

BOX 164.

3. A-16 ALGIERS CONFERENCE: June 3 - 8, 1943.

SECRET


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is the President's copy of
the Combined Chiefs of Staff Memorandum for In-
formation No. 99 covering the conferences at
Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, dated
7 June 1943.

Very respectfully,


CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff.

1 Incl.

SECRET

This paper will be considered at the Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting on Tuesday, 8 June 1943.

BRITJ

7J

SECRET - SECURITY

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

COPY NO. 38

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

7 June 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 99

CONFERENCES AT ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS, ALGIERS

Note by the Secretaries

Herewith are the minutes of the Conferences held at Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, during the visit of the Prime Minister, General Marshall and General Sir Alan Brooke, 29 May 1943 to 3 June 1943.

H. REDMAN,

J. R. DEANE,

Combined Secretariat.

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

MINUTES OF A MEETING

held at

GENERAL EISENHOWER'S VILLA, ALGIERS,
at 1700 hours, 29 May 1943

PRESENT

BRITISH

The Prime Minister
General Sir Alan F. Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Andrew B. Cunningham
General Sir Harold Alexander
Air Chief Marshal
Sir Arthur Tedder
Lieut. General Sir Hastings L. Ismay
Major General Humphrey Gale
Major General J. F. M. Whiteley
Brigadier C. S. Sugden
Commodore R. M. Dick

U.S.

General G. C. Marshall
General D. D. Eisenhower
Major General W. B. Smith
Brig. General L. W. Rooks

SECRETARIES

Lieut. Colonel Frank McCarthy
Major Carter L. Burgess

1. HOBGOBLIN

GENERAL EISENHOWER explained that HOBGOBLIN was the code name of the island and that the code name of the operation for capturing it was CORKSCREW.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that a telegram had been received from the British Vice Chiefs of Staff asking a number of questions about the operation -- what was the date? What were its military advantages? Would it prejudice surprise in HUSKY?, etc.

GENERAL EISENHOWER said that the date was 11 June; the military advantages of capturing HOBGOBLIN were obvious from a glance at the map; the possession of the airfield was almost essential to enable the necessary air cover to be given to the southern assault on HUSKY; there was no reason to suppose that it would prejudice surprise in HUSKY, since the operation could be represented as a necessary step in clearing the Sicilian narrows. General Eisenhower continuing said that the result of failure at HOBGOBLIN would be very bad, materially and morally, and he described the various precautions which were being taken to insure that failure did not occur.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that his present plan was to use 6-inch cruisers, but he was ready to bring in a 14-inch battleship if this appeared desirable.

THE PRIME MINISTER thought that the operation would provide a very useful experiment as to the extent to which coast defenses could be neutralized by aerial bombardment. There was a school of thought in the United Kingdom which thought that air forces could knock out coast defenses sufficiently to admit of practically unopposed landings. SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the difficulty lay in the fact that there was a time lag between the end of the aerial bombardment and the arrival of the assaulting troops and that this time lag gave the enemy time to recover. THE PRIME MINISTER drew attention to the possibility of following up the bombardment by dropping harmless bombs which would deceive the enemy into thinking that they were still under fire and thus keep their heads down.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that eight destroyers would go right in with the landing craft and cover the landings at point-blank range.

BRIGADIER SUGDEN, in reply to the questions of the Prime Minister, said that nineteen Sherman tanks were included in the assaulting force in the hope that their morale effect would be considerable. The Italians' strength was alleged to be about 10,000, including coast defense troops, together with about 100 tanks, but this information was based on deduction, not on direct evidence.

2. HUSKY

GENERAL EISENHOWER, in reply to a question from the Prime Minister, said that all resources required for HUSKY seemed to be coming forward punctually and in adequate numbers. He then gave a brief description of the plan.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that five American and four or five British cruisers, together with a considerable number of destroyers, would be used to cover the assault. There would also be numerous small gunboats and three large monitors.

SIR ARTHUR TEDDER, in reply to a question from the Prime Minister, said that the principal preoccupation of the Air Force would be to obtain and retain command of the air over the convoys and landings.

3. POST-HUSKY OPERATIONS

GENERAL EISENHOWER said that he had had a long talk with Sir Alan Brooke on the subject of the war situation as a whole and that Sir Alan had emphasized that the Russian Army was the only land force that could yield decisive results. Any Anglo-American force that could be put upon the Continent was merely a drop in the bucket. Sir Alan Brooke had therefore urged that the efforts of our armies must be directed towards diverting German strength from the Russian Front in order to enable the Russian Armies to inflict a decisive defeat upon them. He himself (General Eisenhower) thought that if we had command of the air, an Anglo-American force of, say, fifty divisions would probably be able to hold a force of seventy-five German divisions on the Continent. If it was generally accepted that a Second Front in Western Europe is unnecessary and that our main object was to divert German strength from the Russian Front, the conception of sending seven divisions away from the Mediterranean seemed to him to be somewhat faulty. If we were going to knock out Italy, we ought to do so immediately after HUSKY and with all the means at our disposal. HUSKY would give a good indication of the type of resistance likely to be encountered on the mainland of Italy itself; and if HUSKY proved to be an easy proposition, we ought to go directly into Italy. This would yield far greater prizes than any attack on the islands.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that there was no chance of our putting into Europe an Anglo-American Army in any way comparable in size to that of the Russians, who are now holding 218 German divisions on their front. By the first of May, 1944, we should have an expeditionary force of twenty-nine divisions in the United Kingdom, seven of which would have come from North Africa. Continuing, the Prime Minister said that the United Kingdom must be the assembly point of the largest force which we could accumulate, and it was necessary to have plans ready to cross the Channel in force at any time in case the Germans were to crack. As General Marshall had frequently pointed out, Northern France was the only theater in which the vast British Metropolitan Air Force and the U.S. Air Forces in the United Kingdom could be brought into full play. It was not, in any event, intended that the Anglo-American force in the United Kingdom should continue to accumulate beyond May, 1944, and it was our intention to launch a considerable operation which was likely to be accompanied by very heavy fighting and casualties at that time. The Prime Minister emphasized that both the British people and the British Army were anxious to fight across the Channel.

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

GENERAL MARSHALL said that a definite date for the cross-Channel operation had been settled by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and that five divisions would be used in the assault phase. The difficulty in the accumulation of the tremendous Air Force required lay not so much in the number of airplanes that could be delivered, but in the ability of the United Kingdom to absorb them. General Eisenhower had asked for information as to when he should submit his plan for knocking Italy out of the war. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff felt that no decision could be made until the result of HUSKY had been determined and the situation in Russia was known. The logical approach would be to set up two forces, each with its own staff, in separate places. One force would train for an operation against the islands of Sardinia and Corsica, and the other for an operation on the mainland of Italy. When the situation was sufficiently clear to enable a decision to be taken as to which of these operations was to go forward, the necessary air forces, landing craft, etc., would be made over to the force charged with implementing the selected plan.

THE PRIME MINISTER foresaw that if HUSKY went too quickly, there might be a long interlude of inactivity. GENERAL EISENHOWER said that if HUSKY were polished off easily, he would be willing to go straight to Italy.

SIR HAROLD ALEXANDER thought that if the HUSKY struggle were bitter and prolonged, we should be fighting hard in the island and there would not be any inactive interlude. If, however, HUSKY proved easy, we should immediately establish a bridgehead in Italy.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that a hard struggle between the Russians and Germans was imminent and that we should do all in our power to help the former and disperse the latter. The Germans were subjected to threats in many points in Europe. We had already caused a dispersal of their forces by our presence in North Africa and the skillful use of cover plans. HUSKY would be another step in the right direction. The Germans were faced with operations in Russia, with possible trouble in the Balkans, and with dangers in Italy, France and Norway. Their forces were already widely stretched and they could not further decrease their strength either in Russia or in France. The place where they could most conveniently reduce their commitments is Italy. We should, therefore, base our decisions on the result of HUSKY and on the situation then existing. If the foot of Italy were packed with troops, we should try elsewhere. If Italy were to be knocked out of the war, Germany would have to replace the twenty-six Italian divisions in the Balkans. They would also require additional strength in the Brenner Pass, along the Riviera, and on the Spanish and Italian frontiers. This dispersal of German forces is just what we require for a cross-Channel operation and we should do everything in our power to aggravate it. The defenses on the coast of France would present no difficulty unless they were held by determined men and the Germans had mobile reserves with which to counterattack.

GENERAL EISENHOWER said that the discussion had seemed to simplify his problem. If HUSKY were to succeed, say, within a week, he would at once cross the Straits and establish a bridgehead. The coast defenses of Southern Italy would probably be easier to crack than those of HUSKY.

THE PRIME MINISTER expressed the personal view that HUSKY would be finished by August 15.

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

GENERAL MARSHALL said that we ought to have a good idea of how long the operations would last by the end of July. In the meanwhile, we should prepare for various operations, give our troops the best of training, and postpone the final decision until the result of HUSKY was known.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that if HUSKY had proved successful by August and the strain had not been too heavy, we should at once go for the toe of Italy, provided that not too many German divisions had been moved there. He thought that the Balkans represented a greater danger to Germany than the loss of Italy. In case of trouble in the former, Turkey might react to our advantage. Continuing, he said that he liked the idea of two forces and two staffs, and of preparing for alternative operations. He suggested that further consideration should be given to the matter and that there should be another meeting next Monday.

GENERAL EISENHOWER drew attention to the fact that going to Italy after HUSKY would mean the execution of yet another amphibious operation.

SIR ALAN BROOKE asked what should be done if during HUSKY we should receive evidence of a crack-up in Italy. Certainly we should have some definite scheme.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that such a scheme would be largely a naval proposition.

SIR ALAN BROOKE felt that General Eisenhower should give some thought to this matter and suggested consideration of armistice terms and how far up into Italy we should go.

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that there are nine U.S. divisions in North Africa, including an airborne division. Seven divisions, including some British and U.S., will soon begin to leave around the first of November. There are two and one-half well-armed Polish divisions in Persia, and they wish to take part in any move directed against Italy. The New Zealand Parliament agreed that their division should be available by September, and that an armored brigade would be ready by October. The Poles and the New Zealanders would thus provide four divisions.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the strength would amount to twenty-seven British and Allied Divisions, nine U.S. Divisions and four French Divisions; allowing ten percent casualties for HUSKY and subsequent operations, the total would be thirty-six. This would further be reduced by the seven divisions to be sent to the United Kingdom and two to cover the British commitment to Turkey. The final total would thus be twenty-seven divisions in the Mediterranean area. (Re C.C.S. 244) Sir Alan Brooke then stated what the total liabilities would be for these divisions.

THE PRIME MINISTER said it probably would not be necessary to leave much strength in HUSKY, since its inhabitants were known to be disloyal to Mussolini. The Prime Minister called attention to the fact that the strength of our division is almost double that of the German Division, which is little more than a glorified brigade group.

THE PRIME MINISTER again stated that it would be bad if nothing happened between August or September and next May. Unless we should be repulsed at the beaches in HUSKY, we should make plans and decide which to use when HUSKY has been started.

BRIGADIER SUGDEN stated that landing craft and shipping might impose a limitation on our further movements in the Mediterranean.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that we should be in good condition once we seized ports. Distances are short in the Mediterranean, and it is just as easy to feed troops in HUSKY as in North Africa.

THE PRIME MINISTER added that he hoped that he and General Marshall could make a report to the President within the next few days.

THE CONFERENCE:-

a. Took note of General Eisenhower's opinion that there are three possibilities to be provided for. These are:

- (1) A quick Sicilian collapse. In this event, immediate operations against the Italian Mainland would be undertaken as a logical follow-up of HUSKY without awaiting formal decision. This is being planned by AFHQ.
- (2) Stubborn resistance encountered in HUSKY but success foreseeable by, say, August 15. The specific post-HUSKY operation in this eventuality cannot be decided in advance. Accordingly, it was his intention to designate two separate Headquarters, each with its own staff, to plan and, so far as possible, to mount post-HUSKY operations. One of these Headquarters primarily will plan and partially mount operations to the west of HUSKY (BRIMSTONE - FIRE-BRAND) and secondarily support bridgehead operations from SICILY. The other Headquarters will plan and partially mount operations against the Mainland of ITALY, primarily the toe and ball.

The recommendation of the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, is to be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as soon as possible after the launching of HUSKY in order to have the advantage of experiences gained in the initial phases of the HUSKY Operation and that the decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff may be taken in the light of the general situation existing at the time. As soon as the decision has been taken as to which operation is to be launched, the Air Forces, landing craft, etc., necessary to implement the selected operation will be turned over to the force charged with its execution. The implications of the above are immediately to be studied by General Eisenhower's staff to determine how far it is practicable to carry this plan into effect with the means available.

- (3) Prolonged and bitter resistance which will tie down our aircraft and landing craft for an indefinite period. This would leave no resources available for any immediate post-HUSKY Operation which can now be determined upon.

It will be seen from the above that it is only in the second eventuality that a formal decision by the Combined Chiefs of Staff will be required.

b. Agreed that the Conference would reassemble at 1700 Monday, 31 May, to discuss the results of the above examination.

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

REVISED
MINUTES OF A MEETING

Held At

GENERAL EISENHOWER'S VILLA, ALGIERS,
at 1700 hours, 31 May 1943.

PRESENT

BRITISH

The Prime Minister
The Right Hon. Anthony Eden
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew
B. Cunningham
General Sir Alan F. Brooke
General Sir Harold Alexander
Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur
Tedder
Lieut. General Sir Hastings L.
Ismay
Brigadier C. S. Sugden
Commodore R. M. Dick
Captain T. M. Brownrigg, RN.

U.S.

General G. C. Marshall
General D. D. Eisenhower
Major General T. T. Handy
Major General W. B. Smith
Brig. General L. W. Rooks

SECRETARIES

Lieut. Colonel Frank McCarthy
Major Carter L. Burgess

(Appendix "A" attached to these Minutes)

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

THE PRIME MINISTER opened the meeting by asking General Eisenhower for his comments on the completeness of the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff during the Trident conference in Washington. GENERAL EISENHOWER stated that as far as he was concerned, there was nothing to be added or subtracted. He and his forces would be ready to do all they could in exploitation of HUSKY. In case of rapid destruction of enemy forces in HUSKY, there could be only one course of action; namely, to cross the Straits of Messina and seize the largest possible bridge-head. The final decision, however, as to whether we should go on further into Italy or to Sardinia must depend upon circumstances and must be reserved to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

THE PRIME MINISTER stated his most sincere wish and hope was that we should be able to go from HUSKY directly into Italy. He had circulated some notes (Appendix "A"), which gave his own views, as a background for today's conference.

GENERAL EISENHOWER stated that the term "quick collapse" had often been used and that he wished to define the term. He understood a quick collapse as being a situation which would not require the use of all the forces which we had set up for HUSKY. He estimated that we should be able to predict the outcome of HUSKY fairly accurately within ten days after the initial assault, although some enemy forces might hold out in mountain fastnesses considerably after that time.

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed generally, stating that an accurate prediction might not be made until a fortnight after the first blow. At least it would not be necessary to make a prediction on the basis of the first day's action. His heart lay in an invasion of Southern Italy, but the fortunes of battle might necessitate a different course. At any rate, the alternative between Southern Italy and Sardinia involved the difference between a glorious campaign and a mere convenience.

GENERAL MARSHALL requested clarification of the meaning of "quick decision".

GENERAL EISENHOWER said that by the word "decision" he did not mean conclusion of action, but rather the arrival of a time at which a fairly accurate forecast could be made.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that if, by the first of August, we could predict that the conquest of HUSKY would be complete by 15 August, an attack on the mainland of Italy should be made.

GENERAL MARSHALL introduced the view that a much better decision could be made as to post-HUSKY after the initial phases of HUSKY had been completed. He felt it would be necessary to know something of the German reactions to HUSKY in order to determine whether there would be real resistance in Southern Italy; whether the Germans would withdraw to the Po for example; whether they could organize and handle the Italians with any finesse; of the preparations that might have been made on Sardinia, Corsica, or in the Balkan Peninsula; what readjustments they would make on the Russian Front. All of these things would be factors in deciding our post-HUSKY plans. There were two or three different ways in which Italy might fall, and careful consideration would have to be given to the matter of

U. S. SECRET

BRITISH MOST SECRET

what would be done with such divisions, along with their transport, as might not be used there; how far north we should go in Italy and the rate at which we should become involved. It was his opinion that we should not commit ourselves until we knew as much as possible, but at the same time we should take measures to avoid a serious delay in exploiting HUSKY. While the minutes of the meeting of 29 May explained clearly what alternatives we might have after HUSKY, a great deal could happen between now and July. He, General Eisenhower, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff were fully aware of the Prime Minister's feelings regarding a movement into Italy, but their only desire was to select the post-HUSKY alternative which would be productive of the largest results. We should choose that alternative only after the experiences and intelligence resulting from HUSKY enabled us to make the best possible decision.

GENERAL EISENHOWER wished it understood that small detachments might be sent across the Straits of Messina as a test, and he hoped that the action of putting out these detachments would not be considered in exploitation of HUSKY, but rather a part of the operation itself.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the conclusions of the minutes of the last meeting did not represent his whole feeling, since he very passionately wanted to see Italy out of the war and Rome in our possession. He would be willing to send eight additional divisions if these were needed for the realization of this result.

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that the additional divisions would not be full divisions, but equivalent divisions satisfactory for garrisoning and the like.

GENERAL MARSHALL asked what extra service and anti-aircraft troops would be needed for use in Italy if we held HUSKY and moved on to the mainland.

GENERAL SMITH replied that a flash estimate indicated a requirement of 30,000 United States troops and 33,000 British troops, to be provided from outside the North African Theater of Operations for operations in the toe and ball, but not in the heel, of Italy. These would be supporting and administrative units and would include about six United States and five British anti-aircraft battalions. The toe and ball area could be defined as extending from Reggio to a point somewhat beyond Mt. Etna.

GENERAL MARSHALL inquired why the total of divisions in North Africa prior to the ROUNDHAMMER build-up was set at thirty-six and asked whether this limitation was imposed by shipping or by availability of defense.

SIR ALAN BROOKE answered that both factors influenced the limitation and reminded that many of the divisions within this quota would be equivalent rather than actual.

GENERAL MARSHALL remarked that the need for 63,000 troops above those already scheduled for the impending operations had not been mentioned before and seemed to involve a new shipping commitment. He asked Sir Harold Alexander to comment.

U. S. SECRET

BRITISH MOST SECRET

SIR HAROLD ALEXANDER stated that the figure seemed high, but that we should be well-prepared for whatever decision might follow a quick success in HUSKY.

GENERAL MARSHALL asked what difference there would be in the need for troops other than those which would be in the North African Theater if HUSKY were to come into our hands very quickly.

BRIGADIER SUGDEN replied that there would be very little difference as far as North Africa is concerned, since enemy air threats would still exist at many points. SIR ARTHUR TEDDER concurred in this view.

SIR HAROLD ALEXANDER expressed the opinion that, while there might not be a great difference in the need for anti-aircraft, there should be a difference in the need for other troops, since forces on HUSKY would leave there and move on to other places.

GENERAL SMITH, in answer to a question by General Marshall, stated that in earlier planning for a move against Sardinia, it had been estimated that 67,000 troops other than those already in the North African Theater would be required.

GENERAL MARSHALL expressed the understanding that General Eisenhower was to have available for post-HUSKY all troops in the North African Theater at the time of HUSKY except seven divisions which were to move to the United Kingdom beginning 1 November; air force loaned for HUSKY with the understanding that they would be withdrawn, and possibly certain naval warcraft whose availability was to be decided after the completion of HUSKY. He inquired whether the figure of 63,000 was to apply exclusive of these exceptions.

GENERAL SMITH answered in the affirmative. Some of these additional troops might be found in the Middle East. There was a great need for additional anti-aircraft unless we proposed to take longer risks in North Africa, where we are already cutting down. However, he pointed out that the figure of 63,000 was only an approximation. About one-third would be anti-aircraft and the remaining two-thirds would be Services of Supply and Signal troops.

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that if we secured more ports, we must certainly have more anti-aircraft. It would be absolutely essential to guard ports used for our forward movements. As the enemy rolled away, however, we should be able to lessen the anti-aircraft in ports which became more remote as a result of their retreat. It would be possible to secure some anti-aircraft from the Eastern Mediterranean, and this matter should be looked into carefully, along with the proposition of taking more anti-aircraft strength from England itself. He would be willing to take additional punishment at home in order to see the operations through successfully.

SIR ALAN BROOKE commented that anti-aircraft strength in the United Kingdom had already been considerably lessened, as it had been in Suez, in West Africa, and in a number of other places. He pointed out that the cost of the operations planned would be colossal if we were not prepared to reduce defenses in the rear as we move forward.

U. S. SECRET

BRITISH MOST SECRET

GENERAL SMITH re-emphasized the point that a maximum of protection would be necessary at points of departure for landing craft. On the Tunisian coast, for instance, it would be necessary to double the present antiaircraft strength, as antiaircraft units intended for the operation would be ineffective while loading and during shipment. Once the landing craft had sailed, however, it would be possible to strip down port antiaircraft defenses considerably. Airdromes have already been stripped in the interest of port protection.

GENERAL MARSHALL raised the point that meeting the requirement for 63,000 additional troops would raise a new shipping problem and one which had not previously been considered.

GENERAL SMITH stated that the staff would break down the 63,000 service troop item and see what could be secured from the Middle East.

THE PRIME MINISTER indicated that certain divisions, including some of those of the 8th Army, had moved back without taking all of their service troops and said he believed that some of these could be used as a part of the 63,000. For example, the 8th Army had motor transport sufficient to maintain it over an immense stretch of communications, and it should be possible to make some of this available. He also suggested that we should be able to draw upon some of the administrative services, particularly signal units, of the First Army when that organization was disbanded.

BRIGADIER SUGDEN said that the IX Corps signal units were being absorbed in North Africa and that all of them would be used in HUSKY. The need for troops over and above those already set up for North Africa was due to the fact that if post-HUSKY was to continue immediately upon HUSKY, there would be no time for reorganizing units used during HUSKY and throwing them immediately into the next operation unless there was to be a time lag between HUSKY and post-HUSKY.

SIR ALAN BROOKE reiterated his view that a movement into the toe of Italy should be considered as a part of HUSKY and that the same troops which went into the latter could continue their advance into the former.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that if it took until 14 August to foresee a successful conclusion of HUSKY by 28 August, we should not wait until the latter date to start post-HUSKY, but should rather start it on 14 August. If we found it necessary to deliver extra strength to the North African Theater for the purpose of effecting post-HUSKY, we should do it. Some of the additional antiaircraft units needed could be secured from the United Kingdom and it would not be thought unreasonable to take for this purpose certain of the units which were being held for ROUNDHAMMER. These units could be used for post-HUSKY and still be brought back for their rendezvous in May 1944. THE PRIME MINISTER added that if General Eisenhower wished to move from HUSKY into Italy, there should be no interval between the two operations which would permit the enemy to pull himself together and prepare himself for the second.

U. S. SECRET

BRITISH MOST SECRET

GENERAL MARSHALL spoke of the careful planning which lay behind the shipping arrangements made at the Trident conferences in Washington and to the small deficit in shipping which had been encountered. He reminded his colleagues that the ball and toe of Italy, which it was proposed to take, was only a small part of the entire nation. The shipping situation was so serious that, under plans already formulated and without provision for the 63,000 additional troops, it would be necessary for us to let some divisions fall below strength and for the British to consider the elimination of certain units. He wished to be perfectly sure that the price in shipping was carefully considered and that it did not involve resources in an operation calling for more ships than we could actually secure. He re-emphasized that we should not set our hearts too fully on one operation or another until the early results of HUSKY had been tabulated.

THE PRIME MINISTER stated it would be hard for him to ask the British people to cut their rations again, but he would gladly do so rather than throw away a campaign which had possibilities of great success. He could not endure to see a great army stand idle when they might be engaged in eliminating Italy from the war. Parliament and the people would become impatient if the Army were not active, and he was willing to take almost desperate steps in order to prevent such a calamity.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he was not arguing against the broad commitment made in Washington to aim at the fall of Italy. He only wished to emphasize that we must exercise great discretion in the selection of an operation to follow HUSKY, calculating closely what would be required and basing calculations upon an accurate knowledge of what was to be faced.

MR. EDEN, upon the question of the Prime Minister, commented on the Turkish situation. He said it should be borne in mind that prospects for bringing Turkey into the war through persuasion were not good and that perhaps the time had arrived for more forceful measures. Knocking Italy out of the war would go a long way towards bringing the Turks in. They would become much more friendly when our troops had reached the Balkan area.

THE PRIME MINISTER intervened to observe emphatically that he was not advocating sending an army into the Balkans now or in the near future.

MR. EDEN said that it would not be necessary to put an army into the Balkans, since the Turks would begin to show favorable reactions as soon as we were able to constitute an actual and immediate threat to the Balkans. Continuing, he said that a feeling was growing up among the Italians that Germany was not giving them the help that their plight necessitated. If this state of affairs continued, there was a good chance of Italy going out of the war.

U. S. SECRET

BRITISH MOST SECRET

SIR ALAN BROOKE gave an analysis of the problem of the Germans as he saw it. A great battle in Russia was imminent, with the Russians well-situated and probably planning to attack if the Germans did not do so, although they would actually prefer to wait for colder weather before assuming the offensive. It was reported that there had been some minor successes in the Kuban. He did not anticipate a large withdrawal of German troops from Russia. On the other hand, the Germans must certainly have foreseen the signs of an attack to be made by Great Britain and the United States. As a result of the arrival of our landing craft and of other signs pointing to offensive action on our part, the Germans were probably nervous about committing themselves heavily in Russia. Falling back in Russia would cause them to expose some vital areas to Russian bombing. Thus it appeared that they would either give up Italy or withdraw from the Balkans. It appeared unlikely that they would choose the former course. He felt that their problem was a very difficult one.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that certain units were already being moved away from HUSKY and that the Germans may have already made up their minds as to what they should abandon.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said he believed the units moved from HUSKY were motor torpedo units. They were moved to the southern coast of France but they might return. While such movement might be a straw in the wind, it was a small straw, since there would be no use for these units along the French coast and since HUSKY was the only place where they would be of any value. It seemed likely that the Germans had moved their main repair bases to France and that the motor torpedo units were going in for repairs.

SIR HAROLD ALEXANDER, upon the request of the Prime Minister, stated his general impression regarding our forthcoming operations. After examining intelligence on the defense of HUSKY and after recent fighting against Germans and Italians, he was optimistic. The fighting value of our troops and equipment was excellent. Our chances of success were excellent, although it might take a fortnight of very bitter fighting to attain it. Once we joined battle, he continued, the sloggng generally lasts from ten days to a fortnight or even three weeks. Then the end comes quickly. He said that the most important points in connection with HUSKY were the airfields, in the southeast corner of the island, and the ports. Once we had a firm grip on these, we could ignore the remainder of the island for the time being. It should be possible to cross the Straits of Messina and secure a foothold on the opposite shore, which was the very windpipe of HUSKY. He repeated his statement made in the meeting of 29 May that securing a bridgehead on the Italian mainland should be considered as a part of HUSKY. It would be impossible for us to win a great victory unless we should exploit HUSKY by moving ahead, preferably up into Italy. All this, however, will be clarified as the HUSKY operation moves along. It is not impossible, although it seems unlikely, that the toe of Italy will be so strongly held as to require a complete restaging of operations. We should be prepared, however, to continue moving with no stop at all once HUSKY is inaugurated. Modern warfare allows us to forge ahead very rapidly with radio controlling troops at a great distance and with air providing protection and support over a great area.

U. S. SECRET

BRITISH MOST SECRET

The going may become more difficult as we move up the Italian mainland, but this is no argument against going as far as we can on the momentum of the HUSKY drive. He stated that none of the possibilities he had discussed could be accurately foreseen. In war the incredible often occurred. A few months ago it would have been impossible for him to believe what has actually happened to Rommel and his Afrika Korps. A few weeks ago he would have found it difficult to believe that 300,000 Germans would collapse in a week. The enemy air forces had been swept out of the skies so completely that we could have a parade, if we chose, of all our North Africa forces on one field in Tunisia without any danger from enemy aircraft.

SIR ARTHUR TEDDER said that we could not, in the initial phase of HUSKY, expect the degree of air superiority which had been attained in the final phase of the Tunisian campaign. The air threat to the shipping and landing craft should however be greatly eased once we have seized the airfields.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM, in answer to the Prime Minister's request that he offer comments on HUSKY and post-HUSKY, stated his view that we had every chance for success; that, after backing and filling, a good plan had been produced, and that sufficient time had been allowed for preparation. He agreed with Sir Harold Alexander that if all went well with HUSKY, we should go directly across the Straits. He pointed out that HUSKY was different from Tunis in that it will be impossible to put an absolute stop to enemy supply. There was no doubt that we should lose some ships, but because of our excellent air support he did not fear bombing as much as he feared the action of E-boats. Enemy air attacks would probably not pay because of the high degree of confidence which the crews of our small ships had developed in serial support. They themselves had shot down many enemy aircraft. There did not seem to be much cause to worry about losses in naval vessels, he said, and although we might feel losses in merchant ships, they should not be too large.

SIR HAROLD ALEXANDER stated that at the moment the Germans did not have much strength in the places we proposed to attack, although they did have some artillery and tanks. Communications in Italy, he said, were bad and getting worse. It was his feeling that if the Germans did not move quickly into Italy in larger force, they might be too late.

SIR ARTHUR TEDDER said that the air forces had been blasting Italian communications for weeks, the pressure on the enemy windpipe of which Sir Harold had referred was already being exerted. We knew that the enemy was already in serious difficulties in maintaining his supplies and reinforcing.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he thought the German High Command might have gone to Hitler and advised him they did not wish another Tunisia in Sardinia. He added that the discussions in Algiers had enabled him to form an opinion and provided material for a report to his Government.

GENERAL EISENHOWER said that he thought everything was well understood and that he appreciated the trip which the Prime Minister and General Marshall had made to clarify for him what the Combined Chiefs of Staff had done. He understood it was his

U. S. SECRET

BRITISH MOST SECRET

responsibility to get information regarding the early phases of HUSKY and forward them to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in time for the latter to make a decision regarding a plan which would follow upon HUSKY without a break or a stop. He would send not only information, but also strong recommendations based upon the conditions of the moment. He hoped that his three top commanders would have an opportunity to comment more formally on these matters, although he concurred completely in what they had said thus far.

It was agreed that there would be another meeting at General Eisenhower's villa on Thursday afternoon, 3 June, at an appropriate time.

APPENDIX "A"

31 May 1943

BACKGROUND NOTES

BY

THE PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE.

1. The troops in the table attached (Annex I) are in the Mediterranean. Of these the British or British controlled units which are under General Eisenhower's Command or earmarked for HUSKY are shown in Annex II.

From 1 November three British and four United States Divisions must begin their successive movement into the BOLERO area. Apart from sending drafts to existing units His Majesty's Government is prepared to reinforce General Eisenhower's Command, at such dates as may be found convenient or necessary, by the units shown in Annex III.

2. His Majesty's Government feel most strongly that this great force, which comprises their finest and most experienced divisions, and the main part of their army, should not in any circumstances remain idle. Such an attitude could not be justified to the British nation or to our Russian allies. We hold it our duty to engage the enemy as continuously and intensely as possible, and to draw off as many hostile divisions as possible from the front of our Russian allies. In this way, among others, the most favorable conditions will be established for the launching of BOLERO in 1944.

3. Compelling or inducing Italy to quit the war is the only objective in the Mediterranean worthy of the famous campaign already begun and adequate to the allied forces available and already in the Mediterranean basin. For this purpose the operation HUSKY is an indispensable preliminary, and the invasion of the mainland of Italy and the capture of Rome are the evident steps. In this way the greatest service can be rendered to the allied cause and the general progress of the war, both here and in the Channel Theater.

4. We cannot tell at present what degree of resistance the enemy will oppose to our action. Germany may make the strongest effort to defend HUSKYLAND and ITALY. We are told one Division a week could be transported to HUSKYLAND or the southern part of ITALY. It is desirable that this possibility should be reviewed in the light of the latest information, and stated in precise terms, i.e., the strength, gross and net, of the German Divisions, the number of guns, tanks and vehicles accompanying them, the areas from which they would most likely be drawn during the next 12 weeks and whether they will come by rail, march or sea. There are no signs at present of any movement of this character or on this scale. In order to have six Divisions in HUSKYLAND before the operation, the enemy decisions and preparations must

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

already have been made and their movement should already now be apparent. Moreover, if these six Divisions are to move to HUSKYLAND the southern parts of Italy must remain denuded. It is asked that the most searching re-examination of the German movements and capacity to move in the direction mentioned should be made by the Staffs.

5. If the Germans decide to move forces of the order of between 6 and 12 Divisions into HUSKYLAND and ITALY we shall certainly have achieved part of our task in drawing, directly or indirectly, forces off our Russian allies. If they do not do so, but only send one or two Divisions to stimulate Italian effort the tasks mentioned in paragraph 3 should not be beyond our strength in the next three or four months. If, on the other hand, the Germans elect to fight a major battle for HUSKYLAND or for the Italian toe, or both, our armies will be fully engaged and we shall bring about that intensity of air fighting which from our growing relative strength is so greatly to our advantage. If after we have established ourselves in the southern parts of Italy, Italy still continues to fight and the Germans send belated reinforcements on a large scale we might have to withdraw towards the tip, forcing them to attack successive prepared positions at heavy cost with all the advantages of a procured diversion and of the air battle aforesaid. There would be no reason to regard this as a disaster. As long as we are fighting heavily with the Germans or even with the Italians we shall be playing our part.

6. The present believed distribution of the Italian Army is set out in Annex IV. It will be seen that there are only 11 Italian Divisions in the mainland of Italy, about 4 in HUSKYLAND and 5 along the Riviera, and that no fewer than 28 are tied up in Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece. To these 28 must be added 8 Roumanian and 11 German Divisions, making a total of 47 held in the Balkan Peninsula by the guerrilla activities of the Serbian Michailovitch, the Croatian partisans, the general disorders in Greece and the unrest in these enslaved countries.

7. Should Italy be made to quit the war, the following practical advantages would be gained by us. The Germans would be forced to provide troops to occupy the Riviera, to maintain a new front along the Po or on the Brenner and, above all, to fill the void in the Balkans caused by the demobilization and withdrawal of Italian Divisions. Up to the present the guerrillas, etc., have only been nourished by parachute packets dropped from less than a dozen airplanes. Nevertheless, they are accomplishing the prodigious feat of immobilizing 47 enemy Divisions. The occupation of the southern parts of Italy, or even merely of the whole of the toe or heel would give us access to the Adriatic and the power to send shiploads of munitions to Adriatic ports, and also Agents and possibly small Commando bands. We should not have the troops to engage in any serious operations there, and His Majesty's Government do not contemplate or desire the provision of any organized armed force for the Balkan theater, either this year or in any period with which we are now concerned. Nevertheless, the aiding within the limits proposed of the patriot bands in Yugoslavia, the fomenting of revolt in Greece and Albania are measures of high importance all of which, together with our main operations, will influence the action of Turkey when, (provided the necessary conditions are established) she is subjected to our demands later in the year. In this way the utmost aid in our power will

U. S. SECRET

BRITISH MOST SECRET

be given to Russia and also to BOLERO. It is only when and if these prospects are decisively closed to us that we should consider secondary or minor alternatives for Mediterranean action.

8. All attempts to forecast the German action in the Mediterranean are, of course, highly speculative. Importance should however be attached to the painful impression certainly sustained by the German High Command of the complete destruction of an Army of over a quarter of a million men. In the light of this event it may be doubtful whether they would court the repetition in HUSKYLAND of a similar disaster though on a smaller scale. Our situation has vastly improved. First by the inspiring of the allied armies through their recent victories. Secondly, by the fact that only a few hundred of the enemy escaped from TUNISIA to HUSKYLAND. Thirdly, the psychological effects produced on Spain and Portugal, on Metropolitan France, in Italy and in Turkey and, indeed, throughout the whole area of the war. The German position has proportionately deteriorated. The series of immense battles impending on the Russian front must absorb their main strength. If the Germans do not attack, the Russians certainly will, and may indeed even forestall their enemy. We cannot foretell the results of these battles, but there is no reason to suppose that the conditions are not more favorable to the Russians than they were this time last year. It must therefore be considered unlikely:

a. that the Germans will attempt to fight a major battle in HUSKYLAND; or

b. that they will send strong forces into the leg of Italy. They would be wiser to fight only delaying actions, stimulating the Italians in these regions and retiring to the line of the Po, reserving their strength to hold the Riviera and the Balkans, which are of value as a supply area. If the battle goes against them in Russia and if our action upon or in Italy is also successful the Germans may be forced by events to withdraw to the Alps and the Danube, as well as making further withdrawal on the Russian front and possibly evacuating Norway. All these results may be achieved within the present year by bold and vigorous use of the forces at our disposal. No other action of the first magnitude is open to us this year in Europe.

ANNEX I TO APPENDIX "A"

Reference Para 1 of "BACKGROUND Notes"

31 May 1943

TROOPS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Notes:- 1. This list includes troops in NORTH AFRICA, TRIPOLITANIA, CYRENAICA, EGYPT, PALESTINE, SYRIA AND CYPRUS, plus formations allotted ex U.S.A. and U.K. for HUSKY, and one division on call from PAIC.

2. Certain divisions including those marked * will not become available for operations until a later date.

3. No account is taken of the possibility of having to break up one or more British divisions to provide reinforcements.

		Equivalent Subtotal	Divisions Total
<u>a. U.S.</u>			
Inf. Divs.	1, 3, 9, 34, 36, 45	6	
Armd. Divs.	1, 2	2	
Airborne Div.	82	1	9
<u>b. French</u>			
Inf. Divs.	three	3*	
Armd. Bdes.	one	1/3	3 1/3
<u>c. British and British Controlled</u>			
Inf. Divs.	1, 5, 46, 50, 51, 56, 78, 1 Cdn, 4 Ind, 8 Ind, 10 Ind, 3 Carpathian,* 5 Pol- ish,* Free French	14	
Divs.	4, N.Z.*	2	
Armd. Divs.	1, 6, 7, 10, 6 S.A.* 31 Ind.	6	
Airborne Div.	1	1	
Independent Inf. Bdes.	231, 1 Greek, 2 Greek, Belgian, SDF, Libyan Arab Force	2	
Independent Tank Bdes.	1 Cdn, 1 & 25 Army Tank Bdes, 8 & 23 Armd. Bdes, 4 Lt. Armd. Bde, 2 Polish*	2-1/3	27-1/3
Independent Para. Bde.	4	1/3	1/3
	Grand Total		40

U.S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

ANNEX II TO APPENDIX "A"

Reference Para 1 of "BACKGROUND Notes"

31 May 1943.

BRITISH AND BRITISH-CONTROLLED UNITS UNDER GENERAL
EISENHOWER'S COMMAND OR EARMARKED FOR HUSKY

		Total Equivalent Divisions
Inf Divs.	1, 5, 46, 50, 51, 78, 1 Cdn	7
Div.	4	1
Armd. Div.	6	1
Airborne Divisions	1	1
Independent Inf. Bde.	231	1/3
Independent Tank Bdes.	1 Cdn, 25 Army Tank Bde.	2/3
Independent Para. Bde.	4	1/3
	Total	11-1/3

Note:- Three of the above divisions will be earmarked for return to U.K. after HUSKY.

U.S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

ANNEX III TO APPENDIX "A"

Reference Para 1 of "BACKGROUND Notes"

31 May 1943.

BRITISH AND BRITISH-CONTROLLED UNITS WHICH COULD BE
TRANSFERRED TO GENERAL EISENHOWER'S COMMAND

Note: Allowance has been made in this table for internal security and other commitments of Middle East Command, but as there has been no opportunity to discuss these requirements with representatives of Middle East, figures and in particular nominations must be taken as approximate.

		Total Equivalent Divisions
Inf. Divs.	56, 4 Ind, 8 Ind, 3 Car- pathian, 5 Polish	5
Divs.	N.Z.	1
Armd. Divs.	1	1
Independent Tank Bdes.	1 Army Tank Bde, 4 Lt. Armd, 8 and 23d Armd, 2 Polish	1-2/3
	Total	<hr/> 8-2/3

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

MINUTES OF A MEETING

held at

GENERAL EISENHOWER'S VILLA, ALGIERS
at 1700 hours, 3 June 1943

PRESENT

BRITISH

The Prime Minister
The Right Hon. Anthony Eden
Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Andrew B. Cunningham
General Sir Alan F. Brooke
General Sir Harold Alexander
Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder
General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery
Lieutenant General
Sir Hastings L. Ismay
Brigadier C. S. Sugden
Commodore R. M. Dick

U. S.

General G. C. Marshall
General D. D. Eisenhower
Major General T. T. Handy
Major General W. B. Smith
Brig. General L. W. Rooks

SECRETARIES

Lieut. Colonel Frank McCarthy
Major Carter L. Burgess

1. OPERATION "SOAPSUDS"

GENERAL ISMAY said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had asked for General Eisenhower's recommendations on SOAPSUDS and inquired whether the conclusions of these minutes should be submitted to them.

GENERAL EISENHOWER replied in the affirmative.

After a general discussion of the proposed operation,

THE CONFERENCE:-

a. Agreed:

- (1) That SOAPSUDS is an important and desirable operation which should be undertaken by General Eisenhower at the earliest possible moment, provided that:
 - (a) It does not detract from the weight of HUSKY; and
 - (b) Adequate time is allowed for training and preparation. This would not be possible by June. The precise moment for this execution must be left to General Eisenhower.
- (2) That two groups of B-24's now in the U.K. and one group of B-24's now enroute to the U.K. from the United States by Africa should be assembled in North Africa as soon as possible for training. That during this period they will be available for operational use.
- (3) That it is inadvisable to withdraw for SOAPSUDS a heavy bombardment group from India.

b. Took note that the Prime Minister and General Marshall would present their conclusion to the British War Cabinet and the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, respectively, and that General Eisenhower's recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff would conform thereto.

2. MARSHALLING YARDS AT ROME

THE PRIME MINISTER requested Sir Arthur Tedder to comment upon air force activities in connection with HUSKY.

SIR ARTHUR TEDDER stated that our air forces were trying to keep enemy aircraft down and press them back. We are attacking the enemy's main bases. Several days ago we attacked Bari, from which he moved to Foggia. He has now moved farther away to Piazensa. We are interfering with his shipping and supply lines by hitting ports and railroads. Our attacks are telling. Recent photographs indicate that the enemy is using ferries for taking supplies into Italy.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he understood it was our object to build up in a steady crescendo, employing eventually all the air forces for bombing HUSKY.

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

THE PRIME MINISTER, upon inquiry from General Marshall, stated his feeling that some discussion of a proposal to bomb the marshalling yards near Rome would be appropriate. After seeing Archbishop Spellman, he had told the President that we would not bomb Rome for the present because of possible political repercussions. He now felt, however, that there was no tenable objection to the proposition, and for his own part he was ready to agree to bombing the marshalling yards. He pointed out that since daylight precision bombing was quite accurate, it was probable the yards could be attacked with small chance of damage to Rome itself and none to the Vatican. He not only would raise no objection to the bombing, but he would even suggest that it should be done.

MR. EDEN said that Rome, like Naples, was on the HUSKY supply line. He inquired as to the location of the marshalling yards with respect to Vatican City.

SIR ARTHUR TEDDER replied that, as he remembered, the marshalling yards were to the Southeast.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM indicated that since the yards and Vatican City were on different sides of the Tiber, there was a clear line between them.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that he considered the marshalling yards a purely military objective, and that while their destruction would be of material benefit to the HUSKY operation, the psychological effect would be even more important. The bombing should be executed by a very large force of aircraft.

MR. EDEN said he was amazed at the accuracy of the bombing of Tunis and at the fact that very few bombs dropped anywhere except in the port area.

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that he would like to see the British War Cabinet and the President empower General Eisenhower to go ahead with the bombing whenever such action would assist HUSKY.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that if we were to bomb the marshalling yards, we should be prepared to have Cairo bombed in retaliation.

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that a declaration of war by Egypt might follow a bombing of Cairo. He recalled he had often said to Parliament that we were in no way inhibited from bombing Rome although we had not yet done it. He doubted actually whether there would be a bombing of Cairo. There had never been any agreement to refrain from bombing Rome if the enemy refrained from bombing Cairo.

GENERAL EISENHOWER suggested that consideration might be given to the proposition of bombing other rail junctions further south in order to make the marshalling yards useless without direct attack and inquired as to the actual military value of destroying the yards.

SIR ARTHUR TEDDER replied that the operation would constitute another step in pushing the enemy farther back and making the maintenance of his communications more difficult.

THE CONFERENCE:-

a. Agreed:

- (1) That marshalling yards of Rome are an important and necessary military objective within our bombardment plan.
- (2) That there is no valid reason for refraining from bombing this target, provided that the attacks be made by day and that due care is taken to prevent damage elsewhere.

b. Took note that the Prime Minister and General Marshall would report the above conclusions to the British War Cabinet and the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, respectively, with a view of getting authority from the U.S. and British Governments empowering General Eisenhower to take action against the marshalling yards at the moment that he thinks best for the successful prosecution of HUSKY.

3. OPERATION "HUSKY"

SIR BERNARD MONTGOMERY, upon request of the Prime Minister, outlined his views on HUSKY. He said that all his commanders had complete confidence in the present plan, and that troops would be filled with enthusiasm when they stepped ashore. Risks were involved, but they had been gone into very carefully and he felt that they were justified. He pointed out that although he had two airborne divisions, he had only enough air transport for one. In the early stages, he would be able to employ only about one-third of his airborne strength; the remainder to be brought in on D + 2 or D + 3. With 140 more aircraft, he could employ another airborne brigade at the very first. However, he understood that these were not available and the limitation was accepted. His officers were completely happy about the whole thing. As regards post-HUSKY, he felt it important that we decide in what direction we wanted to go and use our military strength to make the battle move that way.

THE PRIME MINISTER inquired whether there was any great danger that bad weather might seriously interfere with the operation.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM stated that although we now usually had a number of calm, flat days in succession, there might possibly be a strong northwesterly breeze which would necessitate postponing the operation for a day.

SIR HAROLD ALEXANDER said it would be dangerous to put the operation off, and SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM replied that, in the event of unfavorable weather, it would be even more dangerous to put it on. He stated the belief that the enemy would see a vast armada of hundreds of ships and would know by 1800 hours the night before the attack that the ships were going to HUSKY. In answer to an inquiry by the Prime Minister, he said that it would be possible to mark time if the weather were not suitable for landing, provided the decision were taken 24 hours in advance. A fairly good prediction of weather conditions should be possible 24 hours before the landings.

4. POST-HUSKY

THE PRIME MINISTER expressed his satisfaction at the great measure of agreement which he had found in these meetings. He did not think we should attempt to draw up a formal post-HUSKY plan at this time. It was understood that post-HUSKY would be in General Eisenhower's hands and that he would recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff whichever operation seemed best. However, he felt everyone agreed that it would be best to put Italy out of the war as soon as possible. The capture of Rome, with or without the elimination of Italy from the war, would be a very great achievement for our Mediterranean forces. We could only talk about the possibilities of this project after the launching of HUSKY, when General Eisenhower would report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. If there should arise differences as to post-HUSKY, they would be settled between the two Governments. He had not been conscious of expressing in the meetings of 29 May, 31 May, and today, anything not in harmony with his background notes, and that the minutes should be read with this understanding. During these meetings he had been most solidly encouraged and he would take home a feeling of confidence and comradeship which characterized actions in this Theater. He had never received so strong an impression of cooperation and control as during his visit here. It would be impossible to embark on an undertaking under better augury. He should not like to go away without reaffirming his full confidence in General Eisenhower and without expressing his admiration of the manner in which the General had handled his many great problems.

GENERAL EISENHOWER replied that any praise which might be given belonged to the officers around the table and stated that, while there might be differences of opinions and discussions in his Headquarters, these were never based upon national differences.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff concurred in the Prime Minister's statement of the accomplishments and the success of General Eisenhower and his officers. The fine support given to General Eisenhower by the British, and especially by Admiral Cunningham, General Alexander, Air Chief Marshal Tedder, General Montgomery, and General Anderson, was deeply appreciated. He felt the greatest discomfort the Germans must have experienced came not so much from their loss of troops as from the fact that Great Britain and the United States have worked so well as a team.

GENERAL BROOKE said that he particularly appreciated the manner in which General Eisenhower and his staff had cooperated with the British War Office.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he, Mr. Eden, and General Brooke would report these discussions to the British Government upon their return to London, and he understood that General Marshall would report orally to the President and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that he would also give an account of the discussions to the Chief of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington.

4. POST-HUSKY

THE PRIME MINISTER expressed his satisfaction at the great measure of agreement which he had found in these meetings. He did not think we should attempt to draw up a formal post-HUSKY plan at this time. It was understood that post-HUSKY would be in General Eisenhower's hands and that he would recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff whichever operation seemed best. However, he felt everyone agreed that it would be best to put Italy out of the war as soon as possible. The capture of Rome, with or without the elimination of Italy from the war, would be a very great achievement for our Mediterranean forces. We could only talk about the possibilities of this project after the launching of HUSKY, when General Eisenhower would report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. If there should arise differences as to post-HUSKY, they would be settled between the two Governments. He had not been conscious of expressing in the meetings of 29 May, 31 May, and today, anything not in harmony with his background notes, and that the minutes should be read with this understanding. During these meetings he had been most solidly encouraged and he would take home a feeling of confidence and comradeship which characterized actions in this Theater. He had never received so strong an impression of cooperation and control as during his visit here. It would be impossible to embark on an undertaking under better augury. He should not like to go away without reaffirming his full confidence in General Eisenhower and without expressing his admiration of the manner in which the General had handled his many great problems.

GENERAL EISENHOWER replied that any praise which might be given belonged to the officers around the table and stated that, while there might be differences of opinions and discussions in his Headquarters, these were never based upon national differences.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff concurred in the Prime Minister's statement of the accomplishments and the success of General Eisenhower and his officers. The fine support given to General Eisenhower by the British, and especially by Admiral Cunningham, General Alexander, Air Chief Marshal Tedder, General Montgomery, and General Anderson, was deeply appreciated. He felt the greatest discomfort the Germans must have experienced came not so much from their loss of troops as from the fact that Great Britain and the United States have worked so well as a team.

GENERAL BROOKE said that he particularly appreciated the manner in which General Eisenhower and his staff had cooperated with the British War Office.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he, Mr. Eden, and General Brooke would report these discussions to the British Government upon their return to London, and he understood that General Marshall would report orally to the President and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that he would also give an account of the discussions to the Chief of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington.

ANNEX TO MINUTES, AFHQ

3 June 1943

PARAPHRASE OF A TELEGRAM FROM
WAR CABINET OFFICE, LONDON

Joint Intelligence Staff appreciate situation as follows:

1. Axis obtain 3 million tons per annum from Roumanian of which 2 million tons goes to Germany and 1 million tons to Italy.

2. Capacity of 6 main active Ploesti refineries is 5 million tons per annum and present production thereof is 4 million tons per annum.

3. If 5 major Ploesti oil refineries were destroyed, Germany would endeavor to transfer load to other oil refineries in Roumania and occupied Europe. In absence of firm information about present serviceability of these other refineries, difficult to estimate total delay involved, but we think that no Roumanian oil supplies via these other refineries can be recommenced before 6 weeks and only half date for next 6 weeks. Result would be loss to Axis supplies of about 550,000 tons over three months after raid.

4. Following estimate however, of strategic effect assumes that effect of attack is to deny at least 250,000 tons over three months. The attack 1st July might have any of following strategic effects:

a. To cripple Italy's war effort.

b. To frustrate any German offensive then current in Russia.

c. To prevent such offensive from taking place.

d. To cause German failure to resist a Russian offensive which might otherwise have been withstood.

5. Not possible to calculate strategic effect with certainty since it would depend on other elements in total situation at the time especially degree of Russian activity. We remain of opinion that whatever the situation a really successful attack on Ploesti could not fail to have a major effect either on German strategy or on the outcome of her operations then in progress.

6. Substantial increase in Germany's synthetic capacity may well not take place before 1944 though this cannot be confirmed without further photographic reconnaissance now pending. In any case an unexpected major curtailment of supply during operations as result of attack whether on 1st July or 1st September coupled with apprehension which it would induce about effect of further attacks against Roumanian and other oil targets must in our opinion have effects described above.

7. If Italy goes out of the war before the attack effect will require recalculating in light of all changed factors including diversion to Germany of Roumanian supplies at present going to Italy.