MR 142, Sec. 3 — RUSSIAN CONVOYS

1944 - 1945
Northern Fleet reports period February 19 to 26 U-Boats continue to operate off Murmansk coast and Norwegian Sea from 2 to 3 subs in each region for same period German planes types BF 110, HE 111, and Ju 88 carried on reconnaissance over Norwegian Sea. In Narvik Feb 24, 2 Sub Tenders 3 subs 1 Light Cruiser 1 750 ton transport plus 1 3000 tons plus 1 1500 tons and probably 5 transports at 4500 tons each plus 25 escort ships. Period Feb 20 to 22, Ju 88 torpedo planes attacked Ally convoy.

16-COG

Cominch op 03...20c....

Secret

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

Declassified
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
NAVY DEPARTMENT

NAVAL MESSAGE

DRATER
ADMIRALTY

RELEASED BY

DATE
23 FEBRUARY 1945

TOR CODEROOM
159/23

DECODED BY
PARAPHRASED BY
MORRIS

FOR ACTION

KATEL SECTION B
(NEGATIVE FOC W AFRICA)

INFORMATION

PRECEDECE

PRIORITY
RUTINE
DEFERRED
PRIORITY
RUTINE
DEFERRED

213217A
NCR 9247

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT
(RECEIVED BY HAND FROM D.A.D.)

ALL 2/TH ABOUT 25 TORPEDO JUNKERS 88 ATTACKED CONVOY FROM NORTH RUSSIA IN BOR ISLAND AREA. ATTACK WAS
UNSUCCESSFUL AND BELIEVED NO DAMAGE TO 4 STRAGGLERS.
HALIFAX CONVOY HAD TO LEAVE TO ON 29TH BUT WAS REPORTED
PROCEEDING ON 2/TH. 3 ENEMY AIRCRAFT WERE SHOT DOWN.
H.M.S. VELVET ESCORTING CONVOY TO IRISH SEA HAS TORPEDOED AND SUNK ON 2/TH SOUTH WEST OF TUSKAR ROCK. NIGHT
28TH/29TH CIRCSRED ACTIVITY BY 2-BOATS TOOK PLACE IN
SOUTHERN NORTH SEA. REPORTED MANY ENGAGEMENTS TOOK
PLACE IN MINELAYING SUSPECTED. 4 U.S. MERCHANT SHIPS IN
FIRST CONVOY TO ENTER BLACK SEA WERE DUE AT ODESSA ON
2/TH. H.M.S. PATHFINDER H.M.S. PALADIN WITH 6 2/LS AND
5 40MM, AND 14 LCA HAVE OPERATED EAST OF RAEREE ISLAND
IN SUPPORT OF ARMY AND PREVENTED ESCAPE OF JAPANESE.
12 LAUNCHED ENEMY CRAFT ENEMY CRAFT SUNK 65 JAPANESE
KILLED. ON 11TH H.M.S. PATHFINDER DAMAGED BY NEAR MISS
DURING ATTACK ON THIS FORCE BY 8 ENEMY A/C

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-15
213217A

RECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/15/44

Regraded Unclassified
**TOP SECRET DISPATCH**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DRAFTER</th>
<th>ALUSNA MOSCOW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RELEASED BY</td>
<td>21 FEB 1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>1109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOR CODEROOM</td>
<td>KIMBRELL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DECODED BY</td>
<td>HARTZELL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARAPHRASED BY</td>
<td>WHITTINGTON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROUTED BY</td>
<td>WHITTINGTON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOR ACTION</td>
<td>CNO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADDRESSER</td>
<td>COM 8TH FLT ALUSNA ISTANBUL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRECEDENCE</td>
<td>ROUTINE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CINCME0 091343 OF DECEMBER INDICATED COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF AGREEMENT TO CONTROL ORGANIZATION DESCRIBED THEREIN FOR BLACK SEA ALLIED SHIPPING. ALUSNA MOSCOW 081815 GAVE ALUSNA ISTANBUL POLICY INSTRUCTIONS BASED ON CINCME0 DESPATCH AND CURRENT SITUATION. ALUSNA ISTANBUL 151422 PASSED BY OPNAV AS 180830 RAISES QUESTION AS TO BRITISH OR AMERICAN RESPONSIBILITY FOR GIVING SHIPS INSTRUCTIONS, REQUEST CNO CLARIFY CONTROL DESIRED BY US SHIPPING FROM ISTANBUL AND DEFINE USNAVPO DUTIES CONNECTION THEREWITH.**

**NCR ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:**

**COMINCH(#1-8)...ACT**

**16(#9)...FX37(#10)...**

**NOTE:** NCR HAS REENCIPHERED AND PASSED TO NAVCOM FOR TRANSMISSION TO COM 8TH FLT AND ALUSNA ISTANBUL FOR INFO AS 211530.
TOP SECRET DISPATCH

FROM: ALUSNA ISTANBUL
RELEASED BY: [Handwritten initials]
DATE: 15 FEB 1945
TOR CODE ROOM: 1747
DECODED BY: SCHMICK
PAR Coded By: WHITTINGTON CHARDZELL
ROUTED BY: WHITTINGTON
ADDRESS: ALUSNA ISTANBUL
ADDRESSEES: CNO
FOR ACTION: ALUSNA MOSCOW

PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY 1

151422
NCR 2318

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

THIS IS TOPSECRET. ALUSNA ISTANBUL SENDS TO CNO WHO RELAY TO
ALUSNA MOSCOW FOR ACTION. **

YOUR 091412Z* YOUR INSTRUCTIONS THAT CONTROL OF U.S. SHIPS
PROCEEDING BLACK SEA FROM BOSPORUS IS A MATTER OF U.S.
COLLABORATION RAISES QUESTION AS TO WHETHER BRITISH OR
AMERICAN AUTHORITIES HERE RESPONSIBLE FOR GIVING SHIPS THEIR
INSTRUCTIONS. REQUEST CLARIFICATION.

NOTE: DELAYED DUE TO SERVICE FOR 10 MISSING GROUPS

*DATE/TIME GROUP USED BY RDO WASHN FOR REENCRYPTER TO
ALUSNA ISTANBUL AND COMEYTHFLT OF ALUSNA MOSCOW'S 081815Z.

NCR ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:
COMINCH(#1-8).......COG
16(#9)......FX37(#10).....

**RDO WASHN REENCRYPTED AND SENT TO NAVCOM FOR TRANSMISSION TO
ALUSNA MOSCOW AB 100630

This dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence and as administrative.

UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

Regraded Unclassified
### Top Secret Dispatch

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drawer</th>
<th>Ext.</th>
<th>Addresses</th>
<th>Precedence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALUSNA MOSCOW</td>
<td></td>
<td>USNAVPO ISTANBUL</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>COM 8TH FLT</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>COMINCH</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>WSA WASHINGTON</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ALUSNA ODESSA</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Date:** 9 FEB 1945  
**Released by:**  
**To Tower:** 091015  
**Decoded by:** ANDERSON  
**Paraphrased by:** BALDWIN  
**Checked by:** BALDWIN  
**Dittoed by:** BALDWIN  
**Routed by:** BALDWIN  

*UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.*

---

**Page 1 of 2**  
**0818152**  
**NCR 5313**

---

The following policy instructions subject to modification by INFO Addressee are for your guidance in administering and routing American ships from Bosphorus to Black Sea Ports:

(A) Black Sea Routes to be promulgated will be result of Tripartite Agreement in Moscow and may be sent to you by either US or British authorities.

(B) British control of US ships which they have exercised in Med and the Straits does not extend into Black Sea but is a matter of US collaboration.

(C) Close cooperation should be maintained with Capt Stevens. Your cooperation should be maintained with understanding that you are conducting US business in the Black Sea directly with the Russians and the following:

(D) Lt Comdr Harshaw whose cable address is ALUSNA ODESSA. He is:

---

**Top Secret**

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations.

---

Regraded Unclassified

---

DECLASSIFIED  
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4  
NLR 101  
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

---

OPNAV 19-78
SECRET DISPATCH

FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW

RELEASED BY

DATE 9 FEB 1945

TOR CODEROOM

DECODED BY

PARAPHRASED BY

ROUTED BY

ADDRSEES

ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRSEEE

PRECEDENCE

1 PRIORITY

2 ROUTINE

3 DEFERRED

4 BASEGRAM

5 PRIORITY

6 ROUTINE

7 DEFERRED

8 BASEGRAM

9 PRIORITY

10 ROUTINE

11 DEFERRED

12 BASEGRAM

13 PRIORITY

14 ROUTINE

15 DEFERRED

16 BASEGRAM

17 IF OPERATIONAL

18 CHECK BELOW

PAGE 2 OF 2 0818152 NCR 5313

DESIGNATED WSA REPRESENTATIVE ODESSA.

(E) ALUSNA MOSCOW WHO WILL PASS TO US MILMIS WHO IN TURN HANDLES

WSA MATTERS IN MOSCOW.

(F) RETURN ROUTING INSTRUCTIONS TO THE BOSPORUS WILL BE ISSUED

BY HARSHAW.

* NCR HAS REENCIPIHERED AND PASSED CODE TO NAVCOM FOR TRANSMISSION

TO COM 8TH FLT AS 091412 AND TO USNAVPO ISTANBUL AS 091412

NCR ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION:

COMINCH(#1-8)....COG

16(#9).....FX37(#10)....WSA(#11).....

Regraded Unclassified
NAVAL MESSAGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DRAFTER</th>
<th>EXTENSION NUMBER</th>
<th>ADDRESSES</th>
<th>PRECEDENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALASKA, U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>2322</td>
<td>CNO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RELEASED BY 9 JAN 45

TOR CORDEROM: YEAGER

DECODED BY LITTLE, E.

TYPED BY THOMPSON

Routed by

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND PRIORITY ROUTINE

if operational check below

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>TIME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

WINTER ROUTE IN OKhotsk Sea for Soviet Vessels

Proceeding to US and return goes into effect 1st January. Course same as that laid down last year namely vessels proceed from 1st Kurile Strait to Lat 51-30 N Long 155 E thence to Lat 46-30 N along 148 E. From latter point chart of vessels will be guided by instructions of icebreakers handling passage through LAV PERILOCT.

ACTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

COMINCH...CNO...20G...FX37...NAVAGE...20GP...

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to code room watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

DECLASSIFIED

Regraded Unclassified
**TOP SECRET DISPATCH**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DRAFTER</th>
<th>EXT.</th>
<th>ADDRESSEES</th>
<th>PRECEDENCE</th>
<th>PRIORITY</th>
<th>ROUTINE</th>
<th>DEFERRED</th>
<th>BASEGRAM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FROM</td>
<td>ALUSHA MOSCOW RUSSIA</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>CNO*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELEASED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>5 JANUARY 1945</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOR CODEBOOK</td>
<td>219</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DECODED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARAPHRASED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROUTED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**INFORMATION**

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

**ORIGINATOR TELL IN DATE AND TIME GROUP**

(Use G. C. T.)

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

TOP SECRET.

ACCORDING TO SOVIET NAVAL STAFF MINIMUM DEPTH OF WATER IN CHANNEL SEA OF OKHOTSK TO SEA OF JAPAN THROUGH TARTAR STRAITS IS 17 FEET. THEY STATE HOWEVER THAT UNFAVORABLE WINDS OR TIRES ON OCCASIONS MAY REDUCE THIS TO 16 OR EVEN 15 FEET. TIRES ALSO INCREASE MINIMUM DEPTH AT TIMES BY 5 OR 6 FEET.

YOUR 3/2146 DEC. AS PRACTICAL MATTER A NUMBER OF LIBERTIES LIGHTENED TO 17 AND 1/2 FOOT DRAFT GOT THROUGH WITHOUT DIFFICULTY PAST SUMMER. ALL VESSELS MAKING THIS PASSAGE TAKE ON PILOTS. USE OF STRAIT BY VESSELS DRAWING 20 FEET NOT FEASIBLE. FOR PLANNING PURPOSES CONSIDER 17 1/2 FOOT AS MAXIMUM USEABLE DRAFT AS ANY GREATER IS TOO MUCH DEPENDENT UPON DAILY TIDAL AND WEATHER CONDITIONS.

**C/CH:\** COPIES 1 TO 8 INCLUSIVE **SCR HAS NOT DELIVERED TO CNO**

No. 1 ADMIRAL
No. 2 FILE
No. 3F-1 OR CHARTROOM
No. SPECIAL

DECLAREIFIED E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

Regraded Unclassified
THE FOLLOWING INFO RELATIVE TO NAVIGATION OF SHIPS ENTERING THE BLACK SEA BOUND FOR ODESSA IS QUOTED FROM SOVIET LETTER.

IT IS BEING PASSED TO BRITISH HERE AND SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO EACH SHIP ENTERING THE BLACK SEA AND INTERESTED ALLIED OFFICERS: "COURSE OF AMERICAN TRANSPORTS IN THE BLACK SEA:

(A) AFTER EMERGING FROM THE BOSPORUS TRANSPORTS WILL PROCEED ALONG THE TURKISH COAST TO A POINT LAT 41-16 LONG 29-25 THEN WILL LAY A STRAIGHT COURSE TO THE APPROACH POINT LAT 46-08-01 LONG 31-26-02.

(B) FROM THE APPROACH POINT TRANSPORTS WILL INDEPENDENTLY PROCEED TO THE WAITING AREA THE LIMITS OF WHICH ARE, ON THE SOUTH THE 46-05-00 PARALLEL ON THE NORTH TENDROFKA ISLAND ON THE WEST MERIDIAN 31-35-00 AND ON THE EAST MERIDIAN 31-45-00.

(C) FROM THE WAITING AREA TRANSPORTS WILL PROCEED TO THE PORT
OP SECRET DISPATCH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DRAFTER</th>
<th>EXT.</th>
<th>ADDRESSES</th>
<th>PRECEDENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALUSNA MOSCOW</td>
<td></td>
<td>CNO</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DECODED BY:

PARAPHRASED CHECKED BY:

ROUTED BY:

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.

OF ODessa UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF PILOTS OR IN THE CASE OF BAD WEATHER AND DIFFICULTY IN RECEIVING PILOTS ABOARD TRANS-PORTS UNDER GUIDANCE OF PATROL CUTTERS, AREAS DANGEROUS TO NAVIGATION.

(D) IN LEAVING THE BOSPORUS THERE IS AN AREA DANGEROUS FOR NAVIGATION BOUNDED ON THE SOUTH BY THE 41-19-00 PARALLEL AND ON THE EAST BY MERIDIAN 29-20-00.

(E) NORTH OF THE APPROACH POINT TRANSPORTS MUST NOT PROCEED WITHOUT PILOTS OR PATROL CUTTERS INTO THE REGION BOUNDED ON THE NORTH BY PARALLEL 31-25-00 AND ON THE SOUTH BY THE PARA-ALLEL 46-10-00. AIDS TO NAVIGATION ALONG THE ROUTE FOLLOWED BY TRANSPORTS INDEPENDENTLY.

(F) LIGHTED BUOY ON THE APPROACH POINT LAT 46-08-01 LONG 31-26-02. LIGHT IS WHITE. FLASHING VISIBLE WITHIN A RANGE OF 4 MILES.

(G) TENDROFSKY LIGHT. LAT 46-19-03 LONG 31-30-09. LIGHT IS

---

SECRET

---

Regraded Unclassified
WHITE CONSTANT VISIBLE 13 MILES. 

(H) A RADIO BEACON OPERATING IN ALL DIRECTIONS ON CAPE BOLSHOI.

FONTRAN LAT 46-22-06 LONG 30-45-00. RADIO BEACON WORKS ON CALL ON A WAVE LENGTH OF 942 METERS. CALL IS RR 90 MILES.

COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN SHIP AND SHORE WILL BE FROM SOVIET STATION AT ODESSA MANNED BY OPERATORS CAPABLE OF USING ENGLISH CODE. REQUEST ADVISE US MERSHIP CALL PROCEDURE AND FREQUENCIES THEY USE. I HAVE ASKED FOR CURRENT INFO ON ALL BLACK SEA NAV.

GATION AID AND ON KNOWN MINED AREAS WRECKS ETC, AND ALSO THAT CHIEF OF STAFF AT ODESSA BE GIVEN GENERAL DIRECTIVE FROM MOSCOW TO MAKE ALL PRESENT AND CHANGING INFO DIRECTLY AVAILABLE TO LT COMDR HARSHAW AT ODESSA. THE ROUTE TO ODESSA IS CLEAR OF MINES OR OBSTRUCTION. SHIPS MUST POSITIVELY AVOID ARRIVAL OF PILOT OR GUIDE SHIP AT WAITING AREA BECAUSE SWEEPED CHANNEL THROUGH LARGE DANGER AREA IS HARROW AND MARKINGS ARE KNOWN ONLY TO PILOTS.
### OP SECRET DISPATCH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>ALUSNA MOSCOW</th>
<th>RELEASED BY</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>22 DEC 1944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TO CODED BY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DECODED BY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARAPHRASED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROUTED BY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ADDRESSEES**

- CNO

**PRECEDENCE**

- PRIORITY
- ROUTINE
- DEFERRED
- BASEGRAM

---

**NCR ORIGINAL DISTRIBUTION**

- COMINCH(#1-8)....ACT
- FX37(#9)....

**NO FURTHER DISTRIBUTION UNLESS DIRECTED BY COMINCH**

---

**DECLASSIFIED**

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94

---

**Regraded Unclassified**
(TOP SECRET FOR COMINCH AND CNO FROM ALUSNA MOSCOW)

REF UR 202132 LAST PARA. SINCE BLACK SEA IS NO LONGER A
COMBATANT AREA AND IS WELL REMOVED FROM PROBABLE AIR ATTACKS
SOVIETS DO NOT CONSIDER IT NECESSARY TO CONVOY OR ESCORT SHIPS
FROM ISTANBUL TO BLACK SEA PORTS. THEIR FIRST INFORMATION ON
BLACK SEA ROUTING AND CONTROL WAS RECEIVED YESTERDAY AND
IS BEING PREPARED FOR SEPARATE DISPATCH. THEY SPECIFY NO
CONVOY ROUTING SECTION REQUIRED AT ODESSA OTHER THAN WSA
REPRESENTATION BY 4 NAVAL PERSONNEL. THEY ARE ARRANGING FOR
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN SHIP AND SHORE BY ASSIGNING
OPERATORS TO THEIR ODESSA STATION CAPABLE OF HANDLING ENGLISH
CODES. I AM SENDING LT COMDR HARSHAW TO ODESSA TO TAKE CHARGE
AND BELIEVE HIM CAPABLE OF HANDLING SITUATION BEST AFTER HIS

Top Secret

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations.
OP SECRET DISPATCH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ext.</th>
<th>Address(es)</th>
<th>Precedence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Released by

Date

From code room

Decoded by

Paraphrased by

Suggested by

*Asterisk (*) indicates flagrant address.

Unless otherwise indicated, this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence and at administrative.

If operational, check below

 Originator fill in date and time group

(Use G.C.T.)

3 years experience with Russian liaison and routing at Archangel.

Copying copies 1 to 8 inclusive.

No. 1 Admiral

Top Secret

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in article 78, Navy Regulations.

Reclassified

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/30/94

OPNAV 19-78

Regraded Unclassified
FOLLOWING IS DIGEST OF US MILITARY MISSION MOSCOW NR 41
22963 TO WAR DEPT. SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS READY TO TAKE AMERICAN
SHIPS AT ODESSA CAPACITY OF WHICH IS 9 CARGO SHIPS AND 5 TANKERS
SIMULTANEOUSLY MAXIMUM DRAFT 28 FEET. EXCESSES WILL BE RECEIVED
AT NOVOROSSISK AND TUAPSE. THEY ARE READY TO RECEIVE FIRST 5
SHIPS IN BLACK SEA TOWARD END OF JANUARY. 15,000 TO 20,000 TONS
OF MANGANESE PER MONTH WILL BE AVAILABLE AT PORT OF POTI FOR
RETURN CARGOES. ODESSA WILL PROVIDE FUEL SUFFICIENT TO ENABLE
RETURNING SHIPS TO PROCEED TO NEXT MEDITERRANEAN BASE. SOVIET
RADIO OPERATORS AT ODESSA WILL MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH AMERICAN
SHIPS. OFFICE AND LIVING SPACE WILL BE PROVIDED FOR NSA REPRESENT-
ATIVES IN ODESSA. ON JANUARY 15 ADMIRAL OLSEN WILL SEND 2 NAVAL
OFFICERS AND 2 RATINGS TO ODESSA FROM MOSCOW. SOVIETS ADVISE
**TOP SECRET DISPATCH**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LETTER</th>
<th>EXT.</th>
<th>ADDRESSEES</th>
<th>PRECEDENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FROM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELEASED BY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOR CODE Room</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DECODED BY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARAPHRASED BY</td>
<td>CHECKED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DITTOED</td>
<td>BY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROUTED BY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW**

Unless otherwise indicated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence and as administrative.

**PAGE 2 OF 2**

202132 NCR 49369/49370

Originator fill in DATE AND TIME GROUP (Use G. C. T.)

On outgoing dispatches please leave about one inch clear space before beginning text

That such technical details as routing, navigation aids, pilots, communications will be arranged between themselves and naval division of US military mission Moscow.

in view of availability in eighth fleet of personnel qualified in routing and similar matters US military mission Moscow should deal directly with com Eighth Fleet in obtaining personnel within latter's capacity to supply.

COMINCH copies 1 to 8 inclusive

COMINCH has delivered to NCR for further distribution to C/S US ARMY (#9)........WSA (#10)...........

No. 1 ADMIRAL.

No. 2 FILE.

No. 3-F-1 OR CHARTROOM.

No. 4 SPECIAL.

**TOP SECRET**

Handle only in accordance with "Top Secret" instructions contained in Article 76, Navy Regulations.

OPNAV 19-78

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

Regraded Unclassified
ALUSNA MOSCOW

INFORMED BY SENIOR NAVAL OFFICER NORTH RUSSIA BRITISH DESTROYER CRISANDRA ESCORTING RA 62 DAMAGED BY SUBMARINE TORPEDO AND RETURNED KOLA INLET FOR REPAIR. DURING AIR ATTACKS ON CONVOY N3 JU 88 DESTROYED AND 1 BRITISH PLANE LOST. NORVEGIAN FRIGATE UNGANVASTLE SUNK BY MINE OFF KILKENESS. ADVISE IF SUCH INFO DESIRED IN FUTURE OR IS IT BEING RECEIVED BY MORE DIRECT MEANS.
From: US Military Mission, Moscow Russia
To: War Department
Nr: M 22063 18 Dec 1944

To AGWAR for Joint Chiefs of Staff and for York Presidents Protocol Committee from Deane M 22063.

I had a meeting with Yutikov, Vice Commissar of Soviet Foreign Trade, who gave me the following information relative to the Black Sea.

1. The Soviet Government is prepared to accept American Ships at Odessa.
2. Odessa can receive 9 cargo ships simultaneously with a draft up to 28 feet. At the same time it can receive simultaneously 5 tankers.
3. If in the future the number of ships being sent exceed the capacity of Odessa the Soviets are prepared to receive dry cargo ships and tankers in the ports of Novorossisk and Tuapse.
4. Soviets state that in accordance with the suggestion submitted by General Spalding some time ago, it is agreeable to them to have the first 5 ships arrive in the Black Sea toward the end of January and they will be accepted at Odessa.
5. Soviet Government is agreeable in having part of the ships loaded for Persia Gulf diverted to the Black Sea.
6. Soviets state that it is particularly important and desirable that all cranes for the Black Sea be loaded on the first ships to arrive and that in addition there be provided 10 to 12 knock-down metal warehouses.

CM-IN-18893 (20 Dec 44)
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

PRIORITY
CORRECTED COPY

Page 2

From: US Military Mission Moscow Russia

Nr: M 22063 18 Dec 1944

7. Manganese will be available at the port of Poti for return cargoes in the amount of 15000 to 20000 tons per month.

8. Bunker fuel will be provided at Odessa for returning American ships in sufficient quantity to enable them to proceed to nearest Mediterranean Base.


10. Radio contact with American ships will be maintained through Soviet radio communications with Soviet operators at Odessa.

11. Living and office space will be made available for WSA representatives in Odessa. In this connection I informed Krutikov that Admiral Olsen would send 2 Naval officers and 2 enlisted men to Odessa from Moscow on January 15. This was agreeable to Krutikov.

Krutikov informed me that the necessary technical details would be arranged between the Naval division of this mission and the Soviet Naval authorities. This is in reference to routing, navigation aides, use of Soviet pilots, radio communications, danger point, submerged wrecks and related matters.

Request that I be informed as soon as possible of your present program for Black Sea shipping.

End

Corrected copy of CM-IN-18038 (19 Dec 44) GEN YORK
ACTION: GEN YORK
INFO : JCS, ADM LEARY, GEN ARNOLD, GEN SOMERVELL, GEN HULL,
GEN BISSELL, ADM KING, C OF S

CM-IN-18893 (20 Dec 44) 0055Z

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAR 2 F 1974

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia
To: War Department
Nr: M 22063 18 December 1944

I had a meeting with Krutikov, Vice Commissar of Soviet Foreign Trade, who gave me the following information relative to the Black Sea.

1. The Soviet Government is prepared to accept American ships at Odessa.

2. Odessa can receive 9 cargo ships simultaneously with a draft up to 28 feet. At the same time it can receive simultaneously 5 tankers.

3. If in the future the number of ships being sent exceed the capacity of Odessa the Soviets are prepared to receive dry cargo ships and tankers in the ports of Novorossisk and Tuapse.

4. Soviets state that in accordance with the suggestion submitted by General Spalding some time ago, it is agreeable to them to have the first 5 ships arrive in the Black Sea toward the end of January and they will be accepted at Odessa.

5. Soviet Government is agreeable in having part of the ships loaded for Persia Gulf diverted to the Black Sea.

CM-IN-18038 (19 Dec 44)
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia
Nr: M 22063 18 December 1944

6. Soviets state that it is particularly important and desirable that all * for the Black Sea be loaded on the first ships to arrive and that in addition there be provided 10 to 12 knock-down metal warehouses.

7. Manganese will be available at the port of Poti for for return cargoes in the amount of 15,000 to 20,000 tons per month.

8. * fuel will be provided at Odessa for returning American ships in sufficient quantity to enable them to proceed to nearest Mediterranean base.


10. Radio contact with American ships will be maintained through Soviet radio communications with Soviet operators at Odessa.

11. Living and office space will be made available for WSA representatives in Odessa. In this connection I informed Krutikov that Admiral Olsen would send 2 Naval officers and 2 enlisted men to Odessa from Moscow on January 15. This was agreeable to Krutikov.

Krutikov informed me that the necessary technical details would be arranged between the Naval division of this

CM-IN-18038 (19 Dec 44)

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Dated MAR 26 1974

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

Regraded Unclassified
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TMT
PRIORITY

From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia
 Nr: M 22063 18 December 1944

mission and the Soviet Naval authorities. This is in reference to routing, navigation aids, use of Soviet pilots, radio communications, danger point, submerged wrecks and related matters *. Request that I be informed as soon as possible of your present program for Black Sea shipping.

End

* Being serviced.

ACTION: JC/S
INFO: ADM LEAHY
      GEN ARNOLD
      GEN SOMERVELL
      GEN HULL
      GEN BISSELL
      ADM KING
      GEN YORK
      C OF S

CM-IN-18038 (19 Dec 44) 0324Z mcs

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAR 26 1974

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
Commanding General,
Allied Force Headquarters,
Caserta, Italy

Supreme Headquarters,
Allied Expeditionary Forces,
Main Echelon,
Versailles, France

Commanding General,
United Kingdom Base Section,
London, England

Headquarters, Communications Zone,
European Theater of Operations,
Main Echelon,
Paris, France

Number: WARX 66822

Book Message to Wilson for action, to SHAEF Versailles for Eisenhower, and to Central District United Kingdom Base Section, London pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information, PAK 456 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff intend shortly to authorize sailings direct to Black Sea ports for discharge. You are requested to make arrangements for routing and any protection considered necessary and to report the date on which this traffic can be accepted.

End.

ORIGINATOR: CCS


CM-OUT-66822 (22 Nov 44) 2103Z hy

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/44

COPY No. 33

Regraded Unclassified
From: CG, US Military Mission, Moscow
To: War Department
No: M 21730 16 November 1944
To Joint Chiefs of Staff from Deane, M 21730.

Reference WAR 63115 dated 15 November. Naval visas have now been issued which will permit Odessa representations. While no reply has yet been received from the Soviets to a request for authorization of US Naval officers to represent WSA in Black Sea ports, at no time have they indicated an unwillingness to have such representation at the ports when they are ready to receive cargoes. There are many other questions concerning the opening of the Black Sea to which reply has not been received.

Among these are detailed data as to berths, permissible drafts, bunkering and return cargo. I have been informed that there are many points to be settled in regard to all of these details, and study has not yet progressed to a point where information is available. It is believed that this situation is similar to other cases that have arisen in the past where the Soviets desire to make a complete roundup before they give their intentions regarding any detail.

The Soviets have not disclosed the reason for their unreadiness to receive ships. The visit of Captain Frankel to Odessa was authorized yesterday, but it was remarked that considerable destruction would be noted at the docks. It is possible that the work of reconstruction has not
From: CG, US Military Mission, Moscow

No: M 21730 16 November 1944

Progressed as fast as anticipated. It was pointed out that Odessa was to be the port used by US vessels.

At Ambassador Harriman's request I am seeing Mr. Mikoyan tonight and hope to have a reply to the outstanding questions. Request that Ambassador Harriman be informed of the contents of this cable.

End

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAR 26 1974

ACTION: JC/S
INFO: Admiral Leahy, General Arnold, General Somervell, General Bull, General Bissell, Admiral King, C of S

CM-IN-16309 (17 Nov 44) 0838Z m/m

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
Commanding General
U.S. Military Mission to USSR
Moscow, Russia

Number WAR 63115

To Deane from the Joint Chiefs of Staff

United States Chiefs of Staff are recommending to Combined Chiefs of Staff that shipments which can be handled in Black Sea ports should start as soon as practicable. The only obstacle to early inauguration of this route appears to be the unwillingness of the Russians to permit the entry of U.S. Naval officers selected for duty in the Black Sea ports. Please present this matter to Russian authorities and urge again early action on pending passport visas.

End

ORIGOMATOR: JC/S

INFORMATION: Gen Somervell
Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
Gen Hull
Gen Bissell
Adm King
C of S

CM-OUT-63115 (15 Nov 44)

RECEIVED: 11-28-44

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHF, NLR, Date MAR 28 1974

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Regraded Unclassified
From: Chiefs of Staff
To: 30 Military Mission
No: OZ 6309 26 October 1944

O.T.P. IMMEDIATE OZ 6309.

Following from Chiefs of Staff.

1. U.S. Chiefs of Staff have informed us that Soviet Authorities consider the opening of the Black Sea route a matter of great importance.

2. U.S. Chiefs of Staff consider that use of Black Sea route would enable, by the re-routing of Lend-lease shipments from the Persian Gulf to the Black Sea, a considerable reduction to be effected in the number of personnel at present employed in the Persian Gulf Command.

3. We have informed U.S. Chiefs of Staff that we agree to use of Black Sea ports as soon as they are capable of accepting and clearing shipments, and have stated that, when port facilities become available in the Black Sea, we would wish to transfer to this route part of the shipping now using the North Russian Route. We have also stated that we consider the closing of the Persian route should be regulated to avoid too great a dislocation of Persian economy and consequent deterioration in the internal security situation which might affect oil supplies.

4. The Foreign Office and State Department have been invited to take up with the Turkish Government the question of the pessage of Lend-lease material through the Dardanelles.
From: Chiefs of Staff

No: OZ 6309

26 October 1944

5. You should concert with General Deane in his negotiations with Russian authorities: Foreign Office are inviting H. M. Ambassador to assist wherever necessary.

T.O.O. 262050Z

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAR 26 1974

FOOTNOTE: See M 21316 CM-IN-7020 (7 Oct 44) JC/S

ACTION: JC/S

INFO: Adm Leahy, Gen Arnold, Gen Somervell, OPD, Gen Bissell, Adm King, Log

CM-IN-26793 (28 Oct 44) 1722Z okk

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

Regraded Unclassified
Khabarovsk Press announces end navigation season lower Amur 15th. Season for upper river will close 10th. Convoy officer states grease ice now forming Tataric however expects no hindrance traffic until end of month.

16...ACT
COMINCH...CNO...20G...MAVAIDE...200P....
From: US Military Attache, Moscow, Russia

To: War Department

No: M 21316 7 October 1944

Joint Chiefs of Staff from Deane M 21316. Reference your WAR 42432, October 7th, 1944.

According to present information the Soviets expect to have the Black Sea ports cleared of mines by the end of October. They are now engaged in making port repairs and believe they will be able to receive convoys in December. It is possible that a limited number of vessels with selected cargo could be received earlier. A detailed survey of the ports is now being completed and specific information, in regard to the ports, should be available shortly.

Soviets are very anxious to use the Black Sea route as soon as possible on account of the great economy in railway transportation, man power and time. The urgency of furnishing information and expediting preparation has been stressed.

End

ACTION: JC/3

INFO: Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
Gen Somervell
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Log

CM-IN-7020 (7 Oct 44) 21362

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAR 26 1974

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
Commanding General  
US Military Mission to the USSR  
Moscow, Russia  

Number: WAR 42432  

To Deane Moscow from the Joint Chiefs of Staff  

Your M 20861, 6 September is the reference.  

No estimate can now be made as to the date of opening the Black Sea route. It is dependent upon the ability of the Soviet ports to accept and clear the tonnage and upon British agreement to furnish Allied escorts through the Aegean.  

It is the desire of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to open this route at the earliest practicable date in order to reduce the Persian Gulf Command so far as possible and make this personnel available in the Pacific where it is urgently needed.  

We are recommending to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that approval be given to the use of Allied forces in the Mediterranean to escort shipping through the Aegean, and that the Combined Chiefs of Staff request that the British Foreign Office and the State Department, supported by the Soviet Foreign Office, present a formal request to the Turks for passage of Lend-Lease shipping through the Straits.  

Once the above agreements have been reached, it is our intention to insist on the Soviets preparing the ports and lines of communication inland to take care of the traffic now going to the Persian Gulf.
In the meantime you should inform the Soviets that the problem of escorts through the Aegean is under study and if the escorts can be provided, shipments to the Persian Gulf will be rerouted, in which case it is essential that the Soviets be prepared to accept and clear them. In the event that escorts are not available, we will reroute the shipping upon the cessation of hostilities in Europe or earlier if the German menace in the Aegean can be eliminated. You should emphasize the necessity for furnishing the detailed port information currently requested.

End
AGWAR for The Joint Chiefs of Staff from Deane M 20861.

In view of the changing situation in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean, it is possible that the Black Sea route may soon be opened into Russia. If it is, great economy will be effected in Allied shipping, in American and Russian personnel now in the Persian Gulf, and in Russian rail transportation.

If any estimate can be made as to when the Black Sea route can be opened, the Russians should be kept informed in order to make certain they will prepare adequate port facilities and make advance plans for their inland rail shipments. Request such instructions as may be considered necessary.

ACTION: JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

INFO: CG AAF
ASF
OPD
G-2
ADM KING
ADM LEAHY
LOG
CM-IN-5524 (7 Sep 44)
Commanding General  
U S Military Mission  
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Number WAR 77523

To Deane for Spalding from Protocol Committee (York). This is in reply to your #20453 of 4th August.

Every effort is being made to obtain firm commitments for British assistance in escorting north convoys. Although War Shipping Administration has received strong indications from London that convoys will operate regularly this period, no answer has yet been given to JCS request for northern convoys which can be considered as a firm commitment. Efforts to get such commitment are continuing.

The problem of cargo ships is as difficult as that of escorts. It had been anticipated that by September we could count upon 20 ships to the north and 25 ships to the south each month. However, now and sometimes unforeseen United States and British requirements continue to outrun our resources in ships and as a result we will get 20 ships to the north but only 17 to the Persian Gulf in September. The difficulties in connection with providing for October and later months cannot now be predicted.

Considering both escorts and cargo ships, War Shipping Administration has reluctantly agreed to increase the Atlantic shipping commitment from 225,000 to 250,000 short tons per month. We hope this will satisfy the Soviets because in our opinion it is as high as we should go at this time in making a firm commitment. Mr. Hopkins concurs. In this connection we must consider the possibility of closing Pacific route which would be followed by Soviet pressure to make counter-balancing increase in Atlantic shipments required to meet our overall commitments.

It should be stressed that total performance in tonnage delivered is more important than the formal shipping commit-
War Shipping fully intends to deliver the greatest amount of cargo possible to the U.S.S.R. but they feel that they cannot over commit themselves in view of the remaining uncertainties with reference to British escorts and the fact that shipping requirements continue to outstrip the available supply. Full recognition of our intention to achieve maximum shipments is contained in the 4th protocol which provides for selection of an additional list of supplies amounting to approximately 1,000,000 short tons which will provide a basis for planning cargoes for ships which we hope will become available in excess of our minimum commitment.

With reference to expediting the United Kingdom schedules we will do what we can from here in cooperation with Reid in London. We are submitting certain tentative lists at this time but do not feel that we can go too far in this direction until the British schedules are received.

End

ORIGINATOR: Gen York
INFORMATION: Gen Somervell
             OPD
             Gen Maxwell
             Col Park
             CoF3

CM-OUT-77523 (8 Aug 44) 2103Z pa

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/1/94

Regraded Unclassified
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Joint Chiefs of Staff
71459
10 July 1944

Commanding General
U.S. Military Mission
Moscow, Russia

Number: WAR 63123

to Deane Moscow from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Every effort is being extended to speed up the loading of ships for the Soviet Far East. U.S. Military Mission Moscow, message number 722, dated 22 June 1944 is the reference. The critical shipping situation will not permit diversion at this time of additional ships to the Northern Pacific. It is therefore recommended that shipments of supplies for western Russia be concentrated in the north Russian and Persian Gulf routes and that supplies for the Far East be carried on the Pacific route. Protocol Committee informed of foregoing.

End

ORIGINATOR: JC/S

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm Leahy
Adm King
Col Park
CM-OUT-63123

(11 July 44) 0222Z hrt

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94
IMPROVED IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM...
NIGHT IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE...
ROUTING IN SIBERIAN WATERS...CHART OF SOVIET MERSHIP ROUTES.......

THIS REPORT SUPERSEDES:
Op-16-FT Serial 88-43, Soviet Mership Identification and Routes, Okhotak - Bering - Japan Seas, dated 29 December, 1943
Op-16-FT Serial 5-44, Soviet Mership Routes, Bering Sea - Change in, dated 17 January, 1944.
Op-16-FT Serial 8-44, Soviet Mership Routes, Okhotak Sea - Change in, dated 26 January, 1944.

IMPROVED IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM

1. Soviet agreement to revised identification system, effective 16 May 1944, affords greater security to USSR merships in the transpacific run. New system is in force while vessels are traversing Japan, Okhotak, and Bering Seas. Between Akutan and U. S. west coast ports or Canada, Soviet ships carry such features of the system as American Convoy and Routing authorities may direct.

MARKINGS ON SIDES AND DECK

2. In order to improve visibility, standard proportions have now been established for the identification device displayed on sides and deck, consisting of painted national merchant ensign (solid red field bearing yellow hammer and sickle topped by star), bordered in white. The ratio of ensign length to width is fixed at 2 to 1. White border, narrow at top and sides, forms a base equal in depth to width of ensign. On upper half of white base are painted, in black, the letters U S S R, tops of letters touching bottom edge of ensign. Lower half of base remains clear white. (See illustration page 2.)

Distribution By Originator

Op-16-A-3-5  NSHQ Ottawa (4)  NAS Atiu IU (2)
(Via Op-16-F)  Op-13
Op-16-B-5  Alusma Moscow (3)
Op-16-B-5  Alusma Ottawa
Op-16-E-2  AmCon Vladivostok
Op-16-F-5  MID (7)
Op-16-F-2  Buene11e
Op-16-FX-37  WSA (3)
Op-16-FP  San Francisco
Op-16-F-2  FEA (2)
Op-16-F-2  Port Directori
San Pedro  NA1val Aids
ComSubPac (1)  Naval Aids
Seattle  Naval Aids
ComNorPac (10)  Naval Aids
ComMarSeaPon (10)  Naval Aids
ComMarSeaPon (10)  Naval Aids
ComMarSeaPon (10)  Naval Aids
(0,0,0,0)  Naval Aids
Op-16-J,T,S  NOB Dutch Harbor (5)  DCGO Ketchikan
Adv.Int.Ctr. NoPap (2)  NOB Adak IU (2)
Op-12  Alusma Vancouver

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

Regraded Unclassified
3. Dimensions of ensign have been officially reported as 3 meters by 1.5 meters. In practice, however, size of marking varies in accordance with space available on ship, maximum feasible size being used and specified proportions maintained with exception of top and side border, which remains constant at 10 centimeters.

4. Flags are sometimes painted directly on side of vessel, sometimes on demountable boards, which are not removed in waters east of Akutan. Flags on deck are usually painted on canvas over hatch cover.

**TWO-FLAG HOIST NEW FEATURE**

5. In addition to earlier identification features, all of which are retained with some modifications, USSR vessels now fly two-letter flag hoists, to be changed periodically, at zero hour, zone minus 3 time, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Signal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16 May</td>
<td>25 June</td>
<td>ZS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 June</td>
<td>10 July</td>
<td>BB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 July</td>
<td>15 August</td>
<td>UA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 August</td>
<td>20 September</td>
<td>YS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 September</td>
<td>30 October</td>
<td>PD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 October</td>
<td>27 November</td>
<td>EE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 November</td>
<td>22 December</td>
<td>ZT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 December</td>
<td>18 January</td>
<td>BS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 January</td>
<td>12 February</td>
<td>ZI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 February</td>
<td>14 March</td>
<td>XR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 March</td>
<td>19 April</td>
<td>WB</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. All Soviet shipmasters have been provided with yearly signal table and properly instructed in use of flags.

**FLAG DISPLAY**

7. The national merchant ensign is flown from the gaff day and night, as before. When approaching U.S. territory, the American flag is usually flown at fore.

**NIGHT IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE**

8. At night, side and masthead lights of normal brightness are shown. A vertical row of three lights, identifying nationality, in sequence of green, red, green, visible through 360 degrees, is carried on mainmast.

9. Upon meeting other ships at night, Soviet vessels illuminate flag at gaff as well as painted devices on sides and deck; or, by flashing light, signal the letters USSR in Morse code.
10. Resumption of some summer routes as in 1943 was scheduled for 20 June although possible delay was anticipated in use of Tartary Straits, which on 12 June were not completely free of ice. Courses to be followed are:

a) Tartary Straits Route

Vessels proceed from Vladivostok through Sea of Japan and Tartary Straits to Okhotsk Bay, thence through points 54.25 N - 141.24 E and 54.35 N - 142.44 E, to a point 2 miles off Mikoyanovski Light (52.40 N - 156.14 E), bearing 270 degrees; thence coast wise by territorial waters through First Kuril Strait to Akhomen Bay (south of Petropavlovsk). From Akhomen Bay or Petropavlovsk, ships follow regular Akutan route established 15 April 1943, via 56.00 N - 165.00 E, thence along 56th parallel to 180°, thence to 55 N - 166.30 W, from which point Akutan is approached. Eastbound vessels travel south of 56th parallel, westbound vessels, north.

b) La Perouse Route

From Vladivostok, ships proceed through La Perouse Strait, by either northern or southern channel, thence through points 45.40 N - 145.00 E and 52.40 N - 151.35 E, to Mikoyanovski Light, thence as above.

c) Nagaev Route

Vessels en route Nagaev either from Mikoyanovski Light or point 54.25 N - 141.24 E pass through point 59.00 N - 150.00 E, thence to Nagaev Bay.
SIBERIAN SHIPPING Halted - Four ships forced into JAP Territorial Waters - New Routes discussed - Departures from Siberia and West Coast Ports at low - Salvage operations on Harupol suspended - Repairs at west coast yards surveyed.

SHIPPING LINES THROUGH KURILE ISLANDS and Probable Ice Conditions.

The title from page 1 (original and model). The title is in 9 inch letters with vertical alignment as specified in paragraph 19 of NAVY Instruction 4070.3A. The title is subdivided into two sections, the first containing the title of the report, the second containing the publisher and release date.

LEGEND

1. First Kurile Strait normally used by vessels in Transpacific trade.
2. Second =
3. Third =
4. Fourth = peacetime passage into Okhotsk.
5. Fifth =
6. Melupol aground on Shimushu.
7. Aonid, Levosky, Monich, Pinchag caught in ice floe.
8. Reported routes of these vessels to Petropavlovsk after transiting Kunashiri Strait. Arrows in ice area indicate counter clockwise movement of ice in Sea of Okhotsk.

Op-16-4-3-e Op-20-G (3)
(Via Op-16-F) Op-50-C
Op-16-B-5 Conimch
Op-16-E-2 " F-22 (2)
Op-16-FA-5 " FX-37
Op-16-FF (2) ConMPCac (2)
Op-16-PF (2) ConSSubPac (2)
Op-16-PP (2) ConNorPacP (5)
Op-16-Z (1) ConNorWestSeaPron (2)
(O.S.S.) (2) ConWestSeaPron (2)
Op-16-J.I.S. ConNorSeaPron
Op-12 Adv. Int. Ctr. NorPac (2) NID 18 (5)
Op-13 44 NSR Ottawa

Aluako Vancouver MND (7)
Alusna Moscow NSA (3)
Alusna Ottawa FRA (2)
AmCon Vladivostok (Div. Soviet)
Port Directors: Supply (2)
San Pedro Naval Aide
San Francisco USC0
Seattle DIO
ZHIO Portland, Ore. 3, 11, 12, 13 (3)
NDB Dutch Harbor (2)
State (2)
Naval Supply Depot, Akutan

Regraded Unclassified
ICE CONDITIONS STOP TRAFFIC

1. Shipping in the Okhotsk Sea and La Perouse has been halted since latter part of January by severe ice conditions. Ice fields in La Perouse have been reported ranging from 90 to 120 miles wide. Parts of these fields are solid ice, while other areas consist of sludge and broken ice. The probable extent of the ice area is shown in chart above.

2. At the present time nineteen Soviet vessels are reported caught in La Perouse and unable to navigate. Included are the icebreakers MIKOLAY, KAGANOVICH and DAVIDOV. The last vessel to pass through La Perouse was the BAKU, which arrived Vladivostok 22 January. No movements through this area are understood to have been made after this date. Abnormally cold weather has apparently made operating conditions worse than anticipated.

FOUR SOVIET SHIPS FORCED INTO JAP WATERS

3. PINEGA, LOZOFSKY, ANADIR and MANICH enroute to Petro during January were icebound beyond La Perouse and forced to proceed with flow of ice. Since current in the Okhotsk Sea moves counter-clockwise and toward Pacific (shown in chart), the ships were forced into territorial waters of Etorofu Island (see A and AI in chart). A Soviet icebreaker sent to assist them was recalled. (Reason not known.)

4. Transiting the prescribed waters of Runashiri Strait early in February three of these vessels are understood to have sailed for Petro east of the Kuriles via route B shown in chart. All arrived Petro. The fourth vessel, MANICH, minus rudder, is understood to have been towed to Petro via Okhotsk route. (See track C in chart for probable course.)

POSSIBILITY OF NEW ROUTES HIGHLIGHTED

5. Bad ice conditions in La Perouse and the movement of the four Soviet vessels through Jap waters, raised again the possibility of re-routing Soviet shipping. Several routes were understood to be under consideration, with considerable doubt as to Jap acquiescence. Two possible tracks, both in waters reserved for Jap-Kurile traffic are as follows:

(a) Vlad to Petro via lower Kurile Straits (Runashiri, Etorofu, or Bussol); This route, while requiring aid of icebreakers through La Perouse, is relatively safe once outside of Kuriles. Water is warmer and islands afford protection from prevailing northwest winds. Route is reported in use by Jap ships to and from Paramushiro.

(b) Vlad to Petro via Tsushima Straits: While Red Navy is understood to have considered this alternate route, indications are that Jap permission has not been requested to date, and that Tsushima will not be used this season.

6. Uncertainties surrounding these routes indicate that the Russians will continue using present track through La Perouse whenever ice conditions permit. SOVIETSKAYA NEFT and JAN TOMP were reported sailing from Vlad 1 March. Ships to "heave to" at ice edge at La Perouse until breakers free to assist them.

CASUALTIES

7. SS MSTA (1931 g.t.) was the only Soviet shipping casualty reported during the month, was crushed in heavy ice and sank south of Nagaeva.
8. It is believed that there have been numerous instances of cracking occurring to Soviet vessels of all types. On 11 February 70 tons of ship plates were sent on the DJURMA to Petro where repairs are frequently made in order to enable vessels to reach U. S. ports safely.

DEPARTURES FROM SIBERIA AT SEASON'S LOW

9. Only fourteen ships sailed from Siberia during February for U. S. and Canadian ports. This compares with 6 in January, 7 in December and 11 in November. No departures from Nagaev were reported. The four ships which left Vlad and Nahodka prior to 10 February are unreported except for the VOLKHOVSTROI which is now in Olga Bay. The other three vessels are believed to have been caught in ice or to have turned back.

10. As indicated in January summary (Serial FT-13-44), Petro has become the Soviets most active winter season port. Of the 14 ships which sailed from Siberia during the month, 10 of these left from Petro. Departures for February by ports are shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ports</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vladivostok</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petropavlovsk</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nahodka</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONGESTION AT VLAD BEING BASED

11. With only one ship arriving at Vlad during February the Soviets have been able to reduce backlog of cargo there to an appreciable extent. Increase in available rolling stock and good local weather have been of assistance. Port area is still congested with an estimated 200,000 tons remaining.

BUNKER SHORTAGES PETRO AND AKUTAN DELAY SAILINGS

12. Departure of a number of vessels from Petropavlovsk was delayed in February due to lack of bunker. Four instances were reported, but it is believed that a greater number were affected by the situation. Ice conditions in the Okhotsk Sea and at La Perouse may have caused faulty distribution.

13. To alleviate the shortages at Siberian ports and particularly Petro, masters of all Soviet vessels westbound have been instructed to bunker to full capacity before departing Akutan. Ship movements have also been slowed down at Akutan by insufficient bunker stocks.

WEST COAST SAILINGS ALSO OFF

14. There were 20 departures from U. S. and Canadian ports in February compared with 29 in January, 39 in December and 33 in November.

15. Loadings for the month were as follows (figures approximate):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U. S. Lend-Lease goods to Russia</td>
<td>61,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Lend-Lease goods to Russia</td>
<td>29,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 tanker with petroleum products</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>100,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MARIUPOL - SALVAGE OPERATIONS SUSPENDED

16. Salvage operations of tanker MARIUPOL have been stopped for the winter. (See chart for location.) Guns, bridge equipment, stores and all other easily movable material as well as 180 tons of cargo were taken off. Balance of cargo of gasoline blending agent (8520 tons) is reported as "contaminated by salt water". Crew members have been removed, except for ten men reported left to retain possession for the Russians who may re-attempt to salvage the hull when weather improves.

17. It has been learned that TUAPSE stood by the MARIUPOL from 11 November 1943 to 23 January 1944. Japanese did not permit the TUAPSE to contact the MARIUPOL for salvage purposes until 11 December, one month after the vessel grounded. On 16 December the TUAPSE, aided by the Soviet tanker NENETS, proceeded to salvage all parts that could be moved. By that time heavy winds and seas had pushed the MARIUPOL still higher on Shimushu ledges, doing great damage to ship's bottom. Boilers were dislodged from their foundations.

NOTE: Various reports indicate that Japs permitted Russians to salvage the ship during first two or three weeks, it might have been possible to pull MARIUPOL off the beach at high tide. Only after the cargo had become contaminated and operations became virtually impossible was Jap permission given to salvage MARIUPOL.

18. TUAPSE sailed for Petro on 23 January leaving the Soviet-trawler PALTUS (phonetic) to remain with MARIUPOL for salvage purposes. During the time TUAPSE stood by, a Japanese destroyer was always present. Japanese also made periodic visits to the MARIUPOL to observe and prevent salvage operations. Because the power supply of MARIUPOL was not operating, radio messages, instructions, etc. were forwarded by TUAPSE.

SURVEY SOVIET VESSELS UNDER REPAIR AT WEST COAST PORTS

19. Fifty-six Soviet ships are in U. S. and Canadian west coast shipyards. Of these, 31 are presently undergoing major repairs; included are 8 Liberties whose hulls are being strengthened for navigation in ice. (Repairs are estimated to take one month for each vessel).

20. Survey of 6 additional ships also badly in need of repair is being made by WSA. Application for repairs to an additional group of 6 vessels has been denied by WSA, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>G.R.T.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GILIAK</td>
<td>3154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAPITAN POSPELOV</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAPITAN VERONIN</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAIM</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUYUSHINTA</td>
<td>562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YAKUT</td>
<td>2694</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21. The remaining 13 vessels, although undergoing usual minor voyage repairs, will be available for March loading and subsequent departure for Siberia.

TANKER EXCHANGE

22. It is understood that the Lend-Lease tanker DONBASS (4767 g.t.), built in 1930, is to be exchanged because of poor performance for U. S. DAYLIGHT (9180 g.t.). Transfer is to take place 21 March with Soviets taking delivery of vessel in Caribbean.
Commanding General
U S Military Mission to USSR
Moscow Russia

Number WAR 56044
For D wane signed Arnold

Supplementing our WAR 52550 of 17 June in connection with your discussions with Russians on routes outlined your 886 of 13 June it is suggested that best interests of all concerned warrant emphasis on agreement for North Atlantic route on assumption that route may soon be available for Air Transport Command-Soviet reciprocal services. If it is concluded that North Atlantic route will not soon be available Russians may insist upon obtaining the right to operate service to United States comparable to Air Transport Command service to Moscow via Middle East but Azores route not now available to Russians for reasons given and alternate route for Russians from North Africa via England and Newfoundland may be too long to be desirable. Under such circumstances we would have no objection to Russian service via Alaska to Washington or other appropriate place within United States provided we obtain right for Air Transport Command Service through Alaska to Moscow (Which on account of distances does not at present have relative value for US in comparison with other potential routes) or right for Air Transport Command Service through Alaska and Russia to China is obtained.

3017 End

ORIGINATOR: CG AAF

INFORMATION: OPD, COL (Col Park) LOG

CM-OUT 56044 (25 June 1944) 1741Z om
CHO 12153 CONFIRMED BY CONVOY OFFICER AND FAR EAST FOREIGN TRADE REPRESENTATIVE.

STRAITS EXPECTED TO BE ICE FREE ABOUT MIDDLE JUNE. SAME ARRANGEMENT LIGHTERING THRU 21ST CHANNEL AS LAST YEAR. NO IMMEDIATE CHANGE.

SINGAPORE ROUTING AS NOT YET COMPLETELY ICE FREE. SOVIETS STATED WILL ADVISE IN BOTH CASES WHEN ROUTES EFFECTIVE.

RE: SOVIETS PLAN USE TARTARY ROUTING FOR LIBERATION

16...AT

CONFIDENTIAL

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

Regraded Unclassified
UNDERSTAND SOVIETS PLAN USE TARTARY
ROUTING FOR SUMMER NAVIGATION LIBERTIES
LOADED WITH MUNITIONS AND LOCOMOTIVES.
ARE STRAITS NOW ICE FREE.

16...ORIG
COMINCH....FX37.....NAVAIDE....

CONFIDENTIAL
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 71469
May 27, 1944

Commanding General
US Military Mission to USSR
Moscow, Russia

Number: WAR 42644

For Deane Moscow from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in your views that the resumption of northern convoys to Russia at the earliest opportunity consistent with European operations is most desirable. This is in reply to your number 457. They are presenting their views to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and will inform you as soon as possible as to what will be done regarding the resumption of these convoys.

ORIGINATOR: JC/3

INFORMATION: General Arnold
OPD

A. H. King
Col. Park

CM-OUT-42644 (27 May 44) 22042 eju

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAR 26 1974

COPY No. 28

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

Regraded Unclassified
INFORM CONVOY OFFICER YOUR 230245 THAT SUBJET HIS INQUIRY SHOULD BE HANDLED BY SOVIET FOREIGN OFFICE VIA U.S. AMBASSADOR.

CONFIDENTIAL
President's Soviet Protocol Committee, Room 149, C.C.S. Bldg., 1901 Constitution, RE 6700 EX. 79672
May 23, 1944

U.S. Military Mission, Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Number: WAR 40320 - M-311
For General Deane from Protocol Committee (General York).

This pertains to the portion of your number 581 of May 21st dealing with the repair and loading of Soviet vessels on the Pacific coast which is a responsibility of the Protocol Committee. Other matters covered by your telegram are under consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

War Shipping administration was aware of the problems involved in repair and loading of Soviet ships and was endeavoring to solve them prior to recent protests by Soviet representatives and prior to receipt of your cable. Pressure is now being exerted all along the line to alleviate these situations which are aggravated by a serious overall manpower shortage on the West coast.

West coast repair facilities are inadequate for the total load, Soviet and United States, which they must carry. Difficulties are accentuated by the simultaneous arrival of a large number of ships which have suffered ice damage. Some delay is due to shortage of Russian personnel on West coast for processing repair requisitions and specifications. There is some hope of improving the repair situation as a result of negotiations now pending with Canada for repair of Soviet ships in Canadian yards which are less busy than ours.
Due to lack of Soviet ships loading during the slack winter months stevedore gangs dispersed to other ports and to other industries. Pressure is now being exerted to get this personnel back in loading gangs and there is a day to day improvement in the situation. Soviet vessels are being given preference over other ships and our information indicates that Soviet representatives while not satisfied are convinced that everything possible is being done to expedite the loading of Soviet vessels. Protocol Committee continues to endeavor to move the greatest possible tonnage to the U.S.S.R. during the present shipping season.
SOVIET CONVOY OFFICER INQUIRES LATEST DEVELOPMENT
CNO SECRET DIS 062525 FEBRUARY

CONFIDENTIAL

230245  NCR 9489

SOVIET CONVOY OFFICER INQUIRES LATEST DEVELOPMENT
CNO SECRET DIS 062525 FEBRUARY

CONFIDENTIAL

230245  442

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94

Regraded Unclassified
From: U.S. Military Mission Moscow, Russia
To: War Department
Nr: 581, 21 May 1944

To Joint Chiefs of Staff info Ambassador Harriman and Protocol Committee (York) from Deane.

It is understood that a large number of Soviet vessels which have been held up in the Far East on account of ice and Japanese interference, have now reached our west coast. Considerable delay is reported as being encountered on our west coast due to delays in essential repair and because of shortage of labor and facilities for loading.

It is believed that everything possible should be done to expedite the repair and loading of these vessels or to add new vessels in order to take full advantage of the open season this summer and early fall.

This would constitute a major contribution of hostilities between Japan and the USSR should break out this fall or winter, as well as helping the war effort in the west. If we were free to plan with the Russians, the ideal solution would be to establish reserve stocks in the Far East of those items which the United States is supplying to the Red Army and of those items which the United States Air Force would require in the event of their participation.

Failing this specific plan, the most favorable situation can be brought about by sending the maximum of supplies possible this summer with design to keeping the pipe line of supply full. If hostilities should commence, this would

CM-IN-16394 (22 May 44)
From: U.S. Military Mission Moscow, Russia
Nr: 581, 21 May 1944

provide a good initial supply in the right place or close thereto. It seems to be particularly important that as much aviation gas as can be spared, be supplied the USSR so that they will be in a comfortable position at all times and possibly with storage in Siberia.

All reports indicate that Vladivostok is in good operating condition and is in a position to handle a large amount of cargo. Spalding is going out there in the next few days to make certain that everything is being done there to assure a prompt turn around of vessels.

No Sig

ACTION: JC/S

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
Gen Handy
Gen Bissell (State Dept)
Adm King
Col Park
Gen York
CofS

CM-IN-16394 (22 May 44) 06272 bjm
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: CONWAY

RELEASED BY: 7 MAY 1944

TO: COHEN/ROGERS

DECODED BY: MONTGOMERY

PARAPHRASED BY: KOHOUTEK

ROUTED BY: (Passed to CONWAY WSA.)

*CONWAY SENDS ACTION CNV INFO COM 15TH FLT (CGR) *

CONVOY RA 59 ARRIVED UKAY PORTS MAY 6. TOTAL 44 SHIPS.

36 US.

7 BRITISH.

1 NORWEGIAN.

WILLIAM S THAYER TORPEDOED AND SUNK EN ROUTE.

HIDTS 31515 REFER.

FX37 FOR WSA ... ACT

CHG 1919C 21139 NAVAIL 16

CHO 20R 200 200P ANPB ATCC

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room WSA and keep in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

071213 42

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/18/94

Regraded Unclassified
From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia
To: War Department
Number 457, 22 April 1944
Joint Chiefs of Staff from Dean.

Ambassador and Adm Olsen report enthusiastically on operations of northern ports after returning from recent visit. It is urged that serious consideration be given to resumption of northern convoys at the earliest opportunity consistent with European operations.

During period of recent convoys, Soviets have built up organization of northern ports so that they now handle 20,000 cargo tons daily as against 9,000 tons last December. This organization will disintegrate and equipment be taken away if ports are not used for a considerable period of time. Maintenance of organization is very much to our interest in reducing time that our ships are in Russian ports. Russians prefer this route of supply because it facilitates their war effort in more rapid delivery and with less strain on their inland transport.

We hope to negotiate a buildup in preparation for air operations in Far East. Additional tonnage involved in such a buildup will overtax the capacity of other routes if northern routes are stopped. Continuation of northern
routes would increase our bargaining power on buildup in Far East, if we could promise continuance for a percentage of the capacity to import supplies for a Far East buildup. Also, Soviets would be less concerned over possible stoppage of Pacific route.

The Ambassador concurs in this message and we would both appreciate any information regarding your views on subject and what you anticipate might be done.
ADMIRAL OLSEN MURMANSK

RELEASED BY

DATE 22 APRIL 1944

TOR CODEROOM 2145/21

DECODED BY O'LEARY

PARAPHRASED BY VISSLER

ROUTED BY MORRIS

CNO

MOSCOW

O91428

NCR 4093

...SECRET...

Such info as can be given or estimates made as to probable shipping into North Russian ports later this summer would greatly assist planning use of personnel after RA 59. Present situation indicates 20 ships will be left indefinitely after departure RA 59 and will require considerable care taking. Probability transfer Vladivostok shipping to this side and of opening of Baltic and Black Seas being kept in mind. Most immediate concern is how soon resumption of convoys may be expected.

16...ACT

COMINCH...FX37...26G...CHO...NAVIADE...20P...

Regraded Unclassified
STEAMERS PINENA AND LOZOVTRY NOW PETRO PASSED THRU STRAITS ON 7TH AFTER STATED NEGOTIATIONS. CNO §82220. ANADIR DUE TRANSIT STRAITS TODAY MANICH LOST RUDDER DUE TRANSIT 16TH WHERE SHE WILL BE MET BY UNKNOWN SOVIET VESSEL AND TOWED PETRO VIA OKHTOK ROUTE. CONVOY OFF ICEC STATES JAPS HAVE DROPPED PROTEST AND SKIPPERS 1ST 2 SHIPS STATE OBSERVED NO EVIDENCE MINES NOR JAP NAVAL ACTIVITY THEY PASSED THRU STRAITS UNASSISTED EXPERIENCED NO TROUBLE.
RUSSIAN SHIPS RE ROULLARD VALDIVOSTOK 870650
REPORTED DRIFTING EAST OF KURILES AND WILL SAIL
EAST OF KURILES WHEN ICE-FREE.

SECRET
NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM: CNO
RELEASED BY: SCHUTRMANN
DATE: 12 FEB 44
TON CODE ROOM: 1221/9

ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE

FOR ACTION

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

DECAPITATED

ADDRESS

ALUSNA BOSCO

AMERICAN CONSUL

VLADIVOSTOK

INFORMATION

DECODER

WEIR

PARAPHRASED BY

PIPP

ROUTED BY

TO

WITH

FROM

IN

12242 NCR 6262

ORIGINAd Fill in date and time:

DATE

TIME

GCT

ACTION

DECORAPHRASED

1224/2

DECORAPHRASED

1224/2

SECRET

Make original only: Deliver to code room watch officer in person. (See Art 78 (4) NAVREG.)

PRINTED COPY

DECORAPHRASED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4 NNR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

Regraded Unclassified
(ROULLARD HAS THIS FOR INFO)

DISCUSSED CNO 11/36 WITH VICE COMMISSAR. REDS NOW CONSIDERING NECESSITY USING TSUSHIMA DUE ICE OKHOTSK HORST IN LONG TIME. PERMISSION AND ROUTING NOT YET REQUESTED OF JAPS BUT REDS FEEL IT WILL BE ALLOWED. ASKED ASSURANCE SECURITY FROM OUR SBS AND SUGGEST SAME ROUTE AS LAST YEAR. IF ROUTE ESTABLISHED THEY WILL GIVE ROULLARD AND THEIR WASHN REPRESENTATIVES AVAILABLE INFO DEPARTURES AND ETA TSUSHIMA.

IN COMPL. FLEET CANDR PREFERS OTHER ROUTING REQUEST. ADVISE IMMEDIATELY.

16...ACT

COMINCH...CNO...NAVYDE...FX37...2/C...

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Waicho Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREG.)

OPNAV-SCR-13
102/09 4/4

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/3/96
CAN YOU ESTIMATE WHEN PINEGA TRANSITED KUNASHIRI URDI8 070650° AND WHETHER PRIOR TO NEGOTIATIONS YOUR 200600° JANUARY.

*VLAD. 070650°: JAPs PROTESTING 4 SOVIET SHIPS IN KURILE TERRITORIAL WATERS... HEAVY ICE FORCED PINEGA THROUGH KUNASHIRI, RETURNED OKHOTSK THROUGH FRIZ STRAIT.

**VLAD 200600° JAN.: SOVIETS REPORTED NEGOTIATING WITH JAPS FOR PERMISSION USE KUNASHIRI OR FRIZ.... ICE COMING DOWN EARLY THIS YEAR.

16.... ORIG

COMINCH... NAVFDE... CNO....

SECRET
SECRET

OFFICER IN CHARGE CONVOYS STATES 4 SHIPS PINEGA, LOZOVSKY, ANADIR AND PANICH CAUGHT IN HEAVY ICE BEING FORCED INTO TERRITORIAL WATERS. ITURUP ISLAND JAPS PROTESTING. ICE BREAKER WAS SENT TO THEIR ASSISTANCE BUT MOSCOW HAD IT RECALLED. PINEGA ENROUTE PETRO FORCED THRU KUNASHIRI STRAIT REACHED CLEAR WATER THEN RETURNED TO OKhotsk ROUTE THRU FRIZ STRAIT. DANGER FUTURE CASES HOWEVER SHIPS WILL CARRY USUAL IDENTIFICATION LIGHTS AND MARKINGS. PERSONAL OPINION SOVIETS ANTICIPATE SEIZURES REASON FOR RECALL ICE BREAKER WHICH THEY WERE NOT WILLING TAKE CHANCE WITH.

ETOIFO - VN
FRIES ST.

FX37... ACT

ADD: COMINCH....

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVRECS.)

OPNAV-NCR-14
070650

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12336, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

Regraded Unclassified