1. A7-1 PUBLICITY, PROPAGANDA, PRESS RELEASES, CORRESPONDENTS, etc.: May 11, 1942 - October 24, 1944.


BOX 163. NAVAL AIDE'S FILES A7-1 to A4

1. A7-1 PUBLICITY, PROPAGANDA, PRESS RELEASES, CORRESPONDENTS, etc.:

May 11, 1942 - October 24, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOPKINS:

I have not yet thought of any action reports that might be included in a speech other than what George Elsey can contribute from the Normandy beachhead; but I suggest the following as of possible values:

(a) The German war lords made the same decisive strategic mistake in the late 30's that they made in 1914 by completely underestimating the war-making power of the United States.

(b) I think the record will show that Hitler repeatedly said there were not enough ships in the world to carry an effective army from Germany to the Americas or vice versa; that he jeered at our first air and shipbuilding program as fantastic propaganda and that he did not even bother to reply to notes from the President urging him to maintain the peace.

(c) In fact we have accomplished infinitely more in three years than any other nation in the world by not only expanding our own air, army and navy many times but providing our allies with the necessities of war. Many reasons may be advanced as to the causes that have enabled us to carry out this tremendous accomplishment but we must recognize: (1) that our system of general education makes it possible for the mass of our people to learn the arts of war and of production more quickly than the people of any other country; (2) that the strong religious influence throughout our history has given our fighters and our workers a crusader's zeal in punishing acts of barbarism; and (3), that the influence of our tradition demands individual courage, a strong offensive spirit and a courageous initiative of the individuals; (4) Good planning and good national leadership. Our critics do not fail to try to attach blame for anything that goes wrong. They surely should not be too stickly to give credit where credit is due.

I think Stalin has gone on record as describing our productive capacity as the decisive element of the war. According to Major Boettiger, Marshal Stalin commented as follows last year at Teheran: "I want to tell you, from the Russian point of view, what the President and the United States have done to win the war. The most important things in this war are machines. The United States has proved that it can turn out from 8,000 to 10,000 airplanes a month. England turns out 3,000 to 3,500, which are principally bombers. Russia can only turn out, at most, 3,000 airplanes a month. The United States, therefore, is a country of machines. Without the use of these machines, through Lend-Lease, we would lose this war." This latter quotation should not, of course, be used without the President's authority.

WILSON BROWN.
September 3, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Proposed Statement on Freedom of Information

Attached, a memorandum approved by the Secretary relating to a proposed statement by you on freedom of information. Mr. Hull has approved it, and suggests that it be sent over to you immediately.

The timing is of some importance; it might appropriately be timed with the announcement of the draft of any agreement reached at Dumbarton Oaks.

Alternatively, a joint declaration by yourself and Churchill might be even better.

Adolf A. Berle, Jr.

Enclosure:

Memorandum to the Secretary attaching proposed statement.
MEMORANDUM

September 8, 1944

S — Mr. Secretary:

The Policy Committee this morning had before it the question of action looking towards international arrangements assisting freedom of information which was raised, as you will recall, by the American Society of Newspaper Editors, the Associated Press, and a considerable number of other interested parties. In this connection, it further considered the situation raised by the introduction, by Congressman Fulbright, of a resolution along this line reported in this morning's New York Times and in respect of which we are advised a considerable publicity campaign may follow.

The Policy Committee considered the report of an informal group which had been constituted in the Department to study the matter, and unanimously voted to recommend to you that the Department ask the President to make the attached statement.

A. A. B., Jr.

Accompaniment:

Proposed Statement on Freedom of Information.

A-B: AAB: LJJ

Regraded Unclassified
Proposed Statement on Freedom of Information

September 9, 1944

I have always been convinced that an enlightened public opinion based on full and free information is indispensable to the maintenance of peace and to friendly understanding among the peoples of the world.

To achieve this end, I believe:

That all nations should admit to the territories under their control, on an equal and unrestricted basis, bona fide representatives of the recognized press and information agencies of other nations engaged in disseminating information to the public in their own countries, and should permit information gathered by them as to events, activities, and conditions, to be transmitted to points outside such territories without hindrance or discrimination; and

That each nation should permit the reception in and transmission through territories under its control of information so gathered in other countries.

This matter has been actively under consideration both by me and in the Department of State. I earnestly hope that in the very near future these vital principles may be presented to the United Nations for appropriate action.

[Signature]

Aidif L. Berle, Jr.

Memorandum

Memorandum to the Secretary
attaching proposed statement.
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A - Mr. Secretary,
Proposed Statement on Freedom of Information

I have always been convinced that an enlightened public opinion based on full and free information is indispensable to the maintenance of peace and to friendly understanding among the peoples of the world.

To achieve this end, I believe:

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That each nation should permit the reception in and transmission through territories under its control of information so gathered in other countries.

This matter has been actively under consideration both by me and in the Department of State. I earnestly hope that in the very near future these vital principles may be presented to the United Nations for appropriate action.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 3, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MISS TULLY.

Steve asked me to have these instructions issued to the Navy but I find that Mr. Forrestal has taken a firm stand with Naval Public Relations, so that a memorandum from the President to Secretary Forrestal may be necessary to get results.

WILSON BROWN.
MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF WAR

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Subjects: News Releases Affecting all of the Armed Services.

1. It seems to me appropriate that news releases which have to do with the Army, Navy and Air should be released by the White House. I will appreciate it very much if Public Relations officers can be instructed to have in mind occasional news releases from the White House having to do with the Armed Services and that material for such releases be furnished to Secretary Early frequently.

F.D.R.

Copy to:
Secretary Early
MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT.

It occurred to me that you might possibly like to give to the press the following comments from Marshal Stalin to Ambassador Harriman:

"The history of war has never witnessed such a grand operation. An operation Napoleon himself had never even attempted."

Very respectfully,

WILSON BROWN.
MEMORANDUM FOR:

Director of Public Relations,
Navy Department.

Subject: Proposed Release on U.S.S. LAFAYETTE.

1. The subject proposed release, a copy of which is attached, has been submitted to the President and he directs that "No statement of any kind" be made on this subject until further advice from the White House.

2. Acknowledgment of this directive is requested.

Respectfully,

Chester C. Wood,
Captain, U.S.Navy,
Assistant Naval Aide to the President.
MEMORANDUM for Captain C. C. Wood, U.S.N.

The attached proposed press release is forwarded for consideration. Unless the White House has objection, the Navy Department would like to make this announcement.

Respectfully,

G. W. CAMPBELL
Commander, U. S. Navy

No statement of any kind
Decision has been reached as a result of surveys made since the ship was raised, not to convert the USS LAFAYETTE (formerly the French Liner SS NORMANDIE) for War service.

It has been concluded that the length of time, the manpower, and the financial outlay required to refit the LAFAYETTE for Naval service do not justify the project. The same elements devoted to other construction will produce tonnage that can be brought into more effective use in the war. The LAFAYETTE, now docked at the Todd Shipyard Corporation, Brooklyn plant, consequently will remain in her present status until final disposition is made of her after the war.

The 79,280-ton vessel burned in the North River, New York City, on February 9, 1942, and capsized early the next morning. It was necessary to refloat and remove the huge vessel, a job requiring many months in order to reclaim the use of valuable pier space needed for war shipping purposes. In connection with these operations a Salvage School was organized by the Navy at the New York pier where the big ship lay. A large number of salvage engineers and divers, both in and out of the Naval service, have received training there which enabled them subsequently to perform invaluable services in the clearing of occupied enemy harbors in North Africa, Sicily and Italy.

***
MEMORANDUM for Captain Chester C. Wood, U.S.N.
Assistant Naval Aide to the President

1. Your memorandum concerning the USS LAFAYETTE has been received. This office will comply with the directive that no statement on this subject be made without further advice from your office.

Leland P. Loveitte
Captain, U.S. Navy
Director
MEMORANDUM FOR:

Director of Public Relations,
Navy Department.

The attached proposed releases are returned, inviting attention to Mr. Early's memorandum.

Respectfully,

Chester C. Wood,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Assistant Naval Aide to the President.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 17, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN CHESTER C. WOOD,
Naval Aide's Office.

Dear Captain:

I return herewith the proposed releases for Wednesday and Thursday of next week.

I have only one suggestion to make in connection with these releases. And that is that the releases be given to the Office of War Information. My purpose in making this suggestion is to get the stories to the Negro newspapers of the country. They will be particularly interested.

The Office of War Information has a section specifically charged with the duty of caring for news announcements of a special interest to the Negro Press.

STEPHEN EARLY,
Secretary to the President.
5 January 1944

NAVY DEPARTMENT

IMMEDIATE RELEASE
PRESS AND RADIO

FEBRUARY, 1944.

NEGRO CREWS TO MAN TWO ANTI-SUBMARINE VESSELS.

Two new U. S. Naval anti-submarine vessels will be manned predominantly by Negro crews.

The USS MASON, a destroyer escort under construction at the U. S. Navy Yard, Boston, Massachusetts, initially will have an enlisted crew of 160 Negroes and 44 whites. The white ratings will be limited to billets requiring specialized training or experience not yet had by Negroes. It is anticipated that as soon as Negroes qualify, they will replace the white enlisted members so that the entire crew eventually will be Negroes. The USS. MASON will be commissioned within the next few weeks.

The USS PC 1264, building at the Consolidated Shipbuilding Corporation, Morris Heights, New York, will have an initial crew of 52 Negroes and nine whites. It is anticipated that this vessel, which is scheduled for commissioning late in March, also will be manned eventually by an all Negro crew.

As is customary for all U. S. Naval personnel assigned to this type of duty, all members of the crews assigned to these two vessels will receive specialized training. The crew of the USS MASON already has reported to the Destroyer Escort School at the Naval Operating Base, Norfolk, Virginia, and the crew of the USS PC 1264 soon will be assigned to the Submarine Chaser Training Center, Miami, Florida.

*******

Regraded Unclassified
NAVY DEPARTMENT

IMMEDIATE RELEASE
PRESS AND RADIO

FEBRUARY, 1944

SELECTION OF NEGRO CANDIDATES FOR COMMISSIONING IN NAVAL RESERVE

As a result of plans which have been under development by the Navy Department for several months, selection of Negro candidates for commissioning as officers in the U. S. Naval Reserve is now being made to fill approximately 22 available billets.

Twelve qualified enlisted men will be selected as line officers, with the rank of Ensign.

Ten professionally qualified Negroes will be commissioned as staff officers, with the rank of Ensign or Lieutenant (junior grade), depending upon the ages and professional qualifications of the men commissioned. It is anticipated that these staff officers will be appointed from civilian life. Two officers will be selected for each of the following Naval staff duties: Chaplain Corps, Dental Corps, Medical Corps, Civil Engineering Corps, and Supply Corps.

The Negro enlisted men commissioned as line officers will be given a special training course of from three to six months duration at the U. S. Naval Training Station, Great Lakes, Illinois. Upon completion of this course, the officers will be assigned to duty initially at the U. S. Naval Training School, Hampton Institute, Hampton, Virginia, and the U. S. Naval Training Station, Great Lakes, Illinois.

The staff officers also will be given a short indoctrination course at the U. S. Naval Training Station, Great Lakes, Illinois, and afterwards assigned initially to the U. S. Naval Training School, Hampton, Virginia, or the U. S. Naval Training Station, Great Lakes, Illinois.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 16, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. Early.

Enclosed herewith are two proposed releases for Wednesday and Thursday of next week.

They were given to me to be transmitted to you for information and such comment, prior to release, as you may care to make.

Respectfully,

CHESTER C. WOOD.
MEMORANDUM for Captain G. C. Wood, U.S.N.

It is proposed to distribute advance copies of the attached releases to the Negro press, for inclusion in their weekly editions which are circulated on Wednesday and Thursday of next week. General release of the stories then will be made at Noon on Wednesday, 23 February.

Respectfully,

G. W. CAMPBELL
Commander, U.S.N.
February 17, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

The President.

The following suggested topic for a press conference is respectfully submitted:

As the official reports of the recent Marshall Islands operations come in, several pertinent conclusions become obvious to us and, I trust, painful to the Japanese.

First, the personnel of the Army, the Navy and the Marine Corps have learned to work in the closest harmony and with the greatest cooperation, not only in the higher command but in all echelons.

Second, the same spirit of harmony prevails as regards the various types of weapons used. The operations of the shore based aircraft mesh closely with those of the carrier planes; bombardment by surface craft is coordinated closely with that of aircraft; the destroyers fulfill their task in screening the larger surface forces and yet contribute their part to shore bombardment; the transports, the amphibious craft and the troops they carry move forward as the final and devastating spearhead of the attack.

Third, the nation's output of aircraft appears to be such that in at least certain sections of the enemy's territory we may be able to expect not only superiority but complete mastery of the air.

Fourth, that because of careful planning and sound execution we were able to move the largest armada of all history into the very heart of the Marshall Islands group and capture our objectives without the loss of a single ship.

This operation is but one of a line that stretches far into the future and across many miles of enemy-held territory. The going will not always be as easy or as cheap in lives, ships and planes, but the going will eventually take us to Tokyo itself.

Very respectfully,

CHESTER C. WOOD.
February 17, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:
The President.

The following suggested topic for a press conference is respectfully submitted:

We are all beginning to realize under what serious disadvantages the Japanese are now laboring because of the continuing heavy losses in their merchant marine. These losses have been imposed mostly by our submarines, but in addition the air forces of both the Army and the Navy have also taken an extremely heavy toll.

It has become evident for some time that the Japanese are attempting to fill their acute shortage in shipping by building a large number of motor barges which are used to distribute supplies and men in the more advanced battle fronts, particularly in the South Pacific. The battle against these barges has become one of the most spectacular and exciting phases of the war. Figures indicate that well over a thousand barges have been destroyed since the beginning of the war and several hundred more have been probably destroyed and damaged. With crews of from 10 to 20 and with troop loads as high as 200 to 300, it can be seen that the personnel losses have been severe, even by Japanese standards.

In these operations our aircraft and PT boats have played the major role on our side. The PT boats are becoming more and more effective as their numbers increase and as their daring and ingenious tactics are developed.

As we go further into Japanese territory, and the hurried transportation of Japanese troops and supplies behind and close to our lines becomes more necessary, this phase of the war will be increasingly important from our angle and more damaging to the enemy.

Very respectfully,

CHESTER C. WOOD.
February 16, 1944

Memorandum for the President.

Via: Naval Aides.

Subject: Radio and Press Predictions of Pacific Operations.

Reference: (a) President's Memorandum re subject dated February 15th. (b) Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to President.

1. Reference (b) concerns itself with security matters which will be presented to you by Admiral Leahy. It includes measures (which the Joint Chiefs of Staff propose for your consideration) which are pertinent to the situation dealt with in your memorandum (reference (a)).

E.J. King

[Signature]
MEMORANDUM FOR:  
   Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.

Subject: Radio and Press Predictions of Pacific Operations.

1. It has been brought to my attention that the Columbia Broadcasting Company at 8:00 a.m. this morning announced the heavy bombing of ENIWETOK and predicted an early landing and occupation there.

2. I would be interested to know how you and Admiral Nimitz view such conjecture by radio announcers who have greater opportunity to form an opinion by observation and conversation than has the enemy.

3. Do you think any action should be taken by me or by Nimitz to govern for the future?

/s/ F. D. R.

F. D. R. 

SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Safeguarding Military Information

The British Chiefs of Staff have brought to our attention their serious concern and that of the Commander of the European Theater of Operations over comment in the press and on the radio by prominent persons with respect to projected military operations. This concern is shared by us.

From a study of such material, it is apparent that there is serious danger of compromising the security of projected military operations which conceivably could result in unnecessary loss of lives and jeopardy to the operations themselves. We have already discussed this matter from the viewpoint of censorship with Mr. Byron Price of the Office of Censorship who is taking such action as lies within his power to prevent disclosures of classified information.

Therefore, it is requested that you issue to all heads of government departments a request for them and their subordinates to refrain from any speculation or discussion, either privately or for publication regarding secret weapons or equipment, current operations or plans, movement of troops and ships, prior to announcement by the proper military or naval or higher authority, and high level international conferences prior to announcement by the White House.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.
18 February 1944

RESTRICTED

My dear ________:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and our military commanders in the field have expressed their serious concern over comment in the press and on the radio by prominent persons in this country with respect to projected military operations. This concern is shared by me.

From a study of such material, it is apparent that there is serious danger of compromising the security of projected military operations which conceivably could result in unnecessary loss of lives and jeopardy to the operations themselves. The Office of Censorship is taking such action as lies within its power to prevent disclosures of classified information in the press and on the radio.

Will you please see that your particular department and its various bureaus and divisions issue instructions to their personnel to refrain from any speculation or discussion, either privately or for publication, regarding secret weapons or equipment, current and future military operations or plans and the movements of troops and ships, prior to announcement by the proper military or naval or higher authority; and, in cases of high level international conferences, prior to authorization being secured from the Executive Office of the President.

I am sending an identical letter to the responsible head of each Department and Agency of the Federal Government which may be concerned in this matter.

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
DISTRIBUTION

The Honorable
The Secretary of State.

The Honorable
The Secretary of the Treasury.

The Honorable
the Secretary of War.

The Honorable
The Attorney General.

The Honorable
The Postmaster General.

The Honorable
The Secretary of the Navy.

The Honorable
The Secretary of the Interior.

The Honorable
The Secretary of Agriculture.

The Honorable
The Secretary of Commerce.

The Honorable
The Secretary of Labor.

The Honorable
Administrator
Federal Security Agency.

Major General Philip B. Fleming
Administrator
Federal Works Agency.

Honorable Marvin Jones
War Food Administrator.

Honorable Norman H. Davis
Chairman
American National Red Cross.

Honorable James Lawrence Fly,
Chairman
Office of Science,
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Robert E. Webb,
Acting Chairman
Board of Investigation and Research -
Transportation,
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Harriner S. Eccles,
Chairman
Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System,
Washington, D. C.

Honorable L. Welch Pogue,
Chairman
Civil Aeronautica Board,
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Lindsay C. Warren,
Comptroller General of the
United States,
Washington, D. C.

Brigadier General William J. Donovan,
Director of the Office of Strategic
Services,
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Byron Price,
Director of Censorship,
Washington, D. C.

Honorable James L. Fly,
Chairman
Federal Communications Commission,
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Robert E. Freer
Chairman
Federal Trade Commission,
Washington, D. C.

Vice Admiral Alfred W. Johnson,
Chairman, United States Members,
Joint Mexican - United States Defense
Commission,
Washington, D. C.
Honorable Frank B. Jewett,  
President,  
National Academy of Sciences,  
Washington, D. C.

Dr. Jerome C. Hunsaker,  
Chairman,  
National Advisory Committee for  
Aeronautics,  
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Harry A. Millis,  
Chairman,  
National Labor Relations Board,  
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Chester Bowles,  
Administrator,  
Office of Price Administration,  
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Fiorello H. LaGuardia,  
Chairman, United States Section,  
Permanent Joint Board on Defense - United States and Canada,  
c/o Mr. John Hickerson,  
State Department,  
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Joseph E. Davies,  
Chairman,  
War Relief Control Board,  
Washington, D. C.

Brigadier General Frank T. Hines,  
Administrator of Veterans' Affairs,  
Washington, D. C.

Major General Lewis E. Hershey,  
Director of Selective Service,  
Washington, D. C.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Dr. Richard R. Brown,  
Director,  
Division of Central Administrative  
Services,  
Office for Emergency Management,  
Washington, D. C.

Honorable James Lawrence Fly,  
Chairman,  
Board of War Communications,  
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller,  
Coordinator,  
Office of the Coordinator of  
Inter-American Affairs,  
Washington, D. C.

Honorable William H. Davis,  
Chairman,  
National War Labor Board,  
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Donald M. Nelson,  
Chairman,  
War Production Board,  
Washington, D. C.

Dr. Vannevar Bush,  
Director,  
Office of Scientific Research and  
Development,  
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Joseph B. Eastman,  
Director,  
Office of Defense Transportation  
Washington, D. C.

Rear Admiral Emory S. Land,  
Administrator,  
War Shipping Administration,  
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Leo T. Crowley,  
Alien Property Custodian,  
Office of Alien Property Custodian,  
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Paul V. McNutt,  
Chairman,  
War Manpower Commission,  
Washington, D. C.
Honorable Elmer Davis,
Director,
Office of War Information,
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Fred M. Vinson,
Director,
Office of Economic Stabilization,
Washington, D. C.

Honorable James F. Byrnes,
Director,
Office of War Mobilization,
Washington, D. C.

Honorable Harold D. Smith,
Director,
Bureau of the Budget,
Washington, D. C.

Honorable John B. Martin,
Acting Director,
Office of Civilian Defense,
Washington, D. C.
File
(per Attorney Brown)

Action taken in
Conference.

McClary
10 September 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER:

Subject: Propaganda Committees to Handle Emergency Situations.

Reference: C.C.S. 310/3 (copy attached).

We have made a further examination of the question raised by us with you in our memorandum of 8th September 1943, and would like to make clear two points in connection with it.

In the first place, our proposal was in no way intended to cover the arrangements that will be necessary for the general direction of propaganda. This must, of course, be a matter for the two Governments. We were merely trying to set up a machinery for giving decisions in emergency, machinery which recent experience has shown to be most necessary.

Secondly, the inclusion of representatives of O.W.I. and the British P.W.E. has already been arranged. We would be grateful, therefore, if approval could be given for this emergency procedure to be set up, at least provisionally. It would meet a real military need.

For the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

J. G. DILL, Head of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington.

WILLIAM D. LEAHY, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

SECRET
U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
645-4
(C.C.S. 310/3)
8 September 1943

COPY NO. 59
(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE

(1) CCS 310
(2) CCS 310/1
(3) CCS 310/2

Regraded Unclassified
Note by the Secretaries

The following note was received from the President by Admiral Leahy:

"THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 7, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

In regard to the Combined Staff proposals concerning need of closer coordination of propaganda policy as between Washington, London and the various theatres of war, I have talked this over with the Prime Minister.

Both of us would like to have further examination of this plan.

It creates three new authorities. It creates a central authority of only four, omitting OWI and the British PWE.

Personally, I wonder if it is necessary or whether it could be handled for awhile under less machinery, using preferably a more informal method.

/s/ F.D.R."

H. REDMAN,
J. R. DEANE,
Combined Secretariat.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM ROBERT E. SHERWOOD.

There has been considerable discussion of the confusion and inconsistencies which have existed lately as a result of inadequate policy control over propaganda emanating from Algiers, London and the United States since the fall of Mussolini.

The danger is that our enemies do not fail to notice these differences. They conclude that the threatening talk broadcast by North African stations under General Eisenhower's control is mere bluff, unsupported by Washington.

As other theatres of war become opened and further propaganda activities develop this confusion can become worse confounded.

As a remedy, it is suggested that a six man policy board be formed, either in Washington or London, to consist of two representatives of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, (one British and one American), a representative of the State Department, a representative of the Foreign Office, a representative of the Office of War Information Overseas Operations and a representative of the British Political Warfare Executive.

I have discussed this with Elmer Davis and with David Bowes-Lyon, head of the British Political Warfare Mission in Washington. Both concur.

Robert Sherwood
MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL BROWN:

I want to take this up with the Prime Minister. It is a new subject.

F.D.R.
MEMORANDUM TO: Elmer Davis
FROM: Robert Sherwood.

There has lately been much confusion and some complaint (particularly in London) because of the lack of coordination of propaganda policy as between Algiers, London and Washington.

This has reached such a state of disorganization that, at one time, OWI, Washington, was following an Algiers directive on policy toward the Badoglio Government, PWE, London, was deliberately disregarding this directive, and Algiers itself was attacking Badoglio (by name) as a "betrayal" in violation of its own directive.

The enemy, listening to this confusion and contradiction, could only conclude that there was dissenion between Allies and even between General Eisenhower and the U. S. high command in Washington.

When other theaters of war are opened, this confusion may well be worse confounded.

The solution, as I see it, is a central propaganda policy committee, attached to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This could contain representatives of the Combined Chiefs, the State Department, the Foreign Office, OWI and PWE. It could have power to enforce the policy, as approved by the President and Prime Minister, in all theaters.

I have discussed this with David Bowes-Lyon, head of the PWE Mission in Washington, and he concurs.
Dear Captain McCrea,

You will recall that at the meeting of the Pacific War Council held on 2nd September, the President referred to reports ascribed to the London Star's correspondent in Australia about the number of Japanese ships sunk in the Solomons area. I have enquired about the transmission of this news from Australia and I am now informed that the records in Australia show that there is no outgoing cable message which could be responsible for the press report. The Government also informed me that there is no London Star correspondent accredited to General Headquarters in Australia and that there is no correspondent who acts as a contributor to the London Star. Accordingly, it was thought that the report did not come from Australia.

The suggestion is made in the message to me from Australia that perhaps the story originated from New Zealand, or some other Pacific base outside Australia. There was a reference in a report from New Zealand to fifteen damaged Japanese ships and the possibility is suggested of a mutilation of this message giving rise to the report to which the President referred.

It is not a matter about which it is worth troubling the President personally but I should be glad if you would bring this information to the notice of whatever authority is appropriate; for I assume that the matter was brought to the President's attention officially.

I may add that I referred in my communication to Australia to tightening up the censorship.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Captain J.L. McCrea,
Naval Aide to the President,
White House,
Washington, D.C.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The attached radiogram relative to the release of publicity in Australia has just been received from General MacArthur. Our Number 31 to which he refers in his last sentence is the radiogram which you sent to him on May 6th and specifically I believe he refers to the following paragraph of that radiogram:

"The only difficulty I am having here is a good deal of loose newspaper talk coming out of Australia and I suggest you do all possible to get a censorship on all outgoing messages from Australia and possibly New Zealand."

Incl.
Radio - AG #745
May 15, 1942.

* This message is in Jacket
A6-1 (President-MacArthur Personal Messages)
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Priority

From: USAFIA
To: Chief of Staff

No. AG 745 May 15, 1942

Chief of Staff. I have had a series of conferences with the Prime Minister in which I represented to him the advisability of limiting the Freedom of Publicity in this country. In advocating this point of view I stressed that I was not in any way intended even by inference to suggest a control of this matter by the American Government. On the contrary I assured him that if corrective measures were to be taken they must be taken by the Australian Government itself. He has agreed in general principle to my suggestion and has directed the members of his cabinet and all other government officials to be completely restrained in public utterances. He has privately assembled the editors of the country and has obtained their promises of restraint in publication and has given me partial control over the Australian censorship. This has been done in such a way that our own government is not in any way involved and no allegation can be made that it is attempting to impose its will in any way upon that of the
From: U.S.A.F.I.A
To: Chief of Staff
No. AG 745 May 15, 1942

Australians, I am hopeful that real results will be obtained. In view of President Roosevelt's comments to me in your Ad 31 of May 6th will you please inform him.

MacArthur

Note: Reply to secret message No. 31 (CM-OUT-1131, 5/6/42) OPD.

Action Copy: OPD
Info. Copies: SGS
File

CM-IN-4041 (5/15/42) AM 10:20
May 15, 1942.

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Chief of Staff.

Incl.
Radio - AO 8745
May 15, 1942.

mnk
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

May 11, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I have drafted the enclosed telegram to
MacArthur as a suggestion for a message from you as
Commander-in-Chief to him, in relation to the matter of
publicity regarding Naval operations.

Secretary of War.

encl
May 11, 1942.

Commander in Chief,
Southwest Pacific Area,
Melbourne, Australia.

Your 179 of May 10 has surprised and disappointed me. Units constituting any naval forces are always comparatively very limited in number, vulnerable, and difficult to replace.

The task units of the American fleet now operating in the South Pacific are particularly more vulnerable than normal naval units by virtue of their extended lines of communication and their distance from naval bases. As a result of these unescapable conditions, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific fleet now labors under a responsibility which is unique in contrast with the responsibility of the Commanders of other American Military Forces operating in any Pacific theatre.

Not only does the safety of the Australian people to which you refer depend upon the successful operation of that American Naval Force, but the security of the United States, itself, also depends upon it.

In the light of these conditions, we have all here recognized that the decision of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific fleet must control all information released for publicity in respect to any of the fleet's operations in any portion of the Pacific Ocean. It is impossible for anyone not personally acquainted with all features of such operation and personally responsible for the entire fleet's security to determine what fragment of publicity may jeopardize some portion of the safety of the fleet.

In no other way than such concentration of responsibility can the security of the whole be achieved. This is the thoroughly considered and imperative decision of our government based upon its sovereign rights and safety which it will not depart from at the behest of any of other government even of trusted allies.

You will please make this clear, not only to the staff and your public relations, but to the head of the Australian Government himself.