5. A-16 BALKAN COUNTRIES: November 12, 1943 - September 24, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am sending to you the following paraphrase of message sent by General Wilson to Marshal Tito on 16 September, and a report from our Bari office concerning an order issued by Marshal Tito's headquarters on 20 September restricting intelligence operations both of ourselves and the British. You will recall that on 22 September I sent you a report indicating that Marshal Tito departed from Vis in a Russian plane on the 18 of September. It is not known where he is. The last report indicates that he has not yet returned to Vis.

I am also advising the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General Wilson's message to Marshal Tito:

"1. A communication was addressed by you on the 5 of September to the British and American missions at your Headquarters, in which you made a statement to the effect that the Chetniks were being sent supplies and afforded other aid by the Allies, and that the Allied command in Italy is maintaining relations with Draga Mihailovich.

"2. It is not my plan to send these to either
the British or the United States governments as a strong exception to these allegations is taken by me personally. I am perfectly competent to take care of the situation as the Allied officer personnel to which you made reference in your communication of the 5 of September are under my direct orders.

"3. In any event, you have apparently been mis-informed. The statement that we are sending Mihailovich any supplies or maintaining relationship with him is absolutely false. At the time, you were made aware of the special reasons for which the two American missions have been in the region that Mihailovich controls. The evacuation of Allied air personnel in Yugoslavia was the specific reason of the first mission, the air crew rescue unit. A small unit under direction of Col. McDowell, the second mission, is in no way accredited to General Draga Mihailovich; its sole object is to collect intelligence in Serbia.

"4. After investigating I have found the following facts in regard to the specific allegations in the 2nd paragraph of your communication: 43 United States airmen, 1 U. S. civilian, 4 Russians, 2 Poles, 2 British airmen, and 9 Italians were evacuated by the air crew.
rescue unit on the 27 of August. Col. Kraigher, the commanding officer of this unit, informs me that he is sure that in this bunch there were no Yugoslav Nationals as he himself was on the airfield in Bari on the night in question. No supplies, except those that were of necessity to the air crew rescue unit, were carried by aircraft for this evacuation.

"5. Specific instructions were given to the members of the air crew rescue unit when it departed for Yugoslavia that no assistance was to be given in the evacuation of Yugoslav Nationals. Only on the 9th of August were these instructions violated, when 9 Yugoslav Nationals were brought out, 4 of which were representatives of General Mihailovich while the other 5 were stowaways. We included the Mihailovich representatives at the last moment because it was impossible to avoid doing so without jeopardizing the possibility of successfully evacuating the large number of American airmen who are still waiting evacuation from Serbia. You were advised of that fact at that time. The 4 Mihailovich representatives referred to are at present still in Bari, pending instructions from the U.S. and
British Governments as to how they should be handled.

"6. The fact that on a few occasions rescued American airmen were brought out garbed in Chetnik clothing because of the loss of their own, may have caused some misunderstanding. A few supplies, which may have been dropped in the wrong area, may have fallen into the hands of the Chetniks. The complaints made by you must be wholly based on erroneous reports which resulted from distortion of the facts stated above."

Report concerning order issued by Marshal Tito's Headquarters on 20 September:

"Tito's headquarters issued orders on September 20 to all Partisan corps commanders to the effect that no Allied missions may operate henceforth with units smaller than a corps and further that no Allied military personnel are to travel inside the country unless Tito has given them written permission to do so. The Partisan Istrian Corps Headquarters has ordered one of our officers stationed in Slovenia to report to the headquarters without delay. This order was in fulfillment to Tito's order.

"According to the British military mission, similar communications have been received by its representatives.

SECRET
in other areas. All supply drops were immediately cancelled by the British and also all flights to remove Partisan wounded. Nothing further will be done along either line until the situation is clarified. Col. Huntington has gone to AFHQ today to advise the highest political and military authorities in that location of the present situation. The British have advised MacLean, now in Caserta, so that he may present the matter to Wilson without delay.

"Probably the motive behind Tito's move is his desire to curtail and control American and British military representation in the country now that he believes the civil war is all but in the bag and now that British and American supplies are no longer needed. He evidently does not wish American and British representatives to observe and report developments of his plans to consolidate his military victory in the political and economic field. The order, significantly enough, was issued at a moment when Tito was almost certainly with the Russian leaders in Bulgaria or Rumania. He has not come back to Vis since he left for an undisclosed destination in Russian planes. There is no way of knowing if the Russians come under the phrase "allied" personnel."
"The Russians have for a long time had the closest possible liaison with Tito and his staff and have probably taken part in his political and military councils."

William J. Donovan
Director
Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

I should be grateful if you would see that the attached reports containing urgent messages received today would reach the President's desk.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 23, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

TO READ AND PLEASE RETURN
FOR MY FILES.

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: OSS Activities in Mihailovich-Controlled Areas

We relayed to General Donovan your instructions of September 3. He asks that you be informed that word has been dispatched to the field to carry out your orders.

Your instruction to withdraw our "mission" to Mihailovich has been interpreted to include not only the four OSS individuals in that area whose function it has been to obtain strategic and technical intelligence and to infiltrate teams into Central Europe, but also to include the four OSS men who, at the request of the 15th Air Force, were assigned to the command and operational control of the Air Force's Air Crew Rescue Unit in Mihailovich territory.

The British objection to our activities comes at a time when they themselves feel free to drop personnel into Chetnik areas. There have just come to our attention two State Department dispatches, dated 31 August and 2 September from Caserta (Appendix A), which show that Brigadier MacLean, head of the British Mission
to Tito, went into the Mihailovich area a few days ago and is sending out intelligence reports.* In the case of Rumania also, the British sent in teams at a time when they had delayed our presence there by diplomatic representations. While such inconsistent action by the British is undoubtedly the result of bad coordination, it demonstrates the advisability of independence in the field of intelligence where a change of mind on the part of the objecting party alone may give that party a monopoly of first-hand information.

The personnel assigned to the Air Crew Rescue Unit were requested by the Air Force because of their peculiar knowledge of the country, the language and secret signal equipment. They had already succeeded in evacuating over 200 airmen from Chetnik country and were maintaining a continuous search for others who had been downed. In Greece and Rumania we are doing similar work and have been instrumental in the evacuation of nearly 1,000 airmen from the latter country within the last few weeks.

* Brigadier MacLean was formerly a Foreign Office representative
We believe that if General Donovan were here he would desire to stress that nothing has been done without agreement of the British, and to give you the facts concerning his talk with Marshall Tito about this matter.

At a meeting on August 11 with Tito, General Donovan informed him through Brigadier MacLean (who was present) of the dispatch of an OSS rescue and intelligence team to Mihailovich. At that time Tito nodded his head and voiced no objection, although he said that the men might not have such a good time with Mihailovich and suggested that their names be given to him so that he could advise his troops to protect them in the event of trouble.

General Donovan had earlier discussed with Sir Alexander Cadogan the right of every sovereign nation to have completely independent secret intelligence operations. Sir Alexander agreed with this principle and raised no objection when informed that OSS contemplated dispatch of intelligence units to various parts of the Balkans.

Last June, General Wilson told General Donovan that no intelligence was being received from the Chetniks.
area and that it was urgently needed by the Allies. He not only agreed with the basic principle of independent American secret intelligence operations and approved General Donovan's proposal to dispatch an intelligence team to the Chetniks but urged that this be done. General Donovan wrote you of this talk on July fourth and on the sixth of July discussed the matter with you in person. On that same day, he cabled the field of your approval to send an OSS intelligence unit into the Mihailovich area.

Shortly thereafter, efforts were made to parachute OSS personnel assigned to the Air Crew Rescue Unit. On the night of 2 August, one officer and two enlisted men were successfully dropped to make arrangements for the evacuation of the airmen with Mihailovich.

On 3 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were informed of General Donovan's talks with General Wilson and of OSS plans to send teams into the Balkans (an earlier memorandum to the JCS on this subject had been returned by its secretariat to be revised and expanded). The 3 August memorandum recited your oral approval and General Donovan's directions to the field for the dispatch of
teams into Yugoslavia and other Balkan countries (Appendix B).

On the fifth of August (three days after the air rescue personnel had been dropped under the directions issued at the time of your earlier oral approval) a White House memorandum was received containing written withdrawal of your April objection with the request that the matter be cleared with the State Department and the JCS. The State Department was called immediately and informed us that their previous clearance still stood. The memorandum from the White House was shown to a member of the JCS secretariat, who was also told of the prior dispatch of the rescue team.*

Meanwhile, the rescue team had completed its arrangements and on the tenth and eleventh of August more than 200 airmen were flown out. The last reports we have indicate that a considerable number of wounded airmen still remained.

Indications of increasing Allied ground and air activity in Yugoslavia underline the necessity for independent American intelligence of all kinds from this

* At this time it was thought in Washington that the air crew rescue personnel were under direct OSS control, and it was not until later that copies of the official orders were forwarded to Washington informing us that this personnel had been transferred to the command and operational control of the 15th Air Force Air Crew Rescue Unit.
area, which is still the only accurate source of information on the highly equivocal question of alleged Chetnik collaboration with the Germans. This territory is also of real importance at this particular time because of its strategic situation as a jumping-off place for projecting intelligence teams into Germany, Austria and other parts of Central Europe, and for counter subversive action against German underground movements. In fact, an intelligence team had already been dispatched into Austria from there; others had been planned.

Attention is respectfully directed to Ambassador Murphy's letter of July 1, 1944 to the Secretary of State with enclosures (Appendix C). The Ambassador's letter indicates his hope that American personnel to be used in Chetnik areas for air rescue purposes might also provide intelligence of a military or general character. The enclosed memorandum to Ambassador Murphy from his Special Assistant, Mr. Frederick T. Merrill, on this subject, contains two paragraphs we believe to be worth quoting:

"Our policy is to give support to anyone willing to kill Germans - a corollary might be - or forward the war effort. The expeditious recovery of these airmen is certainly forwarding.
the war effort. Moreover, although we will
to some extent be "recognizing" Mihailovich
by the necessity of having to ask his coopera-
tion, we will not be aiding him in any material
way."

"I conclude - and Norden concurs - the
lives of American airmen and the military ad-
Vantage gained by their recovery overrides any
objection the British might have on political
grounds."

The State Department has never objected to
having an intelligence unit with Mihailovich and, indeed,
is anxious for information from that area. In a paral-
lel case, that of Greece, where the British had ordered
withdrawal of our personnel without previous notice to
us, the State Department's only concern was that we have
personnel with Zervas as well as EAM/ELAS in order to
avoid political implications which might arise from
the presence of personnel with one group and not with
the other.

In accordance with the mandate imposed upon
us by the JCS, every effort has been made by OSS in its
activities in the Balkans to avoid political involve-
ment. The attached message from General Donovan, re-
viewing our position vis-a-vis both Tito and Mihailovich
demonstrates that scrupulous care has been taken to avoid commitments that may in any way be misinterpreted (Appendix D).

In conclusion, we have been asked by General Donovan to state that if you wish to have us continue the assignment of our personnel to the 15th Air Force for the rescue of American airmen in Mihailovich territory, he would appreciate word to that effect.

Respectfully submitted,

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director
MacLean went into the Mihailovic area a few days ago and he now reports to AFRICOM that the Chetniks are aiding the Germans actively and are keeping the Partisans from making the most just now out of the German confusion. It is entirely possible that the military gain which the Allies should make from the fall of Bulgaria will be lost. The civilians do not understand very clearly what is involved and some of them are hindering operations, under the impression that the Chetniks have Allied support.

Brigadier MacLean is of the opinion that an Allied source should say something official on this subject. He suggests that General Wilson make the statement. MacLean has wired a proposed text of this to AFRICOM which he asserts is harmless, saying to more than other official declarations have said. It makes clear that some of the Chetnik groups have been aiding actively the Nedic and German units who are seeking to disarm the Bulgarians. The Chetniks have even aided the enemy in their assaults on the JANK. The Nazis receive benefit from this. The JANK is the only force in Yugoslavia which is supported by the Allied and those troops or guerrillas who aid the enemy will receive no Allied aid in any shape or form.

The Brigadier wants this statement published at once. He
thinks it should be put on the air in Serbo-Croatian by certain radio stations and that it should be dropped in leaflet form. The same leaflets can be distributed also through the cooperation of the Partisans and the British Liaison group. At the close of his report MacLean says that Tito is winning over more and more of the Chetnik rank and file.

MURPHY
Brigadier MacLean has sent word to SAC that in Mihailovic's area where he was dropped a few days ago Bulgarian forces are providing the Germans with valuable assistance by maintaining themselves along the chief communication lines and resisting actively the efforts of the Partisans to reach and cut these lines. The motive of the Bulgarians doubtless is to protect their own avenues of retreat to their frontiers, but by this action the Germans are securing precious time for stabilizing their positions. MacLean's message then proposes that prior to the making of any agreement with the Armistice Mission from Bulgaria, which at present is in Cairo, that Mission should agree to see that instructions are sent at once to the Bulgarian forces in Serbia and Macedonia, pending their withdrawal, either to begin to cooperate with the Partisans or in any case to offer no hindrance to the latter's operations, as these are regarded by the Allies as highly important and forming part of the current concerted plan. The message ends by stating that while it is obviously not in the Partisans' interests to have the Bulgarians remain on Yugoslav soil, the Partisans are obliged to regard them as outright enemies as long as they behave as such.

It may be noted that MacLean has wired to General Gammell of AFHQ word that he has been in touch with General Popovic and that Popovic has undertaken to destroy the Kraljevo-Skoplje,
Nish-Sofia, and Nish-Skopljé railroads in connection with the forthcoming offensives.

OFFIE
3 August 1944

MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION FOR THE JOINT U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Dispatch of intelligence and air search teams into Balkan countries

REFERENCES: (a) Memorandum to JCS from OSS dated 12 July 1944 relating to OSS dispatch of intelligence team into Rumania

(b) JCS 714

(c) Memorandum from Secretary, JCS to OSS dated 8 April 1944, relating to representative with Mihailovich

1. By Reference (a) information was given to the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning conversation with General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson on 23 June 1944. General Wilson stated that the Office of Strategic Services was right in its position with reference to dispatch of clandestine agents for the purpose of obtaining intelligence. He said we were entitled (as were the British) to undertake to dispatch such teams to Balkan areas without consultation with anyone. The British had not only sent a team into Rumania (from which we had been temporarily barred by diplomatic action of the British) but intended to send an intelligence team into the Mihailovich area. General Wilson also thought we should aid him in search for American pilots known to be in that area.

2. While control of this organization's intelligence and morale subversion operations rests only in the United States
Commanding General (JCS 714), the statements of General Wilson are pertinent because it was through British representations that our earlier efforts to send teams into these areas were delayed or prevented.

3. Upon my return to this country I informed the President of these conversations. The President orally withdrew his earlier directive against sending teams to the Mihailovich area, Reference (c), and gave me his oral approval to send intelligence and air search teams into this area.

4. The United States Commanding General in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, General Jacob L. Devers, has approved the dispatch of intelligence teams into the Balkan countries. I have therefore directed that teams be sent into Rumania, Yugoslavia and other Balkan countries for clandestine intelligence and air rescue purposes. This does not, of course, apply to our operations activities, or communications concerning them; we shall, as in the past, continue to coordinate these activities with the British under control of the Theater Commander.

William J. Donovan
Director
The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose a copy of a secret memorandum dated June 19, 1944, from Major General H. F. Teeling, Commanding General, 18th AAF, to the Commanding General, AEF/SHAEF, regarding the evacuation of USAF personnel from Serbia which is referred to in my S179, June 22, 4 p.m. In that connection I also enclose a copy of a memorandum from Mr. Frederick F. Hurwitz, dated June 22, 1944, on the same subject.

I have discussed this matter with Generals Baker and Donovan and I understand that there is every intention to implement the plan to put an American mission into Mihailovic territory for the purpose stated. It would be hoped, of course, that such American officers as might be designated for this purpose would, as an incident to their purpose of rescuing American airmen, provide whatever information of a military or general character that might come to their attention in the course of their regular routine.

Respectfully yours,

Robert D. Murphy,
American Ambassador.

Confidential File

698

Regraded Unclassified
Enclosures:

1. Copy of memorandum dated June 19, 1944, from Major General H. P. Twining, Commanding General, 15th AAF, to the Commanding General, AAF/ETO.

2. Copy of memorandum dated June 20, 1944, from Mr. Frederick T. Merrill to Ambassador Robert D. Murphy.

RDA
RE# 390

Copy to Ambassador MacVey, Cairo.
In triplicate.
APPENDIX C (PAGE 3)

Maj. Greenwood and Greenberg, who were among the last officers of the British mission to be evacuated 30 May from the Mihailovich territory. These two officers had been in Serbia for over a year and were well-informed on conditions there; the following facts were brought out in the conference:

a. The entire area of Serbia that is under Chetnik control is relatively safe for Allied airmen (particularly Americans) who are forced to bail out or crash-land.

b. Mihailovich is extremely friendly to the United States and his people are most hospitable to American airmen.

c. The Chetniks offer little military resistance to the Germans; their first enemies are the Partisans, and after them come the Germans. However, if American airmen fall into German hands in Chetnik territory, it is the policy of Mihailovich's men to fight to rescue them.

d. Mihailovich is now receiving no support from the Allies in the form of missions or supplies. As a result, he is limited to contact with Partisans to try to rescue American airmen who have succeeded in evading German or Partisan occupation in the Adriatic coast.

e. Although air crews are relatively safe from capture in Serbia, there is no method at this time to evacuate them, since Mihailovich would be unwilling to pass them over to Partisans for air evacuation from Partisan territory or boat evacuation on the Adriatic coast.

f. It is believed that Mihailovich would welcome a non-political representation at his headquarters for the sole purpose of collecting, aiding, and arranging evacuation of Allied airmen.

g. Since all Force 546 missions have been withdrawn from Chetnik territory, there is no organized radio communication with Mihailovich's headquarters at this time. However, he does have a radio station, and on 30 June a message from same was intercepted, indicating that the Fifteenth Air Force crew members were at his headquarters and anxious for us to arrange evacuation. 10 June interception increases number to forty airmen.

h. During April, May and up to date in June, about five hundred Fifteenth Air Force crew members have been reported by groups on having bailed out or crash-landed in Serbia. Since communications have been disrupted among the Chetnik provinces for the last couple of months, it may be assumed that a large percentage of these men are still alive and uncaught in various parts of Serbia.
3. On 28 May twenty-nine Fifteenth Air Force crew members were 
evacuated by air from Kihailovich's headquarters, along with the 
British mission officers (including Brigadier Armstrong) who were withdrawn 
28 to 29 May, inclusive. Almost all of these airmen were in good physical 
condition and they reported excellent treatment by the Chetniks.

4. During the coming months, if we continue our bombing offensive 
in the Balkans, and along the allied-Russian bomb line, it may be 
assumed that several hundred Allied airmen will bail out or crash-land 
in Serbia.

5. In view of the above facts, it is recommended that steps be 
taken to immediately establish a non-political AAF representation at 
Kihailovich's headquarters for the sole purpose of collecting, aiding, 
and arranging air evacuation of distressed Allied airmen. A party of 
seven would be required. Two officers, three radio operators (also 
trained in ciphers), and two landing ground non-coms. The representa-
tion should be entirely non-political.

6. The party with all necessary equipment and supplies for initial 
operation could be delivered to Kihailovich's headquarters with 
one C-47. In addition to personal equipment, first aid kits, bedding, 
arms and ammunition, the following equipment would be required:

- 2 radio sets - SNET 1 Finch Radio Corp. (available at SHTS).
- 2 spare sets of tubes.
- 1 "Tiny Tim" generator (available at SHTS).
- 1 PE-75 Generator (available at SHTS).
- 3 6-V batteries (available at SHTS).
- 1 drum of gasoline for generators.
- 3 SCR-306 short-range RT sets.

7. Majors Greenwood and Greenless can supply a complete list of 
valuable contacts in the area.

8. This plan has received complete concurrence of SHTS, particu-
larly as a result of corroborating information brought back by Lt. 
Colonel Varich with whom a conference was held 17 June.

9. This plan also has received concurrence of RAF, Air Ops, SHTS, 
Force 266 and "A" Force.

10. It is believed that such a plan, promptly put into action by 
the Fifteenth Air Force would permit evacuation of practically all 
Fifteenth Air Force personnel forced down in East Serbia and adjacent 
territory.

R. F. Twining,
Major General, USA,
Commanding.
SUBJECT: Evacuation of Stranded Airmen from Mihailovich Territory.

In addition to the points elaborated in General Eaker's letter to General Harker, the following considerations were developed in conversations with officers of the Fifteenth and with the British majors - Greenwood and Greenless.

1. The estimated cost of training personnel per bomber crew is a quarter of a million dollars. In crude dollars and cents terms, the recovery of forty bomber crews - the estimated loss over Burma if the present rate of operations continues to August 1 in time ten million dollars. More important, however, is the availability of replacements - a factor which might conceivably affect future operations.

2. The knowledge that there exists "a way back" greatly raises morale of bomber crews. It also tends to influence pilots from plucking their crews in their efforts to bring home wounded bombers.

3. The British, of course, may object that the sending of a technical mission implies political support and that Mihailovich will so interpret it and make use of such a mission for his own propaganda purposes. This is partly offset, however, by the fact that Mihailovich is already "showing off" American airmen and giving the impression to his people that he has his own support.

4. Plans are now in a formative stage to set up a separate wing of the Fifteenth AF, sole function of which will be the evacuation of disabled airmen from all sections of Yugoslavia. Utilization of a Ninth Air Force base (formerly SG) is not thought practical, partly because only monthly five per cent of the stranded crews will by SG. The omission of three planned operations would therefore seem to assure very probable success. Since it is known that forty airmen are currently collecting evacuation at Mihailovich's N., a technical mission must be sent there immediately.

5. SG has offered to Fifteenth trained personnel for this mission and the Fifteenth will probably accept. The mission should be extended to other areas of politics. SG probably hopes to develop its SG in Russia by this means.

6. It is not believed that Mihailovich will demand a quick pro

ot least at this stage, since he will probably feel he is gaining

American sympathy and hence the British will talk at material odd.

June 20, 1944.
7. Our policy is to give support to anyone willing to kill German - a corollary might be - or forward the war effort. The obvious recovery of these airmen is certainly forwarding the war effort. Moreover, although we will to some extent be "recognizing" Hitlerism - by the necessity of having to ask his cooperation, we will not be aiding him in any material way.

8. If the press have to be informed, the technical aspects of the mission should be stressed.

9. I conclude - and Norden concurs - the lives of American airmen and the military advantage gained by their recovery overrides any objection the British might have on political grounds.

(Signed): FREDICK T. MERRILL.
MESSAGE FROM GENERAL DONOVAN, DATED 1 SEPTEMBER 1944:

"It is very difficult to reduce the situation in Yugoslavia to simple terms but, in general, the situation remains the same as between Tito and Mihailovich as it has always been."

"To both Tito and Mihailovich we have made clear our position: (1) that we have established mission with Tito with no promise of any kind as to arms, equipment or supplies; (2) We have made clear that we will not support either side in internal political strife although the fact of delivery of supplies by British in which our supplies to British were included may be construed as reputation of this and that in fact such action constiutes material and political support; (3) That we have no political favors to seek and no political commitments to make; (4) That we have established mission with Tito in order more effectively to collaborate with our allies; (5) That our purpose in being in this area is to use it as a base from which we may better project our intelligence teams into Central Europe and more particularly into Germany; (6) That we have established no mission with Mihailovich but that we have placed there joint search parties and intelligence teams for purpose of seeking, assembling and effecting rescue of American pilots and crewmen. This in conjunction with American Air Command. It should be stated that Mihailovich has been most helpful in this respect; (7) That insofar as supplies are concerned the British have had (except for two or three months immediately following fall of Sicily) and continue to have control of supplies and transport; (8) That for first year beginning with deliveries of about 50 tons a month by progressive increase they have now reached in last two months delivery of about two thousand tons a month; (9) That military arms and equipment have been of British type although certain percentage of them which British themselves do not know are made in U. S. (10) That food and clothing supplies have been about 60 percent of American origin mostly delivered to British on lend lease; (11) That in addition between December and early May we delivered to the British from our stores in Cairo between seven and eight thousand tons consisting of plastic, shoes, clothing, trucks which were co-mingled with British supplies. In such allotment were about fifteen hundred Marlin guns which have either been delivered to or are set aside for use of OSS patrols in that area who have encounters with German patrols."

"Consideration should also be given to the fact that as I have already advised you, Subasich is convinced that best opinion
in Serbia is for elimination of this political warfare between two groups and for organized attack against Germans."

"To summarize, our conduct here has been most punctilious in keeping out of any of this political controversy, no playing any part in whatever conflicting purposes there may be between British and Russians and in avoiding any entanglement in rivalry between Mihailovich and Tito. In any case it must be remembered that we are making use of Yugoslavia as jump-off for work that must be done in coming to grips with Germany in Central Europe. Wisdom of that course is now being demonstrated as appears from intelligence teams that we have already placed or are placing, and by means of which we will be able to carry on our operations. We have done this so far without incurring hostility of either Tito or Mihailovich although each one feels that we should not in any way be working with the other. However within Yugoslavia itself an American soldier can still move without fear of harm in Partisan or Chetnik territory."
23 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Miss Tully

The President will be interested to
read this when and if he has the opportunity.

WILSON BROWN

Forwards letter from General Arnold to the President 9/22/44. Enclosure thereto is letter from General Eaker to General Arnold relative to Eaker's visit to the Ploesti oil fields and damage he found. Also encloses 10 photographs which General Arnold considered "typical pictures" of damage inflicted.
GUNFIRE NO.

PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET.

Following for Foreign Secretary from Prime Minister.

1. Message for Stalin should be sent through Clark Kerr as in my immediately following telegram. Identical message is being sent from President through Harriman.

2. I do not agree to omission of sentence regarding Yugoslavia and Greece in paragraph 2 as this is the whole point. Together we are strong enough to carry the message. I have received your CORDINE No. 351 but it would be difficult to reopen the subject after the present telegram has been agreed.

18.9.44
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is message just received relating to Russia's terms to Rumania. This was received through our intelligence representative in Bucharest.

Because of the urgency of the matter, we have submitted the message in exactly the form in which it was received.

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director
The following message is "URGENT".

On the evening of September 12, the Romanian Undersecretary of State for National Economy, Georgescu, advised our Bucharest representative that the 1st armistice conditions from Moscow had been received by the Romanian Government. Georgescu added that the government is dumbfounded and confused by certain of the armistice terms and that the following terms were especially offensive.

1. All means of communication, all the merchant Marine, all utilities, all industries, all factories, and all storage depots will be controlled by the Russians and will be subject to Russian use during the period of occupation.

2. The Russians will control all publicity and propaganda including the press, radio and public spectacles. The political and economic life of Romania will be completely paralyzed by the list of these provisions and the intellectual and spiritual life will likewise be stifled by provision number 2.

Georgescu stated that what is most inconceivable is the fact that they are far more severe and cannot even be compared with the terms which the 3 Allied Nations proposed to the Romanian Government in Cairo and later as well. At the present time the Romanian Government is composed for the most part of persons who have been pro-Allied and working in the interests of the Allies for many months. Some have spent time in prison because of their pro-Allied activities and sentiments. Others have been constantly in danger of imprisonment. Our informant added that the conditions are worse than might have been expected under the terms of unconditional surrender and that the
present government has no choice but to conclude that it has been abandoned and undercut so that it will fall. Since the Romanian Government cannot accept the conditions offered, its only alternative would seem to be resignation and it certain that no other party or group of parties, representative to any degree of the Romanian people, would accept to govern under these terms. No exception is being taken to the $3,000,000.00 indemnity but it is not known how the sum can be raised since there is a proviso in the armistice terms that all industries in Romania will be subject to control by Russia. The matter which most immediately concerns the Government is the demand that the Romanian Government supply and support the Russian Army on Romanian territory since this obligation is undefined and opened with consequence that cannot obviously be predicted. The Russian Military authorities have already demanded the prompt delivery of

(1) More than 2,500,000 tons of grain
(2) 1,700,000 head of cattle
(3) 15,000 horses
(4) quantities of potatoes, vegetables and cigarettes.

All the above is estimated to value $900,000,000,000 lei. The Romanian Government has answered these demands with the statement that they are above the economic possibilities of the Romanian economy. It should be noted that the Russian Military authorities are not demanding petroleum products since they have already assumed control over production and refining and are taking what they want without making a formal request.

The provision which demands that 12 Romanian divisions join the Russian Armies is acceptable as are several other conditions of the armistice. The government wishes to continue actively in its prosecution of the war against Hungary and Germany at least to the extent of the recognized Romanian boundary, including the Transylvanian area. After the Government had been advised that the armistice had been signed, Geor esteau was contacted once more. This was on September 13. All he said was that the armistice contained the terms outlined above and he had nothing more to say on the matter. Maniu, according to Geoer esteau, wished to consider the terms at length, before making any formal statement.

TOR: 9/14/44 9:59 p.m.
Miss Grace Tully  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.  

Dear Miss Tully:

Attached is memorandum to the President concerning a matter of urgency. It would be appreciated if you would bring this to his attention at once, since we believe it is the first report direct from Rumania relating to the terms offered Rumania by Russia.

Sincerely,

Charles S. Cheston  
Acting Director
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

September 11, 1944

The White House:

Please transmit to the
President at Quebec.

[Signature]

Regraded Unclassified
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Greek Interest in Bulgarian Armistice

Attached, a summary of a request presented urgently by the Greek Government to the Department this afternoon.

Enclosure:

Memorandum.
September 11, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Greek Interest in Bulgarian Armistice

Attached, a summary of a request presented urgently by the Greek Government to the Department this afternoon.

Enclosure:

Memorandum:

Churchill.
MEMORANDUM: GREEK INTEREST IN BULGARIAN ARMISTICE

The Greek Government is urgently requesting the British and, if possible, ourselves to take prompt military action in the Balkans. They probably have particular reference to those parts occupied by the Bulgarians and especially Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace. The Greek forces are at present engaged before Rimini. The Greek Government fears that Bulgarians who have now declared war on Germany will fight the Germans largely in Greek territory, and though they do not say so, they imply that this might very well mean they were killing more Greeks than Germans. The Greeks have asked General Wilson to send forces to this area, if possible, and ask our support in this request.

You no doubt will wish to discuss this with Churchill.
American Policy Towards Hungary

The Hungarians have failed to take any realistic action to withdraw from the war, though they have repeatedly avowed their desire to do so. The difficulty has been their hope that the "Anglo-Americans" would protect them against Soviet Russia, and their unwillingness to part with territories acquired with German aid. The country is now in ferment, however, and events may move rapidly.

Draft armistice terms for Hungary, having the approval of the Joint Chiefs, were sent to the European Advisory Commission several months ago. Subsequently revised terms, including certain inducements to the Hungarians while maintaining the principle of unconditional surrender, were sent forward.

The United States does not contemplate participation in military operations in Hungary or in the occupation of that country. American troops in that area could probably be used more effectively, in the political sense, than either British or Soviet armies, but such participation would inevitably involve this Government as an active agent in the political questions of Southeastern Europe. Although planning for civil affairs administration in Hungary after surrender is under the jurisdiction of AFHQ in the Mediterranean Theater, American representatives have taken no part in whatever planning has been done. The United States will, however, desire political representatives in Hungary in the period after surrender. Such representation is desirable for the execution of the political terms of the armistice, for supporting our general objectives of promoting a just and stable political and territorial settlement, as well as for securing accurate first-hand political and economic information, and protecting American interests.

As a long term objective the United States favors the establishment of a broadly-based provisional government, designed to carry through by democratic means the transition to a permanent regime. There are revolutionary forces in Hungary working for land reform, electoral reform and the overthrow of the present ruling group. We acknowledge the need and the strong public demand for changes in the Hungarian system, and must expect that these reforms will not be accomplished without some violence.

In regard to the territorial settlement, the United States favors, as a matter of principle, the restoration of the pre-Munich frontiers, and any consideration of the boundary disputes between Hungary and its neighbors should start from that point.

However,
However, we do not regard the pre-Munich boundaries as unchangeable and believe certain changes to be desirable in the interest of a stable settlement.

Thus, in the case of the frontier with Czechoslovakia, if an opportunity arises for revision by agreement which would leave to Hungary certain overwhelmingly Magyar-inhabited districts, the United States would favor such a solution. In the case of the frontier with Yugoslavia, the United States sees some merit in a compromise solution which would leave to Hungary the northern part of the Voyvodina, although this Government should not, we feel, press for such a solution. In the case of the frontier with Rumania, the American position will be more or less frozen by our agreement to the armistice terms for Rumania which provide for the restoration to that country of "all or the major part of Transylvania, subject to confirmation at the peace settlement." In the final settlement the United States would favor, at the least, a revision of the pre-war frontier on ethnic grounds, transferring to Hungary a small strip of territory given to Rumania at the end of the last war.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON  
August 5, 1944

SECRET

My dear Admiral Leahy:

With reference to my letter to you of July 26, 1944, which transmitted for the attention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a summary of three telegrams from Istanbul regarding the prospective withdrawal of Bulgaria from the war, I am now sending you a paraphrase of telegraphic instructions which are being sent to our Embassies in London and Moscow in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs as given in General Marshall’s letter to me of August 2, 1944.

In view of the interest which the President has manifested in peace approaches from these quarters, you may wish to inform him of these latest developments.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]
Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Paraphrase of telegrams to Moscow and London.

Admiral William D. Leahy,  
Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief  
of the Army and Navy,  
The White House.
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM
SENT

TO: AMBASSADOR, London.
FROM: Secretary of State, Washington.
DATED: August 4, midnight.

The Department has been informed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, in the matter of proposed peace discussions with the Bulgarians, Bulgaria's separation from the Axis is of considerable military import despite the favorable way in which the war is progressing in Europe and that if the Bulgarians should decide definitely to seek an armistice on this basis it would be most useful to follow up the project with vigor.

You should advise the Foreign Office that the American Government proposes that the Bulgarians be informed that they may still avail themselves of the plan for conversations to be held at Cairo as agreed to by the three principal Allies last March.

In as much as it is important from the Allied standpoint that there should be no delay, we hope that a prompt agreement in this sense can be reached by the British, Soviet and American Governments. The American Consul General at Istanbul will then be sent telegraphic authorization to recall to his Bulgarian contact that the three Allies offered as long ago as last March to have their representatives meet a Bulgarian mission or emissary at Cairo in order to hear what they have to say, and to state that if the Bulgarians genuinely desire to conclude an immediate armistice they should at once send out a fully qualified emissary or mission in order that the discussions may begin at once.
A copy of this letter was forwarded to General McFarland for his information.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

August 28, 1944.

Subject: The American Position as Regards an Eventual Allied Occupation of Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria.

The Department understands that the decision has already been taken that American ground forces are not to participate in operations in the three satellite countries of Southeastern Europe. There have been, of course, considerable air force operations, under the Mediterranean command, probably the greater part of them conducted by American planes. In the case of Rumania, General Wilson has now ordered more intensive air operations, in the light of the events of the last few days, and these may now or at a later stage involve airborne troops, but we are not informed that any American personnel are being used. It seems to be, however, our basic military policy not to use U. S. forces in Balkan operations.

The O.S.S. does, however, have teams ready, or in process of organization, for use in these countries, chiefly for intelligence but also for special operations.

As regards occupation, the documents to be used as the basis for terms of surrender, and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provide for Allied occupation, but it is understood that our military policy is not to use American forces as a part of the army of occupation.

It is supposed that American missions will go into each of the countries after surrender. These missions will have political, military and technical functions. The Department has not been informed of the Army's plans for assigning military personnel for this work.

As regards civil affairs in the Balkans, it has been decided that the United States will participate in relief and rehabilitation work.
work in the military period, but this, so far, has been planned only for "liberated" territory; namely, Greece, Yugoslavia and Albania, and not for the satellite states.

The terms of surrender contemplate, however, the utilization of the resources or supplies which may be available in the satellite countries and useful to the Allies in the prosecution of the war. Technical personnel in the form of Allied missions will be necessary for the administration of this program. This has been in discussion with the F.E.A. The present disposition is not to send American personnel into the countries for this purpose. This would be in line with the general policy to hold to a minimum actual American participation both in the operations stage and the occupation stage.
SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

August 26, 1944.

In connection with the current negotiations looking toward the withdrawal of Rumania from the war the Department has prepared a chronological summary of the pertinent events, which may be useful as a matter of reference. A copy of it is enclosed. The more detailed accounts are of course on record in the series of communications to the Joint Chiefs covering the important developments as they occurred.

As a matter of rather particular interest, in connection with the events in Rumania of the last few days, reports have today been received indicating that the sudden action leading to the overthrow of the Antonescu Government, as reported in the press as occurring on August 23, was actually planned to take place today, the 26th. It appears that King Mihai grasped an unexpected opportunity to arrest Marshal Antonescu and his entire Government in the Palace.

Having planned the action for August 26, the King had instructed the Rumanian Minister to Turkey to direct Prince Stirbey to ask General Wilson "in conformity with his promise" to order a massive bombardment on that day of certain specified objectives in Rumania and Hungary. A subsequent message requested that, since events had been precipitated, this operation be carried out at once, that three airborne brigades be landed near Bucharest, and that automatic arms and anti-tank guns be supplied.

Copies of the pertinent telegrams reporting these events are enclosed.

Mr. Harriman's telegram no. 3159 of August 26, addressed to the President and the Secretary, concerning the Soviet proposal for armistice terms for Rumania, has been communicated separately to the White House.

Enclosures:

As stated.
COPY

SECRET

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Secretary of State,
Washington,

YUGOS

136, August 25, 10 a.m.

Message from King Michael for Stirbey received by Grozianu 8:30 p.m. Wednesday, 23rd, shortly before proclamation of break with Axis states that in view of decisive action which will take place in Rumania on Saturday August 26 he requests, in conformity with promise of General Wilson a massive bombardment of numerous specified places in Rumania and Hungary. (Repeated to Murphy as number 15 and to Moscow).

This message, which was received here and sent to AFHQ Caserta yesterday, makes it appear that Rumanian break was planned for tomorrow and that events forced prior action.

De Chastelain and two Rumanian staff officers reached Ankara yesterday.

SHANTZ
SECRET
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (SECRET)

Cairo
Dated August 25, 1944.
Rec'd 3 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington

MOST IMMEDIATE

YUGOS

140 August 25, 8 p.m.

Direct message from Maniu to British here dated today states that although the Rumanian Government informed the German Army they would not attack them but would allow them free passage, the German Army attacked and bombed Bucharest savagely, completely destroying the Royal Palace. Message says that German Air Force is concentrated at Otopeni airdrome, and asks urgently for 200 Allied fighters which can use the airdromes at Craiova and Targul Jiu which are in Rumanian hands. (Repeated to Murphy as number 20 and to Moscow). It adds that "attack on Bucharest was made from close at hand and continued all day and prevents all activity whatsoever."

SHANTZ
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Cairo
Dated August 25, 1944
Rec’d 2:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.
Immediate
YUGOS
139, August 25, 3 p.m.

British message from de Chastelain yesterday states that credit for Rumanian changeover goes to King who planned it for tomorrow but grasped unexpected opportunity to arrest Marshal Antonesou and entire Government in Palace. King, claiming to have laid basis of scheme in February, was dissatisfied at persistent delays of political leaders.

Entire ex-Government under guard in Palace and all military commanders ordered to resist all acts of German aggression.

Repeated to Murphy as No. 17, London as 6 and to Moscow.

Rumanian units being concentrated in Bucharest area. King again asks if three airborne brigades could be landed near Bucharest and requests urgent supplies automatic arms and antitank guns.

When Chastelain left Bucharest at 5 a.m. yesterday popular feeling strongly favored immediate action against Germans who had occupied, but under threat of armed action had agreed to leave, Giurgiu, Galatz and Turda post and telephone offices and Bucharest Ploesti road at Otopedr.

SHANTZ
SECRET

Cairo

Dated August 25, 1944.

Rec'd 1:36 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

MOST IMMEDIATE

YUGOS

139, August 25, 5 p.m.

Cretzeanu yesterday gave British a message he received from Nicolaescu-Buzesti instructing him in name of King to inform British, American and Soviet Governments that on August 23 the King dismissed the Government of Marshal Antonescu and named General Sanatescu Premier of a Government of National Union including the leaders of four parties comprising the National Democratic bloc and Grigore Nicolaescu-Buzesti as Foreign Minister. (Repeated to Murphy as No. 18, to London as No. 7, to Moscow and to Ankara.)

Message adds that the new Government intends to sign armistice at once and asks that, since events planned for Twenty-sixth took place on the Twenty-third, the bombing requested for tomorrow (see my YUGOS 136) be done immediately.

SHANTZ
MEMORANDUM

SECRET

August 26, 1944.

CHRONOLOGICAL SURVEY OF EVENTS REGARDING
RUMANIAN PEACE EFFORTS

NOVEMBER—DECEMBER 1943

ANTONESCU GOVERNMENT FEELERS - Madrid's 3671 December 14th and
Memorandum from British Embassy at Washington reported that M. Pan-
gal and Rumanian Minister, Cadere, in Lisbon and Rumanian First
Secretary Madrid claimed to represent Mihai Antonescu and that the
Rumanian Government was prepared to surrender unconditionally upon
arrival Anglo-American troops in Balkans. Bern's 7566 December 2
reported similar views expressed by Dan Gebescou, Rumanian Consul
General.

MANIU AND KING - Stockholm's 4166 December 28 reported efforts of
Maniu and King to establish contacts with Anglo-Americans through
Rumanian Counselor of Legation, Duca, and/or Nicolescu Buzesti, of
Rumanian Foreign Office. Some Russian interest shown but nothing
developed.

FEBRUARY 1944

MANIU AND OPPOSITION - By February, Soviet Russia, Great Britain
and United States agreed to inform Maniu that no purpose would be
served if they sent out a representative unless he was authorized
to sign terms of unconditional surrender on behalf of Government
or at least to discuss details leading to overthrow of Government
and surrender. The three powers were agreed that the feelers from
Lisbon, Bern and Madrid were not to be taken seriously.

Maniu was finally informed that Soviet, British and American
representatives would meet his representative at Cairo for discus-
sion operational details for overthrow of Antonescu Government.

MARCH 1944

PRINCE BARBU STIRBEY - Cairo's 1796 March 4 indicated that Prince
Stirbej was Maniu's emissary and that he had arrived in Ankara.
Purpose of mission leaked in Press stories, causing Maniu to send
urgent message to Allies through his Stockholm representative re-
questing silencing of the press stories which had already endangered
opposition's plans and aroused German suspicion.

CAIRO DISCUSSIONS - MacVeagh's Yugosl March 17th, reported sub-
stance of first conversations with Stirbej.

London's reaction to Stirbej's proposals was one of surprise and
satisfaction, warranting continuation conversations.

Washington's
Washington's reaction, both State Department and Joint Chiefs, pleased. Joint Chiefs suggested Allied air support might be given.

Moscow's reaction, as expressed by Novikov and Molotov, was rather cold. Didn't believe talks could lead to positive results. Considered Maniu tool of Antonescu.

THE OCCUPATION OF HUNGARY, March 19 to 20, and summoning of the Antonescu to Germany accelerated events and caused General Wilson to despatch urgent message to Antonescu, without prior consultation with American and Soviet representatives, to effect that Antonescu should not go to Hitler, which would be considered as evidence further Romanian collaboration. He should surrender to three Allied immediately.

Moscow was annoyed that Wilson acted without consulting them.

By March 27, however, Moscow decided to take action and proposed that General Wilson's statement be supplemented by following message to Antonescu:

1. Soviet Government ready to establish contact with Antonescu.

2. Antonescu should order troops in contact with Soviet troops to surrender. If this carried out in Crimea or Dniester area, Soviet Commander would undertake to send surrendered troops to Fruth to be returned to Antonescu for organization by Romanian Government to resist German troops.

3. Direct contact between Soviet and Romanian High Command for settlement problems mutual military action against Germans. Antonescu should appoint person or give authority to surrendered Romanian General in Russia.

The foregoing was communicated to Maniu by Lord Moyne March 27. On same day Maniu telegraphed that the Antonescus had returned from Germany; that he was as yet uninformed regarding decisions taken; that the occupation of Rumania had apparently been postponed; and that if Antonescu did not break with Germans, Maniu, with consent of King, had decided to overthrow Antonescu. He envisaged possibility of organised resistance to Germans in the Banat and Oltenia, where, if necessary they could retreat into Yugoslavia.

REACTION JOINT CHIEFS - The Joint Chiefs raise no objection to Stirbey's four points; they stress:

1. Importance Rumania's immediate surrender.

2. Suggest
2. Suggest Allies may be able aid resistance with air bombardments.

3. Feel Russians should be given full power carry out surrender, unimpeded by less relevant political consideration, such as token Allied representation.

March 26. Telegram from British Minister Resident to Mr. Eden revealed that Rumanian Military Attaché at Ankara approached British M.A. with following message from Marshal Antonescu:

1. If Germany presents written demands can Antonescu count on
   a) Air-borne assistance from Allies.
   b) Helpful policy declaration re Transylvania and/or Atlantic Charter to help Marshal work up Rumanian will to fight.

2. Rumanian Army has 7 divisions in Crimea, 3 on Dniester front and 3 near reorganization. Remaining 15 divisions secretly mobilizing, lack heavy armament.

3. If he decides to resist, he will retreat to Yugoslavia if hard pressed and cooperate with Tito and Allies.

4. Floesti is completely in control of Germans.

British M.A. at Ankara was instructed to inform Rumanian M.A. of Moscow’s message of March 26th. If agreed British GHQ suggested further reply be sent to effect that:

1. Allies would bomb targets indicated by Rumanians.

2. Question of declaration would be considered.

Mr. Eden’s telegram March 28 to Cairo revealed that British Government concurred with Joint Chiefs that Anglo-American representation at surrender of Rumanian troops unimportant if Soviet Government accepts surrender on behalf of all three Allies and consult Anglo-Americans in advance on Armistice terms.

March 29, Stibey sent message to Maniu advising him that Soviet terms to Antonescu applied to Maniu and he advised Maniu to take immediate action if Antonescu failed to do so.

April 1st Soviet Embassy presented Department with copy of proposed statement to Rumania to effect that

1. Soviet
1. Soviet Government had no territorial claim beyond the Pruth.

2. Soviet Government did not aim to change existing social regime of Rumania.

Ankara reported April 1st that Marshal Antonescu promised Hitler 1,000,000 soldiers, 300,000 for Galatz - Foosani - Odobesti Line, 700,000 as needed. Hitler reported promised adequate armament and support for return of Transylvania.

April 1st Cairo's Yugos 78 reported:

1. General Wilson advised Maniu take action suggested by Russians.

2. Allies prepared to make powerful air attacks on targets suggested by Maniu.

3. A message from Maniu dated March 31st stated Antonescu won over to Allies "in principle" awaiting repetition Soviet conditions through Cretzianu.

4. Cairo's Yugos 80 reported that Lord Moyne sent message to Antonescu drawing attention to Molotov statement and demanding immediate reply of acceptance Soviet proposals.

April 3 London's 2694 reported British Foreign Office surprised and puzzled over Russian willingness to play with Maniu or Antonescu.

Speculating on future course of events British F.O. thought King Michael would dismiss Antonescu and appoint Maniu who would surrender to Allies.

Cairo's Yugos 81, April 4, reported that Stirbey had cabled Maniu that if he did not take immediate action, he would assume that his mission was terminated.

April 4, copy of telegram dated March 31, from Cairo to London indicated that Moscow was prepared to return all of Transylvania to Rumania.

Stockholm's 1114, April 4 reported that Duca had received request to ascertain possibilities of sending Rumanian representative by plane to Moscow.

Russian Armistice Terms

Cairo's Yugos 84, April 8, informed Department that Novikov had presented MacVeagh and Lord Moyne with following armistice terms for Rumania: 

Regraded Unclassified
Rumania:

1. Rumanian divisions in Crimea, Odessa and Kichinev must surrender to Red Army or attack Germans in rear, cooperating with Russians. If this done Russians will re-equip Rumanians and place them at disposition of Antonescu and Maniu.

2. Soviet minimum conditions are:

(a) rupture with Germans and cooperation with Russians;

(b) re-establishment of Rumanian-Soviet frontier agreed to 1940;

(c) indemnity for losses caused Russians by hostilities and occupation of Soviet territory;

(d) repatriation Soviet and Allied prisoners and internees.

These minimum conditions can be changed for the worse if not accepted.

3. Soviet Government does not demand occupation Rumanian territory for duration of war but unrestricted freedom of movement Soviet and Allied troops if necessary. Rumanian Government must contribute with all its means of communication on land, water and in air.

4. Soviet Government considers Vienna award unjust and is ready to conduct operation in common with Rumania for restoration to Rumania of all of Transylvania or major part thereof.

5. Rumania may have political representative for political questions with Russians.

Department's reaction.

1. Terms essentially Russian, not allied or tripartite and represent departure from unconditional surrender principle.

2. Russian proposals differ considerably from those prepared by Department and submitted to European Advisory Commission.

3. Terms are at variance with American view on territorial question of Bessarabia, Bukovina and Transylvania.

4. We do not favor Rumanian occupation of Hungarian territory or disputed Transylvania territory.

Joint Chiefs' Reaction.
Our Government should give full assent to military provisions and hoped our Government could find basis of agreement on political provisions.

**British reaction.**

Churchill's message of April 9 to Molotov indicated British acceptance of Russian terms, if Clause 4 could be amended to conclude "subject to confirmation at the peace settlement". This referred to Transylvania.

The British also expressed concern that Clause 5 would not preclude British and American political representatives just as Soviets enjoyed in Italy.

**Department’s Yugoslav 23 of April 11.**

Cairo authorized Maenagh to inform Novikov that our Government agreed to armistice terms as amended by Mr. Churchill’s suggestions.

The Soviets agreed to the proposed changes and the terms were transmitted through DC on April 14th for transmission to Antonescu and Maniu.

**Maniu Government in Moldavia**

Cairo's Yugoslav 92 April 16 reported Russian approval of its terms to apply to Maniu, if he set up opposition Government in Russian occupied Moldavia. This idea was proposed by Stirbey.

**APRIL 1944**

**Allied Armistice Terms Sent - Cairo, on April 14, reported the Allied armistice terms were sent to both Maniu and Marshal Antonescu.**

**Proposed Strong Messages to the Romanians -** The receipt of armistice terms from Maniu were reported by Cairo on April 17, wherein he requested two airborne divisions from the Middle East. The Allied delegates considered sending strong statements to Marshal Antonescu and Maniu, giving the former a time limit to accept Allied terms and demanding from the latter his final attitude toward these terms.

**Department Reaction to Plan for Maniu Regime in Russian-held Territory—** The Department told Cairo on April 18 it had no objection to Maniu establishing an opposition government in Moldavia, but believed this would make difficult the operation of Articles 1 and 2 of the Soviet terms. The other Articles could be accorded him. The American position of deferring boundary settlements until the close of the war was repeated.
Department Approves Proposed Message to Maniu - On April 20 the message to Maniu as reported by Cairo on April 17 was approved, but it was objected that the Antonescu message wording was illogical, making him a co-belligerent commander if he accepted and a war criminal if he refused.

Stirbey Asks Maniu to Act - Stirbey personally appealed to Maniu for action, said Cairo on April 22. Maniu acknowledged the Soviet armistice terms, together with "suggestions" sent by him via Ankara as a basis for negotiations.

American and Soviet Position on Bessarabia - Stirbey was granted permission to propose to Maniu an opposition government in Russian-held Moldavia, said Cairo on April 24.

A Russian inquiry, if the Department's statement on territorial questions on April 18 applied to Bessarabia, was answered by repeating the American policy of deferring boundary problems until the war's close. Since the United States had agreed to the Russian armistice terms, the Soviet Government stated its understanding that the United States accepted its position on Bessarabia. The Soviets added the Molotov declaration upon Rumania's frontiers was applicable in determining Maniu's future territorial jurisdiction.

Messages to Maniu and Antonescu - On April 27 Cairo reported the proposed message to Marshal Antonescu had been changed in accordance with the Department's cable of April 20. The Maniu message was delayed until Soviet approval of the text was received.

MAY 1944

Maniu Message Sent - New Envoy - The Maniu message was sent on May 1, said Cairo, as from delegates of the three Allied powers. The ultimatum in the message to Antonescu expired. The Allies agreed to receive Visoiianu as Maniu's extra delegate.

Russian Suspicion of British - Cairo reported May 4 a Molotov suggestion to the British Ambassador at Moscow that negotiations were being delayed because the British mission in Rumania worked with Marshal Antonescu under an agreement whose terms were unknown. He asked for an explanation, and in Cairo the British explained to the Americans and Russians the communications media to Rumania, which they had been operating.

Second Envoy's Arrival and New Action Details - On May 26 Cairo reported that Visoiianu, the second Maniu envoy, had arrived. He stated that, because of German troop distributions, any Rumanian action had been greatly endangered, Maniu asked for full Allied directions. Maniu was to be told to send an officer to the Russian lines for joint military planning.
-3-

Maniu Told to Act with Russians - Details of means by which Maniu’s military emissary could meet the Russians were sent, said Cairo on May 29.

JUNE 1944

Assurances Desired by Maniu - Reported by Cairo’s June 1 as follows:

1. Only Rumanian administration in all occupied territory;

2. No Allied occupation of non-operational zones in Rumania, including Bucharest;

3. The new regime to be given the German-seized National Bank of Rumania funds;

4. Release of frozen government funds from the United States and Great Britain;

5. Return all Transylvania to Rumania.

Proposed Message to Maniu - The Department assented on June 3 to a Cairo request of June 1 that Maniu be informed that he should follow the previous advice and contact the Red Army. Further negotiations were considered useless.

Maniu to Elaborate Means to Implement Armistice - A Cairo cable of June 13 said Maniu would shortly submit means to implement the armistice. He wished lenient application of their terms. This disturbed the Allied delegates.

Maniu Peace and Military Proposals - Maniu continued unwilling to contact the Russians directly, reported Cairo on June 29. The Maniu plan provided:

1. The present regime to be supplanted coincident with the armistice and a heavy Russian offensive;

2. An Allied bombardment of communications in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary;

3. Three Allied air-borne brigades and two thousand paratroops of any Allied nationality;

4. The signed armistice at Cairo to be announced when the government changes and a Rumanian statement is issued withdrawing from the Axis.

In the light of the above, Maniu asked for any modifications that could be made in the Allied terms.

JULY 1944

American
American Reaction to Maniu Plan - Department on July 6 told Cairo the Soviet Government would decide the military acceptance of Maniu's plan. This view was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who stated they were unable to furnish American troops, but that the requested bombing would be done.

Another Rumanian Message - Cairo on July 12 said a message from the Rumanians asked for prompt Allied action, in view of the interspersal of German with Rumanian troops. They pleaded for cessation of Allied bombing until the plan went into effect.

No Soviet Reaction - By the end of July 29 no Soviet reaction to the Maniu plan had been received.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

August 26, 1944

Subject: Armistice Terms For Bulgaria

The Department has received information from London that on August 25 the European Advisory Commission discussed and drafted the text of a draft armistice with Bulgaria. This text has received the approval of the British Government and has been sent to Moscow by the Soviet Ambassador for Soviet approval. The document was drawn up on the basis of the materials furnished by the Department in February and July, 1944, and cleared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The text of this document is attached.

The Department is informing the Embassy in London that it approves the document as it now stands pending clearance by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It suggests, however, that as the negotiations proceed, thought might be given to an alteration of Article Three by adding the words, "their withdrawal to be carried out according to a schedule laid down by the Allied occupation authorities." The Department has in mind the possibility that the immediate withdrawal of the Bulgarian forces from the occupied territories in Yugoslavia and Greece might result in widespread disorder, and invites the views of the Joint Chiefs on this matter.

The European Advisory Commission has also raised the questions whether Bulgaria should be assured of its future independence at the time of the negotiations as a means of facilitating its acceptance of the terms, and regarding the form which the association of Greece and Yugoslavia as signatories of the armistice should take. The Department is informing its representative on the Commission that in its view Bulgaria might, at the discretion of the Allied representatives, be given orally such
such assurance of future independence, and that Greek and Yugoslav representatives should be invited to assent to the surrender terms without signing them. It is proposed that the other Governments at war with Bulgaria should be informed of the terms at the time of their acceptance.

A memorandum on this subject, identical in text, is being addressed to Admiral Leahy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Enclosure:

Armistice Terms for Bulgaria
TOP SECRET

Armistice Terms For Bulgaria

The following conditions have been accepted by the Bulgarian Government:

One. Hostilities to cease between Bulgaria and the United Nations at blank space.

Two. Bulgaria to sever all relations with Germany and other enemy powers, to disarm and intern enemy forces and nationals and to control enemy property.

Three. Bulgarian forces, officials and nationals to withdraw from all Allied territory at present occupied by Bulgaria.

Four. The Supreme Allied Command to have the right to move their forces freely into or across Bulgarian territory at the cost of Bulgaria if the military situation requires or if the Bulgarian Government fail in any respect to fulfill the terms of the armistice.

Five. Bulgaria to carry out such measures of disarmament and demobilization, as may be required.

Six. Bulgaria to release Allied prisoners of war and internees.

Seven. Bulgaria to comply with Allied requirements for the use and control of transport including Danubian navigation and transport facilities.

Eight. Bulgaria to release all persons detained for political reasons or as a result of discriminatory legislation. Such legislation to be repealed.

Nine. Bulgaria to cooperate in the apprehension and trial of persons accused of war crimes.

Ten. Bulgaria to restore all United Nations property and to make reparation for war damage.

Eleven. Bulgaria to make such contribution towards general relief and rehabilitation as may be required of her.

Twelve
"Twelve. Bulgaria to comply with any further Allied instructions for giving effect to the armistice; and to meet Allied requirements for the reestablishment of peace and security."
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

General Marshall has asked me to send this to you for your information and to pass on to the President.

H. M. PASCO
Lt. Col., General Staff Corps
Acting Secretary, General Staff

Enc. Memo for Pres.
8/18 fr CS
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The War Department has received a letter from the Royal Yugoslav Military Attaché to this country, Lt. Col. Zivan L. Knezevich, forwarding a telegram from General Mihailovich who states that Partisan units are fighting against the people of Serbia and against the Yugoslav Army commanded by General Mihailovich. This fighting, he states, is made possible by the armament being sent by the Allies to Partisan units intended for use against the Germans. The telegram intimates that a continuation of the present situation will result in the gradual annihilation of the Serbian people and the Yugoslav Army which also includes the Slovenian people.

The Military Attaché points out that the Serbian people led the Yugoslavs over to the side of the Allies by the coup d'etat in March 1941 and that they have fought for three years in the Regular Yugoslav Army under Mihailovich against the Germans. He further points out that the Serbian people have 140,000 prisoners of war in Germany and have had more than a million of their people killed by the Germans.

Colonel Knezevich states that the only way to stop the annihilation of the Serbian people and their Army is to cease sending armament to the Partisans, who are in effect a terroristic minority.

Chief of Staff
TOP SECRET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
FOR: BILL DONOVAN, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES.

HAVE JUST READ YOURS OF JULY FOURTH IN REGARD TO YUGOSLAVIA.
I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO SENDING AN INTELLIGENCE TEAM AND SEARCH
PARTIES BUT PLEASE CLEAR WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND JOINT STAFF.

F.D.R.

TOP SECRET

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: GENERAL MARSHALL.

HAVE SENT YOUR SUGGESTED DRAFT OF REPLY TO CHAIRMAN WAR PRODUCTION
BOARD EXACTLY AS YOU HAVE SUGGESTED.

F.D.R.

TOP SECRET

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE CHAIRMAN WAR PRODUCTION BOARD.

WITH REFERENCE TO YOUR LETTER OF JUNE 15, I CONSIDER THAT IT IS DESIRABLE
TO ORGANIZE A UNITED STATES TECHNICAL MISSION TO THE JAPANESE MANDATED ISLANDS
TO SURVEY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE OCCUPATION BY UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES,
THE MATERIAL RESOURCES, INCLUDING BAUXITE, AND AS YOU SUGGEST MAKE A REPORT THEREON.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF HAVE ADVISED ME THAT THERE IS NO MILITARY OBJECTION
TO THE DISPATCH OF A SMALL MISSION, SUBJECT TO THE USUAL CONSIDERATIONS APPLYING
IN CASES WHERE CIVILIANS ARE SENT TO ACTIVE THEATRES, AND PROVIDED THE APPROVAL
OF THE THEATRE COMMANDER IS OBTAINED. FURTHER ARRANGEMENTS IN THIS CONNECTION
SHOULD BE MADE THROUGH THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

INASMUCH AS THE PROPOSED MISSION IS OF CONSIDERABLE INTEREST TO OTHER
AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT (THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FOR EXAMPLE) IT IS DESIRED
THAT YOU INTEGRATE ALL SUCH INTERESTS BEFORE YOU TAKE FINAL ACTION IN THIS MATTER.

ROOSEVELT.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

4 July 1944

You will recall your letter to me of 22 March 1944 authorizing the despatch of secret intelligence agents to the Yugoslav territory now occupied by Mihailovich, not only to secure intelligence of independent American origin for that area, but also to use that area as a springboard from which to move northward with other intelligence agents toward and into Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Austria and Germany, itself.

That program was deferred while I was at the Hollandia operations. This, as I have been informed by Mr. Churchill, was in compliance with his request. Accordingly, we withdrew the one representative we had left there for that purpose.

The situation seems to have altered somewhat in Yugoslavia and on 23 June I discussed the matter of the Mihailovich Area with General Wilson, who recognized
its importance from the standpoint of penetration into Austria and Central Europe and stated that he urgently needed information from this region.

General Wilson stated that we were right in our position that there was a basic difference between clandestine agents sent in for the purpose of obtaining general information and operational reconnaissance directed to the preparation of military movements. As to the first, he said we were as entitled, as he considered were the British, to undertake as we elected without consultation with anyone. As to the second, due to the avoidance of conflicting operations, coordination was necessary.

Further, the British intend to send (if they have not already done so) an intelligence team into that area. In view of the above facts, and particularly of the view of General Wilson that we aid him in searching for American pilots now known to be in that area, I respectfully request that we be permitted to send in our intelligence team and also our search parties. It is a very difficult task to turn off and on intelligence work, and information of Central Europe is badly needed.

William J. Donovan
Director
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

4 July 1944

You will recall your letter to me of 22 March 1944 requesting me to dispatch of secret intelligence agents to the new territory now occupied by M. Halilovich, not only to secure intelligence of independent origin for that area, but also to see that area as a springboard for other operations.

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the attached memorandum will be of interest to the President. Will you please hand it to him? Thank you.

That program was developed while I was at the Hollandia operations. This, as I have been informed by Mr. Churchill, was in compliance with his request.

Accordingly, we withdrew the one report we had left there for that purpose.

The situation seems to have altered somewhat in Yugoslavia and on 21 June I discussed the matter of the Halilovich Area with General Wilson, who recognized

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director
4 July 1944

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William J. Donovan
Director
Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Grace:

I believe the attached memorandum will be of interest to the President. Will you please hand it to him? Thank you.

Sincerely

[Signature]

William J. Donovan
Director
July 8, 1944

My dear Mr. President:

I yesterday received your letter of June 30 enclosing paraphrases or extracts of messages exchanged between the British Prime Minister and yourself concerning the proposed British-Russian agreement for “taking the lead” in Greek and Rumanian affairs respectively.

On the basis of this exchange of messages the Department will now be able to reply to the telegram from Mr. MacVeagh at Cairo, a copy of which was sent to you with my letter of June 25, and to the other American representatives abroad dealing with this matter.

I think you will also be interested in a similar telegram from Mr. Robert Murphy, a copy of which is enclosed, in which is quoted what Mr. Murphy has been informed is Mr. Eden’s letter to the Soviet Ambassador at London on this same subject.

Presumably as a result of this correspondence, the Soviet Ambassador here has received instructions from Moscow to obtain confirmation of the attitude of this Government on this question. A copy of the aide mémoire which he has left with me is enclosed, together with a draft of the memorandum which the Department proposes to send to the Soviet Embassy, if you approve.

Enclosures:

1. Telegram from Mr. Murphy;
2. Aide mémoire from Soviet Embassy; and
3. Draft reply to the Soviet communication.

Faithfully yours,

The President,

The White House.
SECRET

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Algiers

Dated June 28, 1944

Ree'd 10:06 p.m. July 1

Secretary of State,
Washington.

2161, June 28, midnight.

FROM MURPHY

Referring to Department's circular telegram of June 22, noon there is quoted below text of letter from British Foreign Secretary to Soviet Ambassador London dated June 19 as supplied by British services here:

"In our interview on May 18 you informed me that the Soviet Government agreed as a practical matter they should take the lead in dealing with Rumanian affairs while we should take the lead in Greece. You stated that before the Soviet Government gave any final assurance in the matter they would like to know whether the United States Government also agreed.

The United States Government have now been consulted and they agree with the arrangement proposed. They feel some anxiety however lest it should extend beyond the immediate circumstances for which it has been devised and should lead to a partition of Balkan countries into spheres of influence. We ourselves have always intended that the arrangement should apply only to war conditions and should not affect the rights and responsibilities which each of our three governments will have to exercise at the peace settlement and afterwards in regard to the whole of Europe. In order to guard against any danger of the arrangement extending beyond the purpose for which it has been devised we have suggested to the United States Government and they have agreed, that it should be given a trial of three months after which it would be reviewed by our three governments. I hope therefore that the Soviet Government will agree to arrangement coming into force on this basis.

CHAPIN
On May 5, 1944 in a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador at London, Mr. F.T. Gousev, on the Roumanian and Greek questions Mr. Eden stated that the British Government considers the Soviet Government as leading in the Roumanian affairs and that Roumania is the sphere of activities of the U.S.S.R. Mr. Eden also stated that, on its part, the British Government considers itself as leading in the Greek affairs, and considers Greece its sphere of activities. Mr. Eden expressed, besides, the wish of the British Government that England and the U.S.S.R. assist each other in this matter.

In reply to this statement of Mr. Eden on May 18, 1944 Mr. F.T. Gousev, on instructions of the Soviet Government, has made an oral statement to Mr. Eden, in which he informed him that the Soviet Government agrees in principle with the stated point of view of the British Government but, before giving a final reply on the question raised, the Soviet Government would like to know whether the Government of the United States has been informed of the point of view of Great Britain, and if it has been informed does it have any objections against this point of view.

Since in his latest statement of June 19, 1944 Mr. Eden has informed the Soviet Ambassador at London, that in respect to the leading role in the Roumanian affairs and the leading role of Great Britain in Greek affairs the Government of the United States as well as the Government of Great Britain are proceeding from the fact that the British proposal should refer only to military conditions and that the Government of the United States expresses certain fear that this plan should not go beyond the limit of the present circumstances and should not bring about the division of the Balkan countries into spheres of influence, and it was suggested to set a three months trial, after which the said question should be again considered by our three Governments, -- the Soviet Government deems it necessary to subject this matter to additional study. The Soviet Government has in mind, besides, to ascertain whether the realization of such a proposal would introduce anything new into the already formed actual situation. The Soviet Government has also informed the British Government
Government that it considers it expedient to get in touch directly with the Government of the United States so as to get better acquainted with its point of view on this question, as until this time that question will not yet become subject of Soviet-American discussion.

The Soviet Government would be grateful to the Government of the United States for informing its point of view on the given matter.

Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Washington, D. C. 

July 1, 1944.
DRAFT OF MEMORANDUM FROM THE DEPARTMENT TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY REGARDING THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT FOR HUMANIAN-GREEK AFFAIRS

In its aide-mémoire of July 1 the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics reviewed the conversations which have taken place at London concerning the positions of the Soviet and British Governments in taking the lead in HUMANIAN and Greek affairs, respectively. The Embassy states that the Soviet Government deems it necessary to subject this matter to additional study, in view of Mr. Eden's statement to the Soviet Ambassador at London on June 19, in which he gave a new outline of the arrangement, mentioning the Government of the United States as associated with the British proposal if it should not go beyond the limit of the present circumstances and should not bring about the division of the Balkan countries into spheres of influence; Mr. Eden added that it was now suggested to set a three months' trial, after which the question would be again considered by the three Governments. The Embassy then states that the Soviet Government desires to be acquainted with the point of view of this Government.

It is correct that the Government of the United States assented to the arrangement, for a trial period of three months, this assent being given in consideration of the present war strategy. Except for this overriding consideration, this Government would wish to make known its apprehension lest the proposed agreement might, by the natural tendency of such arrangements, lead to the division in fact of the Balkan region into spheres of influence.

It would be unfortunate, in view of the decisions of the Moscow Conference, if any temporary arrangement should be so conceived as to appear to be a departure from the principle adopted by the three Governments at Moscow, in definite rejection of the spheres of influence idea. Consequently this Government hopes that no projected measures will be allowed to prejudice the efforts toward directing the policies of the Allied Governments along lines of collaboration rather than independent action, since any arrangement suggestive of spheres of influence cannot but militate against the establishment and effective functioning of a broader system of general security in which
all countries will have their part.

It is supposed that the three-month trial period will enable the British and Soviet Governments to determine whether such an arrangement is practicable and efficacious as applicable only to war conditions and essentially related to the military operations of their respective forces, without in any way affecting the rights and responsibilities which each of the three principal Allies will have to exercise during the period of the re-establishment of peace, and afterwards, in regard to the whole of Europe.

Finally, this Government assumes that the arrangement would have neither direct nor indirect validity as affecting the interests of this Government, or of other Governments associated with the three principal Allies.

Department of State,

Washington,
SECRET

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

2161, June 28, midnight.

FROM MURPHY

Referring to Department's circular telegram of June 22, noon there is quoted below text of letter from British Foreign Secretary to Soviet Ambassador London dated June 19 as supplied by British services here:

"In our interview on May 18 you informed me that the Soviet Government agreed as a practical matter they should take the lead in dealing with Rumanian affairs while we should take the lead in Greece. You stated that before the Soviet Government gave any final assurance in the matter they would like to know whether the United States Government also agreed.

The United States Government have now been consulted and they agree with the arrangement proposed. They feel some anxiety however lest it should extend beyond the immediate circumstances for which it has been devised and should lead to a partition of Balkan countries into spheres of influence. We ourselves have always intended that the arrangement should apply only to war conditions and should not affect the rights and responsibilities which each of our three governments will have to exercise at the peace settlement and afterwards in regard to the whole of Europe. In order to guard against any danger of the arrangement extending beyond the purpose for which it has been devised we have suggested to the United States Government and they have agreed, that it should be given a trial of three months after which it would be reviewed by our three governments. I hope therefore that the Soviet Government will agree to arrangement coming into force on this basis.

CHAPIN

Algiers  
Dated June 28, 1944  
Rec'd 10:06 p.m. July 1
SECRET

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CHAPIN

Regraded Unclassified
AIDE-MEMOIRE

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In reply to this statement of Mr. Eden on May 18, 1944 Mr. F.T. Gousev, on instructions of the Soviet Government, has made an oral statement to Mr. Eden, in which he informed him that the Soviet Government agrees in principle with the stated point of view of the British Government but, before giving a final reply on the question raised, the Soviet Government would like to know whether the Government of the United States has been informed of the point of view of Great Britain, and if it has been informed does it have any objections against this point of view.

Since in his latest statement of June 19, 1944 Mr. Eden has informed the Soviet Ambassador at London, that in respect to the leading role in the Roumanian affairs and the leading role of Great Britain in Greek affairs the Government of the United States as well as the Government of Great Britain are proceeding from the fact that the British proposal should refer only to military conditions and that the Government of the United States expresses certain fear that this plan should not go beyond the limit of the present circumstances and should not bring about the division of the Balkan countries into spheres of influence, and it was suggested to set a three months trial, after which the said question should be again considered by our three Governments, -- the Soviet Government deems it necessary to subject this matter to additional study. The Soviet Government has in mind, besides, to ascertain whether the realization of such a proposal would introduce anything new into the already formed actual situation. The Soviet Government has also informed the British Government.
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The Soviet Government would be grateful to the Government of the United States for informing its point of view on the given matter.

It is agreed that the Government of the United States assented to the arrangement, that a trial period of three months, this matter being given in consideration of the present war situation. Except for this over-riding consideration, this Government would wish to make known its apprehension lest the proposed arrangement might, by the natural tendency of such arrangements, lead to the division of the Balkan region into spheres of influence.

It could be unfortunate, in view of the divisions from which it is hoped that the Balkans will be recoverable, that it be implied by the terms of this arrangement that this Government hopes that its proposed measures will be allowed to prejudice the efforts toward diverting the policies of the Allied Governments along lines of collaboration rather than independence. Hence, since any arrangements designed of spheres of influence against will alike against the establishment and effective realization of a broad system of general security in which
In its aide-mémoire of July 1 the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics reviewed the conversations which have taken place at London concerning the positions of the Soviet and British Governments in taking the lead in Rumanian and Greek affairs, respectively. The Embassy states that the Soviet Government deems it necessary to subject this matter to additional study, in view of Mr. Eden's statement to the Soviet Ambassador at London on June 19, in which he gave a new outline of the arrangement, mentioning the Government of the United States as associated with the British proposal if it should not go beyond the limit of the present circumstances and should not bring about the division of the Balkan countries into spheres of influence; Mr. Eden added that it was now suggested to set a three months' trial, after which the question would be again considered by the three Governments. The Embassy then states that the Soviet Government desires to be acquainted with the point of view of this Government.

It is correct that the Government of the United States assented to the arrangement, for a trial period of three months, this assent being given in consideration of the present war strategy. Except for this overriding consideration, this Government would wish to make known its apprehension lest the proposed agreement might, by the natural tendency of such arrangements, lead to the division in fact of the Balkan region into spheres of influence.

It would be unfortunate, in view of the decisions of the Moscow Conference, if any temporary arrangement should be so conceived as to appear to be a departure from the principle adopted by the three Governments at Moscow, in definite rejection of the spheres of influence idea. Consequently this Government hopes that no projected measures will be allowed to prejudice the efforts toward directing the policies of the Allied Governments along lines of collaboration rather than independent action, since any arrangement suggestive of spheres of influence cannot but militate against the establishment and effective functioning of a broader system of general security in which
all countries will have their part.

It is supposed that the three-month trial period will enable the British and Soviet Governments to determine whether such an arrangement is practicable and efficacious as applicable only to war conditions and essentially related to the military operations of their respective forces, without in any way affecting the rights and responsibilities which each of the three principal Allies will have to exercise during the period of the re-establishment of peace, and afterwards, in regard to the whole of Europe.

Finally, this Government assumes that the arrangement would have neither direct nor indirect validity as affecting the interests of this Government, or of other Governments associated with the three principal Allies.
My dear Mr. President:

I yesterday received your letter of June 30 enclosing paraphrases or extracts of messages exchanged between the British Prime Minister and yourself concerning the proposed British-Russian agreement for "taking the lead" in Greek and Rumanian affairs respectively.

On the basis of this exchange of messages the Department will now be able to reply to the telegram from Mr. MacVeagh at Cairo, a copy of which was sent to you with my letter of June 29, and to the other American representatives abroad dealing with this matter.

I think you will also be interested in a similar telegram from Mr. Robert Murphy, a copy of which is enclosed, in which is quoted what Mr. Murphy has been informed is Mr. Eden's letter to the Soviet Ambassador at London on this same subject.

Presumably as a result of this correspondence, the Soviet Ambassador here has received instructions from Moscow to obtain confirmation of the attitude of this Government on this question. A copy of the aide mémoire which he has left with me is enclosed, together with a draft of the memorandum which the Department proposes to send to the Soviet Embassy, if you approve.

Enclosures:

1. Telegram from Mr. Murphy;
2. Aide mémoire from Soviet Embassy; and
3. Draft reply to the Soviet communication.

Faithfully yours,

The President,

The White House.
MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

I do not know just what happened on this matter. Will you check on it and communicate with Secretary Hull?

F.D.R.

This business was completed by President's letter to Secretary of State dated 30 June 1944

[Signature]
MEMORANDUM FOR

ADmiral Leahy:

I do not know just what happened on this matter. Will you check on it and communicate with Secretary Hull?

F.D.R.
June 30, 1944

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In reply to your letter of June 29, 1944, requesting our position in regard to an arrangement between the British and Russian Governments relative to Greek and Rumanian affairs, I am enclosing paraphrases or extracts of messages which have been exchanged between the Prime Minister and myself on this subject.

Sincerely,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable
The Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Enclosures:
1. Prime Minister to President #637
2. President to Prime Minister #557
3. Prime Minister to President #700
4. President to Prime Minister #560
5. Extract of Prime to President #703
6. President to Prime Minister #565
7. Prime Minister to President #712
8. Extract of President to Prime #570
SECRET PARAPHRASE

FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT

NO: 687, 31 MAY 1944.

Disquieting signs of a possible divergence of policy between ourselves and Russia in regard to the Balkan countries and particularly toward Greece recently have appeared. Therefore we suggested to the Russian Ambassador here in London that we should agree between ourselves as a practical matter that the Russian Government would take the lead in the affairs of Roumania, while we would take the lead in the affairs of Greece, each government giving the other assistance in the respective countries. Since the Roumanian territory falls within the area of the Red Armies and the Greeks within the sphere of the Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, General Wilson, an arrangement such as this would be a natural development of the existing military situation.

On May 18th, the Russian Ambassador informed Mr. Anthony Eden that the Soviets were in agreement with this suggestion, but before any final assurances in the matter were given, they would like to know whether we had consulted the Government of the United States and whether the latter was also in agreement with this arrangement. I hope you may feel able to give this proposal your blessing.

Of course we do not wish to cut up the Balkans into areas of influence and in agreeing to the arrangement we should make it clear that it did not affect the rights and responsibilities which the United States, Great Britain and the Soviets will have to exercise at the peace settlement and later on in regard to Europe as a whole, but that it applied only to war conditions. There would of course be no change involved by this arrangement in the present collaboration between the Governments of the United States and Great Britain in the formulation and execution of the policy of the Allies toward these countries. However we feel that the now proposed arrangement would be a device useful for preventing any divergence of policy between ourselves and them in the Balkan countries.

In the meantime I have requested Lord Halifax to take up this matter with the Department of State along the lines indicated above.

Prime
The proposed agreement between your Government and Russia concerning Roumania and Greece, outlined in your telegram No. 687 of May 31, was discussed by Lord Halifax with Mr. Hull on May 30. The State Department has communicated to Lord Halifax the reasons why this Government is unwilling to approve the proposed arrangement. Briefly, we acknowledge that the militarily responsible Government in any given territory will inevitably make decisions required by military developments but are convinced that the natural tendency for such decisions to extend to other than military fields would be strengthened by agreement of the type suggested. In our opinion, this would certainly result in the persistence of differences between you and the Soviets and in the division of the Balkan region into spheres of influence despite the declared intention to limit the arrangement to military matters.

We believe efforts should preferably be made to establish consultative machinery to dispel misunderstandings and restrain the tendency toward the development of exclusive spheres.

ROOSEVELT
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER
TO: THE PRESIDENT

NO : 700, 11 JUNE 1944

1. Your No. 557 gives me much concern. If everybody is to consult everybody else about everything before action is taken, action will be paralyzed. In these Balkan regions the events will always outstrip the changing situations. Power to plan and act must be given to someone. A committee for consultation would merely obstruct and, in case of emergency, would always be overridden by direct interchanges between me and you, or between Stalin and either of us.

2. Please recall what took place at Easter when I had charge not only of the Foreign Office but of the Armed British Forces. We found it possible to handle the mutiny of the Greek forces in complete accord with your own opinions. This was accomplished because I was able to give constant orders to the military commanders, who suggested conciliation at the beginning and, moreover, no use or even threat of force. There was little loss of life. The improvement of the Greek situation has been immense, and will be rescued from confusion and disaster if firmness is maintained. The Soviets are prepared to give us the lead in Greek affairs, which means that the national forces of Greece can be placed in control over EAM with all its malice. There will otherwise be civil war and ruin in the land about which you care so much. I have reported to you always and I will report to you always. Every telegram I send shall be seen by you. In this, I believe you might trust me.

3. In Egypt troubles similarly arose when King Farouk wished to discard Nahas and to install his court minister to control the elections. Widespread riots and disorder throughout Egypt might easily have followed from this. In this case also the advice of the military was to take no action which required the use of force. Without having to consult anybody, I was in a position to issue the required orders to military commanders, and the result has been more pleasing to them than to anyone. Once again I kept you informed of this event, and your Ambassador at Cairo was kept informed by Lord Killearn. The situation was resolved happily without any struggle.

4. In either of these two difficulties, if we had been required to consult other powers and a system of triangular or quadrangular cables got underway, chaos or impotence would have been the only result.

5. Since the Russians are about to invade Roumania in great force and are going to assist Roumania to recapture part of Transylvania from Hungary, it seems to me, provided the Roumanians play, which they may, considering all that, it would be desirable to follow the same leadership in view of the
fact that neither you nor we have any forces there at all and that, anyhow, they will probably do what they like. In addition, I considered their terms, apart from indemnity, even generous and very sensible. The Roumanian Army went into the war against Russia gleefully and has inflicted many injuries upon the Soviet troops. In my opinion there should be no difficulty whatever in our addressing the Russians upon any subject at any time, but since they are doing all the work, please let them go ahead upon the lines agreed.

6. Our situation in Greece is similar. Greece is an old ally of ours. In trying to defend Greece against Hitler we had 40,000 casualties, not including Crete. The Greek Government and the Greek King have put themselves under our care. At present they are in residence in Egypt. It is very likely that they may move to the Lebanon, whose atmosphere would be better than Cairo. In addition to the 40,000 men lost in helping Greece, we lost also a great mass of warships and shipping, and by stripping Cyrenaica to help Greece, the whole of Wavell's conquest in Cyrenaica was also lost. In those days these were heavy blows to us. In the recent crisis your telegrams to me worked wonders. Our agreement was complete and the result is entirely satisfactory. Why should all this efficient direction be broken up into a committee of mediocre officials such as we are littering throughout the world? Considering how we see eye to eye about so much of it, why can we not keep this in our own hands?

7. In summary, I suggest that the arrangements proposed in my number 687 may be agreed upon to have a three months' trial, following which the three powers must review them.
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER

NO.: 560, 12 JUNE 1944.

I am in agreement with your proposal in paragraph seven of your number 700.

Care must be exercised by us to make it clear that no post-war spheres of influence are being established.
Referring to your Number 560. I am deeply grateful to you for your reply to my number 700. I have asked the Foreign Secretary to convey the information to Monsieur Molotov and to make it clear that the reason for the three months' limit is in order that we should not prejudice the question of establishing post-war spheres of influence.

* * * * *

PRIME
This is an exact copy of a message prepared by State Department and must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER
NO: 22 JUNE 1944, #565

With reference to your 687 and my 560, regarding matters in the Balkans, I am a bit worried and so is the State Department. I think I should tell you frankly that we were disturbed that your people took this matter up with us only after it had been put up to the Russians and they had inquired whether we were agreeable. Your Foreign Office apparently sensed this and has now explained that the proposal "arose out of a chance remark" which was converted by the Soviet Government into a formal proposal. However, I hope matters of this importance can be prevented from developing in such a manner in the future.

ROOSEVELT
FROM: THE PRIME MINISTER  
TO: THE PRESIDENT  
NO. 712, 23 JUNE 1944

Your number 565.

The only power that can do anything in Roumania is Russia, and I thought you and I had agreed that on the basis of their reasonable armistice terms, except indemnities, they should try to exercise coherent direction there. Actually, we have all three cooperated closely in handling the recent Roumanian peace feelers in Cairo. The Greek burden, on the other hand, has rested almost entirely upon us since we lost 40,000 men in 1941 in our unsuccessful attempt to help them. Likewise, you have let us play the hand in Turkey, but on policy considerations we have always consulted you and on the line to be followed, I think we have been in accord. On the popular foreign policy on the general principle of slithering to the left, it would be quite easy for me to let things rip when the King of Greece probably would be forced to abdicate and EAM would work a reign of terror in Greece, forcing the villagers and other classes to attempt to prevent utter anarchy by organizing security battalions under German auspices. I can prevent this only by persuading the Russians to quit ramming EAM forward with all their force. For these reasons, I proposed to the Russians a temporary working arrangement for the better conduct of the war. This was only a proposal which had to be referred to you for your agreement.

In this matter I cannot admit that I have done anything wrong. Three people in different parts of the world cannot work together effectively if each must keep the third informed of any suggestion to either of the others. The message which you quite properly sent to U.S. about your conversations with the Poles, of which I have yet heard nothing from you, is a recent example of this. I am not complaining at all because of this since I know we are both working for the same general theme and purposes and I hope you will believe this true in my conduct of the Greek problem.

Also, I have taken action to try to effect a union of the Tito forces with those in Serbia and with all factions adherent to the Royal Yugoslav Government which has been recognized by both of us. We have kept you informed at every stage of how this heavy burden, which at present rests mainly on us, is being borne. With respect to this affair again, it would be easy to throw the King and the Royal Yugoslav Government to the wolves and permit civil war to break out in Yugoslavia which would overjoy the Germans. In both cases I am struggling to bring order out of the chaos and concentrate all efforts against the enemy. I am keeping you constantly informed and I hope to have your confidence and help within the spheres of action in which the initiative is assigned to us.

PRIME

TOP-SECRET
TOP-SECRET
TOP SECRET
PARAPHRASE (EXCEPT)

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER
NO.: 570, 26 JUNE 1944

With respect to your number 712, it would seem that each of us has inadvertently taken independent steps in a direction which we both now agree was for the time being expedient.

That we should always be in accord over questions bearing on our Allied war effort is essential. My next following message quotes the one I sent to U.J. about the visit of the Polish Prime Minister.
June 30, 1944

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In reply to your letter of June 29, 1944, requesting our position in regard to an arrangement between the British and Russian Governments relative to Greek and Rumanian affairs, I am enclosing paraphrases or extracts of messages which have been exchanged between the Prime Minister and myself on this subject.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

The Honorable
The Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Enclosures:
1. Prime Minister to President #687
2. President to Prime Minister #557
3. Prime Minister to President #700
4. President to Prime Minister #550
5. Extract of Prime to President #703
6. President to Prime Minister #565
7. Prime Minister to President #712
8. Extract of President to Prime #570
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 5, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

As directed by the President,
I am sending you the enclosed correspondence

to read before it is forwarded to the
Secretary of State.

Will you please return it after
you have noted it?

M. C. Latta

Acquaints SecState with policy re.
Greece and Roumania.
Mr. Rattle:

Admiral Leahy's Office

Refused this by hand,
advising that it had been
noted by the Admiral.

W.J.H.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 4, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LATTA:

The President asks that this correspondence be sent to Admiral Leahy for him to read before it is forwarded to the Secretary of State.

W. D. H.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 4, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR
MR. LATTA:

The President asks that this correspondence be sent to Admiral Leahy for him to read before it is forwarded to the Secretary of State.

W. D. H.

Attachments: Memorandum from the President to the Secretary of State, dated June 30, 1944, re arrangement between British and Russian Governments relative to Greek and Rumanian affairs — and enclosures.
July 5, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEARY:

As directed by the President,
I am sending you the enclosed correspondence

to read before it is forwarded to the
Secretary of State.

Will you please return it after
you have noted it?

E. C. L.

Regraded Unclassified
June 30, 1944

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In reply to your letter of June 29, 1944, requesting our position in regard to an arrangement between the British and Russian Governments relative to Greek and Rumanian affairs, I am enclosing paraphrases or extracts of messages which have been exchanged between the Prime Minister and myself on this subject.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Lt. Commander, U.S.N.
Aide

The Honorable
The Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.

Enclosures:
1. Prime Minister to President #687
2. President to Prime Minister #557
3. Prime Minister to President #700
4. President to Prime Minister #550
5. Extract of Prime to President #703
6. President to Prime Minister #555
7. Prime Minister to President #712
8. Extract of President to Prime #570

Regraded Unclassified
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 30, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

Miss Tully:

The attached letter from the Secretary of State to the President, dated June 29, 1944, was handed to me this morning by the Map Room watch officer who stated that during the previous evening Admiral McIntire had brought it in with the instructions that it be shown to Admiral Leahy "for whatever action that is necessary."

I have shown the letter to Admiral Leahy at his home and he directed me to prepare a reply from the President, enclosing paraphrases of the necessary telegrams.

This proposed reply to Secretary Hull is enclosed for submission to the President.

Respectfully,

J. V. Smith
Lt. Commander, USN
Aide

Regraded Unclassified
My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing herewith a copy of a telegram just received from Ambassador MacVeagh at Cairo reporting that he has been informed by his British colleague that the American Government has agreed to the proposal for an arrangement between the British and Russian Governments whereby they would respectively take the lead in Greek affairs and Rumanian affairs, our agreement, according to this information, being subject to the understanding that the arrangement should not extend beyond the circumstances for which it was devised and should not lead to the division of the Balkans into spheres of influence, and with the further provision that the arrangement should be subject to review after three months.

This is the project to which I referred in my letter of June 17 and which goes back to Mr. Churchill's telegram 687 of May 31. You will recall that the Department suggested a draft reply to Mr. Churchill's telegram which I think you despatched on or about June 10. On June 12 the Department delivered to the British Embassy a memorandum in the same sense, the draft of which had been submitted to you for approval, and subsequently the substance of this communication was telegraphed to the American Chiefs of Mission primarily concerned with matters of this kind.

On June 15 Lord Halifax informed me of Mr. Churchill's proposal direct to you that the arrangement be tried out for three months, subject then to review by the three powers. From information furnished to Mr. MacVeagh by the British it would appear that some change has been made in our position, although I have not been informed of your views on this new aspect of the question.

The President,

The White House.
I should be grateful if you would let me know what changes have been made in our position, in order that appropriate instructions, in amendment of the telegrams already despatched, can be sent to Mr. MacVeagh and the other Chiefs of Mission dealing with these questions.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Enclosure:

Copy of telegram no. 203, June 26, from Cairo.

On June 12 Lord Milford informed me of Mr. Churchill's principal interest in the matter and that arrangements be made to hold a conference to be attended by the three ministers. From information furnished by Mr. MacVeagh by the British envoy it would appear that some action has been taken on our position, although I have not been informed of your views on this matter or the question.
SECRET

LC - 937
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Cairo
Dated June 26, 1944
Rec'd 2:58 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

GREEK

203, June 26, noon.

My British colleague has recently several times spoken to me of a proposal for what he called a "purely practical war time arrangement" between the British and Russian Governments whereby the latter would take the lead in Rumania; the former in Greek affairs. This arrangement, he said, would provide for British support of Russian initiative in Rumania and Russian support of British initiative in Greece, but there would be no question of dividing the Balkans into spheres of influence. He said that the matter had been laid before the Department, since Moscow had reserved full acceptance pending agreement by the United States Government, and he promised to keep me informed of developments.

He has now read me a telegram, dated June 19, from the Foreign Office in London to its Embassy in Moscow, and at my request has confirmed this to me in a personal note dated yesterday the 24th, according to which the United States Government "after some delay" has agreed to the arrangement on the understanding that "it should not extend beyond the circumstances for which it was devised and should not lead to the division of the Balkans into spheres of influence." His note adds that "to make doubly sure" it is agreed that "the arrangement should be subject to revision after three months."

As his information that the United States has given its agreement runs contrary to my own understanding of the situation, derived from recent advices circulated through the Department's information service, and as the matter is one of specific importance to this Embassy, I would appreciate the Department's comments and instructions.

Repeated to Moscow. MACVEAGH
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 11, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR
The President:

I have discussed with Marshall, King and Arnold the attached report from General Donovan on the internal situation in Jugoslavia.

We are all in agreement that any effective effort to bring the conflicting Jugoslavian elements into agreement should be made by Great Britain and Soviet Russia acting together.

We are also in agreement that action by the United States toward this end would immediately involve us in the domestic politics of Jugoslavia which we have heretofore successfully avoided in spite of apparent efforts by the British Government to get us involved.

It appears that no military implications or commitments by the U.S. are necessary in connection with the problem.

Great Britain and Russia are undoubtedly fully informed in regard to the civil war in Jugoslavia which could be ended by getting Tito and Mihailovic into agreement.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff can see no possibility of our inaugurating corrective action without getting ourselves involved in European politics.

Perhaps something could be attempted by you in an oral discussion with Churchill at our next staff meeting.

W.D.S. 12 July 44

The President directed
This to be filed

Regarded Unclassified
July 11, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADmiral LeahY:

Please ask General Marshall, Admiral King and General Arnold to read this amazing report and to let me know what they think we should do about it.

F. D. R.

Thank you.
8 July 1944

Miss Grace Tully,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

Will you please place the attached memorandum before the President?

Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan,
Director.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This report was prepared by one of our officers who was with Tito's command on three different periods. I thought you would be interested in the observations of an officer who had an unusual opportunity of seeing the situation at close hand.

Willam J. Donovan
Director

Lt. Col. Seitz, Capt. Nanfield, and Lt. Masulin, who were in liaison with the forces under the command of General Makedovitch, were all known to me. Col. Seitz is a friend of long standing, and I have perfect confidence that my report or statement, or the report that has been handed and disclosed, although not in whole, is correct. I am positive that the same applies to Capt. Seitz and Lt. Masulin.

All of the above mentioned officers are now listed.
Summary Report on Observations in Jugoslavia for the period 19 Sept. 1943 until 16 June 1944.

(Prepared by Linn M. Farish, Lt. Col., AUS, Senior American Officer, Anglo-American Military Mission to the Jugoslav Peoples Army of National Liberation.)

I have been asked by Lt. Comdr. Green, USNR, Commanding Officer, Strategic Balkans Services (OSS), Bari, Italy, to prepare a report on conditions in Jugoslavia.

The basis for this report is approximately six months spent in the field during the periods 19 September to 3 November 1943, 20 January to 19 March 1944, and 16 April to 16 June 1944. Entrance to the country was effected by three parachute descents, on 19 September 1943, between Banja Luka and Mrkonic Grad, Bosnia; on 20 January 1944 at Bosanski Petrovac, Bosnia; and on 16 April 1944 at Shiroka Planina, South Serbia, near Vranje, between the Morava River and the old Bulgarian border.

During these periods I served as a staff officer under Brigadier F. H. Maclean, who commanded the Anglo-American Mission. In the first period, Capt. Benson and myself were the sole American members of the mission. In the second period, the American members were Capt. Selvig, Capt. Goodwin, Lt. Green and Lt. Popovich. During the third period, the personnel and conditions remained the same, with the exception that Lt. Popovich and myself were in direct radio contact with S.B.S. base in Bari. Our radio operator was Arthur Jibilian, SP(X) 3c USNR.

Lt. Col. Seitz, Capt. Mansfield, and Lt. Musulin, who were in liaison with the forces under the command of General Mihailovich, are all known to me. Col. Seitz is a friend of long standing, and I have perfect confidence that any report or statement he has made has been honest and sincere. Although not so well known to me, I am positive that the same applies to Capt. Mansfield and Lt. Musulin.

All of the above mentioned officers and men have, to my
knowledge, conducted themselves admirably under the most difficult conditions. The hardships they have undergone, the physical courage they have shown, and the mental distress they have experienced due to the confused position in which they have been placed, will probably never be known. I can only attest that their conduct in the field has brought credit to America and the Armed Forces of the United States. Placed in a perplexing whirl of external and internal politics, they have endeavored to maintain their balance and to report objectively on conditions as they saw and experienced them.

Severe cases of mental and physical exhaustion are certain to develop among those officers who have taken their work seriously. It is a known fact that the mental powers of certain British officers who have undergone slightly more have been definitively impaired.

The work which the American personnel in combination with the British personnel, both through the aid of the Yugoslav people, have performed in the rescue and evacuation of Allied airmen, especially American, has in itself been outstanding and a direct contribution to the war effort.

The situation in Yugoslavia has, from the beginning, been terribly confusing, and almost beyond the comprehension of an impartial outside observer. The deep rooted causes of the internecine strife are contained in racial, religious, and political dispute which are of such long standing that the people themselves do not understand them. The same applies to the present civil war, or wars being waged by the various factions. In the case of the forces of Marshal Tito and General Mihailovich, both sides tell exactly the same stories of incidents which occurred at certain places on the same dates, the only difference being that each side places the blame on the other.

Both sides proclaim as their aim a Free, United and Democratic Yugoslavia with a form of government determined by a free electorate of the people after the country has been freed of the occupier. Both sides tell the people that the other side is not sincere. The Chetniks say, and undoubtedly believe, that the aim of the Partisans is to force the indoctrinated communism of a minority on all the people. The Partisans say that the Chetniks are fighting to return the government of a few,
which they claim is corrupt, fascist and dictatorial. At the same time, as stated above, both sides proclaim almost identical aims for the future of Yugoslavia.

Both sides attribute to the other the lack of effective resistance to the Germans. The Partisans say that they were betrayed by elements of the Government which are now included in the government-in-exile and the forces of General Mihailovich. The Chetniks claim that the Communists many of whom are now the leaders of the Partisans, particularly the Croats, committed acts of sabotage and prevented the effective mobilization of the Yugoslav Army.

Both sides claim that they have been attacked by the other in collaboration with the Germans and will cite time and places as evidence.

Both sides claim that they have not been supported by the Allies, and that in order to fight the enemy that they have had to first face arms in the hands of traitorous countrymen placed there by the Allies.

Both sides believe that their first enemy is the other, with the Germans and Bulgarians second.

We have in our possession direct orders from Mihailovich Headquarters to that effect. Many Partisans have told us that their first enemy is the traitor at their works. I am inclined to believe that in this case both sides are speaking the truth. They are their own worst enemies. When we were with the Partisans, our actions were more hampered by the Chetniks and other native elements than they were by the true enemy, the Germans and Bulgarians. Both the Chetniks and the Partisans are composed of men of unquestionable fighting qualities, men of terrific endurance and perfectly at home in the rugged mountains where no outsider could possibly find his way about.

On 21 May we watched 3000 men of the Partisan First Serbian Division march south from the Rodon Mountains into the Kukavica Mountains where they engaged and defeated the Chetnik forces under the command of Major Djuric composed of 2000 men.
The Partisans forces were 70% armed by recent sorties received by the British mission, of which at least 50% were American manufactured and of all aircraft received at least 90% were American and flown by American crews.

From a strictly military point of view, the Partisan attack on the Chetniks was absolutely necessary. The Partisan position in the Rodan Mountains was not secure. The Bulgarians and German positions protecting the railway were in the open valley to the North. The Chetnik troops occupied the mountainous areas to the South, which were admirably suited for an attack on the railway. If the Partisans attacked the Bulgarians and Germans to the North, they would have been forced to advance across open country, while the Chetniks could infiltrate into their rear leaving the Partisans no place to return when forced to withdraw by superior enemy strength.

So the Partisans attacked the Chetniks first, drove them out of a portion of the Kukavica Mountains, regrouped their forces, and on the night of 19 June attacked the large city of Leskovac, where they inflicted great damage on the enemy garrison and the railway center which they were guarding.

On 1 June, Lt. Popovich, of my party, Lt. Comdr. MacPhail, a British doctor, and his orderly, and myself, arrived in the Kukavica Mountains in search of three wounded American airmen, whom we found in a former Chetnik hospital in the area which the fighting had taken place. These airmen informed us that they had been rescued by the Chetniks, that Chetnik doctors had treated them as best they could, and that the people of the so-called "Chetnik Villages" had done everything possible to make them comfortable. They stated that a Chetnik doctor came back through the fighting for three nights to dress their wounds. They further stated that this Chetnik doctor had photographs of a great many American and British airmen whom he had treated and helped to escape from the country.

As we carried our wounded through villages which a few days before had been "dangerous Chetnik territory," it was heartrending to witness the treatment which they received. Peasants supplied carts, oxen, and straw. They lined the roads with food and drink, wreaths of flowers, presents of all kinds.
Women stroked the brows of the wounded men, they cried and prayed over them. Men offered them strong drinks of rakija and called them brother but they cursed the Germans.

We saw both Chetnik and Partisan wounded. To me they were only poorly clothed, barefoot and hungry peasant farmers, some of them badly wounded, who had borne their pain with a forbearance one would hardly believe possible. I could not see any dangerous characters among them. I couldn't tell who was Left or who was Right, who was Communist or Reactionary. Somehow those terms that one hears used so glibly on the outside did not seem to fit the actual circumstances.

What a very peculiar set of circumstances these facts bring out! Rifles stamped "U.S. Property", firing W.R.A. Ammunition, flown by American airmen in American aircraft being fired at people who have rescued other American airmen and who were doing everything to make them comfortable and to return them to safety.

If I am confused, what must be the state of mind of the people of Jugoslavia. Add to what has already been mentioned as controversial between the Partisans and the Chetniks the strong propaganda of the Germans, Bulgarians, Italians, Nedic, Leotic, White Guard, Ustasi and so on. Is it any wonder that hundreds of them have taken us aside and asked us to tell them what to do, which way to turn.

In all of this welter of confusion, of conflicting reports and misunderstandings, a few pertinent facts stand out:

1. The vast majority of the people in Jugoslavia, and we have seen them in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dalmatia, Sandjak, Montenegro, Serbia, Macedonia, and the Dalmation Islands, are neither Right, Left, Communist, Reactionary, or anything else. They are a simple peasant type of people, strong willed hot blooded, with tremendous powers of endurance and great personal courage. They love intrigue and gossip, and are the most profound liars I have ever met. I do not believe there is any tremendous urge for Revolution among them. They love their mountains, their small homes, their farms, and their flocks. They want something better, but, measured by our standards, what
most of them ask is not a great deal, a good government, their King and their church, schools, more roads, shoes, clothing, a few modern conveniences, better modern farming equipment and some better livestock.

2. These people quite unique in Europe, have the will and the environment with which to effectively fight the enemy. Despite the confused state of their affairs they have caused him great difficulty and have killed large numbers of his troops. Retaliation against them by various enemies have never stopped and is not stopping them today. Rather it has made them more determined and increased their hatred of the enemy.

3. The senseless killing of these people by each other must be stopped. It is useless now to endeavor to decide which side first did wrong. Too much blood has been spilt, the feeling is too bitter, and too many men on both sides have uttered rash accusations and performed rash acts.

4. It does not seem to me that the Allies have done well in Jugoslawia. We have never presented a united front to them. I have always believed in Allied cooperation, that there should have been one Military Mission composed of duly constituted high-ranking officers of at least Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, and the United States, who could have called all the conflicting parties together and taken such steps as were necessary in the form of a provisional government and military command to the end that the civil war was stopped and the maximum effort directed against the enemy. I have always opposed, as far as possible independent missions of the various Allies and have always worked to present at least an Anglo-American front to the Partisans.

However, as in the case of the primary issues between the Chetniks and the Partisans, it does no good to report what we believe should have been done. What we must decide is, what shall we do in the face of conditions as they exist today. It is too late to draw all the factions together into one group directed against the enemy under the guarantee of a free election without violence after the war? As far as the great mass of the people are concerned, it can be done, because they are
weary of fighting each other, but eager to fight the enemy. There are thousands who have buried their rifles and refuse to march with any group. There are thousands more who would volunteer if they could decide which side to support.

Only a few people on each side prevent a union from being formed--a few defeatists among the Medics group who believed it hopeless to oppose the German Army - a few Croats who hated the Serbs worse than the Germans - a few communists who would see their brothers killed to further their political aims - a few Serb Nationalists who classed as X Communists all those who did not agree with them - a few politicians who did not think of anything except to retain their power after the war - a few clergymen who forgot their teachings - only a handful of misguided people, in comparison to the millions who have suffered as a result of their misguidance, either honest or dishonest.

5. In all of this terrible story of misguidance, of rape and death and destruction, the one great power that I feel might have prevented it, or have stopped it, has never been used. The United States of America is mentioned in the same breath with God in Jugoslavia. We were the one nation on earth to whom the people believed they could turn for unbiased, unpolti­cal aid and advice without having to pay something in return. I am speaking now of the common man, not of Marshal Tito, Gen­eral Mihailovich, or any one of the members of the government or the leaders of the various factions. How many hundreds of homes did we enter in which the people crossed themselves and thanked God when they found that we were American officers. Other of our officers, as well as British officers, have reported similar ex­periences. It would be difficult to express the utter sense of helplessness and frustration which we felt in the face of such complete faith in the ability of our country to right the wrongs which were so evident on all sides.

There is in the records of the 15th Air Force evidence from returning airmen that practically every faction in Jugoslavia has
aided in the rescue and evacuation of our men forced to descend in that country. This applies to Medic troops, even Ustasi and Bulgars. But it is wrong to say that the people who have aided our men were Medic. Chetnik, Partisan, and so forth - it is more proper to say that they were the common people of Yugoslavia, a people confused and suffering, suffering under the heel of the occupying enemy and then at the same time torn by internal strife. They saw in us and those airmen of ours the representatives of a powerful democratic nation in which people of all racial extraction, religions, and political beliefs live side by side in harmony, free to speak openly and to discuss their mutual problems without fear. In comparison to their own pitiful condition, it is not hard to realize why the free and abundant life of America, where we have at least partially solved the identical problems which now confront Yugoslavia, has taken on a more rosy hue than it perhaps deserves.

All this is not rhetoric, it is based upon hundreds of conversations with people all over Yugoslavia. It has been the experience of all the American officers with whom I have talked. The question that worries all of us is, how long can a great nation continue not to pay attention to the obligations contained in such trust and respect? How long can a great nation continue in this manner and still remain great?

6. I do not ask for aid to the Partisans, as I am confident that the officers who have been with the Chetniks will not ask for aid to the Chetniks. An exact literal translation of our reports could be interpreted in this manner but we are not Chetniks or Partisans, we are American officers who have been with opposing factions composed of the same people. When I have called for aid to the Partisans, and officers with the Chetniks have called for aid to their group, we have had the same person in mind - a barefoot, cold, and hungry peasant farmer, a man whose courage and endurance must be observed to be understood. To us they were not Communists or Reactionaries, Partisans or Chetniks; they were merely brave men who looked to us for aid with great confidence that it would be forthcoming. We would have been strange people if we had not responded - we could not have done otherwise, and been American.

7. It is not now a question of whether the United States should
send aid and representation to the Partisans. We have been sending them aid and have had representation with them for a long time.

During January, February and March of this year, we saw and received in Bosnia numerous night sorties, two mass daylight drops with fighter escort, one daylight glider sortie with fighter escort, and several night landings.

During April, May and June, we saw and helped receive in Serbia approximately 100 night sorties and one night landing.

Out of all these aircraft, something in the neighborhood of 300 with 60 in the air at one time, I have only identified 50 which were not American.

The Russian Mission to the Partisans was landed by gliders, American gliders towed by C-47's flown by American pilots and escorted by American fighters. The Russian Mission rode in the gliders and British pilots landed them. We have seen "Russian" aid dropped to the Partisans from "Russian" planes, yet the planes were again the old C-47's and the goods were largely American packed in American containers dropped by American parachutes.

We have helped to collect hundreds of tons of American radio equipment, drugs, foods, clothing, arms and ammunition, again dropped with American parachutes from American planes flown by American pilots. The first motor vehicle landed in Yugoslavia was an American Jeep and trailer - again with the faithful C-47.

Nothing stated here should be construed as anti-British, anti-Russian, or anti-anything. They are merely statements of facts intended to point out that we do have a very direct interest in what is taking place in Yugoslavia. It does no good to say that we are not interested in Yugoslavia and are not participating in the situation there, because we are, in a most material and effective manner.

I, personally, do not feel that I can go on with the work in Yugoslavia unless I can sincerely feel that every possible
honest effort is being made to put an end to the civil strife. It is not nice to see arms dropped by one group of our airmen to be turned against men who have rescued and protected their brothers in arms. It is not a pleasant sight to see our wounded lying side by side with the men who rescued and cared for them, and to realize that the bullet holes in the rescuers could have resulted from American ammunition, fired from American rifles, dropped from American aircraft flown by American pilots.

At one time I worried because America was not getting the proper recognition for her participation in supply operations. Now I wonder - do we want it. I can only hope that the small round holes which I saw in those simple peasant boys in the guerilla hospital in Lipovica village were not caused by cartridges stamped W.R.A., or fired from rifles marked "U. S. Property".

It is inconceivable that the combined strength and influence of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States could not put an abrupt end to the civil wars in Yugoslavia and guarantee the people a free electorate after the occupying troops have withdrawn and the hot blood has cooled. That it has not been done is, in the eyes of many, not a good portent for the future. The issues in Yugoslavia are ones which will have to be faced in many parts of the world. The Yugoslavian's with their wild, turbulent, strong-willed nature, have abandoned Reason and resorted to Force. Is this the shape of the things to come? Are we all of us sacrificing to end this war only to have dozens of little wars spring up which may well merge into one gigantic conflict involving all Mankind?

I posed the above questions in a report written last November. They are even more apparent now. It appears to me that there are indications in the past few months that there has been less emphasis placed on the fight against the enemy and more preparation for the political struggle to follow the ending of the war. Under any conditions, two things stand out - every effort must be made to end the conflict among the people of Yugoslavia and the United States has a very definite interest in seeing that it is ended as soon as possible. This is furthermore a test of the ability of the United
Nations, especially the three Great Powers interested in the war in Europe, to cooperate unselfishly toward a common end, that end being that the people of Jugoslavia shall be free to select the form of government and manner of living which the majority of them desire, free from undue external political pressure and the fear of armed internal minorities.

/s/ Louis M. Farish
Lt. Col., AUS

Bari, Italy
28 June, 1944
June 22, 1944.

TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

Just as the Department was despatching to you the Acting Secretary's letter of June 17, 1944, relating to the draft agreement between the British and Soviet Governments, a memorandum was received from Mr. Churchill and one from the Foreign Office on this subject, copies of which are attached for your information.

With reference to your 897 and my 560 regarding matters in the Balkans, I am a bit worried and so is the State Department. I think I should tell you frankly that we were disturbed that your people took this matter up with us only after it had been put up to the Russians and they had inquired whether we were agreeable. Your Foreign Office apparently sensed this and has now explained that the proposal arose out of a chance remark which was converted by the Soviet Government into a formal proposal.

However, I hope matters of this importance can be prevented from developing in such a manner in the future.

Faithfully yours,

ROOSEVELT

1) Blank
2) For your eyes only.

Regraded Unclassified
June 17, 1944

My dear Mr. President:

Just as the Department was despatching to you the Acting Secretary's letter of June 10, 1944, relating to the proposed agreement between the British and Soviet Governments regarding Rumania and Greece, Lord Halifax handed to Mr. Stettinius a further telegram from the Prime Minister and one from the Foreign Office on this subject, copies of which are attached for your information.

Mr. Churchill's further exposition of the British case did not overcome our objections or seem to us to warrant any change in our views toward this dangerous proposal. You will be interested to note, however, that the Prime Minister refers to the British sacrifice for the Greeks in 1941 (but not the Greek sacrifice for British); that he openly applies the proposition to the entire Balkan region by mentioning Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, in addition to Rumania and Greece; and that he advances our position in South America as an analogy.

The Foreign Office telegram touches upon another and extremely disturbing aspect of this matter which the Department planned to take up with you as soon as the immediate issue was disposed of. This is the fact that the British did not discuss a proposal of this nature with us until after it had been put up to the Russians and the latter inquired whether we had been consulted.

The Foreign Office, apparently realizing belatedly that Mr. Churchill's frank telegram to you had exposed Lord Halifax's failure to mention this aspect of the question to me, now describes the whole thing as the "Soviet Government's proposal" and explains unconvincingly that it "arose out of a chance remark" of the Foreign Secretary to the Soviet Ambassador at London. The Prime Minister's telegram clearly stated, however, that the British "suggested to the Russian Ambassador that we should agree between ourselves" and indicated that this Government would have been faced with a concluded spheres-of-influence agreement between the British and Russians if the latter had simply agreed without raising the question of our position.

You may want to call this to the Prime Minister's attention. A suggested draft is attached for possible use in this connection.

Faithfully yours,

/s/ Cordell Hull

Enclosures:

1) Draft telegram to Mr. Churchill;

2) See next page.
Enclosures: (Cont'd)

2) Telegram from the Prime Minister to the British Embassy, dated June 8, 1944; and

3) Telegram from Foreign Office to the British Embassy, dated June 8, 1944.

The President

The White House
SECRET

From: The President
To: The Prime Minister

With reference to your 697 and my ___, I believe I should tell you frankly that we were disturbed that you consulted us on this matter only after it had been put up to the Russians and they had inquired whether we were agreeable. The Foreign Office apparently sensed this and has now explained that the proposal "arose out of a chance remark" which was converted by the Soviet Government into a formal proposal. However, I hope matters of this importance can be prevented from developing in such a manner in the future.

1. By all means show this to Mr. Hull or anyone else you think wise if you think worth while.
Telegram from London dated June 8, 1944

Following from Prime Minister

**Greece and Roumania**

There is no question of spheres of influence. We all have to act together but someone must be playing the hand. It seems reasonable that the Russians should deal with Roumanians and Bulgarians upon whom their armies are infringing and that we should deal with the Greeks who are in our assigned theatre, who are our old Allies and for whom we sacrificed 40,000 men in 1941. I have reason to believe that the President is in entire agreement with the line that I am taking about Greece. The same is true of Yugoslavia. I keep him constantly informed but on the whole we, His Majesty's Government are playing the hand and have to be very careful to play it agreeably with the Russians. Events move very rapidly in these countries.

2. On the other hand we follow the lead of United States in South America as far as possible as long as it is not a question of our beef and mutton. On this we naturally develop strong views on account of the little folk.

3. By all means show this to Mr. Hull or anyone else you think wise if you think worth while.

---oo---
Soviet Government's proposal arose out of chance remark by the Secretary of State in conversation with the Soviet Ambassador. There was thus no opportunity of discussing proposal at its inception with the Americans. But as soon as the Soviet Government took up this chance remark and converted it into a formal proposal we consulted the United States Government as indeed the Soviet Government suggested we should do.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 23, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

There is forwarded herewith a personal letter from the President addressed to His Majesty Peter II, King of Yugoslavia. It is requested that this letter be forwarded to King Peter via the regular State Department channels.

Respectfully,

WILSON BROWN,
Rear Admiral, USN,
Naval Aide to the President.
Dear Peter:

I have read your letter with most careful attention and have given much thought to the several questions you raise. I shall reply with complete candor and in simple terms, and I am sure you will see how deeply and sympathetically we in America realize the problems facing the Yugoslav people.

You remember the burst of admiration with which we greeted your country's defiance of Germany three years ago. Believe me, our sentiments have not changed. We are pledged to the liberation of Yugoslavia and we hope again to see the union of its national elements under a common government, democratic in form and fact, as the purposes for which this war is being fought require.

It is one of the misfortunes of the war that your country, battered and dismembered by the enemy, has suffered also from internal conflicts, which in turn have revived other older antagonisms. You try, I know, impartially to defend the interests of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and to bind them together in loyalty to the common interest. Let me frankly say that I think your advisers and your officials have not always shown the wisdom necessary to achieve this end. I mention this because you speak of the
Government's popularity with the people at home. I wish
I could say that our reports from within Yugoslavia con-
firm this. On the contrary, they indicate that the people
in Yugoslavia have sought, and still are seeking, a leader-
ship which would have vision for dealing with the new so-
cial forces at work in the world today, and energy for
undertaking the vast tasks ahead.

It is characteristic of you that you should find it
hard to agree to a proposal which would affect the status
of General Mihailovich. Let us not forget that the Mihai-
loovich question has become more political than military. He
did not mean it to be so, I am sure, and I really think it
would be to the best interest of your country, and only fair
to him as well, to use his excellent talents in the field
but relieve him of government responsibility. It always
seemed to me that this fine soldier should not have been
expected to share the administrative burdens and the re-
sponsibilities of a member of the Cabinet, or of successive
Cabinets, with which he has only intermittent contact, and
of whose political decisions he can be kept only very im-
perfectly informed. In view of the important events ahead,
a decision which would emphasize his service as a soldier
in the field would be something which military men everywhere
would understand. As a loyal officer he too would acknowledge
the necessity for such action.

The suggestion that you might reorganize your Government by forming what one may call a "streamlined" administration, was doubtless one of several alternatives advanced in the search for a settlement of some of the troubles in Yugoslavia and some of the unhappy disputes among Yugoslav groups abroad. This is a question on which you will now have the wise counsel of Ban Subasic. I was pleased to learn of your decision to call him to London. Some of our officials here saw him before his departure, and he will tell you what our people have been thinking on Yugoslav matters in general and will assure you of our abiding interest in the welfare of your country.

He will report also on our attitude toward the Partisans, which is precisely what Mr. Hull and others have publicly stated, -- military aid where it can be got through most effectively for resistance forces in operations against the enemy. While our relations with the Partisan leaders are of a military character, we are fully aware of the political implications of the Partisan movement, and of the desire of its leaders for representation or recognition, also in the field of foreign affairs. We contemplate no change in our present relationships, but you, better than anyone
else, will realize how useful it would be to us in carrying out this policy if the public generally were sure that an earnest effort is being made to resolve certain basic difficulties. One of them is that the Partisan movement is stronger, and has far greater popular support, and sympathy for it extends into larger areas, than your Government has been willing to acknowledge. I can assure you that our reports prepared by expert and impartial observers who have been able to evaluate and recheck the intelligence on the spot, as regards both the Mihailovich and the Tito forces, leave no doubt of this. Any fundamental approach to a solution of the unhappy civil strife in Yugoslavia must take this reality into account.

It is indeed our plan to work together with the British and the Soviet Governments in questions relating to Yugoslavia. I want you to know that, though we may be considered to have a less direct interest in Southeastern Europe, we treasure the friendship of your people, and are counting upon their cooperation both for expelling and defeating the enemy and for wholehearted association with us in a long-range program of general security and prosperity. These are the main objectives of us all, and we can speak frankly to the British and Soviet Governments on these
things, and you may be sure I shall not forget the points you bring out in your letter.

If some of my observations seem disappointing, it is because my warm friendship for you prompts me to give you in this personal and direct way my thoughts on the several questions you ask.

Do not think I underrate your own admirable efforts on behalf of your country and people. These are times that strain to the limit the energies and wisdom of the most experienced statesmen, and I know with what earnestness and energy you are devoting your young years to your country's service.

I send you from my heart every good wish for your welfare and happiness.

Very sincerely yours,

[Signature]

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

His Majesty

Peter II,

King of Yugoslavia,

London.
May 19, 1944

Dear Mr. President:

I have examined carefully the enclosed State Department draft of a personal letter from you to King Peter of Yugoslavia.

In view of Prime Minister Churchill's message to Tito in regard to the formation of a government under the Ban and your reply to the Prime Minister expressing your accord, I am of the opinion that the proposed letter to Peter is about as good as can be written at the present time.

The draft letter to Peter is enclosed herewith for your signature if it meets with your approval.

Most respectfully,

[Signature]

The President
White House
Washington, D.C.
Mr. President,

I am sorry that I am forced to address myself to you in this way, but I am encouraged by your friendship, for which I am grateful and of which I am proud.

Immediately upon my arrival here, on March 15-th, Mr. Eden advised me to change the Royal Government and to abandon the Minister of War General Mihailovich. Two days later the British Ambassador told me that I did not need a Government, that I should organize a Committee of three members, whose sole duty would be to take care of the officials in emigration and that I should thus await the development of events in Yugoslavia and the future organization of the country. On March 16-th, Mr. Churchill asked that on the day following my marriage I should no longer have a Government, but only a Committee, which would begin negotiation with Tito; thereafter, I should entrust the rule of Yugoslavia to the Committee, which would become the "chief constable" of Yugoslavia.

My reply was that I could not change the Government, that I was very satisfied with it, that it was very popular with the people, and that the head of the Government was the
best that I ever had. Mr. Churchill while approving of all this, concluded that the Royal Government had been compromised in the eyes of Tito.

The crux of the question is the Minister of War General Mihailovich, whom the Government cannot abandon, without betraying the people, which for three years has been fighting under the most difficult conditions, without help, with its own blood and bread. I, personally would become the traitor of my people and My Army in Yugoslavia, of which I am Supreme Commander. I told Mr. Churchill that it was too great a responsibility for me to assume and that I would like him to transmit his view in writing. 

Mr. Churchill replied that all this was not an official conversation, but a friendly suggestion, on which Tito insisted. The reality is murder, under disguise of my personal suicide.

On April 6-th, Mr. Eden called on me again, apologizing for his action, since he felt not to have the right to interfere in our internal affairs, but stating that he was acting upon instructions. Again he counselled me to replace the Government with a new one, which de facto would be composed of three persons favorable to Tito.

On April 13-th, Mr. Churchill insisted again, this time with an ultimatum-like request and with the menace that he
would accuse General Mihailovich of collaboration with the Germans and that he would treat all of us accordingly, myself as well as the Royal Government. As a proof of the alleged collaboration he even showed me a safe-conduct, in German, for some chetniks in Montenegro, despite my explanation that the term "chetnik" is also being used by Nedich's detachments in order to create confusion.

We cannot believe that anything could have been decided, without our being consulted, either at Moscow or Teheran, concerning the future of Yugoslavia. If so, why do we have to commit suicide? Even if I should be forced, or worst, capable, of betraying, why provoke one of the greatest scandals in history by libelling as "traitors" our courageous people, who are fighting alone without anyone's help, drowning in their own blood?

We have been told that there will not be any landing in the Balkans. If such a fatal decision was taken I implore you to change it.

Questionned about what would become of us if the Germans, under pressure from different sides, retreated and evacuated Yugoslavia, and the civil war there continued, we were told that the policy of non-intervention would be followed, as in Spain. This in fact would mean that others would have the opportunity

./.
The case of Tito is not Yugoslav alone. It is the test case for all of Central Europe, and, if successful, it will lead to much more, with no end in sight. Mr. Churchill was indeed correct when he stated that Tito was the "unifying element", but it is true only in the reverse sense: for Tito has united against himself all Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

My people have always fought for moral principles of humanity, for liberty and independence, never asking the price to be paid with their blood, carrying on their shoulders the Cross of our Lord. They should be helped and not left alone in their fight in the service of our civilization.

Tito's following deos not exceed thirty thousand men, which is less than a quarter of one per cent of the population of Yugoslavia. It is obvious that Tito, as representative of international communism, is repudiated by our nation, which remains deeply attached to its democratic faith and national tradition. Tito is weak and therefore I have to renounce the only Allied Minister of War in an occupied country, General Mihailovich; therefore I have to turn over to Tito the authority over the country and its future and to await the decision about my Throne, a question that the enormous majority of the people has never raised. All this for whose sake? My people and My
Army in the country expect me either to come there and fight together with them, or to defend them outside of the country as courageously as they are fighting in the Fatherland.

We cannot accept that the future of Yugoslavia be decided outside of us and without the participation of one of the three great Allies the United States of America. Therefore, I beg you, Mr. President, to intervene that the question of Yugoslavia, if not of all the Balkans, be the subject of a common discussion between ourselves, the United States, Great Britain and Russia, and under their common guarantee.

I, my Government and my Army in the country, as well as my entire people stand ready, as always, to make the greatest sacrifices for the common victory over the enemy and to rise as one man at the chosen and agreed moment.

In these times so difficult for my people, and me being fatherless, I address myself to you, Mr. President, as to a trusted friend, asking you to be good enough and send me, without delay, your advice and opinion.

I remain,

As ever Yours,

Peter II
Mr. President,

I have been instructed, personally, by My Sovereign H.M. King Peter II to convey to Your Excellency the enclosed urgent message, dated from London April 16-th.

In a subsequent and most confidential message of King Peter II I was instructed to inform you, Mr. President, that H.M. King George VI, after being personally informed by him of his conversation with Mr. Churchill of March 18-th, has advised King Peter to avoid, for the time being, any personal contacts and not to answer.

I would be grateful, Mr. President, to transmit any message, which you may have for H.M. King Peter.

Respectfully Yours,

[Signature]

His Excellency,
Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington D.C.
My dear Mr. President:

I am returning herewith the letter from King Peter and the draft of a reply for your approval.

Although we have not been associated with the British in their initiative in trying to work out the Yugoslav problem, this seemed to be a good occasion to let the Yugoslavs know the trend of our thinking. The proposed letter therefore discusses in some detail the various points raised by King Peter.

You will also recall that Major Weil who recently returned from Partisan headquarters brought with him a letter addressed to you by Marshal Tito. As you suggested, the Department has gone over this matter with Major Weil. Since there has been no abatement in the conflict between Tito and the Government which we continue to recognize I suggest that it might be well for you to delegate the reply to Tito's letter to the head of the proposed military mission, to which I shall refer below. I think that at this juncture a personal letter from you as Chief of State would be open to interpretations which would serve further to complicate the unhappy Yugoslav conflict. Accordingly I enclose for your approval a draft which I think would constitute a suitable acknowledgment of Tito's letter.

In this connection I should say for the record that there is pending also a letter addressed to you by General Mihailovich to which it may or may not be advisable to send an acknowledgement, depending on the results of the Yugoslav talks still in progress. In any event there is at the moment no means of communication with him.

Finally, in order that the various Yugoslav matters should be brought together, I should like to inform you that General Donovan has proposed, and I have approved the idea, that the American military mission now with the Partisans

The President,

The White House.
Partisans should be expanded and so organized as to operate independently. This matter is now being referred, I think, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Faithfully yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosures:

1. King Peter's letter and draft reply;
2. Marshal Tito's letter and draft reply.
May 30, 1944.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The President has approved the enclosed draft of a letter to be signed by the head of the proposed American Military Mission, for Marshal Tito in acknowledgment of his letter to the President.

He requests that you send it to the appropriate O.S.S. authority.

Sincerely yours,

Wilson Brown,
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.

Enc-1

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

Copy to:
Admiral Leahy.
My dear Marshal Tito:

The President has directed me to thank you for your attentive reception of the American officers who were sent into Yugoslavia, and for the friendly letter which you handed to Major Well for delivery to him.

The people and Government of the United States do not underrate the valiant contribution which the Yugoslav people have already made to our common cause. We Americans know to what degree the people of Yugoslavia have suffered because they chose the hard but nobler way when the enemy came down upon them, and we realize both the urgent need for help of many kinds, while the war continues, and the tremendous tasks ahead for repairing the ravages of war and rebuilding the institutions necessary to a free people.

I have been particularly directed to say that the information which our officers have already obtained within Yugoslavia will be most useful to our military authorities and to the Allied command in working out the plans for rendering more effective assistance in strengthening resistance in Yugoslavia to the Germans, for contriving improved service of supply, and for fitting the operations in Yugoslavia into the general scheme for the conduct of the war.

It is now our business actively to carry forward this work under arrangements which will be taken up with you separately. The President has directed me to say that he knows that we shall have your unreserved and energetic help.
DRAFT OF LETTER TO BE SIGNED BY THE HEAD OF THE PROPOSED AMERICAN MILITARY MISSION, FOR MARSHAL TITO IN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF HIS LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT.

My dear Marshal Tito:

The President has directed me to thank you for your attentive reception of the American officers who were sent into Yugoslavia, and for the friendly letter which you handed to Major Weil for delivery to him.

The people and Government of the United States do not underrate the valiant contribution which the Yugoslav people have already made to our common cause. We Americans know to what degree the people of Yugoslavia have suffered because they chose the hard but nobler way when the enemy came down upon them, and we realize both the urgent need for help of many kinds, while the war continues, and the tremendous tasks ahead for repairing the ravages of war and rebuilding the institutions necessary to a free people.

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It is now our business actively to carry forward this work under arrangements which will be taken up with you separately. The President has directed me to say that he knows that we shall have your unreserved and energetic help.

TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR

The President

RePLYING TO your suggestion that a personal note from you to Tito might be appropriate in connection with the proposed message to him from the head of the American Military Mission (copy attached), it appears to me that the action taken by Churchill (see Prime's 667), the possibility of difficulties between Tito and the Ban's Government, your friendly letter to King Peter, and the possibility of the United States getting unnecessarily involved in the Balkan political problem, indicate that a personal letter from you to Tito at the present time would serve no useful purpose and might possibly make difficulties for the King and the Ban.

If you approve the enclosed draft I will send it via the State Department to O.S.S.

[Signature]

[Signature]

[Initials]
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 22, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

I am returning the enclosed to you because they are "Top Secret". Will you be good enough to do the necessary and if you think we should have the copies in our secret files, will you please return the correspondence to me?

My best to you,

[Signature]
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 18, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Do you want to send a little personal line to Tito along with the official letter prepared by the State Department?

GGT
Draft of Letter to be Signed by the Head of the Proposed
American Military Mission, for Marshal Tito in Acknowledgement of His Letter to the President.

My dear Marshal Tito:

The President has directed me to thank you for your attentive reception of the American officers who were sent into Yugoslavia, and for the friendly letter which you handed to Major Weil for delivery to him.

The people and government of the United States do not underrate the valiant contribution which the Yugoslav people have already made to our common cause. We Americans know to what degree the people of Yugoslavia have suffered because they chose the hard but nobler way when the enemy came down upon them, and we realize both the urgent need for help of many kinds, while the war continues, and the tremendous tasks ahead for repairing the ravages of war and rebuilding the institutions necessary to a free people.

I have been particularly directed to say that the information which our officers have already obtained within Yugoslavia will be most useful to our military authorities and to the Allied command in working out the plans for rendering more effective assistance in strengthening resistance in Yugoslavia to the Germans, for contriving improved service of supply, and for fitting the operations in Yugoslavia into the general scheme for the conduct of the war.

It is now our business actively to carry forward this work under arrangements which will be taken up with you separately. The President has directed me to say that he knows that we shall have your unreserved and energetic help.
THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington

April 26, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. BUXTON.

I think that Major Weil had better have a talk with whoever is handling this in the State Department and work with them on a reply for me to send at the same time I send a reply to King Peter who wrote me recently. I don't want to cross wires.

F.D.R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 26, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. BUXTON

I think that Major Weil had better have a talk with whoever is handling this in the State Department and work with them on a reply for me to send at the same time I send a reply to King Peter who wrote me recently. I don't want to cross wires.

F. D. R.

Memo from G. Edward Buxton, Acting Director, OSS, 4-26-44, together with message from Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia.
24 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached communication from Tito to you was brought out by one of our officers at Tito's request.

Major Weil, the bearer of this message, is in Washington, and will be available if you wish any further information from him.

We will furnish a copy of Major Weil's report which will soon be available.

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director
Gospodin FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT
Pretajednik Sjedinjenih Američkih Dražava

Gospodine Pretsjedniče,

Koristim priliku da Vam preko oficira Vaše Armije, g. potpukovnika Weil-a uputim zahvalnost za pomoć, koju naša Narodno-oslobodilačka Vojska dobija od Vas i Američkog naroda u materijalu i u aviaciji. Zalaganje Vaših oficira da se našem narodu i Vojsci što više pomogne, izaziva velike simpatije u našoj zemlji prema narodima Amerike.

Nadčovječanska borba, koju narodi Jugoslavije vode već pune tri godine, nije samo borba za istjerivanje zločinačkih okupatora iz naše zemlje, već je to i isto vrijeme i borba za jedan bolji i pravedniji poredak, koji bi narodima Jugoslavije osigurao istinsku demokratiju, ravnopravnost i socijalnu pravednost. Ove težnje i perspektive dale su našim narodima da izdrže sve dosadašnje teškocе i stradanja ove teške i nejednake borbe. Za ostvarenje tih svojih težnji narodi Jugoslavije očekuju pomoć od Vaše velike demokratske zemlje, od naroda Sjedinjenih Američkih Država i od Vas, gospodine Pretsjedniče.


Možda ni jedna zemlja u Evropi nije tako strašno opustošena i razorena kao Jugoslavija. Ovaj rat ostaviće teške ranе koje će tražiti dugotrajno liječenje. A ovo će se moći izvršiti samo tako, ako se očuva jedinstvo i bratstvo naroda Jugoslavije, koje se stvara u toku ove krvave borbe. Ono će se moći ostvariti samo tako, ako narodi Jugoslavije budu imali punu političku i ekonomsku podršku pri stvaranju nove, istinske demokratske, federativne Jugoslavije u kojoj će.
svi narodi imati svoja nacionalna prava.
Gospodin potpukovnik Neil moći će usmeno da Vam izloži naše potrebe i želje. Uvjerem sam da ćemo kod Vas u tome naići na punu podršku.

Primite, gospodine Predsjednike, izraz mog dubokog poštovanja.

15. III. 1944 g.

MARŠAL JUGOSLAVIJE

[Signature]
His Excellency FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT
President of the United States of America

Sir,

The departure of Lt. Colonel Richard Neil, Jr., AUS., offers me the opportunity of expressing my gratitude to you for the assistance in material and in the cooperation of your Air Force, tendered to our Army of National Liberation by you and the people of America.

The superhuman struggle which has been waged by the people of Yugoslavia for the last three years, aims, not only at clearing our country of the criminal occupiers, but also at the creation of a better and more righteous order, which would guarantee true democracy, equal rights and social justice to all nations of Yugoslavia. These aspirations and perspectives have given our nations the strength to endure all the difficulties and suffering of this unequal struggle. For the fulfilment of their strivings the people of Yugoslavia expect the aid of your great democratic country, of the people of the U.S.A., and of yourself.

The achievement of the ideals of our nations is arduous. The enemy is still strong. The struggle with the occupier is still tough and extremely bloody. The home traitors Nedich, Povelich, Burunić and Draža Mihailović, unite their efforts with the occupier to prevent the nations of Yugoslavia from attaining these great and progressive aims. But no sacrifices or difficulties frighten us, for we are convinced in the victory of our righteous cause, as we are certain in the victory of all the Allies over the German Fascist aggressors.

Perhaps no other country is so terribly devastated and ravaged as Yugoslavia. This war will leave painful wounds which will require a long time to heal. And this will be possible only if the nations of Yugoslavia receive full economic and political support in the creation of a new, truly democratic, federative Yugoslavia, in which all nations will have their national rights.

Lt. Colonel Neil will be able to expose to you our needs and wishes. I am convinced that they will be granted your support.

/signed/ Tito

Marshall of Yugoslavia

15th March 1944
FMH-553
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

539, March 27, 6 p.m.
MOST SECRET
I have learned from a source within the German Embassy that the Russian Government is said to have proposed to the Rumanian Government the following peace terms and that Prince Stirbey's mission to Cairo is primarily for the purpose of softening these conditions.

One. Abolition of the Monarchy.

Two. The Rumanian oil fields to remain under Russian military control for two years.

Three. The harbors of Braila and Galati to remain under Soviet military control.

Four. Constanza to become a free port.

Five. The Germans to be driven out of Rumania by the Rumanian Army.

Six. Acceptance or rejection of the above terms by March 27.

STEINHARDT

ANKARA

Dated March 27, 1944
Rec'd 10:50 a.m., 28th

Regarded Unclassified
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Letter from Sir Ronald Campbell.

I return herewith Sir Ronald Campbell's letter to you of March 2, together with a copy of the Prime Minister's message to Marshal Tito, and the latter's reply, which you forwarded to me on March 6.

Enclosure:
Letter from Sir Ronald Campbell
Prime Minister's message to Marshal Tito
Marshal Tito's reply to the Prime Minister

Regraded Unclassified
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

March 6, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.,

To read and return for my files.

F.D.R.
SECRET & PERSONAL.

March 2nd, 1944.

My dear Mr. President,

In Lord Halifax's absence I am sending you, on the instructions of the Foreign Office, a copy of a message sent by the Prime Minister to Marshal Tito and also a copy of the latter's reply, which is dated February 9th.

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

Ronald I. Campbell

The Honourable Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The President of the United States of America,
The White House.
Text of Prime Minister's message to Marshal Tito.

I am very pleased that my letter has reached you safely and I have received your message with pleasure. I can understand the position of reserve which you adopt towards King Peter. I have for several months past been in favour of advising him to dismiss Mihailovic and to face the consequent resignations of all his present advisers. I have been deterred from doing this by the argument that I should thus be advising him to cast away his only adherents. You will understand that I feel a personal responsibility towards him. I should be obliged if you would let me know whether his dismissal of Mihailovic would pave the way for friendly relations with you and your movement and later on for his joining you in the field, it being understood that the future question of monarchy is reserved until Yugoslavia has been entirely liberated. There is no doubt that a working arrangement between you and the King would consolidate many forces especially Serbian elements now estranged and that it would invest your government and movement with added authority and provide them with numerous resources.

Yugoslavia would then be able to speak with a united voice in the councils of the Allies during this formative period when so much is in flux. I much hope that you will feel able to give me the answer you can see I want.

2. Your third paragraph expressed exactly what His Britannic Majesty's Government desires, namely to assemble all patriotic and honourable elements so as to render your struggle against the invader as efficient as possible; secondly, to create union and brotherhood of Yugoslav nations; and thirdly, to create conditions for a truly democratic...
democratic and federate Yugoslavia. You will certainly have the support of His Majesty's Government in all this.

3. I have asked the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean to form immediately an amphibious force of commandos supported by air and flotillas to attack with your aid garrisons which the Germans have left in the islands they have taken along the Dalmation coast. There is no reason why these garrisons should not be exterminated with the forces which will shortly be available. Secondly, we must try to get a through line of communication with you from the sea even if we have to move it from time to time. This alone will enable tanks and anti-tank guns and other categories of munitions together with other necessary supplies to be brought in in the quantities which your armies require. You should talk all this over with Brigadier Maclean who has my entire confidence and immediate access to me as well as to the Supreme Commander.
Text of Marshal Tito's reply.

To the Right Honourable Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain.

Your Excellency:

Following message contained in your paper of February 5th and message of His Britannic Majesty's Government, I was obliged to consult members of the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia and members of the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation on the points raised in those messages. The analysis of these points led to the following conclusion.

1. The Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia, as you know, confirmed at their second session on November 29th, 1943, that they firmly stand for the union of Yugoslav nations. However, as long as there are two governments, one in Yugoslavia and the other in Cairo, there can be no complete union. Therefore the Government in Cairo must be suppressed and with them, Draza Mihailovic. That Government must account to the government of ACNKLY for having squandered enormous sums of the nation's money.

2. The National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia should be acknowledged by the Allies as the only Government of Yugoslavia and King Peter II would have to submit to the laws of ACNL.

3. If King Peter accepts all these conditions the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation will not refuse to cooperate with him on condition that the question of monarchy in Yugoslavia be decided after the liberation of Yugoslavia by the free will of the people.

4. King Peter II should issue declaration to the effect that he has only the interests of his Fatherland at heart.
heart, which he wishes to be free and organised as the people themselves decide after the war is over by their free will, and until then he will do all in his power to support the arduous struggle of the peoples of Yugoslavia.

5. These conclusions were reached in consideration of the following facts:

(a) A special arrangement with King Peter during the war would have the opposite effect to that which Your Excellency and His Majesty's Government desire. We believe that a huge number of neutrals and hesitant elements, especially in Serbia, would join us but such a measure on our part would provoke amongst the patriots of all parts of Yugoslavia, who have been fighting for three years, serious anxiety and suspicion especially in Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia.

(b) This would on the one hand shake the morale of our army while on the other hand the Germans, Ustashi and others would make use of it in their propaganda against us and make it impossible for us to mobilise new forces against the invader in Partisan areas. We are convinced that the solution of this matter lies with proposals which we consider do not differ in principle from yours and which would have most favourable effect not only on our struggle for national liberation but also on the status of the Allies and of the King himself, who would in this way be delivered in the eyes of the people of all further responsibility of bulk of those deeds which various traitors are committing in his name.

6. I hope, Your Excellency, that the reasons I have given may help you to exert influence on the far reaching demands made in this matter which will extremely indebted the nations of Yugoslavia to His Britannic Majesty's Government.

Yours sincerely,

(sgd.) TITO
President of the Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia.

February 9th, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

I think it would be a great mistake for us to participate in a military campaign against the Balkans at this time. We can attach half a dozen observers to the British Army, but until later on I think we should do nothing further.

You might take this up with the War Department.

F. D. R.

Dispatch from MacVeagh in Cairo, dated Feb. 18, 1944, re joint operations by the British and Americans in the Balkans. MacVeagh advises strongly against the U. S. taking part.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

At General Donovan's request, we are forwarding herewith copy of a cable received from him today in regard to a proposed Allied Military Mission to Tito's Yugoslav Forces. General Donovan adds in his cable that he subsequently learned that his objections might possibly result in the abandonment of this proposal.

Copies of this cable are also being sent to the Secretary of State and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE January 19, 1944
FROM
EXECT, ALFRED

TO
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

RECEIVED

#19164. For Colonel Buxton from General Donovan.

Copies of this message should be given to President Roosevelt, State Department and Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Wilson requested me to meet with his staff and Ambassador McMillan today. In addition to McMillan and myself, the following attended the conference: the new Deputy Chief of Staff (General Rocks), the Chief of Staff and 6 other English Generals. The topic under discussion was the question of the transfer of allied operations in support of Tito's Yugoslav forces from the Middle East Command to General Alexander in Italy. The paper which was presented made provision for General Alexander's contact with the Partisans via an Allied Military Mission headed by Brigadier General McLain. The latter was in the Foreign Office as I informed you earlier, and has been promoted from captain to brigadier recently to assume command of this area. In my opinion the significant thing about the paper was the suggestion that this mission be changed to an Allied Military Mission under General Alexander. The result of this would be to deprive SOE of its control in Yugoslavia, though its position in any other country would not be affected. It should be remembered that, with the approval of Combined Chiefs, we became a party to an agreement with SOE, establishing the mission under which we operated as liaison mission. General Wilson asked that the meeting indicate its approval of the proposal. Except for approving the transfer to General Alexander of the Command of Operations, no suggestion was adopted that further consideration of the
paper be postponed pending receipt of additional information as to the desires of our government. It is for this reason that the State Department and JCS should be supplied with a copy of this communication. They should also be advised of the following conditions: McLaIn would not only represent all military affairs but would also have direct access to Prime Minister Churchill on political matters; this would be a repetition of a previous state of affairs. I said at the meeting that my impression of the paper was that though the mission was organized on a military basis, it was actually a political arrangement and in many ways involved dealing with Tito as Head of State. I also stated that I could not consent to the adoption of the paper, since our instructions were to refrain from any political commitments. In addition I made it plain that in spite of the fact that it was termed an Allied mission it was in truth British, with a British Commander, and completely different in character from that mission under whose terms our officers had been placed. I stated very candidly that, in view of Molotov's statement that he was sending a Russian mission to Tito, it might be that our Government would desire to consider sending its own separate mission, so as to have representation on a par with the British and Russians, rather than to go along merely as subsidiary to the British outfit. I also let it be known that we had had trouble with McLain who was acting under instructions of the Foreign Office in that area before when we were making preparations, with Tito's consent, for our Intelligence officer agents to penetrate into German territory. I explained that General Wilson's intervention was required before McLain's objection was overridden, and that we did not want to take a chance on a recurrence of that sort of thing. I also voiced the opinion that unless we were strongly represented with Tito both our future and present dealings with him might be prejudiced, and furthermore that if we were prevented from using it (sic; this area?) as a base for intelligence, it might have a detrimental effect upon our ability to cooperate with Russia in sending agents into central Europe, in fulfillment of the pledge which we made in Moscow.
The Prime Minister has received a copy of these papers from Admiral Leahy.

Unfavorable. 1/16 return

Note on NSC 31
SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER:

Subject: Russian Attack Against Ploesti.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff recommend that you send the following message to Marshal Stalin, suggesting to him the possibility of using Russian air forces to follow up our attack against Ploesti from Russian bases:

"Following the recent successful attack by U.S. bombers on the Rumanian oil refineries at Ploesti, further attacks by United Nations bombers are highly desirable to insure complete destruction and preclude repair of the damage to this vital objective. We suggest that when the situation permits you consider the possibility of sending Red air force bombers from Soviet bases to attack this objective. If you should consider this operation favorably, we shall be glad to advance detailed intelligence material relating to the targets."

For the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

L. G. Dill
Field Marshal,
Head of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.
FROM ANGORA TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen, D. 11.52 p.m. 7th May 1943
No. 889
7th May 1943 R. 10.30 a.m. 8th May 1943

IMPORTANT.

Secret.

I to-day handed to Sarajoglu memorandum with lists of (grp. undec. ? war material) arising out of Adana. I also gave him the Prime Minister's message.

2. Sarajoglu expressed the warmest gratification ([3 grps. undec. ? at the conferences,] charging me to tell the Prime Minister that he wished to embrace him.

3. Speaking personally and unofficially Sarajoglu went on to say that he realised from the message that Churchill wished Turkey to be strong and independent so that she could face any danger which might threaten her from whatever quarter he made it clear that he was thinking not only of Germany but of Russia also. I said that our sole idea was to beat Germany as quickly as possible.

4. Prime Minister went on to speak of German Ambassador's audience with the President, which is taking place to-day (see my telegram No. 882). We discussed whether von Papen would ask for a quid pro quo for Hitler's assurances. I expressed the view that the German game was clear. They had been seriously alarmed by Sir H. Maitland Wilson's visit and, as Sarajoglu himself had said, (see my telegram No. 778 paragraph 3) we Germans must see the direction in which the recent British visits pointed. They would do all they could to prevent Turkey from following that road. I said I did not like the assurances which von Papen was giving. The Minister for Foreign Affairs had told me he had mentioned to the German Ambassador that Turkey remained faithful to [4 grps. undec. ? her Treaty clauses.] There was one of these (i.e. the close touch clause) which I thought might cause difficulty in future: I had been examining the Anglo-Turkish Treaty to see how this clause fitted in with its provisions.

Please repeat to Minister of State.

[Repeated to Minister of State, Cairo under Foreign Office No. 1500].

O.T.P.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]
FORMER NAVAL PERSON FOR ALPHA NUMBER TWO EIGHT SIX PAREN
CHARLOTTESVILLE FROM KENT PAREN PARA BEGINS IT WAS AGREED AT
CASABLANCA THAT I SHOULD PLAY THE HAND WITH TURKEY X NOW I WANT
YOU TO KNOW HOW THINGS ARE PROGRESSING X SINCE THE ADANA MEETING A
GREAT DEAL HAS BEEN DONE TO PREPARE FOR THE MOVEMENT OF LARGE AIR
FORCES TO TURKEY WHEN THE RIGHT MOMENT COMES X WE ARE DOING WHAT
WE CAN TO IMPROVE TURKISH COMMUNICATIONS AND WE ARE GIVING THEM
ALL THE HELP WE CAN IN THE WAY OF TRAINING FACILITIES OF ALL KINDS X
Also instructors X Air Marshal Douglas and General Wilson have both visited Ankara and a beginning. Has been made with plans for joint operations X from our strained middle east resources we have given them five ships to carry munitions under the Turkish flag with Turkish crews X I am going to keep these filled and busy X Para expansive requests for further arms and equipment have also been received from the Turks X These requests are far beyond what we can ship CMA or what they could receive at their ports X.
I have thought it necessary to avoid any appearance of being niggardly in drawing up the lists of what we are prepared to send. We should prefer to have the patient complain of indigestion rather than hunger. In any case, their transportation facilities and reception ports are a bottleneck. It is preferable that the blame be theirs for being unable to receive than ours for being unwilling to offer. You will no doubt hear complaints from the British. Dash American.
PART FOUR

COORDINATION COMMITTEE AT ANGORA THAT THE LISTS I HAVE FURNISHED TO THE TURKS AND THE IMPORT PROGRAMS FOR WHICH I AM AIMING ARE EXCESSIVE X ONE OF YOUR MEN HERE EXPRESSED IT AS FEEDING EIGHT COURSES TO AN EIGHT YEAR OLD BABY X THIS IS AN EXAGGERATED PORTRAYAL FOR THE REASONS I HAVE STATED X WHEN THE TIME COMES CMA AS IT MAY THIS AUTUMN CMA FOR STRONG PRESSURE TO BE PUT ON THE TURKS TO LET US USE THEIR BASES FOR BOMBING PLOESTI AND ALSO FOR OPERATIONS...
PART FIVE

QUOTE HANDCUFF UNQUOTE PAREN DODECANESE PAREN 2WA I WANT THE TURKS TO FEEL THAT THEY HAVE A BALL ON LARGE SUPPLIES OF THE MOST MODERN EQUIPMENT X THE EXTENT TO WHICH WE SHALL HAVE STRENGTHENED THEM AGAINST THE ENEMIES COUNTER MEASURES WILL PARTLY DETERMINE THEIR ANSWER X IT WILL ALSO DEPEND UPON THEIR CONVICTION THAT WE EARNESTLY WISH TO HELP THEM X PARA X I TRUST THAT MY COURSE HAS YOUR APPROVAL AND THAT YOU WILL EXPLAIN TO THE NECESSARY QUARTERS THE POSITION TAKEN X
IN SOME CASES I MAY HAVE PROMISED EQUIPMENT WHICH CAN ONLY COME FROM YOUR PRODUCTION X IN THE USUAL WAY WE SHALL APPLY FOR THIS X I TRUST THAT OUR REQUESTS WILL MEET WITH A SYMPATHETIC RECEPTION X END X PAREN MAP ROOM NOTE X BOSTON WISHES TO KNOW IF COPY THIS MESSAGE SHOULD BE FURNISHED COMBINED CHIEFS PAREN

NO SIG APRIL 27 1943 0300Z
Very Secret

January 23, 1943.

President Inouye:

The Prime Minister, who has been conferring with me, is going shortly to Cairo. He will in all probability wish to confer with you or with your Prime Minister at some convenient secret place. In case Prime Minister Churchill does seek a conference, I earnestly hope you or your Prime Minister will find it possible to meet him.

Roosevelt
The Prime Minister, who has been conferring with me shortly is going to leave. He will in all probability wish to confer with you or with your Prime Minister at some convenient date through the Prime Minister (Churche) does seek a conference.

I earnestly hope you or your Prime Minister will find it convenient to see him.

1/3/43

Delivered original typewritten copy of above to Mr. Rowan (Priv. Sec. to the P.M) at 3:00 p.m. this date - Terry
EVEY SECRET

January 23, 1943.

President Inouye:

The Prime Minister, who has been conferring with me, is going shortly to Cairo. He will in all probability wish to confer with you or with your Prime Minister at some convenient secret place. In case Prime Minister Churchill does seek a conference, I earnestly hope you or your Prime Minister will find it possible to meet him.

ROOSEVELT
FOREIGN OFFICE,
S.W.1.

12th November, 1943.


We think the Prime Minister may like to see the enclosed copy of Brigadier Maclean's report on his Mission to the Yugoslav Partisans. Maclean has just visited Cairo but has now returned to his post with the Partisans.

We are sending copies to Pearson, Hollis, Bridges, Glanville, Rushbrooke, Talbot Rice and Miss Barker.

F.D. Brown, Esq.
10, Downing Street.
[R 11589/2/G]

REPORT BY BRIGADIER F. H. R. MACLEAN, COMMANDING ALLIED MILITARY MISSION TO THE PARTISAN FORCES IN YUGOSLAVIA.

THE PARTISAN MOVEMENT IN YUGOSLAVIA.

I.

THE Partisan Movement, which now dominates the greater part of Yugoslavia and disposes of an army of some twenty-six divisions and an efficient political and administrative system, had its beginnings in the summer of 1941 in a few handfuls of determined men scattered in the woods and mountains. For arms and equipment, the Partisans relied on what they could capture from the enemy. They followed traditional guerrilla tactics of attacking and harassing the enemy wherever possible, while never allowing themselves to be forced on to the defensive. By these means, they were successful in keeping their own casualties to a minimum, while inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. (They count on not losing more than one man killed for five of the enemy against Germans and ten against Ustas or Cetniks.) They have received the whole-hearted support of the civil population. The savage reprisals of the enemy are not taken into consideration. All share the same dangers and are equally careless of death. Quarter is neither given nor expected. As Lawrence wrote of the Arab revolt: “We had won a province when we had taught the civilians in it to die for our ideal of freedom. The presence or absence of the enemy was a secondary matter.” As their successes became known and their supply of arms increased, they were joined by large numbers of fresh volunteers. These came from all over the country and from all walks of life, and were of widely differing political opinions and creeds. They joined the Partisan movement because they saw in it their best chance of striking a blow for freedom.

The fortunes of the Partisans have varied. The enemy soon realised the danger, and, in the course of two years, have launched against them no less than five major offensives. These culminated in the Montenegrin campaign this summer, when the main body of the Partisan forces came near to being completely encircled and wiped out by a combined force including, in addition to seven German and four Italian divisions, Bulgarian, Ustas and Domobran troops and the Cetniks of General Mihailovic, backed by strong artillery and air support. The enemy failed, however, in their object, and the Partisans emerged from the ordeal stronger and more confident than ever. The collapse of Italy has brought further benefit by greatly increasing their stock of arms and weakening the German position in Yugoslavia.

From the outset, the Partisan movement has been based on a common front, directed by the Communist party in the person of Tito, the Commander-in-chief of the Partisan forces, and his principal political and military advisers. Tito's identity is kept a secret. He is known to be a man of the people and to have worked underground as a Communist agent ever since the last war. It seems likely that he is, in fact, Joseph Broz, a Zagreb metal worker, who, after passing some years in the Soviet Union, was sent back to Yugoslavia by the Comintern in 1937 to reorganise and assume the leadership of the illegal Yugoslav Communist party. Although primarily a politician, with no previous experience as a military commander, he has from the start personally directed and assisted at the operations of his forces, his Chief of Staff and other military advisers playing a secondary role. In political and administrative matters, though he holds no office save that of leader of the Communist party, he is the dominating personality.

As a leader, he enjoys the undivided devotion of his followers for whom he has become a legendary figure. In appearance, he is a sensible looking man of 45 to 50, clean shaven and tidy, with grey hair, and giving an impression of intelligence and determination. In conversation, while he leaves no doubt as to his views on a subject, I have always found him reasonable and friendly, with a wide comprehension of military and political problems and a well developed sense of humour.
The military and political structure built up by Tito and his followers in two years, from nothing, in enemy-occupied territory, with no outside help, is an impressive one. Much of what has been achieved is due to the traditional love of liberty of the people of Yugoslavia and much to the leadership and ability of Tito and of the many younger men placed by him in positions of responsibility, but perhaps most of all is due to the immense enthusiasm of all concerned for the new Yugoslavia which they are building and to their unshakable confidence in the future. It is this enthusiasm and this confidence that first strike an observer and convince him, as much as any of the material achievements of the Partisans, that here is something more considerable than is generally suspected in the outside world.

II.

The National Army of Liberation (N.O.V. & P.O.J.) does not, as generally supposed, consist of scattered guerrilla bands living in the mountains and woods and carrying out haphazard raids on the enemy's communications, but is in fact a well-organised force, which completely controls large areas of Yugoslavia and has, unaided, forced the Germans to withdraw into the main towns and confine their activities to keeping open the roads to the towns which they occupy. It is now organised into brigades, divisions and corps, though this is not a rigid organisation, the size of the different formations varying according to circumstances. Moreover, it must be realised that their armaments consist of infantry weapons with but few supporting arms. The latest information gives the number of divisions as 26 and the total number of troops as 220,000. Of these 50,000 are said to be in Bosnia, 15,000 in the Sanjak, 20,000 in Croatia, 10,000 in Slavonia, 60,000 in Slovenia and Istria, 25,000 in Dalmatia, 10,000 in Vojvodina and 30,000 in Serbia and Macedonia. Formations possess properly organised staffs, which, in spite of occasionally deficient communications, exercise complete control over units under their command. Similarly, the Partisan General Staff completely controls the whole. In the case of the more remote formations, such as those in Slovenia, Slavonia and Macedonia, the policy is laid down by Partisan general headquarters, and it is left to the formations concerned to interpret it in detail. In all cases, in spite of difficult conditions, morale seems high and discipline good.

Communications between general headquarters and certain of the more important outlying formations is by wireless and, wherever possible, formations have established telephone communication to neighbouring localities within the liberated areas. Otherwise all communication is by courier, a slow and often uncertain method. The provision of more wireless sets would, by improving communications, make possible more complete control, and is thus of the first importance.

An impressive feature of the National Army of Liberation is its administration, which by making full use of the limited means available, and by intelligent improvisation succeeds in supplying and feeding very considerable forces. The distribution of material captured from the enemy or supplied by the Allies is methodical, rapid and well planned. The large quantities of stores and equipment recently taken from the Italians, including a certain number of trucks and even a few small tanks and armoured cars, have been valuable, and have made it possible to arm and equip numbers of fresh volunteers; but they are far from meeting the Army's requirements.

The need for the rapid organisation and despatch of supplies by the Allies cannot be emphasised enough. In particular the despatch of supplies by sea is of the greatest urgency. Air supplies, although of assistance, are really no more than a token that we are prepared to help. Thus, despite our promise of seventy sorties for September and sixty for October, no more than eleven sorties were flown to the whole of the National Army of Liberation in September and thirty in October, making together approximately 80 tons of material in two months, or the equivalent of the cargo of one small schooner. During the three months previous to this, going back to the date when we first started helping the Partisans, supplies were on an even smaller scale, and it is doubtful whether, in all, we have supplied more than 750 tons of material by this means. For nearly two months the Partisans have now controlled the islands and large stretches of coast, but little or no use has so far been made of this opportunity, and it is essential that an efficient system of sea supplies on a large scale should be set up without further delay. Almost equally important, both strategically and from the point of view of morale, are attacks by the Allied air forces on targets in Yugoslavia. The first signs of Allied air support have been greeted with great enthusiasm by the Partisans.
In spite of the great development of the Partisan forces, the fundamental principles of Tito’s strategy have remained unchanged. He well realizes that, although his troops are ideally suited to the semi-guerrilla warfare in which they are now engaged, they are neither trained nor equipped for normal modern warfare, and that if they attempted a pitched battle with the Germans they would undoubtedly be heavily defeated. His policy has therefore been to attack the enemy wherever the enemy is least prepared to meet an attack, and to avoid being forced into positions which it would be costly to defend. This does not mean that he confines himself to small-scale raids or isolated attacks on lines of communication, though the Partisans have been particularly successful in this sphere (see Railway Map). If the opportunity offers he will, and does, occupy towns and large areas of country, and exploit the resources which they contain, but he is never tempted, either by these resources or by considerations of prestige to risk his valuable troops in the last man-last round defence of them. Many parts of the country have been captured, evacuated and recaptured two or three times in the past two years. Similarly, the Partisans will use, when they can, captured artillery and transport and even tanks, but they do not allow the fact of their possession to lead them into changing their basic mode of warfare, and they are always ready to abandon them and revert to the hills and to classical guerrilla tactics at a moment’s notice, should circumstances demand it.

The attacks of the National Army of Liberation are causing ever greater embarrassment to the Germans, who, with an enemy who presents no targets against which they can strike back decisively, with unreliable allies; and without enough troops of their own to occupy the country effectively, have been obliged to confine themselves to garrisoning the larger towns and trying to keep open communications between them, while leaving the rest of the country to the Partisans. Thus the Partisans have achieved practically unassisted. Were they to be provided with sufficient arms and equipment, the embarrassment caused to the Germans would be enormously increased, and it might well be that in time the National Army of Liberation could force the Germans to withdraw from the country altogether. At present the number of Reichswehr divisions in Yugoslavia is estimated at about fourteen. There is, of course, no question of any Allied officer or other outside authority conducting the operations of the National Army of Liberation or in any way directing its strategy. Tito has, however, agreed that it would be useful if I would, in accordance with the terms of my charter laid down in General Wilson’s message to him, keep him informed of the main lines of Allied military policy, and he has undertaken to do what he can to further Allied plans. I have no doubt that his readiness to accept our guidance and suit his strategy to our plans will be in direct proportion to the amount of material help that we are able to give him.

III.

As the areas controlled by them grow larger, political and administrative problems are becoming of increasing interest to the Partisans. A foundation has existed from the start. The Communists, officially accepted as the directing force of the movement have, needless to say, never lacked in political consciousness and have sufficient experience to be able to work underground in any circumstances. The administrative and political unit adopted by the Partisans is the Odbor, corresponding to the Russian Soviet, and constitutional arrangements are roughly on Soviet lines. The town or village Odbor is elected by universal suffrage and its delegates in turn elect from their numbers the members of the District Odbors, whence the chain goes on through Area and Regional Odbors, to the committees of the various nationalities (e.g., Zavnoh, the Croat Anti-Fascist Committee of National Liberation) and, finally, to Avnoj, the Yugoslav Anti-Fascist Committee of National Liberation, which is the supreme civil authority. Each Odbor is divided into various sections dealing with different subjects. It also has a plenum, an executive committee and a president. The president of Avnoj is Dr. Ivan Rihar, the former Speaker of the Yugoslav Parliament, who is nominally the political head of the movement, though, in fact, he and his colleagues are completely overshadowed by Tito. Elections to the various Odbors have been held under the occupation, regardless of the presence of the enemy, with the result that, when Partisan forces capture a town or village, the necessary local administrative and political machinery is already in existence and is able to take over the administration forthwith. Liaison between the political and military authorities is undertaken locally by
the political commissars of units and formations, who, like their former Soviet counterparts, are also entrusted with the ideological welfare of the troops. Political commissars are all picked men and take an active part in military operations. I have been most favourably impressed by all those I have met.

The elections are nominally on non-party lines, the Partisan political system being based on a common anti-Fascist front under Communist leadership. In fact, however, all key posts are held by members of the Communist party and policy is dictated by them. Provided that they are prepared to accept Communist hegemony and follow the party line, other parties and institutions, though ultimate Gleichschaltung doubtless awaits them, are tolerated and encouraged to join the common front. In Croatia, a section of the Croat Peasant party has joined the Partisans and, under their auspices, even publishes its own newspaper. Slobodni Dom. (Most of the remainder of the Croat Peasant party have thrown in their lot with the Ustasla, and Macek, though imprisoned by the Germans, is denounced by the Partisans as a traitor.) In Slovenia, the common front comprises several of the former political parties.

Religious toleration prevails. The movement includes numbers of Catholic and Orthodox priests, as well as Moslem Imams, and even has its official chaplains to the Partisan forces. In Jajce, the Partisans have restored and formally reopened the Orthodox Church destroyed by the Ustasla, and services are also held in the Catholic Church and in the numerous mosques. This policy has won over many who had expected of the Partisans an anti-God attitude on out of date Soviet lines.

Nor are there any signs of class warfare. Numbers of the military and political leaders of the movement come from the well-to-do classes, and there is a strong sprinkling of intelligentsia, including many technical experts. Many regular officers have also joined the Partisans, some after they had been disappointed by General Mihailovic.

The question of private property and private enterprise has conveniently been left in abeyance. Amongst the Partisans themselves all assets are paid into official funds, whence they are redistributed as required. Looting or violence against the civil population is punished by death, nor have I been able to find evidence of mass arrests or executions on the lines of those perpetrated by the Ustasla and Cetniks.

Partisan policy is in short constructive rather than destructive. To this bears witness the rapidity with which, throughout the liberated areas, factories, power stations and even railways are set working, while on the cultural side corresponding activity is shown, newspapers are produced, and schools, youth associations, women's institutes and other similar societies are set up, all, needless to say, on strictly party lines. In particular a determined effort is being made to combat illiteracy. In all these activities an increasingly active part is being played by the women whose emancipation is an important plank in the Partisan platform.

The movement is none the less essentially revolutionary. The Yugoslav Communists have profited by the experience of others; they have begun where their Russian counterparts left off, and have not found it necessary to persecute and thereby alienate whole sections of the population, but there can be no question of a return to the old order.

In particular great emphasis is laid on the need for a new solution of the problem of nationalities within Yugoslavia. To quote Tito: "The struggle for National freedom and the question of nationalities in Yugoslavia are closely connected. Our efforts to liberate our country would not be so determined or so successful if the peoples of Yugoslavia did not see in them to-day, not only a victory over Fascism, but a victory over the old régime and over those who once oppressed the different races of Yugoslavia and hope to oppress them once again."

A federal scheme is envisaged under which Serbs, Croats and Slovenes will enjoy equal rights and good mutual relations under a central Government, and no one race dominate the rest. At the same time, the Partisans strongly discourage separatist tendencies and point to the unity and harmony prevailing in their own ranks, where all the different nationalities are well represented. Serbs actually predominating.

In contrast to their attitude towards the parties and organisations who have joined their common front against the Axis, the Partisans have sworn undying hatred against Nedic, Pavelic, Macek and Mihailovic. With Mihailovic, they sought to reach an understanding in 1941, when he still showed some signs of resisting the invaders. According to Partisan accounts, negotiations between Tito and Mihailovic for the unification of their forces under Mihailovic's
command broke down when the Cetniks joined the Germans in an attack on the Partisans at Uzice. After the Cetniks had explained that this was due to a mistake, negotiations were resumed, but a repetition of the incident, followed by further acts of treachery, including the wholesale murder of Partisan wounded and medical personnel, caused the Partisans to put aside for good any hope of an understanding with Mihailovic, whom they now regard as a traitor to his country and one of their bitterest enemies, and whom, as such, they are bent on exterminating. Ever since, evidence of Cetnik collaboration with both the Germans and Italians has been steadily accumulating. (Particulars of this have already been given by signal and a detailed report is now under preparation.) General Mihailovic may possibly deny that he himself has acted in direct collaboration with the Axis, but he cannot deny the open and active collaboration of many of his principal commanders, of which there is irrefutable evidence. To take only one example, Djucic, commander of the Cetnik Dinaric Division of 8,000 men, representing approximately one quarter of the total Cetnik forces, has steadily collaborated first with the Italians and now with the Germans. Mihailovic cannot disown him, for it was on his recommendation that Djucic was awarded the Karageorge Star over the B.B.C. by the Royal Yugoslav Government, an award which, according to an Italian officer whom I met, he celebrated at the table of the local Italian divisional commander. In any case, if he disowns only the most notorious collaborationists among his commanders, it leaves him with practically no forces at his disposal. If, on the other hand, he admits to having so little control over his commanders that, instead of fighting the enemy, they place themselves under enemy command, it says very little for his powers as a leader.

By their support of their Minister of War, the Royal Yugoslav Government, or Government of traitors and deserters, as they are known in their own country, have earned the same degree of hatred as is felt for Mihailovic himself. This hatred is continually expressed in articles, speeches and informal conversation by Partisans of all kinds, whether Serb, Croat or Slovene. In particular the Government are regarded as sharing Mihailovic’s violently Pan-Serb and anti-Croat views and as aiming at the restoration of the old regime with all its abuses. To this must be added the contempt felt for a Government who, while the Partisans have been fighting and building up a new Yugoslavia, have been living comfortably in London, proclaiming over the B.B.C. that ‘The time has not yet come to start the fight for Freedom.’

Unfortunately, King Peter’s public support of Mihailovic has also caused deep offence and has served to strengthen the belief that a return of the Dynasty would mean a return to Pan-Serb policy and to the old order of things. Nor do the Partisans feel that they have much in common with a King who has taken no part in their struggle for liberation and who, even if he joined them at this juncture, would in their estimation arrive two years too late. Partisan propaganda has, however, scrupulously refrained from attacking His Majesty and it is clear that the Partisan leaders do not wish the question of the Monarchy raised at this juncture, their attitude being that it is a matter which must in due course be freely decided by the people of Yugoslavia.

IV.

Their struggle against the invader has left the Partisans but little time for Foreign Affairs. Towards foreign countries in general, their attitude is one of universal benevolence on Soviet lines, attributing any lapses from virtue to the inherent wickedness of most Governments, and based on the assumption that, if left to themselves, the workers of the world would be only too glad to unite. On this basis, they look forward to friendly collaboration after the war with all neighbouring countries including their former enemies. They seek no territorial aggrandisement beyond their pre-war frontiers, with the exception of the former Italian territories of Slovene and Croat population, already for the most part in their hands.

At the same time, certain aspects of the world situation loom very large on their horizon. First and foremost comes Soviet Russia. The liquidation of the Tsars did not put an end to Pan-Slavism, nor has the liquidation of the Comintern cut off Moscow from all contact with Communist parties in other countries. Both these factors play an important part in Yugoslavia to-day, and to them must be added the superiority of Soviet propaganda to that of most other countries. To the Partisans, Soviet Russia appears variously as their political mentor, as the traditional protector of all Slav races and, finally, as the only country taking
any part in the war besides themselves. Everywhere Comrade Tito's portrait is balanced by that of Comrade Stalin; the latest Russian songs are sung in preference to Yugoslav ones; Soviet institutions and jargon are copied, and praise of the Glorious Red Army and the "Great Russian people" (in the classical phrase, "Veliki russki narod"). is on everyone's lips. In fact, with political slogans on every wall and Red Star, Hammer and Sickle on the cap badges of the troops, an observer familiar with the Soviet Union might, at times, imagine himself in one of the Republics of the Union. How far the Soviet Government actively intervene in Partisan affairs is another matter. There is not as yet any official Soviet representative with the Partisans, nor have the Soviet Government given them any material support. On the other hand, the Free Yugoslavia broadcasting station is unofficially admitted to be on Soviet territory, and Partisan General Headquarters is in wireless touch with Moscow. Events will show the nature of Soviet intentions towards Yugoslavia, much will also depend on Tito, and whether he sees himself still in his former role of Comintern agent or as the potential ruler of an independent Yugoslav State. Much, finally, depends on the part played by other Powers in the liberation of Yugoslavia.

At present Great Britain comes a long way after Russia in the estimation of the Partisans. For one thing, as a capitalist and non-Slav State, we are at a certain disadvantage. Further, the Partisans are puzzled by our continued support of Mihailovic, despite his collaboration with the Axis and failure to use the Partisans' help against anyone except the Partisans themselves. Although Tito, at any rate, understands the nature and extent of our obligations towards the King and the Royal Yugoslav Government, and has readily accepted my assurance that it is the desire of His Majesty's Government that the Yugoslav people should freely choose their own type of Government, many of the rank and file undoubtedly suspect us of wishing to impose on them by force the former régime, with all its evils and Mihailovic thrown in. Suspicion and resentment have also been caused by the misguided broadcasts of the B.B.C., which, though an improvement is now noticeable, over a long period consistently extolled Mihailovic and ignored or attacked the Partisans, or, worse still, attributed to the former the exploits of the latter. This served to discredit British propaganda in Partisan eyes, while lack of suitable information has led them greatly to underestimate the British share in the war. Grave disappointment has also been felt at our prolonged failure to give the National Army of Liberation any substantial material aid or active support, particularly since the way has been open for supplies by sea. On the other hand, there is, to my mind, in Yugoslavia a deep-seated liking and admiration for Great Britain which could easily be developed. Everywhere my mission has been given a most friendly reception and overwhelmed with requests for information about Great Britain and the British war effort, as well as for Union Jacks and portraits of the Prime Minister to take their place alongside those of Tito and Stalin. Finally, the Partisans cannot but realise that, unlike the Russians, we dominate the Mediterranean and are in a position at this juncture to give them the active help and support they so urgently need.

Most of these considerations apply also to the United States. Here again, the same factors have damped the enthusiasm and admiration which undoubtedly exist. For instance, the news of the recent gift of the United States Government of four Liberators to the Royal Yugoslav Government was very badly received, while Columbia broadcasts are a perpetual source of annoyance.

V.

For His Majesty's Government the choice lies between continuing, as long as circumstances permit, the present policy of giving an approximately equal measure of moral and material support to both the Partisans and Mihailovic, or, on the other hand, dropping Mihailovic and giving our wholehearted support to the Partisans. Of reconciliation, or of dividing the country into two spheres of influence, there can be no question.

In reaching a decision, there are two main aspects of the problem to be considered: the immediate Yugoslav contribution to the Allied war effort, and our standing in Yugoslavia and in the Balkans after the war. In the matter of military effectiveness there can clearly be no comparison between the Partisans and the Cetniks. The Partisans are between 10 and 20 times as numerous, infinitely better organised, better equipped and better disciplined. Moreover, they fight the Germans, while the Cetniks either help the Germans or do nothing.
It might, of course, be argued that it is worth continuing to support the Cetniks in the hope that they may eventually turn against the Germans and thereby contribute something to the united war effort. This argument would carry more weight if the Cetniks were more numerous, less disorganised and less set in their collaborationist ways. As it is, it seems likely that they are only kept going by our moral and material support, and that, if we were to drop them, the leaders would fade away and the rank and file join the Partisans, as many of them have done already. Apart from relieving the Partisans of a constant source of annoyance, we should, by withdrawing our support from the Cetniks, release arms of which the Partisans could make the best possible use.

Taking a long view, the case for wholehearted support of the Partisans is equally strong. There seems little doubt that nothing short of large-scale armed intervention will prevent them from taking power in Yugoslavia as soon as the Germans are finally driven out. In fact, they effectively control large areas already. Furthermore, they can count on the powerful backing of our Soviet allies. Mihailovic, on the other hand, is thoroughly discredited in the eyes of most of the population and, even in the most favourable circumstances, would have no prospect of uniting the country. His policy is, in any case, Pan-Serb, anti-Croat and violently reactionary, and is therefore opposed to our own aims. The support which we give him can only serve to prolong existing internal dissensions, and by it, we are, in return for no corresponding advantage, prejudicing our position with the Partisans and driving them more and more to the conclusion that the Soviet Union is their only friend.

On the other hand, were we to drop Mihailovic and at the same time substantially increase our material aid to the Partisans, we should not only further the Yugoslav contribution to the Allied war effort, but we should establish Anglo-Yugoslav relations on a firm basis, which would do much to consolidate our position in the Balkans after the war.

In these circumstances my recommendations are as follows:

(1) That support of Mihailovic should be discontinued.
(2) That our aid to the Partisans should be substantially increased.
(3) That, in particular, an efficient system of supply by sea should be organised on a large scale without further delay.
(4) That suitable targets in Yugoslavia should be attacked from the air whenever possible.
(5) That B.B.C. broadcasts and other publicity should be kept in line with the policy of His Majesty's Government.

F. H. R. MACLEAN, Brigadier,
Commanding Allied Military Mission to the Partisan Forces.

6th November, 1943.