

BOX 165. A16-3 WARFARE -- CHINA to CRIMEAN CONFERENCE

1. A16-3 CHINA: June 15, 1942 - April 12, 1945, including a comprehensive report: "The President and Aid to China: 1944." 65 pages.
2. A16-3 BOLERO (Build-up in U.K. for Overlord operation): 1942 - April, 1943.
3. A/16 CASABLANCA CONFERENCE: January - March, 1943.
4. A/16 CRIMEAN CONFERENCE:
 - a. Undated reports on Haile Selassie, Ibn Saud, etc. and other data on subsidiary meetings after the conference.
 - b. "Political Memoranda": statements on U.S. Government policy toward the areas listed below for use by U.S. conference team.

World Security

Europe (policy vis a vis Germany and satellites)

Near East

Far East

Latin America

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1. A16-3 CHINA: June 15, 1942 - April 12, 1945, including a comprehensive report: "The President and Aid to China: 1944." 65 pages.

2. A-16/3 WARFARE -- INDIA-BURMA AREA: May, 1942 - December, 1944.

3. A-16 FRANCE and FREE FRENCH; February, 1943 - April, 1945.

Regraded Unclassified

BOX 167.

A16/ch

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

April 12, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

The President has read the attached papers concerning a proposed agreement to supplement the SACCO Agreement and has directed me to inform you that he approves of the action proposed by the Secretary of the Navy.

J. A. TIRRE, Jr.,
Commander, U.S. Navy,
Assistant Naval Aide to the President.

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JR.

OFFICE OF THE
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

11 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL BROWN:

The President has read the attached papers and has directed that they be returned to the Secretary of the Navy with the notation that he has approved them.

Very respectfully,

Ogden S. Collins, Jr.
OGDEN S. COLLINS, JR.
Lieutenant USNR.

James M. ...

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

7 April 1945

Memo. for THE PRESIDENT.

General Wedemeyer has proposed an agreement to supplement the SACO Agreement, giving him command of U.S. personnel and material in SACO. He says this is necessary for essential coordination with his other U.S. forces. He says the Generalissimo has approved his proposal, but wants agreement on governmental level signed by me and Dr. Soong. General Hurley has stated his approval.

The Joint Chiefs have asked me to accomplish the attached Agreement, which is in the form required by the SACO Agreement.

To avoid implication of complaint in requesting the change, the attached letter of transmittal expresses satisfaction with Chinese cooperation in SACO. This is merited.

If you approve, I will sign the letter and the Agreement.

James Foran

TOP SECRET

**WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

December 20, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I have just received a long letter, dated December 10, from General Wedemeyer. I believe the following extracted portions will be of interest to you:

"Initial survey of the situation and the relation of the Americans to the war effort here in consonance with the China Theater directive emphasized almost immediately after my arrival the following broad points:

"a) We must retain the Kunming area as our terminal of supply.

"b) Chungking should receive second priority, for its loss unquestionably would have disastrous political, economic, as well as psychological effect.

"c) The Chinese have no conception of organization, logistics or modern warfare.

"d) The Generalissimo is striving to conduct the war from Chungking. The management of affairs of State in itself would require a Disraeli, Churchill and Machiavelli all combined in one. The Gissimo will not decentralize power to subordinates.

"In early conferences with the Generalissimo, I pointed out that we should make disposition of forces and allocation of equipment as early as possible to insure the defense of the Kunming area. I presented a plan for this purpose and he approved that plan. This was about four weeks ago. Now I find that he is vacillating - in fact, he has ordered movements of divisions from the Kunming area without my knowledge. There are increasing indications that he no longer fully accepts the premise that Kunming should receive first priority. Apparently his advisors in the interim have emphasized the necessity for holding Chungking which, as stated above, we agree as necessary, but only after we have made appropriate preparations for the defense of Kunming.

"Recently in discussing the defense of Chungking with the Generalissimo, I mentioned that we should make plans now for evacuation should the enemy advance continue on the capitol and require our

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withdrawal. The Generalissimo categorically stated that he intended to remain in the capitol and die here, if necessary. He has stated this on two other occasions, General, once in Nanking and again in Hankow, but was prevailed upon by his advisors to get out at the last minute. My purpose in making plans is to preclude chaos and confusion under the circumstances and to insure that we could set up a seat of government in some other appropriate location, preferably Kunming. There are so many political implications in everything we do here that this may not materialize. For example, the Governor of Yunnan Province and the Generalissimo are very unfriendly. Further, the Generalissimo wants to remain near Szechuen Province which I am told is one of the most thickly populated (65,000,000) and one of the most productive. If he goes to the Kunming area, the Governor of Yunnan may kidnap him or at least place him under protective custody. Also, he would be cut off from provinces to the north, Szechuen, for example.

"In connection with the Americans, I have plans for their evacuation - in fact, I am gradually moving officers and men to the Kunming area. I will remain here with the Generalissimo as long as possible, but not long enough to be captured by the Japs, I hope. I understand that the Generalissimo has considered moving his capitol to Laochow in Sinkiang Province. We would be out of touch with the military situation there. Politically he could still carry on, but militarily he would be impotent from that area.

"The above may suggest that I am beginning to accept as inevitable a successful Japanese advance on Chungking and Kunming. I want to assure you that we are not defeatists. In fact, we are going to give everything we have to hold Kunming and Chungking and to insure that it can never be said that Americans abandoned China in the final and decisive stages of the Sino-Jap War. In this connection, I wish you could witness the spirit our American officers and men have. Everyone is working hard. If we can but get Chinese collaboration, stop this business of last minute changes in plans, and inspire the men to fight, we have confidence that everything will come out all right. Most of us are resilient and can accept frustrations and disappointments and still come back for more.

"My approach to the Generalissimo has been friendly, direct and firm. I believe that he likes and respects me now. It is the influence and chicanery of his advisors, who have selfish, mercurial motives and who persuade him when I am not present to take action that conflicts with agreed plans. I have been uniformly careful to massage his ego and to place myself in an advisory position so that he will not lose face or feel that I am trying to coerce him in action not in consonance with sound military plans.

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"We have recommended dispositions which, if the Chinese will fight with determination and élan, should insure the security of the capitol. Also, we are moving an ample supply of munitions centrally located for the troops. We could make a continued Japanese advance costly, in fact prohibitive, in time and effort. It is difficult to imagine the pressure that is being brought to bear from various facets and high officials to concentrate for the defense of Chungking in lieu of Kunming. In this connection, it is amusing and also tragic to note that many highranking Chinese officials are asking me to facilitate their evacuation to America by air. One very highranking Chinese general stated that he wanted to take forty outstanding Chinese army and naval officers to Europe very soon to study the European battlefields. Tactfully but firmly I told him that if he had that many Chinese officers who were highly trained, we needed them right now during this critical hour in China and that we could employ them in key posts in connection with plans for the defense of their country. Another Chinese general asked me for permission to send ten Chinese officers to America to study strategy, particularly the employment of armored units. My answer to him was along the same lines. This is indicative of the psychological approach of Chinese who should know better. Self-sacrifice and patriotism are unknown quantities among the educated and privileged classes.

"We have taken steps to improve the diet of Chinese soldiers. The Chinese soldiers are starving by the hundreds. This is due to graft and inefficiency. I have told the Generalissimo that until we insure that we have food, rice, pork and some vegetables for our soldiers, we cannot expect them to fight effectively. I have emphasized this point over and over again and have explained to him that if we feed our troops well I am sure that the desertions will drop down materially - in fact, we will have men eager to join the army. We have evolved a good plan for feeding the men, and I hope to supplement their diet with vitamins and dehydrated foods from America. A wire has been sent to Somervell in this connection. I am instituting plans that will be executed under American supervision to eliminate graft and insure better and ample food for the army.

"In connection with troop movements, the Chinese march an outfit from A to B and make no provision for bivouacs, food, and so forth along the route. This is being taken care of. If only the Chinese will cooperate! American officers have been designated to supervise such movements and we are well on the way to exercising constructive influence with regard to this very important factor. The Generalissimo often asks me to move by air 50,000 men from A to B, and after carefully studying such movement we make appropriate arrangements. Suddenly he will order a change and there are all kinds of ramifications

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involved which render it impossible or at least impracticable to comply with his wishes. Neither he nor his advisors really understand supply and movement problems. But they ask for the most astounding troop movements to implement their strategy, which is really piecemeal, uncoordinated employment of forces.

"The Chinese S.O.S. is terrifyingly inefficient. I have placed my S.O.S. Major General Cheves, who is fine and able, in charge of supply and movements in the area between Kweiyang and Kunming. The Chinese S.O.S. is responsible for supply and movement in the Chungking area. I have given the Chinese S.O.S. four of my officers to assist. If they would but listen to the American officers and heed the advice given them, many of our difficulties would be alleviated. I have established a policy in the theater that no Chinese soldier will be moved by air or truck if he is physically unfit. I now have American medical officers present at points of departure (air or truck) to examine the men. The Generalissimo approved this, but old China hands tell me I am going to decimate the army for so few are really fit. To get around this, our standards cannot be so high and later, if we do succeed in building up the men physically, we will raise our physical standards for combat.

"I have already indicated to the Generalissimo that here in Chungking we must issue broad policies and directives to responsible commanders in the field and that we definitely must not tell them how to carry them out. If we find that these commanders are not complying, then relieve them. I emphasized that it is wrong to direct operations from Chungking. Although he has agreed to the soundness of this approach, he violates his agreement almost daily, and this adds to our difficulties. I told you that he did not give me the best Chinese general for the command of the ALPHA plan, yet I impressed upon him that it was the most important military operation with which any Chinese had ever been charged. I receive continual reports of the inefficiency of General Ho. Apparently he is a suave, self-seeking individual, very rich and dissolute. For political reasons the Generalissimo does not desire to remove him from a position of responsibility in the war effort.

"I was most reluctant to make recommendations to the Chiefs of Staff with reference to the removal of divisions from the Burma Theater. Perhaps no one is more familiar with the implications, and I recall vividly the disappointment of British and Americans alike in SEAC when at the Cairo Conference a year ago amphibious resources were taken away for operations elsewhere. Today I am making recommendations that will stultify Admiral Mountbatten in the midst of a successful effort in Burma. In so doing I recognize that I may be jeopardizing the operations that would create a land route to the

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China Theater. I was careful not to recommend prematurely that this be done and weighed every possibility and resorted to every expedient to minimize our requirements. There have been indications that Mountbatten feels very keenly about this; however, I want you to know that I made these decisions only after careful deliberation. If I hurt him I am sorry, but the war is bigger than individuals either in his case or my own. I did exactly what I think you would have done under similar circumstances.

"If we are successful in riding through this crisis until 1 June 1945, we can I believe create conditions that will make an effective contribution to continued effort against the Japanese on the continent. Tonnages over the hump, by air, pipeline and road will increase to approximately 100,000 tons per month by that time, and that quantity of materiel should certainly support a sizeable striking force, particularly in the air. We will plan amphibious operations against the coast with a view to securing a lodgment with sea communications. Having firmly secured an area on the coast with suitable airfields, we might advance up the coast in scallops so that we could establish air and sea striking bases closer to the heart of the Japanese inner zone. But all of that is fantasy at this time, when realistically we are confronted with a precarious situation in our front yard!

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"I am increasingly certain that it would be sound to employ the XX Bomber Command against the Hankow area with maximum bomb loads. This area is a focal point for communications and also has vital air and industrial installations which contribute to the Jap effort. I do not accept the premise that such an attack would not pay commensurate dividends. If 100 B-29s with ten tons of explosives each were to be employed against Hankow, the Jap effort would be materially weakened. On two or more occasions these ships have been employed against Bangkok and Rangoon. Such strikes were not in my opinion as vital to our over-all war effort as strikes would be against Hankow and/or Canton. I do agree that the XX Bomber Command should be employed to facilitate the projected Pacific operations and do not want to recommend anything that would militate against FIVESOME.

"When I was home last August, both you and Alec Surles spoke to me about my relations with the newspaper correspondents in SEAC. Apparently the newspaper correspondents returning to the States reported that I was aloof. You suggested that I see them occasionally and once in a while entertain them. Upon my return to Kandy I gave a cocktail party for them. However, I was in a difficult position in Kandy with reference to newspaper men. As a pick and shovel man

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on Admiral Mountbatten's staff I felt reluctant to make any statements to the press. He is not one iota bashful about such matters and not only held a weekly press conference but saw many of the correspondents in between. Obviously there wasn't much that I could say of additional interest. However, Surles provided us with an excellent press relations officer and he had the situation well in hand in Kandy.

"Upon my arrival in Chungking, the Generalissimo asked me to see the press not less than once a week, and I am complying. There are about fifty newspaper representatives who come to my office every Thursday. They ask questions, many of which are borderline or in absolute violation of military security. I am able to cope with such questions, but they also introduce subjects which, while not violating military security, would if answered tend to increase concern of the Chinese people or shake their confidence in their leaders. At the first meeting of the press, I asked them never to quote me and stipulated that all communiques going out from Chungking were to be sent out over headline from China Theater Headquarters and not from General Wedemeyer's Headquarters. I received information from friends at home stating that the press there is presenting me in the light of a publicity seeker, and I felt badly about it. General Embick even radioed me concerning this matter. I have been so busy with other more pressing matters that I have not checked personally the dispatches emanating from these headquarters. My press relations officer is inexperienced and I asked General Surles to send me a capable man. Also, my press censor does not appear particularly capable. With the arrival of an able press relations officer, the present unsatisfactory situation will be alleviated.

"Perhaps in no theater is the problem of handling the press more acute and dangerous. I appreciate this fact and will strive to avoid pitfalls. I abhor personal publicity and am encouraging correspondents to stress human interest stories about subordinates in the field. I do hope that my relations with the press and the information published will not cause you or the United States Government embarrassment.

"Congressman Mansfield of Montana reported here a few weeks ago as a special representative of the President. I had a few conferences with him and he impressed me very favorably. I placed every facility at his disposal to get around in the theater and see conditions for himself. I hope that upon his return you will be able to have a heart-to-heart with him. He, of course, would give you political views that do affect our military effort. Nelson should be able to provide an economic picture, and Hurley the diplomatic. I

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Regraded Unclassified

will send an officer with Hurley to give you military information, and also explain our requirements in personnel. I do hope that we will overcome what now appear to be almost insuperable obstacles and that I can give you more optimistic reports about the future of China Theater."

William T. ...
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 4, 1944

*Admiral Brown
to file*
TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR

The President:

The following quoted memorandum to the British Staff Representatives in Washington, and the message sent yesterday by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Wedemeyer, seem to clear up the differences we have had with Mountbatten's desire to retain Chiang's divisions for the Burma campaign:

"Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff.

"1. The United States Chiefs of Staff have noted the concurrence of the British Chiefs of Staff with all except paragraph 3 of the message to General Wedemeyer contained in CCS 740.

"2. With reference to the substitute paragraph 3 proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff: The United States Chiefs of Staff feel that the situation in China demands such urgent action that to postpone the transfer of the two Chinese divisions to China, pending discussions and agreement on the means of transport of those divisions, might well be disastrous. The retention in India-Burma of transport aircraft to assist future offensive operations by Admiral Mountbatten's forces at a time when the transfer of those aircraft appears imperatively necessary to halt an approaching catastrophe in China is not, in their opinion, justified.

"3. In CCS 308/8, the United States Chiefs of Staff reserved the right to reassign units from the Tenth to the Fourteenth Air Force. This reservation was agreed by the British Chiefs of Staff. As to the U.S. Air Transport Command and Twentieth Bomber Command which are not normally under control of the theater commanders, all the resources of these commands are being made available to General Wedemeyer.

"4. Under the existing conditions, the United States Chiefs of Staff feel it necessary to authorize the diversion

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of any U.S. resources in India or Burma required to meet the immediate threat in China and are issuing to General Wedemeyer the directive contained in CCS 740. However, in view of the concern expressed by the British Chiefs of Staff over the possible diversion of transport aircraft, they will direct General Wedemeyer to limit his demands for transport aircraft to those not at present actively employed and urgently required for the supply of SEAC forces engaged with the enemy, unless no other means of meeting his emergency requirements can be found. The United States Chiefs of Staff request that the British Chiefs of Staff advise Admiral Mountbatten accordingly."

Message to Wedemeyer and Sultan, for information to Wheeler:

"The British Chiefs of Staff have concurred in the provisions of that directive with the exception of paragraph 3, which authorizes the diversion to China of any U.S. resources required to meet this emergency. The British Chiefs of Staff are particularly concerned with the possible withdrawal of transport aircraft required by Admiral Mountbatten for the conduct of operations CAPITAL and ROMULUS. In view of the concern of the British, General Wedemeyer is instructed to limit his demands for transport aircraft to those not at present actively employed and urgently required for the supply of SEAC forces engaged with the enemy, unless no other means of meeting his emergency requirements can be found.

"General Sultan will report in detail the forces and resources withdrawn from India-Burma as a result of these instructions, and the effect of these withdrawals on operations of SEAC.

"The British Chiefs of Staff are being asked to inform Admiral Mountbatten of the action being taken by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff."

William D. Leahy

*Admiral
Brown
go file*

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*File
WSD*

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C.

December 3, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: China Situation.

The following has just been received from Wedemeyer, which will be of interest to you. The Hearn he refers to was Stilwell's Chief of Staff in Chungking and is now in New Delhi en route home.

Incidentally, the British Chiefs of Staff have agreed to the movement of the two Chinese divisions from Burma to Yunnan Province and Wedemeyer proposes to take the 14th Division, now at Myitkyina, instead of one of the two crack Ramghar divisions now fighting near Bhamo. The trouble is the British Chiefs are opposing sufficient freedom of decision by Wedemeyer in use of U. S. transport planes to facilitate prompt movement of troops over the Hump, without the necessity for prolonged discussions with Mountbatten who naturally wishes to hold on to these planes, followed by reference to CCS. We, however, are giving Wedemeyer the necessary authority.

Here follows Wedemeyer's message:

"After drawing up plan for defense of the Kunning area I presented same to the Generalissimo. I explained carefully that the execution of this plan was vital to China and that he should appoint his best general to execute that plan. I recommended General Chen Cheng. The Generalissimo stated that he had another important post for Chen Cheng and confided that he proposed to make him Minister of War. I continued to press the Generalissimo for Chen Cheng by suggesting that he make him Commander-in-Chief of the plan during the critical next 3 or 4 months. The Generalissimo told me that he would consider this recommendation. A few days later I learned that the Generalissimo had appointed General Chen Cheng as Minister of War and that he had appointed General Ho Ying Chin, the former Minister of War and also Chief of Staff of the Chinese Army, to be commander in Chief of the Kunning Defense Forces.

"This was a decided blow. I have been informed, and my several contacts with General Ho confirm, that he is weak, dilatory, a Politico and incapable militarily. My advisors inform me that he is justifiably suspected of being pro Japanese. Again I discussed the subject with the Generalissimo and

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as forcefully as I could to the head of a state, I pointed out that the defense of the Kunming area was the decisive operation politically, economically, and militarily to China.

"I then put this question to the Generalissimo: 'Realizing this, Generalissimo, you have appointed General Ho Ying Chin to the important post of Commander of all forces in the Kunming area instead of General Chen Chang, whom I am informed is your outstanding General?' The Generalissimo replied that that was the very reason that he had appointed General Ho, the obvious implication being that Ho is considered by the Chinese as most capable. Apparently we are to be saddled with a mediocre general to implement our important plan. However, General Ho has been given a good Chinese General as Chief of Staff. He is General Hsiao and has been Chief of Staff with CEF.

"I had already designated Dorn to General Ho as American advisor. I have given General Ho American officers to work on his staff in the following sections: G-2, G-3, G-4, air, medical, engineer, and signal.

"Giving up these officers further depletes my own staff, but I feel that General Ho without such American support could not possibly cope with the responsibilities involved.

"Language difficulties and the face-saving reluctance of Chinese Generals to accept advice of Americans junior to them add to our problems, but I am doing all possible to build up mutual respect and confidence in cooperative and friendly atmosphere.

"The situation has grown steadily worse since June. The Chinese have not offered resistance worthy of the name since the defense of Hengyang, where they fought creditably. I have carefully reviewed US intelligence reports extending over the past 6 months. The Japanese present capabilities and intentions are perfectly obvious when one analyzes such reports. Appropriate countermeasures were not taken by the Chinese. I do not know what advice they received from Americans, but my experiences the past four weeks convince me that due to disorganization, political intrigue, and outright military inefficiency, they probably were powerless to act in an appropriate or timely manner. The seriousness of the situation was apparent within one week of my arrival, although the Chinese assured me that the Japanese advance would be stopped or at least delayed. I had felt that I would have more time in which to plan and prepare for the defense of the Kunming area. I heard that such

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plans would not impinge heavily on operations of the 20th Bomber Command, FIVESOME and CAPITAL. The Japanese advance has been more rapid than I or even old China hands had believed possible. I agree with Hearn that if the Japs meet stiff resistance they will not push their attack further.

"The fighting effectiveness of available Chinese units is so unpredictable that no American officer can state categorically when, where and how such resistance can be definitely provided. We can throw in great numbers of troops at tremendous cost logistically, but we do not know whether the Chinese will stick and fight. I have pointed this out to the Generalissimo.

"We are moving 60,000 troops by air from Sian area to bolster Kuning plan. The Gissimo assured me that these men can and will fight. These troops include 30,000 in formed units; however, they will require additional equipment and training. The remaining 30,000 are replacements of unknown value. I have instituted policy in theater that every man will be physically examined by US medical officer to preclude movement of physically unfit. I am doing everything possible to insure that food and ammunition are provided for all of these troops vital to our plan and all the troops engaged with the enemy. These vital provisions have been uniformly neglected in the past.

"I have just received a message from Wheeler inspired by Mountbatten urging me to take the 50th and the 14th Chinese Divisions from upper Burma, neither of which is actively engaged. Of course, this is absolutely sound, as their removal would militate least against CAPITAL, but actually what I require is men who will fight.

"The 50th and 14th Divisions are not comparable to the 22nd and 38th Divisions (trained by Stilwell at Ramghar). The latter 2 divisions have proven themselves in combat and are American trained, equipped and fed.

"As indicated in previous messages to you and Mountbatten, I have considered all of the implications of removing the 22nd and 38th Divisions and I concluded that these 2 divisions would be necessary in China. I discussed this matter with the Generalissimo last night. He agreed to accept the 14th, which is readily available for movement, to be followed by either the 22nd or 38th, but he indicated that he may move additional Chinese Divisions from Burma.

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
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"I am sending a small group of American officers to Sultan immediately to work out movement plans. What I actually need, as you can discern from the above, is men with fighting spirit and determination.

"I appreciate the support of US Chiefs of Staff in the premises, and will do utmost to surmount difficulties in consonance with my directive and their desires. The attitude of the Americans in this crisis is superb. McClure, Chennault, Cheves, Dorn, and my Staff--in fact, all of the officers and enlisted men--are working strenuously to preclude disaster.

"Following soon will be radio describing in detail the plan for the defense of the Kunming area. The situation is developing so rapidly that events may overtake us. We are prepared, of course, to change the plan accordingly."



Chief of Staff

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
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Chief of Staff

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A16/china
—

W. Rigdon

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

OCTOBER 28, 1944

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General Stilwell has been relieved as Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, as Deputy to Admiral Mountbatten, Commander of the South East Asia Command, and as U. S. Commander of the China-Burma-India Theater and has been recalled to Washington. The former China-Burma-India Theater will be divided into two theaters under separate commanders. The U. S. Forces in the China Theater will be commanded by Major General A. C. Wedemeyer, who has been appointed concurrently by the Generalissimo, Chief of Staff of the China Theater. General Wedemeyer is now Deputy Chief of Staff to Admiral Mountbatten. The United States Forces in the India-Burma Theater will be commanded by Lieutenant General Daniel I. Sultan, now Deputy Commander of the China-Burma-India Theater.

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Alb/China

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WFS

October 9, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Dear Mr. President:

Dr. H.H. K'ung came to see me yesterday. He told me that he planned to go to New York the end of the coming week for an operation, after which time he planned to go to China.

I told Dr. K'ung that our government took a serious view of any hesitation which the Generalissimo might have in replying in the affirmative to your proposal.

K'ung told me he was going to cable the Generalissimo at once to urge him to make an affirmative reply to you.

H.L.H.

via wire

A16/China

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 8, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Dear Mr. President:

Here is a copy of a memorandum I got from Davies. You may recall that you saw Davies and Stilwell in Cairo.

Harry
H.L.H.

encl.

He is the State Dept man with Stilwell.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

file

Source:
Could you have

The Need for Flexibility
in American Policy toward
China.

The threat of a coup d'etat in China appears to have subsided for the time being. However, wide-spread dissatisfaction throughout China with Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang regime will probably again precipitate before long sectional maneuvers to break away from or overthrow the Chungking Government.

We have made and are continuing to make the mistake of personalizing our support of China. We think and speak of the Big Four in terms of four personalities — Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill, and Chiang. This is dangerous and misleading in the case of China. Our thinking is now so in error that if Chiang is abandoned or overthrown by dissident factions we shall imagine that China has disintegrated and ceased to be one of the Big Four.

We must recognize that the isolation or overthrow of Chiang does not necessarily mean the collapse of China. A coalition which may overshadow or overthrow Chiang may well (1) play a more active and cooperative role in the war against Japan and (2) serve to unify and strengthen China to a degree which Chiang has not recently been able to do.

If we assume a position of inflexible support of Chiang we may find ourselves discredited and our ends defeated through the repudiation and overthrow of the Chungking regime by a coalition commanding overwhelmingly public support. Our strategic objective of a strong, independent, and democratic China is best served by mobile tactics — readiness to support any cohesive coalition which has a broader popular base than the Chungking Government and gives promise of positive cooperation in the war against Japan.

(s) John Davies

Washington,
August 30, 1944.

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Grace :-

Could you have
the President read this
on the way to Inbee
Hay

File
W



Alb/China

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 28, 1944

File
MS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Dissident Movement in Southwest China.

We have received a number of despatches and telegrams from Ambassador Gauss at Chungking in regard to dissident political developments in southwest China in opposition to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the National (Kuomintang) Government. Although the Ambassador feels that the situation is serious, he does not foresee that the movement will spread or result in civil war.

Whereas this dissident movement does not have sufficient strength of cohesion to constitute organized opposition to the National Government, it is symptomatic of a general feeling of dissatisfaction throughout the country with the undemocratic, selfish and unconstructive policies of the leaders of the Kuomintang. If the movement could bring home to Chiang Kai-shek the necessity for broadening the base of his present government to include influential non-Kuomintang elements it would serve a useful purpose. It is not believed that a reform of the present government would bring about any radical change in the situation in China but in all probability it would strengthen popular resistance against the Japanese and create a situation in Chungking more agreeable to us now and more promising for our future relations with China.

Should the movement crystallize it is possible that there might be disturbances in Yunnan Province where our Fourteenth Air Force is based and where most of the material assistance to that force and to the Chinese is landed by plane. However, Ambassador Gauss believes that the troops of the Generalissimo could successfully suppress any insubordinate uprising in that province. It is our belief that the necessity for such action would not arise because the governor of the province of Yunnan is unlikely to make any move which would bring him or his troops into open conflict with the Generalissimo.



A16/China

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

My [unclear] file

August 18, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

F. Co. WS.
81

GENERAL MARSHALL:

TO READ AND PREPARE REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F.D.R.

MINISTRY OF FINANCE
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA

New York, N.Y.
August 15, 1944.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. President:

In President Chiang's telegram to you dated August 12 he made reference to his Memorandum of July 23. It was his desire that I shall hand it to you in person and since you have been away, I am holding it for you.

However, in order to enable you to have a clearer idea of President Chiang's views in his telegram of August 12, which I had sent to you, I deem it advisable to enclose herewith his Memorandum. Since there are certain points in connection with his Memorandum which may require my personal explanation, and as you may have also other questions to discuss with me, I hope it would be possible for you to give me more time for our interview as soon as it is convenient to you.

With best regards,

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'H. H. Kung', written over a faint circular stamp or mark.

MEMORANDUM

I.

China's forces, directly under the Generalissimo. In regard to the actual implementation of such proposal, however, The basis of Sino-American cooperation rests upon high moral principles, mutual confidence, and unity of purpose. In the seven years of China's war of resistance, President Roosevelt has, from the very beginning, made the most earnest effort to assist her. As an industrially undeveloped and militarily unprepared nation, China has been able to attain her present position principally through the United States' consistent policy of aid to China, and this can never be forgotten, but will be gratefully remembered, by the entire Chinese people.

The extent of close cooperation between China and the United States cannot, indeed, be compared or equaled by any other countries. Consequently China has always supported President Roosevelt's views and plans, whether in relation to China or to the world at large, and has not failed to accept any proposal which might advance the common purpose of China and the United States, and does not prejudice the fundamental national interests of China.

It was, therefore, without hesitation that the Generalissimo accepted, in principle, the proposal of the President to place General Stilwell in command of

China's forces, directly under the Generalissimo. In regard to the actual implementation of such proposal, however, the Generalissimo has found it necessary to give it the fullest consideration in the light of the realities of the situation so that the proposal may be carried out satisfactorily without the slightest hindrance. In other words, while it is realized that swiftness of action is desirable, the Generalissimo feels it incumbent on him as an ally to present fully and frankly the difficulties of the situation when he feels there is at stake the future of Sino-American cooperation and the common objective of the joint war efforts. This was the spirit and purpose underlying the previous telegram of the Generalissimo.

II.

Since the receipt of the President's second telegram the Generalissimo is able to appreciate all the more the President's concern over the military situation in China, and is particularly moved by the earnestness and sincerity with which the President has reiterated and explained his original proposal. The Generalissimo has given the matter the most careful and comprehensive consideration, which leads

him to the conclusion that certain factors are essential for the implementation of the proposal, namely: (1) Due regard should be given to the political circumstances obtaining in China; (2) The psychology of the Chinese army and people should be taken into account; (3) General Stilwell should be enabled, under the command of the Generalissimo, to direct military affairs in the most effective manner for the actual furtherance of the joint war effort.

In view of these practical considerations it is therefore felt that a preparatory period is required; for, otherwise, to put the proposal into effect hastily, without insuring proper understanding on the part of the Chinese army and people, may give rise in their minds to certain doubts and apprehensions and lead to unfavorable consequences, both politically and militarily.

III.

In the light of the considerations set forth above, the Generalissimo wishes to make the following observations:

- (1) In accordance with the expressed hope of the President, the Generalissimo will do his utmost to proceed with the necessary preparations in order to achieve complete cooperation in the shortest possible period.

- (2) The Chinese forces to be placed under the command of General Stilwell as referred to the President's first telegram should be understood to mean all forces under the control of the Chinese National Government serving at the front. The scope of such command and the arrangements connected therewith should be specifically stated. The question of inclusion of communist troops under such command should not be decided upon for the time being, until it is ascertained that they will henceforth submit faithfully to the administrative and military orders of the Central Government.
- (3) In order to enable General Stilwell to exercise effectively his duties under the Generalissimo, there should be clearly defined, prior to the assumption of duty by General Stilwell, the following matters, namely: (a) General Stilwell's functions and authority; (b) his title; and (c) the relation between the Generalissimo and General Stilwell. On these matters in particular, it is desired first to consult the views of the President so that appropriate arrangements may be formulated.
- (4) The distribution and disposal of all military supplies under the Lend-Lease arrangements should, in accordance with the spirit underlying the Lend-Lease Act, be placed entirely under the authority of The Chinese Government or its Commander-in-Chief. The Generalissimo, however, is prepared to delegate authority to certain officers of the United States army to supervise over the disposal of such supplies.

In addition to the four points stated above, The Generalissimo will take the necessary steps to bring about proper appreciation and understanding of the proposal by the entire Chinese army and people,

and at the same time secure the consent of the Supreme National Defense Council.

IV.

Finally, the Generalissimo wishes to express the hope that the President will send to China at an early date a personal representative in whom the President has full confidence, and with whom the Generalissimo can talk as if personally with the President. Such a representative should be in a position not only to discuss and decide all questions relative to the advancement of Sino-American cooperation and the co-ordination of the war effort in the China and the Pacific theatres, but, it is hoped, will also be able politically to understand the realities of the situation in China, so that cooperation between the two countries in both political and military spheres can be further strengthened.

July 23rd, 1944.

SECRET

A 16/China

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

July 17, 1944.

SECRET

16 July 1944

My dear General Shang:

Will you please convey to the Generalissimo my very deep appreciation of the efforts of the Chinese Government and people in the rapid completion of the new instrument let-down field at Luliang.

MEMORANDUM TO ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. LEAHY.

The fine spirit of cooperation of which this field is a symbol is an inspiration to us all. The improved efficiency of operations over "The Hump" which will be made possible through use of this fine new base, will be reflected in the greater victories over our common enemy.


signature, to General Shang Chen's letter forwarding to the President

Sincerely,

message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek upon completion of the

instrument let-down field at Luliang.

(s) Franklin D. Roosevelt



W. D. LEAHY,
General, U. S. Army,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

1 Incl:

Lt General Shang Chen,
Shang Chief of the Chinese Military Mission
to the United States,
Munitions Building,
Washington, D.C.

SECRET

ADDRESS REPLY TO
COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SECRET



THE WHITE HOUSE
HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

ATTENTION:

14 July 1944

*File
WA*

General Shang Chen
Chief of the Chinese Military Missions to the United States
MEMORANDUM TO ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. LEAHY.

SUBJECT: Message to Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek.

1. Attached is a proposed reply, for the President's appreciation of the efforts of the Chinese Government, signature, to General Shang Chen's letter forwarding to the President a message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek upon completion of the instrument let-down field at Luliang.

H. H. ARNOLD,
General, U. S. Army,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

1 Incl:
Ltr to General
Shang Chen.

SECRET

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

General Shang Chen
Chief of the Chinese Military Mission to the United States
Munitions Building
Washington, D. C.

My dear General Chen:

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SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 10, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY.

F.D.R.

*To Arnold to prepare
draft reply -*


CHINESE MILITARY MISSION
TO THE UNITED STATES
MUNITIONS BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D. C.

July 10, 1944

My dear Mr. President:

With reference to my letter dated July 1st, I have the honour to report to you that a cable, dated July 9th, has just been received from President Chiang Kai-shek. An English translation of the same is enclosed herewith for your information.

Yours respectfully,



SHANG CHEN
Chief of the Chinese Military Mission to the
United States of America.

enclosure.

The President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

SECRET

TRANSLATION OF PRESIDENT CHIANG'S CABLE DATED JULY 9, 1944.

GENERAL SHANG CHEN, CHIEF,
CHINESE MILITARY MISSION TO THE UNITED STATES.

THE AIRFIELD AT LULIANG WAS BUILT ACCORDING TO THE PLAN DRAWN UP BY THE AMERICAN CHIEF ENGINEER. THE ORIGINAL PLAN PROVIDES FOR THE ACCOMMODATION OF ONE HUNDRED TRANSPORTS, ONE SQUADRON OF PURSUIT PLANES AND ONE GROUP OF BOMBERS. THE RUNWAY HAS NOW BEEN COMPLETED AND IS AVAILABLE FOR USE. MOST OF THE OTHER IMPORTANT INSTALLATIONS HAVE ALSO BEEN COMPLETED. THOSE NOT YET COMPLETED WILL BE FINISHED BY THE END OF JULY. PLEASE CONVEY THE ABOVE TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK

TOP SECRET

June 18, 1944

My dear General:

I have had a most careful study made of the problem presented in your aide-memoire of May 31 on the situation in China.

While our information does not permit complete agreement with that contained in your aide-memoire, we do share with the Generalissimo considerable concern over the movements of the enemy in Central and Southeast China. Every practicable step should be taken to prevent the enemy from consolidating his position in this strategically important area. We have recognized from the beginning the importance of affording Chinese ground forces the maximum of air support. The principle of support by lines of communication from Assam to Kuming has always been fundamental with us.

Acting immediately in this emergency to furnish the Generalissimo's ground forces all possible air support, General Stilwell has taken the following specific action to increase the effectiveness of General Chennault's forces:

1500 tons from other activities in China have been diverted to the 14th Air Force.

General Stilwell requested the approval of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff to the diversion of the 10th Air Force Heavy Bombardment Group to transportation services, thus increasing operations supplies to the 14th Air Force by about 2000 additional tons. The U. S. Chiefs of Staff have approved this diversion as an emergency measure available by air to China.

Until Kytlykina is secure, however, and facilities established there, little additional increase in tonnage over the 8mp appears feasible. Once the Kytlykina area is available,

*original delivered
to Gen. Sheny Chew
office in Murrumbidgee
Bldg. June 26th
Rigney*

*Signed 6/26/44
& del. to Adm. Brown
for delivery
RM*

Regraded Unclassified

TOP SECRET

the wider and lower altitude channel into China with the greater flexibility resulting from these additional facilities, will materially increase our ability to fly supplies over the Hump into China. The need for these additional facilities makes it mandatory that we push the ground offensive in North Burma, both on the Mogaung and the Salween fronts even though we must use some of our air tonnage in the supply of the ground troops operating on these fronts.

During the monsoon, the total tonnage deliverable to China by air will still depend upon the number of instrument let-down fields, for bad weather landings, available in the Kunming area. There are now only two such fields suitably spaced, the one at Kunming and the other at Chengkung, and these are both being operated to capacity. The provision of any substantial tonnage beyond that resulting from the above measures will also require early completion of a third instrument let-down field in the Kunming area. I am therefore hopeful that your government will press the early completion of the field at Luliang. We shall then be able to make full utilization of our available transport aircraft and existing facilities in India, currently restricted by insufficient facilities in China.

Pending the buildup of total Hump lift, General Stilwell will continue to allocate such additional tonnage to the 14th Air Force as is not urgently required for operations on the Salween front and which he considers safe to withdraw from all other activity in China.

Any strengthening of the Chinese Air Force or the flying into China of large quantities of material such as the 2600 tons of rockets you request would necessarily be at the expense of building up the effectiveness of the 14th Air Force and our Chinese-American Wing. We shall continue the steady build up of the Chinese-American Composite Wing whose operations have been of increasing effectiveness. As for the rockets, we are considerably short in production. We have, however, made 500 rocket launchers and 50,000 rockets available for early shipment by air to China.

Due to the present restricted capacity of the United States air line into China and your need for the rockets, I wonder if it would be found practicable to devote

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

for the period of the emergency a major share of the tonnage of the China National Aviation Corporation to supplies for the 14th Air Force. This would certainly help.

The resources in the Chengtu area are needed in their entirety for proposed operations against Japan. Their diversion to the 14th Air Force would force an untimely delay of these pending operations.

I am encouraged by the progress of operations on all Burma fronts and am hopeful that the unrelinquished vigor of our joint operations there will permit us to further develop the lines of communication to China.

Sincerely,

/s/ Franklin D. Roosevelt

General Shang Chen
Chief of the Chinese Military Mission
to the United States of America
2311 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

TOP SECRET

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OK
to go
~~do not change date~~

To be shown to

Admiral Leahy and Colonel Park tomorrow
Tuesday.....

R.S.

*Please return to Ridgen for
filing.*

A 16 / China

Return to Adm Brown

F-30
WS

Most Secret

May 31, 1944.

AIDE-MEMOIRE TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

delivered by General Shang Chen 31 May

President Chiang Kai-Shek of the National Government of China has directed in his cablegram of May 29th, 1944 that the following information regarding present critical situation in China be transmitted to the President of the United States of America:

I. In Manchuria Japan originally had twenty divisions, five of which, i.e., 2D, 14D, 16D, 52D, and 54D, have already been transferred to the South Pacific prior to the signing of the Fishery Agreement with Soviet Russia, and three more divisions, i.e., 10D, 29D, and 53D, followed after the Agreement has been concluded. In addition, 27D, 71D, 9D, and 28D have been transferred to China; 11D, and 12D are also being transferred to the south. Now it has come to our knowledge that 28D is in the Honan battle-front and 9D in Hongkong. At present Japan's total strength in Manchuria is only six divisions.

II. Four hundred seventy-one (471) trainloads of enemy troops moved southward from Manchuria via the Tientsin-Pukow Railway during the period of March 1 and April 8, 1944, and again one hundred thirty-three (133) train-loads between April 9 and May 8. Enemy troops numbering sixty thousand (60,000) also reached Nanking between May 8 to 13. Ever since March 1 troops totalling approximately five hundred thousand (500,000) have been transported uninterruptedly by rail to the south on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway.

III. The enemy has already taken definite steps to reinforce his troops in the war areas of China with units of the Kwangtung Army and to launch a general offensive in all directions.

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TOP SECRET

ten thousand (10,000) tons.

(1) In North China, the enemy has succeeded in crossing the Yellow River on April 18 and is pushing south along the Peiping-Hankow Railway and also attacking on the west from the Lunghai Railway. His aim is to seize the entire line of the Peiping-Hankow Railway and to threat Sian, the seat of China's war of resistance in the North-west.

(2) In Wuhan of Central China, the enemy has concentrated 3D, 13D, 27D, 34D, 39D, 40D, 58D, 68D and 116D, as well as 17, 5, 7, and 12 Independent Brigades, totalling eleven (11) divisions; and beginning from May 25 has crossed the Sinchiang River and is attacking Changsha from four different columns. In Canton, the enemy has concentrated four (4) divisions, attempting to attack from both the North and the South with the ultimate aim to seize the Canton-Hankow Railway and to occupy the airfields in Kweilin and Hengyang.

(3) In Indo-China, the enemy is now concentrating his troops ready to attack Kunming.

(4) Part of the enemy troops moving south from the Tientsin-Pukow Railway is now concentrating in the central part of the Yangtze River thereby threatening Chungking.

IV. President Chiang believes that the most immediate and effective ways to remedy the present critical situation in China are:

(1) The 14th U.S. Army Air Force should be strengthened. With the exception of whatever small amount that is absolutely necessary, the air tonnage between India and Kunming should all be allocated for the shipment of gasoline and spare parts for the said Air Force. It is therefore urgently requested that the total tonnage for shipment of supplies to the 14th U.S. Army Air Force be increased to at least

THE WHITE HOUSE
ten thousand (10,000) tons.

(2) The enemy has already commenced attacking the Canton-Hankow Railway and intends to seize the entire railway line in a month's time. Unless the air force along the Canton-Hankow Railway be immediately strengthened, in case the enemy should succeed in seizing the railway line and realize his dream of conquest of the continent of East Asia, it would mean a delay of at least three more years in defeating Japan. Request is therefore made that the entire stock of gasoline, spare parts and aircrafts stored in Chengtu be immediately turned over to the 14th U.S. Army Air Force to be concentrated for operation along the Peiping-Hankow Railway.

(3) It is also requested that the Chinese Air Force be strengthened, if possible.

(4) The ground troops should also be strengthened. Request is made to have eight thousand (8,000) launcher rockets, each with one hundred (100) ammunition, delivered as soon as possible in order that the fire power of the Chinese troops in the various war areas may be effectively increased.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

To Admin
Brown

for
file.

[by E.C. Wood]

SECRET

ADDRESS REPLY TO
COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

ATTENTION:

A16/china

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON



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APR 22 1944

The President
The White House

Dear Mr. President:

In a letter dated 12 March 1944, Chennault informed me that the Chinese have refused to release the Lend-Lease aircraft allocated by the Munitions Assignments Board as replacements for the Chinese-American Composite Wing. Since Chennault states that the situation is critical, I am recommending to the Munitions Assignments Board that definite fighter and medium bomber aircraft replacements be set up for the Chinese-American Composite Wing out of Army Air Forces allocations, and that Lend-Lease allocations to the Chinese Air Force be reduced accordingly.

This view is taken due to the fact that the Chinese-American Composite Wing is fighting and their losses are actual while the Chinese Air Force is not sustaining combat losses at present.

In the above arrangement the total number of airplanes to go into the Chinese Theatre will not be reduced; however Chennault will have full authority to move them into the units which are doing the fighting.

Trusting this meets with your approval, I am,

Sincerely,

H. H. ARNOLD,
General, U. S. Army,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

SECRET

Ally/China

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ADMIRAL BROWN

TO FILE

THIS COMES FROM MAJOR GENERAL C. L.

CHENNAULT.

THE OBJECTIVE: To exploit to the fullest extent China's position on the flank of the Japanese Empire, by the use of air power.

II

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM: 1. Preparations to exploit China's possible facilities as an air base on the exposed Japanese flank are at present limited to the Twilight Project. This project calls for employment of VLR Bombardment, largely based in Szechuan Province in the interior of Free China, to strike at industrial centers in the Japanese Islands and elsewhere. European experience has demonstrated that considerable time is needed to achieve decisive results by this method.

2. From the standpoint of strategy for the year 1944, it is equally important to use China effectively as a base from which to strike at Japanese shipping and air power. These are the two weak points in the enemy's military system. Both are known to be under heavy strain already. Both are open to determined attack from existing air bases in Eastern Free China, in the Provinces of Kwangsi, Hunan, Kwangtung, Chekiang and Anhwei. Offensive air operations from these bases should increase to the breaking point the strain on enemy shipping and air power by inflicting severe losses additional to those incurred in other areas. Without enough shipping and air power to hold it together, the rambling structure of the new Japanese Empire in the South must collapse under slight frontal pressure.

3. Japanese shipping may be attacked from the East China air bases in the following areas:

a. Along the Yangtze River. The river is the sole supply line of the enemy positions in the Yangtze Valley, from

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COPY.

PLAN OF AIR OPERATIONS IN CHINA

July 1, 1944 -- December 31, 1944

I

THE OBJECTIVE: To exploit to the fullest extent China's position on the flank of the Japanese Empire, by the use of air power.

II

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a. Along the Yangtze River. The river is the sole supply line of the enemy positions in the Yangtze Valley, from

SECRET

SECRET

kiukiang up to Hankow and Ichang. Traffic on the river has already been experimentally interrupted by the Fourteenth Air Force.

b. Along the China coast and in the Straits of Formosa. The Japanese held ports in China and Indo-China are now used as entrepots and shipping repair centers. Supplies for enemy positions in Indo-China, Thailand, Burma, Malaya, the Netherlands Indies, and Borneo are carried by the sealans along the coast and through the Formosa Straits. Air attacks on shipping in this area, although delivered by an exceedingly small force, have already yielded remarkable results.

c. In the China Sea, from the China coast to the Northern tip of the Philippine Islands. The sealans through the Formosa Straits may be partly abandoned, but the bulk of Japan's shipping must travel continuously through the China Sea, carrying supplies to the outposts of the Empire in the South, and returning with essential raw materials. It is thus exposed to attack by heavy bombers adapted for sea search, such as are now used against submarines in the Atlantic.

4. Japan cannot minimize the danger from China by convoying shipping through the China Sea, or evade the danger by re-routing shipping around the Philippines. Resort to either of these expedients would, in itself, over-strain Japanese shipping resources, by automatically increasing the demand for shipping tonnage. The enemy's only alternative to exposing the bulk of his shipping to the danger from China, is virtual abandonment of the most valuable regions he now holds in Southeast Asia, as well as his vital positions in China proper from the Yangtze Valley southwards. This alternative is obviously unacceptable. The shipping must continue to be exposed. It is, therefore, believed that a suitably prepared and supported China air offensive can account for a minimum of 200,000 tons of Japanese shipping monthly.

5. The enemy must answer a China air offensive by throwing units into China for air defense. On the other hand, experience justifies the statement that in China, Japan cannot improvise a successful air defense. Thus far, the enemy has always encountered in China a force numerically inferior to his own, and composed, especially with respect to fighter aircraft, of types inferior to the best which can be produced. Yet owing to the disadvantage imposed by a highly specialized local tactical situation, the Japanese have constantly had to expend nine of their aircraft for each American aircraft destroyed. This 9-1 ratio of loss will actually be easier to maintain on a larger scale, when the force employed is more adequate to the job in hand. It is not difficult to foresee the effect on Japanese air power of losses in China in this ratio and on a much larger scale, in conjunction with losses elsewhere.

6. While the enemy's shipping and air power are the prime objectives, there are also many important ground targets within easy range of attack from the east China air bases. The most vital to the enemy are the great staging areas on Formosa, the vulnerability of which was demonstrated in the recent Shinhiku raid, and the military positions at Ichang, Hankow, Hong Kong and Canton. Use of the Formosan staging areas can be virtually interdicted by sustained air attack. The enemy will then be forced to adopt much more expensive methods of moving

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reinforcements southwards and reforming shattered units withdrawn from the front lines. Ichang and Hankow can be virtually cut off from supplies, by interruption of traffic on the Yangtze. These positions will then be open to an offensive by the Chinese ground forces.

7. The purpose of the Twilight Project is important, but quite different from achieving the results listed above. VLR Bombardment of the type planned for the Twilight Project is not well suited to strike at enemy shipping, or to force lavish expenditure of enemy air power, or even to strike with maximum effect at the particular ground targets named in para. 6. For these purposes, and to support the Chinese ground forces, the Twilight Project must be supplemented by employment of a balanced force of Fighters, Medium Bombers, and Heavy bombers based in East China. Owing to the vulnerability of all targets, and to the disadvantage imposed on the enemy by the local tactical situation, this force can be extremely small by ordinary standards. About 500 aircraft with regular monthly replacements, will be enough to attain the stated objectives. Compared to the anticipated returns, this investment may be described as trivial.

8. The objection, that the Japanese ground forces can capture and destroy the East China air bases, has always been made to previous proposals for a China air offensive of this type. This objection is founded, however, on experience in a period when the Chinese armies were entirely without air support. It also ignores the most striking fact of the war in China, that Japanese forces have never succeeded in penetrating Chinese territory to a distance of more than about 100 miles from a major supply line. This was so even when the Japanese enjoyed air supremacy in China. The situation has now been radically changed by the transfer of air superiority to the Chinese side. In the first place, as has been noted already, traffic on the major Japanese supply line within China, the Yangtze River, has actually been interdicted experimentally for a short period of time. Almost all Japanese supply lines within China are water borne, and can no longer be considered dependable. In the second place, the recent battle of Changteh, the first in which Chinese troops have had well organized air support, showed that with this assistance the Chinese armies are quite capable of resisting and throwing back a serious Japanese advance.

9. It is not denied that the Japanese might perhaps capture certain of the East China air bases if they organized a major offensive, employing large numbers of first class troops and an overwhelming strength in the air. But organizing such an offensive would be self-defeating. By concentrating their effort in China, the Japanese would inevitably risk rapid loss of their new empire in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific.

10. Difficulty of supply has hitherto been another main obstacle to launching a China air offensive. Improvement of the Assam-Yunnan air transport operation has already made it possible to bring needed tonnages of supplies into China. Transport within China, from Yunnan to the Eastern air bases, still presents something of a problem, but it is now being taken in hand. This problem will also be solved by well planned effort.

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11. The weather opens in east China in July, and continues good until the end of December. Therefore, the period from July 1, 1944 to December 31, 1944 is chosen as best suited to the most intensive operations. The intervening months must be employed, however, in preparing for the main offensive by gradually building up the force of the attack.

III

CONCLUSIONS: 1. The Twilight Project, largely based in the interior of Free China, and planned exclusively for long range bombardment of industrial centers in the Japanese Islands and elsewhere, will not exploit the most immediately important opportunity in the air in China.

2. Offensive air operations, carried on from advanced bases in East China, and primarily aimed at Japan's shipping and air power, are also feasible, and will not be attended by undue risk.

3. They are capable of increasing to the breaking point the present strains on Japan's air power and shipping resources.

4. They will thus contribute materially, and perhaps decisively, to future operations of the Southeast Asia and Southwest Pacific commands, since the military structure which these commands must assault is held together solely by air power and shipping.

5. Valuable economy in military effort will therefore, result, in view of the smallness of the force needed for the proposed air operations.

IV

RECOMMENDATIONS: 1. That this plan for a China air offensive against Japan's shipping and air power, to be undertaken in conjunction with the Twilight Project, be approved and incorporated in the general strategic plan for the assault on Japan during 1944.

2. That the Fourteenth Air Force be augmented by July 1, 1944, to provide forces for this special purpose, as follows:

Six (6) Groups, Fighter
Two (2) Groups, Bombardment (H)
One (1) Group, Bombardment (H) for sea search
Three (3) Squadrons, Troop Carrier
Two (2) Squadrons, Photo Reconnaissance.

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3. That the necessary priorities for air transport tonnage be allocated, and that the program for expanding transport capacity from Yunnan to East China be pushed forward with all speed.

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INCLOSURE I

DETAILED OPERATIONAL PLAN

1. For the purpose of air operations, South and East Free China are divided into Eastern and Western Areas, on the line of the 107th Degree of Longitude. The division is dictated by differences in available targets and prevailing weather conditions.

2. In the Eastern Area, weather conditions are favorable from July through December, and unfavorable during the rest of the year, except that the coastal weather permits sea search to be maintained continuously. In the Western Area, weather conditions are favorable from November through April, and unfavorable during the rest of the year.

3. From existing air bases in the Eastern Area, Medium Bombers and Fighters can strike at Japanese positions in the Yangtze Valley from Ichang down to Shanghai; at ports held by the Japanese along the China coast as far South as Kwangchow; at targets in the Island of Formosa, and at shipping in China's inland waters, in the Straits of Formosa, and up and down the coast. From the same air bases, Heavy Bombers of the B-24 type which has been especially adapted to sea search can cover the whole width of the China Sea as far as the Northern tip of the Philippines.

4. From the Western Area's airbases, targets in North Burma, Indo-China as far South as Cam-Ranh Bay, and Hainan Island are vulnerable.

5. For obvious reasons, offensive operations will be conducted almost entirely from the air bases in the Eastern Area. In the Western Area, only such forces will be retained as are necessary for defence of the air bases and the air transport line, and for occasional attacks on the named targets when weather permits.

6. The Troops available will be as follows:

Six (6) Groups, Fighter, including 51st Fighter Group of four (4) Squadrons and Fighters of Chinese American Composite Wing, equivalent to four (4) American Squadrons, or a total of Twenty (20) Squadrons, Fighter.
Two (2) Groups, Bombardment (M), or six (6) Squadrons Bombardment (M)
One (1) Group, Bombardment (H), or four (4) Squadrons Bombardment (H)
Three (3) Squadrons, Troops Carrier.
Two (2) Squadrons, Photo Reconnaissance.

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7. The disposition of Forces will be as follows:-

EASTERN AREA

WESTERN AREA

Sixteen (16) Squadrons Fighters	Four (4) Squadrons, Fighter
Five (5) Squadrons, Bombardment (M)	One (1) Squadron, Bombardment (M)
Four (4) Squadrons, Bombardment (H)	Three (3) Squadrons, Troop Carrier
One (1) Squadron and One (1) Flight of Photo Reconnaissance	One (1) Flight, Photo-Reconnaissance

8. The fighters will have three principal missions in the Eastern area:

- a. To protect our air bases
- b. To escort the Medium Bombers to the targets listed in para. 3 above, and to attack suitable targets themselves by ground strafing.
- c. To supplement the Medium Bombers in the task of cutting enemy supply lines along the inland waterways, by strafing smaller craft.

A particularly heavy Fighter strength is required, because of the importance of maintaining full air superiority throughout the period of offensive operations, and because additional Fighters are needed for Mission C.

9. The Medium Bombers will have three principal missions in the Eastern Area:

- a. To attack ground targets within China when desirable.
- b. To destroy shipping on the Chinese inland waterways, in the Straits of Formosa and along the coast.
- c. To interdict the use of Formosa as a staging area.

10. The Heavy Bombers adapted for sea search will have one mission in the Eastern Area:

To cover a broad band of the China Sea, from the coast to the Northern tip of the Philippines, attacking shipping in transit to and from the outposts of the Japanese Empire in the South. Two (2) Squadrons will be based at Suichwan and two (2) Squadrons will be based at Kweilin. Operating from these bases, turning North and South respectively after making landfall at the Philippines, they can include in the sea search an area larger than a merchant vessel can traverse in a night, thus insuring maximum sinkages.

11. The detailed pattern of operations will be governed by the Japanese reaction. Insofar as this can be predicted, it is believed that

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operations will fall into two rather well-marked phases. It is expected that the enemy reaction will take the form of repeated attempts to contest control of the air in China, which will gradually diminish in power as the toll taken of Japanese aircraft gradually mounts. Thus, in the first phase of operations, Fighters and Medium Bombers will be primarily engaged in seeking out and destroying Japanese aircraft and air installations. In view of the favorable prevailing ratio of air losses, it should be possible to win the battle for air supremacy in two to three months. Thereafter, in the second phase, attacks may be concentrated on enemy ground targets. In both phases, however, shipping will be strongly attacked, and the Heavy Bombers specially adapted for sea search will be used for this purpose throughout.

12. While the objectives of these operations will be different from those of the Twilight Project, the two forms of attack will be closely interdependent. They should be regarded, so to speak, as a boxer's right and left. Each will complement the other. Each will increase the effect of the other. If operations are wisely planned, each blow from one will prepare for the next blow from the other. The best results cannot be attained from either form of attack without day to day coordination and central planning.

13. During the months until July 1, 1944, it will also be desirable to prepare for the main offensive operations in East China by intensifying the attack on enemy shipping, insofar as supply situation permits.

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INCLOSURE II

DETAILED LOGISTICAL PLAN

1. Ample time is allowed to bring into China all additional units needed to constitute a force of the desired strength. All units should be present and ready for action by the end of June, however, so that prompt assignment and despatch from the United States is essential.

2. Units now present in China, or obligated to enter China during the months immediately ahead, are as follows:

23rd Fighter Group, three (3) Squadrons
51st Fighter Group, Four (4) Squadrons
Fighters of Chinese American Composite Wing, equivalent to four (4) American Fighter Squadrons.

34th Bombardment Group (M), three (3) Squadrons
Medium Bombers of Chinese-American Composite Wing, equivalent to three (3) American Medium Bomb Squadrons.

308th Bombardment Group (H), four (4) Squadrons

Eight (8) Troop Carriers, on detached service from the 10th Air Force and Air Transport Command.

21st Photo Reconnaissance Squadron.

3. Additional units needed to constitute a force of the desired strength are as follows:

Three (3) Groups, Fighter, nine (9) Squadrons

Additional Troop Carriers to constitute three (3) Squadrons, Troop Carrier.

One (1) Squadron, Photo Reconnaissance.

4. Besides bringing in these additional units, it will be necessary to re-equip the 308th Bombardment Group (H) with the type of B-24 which has been adapted for sea search. It will also be necessary to equip the Fighter Groups with first class types, preferably P-51B's, in order to meet the Japanese Tojo Fighter on equal terms. Owing to short range and high fuel consumption, the P-47 fighter is not suitable to service in China, but if sufficient P-51B's cannot be scheduled for all Fighter Squadrons, a mixed force of P-51B's, P-38's and P-40's will do the job.

5. Regular monthly replacements, at the rate of 20 per cent of Fighter strength and 15 percent of Bomber strength, must be scheduled.

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6. Estimated monthly expenditures of supplies by the above listed units, in the Eastern and Western Areas and in total, are shown in the following table.

<u>MONTHS</u>	<u>EASTERN AREA</u>	<u>WESTERN AREA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
July	10,000 tons*	2200 tons	12,200 tons
August	10,000 tons	2200 tons	12,200 tons
September	11,000 tons	2200 tons	13,200 tons
October	11,000 tons	2200 tons	13,200 tons
November	11,000 tons	2200 tons **	13,200 tons
December	11,000 tons	2200 tons	13,200 tons

*NOTE: During July and August, supply expenditure in the Eastern Area will be slightly below the maximum, since the East China weather in these months, while favorable, is not quite so good as in the months from September through December.

**NOTE: No increase of supply expenditure in the Western Area is anticipated during November and December, although the weather there then improves, because it is assumed that by then the targets available from this area will have been considerably reduced.

7. The tonnages listed in the "Total" column in the foregoing table may be taken as the tonnages which must be transported by air into China by the Assam-Yunnan air transport line to support the proposed operations. The Twilight Project will, of course, be self-supporting.

8. The tonnages listed in the "Eastern Area" column in the foregoing table may be taken as the tonnages which must be carried from Yunnan to East China to support the proposed operations. A goal of 10,000 tons of monthly capacity by July 1, 1944, has been set for the program to improve transport facilities between Yunnan and East China. Special priorities of air transport tonnage, to bring in from 1500 to 2000 tons of personnel and materiel for this program, must be established for March, April, May and June, 1944. In addition, air transport space must be allocated to bring in lubricants, spare parts, etc., with which to maintain the transport operation. The total needed will be approximately 400 tons a month from July onwards, rising to that maximum by increments March onwards.

9. It is believed that the goal of 10,000 tons of monthly transport capacity between Yunnan and East China can be reached by July 1, 1944. If determined effort is made. A broad margin of safety is provided, however, by the three Troop Carrier Squadrons. These can carry at least 2000 tons a month from Yunnan to the new air base at Kiuchow, the East China railhead, thus eliminating the existing bottleneck on the Kutsing-Tuhshan Highway.

10. The program for expanding transport capacity includes improvement of transport facilities from the rail terminals in East China to the various air bases.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C.

29 January 1944

File
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Fighting potential of Chinese Ground Forces.

General Stilwell for some weeks has been in personal command of the Chinese Army Corps on the Ledo Road which he trained at Ramgarh. Incidentally, though Deputy Commander for Mountbatten's forces he has accepted for the time being, on his own motion, subordination to the British ground commander, General Slim, in order that he, Stilwell, might continue to give personal leadership to the Chinese troops in their first heavy test in offensive battle.

January 17th I sent him the following message:

"In your message of January 2 you gave heartening report on the Chinese 38th Division operations against the Japs in late December. In another message on the same date you again refer to excellent combat ability of Ledo Chinese forces. As a result of your intimate knowledge of the situation and present personal experience with these Chinese troops please give us the salient features of the combat history of Ledo operations together with your considered opinion of the combat value of these Chinese troops."

This morning the following radio from Stilwell of January 28th reaches me:

"Since December 23rd in 3 serious actions lasting 2 days each and in some 20 smaller actions Chinese have been uniformly successful except in 3 small attacks in which we bumped our noses. Opposition is 18th Japanese Division, and they are tough. Only 2 prisoners so far. They have been well dug in, with heavy allotment of machine guns, and fight to the last. Terrain is dense jungle.

"We have used 2 regiments of 38 Division and 1 of 22 Division. All performed very well indeed. At first, there was much waste of ammunition. This has been corrected. The men are keen and fearless. Command officers lead when in and they attack with dash. Numerous instances of men who deserve DSC. They now know they can lick the Japs and have their tails up.

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A16/China

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29 January 1944

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*copy for
White House*

VIP | [unclear]

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"Two batteries of 75s have been in action. Performance excellent. Japs have been using about same amount of artillery. Three battalions of the Jap 55th Regiment have been well chewed up. Known Jap casualties include 1 Regimental Commander and 3 Battalion Commanders besides numerous company officers.

"In last action by 65th Regiment of 22nd Division our liaison officers report 250 dead Japs. The principal weaknesses are patrolling and the High Command. My opinion of the Chinese soldiers is what it has always been. With good training, equipment, and leadership, he is as good as anybody. We hope to prove so, fully realizing that this is only a small show as yet.

"The foregoing is heartily concurred in by all liaison officers with whom I have talked."

(Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL

Chief of Staff.

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Cairo, Egypt.
20 November 1943.

Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

I have inspected the Chinese Theatre of Operations. I spent considerable time with the American Generals, Lieutenant General Stilwell, Major General Chennault, and other Chinese and American Army Officers. I was accompanied into the Chinese Theatre by Major General Stratemeyer who is Commander of the American Air Operations in the India and China Theatres. I had two conferences with the President of China, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The Generalissimo expressed his complete confidence in you, in your motives, and in the principles that you have promulgated.

The Generalissimo talked very frankly about the coming conference in Cairo. He questioned whether or not he could meet Marshal Stalin at Teheran on the terms of amity becoming such a meeting. He related to me frankly the causes that impelled him to hesitate to have a personal meeting with Marshal Stalin. He related to me his suspicions concerning Russia's desires to communise China and perhaps for a complete conquest and annexation to Russia of a portion of China.

I recalled to him Marshal Stalin's renunciation of world conquest as a fundamental policy of communism. I told him that in my opinion Marshal

Stalin is now committed to the proposition that communism can succeed in Russia alone without an attempt being made to force it on the rest of the world. I said also that in my opinion Russia is no longer subsidizing or directing communist activities in other nations. I suggested to the Generalissimo that Russia's own experience with communism in Russia is to some extent neutralizing what we considered to be the harsher elements of the communistic ideology. I said that I realized that there are communist political parties in other nations but in my opinion such parties are neither directed nor subsidized from Russia.

In corroboration of these arguments I drew the Generalissimo's attention to the recent Moscow declaration. Notwithstanding this, the Generalissimo still appeared to entertain grave doubts of the friendly intentions of the Soviet Government toward China.

The Generalissimo stated that he wished to see you first in Cairo and much depended on his conference with you as to whether or not he would subsequently confer with Marshal Stalin.

I hope I may have the opportunity of discussing with you the Chinese-Russian problem before you have a conference with the Generalissimo.

The Generalissimo stated that so far as you and Prime Minister Churchill are concerned he has no doubt of being able to find a basis of complete cooperation.

As President of China and as Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek will recommend that the coming conference reiterate the Atlantic Charter. If possible he would like to have your Four Freedoms specifically included in the declaration of the Cairo or Teheran conference.

After conferences with the Generalissimo which covered approximately six hours, I have drawn the following conclusions:

(1) The Generalissimo and the Chinese people favor the principles of democracy and liberty.

(2) The Generalissimo and the Chinese people are opposed to the principles of imperialism and communism.

(3) He believes that you, of course, favor democracy and liberty. He understands, however, that you may temporarily have to temporize with imperialism and communism in the interests of the joint war effort.

(4) He is sure that the future co-operation and unity of the United Nations must depend upon your ability to assimilate rather than eliminate divergent ideologies. He is convinced that you must find principles on which the Big Four nations can agree. In seeking these principles he feels that you must have extensive freedom of action.

(5) He wanted me to say to you that he has implicit confidence in your motives and that he is committed to the fundamental principles which you have promulgated.

(6) He will, therefore, follow your leadership on the diplomatic and political questions that will be considered in the impending conference.

On strategy he finds himself unable to accept a subordinate position in the Asiatic area to Lord Mountbatten. He stated that so far as the Chinese Theatre of Operations is concerned he must be supreme. He stated that if he should accept a secondary position in that theatre it would divide his following and eventually so weaken his position that he could no longer maintain himself as the leader of all China. Notwithstanding this attitude he is ready to cooperate fully with Lord Mountbatten and he thinks that in Northern Burma and eventually in Thailand and possibly in Indo-China, there would be circumstances in which he would favor the control of British, American and Chinese troops being placed under one commander. He said that he personally liked

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Lord Mountbatten and that he could visualize future operations outside of China where he would want his Lordship to be the Supreme Commander of United Nations forces, including Chinese armies. However, he was steadfast in maintenance of the principle that in the Chinese Theatre it is better for himself and China and the United Nations that he should remain the ultimate authority.

He expressed the opinion that the subjugation of Japan should be sought through an attack on Japan in Japan. Attacks should be made from various sectors of the Pacific Theatre, the India-Burmae and the Chinese Theatres simultaneously. These attacks should be co-ordinated and directed toward the ultimate occupation and conquest of Japan in Japan. Tokyo and all Japan is the objective rather than any state, island or citadel outside of Japan. He also spoke with clarity of the strategy of attacking Formosa and all Japan through China.

In all of the foregoing it will be apparent to you that I have confined myself to a discussion of the attitude of President-Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek toward a meeting with Marshal Stalin. I have purposely refrained from injecting into this letter any of the reasons why Marshal Stalin might not want a public meeting with Chiang Kai-shek at this moment. For instance, Marshal Stalin might be opposed to taking any action that might cause the closing of the Port of Vladivostok. Moreover, you may find that Marshal Stalin might be convinced that it would be unwise to take any action that might bring an enemy down on his rear in the present posture of the conflict.

In evaluating the Generalissimo's conversations it is advisable to consider with some skepticism the Chinese capacity, or readiness, to contribute materially to offensive warfare. It is advisable likewise to give consideration to the relative importance placed by the Chinese Central Government upon conserving its strength for maintenance of its postwar internal supremacy as

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against the more immediate objective of defeating Japan. These are questions I should like to discuss with you further.

Respectfully yours,

PATRICK J. HURLEY,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C.


November 8, 1943

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following message has just been received from General Stilwell:

"I assume Somervell gave you full story of happenings here. Relations with Chiang Kai-shek now excellent, better than at any time previously. Obstructions being cleared away and on surface at least War Ministry getting in line. Prospects much improved. Kweilin school off to good start on November 1 as scheduled. Unit schools reaching Divisions of Y force. This will be pushed by order of Chiang Kai-shek. Matter of replacements and improved rations now receiving full attention. Chen Cheng still sick with serious stomach trouble and will probably have to be replaced. This is bad. In India everything going smoothly. Road construction much more promising. Hope to get motorable track to Shinbuiyang by January 1. Ferry line operating day and night. Doing our best to cover transports in flight. Relations with Mountbatten and Staff excellent. He is reasonable and open minded, but there is obvious tendency on part of British to muscle in on us in China, and in general to submerge and absorb all American effort and participation in this area. We are cooperating to fullest extent consistent with protection of American interests."



Chief of Staff

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A16/china

November 6, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There are attached the text of a message, dated November 3, 1943, addressed to you by President Chiang Kai-shek of the Republic of China upon the occasion of signature of the Joint Four-Nation Declaration, and a suggested reply which you may care to make to his message.

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, Jr.

Enclosures:

1. From President Chiang, (This never received by us for file Rg
November 3.
2. To President Chiang.

See File
A16/4 Power Agreement

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

Memo. for the President;

The attached files
concerned were the of
interest to you.

GCW

Nov. 1-43

COPY

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*Admiral Brown
to file
F. J. W.*

EYES ONLY

24 October 1943

General George C. Marshall
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
War Department, Washington, D.C.

Dear General:

I have sent you official reports on our visit to Chungking. I know, however, that you will be interested in some personal sidelights on the situation.

I was quite unprepared for T.V. Soong's flat statement in Delhi that the Generalissimo would have no more of Stilwell and that he would demand his release. Mountbatten, who had just finished establishing the most friendly relationship with Stilwell was likewise disturbed over the proposal of making a change. His views were colored not only by the possible effect which the substitution of a new commander might have on the campaign, but also by his apprehension that newspaper and other publicity in the United States would be highly unfavorable to him as a result of the change. He felt that the same group that claimed that he was attempting to supplant MacArthur would claim that no sooner had he arrived than he had successfully ousted the one possible contestant for fame and glory in South East Asia. He was of the opinion, however, that if the change would have to take place that it should take place at once instead of in the middle of the campaign. It was at this point that I sent you the warning. I had my choice of two evils -- either to send this over Stilwell's wire, or else to Ismay. As T.V. Soong had acquainted Mountbatten with the entire situation it seemed best to follow the course which I pursued.

We arrived in China in the middle of the afternoon and the Generalissimo saw me the next morning. T.V. arranged to have himself used as the interpreter during the meeting. It was plain that Madame was greatly distressed over the whole proceedings. After some consideration I thought that the only decent thing to do was to take Stilwell into the situation. I did so, telling him that I expected to ask the Generalissimo to reconsider the matter the following day and asked Stilwell for any other arguments with which I might arm myself. I then went back to General Ho Yeng Chin's house where I was staying. General Shang Chen who had been present at the interview with the Generalissimo had already reported the situation to General Ho, who said point-blank that he thought that the Generalissimo's action was very bad and that he would see him and attempt to change his position. I asked him at the same time to arrange for my next meeting with the Generalissimo. He asked me if I had talked to T.V. on the subject any further. I told him I had not. Apparently he then talked to T.V. and the Generalissimo. T.V. again arranged to be present and to act as interpreter. Although I could see that I had shaken the Generalissimo during my interview, when it was over he was still maintaining the position which he had

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taken the day before. In the meantime, Mountbatten had arrived and I had to rush from the meeting with the Generalissimo to lunch and conferences which lasted for the better part of the afternoon. As soon as this was over I again got in touch with Ho and Shang. As a result Ho said that he would again go back to the Generalissimo. In the meantime Madame had sent for Stilwell and arranged for the Generalissimo to see him. Ho left the big party which he was giving for Mountbatten and went to the Generalissimo. He came back with the statement that the Generalissimo would reverse his position at another interview which he would grant me the following day; that only the Generalissimo, Madame, Ho and I would be present. I then saw Stilwell who stated that he had gone to see the Generalissimo; that the Generalissimo had asked if he had not lived up in spirit and letter to all of his commitments. Stilwell stated that he had. The Generalissimo then asked if he had any complaint with regard to his attitude. Stilwell told him no; that he had probably made a great many mistakes, and that if he had, they were not intentional and were a result of Stilwell's not having fully understood Chinese psychology. After some more discussion they apparently fell on each other's necks and it was love and kisses all around.

At the meeting the next day the Generalissimo stated that Stilwell had fully satisfied him on his objections to Stilwell, which apparently consisted of alleged petty slights to the Chinese and arrogance on Stilwell's part. One of the chief complaints was that Stilwell had called the "Somervell of China" a bandit and a big crook. During this conference the Generalissimo made only three conditions: (1) that Stilwell should sign orders to the Chinese troops "by order of Admiral Mountbatten, J.W. Stilwell"; (2) that if Stilwell had a deputy with the Ledo force that he should be Chinese; (3) and that any American or British forces in China would come under the Generalissimo's command. The first two were entirely satisfactory to Stilwell, and the last, insofar as American troops are concerned, is an accomplished fact. I have advised Mountbatten on this point insofar as the British troops are concerned.

The Generalissimo made a big concession in placing General Chen Chen, who had heretofore not been under Stilwell, under his command for the coming campaign. This gives Stilwell direct command of both the Ledo and Yunnan forces in his own right.

The story on the boundaries of the South East Asia Command is almost the same. The formula which was finally adopted was not arrived at until our final informal chat with the Generalissimo and Madame after dinner on the last night of Mountbatten's stay. Mountbatten left the next morning and I went back to the fray, having four conferences with the Generalissimo during the day before the final solution was arrived at.

Although Chiang states that the Japanese propaganda is to the effect that the British intend to hold Thailand, it is quite obvious that the Chinese feel suspicious of the British intentions in this regard. It is for this reason, I am sure, that the paragraph on the political commission in

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Chungking was added to the notes. I can see no harm whatever in the commission and, if we are represented by a strong and able man, much good can come of it. As I stated in my wire, our Minister and Stilwell are of the belief that a joint British-American declaration of intention would serve to clear the air to a considerable extent.

It was reported that there was an unholy family row over Stilwell, and the Madame was overheard telling Soong that thenceforth he would be sick, to go home, and not to reappear during the conference. General Ho told me that the Generalissimo had made a very pointed reference to the fact that only he, Madame, and I would be present at the final conference.

The feeling of rather medieval court intrigue added very much to the unreality of the situation; this, coupled with the strange surroundings and difficulties with the language, made the whole affair highly exciting for me. I felt that I had lost two battles several times, and when I finally wound up with our point of view established, I almost had to pinch myself to believe that it was really true. To cap the climax our last discussion was a heated argument between Stilwell, Chennault, and Madame regarding a whore house — this floored me! It was all settled amicably and I hope for better relationships between Chennault and Stilwell. They really get along beautifully on all operational matters, and I believe these petty administrative affairs will be less troublesome in the future.

Mountbatten arrived with letters of credence and warm greetings from the King and the P.M. to the Generalissimo. He also was weighted down with gifts for Madame and some other influential ladies. I had no letters. I had no gifts. The lack of both was somewhat embarrassing. I tried to make up for the lack of letters by stating that the President and you had sent out a personal representative, as the matter was so important, rather than resorting to the common method of communication. This went over, but it was not too hot. I remedied the other situation by buying presents in Delhi for Mesdames Chiang, Kung, Ho, and Shen with some of the cash which you had given me. Madame said that she was candy-hungry, so I added a big five-pound box to the rest of the load. I hope you will approve — if not I shall pay for the presents with my own funds.

I was much disgusted with the news contained in a letter which I received from Styer in reference to the unfavorable publicity which was given to the rumor of your appointment as supreme commander. How such swine can exist is beyond me. I am, of course, distressed that my name was mixed up in it in any way, and that you had this stupid thing to contend with in addition to all of your other burdens.

We have gone at it hammer and tongs and as thoroughly as we could everywhere we have been. I believe we have done a good deal of good in ironing out administrative and supply difficulties, and in creating a better understanding of mutual problems in the field and in the U.S. I hope my dispatches and notes have been a help to you and that they have been

SECRET - 3 - SECURITY

Regraded Unclassified

~~SECRET~~ SECURITY

written in the way to throw the most light on the situation. I regret to say that some of them, including this letter have been entirely too long, but I was unable to give you the picture in fewer words.

I hope that you have been well and that Washington vexations have not been too much of a burden. We have all been in good health and, except for being rather tired a few times, have, in fact, been in top condition.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

(sgd) Brehon Somervell
Lieutenant General

- 4 -
~~SECRET~~ SECURITY

Regraded Unclassified

SECRET

China

6 SEP 1943

His Excellency Dr. T. V. Soong
Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs
2311 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

My dear Dr. Soong:

Your contemplated early departure for a trip to China offers the opportunity to provide the Generalissimo with information, which I am sure he is very anxious to receive, in regard to our objectives in the transportation of supplies by air from the Assam Area in India to China. In the temporary absence of General Arnold, I assure you he would be pleased if you would present to the Generalissimo the following statement of our objectives:

India-China Air Transport.

The objective is to transport supplies by air at the rate of 10,000 tons per month from the Assam Area in India to the Kunming Area in China. Of this tonnage, 7,000 tons monthly will consist of aviation supplies, under present plans. 4,700 of the interim objective of 7,000 tons were aviation supplies.

India-China Pipe Line.

This is a separate and distinct project which is not to interfere with the above, the objective being to provide the necessary means for transportation of pipe line materials and personnel to a number of locations between India and China so as to permit simultaneous construction at these several points.

Q.S.S. Project, J.C.S. 245.

The objective is to transport 150 tons of supplies per month from India for the Saco Project (Captain Miles, U.S.N.) in China.

COPY FOR THE PRESIDENT

SECRET

SECRET

Undoubtedly, during your trip to China you will observe the difficulties under which these operations are conducted. Particular factors effecting these operations are the extremely high terrain and adverse climatic conditions, over-taxed ground transportation facilities, incompletely developed communications, inadequate facilities and living conditions which affect the health of our personnel. In addition, the Curtiss C-46, which is being depended upon principally for the accomplishment of these objectives, has been developing many mechanical difficulties which normally could not have been anticipated, but which are seriously retarding progress. Of course, we are making an intensive effort to overcome the many difficulties being encountered; special equipment and expert technical personnel have been sent to India by air to assist in solving local maintenance and repair problems and every effort is being made to effect necessary technical changes in the C-46 in the factory production line.

We are applying all available resources and personnel and making an extreme effort to attain the tonnage rates which have been established for these "over the hump" operations. In addition, a very important consideration is the fact that the overburdened lines of communication from Indian ports to Assam constitute the limiting factor in the ultimate effort that can be put into the "over the hump" operations and the timing of any increases in the present outlay in Assam for this effort. These lines of communication are strained by current requirements for planned operations and the hump operations now in existence. Any increase in means for the hump effort will, therefore, seriously conflict with Allied operations planned in this Theater.

Your assistance in these matters is greatly appreciated, and the above information together with your observations enroute to China should promote a better understanding of our mutual problems.

Sincerely yours

Signed

Dispatched
6 SEP 1943
AAG

BARNEY M. GILES
Major General, U.S.A.
Chief of the Air Staff

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Regraded Unclassified

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES
DOCUMENT RECEIPT
(EXTERNAL)



*Admiral Brown
to file confidential*

ORIGINATING OFFICE Air AG	ADDRESSEE The President
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IDENTIFICATION OF DOCUMENT

TYPE cc ltr	DATE 6 Sep 43
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SHORT TITLE	BASIC DATED 6 Sep 43
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NUMBER AND TYPE OF ENCLOSURES OR ATTACHMENTS

1.
2.
3.
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PLEASE ACCOMPLISH AND RETURN IMMEDIATELY TO: *Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Office of Air Adjutant General, Central Mail Section, Washington, D. C.*

RECEIVING HEADQUARTERS	DATE RECEIVED
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SIGNED SIGNATURE

TYPED SIGNATURE	GRADE	ARM, SERV. OR ORG.
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FILE DATE AG 400 China (10)	COURIER NUMBER	REGISTERED NUMBER
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(See Instructions on Reverse Side)

3-5287, AF

10 Obsolete
Transport Planes.

SECRET

*Abnormal Brown
to file
R-103*

CARGO PLANES
China Air Freight Run

TYPE	PRESENT	TO BE ADDED DURING JUNE AND JULY	TOTALS
<u>4 engine</u>			
C-87	10	14	24
<u>2 engine</u>			
Commando C-46	41	52	93
Douglas DC3	<u>82</u>	---	82
CNAC DC3	20	8	28
TOTALS	153	74	227

China

SECRET

23 August 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff just learned through a telephone message from Mr. Hopkins to General Arnold that you have a luncheon engagement with Mr. T. V. Soong, the Chinese Foreign Minister, at 1300 today, and that you desire information pertaining to certain subjects which you contemplate discussing with the Minister.

a. OPERATIONS IN NORTH BURMA.

It is proposed that operations be conducted with a view to capturing Upper Burma in order to facilitate air transport and to establish overland communications with China.

b. ASSAM COMMUNICATIONS.

Present plans give first priority of resources available in the China-Burma-India theater to the building up and increasing of the air routes and air supplies to China, and the development of air facilities.

c. PIPELINE INDIA-CHINA.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved the construction of a 4-inch pipeline from Assam to Kunming and of a 6-inch pipeline from Calcutta to Assam. This pipeling will deliver approximately 18,000 tons of gasoline per month to Kunming. (See Tab A)

d. 14TH AIR FORCE.

Continuous studies are being conducted with a view to improving the operations of this force.

e. Air Transport Build-up.

Development of resources to facilitate the maintenance of increasing U. S. and Chinese military forces in China is being conducted. (See Tab B)

f. WINGATE OPERATIONS.

The utilization of long-range penetration groups introduced by Brigadier Wingate as an affective means of conducting operations against the Japanese is being carefully considered, particularly in connection with

the contributions such operations will make to those contemplated in North Burma and the amphibious operations to the south.

The U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the subject pertaining to the creation of a Southeast Asia theater not be discussed at this time due to the many complex problems associated with the command set-up. They feel that they should invite Dr. Soong to appear before them tomorrow morning (Tuesday), where he will be permitted to convey such information as he may desire. However, the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that the decisions reached at the conference should not be discussed with him at that meeting. They recognize that you and the Prime Minister will make appropriate decisions relative to the time and manner in which information pertaining to the firm decisions of the conference are conveyed to the Chinese Foreign Minister.

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief
of the Army and Navy.

S E C R E T

PIPELINE INTO CHINA

The United States is exploring the possibilities of constructing a pipeline from Calcutta to Dibrugarh and from Dibrugarh to Kuming. When completed, this pipeline will deliver approximately 18,000 tons of gasoline per month to Kuming.

The construction of the line from Dibrugarh to Kuming will entail the movement by air of 15,000 tons of pipe.

The extent to which the air movement of pipe will interfere with planned air supply to China is not yet definitely known. It is our thought, however, that the delivery of 18,000 tons of gasoline per month by pipeline would very quickly more than compensate for the air tonnage temporarily lost due to the movement of pipe.

It is estimated that once materials are available in India, 5 months will be required for construction of the line to Dibrugarh and 8 months from Dibrugarh to Kuming.

There is a possibility of constructing these two lines simultaneously; however, simultaneous construction would place an added burden on the Calcutta-Assam line of communications, which it may or may not be able to carry.

S E C R E T

SECRET SECURITY

STATUS OF INDIA-CHINA AIR TRANSPORT ROUTE

July 1943 Objective - 7,000 tons.

Performance - 3,300 tons. Causes of shortage:- Delays in production and modification of transport aircraft, scarcity of operational spare parts, failure to complete airdromes in Assam area, India, and floods in India and Kunming.

August 1943 Objective - 7,000 tons.

Performance - 31 July - 13 August - 1,979 tons.

Comments - Airdromes and transport aircraft nearing program levels, but all C-46 aircraft were grounded for several days due to serious failures in operations. Corrective action has been taken and most of C-46 were to be in operation again by 22 August. August performance expected to reach 7,000 tons or fall short by only small margin.

September 1943 Objective - 10,000 tons.

Estimated Performance - 10,000 tons.

Estimated Maximum Tonnages - 20,000 tons monthly Assam-Kunming.

Comments:-

1. Maximum tonnages Assam-Kunming could be reached by 1 April 1944 but could not be fully maintained during monsoon season May-October.
2. This summary does not include air transportation required for Calcutta-Kunming pipeline project nor the Calcutta-Assam-China operations with B-24's in large numbers.

SECRET

**WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON**

*Tonnage has
seen. File
W/L*

June 25, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Tonnage Moved into China from
India During June, 1943.

I regret very much that the tonnage of supplies moved into China from India has not been at a rate to bring the total during June to 4,000 tons. Unless the operating conditions change materially, the total tonnage during June will only be about 3,000 tons.

For your information, there are 145 planes from the Air Transport Command and 20 from CNAC available for this work.

H. H. Arnold
H. H. ARNOLD,
General, U. S. Army,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.



SECRET

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Noted H.H.A.

*Admiral Brown
to file*

**WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON**

June 11, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Aircraft for Chinese Air Force and China National Airways Corporation.

1. Five (5) C-47 aircraft will depart from the United States within ten days for delivery to the China National Airways Corporation in China.
2. One squadron of P-38's has already been ordered from Middle East to the Assam China area.
3. Twenty-five (25) P-40 aircraft are being transferred from the Middle East to India to a station suitable to General Chennault for assignment to the Chinese Air Force and will arrive in India prior to July 15th.
4. The above arrangements have been discussed with Dr. Soong and they are entirely satisfactory to him.

H. H. Arnold
H. H. ARNOLD,
General, U. S. Army,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.



SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*Admiral Brown
to file*

June 5, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE CHIEFS OF STAFF:

To read and return. I have
verbally answered the questions sub-
mitted on the second page.

F.D.R.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff
have read the attached papers.

W.L.F.

W. L. Freseman,
Commander, U. S. Navy.

SECRET

TRANSLATION OF TELEGRAM TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

FROM GENERALISSIMO CHIANG

Chungking, May 29, 1943

I am in receipt of your telegram of May 25 and wish to express my deep appreciation of the measures you have taken to strengthen the United States Air Force in China, and to increase the capacity of air transport to China.

In regard to ANAKIM I feel assured that you already possess a comprehensive and well-prepared plan of strategy, and that you are resolutely determined on pressing it forward to victory. I feel particularly grateful for the patience and courage with which you have resolved the many difficulties arising on all sides so that ANAKIM can go through. I venture to make a few supplementary observations which I have asked Dr. T. V. Soong to submit to you for your consideration.

(signed) CHIANG KAI-SHEK

SECRET

TRANSLATION OF TELEGRAM FROM THE GENERALISSIMO

TO THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Chungking, May 29, 1943

Please submit orally to the President the following points for his consideration:

(1) Has Great Britain committed herself to engage her navy in giving effective support for joint action in the Andaman Sea and is she determined to retake Rangoon?

(2) Is the United States providing the same naval strength for ANAKIM as that indicated by General Arnold in Chungking, and is Great Britain sending an equal or greater number of naval units? Now that the North African campaign has come to a successful conclusion, is it possible to increase the strength of the naval participation for ANAKIM in order to accelerate the capture of Rangoon?

(3) Is the U. S. Army participating in the campaign, and if so, how many divisions will be engaged?

(4) While I do not doubt that Great Britain will be able to fulfill her commitments in regard to the plan decided upon by the President with Mr. Churchill, it seems to me that it is necessary for the President to exercise his influence continually in order to prevent delay in the execution of the plan.

(5) To carry out ANAKIM it is absolutely essential to synchronize the movements of the army attacking in the north with amphibious operations against Southern Burma so that both could take place at the same time. Otherwise, if the two operations were not coordinated in their movements or either of them should take independent action, they would be exposed to being defeated in detail by the enemy. It is earnestly hoped that the President would pay special attention to this point in regard to what the British propose to do.

File

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 4, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
GENERAL McNARNEY:

For the information of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Please
return for my files.

F.D.R.

File

MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
REPUBLIC OF CHINA

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
Washington, D. C.
June 2, 1943

Dear Mr. President:

On receipt of your memorandum of May 21, 1943, I cabled the Generalissimo asking that all possible cargo space on the twenty or so CNAC planes on the India-China run be allocated to supplies for the air offensive.

The Generalissimo has just cabled me in reply that for the CNAC capacity for the next two months, 55% will be reserved for immediate aviation supplies (40% for the American air force, and 15% for the Chinese air force). The balance of 45% will be used for the carriage of banknotes, which is necessary to meet the acute inflationary situation in China, and such essential supplies for arsenal materials, etc., which are critically needed to make very large quantities of related materials. Even medicine is on the proscribed list.

Yours sincerely,



The President

The White House

China
Admiral Brown
to file

SECRET

May 25, 1943.

STATEMENT TO BE MADE TO THE CHINESE

Following is a suggested statement to be made to the Chinese authorities with regard to decisions reached at the Trident Conference, *limits, except those imposed by time and circumstances,* will be "It has been decided to pursue the operations in the ANAKIN theater which were discussed at the Calcutta Conference with certain modifications. The following are the proposals which will be made to the Generalissimo: -

First, the concentration of available resources as supreme priority within the Assam-Burma area on the building up and increasing of the Air route to China to a capacity of 10,000 tons monthly by early Fall, and the development of Air facilities in ASSAM with a view to:

- a. Intensifying Air operations against the Japanese in BURMA;
- b. Maintaining increased American Air forces in CHINA; and
- c. Maintaining the flow of airborne supplies to China.

Secondly, vigorous and aggressive land and Air operations will be begun at the end of 1943 monsoon from ASSAM into BURMA via LEKTO and IMPHAL in step with an advance by Chinese forces from YUNNAN, with the object of containing and engaging as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the Air route to China, and as an essential step towards the opening of the BURMA road.

Thirdly, amphibious operations against the Burmese coast with the purpose of interrupting Japanese communications between the coast and their northern front.

Fourthly, the interruption of Japanese sea communications into BURMA.

For the above purposes all possible measures will be taken to secure the Naval Command of the Bay of Bengal by an adequate

SECRET

STATEMENT TO BE MADE TO THE CHINESE (Cont'd)

force. No limits, except those imposed by time and circumstances, will be placed on the above operations, which have for their object the relief of the siege of China."

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Pres

*Admiral Brown
to file*

RCC

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Chungking

Dated May 15, 1943

Rec'd 2:39 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

US URGENT

717, May 15, 5 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

During a call on the Generalissimo this afternoon, General Chiang stated to Vincent and me, with the acting Foreign Minister interpreting, that if during the discussions in Washington between the President and Mr. Churchill there should arise any questions in regard to China or to the Pacific area necessitating consultation with Chinese representatives, it was his desire that both Madame Chiang and Dr. T.V. Soong act as such representatives. General Chiang asked that this be considered an official request by the Chinese Government.

ATCHESON

LMS


~~SECRET~~
WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

adm. B. to file
FJD
WS.

April 23, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached is a copy of a message just received from General Stilwell.



Chief of Staff.

Incl.

SECRET

THE CHIEF OF STAFF
JAMES DELANEY

China

COPY

From: New Delhi

April 23, 1943.

To: General Marshall

"In last conference with Chiang Kai-shek he told me to report to the President that morale in China was low, that the prestige of Nanking was rising and that of Chungking falling, that there was danger of Jap attack this summer up Yangtze towards Wanh sien; that he must have three more groups of pursuit to prevent this; that they must arrive before June or else China might crack. He would not listen to reason, logic or argument.

"He is also demanding American units for ANAKIM. He complains about the little help the United States is giving him. My impression is that it is partly acting, that he is also getting wind up. He has checked certain reports and found them true. After ignoring the matter for three months, he has finally agreed to designate the units of the second thirty divisions so that training can be started.

"Training centers at Kunming are in full swing. One hundred of Chen Cheng's officers, including three Army commanders, six Division commanders, several assistant Division commanders, have gone to Ramgarh for tactical training. Chen Cheng is playing ball. Obstruction has put us back six months but we are moving now and with luck will get into shape in time.

"I leave Delhi today, April 23rd, and Karachi tomorrow, April 24th.

Stilwell."

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Regraded Unclassified

China
Sam Brown
file

SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

File
MS

April 20, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: United States Air Assistance to China.

The status of our air program for China is set forth below for your information.

India-China Air Freight Route

The India-China Air Freight Line on April 13th was operating 141 transport airplanes. En route and being prepared are 57 transport airplanes (Commando). These planes have twice the tonnage capacity of the type now assigned, as well as a much better altitude performance. Upon arrival this type will replace the older transports now on the run which will be sent to North Africa where they are badly needed.

For the past three months the average monthly tonnage delivered to China was 2780 tons. However, deliveries the first two weeks of April have fallen considerably below this average. Heavy rains, serious icing conditions, as well as special food dropping missions to Chinese and Indian troops protecting the air route, were the factors causing this decrease.

Airdrome Sites

General Chennault has selected the necessary airdrome sites in China for our operations there. Dr. T. V. Soong states that work on these fields will be rushed to completion.

On the India side the British have completed less than 50% of the airfield construction necessary for full operation of our transport fleet at the beginning of the monsoon (May 15th). This situation has been brought to Marshal Wavell's attention, who stated he is doing the utmost within his means to accelerate this necessary construction.

Chennault's Air Force

Chennault has been directed to build up his Air strength by adding Chinese Air Force units which he will organize



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
and train. For this purpose 300 airplanes have been allotted to equip one Fighter and one Light Bombardment Group in 1943. These airplanes will be dispatched to China when Chennault states he can supply and operate them effectively. Recently 36 Chinese pilots were assigned to Chennault from the Chinese Air Force. Two of these pilots have already crashed in training flights, one fatally.

Tonnage for Chennault

General Stilwell has been directed to allocate tonnage to Chennault on basis of 1500 tons out of a total of 4000 tons transported.

Heavy Bomb Group

The U.S. Heavy Bomb Group assigned to Chennault is presently employed in flying from India the necessary supplies to bases in China. It is anticipated this group will be ready to perform its first mission against the Japanese the latter part of April. The original date was April 15th - but bad weather has delayed the supply flights and has caused the loss of two B-24's.


Chief of Staff.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

Alb/China

April 11, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following has come from the officer in charge of the air transport into China:

"The weather here has been awful. The icing level starts at 12,000 feet. Today a C-87 went to 29,500 on instruments, was unable to climb higher and could not get on top. It has rained seven and one-half inches in the past five days. All aircraft are grounded. As of March 24, we had carried 2,035 tons only into China. However a tremendous amount of food was dropped, British troops were carried into Fort Hertz and evacuees were brought out of Burma."

[Handwritten Signature]
Chief of Staff

Political Complications- The Tibetan Government has indicated that it will withhold the passage through its territory of non-military goods only to China. The Indian Government wishes no participation as a third party in any agreement on this subject between the Chinese Government and the Tibetan Government. The Chinese consider Tibet an integral part of China and will not consider entering into any agreement with the Tibetans, with the Indian Government acting as third party. (Tab A). The Tibetan Government has informed the Indian Government that it does not desire any alienable groups of Chinese wandering in its territory. (Tab B).

Emaciation- Japanese developments in Burma prohibit the use of the route through Southern Burma (Route B). The problem of subsistence on route A, coupled with the fact that porters be insured to high altitudes, and weather other than those adverse locally to operate routes... Consequently, an agreement with the Tibetan Government to transport

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WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

April 1, 1943.

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MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

Subject: Coolie Routes to China.

As a result of the President's request which you forwarded to me February 24th, an investigation has been made concerning a possible "Coolie Route" across Burma to China. The results of the study are set out below.

Essential Elements of Project. There are two possible routes marked A and B on attached map. Route A traverses Tibet and is 900 miles in length. It crosses one pass 16,000 feet high and requires an estimated 60 days for the trip. Route B crosses North Burma and is 507 miles in length. The highest pass along this route is 12,500 feet and the estimated trip is 35 days. Large areas on both routes are uninhabited, and porters must carry their own food as only a small group of porters on either route A or B could subsist on country. The estimated minimum food requirement per coolie per day is 2 pounds. The total weight of food per man required for a trip on either route would exceed the carrying capacity of a porter.


Political Considerations. The Tibetan Government has indicated that it will authorize the passage through its territory of non-military goods only to China. The Indian Government insists on participation as a third party in any agreement on this subject between the Chinese Government and the Tibetan Government. The Chinese consider Tibet an integral part of China and will not consider entering into any agreement with the Tibetans, with the Indian Government acting as third party. (Tab A). The Tibetan Government has informed the Indian Government that it does not desire any sizeable groups of Chinese wandering in its territory. (Tab B).

Conclusions. Japanese deployments in Burma prohibit the use of the route through Northern Burma (Route B) at this time. The problem of subsistence on route A, coupled with the requirement that porters be inured to high altitudes, prevents the use of porters other than those obtained locally to operate sections along the route. Consequently, an agreement with the Tibetans to transport



SECRET

materials through that country is necessary. Scarce population along this route would limit its capacity to a few tons. The crucial element in establishing coolie transport into China at present is the porter service across Tibet. The political complications in obtaining this service indicate that this matter requires the initiative of the Chinese Government. The United States could undertake to have supplies delivered to the India-Tibet border and to lend diplomatic assistance to the Chinese Government in making necessary arrangements.


Chief of Staff.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

March 25, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following rather encouraging message from Stilwell has just arrived:

"We have at last gotten action on replacements for Yunnan Force which had been promised for end of January. All units are far below strength and yesterday the fact was out and official figures furnished for first time.

"133,000 men are required to fill up all units. I have been assured that orders are out for drafts totaling this number to report, all men to be on their way by end of April. By end of May they should be with their units. If this program is carried out we are over our biggest hurdle.

"Ramgarh training has made a big impression on Ho Ying Chin. He has been making speeches about it since he returned.

"Pai Chung Hsi, Director of Training, is now with us, and feeling in the War Ministry is better. There will be more grief of course but I feel we are getting a toe hold. We are all set to start officers' schools on April 1st."

The point of this is that the small ineffective so-called divisions will be built up to strength and that their officer personnel will get some real training without which the entire Force would be ineffective.

The Army Corps which is coming out of Ramgarh is a well-trained Artillery-Infantry coordinated unit with a knowledge of how to use all the special weapons. This has never before been the case in any Chinese unit. Dr. Soong told me at lunch here a few days ago that the Chinese Artillery almost invariably fired their guns for the first time on the battlefield. In other words this means they merely made a noise. Now they know how to manage the guns and their leaders know how to coordinate the gun with the front line. Given the endurance, phlegmatic courage and ground-covering ability of the Chinese soldier, along with adequate reconnaissance which they have now been trained to carry out, and we may really get some amazing results. But it has been a hard battle for Stilwell.



W. H. H. H.
Chief of Staff.

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 16, 1943.

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PERSONAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ADMIRAL KING.

The President has repeatedly directed the Army to maintain their effort to increase General Chenault's air force.

As the bottleneck is transport planes and trained crews, the President directs that the Navy make a most careful survey of what PBV planes and crews can be transferred to the Transport Service to relieve more suitable types for China duty. The President wishes this study given high priority.

Very respectfully,

Wilson Brown,
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

March 16, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Your note to me of March 8th reference China.

I have given a careful reading to your private memorandum of March 8th regarding the relations between the Generalissimo and Stilwell. I should like your permission to quote to him the second and third paragraphs of your memorandum, omitting the direct reference to the Sultan of Morocco (memorandum is attached).

As to the air phase of the matter, Stilwell is cognizant of our planned air effort out of China which will take place immediately upon the establishment of bases. I will further impress upon him to assist Chennault to the maximum, giving Chennault wide latitude in his operations. In this connection, the planes of the heavy bombardment group have already arrived in India; the ground crews will be there in about three weeks.

The supply problem, affecting air operations from China in 1943, is a tremendous one. Chennault requires help in his logistical planning. To this end, we are sending General Glenn this weekend to be Chennault's Chief of Staff, with General Haddon as his Service Commander, together with a selected staff.

However, the problem which we will face later in continuous air operations is ground protection for the China airdromes we use, as well as for the air freight route. We must build for that now. Here is the most serious consideration: as soon as our air effort hurts the Japs, they will move in on us, not only in the air but also on the ground. The air situation Chennault can take care of with his fighters, but the ground effort against our bases must be met by men on the ground. Our "bomb Tokyo bases" in Chekiang Province have been destroyed as a result of Japanese ground action. These fields have not been repaired.

The present Japanese advance into north Burma, although not yet in strength, probably has for its purpose the capture of the air warning stations protecting our Assam Air Freight Terminal. One station has already been forced to retire. Stilwell has just ordered a second Chinese regiment from Ramgarh to oppose this Jap move.

The size of an air force that can operate from China is limited by the means that can be made available to Stilwell from the



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U.S.. On the other hand, ground protection for our airdromes in China and the terminals of the air transport route must come from the Chinese Army.

General Stilwell, realizing this, has concentrated on his local problem of creating dependable units in the Chinese Army. His approach to this problem has been fundamentally sound; namely, to assemble into a field force selected units, officered by selected leaders; this force to be equipped with U.S. equipment and trained sufficiently to place dependence on them in combat.

Stilwell has had marked success in assembling a few units (Rangarh Project) with selected leaders. However, he has met with considerable obstruction and delay in concentrating a larger force in Yunnan. Although recent reports indicate progress is being made, it will be an uphill fight all the way. It is firmly established that Ho Ying-chin embodies a school of thought now existing in the Chinese Army, that a military "watch and wait" policy should be followed. This is manifested by constantly emphasizing a U.S. air effort against the Japs from China as a substitute for creating and training the necessary Chinese ground forces to make such air effort effective by opening a ground route of communications through Burma.

The comparatively small air effort possible from China in 1943, although of great strategic value, can be only a beginning. With a land supply route through Burma and dependable forces to secure our air bases in China, we can increase our air action against the Japs and really hurt them.

This means Burma must be recaptured. The part contemplated for the Chinese forces in this offensive is extremely important and the time remaining for their preparation is all too short. Accordingly, delay in organization and concentration for training is a serious obstacle to overcome.

At every turn General Stilwell has been faced with the "let the other fellow do it" attitude on the part of the Chinese leaders. This attitude, combined with the present low combat worth of the Chinese Army, must be reversed before we can fully realize the Chinese potential in this war. To correct this must be the primary objective of any representative dispatched to this theater to represent American interests.

General Stilwell has no doubt talked very plainly to the Generalissimo on many of these points in order to secure his assistance in creating conditions where our help would be effective against the Japanese. In doing this, there have been times when he has incurred the displeasure of the Generalissimo. This is unfortunate.

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However, I do not know of any other officer in our Army who combines Stilwell's knowledge of the Chinese and their language with his ability as a soldier and as an organizer. He is tough, but only such a man would have survived the Burma campaign, battered down British - Indian sluggish resistance to all our plans and made some headway with reorganization of the Chinese forces. Conditions must be created in China and a land route established to make an all-out air effort continuous and effective.


I am confident that the relationship between Stilwell and Chennault is such that Chennault will be given every opportunity to use his uncanny skill in the air against the Japs (see attached message).

Stilwell radioed me yesterday the following from Kunming:

"Chen Cheng is here and I am sticking to him to get a headquarters set-up established. He is our best bet and present indications are that he will go along with us. I hope to open Infantry and Artillery Training Centers here (Kunming) by end of month. Soong's remark about threat on several fronts is nonsense. Japs are foraging near Shasi, elsewhere there is no activity. Generalissimo is entirely unconcerned about threats on any front.

"Chungking cannot or will not enforce its orders in this area. Our presence threatens to affect the enormous smuggling racket here, and you may expect a campaign of vilification against me personally. I have already been accused of bad faith for keeping military supplies from racketeers. The continued publication of Chungking propaganda in the United States is an increasing handicap to my work. Utterly false impression has been created in United States public opinion. Army is generally in desperate condition, underfed, unpaid, untrained, neglected, and rotten with corruption. We can pull them out of this cesspool, but continued concessions have made the Generalissimo believe he has only to insist and we will yield.

"If we can train and equip the Yunnan force, we can save the situation, but I may have to call for backing in case a showdown is necessary. You may think a year of this has had its effect on me. My opinion of the Chinese soldier and the Chinese people is unchanged. It is the gang of Army 'leaders' that is the cause of all our grief. With best wishes and hoping for a better picture soon."


Chief of Staff.

Incls.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PRIVATE

March 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GEORGE MARSHALL

Thank you for letting me see the copy of Stilwell's letter of February ninth in regard to Arnold's and Somervell's trip. I have read this letter with a good deal of care and my first thought is that Stilwell has exactly the wrong approach in dealing with Generalissimo Chiang who, after all, cannot be expected, as a Chinese, to use the same methods that we do. When Stilwell speaks about the fact that the Generalissimo is very irritable and hard to handle, upping his demands, etc., he is, of course, correct; but when he speaks of talking to him in sterner tones, he goes about it just the wrong way.

✓ { All of us must remember that the Generalissimo came up the hard way to become the undisputed leader of four hundred million people -- an enormously difficult job to attain any kind of unity from a diverse group of all kinds of leaders -- military men, educators, scientists, public health people, engineers, all of them struggling for power and mastery, local or national, and to create in a very short time throughout China what it took us a couple of centuries to attain.

✓ { Besides that the Generalissimo finds it necessary to maintain his position of supremacy. You and I would do the same thing under the circumstances. He is the Chief Executive as well as the Commander-in-Chief, and one cannot speak sternly to a man like that or exact commitments from him the way we might do. ~~from the Sultan of Morocco.~~

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The other matter relates to the complete omission by Stilwell of any mention of air action in China in 1943. He is thinking of the Burma end of things and he is thinking of the ground forces now being trained in China.

While I am hopeful of the Burma operation, I still believe that important emphasis be placed on the strategic value of Chennault's air operations in 1943. I am glad to see it being pushed.

I know you will see that the directives sent to Stilwell and Chennault are so clear about our air plans that there will be no misunderstanding of our intentions.

It is essential that Chennault get his share of the supplies, and I believe he should get all above 4,000 tons a month until he gets an amount that will really keep his force operating. I understand from Arnold that is something over 2,500 tons a month on ~~an~~ all out basis.

The construction and improvement of airfields both in India and China should be pushed to the limit.

I am assuming that the big bomber group now en route will be directly under Chennault's command.

Of more importance is the assurance -- the air policy having been fixed in China -- that Chennault, with Stilwell's approval, will have complete control over his operations and tactics.

While I am sure the relationship of Stilwell and the Generalissimo has improved, I hope nothing will be done to prevent Chennault from discussing air operations with the Chinese in an appropriate manner.

Our relations with China are important and I wish you would impress on Stilwell and Chennault that they are our representatives over there in more senses than one. Compatible with their military duties, they may well turn out to be the best "Ambassadors" we have in China. I hope they will.

Above all, I am depending on you to see that Chennault gets his chance to do what he believes he can do.

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I do not think that the Staff plans either in Casablanca or here have given sufficient weight to the attrition against Japan each week and each month, or that that attrition can be greatly accelerated through increasing air power in China, by the sinking of Japanese ships off the coast of China, the destruction of Japanese aircraft, and the occasional bombing of Japanese cities.

Just between ourselves, if I had not considered the European and African fields of action in their broadest geographic sense, you and I know we would not be in North Africa today -- in fact, we would not have landed either in Africa or in Europe!

F. D. R.

FJR

SECRET

MESSAGE TO STILWELL FROM CHENNAULT

FROM: Chungking
TO : AGWAR

March 3, 1943

"To: Commanding General, US Army Forces, China-Burma and India.

The February 15, 1943 article in Time magazine entitled "On the Yangtze" has just reached me. The statements contained in this article are so false, distorted and unpatriotic as to be definitely prejudicial to military discipline and to amicable relations between the US and China. I desire, therefore, to disclaim all responsibility for any previous knowledge of this article and to condemn it as a flagrant misstatement of fact.

I have never deliberately or intentionally violated your instructions or those of General Bissell. The implication of disrespect for your judgment in any military matters or in matters concerning the Chinese is a contortion of the truth. You are the only Regular Army General I know of who has long observed the Chinese, served with the Chinese Army and in whom the Chinese have had sufficient confidence to entrust the command of their forces.

The references and implications regarding General Bissell are equally false. The frank statement of superior officers cannot be justly attributed to personal animosity. I heartily condemn such inferences in this article the true facts surrounding the absorption of the AVG into the 23 Fighter Group are a matter of official record.

Every able commander in this war fully realizes that the achievement of our common objective can be reached only through unity of command and the fullest cooperation of all concerned. All the American forces in China have got to work in closest harmony under the designated American Commander. Any officer who declines to do so should be summarily removed. In time of war, the greatest disservice that any soldier can do is to undermine in any way the relations of our Government with our Allies.

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I assure you that you have and will continue to have my loyal support of all your plans and your decisions.

/s/ C L CHENNAULT,
Brigadier General, AUS."

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WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

February 18, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following is a copy of a longhand letter from General Stilwell, dated February 9, 1943:


"Arnold's and Somervell's trip has been very helpful. I am particularly pleased that Arnold had a look at the machinery of Chinese government and a glimpse of the personalities we have to deal with.

"We are grateful for your assistance, even if the Chinese are not. Chiang Kai-shek has been very irritable and hard to handle, upping his demands no matter what is given him, and this attitude will continue until he is talked to in sterner tones. For everything we do for him, we should exact a commitment from him.

"It has taken three months to get Ch'en Ch'eng detailed and have his orders issued. I hope things will move along faster now. We are ready to set up the training centers for Infantry and Artillery and go to work on the Yunnan force. The Medical tangle is being straightened out. The S.O.S. is making progress, but we still have a battle on our hands there to keep the Chungking gang from interfering. In general, unless other blocks develop, we will get some much-needed training done on the Yunnan force, in time to make it capable of a serious effort. (I hope, I hope.)

"Arnold has the general picture, and can amplify this brief note, written in haste with a hotel pen. And a Calcutta hotel at that.

"Whether or not we ever accomplish anything out here, you may be sure of one thing, and that is that we are all working at it."


Chief of Staff.



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SECURITY

Memorandum by Gordon T. Bowles, dated New Delhi, February 7, 1943.

Forwarded to Department of State by Mr. William Phillips, personal representative of the President to India.

* * * * *

2. Concerning caravan routes traversing Tibet:

Government of India's attitude toward use of routes via Lhasa to Sining or Kangting and via Sadiya to Likiang or Sichang may be best described in Weightman's own words, "Last year overtures were made by the Government of India to the Tibetan and Chinese Governments with a view to opening these as supply routes to China. At that time the Chinese Government showed little interest. Now, suddenly, when it is too late, due to political complications, they show a keen interest. The Government of India is quite willing to see supplies pass through Tibet but insists on making all arrangements jointly with the Tibetan and Chinese Governments. Until such time comes the Indian Government is not willing to reopen discussions."

The Chinese Government's attitude is that this is not a matter of third party agreement since Tibet is considered an integral part of China and all external affairs of Tibet must, therefore, be handled through Chungking. As long as these respective attitudes prevail all matters relating to the trans-shipment of supplies other than the usual market commodities have reached an impasse. Commissioner Shen's attitude, in confidence, is that China will never agree to consideration of a tripartite agreement over such a small matter and would prefer to forego the potential 4000 tons per annum of supplies than to yield on a matter which might establish a dangerous political precedent.

In discussing the matter of Tibetan trade, Mr. Weightman believed that India would manage to absorb all the excess Tibetan wool which has been accumulating along the border although this does not appear to conform to reports from our Consulate in Calcutta as received in Washington. One thing appears to be definite, however, and that is that only the usual commercial goods will be allowed to pass across Tibet this year unless in a few instances private arrangements are made for trans-shipment of other goods; Weightman indicated that the Chinese had sent a man to Kalimpong to try to get some materials through, but doubted if he would succeed in his undertaking.

* * * * *

*This belongs with
General Marshall's memo of 1 April 43*

SECRET SECURITY

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SECURITY

Military Observer's Report, New Delhi, India, January 13, 1943.

The present situation regarding supplies to China via Tibet remains unsettled having now reached an impasse. The British Government, as a token of good will, had endeavored, over this route, to have a small trickle of war materials reach China and succeeded instead in involving itself in a real political controversy. The Tibetan Government was not averse to the using of their country and transport facilities (pack animals) provided certain regulations, laid down by them, were adhered to. These were: No war materials were to pass through the country, supervision to be only in their hands, no Chinese to be allowed at any of the various stages or to be free to wander, at large throughout the country, financing of the entire project to be guaranteed by the British. Actually, the British were to guarantee all of these provisions and it is at this very stipulation that the Chinese Government has balked as they fear it may weaken the position they pretend to hold regarding Tibet. The British Government acknowledges the Chinese Suzerainty over Tibet but in a half hearted way as they also acknowledge Tibet's autonomy. This latter is certainly a de facto one and the Chinese claim a de jure one. Actually China looks upon Tibet as one of its provinces and is adamant against the possibility of any British influence in that country. So strongly do they feel that they would actually prefer to have no supplies of any kind reach them this way than have the British assume any official position in the proceedings. The following telegram from the Tibetan Government to the British well describes the former's attitude on the whole matter:

"The proposals for passage of supplies through Tibet to China was first put forward by British Government and with a view to cementing existing friendly relations between British and Tibetan Governments. The Tibetan Government is quite reluctant to negotiate the proposals direct with the Chinese Government. They will now be obliged to consent if Chinese Government approach them, as they have already agreed to the passage of non-military supplies through Tibet to China in compliance with request made by British Government. They have not yet heard from Chinese Government that they are taking matters into their own hands. Naturally, consent will be taken as a matter of course. When they originally gave their consent, terms were laid down by Tibetan Government through their foreign office and these terms were agreed to by Government of India. The

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SECRET SECURITY

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Tibetan Government are pleased to note in above mentioned telegram Government of India undertakes to see that terms agreed to will be adhered to by Chinese Government. It is absolutely essential to have British Government as an intermediary power guaranteeing adherence to terms and Tibetan Government cannot agree to Chinese ministry communications establishing stations in any part of Tibet or their representatives travelling all over the country. It is therefore requested that Chinese Ministry of Communications at Delhi may be informed by Government of India in a suitable manner."

Under these conditions it seems unlikely that there will be any outcome from the British original plan. They made a good gesture and the failure cannot be laid to them.

Source: Major Charles S. Cutting, Military Observer, India.

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SECRET SECURITY

China

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WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

*Capt McClean
to file*

December 30, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The inclosed message just received from General Stilwell explains the attitude of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek expressed in his message which I forwarded to you this morning.

[Handwritten Signature]
Chief of Staff.

Incl.

SECRET

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CHUNGKING
DECEMBER 28, 1942.

Generalissimo told me yesterday he had ordered Ch'En Ch'Eng to take command of Yunnan Force. This man is about as good as they come in Chinese Army. Thus ends a long struggle. I believe we now have a dependable commander.

Orders are out for the move of the Artillery units; our plan was accepted with few changes. Infantry divisions have their orders for reorganization and consolidation. Some units have long march to make; now I am worried about getting the concentration completed on time. Our Services of Supply team is working alongside the Chinese opposite numbers. We are commencing to get our instructors in to be planted in Chinese units. Supply essentials for Yunnan Force are being flown in.

There is now no serious matter unsettled in connection with coming operation except following: Chiang Kai-Shek insists British promise naval force in Bay of Bengal sufficient to insure superiority. Admiral Somerville told me he had nothing except three subs and some destroyers, and no prospects for reinforcements. If British do not make a show of naval activity, Chiang Kai-Shek is sure to put his back up and stand fast. He said today that we would make all preparations to jump off on date set, and then see what the British were doing about their promise. If the fleet had appeared, we would jump off. If not, we would not move a finger. He has radiced the President about this. I have tried to argue that the matter has no vital influence on proposed operations, but with little effect. I believe it will be important to have some sort of naval demonstration just before D-day.

Stilwell

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A.16/China

*J.L. McC -
To do the
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 23, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We have learned informally from officers of the Chinese Embassy that General Hsiung Shih-Fei, head of the Chinese Military Mission in Washington, plans to return with his staff to China within the next few weeks.

As you know, General Hsiung is a close personal friend, confidant and trusted adviser of Chiang Kai-shek. It is understood that General Hsiung feels that he has not been called upon to participate in high military planning of the character which he and General Chiang Kai-shek probably envisaged as his function in this country.

If the report that General Hsiung has decided to return to China is accurate (there have been previous reports to this effect which have not materialized), it would probably not be advisable to urge General Hsiung to remain in Washington unless arrangements could be

made

FOR DEFENSE



BUY
UNITED
STATES
SAVINGS
BONDS
AND STAMPS

made promptly for his participation in the highest military councils. However, it seems very important that he be accorded before his departure some special personal recognition as the military representative here of General Chiang Kai-shek in addition to such recognition as has already been accorded to him. To this end it is suggested that you may care to request that General Marshall have a special, personal and comprehensive conference with General Hsiung in regard to the high military strategy of the war. It is also suggested that arrangements be made by General Marshall for General Hsiung to make a special call upon you.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

A6

December 28, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL WATSON.

The Secretary of State has recommended that the President see General Hsuing Shih-Fei before he returns to China.

The President told me that I might inform you that he would be glad to see General Hsuing Shih-Fei (Head of the Chinese Military Mission in Washington) at some convenient time.

JOHN L. MCCREA.

A16-*China*


SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

December 9, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The inclosed message has just been
received from General Stilwell.



Chief of Staff.

Incl.

SECRET

SECRET

From: Chungking

December 8, 1942.

Depending on the promises of air support in particular of transport planes, including twelve 4-engined transport planes, we have proceeded with plans that of necessity include a commitment of tonnage to be flown into China.

We have, after a prolonged struggle, brought the Chinese to agree to an offensive and they are allocating to it the bulk of their remaining resources. Time and space factors demand that preparations begin at once. Even working at top speed with all facilities, we have barely time to move the necessary minimum of supplies and re-arrange, reorganize and re-equip the troops that are to participate. Work is under way on both sides, the arsenals have started on their program and the orders for Infantry and Artillery units are in the mill. This is the moment the Air Transport Command takes to inform us that the C-87s will be delayed from one to four months. The Generalissimo has been informed that they would be available beginning December 15. If I now tell him that the War Department has changed its mind and that we cannot get them for an indefinite period, it will be evident at once that the plans already started cannot be carried out. In my opinion this will blow the lid off. If the meager means promised this theater cannot be depended upon to arrive, the Chinese cannot be expected to continue with present plans. The blow to American prestige will be out of all proportion to the value of the material. The important aspect of the case is not the gain or loss of a few planes, but that the United States has once more fallen down on a promise of aid and will this time, I believe, definitely lose all we have built up in confidence and respect. Either the War Department is or is not interested in having the Chinese continue this fight. If not, it would be better to close out here.

If the Chinese are to continue, they must be supported on the basis of what Wavell is getting for the Indian Army; contribution to China is insignificant.

We have set up an offensive and with pitifully scanty means the Chinese are ready to throw in a respectable force to make it go. The British have all along been luke warm in their cooperation. Now Wavell is trying to weasel out entirely. If we also fail them, I do not know what the outcome will be, but I know it will be serious. We will be in the position of two big boys getting a little one to go for a bully and then running off and letting him alone.

The obvious way to help this situation is to get tough with the British, who have a million and a half men on the rolls in India, and to send at once to this theater a substantial air reinforcement, both combat and transport planes, drawn from anywhere, even though the need elsewhere appears great. Up to now other theaters have been favored at the expense of this one. For once this one should be

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avored at the expense of some other. The narrow margin on which we work is obvious from the fact that a prospective loss of twelve transport planes can upset the balance.

I have been working on a shoestring here, and will continue to do what I am told, but I cannot go on deceiving the Chinese about assistance from the United States. The War Department will perhaps consider it a small matter to discontinue preparations for an offensive by 20 or 30 Chinese divisions. You, however, know the character of this people and can realize what it has meant to get them turned from the defensive to a prospective offensive. Now that the thing is possible, we risk all we might gain for a matter of a few planes. Let England take a small cut on her enormous allocations for the year, and this country can be kept in line. I recommend as strongly as it can be stated that a material increase be made at once in our help to China, that two groups of fighters, one group of medium bombers and 50 additional transport planes be sent to India immediately, and that the Chinese 3,500 ton program be raised to 10,000 monthly beginning now, whether or not the stuff can be moved out of India.

I request that this matter be taken to the top and strong representations be made in order to keep this base for future operations from being lost to us. I am sorry to add this matter to your other troubles, but I have reached a point where I must know whether or not I can depend on commitments. If Chiang Kai-shek requires an opinion from me as to the advisability of proceeding under the circumstances, an honest one would have to be in the negative. A prompt answer to this message will be appreciated.

Stilwell

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WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

A/6-3/Chiang

*Was this answered
yes*

November 27, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The attached message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek has just been received through General Stilwell.

[Handwritten Signature]
Chief of Staff.

Incl.

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CONFIDENTIAL
THE CHINESE OR JAPANESE
INTELLIGENCE

Following is paraphrase of message from Chiang Kai-shek to President dated November 24.

"For the President. Your message of the 21st was most gratefully received. The influence of the victory in North Africa on operations in this theater, in particular with regard to the reopening of the Burma Road, is obvious to me. With General Stilwell's assistance I am doing all I can to get the Chinese Army in Yunnan ready for its role in the Allied spring offensive in Burma already agreed upon. My greatest difficulty, however, is in the transportation by air from India of the minimum of munitions which this expeditionary force will need. To carry this additional load and to maintain the trickle of supplies needed for the functioning of the Chinese Army and arsenals, there are at present only 53 2-engined transport planes available. I realize that a further strain on air transport is being caused by the operations in North Africa, but if we do not by March of next year begin the operation to recover Burma, the rainy season will intervene to delay by a full year the Allies final victory over Japan.

"Will it be possible to keep to the original plan of having 100 twin engined transports on the India-China run? Alternatively, could an extra 25 of the C-87 (the converted 4-engine transports) be placed in that service immediately? It is my understanding that 12 of these C-87s, at the rate of four a month, have been assigned to that run during the next three months. However, time is of the essence if we are to meet the needs of the zero hour, and in view of the importance we all attach to the spring campaign in Burma, I am sure that no effort will be spared by your War Department to make these urgently needed planes available.

Chiang Kai-shek"

Stilwell.

SECRET

A16-3/China
Copy to file

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WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

November 12, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following message from General Stilwell shows further progress.

"Chungking, November 11, 1942.

"Conference with Operations Section Chinese General Staff. They agree to assign thirty divisions to the job, reduce them to twenty, using extra men and weapons to build these twenty up to full strength, and assign artillery to support them. They will plan to make Indo-China border safe with six of the twenty in first line and four in reserve. The other ten, which will get priority in supply, will go into the attack. The Chinese will take advice on organization of Services of Supply. Wheeler is coming up for this purpose. Present head of Services of Supply, to whom I object violently, is to be sidetracked. Will now push for action on these preparations and begin to place our observers with units concerned.

"Matter of command is very difficult. Last Chinese suggestion is one British Commander and one Chinese Commander, with Chiang Kai-shek nominally on top and with me as his Chief of Staff actually in the field with his authority to direct. British won't like this.

"Have gotten rid of Lo Cho Ying, who has been recalled from India. Only one staff and command there now, under my control. Training proceeding satisfactorily. Nearly eight thousand men have been moved down without accident. General air here now is one of cooperation and agreement on the points I have stuck out for."

W. H. Stilwell
Chief of Staff.



SECRET

A16 (China)

*Capt. T. V. Soong
to file*

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

November 5, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following message to me from General Stilwell is encouraging. Previously, through Sir John Dill and Admiral Cunningham, I had the British Chiefs of Staff in London practically force the British Foreign Office to instruct the Viceroy in England to permit Wavell to agree to a corps of 30,000 Chinese troops at Ramgahr, and also I forcibly impressed T. V. Soong with the fact that the great issue was Burma (not merely a harmonious group at Chungking); which meant a properly trained Chinese force at Ramgahr, an improved or selected Chinese force in Yunnan and a practical basis of cooperation with the British in such an operation--in other words Stilwell.

General Stilwell apparently has gained ground that I did not anticipate. We have been working in the Combined Chiefs of Staff on an operation into Burma, and of course the great problem pertains to the logistics and the naval support required. Until the situation is clarified in the Middle East and in the Caucasus, the calculations could only be on such a vague basis as to have little reality. I hope soon that we can get into the matter more definitely here in relation to what Stilwell and Wavell and the Generalissimo may do out there.

"Chungking, November 4, 1942.

"For the eyes of General Marshall alone. Conference with Chiang Kai-shek November 3. T. V. and Madame present. In general Chiang Kai-shek accepts Wavell's plan, but insists he must be reasonably assured of air superiority and Naval control of Bay of Bengal. Otherwise he won't move. If assured on these points he will have fifteen divisions ready for the operation by February 15. Asked me if fifteen were enough. I said yes, if good troops and properly led. Madame at once suggested that I look over units and commanders and make recommendations to Chiang Kai-shek. He did not veto this amazing suggestion and it is possible he may order it. I asked him for proper artillery support for these units and he promised it to limit of means available. He realizes at last necessity of this operation and apparently will back it wholeheartedly.

"Question of command came up. Chiang Kai-shek proposed joint staff of one American, one Chinese, and one Britisher with me as Chief of Staff to direct the operation. Told him British would probably object. He said he would consider other




SECRET

SECRET

possibilities. Asked if British command of Ramgahr force was O.K. I told him yes, because we would be physically separated and would be working towards a junction with the Yunnan force. Assumption was that I would command Ramgahr force. I did not ask for definite decision because I believe it will work out if not pressed. Chiang Kai-shek then told me I could send Lo Cho Ying back to China any time I wanted to. Also that I could give orders to Chinese Headquarters in India. This Headquarters expected to take over troops after training period and command them during the operation. Chiang Kai-shek apparently beginning to realize deficiencies of Chinese High Command.

"Whole meeting very smooth. Feel we are definitely making progress. Had conference with T. V. today, November 4, in which he promised full cooperation and help. He can be of great assistance. I think I recognize your fine Italian hand. Best wishes."

"Stilwell"


Chief of Staff.

- 2 -

SECRET

SECRET

FROM: AIRMAIL (CHINA)

FOR ACTION: OPMAT

SUBJECT: A16-3(S. W. Pacific)

August 12, 1942

OS0100 NCR 9841

CROSS-INDEX SHEET

For exchange of despatches between Generals
MacArthur and Marshall re certain editorials
and press releases regarding strength of
American forces in Australia as related to
failure to take offensive action see file

A7-1

REPORTED BY AIRMAIL SERVICE THAT CHANG WILL LEAVE SOON
FOR USA TO MEET WITH AMERICAN PUBLIC AND INCREASED
AID TO CHINA. SHE WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY MAJ GEN HUANGPING
RECENTLY POSSIBLY HAVING RETURNED FROM AUSTRALIA SAID MADE BY CHANG
WHEN HE WAS REPORTED AFTER HIS RECENT RETURN THAT WHETHER SOON
FOR HU GEN CARRYING ENOUGH WEIGHT TO SWING TIDE BUT ADMIRATION
HELD BY US PUBLIC FOR CHANG PERSONALLY WOULD DO TRICK. CHANG
RECENTLY VERY UPSET OVER DIVISION LONG PROMISED LEASE LEND PLANES
AND ASKED THAT HARRY HOPEING SOME CHANGING. WIFE'S VISIT IS
SIMILAR MOVE TO FORCE IMMEDIATE AID AS BELIEVE CHANG GENUINELY
WORRIED OVER PROSPECT FURTHER JAP OFFENSIVES TO END WAR. HE IS
PROBABLY UNDER THINLY VEILED REINFORCE FROM THE NAZI REACTION
OVER SON ARRIVAL ON ROAD WHICH BRITISH AND AMERICAN CONFIDENCE
(2 CAPULET ENVOY).

16 ACTION

(COPY MADE AT DIRECTION OF
CAPTAIN MOORE FOR INDEX
OF 7/11/42.)

SECRET

A16-3 (China)

SECRET

FROM: ALUSNA CHUNGKING

FOR ACTION: OPNAV

DATE: 10 JULY 42

080100 NCR 9841

REPORTED BY RELIABLE SOURCE THAT MME CHIANG WILL LEAVE SHORTLY FOR USA TO MAKE PERSONAL APPEAL AMERICAN PUBLIC FOR INCREASED AID TO CHINA. SHE WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY MAJ GEN HUANGPING HEYGOAD POSSIBLY HOLLING TOTTONG. DECISION SAID MADE BY GISSIMO WHEN HUANG REPORTED AFTER HIS RECENT RETURN THAT NEITHER SOONG NOR HU SHIH CARRIES ENOUGH WEIGHT TO SWING TIDE BUT ADMIRATION HELD BY US PUBLIC FOR CHIANGS PERSONNALLY WOULD DO TRICK. GISSIMO RECENTLY VERY UPSET OVER DIVERSION LONG PROMISED LEASE LEND PLANES AND ASKED THAT HARRY HOPKINS COME CHUNGKING. WIFE'S VISIT IS SIMILAR MOVE TO FORCE IMMEDIATE AID AS BELIEVE CHIANG GENUINELY WORRIED OVER PROSPECT FURTHER JAP OFFENSIVES TO END WAR. HE IS PROBABLY UNDER THINLY VEILED RIDICULE FROM PRO NAZI BACTION HERE OVER NON ARRIVAL ON ROAD WHICH BRITISH AND RUSSIANS CONTINUE (2 GARBLED GROUPS).

16 ACTION

(COPY MADE AT DIRECTION OF
CAPTAIN MCCREA FOR POUCH
OF 7/11/42.)

SECRET

L21 (China)

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON


June 20, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Transports for China.

Reference your memorandum of June 15th and my memorandum of the 16th, copies attached, concerning statement purported to be made by General Stilwell that there were sufficient transports available for carrying strategic war materials into China, additional information received this date.

General Stilwell states that the statement quoted is not correct. He further states that 75 transports operated by the Army and 25 to be operated by CNAC will be satisfactory only if ownership of transports loaned to CNAC is retained by the Army to insure movement of essential military personnel and supplies.


H. H. ARNOLD
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

Incl: Cpy of Secret memo for the
President, 6/16/42 frm. Gen.
Arnold re above subj.
Cpy of Secret memo for Gen.
Arnold, 6/15/42 frm. the
President re above subj.



SECRET

SECRET

June 16, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Transports for China.

In connection with the cablegram from Brereton relative to transports now in use between India and China being sufficient, it is to be noted that Brereton states, "Stilwell reports".

Regardless of the above, I am continuing to send transports to India for service in China until a total of 75 has been reached. This is in accordance with the agreement made with the Chinese that a total of 75 planes be available for this run by the end of June. If they cannot be used between India and China, they can be used in the trans-India service where transports are urgently needed.

In this connection, I am sending a cablegram to Stilwell for confirmation of his statement, and also intimating that we cannot understand why this small number is sufficient when there is so much strategical material to be carried in.

I am not satisfied that we can continue to run the 2 engine airplanes from India into China indefinitely. I am still of the opinion that while we will either replace the 2 engine planes by 4 engine planes or fly into China by another route from partial service already made, the best route ultimately should be from Eastern Siberia into Northern China.

H. H. ARNOLD
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.
Commanding General, Army Air Forces

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COPY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 15, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL ARNOLD:

Apropos of General Brereton's cable that no more transports are needed into China, do you know whether this message was seen by General Stilwell and whether or not it has Stilwell's approval?

I can't quite understand Brereton's message in the light of the small tonnage which has been taken in each month.

Are you satisfied that we can continue to run the 2-engine planes from India into China?

F.D.R.
/s/ F.D.R.

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

A/6 chin

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 4, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL BROWN:

I have read this Lend Lease report in regard to Chiang Kai-Shek by Elsey and think it is excellent. Please thank him for me.

F.D.R.

End-1 The White House, Washington, D.C.,
December 5, 1944.

From: The Naval Aide to the President.
To : Lieutenant George M. Elsey, U.S.N.R.

1. answered, with congratulations.

WILSON BROWN.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

15 November 1944

TOP-SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Admiral Brown

The attached report, "The President and U.S. Aid to China," is an account of the President's efforts to keep China in the war and to make her an effective military ally. It covers the period from the Cairo conference to the present. During this year, the President supported Chiang's leadership in China, continued his efforts to bring about political and military unity in China, controlled U.S. military activities in the Far East, and tried to persuade Chiang to accept the strategic decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and engage in combined operations with Anglo-American forces.

The report discusses only those phases of U.S. aid to China which have entered into the correspondence of the President and the Generalissimo. Material on other aspects of our assistance -- financial and technical -- is not available here.

The report should be considered TOP SECRET inasmuch as it mentions the Russian decision to declare war on Japan after the defeat of Germany.

I apologize for excessive length and suggest that you turn to the Summary on Page 54.

Very respectfully,

George M. Ely

TOP-SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

18 November 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL BROWN

In response to your comments about the desirability of including a statement on Lend-Lease in my report, I have compiled the following figures from the most recent published report on Lend-Lease operations:

Although China has been cut off by land and by sea since the Burma Road was closed in April 1942, a total of \$380,584,000 in Lend-Lease supplies had been delivered to the Chinese Government by 30 June 1944. All of this material was flown over the Hump. Supplies delivered in China represent about 14% of all Lend-Lease material devoted to the war against Japan.

In addition, another \$867,000,000 in Lend-Lease supplies has been consigned to India where much of it is used by Chinese troops in training or by Chinese forces operating from India.

Very respectfully,

George W. Elsey

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