

a. Memorandum General Marshall to FDR: July 3, 1942 re North

Map Room Files.

90

BOX 162. (Continued)

- b. Memorandum Admiral King to Admiral Leahy: October 8, 1942 re disposition of airplanes produced under naval cognizance -- 1942.
- c. Memorandum Captain McCrea to CIC, U.S. Fleet: December 26, 1942.
- d. Memorandum Admiral King to FDR: August 31, 1943.
- e. Reports "Status of DE's" for September 6, November 1, and December 13, 1943.
- f. Memorandum Admiral Brown to CIC, U.S. Fleet: October 20, 1943.
- g. Memorandum Admiral King to President's Naval Aide: December 21, 1943.
- h. Memorandum General H. H. Arnold to FDR: February 5, 1944.
- i. Memorandum Admiral Brown to FDR: February 24, 1944.
- j. Memorandum Admiral King to Admiral Leahy: February 24, 1944 re small craft.
- k. Memorandum Admiral Leahy to FDR conveying above: February 24, 1944.
- l. Memorandum FDR to Admiral Leahy re above: February 26, 1944.
- m. Report William J. Flournoy (American Maritime Delegation in the Azores) to Secretary of State: January 28, 1944.
- n. Memorandum Captain Wood (USN) to Admirals Stark and Leahy: May 3, 1944.
- o. ? to Admiral Leahy: May 2, 1944.
- p. Memorandum FDR to Admiral Brown; September 22, 1944.
- q. Memorandum Admiral Brown to Admiral King (and reply on same sheet): November 20, 1944.
- r. Memorandum Admiral King to FDR re merchant shipping: November 28, 1944.

BOX 162 (Continued)

91

- s. Admiral Brown to FDR re merchant shipping: November 30, 1944.
- t. Admiral Brown to FDR re merchant shipping: December 2, 1944.
- u. Memorandum Admiral Leahy to FDR re merchant shipping: December 10, 1944.

Regraded Unclassified



AW

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



TOP SECRET

10 December 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the U.S. shipping position for the next few months after taking into account the effect of the actions directed in your memorandum of 20 November.

A considerable improvement is noted in the shipping now estimated to be available to meet operational demands. Congestion in Atlantic theaters will be eliminated by January, and positive action has been taken to reduce congestion in other areas.

In arriving at the January shipping position allowance has been made for the provision of 20 additional ships from Atlantic services for Russian account in that month and for successful negotiation for transfer of 40 sailings per month from the United Kingdom stockpile account. It is noted that, to date, the War Shipping Administration has not secured British concurrence in such a transfer and therefore is continuing to carry 40 sailings per month as a commitment to the British.

Serious deficits will still exist. The importance of the Russian program, however, justifies the allocation of up to 20 ships in January to be taken from Atlantic services, with such adjustments as are necessary being made in other programs. Such favorable action can be taken only on the supposition that Admiral Land's negotiations with the British to transfer 40 sailings per month from the United Kingdom stockpile account are successful in full. Should such negotiations fail, the number of ships made available to the Russians must be correspondingly reduced.

The War Shipping Administration therefore is being requested to press vigorously with the British negotiations

Copy to accompany original.

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

for the transfer of 40 sailings from the United Kingdom stockpile account so that the necessary additional vessels can be made available for the Russian account.

The Navy Department will reduce the Mediterranean convoy cycle from 10 to 5 days beginning January 3, 1945, assuming no adverse change in the submarine situation. It is anticipated that this action will result in substantial savings in ship turnaround in subsequent months.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that relief for the manpower shortage in shipyards will tend to accelerate deliveries and counteract in subsequent months the slippage heretofore experienced in the Maritime Commission shipbuilding program. In consonance with your memorandum to Admiral Land, Joint Chiefs of Staff agencies have been directed to study, in collaboration with the Maritime Commission, the additional ship construction that may be accomplished to provide further aid to the war effort.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,  
Admiral, U.S. Navy,  
Chief of Staff to the  
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

~~TOP SECRET~~

WJ  
AH/Pres

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 1, 1944.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT.

With reference to Admiral King's memorandum of November 28th about frequency of convoys, I have had a talk with Edwards and he assures me that steps are in progress to stir up all area commanders — British and Americans — to release ships that have been tied up in ports unduly. He is confident of at least a temporary improvement.

Very respectfully,

WILSON BROWN.

A4-3 THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

November 30, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT.

Harry Hopkins says he believes that the shipping situation is improving. I will enquire further of King what he intends to do to reduce the tying up of ships used for temporary storage purposes and to speed up the turn-around in unloading.

Very respectfully,

WILSON BROWN.

COMINCH FILE

WASHINGTON  
THE WHITE HOUSE

UNITED STATES FLEET  
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF  
NAVY DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



FF1/A4-3

Serial: 003455

**SECRET**  
SECRET

28 NOV 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

1. In reply to your memorandum of 20 November on the subject of merchant shipping, and with particular reference to the second paragraph, I wish to assure you that the matter of exploring ways and means of increasing the economy of employment of merchant shipping is under constant review.
2. Those agencies whose interests lie primarily in delivery of goods are naturally disposed to reduce or eliminate convoys. While we have no less interest in the delivery of goods, we have a considerably greater interest and responsibility in getting the shipping through, and I have, therefore, on numerous occasions been forced to deny requests premised primarily on quick turn-around and with little or no regard to security.
3. To change from a 10-day to a 5-day sailing interval and thus to provide 10-12 additional sailings per month would require 6 additional escort groups (total 42 ships). Such ships are not available in the Atlantic and could only be provided by taking them from the Pacific. Only within the last week we have had to order from the Atlantic 30 additional destroyer escorts and 29 smaller escort craft to the Southwest Pacific theatre in support of the current and projected Philippine campaign under General MacArthur.
4. In view of the foregoing and of the imminence of renewed U-boat activity in the Atlantic on what may be a large scale, I am constrained to recommend that we do not, at this time at least, change the cycle of the Mediterranean convoys from 10 to 5 days.

*E. J. King*  
Admiral, U. S. Navy.

A43  
b11(c)

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

File  
W

November 20, 1944.

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ADMIRAL KING.

The President is very much concerned about reports reaching him from various sources that many of our cargo ships are seriously delayed in many theatres of the war in unloading and in making a turn-around. The President asks for suggestions from you as to what steps should be taken to improve this situation. He has in mind a survey of the Mediterranean Area that was made about two years ago.

*in the past 10 days*

*W. Brown*

WILSON BROWN,  
Rear Admiral, USN.,  
Naval Aide to the President.

*This matter is continuously under review of the Joint Chiefs of Staff - they have sent despatches (as frequently before) to all theater and area commanders - "jacking them up" about reduction of delays.*

*A paper from Joint Chiefs of Staff is on its way to the President - asking his action to help reduce various non-military shipping activities - both U.S. and Allied*

*EDV*

~~ACU~~

F. D. R.  
WR

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

September 22, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL BROWN

I might possibly go abroad  
(England and France) about the  
middle of November.

RE 105

You might find out what  
would be available

- (a) In the way of a battle-  
ship -- Missouri, just completed,  
as a possibility, or
- (b) A large cruiser --  
Alaska or Guam -- or
- (c) A CV

Naturally I do not want to  
take any ship out of combat service  
but in these classes it might be  
possible to find one in the middle  
of the shakedown period.

F. D. R.

TOP SECRET  
SECRET

AH

2 May 1944

To Admiral W. D. Leahy, personal and secret.

Dear Admiral,

As usual, Edwin behaved himself very well at the funeral even though the thermometer was about 80 and we were en route to the cemetery for nearly two hours, the moving picture industry having practically taken charge of proceedings. I regret to say that the pallbearers rode at ease in automobiles instead of keeping up with troops, which included Waves and female Marines.

This morning I asked Edwards whether they were still holding a ship in the Atlantic for possible use by the President in May. He replied that they were holding the VINCENNES. I asked what use would be made of the VINCENNES if she were not held for our use and the reply was "Overlord." I thought perhaps you would like to know that she will be held unless we release her.

I enclose another message about publicity for the turnover of the MILWAUKEE. Edwards pointed out that unless an announcement is made soon the news will probably leak out from returning merchantmen and might be seized upon by the opposition for their political advantage by trying to make it appear that the American public is not being informed about the transfer of our ships; secret Teheran agreements, etc. Our last instructions to Harriman, dated 15 April 44, were, "you may make announcement regarding MILWAUKEE at any date and time acceptable to the Soviet, informing me in advance as previously directed."

Best wishes to you all for pleasant sunshining weather and good fishing.

Sincerely yours,

1 Incl.

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

TOP-SECRET

COPY

3 May 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet  
and Chief of Naval Operations

Admiral Leahy has directed that the following message be delivered to "OPNAV".

"By direction of the President, the USS VINCENNES, now held ready for a special mission in the month of May, is hereby released from that assignment."

Through an error on my part, the "VINCENNES" was mentioned as the ship in question rather than the "QUINCY". It is therefore assumed that "QUINCY" should be substituted for "VINCENNES" in the above message.

Respectfully,

CHESTER C. WOOD,  
Captain, U. S. Navy,  
Assistant Naval Aide to the President.

Noted. I told Ad. Corbett  
a ship might be required  
in the Pacific early in June.  
He will study possibilities  
& off hand suggested the  
intended

TOP-SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

A4

Admiral Brown  
to file

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON  
March 14, 1944

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached a copy of despatch no. 5 dated January 28, 1944, from the American Maritime Delegate in Ponta Delgada, Azores, on the subject of a conversation with Vice Admiral Sir Harold Burroughs.

This despatch has been brought to the attention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Enclosure:

Despatch no. 5  
from Ponta Delgada,  
January 28, 1944.

C.H.

No. 5

AMERICAN MARITIME DELEGATION  
Ponta Delgada, São Miguel, Azores,  
January 28, 1944.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Visit to Ponta Delgada, Azores, of Vice Admiral Sir Harold Burroughs, Flag Officer in Command of Mediterranean Approaches.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that Vice Admiral Sir Harold Burroughs, Flag Officer in Command of the Mediterranean Approaches, with headquarters at Gibraltar arrived at Ponta Delgada on January 26, on a courtesy visit after having made an inspection of the British installations on the island of Fayal and Terceira. The visit was carried out with full formality. Calls were exchanged, the Commanding General of the Azores entertained the Admiral with a luncheon at Furnas, the Commanding Naval officer had a cocktail party, and the British Maritime Delegate a dinner.

The Admiral was pleased with the reception he received here and remarked that he was struck with the cordiality of General Passos e Sousa. The Admiral in turn undoubtedly made an excellent impression on the local officials.

During the evening I questioned the Admiral regarding American participation in the Azores and particularly on the island of Terceira. The Admiral's comments were very frank and outspoken and were offered with a waiver that "I am just a sailor," "I shouldn't say this." He then went on to say that the British were able to obtain concessions in the Azores only because of their five-hundred year old treaty with Portugal and that based on their agreement with Portugal Air Vice Marshall Bromett, Commanding Officer at Terceira, had established very good working agreement with the Portuguese officials there. Then, said the Admiral, American military personnel arrives; their presence is not covered by the agreement and the Portuguese "are beginning to wonder if Bromett is not double crossing them." After this Admiral Burroughs came forth with a remarkable statement. He said, "Admiral King is pushing this thing too hard. As far as operations in

the Azores is concerned the American Navy is not concerned with winning this war but with post war commercial air line operation. America has the air equipment to cover the world and Britain fears an American reaction from isolationism toward imperialism."

The Admiral offered the foregoing in a most pleasant and unheated manner and I cannot believe that he would have made such indiscreet remarks to an American official without the full realization that I would report them.

His opinion regarding American commercial aspirations in the Azores is in line with the remarks that Goodden, the British Maritime Delegate, made to me about two weeks ago when he said he believed that Pan American Airways was pushing our Navy to take an active part in the development of air facilities in the Azores.

The Admiral closed his remarks by speaking very highly of Captain Tomlinson, U.S.N., commanding American forces at Terceira and said finally that as long as President Roosevelt and Churchill were heads of their Government, neither nation had anything to fear.

Admiral Burroughs also told me that he was reporting his view of the Azorean situation to the British Admiralty.

Respectfully yours,

William E. Flournoy, Jr.  
Foreign Service Officer of the United  
States detailed as Maritime Delegate.

In duplicate to Dept.  
CC-American Legation, Lisbon.  
800  
WEF/ca

THE COMBAT DIRECTOR  
MOLIG AND PLISSIN  
OPERATION. THESE  
WITH WINNING THE  
THE AXLES TO CONE

15 Feb.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Admiral Leahy

You will be interested  
in S. H. views of our  
motion in the Ayres  
Please return

WJ

Return to Rear Admiral  
Brown

WJ

AH

Admiral Brown's  
file

F. D. R.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 26, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

I rather expected that Admiral King would answer as he did on February 24th in regard to the use of small craft.

I think nothing of the personnel plea. The personnel required for one hundred small craft ought not to exceed four per ship and if the Navy cannot find four hundred enlisted men, C.P.O.'s or Warrant Officer, something is wrong.

In regard to the poor material condition of the small boats involved, I would say offhand that the condition of these small craft, now in the Navy, ought to be far better than the British small craft which operated at Dunkirk in 1940.

The real crux is whether the Shipping Board could take one boat on each merchant ship or transport without displacing too much other deck load.

I should hate to be accused of not doing all we can in case a lot of drowning people are floating around in the Channel.

F. D. R.

**SECRET**

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 24, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

The President

The attached letter from Admiral King regarding the possible use of American small craft in the OVERLORD attack, is forwarded for your information.

In consideration of the logistic problem involved, the demand for additional personnel, and the probable availability of small ships in the Channel at all times during the landing, I am inclined to agree with Admiral King that the probable value of small American boats for rescue purposes does not justify the cost in personnel and in effort.

I will bring the matter to your attention when we hear from Admiral Stark.

*William D. Leahy*

UNITED STATES FLEET  
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF  
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

FF1/A4-3

Serial: 00627

**SECRET**  
S-E-C-R-E-T

24 FEB 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY.

Subject: Status of Small Craft.

1. With respect to your memorandum conveying the suggestion that many of our small boats, now being decommissioned on the East Coast, should be sent to United Kingdom for use as rescue craft or other possible useful employment:

(a) There will be in the assault area over 900 major landing craft, over 2000 minor landing craft, and 200 British coasters, all more capable rescue craft than any others we could send. In addition there are in United Kingdom Waters a large number of small craft (such as were used in the evacuation of Dunkirk) which presumably are as good as the small craft which it is proposed to send from the United States.

(b) The shipment of any considerable number of boats to United Kingdom as deck cargo at this time will result in displacing tanks or other combatant material normally shipped to the full capacity of deck cargo space.

(c) The laying up program was undertaken in part to recover personnel for manning new ships. Keeping the acquired boats in commission would defeat this purpose.

(d) Owing to the poor material condition of the small boats involved, a large maintenance force would be required to keep them running, which would add to logistic difficulties without commensurate return.

2. On the possibility that Admiral Stark may see a need for such craft over what the British can supply, I have queried him by despatch. Unless he advises me that there is an urgent need for some of these craft, I recommend no further action.

*E. J. King*  
Admiral, U. S. Navy.

A4  
(Pres. file)

This was not  
signed or  
ever sent.  
By

February 24, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

1. Subsequent to your departure, the following information relative to the proposed trip South has come to light.
2. (a) As indicated in the attached correspondence you approved a recommendation of the Chief of Naval Operations in 1941 to the effect that the POTOMAC should not proceed through waters in which a 30° roll might be expected without your expressed approval.  
  
(b) Since 1941 there has been no appreciable improvement in the basic stability of the ship. Furthermore, it is possible that there may have been some decrease along these lines. (Figures indicated in 1941 that her maximum righting arm was 0.75 feet with a 30° roll and zero righting arm at 50° roll.)  
  
(c) In order to place blackout gear of latest approved design aboard will require an additional weight above the waterline of approximately three tons. This would decrease her stability to a certain extent.
3. In view of the above, and in view of the type of sea which can be expected at this time of the year along the projected course, it is recommended that the prospective plans for taking the POTOMAC south be cancelled. In lieu thereof, one of the following, and apparently satisfactory plans, is recommended.
4. (a) Utilize quarters on the station which are available and are not occupied by the Commandant. It is understood that a very comfortable house is occupied alone by the Captain of the Yard (or comparable official). He could move out with no appreciable dislocation of plans or arrangements. A nearby guest house is available for other members of the party. These quarters are in the vicinity of the Commandant's but in no way connected. Complete privacy could readily be arranged. Captain Perry, the Aide to Secretary Knox, has said that quarters ashore at this time of the year would be far cooler at night than comparable quarters on board ship due to the radical overheating of steel ships during the daytime and the more exposed position, relative to breezes, of the quarters ashore.  
  
(b) Take over the DAUNTLESS from the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, for the period in question. I have inspected the DAUNTLESS and found her to be well equipped for your comfort, at least insofar as living aboard is concerned.
5. Pending a decision in the matter, I have held in abeyance the installation of approved blackout equipment in the POTOMAC. Other work in connection with the POTOMAC's routine overhaul is proceeding. She will be ready to make the trip except as to stability feature mentioned above.
6. I will take no further steps toward detailed arrangements until word as to your decision has been received.

Very respectfully, WILSON BROWN.

February 5, 1944

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Report on Alleged British Failure to Cooperate in  
Lisbon-Azores Air Transport.

Reference your confidential memorandum of January 31st.,  
I am pleased to report the following information received from  
an officer just returned from the Lisbon-Azores area:

a. Army Air Forces do not operate between Lisbon and the  
Azores. This is purely a Pan American operation and they do  
not operate from our base at Lages.

b. To date we have not lost any airplanes on the run  
through the Azores.

c. The British cooperation has been excellent and we  
have had no trouble whatsoever in that respect.

d. This is apparently a rumor without foundation insofar  
as the Army Air Forces is concerned.

H. H. ARNOLD  
General, U. S. A.  
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

Incl: Memo from the President 1/31/44  
Unsigned, undated memo, re above.

*See file  
"H"*

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

UNITED STATES FLEET

MEMORANDUM

Date 21 Dec 43

A4

From: Admiral King  
Naval Aide to the President

SECRET-SECURITY

Please let the President know that  
Bat Div 7 - IOWA, NEW JERSEY -  
Rear Admiral Hustvedt - are being  
ordered to Pacific Fleet - to leave  
U.S. ports about January 2d

EJK.

Done File WS

~~Carter to Louwder - Carpenter  
Carter - Congleton Med.~~

A4

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL  
CONFIDENTIAL

October 20, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Commander in Chief,  
United States Fleet.

Subject: Japanese Hospital Ships.

1. The President notes that the Japanese have 20 ships listed as hospital ships. He has directed me to ask you whether you think we should continue to accept this figure or whether we should take steps to limit the number of hospital ships whose markings we will respect.

2. I think the President has in mind the possibility of an investigation by Red Cross or neutrals.

Wilson Brown,  
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,  
Naval Aide to the President.

CONFIDENTIAL

**SECRET**  
SECRET

13 December 1943

STATUS OF DE'S

	<u>LantFlt</u>		<u>PacFlt</u>		<u>DE TraCen</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>12/6</u>	<u>12/13</u>	<u>12/6</u>	<u>12/13</u>	<u>12/6</u>	<u>12/13</u>	<u>12/6</u>	<u>12/13</u>
In service	85	88	46	49	8	8	139	145
In shakedown	27	27	19	19	0	0	46	46
Fitting out, already accepted	9	8	9	9	0	0	18	17
Fitting Out, Not yet accepted	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>
Total commissioned	123	124	75	79	8	8	206	211

*W B Hall*  
W. B. HALL.

Distribution:

Admiral King ✓  
" Edwards  
" Cooke  
" DeLany  
" Davis  
" Low  
Op-23 (Capt. Austin)  
SecNav (LtCdr. Gardner)

14 Dec/43

Naval Aide to President:

I think the President will be interested

*EJK*

401(2)

SECRET

SECRET

1 November 1943.

STATUS OF DE'S

	<u>LantFlt</u>		<u>PacFlt</u>		<u>DETraCen</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>10/25</u>	<u>11/1</u>	<u>10/25</u>	<u>11/1</u>	<u>10/25</u>	<u>11/1</u>	<u>10/25</u>	<u>11/1</u>
In service	51	53	36	38	8	8	95	99
In shakedown	35	34	9	9	0	0	44	43
Fitting out, already accepted	7	14	4	5	0	0	11	19
Fitting out, not yet accepted	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>4</u>
Total commissioned	94	102	53	55	8	8	155	165


*W B Hall*  
W. B. HALL.

Distribution:

→ Admiral King  
" Edwards  
" Cooke  
" DeLany  
" Davis  
" Low  
SecNav (LtComdr Gardner)  
Op-23 (Lt Lipman)

*Dear Admiral Brown:*

*I think this might be of  
interest to the President*



**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

6 September 1943.

	<u>LantFlt</u>		<u>PacFlt</u>		<u>DE TraCen</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>8/30</u>	<u>9/6</u>	<u>8/30</u>	<u>9/6</u>	<u>8/30</u>	<u>9/6</u>	<u>8/30</u>	<u>9/6</u>
In service	21	21	23	24	7	7	51	52
In shakedown	19	24	11	11	1	1	31	36
Fitting out, already accepted	11	14	2	3	0	0	13	17
Fitting out, not yet accepted	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>
Total Commissioned	52	60	37	39	8	8	97	107

Naval Aide to the President:

The President might  
wish to see these figures

*E.J.N.*

A4  
COMINCH FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET  
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF  
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Admiral Brown  
file  
Confidential  
File  
W.S.

FF1/A14-1

Serial: 001825

**SECRET**  
SECRET

31 AUG 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

1. I have been making arrangements for the special combined convoy which you and the Prime Minister desire to despatch about October 20.
2. So far as the U.S. Navy is concerned the convoy presents no difficulties.
3. Since my return from Quebec there has been no British officer in Washington who knows anything about the matter and I doubt that the Admiralty will be able to give it consideration until the First Sea Lord returns to London. Admiral Noble will return in a few days and implementation will be taken up with him as soon as he gets here.
4. I shall keep you informed of the progress of arrangements.

*E. J. King*  
E. J. KING.

COMENCH FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET  
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF  
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

FFL/Alh-1

Serial: 001825

**SECRET**  
~~SECRET~~

81 AUG 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

1. I have been making arrangements for the special combined convoy which you and the Prime Minister desire to despatch about October 20.
2. So far as the U.S. Navy is concerned the convoy presents no difficulties.
3. Since my return from Quebec there has been no British officer in Washington who knows anything about the matter and I doubt that the Admiralty will be able to give it consideration until the First Sea Lord returns to London. Admiral Noble will return in a few days and implementation will be taken up with him as soon as he gets here.
4. I shall keep you informed of the progress of arrangements.

E. J. KING.

A4

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

**SECRET** December 26, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. FLEET.

The President has directed that I get from the Department the present location and use of all patrol craft of the following types which have been delivered to the Navy since January 1, 1941:

SC - 110 feet  
SC - 173 feet  
SC - 183 feet (type delivered to  
Dutch and Norwegians)  
PC - 1466 to 1471  
PT - 81 to 149.

Very respectfully,

John L. McCrea,  
Captain, U.S. Navy,  
Naval Aide to the President.

AH  
COMINCH FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF  
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

001170

OCT 8 1942

SECRET

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

**For:** Admiral Leahy.  
**Subject:** Disposition of Airplanes Produced under  
Naval Cognizance - Calendar Year 1942.

1. The attached tables indicate the monthly acceptances of Naval airplanes produced in the calendar year 1942, the summary by models, and the summary by types. The monthly figures for October, November, and December, are predicted acceptances and both summary tables include the predicted acceptances for those months.

2. The matter of training plane requirements for all service for the coming year is at present being reviewed by the Joint Aircraft Committee. The result of this study will determine what, if any, facilities, small or large, now devoted to training plane production, can be converted for the production of combatant aircraft. It is not possible to make a statement in this matter until the Joint Aircraft Committee has completed its study. A further report in the matter will therefore be made.

E. J. KING

See A1

JUL 10 PM



IN  
OFFICE

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

July 3, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: North Atlantic Air Ferry Route.

The expansion of the present North Atlantic Air Ferry Route to include additional airdromes in the Hudson Bay, Baffin Island, and Labrador areas will materially contribute to the facilities along this general route for rapidly placing military aircraft in the European Theater.

By reducing the time during which aircraft are in transit, this air route will in fact increase the fighting strength of our planned operations in that theater.

I strongly recommend that this project be pushed as vigorously as possible within the limitations imposed by shipping and construction materiel.

The Board in taking this action merely implemented the recommendations of the War Department.

*[Handwritten signature]*  
Chief of Staff.

S.M.  
OK  
HJR

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

4 February 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL BROWN:

The attached letter from General Marshall to the President of 3 July 1942 has been returned by the War Department to Mr. Fred Shipman by reason of the recent White House request for the return of all documents initialled by The President.

In my conversations with you on the subject of storing such returned papers you indicated you would be willing to have secret papers placed with your files provided the quantity was not too great and I so informed Mr. Shipman.

Mr. Shipman therefore forwards the attached paper and requests that it be kept with your files.

This is the first document of a secret classification returned by either the War or Navy Departments and Mr. Shipman does not expect many others.

Very respectfully,

*George M. Elsey*  
George M. Elsey  
Lieutenant, USNR

*FDS*  
*WS*