

Map Room Files.

92

BOX 163. NAVAL AIDE'S FILES A7-1 to A14

4. A14 INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: November 19, 1942 - April 25, 1945.

A14/WHF

HOLD FOR RELEASE

HOLD FOR RELEASE

HOLD FOR RELEASE

APRIL 25, 1945

CAUTION: The following address of the President, to be broadcast in connection with the opening of the San Francisco Conference, MUST BE HELD IN CONFIDENCE until released.

NOTE: Release to editions of all newspapers appearing on the streets NOT EARLIER THAN 7:35 P.M., E.W.T., WEDNESDAY, April 25, 1945. The same release applies to radio announcers and news commentators.

CARE MUST BE EXERCISED TO PREVENT PREMATURE PUBLICATION.

JONATHAN DANIELS  
Secretary to the President

Delegates to the United Nations Conference  
on International Organization:

The world has experienced a revival of an old faith in the everlasting moral force of justice. At no time in history has there been a more important Conference, nor a more necessary meeting, than this one in San Francisco, which you are opening today.

On behalf of the American people, I extend to you a most hearty welcome.

President Roosevelt appointed an able delegation to represent the United States. I have complete confidence in its Chairman, Secretary of State Stettinius, and in his distinguished colleagues, former Secretary Cordell Hull, Senator Connally, Senator Vandenberg, Representative Bloom and Representative Eaton, Governor Stassen and Dean Gildersleeve.

They have my confidence. They have my support.

In the name of a great humanitarian -- one who surely is with us today in spirit -- I earnestly appeal to each and every one of you to rise above personal interests, and adhere to those lofty principles, which benefit all mankind.

Franklin D. Roosevelt gave his life while trying to perpetuate these high ideals. This Conference owes its existence, in a large part, to the vision and foresight and determination of Franklin Roosevelt.

Each of you can remember other courageous champions, who also made the supreme sacrifice, serving under your flag. They gave their lives, so that others might live in security. They died to insure justice. We must work and live to guarantee justice -- for all.

You members of this Conference are to be the architects of the better world. In your hands rests our future. By your labors at this Conference, we shall know if suffering humanity is to achieve a just and lasting peace.

Let us labor to achieve a peace which is really worthy of their great sacrifice. We must make certain, by your work here, that another war will be impossible.

We, who have lived through the torture and the tragedy of two world conflicts, must realize the magnitude of the problem before us. We do not need far-sighted vision to understand the trend in recent history. Its significance is all too clear.

Regraded Unclassified

With ever-increasing brutality and destruction, modern warfare, if unchecked, would ultimately crush all civilization. We still have a choice between the alternatives: the continuation of international chaos -- or the establishment of a world organization for the enforcement of peace.

It is not the purpose of this Conference to draft a treaty of peace in the old sense of that term. It is not our assignment to settle specific questions of territories, boundaries, citizenship and reparations.

This Conference will devote its energies and its labors exclusively to the single problem of setting up the essential organization to keep the peace. You are to write the fundamental charter.

Our sole objective, at this decisive gathering, is to create the structure. We must provide the machinery, which will make future peace, not only possible, but certain.

The construction of this delicate machine is far more complicated than drawing boundary lines on a map, or estimating fair reparations, or placing reasonable limits upon armaments. Your task must be completed first.

We represent the overwhelming majority of all mankind. We speak for people, who have endured the most savage and devastating war ever inflicted upon innocent men, women and children.

We hold a powerful mandate from our people. They believe we will fulfill this obligation. We must prevent, if human mind, heart and hope can prevent it, the repetition of the disaster from which the entire world will suffer for years to come.

If we should pay merely lip service to inspiring ideals, and later do violence to simple justice, we would draw down upon us the bitter wrath of generations yet unborn.

We must not continue to sacrifice the flower of our youth merely to check madmen, those who in every age plan world domination. The sacrifices of our youth today must lead, through your efforts, to the building for tomorrow of a mighty combination of nations founded upon justice for peace.

Justice remains the greatest power on earth.

To that tremendous power alone, will we submit.

Nine days ago, I told the Congress of the United States, and I now repeat it to you:

"Nothing is more essential to the future peace of the world, than continued cooperation of the nations, which had to muster the force necessary to defeat the conspiracy of the axis powers to dominate the world.

"While these great states have a special responsibility to enforce the peace, their responsibility is based upon the obligations resting upon all states, large and small, not to use force in international relations, except in the defense of law. The responsibility of the great states is to serve, and not dominate the peoples of the world."

None of us doubt that with Divine guidance, friendly cooperation, and hard work, we shall find an adequate answer to the problem history has put before us.

Realizing the scope of our task and the imperative need for success, we proceed with humility and determination.

By harmonious cooperation, the United Nations repelled the onslaught of the greatest aggregation of military force that was ever assembled in the long history of aggression. Every nation now fighting for freedom is giving according to its ability and opportunity.

We fully realize today that victory in war requires a mighty united effort. Certainly, victory in peace calls for, and must receive, an equal effort.

Man has learned long ago, that it is impossible to live unto himself. This same basic principle applies today to nations. We were not isolated during the war. We dare not become isolated in peace.

All will concede that in order to have good neighbors, we must also be good neighbors. That applies in every field of human endeavor.

For lasting security, men of good-will must unite and organize. Moreover, if our friendly policies should ever be considered by belligerent leaders, as merely evidence of weakness, the organization we establish must be adequately prepared to meet any challenge.

Differences between men, and between nations, will always remain. In fact, if held within reasonable limits, such disagreements are actually wholesome. All progress begins with differences of opinion and moves onward as the differences are adjusted through reason and mutual understanding.

In recent years, our enemies have clearly demonstrated the disaster which follows when freedom of thought is no longer tolerated. Honest minds cannot long be regimented without protest.

The essence of our problem here is to provide sensible machinery for the settlement of disputes among nations. Without this, peace cannot exist. We can no longer permit any nation, or group of nations, to attempt to settle their arguments with bombs and bayonets.

If we continue to abide by such decisions, we will be forced to accept the fundamental philosophy of our enemies, namely, that "Might Makes Right". To deny this premise, and we most certainly do, we are obliged to provide the necessary means to refute it. Words are not enough.

We must, once and for all, reverse the order, and prove by our acts conclusively, that Right Has Might.

If we do not want to die together in war, we must learn to live together in peace.

With firm faith in our hearts, to sustain us along the hard road to victory, we will find our way to a secure peace, for the ultimate benefit of all humanity.

We must build a new world -- a far better world -- one in which the eternal dignity of man is respected.

As we are about to undertake our heavy duties, we beseech Almighty God to guide us in building a permanent monument to those who gave their lives that this moment might come.

May He lead our steps in His own righteous path of peace.

A14/WHF

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

MARCH 29, 1945

WR

Soviet representatives at the Yalta Conference indicated their desire to raise at the San Francisco Conference of the United Nations, the question of representation for the Ukranian Soviet Republic and the White Russian Soviet Republic in the Assembly of the proposed United Nations Organization.

The American and British representatives at the Yalta Conference were requested by the Soviet representatives to support this proposal when submitted to the Conference of the United Nations at San Francisco. They agreed to do so but the American representatives stated that, if the United Nations Organization agreed to let the Soviet Republics have three votes, the United States would ask for three votes also.

The British and Soviet representatives stated that they would have no objection to the United States and its possessions having three votes in the Assembly if it **is so desired**.

These conversations at Yalta related to the submission of a question to the San Francisco Conference where the ultimate decision will be made.

- - - -

AH/PMB

WS

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

MARCH 13, 1945

During the Canadian Prime Minister's visit to Washington, Mr. King and the President discussed questions of general international interest as well as those more specifically concerned with the relations between the two countries; relations which are as firm and friendly as ever. Among other things, a survey was made of questions arising out of the recent Crimea Conference and likely to arise at the forthcoming San Francisco Conference. They discussed in part the place which Canada will occupy in the new international organization.

The President and the Prime Minister also had an opportunity of discussing questions of international economic and trading policy which both their countries will have to face as soon as hostilities end. They agreed that the solution of these questions should be sought along bold and expansive lines with a view to the removal of discriminations and the reduction of barriers to the exchange of goods between all countries. They recognized a common interest in working toward these objectives.

It was felt that the United States and Canada, with their long experience of friendly relations and their high degree of economic interdependence, should meet the new problems that peace will bring in the same spirit of co-operation with the other United Nations that has sustained their common war effort.

-----

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*F.D.R.*  
*W*

March 12, 1946.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

TO READ AND FILE.

F.D.R.

TOP SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

*wsh*

March 6, 1945

SPECIAL INFORMATION FOR THE PRESIDENT

These current developments in foreign affairs may be of interest to you:

POLISH CONVERSATIONS. Molotov, Harriman and Clark Kerr met again during the night of March 5 but found no agreement possible in regard to the invitations to Polish leaders. Molotov brushed aside all arguments and firmly maintained the position that only those Poles acceptable to Warsaw could be invited. He refused to invite the five men from within Poland originally named by the President at Yalta and refused to consider the suggestion that any Pole named by any Commissioner be invited. He indicated that Sapieha was not truly democratic and refused to consider inviting Mikolajczyk. Two counter proposals made by Molotov covered a prior invitation to the Warsaw Poles in order to obtain information about other Poles and a limitation of invitations to Warsaw representatives and four other Poles acceptable to Warsaw. Both Harriman and Clark Kerr refused to consider these proposals. Molotov at one time raised the question of the wording of the communique but dropped this matter when Harriman explained our interpretation. Harriman informed Molotov that he knew the President would be shocked to learn of Molotov's obstruction of the Commission's work and pointed out that Stalin had agreed to the inviting of Sapieha and Witos at Yalta. Molotov replied that communique was "anchor" for Commission's work and that no other Yalta conversations had any bearing

on

-2-

on the subject. Clark Kerr raised the question of a British mission going to Poland and Molotov stated that he could not now raise this question with the Warsaw government because of Eden's recent "offensive remarks" about that government in Parliament. The meeting closed with the understanding that Molotov's position would be reported to the American and British Governments. Previously Harriman had expressed the belief that Clark Kerr is handicapped because he is given no discretion by British Foreign Office. Harriman considers that British are viewing Commission's work more from point of view of Parliament debate than urgent need of making progress.

The Department has informed Harriman that it agrees that Mikolajczyk should be persuaded to abandon the conditions laid down by him for his acceptance of an invitation to Moscow but feels that the matter should not be raised until the Commission has decided upon the list of Poles to be invited.

RUMANIAN DEVELOPMENTS. Since National Peasant and National Liberation Party leaders refuse to enter a government in which majority of cabinet posts are held by Communist-dominated NDF, Groza is now attempting to form a cabinet in which half the places will be held by NDF. Political tension continues and General Schuyler's request for an effective ACC meeting has been turned down. Berry understands that the King feels that he cannot change the mandate given to Groza since it was based upon consultations with all party leaders. If a proper cabinet cannot be formed the King will again consult party leaders with the idea of surrendering his prerogatives.

PORTUGUESE ATC NEGOTIATIONS. Although Salazar has again refused to accept the American position in regard to the secrecy of meteorological equipment and operations, the Embassy believes that there is some slight hope that a practical arrangement may be worked out.


TURKISH

-3-

TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR. Kirk reports that AFHQ is giving consideration to the possibility that Turkish troops might be used on the Italian front. If so, start would be made with one division which would be built up to at least a corps.

CURRIE MISSION. Currie reports that he has obtained from the Swiss entirely satisfactory concessions on safehaven matters, including blocking decrees, a census of assets, refusal to purchase German gold and consultation with governments concerned before blocking controls are removed. These concessions will be recommended by Swiss delegation to Federal Council. Economic and transit negotiations are continuing and Swiss appear to be willing to make considerable concessions despite disappointment over coal decision. Currie has assured Swiss that we will furnish coal as soon as possible.

SWISS BOMBINGS. The Legation at Bern has been informed that General Marshall is personally greatly concerned over recurrent accidental bombings of Swiss territory by American aircraft and has therefore ordered General Spaatz immediately to proceed to Bern to consult with Swiss authorities as to the best method of handling these incidents.



Acting Secretary

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

March 6, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Negotiations in Moscow Commission  
on Poland

I believe you may be interested in reading in full the enclosed telegram from Harriman in which he describes the completely intransigent attitude now being displayed by Molotov in the Polish negotiations.



Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Copy of telegram  
no. 636 from Moscow,  
March 6, 1945.

DEPARTMENT  
OF  
STATE

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF  
CENTRAL SERVICES  
TELEGRAPH SECTION

LFR-438

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SECRET)

Moscow via Army

Dated March 6, 1945

Rec'd 1 a.m.,

*W.H.L.*

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

PRIORITY

636, March 6, 2 a.m.

We had three more unproductive hours of discussion  
at the meeting of the commission on Poland this evening,  
(POLCO) going over much the same ground as last time.

The British Ambassador and I proposed that the com-  
mission invite the five men from within Poland originally  
named by the President at Yalta and indicated a willingness  
to agree to the inviting of any other Poles from Poland  
whom Molotov might wish. I argued for the Department's  
suggestion that the commission agree to invite any Poles  
whom anyone of the three of us considered useful for con-  
sultation. Molotov brushed all our arguments aside saying  
that he did not know enough about any of our suggestions  
to allow him to agree to their being invited except  
Kutrzeba for the reason that he was acceptable to the  
Warsaw Poles. He suggested that they might not be truly  
democratic. When queried about Prince Sapieha he said

his information

-2- #636, March 6, 2 a.m., from Moscow via Army

his information indicated he was not truly democratic as he had once opposed the increase of public school as being a luxury.

Molotov made two counter proposals: 1) That we invite the Warsaw Poles to Moscow at once and get from them first hand information about various Poles under consideration although he readily acquiesced that the commission should not be bound by the Warsaw opinion. If we did not get Warsaw's advice, however, we might make a mistake and find a Fascist in our midst. He consistently denied that he had adequate information on these people and repeatedly suggested that the best way to get such information was to bring the Warsaw Poles to Moscow for consultation.

In justification of this position he cited the words "In the first instance" in the communique. This gave me an opportunity to explain the meaning in accordance with Department's 492, March 3, midnight. At first he challenged strongly our interpretation but when I pointed out that our obligation in the communique was to consult the Warsaw Government about its reorganization and not about whom we should invite he dropped the argument.

When Clark Kerr and I firmly stated that our  
respective

~~3~~#636, March 6, 2 a.m., from Moscow via Army

respective governments were unwilling to ask Warsaw Poles to come to Moscow until invitations had been extended to other representative Poles from within Poland on account of the unfavorable reaction in public opinion this would create in England and the United States, Molotov made his second proposal: 2) That we limit our invitations as a first step to the Warsaw representatives and four other Poles acceptable to the Warsaw Government, namely from within Poland, Kutrzeba and any one of the other four suggested by Warsaw and from London, Grabski and General Zeligowski. Clark Kerr and I bluntly pointed out to Molotov the absurdity of this suggestion.

I agreed to limit our invitations to four at this time if Mikolajczyk and Grabski were named from London and Kutrzeba and one of the other men of our list from within Poland, indicating, however, that I was ready to consider adding any names which Molotov might suggest from within Poland. Molotov refused to consider Mikolajczyk until we had had a chance to talk to the Warsaw Poles.

Clark Kerr then again proposed that we ask at this time only Poles from within Poland, attempting to get

-4-#636, March 6, 2 a.m., from Moscow via Army

to get Molotov to broaden his selection. Molotov maintained the position that he could not agree to inviting any Poles from within Poland except from the list of five suggested by the Warsaw Government until we had had an opportunity to talk the matter over with the Warsaw Poles face to face.

Every argument Clark Kerr and I advanced was brushed aside. For example I told him that I knew the President would be shocked to learn of Molotov's obstruction to the progress of the work of the commission in objecting to our calling representative Polish democratic leaders to Moscow. I pointed out that Marshall Stalin had agreed to the inviting of Sapieha and Witos to Yalta and I failed to understand why Molotov now went back on this position. In reply he said that the communique was the "anchor" for the commission's work and that no other conversations at Yalta had a bearing.

At no time did Molotov budge an inch from the position he had taken at our last meeting, although at all times he refused to allow the conversation to become in any way acrimonious.

In view of the deadlock Clark Kerr and I finally agreed to report Molotov's position to our governments.

In closing

-5-#636, March 6, 2 a.m., from Moscow via Army

In closing Clark Kerr mentioned the question of a British mission going to Poland as a means of getting more information. Molotov interrupted by stating he did not feel he could now even take this question up with the Warsaw Government because of Mr. Edon's recent "offensive remarks" about the Warsaw Government in the House.

I will comment in another message tomorrow on my reaction to this impasse.

HARRIMAN

MJF

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*File*  
*W*

March 12, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

TO READ AND FILE.

F.D.R.

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

*W.A.H.*

March 3, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Polish Conversations

I am sure you will be interested in reading in full the attached telegram from Ambassador Harriman in regard to the Polish conversations. We fully share the Ambassador's view that although these tactics are discouraging there are no grounds as yet for pessimism since it is difficult to conceive the Russians would let the Crimean decisions break down through any incurring of a clear violation of the intent of those decisions. We are sending Harriman a telegram approving the position he has taken on various points covered in his telegram.

We are also telling him that we feel here that it is of the highest importance that the Commission should act as a unit in all dealings with the various Polish factions and there should be no appearance given in any of their outward actions that the United States and Great Britain are advocates of the non-Lublin Poles and the Soviet Union the sponsor of the Lublin Government.

*Joseph P. Gurnea*

Enclosure:

Copy of telegram  
no. 610 from Moscow,  
March 2, 1945.

Acting Secretary

SECRET

March 3, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Polish Conversations

I am sure you will be interested in reading in full the attached telegram from Ambassador Harriman in regard to the Polish conversations. We fully share the Ambassador's view that although these tactics are discouraging there are no grounds as yet for pessimism since it is difficult to conceive the Russians would let the Crimean decisions break down through any incurring of a clear violation of the intent of those decisions. We are sending Harriman a telegram approving the position he has taken on various points covered in his telegram.

We are also telling him that we feel here that it is of the highest importance that the Commission should act as a unit in all dealings with the various Polish factions and there should be no appearance given in any of their outward actions that the United States and Great Britain are advocates of the non-Lublin Poles and the Soviet Union the sponsor of the Lublin Government.

Enclosure:

Copy of telegram  
no. 610 from Moscow,  
March 2, 1945.

Acting Secretary

DEPARTMENT  
OF  
STATE

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF  
CENTRAL SERVICES  
TELEGRAPH SECTION

MB-1649

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SECRET)

Moscow

Dated March 2, 1945

Rec'd 7:45 a.m., 3rd

WAL

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

610, March 2, 4 p.m.

SECRET FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY

British Ambassador received a message late in evening of February 28 from Eden stating that he regretted that the British Ambassador had agreed to call the Warsaw Poles to Moscow prior to the extension by the commission of an invitation to other Polish leaders from liberated Poland, explaining that this would confirm the worst fears of certain members of the House and thereby cause the British Government further difficulties. Clark Kerr was therefore instructed to insist that the commission before the arrival of the representatives of the Warsaw Government invite these other Polish leaders to come to Moscow at once.

We therefore had a meeting late last night lasting three and a half hours to discuss the proposal of the British Government. The discussion confirmed my view that

-2- 610, March 2, 4 p.m., from Moscow

my view that Molotov would take no action without previous consultation with the Warsaw Poles even in the selection of the independent Poles to be invited to Moscow. He was willing to invite only persons who were on the list submitted by the Warsaw Government as contained in my 557, February 27, 11 a.m.. You will realize that the five names suggested by Bierut from western Poland included only one of those proposed by us, namely Professor Kutrzeba, and four other persons regarding whom we have absolutely no information and who have never been publicly known to be active in politics. The names from London included only one that we had suggested, namely Grabski.

At one time Molotov suggested that we limit our invitation at this time to Kutrzeba Grabski and General Zeligowski. He firmly resisted the invitation to Mikolajczyk contending against all argument, including the reading of Mikolajczyk's statement to the press, that Mikolajczyk had publicly disavowed the Crimean decision.

As Mikolajczyk has refused to come to Moscow until after the arrival of the Poles from Warsaw, Clark Kerr explained that he was suggesting at this time the extending of invitations only to Poles from within Poland, and we both stated categorically that we would not agree to the extension of any invitations to London Poles unless Mikolajczyk was included. Molotov therefore agreed to

-3- 610, March 2, 4 p.m., from Moscow

agreed to limit the discussion to the inviting of Poles from within Poland. After hours of discussion it was obvious that we could come to no agreement. Molotov kept insisting that he would not invite Poles to Moscow until he had direct knowledge that those individuals were in sympathy with the Crimea decision. He contended that he had no information about any of the men on our list except Professor Kutrzeba and admitted that until he had consulted the Warsaw Government he would be unable to include any others.

The upshot of the conversation was agreement between Clark Kerr and Molotov to put off the invitation of the Warsaw Poles. I objected to the delay and insisted that the commission should be ready to work independently of the opinion of the Warsaw Government, but Molotov was adamant. Under the circumstances I agree to join in a telegram to Bierut requesting the postponement of the visit to Moscow.

I am not able to judge the reactions in England as described by Eden's message but from the standpoint of the negotiations here I regret that it has not been possible for us to bring the Warsaw Poles to Moscow at this stage and have a blunt talk with them. Their telegram has indicated that they do not (repeat not) accept the spirit of the Crimea decisions and I still

feel it is

-4- 610, March 2, 4 p.m., from Moscow

feel it is essential to talk with them and Molotov together in order to find out whether there is any basis at all for agreement.

It is still my conviction that the Russians cannot afford to let the Crimea decisions break down. On the other hand it is apparent that Molotov is under instructions from Stalin and his associates to give as little ground as possible in the direction of bringing in elements not under Soviet control and to fight every inch of the way. It is equally my intention, unless I am instructed otherwise, not (repeat not) to be a party to inviting any Poles outside the Warsaw Government unless the group includes a reasonable number of independent leaders who are well known to the outside world, even though several of the list suggested by Warsaw might also be included. In addition I will not (repeat not) agree to inviting any Poles from London unless Mikolajczyk is included.

I feel we are going through the usual Russian tactic of attempting to wear us down. I am not (repeat not) yet pessimistic over the outcome, though I cannot help but be resentful of the tactics employed. The only good news I can give of the talk last night is that Molotov was obviously making every effort to keep the conversation

-5- 610, March 2, 4 p.m., from Moscow

the conversation in a friendly tone.

Molotov has agreed to attempt to inform himself regarding the names we have proposed within Poland and at our next meeting he will inform us whether he will agree to the inviting of a representative list. I have maintained that he should agree to invite anyone that Clark Kerr and I feel will be useful. On the other hand, I have told him that I would be similarly ready to invite anyone that he wished to bring. Molotov's only answer is the continued reiteration of his position that we should invite only Poles known to support the Crimea decisions.

We also had a brief talk regarding sending British and American representatives to Poland (REEMBS 597, March 1, 3 p.m.)

Molotov appeared less interested than in our last talk and asked Clark Kerr to advise exactly what our representatives were to do if they went to Poland. Clark Kerr is cabling the Prime Minister in order to be sure that he covers the ground Mr. Churchill has in mind.

Unfortunately Clark Kerr is undergoing a slight operation to his eye which will lay him up for three or four days and thus delay further meetings.

HARRIMAN

BB

*JW*  
*AH/P*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 10, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE:

I called Admiral Jacobs on 10 March in reference to the orders to Commander Stassen and I asked Jacobs to inform Admiral Halsey that he should plan to release Stassen from all duties beginning 15 March until after the San Francisco Conference in order that Stassen may be free to attend the State Department indoctrination course which starts March 15th.

*W. B.*  
WILSON BROWN.

11  
d A14/P22

F-10  
WZ

I was very much impressed February 6, 1945.

... things you said today, particularly your determination  
**My dear Marshal Stalin:**

I have been giving a great deal of thought to our meeting this afternoon, and I want to tell you in all frankness what is on my mind.

In so far as the Polish Government is concerned, I am greatly disturbed that the three great powers do not have a meeting of minds about the political setup in Poland. It seems to me that it puts all of us in a bad light throughout the world to have you recognizing one government while we and the British are recognizing another in London. I am sure this state of affairs should not continue and that if it does it can only lead our people to think there is a breach between us, which is not the case. I am determined that there shall be no breach between ourselves and the Soviet Union. Surely there is a way to reconcile our differences.

I was  
with an open and obvious divergence between us on

**Marshal V. I. Stalin,**  
**Koreis,**  
**The Crimea.**

VIA  
D

- 2 -

I was very much impressed with some of the things you said today, particularly your determination that your rear must be safeguarded as your army moves into Berlin. You cannot, and we must not, tolerate any temporary government which will give your armed forces any trouble of this sort. I want you to know that I am fully mindful of this.

You must believe me when I tell you that our people at home look with a critical eye on what they consider a disagreement between us at this vital stage of the war. They, in effect, say that if we cannot get a meeting of minds now when our armies are converging on the common enemy, how can we get an understanding on even more vital things in the future.

I have had to make it clear to you that we cannot recognize the Lublin Government as now composed, and the world would regard it as a lamentable outcome of our work here if we parted with an open and obvious divergence between us on this issue.

You said

Mr. Nikol: You said today that you would be prepared to support any suggestions for the solution of this problem which offered a fair chance of success, and you also mentioned the possibility of bringing some members of the Lublin government here.

Governor: Realizing that we all have the same anxiety in getting this matter settled, I would like to develop your proposal a little and suggest that we invite here to Yalta at once Mr. Beirut and Mr. Osobka Morawski from the Lublin government and also two or three from the following list of Poles, which according to our information would be desirable as representatives of the other elements of the Polish people in the development of a new temporary government which all three of us could recognize and support: Bishop Sapieha of Cracow, Vincente Witos, Mr. Zurlewski, Professor Buyak, and Professor Kutzeba. If, as a result of the presence of these Polish leaders here, we could jointly agree with them on a provisional government in Poland which should no doubt include some Polish leaders from abroad such as

Mr. Mikolajczyk

CONCRETE PROPOSALS ON THE POLISH QUESTION

- 4 -

General Problems

Mr. Mikolajczyk, Mr. Grabski and Mr. Romer, the United States Government, and I feel sure the British Government as well, would then be prepared to examine with you conditions in which they would dissociate themselves from the London

government and transfer their recognition to the new provisional government.

I hope I do not have to assure you that the United States will never lend its support in any way to any provisional government in Poland that would be inimical to your interests.

It goes without saying that any interim government which could be formed as a result of our conference with the Poles here would be

Political Problem

pledged to the holding of free elections in Poland at the earliest possible date. I know this is

completely consistent with your desire to see a new free and democratic Poland emerge from the welter of this war.

Most sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT (Signed)

## CONCRETE PROPOSALS ON THE POLISH QUESTION

### Territorial Problems

We should make every effort to obtain agreement for a Polish frontier in the east which should run along the Curzon Line in the north and central section, and in the southern section should follow generally the eastern frontier line of the Lwow Province. This would give to Poland the Polish city of Lwow and the economically important oil fields. This frontier would correspond generally with one of the suggested frontiers proposed in 1919 to the Supreme Allied Council.

In regard to German territory to be turned over to Poland, we should make every effort to limit this compensation to East Prussia (except Koenigsberg), a small salient of Pomerania, which would include an area about one hundred miles west along the Baltic coast to the Polish Corridor and Upper Silesia.

If we are unable to obtain Lwow Province for Poland, and if efforts are made to obtain greater compensation for Poland in the west, we should make every effort to keep this compensation to a minimum particularly because of the large population transfers which would have to be carried out of these purely German areas are included in Poland. We should resist vigorously efforts to extend the Polish frontier to the Oder Line or the Oder-Weisse Line.

### Political Problems

The problem here involves the future independence of the Polish State. The Lublin Government in its present form cannot be regarded as representative of the Polish people. For this reason without violation of our commitments to the Polish people and without causing the most serious repercussions in American public opinion, we cannot transfer our recognition from the London Government to the Lublin Government. We must make every effort to resolve the question of the creation of a new interim Polish Government of national unity which should be composed of representative members of all important Polish political parties. This new interim government should not be in the form of an amalgamation of the Polish Government in London and of the Lublin Government. The first step in the direction of such a solution might be an agreement

at this meeting to set up a Presidential Council which would be charged by the three powers (four if France would be included) with appointment of an interim Polish Government composed of the representatives of leading Polish political parties. This Presidential Council might be composed of Beirut, the present head of the Lublin Government, and a small number of Poles from inside Poland taken from the following list: Bishop Sapieha of Cracow, Vincente Witos - one of the leaders of the Polish Peasant Party and a former Prime Minister, Zudowski, a Socialist leader, Bishop Lukomski, Professor Buyak, and Professor Kutzeba.

This Presidential Council would be commissioned by the three or four powers possibly acting through the medium of the proposed Emergency High Commission or by agreement among themselves to form an interim government which would be pledged to the holding of free elections when conditions inside Poland permit. The High Commission or other Allied instrument would assume responsibility for seeing that the Presidential Council selected an interim government based on a fair representation of Polish political parties and also that the interim government would carry out its pledge to hold free elections as soon as conditions permit.

Among the representatives of the Polish political parties making up this government would, of course, be certain present members of the Lublin Government as well as Poles from abroad, in particular Mikolajczyk.

TOP SECRET

A14

WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

→ W B  
to file  
WB

gov,  
eyed

January 3, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR VICE ADMIRAL WILSON BROWN:

Ambassador Winant has requested that the attached two top secret ULTRA messages be called to the President's attention.



H. M. PASCO  
Lt. Col., General Staff  
Acting Secretary, General Staff

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET ULTRA

**TOP SECRET ULTRA**

The following message from Turkish Ambassador Sarper in Moscow, based on information received from French Ambassador Garreau, was relayed from Ankara to London on 20 December:

"General de Gaulle will most probably be in Paris on Friday evening. The treaty which has been signed will be published at the same time in Paris and Moscow, either Sunday or Monday.

"De Gaulle did not go to Moscow to conclude a treaty. De Gaulle's aims in these talks, which he initiated himself by inviting Stalin to Paris, were (1) that France's foreign policy should not rest exclusively upon her relations with England; (2) that the French and Russian points of view vis-a-vis the German peril should be identical; and (3) that there should be a discussion of questions of a general nature in order, for instance, to dispel the anxiety caused in Russia by the idea of a bloc of western states. The French linked the first and second points together and observed, as regards German aggression, that it is always the French and Russians who suffer the first and most devastating German blow, that England, possessing no permanent army, is late in her active intervention on the continent of Europe, and that the Germans, taking advantage of the policy of armed expansion until all preparations are made, start on their career of war. France and Russia decided on joint action against this danger. As a natural consequence of this identity of interests, the French gave assurances that they would not be a party to a policy directed against Russia within a bloc of western states.

"The Russians asked whether the French wanted to confirm the points mentioned in a treaty. Upon de Gaulle's consenting in principle, the Russians informed the British and Americans of the matter. The British stated that they were pleased with the idea of such a Franco-Russian alliance because they considered it would be a factor in completing and strengthening the Franco-British alliance, and suggested--the proposal being made directly by Churchill--that the treaty of alliance, with the conditions mentioned above, should be realized as a three-power British-Franco-Soviet treaty of alliance. However, as the adhesion of the British to the agreement reached between the Russians and French on the question of France's frontier with Germany and Russia's frontier with Poland necessitated full investigation, a Franco-Russian treaty was signed in order not to lose time waiting to transform the two-power alliance into a three-power alliance.

**TOP SECRET ULTRA**

TOP SECRET ULTRA

"As a result of negotiations lasting 8 days, they agreed on measures to render impossible any German aggression in the future. They agreed on (1) the Rhine as the Franco-German frontier; (2) the 1939 frontier, more or less, for the Russians in Poland, leaving in Russia Vilna in the north and Lwow in the south; and (3) as compensation for Poland, the Oder as the frontier for Poland, with the German population east of this river being transferred to Germany. Nevertheless, the signature of the treaty was not easy. Difficulties arose about the Polish question. The Russians tried to suggest that the French should recognize the Polish Committee of Liberation as the Polish Government. The French, however, hesitated to fling this fait accompli in England's face, nor did they want to anger the Americans in spite of past misunderstanding. Consequently, they urged that the liberated portion of Polish territory was still only a small part of Poland and that it would be better to await the manifestation of the will of the whole nation, but they agreed that the Government in London was out of touch with reality and far removed from rendering assistance to the Polish nation. In this way, the stubborn attitude of the French delayed the signature of the treaty, so much so that, at the last farewell banquet given in honor of de Gaulle by the Russians, the talks lasted until 3 A.M. At that time de Gaulle and Foreign Minister Bidault made their farewells and left, and only Garreau, the French Ambassador, remained with Stalin and Molotov. At 5 A.M. the Russians were on the point of signing and de Gaulle was roused and called to the Kremlin. The treaty was signed at 5:45 A.M., and talks continued until 7 A.M. at a magnificent buffet hastily prepared in Molotov's office. Stalin was with them all night. Garreau described this as 'the test of a ----- [two words missing]'.

"According to supplementary information which I have received, the Balkan and Mediterranean conditions were not touched upon all during these talks. This last information I personally accept with reserve.

"According to what Garreau said, it is proposed that the Franco-Russian alliance should be completed by the Russo-Polish ----- [word missing], Polish-Czechoslovak and Czechoslovak-Yugoslav treaties of alliance, the whole being brought into a unified system."

TOP SECRET ULTRA

**TOP SECRET ULTRA**

On 22 December 1944 French Foreign Minister Bidault sent the following message to M. Jacques Paris, Counselor of the French Embassy in London:

London:

"Upon receipt of this cable please call upon the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs to inform him of the conversations that General de Gaulle and I had with M. Stalin and with M. Stalin and M. Molotov regarding the Polish question. M. Tarnowski has surely already received some information from his Ambassador in Paris, whom I received yesterday and who had a long interview with the Director of Political Affairs.

"As soon as the question of the Polish problem was brought up General de Gaulle, who had been informed of the demarche made soon after his departure by Morawski to Chauvel, pointedly recalled the traditional Franco-Polish friendship, invoking the political and sentimental reasons for it. He pointed out also that the French Government intended to maintain the good relations which it has always had with the Polish Government in London.

"You no doubt know that even before the trip to Moscow we had planned to send to liberated Poland a representative charged with protecting the French who are there and whose number increases as the Soviet advance frees our prisoners. It was therefore decided with the approval of the Soviet Government that a French delegate without definite status would be sent to Lublin. On the other hand, a delegate from the Polish Committee of National Liberation would go to Paris under the same conditions. You will please inform M. Tarnowski of this so that he will not be surprised to read in the press in the near future a short communique simply stating this fact.

"You will not fail to point out that, since ----- [word missing, presumably Russia] took the initiative in bringing up the Polish question with us, it is quite possible that the French Government will find herself in the position of exercising a certain influence on the Soviet Government, toward the reconstruction of a strong, united, and truly independent Poland which would be the friend and ally of France as well as of the USSR. You can add that such a thought is in keeping with the stand adopted by the French Government."

**TOP SECRET ULTRA**

Regraded Unclassified

*gm*  
R14/WHF

*Ed Bigdon*  
*WB*

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JANUARY 4, 1945

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Turkey's decision to sever relations with Japan is further evidence of Turkey's desire for the rapid and complete victory of the Allies. This action will result in the closing of Japanese Government establishments in Turkey which, since the German establishments were closed by the Turkish Government, were the last footholds of the Axis on Turkish soil.

I welcome this action by the Republic of Turkey.

- - - - -

A14/W

DUMBARTON OAKS  
DOCUMENTS  
ON INTERNATIONAL  
ORGANIZATION



TOGETHER WITH CHART  
AND QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

11/4/44

DUMBARTON OAKS  
DOCUMENTS

**CONTENTS**

	PAGE
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES . . . . .	1
STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE . . . . .	2
REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE SUBMITTED BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION . . . . .	3
STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS . . . . .	4
PROPOSALS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A GENERAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION . . . . .	5
CHART OF THE PROPOSED GENERAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION . . . . .	10
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE DUMBARTON OAKS PROPOSALS . . . . .	17

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PUBLICATION 2223

CONFERENCE SERIES 60

A reprint combining two previously printed pamphlets, *Dumbarton Oaks Documents on International Organization* (Publication 2192, Conference Series 56), and *Questions and Answers on the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals* (Publication 2218, Conference Series 58).

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., at 5 cents a copy.

**STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE  
UNITED STATES**

I WISH to take this opportunity to refer to the work of the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations between the delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China on the plans for an international organization for the maintenance of peace and security.

The conversations were completed Saturday, October 7, 1944, and proposals were submitted to the four Governments for their consideration. These proposals have been made public to permit full discussion by the people of this country prior to the convening of a wider conference on this all-important subject.

Although I have not yet been able to make a thorough study of these proposals, my first impression is one of extreme satisfaction, and even surprise, that so much could have been accomplished on so difficult a subject in so short a time. This achievement was largely due to the long and thorough preparations which were made by the Governments represented, and in our case, was the result of the untiring devotion and care which the Secretary of State has personally given to this work for more than two and a half years—indeed for many years.

The projected international organization has for its primary purpose the maintenance of international peace and security and the creation of the conditions that make for peace.

We now know the need for such an organization of the peace-loving peoples and the spirit of unity which will be required to maintain it. Aggressors like Hitler and the Japanese war lords organize for years for the day when they can launch their evil strength against weaker nations devoted to their peaceful pursuits. This time we have been determined first to defeat the enemy, assure that he shall never again be in position to plunge the world into war, and then to so organize the peace-loving nations that they may through unity of desire, unity of will, and unity of strength be in position to assure that no other would-be aggressor or conqueror shall even get started. That is why from the very beginning of the war, and paralleling our military plans, we have begun to lay the foundations for the general organization for the maintenance of peace and security.

It represents, therefore, a major objective for which this war is being fought, and as such, it inspires the highest hopes of the millions of

fathers and mothers whose sons and daughters are engaged in the terrible struggle and suffering of war.

The projected general organization may be regarded as the keystone of the arch and will include within its framework a number of specialized economic and social agencies now existing or to be established.

The task of planning the great design of security and peace has been well begun. It now remains for the nations to complete the structure in a spirit of constructive purpose and mutual confidence.

*October 9, 1944*

### STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

THE PROPOSALS for an international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security, upon which the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China have agreed during the conversations at Dumbarton Oaks, have been submitted to the four Governments and are today being made generally available to the people of this Nation and of the world.

All of us have every reason to be immensely gratified by the results achieved at these conversations. To be sure, the Proposals in their present form are neither complete nor final. Much work still remains to be done before a set of completed proposals can be placed before the peace-loving nations of the world as a basis of discussion at a formal conference to draft a charter of the projected organization for submission to the governments. But the document which has been prepared by the able representatives of the four participating nations and has been agreed to by them as their recommendation to their respective Governments is sufficiently detailed to indicate the kind of an international organization which, in their judgment, will meet the imperative need of providing for the maintenance of international peace and security.

These proposals are now being studied by the four Governments which were represented at the Washington Conversations and which will give their urgent attention to the next steps which will be necessary to reach the goal of achieving the establishment of an effective international organization.

These proposals are now available for full study and discussion by the peoples of all countries.

We in this country have spent many months in careful planning and wide consultation in preparation for the conversations which have just been concluded. Those who represented the Government of the United States in these discussions were armed with the ideas and with the results of thinking contributed by numerous leaders of our

national thought and opinion, without regard to political or other affiliations.

It is my earnest hope that, during the time which must elapse before the convocation of a full United Nations conference, discussions in the United States on this all-important subject will continue to be carried on in the same non-partisan spirit of devotion to our paramount national interest in peace and security which has characterized our previous consultations. I am certain that all of us will be constantly mindful of the high responsibility for us and for all peace-loving nations which attaches to this effort to make permanent a victory purchased at so heavy a cost in blood, in tragic suffering, and in treasure. We must be constantly mindful of the price which all of us will pay if we fail to measure up to this unprecedented responsibility.

It is, of course, inevitable that when many governments and peoples attempt to agree on a single plan the result will be in terms of the highest common denominator rather than of the plan of any one nation. The organization to be created must reflect the ideas and hopes of all the peace-loving nations which participate in its creation. The spirit of cooperation must manifest itself in mutual striving to attain the high goal by common agreement.

The road to the establishment of an international organization capable of effectively maintaining international peace and security will be long. At times it will be difficult. But we cannot hope to attain so great an objective without constant effort and unflinching determination that the sacrifices of this war shall not be in vain.

*October 9, 1944*

### REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBMITTED BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION

I TAKE great pleasure in submitting to you the results of the exploratory conversations on international organization held in Washington between representatives of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China. The first phase of the conversations, between representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, took place from August 21 to September 28; the second phase, between representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and China, was held from September 29 to October 7. The results of the work accomplished in both phases are embodied in the following Proposals which each of the four delegations is transmitting to its respective Government as the unanimously agreed recommendations of the four delegations.

I am happy to report that the conversations throughout were characterized by a spirit of complete cooperation and great cordiality among

all participants, the proof of which is evident in the wide area of agreement covered in the Proposals. The few questions which remain for further consideration, though important, are not in any sense insuperable, and I recommend that the necessary steps for obtaining agreement on these points be taken as soon as possible.

It is proper to emphasize, at the conclusion of these preliminary conversations, that the Proposals as they are now submitted to the four Governments comprise substantial contributions from each of the delegations. It is my own view, which I believe is shared by all the participants, that the agreed Proposals constitute an advance over the tentative and preliminary proposals presented by each delegation. This has resulted from a single-minded effort of all the delegations at Dumbarton Oaks to reach a common understanding as to the most effective international organization capable of fulfilling the hopes of all peoples everywhere.

I wish to take this opportunity to express my grateful recognition of the contribution to the successful outcome of these conversations made by the members of the American delegation and to commend the advisers and the staff for their most helpful assistance. Above all, I wish to express my profound appreciation to the President and to you, Mr. Secretary, for the constant advice and guidance without which our work could not have been accomplished with such constructive and satisfactory results.

E. R. STEPHENSON, JR.

*October 7, 1944*

### STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS

THE GOVERNMENT of the United States has now received the report of its delegation to the conversations held in Washington between August 21 and October 7, 1944, with the delegations of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China on the subject of an international organization for the maintenance of peace and security.

There follows a statement of tentative proposals indicating in detail the wide range of subjects on which agreement has been reached at the conversations.

The Governments which were represented in the discussions in Washington have agreed that after further study of these proposals they will as soon as possible take the necessary steps with a view to the preparation of complete proposals which could then serve as a basis of discussion at a full United Nations conference.

*October 9, 1944*

## PROPOSALS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A GENERAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

THERE should be established an international organization under the title of The United Nations, the Charter of which should contain provisions necessary to give effect to the proposals which follow.

### CHAPTER I. PURPOSES

The purposes of the Organization should be:

1. To maintain international peace and security; and to that end to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means adjustment or settlement of international disputes which may lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international cooperation in the solution of international economic, social and other humanitarian problems; and
4. To afford a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the achievement of these common ends.

### CHAPTER II. PRINCIPLES

In pursuit of the purposes mentioned in Chapter I the Organization and its members should act in accordance with the following principles:

1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states.
2. All members of the Organization undertake, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership in the Organization, to fulfill the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter.
3. All members of the Organization shall settle their disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security are not endangered.
4. All members of the Organization shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Organization.
5. All members of the Organization shall give every assistance to the Organization in any action undertaken by it in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.
6. All members of the Organization shall refrain from giving assist-

ance to any state against which preventive or enforcement action is being undertaken by the Organization.

The Organization should ensure that states not members of the Organization act in accordance with these principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

#### CHAPTER III. MEMBERSHIP

1. Membership of the Organization should be open to all peace-loving states.

#### CHAPTER IV. PRINCIPAL ORGANS

1. The Organization should have as its principal organs:

- a. A General Assembly;
- b. A Security Council;
- c. An international court of justice; and
- d. A Secretariat.

2. The Organization should have such subsidiary agencies as may be found necessary.

#### CHAPTER V. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

*Section A. Composition.* All members of the Organization should be members of the General Assembly and should have a number of representatives to be specified in the Charter.

*Section B. Functions and Powers.* 1. The General Assembly should have the right to consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments; to discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any member or members of the Organization or by the Security Council; and to make recommendations with regard to any such principles or questions. Any such questions on which action is necessary should be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion. The General Assembly should not on its own initiative make recommendations on any matter relating to the maintenance of international peace and security which is being dealt with by the Security Council.

2. The General Assembly should be empowered to admit new members to the Organization upon recommendation of the Security Council.

3. The General Assembly should, upon recommendation of the Security Council, be empowered to suspend from the exercise of any rights or privileges of membership any member of the Organization against which preventive or enforcement action shall have been taken by the Security Council. The exercise of the rights and privileges thus suspended may be restored by decision of the Security Council. The General Assembly should be empowered, upon recommendation

of the Security Council, to expel from the Organization any member of the Organization which persistently violates the principles contained in the Charter.

4. The General Assembly should elect the non-permanent members of the Security Council and the members of the Economic and Social Council provided for in Chapter IX. It should be empowered to elect, upon recommendation of the Security Council, the Secretary-General of the Organization. It should perform such functions in relation to the election of the judges of the international court of justice as may be conferred upon it by the statute of the court.

5. The General Assembly should apportion the expenses among the members of the Organization and should be empowered to approve the budgets of the Organization.

6. The General Assembly should initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of promoting international cooperation in political, economic and social fields and of adjusting situations likely to impair the general welfare.

7. The General Assembly should make recommendations for the coordination of the policies of international economic, social, and other specialized agencies brought into relation with the Organization in accordance with agreements between such agencies and the Organization.

8. The General Assembly should receive and consider annual and special reports from the Security Council and reports from other bodies of the Organization.

*Section C. Voting.* 1. Each member of the Organization should have one vote in the General Assembly.

2. Important decisions of the General Assembly, including recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security; election of members of the Security Council; election of members of the Economic and Social Council; admission of members, suspension of the exercise of the rights and privileges of members, and expulsion of members; and budgetary questions, should be made by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting. On other questions, including the determination of additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, the decisions of the General Assembly should be made by a simple majority vote.

*Section D. Procedure.* 1. The General Assembly should meet in regular annual sessions and in such special sessions as occasion may require.

2. The General Assembly should adopt its own rules of procedure and elect its President for each session.

3. The General Assembly should be empowered to set up such bodies and agencies as it may deem necessary for the performance of its functions.

#### CHAPTER VI. THE SECURITY COUNCIL

*Section A. Composition.* The Security Council should consist of one representative of each of eleven members of the Organization. Representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Republic of China, and, in due course, France, should have permanent seats. The General Assembly should elect six states to fill the non-permanent seats. These six states should be elected for a term of two years, three retiring each year. They should not be immediately eligible for reelection. In the first election of the non-permanent members three should be chosen by the General Assembly for one-year terms and three for two-year terms.

*Section B. Principal Functions and Powers.* 1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the Organization, members of the Organization should by the Charter confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and should agree that in carrying out these duties under this responsibility it should act on their behalf.

2. In discharging these duties the Security Council should act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Organization.

3. The specific powers conferred on the Security Council in order to carry out these duties are laid down in Chapter VIII.

4. All members of the Organization should obligate themselves to accept the decisions of the Security Council and to carry them out in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

5. In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion of the world's human and economic resources for armaments, the Security Council, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Chapter VIII, Section B, paragraph 9, should have the responsibility for formulating plans for the establishment of a system of regulation of armaments for submission to the members of the Organization.

*Section C. Voting.* (NOTE.—The question of voting procedure in the Security Council is still under consideration.)

*Section D. Procedure.* 1. The Security Council should be so organized as to be able to function continuously and each state member of the Security Council should be permanently represented at the headquarters of the Organization. It may hold meetings at such other places as in its judgment may best facilitate its work. There should be periodic meetings at which each state member of the Security

Council could if it so desired be represented by a member of the government or some other special representative.

2. The Security Council should be empowered to set up such bodies or agencies as it may deem necessary for the performance of its functions including regional subcommittees of the Military Staff Committee.

3. The Security Council should adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.

4. Any member of the Organization should participate in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the Security Council considers that the interests of that member of the Organization are specially affected.

5. Any member of the Organization not having a seat on the Security Council and any state not a member of the Organization, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, should be invited to participate in the discussion relating to the dispute.

#### CHAPTER VII. AN INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

1. There should be an international court of justice which should constitute the principal judicial organ of the Organization.

2. The court should be constituted and should function in accordance with a statute which should be annexed to and be a part of the Charter of the Organization.

3. The statute of the court of international justice should be either (a) the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, continued in force with such modifications as may be desirable or (b) a new statute in the preparation of which the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice should be used as a basis.

4. All members of the Organization should *ipso facto* be parties to the statute of the international court of justice.

5. Conditions under which states not members of the Organization may become parties to the statute of the international court of justice should be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council.


#### CHAPTER VIII. ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY INCLUDING PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF AGGRESSION

*Section A. Pacific Settlement of Disputes.* 1. The Security Council should be empowered to investigate any dispute, or any situation which may lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether its continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

2. Any state, whether member of the Organization or not, may

# THE UNITED NATIONS

## DUMBARTON OAKS PROPOSALS FOR THE GENERAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION



————— Direct relationship as defined in the Proposals  
 - - - - - Relationship to be determined by special agreements or arrangements

Chapter numbers refer to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, October 7, 1944, State Department Publication 2192.

Prepared by the Division of International Security and Organization, and the Division of Geography and Cartography, Department of State.

November 7, 1944. 1506 D.

Chart prepared subsequent to the conversations held at Dumbarton Oaks to indicate graphically the relations between the different organs of the proposed organization and the relations with other organizations to be determined by special agreements or arrangements.

bring any such dispute or situation to the attention of the General Assembly or of the Security Council.

3. The parties to any dispute the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security should obligate themselves, first of all, to seek a solution by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement, or other peaceful means of their own choice. The Security Council should call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

4. If, nevertheless, parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in paragraph 3 above fail to settle it by the means indicated in that paragraph, they should obligate themselves to refer it to the Security Council. The Security Council should in each case decide whether or not the continuance of the particular dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, and, accordingly, whether the Security Council should deal with the dispute, and, if so, whether it should take action under paragraph 5.

5. The Security Council should be empowered, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in paragraph 3 above, to recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.

6. Justiciable disputes should normally be referred to the international court of justice. The Security Council should be empowered to refer to the court, for advice, legal questions connected with other disputes.

7. The provisions of paragraph 1 to 6 of Section A should not apply to situations or disputes arising out of matters which by international law are solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the state concerned.

*Section B. Determination of Threats to the Peace or Acts of Aggression and Action With Respect Thereto.* 1. Should the Security Council deem that a failure to settle a dispute in accordance with procedures indicated in paragraph 3 of Section A, or in accordance with its recommendations made under paragraph 5 of Section A, constitutes a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security, it should take any measures necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Organization.

2. In general the Security Council should determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression and should make recommendations or decide upon the measures to be taken to maintain or restore peace and security.

3. The Security Council should be empowered to determine what diplomatic, economic, or other measures not involving the use of armed force should be employed to give effect to its decisions, and to call upon members of the Organization to apply such measures. Such measures may include complete or partial interruption of rail, sea, air, postal,

telegraphic, radio and other means of communication and the severance of diplomatic and economic relations.

4. Should the Security Council consider such measures to be inadequate, it should be empowered to take such action by air, naval or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade and other operations by air, sea or land forces of members of the Organization.

5. In order that all members of the Organization should contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, they should undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements concluded among themselves, armed forces, facilities and assistance necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. Such agreement or agreements should govern the numbers and types of forces and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided. The special agreement or agreements should be negotiated as soon as possible and should in each case be subject to approval by the Security Council and to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their constitutional processes.

6. In order to enable urgent military measures to be taken by the Organization there should be held immediately available by the members of the Organization national air force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action should be determined by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in paragraph 5 above.

7. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security should be taken by all the members of the Organization in cooperation or by some of them as the Security Council may determine. This undertaking should be carried out by the members of the Organization by their own action and through action of the appropriate specialized organizations and agencies of which they are members.

8. Plans for the application of armed force should be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in paragraph 9 below.

9. There should be established a Military Staff Committee the functions of which should be to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, to the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, to the regulation of armaments, and to possible disarmament. It should be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of

any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. The Committee should be composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any member of the Organization not permanently represented on the Committee should be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires that such a state should participate in its work. Questions of command of forces should be worked out subsequently.

10. The members of the Organization should join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

11. Any state, whether a member of the Organization or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of measures which have been decided upon by the Security Council should have the right to consult the Security Council in regard to a solution of those problems.

*Section C. Regional Arrangements.* 1. Nothing in the Charter should preclude the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the Organization. The Security Council should encourage settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies, either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

2. The Security Council should, where appropriate, utilize such arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority, but no enforcement action should be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.

3. The Security Council should at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

#### CHAPTER IX. ARRANGEMENTS FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COOPERATION

*Section A. Purpose and Relationships.* 1. With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations, the Organization should facilitate solutions of international economic, social and other humanitarian problems and promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Responsibility for the discharge of this function should be vested in the General Assembly and, under the

authority of the General Assembly, in an Economic and Social Council.

2. The various specialized economic, social and other organizations and agencies would have responsibilities in their respective fields as defined in their statutes. Each such organization or agency should be brought into relationship with the Organization on terms to be determined by agreement between the Economic and Social Council and the appropriate authorities of the specialized organization or agency, subject to approval by the General Assembly.

*Section B. Composition and Voting.* The Economic and Social Council should consist of representatives of eighteen members of the Organization. The states to be represented for this purpose should be elected by the General Assembly for terms of three years. Each such state should have one representative, who should have one vote. Decisions of the Economic and Social Council should be taken by simple majority vote of those present and voting.

*Section C. Functions and Powers of the Economic and Social Council*

1. The Economic and Social Council should be empowered:
  - a. to carry out, within the scope of its functions, recommendations of the General Assembly;
  - b. to make recommendations, on its own initiative, with respect to international economic, social and other humanitarian matters;
  - c. to receive and consider reports from the economic, social and other organizations or agencies brought into relationship with the Organization, and to coordinate their activities through consultations with, and recommendations to, such organizations or agencies;
  - d. to examine the administrative budgets of such specialized organizations or agencies with a view to making recommendations to the organizations or agencies concerned;
  - e. to enable the Secretary-General to provide information to the Security Council;
  - f. to assist the Security Council upon its request; and
  - g. to perform such other functions within the general scope of its competence as may be assigned to it by the General Assembly.

*Section D. Organization and Procedure.* 1. The Economic and Social Council should set up an economic commission, a social commission, and such other commissions as may be required. These commissions should consist of experts. There should be a permanent staff which should constitute a part of the Secretariat of the Organization.

2. The Economic and Social Council should make suitable arrangements for representatives of the specialized organizations or agencies

to participate without vote in its deliberations and in those of the commissions established by it.

3. The Economic and Social Council should adopt its own rules of procedure and the method of selecting its President.

#### CHAPTER X. THE SECRETARIAT

1. There should be a Secretariat comprising a Secretary-General and such staff as may be required. The Secretary-General should be the chief administrative officer of the Organization. He should be elected by the General Assembly, on recommendation of the Security Council, for such term and under such conditions as are specified in the Charter.

2. The Secretary-General should act in that capacity in all meetings of the General Assembly, of the Security Council, and of the Economic and Social Council and should make an annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization.

3. The Secretary-General should have the right to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten international peace and security.

#### CHAPTER XI. AMENDMENTS

Amendments should come into force for all members of the Organization, when they have been adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by the members of the Organization having permanent membership on the Security Council and by a majority of the other members of the Organization.

#### CHAPTER XII. TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

1. Pending the coming into force of the special agreement or agreements referred to in Chapter VIII, Section B, paragraph 5, and in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of the Four-Nation Declaration, signed at Moscow, October 30, 1943, the states parties to that Declaration should consult with one another and as occasion arises with other members of the Organization with a view to such joint action on behalf of the Organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

2. No provision of the Charter should preclude action taken or authorized in relation to enemy states as a result of the present war by the Governments having responsibility for such action.

#### NOTE

In addition to the question of voting procedure in the Security Council referred to in Chapter VI, several other questions are still under consideration.

WASHINGTON, D. C.  
October 7, 1944

## QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE DUMBARTON OAKS PROPOSALS

THE Department of State has prepared the following questions and answers to assist in the study of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals:

#### *What Are the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals?*

The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals are recommendations for the establishment of a general international organization, which were agreed to by representatives of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China, at Dumbarton Oaks, Washington, D. C. The Proposals were published October 9, 1944.

#### *What Use Will Be Made of These Proposals?*

The Proposals are now being considered by these four Governments, with a view to completing several topics left for further consideration. The completed Proposals will then be formally submitted to the various Governments to serve as a basis of discussion at a full United Nations Conference at which the Charter of the Organization will be drawn up. The Charter would be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their constitutional processes.

#### *In What Major Fields Would the Proposed Organization Operate?*

In the field of security, it would seek to prevent the outbreak of war (1) by encouraging peaceful adjustment or settlement of international disputes, (2) by preventing and removing threats to the peace, and (3) by suppressing breaches of the peace, by combined force if necessary.

In the field of economic and social cooperation, it would facilitate solutions of international economic, social, and other humanitarian problems, and promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

#### *Through What Main Bodies Would the Organization Operate?*

A General Assembly, composed of representatives of all member states, meeting in annual and special sessions, in which each state would have one vote;

A Security Council, composed of representatives of eleven member states and so organized as to be able to function continuously. The

United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China, and eventually France, would have permanent seats, while six states would be elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly;

An international court of justice, to whose statute all members of the Organization would be parties;

A Secretariat, comprising an expert staff and headed by a Secretary-General as chief administrative officer;

An Economic and Social Council, composed of representatives of eighteen member states chosen by the General Assembly for three-year terms;

A Military Staff Committee, composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives with provision for the participation by other states when necessary.

*What States Would Be Members of the Organization?*

Any peace-loving state could become a member of the Organization. States which do not become original members could be admitted by the General Assembly, upon recommendation of the Security Council.

*What Would Be the Primary Responsibilities of the General Assembly?*

It would:

- (1) initiate studies and make recommendations for the promotion of international cooperation in political, economic, and social fields and for adjustment of situations likely to impair the general welfare;
- (2) consider and make recommendations with respect both to general principles of cooperation in, and questions relating to, the maintenance of international peace and security, except that the General Assembly would not on its own initiative make recommendations on any matter relating to the maintenance of international peace and security being dealt with by the Security Council;
- (3) make recommendations for coordinating the policies of the specialized agencies brought into relationship with the Organization;
- (4) elect the non-permanent members of the Security Council and all the members of the Economic and Social Council; and
- (5) be responsible for the finances of the Organization.

*What Would Be the Principal Powers of the Security Council for Maintaining Peace?*

It would be empowered:

- (1) to investigate any dispute or any situation the continuance of which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute;

- (2) to call upon states to settle their disputes by peaceful means of their own choice;
- (3) to recommend to states appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment of disputes likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security;
- (4) to determine whether any situation threatens the peace or involves a breach of the peace, and to take any measures necessary to maintain or restore peace, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Organization;
- (5) to take diplomatic, economic, and other measures to give effect to its decisions; and
- (6) to employ air, naval, or land forces to maintain or restore international peace, if measures short of force prove inadequate.

*How Would the Security Council Obtain the Military Forces That Might Be Needed in Maintaining Peace?*

Member states would conclude a special agreement or agreements among themselves, subject to approval by the Security Council and to ratification in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The agreement or agreements would specify the numbers and types of forces and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be made available to the Security Council. The Security Council could call upon some of the members of the Organization, or when necessary all of them, to make available the forces, facilities, or assistance thus agreed upon, including national air force contingents which member states would hold immediately available to enable urgent military measures to be taken by the Organization.

*How Would the Security Council Employ Any Military Forces Made Available to It?*

Armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council would operate under its authority in accordance with plans made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee. Questions of the command of such forces would be worked out later.

*What Provisions Are Made for the Regulation of Armaments?*

The Security Council would have responsibility for formulating plans for the establishment of a system of regulation of armaments to be submitted to member states. The Military Staff Committee would advise the Security Council on questions relating to the regulation of armaments and to possible disarmament.

*What Would Be the Functions of the International Court of Justice?*

As the principal judicial organ of the Organization, it would consider and render judgments in disputes referred to it which can be

settled upon the basis of rules of law. The court would also, upon request, give advice to the Security Council on legal questions involved in other disputes.

*What Would Be the Chief Responsibilities of the Economic and Social Council?*

The Economic and Social Council, acting under the authority of the General Assembly, would be responsible for:

- (1) facilitating solutions of international economic, social, and other humanitarian problems;
- (2) promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and
- (3) recommending the coordination of the activities of international organizations and agencies which may be brought into relationship with the Organization, such as the projected United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Labor Organization, the proposed International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and probably other specialized agencies in the field of education, cultural cooperation, health, etc.

*Why Should the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China, and France Have Permanent Seats on the Security Council?*

It is necessary and inevitable that primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security should rest upon those states which, by reason of their capacity and resources, are in the best position to exercise that responsibility most effectively. This heavy responsibility would be discharged under the authority of the whole Security Council and on behalf of the whole Organization.

*What Positions Would Smaller States Have in the Organization?*

In the General Assembly their representatives would have an equal voice with the larger states. They would occupy six non-permanent seats on the Security Council and so participate in all important security decisions. All members of the Organization would have equal access to and equal standing before the international court of justice, and would be equally eligible to election as one of the eighteen members of the Economic and Social Council.

*What Would Be the Effect of the Establishment of the United Nations Upon the Inter-American System and Any Other Such Regional Arrangements?*

Regional systems or arrangements whose principles and purposes are consistent with those of the United Nations Organization would

not be prohibited. These systems and arrangements would be encouraged, either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council, to undertake the peaceful settlement of such disputes as are appropriate for regional action. Regional agencies might also be used in enforcement actions, but only with the authorization and under the supervision of the Security Council.

*What Are Some of the Important Differences Between the Proposed Organization and the League of Nations?*

- (1) Unlike the League of Nations, where both the Assembly and the Council had similar general powers, in the proposed Organization the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security would be assigned to the Security Council, while the General Assembly would have primary responsibility for the facilitation of solutions of international economic, social, and other humanitarian problems and the promotion of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
- (2) The proposed Charter would make illegal the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Organization, in contrast to the League Covenant which made only outright war illegal.
- (3) The proposed Organization would be empowered to ensure that states not members of the Organization act in accordance with the principles of the Organization so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security, whereas the League Covenant contained no provision with respect to compliance by non-member states with the principles of the Covenant for the maintenance of peace.
- (4) The new Organization would not have one Council, as did the League, but would have instead more specialized Councils, including the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, each with responsibilities in clearly defined fields and with different composition and powers to correspond with their specialized tasks.
- (5) The Security Council would have greater powers in the use of military and non-military enforcement measures than did the League Council, particularly since the projected agreements and arrangements among member states would place two basic obligations on states not explicitly recognized under the League: the obligations (a) to *make available* forces, facilities and assistance necessary to the Security Council in maintaining peace, and (b) to *hold immediately available* national air force contingents for carrying out urgent military measures through combined international enforcement action.

- (6) The Economic and Social Council, under the authority of the General Assembly, would be empowered to consider not only an enumerated list of problems in the field of economic and social cooperation, as was the League, but to facilitate solution of problems in this field generally.
- (7) In contrast to the League, which provided for placing only existing international bureaus under the direction of the League, the present Proposals provide that each specialized economic, social, and other organization or agency, existing or projected, should be brought into relationship with the new Organization on mutually agreeable terms.
- (8) The unanimity rule that prevailed in the League would not be applied in the new Organization except perhaps in restricted form and in restricted categories of cases, yet to be defined. The General Assembly would deal with important questions by a two-thirds vote, and the Economic and Social Council would make its recommendations by majority vote.
- (9) The international court of justice would be one of the principal organs of the proposed Organization and its statute a part of the Charter of the Organization, instead of being a related body as was the case with the Permanent Court of International Justice.
- (10) The Military Staff Committee would be a new feature in international organization.
- (11) Provision would be made for the suspension from the exercise of any right or privilege of membership of any member of the Organization against which preventive or enforcement action is taken, a provision not contained in the League Covenant.
- (12) The Charter of the proposed Organization would be an independent instrument, unlike the League Covenant which was incorporated in the Treaty of Versailles and other peace treaties.

*Where Can Copies of the Proposals Be Obtained?*

A pamphlet entitled, "Dumbarton Oaks Documents on International Organization", State Department Publication 2192, may be obtained at 5 cents per copy from the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C.

*November 20, 1944.*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

October 5, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Put up*  
*[Signature]*

Supplementing my memorandum of September 8 on Indochina and Southeast Asia, it is interesting to note that on that day Premier Koiso, in a speech before the Japanese Diet, promised independence to the Netherlands East Indies.

In a radio address extolling the pledge of independence, Soekarno, President of the Java Central Council and principal native leader of Indonesia, emphasized the contrast between the Japanese program and the alleged imperialistic designs of "the Anglo-American-Dutch coalition". Noting the difference in laws and culture and the distance separating Indonesia from these Western powers he asked: "Why do you want to return to our country so eagerly if not for your own profit and the benefit of your nations?" It is significant that throughout his address Soekarno stressed the identification of America with British and Dutch imperialism.

An Indonesian national flag has now been officially adopted which is almost identical with the revolutionary flag used by the Indonesian Nationalists during the 1920's. "Indonesia Raya", outlawed by the Dutch, has been officially adopted as the Indonesian national anthem.

The Japanese, conscious of native sentiment, presumably hope by this move to outbid United Nations propaganda and to secure more active native cooperation in the war, including, possibly, Indonesian troops. On September 28, Soekarno publicly read a petition for the speedy adoption of conscription in Java.

The Japanese move is more important, however, as indicating adoption of a "scorched earth" political course as they retreat, in order to put the United Nations on the defensive and to lay the foundations for a possible resurgence of Japanese influence in Asia by identifying themselves as the champions of liberation who were thwarted and defeated by Western imperial powers. In their defeat, they are doing their best to plant seeds of revolt in the lands they are being forced to abandon and to jeopardize future friendly relations between the Western powers and the Oriental nations.

The Japanese pledge of Indonesian independence emphasizes the need for prompt formulation of American policies towards the regions of Southeast Asia and the importance - as a measure of psychological warfare - of a concerted, dramatic announcement by the appropriate United Nations regarding the future of these regions.



*C.H.*

OCTOBER 9, 1944

CAUTION: The following statement by the President regarding the Dumbarton Oaks proposals MUST BE HELD IN CONFIDENCE until released.

NOTE: Release to editions of all newspapers appearing on the streets NOT EARLIER THAN 12:00 o'clock, noon, E.W.T., Monday, October 9, 1944. The same release also applies to radio announcers and news commentators.

CARE MUST BE EXERCISED TO PREVENT PREMATURE PUBLICATION.

STEPHEN EARLY  
Secretary to the President

-----

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

I wish to take this opportunity to refer to the work of the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations between the delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China, on the plans for an international organization for the maintenance of peace and security.

The conversations were completed Saturday, October 7, 1944, and proposals were submitted to the four Governments for their consideration. These proposals have been made public to permit full discussion by the people of this country prior to the convening of a wider conference on this all-important subject.

Although I have not yet been able to make a thorough study of these proposals, my first impression is one of extreme satisfaction, and even surprise, that so much could have been accomplished on so difficult a subject in so short a time. This achievement was largely due to the long and thorough preparations which were made by the Governments represented, and in our case, were the result of the untiring devotion and care which the Secretary of State has personally given to this work for more than two and a half years -- indeed for many years.

The projected international organization has for its primary purpose the maintenance of international peace and security and the creation of the conditions that make for peace.

We now know the need for such an organization of the peace-loving peoples and the spirit of unity which will be required to maintain it. Aggressors like Hitler and the Japanese war lords organize for years for the day when they can launch their evil strength against weaker nations devoted to their peaceful pursuits. This time we have been determined first to defeat the enemy, assure that he shall never again be in position to plunge the world into war and then to so organize the peace-loving nations that they may through unity of desire, unity of will, and unity of strength be in position to assure that no other would-be aggressor or conqueror shall even get started. That is why from the very beginning of the war, and paralleling our military plans, we have begun to lay the foundations for the general organization for the maintenance of peace and security.

It represents, therefore, a major objective for which this war is being fought, and as such, it inspires the highest hopes of

the millions of fathers and mothers whose sons and daughters are engaged in the terrible struggle and suffering of war.

The projected general organization may be regarded as the keystone of the arch and will include within its framework a number of specialized economic and social agencies now existing or to be established.

The task of planning the great design of security and peace has been well begun. It now remains for the nations to complete the structure in a spirit of constructive purpose and mutual confidence.

-----

A14

F-20  
WB

file

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

September 15, 1944

**TOP SECRET**

RE-ORIENTATION OF SWEDISH POLICY VIS-À-VIS GERMANY  
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

On July 12, 1944 representatives of the War, Navy, Treasury and State Departments and the Foreign Economic Administration decided that increasing pressure be placed on Sweden to force a change in her policy vis-à-vis Germany including, *inter alia*, the cessation of all trade between Sweden and Germany. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff fully concurred in this view and recommended that the State Department use all means at its disposal to attain the desired objective. There are attached your message of July 15, 1944 to Mr. Churchill and his reply of July 28, 1944.

Following strong oral pressure by representatives of this Government on the Swedish authorities, an Anglo-American *démarche* calling upon Sweden to re-orientate its policy towards Germany was delivered to the Swedish Foreign Minister on August 26. The Soviet Minister at Stockholm also backed up our demand. The Swedish Foreign Minister rejected our request on September 4 although in the ensuing conversation

conversation with the American and British Ministers he made it clear that the door was not closed. For the record, the Swedes have usually turned down formal demands by the belligerent powers although actually yielding to informal pressure. Advantages which we have secured from Sweden since July, 1944 as a consequence of informal pressure include (a) the cancellation of all insurance on Swedish vessels operating between Swedish and German ports, thereby reducing the tonnage in this trade by two-thirds, (b) a formal statement that Sweden will not grant asylum to war criminals, (c) a statement that Sweden will not permit the entry of war loot, and (d) the cessation of all transit traffic via Sweden between Germany and Norway.

Although Sweden has gone a long way toward meeting our demands she has not yet terminated all trade with Germany. The means available to us to influence Sweden to meet our wishes include: (a) Blacklisting of additional prominent Swedish firms; (b) Suspension of Anglo-American-Swedish Basic Rations under the War Trade Agreement; (c) Cancellation of General License No. 11 as pertaining to financial transactions with Sweden and (d) Vesting of subsidiaries in this country of Swedish enterprises.

It is extremely doubtful whether the British Government would be willing to join us in employing (a), (b) and (c), steps which to be fully effective would require corresponding  
action

action by the British. Vesting, however, would not require British concurrence and would carry great weight in Sweden. The possible repercussions in this country would appear to be a domestic matter outside of the realm of foreign relations. Should you concur, it is proposed that, following consultation with the British and the Soviets, and after securing the assurance of United States production authorities that our war production would not suffer, we inform Sweden that unless all trade with Germany is immediately ended, this Government will proceed to vest various Swedish subsidiaries in this country. If the British and Russians concur, it is further proposed that concurrently we jointly inform the Swedes that our attitude toward the release of supplies she will require from Allied-controlled sources after the collapse of Germany will depend on her reply to this request.

**Attachments:**

Your message of July 13, 1944  
to Mr. Churchill and his reply  
of July 28, 1944.

CH

COPY

TELEGRAM SENT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRET

July 13, 1944  
4 p.m.

U.S. URGENT

NO DISTRIBUTION - NO STENCIL

AMEMBASSY

LONDON

No. 5490

PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE AMBASSADOR

At the direction of the President please deliver the following message from him to the Prime Minister:

QUOTE Swedish exports to the enemy are becoming a very pressing question here. All the circumstances of the war, particularly Soviet successes in the Baltic area, could now be favorably used by us to bring maximum pressure to bear on Sweden to eliminate exports to the enemy. I would appreciate your getting behind the matter personally as Winant is now taking this question up with your people in the Foreign Office. UNQUOTE

HULL

COPY

TOP SECRET  
PARAPHRASE

From: The Prime Minister  
To: The President  
NO.: 738, 28 July 1944.

In reply to your message of 14th July, I agree entirely on the desirability of stopping exports from Sweden to Germany. However, we must attempt not to jeopardize:

(1) The considerable advantages of economic warfare we have already secured in Sweden:

(2) Our military requirements, with regard to deception plans in particular:

(3) Our intelligence sources in Sweden:

(4) Our establishments in Sweden for underground operations in Central Europe and Denmark.

A communication is being sent to Winant by the Foreign Office with regard to the timing and form of our approach to the Government of Sweden.

It will be necessary, as soon as this is determined, to approach the Soviet Government and endeavor to obtain their support.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

September 8, 1944

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Indochina and Southeast Asia

The French seek restoration of Indochina and have promised some reforms to offset the independence sentiment which exists among the Indochinese and to enlist American support which they presently consider vital. They are fearful of Chinese ambitions. The French and British believe that French participation in the liberation of Indochina will stimulate Free French resistance within the country and thus aid military operations, but the extent and value of such aid is open to question. It is thought that the Japanese may shortly disarm all French troops and take over the country, possibly establishing an independent puppet regime. It seems doubtful if outside assistance could prevent such Japanese action. The experience of our military intelligence authorities is that few of the French in Indochina or in Yunnan and Kwangsi in China are to be relied upon. Very little useful intelligence has been furnished by the Free French. There is much mutual distrust among the French with whom our people have come in contact. The French divisions in Indochina are considered ineffective.

Despite Mr. Eden's apparent approval in March 1943 of placing Indochina under trusteeship, British policy has swung behind restoration of French authority. It is believed that an important factor in the British position is a desire to strengthen their claim for restoration of Hong Kong. In May the French, it is thought at British instigation, requested the British, with Lord Mountbatten's approval, for permission to send a military mission to SEAC, a light intervention force to India for subsequent use in Indochina, and, later on, an expeditionary force to Indochina. They have also asked to participate in planning political warfare in the east and in planning military operations against Japan. The British have indicated they approve of all but the last.

Although



Although Indochina is not at present in the SEAC theater, it is to be noted the British desire that the details of the proposed French political warfare be worked out between SEAC and the proposed French military mission. Even prior to May the British SOE was training a large number of French officers for officering the light intervention force. Recently, using American facilities and misleading Chennault as to the purpose, the British dropped a de Gaullist agent in Indochina and agreed on two such further operations (one agent carrying a letter of credentials from de Gaulle) despite insistence by American officers attached to SEAC that the purpose was primarily political and not military and must be approved in Washington.

Reports indicate a British hope to extend the SEAC theater so as to include Indochina, most of the Dutch East Indies, Borneo and Hong Kong.

The Chinese are actively backing the Annamite Revolutionary party which seeks Indochinese independence. There are persistent reports that the Chinese hope for political ascendancy in northern Indochina, or at least creation of a free port and release from the economic stranglehold on southwest China which the French formerly exercised through the Yunnan railroad. They are particularly concerned over the danger to Chinese security inherent in French control of the railroad and their inability to defend it. The Chinese have indicated interest regarding the military government to be established in Indochina.

It would seem of substantial military importance to secure for the United Nations the good will of the native peoples of southeast Asia among whom, for some years, there has been increasing nationalistic sentiment, and who, for the past three years, have been subjected to intense Japanese propaganda exploiting the old slogan of "Asia for the Asiatics". In this objective Indochina cannot be considered apart from other countries of southeast Asia.

It is suggested that early, dramatic and concerted announcements by the nations concerned making definite commitments as to the future of the regions of southeast Asia would save many American and Allied lives and facilitate military operations. It would be especially helpful if such concerted announcements could include (1) specific dates when independence or complete (dominion) self-government will be accorded, (2) specified steps to be taken to develop native capacity for self-rule, and (3) a pledge of economic autonomy and equality of economic treatment towards other nations. Such announcements might

well

well be accompanied by a reaffirmation of American determination to grant Philippine independence, a joint commitment to restore the independence of Thailand, and a pledge to establish a regional commission for consultation on social and economic problems in the region, on which all countries and peoples concerned would be invited to have membership. The value of such concerted announcements would be still further enhanced if each of the colonial powers concerned would pledge a formal declaration of trusteeship under an international organization for the period of tutelage, but it might be unwise for the United States to attempt to insist upon such a declaration of trusteeship by one country if similar declarations could not be secured from the others.

In addition to their great value as psychological warfare, such announcements would appear to be directly in line with American post-war interests. These areas are sources of products essential to both our wartime and peacetime economy. They are potentially important markets for American exports. They lie athwart the southwestern approaches to the Pacific Ocean and have important bearing on our security and the security of the Philippines. Their economic and political stability will be an important factor in the maintenance of peace in Asia. Emergence of these regions as self-governing countries would appear desirable as soon as they are capable of self-rule, either as independent nations or in close voluntary association with western powers, for example as dominions. Such association might indeed lend them political and economic strength (the weakness of Asiatic powers has long been a cause of war) and help prevent future cleavage along regional or racial lines.

Failure of the western powers to recognize the new conditions and forces in southeast Asia and an attempt to reestablish pre-war conditions will almost surely lead to serious social and political conflict, and may lead to ultimate unifying of oriental opposition to the west.

A memorandum on British attitudes towards southeast Asia, generally, is attached.

Will you advise me if you wish the Department to develop details of policy along the lines indicated in the above suggestions.

CH

Enclosure:  
Memorandum.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

September 8, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

TOP SECRET

Southeast Asia: British Attitudes: There are persistent reports of a British desire to create a Southeast Asia federation of Burma, Malaya, Thailand and Indochina under British aegis, if not direct control. This apparently develops from a report prepared last year by five officers of the Burma government. It is strongly denied in London which points to the expectation of eventual dominion status for Burma and British support of French restoration in Indochina. However, the British anticipate a fairly extended military occupation of Thailand and anticipate the need of strong economic control of all these regions to assure revival of sound industrial and agricultural practices. It seems clear that the British envisage economic ascendancy in these areas.

It is significant that the British government has refused to make a public statement in line with yours and the Generalissimo's on the restoration of the independence of Thailand. They have suggested that security questions may be involved in the Kra Peninsula (rich rubber area of Thailand) and have raised the question of boundary adjustments. Winant has been instructed to secure, if possible, at least a confidential statement of the position of the British government. There is strong evidence that the British hope to gain predominant influence over the post-war government of Thailand.

Desire for dominion status for Burma has received public British affirmations but is apparently distant. Military government is believed planned for a considerable period and various liberal reforms reportedly urged by the Burmese government-in-exile are believed to have been rejected by London.

In Malaya also it is understood that military government is planned for a period of at least two years. Reform in administration has been urged by business interests and elimination of special treatment and "protection" of racial groups.

Despite rumors of British desire to secure Sumatra, it is believed that the British are in favor of restoring Dutch authority in the Netherlands Indies. A desire to strengthen the restoration of British prestige and controls in Southeast Asia is believed to be an important factor in this position.

All reports indicate that the military operations of SEAC are aimed primarily at the resurgence of British political and economic ascendancy in Southeastern Asia and the restoration of British prestige. To minimize American association in the public eye with restoration of British imperialism which is admittedly highly unpopular in Asia, no American civil affairs officer is to serve in any area in the SEAC theater unless under independent American command, and no American officer may collaborate in SEAC political warfare.



CJ

114

# TOP SECRET

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

September 7, 1944

Dear Miss Tully,

After the President's reception for the Philippines yesterday afternoon at the White House, Mr. Hull and I had a long session with the President. He asked me to send to you the attached papers.

1. A memorandum entitled "Location of New International Organization," with enclosures, which the President expressed a desire to have with him on his forthcoming trip, as he expects that this question might be raised.

2. Six memoranda entitled:

- (a) "Procedure for the Convocation of the United Nations Conference;"
- (b) "Bases;"
- (c) "Conversations with the Chinese;"
- (d) "Suspension and Expulsion;"
- (e) "Voting in the Council;"
- (f) "International Air Force;"


which were discussed with the President and which I think he would like to have in his private files.

3. Progress Reports covering the Dumbarton Oaks conversations for the 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th days of our conversations which the President asked me to send to you in order that his files may be complete on this subject. Inasmuch as I have discussed with the President the greater part of these memoranda, I do not think it will be necessary for him to review them.

With many thanks and best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

Miss Grace Tully  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.



**TOP SECRET**

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

September 5, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Location of New International  
Organization

You will recall your private conversation with me last week relative to a location where the Council of the new international organization might hold its meetings. You mentioned specifically the Island of Flores in the Azores and the island in the Hawaiian group that you referred to, I believe, as Niihau.

You will find attached a memorandum and charts giving general information relative to both locations, which you might wish to study at leisure.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be the initials 'ES' or similar, written in a cursive style.

TOP SECRET

FLORES ISLAND, IN THE AZORES

Size and position. Flores is about 10.3 miles north-south and 7.6 miles east-west, with an area of about 53.5 square miles. The distance from Lisbon is 1180 miles and from New York 2240 miles and from Washington 2430 miles.

General. Flores is the westernmost of the nine islands comprising the Azores. All but Santa Maria are of volcanic origin. They are rugged and generally mountainous and picturesque. Earthquakes are frequent.

Delgada Point, northernmost point of Flores, is 39° 31' N., 31° 13' W. Morro Grande, the highest mountain, is 3,087 feet high; other mountains range from about 700 to 2,000 feet; numerous cascades fall into the sea. Flores is highly cultivated, and had 6,861 inhabitants in 1930.

Villa de Santa Cruz is the principal town. There is regular steamer connection with Lisbon and with North America.

Harbors and anchorages. Flores has no good harbors. The bay between Santa Cruz Point and Cabeiro Point affords the best anchorage and is much frequented. The usual berth is in 18 fathoms, sand, about midway between the two points. Anchorage in 35 to 40 fathoms is also to be found about 3/4 mile offshore, where there is shelter from winds northward through west to southwestward.

Climate. The climate of the Azores is particularly temperate and equable, but the extremities of sensible heat and cold are increased by the humidity. In summer the Azores lie within the northern boundary of the northeast trade winds; but in winter southwest and west winds prevail, and stormy days are numerous. Fine weather prevails from the middle of June to the end of September, but the winters are generally unpleasantly wet. Very clear atmosphere usually precedes a southerly gale. The group is situated in or near the northern part of a fairly constant area of high barometric pressure, the "Azores high".

Monthly mean temperatures at Santa Cruz, Flores, for five years (1933-1937) ranged from 57° F in January to 74° F in August. The maximum temperature ranged from 68° F in February to 88° F in August. The average minimum was 37° F in January and 61° F in July. Relative humidity varied from about 70 percent (usually in the winter months) to about 85 percent (usually in the summer months), but generally about 73 percent to 80 percent in the summer.

Cloudy days (0.8 or more of sky covered), in a 12-year average, ranged from 10 in August to 18 to 20 during six months December through June. Rain fell on from 11 days (July) to 22 days


(January

(January and March), over a 12-year average. Visibility is good almost all the time, for less than a mile, and fog occurs on less than half a day a month about six months of the year and scarcely at all during the other months.


Maps. A map, photographically reduced to a scale of 1:125,000, is attached. Temperature, precipitation, wind roses, and other climatic data are graphically presented thereon.

A small photographic reduction of a hachured map, together with profiles, is attached to indicate relief.

*SwB*  
GE:SWB:gpd  
September 2, 1944



**TEMPERATURE**



**AVERAGE RAINFALL**




**DAYS WITH:**

**RAINFALL**



**THUNDERSTORMS**




**CLOUDS**



**CEILINGS LESS THAN 3,000 FEET**




**VISIBILITY LESS THAN 2 1/2 MILES**



**VISIBILITY LESS THAN 3/4 MILES**



**FOG**



\* Less than 1/2 day

**PREVAILING WINDS**





TOP SECRET

NIIHAU

Size and position. Seventh in size of the main Hawaiian group; about 18 statute miles long, 3 to 6 miles wide; area 72 square miles. Situated at westerly end of the group; 20 miles west of Kauai; 149 miles from Honolulu.

General. The island is owned by the family of Aubrey Robinson, who died several years ago. His widow may still be living on the west coast of Kauai. The stock-raising interests are directed by the four sons. They raise about 1,000 head of cattle, 15,000 sheep, swine and turkeys. Lack of rain and of water supply definitely limit stock-raising and population, (about 150).

The maximum elevation is about 1300 feet, near the east coast. Most of the island is low lying. There are no rivers, and the water supply depends upon a few small springs, surface wells, both brackish, and a reservoir and small ponds in which scanty rain is stored.

A lost Japanese pilot was forced down there after the Pearl Harbor attack; he was finally captured by a Hawaiian native. The American Army has since moved in on this hermit island, introducing many things that had been excluded for 50 to 75 years. Troops of Hawaiian blood have now taken over protection of the island. Published information concerning Niihau is very scarce, but more could now doubtless be obtained from the War Department.

Harbors. Niihau has no harbors. There are two landings, Kii Landing near the north end on the east coast, and Nonopapa Landing 5 1/2 miles northwestward of the cape at the southern end. Kii Landing is only slightly protected from the trade winds, and can not be used during southerly weather. The landing is built on beach boulders and has only 2 or 3 feet of water. Anchorage may be had in about 8 fathoms coral bottom 5/8 mile off shore. The 10-fathom curve is about 1 mile off shore.

Nonopapa Landing is the principal landing, and is somewhat protected by a small reef. It is used by small boats only from May to September, as there is a heavy northerly swell in winter. Anchorage may be made in 8 fathoms, coral and sand bottom.

Climate. No weather station has been maintained on the island. Climate closely resembles that of the Hawaiian group. There are stations on Kauai. In general, fair weather prevails from May to October. Fog does not occur around the islands, and there is little thick weather. Niihau receives more northerly winds than Kauai and

is believed

is believed to have a little lower temperature. At Lihue, Kauai, with 34 years observation, the maximum recorded temperature is 91° F. (July, Sept., Oct.), with mean maximum 83° (July-October); the absolute minimum recorded is 46°-47° (Jan.-March), with mean minima 60.6° to 63.8° (Dec.-April). Rainfall at Lihue (207 feet elevation) varies rather widely, averaging 53.3 inches a year. Near Mt. Waialeale, Kauai, there is an annual rainfall of over 400 inches. But on Niihau rainfall is deficient, and humidity is low.


Northeast trade winds prevail throughout the year. In summer they are almost continuous, and usually veer a little to the north. In winter they are apt to be interrupted by variable winds or "konas", the local name for strong southerly or southwesterly winds, which sometimes occur. The trades veer more to the easterly in winter. The konas, occurring occasionally between October and April, last from a few hours to two or three days and are attended by rain.

Vegetation comprises grass, algaroba and coconut trees along the shores, and mimosa and other trees in clumps generally inland.


Maps. A map, photographically reduced to a scale of 1:125,000, is attached. Temperature, precipitation, wind roses, and other climatic data are graphically presented thereon.

A small photographic reduction of the U. S. Geological Survey map, with contours, is attached to indicate relief.

  
GE:SWB:gpd  
September 2, 1944.



**TEMPERATURE**




**AVERAGE RAINFALL**




**DAYS OF RAINFALL**



**PREVAILING WINDS**



Drawn in the Department of State, Division of Geography and Cartography, Sept. 2, 1944 - 1589 D



**TOP SECRET**

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

September 6, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Procedure for the Convocation  
of the United Nations Conference

It looks now as though it will be feasible to issue invitations to a United Nations conference at the same time that the document emerging from the Dumbarton Oaks meeting will be presented to the United Nations. This might be some time before the end of September.

It is suggested that the invitation to the conference be presented to the Chief of Government of each of the other United Nations and the nations associated with them in the name of the Chiefs of Government of the signatories to the Moscow Declaration. The actual method of presentation of both the document and the invitations might be by concurrent action of the diplomatic representatives of the four nations in each capital. If it is possible to transmit the document and invitations by the end of September, the conference might take place in five to six weeks after this presentation.

We recommend the procedure outlined above.



**TOP SECRET**

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

September 6, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Bases

We are in complete agreement that the armed forces and facilities, including bases, to be placed at the disposal of the Council should be made available in accordance with agreement or agreements concluded among the member states and governing the number and type of forces and the nature of the facilities to be provided; and that such agreements should be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The Russians want to add a provision to the effect that member states not having sufficient armed forces for carrying out actions undertaken by the Council should obligate themselves to make available territory for the establishment of bases, with only the terms of making such territory available to be subject to special agreement. The British object to this provision but might be inclined to compromise.

We believe that this provision is extremely dangerous and should not be allowed to appear in the Dumbarton Oaks document, particularly because it would represent a clear invasion of the sovereign rights of smaller countries.

We recommend that we maintain our position without compromise, except perhaps to have an understanding that the Russians would be free to bring up this subject at the United Nations Conference.

**TOP SECRET**

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

September 6, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Conversations with the  
Chinese

In the event that by the end of this week there will still be important open questions as between the Russians, the British and ourselves, we are wondering if it would not be a good idea to propose the following arrangements to the British and the Russians:

1. That the present phase of the conversations be suspended on Saturday;
2. That we start on Monday conversations between the British, the Chinese and ourselves, to last about a week;
3. That the Russian-British-American conversations be resumed at the conclusion of the Chinese conversations.

We could well say to the press that all of us wish now to give further consideration to the results of the discussions during the past three weeks before we reach final conclusions; and that we have decided it would be very useful in this connection to have the conversations with the Chinese in the light of what the Russians, the British and ourselves have already discussed.



TOP SECRET

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

September 6, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Suspension and Expulsion

The British propose the inclusion of the power to suspend from the exercise of rights and privileges any member state against which action is taken by the Council. The Russians are willing to accept this and propose, in addition, that the organization should have power to expel any member state which persistently violates the principles of the organization. The British are inclined to accept the expulsion provision.

Our position so far has been against the inclusion of either provision. We recommend that we now accept both of them.



# TOP SECRET

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

September 6, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Voting in the Council

I. The British propose a two-thirds majority. The Russians propose a simple majority. Our original proposal was a simple majority but we expressed our willingness to go along with a two-thirds majority if the other two agree. The Russians are holding out for a simple majority. The British are willing to concede the point. Our recommendation is that we should also concede this point.

II. The British insist that the vote of a party to a dispute should not be counted. The Russians insist that it should. We have stated our position strongly as being in agreement with the British position. We recommend that we maintain our position.

TOP SECRET

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

September 6, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: International Air Force .

The Russians are insisting that, in addition to the forces to be provided by special agreement, there should also be attached to the organization an international air force to which the member states would contribute contingents. The size of the contingents would be determined for each participant by the Council and the Council would have direct control and command over the air force.

The British have so far opposed this proposal. However, they received word yesterday that their instructions in this respect may be changed by direct order of the Prime Minister and they may find themselves in a situation in which they would have to accept this proposal and possibly even strengthen it.

In conformity with your statement of June 15, in which you said there would be no international police force, we have strongly opposed the proposal for a special international air force. We have pointed out that under the agreements which are contemplated for the provision of armed forces, there would be ample air forces placed at the disposal of the Council for instantaneous action and that there is no need to set up a special air force, which would be in the nature of an international police force.

We recommend that we should maintain our position and that you make every effort to induce the Prime Minister to withdraw his approval of the change in the British position.



**SECRET**

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

September 1, 1944

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Progress Report on Dumbarton Oaks  
Conversations--Tenth Day

Meeting of the Formulation Group on General Organization

The Formulation Group of the Subcommittee on General Organization met this morning and reached a tentative agreement on the following points on the Pacific Settlement of Disputes.

1. The parties to any dispute the continuance of which is likely to endanger peace should be obligated to seek a settlement by peaceful means of their own choice.
2. The council should watch the situation, investigate it, and by all the means in its power, encourage states to peacefully settle their disputes. If, nevertheless, the parties fail to settle it by such means they should be obligated to refer it to the council, which should be empowered, at any stage of a dispute, to recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.
3. Should the council deem that a failure to settle a dispute in accordance with its recommendations

constitutes a threat to the maintenance of peace and security, it should be empowered to take all measures necessary to maintain peace in accordance with the purposes and principles of the organization.

4. Justiciable disputes should normally be referred to the international court of justice and the council should be empowered to refer to the court for advice legal aspects of other disputes.

5. The provisions of the preceding paragraphs of this section should apply equally to non-member states.

Meeting of the Formulation Group on Security

The Formulation Group on Security reached tentative agreement on the following points relating to the determination of threats to and breaches of the peace and action with regard thereto.

1. The Committee agreed that the council should be empowered to determine when a threat to or breach of the peace exists and should decide upon the action to be recommended or taken to maintain or restore peace.

2. The council should be empowered to determine what non-military measures should be employed and to call upon member states to apply these measures.

3. If other measures prove inadequate, the council should be authorized to provide for the use of armed force.

4. All states should be obligated to assist the council to the utmost of their power in carrying out these actions.


5. The question of member states affording relief to states assuming undue burdens in enforcement action was reserved for decision by the Steering Committee.

6. Member States should undertake to make available to the council on demand armed forces and facilities necessary for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with a special agreement or agreements. Such agreement or agreements would come into effect when ratified by the number of states to be determined by the council, including all permanent members of the council.

7. A Soviet proposal in regard to an international air corps was referred to the Steering Committee.

8. Plans for the application of force would be made by the council aided by a military commission.

9. Pending the conclusion of the above-mentioned special agreement or agreements the states party to the Moscow Declaration, and other states in a position to do so, would provide forces and facilities necessary for the maintenance of peace and security.



**SECRET**

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

September 2, 1944

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Progress Report on Dumbarton Oaks  
Conversations--Eleventh Day

Meeting of the Formulation Group on Security

The group reconsidered the questions relating to the determination of threats to and breaches of the peace and action with regard thereto, and made a number of verbal changes in the points agreed to yesterday. The only changes of substance were the following:

1. It was agreed that no reference should be made in the basic instrument of the organization to the interim provision by the states party to the Moscow Declaration, pending the conclusion of special agreements on this subject, of forces and facilities necessary for the maintenance of peace and security.

2. It was agreed that there should be attached to the council a Military Committee composed of representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the council, the functions of which would be to advise and assist the council on all questions relating to the

employment of forces placed at the disposal of the council. Representatives of other states might be associated with this committee from time to time.

Meeting of the Formulation Group on General Organization

The Formulation Group of the Subcommittee on General Organization met this afternoon to reformulate certain provisions relating to the functions, procedures and voting methods of the council.

As regards functions, the Group agreed that:

1. In order to insure prompt and effective action, member states should confer on the council primary responsibility to maintain peace and security.

2. In order to carry out this responsibility the council should be empowered to encourage states to settle their disputes by peaceful means, to recommend appropriate procedures of adjustment and, in cases where failure to settle a dispute constitutes a threat to the peace, to take all necessary measures to maintain or restore peace; and to take effective collective measures to prevent and suppress threats to or breaches of the peace.

3. In discharging these responsibilities, the council should act on behalf of all members of the organization. (There was a slight difference between the American and British members on the one hand, and the

Soviet on the other, as to the wording of the obligatory character of the council's decisions on member states.)

On procedure, the Group agreed:

1. That a state not having a seat on the council should be invited to attend during the consideration of a dispute of which it is a party, but that the council should decide whether to invite a state not having a seat on the council to attend when its other interests are especially affected.

2. To present for further consideration by the Steering Committee the wording of a paragraph relating to the continuous session of the council and the character of permanent representation on the council.

In regard to voting, the Group formulated four questions for further consideration:

1. Whether the normal vote of the council should be by majority or two-thirds.

2. Whether the provisions for unanimous vote of the permanent members should be enumerated or left in general terms.

3. Whether provision should be made for voluntary abstention.

4. Whether the vote of a party to a dispute should be counted.



**SECRET**

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

September 3, 1944

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Progress Report on Dumbarton Oaks  
Conversations--Twelfth Day

Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee

The Joint Steering Committee met at 11:00 a.m. today (Sunday) and went over drafts submitted to the Committee by the formulation groups on the following subjects:

The composition, principal functions and powers, voting and procedure of the council;

Pacific settlement of disputes;

Determination of threats to the peace or breaches of the peace and action with respect thereto.

A number of phraseological changes were made in these drafts but none of these changes involved matters of substance.

Points of interest which came up as a result of the discussion at this meeting are listed below:

(a) Time Schedule of Consideration of Unsettled Points

At the outset of the meeting I inquired of Ambassador Gromyko and Sir Alexander Cadogan as to when they thought we could take up those points on which one or more of the groups had thus far maintained reservations.

I said that I was prepared to discuss these moot points at any time. Ambassador Gromyko said that "so far" the Soviet position on these points is unchanged. Sir Alexander Cadogan indicated that he, too, had not yet received his final instructions.

It was generally agreed that we would plan at least to consider these reserved points on Tuesday and there was also general agreement with my expressed hope that we might complete the present phase (i.e. British-Soviet-American phase) of the discussions by Thursday or Friday.

(b) Number of Permanent Seats on the Council


The formulating group had agreed upon a provision that the council should have eleven members and that the United States, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., China, and, in due course, France should have permanent seats. I took this occasion to remind Sir Alexander and Ambassador Gromyko that we had previously brought up for discussion the possibility of adding Brazil as a sixth permanent member. I said that in deference to the positions taken on this point by the British and the Soviet groups we were withdrawing our requests for further consideration of this question. I added in a somewhat jocular aside that I hoped that our prompt and unsolicited withdrawal from a position which we considered one of importance to us might perhaps serve as an example or as a precedent for our further discussions.

I then suggested that perhaps we might insert in the basic document a general provision authorizing a possible future increase in the number of permanent seats. Sir Alexander replied quite promptly that he regretted being the first to depart from the newly established precedent but that he must say that he hoped no such provision would be necessary. Ambassador Gromyko added that he felt such a position would not be suitable at this stage. Sir Alexander remarked that if in the future it is considered desirable to have a sixth permanent member recourse might always be had to the amendment processes.

(c) Miscellaneous Points

After some discussion there seemed to be general agreement that for purposes of the joint recommendations it would be well to set forth the important provisions relating to the pacific settlement of disputes and to the determination of threats to or breaches of the peace in a separate section of the recommendations. We all seemed to feel that at this stage it is desirable to call special attention to these important questions, an end which might not be served were they merely to be listed under the other powers of the council.

The British group on several occasions indicated, by their suggested revisions of phraseology, their continued concern with the sensibilities of the smaller powers, which concern we have constantly shared.



SECRET

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

September 4, 1944

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Progress Report on Dumbarton Oaks  
Conversations--Thirteenth Day

Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee

In general the progress made was less than had been the case at prior meetings. In particular Ambassador Gromyko was more insistent than previously upon preserving intact the language of various statements contained in the Soviet plan even though the substance of these statements had, with the approval of his representative, already been incorporated in the drafts under consideration.

Among points of importance discussed at the meeting were the following:

- (a) Assistance to and Compensation for States Carrying out Economic Measures Decided by the Council

The Soviet representatives contended that no specific measures of assistance and, particularly, no specific measures of compensation can as a practical matter be devised. They felt, consequently, that to include such provisions would be misleading. They said further that if as a result of the adoption of such provisions the member states were encouraged to try to devise methods of assistance or compensation it might be found that the organization

would degenerate from one designed for security into one concentrating on devising measures for mutual relief.

The British and ourselves, on the other hand, emphasized the importance of provisions of this kind. We pointed out that we are all agreed that we should limit the commitments of the member states with respect to military measures to the provisions of a multilateral agreement to be negotiated among the member states. However, the commitment to carry out economic measures decided upon by the council is unlimited and it would be very difficult for various states to accept this commitment unless provisions for assistance and compensation are included. We said that this is not a matter of relief; it is an important means of more effectively insuring the carrying out of the very great authority which will be conferred on the council.

(b) Authorization for Council to Decide, in Appropriate Cases, that only the Armed Forces of the Great Powers Need be Used

Ambassador Gromyko proposed that there should be explicit authorization for the council to determine, in appropriate cases, that the armed forces of some or all of the great powers alone should be utilized to restrain aggression. He thought it desirable that such a procedure be clearly authorized in advance.


(c) Voting in the Council

I took occasion to emphasize the very great importance which we attach to our proposal that a party to a dispute

should not vote in connection with that dispute. I emphasized that if we should be unable to reach an agreement on this matter during the Dumbarton Oaks conversations the success of the whole project for an international organization might be endangered. Sir Alexander Cadogan supported our position. Ambassador Gromyko said that he agreed with my estimate of the importance of this matter being settled during the Dumbarton Oaks talks but he added, rather unyieldingly, that he had no other proposal than the one he had previously made (i.e., that a special procedure should be worked out to govern the voting of a great power involved in a dispute.)

Meeting of Subcommittee on Organization

The Subcommittee on Organization met this afternoon and discussed the draft joint document as it has thus far been approved by the Joint Steering Committee. In addition, an ad hoc committee on nomenclature, of which Mr. Fletcher is chairman, made a preliminary report. The Soviet group is maintaining a reservation as to the name "United Nations" for the general, over-all organization. They assert that the term "United Nations" has a special connotation relating to the prosecution of the war against the Axis which it would be undesirable to have carried over to the future world organization. On other points of nomenclature there appears to be a general meeting of the minds among the three groups.



**SECRET**

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

September 5, 1944

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Progress Report on Dumbarton Oaks  
Conversations--Fourteenth Day

Meetings of the Formulation Group on Security

In meetings yesterday afternoon and this morning the group considered further the questions relating to the determination of threats to or breaches of the peace and action with regard thereto, and began consideration of the question of the regulation of armaments. In regard to the first of these matters, the following points were dealt with:

1. At the request of the Soviet group there was inserted an enumeration of the possible types of measures involving and not involving the use of force to which the council might resort in the maintenance of peace and security.

2. The Soviet representatives took the position that there should be inserted a provision that member states not having sufficient armed forces for carrying out enforcement action undertaken by the council should make available territory for bases for this purpose.

WASHINGTON  
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

~~SECRET~~  
SECRET

The United States and British groups felt that this matter was adequately covered by the paragraph already agreed to in regard to the provision of facilities and furthermore objected to the phrasing of the Soviet proposal. Both the United States and British representatives submitted alternative drafts for this provision which will be considered by the Formulation Group and the Joint Steering Committee.

3. There was approved a paragraph providing that the council is to determine whether all or some members of the organization should participate in any particular enforcement action.

In regard to the regulation of armaments the group reached agreement that member states should undertake to negotiate a general agreement on this subject and that the international organization should be responsible for initiating these negotiations. Both the British and the Soviet representatives objected to the United States proposal that regulation cover "armed forces" as well as armaments. The Soviet representatives were also desirous of mentioning the regulation of armaments specifically among the questions concerning which the general assembly should be authorized to make recommendations, but the British and United States representatives

SECRET

SECRET

saw no reason for singling out this one among the many subjects which the assembly might discuss.

Discussion of the regulation of armaments will be continued in the Formulation Group and in the Joint Steering Committee.



**TOP SECRET**

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

September 6, 1944

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Progress Report on Dumbarton Oaks  
Conversations--Fifteenth Day

Regular Meeting of the American Group

The American group held its regular 9:30 a.m. meeting to exchange views and discuss developments in the last twenty-four hours.

Meeting of the Legal Subcommittee

The American, Soviet and British representatives on the Legal Subcommittee agreed, subject to approval by their respective groups, that the statute of the international court of justice should be prepared not later than the remainder of the basic instrument of the international organization. To this end it was suggested that the Governments participating in the conference to consider the international organization should send representatives to the seat of the conference, at least two weeks in advance, for the purpose of preparing a draft of the statute for submission to the conference.

Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee

The meeting of the Joint Steering Committee scheduled at 10:30 a.m. today has been postponed until later in the

day because of the continued delay in the receipt by Sir Alexander Cadogan of his final instructions. The Committee is holding itself in readiness to meet this afternoon or tonight if these instructions arrive.

Yesterday's Late Afternoon Meeting of the Formulation Group on Organization

The Formulation Group on Organization late Tuesday afternoon prepared the following sections of the basic document:

(a) The Secretariat

The group agreed that the secretary-general should be the chief administrative officer and should be appointed by the assembly on the recommendation of the council for such terms and under such conditions as are specified in the charter; should act in that capacity in all meetings of the assembly, the council, and the economic and social council; should make an annual report to the assembly on the work of the organization; and should have the right to bring to the attention of the council any matter which in his opinion may threaten international peace and security. (The Soviet group continued to reserve their position on any reference to the economic and social council).

(b) Economic and Social Cooperation

The Soviet representative participated in the discussion of the section on economic and social cooperation but maintained the Soviet reservation on the merits of this entire question. The American and British representatives agreed to use substantially the entire American draft text on this subject. It was agreed, however, to reduce the size of the council from twenty-four to eighteen members, and a new concept of the functions of the economic and social council was added by empowering this council to assist the security council upon its request and by enabling the secretary-general to inform the security council on the work of the economic and social council.



file  
Parron

Quebec

File  
44

4 Sept - Ambassador from Poland asked  
that the President read if possible

admission P -  
to file

File  
WR

AA14

Declaration of Prime Minister S. Mikołajczyk at a British  
and American Press Conference given on Thursday, August 31,  
1944.

-----

At a press conference in London on August 31, 1944, Mr.  
Mikołajczyk, Polish Prime Minister, made the following statement:

I should like to deal with two questions, Polish-Russian  
relations and the great fight the Polish nation is putting up  
against the Germans in Poland, and especially in Warsaw. I do  
so for reasons of principle, and not only because there has  
been so much misconception and so little understanding of the  
real situation.

On September 1, we enter upon the sixth year since Germany's  
unprovoked aggression against Poland that began this terrible war.  
Poland defended the integrity of her territory, her independence,  
her sovereignty and her freedom. She thus put a stop to the un-  
opposed subjugation of one country after another, and tore the  
mask from Germany's plan to conquer the world. Everyone knows  
that for five long years, Poles have never ceased to fight in  
Poland and abroad. On every front they have fought and died  
and given proof of their self sacrifice, devotion and loyalty  
to the principles for which they took up arms. But as we near  
the end of this war and the defeat of Germany, the ideological  
principles of the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms have  
somehow lost in value to power politics. I do not minimize power  
or its importance for the maintenance of peace and for the protec-  
tion of humanity against a new calamity. I fear however that  
might may overshadow right and justice particularly if, in the

absence of agreement between Great Powers a "justice" of force were meted out by one power to its weaker neighbors. That is why such states as Poland cannot formulate their policy in the secrecy of diplomatic conferences, but must, to a greater or lesser extent, conduct their affairs openly in the light of day so that public opinion of great nations may judge. Public opinion alone can maintain the balance between might and right, between the power factor and the moral factor. Public opinion alone can harness the former to the service of peace and justice.

Diplomatic notes, protests, reports of underground fighting and its military achievements too often remain hidden in secret files and exert but little influence on actual policy which affects the life of nations. At such times, if current problems are not publicly discussed, when they are kept quiet in an honest desire to avoid friction between Allies, they recoil upon us because of the shortness of human memory. Typical of this is the fact that the problem of Polish-Russian relations is being presented to public opinion as a dispute between the "Poles of the Polish Government in London" and the National Liberation Committee in Lublin. It is forgotten that this problem does concern relations between the Polish State and the Soviet Union, that one half of Poland and eleven million of her citizens are at stake, that the future political system of Poland, its sovereignty, its independence are at stake, that this problem directly concerns the permanent settlement of relations in Europe and the very foundations of lasting peace. This problem therefore cannot be settled as a so-called dispute between Poles and only between Poles. There is

no Pole who when faced with a choice between the interests of his country and his personal interests would hesitate for a moment.

My journey to Moscow, to which Marshal Stalin consented and which I was encouraged to undertake by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill afforded me an opportunity to ascertain the attitude of the Soviet Government and the tendencies of the Committee of National Liberation. But the Soviet Union signed an agreement with the Committee of National Liberation after I had left London for Moscow, after the powers my colleagues had given me had been drafted and before my arrival in Moscow. That is why I had to return to London to work out a new program. This new program of such momentous importance to the future of Poland has been sent to our people at home and has been approved by the Polish Underground Parliament. Now it has been forwarded to Moscow as the unanimous decision of the Polish Government and of the people of Poland. In drafting it we were actuated by the anxiety to retain the full independence and sovereignty of Poland; by our sincere desire to establish lasting and friendly relations between Poland and Russia, including a Polish-Soviet alliance both during the war and after; by our desire to contribute to the creation of a basis for international collaboration, thus securing the world against further aggression; by establishing alliances with the Soviet Union, Britain, France and Czechoslovakia, and maintaining the most intimate relations of friendship between Poland and the United States.

I must stress the heroic attitude of the people in Poland. They endorsed our program when engaged in the bitterest struggle

against the Germans that has been going on in Warsaw ever since August 1st, although they felt forlorn and forgotten. At the time when the radio was informing them that assistance was being given to Bucarest, that Konigsberg and the oil refineries at Czechowice near the ill famed concentration camp of Oswiecim were being bombed, of the shuttle service of American planes landing on Russian bases after bombing Gdynia - they themselves were receiving only little or no help at all. And yet, they endorsed our decision, even when they heard that their comrades of the Underground Army and Administration were being arrested. In spite of that they unanimously endorsed the program of the Polish Government. What better proof could they give of their desire to find a solution of Polish Soviet problems and of their political maturity which enables them to overcome their bitterness.

You may ask why we do not return to the Constitution of 1921. The answer is this: historical facts cannot be ignored, and the status quo automatically restored. (It is necessary to have a minimum of good will and confidence that decisions which the Polish Government has taken and pledges which we have given will be carried out, however). The main point is that if we would refuse to admit the validity of the Constitution of 1935 we would thus declare null and void all treaties and laws concluded or promulgated by the Polish Government after that date. Thus, not only the signature of Poland affixed by us to the Atlantic Charter and the UNRRA would be invalid but so would be the military agreement which provides the basis for the existence of the Polish Armed Forces.

The very basis of the existence of the Polish Government, acting on behalf of Poland and its recognition by the whole free world might be placed in doubt, and even the Polish-Russian pact of non-aggression and the Polish-Soviet treaties of July and December 1941 would be left in the air. But even if one could agree that the Constitution of 1935 is no longer valid, any new Polish government would have to be appointed by the President of the Polish Republic. The theory that the so-called Home National Council should act as a source of sovereign power and appoint a new government cannot stand critical examination; surely in such a case the political parties of the Polish Underground Parliament which have supported the Polish Government have acted uninterruptedly underground ever since 1939, undoubtedly have a far better right to be considered as such a source of sovereign power than a so-called Home National Council which was set up only in January 1944.

Another important factor which must be considered is that although the Constitution of 1935 is still formally in force it has been applied by the Polish Government in a democratic spirit ever since 1939. Indeed when it became obvious that a number of states which were neutral in 1939, including the United States, were willing to recognize as a lawful Polish Government the government based on the Constitution of 1935, we decided to consider everything in it which was not democratic as a dead letter and to apply that Constitution in a strictly democratic spirit. Here are some facts to support what I have said: First, the

Polish Parliament as it existed before the outbreak of the war was immediately dissolved; Second, the National Council composed of representatives of all democratic parties which were in constant opposition to the pre-war Polish regime was set up; Third, a democratic program was promulgated by the government; Fourth, new democratic elections were promised immediately after the liberation of the country; Fifth, a new democratic electoral law in the form of a decree was prepared for this election; Sixth, the President of the Republic gave a pledge to our people at home that he would not exercise his rights on the basis of article 13th of the Constitution without conference with the Government; Seventh, in 1943 the organization of the Supreme Military Authorities was altered and powers of the Commander-in-Chief curtailed; Eighth, the representatives of the labor movement just back from Poland was appointed President designate; Ninth, after General Sikorski's death the present Polish Government was constituted on July 11, 1943 along lines laid down by the Home Political Representation in Poland on July 9, 1943.

Furthermore, the Polish Government have prepared decrees of concerning the organization of Polish law codes, a new press law and agrarian reform, etc. Now, a new constitutional declaration will be promulgated which will contain the outline of the future political structure of the Polish Republic. The proposal which we are now considering, of creating a war cabinet on the English pattern, on which the Chief of Staff would act as an adviser, shows clearly that my Government has no tendency whatever to set up a military regime in Poland.

Declarations of this Government in 1939 and 1942 and the declaration of the political parties in Poland in 1943 show clearly that Poland is treading along the path of true democracy based on freedom and social justice. In a nutshell, the constitutional dispute is but a pretext for the so-called Home National Council, which at best represents only a very small part of our people, to obtain the right to appoint the government of the Polish Republic. Such claims lack all foundation. The program the Polish Government has adopted in agreement with our people at home provides the basis for the satisfactory solution of Polish-Soviet relations and for cooperation of the whole Polish Nation with the Soviet Nation, based on mutual recognition of their sovereignty and independence. It provides the basis for securing both countries against a new German aggression and strenghtens the peaceful cooperation of all peace loving nations.

I think that if this program is backed by the Soviet Government and the Governments of the United States and Britain, and if we obtain guarantees ensuring that this program will be capable of practical and free application in Poland, a sound and felicitous solution will be found which will permit us to forget the past in the interest of the future.

SECRET  
File  
WB



A14

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

August 28, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

There is attached a report <sup>single copy only -</sup> prepared by Ambassador  
MacVeagh on Greece and Yugoslavia which contains certain  
recommendations and which I believe will interest you.

Enclosure:

Report on Greece  
and Yugoslavia.



SECRET

REPORT ON GREECE AND YUGOSLAVIA

1. The problems in both Greece and Yugoslavia today are less military than economic and political. It is currently predicted that as the Allied pincers in Poland and France close on Germany, the Germans will withdraw their forces from the Balkans, and Allied military action is planned at present on this basis. In both countries it is contemplated to use the local guerillas to sabotage German withdrawal, and to confine actual Allied military operations chiefly to the facilitation and protection of the initial stages of relief and rehabilitation.

2. Plans for relief and rehabilitation are far advanced. They cover two periods, a military one, in which UNRRA will assist the military in the distribution of the supplies brought in by the latter, and a so-called UNRRA period to follow, in which that organization will exercise full responsibility. A military organization called the Allied Military Liaison, commanded by a British major general, has been set up in Cairo, and is now adequately staffed, though no troops have yet been assigned to it. On the staff there are some fifty or sixty American civil affairs officers. American participation in the functioning of this mission is strictly limited to collaboration in relief and rehabilitation problems. Should military action be found necessary, either to preserve order or to subdue remnants of the German forces remaining in the country, American forces will take no part in it. The chief unsettled questions in connection with the work of this mission, aside from the assignment of troops, are how to assure sufficient supplies to meet the anticipated needs, and how these supplies are eventually to be paid for. In Greece the currency question is especially acute, the pound sterling having risen from between four and five hundred drachmas to well over a hundred million.

3. In the political field both countries have suffered from the fact that their governments, which went into exile on the approach of the Germans, were newly and hastily formed affairs, while both their kings, and in particular the Greek King, enjoyed only a limited popularity with their people.

(a) As regards Greece, the Government-in-Exile is now formed of a coalition of all parties except the extreme Left, but has a strong republican complexion as a result of popular reaction against the

Fascist

Fascist dictatorship of 1936-1941. This situation has forced the King to agree to a plebiscite on the question of the monarchy, to be held after liberation, and also to agree not to return to Greece unless and until called for as a result of the plebiscite, or previously at the desire of his government. At present his government is against his returning before the plebiscite, but the King continues to hope that it may change its view before the hour of liberation comes. He thinks it possible that continued refusal on the part of the Communists, now controlling the largest of the guerilla organizations in Greece, to join the Government of National Unity may bring about a popular demand for his presence which his government would have to heed. However, his notable lack of personal qualities as a leader is against him, as well as his long association with the recent tyranny of the extreme Right.

(b) As regards the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, the political question is complicated by profound divisions within the country which do not exist in homogeneous Greece. These divisions have long been played upon from the outside, particularly by Italian and German diplomacy, and were acute at the time of the German invasion, which the Serbs resisted wholeheartedly, while the Croats and Slovenes in general did not. On the other hand, the most successful anti-Axis guerilla movement in the country is Croatian and Communist in origin and character, rather than Serb and Royalist, and with military aid from the Allies, granted primarily for the purpose of war against Germany, this movement now seems on its way to attempting to force its domination over Serbia and thus bring an end to the primacy which the latter has enjoyed in the conglomerate state hitherto.

3. Internationally, the Balkans remain a potential region of conflicting pressures. The war is eliminating the Anglo-German conflict of interests, but is replacing it with Anglo-Russian. Communist ideology holds no great appeal for the Balkan peoples, largely composed of peasant landholders, but the success of communist-led resistance movements in disorganized and demoralized territories supplies a dangerous opportunity for the imposition of Communist Party dictatorship. Refugees from Dalmatia, now to be seen in

increasing

increasing numbers in Italy and North Africa, present unmistakable signs of indoctrination and regimentation with this end in view. Russia's interest in the Communist resistance movements of Tito in Yugoslavia and the EAM in Greece has also been clearly shown, particularly by the Soviet press and radio, though Russia continues officially to recognize the Greek and Yugoslav Governments-in-Exile, and there is no evidence that her own government is directing or financing these movements, which stem rather from the international Communism of 1917, than that of present-day Moscow. The British are intensely anxious as regards the Russian attitude, and this explains much of their activity in connection with the internal affairs of both nations. In Greece they have switched from supporting the EAM to opposing it, and in Yugoslavia they have abandoned Michailovitch and are trying to hitch the Tito movement to the car of British policy, possibly with the idea that a great accretion of recruits under British influence will over-balance and destroy its present Communist character. Evidences of growing mutual suspicion between London and Moscow have not been lacking. Shortly after Mr. Churchill began his personal correspondence with Tito, the Russians sent the latter a large liaison mission, headed by a lieutenant general, far out-ranking the local British brigadier. And when the British took strong action to quell the Greek mutinies in Egypt, which were led by adherents of the EAM, the Russian Ambassador in Cairo was outspoken in his disapproval. Further evidence of this sort was forthcoming when the Russians recently expressed displeasure and surprise over British secret operations in Rumania. This last affair has led to an attempt by London to establish a division of zones of interest in the Balkans, though only temporarily, for the war period. The attempt seems doomed to failure, largely on account of the Department's doubts as to the advisability of such action in connection with decisions taken at Teheran. But it shows that London, at least, recognizes the dangers inherent in the present situation if suspicions are allowed to grow.

4. The Rumanian peace feelers made in Cairo by an emissary of Maniu, the peasant party leader, have so far come to nothing, owing partly to a continued hope on the latter's part that the Allies could be split and negotiations carried on with the Anglo-Americans separately from the Russians, but also, it would seem, because of

genuine

genuine impotence on Maniu's part to move against the Germans, whose control of the country up to this time has been exceedingly watchful and thorough. Bulgarian peace feelers, which have been rumored for months, seem now to be imminent, and here a hope of getting special consideration out of the supposed leniency of the Americans is clearly apparent.

5. As the war seems to be drawing to its close, post-war territorial claims and aspirations are coming more and more into the picture in the Balkans. In Yugoslavia, the Tito group is naturally the one most heard from so far. It appears to nurse dreams of domination not only over the whole of Yugoslavia, but also over the vague region known as Macedonia, including parts of Greece and Bulgaria. More serious, perhaps, are the views of the Greeks, who merit consideration for their unquestioning resistance to the Axis from the beginning. All the Greeks who have talked to me on this subject realize fully that any territorial acquisitions beyond the pre-war boundaries of the country must await decisions to be made at the peace conference. But they are nevertheless letting it be known that they regard Greece as entitled to the Dodecanese and Southern Albania, on ethnical grounds, as well as to a boundary with Bulgaria running north of the coastal range, for strategic purposes. It can hardly be questioned that the Dodecanese Islands are predominantly Greek in their population, as well as in their history, while the strongly Greek character of that part of Northern Epirus which is now called Southern Albania, including the towns of Koritza and Argyrocastro, is also undeniable.

6. American policy towards Greece and Yugoslavia is briefly, as I understand it, not to intervene in internal affairs while giving military support, during the war period, to such resistance groups as actively oppose the common enemy. British policy seems to be to insure the establishment of post-war governments favorable to British interests. Russian policy appears, generally speaking, to be similar to the British from the Russian viewpoint. The British are very active in their direction and manipulation of the Governments-in-Exile. My Russian colleague in Cairo complained to me that the real Prime Minister of Greece is the British Ambassador. On the other hand, the Russians, while critical and suspicious of the British, appear for the most part to be holding aloof in the belief that repeated British mistakes, coupled with none on their part, will

infallibly

infallibly orient the sentiment of these distressed countries toward Moscow. So far, this belief may find some justification in the low ebb to which British prestige has fallen owing to the opportunist shifts of British policy toward the resistance movements, the repeated British military fiascos in Greece, Crete, and the Dodecanese, and the many mistakes in psychology which the British have committed in their handling of the Greek military and other problems.

Conclusion: Under the circumstances, I would recommend no change in American policy, but would point out that it might be made more clear to the peoples concerned. At the present moment, owing to faultily married propaganda-directives and the often loose employment of the term "Anglo-American" for activities purely British in character, American policy tends to be confused with British throughout the whole Balkan region, and we are rapidly incurring the same dislike, suspicion, and distrust which the Balkan peoples are increasingly feeling for our cousins. In addition, I believe that, in view of the great dangers for the future peace of the whole world, including ourselves, which the Balkan region continues to present as a crossroads of empire, we should maintain and even intensify our present salutary efforts to associate the Russians together with the British in all Balkan planning and activity of whatever character, from the ground up and in complete openness and confidence. Lord Moyne, the British Resident Minister in the Near East, told me the other day, that he would not recommend associating the Russians with as Anglo-American Balkan Affairs Committee, and other bodies of this sort which he was proposing, because "The Russians themselves never tell us anything". It seems to me that such an attitude can do nothing to remove suspicions already existing, and if persevered in, will infallibly produce more, with evil results.

LMacV:CN:SS

A14

TOP SECRET

August 26, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached herewith a copy of an aide-memoire left with the Department of State this morning by Lord Halifax in which the latter raises certain questions with regard to the French role in military operations in the Far East, with particular reference to French Indo-China.

The Ambassador stated that the question is of considerable urgency owing to Mr. Eden's desire to give an answer on two definite points before the latter leaves London on Tuesday, August 29. The two specific questions on which Mr. Eden desires to give an affirmative answer are:

- (1) The attachment to the South East Asia Command Headquarters of a French Military Mission under General Blaisot, and
- (2) The establishment in India of a "Corps Leger d'Intervention" which apparently has already been established at Algiers.

Although these suggestions are ostensibly military in character, they have wide political implications and for this reason they are being referred to you for decision. If more time is needed for decision we can so inform Lord Halifax.

Enclosure:

Copy of aide-memoire  
from British Embassy.

Also see  
A16/France  
A16/India-Burma

~~SECRET~~

A14

*Admiral Benson  
To file*

August 28, 1944

*File  
MS*

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY**

Attached are four copies of proposals for the creation of an Interim Consultative Security Commission and a European High Commission. The proposals were worked out by a Special Committee, consisting of Messrs. Dunn, Mackworth and Pasvolsky; Generals Embick, Fairchild and Strong; and Admirals Hepburn, Train and Willson. They have been examined and approved, with a slight verbal change, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The purpose of the Interim Consultative Security Commission would be to implement paragraph 5 of the Moscow Declaration during two interim periods: (1) between the termination of hostilities and the actual establishment of a general international organization; and (2) between the establishment of the organization and the negotiation of a general agreement for the provision of armed forces to be placed at the disposal of the organization.

The purpose of the European High Commission would be to make recommendations to the participating governments regarding control over Germany and the other enemy states in Europe and regarding adjustment of other problems in Europe arising out of the war. It would supplant the existing European Advisory Commission.

A similar Far Eastern High Commission might be established later.

It is our thought that these two matters should not be mentioned at Dumbarton Oaks, but should be taken up separately by you, after the meeting, either with the British and Soviet Ambassadors or, possibly, at a meeting of Foreign Ministers.

You may wish to discuss the proposals with the President and, perhaps, also with the Secretaries of War and Navy.

**Leo Pasvolsky**

SA:LP:ERE

**SECRET**  
Secret

150-37  
July 24, 1944

INTERIM CONSULTATIVE SECURITY COMMISSION

A. ESTABLISHMENT  
AND PURPOSE

1. The signatories of the Joint Four-Nation Declaration of Moscow should establish immediately an Interim Consultative Security Commission to carry out the purpose set forth in paragraph 5 of the Declaration which provides:

"That for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the reestablishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security, they will consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations."

B. FUNCTIONS  
AND SCOPE

1. The Interim Consultative Security Commission should be charged with:
  - a. Continuously examining the world situation from the point of view of the maintenance of international peace and security.
  - b. Formulating policies and measures to be recommended to the participating governments with a view to promoting international peace and security and particularly for dealing with conditions and situations deemed by the Commission to constitute a threat to international peace and security.
  - c. Examining and reviewing from the standpoint of international security, and making appropriate recommendations concerning, the policies, proposals and activities of such commissions and agencies, whose functions have a bearing on international peace and security, as may be jointly established, under the

Moscow

Moscow Declaration or otherwise, by some or all of the United Nations.

- d. Making recommendations to the governments of the four nations concerning security functions and procedures of the general international organization pending assumption of such functions by that organization.
- e. Performing such other duties within its competence as may be assigned by mutual consent of the participating governments.

2. In order to make it possible for the Interim Consultative Security Commission to carry out its duty, as provided in paragraph B-1-c above, of examining, reviewing and recommending concerning the activities, proposals and policies of the commissions and agencies referred to in that paragraph, the Interim Consultative Security Commission should be kept fully informed by such commissions or agencies of all of their activities, proposals and policies.

3. The Interim Consultative Security Commission should have no authority with regard to the conduct of military operations in the prosecution of the present war.

#### C. COMPOSITION AND CONSULTATION

1. The Interim Consultative Security Commission should be composed of one political and one military representative of each of the four powers.

2. It should be made incumbent on the Commission to provide for full and adequate consultation, as occasion requires, with representatives of the other United Nations and authorities in regard to matters before the Commission which are of particular concern to such nations and authorities.

#### D. ORGANIZATION

1. The Interim Consultative Security Commission should have authority to set up or utilize such agencies

and

and committees as it may consider necessary to assist it in discharging its responsibilities.

2. The Commission should select its chairman, organize its secretariat, and otherwise perfect its organization and procedure.

E. DURATION  
AND LOCATION

1. The functions of the Interim Consultative Security Commission should terminate when and to the extent that such functions have been absorbed by or transferred to appropriate organs or agencies of the general international organization.

2. The Commission initially should have its headquarters in Washington but may meet in other places as the occasion requires.

**SECRET**

Secret

100  
150-42  
August 16, 1944

EUROPEAN HIGH COMMISSION

A. ESTABLISHMENT  
AND PURPOSE

The governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the Soviet Union should agree to an extension of the membership and competence of the European Advisory Commission in conformity with the provisions of paragraph 5 of Annex 2 to the Protocol signed at Moscow on November 1, 1943, which reads as follows:

"5. The foregoing terms of reference will be subject to review by the three Governments if circumstances should arise which call for an extension of the membership and competence of the Commission."

The commission should henceforth be called the European High Commission.

B. FUNCTIONS  
AND SCOPE

The European High Commission should be responsible for

- a. making recommendations to the participating governments and authorities for action to insure the effective disarmament and control of Germany and other enemy states in Europe as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Moscow Declaration, which read as follows:

"2. That those of them at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy.

"3. That they will take all measures deemed by them to be necessary to provide against any violation of the terms imposed upon the enemy."

- b. supervising and directing, subject to directives jointly agreed to by the participating governments and authorities, the control

commissions

commissions or other similar agencies which may be established in Europe to carry out the purposes set forth in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Moscow Declaration except (1) that the Commission should have no authority with regard to the conduct of military operations in the prosecution of the present war and (2) that, during the period in which any control commission or other agency is exclusively or predominantly under military direction, the authority of the European High Commission, with respect to the activities of such commission or agency, should be limited to making recommendations to the participating governments and authorities;

- c. making recommendations to the participating governments and authorities for the adjustment of problems in Europe arising out of the war, other than those referred to under (a) and (b) above, which are of concern to such governments and authorities and which they may assign to the Commission;
- d. performing such other duties as may be assigned to it by agreement of the participating governments and authorities.

#### C. COMPOSITION

The European High Commission should have as original members one political and one military representative from each of the three nations. It should be the policy of the participating governments to enlarge the membership of the Commission by the addition from time to time of representatives of the other European United Nations and authorities as conditions warrant. Pending admittance to membership on the Commission representatives of the several European United Nations and authorities should be invited to sit with the Commission when matters of primary interest to such nations or authorities are under consideration. The chairmanship of the Commission should be held successively by representatives of the three nations.

#### D. RELATIONSHIP

D. RELATIONSHIP TO THE INTERIM  
CONSULTATIVE SECURITY COMMISSION

The European High Commission should keep the Interim Consultative Security Commission fully informed as to its policies, proposals and activities which have a bearing on international peace and security and should cooperate with that Commission in order to assist it in carrying out its responsibilities.

E. TERMINATION

The functions of the European High Commission should terminate when and to the extent that such functions have been absorbed by or transferred to appropriate organs or agencies of the general international organization.

F. LOCATION AND  
ORGANIZATION

1. The European High Commission initially should have its headquarters in London and thereafter should establish its headquarters wherever the Commission determines. It may meet at other places as the occasion requires.

2. The Commission should organize its secretariat and otherwise perfect its organization and procedure.

SECRET

AIR

Civil Affairs in the Balkans

American planning for civil affairs in the Balkans is restricted to Greece, Yugoslavia and Albania on the theory that these will be liberated territory. No American participation in Bulgaria and Hungary is contemplated in present plans, unless it is found that these countries have surpluses of foodstuffs or products useful in the war, for the handling of which American personnel in Allied missions might be desirable.

The U. S. Army has set up, under authorization of the President, a combined Anglo-American Military Headquarters for relief and rehabilitation in Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia, the American participation being limited to sixty-three, all officers, while British personnel will number several thousand. On our initiative an agreement has been made between UNRRA and the military authorities whereby UNRRA will serve as the agency of the combined military head quarters for the distribution of the supplies during the military period. In view of the American origin of the bulk of the supplies and the limited American military participation, this arrangement may serve to prevent the distribution from being controlled solely by British military and for British political ends. Since these territories would be supplied by UNRRA after the military period, it also seems desirable to have UNRRA on the ground at once.

There has been some differences of opinion between the British and Americans as to the extent of UNRRA's responsibility during the military period. The American position is that UNRRA should be given the maximum possible responsibility under the direction of the military headquarters. The British would prefer to limit UNRRA's role principally to the furnishing of certain personnel who would, as individuals, advise and assist the military. The Combined Civil Affairs Committee is now trying to reach agreement on this point. The British plan for the distribution of supplies in Albania and Yugoslavia has contemplated delivery of supplies at ports, to the local authorities, with practically no control to assume their distribution in accordance with our policy of non-discrimination because of race, creed or political affiliation. The American plan urges agreements with local

authorities

authorities providing for such non-discriminatory distribution, and sufficient personnel, either of UNRRA or the military, within the countries to make sure of compliance with this policy. We feel strongly that relief and supplies should not be used as a political weapon to help any one faction. Particularly in the case of Yugoslavia the scheme of delivery to the people easiest at hand would be sure to give to that faction a powerful impetus in the civil strife within the country. It is to the American long-range interest that we should not become a party to such a program. A clear understanding with the British on this point is essential.

The British plan for Greece envisages a rather elaborate military organization to supervise distribution, restore port facilities, railroads and other utilities. This work will also be facilitated by the organizations already familiar with the problem and the trained personnel available.

We think the Russians should be fully informed of all these activities, through a representative who would be in close touch with the ~~combined~~ military headquarters. Suspicions would be allayed and a precedent established which might advantageously be used in reverse in other areas where Russia is primarily concerned. There has been a reluctance on the part of a number of British officials to agree to keeping the Russians fully informed.

One of the major problems is the lack of contact with the military authorities of the Governments in question. Agreements providing for their cooperation would be desirable with a view to securing both information and the utilization of the services, personnel and administration which will be under their control. In the case of Greece it has now been proposed that the Theater Commander be authorized to discuss these problems with the Greek authorities.

The Yugoslav Government presents a particular problem in this connection, since the reported unity established between the Government-in-exile and the Tito organization is of a very dubious nature, with the additional complication that neither of them has control or more than a claim to authority in Serbia, the heart of the country. It may, therefore, be necessary to continue the planning without much consultation with Yugoslav officials until there is some clarification of the authority and popular support of the respective groups. Unfortunately, the Yugoslav officials have been so preoccupied with their political troubles that they seem to have made no

serious

serious plans of their own. Actual relief operations may in fact have to be postponed while the civil strife continues.

In Albania there is no government with which to deal. Civil affairs operations will of necessity require considerable improvisation, but should present no major problems.

SECRET

A14

## THE POLISH PROBLEM

Recent developments regarding Warsaw make it appear that Stalin may have decided that the Polish Government forces in Poland must be destroyed, despite possible unfortunate repercussions inside Poland and abroad and the inevitable lessening of the chances of an arrangement with Mikolajczyk, in order that the Soviet-Sponsored Committee can gain the upper hand. This thesis is borne out by his persistent refusal to assist the British or ourselves in efforts to strengthen the Warsaw garrison.

He may have come to believe that the strength of the Polish Government forces both in Warsaw and elsewhere in Poland was such as to make it unlikely that his Polish Committee could control the situation if Mikolajczyk and a few of his ministers were allowed to form a government in Warsaw. The reversal of his decision to aid the insurgents may have been made in the thought that it would undermine the position and prestige of Mikolajczyk and minimize the possibility of the latter's return to Warsaw.

In any event, the decision was clearly political and appears to indicate Stalin's determination that the Soviet-sponsored Committee gain as full control as possible of the country.

### Possible Results of these Developments

1. The possibility of Mikolajczyk's forming a coalition government in Warsaw is very small. He might be acceptable to the Soviet Government if he came as an individual to join the Committee, which he probably would be reluctant to do.

2. When the refusal of the Red Army to give aid to Warsaw becomes known, it may cause many pro-Soviet Poles to change their attitude and force the Soviet Government to rule Poland more severely than it otherwise planned.

### 3. Reactions

3. Reactions abroad to the Russian methods used in settling the Polish problem may seriously affect United Nations conversations, including those on security.

4. When the Red Army captures Warsaw, the Soviet propaganda machine will be turned on in full to convince the world that the Warsaw uprising was brought about by a small group of reactionaries and that the rest of the population is one hundred percent behind the Soviet-sponsored Committee.

5. The Committee will be assisted by the Soviet authorities to hold elections and set up a Government as soon as practicable.

#### Possible American Policy

Until Stalin has definitely closed the door to any compromise solution with the Polish Government in London we should continue to urge upon him in every possible manner the necessity of some solution of the Polish question which would be acceptable to world opinion. We should at the same time support Mikolajczyk and his supporters in their efforts to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement with Moscow. While any possibility remains of an agreement between the Polish Government and the Soviet-sponsored Committee, any indication on our part of a change of attitude toward the London Polish Government would lessen the already slim chances of agreement.

Should Stalin proceed, despite all our efforts and those of the British, to a unilateral and arbitrary solution of setting up his own group as the government of Poland, we will have to consider our policy in the light of developments as they occur. In any event we should move very slowly in extending any form of recognition to such a group.

**SECRET**

A14

U. S. Relations with the Soviet Union

Our overall objective in our relations with the Soviet Union is the establishment of the closest, most cooperative relationship on the basis of the mutual acceptance and observance of the essential principles of good international conduct.

Because of the over-riding wartime necessity of avoiding friction which might jeopardize military cooperation, more emphasis has hitherto been placed on cooperating with the Soviet Union per se than on finding an agreed basis upon which the cooperation must be established if it is to endure and form one of the foundations of a secure and peaceful world order.

An excellent start was made at the Moscow and Tehran Conferences toward establishing a common agreement in regard to the broad principles of international cooperation. Recent Soviet policy with regard to Poland, however, its adamant attitude on the Baltic States, and indicated in other areas have been far from encouraging in this respect.

There is a danger that the Soviet Government may mistake friendliness for weakness and continue to operate in the belief that it can obtain all the benefits of cooperation with the United States and Great Britain no matter what policies it pursues in regard to its neighbors unless the British and ourselves demonstrate more forcefully that observation by the Soviet Union of accepted principles of international conduct is both to its own ultimate advantage and essential to lasting cooperation with the Western Powers.

Nothing should be done along political lines which might jeopardize Soviet military cooperation against Germany but, as and when the military situation in Europe permits, increased emphasis should be placed on the principles upon which enduring cooperation must be based. This would require greater willingness on our part to risk Soviet displeasure and franker and more realistic discussions with the Soviet Union in regard to its policies in Europe. It would, of course, be against our interest to seek (or to follow the British in seeking) points of friction or to obstruct or deny legitimate Soviet interests.

It

It is nevertheless important that the Soviet Government realize that, while we desire its cooperation in world affairs as much as it desires ours, we do not intend to acquiesce in Soviet policies which we consider internationally destructive merely for the sake of avoiding unpleasant issues. Cooperation on that basis is perilously close to collusion. A greater degree of firmness in our attitude and policy toward the Soviet Union would avoid more serious difficulties in the future and would place our relations with it on a firmer foundation.

A14  
**TOP SECRET**

Anglo-American-Russian Relations

Great Britain has long profited from her ability to shift the balance of power in Europe and has traditionally sought the role of the "honest broker" between other nations. The present preponderance of Russia outweighs the rest of Europe and Great Britain combined. It is accordingly natural that the British should seek to maintain a balance between the United States and the Soviet Union and to play the role of "honest broker" between them.

The absence of any conflict of vital interests between the United States and the U.S.S.R., however, and the number of points at which British and Soviet interests impinge make it appear probable that we, whether we choose it or not, may be forced to play such a role. The vital importance which the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff attach to solidarity between the three great powers is concisely stated in the following excerpt from a letter of May 16, 1944 from Admiral Leahy:

"From the point of view of national and world-wide security, our basic national policy in post-war settlements of this kind should seek to maintain the solidarity of the three great powers and in all other respects to establish conditions calculated to assure a long period of peace, during which, it may be hoped, arrangements will be perfected for the prevention of future world conflicts. The cardinal importance of this national policy is emphasized by a consideration of the fundamental and revolutionary changes in relative national military strengths that are being brought about in Europe as a result of the war.

"It would seem clear that there cannot be a world war, or even a great war, which does not find one or more of the great military powers on each side. At the conclusion of the present war, there will be, for the foreseeable future, only three such powers -- the United States, Britain, and Russia. Since it would seem in the highest degree unlikely that Britain and Russia, or Russia alone, would be aligned against the United States, it is apparent that any future world conflict in the foreseeable future will find Britain and Russia in opposite camps.

"In

"In appraising possibilities of this nature, the outstanding fact to be noted is the recent phenomenal development of the heretofore latent Russian military and economic strength -- a development which seems certain to prove epochal in its bearing on future politico-military international relationships, and which has yet to reach the full scope attainable with Russian resources. In contrast, as regards Britain several developments have combined to lessen her relative military and economic strength and gravely to impair, if not preclude, her ability to offer effective military opposition to Russia on the continent except possibly in defensive operations in the Atlantic coastal areas. In a conflict between these two powers the disparity in the military strengths that they could dispose upon that continent would, under present conditions, be far too great to be overcome by our intervention on the side of Britain. Having due regard to the military factors involved -- resources, manpower, geography and particularly our ability to project our strength across the ocean and exert it decisively upon the continent -- we might be able to successfully defend Britain, but we could not, under existing conditions, defeat Russia. In other words, we would find ourselves engaged in a war which we could not win even though the United States would be in no danger of defeat and occupation.

"It is apparent that the United States should, now and in the future, exert its utmost efforts and utilize all its influence to prevent such a situation arising and to promote a spirit of mutual cooperation between Britain, Russia and ourselves. So long as Britain and Russia cooperate and collaborate in the interests of peace, there can be no great war in the foreseeable future.

"The greatest likelihood of eventual conflict between Britain and Russia would seem to grow out of either nation initiating attempts to build up its strength, by seeking to attach to herself parts of Europe to the disadvantage and possible danger of her potential adversary. Having regard to the inherent suspicions of the Russians, to present Russia with any agreement on such matters as between the British and ourselves, prior to consultation with Russia, might well result in starting a train of events that would lead eventually to the situation we most wish to avoid."

It

It seems probable that solidarity can best be attained if none of the three powers seeks the role of intermediary between the other two and each of the three works directly with the other two. We should, however, make every effort to prevent discord developing between the other two.

In particular we should:

1. Endeavor to prevent the development in Europe or elsewhere of British and Soviet spheres of influence, with the inevitable potentialities of friction and conflict which that would entail; and
2. Make every effort to secure the full participation of the Soviet Union in the General International Organization and to induce the Soviet Government to settle its international problems through the Organization.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

July 11, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We have developed the following plans for handling the forthcoming discussions with the British, Russians, and Chinese on the subject of international organization and security:

Plan for discussions

The discussions, which are scheduled to begin on August 2, are envisaged as an informal interchange of views at a high diplomatic level, relating both to basic policies and to technical questions. It is contemplated that the order of the discussions will follow three phases: (1) consideration of basic policies; (2) detailed technical discussions in separate groups, based on the discussion of basic policies; and (3) further consideration of basic policies in the light of the detailed technical discussions.

The topics to be discussed fall naturally into three broad categories: (1) the structure and establishment of the proposed international organization, (2) arrangements for pacific settlement of disputes, and



and (3) security arrangements. The detailed discussions would be conducted in three separate sections corresponding to these categories, as indicated in the attached tentative agenda.

Assignments of American group

The Secretary of State would be the senior American representative. He would have general direction of the proceedings and would preside over the first and third phases of the discussions.

The Under Secretary of State would head the American group responsible for the detailed technical discussions and would be chairman of the third section, to which the detailed technical discussions of security arrangements is assigned.

It is contemplated that, in the American-British-Soviet phase of the discussions, a British official would be chairman of the first section and a Soviet official would be chairman of the second section. In the American-British-Chinese phase, a Chinese official would be chairman of the second group.

The American group would be assigned to the three sections as follows:

First

First section: Messrs. Bowman, Grew, and Pasvolksy.

Second section: Messrs. Hackworth, Hornbeck and Cohen.

Third section: Messrs. Stettinius, Dunn and Wilson, Admirals Hepburn, Willson and Train, and Generals Embick, Strong and Fairchild.

Members of all sections and Assistant Secretary of State Long would be present at the first and third phases of the discussions.

#### Advisers and Secretariat

The American group would have advisers and a secretariat to assist them in preparation for and in the conduct of the discussions. Arrangements would be made for the assignment of Army and Navy officers to the secretariat. This secretariat would also function as the secretariat for the discussions. The advisers would be Mr. Notter and officers of the four geographic offices of the Department. Mr. Alger Hiss would act as executive secretary.

#### Arrangements

Tentative arrangements have been made for using Dumbarton Oaks in Georgetown, the former estate of Mr. Robert Woods Bliss, now the property of Harvard University, as headquarters for the discussions.

Meetings

Meetings might be held there for a few hours in the latter part of each morning and afternoon, with luncheon and perhaps tea being served. There would be a few offices available for consultation and immediate drafting needs, but the groups representing the other nations would presumably do the major part of their separate drafting in their own embassies before and after the daily meetings.

Preparatory period

The members of the American group would immediately organize themselves in three committees, corresponding to the three sections. Mr. Stettinius would take general charge of the necessary preparations for the discussions and would look to Mr. Pasvolsky as responsible for the the activities of the first committee; Mr. Hackworth for the second; and Mr. Dunn for the third. We are planning to have the entire group meet once a week with the Secretary of State. There would also be a small informal steering committee, both for the period of preparation and of actual discussions. It would be under the chairmanship of the Secretary with Mr. Stettinius as vice chairman. Its members would be Messrs. Dunn, Hackworth, Pasvolsky, Admiral Willson and General Strong.

I hope that these arrangements meet with your approval.

## TENTATIVE AGENDA

- I. The structure and establishment of the proposed international organization.
  1. General structure and scope of the organization.
  2. Membership, functions, powers, and voting procedures of a general assembly.
  3. Membership, functions, powers, and voting procedures of a smaller executive body (executive council).
  4. Administration and secretariat of the organization.
  5. Arrangements for coordination of economic and other functional activities and agencies, and the relation of such agencies and of any regional arrangements to the general organization.
  6. Procedure of establishment and inauguration of the organization.
  
- II. Arrangements for pacific settlement of disputes.
  1. Methods of pacific settlement.
  2. Procedures, regional and otherwise, outside the central organization.
  3. Procedures in the council and in the assembly.
  4. The structure and functions of the Court of Justice.
  
- III. Security arrangements.
  1. Scope and character of joint action with respect to
    - a. Determination of threats to or breaches of the peace;
    - b. Prevention or suppression of such threats or breaches;
    - c. Enforcement of decisions.
  2. Methods of joint action.
    - a. Not involving use of armed forces.
    - b. Involving use of armed forces.
  3. Arrangements for provision of armed forces and facilities.
  4. Relationship to mutual defense and regional systems.
  5. Arrangements for the regulation of armaments and the manufacture and traffic in arms.
  6. Structure and functions of an armaments and security commission.
  7. Interim arrangements pending the effective functioning in the field of security of the general organization.

**SECRET**

A14  
Pres

Secret

July 6, 1944.

Right to file  
F. S. W. S.

TENTATIVE PROPOSALS FOR A GENERAL  
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
I. <u>General Character of An International Organization</u> .....	1
A. Nature of the Organization .....	1
B. Purposes .....	2
C. Methods .....	2
D. Principal Organs and Agencies .....	3
II. <u>A General Assembly</u> .....	4
A. Composition .....	4
B. Powers .....	4
C. Representation and Voting .....	6
D. Organization and Sessions .....	6
III. <u>An Executive Council</u> .....	8
A. Composition and Representation .....	8
B. Powers .....	8
C. Voting .....	9
D. Organization and Sessions .....	10
IV. <u>An International Court of Justice</u> .....	11
V. <u>Pacific Settlement of Disputes</u> .....	12
VI. <u>Determination of Threats to the Peace or Breaches of the Peace and Action with Respect Thereto</u> .....	14
A. Determination of Threats to the Peace or Breaches of the Peace .....	14
B. Initiation of Action .....	15
C. Measures Not Involving the Use of Armed Force .....	15
D. Measures Involving the Use of Armed Force .....	16
E. Security and Armaments Commission .....	18
VII. <u>Regulation</u>	

	<u>Page</u>
VII. <u>Regulation of Armaments and Armed Forces</u> ....	19
VIII. <u>Arrangements for Economic and Social Cooperation</u> .....	20
A. Purpose and Relationships .....	20
B. Powers .....	20
C. Composition and Voting .....	21
D. Organization .....	22
IX. <u>Arrangements for Territorial Trusteeships</u> ...	23
A. Scope and Purposes .....	23
B. Structure and Composition .....	23
C. Powers .....	24
D. Procedures .....	25
X. <u>General Administration and Secretariat</u> .....	26
A. Office of Director-General and the Central Administrative Staff .....	26
B. Obligations of Member States with Respect to Officials of the Organization .....	27
XI. <u>Procedure of Establishment and Inauguration</u> .....	28

Secret

I

GENERAL CHARACTER OF AN  
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

A. NATURE OF  
THE ORGANIZATION

1. The general international organization to establish and to maintain security and peace, as projected in the Four-Nation Declaration, signed at Moscow, October 30, 1943, should be based on the principle of cooperation freely agreed upon among sovereign and peace-loving states. The organization should be open to membership by all such states, large and small, and should be world-wide in character.
2. The United Nations and the nations associated with them, and such other nations as the United Nations may determine, should comprise the initial membership of the organization.
3. The organization should be empowered to make effective the principle that no nation shall be permitted to maintain or use armed force in international relations in any manner inconsistent with the purposes envisaged in the basic instrument of the international organization or to give assistance to any state contrary to preventive or enforcement action undertaken by the international organization.
4. The organization should be so constituted as to make possible the existence of regional organizations or other arrangements or policies not inconsistent with its purposes, and to enable such organizations and arrangements to function on their own initiation or by reference from the general organization on matters of security and peace which are appropriate for regional adjustment. The general organization should at all times be kept informed of the activities in matters of security and peace undertaken by regional organizations or under regional or other arrangements.
5. The organization should comprise arrangements for cooperation in the fields of economic and other specialized activities.

B. PURPOSES

B. PURPOSES

1. The primary purposes of the organization should be, first, to maintain international security and peace, and second, to foster through international cooperation the creation of conditions of stability and well-being necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations and essential to the maintenance of security and peace.

C. METHODS

As methods to be used for the maintenance of security and peace, the international organization should:

- a. encourage peaceful adjustment of controversies by the parties themselves;
- b. initiate cooperative action by member states for the settlement of disputes;
- c. encourage the use of local or regional procedures for the settlement of disputes capable of adjustment by such procedures;
- d. recommend political or diplomatic action to adjust differences;
- e. provide for, and encourage resort to, processes of mediation, conciliation, and arbitration;
- f. encourage reference of justiciable matters to the international court of justice;
- g. refer to the court justiciable questions pending before the organization;
- h. settle disputes referred to it by the parties or over which it assumes jurisdiction on its own initiative;
- i. determine the existence of threats to the peace or breaches of the peace;
- j. arrange, when necessary, for economic, commercial, financial, and other measures of enforcement not involving use of armed force;
- k. provide

- k. provide for the use of armed force, when necessary in support of security and peace, if other methods and arrangements are inadequate.

D. PRINCIPAL ORGANS  
AND AGENCIES

1. The international organization should have as its principal organs:

- a. A general assembly;
- b. An executive council;
- c. An international court of justice; and
- d. A general secretariat.

2. The international organization should have additional organs, councils, commissions, or other agencies for cooperation in international economic and social activities, for territorial trusteeship responsibilities, and for such other functions as may be found necessary.

II

A GENERAL ASSEMBLY

A. COMPOSITION

The general assembly should be composed of representatives of the states members of the international organization.

B. POWERS

1. It should be empowered to receive and to examine representations addressed to the international organization on matters deemed to be of concern to the organization, and to take action in matters of concern to the international organization which are not allocated to other organs by the basic instrument.

2. The principal powers of the general assembly should be as follows:

- a. to make, on its own initiative or on request of a member state, reports on and recommendations for the peaceful adjustment of any situation or controversy the continuation of which it deems likely to impair the general welfare;
- b. to assist the executive council, upon its request, in enlisting the cooperation of all states toward giving effect to action under consideration in or decided upon by the council with respect to:
  - (1) the settlement of a dispute the continuance of which is likely to endanger security or to lead to a breach of the peace;
  - (2) the maintenance or restoration of peace; and
  - (3) any other matters within the jurisdiction of the council;

c. to

- c. to initiate studies and make recommendations for:
  - (1) the promotion of international cooperation;
  - (2) the development and revision of rules of international law; and
  - (3) the promotion of the observance of basic human rights in accordance with principles or undertakings agreed upon by the states members of the international organization;
- d. to admit to membership in the organization independent states not initial members of the organization;
- e. to elect the members of the executive council not having continuing tenure and the judges of the international court of justice;
- f. to approve the budget of the organs and agencies of the organization, to determine a provisional and a continuing basis of apportionment of expenses of the organization among the member states together with the procedure of apportionment, and to review, make recommendations on, and take other action concerning the budgets of specialized agencies brought into relationship with the international organization in accordance with the terms agreed upon between such agencies and the international organization.
- g. to receive reports from the executive council and other organs and agencies of the organization and from all specialized bodies or agencies brought into relationship with the international organization;
- h. to exercise the powers with respect to economic and social activities and territorial trusteeship stipulated in Sections VIII and IX;
- i. to provide for the coordination of the general policies of all organs and agencies of the international organization and organizations and agencies brought into relationship with it;
- j. to

- j. to set up any bodies or agencies it may deem necessary for the performance of its functions; and
- k. to propose amendments of the basic instrument, which should come into force when approved by two thirds of the member states through their constitutional processes, including the members having continuing tenure on the executive council.

C. REPRESENTATION  
AND VOTING

- 1. The delegation of each member state should consist of not more than six representatives.
- 2. Each member state should have one vote in the general assembly, except as provided for in paragraph 3 below.
- 3. In taking decisions with respect to the budget of the organs and agencies of the organization, the continuing basis of apportionment of expenses of the organization, and the budgets of specialized agencies brought into relationship with the organization each member state should have voting power in proportion to its contribution to the expenses of the organization.
- 4. Decisions with respect to the admission to membership in the organization, the election of the members of the executive council, the election of judges of the international court of justice, and the provisional basis of apportionment of expenses, should be taken by a two-thirds vote. Other decisions should be taken by a majority vote.

D. ORGANIZATION  
AND SESSIONS

- 1. The general assembly should meet annually, but it may be convened in special session on the initiative of the executive council or under any procedure the assembly may adopt.

2. It

2. It should elect its president, vice-presidents, and other principal officers who should serve for annual terms or until their successors assume office. It should perfect its organization and adopt its own rules of procedure.

3. It should maintain headquarters at the seat of the international organization but may hold its sessions in whatever places would best facilitate the accomplishment of its work.

III

AN EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

A. COMPOSITION  
AND REPRESENTATION

1. The executive council should consist of eleven states members of the international organization. These states should be elected annually by the general assembly and should not be immediately eligible for re-election except that the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China should have continuing tenure.

2. There should be a provision in the basic instrument that whenever the executive council finds that a government freely chosen by the French people has been established and is in effective control of the territory of the French Republic, France should be added to the list of states members having continuing tenure on the council.

3. Each state member of the executive council should have one representative.

4. Any state member of the organization not having a seat on the executive council should be entitled to attend and to be heard on matters specially affecting that member.

B. POWERS

1. The executive council should have primary responsibility for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, for the prevention of threats to the peace and breaches of the peace, and for such other activities as may be necessary for the maintenance of international security and peace. It should in such matters represent, and act on behalf of, all the members of the international organization and should in every case seek a just and equitable settlement of international disputes.

2. The

2. The principal powers of the executive council are enumerated below in Section V, Pacific Settlement of Disputes, Section VI, Determination of Threats to the Peace or Breaches of the Peace and Action with Respect Thereto, Section VII, Regulation of Armaments and Armed Forces, and Section X, General Administration and Secretariat.

#### C. VOTING

1. Each state member of the executive council should have one vote.
2. Decisions with respect to the following matters should be taken by a majority vote including the concurring votes of all member states having continuing tenure, except as provided for in paragraphs 4 and 5 below:
  - a. the assumption on its own initiative or on reference to it of jurisdiction over a dispute;
  - b. the terms of settlement of disputes;
  - c. the negotiations for a general agreement on the regulation of armaments and armed forces;
  - d. the determination of threats to the peace, of breaches of the peace, and of acts obstructing measures for the maintenance of security and peace; and
  - e. the institution and application of measures of enforcement.
3. Other decisions should be taken by a simple majority vote.
4. In all decisions any state member of the executive council should have the right to abstain from voting, but in such case the abstaining member should be bound by the decision.
5. Provisions will need to be worked out with respect to the voting procedure in the event of a dispute in which one or more of the members of the council having continuing tenure are directly involved.

#### D. ORGANIZATION

D. ORGANIZATION  
AND SESSIONS

1. The executive council should be in continuous session. Its headquarters should be maintained at the seat of the organization, but its meetings may be held at any places best facilitating its work.

2. It should elect its chairman.

3. It should be empowered (a) to set up any bodies or agencies it may deem necessary for the performance of its functions, (b) to perfect its own organization, and (c) to adopt its own rules of procedure.

IV

AN INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

1. The Permanent Court of International Justice should be reconstituted in accordance with a revision of its present Statute.

2. The revised Statute should be made a part of the basic instrument of the international organization.

3. The parties to any dispute the continuance of which is likely to endanger international security or peace should be obligated, first of all, to seek a settlement by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, reference to the International Court of Justice, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

4. Where feasible, regional or other arrangements should be applied to bring about settlement or settlement of local or regional controversies.

5. If the parties fail to effect a settlement of such a dispute by the means above indicated, they shall be obligated to refer it to the executive council.

6. Any member state should have the right to bring to the attention of the general assembly or the executive council any condition, situation, or controversy the continuance of which the member deems likely to endanger international security or peace.

7. The general assembly should refer to the executive council any such condition, situation, or controversy which it deems to require action to preserve or restore peace or to the peace or breach of the peace.

8. The executive council should be empowered to investigate any such condition, situation, or controversy and should recommend appropriate procedures or measures of adjustment. It should be empowered to do this upon its own initiative, or upon reference from the general assembly, or at the instance of a member state.

V

PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

1. All states, whether members of the international organization or not, should be required (a) to settle disputes by none but peaceful means, and (b) to refrain from the threat or use of force in their international relations in any manner inconsistent with the purposes envisaged in the basic instrument of the international organization.

2. The parties to any dispute the continuance of which is likely to endanger international security or peace should be obligated, first of all, to seek a settlement by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, reference to the international court of justice, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

3. Where feasible, regional or other arrangements should be employed to bring about adjustment or settlement of local or regional controversies.

4. If the parties fail to effect a settlement of such a dispute by the means above indicated, they should be obligated to refer it to the executive council.

5. Any member state should have the right to bring to the attention of the general assembly or the executive council any condition, situation, or controversy the continuance of which the member deems likely to endanger international security or peace.

6. The general assembly should refer to the executive council any such condition, situation, or controversy which it deems to require action to prevent an immediate threat to the peace or breach of the peace.

7. The executive council should be empowered to investigate any such condition, situation, or controversy and should recommend appropriate procedures or measures of adjustment. It should be empowered to do this upon its own initiative, or upon reference from the general assembly, or at the instance of a member state.

8. The

8. The executive council, when it determines upon its own initiative that there exists between member states a dispute which constitutes a threat to security or peace, and which is not being adequately dealt with by other procedures, should be authorized to assume jurisdiction to effect a settlement.

9. In case of a dispute involving a member and a non-member state, or non-member states only, and which is likely to lead to a breach of the peace, the executive council should be authorized to take jurisdiction either upon its own initiative or at the request of any party.

10. In discharging its responsibilities with respect to pacific settlement the executive council should be authorized to seek the advice and assistance of the general assembly, to appoint commissions of inquiry or conciliation, to refer to the international court of justice justiciable disputes or legal aspects of disputes not wholly justiciable, to employ regional or local procedures, or to take any other appropriate measures to effect a settlement.

11. The executive council should be empowered with respect to any dispute referred to in the preceding paragraphs to encourage and facilitate the execution of the terms of any settlement determined under the authority of the international organization.

VI

DETERMINATION OF THREATS TO THE  
PEACE OR BREACHES OF THE PEACE AND  
ACTION WITH RESPECT THERETO

A. DETERMINATION OF  
THREATS TO THE PEACE  
OR BREACHES OF THE PEACE

1. The executive council should be empowered to determine the existence of any threat to the peace or breach of the peace, and to decide upon the action to be recommended or taken to maintain or restore peace. It should be empowered to seek the advice and assistance of the general assembly in any matter in this connection, and of the international court of justice in any matter within the competence of the court.

2. The executive council should be empowered to determine whether any condition, situation, or act involving an alleged threat to the peace or breach of the peace is of sufficient gravity to require action.

Note: The conditions, situations, and acts envisaged above include, for example:

- a. employment of military forces by a state within the jurisdiction of another state not authorized by the international organization;
- b. failure to comply with a request of the executive council to accept procedures of pacific settlement in any dispute;
- c. failure to accept terms of settlement of a dispute as prescribed under the authority of the international organization;
- d. failure to comply with a request of the executive council to maintain the existing position or to return to a prior position as determined by the executive council;
- e. failure

- e. failure to observe obligations with respect to the regulation of armaments and armed forces and the manufacture of and international traffic in arms; and
- f. obstruction of measures for the enforcement of security and peace through failure to comply with a call from the council (1) to carry out agreed undertakings regarding measures of enforcement, and (2) to make available, upon the basis of agreed obligations, forces and facilities for enforcement action.

B. INITIATION  
OF ACTION

1. When the executive council determines that a threat to the peace or breach of the peace exists, it should immediately (a) require the parties to refrain from any action likely to aggravate the situation and (b) decide upon the measures to be recommended or taken.

2. All states, whether members of the international organization or not, should be required to refrain from giving assistance to any state contrary to preventive or enforcement action undertaken by the international organization or with its authorization.

C. MEASURES NOT INVOLVING  
THE USE OF ARMED FORCE

1. The executive council should be empowered to call upon member states to institute measures not requiring the use of armed force in support of its decisions and to determine, in any instance necessitating such action, what measures should be employed and the extent to which the respective member states should be called upon to apply them.

2. In any case in which such action has been decided upon by the executive council, member states should be obligated:

- a. to cooperate with the executive council and the general assembly in obtaining the

information

information necessary for action and in appropriate measures of publicity;

- b. to take part in concerted diplomatic measures;
- c. to take part in collective economic, commercial, and financial measures; and
- d. to join in mutual efforts to afford relief and aid to states assuming undue burdens through participation in such measures instituted by the executive council.

D. MEASURES INVOLVING  
THE USE OF ARMED FORCE

1. In the event that other measures prove to be inadequate, the executive council should be authorized to provide for the use of armed force to assure the maintenance of security and peace.

2. The member states should undertake to furnish forces and facilities when needed for this purpose at the call of the executive council and in accordance with a general agreement governing the number and type of forces and the kind and extent of facilities to be provided. Such an agreement should be concluded among the member states at the earliest possible moment after the organization comes into existence. It should be a duty of the executive council to formulate as rapidly as possible plans and procedure for the negotiation of such agreement. In formulating plans for the agreement and in carrying out operations under the agreement, the council should take account of the geographical position of the member states, their regional or special obligations, their population, and their relative resources.

3. The general agreement should provide that member states should be obligated to maintain in condition of effective readiness the armaments and armed forces which by the agreement they respectively undertake to make available for international cooperative action.

4. Pending the conclusion of the general agreement, the states parties to the Four-Nation Declaration, signed at Moscow, October 30, 1943, and other states

in

in position to do so should provide, on the basis of their various capacities and of undertakings among themselves, such forces and facilities as may be needed for establishing and maintaining security and peace.

5. The executive council should be empowered to call upon the member states for economic, financial, and commercial and other assistance necessary to support and to supplement international action involving the use of armed force as and when undertaken. Member states should undertake:

- a. to afford such assistance, the terms to be determined in consultation between the executive council and member states;
- b. to deny economic or other assistance to a state against which enforcement action is undertaken, the nature of such assistance to be defined by the executive council at the time of the action; and
- c. to join in mutual efforts to afford relief and aid to states assuming undue burdens through participation in security measures involving the use of armed force instituted by the executive council.

6. The executive council should be empowered to call upon member states to grant rights of passage and to furnish facilities, including bases, necessary to the effective action of forces operating under authority of the council. The conditions of the exercise of these rights and of the furnishing of facilities, including bases, should be determined, in advance or at the time of action, by agreement between the executive council and the member states in whose territories these rights and facilities are required.

7. The executive council, advised and assisted by the permanent security and armaments commission described in part E below, should be responsible for the planning of, and should exercise general supervision over, any use of force determined to be necessary under the provisions of the basic instrument of the international organization.

E. SECURITY

E. SECURITY AND  
ARMAMENTS COMMISSION

1. The executive council should establish a permanent security and armaments commission.

2. The permanent security and armaments commission should provide the executive council with the expert military advice and assistance necessary for the discharge of the responsibilities of the council concerning the employment of force and the regulation of armaments and armed forces, and should perform such duties of study, recommendation, administration, and execution as the council may assign to it.

3. The security and armaments commission should have authority, with the approval of the executive council, to establish subordinate agencies and otherwise perfect its organization.

VII

REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS AND ARMED FORCES

1. In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international security and peace with the least diversion of the world's human and economic resources for armaments, the executive council should be made responsible for initiating negotiations for the conclusion of a general international agreement, envisaged in the Four-Nation Declaration signed at Moscow, October 30, 1943, for the establishment of a system of regulation of armaments and armed forces and for the regulation of the manufacture of and international traffic in arms.

2. The executive council should be authorized to exercise such powers for the execution of obligations stipulated in the general international agreement as may be assigned to it by the agreement.

3. The armaments and armed forces of the Axis states [to be named later] should be governed by the terms of their surrender and by the authority established thereunder. The executive council should be empowered to take responsibility for assuring the execution of stipulations governing the armaments and armed forces of the Axis states, to the extent that such responsibility may be assigned to it in succession to the authority established under the surrender terms.

VIII

ARRANGEMENTS FOR  
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COOPERATION

A. PURPOSE AND  
RELATIONSHIPS

1. With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations, the general international organization should facilitate and promote solutions of international economic and social problems, including educational and cultural problems. Responsibility for the discharge of this function should be vested in the general assembly, and under the authority of the general assembly, in an economic and social council, established in the basic instrument of the organization.

2. The various specialized economic and social organizations and agencies would have responsibilities in their respective fields as defined in their statutes. Each specialized economic or social organization or agency should be brought into relationship with the general international organization. The terms under which each specialized organization or agency should be related to the general international organization should be determined by agreement between the economic and social council and the appropriate authorities of the specialized organization or agency, subject to approval by the general assembly.

B. POWERS

1. The economic and social council should be empowered:

- a. to carry out, within the scope of its functions, recommendations of the general assembly in regard to economic or social matters;
- b. to make recommendations, on its own initiative, to the various specialized organizations or agencies, to governments, or to the general assembly, with respect to economic or social problems, including those beyond the scope of the specialized organizations, with a view to

promoting

promoting the fullest and most effective use of the world's economic resources, to achieving high and stable levels of employment, and in general to advancing the well-being of all peoples;

- c. to coordinate the activities of the specialized economic and social organizations or agencies through advisory consultations with, and recommendations to, such organizations;
- d. to receive and consider reports of the activities, decisions and recommendations of the specialized organizations or agencies, and to submit annually an analysis of such reports to the general assembly;
- e. to examine the administrative budgets of the specialized organizations or agencies with a view to recommending to the organizations or agencies concerned, and in appropriate cases to the general assembly, as to the most effective utilization of resources; and
- f. to perform such other functions within the general scope of its competence as may be assigned to it by the general assembly, or as may be provided for in future agreements among member states.

C. COMPOSITION  
AND VOTING

1. The economic and social council should consist of qualified representatives of a specified number [24] of member states. The states designated for this purpose should be selected by the general assembly for terms of three years, and each such state should have one representative.

2. Each representative of a state designated as a member of the economic and social council should have one vote. Decisions of the council should be taken by majority vote.

3. The economic and social council should make suitable arrangements for representatives of the specialized organizations or agencies to participate

without

without vote in its deliberations and in those of the commissions established by it.

D. ORGANIZATION

1. The economic and social council should establish an economic commission, a social commission, and such other commissions as may be required to facilitate the consideration of problems within the scope of its functions. Such commissions should consist of experts specially qualified in their respective fields, who may be nationals of any member state of the general international organization. The members of the commissions should be appointed for periods of three years.

2. The economic and social council should elect a chairman from among its members. A director and a staff of competent experts should serve as the permanent secretariat of the economic and social council and of the commissions, and should constitute a part of the central administrative staff of the general international organization.

3. The council should adopt its own rules of procedure and otherwise perfect its organization.

IX

ARRANGEMENTS FOR  
TERRITORIAL TRUSTEESHIPS

A. SCOPE AND  
PURPOSES

1. Subject to such exceptions as may be made by common agreement in the interests of international peace and security, the international organization should establish a system of international trusteeship by which it would (a) succeed to the rights, titles, and interests of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers under the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of Lausanne and to the rights and responsibilities of the League of Nations under the Covenant with respect to the non-self-governing territories detached from previous sovereigns in 1919, and (b) acquire authority over certain territories which may be detached from the present enemy states. By action of the general assembly the system might be extended to any territories for which assistance is requested by member states having control over such territories. Italy and Japan should be required by the terms of the peace settlement to relinquish all their rights, titles, and interests in the present mandated territories.

2. The basic objectives of the trusteeship system should be: (a) to promote, in accordance with the provisions of any declaration or code that may be agreed upon, the political, economic, and social advancement of the trust territories and their inhabitants and their progressive development toward self-government; (b) to provide non-discriminatory treatment in trust territories for appropriate activities of the nationals of all member states; and (c) to further international peace and security.

B. STRUCTURE AND  
COMPOSITION

1. The responsibilities of trusteeship should be vested in the general assembly and should be exercised through a trusteeship council and through administering authorities in the trust territories.

2. The

2. The trusteeship council should be composed of persons of special competence designated (a) one each by the states administering trust territories as continuing members and (b) one each by an equal number of other states named periodically for that purpose by the general assembly.

3. The administering authority in each trust territory should be a state or a specially constituted international administration. Each territory now administered under a mandate, except those so administered by Japan, should be administered under the trusteeship arrangements by the state which now administers it, unless in a particular case or cases some other disposal is made by the international organization.

4. Each territory should be governed in accordance with a territorial charter, which should constitute the fundamental law of the territory, defining the rights and obligations of the parties concerned. Each charter should be so drawn as to take into account the special circumstances of each territory.

C. POWERS

1. The general assembly should be empowered:  
(a) to call for, receive, and consider the reports, recommendations, and decisions of the trusteeship council;  
(b) to take action upon the recommendations of the trusteeship council concerning the initial territorial charters, alterations in such charters, designation of administering authorities, removal of such authorities for cause, and the conditions of termination and the act of termination of trusteeship in any territory; (c) to establish advisory commissions of a regional or technical character with respect to trust territories situated in a given region; and (d) to encourage and facilitate cooperation between the administering authorities and the specialized agencies brought into relationship with the international organization.

2. The trusteeship council, exercising general supervision over trust territories, should be empowered:  
(a) to advise the administering authorities; (b) to examine reports from the administering authorities;  
(c) to interrogate representatives of those authorities;  
(d) at its discretion, to receive petitions and to hear

petitioners

petitioners in person; (e) to recommend or pass upon economic projects of more than a minor local character and to conduct investigations relevant to such projects; (f) to conduct periodic inspections in the trust territories; and (g) to make recommendations to the general assembly regarding the territorial charters, the administering authorities, and other aspects of the trusteeship system.

D. PROCEDURES

1. The financial position of each trust territory should be reviewed periodically by the trusteeship council. The costs of administration should in general be met from the regular revenues of the trust territory, and the costs of supervision should be provided in the budget of the international organization.

2. The administering authorities should cooperate fully in the application of any international security measures specified by the executive council.

3. The director-general should appoint such deputies and principal officers of the central administrative staff as may be required, subject to confirmation by the general assembly, and such other personnel of subordinate rank for which he is responsible. He should recommend for appointment by the general assembly of the executive council respectively the directors of consular and agencies respectively respectively to these two organs.

4. The director-general and his deputies should not during their terms of office hold any other public office.

5. Officers appointed to the central administrative staff should be selected on the basis of technical

X

GENERAL ADMINISTRATION AND SECRETARIAT

A. OFFICE OF DIRECTOR-  
GENERAL AND THE CENTRAL  
ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

1. A director-general of the international organization should be elected by the general assembly with the concurrence of the executive council. He should serve for a period of five years and should be eligible for re-election.

2. The director-general should have the responsibilities of the chief administrative officer of the organization. He should serve as the secretary-general of the general assembly, of the executive council, and of such other organs and agencies of the international organization as the assembly or the council may direct. He should also provide for coordination, within the general policies appertaining to administration established by the general assembly, of the administrative procedures and regulations of the specialized agencies brought into relationship with the international organization. He should report to the general assembly on the work of all the organs and agencies of the organization and of commissions, agencies, and other bodies of concern to the international organization.

3. The director-general should appoint such deputies and principal officers of the central administrative staff as may be required, subject to confirmation by the general assembly, and such other personnel of secretariats for which he is responsible. He should recommend for appointment by the general assembly or the executive council respectively the directors of commissions and agencies responsible respectively to these two organs.

4. The director-general and his deputies should not during their terms of office hold any other public office.

5. Officers appointed to the central administrative staff should be selected on the basis of technical

or

or administrative competence and experience, and of the widest practicable distribution among nationalities. These officials should be constituted as a continuing international civil service, and they should upon their appointment pledge themselves to perform the duties entrusted to them in the impartial manner and spirit necessary to advance the interests and purposes of the international organization.

B. OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBER STATES WITH RESPECT TO OFFICIALS OF THE ORGANIZATION

1. Member states should impose no obligations upon their nationals who are officials of the international organization that are inconsistent with the performance of their duties.

2. Member states should grant the customary diplomatic immunities to officials of the international organization when engaged on business of the international organization or when traveling to and from their offices.

XI

PROCEDURE OF ESTABLISHMENT AND INAUGURATION

1. The general international organization for the maintenance of peace and security projected in the Four-Nation Declaration signed at Moscow, October 30, 1943, should be established at the earliest practicable date--if feasible, prior to the termination of hostilities.
2. The United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China, the signatories of the Four-Nation Declaration, should take immediate steps to reach agreement in principle on the fundamental features of a plan of the organization.
3. An agreed statement of the fundamental features of the plan of the organization should then be transmitted to the governments of the other United Nations and the nations associated with them, together with an invitation to communicate comments and suggestions for the purpose of arriving at a substantial consensus of views on the fundamental features of the plan.
4. As soon as practicable, the signatories of the Four-Nation Declaration should convene a conference of the United Nations and the nations associated with them for the formulation and signature of an agreement which would constitute the basic instrument of the organization. The agreement should be submitted to the participating governments for ratification in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures.
5. Provision should be made in the agreement for its coming into force when ratified by fifteen states including the signatories of the Four-Nation Declaration.
6. The signatories of the Four-Nation Declaration should be empowered by the agreement to call the first meeting of the general assembly of the organization under the agreement upon its coming into force.
7. The general assembly should elect at its first meeting the non-continuing members of the executive council, and the council should thereupon immediately come into existence and proceed to organize itself.

A14

W B

June 30, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In connection with our recall of Ambassador Armour, we have suggested to the British and to the other Republics that the attitude of the non-recognizing governments would be most forcefully brought home to the Farrell regime if all of the remaining Chiefs of Mission were recalled for consultation during the next two weeks.

We are now certain that practically all of the Republics approached by us, eighteen in all, will follow our lead. However, several of the Republics, including two which have not yet given us a final reply, Uruguay and Chile, have inquired with regard to the British action. Aranha of Brazil has inquired several times whether the British Ambassador is being recalled.

We have sent two urgent messages to Winant and I have discussed the matter with Halifax on two occasions. However, the British show a definite reluctance to take parallel action.

Immediate withdrawal of the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires is of the first importance. The opinion is widely held throughout the continent that the British have been pursuing an independent course in Argentina. If the British act independently on the withdrawal of Ambassadors, the consequences in terms of public reaction may be very serious.

In order to indicate the importance which we attach to this matter, I recommend that you send the attached message to Mr. Churchill.

RPA:CBS:GMH

6/30/44

ARA

8

X X

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

THE WHITE HOUSE

To be Sent: June 30

THE RIGHT HONORABLE  
WINSTON CHURCHILL, C.H., M.P.,  
PRIME MINISTER,  
LONDON.

I understand that the Foreign Office is fully informed with regard to the importance which we attach to the proposal that Ambassador Kelly in Buenos Aires be recalled for consultation.

We have announced Armour's recall. Almost all of the other Republics are taking parallel action. However, it is clear beyond any question that the collective effect of this action will be seriously prejudiced if Kelly stays on in Buenos Aires.

In view of the importance of a common stand at this time, I earnestly hope that your decision will be a favorable one.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

RPA:CBS:GMH 6/30/44 ARA S

DEPARTMENT  
OF  
STATE

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

*Pres*  
*Admiral Brown*

*AI4*

AMT-174  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone, (SECRET)

Moscow

Dated June 29, 1944

Rec'd 10 p.m.

*File WS*

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

U.S. URGENT

2351, June 29, 6 p.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY:

In my conversation with Molotov last night, he referred to our conversation of June 3 in which I had transmitted to him the President's verbal message regarding Mikolajczyk's visit to the United States. Molotov recalled that the President had agreed to meet Mikolajczyk on the condition that he make no official statements while in the United States, whereas it had come to Molotov's attention that Mikolajczyk had made such a statement to representatives of the press on June 14.

I interrupted him to explain that I had said the President's condition was against public speeches, not statements to the press. (In checking on my return to the Embassy my interpreter's notes of the June 3 conversation, I find that I had correctly stated the President's

-2- #2351, June 29, 6 p.m., from Moscow.

President's condition). After some discussion Molotov fully accepted my explanation.

He continued, however, and called my attention to the fact that Mikolajczyk had spoken not only for himself but for the United States Government in connection with leaving boundary settlements till after the war. Molotov said that while he did not consider it expedient to discuss at the present time the merits of Mikolajczyk's statement, he wished to draw my attention to the matter. I said I had not seen a full account of Mikolajczyk's press interview and with that the subject was dropped.

In puzzling over what was in Molotov's mind in mentioning this subject in the manner he did, I could not help but connect it with the previous subject of our conversation regarding the Soviet communications with Turkey. In this case he should have had a guilty conscience for not having informed us several weeks ago, and perhaps Russian style wanted to balance off any criticisms of his omission.

HARRIMAN

LMS  
WTD

A14

Admiral Brown  
To file

June 14, 1944

File  
W.S.

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

In a conversation this morning with the Under Secretary, Prime Minister Nikolajczyk expressed a natural desire to be sure that he clearly understood your offer to lend him moral support in any efforts he might be able to make to reach a mutually satisfactory understanding with the Soviet Government.

The Prime Minister foresees that the need for such moral support might arise under the following possible circumstances:

"For instance, if there should be a possibility of establishing direct conversations between the Polish and Soviet Governments, Premier Nikolajczyk would appreciate it if the President could lend his moral support to the Polish Government by an expression of hope to the Soviet Government that such conversations might be successful provided he felt it opportune to do so at that time. In the event that such conversations take place and a stalemate should ensue therefrom, Premier Nikolajczyk expresses the hope that, if in the prevailing circumstances the President should feel it to be opportune, he might again lend his moral support in an effort to overcome the stalemate.

"Since it is the sincere desire of Premier Nikolajczyk to make every effort to reach a mutually satisfactory understanding with the Soviet Government, he hopes

that

that in the event that such conversations should not take place, or if such conversations should be broken off, he could still count upon the moral support of the United States Government for a free and independent Poland."

The Prime Minister would appreciate any observations or corrections you might care to make in regard to his understanding of this matter when he calls to take leave of you today.

It is felt that in discussing this question with the Polish Prime Minister, it would be advisable to reiterate to him that such moral support as we may be in a position to give will, of necessity, fall within the framework of our tender of good offices.

of German troops and vessels in Finland or their expulsion from Finland not later than the end of April. It is not clear from the statement, "In both cases the Soviet Government can assist Finland with its own armed forces", whether this assistance will be given only in the event that Finland is unable to use its own forces to carry out either the internment or expulsion or whether the Soviet Government intends to participate in such action against the Germans irrespective of the Finnish ability to accomplish either of these purposes.

Under point 3 the Soviet Government is apparently willing in the event that a peace treaty or disengagement from an armistice is signed to bring about the mutual exchange of prisoners of war.

Points 4 and 5 go into greater detail in regard to the demobilization of the Finnish Army and the question of reparations. The amount of 200,000,000 American dollars to be paid in kind in five years would be very difficult for the Finns to accept since it would absorb for that period the bulk of Finnish foreign trade and in addition do great damage to the Finnish economy.

As was expected the Soviet Government agrees to release its lease on Hangö in return for thecession of the Petsamo region.

From our information it appears that points 1 and 5 will be the chief stumbling blocks to Finnish acceptance of these terms.

CH

AH

*Admiral Leahy  
To file*

*File  
WA*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

April 1, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

**SECRET** Subject: Soviet-Finnish Peace Negotiations

This afternoon the Soviet Ambassador left with me the attached memorandum setting forth the results of the meetings in Moscow between the Finnish and Soviet representatives and the revised peace terms which the Soviet Government is proposing as a result of these conversations. The only differences noted between the revised terms and those publicly announced by the Soviet Government in the beginning of March are as follows:

Under point 1 the Soviet Government is willing to accept either the internment of German troops and vessels in Finland or their expulsion from Finland not later than the end of April. It is not clear from the sentence, "In both cases the Soviet Government can assist Finland with its own armed forces", whether this assistance will be given only in the event that Finland is unable by its own forces to carry out either the internment or expulsion or whether the Soviet Government intends to participate in such action against the Germans irrespective of the Finnish ability to accomplish either of those purposes.

Under point 3 the Soviet Government is apparently willing in the event that a peace treaty as distinct from an armistice is signed to bring about the mutual exchange of prisoners of war.

Points 4 and 5 go into greater detail in regard to the demobilization of the Finnish Army and the question of reparations. The amount of 600,000,000 American dollars to be paid in kind in five years would be very difficult for the Finns to accept since it would absorb for that period the bulk of Finnish foreign trade and in addition do great damage to the Finnish economy.

As was expected the Soviet Government agrees to release its lease on Hango in return for the cession of the Petsamo region.

From our information it appears that points 1 and 5 will be the chief stumbling blocks to Finnish acceptance of these terms.



*OH*

respect to

ensure

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

As it is known to the Government of the United States, the first meeting with the Finnish delgation was held on March 27 in Moscow about which information was already given in the memorandum handed on March 28 to United States Ambassador, Mr. Harriman.

The second meeting was held on March 29th. At the first meeting, as well as at the second one, the Finnish delegation, which was interested in receiving the Soviet interpretation of the known six terms, on its part did not suggest any formulated terms.

In the course of the conversations, the Finnish delegates especially stressed the difficulties for Finland to carry out the internment of German troops stationed in Finland. Besides, the Finnish delegates particularly stressed the Finnish Government's concern that the Soviet Union waive its rights, provided by the treaty of 1940, to the lease of Hango.

As a result of exchange of opinions the Soviet Government decided to introduce certain changes into the initial terms in

respect to the demands to the Finnish Government regarding its measures concerning the German troops as well as in regard to Hango and has formulated its proposals for handing them to the Finnish Government, through the arrived Finnish delegates, in the following final edition:

" SOVIET PROPOSALS OF PEACE WITH FINLAND

1. Severance of relations with Germany and internment of German troops and vessels in Finland, or severance of relations with Germany and expulsion of German troops and vessels from the limits of Finland not later than by the end of April.

In both cases the Soviet Government can assist Finland with its own armed forces.

2. Reestablishment of the Soviet-Finnish treaty of 1940 and withdrawal of Finnish troops to the border of 1940 to be carried out in successive phases during April.

3. Immediate return of Soviet and Allied prisoners of war as well as Soviet and Allied persons from among the civilian population being kept in concentration camps or used by the Finns for labor, and, if there will be signed between the U.S.S.R. and Finland not a treaty of armistice but a peace treaty the return of prisoners of

war should be mutual.

4. Demobilization of 50 per cent of the Finnish Army to be carried out during May, and putting the whole Finnish Army on a peace-time basis to be carried out during June and July. (This point should be included in the treaty or should be agreed upon in the form of a separate Soviet-Finnish agreement, subject to signing simultaneously with the peace treaty or the treaty of armistice.)

5. Compensation of damages caused by Finland to the Soviet Union by military actions and occupation of Soviet territory, in the amount of 600,000,000 American dollars, to be paid up during a five years' period in goods (paper, cellulose, sea-going and river-going vessels, various machinery.)

6. Return to the Soviet Union of Petsamo and the Petsamo region, ceded voluntary by the Soviet Union to Finland in accordance with the peace treaties of 1920 and 1940.

7. On condition of acceptance by the Finnish side of the stated above six terms, the Soviet Government considers it possible to waive its rights to the lease of Hango and its region in favor of Finland without any compensation."

A14

*Admiral Brown  
to file*

*F. J. B.*

SECRET

March 11, 1944.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Translating an aide-memoire from the Soviet Ambassador concerning Soviet-Finnish negotiations.

I enclose for your information a copy of an aide-memoire which the Soviet Ambassador left with me this afternoon, giving the texts of the reply of the Finnish Government to the Soviet peace conditions and of the answer of the Soviet Government thereto.

*C. H.*

Department of State,  
Washington.

SECRET

## AIDE-MEMOIRE

The following are the texts of the answer of the Finnish Government to the Soviet peace terms and the consequent reply of the Soviet Government.

"The Finnish Government which is earnestly desiring to establish in the shortest possible time peaceful relations between Finland and the U.S.S.R., has thoroughly studied the peace terms of the Soviet Union to Finland.

"The Finnish Government realizes, that in order that Finland may remain neutral after the conclusion of peace it is necessary that no foreign troops belonging to a belligerent power should remain on her territory. However, this question is so complicated that it demands a more thorough consideration. The Finnish Government therefore desires to suggest to start negotiations so that Finland could have the possibility to explain its point of view on that question and also regarding other questions in connection with the peace terms proposed by the Soviet Government."

The Soviet Government deems it necessary to give the following answer to the statement of the Finnish Government of March 8th.

"The Soviet Government has acquainted itself with the reply of the Finnish Government, transmitted in Stockholm to Madame Kollontai by Mr. Boheman and considers it entirely unsatisfactory. In regard to that reply the Soviet Government states: The Soviet peace terms to Finland, in the form of six points, transmitted to Mr. Paasikivi on February 19, are minimal and elementary and only upon acceptance

acceptance of these terms by the Finnish Government Soviet-Finnish negotiations regarding the cessation of hostilities and regarding the establishment of peace between the U.S.S.R. and Finland are possible.

"Should these terms be accepted by Finland and should the Finnish Government agree in principle to the internment of the German troops, the Soviet Government is ready to discuss the latter question during the negotiations in Moscow.

"The Soviet Government deems it necessary to inform the Finnish Government hereby, that the Soviet Government will await a positive reply within a week, i.e. until March 18, after that the Soviet Government will consider that the Finns are deliberately delaying the negotiations for certain not clear for us purposes and are rejecting the Soviet terms.

"The Soviet Government taking into account the interests of the Finnish Government agrees to keep secret the correspondence as well as the negotiations."

March 11, 1944

A14

*Admiral Brown*  
*File*  
*WS*

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON  
March 8, 1944

*Action taken  
10 March*

*WS*

AGENDA FOR PRESIDENT


A. Argentina

1. No other country has followed Chile in recognition of Argentina. The situation remains same. England will act today; Brazil we hope tomorrow.
2. We have asked Combined Boards and Combined Chiefs of Staff to give us a quick report on the effect of all-out economic sanctions.
3. It is clear that Argentina is concerned with our view.
4. Show President cable 856 and underlined words; Aranha's attitude relative to cruiser.

B. Spanish situation unsatisfactory.  
Oil to Germany.  
Alarming conversation between Jordana and German Ambassador in Madrid.

C. Status of French Statement.

D. Mr. Hull made comment to the British that we would not issue any declaration on refugee matter until discussion with the British.



R14

GHH - 194  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (MCA)

Rio de Janeiro  
Dated March 7, 1944  
Rec'd 9 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

US URGENT  
856, March 7, 4 p.m.  
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL



Aranha renewed this morning a request that he made  
yesterday and this time with insistence that I inform  
the Department that he believes firmly that it would  
be a mistake for Admiral Ingram to visit Montevideo at  
this time. I said that I believed we were trying to  
bolster up Uruguay. "That is definitely not the way to  
do it" he replied. "Your people will make a mistake  
if they send Admiral Ingram to Uruguay at this juncture".

Aranha approves Admiral Ingram's boarding the  
MEMPHIS here tomorrow (as he plans to do) to set out on  
a cruise but in Aranha's firm opinion he should not  
put in at a Uruguayan port.

Repeated to Buenos Aires and Montevideo.

CAFFERY

WTD



A14

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

*Admiral Brown  
to read & file  
File  
WS*

March 7, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Miss Grace G. Tully,  
The White House.

With reference to the attached memorandum of March 4 relative to the garble in Moscow's telegram no. 716, March 3, midnight, the Department has just received word from Moscow that the last clause in the fourth from the last sentence in the message (page 4) should read, "He replied that the time was not ripe" instead of "the time was now ripe".

It would be appreciated if you would correct the copy of this telegram which was sent to the President.

*For the Acting Secretary*

Enclosure:

Memorandum for  
Mr. McMullen,  
March 4, 1944.



CEM-174

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (NCA)

Moscow

Dated March 3, 1944

Rec'd March 4, 1944.

Secretary of State,

**MEMORANDUM FOR:**

Washington,

**Mr. McMullen,** , midnight.

**The White House.**

ACTING SECRETARY.

A careful check of the code text of Moscow's 716, March 3, midnight indicates that the next to the last word, "now", in the fourth from the last sentence of the telegram may not be correct (page four of the message). Since this part of the message was slightly garbled, it is possible that the word should be "not" instead of "now".

A service message has been sent to Moscow to verify the correct reading. As soon as this information is received, it will be immediately transmitted to the Map Room.

and that he did not believe Churchill would be able to accomplish anything.

I explained to him your concern over the reaction in America and asked him what alternatives he had in mind. He stated that

**For the Acting Secretary**

had army as it advanced and would continue to do so.

Either Mikolajczyk's Government would change or another Government would emerge in Poland. Although I pressed

him he did not indicate that he had any moves in mind

at this time except to say that Golev had already

given me

EE:ED:LIS

GEM-174

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (MCA)

Moscow

Dated March 3, 1944

Rec'd 10 a.m., 4th.

Secretary of State,

Washington,  
716, March 3, midnight.

PERSONAL AND SECRET. FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE  
ACTING SECRETARY.

I was asked to call on Stalin this evening.  
Stalin again made it plain that he would not deal with  
the Polish Government in London as now constituted.  
Although at one point he indicated that he would deal  
with them if the government was reorganized he later  
stated that he considered they were fooling Churchill  
and that he did not believe Churchill would be able  
to accomplish anything.

I explained to him your concern over the reaction  
in America and asked him what alternatives he had in  
mind. He stated that the Poles were welcoming the  
Red Army as it advanced and would continue to do so.  
Either Mikolajczyk's Government would change or another  
Government would emerge in Poland. Although I pressed  
him he did not indicate that he had any moves in mind  
at this time except to say that Molotov had already

given me

-2-#716, March 3, midnight from Moscow.

given me in January his suggestions for a possible solution.

I explained that as you had indicated this proposal would not be a representative Government but would be a hand-picked group with no popular movement behind it. He replied that there were no grounds for this assumption saying "Poland needs democrats who will look after the interests of the people, not Tory landlords".

I explained that what was uppermost in your mind was that all Poles should join in assisting the Red Army rather than for a situation to develop which would lead to civil war. He said that there was no danger of this as Mikolajczyk had no armed forces of any size in Poland and the landlords would not be re-admitted. They would be the only ones to create disorder and revolution.

When Stalin said that the Polish Government in London were a group of emigres who did not represent their people I asked him what information he had about the sentiments of the Poles within Poland toward the London Government. He said that the attitude was  
negative and

-3-#716, March 3, midnight from Moscow.

negative and Molotov would give me such detailed information as was available.

In reply to my question as to the size of the Polish underground forces he said that he couldn't answer exactly but their numbers were not great and "they (the Polish Government) have a few agents."

I expressed the belief that we all had the same eventual objective of a democratic government through the free choice of the Polish people and raised the question of how he thought this objective could be reached. He replied he didn't know how the situation would work out, circumstances would show.

He referred to his request which had been submitted to you by Ambassador Gromyko to allow Lange and Orlemanski to come to Russia and asked whether I had your answer. As I had not heard of this request I was unable to reply. I asked him what he hoped would be accomplished by this visit to which he replied that they would meet the Poles in Moscow, find out what was going on in Poland from information here, look the situation over and return to the United States.

In closing the conversation on this subject I said that I understood he would await developments  
and take

-4-#716, March 3, midnight from Moscow.

and take no immediate action to which he replied that the time was ~~was~~<sup>not</sup> ripe. I reemphasized the unfavorable public reaction created in America. He remarked that he was concerned about public opinion here. When I commented that he was skillful in dealing with public opinion he replied "we have had three revolutions in a generation."

HARRIMAN

HPD

**SECRET**

File  
45

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

February 22, 1944

SUMMARY OF URGENT ITEMS AS OF THIS MORNING

EUROPE

Finland

On February 16 Mr. Paasikivi met with the Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm to discuss possible peace terms. The Finns stated their willingness to accept with certain modifications the 1940 boundary, and asked if it would be necessary to enter the war against Germany. The Soviet Government has since advanced its peace terms which would seem to provide a basis for agreement between the Finns and the Russians. The President has approved a telegram to Ambassador Harriman instructing him to convey this Government's appreciation to the Soviet Government for informing us and asking them to keep us informed of developments.

Poland

The Poles have replied to Churchill in the following sense:

1. Boundaries. The Poles reject the Curzon Line, but propose a line roughly half-way between the Riga Treaty frontier and the Curzon Line. They propose that territory to the ~~east~~ of this line should be administered during the war by Soviet military authorities with other United Nations represented. The Poles do not feel that Koenigsberg could be transferred to the Soviet Union.

2. Composition of the Government. The Poles feel that no changes in the composition of the government or of the Polish High Command could be made as a result of the demands of a foreign power.

Spain

Although the Prime Minister has given his support to our Spanish policy, Lord Halifax and other members

**SECRET**

Regraded Unclassified

**SECRET**

-2-

of the British Embassy have complained that this Government has taken unilateral action.

This morning the Department reviewed our policy with the Army, Navy and FEA, and we all see no reason for weakening at this stage. We foresee the possibility of Spain's holding out indefinitely against a complete embargo, but we see no reason why we should recede from our position and continue to send petroleum products until they agree to stop wolfram shipments to Germany. The British have given no reason as to what developments they fear in Spain other than Spanish unwillingness to grant requests in which the British are more interested, namely, the release of Italian merchant ships, the expulsion of Axis agents, and the complete withdrawal of the Blue Division. The British have handed us an aide-mémoire giving rise to a new development, which is described in a separate memorandum.

#### Portugal

Portugal and the other neutrals are watching closely the outcome of our wolfram negotiations with Spain.

#### Great Britain

With regard to rifles for Saudi Arabia, General Boykin Wright talked with General Macready who has forwarded to London for consideration a compromise proposal under which we would agree with the British on a 50-50 basis to furnish 10,000 rifles of American .30 caliber design rather than of .303 caliber British design. This would make all the rifles of American design, rendering Saudi-Arabia dependent upon us for ammunition. In addition, it would establish the principle that United States consent must be obtained where American production makes it possible to transfer munitions to another government.

#### French Committee of National Liberation.

The question of dealing with the French Committee of National Liberation during military operations in France is before the President in the form of a formula drawn up by the War Department which had the Secretary's approval.

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

-3-

Italy

As a result of General Wilson's cable recommending that a decision with regard to the Italian Government be made immediately, the Combined Chiefs have undertaken to reach an early agreement.

General McFarlane recently conversed with the King who again indicated his unwillingness to consider abdication.

NEAR EAST

Iran

It has been learned that the Soviet offer of 35 tanks and 35 planes to Iran was made by Marshal Stalin during the course of a conference with the Shah of Iran at the time of the Tehran Conference. According to our Legation it is generally believed in Tehran that the purpose of the move is to strengthen Soviet influence in that area.

A cable has been prepared to Ambassador Harriman in Moscow urging him to take up with the Soviet authorities the possibility of reaching an understanding under which goods will not be transferred by the Soviet Government to another Government without the consent of the United States, if the goods to be transferred are similar to goods obtained by the Soviet Union under Lend-Lease.

FAR EAST

China

The Department cabled the Embassy in Chungking last week asking for its views regarding the possible sending of a mission to Communist-controlled territory in China. This morning the Embassy replied that while it did not seem likely that Chiang would readily agree, the proposal should be made to the Central Government. The Embassy further believes that such a mission should be predominately military, with which the Department wholly agrees.

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

-4-

**AMERICAN REPUBLICS**

Argentina

A struggle is still apparently going on within the Government and many pro-Axis figures remain in the Government in spite of recent cabinet changes. The Government has officially stated that it never considered any proposal to declare war on the Axis as was rumored at the time Foreign Minister Gilbert was ousted.

Bolivia

The recent changes in the Junta at La Paz do not appear to have altered the political situation in Bolivia since the anti-democratic MNR remains in power.

A number of arrests have recently been made which indicate that the Junta is fearful of a counter-revolution. In this connection, former President Peñaranda mentioned to Ambassador Boal that he expected to return shortly to Bolivia to head a Government.

**SECRET**

A14



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

*file  
Confidential  
W  
FJG  
WS*

February 19, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Polish Reply to the Prime Minister

The attached has just been handed to us by a representative of the Polish Government. It is very discouraging.

It seems that little headway has been made at 10 Downing Street and that the Poles have about turned down all requests, not only as to boundary questions, but likewise as to moves that have been suggested for a change in government.

CONFIDENTIAL

On February 18th, Prime Minister Mikołajczyk communicated to Prime Minister Churchill the text of two Resolutions adopted by the Polish Council of Ministers on February 15th. The texts of the Resolutions was read to the American Chargé d'Affaires in London, who was informed that they would be cabled to the Polish Ambassador in Washington who would communicate them confidentially to the Secretary of State. These texts, as received by the Ambassador, are as follows:

RESOLUTION NO. I. - In its declaration of January 14, the Polish Government declared its readiness to take up conversations with the Soviet Government, "with the participation of the British and United States Governments, of all outstanding questions, the settlement of which should lead to a friendly and permanent cooperation between Poland and the Soviet Union." Thereby, the Polish Government did not exclude territorial matters from such conversations, with the understanding that these would extend to Poland's Eastern, Western and Northern frontiers.

The demand dictated by the Soviets that the Polish Government should agree to the so-called "Curzon Line" as the future Polish-Soviet frontier is unacceptable to the Polish Government.

The final result of the conversations regarding frontiers can only be effected after the war. Immediately, however, - still in the course of war activities, - a demarcation line

running

running to the East of the Cities of Wilno and Lwów should be agreed upon with the Polish Government who will consult the Polish underground authorities in Poland on this matter. To the West of the demarcation line the Polish authorities would take over the administration of the territories liberated from German occupation; the territories to the East of this demarcation line would, for the time being, be administered by the Soviet military authorities with the participation of representatives of the other United Nations.

The Polish Government regards it as its duty to state that the intention of granting to Soviet Russia of a part of East Prussia including the port of Królewiec (Koenigsberg) is contrary to the interests of the Polish State, as it would greatly limit Poland's free access to the sea.

RESOLUTION NO. II. - No personal changes in the composition of the Polish Government and of the Polish High Command can be made dependent on demands of a foreign Power.

February 19, 1944.

A14

(In reply to the Prime Minister's message to the President #882)

January 24, 1944.

TO THE PRIME MINISTER:

I am glad to say that the Argentina picture has changed since receipt of your telegram of January twenty-third. This morning our Ambassador in Buenos Aires telephoned urgently that the Argentine Government gave its solemn word of honor that it would break relations with Germany before Saturday noon of this week. At long last the Argentine Government apparently has suddenly discovered that the German Embassy is carrying on espionage and subversive activities in flagrant violation of assurances made to the Argentine Government.

The contemplated Argentine action is convincing proof that what I have been saying all along is correct, namely, that Argentina is a base of operations for activities dangerous both to our common war effort and to the peace of the Americas. I think it is clear that the Argentines got word of what was up and are taking this action in an endeavor to stave off moral and possible economic sanctions against her. Although it is of real military advantage to have the German Embassy out of the way, Argentina will have to do much more in the way of housecleaning of undesirable elements and of compliance with her inter-American commitments to convince me of the sincerity of her conversion. Now is the time for us to press forward and insist that Argentina put an end to the encouragement of sinister activities that menace the conduct of the war and internal peace within several of the American Republics.

If you and I should refuse to deal energetically with the situation, the subversive forces in Argentina and elsewhere would construe this as a backward step and would be greatly heartened. This would prejudice our joint war effort. In addition it would tend to destroy inter-American solidarity and place the lower part of the Continent in the power of elements unfriendly to us. Our friends there would lose faith in us.

Argentina's present willingness to break with Germany shows that we here had correctly diagnosed the situation and that Argentina would not have fought back in the way you feared against the action which we earlier contemplated. We believe that this action together with any assistance which you may be willing to render should not be abandoned but merely held in abeyance pending developments.

For the present, we are merely issuing a statement to the effect that we are not recognizing the Bolivian revolutionary Junta. A similar statement from you would be useful.

ROOSEVELT

A14

**SECRET**

January 21, 1944.

**MEMORANDUM FOR:**

The President.

The following statement appears in the "Joint Intelligence Committee Weekly Summary" of 19 January. The statement is a part of an article on the subject of "USSR Policy Toward Poland":

"Meanwhile Moscow newspapers publicized the proposal of a Polish Committee of National Liberation made by the leader of the American Friends of Poland in the United States. According to this plan, a committee would be formed containing representatives of the Polish Socialist and Peasant Parties in London, the Union of Polish Patriots in the USSR, and democratic Polish organizations in other countries. It was proposed that the committee should establish diplomatic relations with the USSR, become a signatory of the Soviet-Czech treaty, revise military commands in Polish forces stationed in the Near East, and act as interim government for liberated Poland. The press in Moscow continued to carry attacks on the Polish Government-in-exile, intimating that a change of regime would be necessary before a resumption of relations."

The following paragraph on Russia is also of interest:

"A continuing interest in gold currency of fixed value as a basis for international monetary stabilization appears as a significant feature of Soviet post-war planning. Even during the war, the USSR, unlike the United States, has continued to operate its gold mines and to stockpile the output as an investment for the future."

Very respectfully,

WILSON BROWN.

A16/4 Power Agreement  
AT6  
(4 pages)

November 6, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There are attached the text of a message, dated November 3, 1943, addressed to you by President Chiang Kai-shek of the Republic of China upon the occasion of signature of the Joint Four-Nation Declaration, and a suggested reply which you may care to make to his message.

Enclosures:

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.

1. From President Chiang,  
November 3.
2. To President Chiang.

*This message never  
received for file. R*

November 12, 1943.

Colonel Mathewson:

The President is not sure whether the message to Chiang has been sent by State. If it has not been sent please ask them to send.

W.B.

X X

US URGENT  
AMERICAN EMBASSY,  
CHUNGKING (CHINA).

*WCT*

Please convey the following message from the President  
to President Chiang Kai-shek:

QUOTE I have received with deepest pleasure the cordial message from Your Excellency upon the occasion of the signature of the Joint Four-Nation Declaration, and I reciprocate your feeling of satisfaction at its consummation. I welcome the association of China in the work of establishing a better world order. The Declaration gives assurance that the close coalition for war will be blended into an effective and lasting coalition for peace. Upon our two countries and the other nations associated with us in this undertaking will rest the responsibility for the preservation and extension of the principles of freedom, justice, and integrity among nations, for which we are now fighting. The participation of China in this historic Declaration has afforded Secretary Hull and me deep gratification, as it has the American people. The immediate task before us is that of vanquishing the aggressors. Along with this and beyond are the tasks of reconstruction looking toward creating conditions of lasting peace. Formidable though all these tasks are, we march forward to their accomplishment confident of the full and active cooperation of your Government and people. UNQUOTE

-2-

The foregoing is in response to a message dated November 3, from President Chiang, which was transmitted through the Chinese Embassy.

Acting

FE:TLF:KFP

FE

Telegram to President Roosevelt  
from President Chiang Kai-shek  
Chungking, November 3rd, 1943

"I and the people and army of our entire nation feel deeply gratified on learning of the signature of the Joint Four-Nation Declaration. This act of historic importance makes manifest to the world the righteousness of the cause against aggression. It will not only strengthen the cooperation of our Four Nations for the fulfilment of our common faith, but will also give all peace-loving peoples of the world an assurance of the establishment of international peace and general security, and thereby constitutes an unsurpassed contribution to the future of the world. China is proud to have taken part in the consummation of the Declaration, and I wish to offer you, Mr. President, my heartiest congratulations. This Declaration owes much in its making to your wise directions and the endeavors of Secretary of State Cordell Hull at the Conference, which command our deepest admiration. Please accept my sincere and grateful appreciation."

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

August 11, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing herewith the papers which you requested at the meeting in your office yesterday.

These papers comprise the redraft of the Four-Power Protocol and the original form of the suggested United Nations Protocol. The abbreviated and revised draft of the latter protocol which you requested is not yet completed and I am consequently sending you the original version. During the next few days the shortened and revised form which you desire will be sent to you at Hyde Park.

There are also attached a memorandum prepared for you which gives you the history of the recent British proposal and our analysis of it; the telegram which contains the text of the British proposal, and also the drafts sent to you by Mr. Churchill which you gave us yesterday for our information.

Owing to Secretary Hull's absence today, the redraft of the Four-Power Protocol has not been submitted to him

The President,


The White House.

-2-

but I understand from Dr. Pasvolsky that the present draft  
is in accordance with the Secretary's ideas.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "R. G. Kelly". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial "R" and a long horizontal stroke.

Enclosures.

August 11, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing herewith the papers which you requested at the meeting in your office yesterday.

These papers comprise the redraft of the Four-Power Protocol and the original form of the suggested United Nations Protocol. The abbreviated and revised draft of the latter protocol which you requested is not yet completed and I am consequently sending you the original version. During the next few days the shortened and revised form which you desire will be sent to you at Hyde Park.

There are also attached a memorandum prepared for you which gives you the history of the recent British proposal and our analysis of it; the telegram which contains the text of the British proposal, and also the drafts sent to you by Mr. Churchill which you gave us yesterday for our information.

Owing to Secretary Hull's absence today, the redraft of the Four-Power Protocol has not been submitted to him

The President,

The White House.

-2-

but I understand from Dr. Pasvolsky that the present draft  
is in accordance with the Secretary's ideas.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

Enclosures.

SECRET

PROTOCOL OF A PROPOSED FOUR-POWER SECURITY  
AGREEMENT *Pending Permanent Peace.*

The Governments of the United States, Great Britain,  
the Soviet Union and China:

united in their determination, in accordance with  
the Declaration by the United Nations of January 1, 1942,  
and subsequent declarations, to continue hostilities  
against those Axis powers with which they respectively  
are at war until such states have laid down their arms  
on the basis of unconditional surrender;

conscious of their responsibility to liberate them-  
selves and the peoples allied with them from the menace  
of aggression;

recognizing the necessity of ensuring a rapid and  
orderly transition from war to an organized peace; and

determined to establish and to maintain peace and  
to preserve international security with the least di-  
version of the world's human and economic resources  
for armaments;

have agreed as follows:

~~Article I~~

1. The signatory states agree that their united action,  
pledged for the prosecution of the war until the uncondi-  
tional surrender of the enemy states, shall be continued  
for the organization and maintenance of the peace.

~~Article II~~

2. Those of the signatory states which are at war with  
a common enemy agree to act together in all matters re-  
lating to the surrender and disarmament of the enemy, and  
to the occupation of enemy territory and territory of  
other states held by the enemy.

Article III

~~Article III~~

3. The signatory states agree to take all measures which they deem necessary to provide against any violation of the terms of disarmament by their present enemies.

~~Article IV~~

4. The signatory states agree to the necessity of establishing a permanent international organization, based upon the principle of the sovereign equality of all nations, and open to membership by all nations, for the maintenance of international peace and security, and for such other purposes as may be agreed upon.

~~Article V~~

5. Pending the reestablishment of law and order and the inauguration of a permanent international organization, the signatory states agree to consult and to act jointly in behalf of the community of nations in maintaining international peace and security. They further agree to establish a technical commission composed of representatives of their military, naval and air forces in order to advise them as to the strength and composition of the contingents of their forces which each shall hold available for use at any time in order to preserve the peace.

~~Article VI~~

6. The signatory states undertake to negotiate a joint agreement fixing maximum and minimum limitations for their respective armaments and forces, and for their future reduction, such agreement to become operative when peace is established and general security is assured.

SECRET

UNITED NATIONS PROTOCOL  
FOR THE WAR AND TRANSITION PERIOD

THE UNITED NATIONS:

dedicated to the advancement of the general welfare of mankind;

desiring to give immediate and practical effect to the principles proclaimed in the Atlantic Charter;

seeking to obtain the continuing benefits of economic and social cooperation;

Determined to ensure their common security, and to attain the progressive lightening of the burden of armaments; and

resolved to achieve these purposes through a development of the international organizations of a universal and regional character required for their fulfillment;

have agreed as follows;

Article 1

The signatory states agree that their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war until the unconditional surrender of the enemy states, shall be continued for the organization and maintenance of the peace.

Article 2

The United Nations and the nations presently associated with them agree that a permanent international organization shall be established for the maintenance of peace and the advancement of human welfare. They agree to expedite the creation of this organization. Pending its inauguration, they hereby establish a Provisional United Nations Council to be representative of all

states

states parties to the Declaration by the United Nations, at Washington, January 1, 1942, and of the nations presently associated with them. The member states agree to cooperate in carrying out the measures determined upon by the Council *until permanent world peace is established.*

Article 3

The Provisional United Nations Council shall be composed of eleven members, including one designated by the United States of America, one by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, one by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one by China, two by the group of European states, two by the group of American states, one by the group of Far Eastern states, one by the group of states of the Near and Middle East and of Africa, and one by the British Dominions, as these groups are defined in the first Annex to this Protocol.

Article 4

The members representing each group of states as represented in the Council shall be elected for one year by the group, in conference, from a panel consisting of nominees designated by the states comprising the group. Each state may designate three nominees who may be chosen from among nationals of any of the states of the group of which it is a part.

Article 5

Members of the Provisional United Nations Council shall represent the general interest of the region from which they are designated rather than the particular interests of the states of which they are nationals. They shall in all circumstances take into account the general interest of the whole community of states. In thus discharging their duties, they shall remain in close consultation with the governments of the several states in the regions from which they are designated, and they shall faithfully present to the Council the views of those governments.

Article 6

Article 6

The Provisional United Nations Council shall formulate and recommend to the United Nations the plan for the permanent international organization envisaged in Article 2. Pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, and effective as to any particular region from the date upon which the military authorities therein determine, the Provisional Council shall assume in that region responsibility for the maintenance of international security and shall provide procedures for the pacific settlement of any disputes threatening the peace.

Article 7

The provisional United Nations Council shall establish a Security and Armaments Commission and an Armaments Inspection Commission whose composition, powers, and functions shall be as stated in the second Annex to this Protocol.

Article 8

An effective procedure for the general limitation of armaments shall be instituted by the Council, assisted by the Security and Armaments Commission, as soon as practicable, in order to determine the maximum and minimum levels of armaments to be maintained by all states for the preservation of internal order and the discharge of their respective responsibilities for general security.

Article 9

The Provisional United Nations Council may utilize and establish such technical committees, services, and secretariats as may be required for carrying out the purposes of this Protocol. The Council shall appoint an individual of recognized standing to act as Chairman, without voting power, and to serve as Executive Director of such provisional international administrative organization as may be established. The Chairman of the Council may appoint, subject to confirmation by the Council, such administrative and other officers as may be required.

Article 10

Article 10

The expenses of the Provisional United Nations Council and of any administrative or secretarial staffs which it may create shall be shared by the members in proportions to be determined by the Council.

Article 11

The Provisional United Nations Council shall meet in ordinary session at such times and places as it may determine. It may be convened in special session upon the call of the Chairman or of any member of the Council, or upon the initiative of any state party to this Protocol. The Council shall establish its own rules of procedure. Decisions shall be by two-thirds vote of the members present, including all of the members designated by individual states, except in instances when any one of these members, in advance of the voting, declares an intention to abstain from voting.

Article 12

This Protocol shall remain in force until superseded by the inauguration of the permanent international organization envisaged in Article 2. It may be amended by a decision of the Council proposing to the signatory states such amendments as it may consider desirable, which shall become effective when the ratifications of two-thirds of the signatory states have been received.

Article 13

This Protocol shall come into effect when it shall have been ratified by 20 states members of the United Nations, including the United States, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and China. It shall remain open for adherence by other sovereign and independent states, not original signatories, subject to approval by the Council.

ANNEX 1

REPRESENTATION ON THE PROVISIONAL  
UNITED NATIONS COUNCIL

Representatives on the Provisional United Nations Council shall be designated by the following states and groups of states:

United States of America, 1 representative  
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,  
1 representative  
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 1 representative  
China, 1 representative

European States  
2 representatives

Belgium  
Czechoslovakia  
United Kingdom of Great  
Britain and Northern  
Ireland  
Greece  
\*Iceland  
Luxemburg  
Netherlands  
Norway  
Poland  
Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics  
Yugoslavia

Far Eastern States  
1 representative

China  
Philippines

Near and Middle Eastern  
States and African States  
1 representative

\*Egypt  
Ethiopia  
\*Iran  
Iraq  
\*Liberia

American States  
2 representatives

United States of America  
Bolivia  
Brazil  
\*Chile  
\*Colombia  
Costa Rica  
Cuba  
Dominican Republic  
\*Ecuador  
El Salvador  
Guatemala  
Haiti  
Honduras  
Mexico  
Nicaragua  
Panama  
\*Paraguay  
\*Peru  
\*Uruguay  
\*Venezuela

British Dominions  
1 representative

Australia  
Canada  
/India/  
New Zealand  
Union of South Africa

\*States marked with an asterisk  
are associated nations.

## ANNEX 2

### TECHNICAL SECURITY AND ARMAMENTS COMMISSIONS

#### Article 1

The Security and Armaments Commission, to be established by the Provisional United Nations Council in accordance with Article 7 of the present Protocol, shall be composed of military, naval, aviation, and civilian representatives of the states and groups of states represented on the Council. Additional representatives may be designated by the Council. Each member of the Commission may be accompanied by alternates and experts. The Commission may set up a panel of special experts, and may appoint committees whose number, composition, and functions shall be subject to approval by the Council.

#### Article 2

The Security and Armaments Commission shall be charged with the following duties: (a) to recommend to the Council plans and procedures for the general limitation of armaments as provided in Article 8 of the present Protocol; (b) to supervise the execution of all armaments stipulations, including control over manufacture and trade in arms, which may be adopted in pursuance of the present Protocol, or required of the enemy states by the terms of surrender, and report regularly to the Council; (c) to propose to the Council any modifications and amendments it may deem desirable or necessary to make in armaments limitation agreements, or in armaments terms imposed upon the enemy states; (d) to advise and assist the Council in any emergency in the application of security measures; and (e) to discharge such other duties as may be assigned to it by the Council.

#### Article 3

The Armaments Inspection Commission, to be established by the Provisional United Nations Council in accordance with Article 7 of the present Protocol, shall be composed of military, naval, aviation, and other technical experts, a majority of the total number of whom shall be nationals of states other than those possessing individual representation on the Council. The

Members

Members of the Commission shall be chosen by the Council upon nomination by the Security and Armaments Commission.

Article 4

The Armaments Inspection Commission shall act under the direct authority of the Security and Armaments Commission. It shall regularly report to the Security and Armaments Commission on the armaments and armaments potential of all states, and shall be charged with the duty of inspecting the armaments and armaments potential of the former enemy states, and of other states in accordance with the agreements envisaged in Article 8 of the present Protocol.



SARANAC INN  
ON UPPER SARANAC LAKE  
SARANAC INN P.O. N.Y.

Aug. 10. 43.

Dear Miss Tully.

I am very desirous  
that the President  
should read the enclosed  
before the visit of  
the Prime Minister -  
Will you be good enough  
to put it in his hands  
at an appropriate  
moment.

With many thanks and  
kindest regards  
Sincerely  
Roosevelt

71 BROADWAY  
NEW YORK

Dear Mr President.

I dictated the attached brief summary of the activities of our committee work at the Department of State. To use as a running up at our last meeting before adjournment. As the Congressional members were "occupied" on the days out for the final meeting the meeting was postponed until September. Thus I made no use of it.

I am sending a copy to  
Secretary Hull.

Will you do me the  
honor to read it before  
your meeting with the  
Prime Minister.

I regret exceedingly that  
I did not receive word of  
the meeting with you today  
until too late to reach  
Washington in time. I am  
available at any time it  
wanted.

With kind regards

Sincerely  
Raymond A. Moley

M.C.T. July 8, 1943.

The discussions in the several committees under the leadership of the Department of State during the past sixteen months have developed much thought and information relating to the world problems growing out of the present war. These problems have been subject to continuous study and exchange of ideas among an aggregate committee membership of one hundred thirty-five and a research staff of sixty, generously assisted by other members of the Department of State and representatives from other departments of government. Each problem has been considered separately and in relation to other problems. The ideal approaches to the betterment of mankind throughout the world have been stated, discussed, and re-stated.

There has gradually emerged out of this intensive consideration a set of principles which are directed toward ideal solutions, but which are necessarily influenced by immediate practical considerations. The first of these considerations - without minimizing the importance of others - is world security. In approaching the problem of general security, we must again keep in mind an ideal universal solution, but we must give first thought to the security of the United States and the other American republics, and to the welfare of the peoples of this hemisphere.

PROBLEMS

PROBLEMS REQUIRING  
INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION

In the course of our long discussions we have exposed many important problems that will require post-war collaboration.

Security

For the promotion of security, we have considered what powers the international organization should have to settle disputes and to enforce its decisions. We have discussed possible means for the enforcement of peace and have considered in that connection the establishment of international air fields in the islands of the Pacific and elsewhere.

We have discussed the terms of surrender and the plans of occupation for conquered enemy countries, and have considered how these countries are to be treated in order to assure security. In particular we have weighed the treatment to be accorded Germany in order to weaken its capacity to make another war and to curb the war-like character of the German people. We have explored the possible advantages and disadvantages to durable security of partitioning the German state, in comparison with the gains or risks of leaving Germany unified. And we have considered the possibility of segregating the industrial regions of the Rhineland,

the

the Ruhr, the Saar and Silesia, or of placing these areas under some form of international control in order to prevent the rebuilding of Germany's military might.

Disarmament

We have assessed the cost of armaments during normal periods and during war and have visualized how great a benefit would flow to mankind from an agreed world reduction of armaments accomplished within the needs of world security and the obligations of enforcing peace when necessary.

Restoration of Conquered Countries

We have considered plans for the orderly transition to independence of countries released from Nazi domination. We have explored possible forms of government for such countries and appraised the possibilities of trustworthy and capable leadership within them. We have examined the agrarian and industrial capacity of each country, and have sought to appraise its potential development.

Territorial Adjustments

We have also discussed the many territorial and boundary adjustments that may be required in the post-war world, among them the most practicable disposition of East Prussia and the frontiers of states bordering Russia.

Trusteeship

Trusteeship

We have considered the carrying out of international responsibilities in the mandated areas resulting from the last war and in such trust areas as will be created after the present war. We have contemplated, as a substitute for the theories and practices of mandates, a new and not yet defined type of trusteeship. We have considered the administration of certain trustee areas by local groups of states rather than by a single mandatory state, as was the former practice.

Economic Problems

We have under consideration the full gamut of economic questions - finance (including the problem of a possible world bank), stabilization funds, long and short term credits, power problems, transportation, shipping, commissions, food problems, raw materials, heavy industries, cartels, freight agreements, trade barriers, et cetera.

These highly important economic problems, world-wide in their scope, extend to the vitals of individual and community well-being everywhere. As we have discovered through examination of the economic relationships within our own Union, these world economic activities are intimately related to whatever political structure or arrangements we

may

may create. As the economic relations are weakened or destroyed, the political structure is weakened or destroyed. Similarly, any deterioration of political security immediately undermines economic relations and stability.

#### Refugee Problems

We have discussed the problem of refugee peoples and have sought a solution for the sad plight of those thousands who have not been executed, but who have been torn from their homes and introduced into virtual slavery because of their political, racial or religious affiliations.

#### Economic and Social Improvement

We have considered the need of bringing to the people of the earth a better standard of living, better educational facilities and protection of life and property, freedom of speech and religion.

#### MEANING OF THESE PROBLEMS FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

And so, Mr. Secretary, we have discovered that many serious problems are involved in international collaboration after this war. In our efforts to learn how that collaboration can be achieved we have traveled over a long and difficult course; we have been beset with uncertainties and have realized the resentments, the suspicions and the doubts of every

every country toward the motives of the others. We have tried to understand what problems of race, religion, economic circumstances, tradition, resentment, suspicion, doubt, and hatred have through the long course of history frustrated the will of nations to collaborate - nations which are courageous enough to try once more to build out of such chaos something that will endure and benefit the world.

In our quest, we as Americans have not overlooked the ideal or the practical. Neither can we overlook the distinction between idealism and ideology. The one embodies the very spirit of man; the other has only fleeting value as the ideas of an individual who abandons the practical in the pursuit of an illusion. Such pursuit, as we have seen in the present exploitation of so-called ideologies, has brought the world near disaster. We have tried, and must continue to try, to keep free from any illusion.

Thus, as I stated at the outset, driven by the due sense of the gigantic stakes of peace, proceeding by reason and full discussion, and supported by the highest ethical motives, we undertake now to cope with the great problems emerging from the war through some form of international organization in which America can and will take a responsible part.

part. We seek an agency with sufficient scope and power to prevent the disruption of human affairs and the destruction of human lives through the terrifying agencies of modern war, since we know that only the exercise of kindly observation, timely council and forceful action if necessary can make such conflicts impossible.

NATURE OF THE  
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

What then is this agency that will insure the best future of the world? It can be none other than a world organization of nations - large enough, broad enough, powerful enough, alert enough and energetic enough to see and to act.

It has been our thought that such an organization should have the primary purpose of maintaining security but that it might also carry on other vital functions. To this end, we have envisaged a larger, more complete, better organized, and more effective instrumentality than the League of Nations, with power to adopt rules of right conduct among nations, to settle political disputes, to resolve legal questions by means of a world tribunal, and to prevent aggression by force if necessary. We have therefore considered the possible reorganization of the existing League of Nations, with a restatement of its principles and a redefinition of its functions;

We have questioned how long such regional groups might functions; and we have considered whether a new organization should be created out of United Nations relationships or other current experience.

Possible Regional Groups

We have explored the possibility of setting up groups of states or regional councils, such as those described by Prime Minister Churchill in his address of March this year. With respect to the proposed Council of Europe, we have questioned whether the United States should join Great Britain and Russia in guaranteeing the security of that group of states. We have examined this problem in the light of Western Hemisphere relationships under the Monroe Doctrine and in terms of the more recent Good Neighbor policies.

As an alternative to Mr. Churchill's proposal, we have discussed a union of all European states, excluding Great Britain and Russia, which would be placed under the protection of a world organization that would include Britain and Russia.

We have considered a loosely organized union of states in Eastern Europe under the protection of a world organization. We have also considered a possible Asiatic Council for security purposes as was proposed by Prime Minister Churchill.

We

We have questioned how long such regional groups might escape the greed, rivalries, and ambitions of their component parts, or their utilization for selfish purposes by more powerful members; and we have queried whether those dangers could be avoided only through a strong world order. We have reached a consensus that the universal organization must not be founded upon regional structures and that such regional relationships or organizations should be primarily concerned with local problems, though they could perform some functions by delegation from the general international organization.

THE PROBLEM  
OF SOVEREIGNTY

The creation of such an organization gives rise to the objection that it would mean a surrender of sovereignty. What is the real basis of this claim?

Certainly no surrender of sovereignty over domestic affairs is involved, since no peace plan will be concerned with the internal affairs of nations.

Neither can the judicial process for the settlement of disputes be objected to as violating national interests, since that process is simply a means whereby a nation can safeguard its peace and security through the pacific settlement of international differences.

Civilized

Civilized nations have always claimed to be governed by international law as established by treaties, custom and usage. The promulgation of such rules of right conduct will involve no impairment of national sovereignty unless the disregard of such rules be deemed a privilege of sovereignty.

The treaty making power will not be impaired. Indeed, the field of international cooperation through general international and regional conferences and agreements can profitably be expanded. Many of the problems now under consideration may well be left to that field, outside of the immediate control of any central authority.

An international arrangement to control by force the means of aggression and to prevent acts of aggression may indeed impinge on the alleged rights of would-be aggressors. However, there will be no surrender of sovereignty by nations contributing forces to the maintenance of peace. If, however, individual nations press their claims of sovereignty to the point of judging, each for itself, what force to supply if need arises, the international organization might then be rendered impotent and the likelihood of having to employ force would be increased. Arrangements for the use of force must be set in advance and must be certain.

There

There can be no permanent peace unless nations are prepared to accept the decisions of the international organization on matters entrusted to it, in full faith that the enlightened opinion and moral judgment of the world will prevail in that organization. To that extent only must member states give up the right of individual decision and action. However, any conception of sovereignty that precludes united or co-operative action is an anachronism in the modern world.

There is in fact no real surrender of sovereignty in cooperated or united action; and there is nothing but an act of sovereignty itself in the negotiation of a treaty to enter into organized cooperation. If by the transfer of certain powers to an authority outside the state we obtain the support of other nations in guaranteeing our own security and that of our neighbors and allies, have we diminished our sovereignty? Or have we in fact enlarged it? What is involved is not so much a diminution of sovereignty as a re-distribution of the peoples' authority in order to make it effective over a wider area.

ESTABLISHMENT OF AN  
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

Following the practical sense of our exploration, what are the steps most likely to bring about ultimate world organization?

organization? It seems to me that the natural approach would be through the present association of the United States with three other great powers in a collective effort to crush the common enemy. Their responsibility for securing victory is acknowledged. The four-power relationship has been born in this war and exists in fact. It is not something that has to be created; it is something that has to be extended and expanded. The continuing adherence of those four great nations is essential to the fulfillment of any plan for world peace that is workable and effective. Without any one of them the project becomes dubious.

Certainly European security cannot rest on a foundation that does not bring Russia into agreement with the other powers. Anglo-American understanding is basic and inherent in any plan that can work and endure. Yet certainly the American public would seriously question the encouragement of a project to insure the security of Europe if Great Britain were its only other partner, and would object upon grounds that are too familiar to be recited in this well-informed body.

In my judgment, the approach to the world organization should have as its first step a four-power pact between the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and  
China.


China. It should be a simple document but comprehensive enough to give expression to the public will of this country, which seeks organized protective measures on a world basis. There should then be an effort to promote at the earliest moment a world organization upon lines not inconsistent with the proposed pact.

I am not one of those who believes that a mere declaration of American sentiment would be adequate. I should prefer a fundamental approach to the question of firm agreement among these four nations, urgently presented to the Senate for ratification, with the hope that it may be removed from political controversy in the year to come. The weakness in our position before the world today lies in the fact that other nations do not know whether we will make such an agreement or participate in a world organization. Our failure to enter the League leaves a reasonable doubt as to our sincerity now. To promote the world organization, therefore, some positive step must be taken now to assure the world of our adherence.

We have often referred to the greater prospects of gaining American adherence while the war is in progress, rather than to postpone all definitive action until the war is over. Of this there can be no doubt.

Concluding

Concluding then, it would seem to me undesirable for this country to associate itself in a local organization that has as its objective the maintenance of peace in a particular zone; that its objective should be to promote, either through reorganization of the League of Nations or through other means, a strong universal organization through which the eligible states could effectively maintain peace; and that the approach to such a world organization should be through a four-power pact, entered into promptly and openly, and having behind it the constitutional authority of our Government.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Myron C. Tate", is written over a horizontal line. The signature is positioned to the right of the main text block.

August 11, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. On July 16, 1943, Mr. Eden communicated to our Ambassador in London, for transmission to the Secretary of State, an Aide-Mémoire, the text of which is attached, on "suggested Principles which Would Govern the Conclusion of Hostilities with the European Members of the Axis." The British proposal envisages the creation of an Inter-Allied Armistice Commission or an Inter-Allied Control Commission for each enemy country. It further envisages (paragraph 9) the creation of a supervisory body called "United Nations Commission for Europe", to be situated at some point of the Continent, and to be composed of "high ranking political representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States, U.S.S.R., France and other minor European Allies, and, if so desired, of any Dominion prepared to contribute to the policing of Europe."

This Commission would be the Supreme United Nations authority in Europe. It would "direct and coordinate the activities of the several Armistice Commissions, the Allied Commanders-in-Chief, and any United Nations civilian authorities that may be established." It would  
also

also "deal with current problems, military, political and economic, connected with the maintenance of order." It would have a "Steering Committee", composed of representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States, the U.S.S.R., and of France, "if she should recover her greatness." The Steering Committee would be the directing body of the Commission, and would operate under the unanimity rule.

In paragraph 10 of the British Aide-Mémoire it is further proposed that various civilian authorities, whether set up on a world or on a European basis, should, in respect of their European activities, establish their headquarters in the same city as the United Nations Commission for Europe, and should be responsible to the Commission. The activities indicated include relief and rehabilitation, refugees, shipping, inland transportation, telecommunications, propaganda, reparation, restitution, and other economic problems.

2. The British proposal has been studied in the Department of State and by the Subcommittee on Security of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy. The general comment of the Sub-Committee on Security is as follows:

The

The Subcommittee agrees fully with the view expressed in the Aide-Mémoire to the effect that inter-allied agencies must be set up to supervise the execution of surrender terms by the defeated states, and to deal with problems relating to the rehabilitation of enemy and enemy-occupied territories during the first after-war period. Nonetheless, the Subcommittee questions the desirability of attempting to combine these agencies and functions with those which are general, i.e., world-wide or European in scope, and long-term in character. It is the feeling of the Subcommittee that the decision to create an agency, which would be essentially a kind of super-government for Europe, should be made exclusively on its own merits, and should not be confused with the making of necessary arrangements with respect to the enemy states. It is felt that the political reaction in this country would be unfavorable if the United States were to take such a major step involving general and long-run commitments, under the guise of making a settlement with the enemy. These policy issues should be determined separately.

3. The British Aide-Mémoire raises again the whole issue of regionalism in connection with international organization. That question has been raised several times by Mr. Churchill. His ideas are clearly expressed in the two documents addressed to the President, which are attached to this memorandum. The general thought seems to be that international relations should be basically organized on a regional basis, in the form of three regional Councils--for Europe, for the Western Hemisphere, and for the Far East. There would also be a World Council as a superstructure.

This

This question has been the subject of much study and discussion in the Department and in its various committees. The committee discussions have so far pointed to the following conclusions: (1) that the basis of international organization should be world-wide rather than regional; (2) that there are grave dangers involved in having the world organization rest upon the foundation of previously created, full-fledged regional organizations; and (3) that while there may be advantages in setting up regional arrangements for some purposes, such arrangements should be subsidiary to the world organization and should flow from it.

This points to the desirability of creating a general United Nations agency, operating on a functional basis, and--when advisable--having some subsidiary regional structures. Such an agency could well be set up on a provisional basis during the war to perform concrete tasks involved in the transition from war to peace and to prepare the way for the establishment of a permanent world organization.

4. It is our thought that the first procedural step should be by way of securing agreement between the  
United

United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China on the issuance by them of a joint declaration or parallel identic declarations containing their basic intentions and constituting a pledge on their part to act jointly for certain specified purposes. Such a declaration or declarations should be in the nature of an extension of the pledges undertaken by the four major powers in the Declaration by United Nations of January 1, 1942. There is attached hereto a tentative draft of a joint declaration.

5. It is our further thought that the four-power declaration should be followed, as rapidly as possible, by the negotiation of a United Nations protocol and the setting up, under it, of the necessary provisional machinery for the performance of various tasks as they present themselves in point of time. A statement of the possible provisions of such a protocol will be ready in a few days.

HEL  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (MC)

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

4626, July 16, 5 p.m.

FOR THE SECRETARY AND THE UNDER SECRETARY

When Mr. Eden gave me the following Aide  
Memoire he explained to me that although it had  
been considered by the War Cabinet, it was not  
intended to represent a fixed program but rather  
a document for consideration. It is the result of  
study and a realization that there is danger of  
over-simplification of the problems involved. They  
would much appreciate our comments and reactions.

"AIDE MEMOIRE

Suggested Principles Which Would Govern The  
Conclusion Of Hostilities With the European  
Members Of The Axis

One. The terms to be imposed on any European  
member of the Axis should be presented as one  
comprehensive document covering all the United Nations  
at war with that member, and embodying the principle  
of unconditional surrender.

Two. If

London

Dated July 16, 1943

Rec'd 9:25 p.m.

*Spill*  
S. U. A-B  
SA, PA/D, PA/H, PA/M  
ED/NE, FE, LE

*Abate Cor  
Hammou (initials)*

-2-, #4626, July 16, 5 p.m., from London.

Two. If there exists a central enemy Government with which we are prepared to treat, a fully accredited representative of that Government should be associated with its Commander-in-Chief for purposes of signature; or alternatively the Armistice should not come into force until confirmed by that Government.

Three. If there is no such Government the Armistice should be signed by the enemy Commander-in-Chief only. In that case provisions which the enemy Commander-in-Chief lacks authority to execute would have to be omitted from the Armistice, which would thus be primarily a military document. Non military provisions should so far as necessary be embodied in a Declaration or Proclamation issued by the United Nations.

Four. If there is neither an enemy Government nor Commander-in-Chief with whom we can or are prepared to treat, military resistance would presumably be brought to an end by a series of local capitulations. It would, however, probably be desirable that the United Nations should issue a declaration stating their intentions in respect of the defeated power. This would be followed by a series of proclamations issued by the Allied Commander-in-Chief containing instructions

-3-, #4626, July 16, 5 p.m., from London.

instructions to the local authorities and population.

Five. The administration of any armistice should be placed in the hands of an inter-Allied Armistice Commission, the President to be alternately a representative of the United States, U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom. The Commission would establish its headquarters in the Axis country concerned, and would be responsible for controlling the execution of the Armistice terms; in the first place, the disarmament and demobilization of enemy armed forces, the collection and disposal of surrendered war material and other mobile property and the handing over of fortifications and other fixed property. Representatives of the Armistice Commission would be dispatched to liberated Allied territory to perform a similar task in respect of the enemy troops there located and to regulate their evacuation or internment.

Six. In the absence of an Armistice (See Paragraph Four) a Control Commission should administer the appropriate portions of the Declaration.

Seven. Any Armistice or Declaration would presumably provide for occupation, whether total or partial, of the countries concerned. In the case of Germany the exact method of organizing such an occupation

-4-, #4626, July 16, 5 p.m., from London.

occupation should be the subject of technical discussions between the military advisers of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the U.S.S.R. in the first instance.

Eight. The United Nations Commander-in-Chief in any occupied country should have complete responsibility for the maintenance of law and order.

Nine. There should be established a supervisory body entitled "United Nations Commission for Europe," composed of high ranking political (political) representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the U.S.S.R., of France and the other minor European Allies, and, if so desired, of any Dominion prepared to contribute to the policing of Europe. The Commission should be situated at some convenient point on the Continent.

The Commission would act as the Supreme United Nations authority in Europe to direct and coordinate the activities of the several Armistice Commissions, the Allied Commanders-in-Chief and any United Nations civilian authorities that may be established; and to deal with current problems, military, political and economic, connected with the maintenance of order.

A "Steering Committee, consisting of the  
representatives

-5-, #4626, July 16, 5 p.m., from London.

representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the U.S.S.R., and of France, if she recovers her greatness should be established as the directing body of the Commission. In the "Steering Committee" the unanimity rule should apply.

Ten. It is likely that a number of civilian authorities will be set up by agreement between the United Nations, some on a world and others on a European basis. Apart from the United Nations relief and rehabilitation administration and the Inter-Governmental Committee which may emerge from the Bermuda Conference, the establishment of a United Nations Shipping Authority and a United Nations Inland Transport Authority for Europe have been suggested. Analogous bodies may well be required to control telecommunications and propaganda, and to handle reparation and restitution and other economic problems. These authorities might, in respect of their European activities, establish their headquarters in the same city as the United Nations Commission for Europe, to whom they would be responsible and provide the necessary technical advice.

Foreign Office. Fourteenth July 1943."

FOREIGN OFFICE  
Fourteenth July, 1943.

AIC

WINANT

Secret

August 11, 1943.

TENTATIVE DRAFT OF A  
JOINT FOUR-POWER DECLARATION

The Governments of the United States, Great Britain,  
the Soviet Union and China:

united in their determination, in accordance with  
the Declaration by the United Nations of January 1, 1942,  
and subsequent declarations, to continue hostilities  
against those Axis powers with which they respectively  
are at war until such powers have laid down their arms  
on the basis of unconditional surrender;

conscious of their responsibility to secure the  
liberation of themselves and the peoples allied with  
them from the menace of aggression;

recognizing the necessity of ensuring a rapid and  
orderly transition from war to peace and of establishing  
and maintaining international peace and security with the  
least diversion of the world's human and economic resources  
for armaments;

jointly declare:

1. That their united action, pledged for the  
prosecution of the war, will be continued for the  
organization and maintenance of peace and security.

2. That those of them at war with a common  
enemy will act together in all matters relating to  
the surrender and disarmament of that enemy, and to  
any occupation of enemy territory and of territory  
of other states held by that enemy.

3. That they will take all measures deemed  
by them to be necessary to provide against any  
violation of the requirements imposed upon their  
present enemies.

4. That they recognize the necessity of  
establishing at the earliest practicable date a

general

general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all nations, and open to membership by all nations, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

5. That for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the reestablishment of law and order and the inauguration of a general system of security, they will consult and act jointly in behalf of the community of nations.

6. That, in connection with the foregoing purpose, they will establish a technical commission to advise them on the military problems involved, including the composition and strength of the forces available in an emergency arising from a threat to the peace.

7. That they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation and agreement.

8. That they will confer and cooperate to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the post-war period.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 25, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS GRACE TULLY

SUBJECT: Message from Prime Minister  
to the President re Post-War  
Security.

Dear Grace:

I have read this.



Harry L. Hopkins  
encl.

**BRITISH EMBASSY  
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

MOST SECRET

February 2nd, 1943.

Dear Mr. President,

I enclose the further message  
from the Prime Minister which I mentioned  
in my earlier letter today.

I also enclose a copy of a  
personal message to you from Mr. Eden,  
which has just come in.

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

*Halifax.*

The Honourable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States

of America,

Washington, D. C.

Message from the Prime Minister to the President.

MOST SECRET

MORNING THOUGHTS

Note on Post-War Security.

When United Nations led by three Great Powers, Great Britain, United States and U.S.S.R. have received unconditional surrender of Germany and Italy, Great Britain and United States will turn their full force against Japan in order to punish effectively that greedy and ambitious nation for its treacherous assaults and outrages and to procure likewise from Japan unconditional surrender.

2. In this, although no treaty arrangement has been made, it seems probable that Great Britain and United States will be joined by Russia.

3. The peace conference of the victorious powers will probably assemble in Europe while final stages of war against Japan are still in progress. At this conference the defeated aggressor countries will receive directions of victors. Object of these directions will be to prevent as effectively as possible renewal of acts of aggression of the kind which have caused these two terrible wars in Europe in one generation. For this purpose and so far as possible total disarmament of guilty nations will be enforced. On the other hand no attempt will be made to destroy their peoples or to prevent them gaining their living and leading a decent life in spite of all the crimes they have committed.

4. It is recognized that it is not possible to make

the vanquished pay for war as was tried last time, and consequently task of rebuilding ruined and starving Europe will demand from conquerors a period of exertion scarcely less severe than that of the war. Russia particularly which has suffered such a horrible devastation will be aided in every possible way in her work of restoring the economic life of her people. It seems probable that economic reconstruction and rehabilitation will occupy full energies of all countries for a good many years in view of their previous experiences and lessons they have learned.

5. Russia has signed a treaty with Great Britain on basis of Atlantic Charter binding both nations mutually to aid each other. The duration of this treaty is twenty years. By it and by Atlantic Charter the two nations renounce all idea of territorial gains. Russians no doubt interpret this as giving them right to claim, subject to their agreement with Poland, their frontier of June 1941 before they were attacked by Germany.

6. It is the intention of chiefs of the United Nations to create a world organisation for the preservation of peace based upon the conceptions of freedom and justice and the revival of prosperity. As a part of this organisation an instrument of European Government will be established which will embody the spirit but not be subject to the weakness of former League of Nations. The units forming this body will not only be the great nations of Europe and Asia Minor only. Need for a Scandinavian bloc, Danubian bloc and a Balkan bloc appear to be obvious. A similar instrument will be formed in the Far East with different membership and the

whole will be held together by the fact that victorious powers as yet continue fully armed, especially in the air, while imposing complete disarmament upon the guilty. None can predict with certainty that the victors will never quarrel amongst themselves, or that the United States may not once again retire from Europe, but after the experiences which all have gone through, and their sufferings and the certainty that a third struggle will destroy all that is left of culture, wealth and civilization of mankind and reduce us to the level almost of wild beasts, the most intense effort will be made by the leading Powers to prolong their honourable association and by sacrifice and self-restraint to win for themselves a glorious name in human annals. Great Britain will certainly do her utmost to organize a coalition of resistance to any act of aggression committed by any power; it is believed that the United States will cooperate with her and even possibly take the lead of the world, on account of her numbers and strength, in the good work of preventing such tendencies to aggression before they break into open war.

7. The highest security for Turkey in post-war world will be found by her taking her place as a victorious belligerent and ally at the side of Great Britain, the United States and Russia. In this way a start will be made in all friendliness and confidence, and a new instrument will grow around the goodwill and comradeship of those who have been in the field together, with powerful armies.

8. Turkey may be drawn into war either by being attacked in the despairing convulsions of a still very

powerful Nazi power, or because her interests require her to intervene to help prevent total anarchy in the Balkans, and also because the sentiments of modern Turkey are in harmony with the large and generous conceptions embodied in the Atlantic Charter, which are going to be fought for and defended by new generations of men.

9. We must therefore consider the case of Turkey becoming a belligerent. The military and technical side is under examination by Marshal Chakmak, Generals Brooke, Alexander, Wilson and other high technical authorities. The political aspect is no less important. It would be wrong for Turkey to enter the war unless herself attacked, if that only led her to a disaster, and her ally Britain has never asked and will never ask her to do so under such conditions. On the other hand if the general offensive strength of Turkey is raised by the measures now being taken, and also by the increasing weakness of Nazi Germany, or by their withdrawal to a greater distance, or by the great divisions taking place in Bulgaria, or by the bitter quarrel between the Rumanians and the Hungarians over Transylvania, or through the internal resistance to German and Italian tyranny shewn by Yugoslavia and Greece: for any or all of these reasons and causes, Turkey should play a part and win her place in the council of victors.

10. In the first instance it is possible that the military situation might be such that Turkey would feel justified in taking the same extended view of neutrality or non-belligerency as characterized the attitude of the United States of America towards Great Britain before the United States of America was drawn into the war. In this

connexion the destruction of Rumanian oilfields by air attacks by British and American aircraft operating from Turkish airfields, or re-fuelling there, would have far-reaching consequences and might in view of the oil scarcity in Germany appreciably shorten the struggle. In the same way also the availability of air bases or re-fuelling points in Turkey would be of great assistance to Great Britain in her necessary attack on the Dodecanese, and later upon Crete, for which in any case, whether we get help or not, General Wilson has been directed to prepare during the present year. There is also the immensely important question of opening the Straits to Allied and then closing to Axis traffic. The case contemplated in this paragraph is one in which Turkey would have departed from strictly impartial neutrality and definitely have taken sides with the United Nations without however engaging her armies offensively against Germany or Bulgaria; and those nations would put up with this action on the part of Turkey because they would not wish to excite her to more active hostility.

11. However, we cannot survey this field without facing the possibility of Turkey becoming a full belligerent and of her armies advancing into the Balkans side by side with the Russians on the one hand in the north and the British to the southward. In the event of Turkey becoming thus directly involved either offensively or through being attacked in consequence of her attitude, she would receive the utmost aid from all her allies and in addition it would be right for her before incurring additional risks to seek precise guarantees as to her territorial rights

after/

after the war. Great Britain would be willing to give these guarantees in a treaty at any time quite independently of any other power. She is also willing to join with Russia in giving such guarantees and it is believed that Russia would be willing to make a treaty to cover the case of Turkey becoming a full belligerent either independently or in conjunction with Great Britain. It seems certain to Mr. Churchill that President Roosevelt would gladly associate himself with such treaties and that the whole weight of the United States would be used in peace settlement to that end. At the same time one must not ignore the difficulties which United States Constitution interposes against prolonged European commitments. These treaties and assurances would naturally fall within the ambit of the world-instrument to protect all countries from wrong-doing which it is our main intention and inflexible resolve to create, should God give us the power and lay this high duty upon us.

Message from Mr. Eden to President Roosevelt.

Thank you very much for the kind  
message which you sent me through Mack. I  
too much hope we may meet again soon.

BRITISH EMBASSY  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Secret

May 28th, 1943.

Dear Mr. President,

Winston has asked me to send you the enclosed record of a conversation at luncheon at the Embassy on May 22nd when he gave an outline of his ideas about the post-war security order. He tells me that he expressed similar views to you, but thought you might like to see this note. He wishes to make it clear that on all occasions he stated that he was expressing only personal views.

Believe me,

Yours very sincerely,

*Halifax*

The Honourable  
Franklin D. Roosevelt,  
President of the United States  
of America,  
Washington, D. C.

## MEMORANDUM

The Prime Minister met the following at luncheon at the Embassy on May 22nd, 1943:-

The Vice President (Mr. Wallace), the Secretary of War (Mr. Stimson), the Secretary of the Interior (Mr. Ickes), the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate (Senator Connally) and the Under-Secretary of State (Mr. Sumner Welles).

### World and Regional Councils.

In the course of a general talk about the structure of a post-war settlement, Mr. Churchill said that the first preoccupation must be to prevent further aggression in the future by Germany or Japan. To this end he contemplated an association of the United States, Great Britain and Russia. If, as he understood, the United States wished to include China in an association with the other three, he was perfectly willing that this should be done; but however great the importance of China, she was not comparable to the others. On these Powers would rest the real responsibility for peace. They together with certain other Powers should form a Supreme World Council.

Subordinate to this World Council there should be three Regional Councils, one for Europe, one for the American Hemisphere and one for the Pacific.

### Europe

Mr. Churchill thought that after the war Europe might consist of some twelve states or confederations who would form the Regional European Council. It was important to recreate a strong France, whatever we might think about French deserts or the probable difficulty of achieving our purpose. For the prospect of having no strong country on the map between England and Russia was not attractive.

Moreover/

Moreover the Prime Minister could not easily foresee the United States being able to keep large numbers of men indefinitely on guard in Europe. If such an experiment were tried he could not believe it would last for more than one Presidential election. Great Britain could not do so either. No doubt it would be necessary, and he thought it would be possible, that the United States should be associated in some way in the policing of Europe, in which Great Britain would obviously also have to take part; but France also must assist.

Then there would be Spain and Italy. He also hoped that in South Eastern Europe there might be several confederations; a Danubian federation based on Vienna and doing something to fill the gap caused by the disappearance of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Bavaria might join this group. Then there should be a Balkan federation.

He would like to see Prussia divided from the rest of Germany, forty million Prussians being a manageable European unit. Many people wished to carry the process of division further and divide Prussia itself into component parts, but on this question the Prime Minister reserved judgment. Poland and Czechoslovakia he hoped would stand together in friendly relations with Russia. This left the Scandinavian countries, and Turkey, which last might or might not be willing with Greece to play some part in the Balkan system.

Mr. Wallace asked about Belgium and Holland suggesting that they might join France. Mr. Churchill said that was a possibility, or alternatively they might form a group of the Low Countries with Denmark. Mr. Wallace asked whether the Prime Minister contemplated

the possibility of Switzerland joining with France, but the Prime Minister was disposed to regard Switzerland as a special case.

In his view each of the dozen or so of the European countries should appoint a representative to the European Regional Council thus creating a form of United States of Europe. He thought Count Coudenhov-Kalergi's ideas on this subject had much to recommend them.

#### The American Hemisphere

Similarly there might be a Regional Council for the Americas of which the Prime Minister thought Canada would naturally be a member and would represent the British Commonwealth.

#### The Pacific

There should be a Regional Council for the Pacific in which he supposed that Russia would participate. He thought it was quite possible that when the pressure on her western frontiers had been relieved Russia would turn her attention to the Far East.

#### Relation of the Regional Councils to the Supreme World Council

The Regional Councils should be subordinate in the Prime Minister's view to the World Council. The members of the World Council should sit on the Regional Councils in which they were directly interested and he hoped that in addition to being represented on the American Regional Council and the Pacific Regional Council, the United States would also be represented on the European Regional Council. However this might be, the last word would remain with the Supreme World Council, since any issues that the Regional Councils were unable to settle would automatically be of interest to the

World/

World Council and bring the World Council in.

Mr. Wallace thought that the other countries would not agree that the World Council should consist of the four major Powers alone. Mr. Churchill agreed and expressed the view that to the four Powers should be added others by election in rotation from the Regional Councils. The central idea of the structure was that of a three-legged stool - the World Council resting on three Regional Councils. But he attached great importance to the regional principle. It was only the countries whose interests were directly affected by a dispute who could be expected to apply themselves with sufficient vigour to secure a settlement. If countries remote from a dispute were among those called upon in the first instance to achieve a settlement the result was likely to be merely vapid and academic discussion.

Mr. Wallace asked what in practice would be the procedure if, for example, there were a dispute between Peru and Ecuador. Mr. Churchill said that such a dispute would fall to be dealt with in the first place by the American Regional Council but always under the general overriding authority of the World Council. In the instance chosen the interests of countries outside the American Hemisphere would hardly be affected; but plainly a dispute which threatened the peace of the world might very well not be susceptible to being treated only on a regional basis and the Supreme World Council would quickly be brought in.

#### Neutrality

Mr. Churchill was asked whether the association of nations which he contemplated would be confined to the United Nations, or include the neutrals. He said that in

his view there was advantage in trying to induce those nations at present neutral to join the United Nations before the end of the war. He thought we ought to use all possible persuasion and pressure to secure this when it could be done with safety to the nation concerned. An example was Turkey. His policy was to help Turkey to build up her own forces to the point where, at the right moment she could and would effectively intervene. When the United Nations brought the guilty nations to the bar of justice, he could see little but an ineffective and inglorious role for Mr. de Valera and others who might remain neutral to the end.

#### The Lessons of the League of Nations

Mr. Churchill maintained that we had much to learn from the experience of the League of Nations. It was wrong to say that the League had failed. It was rather the member States who had failed the League. Senator Connally agreed and pointed to the achievements of the League in the years immediately after 1919. Mr. Stimson also agreed and thought that if the original guarantee to France had not fallen through subsequent French policy and also the history of the League would have been very different.

#### National and International Forces

Mr. Churchill said that force would clearly be required to see that peace was preserved. He suggested that there should be an agreement between the United Nations as to the minimum and maximum armed forces which each would maintain. The forces of each country might be divided into two contingents, the one to form the national forces of that country, and the other to form its contingent to an international police force at the

disposal of the Regional Councils under the direction of the Supreme World Council. Thus if one country out of twelve in Europe threatened the peace, eleven contingents would be ready to deal with that country if necessary. The personnel of the international contingent provided by each country would be bound, if it were so decided by the World Council, to undertake operations against any country other than their own. Mr. Wallace said that bases would be required for these contingents. Mr. Churchill agreed. In this connection he said that he would place a total prohibition for an indefinite time upon the practice in the enemy countries, and certainly in Germany, of the art of flying. There should be international air lines, for example, operating in and through Prussia which would give the Prussians as good a service at as cheap rates as obtained elsewhere, but they should neither be allowed to fly themselves nor to build aircraft.

Fraternal Association between Great Britain and the United States

Mr. Churchill said that there was something else in his mind which was complementary to the ideas he had just expressed. The proposals for a world security organisation did not exclude special friendships devoid of sinister purpose against others. He could see small hope for the world unless the United States and the British Commonwealth worked together in what he would call fraternal association. He believed that this could take a form which would confer on each advantages without sacrifice. He would like the citizens of each without losing their present nationality to be able to come and settle and trade with freedom and equal rights

in the territories of the other. There might be a common passport or a special form of passport or visa. There might even be some common form of citizenship, under which citizens of the United States and of the British Commonwealth might enjoy voting privileges after residential qualification and be eligible for public office in the territories of the other, subject of course to the laws and institutions there prevailing.

Then there were bases. He had himself welcomed the Destroyer-Bases deal not for the sake of the destroyers, useful as these were, but because he felt it was to the advantage of both countries that the United States should have the use of such bases in British territory as she might find necessary to her own defence, for a strong United States was a vital interest of the British Commonwealth and vice versa. He looked forward therefore to an extension of the practice of common user of bases for the common defence of common interests. Take the Pacific where there were countless islands possessed by enemy powers. There were also British islands and harbours. If he had anything to do with the direction of public affairs after the war, he would certainly advocate that the United States had the use of those that they might require for bases.

American opinion. Importance of concluding an agreement during the war

All the American guests present said that they had been thinking on more or less the lines propounded by the Prime Minister, and thought that it was not impossible that American opinion would accept them or something like them. The Ambassador asked Mr. Welles whether he thought that the establishment of a Regional

Council for Europe would have the effect of leading United States opinion to disinterest itself in European affairs. Mr. Welles was not afraid of this, having regard to the overriding responsibility of the Supreme World Council and the relation between it and the Regional Councils. Mr. Stimson said most emphatically that in his opinion there would be a tendency to relax after hostilities ceased, and a reluctance to embark upon new international experience. He believed that it would be much easier to secure American agreement during the war; indeed that it was a case of during the war or never. The others were disposed to agree, and all felt that the best approach to future cooperation was to present such plans for the future as a continuation of the cooperation now in force, and to do so while the war was still proceeding.

The Prime Minister made two other suggestions both of which carried the warm assent of those present. First, that after the war we should continue the practice of Combined Staff conversations, and second, that we should by constant contact, take whatever steps were necessary to ensure that the main lines of our foreign policy ran closely together.

Mr. Wallace said to the Ambassador as he left that it was the most encouraging conversation in which he had taken part for the last two years.

Mr. Churchill on all occasions stated that he was expressing only personal views.

A 14

- SECRET -

17th December, 1942.

Dear Mr Winant,

I enclose herewith a re-draft of the Memorandum I showed you yesterday afternoon, which I hope is more or less on the lines you want.

If there is any further information you would like, I hope that you will let me know.

I meant to tell you that Sir Arthur Rucker and Commander Jackson, both of whom see your brother frequently, have just reached this country from Cairo. I believe that you have arranged to see the latter, but I know that Rucker, who has a room in this Office, would greatly value it if you could spare him a few minutes some time in the course of the next few days.

Yours sincerely,

*E. E. Dwyer*

The Hon. John G. Winant,  
1, Grosvenor Square,  
W.1.

OFFICE OF MINISTER OF STATE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

The Office of Minister of State in the Middle East was set up in June, 1941, because it was recognised that the time of the Commanders-in-Chief (and in particular of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief) was being increasingly occupied by administrative questions and by issues of a political nature (e.g., administration of enemy occupied territories; censorship and security; and propaganda). The conclusion was reached that the heavy load on the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief could only be lightened by the appointment of a Civil officer of high standing who could relieve him of these extraneous responsibilities and thereby free him for his essential task of planning and conducting military operations.

Another reason for the creation of this post was to facilitate the prompt settlement on the spot of matters within the policy of the Government (more particularly where several local authorities or Departments were concerned) which would otherwise have to be referred home before decision could be reached.

In the circumstances of the Middle East, which covers many territories and involves relations with H.M. Diplomatic Representatives in Egypt, Iraq and other countries, and also with the Governors and Heads of several Colonial administrations, it was felt that the end in view could only be achieved by the appointment of a Minister of War Cabinet rank.

The Minister has attached to him a small staff, organised rather on the lines of the Cabinet Office in London. He has avoided the assumption of executive functions and responsibilities, executive action being taken by a

Regraded Unclassified

number of separate organisations which work under his general guidance and direction. Among these may be mentioned the Middle East Supply Centre, the Relief and Refugee Administration, Censorship, the local Bureau of the Ministry of Information, and the representatives in the Middle East of a number of Departments; e.g., War Transport, Fuel and Power, Economic Warfare, and the Occupied Territories Administration.

In certain respects the Minister of State's functions and Directive differ from those of any Civil officer who might be appointed to perform analogous functions in North Africa. Thus, the Minister of State presides over a Middle East War Council, which comprises the three Commanders-in-Chief. No such functions could, of course, be contemplated in North Africa, where there is a single Supreme Allied Commander-in-Chief.

Again, the Minister of State has no direct relations with the Egyptian Government, and works through the Ambassador in Egypt, who remains directly responsible to the Foreign Secretary in London in all matters which involve relations with the Egyptian Government. Here, again, the position in North Africa differs from the situation in the Middle East.

17th December, 1942.

KENSINGTON  
OFFICE: CENTRAL 7474

KINGSTON HOUSE SOUTH,  
ENNISMORE GARDENS,  
LONDON. S.W.7

16th December, 1942.

PRIVATE.

*Dear Winant*

I had thought of publishing  
my paper in the Press as you know,  
but I have decided at present to send  
it only to a few of my friends, but I  
may publish it later on, or I may not.  
I have not yet decided.

*Yours very sincerely  
T. Winant*

The Hon. J. G. Winant.

VII.—*Admission of Women.*

32. Women are not at present eligible for posts in the administrative branch of the Foreign Office or in the Diplomatic, Commercial-Diplomatic or Consular Services. For the duration of the war, all regular entry into the Service is suspended. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has, however, already announced his readiness to regard the report of the Committee, which, in 1934, examined the question of the admission of women into the Foreign Service, as no longer necessarily being the last word on the subject, and to consider, after the war, the appointment of a Committee, which will not be confined in its composition to members of the Civil Service, to review the question again in the light of the existing circumstances. In the subordinate grades of the Service women will continue to be employed.

## CONCLUSION.

33. The problems dealt with by the Foreign Service are far-reaching. They often involve issues of peace and war and other national interests of the greatest importance. The results of a mistake or even of inadequacy may involve the expenditure of millions. Diplomacy is but one of the weapons of which His Majesty's Government dispose for the protection of British interests. It is, however, a weapon which, if effective, may make unnecessary the resort to other weapons. His Majesty's Government believe that the proposed reforms—the most important heads of which are summarised above—will materially contribute to render the Foreign Service more effective, and they therefore trust that the proposals will meet with the approval of Parliament.



Miscellaneous No. (1942)

## Proposals for the Reform of the Foreign Service

*Presented by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs  
to Parliament by Command of His Majesty*

LONDON

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

To be purchased directly from H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE at the following addresses:  
York House, Kingsway, London, W.C. 2; 130 George Street, Edinburgh 2;  
39-41 King Street, Manchester 2; 1 St. Andrew's Crescent, Cardiff;  
80 Chichester Street, Belfast;  
or through any bookseller

1942

Price net

Cmd.

## PROPOSALS FOR THE REFORM OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE.

### INTRODUCTION.

IN a statement in the House of Commons on the 11th June, 1941, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs announced the intention of His Majesty's Government to introduce a series of reforms, designed to create a combined Foreign Service distinct from the Home Civil Service, to broaden the field of entry into the new Service, and to increase its efficiency by facilitating the retirement on pension of men who are unfitted for the highest posts. Reforms so wide in their scope cannot all be operative until after the war. Nevertheless, the interest of Parliament in the proposed reforms has been great, and it has been decided to submit a broad outline, necessarily incomplete and liable, perhaps, to modification in detail, of the proposals for a new Foreign Service and, in particular, to seek forthwith Parliament's approval of a Pensions Bill for the purpose to which the Foreign Secretary alluded in his statement.

2. Among the criticisms which have been brought against the Diplomatic Service the view has been expressed that it is recruited from too small a circle, that it tends to represent the interests of certain sections of the nation rather than those of the country as a whole, that its members lead too sheltered a life, that they have insufficient understanding of economic and social questions, that the extent of their experience is too small to enable them properly to understand many of the problems with which they ought to deal, and that the range of their contacts is too limited to allow them to acquire more than a relatively narrow acquaintance with the foreign peoples amongst whom they live.

3. These criticisms are generally overstated and some of them have their origin in a misunderstanding of the functions of the Diplomatic Service. The principal function of a diplomat is to be the channel of communication between His Majesty's Government and foreign Governments and to represent the United Kingdom in the country where he is posted. He is not himself directly responsible for the policy of His Majesty's Government; that is decided by the Cabinet at home; and the art of diplomacy is the art of making that policy, whatever it may be, understood and, if possible, accepted by other countries. The diplomat also has to keep His Majesty's Government informed on all developments of importance in or relating to the country in question and to submit his observations and advice, which may or may not be accepted. However, the conditions which the Diplomatic Service originally grew up to meet no longer exist unchanged in modern international affairs. Economics and finance are inextricably interwoven with politics; an understanding of social problems and labour movements is indispensable in forming a properly balanced judgment of world events. The modern diplomat should have a more intimate understanding of these special problems and greater opportunities to study them than he has always possessed in the past. By introducing the reforms hereinafter described it is intended to re-equip the Foreign Service to meet modern conditions and to create a Service which, by its composition, by the recruitment and training of its members and by its organisation, shall be better able not merely to represent the interests of the nation as a whole, but also to deal with the whole range of international affairs, political, social and

economic, and so constitute an adequate instrument for the maintenance of good relations and mutual understanding between the United Kingdom and other countries.

4. It is a fact, too, that the efficiency of the Foreign Service has suffered in the past from the lack of flexibility which arises from the disparity in conditions of service as between posts at home and posts abroad. Conditions of service in the Foreign Office have been assimilated to those of the Home Civil Service. Members of the Diplomatic Service who are posted abroad, on the other hand, have been treated on a different basis in regard to conditions of service, pension rights, &c. The Secretary of State has not been free, in practice, to move a man from a mission abroad to a post in the Foreign Office without consideration of the effect which such a transfer might have upon the individual concerned. The efficiency of the Service has undoubtedly suffered in consequence. The new Foreign Service, accordingly, will be entirely separated from the Home Civil Service and will be treated as a self-contained and distinct service of the Crown.

5. In this new Foreign Service the present distinction between the Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service, the Commercial-Diplomatic Service and the Consular Service will disappear. It is not intended that amalgamation shall necessarily be applied to present members of these three Services but all future entrants will join a combined Foreign Service and all will receive similar training not merely in languages and history but also in economic and commercial affairs. The system of recruitment will be recast so as to facilitate the entry, from any social sphere, of candidates with suitable qualifications by enabling them to obtain the necessary vocational training at the expense of the State. Uniformity of career for all will be impossible and is, indeed, undesirable, for some men will prove more fitted for work in the Foreign Office and in diplomatic posts and others for commercial or consular work. What is aimed at is wider training and equality of opportunity for all. Every member of the Service will be called upon to serve in consular and commercial-diplomatic as well as in diplomatic posts and in the Foreign Office and all will have the opportunity of rising to the highest posts. Interchange between the different branches, as between posts at home and those abroad, will be facilitated with the object of giving every man as wide an experience as possible and of enabling the best man to be sent to any vacant post. This will involve some adjustment of the present disproportion in the numbers of the diplomatic and consular posts and a regrading of certain posts at home and abroad.

6. The effects of the new system of recruitment and training which is contemplated will not, of course, be felt for some years after its introduction. On the cessation of hostilities, however, the new Service will be faced with a problem which will demand an immediate solution. For a number of years there will have been no new entry. At the top of the Service there will be men who have stayed at their posts during the war against their inclination and who will wish to retire to make room for younger men. The Foreign Service will be understaffed while the tasks which face it will have multiplied. It will be necessary, therefore, to make special arrangements for recruitment pending the introduction of the new system of recruitment and training described below. A scheme of special entry to meet the demands of the Service during the reconstruction period immediately after the war is now being worked out. It is probable that, as happened after the last war, such a scheme will have to be based primarily on the candidate's record of service during the war and on his showing before an interviewing board

rather than on a written examination or academic qualifications. It will be desirable, too, that the scheme should cover, as far as possible, those age groups which, but for the war, would have been represented in the Service to-day.

7. The proposed reforms would be incomplete and perhaps ineffective if they did not extend to the subordinate ranks upon whom the efficient performance of the work of the Service must largely depend. At present members of the subordinate branches in the Foreign Office do not belong to the Foreign Service. Either they form part of the Home Civil Service or they are temporarily recruited on an unestablished basis. They are not liable for service abroad, although they can and do volunteer for it, and those recruited locally and on an unestablished basis are not pensionable. This system is objectionable from every point of view. To rely to any large extent upon unestablished and non-pensionable elements does not make for efficiency and is unfair to those concerned. It is undesirable in the highest degree that confidential papers should be handled by those who are not members of the Service and whose interests are not bound up with it. Finally, the fact that essential services in the Foreign Office are not part of the Foreign Service creates an artificial division between the various branches of the Service, and between home and foreign posts, which restricts free interchange of personnel, hampers efficiency and the development of that *esprit de corps* which must exist in any healthy organisation. It has been decided, therefore, that the subordinate ranks shall be brought into the Foreign Service, that opportunities for promotion shall be made available between the subordinate branches and the senior branch, and that all members of the Foreign Service, of whatever branch, shall be established and therefore pensionable, and under obligation to serve abroad or at home as required.

8. It is necessary to emphasise that, in the Foreign Service, a great measure of direct personal responsibility rests on senior officers, especially abroad. Experience has shown that some men, who are entirely satisfactory in the early years of their service, either do not fulfil their promise or lose the qualities of initiative and energy which are necessary if they are to hold positions of greater responsibility. It is therefore essential that the Foreign Secretary should be able to terminate, by retirement on pension, the careers of men who, though they may have been excellent subordinates, are unsuited to fill the highest posts. This practice has, in fact, been usual in the Armed Forces. It will be necessary to grant to such men, who will have given many of the best years of their lives to the public service, pensions sufficient to keep them from poverty and to mark the fact that no disgrace is implied by their retirement.

9. Being liable to spend a large part of their lives abroad and being subject to transfer between London and posts abroad, members of the Foreign Service, of all branches, will be involved in a good deal of expense which does not fall on home civil servants, who can count on spending their careers in this country and are able to plan their lives on a long-term basis. Grants will accordingly be necessary to compensate officers, who have served abroad, for any extra expense arising from their transfer to the United Kingdom. Officers serving abroad must be ensured emoluments sufficient to enable them not only to represent this country effectively but also to form a wide range of contacts. The effective representation of this country abroad will, moreover, involve the provision of adequate Government buildings for Missions and Consulates, as well as adequate staffs, and it will be essential, after the war, to remember that economies on buildings and staffs are false economies if they result in impaired

efficiency or in reduced security for confidential papers. Arrangements will be made for the more efficient administration of the Service, for the inspection of all posts abroad and for the maintenance of fuller records on which to base recommendations to the Secretary of State for appointments, transfers or superannuation.

10. These reforms will cost money. But the additional expense will be a very small price to pay for a thoroughly efficient Foreign Service such as can contribute appreciably to the avoidance of international conflict. It is in the hope of creating such a Service that it is proposed to introduce the reforms which are summarised in greater detail below.

#### SUMMARY OF PROPOSED REFORMS.

##### I.—Amalgamation of the Services and Regrading of Posts.

11. After the last war the Foreign Office was amalgamated with the Diplomatic Service, but the Commercial Diplomatic and Consular Services remained separate, and the Foreign Office was still regarded as part of the Home Civil Service. The result was that the free interchange between posts of different types, which is essential if all men are to get the wider training and experience that are so desirable, and if the best man is to be made available for any particular post, was hindered, and members of the Commercial Diplomatic and Consular Services were only in exceptional cases able to reach the highest posts. In the new Service most men will have to spend the greater part of their careers abroad, and the Foreign Office will in future be regarded as one of the posts and as the headquarters of the Foreign Service, rather than as a department of the Home Civil Service. The amalgamation of the separate Services into one complete and independent Foreign Service will, it is believed, broaden the training (in its fullest sense) by combining knowledge of economic, industrial and shipping affairs with practical experience of dealing with the public and with the wider appreciation of international relations which is the field of diplomacy. The functions of diplomatic officers accredited to a foreign Government must continue in many respects to differ from those of consular officers. The number of consular posts must continue to exceed that of diplomatic posts. But the maintenance of the present disparity between the numbers of the diplomatic and the consular posts would make an effective amalgamation impossible. It would mean that if there were to be any equality of conditions of service all men would obtain a predominantly consular experience and training. This would be to the detriment of the political work of the Service. It will, therefore, be necessary to increase the number of diplomatic officers and to reduce the number of consular officers. It will in any case be necessary to increase the size of the diplomatic staffs if Missions abroad are to be strong enough to make our influence more widely felt, and if officers, being no longer tied to their desks, are to be enabled to extend the range of their contacts. New arrangements will be made for staffing consular posts of lesser importance, and, by regrouping and reorganising posts and making use of improved communications by air, adequate and effective consular representation will be assured.

12. By facilitating the transfer to the Foreign Office of senior men of experience, more effective interchange of officers between posts at home and abroad will be ensured so that Foreign Service men can keep in touch with developments at home and the Secretary of State will be enabled to employ the most suitable man at any particular post at home or abroad. This will involve an increase in the number of posts at home and the upgrading of posts in the Foreign Office which carry responsibilities greater than should

properly devolve on men of the rank now attaching to them. Furthermore, it will be necessary to improve the prospects of promotion in the junior grades of the Foreign Service and to upgrade the status of certain consular and commercial-diplomatic posts of incontestable importance in order that they may be held by men of the experience and standing which the posts merit.

## II.—Recruitment and Training.

13. In the conduct of international affairs much depends upon the personal relations which a foreign representative succeeds in establishing with the people of the country concerned. In the choice of men for the Foreign Service particular attention must therefore be paid to the personality and character of the candidates while ensuring that they possess the intellectual capacity and knowledge necessary for their career. This knowledge can with difficulty be acquired without special study such as to-day requires the assistance of private means. This in its turn places a limitation on the field of selection of candidates which cannot be accepted. The new scheme of recruitment and training will therefore consist of a preliminary competitive entrance test designed so that it can be taken without special study, followed by a period of training abroad at the expense of the State. At the end of this studentship period candidates will be examined in their special subjects, and, if they qualify, will become members of the Foreign Service. They will then undergo a year's training in this country, part of which will be spent in the Foreign Office and part in getting a grounding in economic, commercial and social questions. The present preliminary Foreign Office Selection Board will be abolished.

14. It will be seen that the entrance examination will be taken in two parts. At the first part, which will be taken between the ages of 21 and 23, the majority of the vacancies will be filled by means of an open competitive examination (Method 1). While it is not considered that an entry based upon selection alone would ensure that candidates possess the necessary intellectual qualities, it is proposed, as an experimental measure, that candidates for a proportion of the vacancies should be chosen by a method based mainly on selection (Method 2).

15. For those who compete by Method 1 there will be an open competitive examination conducted by the Civil Service Commission and so designed that candidates shall be able to take it shortly after their University degree examination and without special study. (Although designed for those who have studied at a University in this country, the examination will be open, as at present, to candidates who have not attended a University). This examination will be similar to that for the Home and Indian Civil Services in order that candidates may compete for all or any of the Services and that a larger number of candidates may therefore be encouraged to compete.

16. Method 2 is designed to attract candidates who might be discouraged at having to sit for another examination immediately after that for their degree and to enable due weight to be given to the claims of character and personality as distinct from mere ability to pass written examinations. For an experimental period of ten years candidates for not more than 25 per cent. of the annual vacancies will be chosen mainly by selection on the basis of their records, of their showing before an interview board (at which they will be required to reach a really high qualifying standard), and of a written examination in the English subjects compulsory for Method 1. Candidates who compete by this method will

be required to have reached a certain academic standard. A candidate will be free to compete by either or both of these Methods in the same year.

17. Candidates who compete successfully by either method will be given travelling studentships from public funds for 18 months in order that, under due supervision, they may study at least two languages abroad, together with history and economics, and acquire the necessary familiarity with life in countries other than their own.

18. The second part of the examination will be held at the end of the studentship period when candidates will have to pass a qualifying examination in the subjects studied during that period. In each part of the examination candidates will have to qualify at an interview before a board constituted by the Civil Service Commission with Foreign Service representation. The object of these interviews will be to assess the candidate's personal suitability for the Foreign Service.

19. Candidates who qualify will become members of the Foreign Service subject to one year's probationary period of work in this country. Half of this period will be spent in the Foreign Office. The other half will be spent in the study of economic, commercial and industrial questions in other Government Departments dealing with these affairs and in visiting centres of industry or in other suitable ways. The period will include study of labour questions and the Trade Union Movement, &c. This training is not aimed at producing experts in economic and social questions but at ensuring that all members of the new Service have a good general understanding of such matters and a foundation on which to build up specialised knowledge if necessary.

20. At the end of this period men will be posted to Missions and Consulates abroad. Provision will be made for ensuring an adequate supply of men for posts in oriental countries. The importance of knowledge of oriental as well as of latin and slavonic languages and the need for ensuring that all juniors get as wide an experience as possible will be borne in mind in the training period and in the posting of men in the early years of their service. During their later careers men will also be expected, so far as their other duties permit, to study the language of the country in which they are posted.

21. The provision made for the training of candidates in economic and commercial affairs and the fact that all men will be liable to serve in commercial-diplomatic and consular as well as political posts, should ensure that all members of the Service possess at least a general knowledge and understanding of ordinary economics and of commercial practice. It is felt that, in these circumstances, the appointment to Missions abroad of expert advisers in commercial affairs from outside the Service may be unnecessary and might, indeed, be undesirable since it would imply that these questions were outside the province of the Foreign Service officer. It is hoped, therefore, that the general level of ability and training of members of the Service will be such that none of them will feel obliged to make any essential part of their work the exclusive province of experts. This will not, however, preclude the appointment of expert advisers on commercial, social, agricultural or other matters when this is clearly in the public interest.

22. In order to facilitate understanding of questions of strategy and Imperial defence, as well as to promote close contact with the Service departments, it is hoped to make arrangements whereby members of the Foreign Service can be attached to the Imperial Defence College in somewhat larger numbers than before the war.

### III.—Conditions of Service at Home.

23. Most members of the Service will spend the greater part of their careers abroad, sometimes in distant and unhealthy posts. Their situation must, therefore, be considered not as that of men employed in this country, who may occasionally be posted away from home, but rather as that of men who spend most of their careers abroad and are only occasionally posted at home. At present, when transferred to the Foreign Office, Foreign Service men are subjected not only to personal inconvenience but also to distinct financial disadvantages. Thus, they normally incur considerable indirect expenditure over their transfer and the comparatively short period for which they may be kept in this country and the uncertainty of their future movements makes it necessary for them to plan their lives on a short-term basis. They thus incur greater expenditure over housing, the education of children, &c., than officials who reside permanently in this country and can plan their future with greater certainty. Moreover, Foreign Service officers posted to London, frequently find themselves involved in special social obligations, partly because of connexions which they have established when they served abroad and also because, if they are to be effective interpreters of this country when they go abroad again, they must be able to maintain wider contacts while at home than might otherwise be necessary.

24. While it is not suggested that the Foreign Service man at headquarters should be required to lead the same sort of representative life as his colleague abroad, it would clearly be inequitable if, as a result of the conditions under which he serves, he were placed in a worse financial position than members of the Home Civil Service. If assistance from public funds is to be given to enable men without private means to compete for the new Service, in order that the basis of recruitment may be widened, it is clearly necessary that such men should be able to live on their emoluments when once they are in the Service, whether abroad or at home. This they will be unable to do if full account is not taken of their special circumstances.

25. It is accordingly proposed that members of the Foreign Service should be paid a special grant on transfer to London.

### IV.—Administration.

26. For the administration of the new Service it is proposed to appoint an additional Deputy Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Office to relieve the Permanent Under-Secretary of administrative and non-political work. Under this officer all questions concerning appointments in the Service will be handled by a Personnel Department which will keep systematic records of every member of the Service based on reports and on personal contacts. Regular inspection of consular posts is already the rule; it will henceforth be applied to diplomatic Missions as well. The Personnel Department will furnish information for the Promotions Board which will advise the Secretary of State on the higher appointments. To advise the Foreign Secretary in cases of retirement on pension before the age of 60, it is proposed to establish a strong board under the chairmanship of a former senior member of the Service.

### V.—Pensions and Superannuation Bill.

27. With improved arrangements for the entry and training of candidates for the Foreign Service and the establishment of more systematic machinery for making appointments, cases of men being found

unsuitable for service in the highest ranks should, in future, be rare. It is, however, necessary for the reasons stated in paragraph 8 that the Foreign Secretary should, now and in the future, have the power to terminate, by retirement on pension before the age of 60, the services of men of the rank of First Secretary or Consul and upwards, who, though they have committed no fault meriting dismissal, are unsuited for posts of the highest responsibility and cannot be found other employment in the Government service. At present the Foreign Secretary has not this power. He is able only to place men on the unemployed list, leaving them without pay or pension, and is therefore subject to considerable pressure to employ a man even though he feels that he is unsuitable.

28. It has accordingly been decided to submit to Parliament a Bill which will give the Foreign Secretary the necessary powers. If he is to make use of these powers the Secretary of State must be able to pension off men—who may have given many years of loyal service—on conditions which do not involve financial hardship. It is therefore proposed, in the present Bill, slightly to increase the rates of pension payable in the middle ranks under existing legislation.

29. The present Bill is aimed at meeting only the immediate needs of the Service. It will be replaced after the war by a comprehensive Foreign Service Pensions and Superannuation Bill designed to meet the needs of the new Foreign Service. The comprehensive Bill will have not only to ensure to the Secretary of State the power to terminate on pension the services of men unfit for the highest posts but also to remove certain anomalies which have resulted from treating the staff of the Foreign Office as part of the Home Civil Service, to revise the basis on which the pensions of the Foreign Service have hitherto been calculated and to make suitable provision for the pensions of members of the subordinate branches of the Service. The necessary legislation will be submitted to Parliament as soon as possible after the war.

### VI.—Subordinate Staff.

30. For the reasons given in paragraph 7 it is intended that the new Foreign Service shall include not only the Diplomatic, Commercial-Diplomatic and Consular Services but also those subordinate branches whose members have hitherto formed part of the Home Civil Service or have been temporarily recruited on an unestablished basis. The combined Foreign Service will then consist of a senior Branch (A), covering the rank of Third Secretary (or Assistant in the Commercial-Diplomatic Service and Probationer Vice-Consul) up to Permanent Under-Secretary of State, and of four junior branches (B, C, D and E). All of its members will be pensionable and will be liable for service abroad as well as at home. Being liable for service abroad the subordinate members of the Service will be subject to the same sort of extra expense, resulting from transfer to London as well as from uncertainty of tenure at home, as members of Branch A. It is therefore intended that they should receive, on transfer to the Foreign Office, grants comparable to those payable to the latter.

31. In addition to the higher posts which will be available in the subordinate branches themselves, it is also proposed that juniors of exceptional merit shall be considered with other candidates competing for posts in Branch A by Method 2 (see paragraph 16). Provision will further be made for the promotion of more senior men, who have proved their suitability, to posts in Branch A.

AI

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 14, 1942.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR

VICE ADMIRAL EDWARDS.

The President asked that I keep him informed about the progress of negotiations with Robert with reference to the French aircraft carrier now at Martinique. This was the first that I had heard of this matter but he stated that you knew all about it.

Very respectfully,

John L. McCrea,  
Captain, U.S.Navy,  
Naval Aide to the President.

COPY

MOST SECRET

A14

McCrean Handle

REPORT NO. 39

NOVEMBER 23, 1942.

JAPANESE FEAR OF A BREAK IN CHILEAN NEUTRALITY

IN ONE OF THE MOST INTERESTING REPORTS AS YET AVAILABLE THE JAPANESE MINISTER IN CHILE SPECULATES AT SOME LENGTH ON THE VARIOUS EVENTUALITIES WHICH MIGHT ARISE IN CASE OF A BREAK BETWEEN CHILE AND THE AXIS.

His first fear is that in case of a break it would be difficult for the Axis powers to send out cyphered reports even from Argentina, thus leaving them without any source of secret information from that continent. He states that if Chile should break off relations with Germany and Italy but not with Japan, the Japanese Legation would forward any necessary messages for its two partners. But he feels that were the break to exclude Japan it would be interpreted as a rift in Axis solidarity, but that otherwise there would be no disadvantage. (He obviously hopes that in case of a break, Chile would except Japan, and arguments below tend to support this view).

He develops at some length the Axis programme in South America which is to isolate the United States from that continent, necessitating an attack upon the Panama Canal, together with raids upon shipping along the Pacific coast. When the time for such an attack comes, the fact that Chile may still be neutral would not, in the express opinion of the Minister, deter Japan in the least. But in order to maintain some semblance of good faith he suggests that before such an attack, diplomatic relations might first be broken, using such pretexts as the following: a previous break between Germany and Italy on the one hand and Chile on the other; complaints of Chilean interference with communications; in short any excuse which any Axis diplomat could devise conveniently on any occasion.

He then speculates about the possibility of a reverse combination of circumstances, namely, the declaration of war by Chile against Japan only. In this case German and Italian interests in Chile would be in a similar situation to Japanese interests in Brazil where a state of war exists between that country on the one hand and Germany and Italy on the other, but not between Brazil and Japan. In such an eventuality the Minister appears rather pessimistic about any effective consideration for Japanese interests shown by his Axis partners.

E.H. Norman,  
345 Laurier E.,  
Ottawa, Ontario.

Sumner

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF  
UNITED STATES FLEET

*Copy memo  
to file*

MEMORANDUM


Date November 20, 1942.

From Flag Secretary.

To: Admiral Leahy.

Admiral King has directed that this be forwarded to you expressing his concurrence.

Very respectfully,

  
G. L. RUSSELL.

Galapagos Islands

A14 - - - - -

In reply refer to Initials

and No.  
Op-13/PS  
Ser. No. 083713  
(SC)A14-7/EF23

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  
FLAG OFFICE  
RECEIVED

11 436

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

1942 NOV 19 16 58

WASHINGTON

SECRET

November 19, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY. *(via Admiral King)*

SUBJECT: Galapagos Islands.

1. The visit of the President of Ecuador to Washington brings to mind the importance of the Galapagos Islands, and the probability that some discussion concerning these islands may take place between the Presidents.

2. Our presence in the Galapagos is covered by an Agreement signed by Secretary Hull and Ambassador Alfaro on 2 February 1942. A copy of this agreement is attached. Attention is invited to Articles V and VI.

3. While the outright purchase of these islands would probably be the most satisfactory answer from our viewpoint, such a plan would probably cause the old spectre of Yankee Imperialism to blazon forth in South America. On the other hand, at this time with war in progress, the importance to all the Americas of the defense of the Panama Canal would probably cause a favorable attitude in South America toward a lease or other agreement with Ecuador which provided for minimum arrangements in the islands to guarantee protection of the canal.

4. In view of the above, it is suggested that consideration be given to discussing a long term lease for certain minimum requirements in the Galapagos which could be made effective at once and yearly payments commenced.

5. Some payment at this time would compensate Ecuador to some extent for any present decrease in the tuna fishing industry income.

6. It is understood that the Peruvian-Ecuadorian border dispute has been for years a bar to direct discussion of this matter with the Ecuadorians. Apparently this bar no longer exists. We have not attempted to discuss this matter with the State Department as to whether it is a good time for negotiations.

7. The following minimum conditions are desired:

- (a) A long term lease for full control of the Seymour Islands and adjacent waters including a strip of the shore of Santa Cruz Island within two miles of South Channel.


(b) Right to establish and maintain on other islands, radar stations, observation posts and such additional defenses as are necessary for the defence of the area and installations covered in (a) above. The sites provided for in this article to be under the full control of the United States.

(c) Rights for U. S. planes and ships to operate freely in and about the whole Archipelago.

(d) Right of entry for equipment, supplies, and personnel without duties or taxes.

(e) Right to obtain fresh water from Freshwater Bay.

8. Some background on this subject is attached herewith in a memorandum from Captain Foster to Captain Struble. Whether an indirect basis, such as a Flora and Fauna Park, is desirable in these negotiations would appear to be a matter that might be settled if the Presidents themselves discussed the subject.

  
F. J. Horne.

SECRET

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

WHEREAS: At the Eighth International Conference of American States held at Lima in December 1938, the Governments of the American States reaffirmed in the Declaration of Lima their continental solidarity, and their purpose to collaborate in the maintenance of the principles upon which this solidarity is based, and to defend their absolute sovereignty against all foreign intervention or activity;

WHEREAS: The Second Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, which was held at Habana in July 1940, in accordance with agreements approved at previous Inter-American Conference, including the Declaration of Lima, adopted a Resolution known as Resolution XV, which declares:

"That any attempt on the part of a non-American State against the integrity or inviolability of the territory, the sovereignty or the political independence of an American State shall be considered as an act of aggression against the States which sign this declaration.

"In case acts of aggression are committed or should there be reason to believe that an act of aggression is being prepared by a non-American nation against the integrity or inviolability of the territory, the sovereignty or the political independence of an American nation, the nations signatory to the present declaration will consult among themselves in order to agree upon the measures it may be advisable to take.

"All the signatory nations, or two or more of them, according to circumstances, shall proceed to negotiate the necessary complementary agreements so as to organize cooperation for defense and the assistance that they shall lend each other in the event of aggressions such as those referred to in this declaration.";

WHEREAS: The United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador, reaffirming their faith in the foregoing principles, recognize the necessity of reaching an agreement regarding cooperative measures for Hemisphere defense in their respective territories and territorial waters; and

WHEREAS: The Executive Power of the Republic of Ecuador, in conformity with the law of September 26, 1941, is empowered to take all measures of a military nature which circumstances demand;

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Ecuador for such purposes agree upon the following:

CONFIDENTIAL

~~The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Ecuador for such purposes agree upon the following:~~

#### ARTICLE I

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Ecuador agree that either country may undertake, according to plans agreed upon between their appropriate military and naval authorities, operations on or over the lands and in or over the territorial waters of the other country for the purposes of Hemisphere defense, and to that end may do with the cooperation of the other Government any and all things necessary to carry out and to maintain such operations.

They furthermore agree that if for purposes of Hemisphere defense either Government should request the cooperation of the other Government for defense from enemy attack, the Government whose assistance has been requested will come to the aid of the other Government in every practicable way. The aid provided by the Government of Ecuador in accordance with this paragraph shall be confined within its own territory and territorial waters.

#### ARTICLE II

Any defense installations which may be made by either Government under Article I shall be for the joint use of the contracting parties on a fully cooperative basis.

#### ARTICLE III

Articles of every description imported into the United States of America or the Republic of Ecuador for use under Article I will not be subject to the payment of customs duties or any other fees or charges.

#### ARTICLE IV

The Government establishing or constructing any defense installations under this Agreement shall bear the cost of any indemnification or damages occasioned by the establishment or construction of such defense installations.

#### ARTICLE V

This Agreement, which shall be in force from the day of signature, shall continue in effect for the period of the present emergency and may continue thereafter, if, in the opinion of the two Governments, there still exists the danger of aggression by a non-American power against an American Power.

ARTICLE VI

The two Governments will maintain this Agreement confidential until such time as they agree that it shall be made public.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized for the purpose, have signed and sealed this Agreement in duplicate, in the English and Spanish languages, at Washington, this second day of February, 1942.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

CORDELL HULL  
Secretary of State of the  
United States of America

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR:

C. E. ALFARO  
Ambassador Extraordinary and  
Plenipotentiary of the Republic  
of Ecuador at Washington.

CONFIDENTIAL

In reply refer to Initials  
and No.

Op-12W-fhg

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON

November 5, 1942.

Memorandum to Captain A. D. Struble,  
Director, Central Division.

Subject: Galapagos negotiations.

1. In making plans for negotiating with Ecuador for acquisition by purchase or by lease or otherwise of the United States military, naval and air base in the Galapagos consideration must be given to several basic factors, some of which are conflicting or involved in questions of traditions, temperament and personalities. The most important of these factors are outlined below:

(A) Historical.

First negotiations between Ecuador and the United States involving the Galapagos began about 1853 and have been revived repeatedly by one side or the other. The subject became a political issue in Ecuador; at least one President was overthrown partly because of the charge that he was trying to sell the Islands to the United States; the question in Ecuador is generally considered to be full of political dynamite and in recent years has been avoided like the "Third Term" issue was avoided for many years in this country. In short, the political background is a definite handicap to any Administration in power in Quito.

Only a very few Ecuadorean citizens have ever visited the Galapagos and for this reason a great illusion has been built up in the minds of the Ecuadorean public concerning the value of these Islands. Ecuadoreans believe the Islands to be exceedingly rich, awaiting only commercial development to become veritable bonanzas. A widely read author in Ecuador (Col. Alfaro, Ecuadorean Consul General at Colon, Panama) in his book "Galapagos Estrategico y Comercial" has proven - to the satisfaction of the Ecuadoreans - that the Galapagos are worth as much to the United States as the Panama Canal itself.

(B) Economics.

Collapse of the world market for cocoa following World War I, coupled with a devastating blight that reduced the output of Ecuador's cocoa crops, resulted in the prostration of Ecuador's economy. The country is desperately poor and in need of extensive and costly improvements such as road building, irrigation projects, etc. that will create a wider base for her future economic life. Ecuador's urgent needs for financial assistance from the United States will outweigh most of the other factors involved.

(C) Political.

The present Liberal Government of Ecuador is definitely friendly to the United States and the President, Dr. Carlos Arroyo Del Rio, is an exceedingly able and intelligent Executive. This Administration was elected in 1940 to serve until August, 1944; there is a Liberal majority in the Senate and in the Chamber of Deputies. However, there is strong and vociferous opposition to President Del Rio arising from:

(a) Hard times.

(b) Acceptance of the Rio settlement of the long standing Peruvian - Ecuadorean border dispute which many Ecuadoreans charge was made under pressure from our Government in the name of Pan American solidarity - but completely at the expense of Ecuador and in violation of justice.

(c) Pro-Axis sympathies in Falangists and Catholic Church groups whose support is openly given to the Conservative, or opposition party. Because of this political condition it would not be reasonable to expect President Del Rio to accept a proposal from our Government that could not be dressed up and presented to the Ecuadorean public in such a manner as to make it appear to be very attractive, and in this connection it should be borne in mind that the Ecuadorean public is illiterate and excitable.

(D) International.

Our State Department consistently opposed opening negotiations with Ecuador with respect to the Galapagos while the boundary dispute between Ecuador and Peru was

(D) continued -

unsettled. Peru took advantage of every mention of such negotiations or the possibility thereof to charge that Ecuador was buying American good will that would be used against Peru in the settlement of the boundary issue. This was a dangerous but purely artificial element that has been removed by the Rio settlement of January 1942. From my talks with diplomats and prominent citizens of nearly every country in Central and South America I am convinced that the Latin American countries would welcome our acquisition of the Galapagos so that these highly strategic Islands would be thereafter in strong hands for the better protection of Central and South America. Therefore, I feel that notwithstanding our public announcement that we do not seek any additional territory we would not encounter any genuine opposition to our acquisition of the Galapagos except from Axis inspired groups in Chile and the Argentine. Caution may still dictate to the State Department a policy of further postponement until some indefinite time in the future, but this issue must be met if we ever expect to acquire a base in the Galapagos and, in my opinion, there are greater risks involved in postponement than in consummating some sort of agreement at this time.

2. There is no yardstick with which to measure, in a military sense, the value of the Galapagos to this country. Our best military and naval authorities agree that an adequate air base in the Galapagos is the keystone to the western defenses of the Panama Canal. The development of aviation in the future certainly will enhance the value of Islands so strategically located as are the Galapagos. Naturally, we should make the deal on the best terms possible, but where so many intangibles are involved we should not start out with fixed, preconceived ideas of exactly how many dollars the Galapagos might be worth to us or might be worth to Ecuador. President Del Rio is a very intelligent lawyer who can not be easily out smarted in any negotiations. If we approach the negotiations with a niggardly attitude and try to drive a close, cheap deal with Ecuador we are doomed to disappointment.

3. Based upon consideration of the above factors, and others not mentioned for the sake of brevity, and upon my own exchange of views with President Del Rio, members of his Cabinet and leading members of the Ecuadorean Congress, I am of the opinion that our Government should endeavor at this time to acquire outright ownership of the entire

3. Continued -

Galapagos archipelago. I shall outline under the heading "Plan A" terms that I think would be acceptable to Ecuador. If this plan should be found to be not feasible, then, in my opinion, the next best plan would be along the lines outlined under the heading "Plan B". Further, if "Plan B" should prove unacceptable, then, in my opinion, the next best course of action would be that outlined under "Plan C". These three plans are attached hereto as enclosures.

*Paul F. Foster*

Paul F. Foster,  
Captain, U.S.N.R.

PLAN A

Outright purchase of Galapagos Archipelago

Under this plan the United States would acquire sovereignty over the entire Galapagos archipelago by outright purchase from Ecuador. Part of the purchase price should be paid in cash but most of it should be in the form of future payments over a period of years to be utilized for certain peace time purposes rather than for building up the Ecuadorean Army, Navy or Air Force for use against Peru. Further substantial assistance could be given in the form of long term loans, without interest, which loans would be for such projects as road building, irrigation, harbor development, agriculture (crop diversification and improvement of livestock), and for the development of mineral resources such as the manganese deposits in El Oro Province. In my opinion a purchase price somewhere between \$25,000,000 and \$50,000,000 would have to be paid; such a price does not seem to be out of line when compared to the purchase price for the Virgin Islands and the sums paid for the Panama Canal Zone. I believe that a comprehensive plan for the rehabilitation of Ecuador's national economy involving the building of roads, irrigation projects and harbor works, together with definite assistance to agriculture, would be found to be very attractive to the Ecuadorean public. The tangible benefits accruing from such a development program would offset the blow to Ecuadorean national ego in the transfer of sovereignty over the Galapagos following so soon upon the Rio Settlement where Ecuador relinquished her claims to vast areas in El Oriente. We should not lose sight of the fact that we have already spent between \$5,000,000 and \$10,000,000 on improvements and installations at our base on Seymour Island which will revert to Ecuador at the end of the war when we are expected to move out.

As a variation of Plan A, and to make the deal appear better in the eyes of the Pan American public, our Government might combine with the purchase an announcement of President Roosevelt's plan to create a Pan American Park or Wild Life Sanctuary in the Galapagos. By setting aside the entire archipelago for a Pan American Park, except for such areas like the Seymour Islands that we might need for military, naval and air bases, we could make the deal appear to be one made in the interest of all of the Latin American Republics rather than exclusively for our own benefit.

PLAN B

Long term lease of Military, Naval and Air base or bases

Under this plan we would take a 99 year lease on one or more Islands in the Galapagos with rights to control certain water areas adjacent thereto. Such a deal would be similar to the one made with Cuba covering our base at Guantanamo. A somewhat similar precedent is the arrangement with Panama covering the Canal Zone.

Under this plan we should obtain full control over North and South Seymour Islands and the right for our ships and planes to operate freely throughout the archipelago. The question of the installation and operation during peace time of radio and/or radar stations on other Islands in the archipelago is of secondary importance; this point could be left for future negotiations if need arose or we might include certain stipulations in the original deal. North and South Seymour Islands should be adequate for our purpose; I do not think we need fleet repair facilities there but we should have storage for fuels and complete communication facilities in addition to seaplane and land plane facilities. In my opinion we should give Ecuador as consideration for a 99 year lease on North and South Seymour Islands a fixed rental (for example \$50,000 per year) together with long term non-interest bearing loans for projects such as road building, irrigation, etc. as outlined in "Plan A". Naturally, Ecuador should not expect as much under "Plan B" as under "Plan A".

PLAN C

Creation by Ecuador of a Pan American Park in the Galapagos

Under this plan Ecuador would create a Pan-American Park or Wild Life Sanctuary comprising the Islands of Indefatigable (Santa Cruz), James (San Salvador), and Albemarle (Isabela). Sovereignty over these Islands would remain in the hands of Ecuador but they would be assigned solely for use as an International Scientific Reservation from which all commercial development would be excluded. All inhabitants on these Islands would be moved off and the Administration of the Islands would be placed in the hands of a Pan-American Board of Governors with representation from each nation in the Western Hemisphere. Our Government in turn would agree to pay for the costs of the creation of this Park, movement of inhabitants from these three Islands to the mainland or to other Islands in the Galapagos, indemnification of private owners of property involved, and cost of elimination of certain harmful wild life such as the wild dogs on Albemarle Island that prey upon the turtles and other rare species that are approaching extinction. Our Government would also indemnify Ecuador for the potential loss of wealth by reason of the exclusion of this park area from the field of commercial development. Our Government would assume the responsibility for the defense and policing of this Pan-American Park and for this purpose would require military, naval and air bases, which would be leased to us by Ecuador.

Sovereignty over the waters of the archipelago, except for certain water areas adjacent to our bases, would remain in the hands of Ecuador and she would continue to collect taxes from the tuna fishing industry from which she has in recent years developed an income of approximately \$100,000 per year. In my opinion, the costs of clearing all inhabitants off the three Islands of Indefatigable, James and Albemarle, together with the cost of satisfying all claims of private property owners involved, should not exceed \$1,000,000. The cost of organizing the proposed Park and eradicating all inimical animal life therein, and in maintaining a small staff of supervising scientists for a period of 10 years should not exceed \$1,000,000. The amount of indemnification that Ecuador would expect to offset the potential loss of revenue from any possible future commercial development of these three Islands could be merged with the rental paid for the lease of North and South Seymour Islands. Actually, these three Islands would probably be more of a liability than an asset to Ecuador but in order to make the transaction appear better in the eyes of the Ecuadorean public this possibility of future commercial development would have to be covered.

PLAN C - continued -

In my opinion, an annual rental of \$50,000 for the use of North and South Seymour Islands would suffice. However, in order to make this deal acceptable to the Ecuadorean public we would have to give further benefits in the form of special loans for the improvement of the national economy within continental Ecuador. Since every Latin American country has had substantial loans from the Export-Import Bank and is continuing to get benefits from our Government from the development and production of strategic materials of all kinds, we cannot count the ordinary loans made to Ecuador as special loans given in consideration of this Galapagos transaction. Ecuadoreans could point to the benefits given Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Venezuela and Uruguay which countries are not asked in return to cede or lease military, naval, and air bases for our use after the war. In other words, no matter what kind of a deal for the Galapagos we attempt to make with Ecuador we must dress it up so that the Ecuadorean public will believe it is really getting something substantial. President Del Rio must be applauded rather than censored for sponsoring the deal and staking his political life on it.