2. Al6-3 BOLERO (Build-up in U.K. for Overlord operation): 1942 - April, 1943.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOPKINS:

Subject: Bolero Operations.

Since our last talk concerning Bolero, I have taken special note of the attitudes of various agencies and individuals concerned with future operations. It is my firm opinion that we should adopt a more aggressive attitude with reference to Roundup and Bolero, and every time anybody talks about future operations based upon expediency or immediate results we should come back in no uncertain terms with our plans for the Bolero project.

In my opinion that should be the answer to the latest suggestion received covering future Mediterranean operations. These operations can not win the war, but they can cause us to disperse to such extent that it will definitely delay our being in a position to crush Germany when the propitious moment arrives.

Quite recently I had a talk with Anthony Eden, and I told him that if we did not watch our step we would still be discussing ways and means for operating Bolero while the Russians were marching into Berlin. Although this may be exaggerated the ideas involved are sound.

I am encouraged somewhat by reading today of the formation of a staff in England to carry on plans for Bolero. Perhaps this staff will create the spark necessary to cause concentration of troops, airplanes, and supplies for the Bolero operation, and will prevent these local operations which are apparently based more upon attrition of the enemy forces than upon a definite plan for overwhelming defeat of Germany.

H. H. ARNOLD,
General, U. S. Army,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The attached message has just been received from Brigadier General W.B. Smith in London.

Chief of Staff.

Incl.
November 26, 1942.

To: General G.C. Marshall
From: Brig.Gen. W.B. Smith

At conclusion of last night's British Chiefs of Staff conference, Churchill brought up the Hartle letter, gist of which is as follows:

"European Theater of Operations has endeavored to get from War Department statement of modification of BOLERO plan necessitated by TORCH. War Department has advised that our construction program in United Kingdom should not exceed present needs. European Theater of Operations interprets this to refer to program for 427,000 tentatively approved by War Department. Present construction program based on 1,100,000. War Department directs that British Chiefs of Staff be advised that any construction in excess of requirements for 427,000 must be done by British labor and material and Lend-Lease material cannot be furnished."

Churchill took this to indicate a change in our basic concept of BOLERO - ROUNDUP. I explained that the letter referred only to the necessity of keeping BOLERO construction in line with the anticipated troop build-up. As understood and accepted during July conference, TORCH commitments made ROUNDUP improbable in 1943 and necessitated revision of BOLERO estimates based on temporary reduced troop lift. I pointed out that other operations which Churchill is pressing strongly will have the same effect and can only be mounted at expense of BOLERO shipping, but that none of this implied any change in our concept of the BOLERO - ROUNDUP plan. He understood and accepted this explanation, stating that his message to President had been sent somewhat impulsively. He at once wired President that he was entirely reassured. Ismay very apologetic for letting Churchill's first message get out during my absence. Actually the Hartle letter was ill-advised and the whole matter could have been handled without friction by personal contact.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 17, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

TO READ AND RETURN FOR MY FILES.

F. D. R.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Moscow
Dated November 15, 1942
Recl'd 6:35 a.m., 16th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

464, November 15, 7 p.m. (SECTION ONE)
SECRET AND PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HURLEY
I have had conferences with Molotov and Stalin.
(Syllabus).

One. Stalin expressed his understanding of the desire for an all-out attack against Japan now. He definitely disapproved that strategy at this time as it would divert materiel and force from this theater. He denied Japan's ability to exploit within the ensuing year or eighteen months the war resources of the territories she has occupied.

Two. Stalin stressed the paramount importance of the defeat of Hitler first, and maintained that the defeat of Japan would be logical consequence. He completely agreed with strategy indicated in your letter and amplified to him by me.

Three. Stalin made clear the necessity of accumulating
November 15, 7 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from Moscow

accumulating in Russia as quickly as possible the material essential to enable Russia to assume the offensive. Such an offensive, he considered, a proper implementation of the strategy outlined by you.

Four. Stalin stated that eventually we would need an additional Front in Asia from which to attack Japan simultaneously with an attack from the Pacific.

Five. Stalin repeated his commendation already expressed through the press of the operations in North Africa.

Six. Stalin agreed to afford me the means of a complete understanding of Russian strategy in Russia. He proposed that this be done through contact with proper military authorities and personal reconnaissance of the vital fighting front. (End Syllabus).

HENDERSON

ALC
AF
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Moscow
Dated November 15, 1942
Rec’d 4:50 a.m.; 16th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

464, November 15, 7 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

My discussion with Stalin of the foregoing subjects began at 11 p.m. on November 14 and continued to 12:30 a.m. on November 15. Molotov, whom I had visited several days before, but with whom I had not discussed the purpose of my mission, sat through the entire conference. He did not participate in the discussions. Pavlov interpreted.

I opened the conference by extending your greetings and expressing your admiration for the fortitude and the intelligence with which Russia is conducting her great fight. I then assured Stalin that any statement he might make to me would be transmitted directly and secretly to President Roosevelt alone. I handed him your letter of October 5 addressed to him. On his direction it was read and interpreted to him at once. Before commenting on the letter he asked if I had anything to say in regard to the subject matter or if I wished to amplify the contents.

I reviewed
-2- #484, November 15, 7 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from Moscow.

I reviewed briefly my recent service in the Pacific area, explained the present situation in that theater, and presented the argument that has heretofore been made by Australians, New Zealanders, and some Americans — including myself — to the effect that we should attack, defeat and destroy the autocracy of Japan before she had time to exploit the great resources of the territory she had occupied. I concluded by pointing out that the defeat of Japan would remove a formidable enemy from our rear and would permit the full utilization of our resources in the Western theater; that likewise, the defeat of Japan would release the war resources of Russia now in the Asiatic area. This would enable the United States and Russia to bring their full force to bear on the paramount objective — the defeat of Hitler.

HENDERSON

REP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Moscow
Dated November 15, 1942
Rec'd 6:25 a.m.; 16th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

464, November 15, 7 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

I then told him that contrary to these views you had decided that the most effective plan in which the United Nations could join for defeating Hitler was through rendering all possible support to the Russian armies and that the defeat of Japan would naturally follow the defeat of Germany. I told Stalin that it was now my purpose to help make your strategy effective.

Mr. Stalin then began talking — slowly, quietly, deliberatively. He expressed his greetings to you and his appreciation of your splendid leadership. His first sentence on the subject under discussion was to the effect that you had adopted the correct and the most effective strategy. He stressed the imperative need of creating a reserve in Russia to justify Russia in assuming the offensive. He referred again to the necessity for a second front in Europe eventually, but agreed fully on the effectiveness of the opening of what he referred to as another front in Africa.

Up to
-2- #464, November 15, 7 p.m. (SECTION THREE) from Moscow.

Up to this time he had made no reference to Japan. I then referred to his recent anniversary address and expressed appreciation for his outline of the objectives of the Soviet-American-Anglo coalition. I referred with commendation to his letter to Mr. Cassidy of the Associated Press on the American-British achievements in North Africa. I then started to suggest that in all his public discussion he had made no mention of the Eastern theater. Before I completed the sentence he laughed and interrupted me to say, "I know. You are going to say that I failed to mention your enemy — Japan."

HENDERSON

ALC
AF
This telegram must be
rephrased before being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

Moscow
Dated November 15, 1942
Rec'd 5 a.m.; 16th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

464, November 15, 7 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

In this statement I cheerfully acquiesced. He
then began a clear analysis of what he termed the war
in Asia. His first comment was that I had placed too
much stress on Japan's ability to exploit the war re-
sources now within her line. He said that Japan had
only such tooling as she had received from the United
States before the war and was now receiving from Ger-
many. He described this as absolutely insufficient.

He said that Japan did not possess trained workers
in sufficient numbers in Japan or in the area she had
occupied. His whole argument on this subject led to
the conclusion that there was no danger whatever of
Japan being able to exploit the captured resources to
any appreciable extent within the next year or eighteen
months. At one point this discussion indicated that
Russia intended in due course to cooperate in the estab-
lishment of a mainland front against Japan, but further
discussion of that subject so modified his statement
that it
2. #464, November 15, 7 p.m. (SECTION FOUR) from Moscow.

that it should not be taken as a commitment.

I asked him if it were not a fact that Japan's role was not that of a selfish opportunist, watching Germany's progress and holding herself in position to take advantage of any success that might come to Germany in the Western theater. This he answered in the negative. He said that the cooperation between Japan and Germany was complete. He knew that recently Japan had made increased demands on Germany for surface ships and airplane engines. He said that Japan was incapable of constructing first class airplanes without the aid of Germany. Great traffic was taking place between Germany and Japan at the present.

HENDERSON

HTM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone, (SC)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

464, November 15, 7 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)

The surface craft and the airplanes which Japan had lost were irreplaceable by Japan alone. The number of Japanese seacraft sunk by the United States and airplanes destroyed had greatly increased Japan's demands upon Germany. He was positive in his conclusion that Japan would be unable to sustain herself in the war without the aid of Germany.

All of this led him to agree completely with you that the defeat of Japan would be a logical consequence of the defeat of Germany.

At this point Stalin stopped me to ask if he had made clear his position on all the questions I had presented. I told him he had, but he had not yet given me a clear statement of Russia's strategy in Russia and that I would like to know, for instance, what Russia now had between her enemy and her oil, how much matériel Russia would require before she could take
could take the offensive, and where, how, and when
she contemplated the offensive. Here I expected to
be thrown out of the Kremlin.

He replied that heretofore he had steadfastly
declined to permit any but Russians to have the
opportunity of seeing and understanding Russia's
manner of contact with the enemy and her present
and future strategy. Much to my surprise he then
said it would take about three days for him to make
arrangements for proper officers to consult with me
on strategy, and a personal reconnaissance trip by
me to the vital fighting areas.

Stalin's attitude was uniformly good natured,
his expressions were always clear, direct and concise.
His attitude toward you and the United States was
always friendly and respectful.

(END OF MESSAGE).

HENDERSON

ALC
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following message has just been received from Brigadier General W. B. Smith who is Deputy Chief of Staff for General Eisenhower in London:

"November 9, 1942

"I spent last evening with the Prime Minister; only others present were Ambassador Winant and Eden. The Prime Minister was evidently much elevated by the success in Egypt and satisfactory initial stage of Torch and he talked even more frankly than customarily, the conversation lasting the greater part of the night. He is extremely anxious to have you and probably Admiral King come here at a very early date for conference to reorient strategy in the light of new Mediterranean situation and will undoubtedly communicate with the President to this effect.

"For the present at least, he has given up with some reluctance the idea of a British operation in Norway as being too difficult and too bloody. His mind now turns to Turkey which he believes can be brought into the war at almost any moment providing tanks and modern materiel can be made available for her forty-five divisions. This he will undoubtedly urge since he visualizes Turkey as a convenient bridge between a usable Mediterranean and Russia. He believes also that Turkey, when properly armed, will erupt to the Balkan Area creating a situation of the greatest difficulty for Germany.

"He seems to be growing colder to the idea of Roundup except as a final stroke against a tottering opponent. As you know, the Pacific to him seems very far away and his constantly reiterated idea is that Russia, Britain and the United States must dispose of Germany and then concentrate upon Japan. He hopes to clinch this strategy by your conference here.

"With respect to Torch the Prime Minister and Eden are reasonably certain that Spain will not take offensive action and that Vichy will not declare war. The British Ambassador to Spain has handled the situation there wonderfully well, smoothing over the flurry caused by our diplomat who delivered what amounted to an ultimatum at a most inopportune time. The Prime
Minister himself is handling DeGaulle who has come through well although obviously bitterly disappointed at not being brought into the picture at an earlier date. The Prime Minister feels bound on honor to support DeGaulle, with all his faults, as the one man who stuck to the apparently sinking ship and whose name has a following in civilian France. With respect to Giraud, he said that while his immediate assistance was of enormous value, he would later be a source of difficulty, also that Britain and the United States cannot each have a pet Frenchman. We continue to have the fullest support in connection with Torch and I deal with the Chiefs of Staff and Foreign Office on the same direct and informal basis as when General Eisenhower was present.

"We will begin shifting the bulk of Allied Force Headquarters as soon as reasonable communications are available in Algiers since the French situation makes the early presence of (garbled) on the scene of this headquarters a matter of considerable importance."

Chief of Staff
Al6-3/(BOLERO)

JULY 23, 1942.

I am next going to show you where I stand myself at the present time. I have found so much who regard "Stalins" should like to see you do gradual as soon as possible, and that we in addition with the fact that preparations for action on the western front in full blast, thus holding the maximum enemy forces opposite England. All that seems to me an absolute

CROSS-INDEX SHEET

For message from M. STALIN to the PRIME MINISTER

dealing with the necessity for opening up a

SECOND FRONT in 1942, see file

Al6-3 (U.S.S.R.)
The White House  
Washington

MOS! SECRET

FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO THE PRESIDENT

NO. 114

July 14, 1942.

I am most anxious for you to know where I stand myself at the present time. I have found no one who regards "Sledgehammer" as possible. I should like to see you do gymnast as soon as possible, and that we in concert with the Russians should try for Jupiter. Meanwhile all preparations for round-up in 1943 should proceed in full blast, thus holding the maximum enemy forces opposite England. All this seems to me as clear as noon day.

PRIME

Extra Copy

President - P.M. file
contains the original

Regraded Unclassified
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Latest British Proposals relative to Bolero and Gymnast.

The memorandum under discussion is from the British Chiefs of Staff to the British Mission in Washington. It presents the view of the British Cabinet that the BOLERO or SLEDGEHAMMER operation in 1942 cannot be carried out unless there is a marked German weakening. It indicates the necessity for some other Allied action and hopes that we (the United States) will consider doing GYMNAST. It states that the British are investigating a Norwegian operation but so far it appears impracticable. This message was to be transmitted by the Prime Minister to the President.

My Comments

The proposal means no BOLERO in 1942 and an inadequate and probably ineffective BOLERO, if any, in the spring of 1943.

It is also our opinion that under existing circumstances the effect of GYMNAST would be indecisive. Therefore, if we undertake the GYMNAST operation at the expense of BOLERO we would nowhere be pressing decisively against the enemy.

If the British attitude as to BOLERO must be accepted, it is our opinion that we should turn to the Pacific, and, using all existing and available dispositions and installations, strike decisively against Japan.

The United Kingdom would be on the defensive with ground activities restricted to commando raids. We would reinforce the United Kingdom with Air but on a reduced basis from that now planned. However, the bombing attacks on the Continent could be continued and increased. Our ground forces in the United Kingdom would only include one or two additional divisions and there would be a very decided reduction in the proposed SOS installations. All shipping,
planes and as much personnel as needed, thus released would be turned to the Pacific Area.

It is impossible to do BOLERO without full British support. Half-hearted measures will doom the entire enterprise to failure. The British must, of necessity, be a large part of the BOLERO undertakings. I believe that we should now put the proposition up to the British on a very definite basis and leave the decision to them. It must be made at once. My object is again to force the British into acceptance of a concentrated effort against Germany, and if this proves impossible, to turn immediately to the Pacific with strong forces and drive for a decision against Japan.

Admiral King and I have signed a joint memorandum to you regarding the foregoing. *

* Attached hereto.
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

July 10, 1942.

SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

We have been informed by the British Chiefs of Staff that the Prime Minister is sending you a message presenting the view that conditions acceptable to the British for carrying out Bolero-Sledgehammer operations this summer are most unlikely to occur. It implies a slow progress of all preparations in 1942. The message proposes alternative operations, including the hope that the United States proceed with Gymnast.

Our view is that the execution of Gymnast, even if found practicable, means definitely no Bolero-Sledgehammer in 1942 and that it will definitely curtail if not make impossible the execution of Bolero-Roundup in the Spring of 1943. We are strongly of the opinion that Gymnast would be both indecisive and a heavy drain on our resources, and that if we undertake it, we would nowhere be acting decisively against the enemy and would definitely jeopardize our naval position in the Pacific.

We recommend that in your answer to the Prime Minister, you urge that we go through with full Bolero plans and that we attempt no other operation which would detract from this major effort. The urgent necessity and great desirability of this action should be impressed upon the British as strongly as possible.

Neither Sledgehammer nor Roundup can be carried out without full and whole-hearted British support. They must of necessity furnish a large part of the forces. Giving up all possibility of Sledgehammer in 1942 not only voids our commitments to Russia, but either of the proposed diversions, namely Jupiter and Gymnast, will definitely operate to delay and weaken readiness for Roundup in 1943. If the United States is to engage in
any other operation than forceful, unswerving adherence to full Bolero plans, we are definitely of the opinion that we should turn to the Pacific and strike decisively against Japan; in other words assume a defensive attitude against Germany, except for air operations; and use all available means in the Pacific. Such action would not only be definite and decisive against one of our principal enemies, but would bring concrete aid to the Russians in case Japan attacks them.

It is most important that the final decision in this matter be made at the earliest possible moment.

[Signature]

Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.

[Signature]

Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations.
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

June 23, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following are my comments on the Prime Minister's memorandum to the President, of which a copy was sent to me on June 20 by Captain McCrea; the paragraphing corresponds to that of the Prime Minister's memorandum:

PARAGRAPH 1 - SHIPPING

The Prime Minister's questions in this paragraph touch on matters which are primarily Naval. The Army Air Corps is developing anti-submarine measures with a special group of planes and scientists at Langley Field which give great promise.

The importance of a ship-building program properly proportioned as to escort and merchant tonnage is under active study by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

PARAGRAPH 2 - BOLERO

Any military operation against odds may lead to disaster. In case of a threatened Russian collapse immediate and drastic measures will be indicated for the United Nations. An operation supported by the entire British Air Force based in the UK and by a large increment from the U.S. Army Air Force has better chance of success than any other. A landing on the coast of France this year should aim at permanent occupation.

PARAGRAPH 3 - SCHEME FOR BOLERO, 1942

a. Plan

The United States, through General Marshall, presented in London outlines of plans for a cross-channel operation in the fall of 1942 to be undertaken (a) should Russian collapse appear imminent, or (b) should a perceptible German weakening be detected. The former would admittedly be the most difficult, but its execution is predicated on a desperate situation. Detailed operational plans for these operations have not been developed here as it was agreed, and is logical, that this should be done in England.
While the difficulties involved in an operation against the mainland of Europe in 1942 are formidable, it is not believed that they are insurmountable. The Germans, by clever utilization of every conceivable method, overcame what were commonly accepted as insurmountable obstacles in virtually all of their great thrusts, March 21, 1918, Norway, Flanders in 1940, Crete, etc. All possible methods to overcome the recognized obstacles involved have not yet been fully exploited. The potential power of the immense Air Force concentrated in the UK, alone introduces many possibilities for new departures. The use of bombers for transport, smoke, protective barriers, feints, etc. is yet to be exploited.

b. Forces to be employed

The United States now has 50,000 soldiers in UK including one Infantry and one Armored Division and a Parachute battalion. The First Infantry Division is now assembling in the Northeast preparatory to embarking for England. The schedule calls for transporting to UK before the end of August the First Division above referred to, two more parachute battalions, 20,000 Air Force personnel, and over 40,000 other troops. By the end of August there will be five heavy bombardment air groups, five fighter groups, and two transport groups in England. Should conditions require, at least one more division could be sent in August.

c. Landing Sites

The operation involves a Channel crossing, probably in the Pas de Calais area, but the Cherbourg peninsula, the Channel Islands, and the Brest peninsula are to be considered, if only for diversion effect.

d. Landing Craft and Shipping

It is estimated that for the fall operation there will be available in the UK the following landing craft from US and UK production:

- 199 tank lighters and tank landing craft of varied sizes
- 583 personnel carriers
- 311 vehicle and AA-carrying craft
- 30 support craft of different sizes.

The total carrying capacity of the above amounts to over 20,000 men, 1,000 tanks and 300 light vehicles, and is sufficient to transport at least a reinforced division. These are all special types of craft, yet the possibilities of improvising landing craft have not been exhausted. The transport of troops and supplies by air are also to be considered.
SECRET

The number of vehicles assigned to divisions for the assault is being reduced and only the lightest types are to be employed. It may thus become possible to transport the combat elements of two divisions by water, with more by air.

2. Commander

I think the comment on this should be, the U.S. is prepared to furnish a commander, or will accept a qualified British commander. But unity of command is regarded as imperative.

3. British Assistance Required

Minimum requirements are indicated in subpar. 6 above. Additional ground forces may be necessary. All available British air-borne troops will be needed as well as the assistance of the entire RAF in England.

PARAGRAPH 4 - INTERIM PLANS

There is no reason why we should "stand idle in the Atlantic theater during the whole of 1942." Even before the Bolero operation is begun, an aggressive, continuous air offensive should be maintained. Such an offensive, followed by the cross-channel operation, would be the best means of taking some of the weight off Russia. As a minimum it would, in our opinion, bring on a major air battle over Western Europe. This air battle in itself would probably be the greatest single aid we could give to Russia.

The operation GYMNAST has been studied and re-studied. It is a poor substitute for Bolero. It would require the diversion of means essential to Bolero, thereby emasculating our main blow to which we should contribute our utmost resources. An outstanding disadvantage is the fact that the operation, even though successful, may not result in withdrawing planes, tanks, or men from the Russian Front.

Chief of Staff.

SECRET
- 3 -
June 22, 1942.

SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Herewith is a memorandum prepared by General Ismay, in which we concur, covering the conclusions arrived at during the meeting of June 21, 1942 at the White House.

GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

ALAN F. BROOKE,
Chief, Imperial General Staff.

Incl.
SECRET
MEMORANDUM

The following are the conclusions of a meeting held at the
White House on the 21st June, between the President and the
Prime Minister. Mr. Harry Hopkins, General G. C. Marshall,
General Sir Alan Brooke, and Major General Sir Hastings Ismay
attended.

1. Plans and preparations for the Bolero operation in
1943 on as large a scale as possible are to be pushed forward
with all speed and energy. It is, however, essential that the
United States and Great Britain should be prepared to act
offensively in 1942.

2. Operations in France or the Low Countries in 1942
would, if successful, yield greater political and strategic
gains than operations in any other theatre. Plans and pre-
parations for the operations in this theatre are to be pressed
forward with all possible speed, energy, and ingenuity. The
most resolute efforts must be made to overcome the obvious
dangers and difficulties of the enterprise. If a sound and
sensible plan can be contrived, we should not hesitate to
give effect to it. If on the other hand detailed examination
shows that despite all efforts, success is improbable, we must
be ready with an alternative.

3. The possibilities of operation Gymnast will be
explored carefully and conscientiously, and plans will be
completed in all details as soon as possible. Forces to be
employed in Gymnast would in the main be found from Bolero
units which had not yet left the United States. The possibil-
ity of operations in Norway and the Iberian Peninsula in the
autumn and winter of 1942 will also be carefully considered
by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

4. Planning of Bolero will continue to be centred in
London. Planning for Gymnast will be centred in Washington.

6/22/42
J: Att.-3(Bolero)  

To King and Marshall  

I cannot agree that it is impossible to develop Sledgehammer in 1942 that we should turn our available men and ships away from Germany and towards Japan. In the first place I am not content with the British cabinet position relative to Sledgehammer in 1942. I want to know what our men in England, Eisenhow, Gage, Clark and Stark think. Do they agree with the British position? Can you get a confidential report?
from them immediately? Above all I must know from the two of you whether in your opinion Sledgehammer can be launched in 1942 and when and where it will be done. If you answer in the affirmative, I will press it vigorously with Britain and come to a prompt and immediate understanding with them one way or the other.

Even though we find that we must reluctantly agree that there can be no Sledgehammer in 1942, I still think we should press forward vigorously with Bolles for 1943. I see
nothing in the message from England to indicate any half-heartedness on their part relative to the 1943 enterprise. But if you think they are half-hearted about Sledgehammer in 1942 as you think they will be equally half-hearted in 1943.

But my main point is that I do not believe we can wait until 1943 to strike at Germany. Indeed I am unwilling to continue with Battles on the full basis unless we are going to have a 1942 Sledgehammer. If we cannot have that then we
must attack it at another point. Suffering might not be discernible, but it would hurt Germany, save the Middle East and make Italy vulnerable to our air power. The war will be lost this year in Europe and Africa not in the Pacific. I think we are doing well in the Pacific. Moving our troops and equipment to that theater will not be decisive until our Navy gets superior force. We are not losing in the Pacific. We are losing in Africa and Russia. I am not afraid to go.
into Africa than the Red Sea and fight with the British, but I prefer alignment with American forces.

I realize with some amended forces on our part. Manpower, air and ships will have to be transferred from Blem to this. Perhaps all the shipping for the next three or even four months will have to be utilized. But we will make our forces felt at once and in a very important manner.

Gist of this was communicated to Adm. King and Gen. Marshall by Capt. McCrea, by phone from Hyde Park to Washington.