

COMMCH...16...CMO...NAVATAC...
FOR McPHERSON MERCHANTING ASTALUSNA MURMANSK ACTION INFO CNO LONDON FROM SPALDING STONE DEANE

A. SUBSTANCE MURMANSK 170845* REGARDING SITUATION NORTHERN PORTS DISCUSSED WITH KRUTIKOV VICE COMMISSAR FOREIGN TRADE WHO MADE FOLLOWING POINTS.

AT MURMANSK SHIPS BOTH A AND B SECTIONS JW 54 HAVE BEEN DISCHARGED AND RELOADED.

AT EKONOMIA ALL SHIPS HAVE BEEN COMPLETELY DISCHARGED SOME NOW BEING RELOADED FOR RETURN TRIP AND WILL LEAVE IN TIME MEET CONVOY REQUIREMENTS.

AT MOLOTOVSK SOME SHIPS HAVE BEEN DELAYED FOR SEVERAL DAYS.

TO CORRECT THIS SITUATION ONLY A FEW SHIPS FROM JW 55 A WILL BE SENT MOLOTOVSK REMAINDER GOING OTHER PORTS.

THERE WILL BE A BERTH FOR EVERY SHIP AND SHIPS WILL BE DISCHARGED IMMEDIATELY UPON ARRIVAL.
B. AS FAR AS CLEARANCE DOCKS CONCERNED KRUTIKOV STATES AT FIRST CLEARING SLOW BUT DUE IMPROVING TEAMWORK AND ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL CLEARANCE NOW IMPROVING AND WILL CONTINUE IMPROVE. DOES NOT ANTICIPATE MUCH DIFFICULTY CLEARING DOCKS. THERE WILL BE ADEQUATE SUPPLY EMPTY CARS.

C. KRUTIKOV AGREES DISCHARGE AND CLEARING MUST BE STEPPED UP SOMewhat BUT THINKS THE 50% INCREASE MENTIONED AS BEING NECESSARY NEEDS FURTHER CHECKING.

*CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE: THIS IS PART ONE. PART 2 REQUESTED IN RDO WASHN 231500

FX37...COG

COMINCH...16...CNO...NAVATDE...
RATE DISCHARGE AND ESPECIALLY CLEARANCE DESPITE FACT
SEASON STARTED WITH CLEAN DOCKS AND ABSENCE OF ENEMY ACTION
HAS BEEN SO LOW AS TO CAUSE EVENTUAL CONGESTION AND
ATTENDANT EXCESSIVE WAITING LOADED SHIPS AT ANCHOR.
CAUSE APPEARS LACK OF SUFFICIENT QUANTITY AND QUALITY
WORKERS PLUS INSUFFICIENT RAIL TRANSPORT. BELIEVE
CONGESTION WILL MAKE ITSELF SO EVIDENT IN HANDLING OF
CONVOY JW-55B AS TO REQUIRE POSTPONEMENT FOLLOWING CONVOY
UNLESS 50% IMPROVEMENT OBTAINED IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE.
WITH PRESENT ICE BREAKER STRENGTH WHITE SEA ESTIMATE
SAFE HANDLING MAXIMUM 8 DRY CARGO SHIPS MONTHLY THAT AREA
LONDON INFORM WIT THAT MORE DETAILED SIGNAL FOLLOWS.
FX37....ACT.
COMINCH...16....CH...NAVAL...

CONFIDENTIAL
Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVRENS.)
OPNAV-NCR-16
170845 44V

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

Regraded Unclassified
NAVY DEPARTMENT

NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM ALUSNA, MOURMANSK

RELEASED BY

DATE 21 DEC 43

TOR CODEROOM GIDEON/ARTHURS

DECODED BY DRUMMOND

PARAPHRASED BY HARRINGTON

ROUTED BY

INFORMATION

CNO

ALUSNA, LONDON

ALUSNA, MOSCOW

ADDRESS

RALLY MAILGRAM ADDRESSES

PRECEDENCE

PRIORITY

RRRR

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

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DECLASSIFIED
RELIABLE INFO 2 ENEMY SUBS DEFINITELY SUNK AND 2 MORE BELIEVED SUNK AT ENTRANCE WHITE SEA BY SOVIET ESCORT WHILE ESCORTING JW 54 A. 1 OF THEM DEFINITELY SUNK BY NEW MINE SWEEPER NR 112 AND THE OTHER BY DESTROYER GROZNIE.
NAVY MESSAGE

FROM COMNAVEU

RELEASED BY

DATE APRIL 26, 1943

TOR CODE ROOM 1943/1908

DECODED BY NILES/NILES

PARAPHRASED BY

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

261711

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

DATE

TIME

GCT

TEXT

ALUSNA LONDON 200731 AND 201914 AND ADMIRALTYS 232029B TO BAD GIVE PRESENT SITUATION REGARDING NORTH RUSSIAN CONVOYS AND PLANS FOR ON SHIPMENT OF CERTAIN MATERIALS EX-JW 54.

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4 NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
(This is Hal 28 to Douglas WSA from Harriman for Westerlund from Kerr)

Reference vessels in JW-50-3 now awaiting return convoy from North Russian ports. Following joint telegram from MWT and Harriman has been sent to Frankel and Dalgliesh.

"Decision has now been given on highest level to cancel convoys JW-50-4, 50-5 and 50-6. Vessels ready for JW-50-4 are now being discharged in UK.

It may be some considerable time before Admiralty can arrange to bring back ships now ready for return from North Russia. We therefore suggest you take steps in consultation with SBNO to move ships, if necessary, to wherever you consider they can best lie in safety.

We should like you to continue loading export cargo

(PAGE ONE OF TWO)
WITH A VIEW TO VESSELS RETURNING WITH FULL CARGOS BUT THIS IS OF SECONDARY IMPORTANCE COMPARED WITH SAFETY OF SHIPS.

ASSUMING HOMeward MOVEMENT MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE UNTIL (A) END JUNE OR (B) END AUGUST, PLEASE ADVISE IMMEDIATELY YOUR ESTIMATE OF MERCHANT SHIP BUNKER POSITION BOTH FOR COAL AND OIL BURNERS, STATING WHETHER ADDITIONAL SUPPLIES WILL BE REQUIRED TO ENABLE SHIPS TO UK. PRESUME SHIPS STORES POSITION SATISFACTORY."

F-57 (WSA) ..... ACTION
FILE.............. COMINCH ADDED............
**NAVY DEPARTMENT**

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<td>OPNAV</td>
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**RELEASED BY**

21 APRIL 1943

**TOR CODEROOM**

2336/20

**DECODED BY**

NILES

**PARAPHRASED BY**

DEMEYER

Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

LT COMDR FUSSelman  2C1914  NCR 291

**ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME**

**DATE**

**TIME**

**TEXT**

(TO DOUGLAS FROM HARRIMAN FOR WESTERLUND FROM KERR)

HAL 30

REFER MY HAL 26 REGARDING VESSELS NORTHERN RUSSIAN PORTS.

FOLLOWING REPLY RECEIVED FROM FRANKEL AND DALGLIESH

MURMANSK.

"IN CONJUNCTION WITH SBNO ARCHANGEL WE WILL MOVE ALL VESSELS ROUND TO WHITE SEA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

2. IN ORDER TO LOAD FULL CARGOES CONSIDERABLE AND AWKWARD
   RESTOWAGE MUST BE DONE ON SEVERAL VESSELS ON THEIR ARRIVAL
   WHITE SEA. THIS WILL MEAN THEY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO SAIL
   IN WEST BOUND CONVOY AT SHORT NOTICE AS AT PRESENT. NO
   RESTOWAGE WILL BE ATTEMPTED HERE.

3. ALL CARGO AVAILABLE HERE WILL BE LOADED BUT VESSELS
   WILL NOT BE HELD HERE MERELY TO LOAD

ACTION F

SEALLED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person.

Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/44
4. TO REACH UK ESTIMATE OIL REQUIREMENTS FOR END JUNE
SAILING FUEL 45% TONS DIESEL 2% TONS. END AUGUST
SAILING FUEL 72% TONS DIESEL 4% TONS. WILL PURSUE
POSITIONS OF LOCAL SUPPLIES AND SIGNAL LATER.
5. PROVIDED NO FURTHER SHIPS ARE SUNK FOOD POSITION
SHOULD BE ALL RIGHT. KOLA SHIPS NOW HERE WILL BE SUPPLIED
WITH 2 MONTHS SUPPLIES FROM SURVIVORS STORES MURMANSK.
ANY OPPORTUNITIES FOR REPLENISHING FROM UK SHOULD BE TAKEN.
6. REQUEST EARLY ADVISE IF INDEPENDENT WESTBOUND SAILINGS
ARE CONTEMPLATED.

F37(DOUGLAS).....ACT
FILE.... (ADD COMINCH).......

SEALED SECRET
Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (e) NAVRECS.)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

5/12/94

Regraded Unclassified
(PERSONAL TO DOUGLAS WSA FROM HARRIMAN)

HAL 15.

A. REFER MY HAL 6 AND SABLO 205. JW 55 WILL NOT SAIL.

B. THE 2 VESSELS WHICH YOU HAVE RECENTLY NOMINATED SHOULD BE DISCHARGED UNLESS THEY CAN BE DIVERTED TO THE PERSIAN GULF. IF THEY HAVE ALREADY SAILED THEY SHOULD BE RECALLED IF POSSIBLE.

C. IF YOU WANT FURTHER INFORMATION CONSULT HOPKINS.
NAVAL MESSAGE

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<td>DATE</td>
<td>18 MARCH 1943</td>
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<td>TOR CODEROOM</td>
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INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

ROONEY 2325A/17 ACR 16125

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

TEXT

(PASS BY HAND FROM BAD)

CONVOY JW. 53 CONSISTING OF 25 SHIPS SAILLED FROM LOCH EGEO ON 15TH FEBRUARY AND A FURTHER 3 SHIPS SAILLED ON THE FOLLOWING DAY. 6 OF THE CONVOY HAD TO RETURN Owing TO WEATHER DAMAGE.

2. ESCORT AND COVER WERE SIMILAR TO JW 52 WITH THE ADDITION OF AN ESCORT CARRIER WITH THE CONVOY AND 7 MORE DESTROYERS IN THE STRIKING FORCE. THE ESCORT CARRIER HAD TO RETURN TO UK FROM THE VICINITY OF ICELAND Owing TO WEATHER DAMAGE.

3. THE CONVOY WAS ATTACKED AT NOON ON THE 25TH FEBRUARY BY 14 JU 88 AND AGAIN AT 1220 ON THE 26TH BY A HIGH LEVEL ATTACK BY AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT. NO DAMAGE WAS SUSTAINED FROM THESE ATTACKS. U-BOATS SHADOWED THE CONVOY FROM 25 DEGREES E BUT NO ATTACKS DEVELOPED.

4. THE CONVOY AND ESCORT ARRIVED SAFELY ON THE 7TH FEBRUARY.

5. THE RETURN CONVOY RA 53 SAILLED KOLA INLET ON THE 1ST MARCH, CONSISTING OF 30 SHIPS WHICH INCLUDED 4 TANKERS.

CLOSE ESCORT AND COVER WERE AS FOR JW 53.

5. ON THE 5TH MARCH, IN VICINITY OF 72°-30 N. 11°-30 E. THE CONVOY WAS ATTACKED BY U-BOATS, THE AMERICAN SHIPS "EXECUTIVE" BEING SUNK, AND "RICHARD BLAND" DAMAGED, BUT ABLE TO CONTINUE WITH THE CONVOY LATER THE SAME DAY;

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

DECLASSIFIED E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4 NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

Regraded Unclassified
12 JU 88's made a medium level bombing attack—no damage was sustained.

7. On the 8th March, American ship "J.T. L. E. CURRY" was abandoned sinking owing to weather damage. "J.H.B.

"LATROBE" steering gear was damaged and she finally had to be towed to SEIDSFJORD.

8. On the 9th March, in the vicinity of 66 46 N. 10 W., American ship "Puerto Rican" was torpedoed and sunk.

9. On the 10th March, "RICHARD BLAND" was torpedoed again and on the 11th she broke in two.

10. Very heavy weather was experienced throughout the convoy was widely dispersed, but on the 14th March, 22 ships arrived at Loch Ewe, 4 having proceeded to ICELAND.

F 37...00G
230P...39...16...24C...CONCH...NAVAGIDE
CNO....

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
FURTHER TO MYDIS 31616 SEE AMERICAN EMBASSY LONDON 1728 MARCH 10 TO STATE DEPARTMENT. AVIATION MATERIAL AT MURMANSK HAS BEEN UNLOADED UNDER LOCAL AGREEMENT THAT IT MAY BE RELOADED AND RETURNED TO UNITED KINGDOM. LOADING OF VESSELS FOR JW 54 INCLUDING REMAINDER OF AVIATION MATERIAL HAS BEEN RESUMED. PROBABLE THAT AGREEMENT WILL ULTIMATELY BE REACHED AND GUESS IS THAT RUSSIANS WILL GET THE MATERIAL. JW55 WILL PROBABLY BE DESPATCHED. JW56 WILL PROBABLY NOT BE DESPATCHED. HARRIMAN MISSION THEREFORE ORDERING FORWARD FOR JW55 ONLY SMALL NUMBER OF SHIPS SO AS TO AVOID LONG LAYOVERS IN UNITED KINGDOM WAITING FOR SUMMER CONVOYS.
Hi Com.

Please see American Embassy London cables to State Department 1426 of 25 Feb. and 1530 of 2 March. Latter covers case fully except that it naturally does not portray the strain and tension as clearly as do the cables from British authorities in Russia on which it is mainly based.

Referring to the mail and customs incidents SBNO North Russia reported on 28 Feb. that Russian authorities had meticulously searched persons, luggage and mail of outgoing draft and forbade exportation of all personal, British and Russian monies. Official mail clearing satisfactorily both directions but personal mail subject close censorship local post offices and possibility diversion incoming personal mail to Moscow for examination still...
EXISTS. SBNO NORTH RUSSIA APPEARS TO BELIEVE THAT
RUSSIAN AUTHORITIES MAY ENDEAVOR FORCE UNLOADING OF
RAF EQUIPMENT DISTRIBUTED IN SIX SHIPS OF JW-53. BRITISH
HAVE DEFERRED UNLOADING THIS EQUIPMENT PENDING DECISION
RE OPERATIONAL CONTROL. SBNO HAS STATED THAT HE WILL
NOT PERMIT EQUIPMENT TO BE UNLOADED. MINISTRY OF WAR
TRANSPORT HAS SUSPENDED LOADING OF SHIPS FOR JW-54.
REFER NMDIS 011616 REFERENCE JW53 FOLLOWING 7 SHIPS DESTINED WHITE SEA ARRIVED GORLO AT 10 HOURS MARCH 18TH.
RUSSIAN PETROVSKI, TBILISI, NORWEGIAN TANKER MARATHON, PANAMERICAN TANKER BEACONHILL, AMERICAN BERING, ISRAEL PUTNAM, CITY OF OMAHA. ALUSNA MURMANSK NOW REPORTS CASUALTIES EN EL ORIENTE NAVAL RATINGS INSTEAD OF MERCHANT SEAMEN AS FOLLOWS: ROY A. ROBINSON 31/C USNR KILLED. SERIOUSLY INJURED JOHN R. MACONTELIE 31/C USN AND EUGENE R. VULCASTLE 31/C USN AND JOHN GIBBONS ORDINARY SEAMAN APPARENTLY MERCHANT SEAMAN. MURMANSK SUFFERED ADDITIONAL HEAVY AIR RAID YESTERDAY CAUSING DAMAGE TO PIER SHEDS AND RAIL FACILITIES. 2 RUSSIAN SHIPS, MOSSOVIET AND ANDRE MARTI, BOTH HEAVILY HIT.
NAVAL MESSAGE

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RELEASED BY

DATE

TOR CODEROOM

DECODED BY

PARAPHRASED BY

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

Ọ 21631  NCR 2937

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

DATE  TIME  OGT

TEXT

ACTION

| F-00 | F-01 | F-015 | F-0015 | F-05 | F-07 | F-1 | F-11 | F-2 | F-3 | F-30 | F-31 | F-32 | F-33 | F-34 | F-35 | F-37 | F-39 | F-090 | VCN0 |

NO REPORT FROM RA 53 SINCE SAILING. WILL FORWARD ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE.

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREDS.)

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/94

Regraded Unclassified
PASS TO DOUGLAS WSA.

REFER HYDIS 241057 HURMANSK SECTION JH 53 AND ESCORT ARRIVED 0600/27 FEBRUARY. WHITE SEA SECTION PROCEEDING AND NOW IN HARROWS. HURMANSK BOOMED AND BRITISH EMPIRE PORTIA HIT HARD PROBABLY TOTAL LOSS.

PANAMA TIAN EL ORIENTE HIT AFTER DECK BY SMALL BOMB KILLING 1 MERCHANT SEAMAN AND SERIOUSLY INJURING 2 OTHER MERCHANT SEAMAN. EL ORIENTE NOT SERIOUSLY DAMAGED AND EXPECTED TO PROCEED WITH RA 53 AT 1300 TODAY TOTAL 35 SHIPS. WILL ADVISE SAILING LATER.

F37. (FOR DEL. TO DOUGLAS WSA) ACT 16...COMINCH...39...ANBB....

FILE.

NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM

Released by

Date

TOR CODE ROOM

decoded by

information

PARAPHRASED BY

indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

TEXT

 PASS TO DOUGLAS WSA.

REFER HYDIS 241057 HURMANSK SECTION JH 53 AND ESCORT ARRIVED 0600/27 FEBRUARY. WHITE SEA SECTION PROCEEDING AND NOW IN HARROWS. HURMANSK BOOMED AND BRITISH EMPIRE PORTIA HIT HARD PROBABLY TOTAL LOSS.

PANAMA TIAN EL ORIENTE HIT AFTER DECK BY SMALL BOMB KILLING 1 MERCHANT SEAMAN AND SERIOUSLY INJURING 2 OTHER MERCHANT SEAMAN. EL ORIENTE NOT SERIOUSLY DAMAGED AND EXPECTED TO PROCEED WITH RA 53 AT 1300 TODAY TOTAL 35 SHIPS. WILL ADVISE SAILING LATER.

F37. (FOR DEL. TO DOUGLAS WSA) ACT 16...COMINCH...39...ANBB....

FILE.

SECRET
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: ADMIRALTY
RELEASED BY: 26 FEB 43
DATE: 2105/25
TOR CODE: WHITE / MONROE

TEXT:

JW 53 comprising 25 ships sailed from Loch Ewe 15th Feb.
As follows - Empire Scott, Empire Galliard, Empire Fortune,
Empire Baffin, Empire Kinsman, Atlantic, Llandaff, Ocean,
Freedom, Dover Hill, British Governor (T), Mobile City,
Francis Scott Key, Bering, Komiles, Petrovski, Tbilisi.

Pieter de Hoogh, Tobruk, Joseph E. Johnston, Israel Putnam,
Thomas Hartley, Articas, Beacon Hill (T), Marathon (T),
and City of Omaha.

2. JW 53B comprising 3 ships sailed to overtake 17th Feb.
As follows - Explorer, John Lawrence and James Bowie.

3. 6 ships returned owing to heavy weather damage as follows:
Komiles, Empire Baffin, Joseph E. Johnston, James Bowie,
John Lawrence, and Explorer.

F37....ACT

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVRECS.)
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM COMNAVEU
RELEASED BY
DATE 21 FEB 43
TOR CODE ROOM 0137
DECODED BY WHISNANT
PARAPHRASED BY ESTERLY

ADDRESSEES OPNAV WSA
FOR ACTION
INFORMATION

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY DEFERRED PRIORITY ROUTINE DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

KNIGHT 201702 NCR 4860
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME PASS TO WSA DATE TIME OCT

TEXT

REFER MY DESPATCH 171659 JW 53 ENCOUNTERING EXTREMELY HEAVY WEATHER WIND FORCE 12. SS JAMES BOWIE REPORTED SPLIT IN DECK PUMPING NECESSARY RUNNING BEFORE WIND AND UNABLE TO PROCEED WITH CONVOY. WIND HAS NOW SHIFTED TEMPORARY REPAIRS EFFECTED AND VESSEL BEING RETURNED TO LOCH EWE EXPECTED ARRIVE LATE MONDAY. RUSSIAN KAMILLES DECK CARGO SHIFTED AND PUT IN TO FAROES ARRIVING 17TH.

DECK CARGO RESTOWED AND VESSEL AWAITING ORDERS SINCE NOON 19TH FEBRUARY. THIS SHIP WILL ALSO RETURN TO LOCH EWE. OTHER SHIPS JW 53 PROCEEDING AND NO ADVERSE REPORTS.

ACT: F37 (DELIVER TO DOUGLAS, WSA)...

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

DECLASSIFIED 00178 0047
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4 NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

Regraded Unclassified
**Naval Message**

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**Lt German 171711 NCR 2428**

Unless otherwise indicated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

**Text**

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*Refer W/IS 171652: JN-53 will have close escort 1 cruiser, 14 destroyers, 7 corvettes and 1 acv. Substantial covering force consisting 2 battleships, cruiser force, plane carrier and destroyers to 15 east.*

*Reference secret.*

**Secret**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREG.)
UNLOADING OF JW 51 B AND LOADING OF JW 51 A EXTREMELY SLOW AND UNSATISFACTORY, PLUS RELUCTANCE SOVIETS TO REPAIR RICHARD BLAND AND RICHARD BASSETT PROPELLORS WHICH WERE DAMAGED IN ICE AT EKONOMIA. THESE REPAIRS ESSENTIAL BEFORE SHIPS CAN PROCEED. AUTHORITIES HERE NOT FULFILLING THEIR PROMISES. IF THIS CONDITION CONTINUES, AND IT IS LIKELY TO DO SO, RECOMMEND NO MORE SHIPS BE SENT INTO WHITE SEA THIS WINTER UNLESS CARGO LOADING AND REPAIRS GREATLY IMPROVE. ICE CONDITIONS NOW BAD. SOVIETS STILL INTERESTED IN LOADED SHIPS, NOT EMPTY ONES.
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ACTION
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JAMAICA SUFFERElJ IJ.It.OR SPLINTER
T-3l
DA M A G E, ENEMY DESTROYER SUil K AND PROBABLY El<EJ. Y CRUISER,
OR AR~OURED
SHIP DAMAGED,

WYDIS 121512 HMS SHEFFIELD WITH HMS JAMAICA IN COMPANY
ENGAGED ENEMY SHIP PRESUMED TO BE THE LUTZOW 1135 DECEMBER
31ST AND ESTIMATED SCORING HITS WITH FIVE SALVOES. CONTACT
THEN LOST, BUT AT 1227 SHEFFIELD REPORTED BEING ENGAGED
WITH ENEMY DESTROYER AND LATER WITH A CRUISER THOUGHT TO
BE THE NURNBERG. RESULTS OF ATTACK ON CONVOY ARE AS FOLLOWS:
HMS ACHATES SUNK. HM Minesweeper Bramble Unaccounted For
Presumed Sunk Probably by Enemy Cruiser. HMS Okslow
Damaged. HMS SHEFFIELD AND JAMAICA SUFFERED MINOR SPLINTER
Damage. ENEMY DESTROYER SUNK AND PROBABLY ENEMY CRUISER
OR ARMoured SHIP DAMAGED.

3 COPIES TO 20-G

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/44
SBNO North Russia Signals following preliminary report on composition and tactics of enemy forces which attacked JW 51B.

3 German destroyers sighted convoy and retired after making contact. Enemy subsequently appeared in at least 2 groups. First group composed of 8-inch cruiser and 2 destroyers. Second group was 8-inch cruiser or heavier but not known if accompanied by destroyer. A third group of one 5.9-inch cruiser may have been nearby since destroyer of close escort engaged one 8-inch cruiser while over horizon two other engagements were in progress.

Intention apparently was for 1 group to draw off and destroy escorting destroyers while other group or groups attacked convoy. No part was taken by German.
DESTROYERS IN ANY OF ACTIONS WITH BRITISH DESTROYERS AND ON ONE ACTION FOLLOWED ENGAGED CRUISER IN SINGLE LINE.

UNDoubtedly ENEMY HAD NO PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF FORCE ROCNR COMPOSED OF 2 BRITISH CRUISERS AND 2 DESTROYERS.  AT ø93Ø/31 HMS ACHATES WAS ON CONVOYS PORT QUARTER WHEN GUN FLASHES SIGHTED ASTERN. PROCEEDED TO SCREEN CONVOY WITH SMOKE BUT CAME UNDER FIRE AND AT THIRD STRADDLE WAS DAMAGED BY NEAR MISS. HMS ONSLOW THEN LED OTHER DESTROYERS DOWN PORT SIDE OF CONVOY AND ENGAGED CRUISER. FIRING AT ACHATES CEASED AND SHE REMAINED IN SCREENING POSITION BUT BY 11ØØ THE MANY SPLINTER HOLES HAD CAUSED FORWARD LOWER COMPARTMENTS TO FLOOD AND SHIP WAS DOWN AT HEAD BY 8 FEET.  AT 1115 SHE WAS HIT ON BRIDGE AND ON PORT SIDE AND WAS BADLY DAMAGED BY NEAR MISS ABREAST NUMBER 2 FILER ROOM

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4 NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
PORT SIDE. RESUMED JOURNEY LAYING NEAR CONVOY BUT AT 1315 WAS SETTLING AND HAD 50 DEGREE LIST TO PORT. THEN 3 MILES ASTERN CONVOY. SURVIVORS WERE PICKED UP AND AT 1330 ACHATES Turned OVER AND SANK.

3 COPIES 20-G
SECOND HALF OF JW 52 ABANDONED.

AGREEMENT REACHED ON HIGHEST AUTHORITY TO SEND FIRST SECTION JW 52 WITH 20 SHIPS INCLUDING 2 TANKERS THIRD WEEK IN JANUARY.

FEBRUARY 11 JW 53 OF 30 SHIPS SCHEDULED. MINIMUM OF 7 SHIPS REQUIRED FROM U.S. PLEASE ADVISE URGENTLY.

20 SHIPS REQUIRED FROM U.S. FOR JW 54 ALSO OF 30 SHIPS, EARLIEST DATE TENTH MARCH. DATE OF APRIL CONVOY DEPENDENT ON FACTORS NOT YET DETERMINABLE BUT PROBABLY WOULD BE OF 30 SHIPS AGAIN, AT LEAST 20 FROM U.S.

BRITISH HERE CALCULATE THAT THEY WILL HAVE FULFILLED THEIR PROTOCOL COMMITMENTS IF THEY CAN LOAD BETWEEN NOW AND JUNE BETWEEN 8 AND 10 SHIPS A MONTH.

IN SHIPS PROCEEDING FEBRUARY CONVOY, BRITISH WILL COMPLETE LOADING OF ALL AVAILABLE U.S. CARGOES PREVIOUSLY UNLOADED.

IN UNITED KINGDOM, THEREFORE IN THE MARCH CONVOY THEY WILL BE ABLE TO CARRY ABOUT 20,000 TONS OF WEIGHT AND FILLER CARGO FROM U.S. ALSO A SIMILAR TONNAGE IN APRIL.
WILL 20 U.S. SHIPS BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR MARCH AND APRIL CONVOYS EACH? PLEASE ADVISE. WILL YOU UNDERTAKE TO DISPATCH TO U.K. FOR TRANSSHIPMENT THE 20,000 TONS A MONTH? PLEASE ADVISE. IF SO MORE EXACT DETAILS OF TONNAGE AND CHARACTER OF THIS CARGO WILL BE FURNISHED BY ME.

DISTRIBUTION:
F37 (DOUGLAS) ACTION
P1A

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: COMNAVEU
RELEASED BY: 
DATE: 31 DECEMBER 1942
TOR Coderoom: 1223
DECODED BY: ROTH/BRINKLEY
PARAPHRASED BY: 

ADDRESS(es): COMINCH
INFORMATION: OPM NAV COMINCH C AND R
PRECEDEncE: PRIORITY ROUTINE DEFERRED
PRIORITY ROUTINE DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESS(es) FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

LT HATCH 311703 NCR 2918

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

DATE TIME

TEXT

(ACTION COMINCH INFO OPM NAV COMINCH C AND R FROM COMNAVEU)

REFERENCE RCDispatch 291653 TO OPM NAV. SCREENING FORCE OF JH51B IN CONTACT WITH ENEMY UNITS TODAY. ONE ENEMY CRUISER HIT, ONE ENEMY DESTROYER HIT AND LEFT IN SHARING CONDITION, ONE BRITISH DESTROYER HIT AND RETIRED UNDER SMOKE SCREEN TO APPROMISATE CONVOY POSITION. DESPATCH TO ADMIRALTY REPORTED 13 GERMAN TORPEDO PLANES CROSSING NORWEGIAN COAST THIS AFTERNOON. 6 RUSSIAN TORPEDO PLANES ORDERED TO SCENE BUT LATER CANCELLED AND WILL NOW PROCEED DAWN TOMORROW. CONVOY NOUN POSITION TODAY APPROXIMATELY 73-30 NORTH 30-00 EAST. RA 51 Sailed 13 HOURS DECEMBER 30 AND 6 HOURS POSITION TODAY 71-30 NORTH 36-10 EAST. NO REPORT OF BEING SIGHTED

(PAGE 1 OF 2)

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

DECCLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

Regraded Unclassified
AS YET, 6 RUSSIAN WESTBOUND INDEPENDENTS ARRIVED AKUREYRI. NO REPORT OF ATTACK OR SIGHTING ON 4 ADDITIONAL RUSSIAN INDEPENDENTS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED TO YOU AND 2 ADDITIONAL RUSSIAN INDEPENDENTS HAVE SAILED FOR AKUREYRI.

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LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

COMING ACT

10...16...230...F37...38...
MEMORANDUM FOR

CAPTAIN McCREA:

A North Russian convoy, JW 51A, (this apparently is a new designation for PQ), sailed from Loch Ewe on the 18th of December. It was composed of 16 ships, 10 of which were to go to Kola Inlet (Murmansk), and 6 to Archangel.

All of these ships have now arrived at their destinations undamaged, and so far as we know at present, unattacked.

A second section of the above convoy, JW 51B, was scheduled to sail from Loch Ewe on the 22nd with 15 additional ships. This convoy is at present approaching Bear Island, and so far as we know, has not been attacked.

At about the same time that JW 51A sailed (15 December), 6 ships were sailed independently by the Russians from Kola Inlet westbound. Nothing has been heard from these ships, but that does not necessarily mean that they have come to grief.

Convoy RA 51 (a new designation for PQ) is scheduled to sail from Kola Inlet tomorrow, 29 December, and it includes all ships available in the North Russian area.

Very respectfully,

W. C. MOTT
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
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**TEXT**

Refer HYDIS 161611JM51A escorted by six destroyers 2 corvettes and 2 trawlers. Will have covering force while east of $15\degree$ degrees east. Complete submarine patrol established JM51B will have same escort.

**COMINCH...ACT.**

F37........19........19c........38........39........AMPB........16.....13...

FILE.

**DECLASSIFIED**

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

Regraded Unclassified
**NAVAL MESSAGE**

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**RELEASED BY**

16 DECEMBER 1942

**TOR CODE ROOM**

228/16

**DECODED BY**

CRISWELL

**PARAPHRASED BY**

DEMEYER

**INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY**

ROONEY

161611

**NCR 2069**

**UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.**

**ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME**

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**TEXT**

(PASS TO DOUGLAS NSA)

NORTH RUSSIAN CONVOY JW 51 A SAILED FROM LOCHEEWE 1600 15TH DECEMBER FOLLOWING 16 SHIPS:BRITISH BRIARWOOD, EMPIRE METEOR, TANKERS SAN CIPRIANO, OLIGARCH, UNITED STATES RICHARD BLAND, BEAURI GARD, EL ALMIANTE, GREYLOCK, GATEWAY CITY, RICHARD BASSET, J L M CURRY, DYNASTIC, OREMAR, WEST GOTOUMA, WINYCHUS, PANAMERICAN EL OCEANO. CONVOY SCHEDULED SPLIT 16 SHIPS TO KOLA AND 6 SHIPS TO WHITE SEA ARRIVING 25 DECEMBER. 3 RUSSIAN ICE BREAKERS LENIN, KAGANOPROCH AND KRABUALLI WILL BE ON DUTY WHITE SEA. RUSSIANS ARE SAILING INDEPENDENTLY ABOUT 6 SHIPS WESTBOUND FROM KOLA ROUTED SO AS NOT TO INTERFERE WITH JW 51 A.

RA 51 SCHEDULED SAIL FROM KOLA INLET 29 DECEMBER INCLUDING ALL SHIPS AVAILABLE. JW51B DEFINITELY SCHEDULED TO SAIL FROM LOCHEE 22 DECEMBER WITH 16 ADDITIONAL SHIPS.

ACT,........F37(FOR NSA)

FILE......39........ANPB........COMINCH........16......13......

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/44

Regraded Unclassified
LT HATCH | 41621 | NCR 3132

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ACTION COMINCH. INFO CPNAV, PASS TO DOUGLAS (#SA)

REFER MYDIS #21652. JW 51 WILL SAIL IN 2 SECTIONS
16 SHIPS EACH AS FOLLOWS: SECTION A 16 KNOTS LEAVES LOCH EWE DECEMBER 15; BRITISH EMPIRE CLARION, DAIJORCH, EMPIRE ARCHER, BRIARWOOD; TANKERS EMPIRE EMERALD AND OLYGARCH.
AMERICAN RICHARD BLAND, BEAUREGARD, EL AMIRANTE, GREYLOCK GATEWAY CITY, ELYOCEANO, DYNASTIC, RICHARD BASSSETT, J L M CURRY AND CREMAR.

SECTION B 9 KNOTS LEAVES LOCH EWE DECEMBER 2; 2 BRITISH DOVER HILL, EMPIRE METEOR, TANKERS SAN CIPRIANO AND PONTFIELD, AMERICAN EXECUTIVE, WEST GOTOUSKA, JEFFERSON MYERS, VERMONT, YORKMAR, WINDRUSH, BALLOTT, CALOBRE, PUERTO RICAN, CHESTER VALLEY, RALPH WALDO EMERSON AND DELSUD. 5 BRITISH SHIPS NOW ICELAND WILL ENJOIN ENROUTE. SECTION A TO ARRIVE KOLA DECEMBER 26 AND ESCORT SCHEDULED TO LEAVE KOLA.
DECEMBER 29 AS RA 51A WITH 4 TANKERS AND ALL OTHER MERCHANT SHIPS READY TO SAIL.
This oversized item has been filmed in sections

APPENDIX "A"

MURMAN COAST AND WHITE SEA
Climatic Conditions

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

Regraded Unclassified
MURMAN COAST AND WHITE SEA
Climatic Conditions

JANUARY, TEMPERATURE °F

JULY, TEMPERATURE °F
Lt. Omeroy gave following on ships in N. Peru ports:

51 ships

12 British - 2 damaged
   (some to be turned over to the British)
8. U.S. (C. Panama)
8. Russian - 3 damaged
   4. minesweepers
3. Miscellaneous

March 14th since Feb. 23

Capt. F. Hamilton wants to see you.

No ships or attacked by the backdoor route used.
VA 2's 122200 is repeated herewith. Begins:

Addressed HMS SAVAGE SDM/S FLOTILLA 1 CAPT (S) 3 DFCSI CINCWA, RADHF, ACIC (R) HOME FLEET OPERATIONAL COMMANEO FROM VA 2.

(Admiralty pass to Cominch and Cinclant. 11 SO M/S 1 pass to HMS WESTCOTT and N.S. EGLANTINE ON ARRIVAL AT SEIDIS FJORD.)

Intend following as Operation... Object to pass Russian ML's and minesweepers, British escort required for RA 54A and relief minesweepers to North Russia. All times Zone minus 1.
2. FORCES INVOLVED. FORCES 2. HMS HARRIER (S.O.U/S FLOTILLA 1). HMS SEAGULL HMS WESTCOTT NS EGLANTINE 5 RUSSIAN M/S SO IN AM 141 AND 6 SLYDI FJORD. FORCE 4 HMS MILNE HMS MUSKETEER HMS MAHATTA HMS MATCHLESS HMS SAVAGE HMS SCORPION HMS SAUMAREZ HMS SCORPION SAILING FROM SCAPA. FORCE 5 HMS LONDON (CS 1) U.S. CRUISER AUGUSTA AS COVERING FORCE SAILING FROM AKUREYI. AKUREYI, ICELAND.

3. D DAY WILL BE THE DAY ON WHICH FORCE 3 LEAVES SEIDIS FJORD AND WILL BE 21ST OCTOBER UNLESS OTHERWISE ORDERED.

4. RA (D) H.F. IS REQUESTED TO SAIL HMS MILNE HMS HARRIER AND HMS SEAGULL TO ARRIVE SEIDIS FJORD

SECRET
P.M. ON DAY MINUS 1 FOR FORCE 3 CONFERENCE A.M. ON D DAY AND REFUEL. AFTER CONFERENCE HMS MILNE TO PROCEED TO SKAALEFJORD, Ireland.

5. RA (D) H.F. IS FURTHER REQUESTED TO SAIL HMS SAVAGE (S.O.) HMS SCOURGE HMS SAUMAREZ HMS SCORPION HMS MUSKETEER HMS MAHRA TTA HMS MATCHLESS TO ARRIVE SKAALEFJORD 1200 DAY PLUS (1) AND COMPLETE WITH FUEL.

6. FORCE 3 IS TO SAIL FROM SEIDIS FJORD AT 1500 ON D DAY ROUTED AS FOLLOWS: SPEED OF ADVANCE 11 KNOTS.

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREC.)
NAVY DEPARTMENT

NAVAL MESSAGE

PAGE 4

122296
NCR 2055

TO ARCHANGEL AS ROUTED BY SBNO NORTH.

7. FORCE 4 IS TO SAIL FROM SKAALEFJORD AT
   0001 DAY PLUS 2 ROUTE:

   HH. 071-02 N 000-30 W

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (c) NAVREG) OPNAV-NCR-15 A 33052

Regraded Unclassified
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM
RELEASED BY
DATE
TOR CODEROOM
DECODED BY
PARAPHRASED BY
ROUTED BY

ADDRESSES
ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSES
FOR ACTION
INFORMATION

PRECEDENCE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED
PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED
PRIORITY
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ROUTINE
DEFERRED

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE

PAGE 5
122200
NCR 2055

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME
DATE
TIME
GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ACTION
F-0
F-01
F-02
F-05
F-07
F-1
F-2
F-20
F-3
F-30
F-31
F-32
F-33
F-34
F-4
FX01
FX30
FX37
FX40
10-00
VCMO

J. 073-10 N 07-35 E
K. 073-47 N 014-15 E
L. 074-10 N 024-22 E
M. 074-13 N 031-30 E
N. 072-50 N 037-20 E
O. 071-15 N 037-45 E

THENCE KOLA INLET AS ROUTED BY SBNO NORTH RUSSIA, S.O.A. 17 KNOTS TO LONGITUDE 014-20 E THENCE 2° KNOTS.

O. CSI IS REQUESTED TO SAIL FROM AKUREYRI WITH FORCE 5 AT 0900 ON DAY PLUS 2 TO COVER THE OPERATION. CRUISERS ARE TO PROCEED TO POSITION

PP. 074-13 N 009-01 E

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVORDG.)
OPNAV-NCR-15 4 33052

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

DECLASSIFIED

Regraded Unclassified
TO ARRIVE 0800 DAY PLUS 4. SUBJECT TO OTHER ENEMY INFORMATION THEY ARE TO REMAIN IN THIS VICINITY UNTIL 1800 ON THAT DAY THEN RETURN HVALFIORD.

9. COMMUNICATIONS. NORMAL HF W/T ORGANIZATION IS TO BE USED. IN ADDITION A WIRELESS GUARD IN EACH FORCE IS TO BE KEPT ON ICELAND PORT WAVE (1570 KC8) WHEN WITHIN 300 MILES OF ICELAND AND ON NORTH RUSSIAN PORT WAVE 4172 KCS WHEN EAST OF 015-00 E. A GUARD IN EACH FORCE IS ALSO TO BE KEPT ON GA ROUTINE WHEN HD RECEPTION IS UNRELIABLE EAST OF 025-00 E.

ATTENTION IS CALLED TO HWCO 13 PARAGRAPHS 3 AND 4 (S 2/43 PAGE 86) AND NORTH RUSSIAN CONVOY INSTRUCTIONS PART 12 PARAGRAPHS 142, 148, 150, 154, 155.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/94
156. R/T CALL SIGN IF REQUIRED H.M.S. WESTCOTT GOB-PORT N.S. EGLANTINE RAMSGATE. REMAINder TO BE TAKEN FROM H.M.C.O APPENDIX 1 TABLE 2 FOR 21ST OCTOBER AND TAKE CALL SIGNS USE THROUGHOUT. S.O. MIKE/SUGAR 1 IS REQUESTED TO ISSUE H.M.S. WESTCOTT AND N.S. EGLANTINE WITH LIST OF CALL SIGNS. COMMUNICATION ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN RUSSIAN VESSELS AND THEIR CLOSE ESCORT WILL BE SIGNalled LATER.

*PASSED TO COMINCH AND CINClANT BY ADMIRALTY
AS 131121Z, NCR 2§55
AT 0200Z/16 USS GEMINI ARRIVED REYKJAVIK FROM SEYDISFJORDUR WITH 149 SURVIVORS BROUGHT TO ICELAND BY BRITISH ESCORTS TO RA-53. 64 FROM SS J. L. M. CURRY. 1 FROM SS PUERTO RICAN. 53 FROM SS EXECUTIVE. 31 FROM RICHARD S. BLAND. BLABO TORPEDOED AT 0927/5 AT 72-45 NORTH 11-4Ø EAST. CONTINUED ON COURSE. TORPEDOED TWICE AT 1543 AND 1838Z/1Ø AT 66-53 NORTH 14-17 WEST AND 66-48 NORTH 14-15 WEST. AFT HALF SUNK. BOW TOWED IN REACHING HERAFSFLOI ICELAND ON 16TH. CONFIDENTIAL PAPERS THROWN OVERBOARD IN WEIGHTED BAG. 24 MISSING. EXECUTIVE TORPEDOED AT 1028Z/5 AT 72-45 NORTH 11-4Ø EAST. SUNK BY GUNFIRE OF ESCORT. CONFIDENTIAL PAPERS WENT DOWN WITH SHIP. 9 MISSING. CURRY CRACKED OPEN AT 1220Z/7 AND SANK AT APPROXIMATELY 0830Z/8. CAUSE NOT KNOWN. CONFIDENTIAL PAPERS BROUGHT TO REYKJAVIK.
ALL CREW RESCUED. NAMES SURVIVORS AND MISSING FROM EXECUTIVE AND BLAND FOLLOW.

DISTRIBUTION:

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Message</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F-00</td>
<td>REFER MYDIS 1917/04 FOLLOWING SHIPS RA-53 ARRIVED UNITED KINGDOM MARCH 14TH:</td>
</tr>
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<td>F-01</td>
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<td>F-015</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BRITISH TEMPLE ARCH
OCEAN FAITH
EMPIRE ARCHER
EMPIRE THISTRAM
SAN CIPRIANO
AMERICAN OREMAR
DEL SUD
CORNELIUS HARNEST
CHESTER VALLEY
GULF WING
WEST GOTOMSKA
CALOBRE
DAN-Y-BRYN
EMPIRE SNOW
EMPIRE CLARION
OLIGARCH
EMPIRE EMERALD
RALPH WALDO EMERSON
NICHOLAS GILMAN
JEFFERSON MYERS
VERMONT
RICHARD BASSETT
PANAMANIAN EL ORIENTE
ARRIVED ICELAND

RUSSIAN MOSSOVIET

AMERICAN YORKMARX

JOHN H. B. LATMOBE - LATTER DAMAGED STEERING GEAR AND WILL BE TOWED TO UNITED KINGDOM.

RICHARD BLAND TORPEDOED 2ND TIME AND FINALLY BROKE IN TWO AND SUNK.

JW-54 CONSISTING OF 30 SHIPS NOW SCHEDULED SAIL FROM UNITED KINGDOM 27TH MARCH.

F37....ACT(FOR DELIVERY DOUGLAS, WSA)

FILE

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified
FROM: COMNAVEU

TO: VCNO

DATE: 12 MARCH 1943

111659 NCR 260

* * * * * *

RICHARD BLAND SERIAL 6 AGAIN TORPEDOED AT 1542Z MARCH 10 POSIT 66-53 NORTH 14-17 WEST REPORTED SINKING SLOWLY 35 SURVIVORS IN ESCORT. * * * * * *

RICHARD BLAND in Russian Convoy # 53. This for file in 442 (1)

Original filed in NR 407.
REFER HYMS 691746. RA53 PUERTO RICAN TORPEDOED BY SUBMARINE AND SUNK 21 HOURS MARCH 9TH IN APPROXIMATELY 66-44 NORTH 19-41 WEST. AIRCRAFT SWEEPING AREA IN SEARCH OF SURVIVORS. JOHN H B LATROBE PROCEEDING AKUREYRI OR NEAREST PORT ACCOUNT DEFECTIVE STEERING GEAR.

CQ COQ...
F-39 (AND FOR WGA) 16 80 39 23 FILE.
FROM: COMMAREU
TO:  VCNO
DATE:  7 MARCH 1943

DAILY SERIAL 6.

AMERICAN RICHARD LAND IN CONVOY RA53 TORPVEDOED POSIT 72-44 N
11-27 E 0630/5 MARCH BUT PROCEEDING.  * * * * * * *

This for file in 442 (1)

Original filed in NR 407
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: COMNAVEU
RELEASED BY: 7 MAR 43
DATE: 7 MAR 43
TOR CODEROOM: T/S16
DECODED BY: STINET/SHGAF

ADDRESSEES: OPNAV
PRIORITY: RRRRRRR ROUTINE
PRIO.: D DEFERRED
INFORMATION: HOSTILITIES
PRIORITY: RRRRRRR ROUTINE
PRIO.: D DEFERRED

PARAPHRASED BY:

HATCH
$61432
NCR 6295

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME
DATE
TIME
GCT

ACTION
P-00
P-01
P-015
P-0015
P-05
P-07
P-1
P-11
P-2
P-3
P-30
P-31
P-32
P-33
P-34
P-35
P-37
IG-00
VCNO

TEXT
(PASS TO DOUGLAS WSA)

I have

REFERLYDIS #31712. ADMIRALTY ADVISES RA 53
ATTACKED BY SUBMARINES APPROXIMATE POSITION
72 DEG NORTH 11 DEG EAST AT 0930 MARCH 5TH.
AMERICAN EXECUTIVE SUNK AND RICHARD BLAND DAMAGED BUT PROCEEDING WITH CONVOY AT 7.5 KNOTS.
53 EXECUTIVE SURVIVORS RESCUED. AT 1430 CONVOY UNDERWENT ATTACK BY 12 BOMBERS FROM MEDIUM LEVEL
NO HITS.

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVRREGS.)

DECLASIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/94
NAVAL MESSAGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DRAFTER</th>
<th>EXTENSION NUMBER</th>
<th>ADDRESSEES</th>
<th>PRECEDENCE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADMIRALTY</td>
<td></td>
<td>BAD WASHINGTON</td>
<td>ROUTINE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RELEASED BY _BAD WASHINGTON_

DATE 11 FEB 1943

TOR CODEROOM 126A/10

DECODED BY M IKELL

PARAPHRASED BY HATCH

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

HATCH 126A/10 NCR 12647

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TEXT ACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONVOY RA 52 CONSISTING OF 11 SHIPS SAILED FROM KOLA INLET ON 29TH JANUARY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. CLOSE ESCORT WAS PROVIDED BY 2 DESTROYERS, 4 CORVETTES, 4 TRAWLERS AND 2 MINESWEEPERS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. A STRIKING FORCE OF 7 FLEET DESTROYERS WAS IN COMPANY AND CLOSE COVER CONSISTED OF 1 8-INCH AND 2 6-INCH CRUISERS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. DISTANT COVER WAS PROVIDED BY 1 BATTLESHIP, 1 6-INCH CRUISER AND 4 DESTROYERS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. THE CONVOY WAS SHADOWED BY U-BOATS AND ON 3RD FEBRUARY ONE AMERICAN SHIP, THE GREYLOCH WAS TORPEDOED AND SUNK. (Reported 2/4/43 &quot;Casualty Report&quot;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. THERE WERE NO FURTHER INCIDENTS AND REMAINING SHIPS OF CONVOY ARRIVED SAFELY AT LOCH EWE TODAY.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

Regraded Unclassified
PASS TO DOUGLAS WSA.

REFER MY DISPATCH Ø11637 RA 52.

ALL SHIPS EXCEPT GREYLOCK ARRIVED LOCH EWE Ø3Ø/9 FEBRUARY. GREYLOCK TORPEDOED BY SUBMARINE AND APPARENTLY SUNK NORTH EAST ICELAND. WESTBOUND RUSSIAN BERGEIA ARRIVED AKUREYRI SAFELY.

F37...ACTION (FOR DELIVERY TO DOUGLAS WSA)

COMINCH...2ØG...16....

FILE
30th January, 1943.

Dear Captain McCrea,

We have had the following particulars on the passage of Convoy JW 52 from the Admiralty. As you probably know, JW is the new name for convoys to Russia, and RA for convoys from Russia.

The convoy consisted of 13 ships and sailed from the United Kingdom on the 17th of January for Kola Inlet. At about noon on the 24th of January an attack was made on the convoy by 4 torpedo bombers in approximately 073° North, 026° East. The attack was unsuccessful and two of the bombers were shot down for certain.

There was some evidence that U-boats were in the vicinity of the convoy, but no attack developed. The convoy and escort arrived safely on the 27th of January.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Captain, R.N.

Captain J. L. McCrea, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President,
Room 2078,
The White House.
INCREASE IN CARGO TONNAGE, 1943 - INCREASE IN VESSEL TRANSFERS, 1943 - VESSELS IN TRANS-PACIFIC TRADE - WAR CASUALTIES - MARINE CASUALTIES - JAP CONTROLS - 1944 PROSPECTS THIS ROUTE.

PACIFIC CARGO TONNAGE TREbled:

1. U. S. aid to Soviets via Pacific route in 1943 increased greatly over aid furnished via this route in 1942. In 1943 cargo tonnage carried (exclusively in Russian bottoms) totalled 2,485,280 long tons as compared to 721,000 tons transported in 1942. 1943 tonnage exceeded 1942 by more than 500 percent, despite Japanese denials and restrictions.

CARGO TONNAGE ARCTIC LiftED:

2. Excluded from above figures are supplies to Soviet Arctic. Thirty-two merchantmen in 1943 carried 117,000 long tons of cargo to Providence Bay and Soviet Arctic ports as compared to 97,000 tons carried in twenty-three ships in 1942.

44 TRANSFERS VIA LEND LEASE 1943:

3. To facilitate this vast flow, U. S. continued policy inaugurated in 1942 of transferring ships to Soviet registry for use in this trans-Pacific traffic. Thirty-four freighters (of which twenty-eight were Liberties) totaling 234,224 g.r.t. were transferred in 1943. Ten tankers totaling 64,408 g.r.t. were transferred in 1943. Transferred under the same procedure in 1942 were twenty freighters totaling 100,437 g.r.t. and two tankers aggregating 13,878 g.r.t.

53 TRANSITS FROM ATLANTIC 1945:

4. Soviets, to further implement trans-Pacific traffic, transferred thirty-two ships totaling 61,121 g.r.t. from the Atlantic to the Pacific via Panama Canal; one Soviet tanker of 6,114 g.r.t. also entered Pacific via same route.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
Regraded Unclassified
SOVIET VESSELS IN PACIFIC WATERS:

5. According to available information, year end situation study indicated 119 Soviet vessels in regular trans-Pacific trade, 67 vessels presumed in Soviet cahottage, or acting for fisheries, and twenty-one vessels presumed still in Arctic waters, having proceeded there in summer through Bering Straits (and did not return to U. S. ports).

CASUALTIES - WAR:

6. 17 February: KOLA 4994 (tons) and ILEN (2569 g.r.t.)-torpedoed and sunk while bound from Vladivostok for U. S. after passing Tsushima Strait.

3 October: ODessa (7176 g.r.t.)-damaged by mine explosion near Avacha Bay; being repaired in Petropavlovsk.

CASUALTIES - Fasting:

7. 1 April: UZBEKISTAN (8059 g.r.t.) - Total loss after grounding off Pachena Point, near Vancouver.

1 April: LAUT (2694 g.r.t.) - Total loss after grounding three miles south of Quellayute River.

3 July: FERSON (7176 g.r.t.) - Grounded and broke in two at Kmutaya Bay off east coast of Kamchatka; both halves later towed to Petropavlovsk for scrap.

August: VOYAGE (7176 g.r.t.) - Grounded at Providence Bay; towed to Fort Townsend; being repaired at estimated cost of $200,000.

10 November: NARIPOL, Tanker (7024 g.r.t.) - Grounded on coast of Shimushu, northernmost of Kurile group. No further word received as to status of vessel, whether cargo and ship salvaged.

14 December: VITYA FULAYON (7176 g.r.t.) - Broke in two in heavy weather at approximately 55.53. W 170.40. Both halves towed to port and title reinvested at that port in NSA.

Unconfirmed:

April: ELARA ZETKIN (8974 g.r.t.) - Reported wrecked at Flaston Bay; towed to Vladivostok and repaired. Soviets refused information as to cause of grounding, date, and extent of damage.

May: TIMEAT (2699 g.r.t.) - Grounded off east coast of Sakhalin Island; reported back in service. Soviets refused information as to cause of grounding, date, and extent of damage.

CONTROLS AND DEFINITIONS:

8. Jap controls in 1943 operated with viewpoint of strictures on Soviet shipping that would slow down their movement and yet not become "causa belli". When, after seizure of Lend Lease vessels KAMPFERS POULOKE and INGIL, Russian authorities protested on presumed basis that ships had been Soviet property prior to outbreak of hostilities between U. S. and Japan, - Tokyo Foreign Office released vessels. (Russians alleged no part of cargo appropriated by Japa.) Same procedure was followed in cases of ROGINS and VINOA. Soviets then rerouted ships of Lend Lease origin via Tartary. This route slowed down turn-arounds, operated to detriment of Soviet war effort, and thereby benefited Germany. At year's end, Jap controls, according to Russian reports, remain quiescent, following the reopening of La Perouse to all Russian ships in October.

Regraded Unclassified
1944 PROGNOSTICATION:

9. Expansion of this route in 1944 is limited by uncertainties of Russ-Jap relations and expected resumption of Atlantic routes to Russia.

10. With decline of German sea power and successful convoy coverage on Murmansk run, prospects are for increasing use of Murmansk during coming year.

11. Opening of Mediterranean and probable Russian recapture of Black Sea ports augurs well for use of ports with direct access to southern Russia.
HARRIMAN SENDS DEANE SIGNS TO SECSTATE FOR KOLLENBURG AND MCPHERSON. ASTALUSNA MURMANSK HAS FOR INFO BY OTHER MEANS.

IN THE ABSENCE OF GENERAL SPALDING WHO IS NOW IN LENINGRAD CALLED ON MIKOVAN TODAY AS SUGGESTED IN YOUR STATE DEPT 1451/23 DEC 1943. THIS MESSAGE RECEIVED BY US 26 DECEMBER. MIKOVAN EXPRESSED THE GREATEST CONFIDENCE THAT THE UNLOADING IS PROGRESSING SATISFATORILY AND WOULD BE COMPLETED IN TIME TO PERMIT ORIGINAL SCHEDULE OF CONVOYS BEING CARRIED OUT IN SUPPORT OF THIS HE PRESENTED THE FOLLOWING TONNAGE FIGURES FOR THE PAST 7 DAYS OF DECEMBER:

22. 24,000
23. 40,000
24. 57,000
The average daily unloading per vessel at the beginning of the period was 200 to 250 tons. However in the last 2 days the average was from 400 to 500 tons per ship. Krutikov is now in Murmansk with instructions to expedite unloading. Mikoyan states that rate shown for 28 December will be maintained and probably increased to 1000 tons. He agreed that Spalding should go to the northern ports immediately upon his return from Leningrad which will probably be tomorrow or the next day. I recommend that you continue
TO WORK ON ORIGINAL CONVOY SCHEDULE UNTIL SPALDING HAS HAD OPPORTUNITY TO SURVEY SITUATION AND CONSULT WITH KRUTIKOV AND FRANKEL ON .................

*40 LETTERS GARbled. HAS BEEN SERVICED.

STATE DEPARTMENT...ACT (SEPARATE WRITE-UP)
16...13...COMINCH...FX37...CN0...NAVAlDE...
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL BROWN

Subj: North Russian Convoys.

1. Since the North Russian Convoys are considered a British operation, detailed information on them is not available in the Convoy and Routing Section of the Navy Department.

2. This much has been established:

   JW 54 A consisting of 19 ships arrived at North Russian Ports on the 26th of November.
   JW 54 B consisting of 17 ships arrived in North Russian Ports on the 4th of December.
   JW 55 A consisting of 19 ships (9 of these U.S. Registry) left for Murman 12 December at 1700. They are due to arrive tomorrow.
   JW 55 B has been designated as a convoy but no information as to sailing time has been received. It is assumed that this will leave within the next few days.

3. The Prime Minister, in his message to the President, (#429) quoted his message to Marshal Stalin in which he said that there would be four convoys sailing at intervals of approximately 20 days for North Russian Ports beginning in November. It would appear that these convoys are running in two sections; that both sections of the first convoy have arrived; that the first section of the second convoy has arrived; and that the second section of the second convoy is either under way or will be under way within a short time.

4. There are 59 ships exclusive of escorts in the North Russian Ports — if the 19 ships of JW 55 A are included. Nine are at Murmansk, three are at Archangel, ten at Molotovsk, and the remainder are scattered about in other North Russian Ports.

Respectfully,

Robert H. Myers
Lieutenant (Jg) USNR

---

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44
ACTION MOSCOW INFO CNO.

REQUEST INFO AS TO SOLUTION OFFERED BY RED NAVY MOSCOW CONNECTION SHIP MOVEMENT REPORTS. CONVOY OFFICER REFUSES TO ALTER IN ANY WAY PRESENT SYSTEM OR GIVE AMPLE WARNING OF DEPARTURES. BEFORE ANY SHIP THIS COAST SAILS FOR USA HE STATES PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FROM HIS OFFICE HAVE THEREFORE REQUESTED BE INFORMED OF CONTEMPLATED DEPARTURES DAY HE GRANTS PERMISSION TO GAINING 1 OR 2 DAYS. IF SAILING DELAYED FOR APPRECIABLE TIME DEPT CAN BE SO ADVISED. THIS HE STATES UNSATISFACTORY AND HAS THUS FAR FAILED OFFER OR CONSIDER ANY SOLUTION WHATSOEVER OR TO REASSURE WE MAY EXPECT ANYTHING BETTER THAN PAST PERFORMANCES.

ADD: NAVYIDE......

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV NCR-15

171819

140 Russian Cover

DECLASSED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/8/94

Regraded Unclassified
TODAY CONVOY OFFICER VERY ANGRILY INFORMED HE HAD BEEN REPRIEVED BY MOSCOW FOR FAILING INFORM OF DEPARTURE 14 VESSELS WHICH ARRIVED AKUTAN UN-ANNOUNCED BETWEEN 20 SEPTEMBER AND 20 NOVEMBER FURTHER DEMANDED TO BE INFORMED OF THE NAMES OF SUBJECT VESSELS IN ORDER TAKE DISCIPLINARY MEASURES AND INTIMATED HIS OFFICE WAS AT FAULT AND RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS REPRIMAND. HE WAS INFORMED MY OFFICE HAD NO INFO ON UNANNOUNCED ARRIVALS OTHER THAN THAT WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN GIVEN HIM FROM TIME TO TIME. SPECIFIC INSTANCES WERE BROUGHT TO ATTENTION. HE THEN ASKED THAT INFO BE OBTAINED FROM NAVY DEPT.

SECRET
WASHINGTON IN ORDER STRAIGHTEN OUT WHOLE MATTER. IN VIEW ABOVE AND EXPECTED SUBSEQUENT REPERCUSSIONS REQUEST COMPLETE LIST BY DISPATCH NAMES OF 14 SUBJECT SHIPS WITH DATES ARRIVAL AKUTAN AND DATES OF RECEIPT OF SAILING NOTIFICATION FROM MY OFFICE IF ANY. FOR SUBMISSION TO CONVOY OFFICER. HE IS NOW AND WILL MAKE EVERY Endeavor THROW BLAME ON US WHITENASHING HIS ORGANIZATION AS HE OPENLY STATES ASST NAVAL ATTACHE OFFICE HAS BEEN THORN IN HIS SIDE EVER SINCE ESTABLISHED LAST YEAR. HE IS NOT NOW PERSONALLY CONCERNED OVER SAFETY OF SHIPS AS SHOWN IN LAST FEW MOVEMENT REPORTS BUT IS PROTECTING HIS OWN POSITION AND CAREER WHICH CONSIDERED PRECARIOUS IN VIEW RECENT EVENTS. SINCE THIS POST

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVRECS.)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94

Regraded Unclassified
**SECRET**

Established in May '42 importance has been continually stressed both written and orally of timely accurate departure reports ships sailing from Soviet Siberian ports for USA.

For DEPTS INFO convoy officer maintains office hours only from 10 to 17 hours daily Sundays and holidays excepted with no duty officer available during free hours. Usually it requires several hours to locate him or responsible clerk who will accept info submitted by my office. Ships departing Vladivostok often delayed because skippers unable locate convoy officer for final instructions. In the past diplomatic agent sometimes furnished CONGEN with typewritten lists of ships departures and arrivals.

---

**DECLASSIFIED**

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/8/94
EVEN THESE REVEALED ERRORS AND OMISSIONS AND HAVE NOW BEEN DISCONTINUED BY THE DIP AGENT FOR SOME UNEXPLAINABLE REASON.

16...ACT

39...FX37...13...NAVACHE...COWINCH...19C....

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94
A-1 REPORT MIKOVICH CONVERSATION HELSON STRONGLY URGED REOPENING NORTHERN CONVOY ROUTE. SAID CANNOT GET ENOUGH SUPPLIES IN THROUGH OTHER ROUTES.

16...ACT
COM INCH...FX37...25G...CNO...NAVAIDE...250P...
FILE.
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: COMNAVEU (INDEF CALL)

RELEASED BY:

DATE: AUGUST 29 1943

TOR CODEROOM: 2447

DECLARED BY: STRICKLAND/KOTEN

PARAPHRASED BY: 

ROUTED BY: 

ADDRESS:

ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSES

FOR ACTION: COMINCH

PRIORITY: DEFERRED

INFORMATION:

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE

291207 NCR 4514

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME OCT

ACTION F-0 24 F-01 25 F-02 26 F-03 27 F-04 28 F-05 29 F-06 30 F-07 31 F-1 32 F-2 33 F-3 34 F-4 35 F-5 36 F-6 37 F-7 38 F-8 39 F-9 40 F-10 41 F-11 42 F-12 43 F-13 44 F-14 45 F-15 46 F-16 47 F-17 48 F-18 49 F-19 50 F-20 51 F-21 52

(Comnaveu sends Cominch for Action)

URDIS 271623 Harriman to Notman. ETA August 31 of 2 destroyers recently dispatched north Russia carrying all mail and 35 tons of cigarettes, sweets, games, clothing, and comforts in effort to improve morale and condition of stranded seamen. Admiralty in conjunction with Ministry of War transport actively studying entire problem. Escort and other required surface units not available before middle October at the earliest. Independent movement would not be good risk before late November. Admiralty hopeful that October 1st will produce a definite plan with all essentials for full relief. 9 US Controlled

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-13

U. S. Government Printing Office 35-03518-6-E

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94

Regraded Unclassified
SHIPS AND 12 BRITISH CONTROLLED SHIPS PLUS 2 BRITISH CRANE SHIPS ARE NOW IN NORTH RUSSIA. 1 BRITISH SHIP UNDERGOING REPAIRS. TOTAL 23 SHIPS.
FOR NOTMAN FROM HARRIMAN

IF YOU HAVE NOT SEEN IT ASK FLANNIGAN SHOW YOU CABLE FROM NAVAL OBSERVER NORTH RUSSIA REGARDING MORALE AND CONDITION OUR SEAMEN. PLEASE DISCUSS WITH LEATHERS WHETHER EFFORT SHOULD NOT BE MADE NOW TO BRING OUR SHIPS OUT EITHER (1) BY BRITISH SENDING ESCORTS TO BRING OUT SOME OR ALL OR (2) BY ATTEMPTING TRICKLE MOVEMENT X FINAL ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE FOR BRITISH TO DISPATCH PROMPTLY NAVAL VESSEL WITH ESSENTIAL SUPPLIES X PLEASE ADVISE NUMBER OF BRITISH SHIPS IN NORTH RUSSIAN PORTS X

COMINCH PASSED TO NCR FOR OP 12,13.
FURTHER DISTRIBUTION BY NCR NCRJ TOR: 2034/31
CNO....OP-49G. 12...EX27...NAVALDE...FILE

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVRELS.)
OPNAV-NCR-45
O. A. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 10-1913-0-0
SECRET

ADM. FISHER INFORMS ME ADMIRALTY HAS REQUESTED INFORMATION IF BRITISH AND AMERICAN MERCHANT SHIPS NORTH RUSSIA HAVE SUFFICIENT SUPPLIES TO LAST THEM TO NOVEMBER OR POSSIBLY JANUARY. I AM AWARE OF THE DIFFICULTIES CONNECTED WITH NORTH RUSSIA CONVOYS BUT NATURALLY AM NOT COGNIZANT OF MANY OF THE PROBLEMS WHICH WOULD RESULT IN A DECISION TO KEEP OUR SHIPS HERE OVER SUCH AN EXTENDED PERIOD. AS BEARING UPON SUCH POSSIBLE DECISION I POINT OUT THE FOLLOWING:

I HAVE TALKED WITH THE CAPTAINS AND ARMED GUARD OFFICERS AND HAVE VISITED EACH AMERICAN SHIP NOW IN RUSSIA. FOOD SUPPLIES ARE EXTREMELY LOW AND SOVIETS ARE EITHER UNABLE OR INDISPOSED TO FURNISH NECESSITIES. CLOTHES AND SHOES ARE WORN OUT AND MUST BE SUPPLIED.
Morale is extremely low and personnel difficulties are increasing. There has been one suicide and one case of mental derangement in American ships and British have had some extremely serious personnel problems. Further delay will result in certain U.S. ships being out of U.S. for a year or more. To date they have received mail only once. Adm. FISHER and I are agreed that supplies are entirely inadequate and that any further extended delay in clearing ships from Russia will most probably result in very serious incidents between Soviets and ships crews. ADM. STANDLEY CONCURS IN THE RECOMMENDATION THAT EXCEPT FOR COMPPELLING REASONS MERCHANT SHIPS BE RETURNED HOME EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE.

FX37...ACTION
COMINCH...2OP...39...16...NAVAIDE...SECRET

Regraded Unclassified
NAVAL MESSAGE

DRAFTER

ALUSNA MOSCOW

FROM

REleased BY

7 AUGUST 1943

DATE

1445/7

TOR CODEBOOK

STRONG

DECODED BY

MORRIS

PARAPHRASED BY

SOBEL

ROUTED BY

INFORMATION

FEAT

ADDRESSES

CNO

PRECEDENCE

PRIORI TY

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30UR17E

DEFERRED

DEFERRED

PAGE 1 OF 2

#61419

NCR 5/4

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

DATE

TIME

ACTION

F-0

F-01

F-02

F-05

F-07

F-1

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F-20

F-3

F-4

F-401

F30

F37

F40

10-00

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (f) NAVREGS.)

061419

DR CLASSIFIED

OCE-5-4-1-5

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

Regraded Unclassified
SHIP UNDER BRIT CONTROL NOT ABLE OBTAIN PERMISSION BY ENLISTING HARSHAW's AID.

BELIEVE POSITIVE ACTION IN SENDING MAIL AND MAGAZINES TO CREWS WOULD BE GREATEST SINGLE BENEFIT TO SAILING MORALE.

16...ACT
COMM...FX37...39...20C...NAVAIR...FILE

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/44

Regraded Unclassified
NAVAl MESSAGE

FROM
FRANKEL (MOURMANSK)

RELEASED BY
27 JULY 43

TOR CODEROOM
1123

DECODED BY
CONNORS

PARAPHRASED BY
SHOAF

ROUTED BY
SOBEL

NAVY DEPARTMENT

ADDRSEES
CNO

EXTENSION NUMBER

PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSES

FOR ACTION

INFORMATION

LONDON

MOSCOW

PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

BLANKS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE

260914 NCR 3593

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

ACTION

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F-33

F-34

F-4

FX01

FX10

FX30

FX37

FX40

10-00

VCNO

JYGF SERIAL 12.

BRITISH STEAMERS EMPIRE SCOTT EMPIRE FORTUNE

AND LLANPAFF ARRIVED MOURMANSK FROM ARCHANGEL

24 JULY WITH RUSSIAN CARGO. LAST NAMED

SHIP SUFFERED BOTH HIT AND FIRE NUMBER 4 HOLD

ENROUTE.

16...ACT

COMINCH...FX37...10/11...20G...NAVAIDE...BADO...

FILE.

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-98

DECLASSIFIED 05-12-78

DECLASSIFIED
E. 0. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/94

Regraded Unclassified
NAVAL MESSAGE

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

CNO 171942 APRIL. ACTUAL DISPOSAL TIME BETWEEN ARRIVAL FROM USA AND DEPARTURE FOR USA. AVERAGES IN DAYS FOR 1ST 6 MONTHS THIS YEAR. FORMER US SHIPS 56. SOVIET VESSELS 33. TANKERS INCLUDING BOTH OF THE ABOVE 38. IN COMPARING ABOVE ATTENTION INVITED THAT MANY SOVIET VESSELS ARE OF SMALL TONNAGE ALSO THAT GREAT MAJORITY FREIGHTERS AND TANKERS SELDOM DISCHARGE COMPLETE CARGO IN 1 PORT. AVERAGE CROSSING TIME IN PAST 3 MONTHS FOR ALL SHIPS ENROUTE (GROUP MISSING) QND FROM USA TO FIRST PORT OF CALL USSR. 19 DAYS.

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-16

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1910--2019-4

Regraded Unclassified
Wounded my 12/900 March depaarted 12th on British Destroyer. Also Mental Case from Steamer Thomas Hartley Name Aureliu Auniz Deck Engineer Seaman's Passport 4391. No Personnel US Vessels remain Murmansk Area.

16...ACT
14/14...SUPER...39...43...DEAD...F37...
BUSANDA...NAVADE...FILE
CPTAIN US FLAG SHIPS NOW NORTH RUSSIAN PORTS VISITING MOSCOW EXPRESS CONCERN MORALE SHIPS CREWS DUE LIVING CONDITIONS ENCOUNTERED LACK OF RECREATION FOOD SITUATION MAIL OR OTHER COMMUNICATION WITH FAMILIES AND COMPLETE LACK INFORMATION AS TO FUTURE MOVEMENTS. AMBASSADOR AGREES WITH SUGGESTION ANY INFORMATION WHICH MAY PROPERLY BE APPLIED THEM COULD BE HELPFUL ALSO THAT ARRANGEMENTS TO DELIVER MAIL AND ARRANGE THEY COMMUNICATE WITH FAMILIES SHOULD BE MADE. OUTGOING MAIL IS NOW FORWARDED CNO IN NAVY POUCH AFTER CENSORING BY ALUSHA MOSCON.
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UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

185852 NCR 37579

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

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16...ACT
F3Y...CONTACT...NAVIGATE...FILE.

PAGE 2 OF 2

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/44
INCLUDING REPAIRS AND WHARVES CONVERTED TO HANDLING CARGO
VESSELS THERE ARE NOW IN MAIN PORT 7 BERTHS 4 OF
WHICH DEPTH 24 FEET 1 OF 25 AND 2 OF 26 PLUS 1 PARTIAL
BERTH DEPTH 28 WHICH USED LIGHTER VESSELS. 2 ADDITIONAL
BERTHS CLUTTERED BY SUNKEN SHIPS IN WHICH WORK
PROGRESING SLOWLY. IN FISH PORT 2 BERTHS DEPTH 22
FEET IN TUGNER PORT 2 OF 23 FEET WHICH CAN BE INCREASED
TO 25 BY BREASTING OUT 6 FEET. 1 ADDITIONAL BERTH ABOUT
2 MILES NORTH MAIN PORT USED FOR DISCHARGE EXPLOSIVES
AND LOADING PHOSPHATE ORE DEPTH 26 FEET. ALL BERTHS
HAVE TRACKS ALONGSIDE. NO BARGES AVAILABLE OFF
LOAD SHIPS AT ANCHOR AND 1 OF ABOVE BERTHS MUST BE
USED FOR DISCHARGING CRANE SHIPS.

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
Regraded Unclassified
NO FLOATING CRANES REMAIN AFLOAT. 7 RAILWAY CRANES OF 7 TON AND 1 OF 45 TON CAPACITY BUT CANNOT PLUMB SHIPS HOLDS. 3 RECENTLY ACQUIRED TRACTOR CRANES CAPACITY ABOUT 6 TONS PLUS 8 ELECTRIC STEVEDORE TRUCKS CAPACITY 2 TONS WHOSE USE PROBLEMATICAL BECAUSE LACK PROPER FLOODING ON DOCKS. ESTIMATE PORT CAN OFF LOAD 5,000 TONS DAILY BUT PAST EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN INABILITY OF RAILROAD HANDLE THIS AMOUNT RESULTING IN CONGESTION DOCKS AND DECELERATION OF DISCHARGE. RAILWAY CLEARANCE CAPACITY NOT OVER 4,000 TONS DAILY UNDER FAVORABLE CIRCUMSTANCES AND LATTER NOT EXPERIENCED THIS YEAR DUE SHORTAGE CARS BOMBING OF LINE AND LIKE CONTRIBUTORY CAUSES.

ACTION: 16

NAVAL DEPARTMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

Regraded Unclassified
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Naval Aide to the President.

Subject: Arctic Sea Route to Siberian Ports.

1. In response to request, our Naval Attache in Moscow advises that he has made several efforts to obtain the Soviet reaction to trial shipping operations during 1943 to Arctic Sea ports of Siberia via Bering Strait, but has been repeatedly put off, and now believes they have no intention of providing the information. He believes they might, however, authorize one of our attaches to make the passage on a Russian ship.

2. Information obtained from Captain Papanin, the Soviet Arctic Shipping Expert at Murmansk, indicates that Siberian ports are not prepared to receive war materials and advises that they be sent through to the White Sea. Passage time is 4-5 weeks from Bering Sea to White Sea, and 15-20 ships can be handled during this time. United States ships now in White Sea should not be sent back via Arctic because of their bronze screws. Steel screws are absolutely essential and Russian ships are so equipped. The Soviets expect to send 26 Soviet ships with United States lend-lease food and supplies to Arctic Siberian ports this season and probably one ice-breaker to the United States for repairs.

3. The United States Merchant Marine does not use or have available any steel propellers. This, with the Soviet adamant attitude seems to preclude our sending ships over the route this season. However, I have directed that arrangements be made, if possible, for an attaché to make the passage with a Russian ship.

E. King
Admiral, U. S. Navy.
ACTION OPNAV INFO FAYMONVILLE AND ALUSNA MOSCOW

PART 1 050315 NCR 306
PART 2 050812 NCR 561
PART 3 050410 NCR 565

ON MAY 4 WAS INVITED BY HARBOR DIRECTOR TO AT (DROPPED 14 LETTERS) OWI REPRESENTATIVE MAJOR OLSON USA ON INSPECTION TOUR OF PORT AREA IN COMPANY SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE REPRESENTATIVE AND DIRECTOR OF FAR EAST STEAMSHIP AGENCY.

FOLLOWING INFO SECURED ANSWERING OPNAV 171942 OF APRIL. COMBINED PORTS OF VLAD AND NAHOZKA CAN HANDLE TOTAL OF 30,000 TONS CARGO PER MONTH IN SUMMER REDUCED TO 25,000 TONS IN WINTER. AT PRESENT THESE TWO PORTS HANDLING 20,000 PER MONTH. PETRO PAVLOVSK AND AIKOL-AEVSK CAN HANDLE 5000 TONS PER MONTH EACH WHILE PORT OF NAGAEVO CAN HANDLE 7500 TONS PER MONTH BETWEEN MIDDLE OF MAY TO MIDDLE OF DECEMBER. BUT THE SE LATTER PORTS BADLY IN NEED OF CRANES. PORT OF VLAD CAN HANDLE MAXIMUM OF 35 SHIPS WITH DEPTHS OF WATER ALONG SIDE DOCKS MAXIMUM 30 FEET MINIMUM 25.

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

Regraded Unclassified
AMPLE ROLLING STOCK THOUGH SCARCE IS MADE AVAILABLE AND PORT GETS FROM 15% TO 33% CARS PER DAY. RAILWAY IS NO BOTTLENECK. NOW CLEARING 7000 TONS CARGO PER DAY BUT REDUCED SOME WHAT IN WINTER NOT OPERATING AT PRESENT MAXIMUM CAPABILITIES. RAIL SIDINGS AT ALL BERTHS. TOTAL 32 CRANES AVAILABLE OF CAPACITIES 3, 6, 10, AND 15 TONS. 2 FLOATING CRANES CAPACITY 6½ TONS AND 1 FLOAT CRANE CAPACITY 12½ TONS. ALL FLOAT CRANES CAN PLUMP HOLDS PLUS 4 OF THE 15 TON RAILWAY CRANES. ADDITIONAL CRANES ENROUTE. WAREHOUSE STOWAGE AVAILABLE FOR COVERING 51000 TONS GENERAL CARGO WITH AMPLE OVERHEAD CONVEYORS AND HANDLING TRUCKS WITH ADDITIONAL FACILITIES ENROUTE. 85% BERTH CAN ACCOMMODATE 2 TANKERS IN COMMERCIAL PORT WITH MAX CAPACITY 60000 TONS PER MONTH. LABOR CONDITIONS GOOD WITH EXPERIENCED STEVEDORES FROM BLACK SEA PORTS AND FEW POLITICAL PRISONERS. FRESH WATER AVAILABLE AT ALL DOCKS. REFueling ACCOMPLISHED BY 2 250 TON SEL'S (CONT'D ON PAGE 3).

CONFIDENTIAL

MAKE ORIGINAL ONLY. DELIVER TO COMMUNICATION WATCH OFFICER IN PERSON. (SEE ART. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Letter 77-5-1

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
PROPELLED FUEL OIL BARGES, BUNKERING WHARF HAS MAX CAPACITY OF 5,000 TONS COAL PER DAY. 4½ CARGO BARGES OF VARIOUS CAPACITIES AVAILABLE. SOVIETS SAY THEY CAN EASILY HANDLE 180 MORE SHIPS ON PACIFIC RUN WITH AVERAGE TURN AROUND OF 16 DAYS. HOWEVER SHIPS ARE QUITE OFTEN HELD UP IN VLAD FOR MANY DAYS AWAITING CLEARANCE BY JAPS AND OTHER MILITARY REASONS. MAJOR OLSON WHO HAS ALSO VISITED NORTHERN SOVIET PORTS CONFIRMS OPINION THAT ABOVE INFO FAIRLY ACCURATE AND THAT PORT OF VLAD IS UNDOUBTEDLY THE BEST EQUIPPED AND MOST EFFICIENTLY RUN SOVIET PORT NOW BEING USED FOR LENDLEASE MATERIAL (THE BLACK MARKET) UP TO MAXIMUM CAPACITY.

16...ACTION

COMINCH...F37...39...NAVAIDE...FILE.

CONFIDENTIAL

Regraded Unclassified
NAVAL MESSAGE

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UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

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F-37
1G-00
VCNO

MAKE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS WITH SOVIET FOR OFFICER FROM YOUR STAFF TO MAKE PASSAGE ON RUSSIAN CONVOY. YOUR 286435. FRANKEL MAY BE SENT AT ALUSNA'S DISCRETION PROVIDED HE CAN BE SPARED FROM DUTIES AS WAR SHIPPING REPRESENTATIVE IN NORTHERN PORTS.

16...ORIG
F37...COMINCH...NAVYDE...39.....13.....FILE.

CONFIDENTIAL

Regraded Unclassified

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
ON THE FIRST OF MAY IN GOLDEN HORN HARBOR, BY

ACTUAL COUNT 26 MERSHIPS PRESENT, ALL COMFORTABLY
BERTHED AT DOCKS, ALL OF TONNAGE OVER 3,000, AMONG
THEM WERE 5 LIBERTY TYPES AND 3 TANKERS. CELEBRATION
WAS MARKED BY 2 DAY HOLIDAY WITH NONE OF SHIPS
WORKING CARGO AND ONLY LABOR IN PORT AREA PERFORMED
BY USUAL NUMBER OF POLITICAL PRISONERS. ALTHOUGH
NO DEMONSTRATION SCHEDULED SMALL MILITARY PARADE
TOOK PLACE. USUAL ARMED MILITARY MILITIA AND NAVAL
PATROLS CONSISTING OF ONE SQUAD IN COMMAND OF JUNIOR
OR PETTY OFFICER WERE DOUBLED. HUGE LIBERTY PARTIES
SENT Ashore FROM WARSHIPS PRESENT AND NAVAL ESTABLISHMENTS BUT FEW SOLDIERS IN EVIDENCE AND NO PLANES IN AIR.
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: HARSHAW (ARCHANGELSK)

RELEASED BY

DATE

TOR CODEROOM

DECODED BY

PARAPHRASED BY

ADDRESSES

FOR ACTION

INFORMATION

NAVAL DEPTM.

ADDRESS:

CNO

WESTERLUND HARRIS FAYMONVILLE

KOHOUTEK

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

SHALL

291617

NCR 7887

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

DATE

TIME

GCT

TEXT

ACTION

(UNCLASSIFIED)

MOVE SERIAL 31 MOLOTOVSK ARRIVALS APR 28 AM

SHIPS BERINAG, FRANCIS SCOTT KEY, THOS. HARTLEY,

CITY OMAHA. OTHERS NOW MOLOTOVSK TANKERS

NORWEGIAN MARATHON, PANAMIAL BEACON HILL,

SOVIETS MARINARASKOVA, DIKSOF, TBILISI, BETROVSKI,

TANKERS AND SOVIETS MOVING OTHER DVINA PORTS WHENE

CLEAR SHORTLY. ISRAEL PUTNAM, UNICAS AND MOBIL

CITY TO BERTHAEBAK HARITSA ON ARRIVAL HERE.

F37(USA)......ACT.

NAVTEX......39....FILE.
IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS PUT BY FRANKEL, CAPT APANIN GAVE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

1. THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE WILL BE OPEN FOR MERCHANT SHIPING ABOUT THE MIDDLE OF JULY AND IF ANY UNITED STATES VESSELS MAKE THIS PASSAGE THEY SHOULD BE IN PROVIDENIA BY THE 25TH OF JULY.

2. THERE IS NO PURPOSE IN SENDING ANY AMERICAN SHIPS WITH WAR MATERIALS TO ARTIC SIBERIAN PORTS BUT ADVISABLE TO SEND THEM THROUGH TO WHITE SEA.

3. ESTIMATED TIME PASSAGE BETWEEN BERIN STRAITS AND WHITE SEA 4 WEEKS WITH MAXIMUM OF 5 WEEKS AND NUMBER OF SHIPS CAPABLE BEING HANDLED BETWEEN 15 AND 20.

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch office in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94

Regraded Unclassified
4. INADVISABLE SEND AMERICAN SHIPS NOW TO MURMANSK-ARCHANGEL AREA THAT ROUTE BECAUSE OF BRONZE SCREWS AND NOT REPAIR FACILITIES ALONG ROUTE.

5. STEEL SCREWS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL ANY VESSELS MAKING THIS PASSAGE AND 3 SOVIET DESTROYERS WHICH DID LAST YEAR WERE SO EQUIPPED FOR THE PASSAGE.

6. SOVIETS EXPECT 26 SOVIET SHIPS TO LOAD IN UNITED STATES WITH FOOD AND OTHER SUPPLIES TO BE UNLOADED AT POINTS ALONG COAST OF YAKUTSK REPUBLIC.

7. THERE IS A PROBABILITY SENDING AT LEAST 1 ICEBREAKER TO AMERICA FOR REPAIRS.

END OF STATEMENTS BY A PAIN. IN CONNECTION POINTS 2, 6, AND 7 RECOMMEND FRANKEL MAKE THIS PASSAGE IF SOVIETS WILL AGREE.

(CONT'D ON PAGE 3)
A. By proceeding West Coast United States via Siberian Alaskan Air Route and join either American Convoy or Russian Vessel making passage.

B. By making West to East on Icebreaker now present Archangel area, apparently Soviets have no intention giving information requested regarding Northern Sea Route but believe they may authorize Frankel to make trip.
Because of desire to replace North Russian route with Vladivostok, USA requests following:


Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREG.)

17/9/42

Regraded Unclassified
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INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

162205 NCR 8888

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

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COMMANDER IN CHIEF DESIRES REPLY BY DISPATCH WHETHER SOVIETS AGREEABLE UNDERTAKING TRIAL SHIPPING OPERATIONS DURING 1943 TO ARCTIC SEA PORTS OF SIBERIA VIA BERING STRAIT.

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/44

Regraded Unclassified
CONVOTS HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED FOR REASONS FULLY COMMUNICATED TO THE HIGHEST

RUSSIAN AUTHORITY BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT X UR 061234

copy to navalsde
HALAIR 5 TO STETTINIUS OLLA AND DOUGLAS WSA FROM HARRIMAN

REFERRING TO RUSSIAN CARGOES DISCHARGED AT UK PORTS, FOLLOWING SHIPMENTS FROM SS TINTAGEL AT LEITH HAVE BEEN LOADED ON BRITISH VESSELS FOR SHIPMENT TO NORTHERN RUSSIA.

ON SS EMPIRE CLAYMORE, 8 CASES OF DODGE CHASSIS, 4 CASES CABS AND 4 BUNDLES BODIES OF BILL OF LADING 3.

ON SS OCEAN VIGOUR, 8 CASES OF DODGE CHASSIS, 4 CASES CABS AND 4 BUNDLES BODIES OF BILL OF LADING 3.

566 REELS OF GALVANIZED BARBED WIRE OF BILL OF LADING 30.

F37 (STETTINIUS, OLLA AND DOUGLAS, WSA) .......ACT.

NAVAIDE .... FILE.

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREG.)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

Regraded Unclassified
March 29, 1943

TO: Admiral William D. Leahy  
    Chief of Staff

FROM: Mr. Harry L. Hopkins

SUBJECT: Bering Sea and Lena River Route to Russia

I asked Lew Douglas to find out whether ships were available if this route proves feasible and I have asked General Burns to find out directly from the Russians whether they will agree to the use of this route.

I think this matter ought to be settled with finality within a few days and I will send to you any answer they give me.

Harry L. Hopkins
encl.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Show to Mrs. Hopkins

Adm. Leahy
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

Subject: Feasibility of Transporting Supplies to EUROPEAN RUSSIA via BERING SEA and LENA RIVER.

1. Little information as to the present, or the possible, development of transportation capacity on the LENA RIVER to EUROPEAN RUSSIA is available to us.

2. From the information available, the following facts are indicated. Some facilities exist at TIKSI BAY near the mouth of the LENA RIVER. Transportation up the river to VITIM, about 1,928 miles, is accomplished by river steamers and self-propelled barges. No accurate information is available as to the number now in use. Other means of transportation would be necessary from VITIM to the railhead at USK KUT, about 440 miles.

3. Ship movements from ALASKA to the mouth of the LENA RIVER can be carried on for a period of about three months each year - from late July to early October. Soviet ships operate annually over this route to supply NORTH SIBERIA. These movements are facilitated by ice breakers and air reconnaissance of ice conditions.

4. Shipping can also pass through VILKITSKY STRAIT during August, unload at ARCHANGEL, and return to the UNITED STATES via the Atlantic.

E. KING
Admiral, U. S. Navy.
(INFO OPNAV)

ATTACHED

262117 FEB TWICE REQUESTED WITH NO ANSWER YET

FORTHCOMING. SOVIETS ARE STILL STUDYING. I AM

JUST INFORMED SOVIETS THROUGH EMBASSY DISPATCH

NO 181 OF 19 MARCH REQUESTED VISA FOR NIKOLA STEPANOV

FOR OSTEBSIBLE PURPOSE VISITING UNITED STATES CONNECTION

OBTAINING EQUIPMENT FOR NORTHERN SEA ROUTE. RECOMMEND

STATE REQUIRE EVIDENCE EXACT PURPOSE THIS VISIT AND

EXACT INFORMATION AS TO WHOM STEPANOV WILL CONTACT IN

UNITED STATES AND WHAT SUPPLIES ARE REQUIRED. ALSO

RECOMMEND NO VISA BE GIVEN UNTIL SOME DEFINITE ACTION

IS TAKEN BY SOVIETS IN REPLY TO REFERENCED DISPATCH.

16: ACT....

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/44
NAVY MESSAGE

FROM: HARSHAW

RELEASED BY: ARCHANGELSK

DATE: 7 APRIL 1943

TOR CORDEROOM: 1956/1

DECODED BY: BLUM

PARAPHRASED BY: LEWIS

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

ROONEY 202039 NCR 6683

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME

TEXT

(FOR HARRIMAN INFO CUSHION GARABLE, FAYMOREVILLE FRANKEL)

REFER HALARC 2 AND 3 AND HALUL 1. REQUEST INFO SOONEST WHETHER TIMBER DESIRED FOR UK IN PREFERENCE OR NEXT OUTBOUND AME SHIPS FROM MOLOTOVSK. DUE INACCESSIBILITY TIMBER PORTS NOW DUE ICE. NECESSITY TRANSPORT TIMBER VIA RAIL ACROSS RIVER TO MOLOTOVSK AND PRESENT THAWING WEATHER TRANSPORTATION ACROSS ICE MAY BE STOPPED SHORTLY WISH TO START MOVEMENT TIMBER NOW IF TO BE GIVEN PRIORITY. DUE IRREGULAR LOADING AND NECESSITY TO DEPART WITH CONVOY CITY OF OMAHA RECEIVED ONLY 3614 TONS ORE. THIS IS HALUL 3.

DELAY DUE TO SERVICE.

F37......ACTION (WSC)

NAVADE......FILE.......CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/94

Regraded Unclassified
March 19, 1943.

Commander Freesman:

The attached paraphrase is transmitted at the request of the Division of European Affairs of this Department for the attention of Admiral Leahy.

N. Lancaster, Jr.,
Assistant to the Liaison Officer
Telegraph no. 1799
From: London
Dated: March 13, 1943.
Reo'd: March 14, 1943.

Last night the Minister of War Transport told me that he was not certain that the British should have pressed the issue of their air squadrons' being based in Russia. Lord Leathers said his view that the British may have made a mistake in this regard was based on the general assumption that the May convoy only will be involved, in as much as plans to take care of allied urgent needs for shipping in the area of active operations will preclude the dispatch of later convoys during the period of long northern daylight.

Matthews
This is our serial "FRAMU #1".

Repeat FRAMU number 1 which letters will be used for all messages intended Harriman.

Regarding outbound cargo both here and Archangel the question has always been not of cargo available in Soviet Union but of cargo at the ships side ready to be loaded and the latter falls short of Moscow assurances because of inadequate rail transport, improper planning and loss by enemy action. This office considers primary objective load or ballast ships with whatever immediately available for safe return voyage in ample time leave with next out-bound convoy.

16. 39. 19C. FILE
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: HARBIN ARKANHANGELSK
RELEASED BY:
DATE: 20 MARCH 1943
TOR CODEROOM: 1640/20
DECODED BY: YANOVER
PARAPHRASED BY: PATTERSON

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

ROONEY 161050 NCR 4819
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GCT

TEXT

(PART TWO HALUL* ONE)

TO CHANGE PLANS NOW OR WAIT TRANSPORT TIMBER FROM EKONOMIA TO MOLOTOVSK OR TO SEND OUR SHIPS TO EKONOMIA

FOR TIMBER WOULD DELAY DEPARTURE WITH A POSSIBLE FURTHER DELAY DUE TO ICE. PETROVSK HAS JUST TAKEN SEVERAL DAYS

TO MAKE PASSAGE MOLOTOVSK TO EKONOMIA, IN VIEW ABOVE WILL CONTINUE LOADINGS BE THREE AME SHIPS UNLESS OTHERWISE

DIRECTED. SOVIETS STATED WILL DO ALL POSSIBLE TO LOAD SHIPS OF NEXT CONVOY WITH TIMBER PER DESIRES BOTH

PARTIES. WEST GATOMSKA AND & BASSETT SAIED WITH LESS THAN MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS DUE SLOW LOADING AND NECESS-

ITY JOIN OUTBOUND CONVOY IN THE NORTH. PRESENT SHIPS LOADING ORE AS FOLLOWS. CITY OMAHA 4000. I PUTNAM

2400 AND BERING 2000. AMOUNTS REQUESTED FOR SAFE PASSAGE.

*PART ONE IS 161012
F37.....ACTION (W8A)

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1944-05-15

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/5/94

Regraded Unclassified
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM       ARCHANGEL
RELEASED BY
DATE       17 MARCH 1943
TOR CODEROOM 2242
DECODED BY TOUSIGNANT/MIKELL
PARAPHRASED BY

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

ROONEY 161012 NCR 4021

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME GCT

TEXT

(FOR HARRIMAN INFO CUSHING GARABLE FAYMONVILLE FRANKEL)

PART 1 OF HALIL 1.
URDIS Ø821Ø2 MY Ø32223 AND HALARC 2.
IN VIEW OUR DEMAND MINIMUM 15ØØ STD'S TIMBER AND DIFFICULTY TRANSPORT SAME TO
MOLOTOVSK AND SOVIETS DESIRE SEND THE
SHIP TBILISI TO UNITED KINGDOM WITH
SOME MIXED CARGO AND DUE DELAY RECEIPT
URDIS OF 8TH SOVIETS ALREADY LOADING
TBILISI WITH AVAILABLE TIMBER AT MOLOTOSK THAT WAS INTENDED FOR BERING. 3
AMERICAN SHIPS NOW BEING LOADED WITH DESIRED AMOUNT ORE FOR UNITED STATES.

F37(WSA) . . ACT
NAV AIDE . . FILE

SECRET

Declassified
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44

Regraded Unclassified
FOREIGN OFFICE DELIVERED NOTE TO AMBASSADOR IN KUJBISHEV IN WHICH SOVIETS ASK OUR
GOVERNMENT TO GIVE THEM FOLLOWING ORGANIZATION OF COMMERCIAL AND GOVERNMENTAL
SHIPBUILDING FACILITIES AND INFORMATION AS TO NAVY'S CONTROL THEREOF. PLANS AND
SPECIFICATIONS OUR LATEST BATTLESHIP CARRIER CRUISER DESTROYER SUBMARINE, DETAILED
PLANS AND DRAWINGS SURFACE AERIAL AND ELECTRIC TORPEDO, SHIP AND AIRCRAFT RADIO,
DETAILS OUR SECRET CIPHERING DEVICES. NAVY HAS NOT PREVIOUSLY REQUESTED ANY OF
ABOVE FROM ME NOR HAVE THEY SINCE MADE REFERENCE TO FACT REQUEST WAS SUBMITTED
THROUGH FOREIGN OFFICE.

AMBASSADOR DELAYED FORWARDING PENDING DISCUSSION WITH ME AND QUESTIONING
OF MOLOTOV IN MOSCOW AS TO SIGNIFICANCE OF SUCH UNPRECEDENTED REQUEST. MOLOTOV
STATED IT WAS SIMPLE REQUEST FOR INFORMATION THEY DESIRED. FOLLOWING IS MY ANALYSIS

(Page one of four)
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**TOR CODERROOM**

**DECODED BY**

**PARAPHRASED BY**

**TEXT**

OF SOVIET REASONS FOR MAKING REQUEST AND SUBMITTING THROUGH STATE, IN LEND LEASE MILITARY EQUIPMENT THEY HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED MAJORITY OF OUR ARMY'S MOST MODERN EQUIPMENT. THEY HAVE NOT BEEN FORCED TO REPAY IN INFORMATION REGARDING RED ARMY EQUIPMENT NOR WILL THEY REPAY UNLESS FORCED, IN OBTAINING OUR EQUIPMENT THEY HAVE DEALT WITH UNITED STATES CIVIL ORGANIZATIONS AND NOT WITH ARMY, THEY REALIZE NAVY WILL NOT GIVE ANOTHER NATION FRUITS OF LONG TECHNICAL EXPERIENCE WITH OUT RECIPROCAL TREATMENT, SOVIETS HAVE NOTHING OF COMPARABLE NAVAL VALUE TO WHAT THEY ASK BUT DO NOT PLAN GIVE WHAT THEY DO HAVE NOR DO THEY PROPOSE IN NOTE ANY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, THEY HOPE BY SUBMITTING THROUGH STATE REQUEST WILL MEET EYES OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES OF SUFFICIENT INFLUENCE WHO BECAUSE OF THEIR SYMPATHY FOR THE SOVIETS AND DESIRE TO MOLLIFY AND PLACATE THEM WILL FORCE NAVY TO DIVULGE INFORMATION WHICH NAVY WOULD NOT OTHERWISE GIVE. I SHOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT THAT DEARTH OF ADEQUATE SOVIET BUILDING FACILITIES MAKE INFORMATION THEY REQUEST OF NO POSSIBLE VALUE TO THEM IN PRESENT WAR, THEY HOPE THAT SENTIMENT OR PLAIN STUPIDITY

---

**SEAL 1 ADMIRAL.**

**SEAL 2 FILE.**

**SEAL 3 F-I OR CHARTROOM.**

**SEAL 4 SPECIAL.**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

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**DECLASSIFIED**

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44

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TOR CODEROOM         |          | PRIORITY     |
DECODED BY          |          | ROUTINE      |
PARAPHRASED BY      |          | DEFERRED     |

INDICATE BY ASTERISK Addressee FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

141600 NCR 2892 (PAGE THREE OF FOUR)

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME | DATE | TIME | OCT

TEXT

ON OUR PART WILL RESULT IN OUR GIVING THEM INFORMATION THAT MIGHT POSSIBLY BE AGAINST US LATER. THE SOVIETS HAVE THE EFFRONTERY TO MAKE THIS REQUEST WHILE DENYING OR DELAYING REPLYS TO OUR QUESTIONS THE ANSWERS TO WHICH WOULD GIVE US INFO WHICH WE COULD USE NOW AGAINST A COMMON ENEMY.

I RECOMMEND NO ANSWER BE MADE TO THIS NOTE. IF SOVIETS BRING UP QUESTION AGAIN I RECOMMEND WE REPLY THAT WE ARE QUOTE STUDYING UNQUOTE. THIS IS SOVIET METHOD AND IS ANSWER I HAVE FREQUENTLY RECEIVED.

I AM IN FULL SYMPATHY WITH THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE AND HEARTILY ENDORSE ASSISTING THEM IN ANY POSSIBLE WAY IN THIS WAR AND LATER. I FURTHER REALIZE HOW VITAL IS MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATION IN POST WAR SETTLEMENTS. MY RELUCTANT CONCLUSION IS THAT THIS CAN ONLY BE ATTAINED BY DEALING WITH THEM ON A HARD BOILED HORSETRADING BASIS, IT IS THEIR METHOD OF DEALING AND THE ONLY METHOD THEY RESPECT IN OTHERS, OUR CHARITABLE METHOD IS SUSPECT EITHER OF WEAKNESS OR AS A CLOAK FOR SOME HIDDEN NEFARIOUS SCHEME.

No. 1 ADMIRAL. No. 2 FILE. No. 3 F-I OR CHARTROOM. No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVRECS.)

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44

Regraded Unclassified
MY FURTHER OPINION IS THAT WE WILL OBTAIN NO COOPERATION UNLESS WE NOW REPEAT NOW USE STRONG MEASURES TO FORCE IT FROM THEM. IN LEND LEASE AND IN US PUBLIC OPINION WE HAVE TWO WEAPONS WHICH THE SOVIETS RESPECT AND FEAR. I BELIEVE THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIETS AND THE WORLD AT LARGE WILL BEST BE SERVED BY USING THESE WEAPONS TO SMOKE THEM OUT AT THIS TIME. IT WOULD SEEM BETTER THAT WE MEET THE ISSUE NOW RATHER THAN TO WAIT FOR THE SECOND FRONT TO COME FACE TO FACE WITH THE SOVIET FRONT ON THE BATTLEFIELDS OF EUROPE. I THEREFORE STRONGLY URGEP THAT THE NAVY IN ITS SEPARATE DEALINGS OPERATE ON THIS BASIS AND THAT IN HIGHER COUNCILS OUR REPRESENTATIVES URGEP LIKE ACTION BY OTHERS.
LAST CONVOY BROUGHT IN BRITISH GROUND CREWS AND EQUIPMENT WHICH BRITISH WERE HOPING TO INSTALL PREPARATORY TO SENDING AIR CONTINGENT NORTH RUSSIA FOR CONVOY PROTECTION. SOVIETS WOULD NOT PERMIT LANDING MEN AND EQUIPMENT. ARE NOW RETURNING UNITED KINGDOM.

16....ACTION

CO: MICH....F-37.....NAVAIDE.......

ACTION: F-1
**NAVAL MESSAGE**

**DRAFTER**

**FROM**

**RELEASED BY** 15 MARCH 1943

**DATE**

**TOR CODEROOM**

**DECODED BY**

**PARAPHRASED BY**

**FOR ACTION**

**cóD**

**INFORMATION**

**Navy Department**

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**ADDRESSEES**

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**HATCH** 141045  NCR 2618

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

**ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME**

**DATE**

**TIME**

**GCT**

**TEXT**

LAST CONVOY BROUGHT IN BRITISH GROUND CREWS AND EQUIPMENT WHICH BRITISH WERE HOPING TO INSTALL PREPARATORY TO SENDING AIR CONTINGENT NORTH RUSSIA FOR CONVOY PROTECTION. SOVIETS WOULD NOT PERMIT LANDING MEN AND EQUIPMENT. ARE NOW RETURNING UNITED KINGDOM.

16 ACTION

COMINCH....F-37.....NAVAIDE......

141045

**SEALEO SECRET**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVRECS.)

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

Regraded Unclassified
(HALARCO ACTION ALUSNA ARCHANGEL INFO FAYLONVILLE MOSCOW CUSHING WBA WASH FRANKEL ARCHANGEL FROM HARRIMAN.)

REFERRING YOUR 032223 AND MY 062102 REGARDING OUTWARD CARGO FOR STEAMSHIPS BERING OMAHA AND PUTNAM. SAWN LUMBER URGENTLY REQUIRED IN UK THEREFORE PLEASE ARRANGE TO LOAD ON SS BERING AS MUCH LUMBER FOR DISCHARGE UK AS VESSEL CAN REASONABLY STOW UNDER AND ON DECK II. MASTERS JUDGEMENT ADVISING US WHAT QUANTITY IS LOADED. AGREEABLE ALSO TO LOADING LUMBER ON STEAMSHIPS CITY OF OMAHA AND ISRAEL PUTNAM FOR DISCHARGE UNITED STATES IN ADDITION TO CHROME ORE FOR US RELATIVE QUANTITIES OF EACH TO BE DETERMINED IN MASTERS JUDGMENT. ADVISE US WHAT QUANTITIES CHROME ORE AND LUMBER YOU CAN ARRANGE. WE ARE DISAPPOINTED IN QUANTITIES OF LUMBER LOADED ON STEAMSHIPS WEST GOTOBSKA AND

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

DECLASSIFIED
121949 NOR 1404 PAGE ONE OF TWO

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

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TIME

GCT

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DECLASSIFIED
Nov. 27, 1973

Make original only. Deliver to an authorized person in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS)

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

Regraded Unclassified
RICHARD BASSETT E 854 AND 759 STANDARDS RESPECTIVELY. IN VIEW OF QUANTITY OF LUMBER WHICH SOVIETS ADVISE TO AVAILABLE PLEASE ADVISE REASONS WHY MINIMUM OF 1500 STANDARDS WERE NOT OBTAINED FOR UK DISCHARGE.

POSSIBLY HARBISHAW

F37(WBA)...COG.

NAVATIE....FILE.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

Another convoy (JW-53), the fourth since their resumption early last December, has successfully reached North Russia. No losses were sustained outward bound. On March 5, one ship homeward bound was sunk and one torpedoeed but still proceeding. JW-53 sailed from Loch Ewe on February 15, 1943, with twenty-six American and British cargo ships and two tankers. Five of these ships had to return to the United Kingdom account heavy weather, but the balance of twenty-three reached their destination.

In February, we sailed from the U. S. as our quota for North Russia (JW-54) a total of twenty dry cargo ships and two tankers. One tanker contained a cargo of high octane gas and the other a cargo of blending agents. These twenty-two ships lifted a total of 163,813 long tons, of which over a third was foodstuffs.

Our March contribution probably will be fifteen ships for North Russia but we are awaiting advices from London to determine the actual number.

The Southern supply route is still handicapped by port congestion in the Persian Gulf, where we have never had control over operations. There is attached a graphic report disclosing the extended ship delays in port and the sheer waste of ship time due to idleness. Progress toward alleviating this condition continues slowly and present indications point to June before the backlog of cargo now there or enroute can be discharged. Because of this costly congestion, which at best will not be cleared up for...
some time, no effort was made to prevent severe slippages in ships’ positions. Accordingly, we only sailed in February seven ships to the Persian Gulf with cargo totalling 48,737 long tons. (See Exhibit A attached.)

In March, however, we should sail at least twenty-five ships, including those of the Army, with cargo approximating 200,000 tons (see Exhibit B attached); so there will be ample ships and cargo in reserve should the June prediction of port normalcy at that time prove accurate. As a safeguard, we have asked our representative in Basra to keep us posted at short intervals during March on the progress made toward stepping up the rate of discharge and clearance.

On the Pacific Coast, February was an improvement over January by approximately 28,000 long tons. Twenty-seven ships carrying 126,030 long tons cleared during the month and, of this amount, practically half represented foodstuffs.

Today we are delivering at Portland, Oregon, another Liberty ship to the Russians, i.e., the E. H. HARRIMAN, renamed DEMABERIST, which makes the sixth Liberty and the thirty-seventh ship we have given them. The acquisition of these larger ships should enable the Soviet Government to step up their cargo clearances from the Pacific Coast in the ensuing months and reach the target of 200,000 tons per month that much earlier.

Respectfully submitted,

E. S. Land,
Administrator.

cc: Major General J. H. Burns.
( EXHIBIT "A"

PERSIAN GULF - RUSSIAN - FEBRUARY 1943

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship Name</th>
<th>Deadweight</th>
<th>Cubic</th>
<th>Loaded</th>
<th>Sailed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. WOODBRIDGE FERRIS</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>500,245</td>
<td>7,950</td>
<td>February 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. LOOKOUT</td>
<td>8,665</td>
<td>498,250</td>
<td>6,652</td>
<td>February 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. THOMAS J. RUSK</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>500,245</td>
<td>7,737</td>
<td>February 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. JOHN A. SUTTER</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>500,245</td>
<td>7,800</td>
<td>February 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. PHILIP SCHUYLER</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>500,245</td>
<td>7,800</td>
<td>February 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. CAPE PORPOISE</td>
<td>7,416</td>
<td>446,100</td>
<td>5,398</td>
<td>February 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. MORMACDALE</td>
<td>7,416</td>
<td>446,100</td>
<td>5,400</td>
<td>February 28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|               | 65,495 | 3,391,430 | 48,737 |

* January Assignments.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Deadweight</th>
<th>Cubic</th>
<th>Loaded</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>WILLIAM ELLERY</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>500,245</td>
<td>7,260</td>
<td>Sailed March 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>THOMAS SIM LEE</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>500,245</td>
<td>7,658</td>
<td>Sailed March 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>HORACE GRAY</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>500,245</td>
<td>8,446</td>
<td>Sailed March 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>GEORGE E. BADGER</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>500,245</td>
<td>7,178</td>
<td>Sailed March 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>MALCOLM FITNEY</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>500,245</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>Expected to sail March 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>WILLIAM R. DAY</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>500,245</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>Expected to sail March 15/16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>WILLIE JONES</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>500,245</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>Expected to sail March 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>BANTAM</td>
<td>12,025</td>
<td>559,280</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>Arrives Phila, March 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>KANSAS</td>
<td>9,500</td>
<td>455,620</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>Sails March 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>SAMUEL BIACHTFORD</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>500,245</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>Sails March 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>DAVY CROCKETT</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>500,245</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>Expected to sail March 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>HENRY L. BENNING</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>500,245</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>Expected to load March 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>JAMES W. DENVER</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>500,245</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>Expected to load March 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>HOWARD A. KELLEY</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>500,245</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>Expected to load March 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>CLIFFORD MALLORY</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>500,245</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>Expected to load March 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>JOHNS HOPKINS</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>500,245</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>Expected to load March 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>HENRY GILBERT COSTIN</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>500,245</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>Expected to load March 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>HENRY KNOX</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>500,245</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>Expected to load March 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>SAMUEL CHASE</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>500,245</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>Expected to load March 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>ZOEIA LYKES</td>
<td>7,416</td>
<td>446,100</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>Expected to load March 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>CAPE CORWIN</td>
<td>7,416</td>
<td>446,100</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>Expected to load March 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>JOSEPH N. TEAL</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>500,245</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>Expected to load March 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>THOMAS CRESAP</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>500,245</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>Expected to load March 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>JOHN GALLUP</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>500,245</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>Expected to load March 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>WILLIAM OSLER</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>500,245</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>Expected to load March 17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

256,855  12,391,845  185,042 *

* Army ships not included in this total.
The pamphlet

PERSIAN GULF TRADE AREA CHARTS
U.S. Controlled Merchant Vessels

which was also an inclusion to this
Memorandum, is filed in the back of this folder.
HEI.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MO)

London
Dated March 10, 1943
Rec'd 12:18 a.m., 11th

Secretary of State,
Washington,

1728, March 10, 9 p.m.

My telegram No. 1665, March 8, 9 p.m.

The text of the Soviet memorandum which Sargent has just sent me reads as follows:

"Secret. - The Soviet Government, after taking

considerable time and careful consideration of the memorandum delivered by the British

Government on the 26th February, 1943, and giving

careful consideration to all the questions contained therein, deems it necessary to state as follows:

(One) The Soviet Government has already

informed the British Government that in view of the extreme difficulties of accommodating the personnel of British air squadrons in the Murmansk

area, where air raids are unceasing, it considers the sending of the British air squadrons to this

area unpracticable, inasmuch as the Soviet Government is able and ready itself to provide aerial protection of convoys with all the means at its disposal.

The Soviet Government deems it necessary to confirm once more its former statement on the subject, avoiding
-2-, #1728, March 10, 9 p.m., from London.

avoiding any polemics on this question in a tone incompatible with our common interests.

With regard to the statement in the British memorandum that it is necessary to secure full coordination between the naval and air forces taking part in the operations, it is sufficient to mention that this task has so far been successfully carried out by the Soviet air forces, and its adequate fulfillment in the future can be fully assured. It cannot be again said that the Soviet air force has had great experience in operations for the protection of British convoys and all relative technical questions (methods of reporting the discovery of the enemy, signalling, et cetera) can be satisfactorily settled by the respective Soviet military authorities together with the British representatives.

It should be pointed out that the British air force in question would have to operate from Soviet territory and, in the first place, in Soviet zones. Consequently, the British air force first of all would have to combine its activities with the Soviet system of air protection and with the Soviet naval vessels and submarines which happened to be within the region of its operations. It is obvious
obvious also that the operations of the British air force in question would require, in a certain degree, protection from Soviet fighter planes, with which there would have to be the closest possible cooperation in combined operations. This task, of course, would be much more successfully fulfilled if all the aircraft were manned by Soviet personnel.

It goes without saying that if the British Government would find it possible to put at the disposal of the Soviet naval command, which has now no lack of pilots, aircraft specially earmarked for transfer to Murmanak, without British personnel, then the question of the protection of convoys would be settled still more satisfactorily.

(Two) The Soviet Government cannot agree with the statement made in the memorandum that the Soviet authorities are taking certain measures which would create a serious threat to the safe passage of convoys. On the contrary, the Soviet authorities have been taking and are taking all possible measures for facilitating the arrival of convoys to the northern ports of the USSR.

With regard to the sealing of the Messing

Set, it
To: #728, March 10, 9 p.m., from London.

Set, it should be pointed out that the set, which was brought at the beginning of last summer and has been in use ever since, was imported into the USSR in infringement of the existing customs rules of the USSR. A respective act was made on the 18th February, 1943, by the Chief of the Narmanak Customs House, and the British representatives were officially informed of it.

A warning must be given that the Soviet authorities cannot overlook the infringement of the established rules. However, desiring to meet half-way the request of the British Government and in order to help the successful protection of the convoys, the Soviet Government gave instructions to reconsider this question and grant to the British naval authorities permission to use, the Measling Set, condition of the coordination of its work with the Soviet naval authorities in the north.

In regard to the British radio stations in the Soviet northern ports, it has been established that, in accordance with the request of the representative of the British naval mission, Commodore Courtenay, the Soviet naval authorities on the 7th March, 1942, gave permission to install eight British radio transmitters.
transmitters in Murmansk, Polazmaya and Archangel. Hereby were exactly stated the limits of power for every transmitter. The British naval mission, however, without the consent of the Soviet authorities, increased the power of its transmitters, and in certain cases multiplied the original power several times. In connection with this, on the 22nd of February, 1943, the People’s Commissariat of the Navy gave instructions to the respective authorities to propose to the British representatives of the naval mission in the north to reduce the power of its radio transmitters, i.e., to bring them into conformity with the power strength agreed upon at the beginning. The Naval Commissariat, however, has not yet given instructions to close down these transmitters. Simultaneously, it was pointed out that, if the British representatives considered it necessary to increase the power of their radio transmitters, they should apply on this question to the Soviet Naval Command for the necessary permission.

The Soviet Government would like to bring to the knowledge of the British Government that the above decisions of the Soviet naval authorities are based on...
-6-, #1728, March 10, 9 p.m., from London.

based on the rules in operation in the Soviet Union, according to which not a single foreign radio station can be opened on the territory of the USSR without special permission of the competent authorities.

Taking into account the request of the British Government, the Soviet Government gave instructions that the desire of the British naval mission for a certain increase of power for the registered British radio transmitters necessary for the operation of the convoy system should, as far as possible, receive consideration on the part of the Soviet naval authorities.

Three. On the vexatious formalities mentioned in the memorandum concerning the method of disembarkation, control of British Government goods, mail, et cetera, the Soviet Government is not quite clear what is meant by the memorandum. If on this question certain concrete facts could be submitted confirming the existence of certain vexatious formalities, the Soviet Government is prepared to give instructions to remove them or possibly to modify the established rules.

Insofar as in the British memorandum are also mentioned
-7- #1788, March 10, 9 p.m., from London.

mentioned formalities concerning the control of official and ordinary post passing through the northern ports, the Soviet Government would like to call the attention of the British Government to the following infringements on the part of British personnel:

For instance, in August 1942, on the British boat TRUMBLE there were brought into the U.S.S.R. 22 postal packages; on the 26th August, 1942, on the boat 1-30, 23 packages; on the 16th November, 1942, 70 packages—all without the necessary permit of the Soviet authorities. The British Embassy was duly informed about these infringements of the Soviet rules and in certain cases, desiring to meet the request of the Embassy, exceptions were made and the post was allowed to go through without the necessary documents. On this question the Foreign Commissariat sent to the British Embassy letters on the 31st August, 1942, the 7th September, 1942, 6th December, 1942 and the 19th, December, 1942. The Soviet Government, therefore, is entitled to expect that the British Government will give the necessary instructions to the respective British authorities to adhere to the existing rules of the
of the U.S.S.R. on this matter and not to infringe
them.

The Soviet Government is of the opinion that
in the practice of collaboration and joint work of
the Soviet and British military authorities it is
desirable and unavoidable that certain mutual
concessions and exceptions should be made, whether
on the question of visas, or receipt and despatch
of post, or customs regulations, etc. The Soviet
Government, however, believes that both governments
must accept as a fundamental principle to honour
the rules and regulations established in the other's
country and correspondingly instruct its subjects,
including representatives of military authorities,
to comply strictly with this principle. Moscow,
March 3, 1943°.

MATTHEWS

NPL
ALUSNA LONDON

9 MAR 1943

0711

TOUSIGNANT

MANSON

ALUSNA ARCHANGEL PASS TO FAYMONVILLE MOSCOW FOR INFO. NAVCOM WASH PASS TO CUSHING WSA FOR INFO. THIS FROM HARRIMAN TO ALUSNA ARCHANGEL

IN VIEW OF URGENT NEED OF SAWN TIMBER IN UNITED KINGDOM AND INASMUCH AS THERE ARE NO AVAILABLE BRITISH VESSELS IN WHITE SEA TO LOAD, WE ARE AGREEABLE TO THE SS BERING LOADING SAWN LUMBER FOR UNITED KINGDOM, QUANTITY NOT EXCEEDING MASTERS REQUIREMENTS, BUT WITH MINIMUM OF ABOUT 1500 STANDARD88. THIS IN REFERENCE TO YOUR 032223! PLEASE ADVISE. WE ARE GLAD TO NOTE THAT SOVIET AUTHORITIES WILL PROVIDE RETURN CARGOES OF CHROME ORE FOR ISRAEL PUTNAM AND CITY OF OMAHA.

REFERENCE IS CONFIDENTIAL

 ACTION: F-37(WSA)......

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

Regarded Unclassified
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

FEASIBILITY OF DELIVERING SUPPLIES TO RUSSIA VIA BERING STRAIT AND ARCTIC RIVERS

Note by the Secretary

The enclosure was prepared in response to a request from the Munitions Assignments Board. That request was distributed as J.I.C. 73/M.

A. SIDNEY BUFORD III,
Secretary.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

1. It is believed that by prompt and vigorous action on the part of the Soviet Government and assistance from the United States Government, the Lena River route (via Tiksi Bay - long. 129° E) could be developed to a point which would enable it during the summer of 1943 to handle around 200,000 tons of cargo. Additional essential information is needed in regard to many important features of the routes which lead inland East of Vilkitsky Strait (long. 103° E).

2. The capacity of the route leading west to the Yenisei and Ob Rivers and to Archangel and Murmansk is limited by the shortness of the navigation season at Vilkitsky Strait (five to eight weeks from about August first). It would also be influenced by the number of suitable icebreakers which the Soviet Government might make available.

3. Complete cooperation and considerable assistance from the Soviet Government are essential to use of these routes. The assistance required includes forecasts and aerial observations of ice conditions and the services of Soviet ice-breakers (all of which are believed to be available), as well as the furnishing of additional information regarding many related matters.

4. Vilkitsky Strait is the point on the Arctic routes at which the navigation season is shortest. The open season at that strait therefore fixes the period during which passage is possible between the Bering Sea in the east and ports on the Kara, White, or Barents seas (Yenisei River, Ob River, Archangel, Murmansk, etc.) in the west. De Long Strait (long. 179° E), usually open from late July to early October, is the point on the Arctic routes which has the next shortest season. The open season at that strait therefore fixes the period during which passage is possible between the Bering Sea and ports in the area between De Long and Vilkitsky Straits (Kolyma and Lena Rivers.)
5. In view of the vulnerability to attack of shipping using the Iceland route to North Russian ports during the summer months, the route through Bering and Vilkitsky Straits could profitably be used during its open period for the home-ward voyage of shipping which earlier reached these ports from the westward, and for the voyage to these North Russian ports of shipping which is later to make its homeward voyage by the Iceland route. It is questionable whether there would be time for a vessel passing west through Vilkitsky Strait to unload and return through that strait before it closed. To the extent practicable, the use of the Yenisei and Ob Rivers in preference to Archangel or Murmansk would have an advantage of security (avoiding the possibility of attack from bases in northern Norway or Finland).

6. If access to the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan is prevented by enemy action, the Lena and Kolyma River routes will assume considerable importance as possible supply routes for eastern Siberia.

ARGUMENT

General

7. The points on the Arctic Coasts of the U.S.S.R. which have already been used for the transshipment of cargo to be moved inland, and the points not known to have been so used which appear most worthy of consideration for future use in that manner, together with their approximate distances from Seattle and from Providence Bay (on the Siberian Coast just south of Bering Strait), are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Route</th>
<th>Distance in nautical miles from Seattle</th>
<th>Distance in nautical miles from Providence Bay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ambarick, at Kolyma</td>
<td>3,230</td>
<td>870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>River Mouth (long. 162° E)</td>
<td>3,240</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiksi Bay, near Lena</td>
<td>3,860</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>River Mouth (long. 129° E)</td>
<td>2,750</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Dickson, at Yenisei River Mouth (long. 80° E)</td>
<td>4,890</td>
<td>1,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 2 -</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Distance in nautical miles from

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Providence Bay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seattle (64° - 25°N,</td>
<td>172° - 35°W)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igarka (480 mi. up Yenisei</td>
<td>5,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>River)</td>
<td>3,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novy Port, Gulf of Ob (67°-</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42'N, 75°-57'E)</td>
<td>2,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archangel, White Sea (64°-</td>
<td>5,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32'N, 40°-33'E)</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murmansk, Kola Inlet (long.</td>
<td>5,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34°E)</td>
<td>2,990</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The distance from Seattle to Pass in the
Aleutians (long. 164°W) is 1,700 miles. The distance from
Pass to Providence Bay is 1,400 miles.

In comparison with the distances shown above, the
distance from New York to Archangel via Iceland is 4,400 miles
1,500 (2,470 from New York to Iceland, and 1,930 from Iceland to
Archangel).

8. The information now available regarding the Arctic
routes to the U.S.S.R. which pass through the waters lying
between Bering Strait on the east and Novaya Zemlya on the west
is incomplete or in need of verification with respect to numerous
matters bearing on ocean navigation, transshipment of cargo at
terminals, or subsequent inland shipment of cargo by river, rail,
or highway. The rough outline of the capacities and potential-
ities of those routes which can be constructed from the informa-
tion now available is, however, believed to be reasonably accurate
and to be probably adequate for the immediate purpose.

9. Little or no tonnage can be moved over any of these
Arctic supply routes without complete cooperation and consider-
able assistance from the Government of the U.S.S.R.

10. Arctic navigation and the use for transportation
purposes of routes passing along the Arctic Coast and leading
inland from it have been developed with some degree of activity
by the Soviet Government during recent years, and considerable
use has been made of these routes. The development has, however, been directed chiefly toward serving local areas by providing means for shipping out local products and shipping in supplies for local use.

Limiting Factors and Areas

11. The principal factors which limit the extent to which the Arctic routes can be used for shipments to the U.S.S.R. are ice, inadequate ports and port facilities, and inadequate facilities for moving cargo to its destination from the point at which it is unloaded from the ocean carrier. The ice and the inadequate ports and port facilities may, among other things, impose such limits on the draft of the ocean vessels which it is practicable to use on some of the Arctic routes that great difficulty would be encountered in finding tonnage which would be suitable and available for such use. Bunkering provisions (about which little is known) might also prove to be to some degree a limiting factor. Coal mined locally is believed to be available at a number of points along the most important of these routes; there is however, no local production of oil.

12. It is reported that a draft of 30 feet can safely be carried between the Bering Sea and the Kara Sea, but there are indications that about 24 or 25 feet may be the limit. Shallow draft is desirable for a vessel operating in Arctic Waters to enable it to use the lane which under bad ice conditions is sometimes open between the shore ice and thick ice grounded off shore in the shallow waters which border most of the coasts, but no definite information in terms of drafts in feet is available on this point. As regards types of ships for this service, the U.S.S.R. has apparently been using successfully a heterogeneous collection of ordinary cargo vessels, mostly of considerable age and small or moderate size.
13. Fog and overcast are frequent during the navigation season in most of the waters off the Arctic coasts of the U.S.S.R., but gales are apparently infrequent, rocks or reefs are apparently few, and soundings can in most areas probably be relied upon for navigational purposes. Ice is much the most serious navigational hazard, but it is believed that with proper assistance from the Soviet Meteorological Service and sufficient use of icebreakers and aircraft (both of which are said to be locally available) it should be possible to avoid losses of shipping from this cause. In the Bering Sea, fog, mist, rain, and low overcast are prevalent during the Arctic navigation season.

14. In scheduling voyages in the waters between the Bering and Kara Seas, generous allowances must be made for the delays and reductions in speed, often unpredictable, which are likely to be caused by ice conditions. It is probable that vessels should proceed through these waters in convoys accompanied by icebreakers rather than singly. It is not necessary for vessels passing through Bering Strait to proceed via Providence Bay (which, however, has a good harbor).

Ice

15. Ice conditions in Arctic Waters differ considerably from year to year. These differences result in considerable variations in the periods during which navigation is possible in each area and in the extent to which the services of icebreakers are required. The Soviet Authorities claim that their Meteorological Service, with its network of observation stations, radio communications and aerial observation facilities, is able, about March, to forecast in general terms the severity of the ice conditions which will be experienced during the coming summer and about a month in advance to forecast local ice conditions with considerable accuracy. They also claim that military priorities have not been permitted to interfere with the personnel or operation of that part of their Meteorological Service which observes and forecasts Arctic weather and ice conditions.
16. From the standpoint of ice, the worst point on the Arctic Coasts of the U.S.S.R. is usually Boris Vilkitsky Strait (long. 103° E.), through which all shipping between the Laptev (Nordenskjold) and Kara Seas must pass; the next worst point is De Long Strait (long. 179° E.), through which all shipping between the Chukotsk and East Siberian Seas must pass. It will be noted that shipping between Bering Strait and Ambarchik (Kolyma River) or Tiksi Bay (Lena River) must pass through De Long Strait but does not pass through Vilkitsky Strait, and that shipping between Bering Strait and all the other points named in paragraph 7 must pass through both De Long and Vilkitsky Straits. The periods during which these straits are navigable usually fix the periods during which navigation between Bering Strait and the points named in paragraph 7 is practicable. While Bering Strait is likely to open nearly a month before the opening of De Long Strait, it is likely to close only a short time after the closing of De Long Strait. Navigation of the western half of the Kara Sea and the waters to the westward of it is usually open for a considerable time before and after the navigation season in Vilkitsky Strait. To the westward of some point between Novaya Zemlya and Kola Inlet, navigation is open the year round.

With the assistance of icebreakers (which may not, however, be needed at all times) Vilkitsky Strait is, in an average year, navigable for much of the time during a period of about five to eight weeks beginning about August first. During this period northwesterly winds are likely, however, from time to time to bring in enough ice to make it temporarily impossible to navigate the strait even with the assistance of an icebreaker.

With the assistance of an icebreaker (which may not, however, be needed at all times) De Long Strait is, in an average year, navigable for about eight to ten weeks beginning the latter part of July. Ice interference here during August and September is usually considerably less than in Vilkitsky Strait.
17. Throughout most of the navigation season, the assistance of icebreakers is likely to be needed at various places, in addition to Vilkitsky and De Long Straits, between Bering Straits and the Kara Sea. The Soviet Government is believed to have six large icebreakers (three of them very large) and over 20 small ones which should be available for use in Arctic waters during the summer. The availability of each of these icebreakers for use elsewhere than in Vilkitsky Strait will depend largely on its location before the opening of navigation in that strait and where it is to be needed after the close of navigation in the strait. During other seasons, some of these icebreakers are usually employed in the White Sea or the vicinity and some in East Siberian waters, but they are not needed in those areas during the Arctic navigation season.

There is not available reliable information concerning the relation between the number and types of icebreakers required and the numbers, types, construction, speeds, and drafts of the vessels which might be convoyed between Bering Strait and points on the Arctic Coasts of the U.S.S.R.

Area West of Vilkitsky Strait

18. Inland shipment facilities are better on the Yenisei and Ob Rivers than on any of the other Arctic rivers. The Yenisei and Ob are usually open to navigation from about July first to late October and during that period could probably carry a considerable tonnage. But since they lie to the west of Vilkitsky Strait they are no more accessible to shipping passing through Bering Strait than are Archangel or other White Sea ports. The limiting factor is the amount of shipping which can be passed through Vilkitsky Strait and the waters to the east of it, rather than the port and inland shipment capacities to the west of the strait. The increased security (avoidance of attack from bases in northern Norway or Finland) might justify the use of the Yenisei and Ob Rivers in preference to
Archangel or Murmansk during the period in which their use is possible. There is need for more complete information concerning the facilities, capacities, and depths of water involved.

19. Since the Arctic route between the Kara and Bering Seas is navigable during the period in which shipping between Iceland and the White Sea is most vulnerable to attack from bases in northern Norway and Finland, there would apparently be advantages in using this route, to such extent as is possible, for shipments to and from ports on the Kara, White, or Barents Seas. The navigational restrictions and hazards which result from ice conditions and shoal water make it appear improbable, though not impossible, that enemy submarines or surface raiders would attempt to operate in the waters between Vilkitsky and De Long Straits. While ships coming west through Vilkitsky Strait might not be able to unload and start the return voyage in time to return through that strait, ships which had reached the Kara, White, or Barents Seas from the westward before the opening of Vilkitsky Strait might make their return voyage through that strait and the waters to the eastward; and ships reaching the Kara, White, or Barents Seas through Vilkitsky Strait might later make their return voyage to the westward. It might be possible by such an interchange of vessels to avoid upsetting any desired balance between the numbers of vessels in the Atlantic and in the Pacific, as might otherwise result from the passage of shipping through Vilkitsky Strait.

Area East of Vilkitsky Strait

20. Of the possible freight routes which lead inland from the Arctic Coast at points east of Vilkitsky Strait, the Lena River route appears to be the most promising. Although there are serious gaps in the information available, it is believed that by prompt and vigorous action this route could be developed to a point which would enable it during the summer of
1943 to handle around 200,000 tons of cargo. The depths in Tiksi Bay, where cargo would be transshipped from the ocean carrier to the river carrier, may limit to 25 feet or possibly even less the draft of the ocean carriers which could be used. There are reported to be, in Tiksi Bay, wharfs with sufficient depth of water for an ocean vessel and some cargo handling equipment, but little is definitely known about the equipment of that nature which is at present available in the vicinity.

From Tiksi Bay, shipments would be transported by river craft 14 miles along the coast to the entrance to the Lena Delta and thence through the delta and up the river to Vitim (1,914 miles). There is some uncertainty as to the means by which freight would be transported for the 440 miles between Vitim and the railhead at Ust Kut on the Lena. From Ust Kut, freight could travel by rail to its destination. Variations, such as branching off on the Aldan River below Yakutak and shipping by that route to a railhead at Tommot, or such as transporting by road from Yakutsk to Tommot, are possible. It is most unlikely that river craft of sufficient capacity are now available, but it might be possible by early and vigorous action in the local construction of wooden river craft and the provision of motive power from other sources to overcome that difficulty by the summer of 1943. Suitable action by the Soviet Government is obviously the most essential factor. The ability of this route to handle freight - except relatively small packages and possibly wheeled vehicles - would probably be very limited at best.

21. Next to the Lena River route, the Kolyma River route appears to be the most promising of the possible freight routes which lead inland from the Arctic Coast at points east of Vilkitsky Strait. By this route freight would be shipped by river to Verkhne-Kolymsky, thence by road or by river and road to Nagaev on the Sea of Okhotsk, thence by ship to Nikolaevsk.
on the Amur River and up that river to the railhead at Komsomol'sk, and thence by rail to destination. If this route should be used, cargo would have to be transhipped from the ocean to the river carrier in an open roadstead. Of the road which might be needed for that purpose there apparently is lacking a section between Verkhne-Kolymsk and Seimchan. It is reported, however, that under favorable conditions the Kolyma River is navigable as far as Seimchan for vessels of very shallow draft.

22. If access to the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan is prevented by enemy action, the Lena and Kolyma River routes will assume considerable importance as possible supply routes for eastern Siberia.
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

CORRIGENDUM

TO

J.I.C. 73/1

1. All holders of J.I.C. 73/1 are requested to substitute the enclosure for the table and last two subparagraphs of Paragraph 7.

2. This substitution does not affect any other part of J.I.C. 73/1 and involves only changes in the distances given and in the name of the pass through the Aleutian Islands mentioned in the subparagraph immediately following the tabulation.

A. SIDNEY BUFORD III,
Secretary.
ENCLOSURE

TO BE SUBSTITUTED FOR TABLE AND LAST TWO SUBPARAGRAPHS OF PARAGRAPH 7, J.I.C. 73/1.

Distance in nautical miles from

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Distance to Providence Bay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seattle</td>
<td>3,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiksi Bay, near Lena River Mouth</td>
<td>3,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Dickson, at Yenisei River</td>
<td>4,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igerka (470 mi. up Yenisei River)</td>
<td>5,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novy Port, Gulf of Ob (67°-42' N,</td>
<td>5,420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archangel, White Sea (64°-32' N,</td>
<td>5,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murmansk, Kola Inlet (long.34° E)</td>
<td>5,820</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The distance from Seattle to Akutan Pass in the Aleutians (long. 164° W) is 1700 miles. The distance from Akutan Pass to Providence Bay is 660 miles.

In comparison with the distances shown above, the distance from New York to Archangel via Iceland is 4,400 miles (2,500 from New York to Iceland, and 1,900 from Iceland to Archangel).
NOTE:

DISTANCES SHOWN ARE INACCURATE

ARCTIC SUPPLY ROUTES TO THE U.S.S.R.

Legend:
- Established northern sea route
- Proposed northern sea route
- Railroads under construction or projected
- Motor roads

North

Pacific

Ocean

Regraded Unclassified

Regraded Unclassified
### NAVAL MESSAGE

**FROM:** Hershaw Archangel  
**RELEASED BY:**  
**DATE:** 6 March 1943  
**TOR CODEROOM:** 1424  
**DECODED BY:** Marron  
**PARAPHRASED BY:** Patterson

**ADDRESSSES:** OPNAV  
**PRECEDENCE:** PRIORITY  
**PRIORITY:**  
**ROUTINE:**  
**DEFERRED:**

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**TEXT**

**ACTION**  
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<th>F-37</th>
<th>IG-00</th>
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(For Cushing and Faymonville)

SOVIETS PROMISED PROVIDE REQUIRED RETURN CARGO OF ORE FOR ISRAEL PUTNAM AND CITY OF OMAHABUT REQUESTS PERMISSION LOAD BERING WITH SAWN TIMBER FOR UK ADVISE. SOVIET STATES AMPLE ORE AND TIMBER BEING ASSEMBLED MOLOTOWSK. THEY EXPECT SHIPS READY DEPART MOLOTOWSK ABOUT MARCH 20.

F37...ACTION (NSA)  
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NAVAREO...FILE...

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/94

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Regraded Unclassified
NAVAL MESSAGE

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<td>OPNAV</td>
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RELEASED BY  

DATE 3 MARCH 1943

TOR CODEROOM 2158/2

DECODED BY NICHOLS

PARAPHRASED BY HATCH

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

HATCH 02970 NCR 2872

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME  

date  

TEXT

FOLLOWING FROM CONVERSATION MOSCOW ROUILLARD WITH CAPT. PAPANIN NOT FOR DISCLOSURE TO BRITISH, INDICATED PAPANIN'S DISPLEASED DALGLEISH AND BELIEF LATTER NOT COOPERATING TO BEST INTERESTS SOVIETS. SATISFIED WITH CAPT MAUND BRITISH SNO ARCHANGEL EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE ENTHUSIASM OVER POSSIBILITY USE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE FOR AMERICAN SHIPS COMING SUMMER AND STATED HE WOULD PERSONALLY LEAD ANY SUCH CONVOY. PLEASED WITH COOPERATION AND HELP AMERICAN NAVAL PERSONNEL NORTH RUSSIA AND SUGGESTED IT WOULD BE MOST USEFUL AND DESIRABLE MORE OFFICERS FAMILIARIZE THEMSELVES THIS AREA. CONTINUES STRESS IMPORTANCE WHITE PORTS AS LESS VULNERABLE THAN MURMANSK AND BELIEVES MAXIMUM EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE BRING AS MANY SHIPS THERE AS POSSIBLE.

(*) AS RECEIVED IN NCR.

F-37 ACTION

COMINCH 16 FILE

ACTION: F-30

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

Regraded Unclassified
SOVIET SHIP AGENTS "INFLOT" HAS PROVEN INCOMPETENT
PROPERLY HANDLE FOREIGN VESSELS DUE DEFICIENCIES IN
ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT. ATTENTION COMMISSARIAT
FOREIGN TRADE INVITED THESE DEFICIENCIES AND IT CONCURS
WITH ASSURANCE OF EARLY REMEDY. WILL ADVISE IF SHORT
COMINGS THIS AGENCY CONTINUE TO JEOPARDIZE READINESS OF
VESSELS FOR RETURN VOYAGE OR WELFARE OF SHIPS IN PORT.

CONFIDENTIAL

Regraded Unclassified
JOINT STRATEGIC SURVEY COMMITTEE DESIRES THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE BY DISPATCH. AMPLIFICATION BY AIRMAIL. ICE PROGNOSIS FOR 1943, COMPLETE INFORMATION ON PORTS ALONG ROUTE, FUEL STORAGE AVAILABLE, LIMITATIONS ON DRAFT AND TYPE OF VESSEL USED ALONG THE ROUTE, MOST SUITABLE SIZE FOR A CONVOY ESCORTED BY ICEBREAKERS, INFORMATION ON KOLYMA LENA YENISEI OB PECHORA RIVERS, DEPTH AND RIVER CRAFT AVAILABLE.

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)
**NAVAL MESSAGE**

**DRAFTER**

FROM: MOSCOW (COMNAVEU)

RELEASED BY

TOR CODEROOM: 1529

DECODED BY: RICHIN/RINDS

PARAPHRASED BY: HANSON

**ADDRESSSES**

OPNAV

COMNAVEU

**PRIORITY**

PRIORITY

PRIORITY

**PRECEDENCE**

ROUTINE

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

DEFERRED

**INFORMATION**

**EXTENSION NUMBER**

**ADDRESSSES**

**TEXT**

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<td>261710</td>
<td>NCR 259</td>
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(ACTION OF NAV FROM MOSCOW INFO COMNAVEU LATTER PASS TO OPNAV)

Motolovsk on Whitt Sea West of Anchorage.

ROULLARD TRIP 12 DAYS ICE BREAKER NIKOVAN TO PONOE LIGHT AND RETURN. TOOK OUT 4 MERCHANT SHIPS FROM MOLOTOVSK WITH HELP BREAKER LENIN. SHIPS LOADED 1/3 CAPACITY PROPS 2 FEET UNDER. IN DAY NEAR MOLOTOVSK 16 INCHES NEW FLAT SOLID ICE.

MADE SPEEDS IN CONVOY 6 TO 8 KNOTS. COMMISSIONING ENTRANCE GORLO AT NIKODINSKI LIGHT ENCOUNTED HUMMACKY FLOES OF BLOCKS OF ICE 2 TO 2 1/2 FEET THICK FILED UP THROUGH ACTION WIND TIDE AND RESEMBLING HUGE BOULDERS. COVERED 2 TO 10 MILES DURING 9 HOURS DAYLIGHT EACH DAY. LAY TO DURING DARKNESS. ICE RECONNAISSANCE PLANES ASSISTED DROPPED NOTES INDICATING BEST COURSES. CONT'D ON PAGE 2

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch office in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

Regraded Unclassified
**NAVY MESSAGE**

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<tr>
<td>PARAPHRASED BY</td>
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**NAVAL MESSAGE**

- MILIOYAN DRAWS ALMOST 29 FEET. POOR QUALITY COAL FROM YOKKUTA CONSIDERABLY REDUCED EFFICIENCY BREAKERS.
- MAXIMUM 2 MERCHANTMEN TO EACH BREAKER. LATTER NOW UNDER US NAVY WITH MERCHANT CREWS AND NAVY ARMED GUARD.
- DISCIPLINE INFORMAL BUT EXCELLENT. FOOD AMERICAN FIRST RATE.
- PLENTIFUL LIQUOR FORBIDDEN. MILIOYAN OF BROAK BEAM TENDS RIDE UP ON ICE WHICH DESIRABLE IN OPENING LEADS.
- SOLID FIELDS BUT WHEN IN BROKEN ICE LATTER PILES UP UNDER BOX EVENTUALLY STOPPING SHIP. LENINGSHARP WITH NARROWER BEAM HAS ADDITIONAL PROPELLOR FORWARD AND IS TYPE WHICH OPERATES WELL IN BROKEN PACK ICE SUCH AS FOUND CORLO.
- INDICATED THAT WITH ICEDREAKER FLEET NOW IN WHITE SEA MILIOYAN LENIN KRASSIN KAGANOVICH LITKE CEDOV-SHIPS CAN BE BROUGHT IN AND OUT MOLTOVSK REST OF ICE SEASON.
- ALTHOUGH GOING MIGHT BE SLOW AT TIMES AND ALWAYS POSSIBILITY CONT'D ON PAGE 3

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

Regraded Unclassified
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM

RELEASED BY

DATE

TOP CODEROOM

DECODED BY

PARAPHRASED BY

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

PAGE 3

261414

NCR 226

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRIORITY.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

DATE

TIME

GCT

TEXT

ACTION

F-00

F-01

F-015

F-015

F-05

F-07

F-1

F-11

F-12

F-13

F-30

F-31

F-32

F-33

F-34

F-35

F-37

10-00

VCNO

SOME DAMAGE PROPS RUDDER. PREFERABLE SHIPS TONNAGE

6,000 OR LESS BUT NOT LOD POWERED. LIBERTYS NOT

RECOMMENDED DUE POOR MANEUVERABILITY LENGTH AND BEAM.

NO DANGER SHIPS HULLS CAUGHT IN ICE DUE BROKEN

CHARACTER SURROUNDING FIELD BUT PROP AND RUDDER

VULNERABLE WHEN SHIP IN BALLAST OR BACKING.

ESPECIALLY OTHER THAN STEEL PROP. OCCASIONAL GERMAN

RECONNAISSANCE PLANES OVER.

ACTION: F-37....

16...39...COMINCH...

FILE. NAVAIDE.......

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

OSD 12-30 Sec 5-3-1

(See Art 76 (4) NAVREGS)

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/44
NAVAL MESSAGE

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RELEASED BY

19 FEB 1943

TOR CODEROOM

947

DECODED BY

RISHIN

MANSON

PARAPHRASED BY

LT. ROBINSON

181415

NCR 3468

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

DATE

TIME

GCT

TEXT

ACTION

F-00

F-01

F-015

F-010

F-05

F-07

F-1

F-11

F-2

F-3

F-30

F-31

F-32

F-35

F-34

F-35

F-37

10-00

VCD

AFTER 8 DAY TRIP TO ICE EDGE WHITE SEA AND 4 DAYS RETURNING ABOARD LARGEST NEWEST BREAKER MIKOVAN COMPANY BREAKER LENIN AND 4 STEAMERS AND CONSIDERING ALL PREVIOUS RECOMMENDATIONS CONVINCED FURTHER USE W. ARCHANGEL

MOLOTOVSK IMPractical UNLESS SOVIETS RADICALLY IMPROVE CARGO HANDLING PLUS USE ONLY SMALL WITH LIGHT LIFTS AND LOADED ALMOST TO CAPACITY. OUTBOUND CONVOY HELD UP IN ICE DUE SHALLOW DRAFT AND POOR MANEUVERABILITY LARGE SHIPS PLUS POOR COAL AVAILABLE FOR BREAKERS.

BAD ICE IN GORLOVEN TROUBLED MIKOVAN BUT WHITE SEA BASIN AND MOLOTOVSK AREA COVERED ONLY WITH SMALL ICE.

ACTION: F-37...