

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 31, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE:

This copy (#1) of Minutes of Meeting held at Anfa Camp on Saturday, 23 January, 1943, at 1700, was found by a steward on the desk used by the President while he was in the USS MEMPHIS. The steward turned same over to Captain H. Y. McCown, Commanding MEMPHIS, who immediately communicated the fact that it had been so found and requested instructions from the Naval Aide to the President as to disposition desired.

At the request of the Naval Aide, this document was transmitted by Captain McCown to Vice Admiral Jonas Ingram, who forwarded it, by regular officer courier service, to the Naval Aide.

SECURITY OF CONTENTS OF DOCUMENT BELIEVED NOT TO HAVE BEEN JEOPARDIZED IN VIEW OF PROMPT PRECAUTIONS TAKEN BY COMMANDING OFFICER, MEMPHIS.

*W. T. Brown*  
WILSON BROWN.

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COPY NO. 1

ANFA 3RD MEETING

MINUTES OF MEETING

Held at ANFA CAMP  
on SATURDAY, 23rd January, 1943, at 1700

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

THE PRESIDENT  
GENERAL G. C. MARSHALL  
ADMIRAL E. J. KING  
LT. GEN. H. H. ARNOLD  
LT. GEN. B. B. SOMERVELL  
MR. HARRY HOPKINS  
COMMANDER R. E. LIBBY

BRITISH

THE RT. HON. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL  
(Prime Minister and Minister  
of Defense)  
ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET  
SIR DUDLEY POUND  
FIELD MARSHAL SIR JOHN DILL  
GENERAL SIR ALAN F. BROOKE  
AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR C. PORTAL  
VICE ADMIRAL  
THE LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN  
LT. GEN. SIR HASTINGS L. ISMAY

SECRETARIAT

BRIG. GENERAL J. R. DEANE  
BRIGADIER E. I. C. JACOB

THE PRESIDENT suggested discussing the report submitted to him and the Prime Minister in C.C.S. 170/1, paragraph by paragraph.

Both the President and the Prime Minister, before starting the discussion, said that they wished to congratulate the Chiefs of Staff on the character of the work which had been done during the conferences. The Prime Minister said it was the first instance he knew of when military leaders had remained together so long, free from political considerations, and had devoted their full thought to the strategic aspects of the war.

The PRESIDENT agreed to this and recalled an incident in the last war when Marechal Foch, Field Marshal Haig and General Pershing had had a similar conference which lasted but 5 hours.

1. SECURITY OF SEA COMMUNICATIONS.

In discussing the security of sea communications, the PRIME MINISTER indicated that he wished German submarines to be referred to as "U-Boats" rather than dignifying them by calling them "submarines".

2. ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA.

A discussion regarding assistance to Russia in relation to other commitments then followed.

The PRESIDENT said that in March we will be faced with the necessity of arranging to extend the Russian protocol. He thought the last sentence in Paragraph 2 of C.C.S. 170/1 which provides that "supply to Russia will not be continued at prohibitive cost to the United Nations' efforts" should stand and asked Mr. Hopkins for his view on the subject.

MR. HOPKINS said that the present protocol has such a clause but that, of course, it cannot be exercised without raising violent objections from Premier Stalin.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that aid to Russia must be pushed, and no investment could pay a better military dividend. The United Nations cannot let Russia down. He said that the Chiefs of Staff had been considering whether or not 16 destroyers could be made available from the United States in order to reduce the length of the convoy turnaround from 40 to 27 days.

ADMIRAL KING said that the destroyers simply were not available. The escort vessel situation is so tight as to make it necessary to eliminate the Russian convoys starting about June 14th in order to take care of the needs of Operation HUSKY. He pointed out that there is already a shortage of 65 escorts to protect the convoys in the Atlantic service and that the HUSKY operation will make this shortage more acute.

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MR. HOPKINS suggested the possibility of stopping the convoys entirely if we could give Russia something that she had not previously expected and suggested that this be airplanes.

THE PRESIDENT asked what new escort construction would be available by June of 1943.

ADMIRAL KING replied that there would be 100 escort vessels completed but that if the present loss rates continued, this number would represent only a small net gain.

SIR DUDLEY POUND said there is no substitute for destroyers in protecting convoys. At the present time we are utilizing 16 destroyers and 8 ships of other types with the convoys running on a 40 day cycle. If this were to be reduced to 27 days, it would be necessary to double this force in order to have two convoys in operation.

MR. HOPKINS asked whether the destroyers and escort vessels that are now with these convoys could not be released for use elsewhere, if the convoys were eliminated entirely.

SIR DUDLEY POUND said the escort vessels would be released, except for the Home Fleet destroyers which must be kept available to watch for a break-out into the Atlantic of the German fleet.

MR. HOPKINS repeated that some consideration should be given by the Chiefs of Staff regarding the entire elimination of the Russian convoys via the northern route. He said that it might be possible to increase the delivery of munitions to Russia over the Persian route and via Alaska although the Russians object to handling some types of munitions over these routes. At the same time, we could increase the protocol in certain types of munitions such as aircraft. If this were done, there would be a saving in the use of the 500,000 tons of shipping from the Russian convoys. The considerable losses of shipping connected with the northern convoys would be eliminated, as well as the cargos which are lost when ships are sunk. He felt that the Chiefs of Staff have been inclined to consider aid to Russia as a political expedient and that actually the question should be viewed from the standpoint of military necessity.

THE PRIME MINISTER said it would be a great thing if we could continue the Russian convoys throughout the HUSKY Operation. He thought it better to continue them on a 40 day cycle rather than attempt the 27 day cycle prior to HUSKY and then stop the convoys while HUSKY was being undertaken. He said we have never made any promises that we would take supplies to Russia. We have merely committed ourselves to making munitions available to them at our ports.

GENERAL SOMERVELL said that by 1st July we will be able to

send 30 ships a month to the Persian Gulf ports and this would offer good prospects for increasing the supply to Russia.

THE PRESIDENT said that supplying Russia is a paying investment. Stopping the convoys in July and August would occur just at the time when the Russians would be engaged in their most severe fighting. He pointed out that it is difficult to say now just what the situation regarding shipping losses will be in July or August, or what the conditions will be along the route of the northern convoys. He said, for example at the time of the last conference in June, 1942, the United States was suffering great shipping losses along her eastern coast. This area has now been almost cleared of submarines and the greatest losses are now occurring off the coast of South America.

ADMIRAL KING said that we are definitely committed to mounting Operation HUSKY and that everything must be done to insure its success, including the elimination of the Russian convoys if that be necessary.

GENERAL MARSHALL, in referring to Mr. Hopkins opinion of the Chiefs of Staff's attitude towards aid to Russia, said that in the current conferences, it had been decided that the first charge against the United Nations was the defeat of the submarine menace and aid to Russia had come next. He said that if we had to take the losses which had been suffered in the Murmansk convoys, they would hurt Russia as much as the U. S. and U. K. Such losses make it impossible for us to attack on other fronts and thus eliminate the possibility of forcing the Germans to withdraw ground and air troops from the Russian front. He said these losses last year came just at the time that we were laboring to build up BOLERO. It must be made certain that we do not hazard the success of Operation HUSKY.

The PRIME MINISTER agreed that if passage of convoys on the northern route were prohibitive in cost, they must be stopped. He thought it would be right to have in our minds the possibility of continuing convoys through the HUSKY period, but to make no promises to Stalin.

SIR DUDLEY POUND said this must be the case because if we were committed to continuing these convoys, the Royal Navy could not play its part in Operation HUSKY.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the discussion should rest on the point that the discontinuance of these convoys will depend upon the losses that are suffered. He said we must tell Mr. Stalin the facts, that he must rely on a 40 day schedule. Also that we cannot promise the continuance of the convoys while Operation HUSKY is being undertaken. He said it should also be made clear to Mr. Stalin that the U. S. and U. K. are under no obligation to continue the convoys.

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THE PRESIDENT said that the draft message to Mr. Stalin would require some revision. It must be remembered that the Russian General Staff are making plans on the assumption that the munitions called for in the protocol will be available. In justice to them, they should know just what is intended. He asked how a 2.4% per month loss rate would relate to the 700,000 tons loss of shipping per year.

ADMIRAL KING said he thought the loss rate of 2.4% would reduce the losses in shipping to less than 700,000 tons. He recalled the Prime Minister's having said before the House of Commons that if our losses could be reduced below 500,000 tons per year, the shipping situation would be satisfactory.

THE PRESIDENT said that the shipping situation is bound to improve during the coming year as a result of nearly doubling the construction program and by reason of the more effective anti-submarine measures which are to be taken.

ADMIRAL KING agreed with this and said that the great losses on the eastern coast of the United States were possible in large measure because of a lack of effective means to combat the submarines. He said that great improvement has been made in this respect.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that it should be decided, that if the shipping situation is better than we expect, we shall continue the 40 day convoy throughout Operation HUSKY, but that we should not commit ourselves either way. He said that, while it might be possible to continue the convoys, they must be stopped if the losses are too great.

ADMIRAL KING suggested that before deciding on discontinuing the convoys, the situation should be reviewed as of the first of May.

3. OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

The discussion then turned to Operation HUSKY.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he wished to set the target date as the period of the favorable June moon rather than that of July.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the matter of training must be considered as well as other features in connection with the preparations for Operation HUSKY. He said that all training and preparations must be scheduled, and that if an impossible or improbable target date was set, and then later changed to one that was practicable, all of the schedules would be out of adjustment. This might result in compromising ourselves with regard to every aspect of the operation. The subject of the

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target date had been quite exhaustively studied and it is going to be difficult to mount Operation HUSKY with properly trained forces even in July.

THE PRESIDENT asked if the fixing of the target date in July was made on the assumption that the Axis forces would be driven from Tunisia by the end of April. He asked what the effect would be if they were to be eliminated from Africa by the end of March.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that success in Tunisia at the end of March would improve the situation somewhat but was not the limiting factor. The limiting factor was on the naval side with respect to organizing crews and assembling landing craft. After this has been accomplished, the naval crews and landing craft must be made available for the training of the troops. He said that the situation in Tunisia might result in delaying Operation HUSKY but that an earlier success there would not help in moving the target date forward.

ADMIRAL KING said it was a question as to whether the assault on Sicily should be made by partially or fully trained forces.

THE PRESIDENT suggested that the operation might be easier than Operation TORCH in view of the better weather found in the Mediterranean.

LORD MOUNTBATTEN said that the difficulty of the HUSKY Operation was not in the weather but the excellence that might be expected in the enemy's defenses.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out some of the errors that had been made in the TORCH operation through lack of adequate training. Some of the landing boats went to the wrong place. One Ranger unit had the mission of taking a shore battery and clearing a certain area. It actually landed 18 miles away from its objective.

THE PRESIDENT said he thought this might have been the result of poor navigation rather than a lack of adequate training.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that while we do have divisions with amphibious training, we do not have the landing craft or crews. The craft must be built and the crews must be trained.

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed that General Marshall's point that the target date for HUSKY did not depend on the Tunisian operations but rather on the necessity of training was a good one.

He said, however, that the British are to send their overseas assault force which has a capacity of 7 brigade groups to participate in Operation HUSKY. He had been told that this could

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not leave England until the 14th of March and then must undergo some training in the eastern mediterranean. He said he felt sure that the force could be sent earlier. In this connection, LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN said that he had been informed that it could be sent by the end of February.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that this would be done. He then discussed the question of navigation. When operations of the importance of HUSKY are to be undertaken, no effort should be spared to obtain capable navigators. He suggested the possibility of combing the navy, particularly the "R" class battleships, with the purpose of setting up a special group of navigators.

SIR DUDLEY POUND said that skilled navigators could not be taken from the navy without serious effects and, in any event, they would have to be supplemented by inexperienced men and the training period could not therefore be shortened.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he feared the gap of perhaps four months during the summer when no U.S. or British troops would be in contact with the Germans.

THE PRESIDENT agreed and said that this gap might have a serious effect all over the world.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had examined the timing of the operation most carefully. September was the first date that had been put forward and this they had rejected. Further study had brought the date back to the end of August. The Combined Chiefs of Staff had then put on the same kind of pressure that the President and the Prime Minister were now applying, with the result that July had been tentatively fixed, though August remained a more likely date. He was in agreement with General Marshall that to try and fix too early a date would prejudice the preparations. It was impossible to shorten the loading period, and thus the only process off which time might be lopped was training. If this were curtailed, the result might be disastrous.

THE PRIME MINISTER thought that by intense efforts the loading might be accelerated. Similarly if landing craft now employed in maintaining the 8th Army could be recovered forthwith, training might start earlier. All these points must be rigorously examined before the July date could be accepted.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that if the date were to be made earlier, it would have to be by a complete four weeks unless the added risks of moonlight were acceptable.

THE PRESIDENT said that the present proposals were based on a large number of factors which might well prove correct, but which were estimates. Another estimate which must be taken into account was the state of morale in Italy, which recent reports

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showed to be deteriorating. If this process continued, the Germans might be faced with an Italy in revolt, and it would then be essential for us to have our preparations far enough advanced to be able to act, not necessarily in Sicily but perhaps in Sardinia, or even in Italy. For this reason he would like to set the date of the operation in June, it being understood that it might have to be carried out in July if the enemy's strength remained as at present.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that to bring back the date at the expense of adequate preparation would not make it any easier to stage an improvised operation during the intervening months. The troops would have been moved into place quite early in the preparatory period, so that they would be standing ready if required.

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed and pointed out that we should probably get some advance indication of an Italian collapse which would enable us to speed up the launching of a smaller force. It would be quite wrong to risk a costly failure by unduly curtailing the period of preparation.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that General Marshall was pleading for the integrity of the operation, and the arguments which he had employed were most convincing. Nevertheless, he was not himself yet convinced that the integrity of the operation could not be maintained with a June date. Some quicker methods might be found of moving troops into place.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that this also had been examined. He pointed out that the period after the fall of Tunis would not be one of inactivity, as a growing air bombardment of Italy would be launched. We ought to place ourselves in a position to do the hard operation against Sicily while being ready to improvise if the enemy weakened. The initial landing in Sicily was on a larger scale than had been envisaged for Operation ROUNDUP.

THE PRESIDENT enquired whether any easement could be secured if the Spanish situation cleared still further during the Spring.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that in any case the troops standing ready to move into Spanish Morocco would be simultaneously training for Sicily.

ADMIRAL KING said that one of the innumerable items which had to be considered in this operation was the provision of armoured landing craft, which he and Lord Louis Mountbatten agreed were essential. None of these were at present available for the U. S. forces. He agreed that the ideal method of launching the operation would be to follow in on the heels of the Germans fleeing from Tunis. He was convinced, however, that the closest we could come to this ideal was July. He would have

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liked June, but felt it impossible to promise such a date.

THE PRESIDENT said that the important point was to retain a flexible mind in the matter so that advantage could be taken of every opportunity.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he had felt embarrassed over the date of this operation remembering as he did the incentive which had existed for hastening TORCH in view of the U. S. elections. In spite of that, it had not proved possible to advance the date.

THE PRIME MINISTER said there had been much admiration in England of the fact that the election had not been allowed to influence in the slightest the course of military events.

After some further discussion it was agreed that (a) the July date should stand subject to an instruction that in the next three weeks, without prejudice to the July date, there should be an intense effort made to try and achieve the favourable June moon as the date of the operation. If at the end of this three weeks, the June date could be fixed, General Eisenhower's instructions could be modified to conform.

(Continued on next page)

(b) The matter of operations from Puerto Rico

The PRIME MINISTER said that it would be advisable to maintain the threat of bombardment against Cuba, but that it should not actually be carried out without further consideration.

THE PRESIDENT agreed.

4. OPERATIONS IN AND FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM

(a) General

The PRIME MINISTER thought that it was very important that there would only be a U.S. division equipped in the U.K. by August 1944. He suggested whether by using the Queen's, the number for September could not be reduced to August.

CORRELL CORNWELL said that the limiting factor in the first half of the year was equipment, and in the second half of the year it was personnel. The equipment would be over in the first half and would be sent to the U.K. in England with no equipment, and take time to be assembled. The Queen's were also being sent to the U.K. in the first half of the year.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the Queen's were

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(b) Cover Plans

The PRIME MINISTER suggested that Norway should again play a part in the cover plans.

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that it might be awkward for the Russian convoys if we gave the Germans cause for reinforcing Norway. He thought that much the best cover would be given by the active preparations going on all over the North African shore. These would not only disguise the objective, but would cause dispersion of enemy forces.

THE PRESIDENT thought that the creation of General Giraud's French army might also play a part in making the enemy think that the southern coast of France was our objective.

(c) Command of the Mediterranean Theatre

The PRIME MINISTER said that he thought the United States had been very generous and broad-minded in the command arrangements. He thought that the most natural method of procedure would be at the appropriate moment to announce that the 8th Army, on entering Tunisia, had passed under the command of General Eisenhower, and that General Alexander had been appointed as his deputy.

(d) The Bomber Offensive from North Africa

The PRIME MINISTER thought that it would be advisable to maintain the threat of bombardment against Rome, but that it should not actually be carried out without further consultation.

THE PRESIDENT agreed.

4. OPERATIONS IN AND FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM

(b) BOLERO

The PRIME MINISTER thought that it was very disappointing that there would only be 4 U.S. divisions equipped in the U.K. by August 15th. He inquired whether by using the Queens, the number for September could not be achieved in August.

GENERAL SOMERVELL said that the limiting factor in the first half of the year was cargo ships, and in the second half of the year it was personnel ships. To move more men over in the first half would only result in their arriving in England with no equipment, and thus their training would be interrupted. The Queens were all fully employed in various parts of the world.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the figures in the

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table were a minimum, and the 4 divisions shown for 15th August would probably be five. The figure for December 31st would probably be 19 rather than 15. Allowance had to be made in the early build-up for the Air Corps personnel.

The PRIME MINISTER inquired whether the initial equipment of 8 tons per man, and the maintenance of 1.3 tons per man per month, could not be reduced. Similarly, could not savings be made on reserves and on vehicles. For the type of operations which would be undertaken in France in 1943, a big advance was not likely. Fighting men for the beaches were the prime essential.

GENERAL SOMERVELL said that the calculation of the rate of build-up had been made on the basis of one ton per man per month. The other factors mentioned by the Prime Minister had also been taken into account, and everything would be done to reduce any unnecessary volume to be transported. He pointed out that there was a 45 day interval between the arrival of a division, and its availability for operations; thus the divisions which were shown as being available on 15th August would have sailed by the 1st July. If the British could lend additional cargo shipping in the early part of the year, the flow of troops could be increased.

The PRIME MINISTER said that it was in the early part of the year that the British shipping shortage would be most acute. He suggested that it should be recorded that the figures shown in the report were a minimum, and that every effort would be made to increase them.

(c) Amphibious Operations in 1943 from the U.K.

The PRIME MINISTER suggested that the word "vigorously" should be inserted before the word "exploiting" in sub-para. (ii) of this section of the report. This was agreed to.

The PRESIDENT inquired whether an operation against the Brest Peninsula could not be staged instead of against Cherbourg. The advantages of the former were very much greater. He also inquired about the date proposed for the operations.

LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN said that the date for the Channel Island operations had been chosen so as to fit in with Operation HUSKY. A difficulty had arisen in that the armoured craft required by the Americans for HUSKY would have to come from the British Channel Assault Force. A telegram had been sent to the Admiralty asking that the output of these craft should be doubled so as to produce 160 more in the next four months. This might be done provided 400 additional Scripps Ford conversion engines were allocated to the U.K. from the U.S.A. He understood this point was under investigation.

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether some Ford tank engines could not be produced and taken by air transport from the U.S.A. to the U.K. He understood that the engine was much the same.

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GENERAL SOMERVELL said that there was a difference in the engines, though the same facilities were required to produce both. He could not at present state the production possibilities.

The PRIME MINISTER suggested that some reduction of tank engine output could be accepted if necessary.

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed.

LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN said that the landing craft resources would only permit of an initial assault by 2 brigade groups with an immediate follow-up of one brigade group and some armour. This could only be increased with U.S. help.

ADMIRAL KING said that all available U.S. resources would be devoted to operation HUSKY.

On the question of command THE PRESIDENT inquired whether sufficient drive would be applied if only a Chief of Staff were appointed. He hoped there would not be a long delay before a Supreme Commander was selected.

GENERAL MARSHALL said he understood it was a question of the availability of the right man.

SIR ALAN BROOKE thought that the Chief of Staff, if a man with the right qualities were chosen, could do what was necessary in the early stages.

The PRIME MINISTER suggested that in any case an American Deputy to the Supreme Commander should be appointed.

SIR ALAN BROOKE and GENERAL MARSHALL agreed.

The PRESIDENT suggested that the last sentence of this section should be omitted. This was agreed to.

5. PACIFIC AND FAR EAST THEATRE

The PRESIDENT said that he was disturbed to find that this section contained no reference to operations in or from China. Operations in Burma, though desirable, would not have the direct effect upon the Chinese which was necessary to sustain and increase their war effort. Similarly an island to island advance across the Pacific would take too long to reduce the Japanese power. Some other method of striking at Japan must be found. The opportunity was presented by Japan's shipping situation. She began the war with 6,000,000 tons. In the first year of the war 1,000,000 tons net had been sunk, leaving her with 5,000,000. When this was reduced to 4,000,000, Japan would be hard pressed to maintain her garrison in the chain of islands stretching all the way from Burma to New Guinea, and would have to start pulling in her lines. The most effective weapon against shipping was the submarine,

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and the U.S. submarines were achieving notable results. There was another method of striking at the Japanese shipping, and that was by attacking the routes running close to the Asiatic shore from Korea down to Siam. This could be done by aircraft operating from China. He thought that 200 aircraft should be operating in China by April. They could spend most of their time in attacks on shipping, but occasionally they could make a special raid on Japan. There seemed to be two methods of achieving this object: either the planes could be based and maintained in China or else they could be based in India, moving to China each time for a mission, returning to their bases in India on completion. An indication of the shortage of Japanese shipping was the fact that they were buying up junks to replace coastal steamers, so that they could employ these on their maintenance routes.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that he was fully aware of the need for reinforcing the U.S. Air Force in China. One group of aircraft was just preparing to leave the U.S.A., and he would examine, when he got to India, the best method of operating the aircraft. He hoped that effective operations would start before April. It should be remembered, however, that there were large demands for transport aircraft in other theatres, and these could not be neglected. Nevertheless, he hoped to have 135 - 150 transport planes operating on the India - China route by the end of the Fall.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the provision of transport planes for India competed with urgent requirements for HUSKY, and for cross-channel operations. Nevertheless, he felt it was vital to step up the effort in China, and this would be done.

The PRIME MINISTER expressed his agreement with the President's proposals. He suggested that the document should now be reconsidered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and amendments arising out of the present discussion should be incorporated in a final edition. The document would then fittingly embody the results of a remarkable period of sustained work.

THE PRESIDENT agreed with this proposal, and expressed his congratulations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the results which they had achieved.

February 11, 1943.

Dear McCown:

As I have relieved Captain McCrea, I opened your letter addressed to the Naval Aide which arrived this morning.

Thank you very much for your correct action in safeguarding the document left on the President's desk on the MEMPHIS. In order that we may know what the document is and what subject it covers, I am asking Admiral Ingram to forward it to the White House whenever an officer messenger may become available to bring it.

You will be interested to know that the President and party seemed to be in fine fettle after their history making journey and I am sure that they all enjoyed their time with the MEMPHIS.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely yours,

Wilson Brown,  
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,  
Naval Aide to the President.

Captain H. Y. McCown, U.S.N.,  
U.S.S. MEMPHIS,  
c/o Fleet Post Office,  
New York, N.Y.

U. S. S. MEMPHIS

February 6, 1943.

Naval Aide to President,  
White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear John:


The steward discovered a secret document, copy #1 conference notes, on the President's desk after his departure. He brought it to me and said he had not read it. I looked to see what it was, did not read it and immediately locked it up.

I have turned it over to Captain Braine, Chief of Staff to Admiral Ingram, in a sealed envelope, marked secret and explained what it was. In case you want it, communicate with him and he will be in a position to get it to you or destroy as desired, whereas I would probably be at sea.

The MEMPHIS will long remember the President's visit. Kindly thank the President for the excellent picture and I wish to thank you for your part in getting it to us. We are framing it and will place it in the Wardroom, as more people can see it there than could, were it in my cabin.

Please give Admiral McIntyre and Mr. Hopkins my regards, and best of luck with your new command.

Sincerely,

  
H.Y. McCOWN

Captain John L. McCrea, U.S.N.  
Naval Aide to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

February 5, 1943

AMEMBASSY,  
LONDON.

FOR MATTHEWS.

Please see that the following message from the President be delivered to the Prime Minister as early as practicable upon his return:

QUOTE In accordance with Casablanca conversations, we have reduced the exchange rate of the dollar in French North and West Africa 25 points, from 75 to 50 francs to the dollar, and the pound rate has been correspondingly changed. In view of our common undertakings in the French situation, I earnestly request that the exchange rate in the territories under the control of the Fighting French be brought into conformity with the rate which has now been established in North and West Africa by raising the rate from 43 to 50 francs to the dollar and that a corresponding change be made in the pound franc exchange rate. I know you will realize the importance of immediate action in this particular. UNQUOTE.

Eu;RA:GwY:ACK  
PA/D:JGD

WASHINGTON  
LONDON  
LONDON

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*adm Bureau  
for priv. files  
WS.*

MEMO

FOR: MISS TULLY:

IN VIEW OF THE CONTENTS OF  
THE ATTACHED, THOUGHT YOU  
MAY WANT THIS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S  
PRIVATE FILES

FAUVER,  
TELEGRAPH ROOM.

*Confidential  
trip file*

CASABLANCA  
January 17, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT'S FILES

At 1200 this date, the President received M. General Chas. A. Nogues, Resident General at Rabat. Also present were Major General G. S. Patton, jr., Commanding General, 1st Armored Corps; Brigadier General William H. Wilbur, 1st Armored Corps; Mr. Robert D. Murphy, Special Representative of the President on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, North African Forces; Captain John L. McCrea, Naval Aide to the President, and Lieutenant Colonel Elliott Roosevelt, Air Corps Reserve.

The President greeted General Nogues with the remark that "I am very pleased to meet you, General, and I must say that you look exactly like your photograph." The General stated that all of Morocco was very proud to have the President here and that the President's presence in Morocco was a source of much surprise to the General.

The President stated that he did not speak very good French and so therefore thought that the conversation should be carried on with the aid of Brigadier General Wilbur, as interpreter. The conversation started out thus, but before long the President and General Nogues were conversing freely in French.

The President stated that he trusted that North Africa had seen the last of the Germans for some time, to which the General readily agreed. The President inquired as to the attitude of the Germans resident in North Africa during the period of the Armistice. General Nogues stated that at all times they were haughty and overbearing, and that everyone was glad to see them depart. He also stated that they were now being well cared for by the French in various concentration camps.

General Patton remarked that the fine cooperation existing between the French and ourselves was largely due to the splendid cooperation which General Nogues had given us. The President remarked that he felt that the newspapers had been making much out of a situation which did not exist, namely, that there was confusion and misunderstanding between the French, the Americans and the British in North Africa, and that the period for "name calling is now over." General Nogues assured the President that everyone was most anxious to cooperate with the United States forces, looking towards the ultimate defeat of the enemy.

The President requested General Nogues' advice as to whether or not, he, the President, should ask the Sultan of Morocco to call on him. Specifically, the President asked if it would be in order for him to entertain the Sultan at lunch or dinner. To this, both General Nogues and General Patton replied that it would be a most gracious thing for the President to do, and that it would definitely cement relations between the Arabs and ourselves. It was then explained that amongst the Arabs no higher compliment can be paid than to invite one to break bread. General Nogues stated that it was equivalent to becoming one's blood brother or fighting a campaign with him. In other words, it cemented relations between the host and guest. The President stated that he would despatch an invitation to the Sultan which he trusted could be delivered in time for the Sultan to make preparations to come to Casablanca. At this point, General Patton stated that the letter should be delivered by

no one less than a General officer, in company with General Nogues. The President stated that when the letter was ready to go, he would give it to his Naval Aide, as his personal representative, who would go in company with an Army general and General Nogues, and deliver the letter to the Sultan.

Discussion was had about the progress being made in repairing ships that were sunk in Casablanca harbor incident to the occupation. As to this, General Nogues could remark only generally, stating that he was not familiar with the details of such repairs. It was stated, however, by General Patton, that it would be most difficult to make repairs to these ships unless in some way they could be moved to American shipyards; that the conversion of the metric system plans to our units of measurement would be a job that would require at least a year's work. Conversation along this line was further pursued in connection with our field pieces and small arms. It was remarked by General Patton that much of our field piece ammunition was interchangeable with the French, but that the small arms situation was another matter. It would be much the easier, the General stated, to equip the French troops with small arms of our manufacture.

The matter of political prisoners was then discussed. General Nogues stated that for the most part the Jews had now been released from the concentration camps. It was also stated that the Jews, especially those in Algeria, had raised the point that they wish restored to them at once the right of suffrage. The President stated that the answer to that was very simple, namely, that there just weren't going to be any elections, so the Jews need not worry about the privilege of voting. Mr. Murphy remarked that the Jews in North Africa were very much disappointed that "the war for liberation" had not immediately resulted in their being given their complete freedom. The President stated that he felt the whole Jewish problem should be studied very carefully and that progress should be definitely planned. In other words, the number of Jews engaged in the practice of the professions (law, medicine, etc.) should be definitely limited to the percentage that the Jewish population in North Africa bears to the whole of the North African population. Such a plan would therefore permit the Jews to engage in the professions, at the same time would not permit them to overcrowd the professions, and would present an unanswerable argument that they were being given their full rights. To the foregoing, General Nogues agreed generally, stating at the same time that it would be a sad thing for the French to win the war merely to open the way for the Jews to control the professions and the business world of North Africa. The President stated that his plan would further eliminate the specific and understandable complaints which the Germans bore towards the Jews in Germany, namely, that while they represented a small part of the population, over fifty percent of the lawyers, doctors, school teachers, college professors, etc., in Germany, were Jews.

At 12:45 p.m., General Nogues, accompanied by General Patton and Brigadier General Wilbur, withdrew to proceed to the villa occupied by Prime Minister Churchill.

NOTE: Shortly after the above interview started, General Patton whispered to Captain McCrea that General Nogues was scheduled to see the Prime Minister at 12:15 p.m.; that he, General Patton, had been informed by the Secretary to the Chiefs of Staff, to this effect. General Patton asked whether or

not he should make an announcement to the President at 12:15 about the scheduled conference with Mr. Churchill. To this, Captain McCrea replied that under no circumstances should he make such an announcement, and that the President would indicate when his conversation with General Nogues was at an end. About 12:30, General Patton again stated to Captain McCrea that he felt that he should indicate that the hour for the Prime Minister's conference with General Nogues had passed, and that the party should proceed to the Prime Minister's villa. Captain McCrea again told General Patton that under no circumstances should such an announcement be made. Upon the conclusion of General Nogues' conference with the President, Captain McCrea informed the President as to what had taken place between General Patton and him.

John McCrea

CASABLANCA  
January 17, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT'S FILES

At 4:20 p.m., January 17, 1943, the President received General Henri Giraud, Commander of the French Armies in North Africa. Present also were Lieutenant General Wayne M. Clark, U. S. Army, Minister Robert D. Murphy and Captain John L. McCrea, U. S. Navy.

After pleasantries had been exchanged, the conversation got down to specific cases. General Giraud early stated that there was only one thing that mattered in all the activity of today and that was the future of France. He stated that in his judgment, all personal ambitions should be subordinated to this thought and that he for one was most willing to do this. He stated that he believed there should be no discussions on a political level and that the civil administrations of French possessions and protectorates in Africa should remain as they are now established. Here followed a discussion of sovereignty, the President pointing out that sovereignty in the United States and in the nation of France rested in the people; this in distinction to sovereignty in Great Britain, which rests in the King. The President pointed out that as a legalistic and constitutional matter it was quite correct to say that there could be no change in the French civil set-up until such time as the people of France were able to exercise their inherent rights in this regard. The President stated that, for example, in his judgment M. Lebrun was still the President of France regardless of the fall of the French government and that he would remain the President of France until the French people had an opportunity to again exercise their political rights. To the foregoing, General Giraud agreed.

The President stated that the discussion could therefore be narrowed down to two items. First, the establishment of an army by the French to assist in throwing the enemy out of the French protectorates in Africa and out of the French home land, and second, a determination on the part of all concerned that there will be no political discussions until the country has been freed of the enemy. Enlarging on the first point, the President asked General Giraud if, in his judgment it would be possible for French North Africa to raise and support an Army of 400,000 men. To this, General Giraud replied in the negative, stating that while troops were available, equipment and white officers and white non-commissioned officers were not available. The President stated that he had been informed by General Nogues that many French officers and non-commissioned officers were surreptitiously leaving France and crossing the Pyrennes into Spain, and that the problem seemed to be to get them to North Africa. The President stated that Spain had set a very fine precedent in permitting the Roumanian King, Carol, and his mistress, Magda Lupescu, to "escape" into Portugal, from whence it was possible for them to proceed to the Western Hemisphere. In this regard, General Giraud remarked that Spain desperately needed phosphates from North Africa, and an agreement might be concluded whereby for every shipload of phosphates the Spaniards got, North Africa in return would receive a shipload of Army evacuees.

The President then remarked that he felt it would be a very splendid thing if Generals Giraud and DeGaulle could get together and handle the military situation for Africa, and together with a leading civilian, form a "Committee for the Liberation of France." General Giraud met the suggestion with enthusiasm. He stated that he was very certain that he and General DeGaulle could work out some military arrangement. General Giraud asked if there were any objection to bringing Madagascar, Reunion, etc., into the African picture. The President stated that he felt that for the time being, all French territory outside the African continent should be excluded from the agreement. This, the President pointed out, would permit DeGaulle to continue in control of the territory over which he now exercises such control, it would permit Robert, as Vichy representative, to continue in control of the French possessions in the Western Hemisphere, etc., etc. "It just occurs to me that by so doing, a number of untoward situations may be thus avoided." The President stated that with the inauguration of the "Committee for the Liberation of France," the French Imperial Council should be disbanded. General Giraud remarked that he was already satisfied with the manner in which M. Boisson was administering Dakar and General Nogues was administering Rabat, but that Algeria represented a different situation; that there was no one at the moment whom he thought capable of administering that area.

The President asked General Giraud as to the Jewish situation in Algeria. This was discussed at some length and the President set forth to General Giraud his views as he had done in this connection to General Nogues. General Giraud did not think the Jewish problem an insurmountable one.

General Giraud then asked that he be permitted to express to the President his great admiration for the Atlantic Charter, adding that he felt that pronouncement held great hope for all occupied countries and small countries throughout the world.

General Giraud spoke at length about the continental campaign to crush Germany for once and for all. He stated that in his judgment, on the conclusion of this war, Germany should be occupied. He said that this had also been his conviction at the end of the last war. The President stated that it was well known that both General Foch and General Pershing wanted to occupy Germany, but that this was denied for political considerations, and that the un wisdom of this policy had long ago become apparent to all. General Giraud then dramatically stated that it would be observed that he wore no ribbons or decorations; that he had foresworn wearing them until he could march down Unter Den Linden at the head of the occupational forces of Germany.

At the President's suggestion, General Giraud then told in detail of his escape from Germany and his subsequent escape from France to North Africa. The details of the General's escape from Germany are fantastic and could hardly be conceived by a writer of fiction.

At 5:30 p.m., the interview terminated with much cordiality, and General Giraud, General Clark and Mr. Murphy withdrew to proceed to the villa occupied by the Prime Minister.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

**SECRET**

19 January 1943

The President received General Henri Giraud at 12:00 noon this date. Present also were Mr. Harry Hopkins, Mr. Robert D. Murphy, Captain John L. McCrea, Lieutenant Colonel Elliott Roosevelt, and Captain A. Beaufre, Aide-de-camp to General Giraud.

The President stated to General Giraud that he had been giving consideration to suggesting the formation of a "Committee for the Liberation of France," to consist of General Giraud, General DeGaulle, and a civilian. The President stated that he recognized the choice of a civilian would no doubt be a matter of some concern to both Generals Giraud and DeGaulle. In this connection, he stated that there were no doubt many Frenchmen who would be unacceptable to Generals Giraud and DeGaulle, and that the important thing to do was to agree on someone of experience as a civil administrator, and unquestioned honesty. The President stated that he did not wish to appear as suggesting anyone, but that he had heard much favorable comment about M. Roger Cambon and M. Boisson. General Giraud stated that M. Petryon too had much in his favor. The President stated that under the circumstances, of course, General Giraud would be the senior member of such a committee and that General DeGaulle might be designated as Chief of Staff, or Inspector-General, or some such convenient title. The civilian member of the committee would be the Aide for Civil Administration, and that it was expected this latter member would relieve General Giraud of many of the duties which he now performs in connection with the civil administration. The impression that I gathered was that the formation of such a committee would meet with the approval of General Giraud. "No distractions," said the General, "should be permitted to interfere with the conduct of the war."

In response to a question by the President, General Giraud stated that practically all the political prisoners in North Africa had now been set free. It was stated that many of these prisoners had been confined since the start of the war. He stated that the political prisoners remaining in confinement were so held because of other crimes with which they were charged.

The President asked General Giraud that if the value of the franc were re-peged in North Africa giving a higher value to the franc, would anyone stand to make a fortune out of such a revaluation. Both General Giraud and Mr. Murphy then explained to the President that there were no large money operators in North Africa. It was stated that no

19 January 1943

doubt a few people would stand to benefit by such a revaluation, but not in an alarming amount. The President then asked if anyone in France with a considerable amount of francs would stand to benefit by such a re-pegging. Both General Giraud and Mr. Murphy then explained to the President that the French Colonial monetary system is entirely divorced from the Bank of France, and that a revaluation such as proposed by the President would affect only the colonial franc and not the franc of the Bank of France.

The President stated that he had met with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the evening of January 18 and that the subject of equipping the North African French Army had been given much consideration. The President stated that he was pleased to inform General Giraud that General Marshall was enthusiastic about the prospects of such an army and that he (General Marshall) had stated to the President that it was his intention to see that such an army was equipped with our latest and best material rather than from our surplus supplies of older material. General Giraud received this statement with much satisfaction and assured the President that a French army so equipped would give a good account of itself against the enemy.

General Giraud then raised the question of propaganda. He stated that propaganda was a well-recognized weapon, but that it had to be used with care. Specifically, he stated that propaganda intended for the French people must be directed by Frenchmen. He admitted that the United Nations had an interest in such propaganda and that it was only right that our interests be given consideration, but that in the final analysis, a Frenchman should pass on propaganda directed towards the French people. To this the President and Mr. Murphy agreed.

At 12:40 p.m., the President and General Giraud withdrew to the terrace where motion and still pictures were made. After a number of shots had thus been made, the President directed Mr. Hopkins, Captain McCrea, and Captain Beaufre to join the party, and additional pictures were made.

At 12:50 p.m., General Giraud and his aide, Captain Beaufre, withdrew.

*John L. McCrea*

JOHN L. MCCREA  
Captain, U.S. Navy

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

4 February 1943

(NOTE: The following brief summary of the conversation which took place between the President and General DeGaulle on the evening of 22 January 1943 at Casablanca would not be complete without stating that the following observations were made by me from a relatively poor point of vantage -- a crack in a door slightly ajar. In view of the fact that General DeGaulle talked in so low a tone of voice as to be inaudible to me, I cannot supply any comments made by him.)

The President met General DeGaulle with much cordiality and, after the exchange of pleasantries, proceeded to tell General DeGaulle the reason for his, the President's and the Prime Minister's visit to North Africa. The President stated that after the occupation of Morocco had become an accomplished fact, it seemed most necessary to him, late in 1942, that plans be made for the calendar year 1943. The President stated that it had originally been intended that Mr. Stalin attend the conference, but that due to the urgency of the Russian Campaign and the fact that Mr. Stalin occupied the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Russian forces, he had been compelled to decline the invitation to be present. In brief, the President remarked that the whole purpose of his meeting with Mr. Churchill was "to get on with the war," and supply an answer to the question, "Where do we go from here?"

The President proceeded to discuss the political situation in North Africa, stating that he recognized that there existed many points of view, almost as many as there were people involved, and that accordingly, there were some conflicting thoughts. The President added, however, that so far as he was able to determine, there were no substantial differences which could not be readily reconciled.

The President stated that he supposed that the collaboration on the part of General Eisenhower with Admiral Darlan had been the source of some wonderment to General DeGaulle. Continuing, the President stated that he had felt from the outset that the problem of North Africa should be regarded as a military one and that the political situation should be entirely incident to the military situation. General Eisenhower had found that Admiral Darlan was very willing to collaborate with the end in view of bringing as much pressure as possible to bear on the enemy at the earliest possible moment. To this end General Eisenhower expressed his willingness to collaborate to the utmost with Admiral Darlan. The President stated that he thoroughly approved of General Eisenhower's decision in this matter and that real progress was being made when the Admiral met his untimely death.

**SECRET**

Regraded Unclassified

4 February 1943

At this point General DeGaulle evidently made some remark to the President with reference to the sovereignty of French Morocco. The President continued, stating that the sovereignty of the occupied territory was not under consideration, that none of the contenders for power in North Africa had the right to say that he, and only he, represented the sovereignty of France. The President pointed out that the sovereignty of France, as in our country, rested with the people, but that unfortunately the people of France were not now in a position to exercise that sovereignty. It was, therefore, necessary for the military commander in the area to accept the political situation as he found it and to collaborate with those in authority in the country at the time that the occupation took place so long as those in authority chose to be of assistance to the military commander. The President stated that any other course of action would have been indefensive.

The President again alluded to the lack of power on the part of the French people at this time to assert their sovereignty. The President pointed out that it was, therefore, necessary to resort to the legal analogy of "trusteeship" and that it was his view that the Allied Nations fighting in French territory at the moment were fighting for the liberation of France and that they should hold the political situation in "trusteeship" for the French people. In other words, the President stated that France is in the position of a little child unable to look out and fend for itself and that in such a case, a court would appoint a trustee to do the necessary. The President stated that he had been twice in consultation with General Giraud and that General Giraud was very definite on the one point that mattered; namely, "to get on with the war." The President further remarked that General Giraud recognized fully the conflicting political situation, but stated that he would, under no circumstances, let it divert him from the immediate and urgent task of freeing French territory of the enemy.

The President stated that following the Civil War in our home country, there was conflict of political thought and that while many mistakes were made, nevertheless, the people realized that personal pride and personal prejudices must often be subordinated for the good of the country as a whole, and the contending French leaders could well follow such a program. The only course of action that would save France, said the President, was for all of her loyal sons to unite to defeat the enemy, and that when the war was ended, victorious France could once again assert the political sovereignty which was hers over her homeland and her empire. At such a time all political considerations would be laid before the sovereign people themselves and that by the use of the democratic processes inherent throughout France and its empire, political differences would be resolved.

After about 20 minutes of conversation, General DeGaulle, with some show of cordiality withdrew.

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JOHN L. McGREA  
Captain, U.S. Navy

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In response to a question by the President, General Giraud stated that practically all the political prisoners in North Africa had now been set free. It was stated that many of these prisoners had been confined since the start of the war. He stated that the political prisoners remaining in confinement were so held because of other crimes with which they were charged.

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At 12:40 p.m., the President and General Giraud withdrew to the terrace where motion and still pictures were made. After a number of shots had thus been made, the President directed Mr. Hopkins, Captain McCrea, and Captain Beaufre to join the party, and additional pictures were made.

At 12:50 p.m., General Giraud and his aide, Captain Beaufre, withdrew.

JOHN L. McCREA  
Captain, U.S. Navy

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CASABLANCA  
January 17, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT'S FILES

At 1200 this date, the President received M. General Chas. A. Nogues, Resident General at Rabat. Also present were Major General G. S. Patton, Jr., Commanding General, 1st Armored Corps; Brigadier General William H. Wilbur, 1st Armored Corps; Mr. Robert D. Murphy, Special Representative of the President on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, North African Forces; Captain John L. McGrea, Naval Aide to the President, and Lieutenant Colonel Elliott Roosevelt, Air Corps Reserve.

The President greeted General Nogues with the remark that "I am very pleased to meet you, General, and I must say that you look exactly like your photograph." The General stated that all of Morocco was very proud to have the President here and that the President's presence in Morocco was a source of much surprise to the General.

The President stated that he did not speak very good French and so therefore thought that the conversation should be carried on with the aid of Brigadier General Wilbur, as interpreter. The conversation started out thus, but before long the President and General Nogues were conversing freely in French.

The President stated that he trusted that North Africa had seen the last of the Germans for some time, to which the General readily agreed. The President inquired as to the attitude of the Germans resident in North Africa during the period of the Armistice. General Nogues stated that at all times they were haughty and overbearing, and that everyone was glad to see them depart. He also stated that they were now being well cared for by the French in various concentration camps.

General Patton remarked that the fine cooperation existing between the French and ourselves was largely due to the splendid cooperation which General Nogues had given us. The President remarked that he felt that the newspapers had been making much out of a situation which did not exist, namely, that there was confusion and misunderstanding between the French, the Americans and the British in North Africa, and that the period for "name calling is now over." General Nogues assured the President that everyone was most anxious to cooperate with the United States forces, looking towards the ultimate defeat of the enemy.

The President requested General Nogues' advice as to whether or not, he, the President, should ask the Sultan of Morocco to call on him. Specifically, the President asked if it would be in order for him to entertain the Sultan at lunch or dinner. To this, both General Nogues and General Patton replied that it would be a most gracious thing for the President to do, and that it would definitely cement relations between the Arabs and ourselves. It was then explained that amongst the Arabs no higher compliment can be paid than to invite one to break bread. General Nogues stated that it was equivalent to becoming one's blood brother or fighting a campaign with him. In other words, it cemented relations between the host and guest. The President stated that he would despatch an invitation to the Sultan which he trusted could be delivered in time for the Sultan to make preparations to come to Casablanca. At this point, General Patton stated that the letter should be delivered by

no one less than a General officer, in company with General Nogues. The President stated that when the letter was ready to go, he would give it to his Naval Aide, as his personal representative, who would go in company with an Army general and General Nogues, and deliver the letter to the Sultan.

Discussion was had about the progress being made in repairing ships that were sunk in Casablanca harbor incident to the occupation. As to this, General Nogues could remark only generally, stating that he was not familiar with the details of such repairs. It was stated, however, by General Patton, that it would be most difficult to make repairs to these ships unless in some way they could be moved to American shipyards; that the conversion of the metric system plans to our units of measurement would be a job that would require at least a year's work. Conversation along this line was further pursued in connection with our field pieces and small arms. It was remarked by General Patton that much of our field piece ammunition was interchangeable with the French, but that the small arms situation was another matter. It would be much the easier, the General stated, to equip the French troops with small arms of our manufacture.

The matter of political prisoners was then discussed. General Nogues stated that for the most part the Jews had now been released from the concentration camps. It was also stated that the Jews, especially those in Algeria, had raised the point that they wish restored to them at once the right of suffrage. The President stated that the answer to that was very simple, namely, that there just weren't going to be any elections, so the Jews need not worry about the privilege of voting. Mr. Murphy remarked that the Jews in North Africa were very much disappointed that "the war for liberation" had not immediately resulted in their being given their complete freedom. The President stated that he felt the whole Jewish problem should be studied very carefully and that progress should be definitely planned. In other words, the number of Jews engaged in the practice of the professions (law, medicine, etc.) should be definitely limited to the percentage that the Jewish population in North Africa bears to the whole of the North African population. Such a plan would therefore permit the Jews to engage in the professions, at the same time would not permit them to overcrowd the professions, and would present an unanswerable argument that they were being given their full rights. To the foregoing, General Nogues agreed generally, stating at the same time that it would be a sad thing for the French to win the war merely to open the way for the Jews to control the professions and the business world of North Africa. The President stated that his plan would further eliminate the specific and understandable complaints which the Germans bore towards the Jews in Germany, namely, that while they represented a small part of the population, over fifty percent of the lawyers, doctors, school teachers, college professors, etc., in Germany, were Jews.

At 12:45 p.m., General Nogues, accompanied by General Patton and Brigadier General Wilbur, withdrew to proceed to the villa occupied by Prime Minister Churchill.

NOTE: Shortly after the above interview started, General Patton whispered to Captain McCrea that General Nogues was scheduled to see the Prime Minister at 12:15 p.m.; that he, General Patton, had been informed by the Secretary to the Chiefs of Staff, to this effect. General Patton asked whether or



CASABLANCA  
January 17, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT'S FILES

At 4:20 p.m., January 17, 1943, the President received General Henri Giraud, Commander of the French Armies in North Africa. Present also were Lieutenant General Wayne M. Clark, U. S. Army, Minister Robert D. Murphy and Captain John L. McCrea, U. S. Navy.

After pleasantries had been exchanged, the conversation got down to specific cases. General Giraud early stated that there was only one thing that mattered in all the activity of today and that was the future of France. He stated that in his judgment, all personal ambitions should be subordinated to this thought and that he for one was most willing to do this. He stated that he believed there should be no discussions on a political level and that the civil administrations of French possessions and protectorates in Africa should remain as they are now established. Here followed a discussion of sovereignty, the President pointing out that sovereignty in the United States and in the nation of France rested in the people; this in distinction to sovereignty in Great Britain, which rests in the King. The President pointed out that as a legalistic and constitutional matter it was quite correct to say that there could be no change in the French civil set-up until such time as the people of France were able to exercise their inherent rights in this regard. The President stated that, for example, in his judgment M. Lebrun was still the President of France regardless of the fall of the French government and that he would remain the President of France until the French people had an opportunity to again exercise their political rights. To the foregoing, General Giraud agreed.

The President stated that the discussion could therefore be narrowed down to two items. First, the establishment of an army by the French to assist in throwing the enemy out of the French protectorates in Africa and out of the French home land, and second, a determination on the part of all concerned that there will be no political discussions until the country has been freed of the enemy. Enlarging on the first point, the President asked General Giraud if, in his judgment it would be possible for French North Africa to raise and support an Army of 400,000 men. To this, General Giraud replied in the negative, stating that while troops were available, equipment and white officers and white non-commissioned officers were not available. The President stated that he had been informed by General Nogues that many French officers and non-commissioned officers were surreptitiously leaving France and crossing the Pyrennes into Spain, and that the problem seemed to be to get them to North Africa. The President stated that Spain had set a very fine precedent in permitting the Roumanian King, Carol, and his mistress, Magda Lupescu, to "escape" into Portugal, from whence it was possible for them to proceed to the Western Hemisphere. In this regard, General Giraud remarked that Spain desperately needed phosphates from North Africa, and an agreement might be concluded whereby for every shipload of phosphates the Spaniards got, North Africa in return would receive a shipload of Army evacuees.

The President then remarked that he felt it would be a very splendid thing if Generals Giraud and DeGaulle could get together and handle the military situation for Africa, and together with a leading civilian, form a "Committee for the Liberation of France." General Giraud met the suggestion with enthusiasm. He stated that he was very certain that he and General DeGaulle could work out some military arrangement. General Giraud asked if there were any objection to bringing Madagascar, Reunion, etc., into the African picture. The President stated that he felt that for the time being, all French territory outside the African continent should be excluded from the agreement. This, the President pointed out, would permit DeGaulle to continue in control of the territory over which he now exercises such control, it would permit Robert, as Vichy representative, to continue in control of the French possessions in the Western Hemisphere, etc., etc. "It just occurs to me that by so doing, a number of untoward situations may be thus avoided." The President stated that with the inauguration of the "Committee for the Liberation of France," the French Imperial Council should be disbanded. General Giraud remarked that he was already satisfied with the manner in which M. Boisson was administering Dakar and General Nogues was administering Rabat, but that Algeria represented a different situation; that there was no one at the moment whom he thought capable of administering that area.

The President asked General Giraud as to the Jewish situation in Algeria. This was discussed at some length and the President set forth to General Giraud his views as he had done in this connection to General Nogues. General Giraud did not think the Jewish problem an insurmountable one.

General Giraud then asked that he be permitted to express to the President his great admiration for the Atlantic Charter, adding that he felt that pronouncement held great hope for all occupied countries and small countries throughout the world.

General Giraud spoke at length about the continental campaign to crush Germany for once and for all. He stated that in his judgment, on the conclusion of this war, Germany should be occupied. He said that this had also been his conviction at the end of the last war. The President stated that it was well known that both General Foch and General Pershing wanted to occupy Germany, but that this was denied for political considerations, and that the unwisdom of this policy had long ago become apparent to all. General Giraud then dramatically stated that it would be observed that he wore no ribbons or decorations; that he had foresworn wearing them until he could march down Unter Den Linden at the head of the occupational forces of Germany.

At the President's suggestion, General Giraud then told in detail of his escape from Germany and his subsequent escape from France to North Africa. The details of the General's escape from Germany are fantastic and could hardly be conceived by a writer of fiction.

At 5:30 p.m., the interview terminated with much cordiality, and General Giraud, General Clark and Mr. Murphy withdrew to proceed to the villa occupied by the Prime Minister.

**SECRET**

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

From: COMNAVEU LONDON

To: ADMIRALS HORNE, LEAHY

031159 NCR 121

MESSAGE HAS BEEN TRANSMITTED BY DE GAULLE VIA EISENHOWER TO GIRAUD PROPOSING SEND CATROUX IMMEDIATELY ALGIERS "TO DISCUSS WITH YOU THE MISSION WHICH THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE EXPECTS TO SEND IN ACCORD WITH CASABLANCA AGREEMENT". DE GAULLE ASKS NO PUBLICITY FOR CATROUX VISIT EXCEPT BY MUTUALLY AGREED COMMUNIQES. IF GIRAUD ACCEPTS THESE SUGGESTIONS CATROUX WILL LEAVE SATURDAY AND STOP IN ALGIERS SEVERAL DAYS ENROUTE SYRIA. LATER CATROUX WILL RETURN TO ALGIERS TO REMAIN AS HEAD OF MISSION. OTHER MEMBERS ARE BEING CHOSEN IN AGREEMENT BETWEEN CATROUX AND GIRAUD. NAMES PROPOSED INCLUDE ADMIRAL DARGENLIEU FOR NAVAL QUESTIONS, COLONEL VAUTPIN, A REGULAR OFFICER RECENTLY ESCAPED FROM FRANCE, AND LEON MARCHEL FORMERLY FIRST SECRETARY FRENCH EMBASSY WASHINGTON.

DISTRIBUTION:

10 (ADM. HORNE).....ACTION  
NAVAIDE (FOR ADM. LEAHY)....FILE

**SECRET**

For Release to Brazilian and United States Saturday morning papers, January 30, 1943.

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JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF BRAZIL AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

The President of Brazil and the President of the United States met at an unannounced place in Brazil on Thursday.

The two presidents lunched together, reviewed and inspected Brazilian and United States armed forces - Army, Navy and Air - and spent the evening conferring on problems of the world war as a whole and the joint Brazilian-United States effort in particular.

They discussed the continuing U-boat menace from the West Indies to and including the South Atlantic, and President Vargas announced redoubled efforts on the part of Brazil to cope with these dangers.

President Roosevelt told his colleague of the important results of the Casablanca Conference, and of the determination that the peace which will come cannot be permitted to allow the Axis to perpetuate any attack on civilization in future years.

He pointed out that the expedition to North Africa has for the time being eliminated the possibility of a threat of a Nazi-held Dakar to the freedom of the Americas at the narrow point of the Atlantic oceans.

Both presidents are in complete accord that it must be definitely and permanently assured that Dakar and the coasts of

West Africa can never again under any set of circumstances be permitted to become an invasion or blockade threat against the Americas.

The two presidents said:

"We have had opportunity to survey the future safety of the Americas. We believe that every one of the republics is equally affected and interested.

"In unity there is strength.

"Brazil and the United States seek to make the Atlantic Ocean safe for all.

"We deeply appreciate the help that our neighbors, almost unanimously, are giving to the great cause of democracy throughout the world."

*Getulio Vargas*

*Franklin D. Roosevelt*

## U. S. S. HUMBOLDT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESS FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT:

The Casablanca Conference was so important in the war effort that President Roosevelt felt that he should delay his return to Washington for a short period in order that he might give an informal report thereon to the President of Brazil, and to confer on increased mutual aid in several particulars.

The presidents are old friends and the conversations were in every way profitable and timely.

President Roosevelt on his trip both to and from Africa has had the chance to visit and inspect a number of vital points in the "Ferry Command," which is performing an almost incredible task in sending every day planes and a great quantity of essential equipment from the United States to North Africa, to the Middle East, to Russia, to the Burma front, and to the air squadrons in China.

- PRESIDENTIAL SPECIAL TRINIDADIAN -  
JAN. 29, 1943 WIRELESS

EVENTS HAVE PROVEN THAT THE ALLIES NOW HAVE THE MEANS WITH WHICH TO WAGE A DECISIVE WAR, AND IN THEIR LONG ORDEAL OF DEFEATS AND DISASTERS, THEIR LEADERS HAVE LEARNED HOW TO WAGE AN EFFECTIVE WAR. THIS, WHEN ROOSEVELT AND CHURCHILL SPOKE CONFIDENTIALLY AND WITH CERTAINTY AT CASABLANCA, THEY NO LONGER DEPENDED UPON FAITH ALONE BUT UPON AUTHORITY AND GREAT DEEDS SUCCESSFULLY DONE.

THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD HAVE LEARNED FROM THE TIME TABLES OF THE PAST HOW MUCH TIME IS NEEDED FOR PREPARATION BETWEEN THE DECISION TO ATTACK AND THE LAUNCHING OF AN ATTACK. THEY NEED THEN HAVE NO DOUBT WHATEVER, THAT MUCH MORE WAS MEANT THAN BARE WORDS SEEM TO SAY WHEN TWO LEADERS ANNOUNCE THEY HAVE; "COMPLETED THEIR PLANS FOR AN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN FOR NINETEEN FORTY THREE". THIS YEAR IS OUR YEAR FOR VICTORY.

FROM THE PACIFIC WAR FRONT COMES THIS DESCRIPTION OF A BOMBING FLIGHT OVER WAKE ISLAND, AS GIVEN TO PRESS RADIO NEWS: THE NARRATOR OF THE STORY WAS A MEMBER OF THE CREW OF ONE OF THE BOMBERS IN THE STRIKING FORCE.

AS WE FLEW OVER THE TARGET AREA, WE VIEWED THE RESULTS OF OUR PREVIOUS RAIDS. IT LOOKED LIKE THEY HAD HAD A GOOD GOING-OVER. ALSO, WE SAW SOME NEW CONSTRUCTION. FROM MY POSITION I COULDN'T SEE ANY ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRING ON THE FIRST RUN OVER THE ISLAND, BUT AS WE TURNED BACK TO THE ATTACK, PUFFS OF SMOKE COULD BE SEEN IN THE SKY.

EIGHT ZEROS ATTACKED THE DEPARTING LIBERATORS, WHICH COUNTER-FIRED AND WE SAW ONE ZERO SPIN INTO THE WATER. FOUR OTHERS WERE SEEN TO BE SMOKING. AND, IT WAS GENERALLY BELIEVED THEY DROWNED, BUT WE COULDN'T WAIT TO SEE. THE ATTACK LASTED TWENTY MINUTES AND I BELIEVE WE HAD DAMAGED MORE THAN WAS REPORTED. WE MADE THEM HESITANT TO ATTACK WITH OUR VOLUME OF FIRE BUT WHEN THEY ATTACKED, THEY CAME IN CLOSE. ONE FELLOW IN PARTICULAR CAME WITHIN ONE HUNDRED FIFTY FEET OF MY PLANE.

ONE AMERICAN BOMB WAS SEEN TO HIT BETWEEN TWO WAKE ISLAND OIL-TANKS AND SMOKE WAS SEEN COMING FROM BOTH. NINETY PERCENT OF ALL BOMBS DROPPED HIT THE TARGET AREA. THE PURSUING JAPANESE HIT MY PLANE TEN TIMES AND KNOCKED OUT ONE ENGINE WHILE DAMAGING ANOTHER.

ALL PILOTS SEEMED TO BE OF AN ACCORD IN THEIR OPINION THE JAPS WERE COMPLETELY SURPRISED AS THEY WERE ON CHRISTMAS EVE. THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT DID NOT START FIRING UNTIL THE AMERICANS WERE OVER THE TARGET AND THE ZERO FIGHTERS DID NOT TAKE OFF UNTIL THEN.

IT WAS OBSERVED THAT ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE WAS HEAVIER THAN HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN ENCOUNTERED, BUT WHEN IT FINALLY STARTED IT WAS AS USUAL, UNEFFECTIVE.

WASHINGTON:

THE NAVY COMMUNIQUE REPORTED TODAY THE CAPTURE BY AMERICAN TROOPS ON GUADALCANAL ISLAND WHAT WAS DESCRIBED AS "A LARGE WELL ESTABLISHED ENEMY COMMAND POST," KILLING THIRTY SIX JAPANESE, AND CAPTURING THREE AND TAKING MUCH ENEMY SUPPLIES.

THE WAR BULLETIN DISCLOSED THAT AMERICAN AIRMEN, AT THE SAME TIME HAVE MADE NEW RAIDS ON JAP-HELD ISLANDS NORTHWEST OF GUADALCANAL, AND HAVE ALSO MADE RAIDS ON SHIPPING IN THE WHOLE AREA. ONE JAP CARGO SHIP WAS LEFT SINKING WHILE TWO DESTROYERS, A TANKER AND ANOTHER CARGO SHIP WERE DAMAGED.

TEN ZERO FIGHTER PLANES WERE SHOT DOWN AND SIX OTHERS PROBABLY WERE DESTROYED DURING THE RAIDS, AND IN A RAID BY THE JAPS ON OUR GUADALCANAL POSITIONS.

NEWYORK:

STOCK PRICES WERE SHARPLY HIGHER THIS MORNING IN ACTIVE TRADING AND THE VOLUME TO ELEVEN AM WAS 223,360 SHARES. NOON PRICES INCLUDED:

U.S. STEEL UP 1 3/8	GENERAL MOTORS UP 1/8
CHRYSLER UP 3/8	DOUGLAS UP 1 3/4
UNITED AIR UP 1/2	ANACONDA UP 5/8
NICKEL UP 1/4	SANTA FE OFF 1/8
NY CENTRAL OFF 1/8	EDISON TELEPHONE UP 1/4

THE REPORT THAT STALIN DID NOT MAKE AN APPEARANCE AT THE CASABLANCA CONFERENCE WAS PROBABLY DUE TO THE FACT STALIN WAS PROBABLY TOO BUSY DIRECTING OPERATIONS ON HIS OWN HOME FRONT.

WE DOUBT THAT IT WAS FEAR OF THE JAPANESE THAT KEPT HIM AWAY. HE HAS A TREATY WITH THE JAPANESE AND WILL AVOID ANY HOSTIL ACT AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. AS WE SEE IT, THE JAPANESE-RUSSIAN CLASH IN THE FAR EAST IS INEVITABLE, BUT IT IS DOUBTFUL IF ANY TROUBLE WILL BE FORTHCOMING AS LONG AS HE HAS THEIR TREATY IN FORCE.

KURUSU WAS HEARD TO SAY IN BRUSSELS NOT LONG AGO;

" WE JAPANESE HAVE A HIGH REGARD FOR THE RUSSIAN ARMY. OUR HIGH-COMMAND PROVOKED THEM AT ONE TIME AND WE WERE SURPRISED AT THE FORCE THEIR ARMY CONTAINS."

MOSCOW:

RUSSIANS TROOPS WERE REPORTED THIS MORNING TO HAVE LIQUIDATED ONE OF THE STRONGEST POCKETS OF ENEMY RESISTANCE ON THE VORONEZH FRONT. KILLING OR CAPTURING NINE THOUSAND MORE AXIS EFFECTIVES AND RAISING TO AT LEAST EIGHTEEN THOUSAND THE NUMBER OF PRISONERS TAKEN IN THAT SECTOR. THE CAPTURE OF KASTORNOYE, A VITAL JUNCTION OF THE MOSCOW, TAGANROG AND VORONEZH CURSK RAILROADS BY GOLIKOV'S NORTHERNMOST FORCES, HAS PLACED THE RED ARMY IN AN EXCELLENT POSITION TO STRIKE AT THE FLANKS OF THE GERMAN ARMIES RETREATING TWARD THE EAST.

ALGIERS:

GIRAUD WAS QUOTED BY THE PRESS TODAY AS SAYING TACTLESS RACIAL INTOLERANCE INSPIRED BY AXIS LEADERS AS THE DOMINATING REGIME IN NORTH AFRICA WOULD SOON BE ABOLISHED. HE SAID THE INITIAL MOVE TO THIS END WOULD BE TO PERMIT JEW CHILDREN TO ATTEND THE SAME SCHOOLS WITH THOSE OF OTHER RACES.

"AFHQ" NORTH AFRICA:

THE FULL UTILIZATION OF NORTH AFRICA AS A "STEPPING STONE" TO GREATER OFFENSIVES ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT WAS FORECAST TODAY, AS THE IMMEDIATE RESULT OF THE ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL CONFERENCE WHEREIN THE HEADS OF STATE DECIDED UPON A SINGLE COMMAND FOR NORTH AFRICA.

IT IS BELIEVED THAT WHO EVER IS NOMINATED ----- PROBABLY MONTGOMERY ----- WILL BE IN COMPLETE CHARGE OF THE COMBINED OPERATIONS FROM THE ATLANTIC TO SUEZ. IT IS CONSIDERED A CERTAINTY THAT THERE ALSO WILL BE SUB-SINGLE COMMANDS SUCH AS THE NAVY, LAND AND AIR.

MONTGOMERY IS BELIEVED THE LIKELIEST CHOICE BECAUSE HIS EIGHTH ARMY IS NOW CONSIDERED THE FINEST STRIKING FORCE IN THE WORLD, AND ALSO THAT MONTGOMERY HAS THREE FULL YEARS EXPERIENCE OF BATTLING THE GERMANS AND ITALIAN MACHINE.

LONDON:

THE UNITED STATES HEAVIEST DEVASTATION OF SFAX AND THE CROWDING OF ROMMEL'S REARGUARD BY THE BRITISH EIGHTH ARMY HAS INDICATED THE ZERO HOUR FOR THE GRAND ALLIED ASSULT OF TUNISIA IS FAST APPROACHING. THE AXIS RADIO IS OPENLY ALARMED ABOUT THE IMPENDING ACTION, AND PARIS RADIO SAID TODAY THAT UNITED STATES FORCES "ARE ADVANCING RAPIDLY" BETWEEN SFAX-GAFSA. THE TREMENDOUS BOMB DAMAGE DONE TO SFAX HAS LEFT THE CITY IN RUINS WITH A NUMBER OF VICTIMS NOT YET REPORTED.

IN A BULLETIN FROM THE ALLIED HIGH COMMAND IT WAS REPORTED THE HEAVIEST BOMBER FORMATIONS EVER ASSEMBLED OVER NORTH AFRICA BY THE TWELFTH AIRFORCE HAD BLASTED PORT SFAX FOR AN HOUR AND A HALF THURSDAY. FOUR WAVES OF FORTRESSES WITH AN UMBRELLA OF FIGHTERS FLEW OVER SFAX BETWEEN 2:30 AND 3 PM, LEAVING THE RAILROAD YARDS IN RUIN.

LONDON:

IT WAS ANNOUNCED THAT VICE ADMIRAL LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN, CHIEF OF THE COMBINED OPERATIONS (COMMANDOS) HAS RETURNED TO LONDON FROM NORTH AFRICA WHERE HE PARTICIPATED IN THE CASABLANCA CONFERENCE.

NEWYORK:

THE BERLIN RADIO IN A BROADCAST RECORDED BY ASSOCIATED PRESS SAID THE MAIN POINTS OF TOJOS ADDRESS TO THE JAPANESE PARLIAMENT, ACCORDING TO DISPATCHES FROM TOKYO WERE ANNOUNCED AS;

" IMPENDING CREATION OF AN INDEPENDENT BURMA, AND REAFFIRMATION OF INDEPENDENCE OF THE PHILIPPINES".

THIS IS APPARENTLY A PART OF JAPANS PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN TO MAKE HERSELF APPEAR AS THE LIBERATOR OF THE ASIATIC PEOPLES FROM THE RULE OF THE WHITE RACES. BOTH BURMA AND THE PHILIPPINES ARE TODAY UNDER THE RIGOROUS JAPANESE MILITARY RULE WITH NO INDICATION IT WILL BE LIFTED IN REALITY.

WASHINGTON:

THE ROME RADIO HEARD BY ASSOCIATED PRESS SAID TODAY THAT ITALY WAS TAKING MEASURES TO MOBILIZE ITS CIVILIAN POPULATION FOR A GREATER WAR EFFORT BY REPLACING MEN WORKERS WITH WOMEN AND CHILDREN FOR EVEN THE HEAVIEST KINDS OF LABOR.

BY ARTHUR "BUGS" BAER:

RUMORS THAT I WAS AN OFFICER OR A GENTLEMAN IN THE LAST WAR WAS FOUNDED ON NEAR-SIGHTED FACT.

A FELLOW WHO USED TO KNOW ME WENT BY WHEN I WAS SEATED OUTSIDE THE MESS HALL. HE SAW EPAULETS ON MY SHOULDER THAT WERE ACTUALLY POTATO PEELS.

I USED TO THROW THE PEELINGS OVER MY RIGHT SHOULDER AND THEN JUMP AROUND QUICK TO SEE IF THEY SPELLED MY SWEET-HEART'S NAME.

THE TECHNIQUE OF PEELING SPUDOLAS REQUIRES YEARS OF STUDY. I GOT SO EXPERT I COULD SKIN A TWO-POUND POTATO RIGHT DOWN TO A CAT'S-EYE.

YOU TAKE THE POTATO IN THE LEFT HAND THE KNIFE IN THE RIGHT HAND, AND FOLLOW THE BIBLICAL INJUNCTION NOT TO LET ONE KNOW WHAT THE OTHER IS DOING.

THE COLONEL USED TO GIVE ME K.P. TO PUNISH ME. BROTHER, YOU SHOULD SEE HOW IT PUNISHED THE POTATOES.

THE COLONEL DIDN'T KNOW I HAD BEEN THE BOY MARBLE CHAMPION OF PENNSYLVANIA. WHEN HE SAW ME SIDESWIPIING A BUSHEL OF SUN-KISSED LONG ISLAND SPUDS HE SAID:

"ARE YOU MAKING A BEEF STEW OR A PEARL NECKLACE?"

I UNDERSTAND THE ARMY NOW HAS MACHINES THAT PEEL POTATOES AS GOOD AS NEW. THAT'S TAKING THE ROMANCE OUT OF K.P.

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ON THE YORONEZH FRONT A THREE-PRONGED DRIVE ROUTED SEVEN NAZI INFANTRY DIVISIONS, CAPTURING FOURTEEN THOUSAND OF THE ENEMY AND KILLING TWELVE THOUSAND. THE REMAINT OF THE ENEMY ARMY WAS SAID TO BE SURROUNDED. THE RED ARMY REMAINED FROM TWENTY FIVE TO THIRTY TWO MILES, CAPTURING THE TOWN OF ROVO-DZOL.

**ZURICH, SWITZERLAND:**

THE JOURNAL DE GENEVE REPORTED TONIGHT THAT TWENTY FIVE GERMAN SOLDIERS WERE SERIOUSLY INJURED RECENTLY IN LYON, FRANCE, WHEN A PASSING CYCLIST TOSSED A BOMB IN THEIR MIDST. THE REPORT SAID TWO FRENCH CIVILIANS WHO RAN AWAY INSTEAD OF CHASING THE CYCLIST WERE SHOT. AS A RESULT OF THE INCIDENT, THE GERMANS HAVE ORDERED ALL PUBLIC ESTABLISHMENTS TO CLOSE BY SEVEN THIRTY PM EVERY NIGHT, AND ALL STREETS CLEARED OF CIVILIANS BETWEEN THE HOURS OF EIGHT PM AND SIX AM.

**WASHINGTON:**

THE O P A CONTROL OVER CERTAIN GOODS AND SERVICES IS SAVING MONEY FOR AMERICAN CUSTOMERS WAS ILLUSTRATED TODAY BY SECRETARY OF LABOR PERKINS IN DATA ON THE RISE IN THE COST OF LIVING. GOODS AND SERVICES UNDER O P A CONTROL HAD RISEN ONLY THREE TENTHS OF ONE PERCENT DURING THE MONTH ENDING FEB. FIFTEENTH AS AGAINST A TWO PERCENT RISE IN PRICES OF UNCONTROLLED ITEMS. MRS. PERKINS REPORTED THAT SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF WAR IN EUROPE THE COST OF LIVING HAS BEEN INCREASED SLIGHTLY MORE THAN TWENTY TWO PER CENT. THIS COMPARES WITH AN INCREASE OF THIRTY FIVE PER CENT DURING THE SAME PERIOD OF THE LAST WAR.

**LONDON:**

IT WAS REPORTED TODAY THAT A BRITISH TORPEDO BOAT SANK A LARGE SUPPLY SHIP OFF THE COAST OF NORWAY TODAY. IN THE SAME COMMUNIQUE IT WAS REPORTED THAT ALLIED PLANES MADE A DAYLIGHT RAID TODAY ON TARGETS IN NORTHERN FRANCE, BELGIUM AND HOLLAND.

**PACIFIC FRONT:**

AMERICAN BOMBERS ON ROUTINE BOMBING FLIGHTS TODAY CAUSED A HEAVY EXPLOSION ON A JAP DESTROYER, WHILE A BOMB HIT WAS SCORED ON A JAP CARGO VESSEL AND A TANKER. BOTH OF THE SHIPS WERE LEFT BADLY DAMAGED AND IN A SINKING CONDITION.

THERE WERE NO AMERICAN PLANE LOSSES IN ANY OF THE ATTACKS, AND ALL OF THE PLANES RETURNED SAFELY TO THEIR BASES.

**MOSCOW:**

THE RED ARMY SCORED IMPORTANT GAINS TODAY BOTH ON THE VORNEZH FRONT AND IN THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS. IN THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS SOVIET TROOPS CAPTURED THE IMPORTANT RAILWAY CITY OF KROPOTKIN.

ON THE VORONEZH FRONT A THREE-PRONGED DRIVE ROUTED SEVEN NAZI INFANTRY DIVISIONS, CAPTURING FOURTEEN THOUSAND OF THE ENEMY AND KILLING TWELVE THOUSAND. THE REMNANT OF THE ENEMY ARMY WAS SAID TO BE SURROUNDED. THE RED ARMY ADVANCED FROM TWENTY FIVE TO THIRTY TWO MILES, CAPTURING THE TOWN OF NOVO OSKOL

TO THE NORTH OF VALUKI ON THE VORONEZH FRONT. THE NAZIS WERE OUSTED FROM TWO HUNDRED RUSSIAN VILLAGES WEST OF VORONEZH.

LONDON:

THE NEWS THAT A WOUNDED NAZI ARMY OFFICER HAD HORSEWIPPED THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR TO BERLIN, DINO ALFIERI, WAS BROADCAST TODAY BY THE OUTLAW GERMAN RADIO STATION GUSTAVE SIEGFRIED EINS.

THE UNDERGROUND STATION SAID THE ARMY OFFICER, CAPTAIN JOACHIM VON ERZ, HAD CHALLENGED THE AMBASSADOR TO A DUEL, BUT THAT A COURT OF HONOR HAD FORBIDDEN THE MEETING BECAUSE OF ALFIERI'S DIPLOMATIC STATUS.

THE STORY WAS THAT CAPTAIN VON ERZ RETURNED HOME AFTER BEING WOUNDED IN AFRICA TO DISCOVER THAT ALFIERI HAD BEEN CARRYING ON AN AFFAIR WITH FRAU VON ERZ. BROADCAST SAID THE NAZI OFFICER HAD LASHED THE AMBASSADOR ACROSS THE FACE WITH A HORSEWHIP AND THEN HAD THROWN HIM INTO THE STREET.

THE SECRET STATION CLAIMS TO BROADCAST INSIDE INFORMATION ABOUT THE GERMAN ARMY. THE ANNOUNCEMENT ENDED WITH A DEMAND THAT ITALY RECALL ALFIERI AND SEND ANOTHER AMBASSADOR TO BERLIN.

WASHINGTON:

LEND LEASE ADMINISTRATOR EDWARD STETTINUS TOLD THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE TODAY THAT THE AID TO DEMOCRACIES PROGRAM IS AN INDISPENSABLE STEP TO FACILITATE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR.

STETTINUS WAS THE FIRST WITNESS BEFORE THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS GROUP AS HEARINGS BEGAN ON AN ACT TO EXTEND LEND-LEASE THROUGH JUNE OF NINETEEN FORTY FOUR. THE PRESENT ACT EXPIRES IN JUNE OF THIS YEAR.

HE DECLARED THAT BRITAIN PROVIDES THE BASE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS OFFENSIVE THROUGH THE POOLING OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN SUPPLIES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM. SAID HE;

" A LARGE PART OF THE NORTH AFRICAN CAMPAIGN WAS LAUNCHED FROM BRITAIN AND SO WERE THE CAMPAIGNS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, ITALIAN AFRICA, SYRIA, AND MADAGASCAR."

HE STRESSED THE OPERATIONS UNDER LEND LEASE, WHEREBY AMERICAN TROOPS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD ARE BEING SUPPLIED WITH FOOD, CLOTHING, ENCAMPMENT, AND EQUIPMENT BY GOVERNMENTS OF THE NATIONS IN WHICH THEY ARE STATIONED.

THE LEND LEASE CHIEF WAS QUESTIONED CLOSELY BY COMMITTEE MEMBERS ON AID TO CHINA, WHICH ONE MEMBER CALLED "PATHETICALLY SMALL"

---PRESS WIRELESS---

--1--

LANSING, MICH:

A BILL PERMITTING ANY MUNICIPALITY IN MICHIGAN TO CHANGE OVER FROM EASTERN TO CENTRAL WAR TIME WAS SIGNED TODAY BY GOVERNOR KELLY.

GOVERNOR KELLY ACTED AFTER THE MEASURE CLEARED ALL LEGISLATIVE HURDLES. EFFECTIVE FEBRUARY FIFTEENTH, CITIES WISHING TO MAKE THE SWITCH MAY DO SO.

OFFICIALS OF INDUSTRIAL DETROIT HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD NOT REVERT TO CENTRAL WAR TIME, DECLARING THAT CLOCKS SET ONE HOUR LATER WERE ESSENTIAL TO THE WAR EFFORT.

WASHINGTON:

THE NAVY DISCLOSED TODAY THAT A MEDIUM-SIZED BRITISH MERCHANTMAN WAS SUNK IN THE ATLANTIC IN MID-OCTOBER. SHE WAS TORPEDOED BY AN AXIS SUBMARINE OFF THE COAST OF AFRICA. THIRTY-FIVE MEMBERS OF HER CREW TOOK TO THE LIFEBOATS AND STILL WERE MISSING, WHILE FIFTEEN OTHERS REACHED LAND SAFELY. AMONG THE VICTIMS WERE TWO OFFICERS AND AN APPRENTICE SEAMAN KILLED BY THE TORPEDO EXPLOSIONS. THE SHIP WENT DOWN BOW FIRST, WHILE THE SUBMARINE CIRCLED THE LIFEBOATS. A GERMAN COMMANDER, WHO SPOKE ENGLISH, ASKED THE NAME OF THE MERCHANTMAN AND THEN STEERED HIS U-BOAT AWAY.

CINCINNATI:

PURCHASE OF PITCHERS, ED HUESHER AND BOB MALLOY FROM THE BIRMINGHAM SOUTHERN ASSOCIATION CLUB, WAS ANNOUNCED TODAY BY THE REDS.

IT WAS A STRAIGHT CASH DEAL, ALTHOUGH THE AMOUNT INVOLVED WAS NOT DIVULGED BY CINCINNATI. HUESHER IS A FORMER MAJOR LEAGUER HAVING TWERLED FOR THE ST. LOUIS CARDS, PHILLIES AND THE ATHLETICS.

WASHINGTON:

NAVY DEPARTMENT ISSUED FOLLOWING COMMUNIQUE AT NOON TODAY:-  
GROUND OPERATIONS ON GUADALCANAL ISLAND RESULTED IN THE CAPTURE OF A LARGE, WELL ESTABLISHED ENEMY COMMAND POST. THIRTY SIX JAPANESE WERE KILLED AND THREE PRISONERS AND LARGE AMOUNT OF ENEMY EQUIPMENT WERE CAPTURED. IN OTHER SECTORS TWO POCKETS OF ENEMY RESISTANCE WERE WIPED OUT. DURING MORNING, ENEMY DIVE-BOMBERS AND HIGH LEVEL BOMBERS, ESCORTED BY FIGHTERS, APPROACHED GUADALCANAL. UNITED STATES FIGHTERS ENGAGED THE ENEMY PLANES AND INCOUNTED MUCH RESISTANCE. ENEMY PLANES DROPPED NO BOMBS. FOUR UNITED STATES PLANES ARE MISSING.

A FORCE OF MARAUDER BOMBERS (MARTIN B62) WITH AIRACOBRA (DELL P39) ESCORT BOMBED ENEMY INSTALLATIONS ON KOLOMBANGARA ISLAND IN NEW GEORGIA GROUP. LARGE FIRES WERE STARTED. ALL UNITED STATES PLANES RETURNED.

DURING EVENING, FORCES OF DAUNTLESS SPEED (DOUGLAS) DIVE BOMBERS AND AVENGER (GRUMMAN) TORPEDO PLANES WITH WILDCAT (GRUMMAN F4F) ESCORT ATTACKED ANEMY DESTROYER AND CARGO SHIP IN VELLA GULF. TWO DIRECT HITS WERE SCORED ON THE CARGO SHIP, WHICH WAS LEFT SINKING.

Regraded Unclassified

WASHINGTON:

MR ROOSEVELT DEMONSTRATED AT THE CASABLANCA CONFERENCE THAT THE NORTH AFRICAN EXPEDITION HAS FOR THE PRESENT ELIMINATED THE POSSIBILITY OF THE THREAT OF A GERMAN HELD DAKAR TO AMERICAN FREEDOM AT THE NARROW POINT OF THE ATLANTIC. BOTH PRESIDENT VARGAS AND PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT ARE IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT THAT IT MUST BE PERMANENTLY AND DEFINITELY ASSURED THAT THE COASTS OF WEST AFRICA AND DAKAR NEVER AGAIN UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES ARE ALLOWED TO BECOME A BLOCKADE OR AN INVASION THREAT AGAINST THE TWO AMERICAS. THE TWO PRESIDENTS SAID, "THIS MEETING HAS GIVEN US AN OPPORTUNITY TO SURVEY THE FUTURE SAFETY OF ALL THE AMERICAS. IN OUR OPINION EACH OF THE REPUBLICS IS INTERESTED AND AFFECTED TO A CERTAIN DEGREE. IN UNITY THERE IS STRENGTH. IT IS THE AIM OF BRAZIL AND OF THE UNITED STATES TO MAKE THE ATLANTIC OCEAN SAFE FOR ALL. WE ARE DEEPLY GRATEFUL FOR THE ALMOST UNANIMOUS HELP THAT OUR NEIGHBORS ARE GIVING TO THE GREAT CAUSE OF DEMOCRACY!" THE ABOVE STATEMENT FROM BOTH PRESIDENTS IS SUPPLEMENTED BY THE FOLLOWING MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESS.

FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT:-

THE PRESIDENT BELIEVED THAT THE CASABLANCA CONFERENCE WAS SO VITAL TO THE WAR EFFORT THAT HE SHOULD DELAY FOR A SHORT TIME HIS RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES SO THAT HE MIGHT TALK INFORMALLY TO PRESIDENT VARGAS OF BRAZIL ABOUT THE CONFERENCE, AND DISCUSS SEVERAL DETAILS OF ADDITIONAL MUTUAL AID.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S JOURNEY TO AFRICA AND ON HIS RETURN HAS HAD MANY OPPORTUNITIES TO VISIT AND INSPECT VITAL POINTS OF THE FERRY COMMAND, WHICH IS DOING A MOST DIFFICULT JOB EVERY DAY IN SENDING PLANE AND QUANTITIES OF VITAL EQUIPMENT FROM AMERICA TO THE MIDDLE EAST, TO NORTH AFRICA, TO RUSSIA, TO THE AIR SQUADRONS IN CHINA, AND TO THE BURMA FRONT. THE PRESIDENTS OF THE TWO NATIONS (THE UNITED STATES AND BRAZIL) ARE OLD FRIENDS AND THEIR TALKS WERE TIMELY AND PROFITABLE, IN EITHER WAY.

WASHINGTON:

RELEASED SUNDAY MORNING STATE DEPARTMENT ISSUED A LENGTHY STATEMENT ENTITLED NATIONAL SOCIALISM WHEREIN IT EXTENSIVELY DISCUSSED NAZI PLANS "FOMENT UNREST OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES THROUGH USE OF GERMAN MINORITIES" SAID SUCH TACTIC "PART DESIGN WORLD CONQUEST" OF NAZIS DIVIDED WORLD INTO EIGHT ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS. QUOTED BY OFFICIAL GERMAN DECREE UNITS.

MACARTHUR HEADQUARTERS:

ANNOUNCED JAP PRISONERS DOCUMENTS CONFIRM THE DEATH OF LEUTGEN TOMATORI HORII WHO COMMANDED JAPANESE PAPUAN ARMY. HORII DEATH WAS ANNOUNCED DECEMBER TWENTY FIRST WHEN DROWNED WITH LIEUTENANT COLONEL OYONARI TANAKA KUMUSI WHEN RAFT OVERTURNED. SKIRMISHING WEST OF MUBO RESULTED IN REPULSING PURSUING JAPS WHEREON HEAVY CASUALTIES INFLICTED.

MADRID:

IT WAS LEARNED FROM FRANCE THAT HITLER PERSONALLY FLEW TO STALINGRAD EARLY JANUARY AND HELD A DRAMATIC INTERVIEW WITH ALL CORPS COMMANDERS STRESSING UTMOST NECESSITY TO FIGHT TO THE LAST MAN, BECAUSE FATE OF GERMANY LAY IN THEIR HANDS. IT WAS ALSO LEARNED THAT A SERIES OF CONFERENCES WERE HELD IN THE FUHRERS HEADQUARTERS IN STALINGRAD. POSSIBILITY OF WITHDRAWING SIXTH ARMY WAS ALSO DISCUSSED BUT HITLER MAINTAINED BECAUSE OF STRONG

MADRID:- ADD CONTINUED---

RUSSIAN FORCES AT KOLACH ON DIRECT RAILWAY CENTERS ALSO AT CHUTOVO, SOUTHWEST, WOULD STRIKE GERMAN ARMY AND PROVE DISASTROUS, INVOLVING OTHER GERMAN POSITIONS IN THE REAR. HITLER ARGUED THAT SIXTH ARMY MUST REMAIN IN POSITIONS AND AN ATTEMPT BE MADE FOR A GREATER ARMY. STEADY RUSS ADVANCES HOWEVER, PREVENTED OBTAINING RELIEF WHEREFORE HITLER DECIDED TO VISIT THE SIXTH ARMY HEADQUARTERS PERSONALLY BEFORE FLYING TO STALINGRAD. IT WAS BELIEVED THAT THE CONFERENCE OCCURRED THREE DAYS BEFORE THE RUSSIANS INVITED GERMANY TO SURRENDER AT STALINGRAD.

IT WAS REPORTED THAT GERMAN GENERALS PROMISED HITLER THEY WOULD FIGHT UNTIL THE LAST BREATH, BUT APPARENTLY THEY WERE FACING CERTAIN DEATH.

WASHINGTON:

SOVIET EMBASSY REVEALED THAT URUGUAY AND RUSSIA HAVE AGREED TO RESUME DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WHICH WERE BROKEN OFF IN NINETEEN THIRTY FOUR. ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE BY URUGUAY'S FOREIGN MINISTER, ALBERT O. GUANI, WITH SOVIET EMBASSADOR DURING THE FORMERS RECENT VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES.

NEWYORK:

FORMER UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO RUSSIA, JOSEPH E. DAVIES SAID THAT ALLIES WOULD PROBABLY NOT GAIN VICTORY UNTIL NINETEEN FORTY FOUR AND THEN ONLY IF ACHIEVED BY OVER-POWERING AIR DOMINATION. "THERE'S NO IMMEDIATE DANGER OF GERMAN CRACKUP THIS YEAR". GERMAN PROPAGANDISTS HAVE SAID. "DEFEAT MEANS SLAVERY, AND STARVATION. LIFE ITSELF UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD BE INTOLERABLE. THIS FEAR WILL SUSTAIN NAZI MILITARY MACHINE EVEN IF HITLER SHOULD LOSE PERSONAL POWER. THERE'S ONLY ONE THING THAT MIGHT SMASH NAZI RESISTANCE AND CAUSE THEM TO SUE FOR PEACE IN NINETEEN FORTY FOUR AND THAT'S THE ALLIES COMPLETE OVERWHELMING AIRPOWER."

LONDON:

BRIG. GENERAL WESTLAKE LARSON, CHIEF OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY AIRFORCE ANTI-SUBMARINE COMMAND SAID THE U-BOAT SITUATION IN THE ATLANTIC APPEARS TO BE IMPROVED AT LEAST MOMENTARILY.

THE SHIFT OF SHIP SINKINGS RECENTLY FROM THE WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES TO THOSE CLOSER TO BRITAIN HAS PLACED A NEW EMPHASIS ON ANTI-SUBMARINE ACTIVITIES. GENERAL WESTLAKE LARSON WAS QUOTED AS SAYING, "WE WILL ESTABLISH ANTI-SUBMARINE BASES IN THE MEDETERRANEAN IF NEEDED".

NEWYORK:

PRESIDENT GRACE ANNOUNCED TODAY THAT BETHLEHM STEEL WOULD IN THE CURRENT YEAR DELIVER 2 MILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF SHIPS WHEREOF 372 SEAGOING SHIPS WOULD BE COMPLETED THIS YEAR PLUS HUNDREDS OF SMALLER CRAFT. THE DIRECTORS VOTED THE USUAL DIVIDEND OF 1.50 A SHARE WHICH HAS BEEN REGULARLY PAID SINCE THE LAST QUARTER OF 1941. THE NET INCOME LAST YEAR WAS 25.4 MILLION OR AN EQUIVALENT OF 6.31 ON THE COMMON SHARE COMPARED WITH 34.5 MILLION DOLLARS, EQUAL TO 9.35 FOR THE YEAR 1941.

PRE-WAR EARNINGS CLOSLY PARALLELED UNITED STATES STEEL, WHICH IS THE WORLDS TOP STEEL PRODUCER. THE LATTERS EARNINGS BEING, BEFORE TAX DEDUCTIONS 227.5 MILLION, WHILE BETHLEHEMS CORRESPONDING FIGURES WERE 213.4 MILLION 648 MILLION AND 188 MILLIONS.

MADRID:-

FROM ALGIERS CAME REPORTS THAT BRITISH PATROLS IN THE MEDJEZ EL ARBA SECTOR HAD SUCCESSFULLY DRIVEN BACK A NUMBER OF AXIS ADVANCED POSTS. IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT A MOUNTAIN MASS STRETCHING BETWEEN SOUK EL ARBA AND TABARKA WAS BEING LEFT ALONE FOR THE PRESENT.

THE FOREIGN LEGION WAS IN YESTER-WEEK FORCED TO ABANDON THEIR ADVANCED POSTS IN PONTDUFARS AND NOW WITH ALLIED REINFORCEMENTS, ESPECIALLY TANKS AND GUNS ARE SLOWLY FEELING THEIR WAY FORWARD AGAIN ALONG THE LINE OF LOW HILLS SOME TWENTY MILES WEST AND NORTH WEST OF KAIROUAN.

PRINCETON, N.J.:

A GALLUPS POLE OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC OPINION ON THE EVE OF HITLERS ANNIVERSARY SAID HE HAD BEEN GREATLY OVER-RATED AS A PROPAGANDA GENIUS AND THAT THE HISTORY BOOKS OF THE FUTURE PROBABLY WOULD CALL HIM ONE OF THE "WORLDS WORST PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERTS", ACCORDING TO THE REVIEW OF THE SURVEYS OF THE PAST YEARS.

"SURVEYS OF UNITED STATES PUBLIC OPINION SHOW HIS PROPAGANDA MANEUVERS NEVER REALLY FOOLED THE AMERICAN PEOPLE" WHO BECAME INCREASINGLY PROBRITISH, RATHER THAN ANTIGERMAN!!

NEWYORK:

THE JOURNAL OF COMMERCE SAID THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE ACTIONS PLACES A GREATER BURDEN THAN EVER UPON UNITED STATES SHIPBUILDERS AND MERCHANT MARINE, FOR NOW IT MUST FACE THE NEED OF MAINTAINING THEIR OFFENSIVE ARMIES IN ADDITION TO THE TRANSPORTING OF MEN AND MATERIALS TO THE THEATRES OF WAR SUCH AS WAS THE SITUATION LAST YEAR. THIS GIGANTIC TASK IS PLACING AN EVEN GREATER DEMAND UPON UNITED STATES SHIPPING, WHICH HAS SUCCEEDED IN DELIVERING INTO ACTIVE SERVICE, ACCORDING TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELTS REQUEST, MORE THAN 8 MILLION TONS OF NEW SHIPPING IN 1942. AT LEAST 24 MILLION ADDITIONAL TONS OF SHIPPING WILL BE ADDED TO THE MERCHANT FLEET OVER A 2 YEAR PERIOD.

MOSCOW:

ANOTHER GREAT RED ARMY OFFENSIVE WEST OF VORONEZH HAS TRAPPED SEVEN GERMAN DIVISIONS AND KILLED OR CAPTURED 26 THOUSAND ENEMY TROOPS, IT WAS REPORTED TONIGHT. THE DRIVE HAS SWEEPED FORWARD FROM TWENTY FIVE TO THIRTY ONE MILES THROUGH MORE THAN TWENTY TOWNS AFTER A BREAK-THROUGH ON A 43 MILE FRONT.

A SERIES OF DECISIVE VICTORIES ALONG THE VORNEZH CAUCASUS FRONTS DISCLOSED THAT GOLIKOV'S FORCES IN THE PAST THREE DAYS HAS MADE ENORMOUS STRIDES TOWARD THEIR OBJECTIVE OF FLANKING THE GERMAN GARRISON OF KURSK. ALSO ANNOUNCED WAS THE CAPTURE OF NOVO OSKOL, 105 KILOMETERS SOUTHWEST OF VORONEZH, AND ABOUT THE SAME DISTANCE SOUTHEAST OF KURSK. A FEW DAYS AGO THE SOVIET TROOPS WEST OF VORONEZH HAD ASSUMED THE OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE GERMAN FASCIST TROOPS. IN THE THREE DAYS OF HEAVY BATTLES THE SOVIET TROOPS HAD CAPTURED SCORES OF SMALL LOCALITIES AFTER LOCAL ADVANCES.

MEANWHILE, MOSCOW HAD CONFIRMED THE REPORT THAT MAJOR GENERAL VON TREBBER, THE COMMANDER OF THE 297TH DIVISION HAD BEEN SURROUNDED ON MONDAY WITH THE REMNANTS OF HIS DIVISION.

**PAN AMERICAN AIRWAYS, S. A.**

**AEROPORTO SANTOS DUMONT - RIO DE JANEIRO**

Natal, Brasil  
28 January 1943

From: Lt.-Cdr: John C. LESLIE, USNR  
To: Capt. John McCrea, USN

Subject: Clipper schedules

1. Clipper No. 2's engine trouble will seemingly be remedied by changing two cylinders. This will be accomplished this afternoon and the engine tested this evening. We anticipate favorable results, tho cannot be certain.
2. The Clippers will leave Natal at 0800 GMT 29 January, arriving Trinidad approximately 2030 GMT. They will be fueled and anchored at the PAA marine base (Cocorite). The crews, including Cone, Vinal, and Leslie will be accommodated at the PAA staff house.
3. We expect to comply with your desires reference arrival time in Miami by leaving Trinidad at 1100 GMT (0700 zone time). This should put us in Miami at 2130 GMT (5:30 PM EDT).
4. To accomplish the 1100 departure from Trinidad, the flight crews will taxi the Clippers from the PAA base to the Naval Air Station buoys and tie up there about 1000 GMT. The crew of plane No:1 will remain aboard. The crew of plane No:2 will be taken to the dock to meet the President in accordance with your suggestion - at about 1030, after which they plus the passengers and baggage for plane no:2 should go to the plane.
5. At about 1030 the passengers for plane no:1 will leave the dock. The President's boat will be brought alongside the Clipper in such position as to permit a few photographs. He will then be unloaded. After he is settled aboard, the photographer will take some interior shots. The photographer and the undersigned will then be returned to Clipper no:2 and both planes should be ready for departure.
6. You will supply the cake and we shall provide all other materials for the noon luncheon between Trinidad and Miami.
7. It is assumed that you will notify me if these plans are incorrect in any particular.

*John C. Leslie*

John C. Leslie

PAN AMERICAN AIRWAYS SYSTEM A MAJOR REDE DE TRANSPORTES AEROS DO MUNDO

**PAN AMERICAN AIRWAYS, S. A.**

**AEROPORTO SANTOS DUMONT - RIO DE JANEIRO**

*Christmas  
Trip*

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*John C. Leslie*  
John C. Leslie

PA-624  
00-1-48

*Casablanca  
Trip*

**PAN AMERICAN AIRWAYS, S. A.**

**AEROPORTO SANTOS DUMONT - RIO DE JANEIRO**

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28 January 1943

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*John C. Leslie*  
John C. Leslie

1A-G-24  
00-1-42



Macqueripe Beach Hotel  
Trinidad

B·W·I

B R E A K F A S T

ORANGE JUICE GRAPEFRUIT JUICE

COLD PAPAYA

FRESH EGGS BY ORDER

WITH CREAM CHICKEN

HAM BACON

HOT CAKES

SYRUP BUTTER

TOAST COFFEE

ARMY AIRCRAFT # C-3

CAPTAIN

Otis F. Bryan

TO MR. PRESIDENT TIME 18.19 (GMT) 14.19 LOCAL TIME

ALT. 6000 FT. (A.S.L.) POSITION 06.30N (LAT.) 58.15W (LONG.)  
(HYDE PARK)

TRUE AIRSPEED 206 MPH (STATUTE) GROUND SPEED 206 MPH (STATUTE)

WIND 30.5 GAIN or LOSS NIL MPH

DEPARTED NATAL AT 09.04 GMT 06.04 LOCAL TIME

DISTANCE FROM DEPARTURE 1883 STATUTE DISTANCE TO DESTINATION 352 STATUTE

ESTIMATED ARRIVAL WALLER FIELD, TRINIDAD AT 20.02 GMT 16.02 LOCAL TIME

DATE 1/29/43

BY: Otis F. Bryan

UNDATED:-

BRITISH LANCASTER AND HALIFAX BOMBERS DRONED THROUGH WINTRY SIKES LAST NIGHT TO REACH THE VITAL RHINELAND INDUSTRIAL CITY OF DEUSSDORF AND POUND IT WITH HIGH EXPLOSIVES AND INCENDIARES. THE BRITISH APPARENTLY USED A STRIKING FORCE OF UPWARDS OF TWO HUNDRED BOMBERS, AS THE AIR MINISTRY REPORTED THAT SIX OF THEM HAD FAILED TO RETURN. OTHER GERMAN TARGETS ALSO WERE BOMBED. AS THE RAF, FOLLOWED UP YESTERDAYS DAYLIGHT ALL AMERICAN RAID ON THE GERMAN SUBMARINE BASE AT WILHELMSHAVEN, THE BRITISH ATTACKS AGAINST GERMANY'S WAR INDUSTRIES CAME AS THE RED ARMY CONTINUED TO POUND BY HITLERS REELING WAR MACHINE IN SOUTH RUSSIA WITHOUT LETUP. THE SOVIET HIGH COMMAND REPORTED THAT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS OVERNIGHT HAD BEEN MARKED BY THE RECAPTURE OF A SOCRE MORE INHABITED LOCALITIES AND THOUSANDS OF GERMAN PRISONERS INCLUDED AMONG THE PRISONERS WAS A GERMAN GENERAL ALONG WITH SEVERAL OF HIS HIGH STAFF OFFICERS. IN THE STALINGRAD REGION GERMAN FORCES NOW HAVE BEEN CUT DOWN TO ABOUT EIGHT THOUSAND TROOPS AND THEIR LIQUIDATION IS PROCEEDING ACCORDING TO SCHEDULE. IN THE DRIVE ON ROSTOV, ONE SOVIET FORCE HAS REACHED A POINT WITHIN SIXTY FIVE MILES OF THE KEY GERMAN ~~HELD~~ BASE AND THE RUSSIAN ARMIES MOVING IN ON ROSTOV, ARE CUTTING ACROSS ENEMY COMMUNICATION LINES, THREATENING TO TRAP A HUGE FORCE OF THE ENEMY. BOTH GENERAL EISENHOWER'S HEADQUARTERS AND BRITISH MIDDLE EAST HEADQUARTERS INDICATED THAT ACTIVITY DURING THE PAST TWENTY FOUR HOURS BOTH ON THE GROUND AND IN THE AIR HAD BEEN OF A LIMITED NATURE. BUT GERMAN SOURCES INDICATED THAT AMERICAN TROOPS WERE PREPARING FOR AN ALL OUT OFFENSIVE AGAINST AXIS POSITIONS AND PROBABLY WOULD ATTEMPT TO GET BEHIND THE MARTH LINE. THE GERMANS OBVIOUSLY WERE SEEKING INFORMATION ALTHOUGH DISPATCHES FROM CORRESPONDENTS AT ALLIED HEADQUARTERS ALSO INDICATED THAT THE START OF THE SHOWDOWN BATTLE FOR TUNISIA MIGHT NOT BE FAR DISTANT IN THE PACIFIC, A NAVY COMMUNIQUE REPORTED THAT JAPANESE FLOATTYPE PLANES IN THE ALEUTIANS AREA HAD ATTACKED ALLIED SHIPPING, BUT WITH LITTLE EFFECT. IN THE SOLOMONS AMERICAN TROOPS CONTINUED THEIR DRIVE TO CLEAR THE JAPS FROM GUADALCANAL, BUT WERE MEETING SOMEWHAT INCREASED RESISTANCE.

BERNE:- ...SWITZERLAND...

A GERMAN NEWS AGENCY DISPATCH SAID TONIGHT LABOR MINISTER FRITZ SAUCKEL HAS ISSUED A DECREE CALLING FOR THE COMPULSORY REGISTRATION OF ALL GERMAN MEN FROM SIXTEEN TO SIXTY FIVE, AND ALL WOMEN FROM SEVENTEEN TO FORTY FIVE, FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE WORK.

WASHINGTON :-...

SIGNS OF ACTIVITY IN THE ALEUTIANS WERE CONTAINED TODAY IN A NAVY COMMUNIQUE WHICH REPORTED AN ATTACK ON A GROUP OF AMERICAN SHIPS BY TWO JAPANESE FLOAT TYPE PLANES. THE VESSELS WERE ATTACKED WEST OF AMERICAN POSITIONS ON THE ANDREOF ISLANDS AND ESCAPED WITHOUT DAMAGE. THEIR PRESENCE IN WATERS SO NEAR JAPANESE HELD KISKA, ISLAND WAS NOT EXPLAINED. THE TYPE OF THE SHIPS ALSO WAS WITHHELD. THE NAVY'S LAST PREVIOUS MENTION OF ACTIVITY IN THE ALEUTIANS WAS CONTAINED IN A WAR BULLETIN REPORTING A RAID ON JANUARY NINTH, CARRIED OUT BY ARMY BOMBERS ON JAPANESE POSITIONS ON KISKA, ON THE OTHER FRONT OF THE TWO FRONT PACIFIC WARFARE THE NAVY REPORTED FURTHER ADVANCES BY OUR TROOPS ON GUADALCANAL. IN THE FACE OF DETERMINED ENEMY RESISTANCE, FORTY JAPS WERE KILLED AND FIVE WERE TAKEN PRISONERS IN THE LATEST ASSAULTS. BRINGING THE TOTAL OF JAPS KILLED IN ONE WEEK TO SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY NINE.

WASHINGTON...CONTINUED...

THE NAVY REPORTED TODAY THAT FOUR AMERICAN MERCHANT VESSELS TRAVELING IN A CONVOY IN THE ATLANTIC EARLY IN JANUARY WERE SENT TO THE BOTTOM BY AXIS SUBMARINES. THE ATTACK OCCURRED OFF THE NORTHERN COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA. THREE OF THE SHIPS WERE MEDIUM SIZED AND THE OTHER WAS A SMALL MERCHANT-MAN. SURVIVORS WERE LANDED AT MIAMI, FLA.

STATE DEPARTMENT:-.....

IN SECRETARY HULLS PRESS CONFERENCE TODAY CORRESPONDENT ASKED IF, IN ORDER TO CLEAR ONCE AND FOR ALL THE CONFUSION WHICH STILL SEEMS TO EXIST IN SOME QUARTERS OVER PEYROUTONS, APPOINTMENT, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR SECRETARY TO SAY NOW WHETHER IT WAS TRUE THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT AT FIRST QUESTIONED ADVISABILITY OF THAT APPOINTMENT AND LATER CONSENTED TO IT WHEN IT BECAME APPARENT THAT AUTHORITIES IN NORTH AFRICA CONSIDERED IT MATTER OF MILITARY NECESSITY. SECRETARY HULL SAID HE THOUGHT HE HAD MADE IT FAIRLY CLEAR FROM BEGINNING THAT DEPARTMENTS WHOLE POLICY HAS BEEN BASED ON MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS, MR HULL SAID IT WOULD BE EASY TO GO INTO DETAILS AT THIS TIME; SUCH AS PHASE TO WHICH CORRESPONDENT REFERRED. THE FACT IS, HE ADDED, THAT ALL THE BASIC FUNDAMENTAL FACTS AND FACTORS IN THAT SITUATION PAST AND PRESENT, HAVE ALREADY COME OUT. AND WITHOUT REGARD TO WHAT THE FACTS ARE IN RELATION TO QUESTION SECRETARY SAID HE WOULD NOT GO INTO ONE DETAIL UNTIL IT WAS POSSIBLE TO GO INTO ANY AND ALL OTHERS. SECRETARY WAS ASKED TO COMMENT ON REPORTED PROPOSAL OF TRADE BOYCOTT OF ARGENTINA, ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF ITS FAILURE TO BREAK WITH AXIS. MR HULL SAID THAT NO PERSON HAD DISCUSSED THAT WITH HIM NOR HAD HE DISCUSSED IT WITH ANY BODY. HE ADDED THAT AS TO WHAT EXTENT IT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED HE REALLY DID NOT KNOW CORRESPONDENT SAID THERE HAS BEEN SOME EDITORIAL COMMENT ON PRESS REPORT PUBLISHED TWO DAYS AGO SUGGESTING THAT STRINGENT MEASURES AGAINST ARGENTINA WOULD BE ADVISABLE AT THIS TIME. HE ASKED IF SECRETARY WOULD CARE TO COMMENT ON, OR SYMPATHIZE WITH THAT EDITORIAL OPINION. SECRETARY HULL SAID HE THOUGHT IT WAS MATTER HE WOULD WANT TO CONSIDER AND DISCUSS BEFORE MAKING PUBLIC STATEMENT ON IT. HE SAID IT HAD NOT BEEN UNDER DISCUSSION SO FAR AS HE KNEW IN DEPARTMENT. ASKED IF THERE WAS ANY INFORMATION HE COULD GIVE CONCERNING DEPARTURE TODAY OF MISSION TO BOLIVIA TO STUDY LABOR CONDITIONS THERE, SECRETARY HULL SAID THAT ON REQUEST OF BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENT, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS UNDERTAKING TO COOPERATE WITH THEM IN DEVELOPING FACTS ABOUT LABOR CONDITIONS BY SENDING MISSION OF QUALIFIED PERSONS DOWN THERE IN ORDER THUS TO COOPERATE. SECRETARY SAID MISSION WOULD LEAVE SOON, THOUGH HE DIDNT KNOW EXACTLY WHEN IN VIEW OF FACT THAT IT IS NOT QUITE MADE UP YET. CORRESPONDENT ASKED IF DEPARTMENT HAD AT ANY TIME REQUESTED TRANSFER OF ERNEST HANFSTENG TO THIS COUNTRY FROM CANADIAN CONCENTRATION CAMP. SECRETARY REPLIED THAT ABOUT ALL HE HAD TO SAY ON MATTER WAS THAT THIS MAN HAS NOT AT ANY TIME WORKD IN THE DEPARTMENT. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD NOT HEARD ANYTHING ON THAT SUBJECT UNTIL LAST EVENING. SECRETARY WAS ASKED IF, IN VIEW OF CONFLICTING INTERPRETIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED RECENTLY WITH REGARD TO ANTI JEWISH RESTRICTIONS IN NORTH AFRICA, HE COULD CLARIFY WHETHER SUCH RESTRICTIONS EXISTED PRIOR TO VICHY GOVERNMENT OR WERE INAUGERATED BY THAT GOVERNMENT. MR HULL POINTED OUT THAT WHOLE SITUATION HAS BEEN DEALT WITH PRIMARILY FROM MILITARY STANDPOINT AND WITH OBJECTIVES IN RESPECT TO ANY AND ALL PHASES OF CONDITIONS THERE THAT WOULD CALL FOR REMEDIAL TREATMENT. SECRETARY ADDED THAT HE WAS NOT ADVISED AS TO DETAILS AS TO JUST HOW FAST MILITARY ACTIVITIES ARE MOVING AT THIS STAGE WITH RESPECT TO THESE MATTERS.

MONROVIA, LIBERIA, JAN. 28:-...

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, ENROUTE HOME FROM THE HISTORIC CASABLANCA WAR COUNCIL MEETING, PAUSED HERE IN LIBERIA TO PAY HIS RESPECTS TO PRESIDENT EDWIN BARCLAY AND REVIEW A LARGE DETACHMENT OF AMERICAN NEGRO TROOPS.

WHILE IN THE AFRICAN STATE, FOUNDED IN 1822 BY NEGRO REEDMEN FROM THE UNITED STATES, THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE ALSO TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO INSPECT THE BIG FIRESTONE RUBBER PLANTATION. THIS AMERICAN-SPONSORED PROJECT AT PRESENT IS PROVIDING VERY MANY POUNDS ANNUALLY OF THE CRITICAL WAR MATERIAL, AND INCREASING ITS OUTPUT STEADILY.

STILL TRAVELING BY AIR, MR. ROOSEVELT AND HIS PARTY FLEW INTO ROBERTS FIELD, SOME 50 MILES FROM MONROVIA, IN TWO BIG FOUR-MOTORED PLANES OF THE AAF AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND. WAITING TO GREET THEM WERE BRIG. GEN. S. W. FITZGERALD, COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE ATC MIDDLE EAST WING AND COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE U.S. ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL AFRICA; BRIG. GEN. JAMES F. C. HYDE, COMMANDING GENERAL OF CENTRAL AFRICAN SERVICE OF SUPPLY; COL. THOMAS L. HARDIN AND COL. FRANK H. COLLINS.

AFTER FRESHENING UP, THE PRESIDENTIAL PARTY WAS ESCORTED TO THE OFFICERS' MESS HALL, WHERE PRESIDENT BARCLAY AND LIBERIAN SECRETARY OF STATE CLARENCE L. SIMPSON WERE WAITING WITH U.S. CHARGE D' AFFAIRES FREDERICK P. HIBBARD.

OTHERS IN THE LUNCHEON PARTY INCLUDED HARRY L. HOPKINS, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT; REAR ADMIRAL ROSS T. MCINTIRE, SURGEON GENERAL OF THE NAVY AND WHITE HOUSE PHYSICIAN, AND CAPT. JOHN R. MCCREA, PRESIDENTIAL NAVAL AIDE.

FOLLOWING LUNCH, PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PRESIDENT BARCLAY GOT INTO AN ARMY JEEP AND BOUNCED OUT TO THE PARADE GROUND. THERE, LINED UP AT RIGID ATTENTION WERE THE 41ST ENGINEERS AND A PORTION OF THE DEFENSE DETACHMENT, UNDER COMMAND OF COL. A. A. KIRCHOFF.

THE BAND PLAYED BOTH NATIONAL ANTHEMS AND RENDERED FULL HONORS, FOLLOWING WHICH THE TWO PRESIDENTS TOURED UP AND DOWN THE LINES FOR A CAREFUL INSPECTION. THEN, TO THE TUNE OF "ANCHORS AWEIGH," THE PROUD TROOPS PASSED IN REVIEW.

THE PARTY WAS THEN TURNED OVER TO GEORGE SEYBOLD, GENERAL MANAGER FOR THE FIRESTONE PLANTATION, WHO GUIDED THEM THROUGH PICTURESQUE AFRICAN VILLAGES WITH THEIR CIRCULAR ADOBE HUTS ROOFEED WITH STRAW THATCH TO THE BIG RUBBER PLANTATION, 69,000 ACRES OF WHICH ARE UNDER INTENSIVE CULTIVATION. THOUSANDS OF ACRES OF NEW SHOOTS WERE SEEN, AS WERE MANY OF THE 18,000 NATIVES EMPLOYED BY FIRESTONE. TAPPING WAS IN FULL SWING IN THE MATURE GROWTHS AND MR. ROOSEVELT INSPECTED THE LATEX RUNNING INTO THE CUPS.

UPON CONCLUSION OF THE CASABLANCA CONFERENCE, PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PRIME MINISTER WINSTON CHURCHILL MOTERED 150 MILES SOUTH TO MARRAKECH, A VERY OLD BERBER AND ARAB TOWN NESTLED AT THE FOOT OF THE ATLAS MOUNTAINS, WHERE THEY SPENT THE NIGHT. THE FOLLOWING DAY, THE TWO ALLIED WAR LEADERS PARTED COMPANY, AND THE PRESIDENT, WITH ONE INTERVENING STOP, FLEW TO LIBERIA...

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23 Jan. 1943

WAR NEWS ROUNDUP, (Allied Press) - ADVANCE ELEMENTS OF THE BRITISH EIGHTH ARMY WERE REPORTED ALREADY INSIDE THE SUBURBS OF TRIPOLI. WITH ITS FALL WILL COLLAPSE MUSCOLINI'S DREAMS OF AN AFRICAN EMPIRE, AN EMPIRE WHICH HE WON BY FORCE AND WHICH HAS BEEN WRESTED BACK FROM HIM BY FORCE. TODAY'S COMMUNIQUE FROM BRITISH MIDEAST HQ DID NOT INDICATE HOW CLOSE THE EIGHTH ARMY WAS TO TRIPOLI. BUT BRITISH TROOPS WERE SAID TO HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT WITH THE AXIS FORCES SOUTH OF TRIPOLI AND WEST OF HOMS INDICATING THAT THEY HAD ADVANCED WELL BEYOND THEIR LAST REPORTED POSITIONS. MOROCCO RADIO WAS THE SOURCE OF THE REPORT THAT ALLIED TROOPS HAD ALREADY ENTERED TRIPOLI. THE FRENCH REPORT SAID PART OF THE CITY WAS IN FLAMES AS THE RESULT OF A TERRIFIC ARTILLERY AND AERIAL BOMBARDMENT. APPARENTLY, THE AXIS TROOPS ARE OFFERING NO ORGANIZED RESISTANCE TO THE ADVANCING ALLIES. PLANES OF THE MIDDLE EAST AIR FORCES HAVE HAD ALMOST UNDISPUTED CONTROL OF THE LIBYAN SKIES, AND THE MAIN AXIS AIRFIELD AT CASTELBENITO, OUTSIDE TRIPOLI, WAS BEEN BASTED HEAVILY AND LATE REPORTS STATED THAT IT WAS ALREADY IN BRITISH HANDS. IN NEARBY TUNISIA, MEANWHILE, AIR WARFARE HAD REACHED NEW HEIGHTS IN INTENSITY ACCORDING TO REPORTS FROM GEN. EISENHOWER'S HQ. AT THE SAME TIME, GERMAN GROUND FORCES WERE TRYING TO DISLODGE ALLIED FORCES FROM COASTAL POSITIONS IN ORDER TO SAFEGUARD THE RETREAT FROM LIBYA OF MARSHAL ROMMEL'S BATTERED AFRIKA KORPS. SEVENTEEN ENEMY TANKS WERE DESTROYED IN THE BOU ARADA BOUBELLAT SECTOR DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS, AND SEVERAL GERMAN BOMBERS WERE DESTROYED. ALLIED BOMBERS ARE MAKING HEAVY ATTACKS ON AXIS LINES OF COMMUNICATION, WHILE ALLIED FIGHTER PLANES MAKE CONSTANT SWEEPS OVER THE BATTLEFIELD. THE BRITISH ADMIRALTY DISCLOSED TODAY THAT LIGHT UNITS OF THE ROYAL NAVY HAD ENTERED TRIPOLI HARBOR LAST TUESDAY TO SHELL SHORE WORKS. DURING THE COURSE OF OPERATIONS, THEY MANAGED TO SINK AN ITALIAN SUBMARINE. IN LONDON, THE AIR MINISTRY ANNOUNCED THAT ROYAL AIR FORCE BOMBERS DURING THE NIGHT RESUMED THE ATTACKS ON RUHR INDUSTRIAL AREA TARGETS. NONE OF THE TARGETS WERE IDENTIFIED, BUT ALL WERE SAID TO HAVE BEEN LEFT BLAZING. FOUR RAF PLANES FAILED TO RETURN FROM THE NIGHT OPERATIONS. ON THE EASTERN FRONT MEANWHILE THE RED ARMY WAS DEVELOPING A GREAT PINCERS MOVEMENT AGAINST THE GERMAN-HELD CITY OF ROSTOV, KEY TO THE ENTIRE GERMAN DEFENSE SYSTEM IN SOUTHERN RUSSIA. TWO POWERFUL COLUMNS ARE STRIKING AT ROSTOV AND THE GERMANS DO NOT APPEAR SO FAR TO BE ABLE TO OFFER ANY ORGANIZED RESISTANCE AGAINST THE CRUSHING RED ARMY OFFENSIVE. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED TODAY THAT THE RAILWAY CENTER OF SALSK HAD BEEN CAPTURED BY TROOPS OPERATING IN THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS. IN THE PACIFIC, A NAVY COMMUNIQUE ANNOUNCED TODAY THAT AMERICAN TROOPS HAD CONTINUED THEIR ADVANCE ON GUADALCANAL DESPITE NUISANCE RAIDS BY SINGLE JAPANESE PLANES. AMERICAN PLANES CARRIED OUT HARRASSING ATTACKS ON ENEMY SHORE WORKS AT BALLALE ISLAND, OFF THE SHORTLANDS.

WASHINGTON, (Allied Press) - War Department announced that 26 passengers and nine crew members died when a fourmotored American transport plane crashed near the coast of Surinam (Dutch Guiana) Jan. 15. The crash took more lives than any crash in American aviation history. Victims included Army Major Eric Knight, author of the bestseller "This Above All", William H. .... (garbled) NYC Commissioner of Welfare and O. I. E. Nelson, of Washington, both on State Department missions, P. E. Foxworth Odson, FBI executive in charge of New York city office and specialist on sabotage cases who worked on case of the 8 Nazi saboteurs who were landed by submarine; Morris Lewis, volunteer writer for the Army and author of soldiers' pocket guides to Great Britain, North Ireland, North Africa, China and Australia; Capt. Basil Gallagher, who was on mission for Yank, the Army weekly newspaper. State Sec. Hull announced that Odson's death was in the service of his country. He said Herbert Lehman had assigned Odson as relief director in North Africa. Previously the greatest number of deaths in an American plane crash occurred when a passenger plane hit a hillside at Lovettsville, Va., August 31, 1940, killed 25, including Sen. Ernest Lundeen, Minn. 49 were killed in the greatest heavier than air aircraft crash in history when the great Russian landplane, "Maxim Gorky" crashed in May, 1935.

WASHINGTON, (Allied Press) - The Navy Department announced that a transport flying from Pearl Harbor to San Francisco is now long overdue with 19 passengers aboard, of whom 10 are Naval officers.

WASHINGTON, (Allied Press) - The War Department disclosed that Colonel K. E. Berry, of San Antonio, Texas, is a prisoner of war held by the Japanese.

BASKETBALL SCORES, (Allied Press) - Yale, 51, Brown, 44; Seton Hall, NJ, 45, Holy Cross, 30; Kansas, 40, Kansas State, 20; George Washington, 57, Army, 48; Georgetown, 68; Loyola, (Balto.), 42; North Carolina State, 47, North Carolina, 36; Tulane, 58, Mississippi State, 43; Camp Grant, 58, Bradley, (Ill.), 38; Baylor, 35, East Texas State Teachers, 33; Detroit Tech, 43, Assumption, Windsor, Ontario, 37; Clarkson, 43, St. Lawrence, 40; Canisius, 62, Scranton U., 40; Pittsburg, 46, Geneva, 32; Connecticut, 76, Northeastern, 56; Fairmont, 76, West Virginia Tech, 50; Bolling Field, 50, Virginia Polytech, 37; Norfolk Naval Training, 65, Virginia, 44; Presbyterian, 62, Charlestown College, 37; Clemson, 54, Wofford, 45; Kansas Wesleyan, 67, Emporia, 23; Valparaiso, 71, St. Johns, (Indiana), 65; Luther, 34, Upper Iowa, 31; Earlham, 39, Wilmington, 35; Loyola, Chicago, 52; Glenview Naval, 33; Defiance, 56, Tri-State, Indiana, 40; Eastern Illinois Teachers, 39, Illinois Normal, 31; Capital, 44, Otterbin, 36; Miami, Ohio, 57, Dayton, 33; Rice, 42; Texas Ag, 33; Howard Payne, 60, Goodfellow Field bombers, 40; Hardin Simmons, 58, Daniel Baker, 28; Washington, 44, Oregon State, 39; Northern Montana, 29, Montana Normal, 23.

NEW YORK, (Allied Press) - Metropolitan basketball coaches recently clamoring for revision of rulebook to prevent ejection of players who have made four personal fouls. While agreeing that excessive fouling must be punished, the coaches point out that manpower shortage means team cannot afford to lose players in middle of a game. Mat Holman, respected and astute coach of City College of New York, suggests that the ejection be eliminated and a system of awarding the opposing team an extra free throw for every personal foul they suffer from opponent who has already committed four personal fouls. Holman insists that best players are the ones who make the most fouls since they are usually most aggressive under the basket.

NEW YORK, (Allied Press) - The Brooklyn Dodgers have announced the acquisition of outfielders Johnny Cooney and Paul Waner both released this week by the Boston Braves. Cooney is 42, Waner, 40. Also announced sale of firstbaseman Babe Dahlgren to Indianapolis and acquisition of veteran firstbaseman George Sisler as scout. Cooney played 54 games last year, batting .207. Waner who three times won the National League batting championship with Pittsburgh Pirates and was voted most valuable player in '27 and knocked out his 3000th hit in Major League last season. He is one of six players to do so, while batting 2588 in 114 games. Dodgers President Branch Rickey said both Cooney and Waner would be used for utility roles. "We have to protect ourselves against player shortages." Dahlgren, formerly with the Red Sox and Yankees, earned his ticket to the minors by batting only 173 in 34 games. Sisler, one of the greatest batters of all times, is currently in business in St. Louis and is commissioner of the National Semi-Pro Baseball Congress.

SOMERVILLE, Mass., (Allied Press) - Imagine Shanty Hogan up at 5:30 a.m.! It's war! Shanty, ex-New York Giants' catcher, is a shipyardworker and goes on duty at 6:00 a.m. It only the late Johnny McGraw, Shanty's one time manager could know that, he would say that he considered it millenium if Shanty reported on time for a 10 a.m. practice. According to Shanty, whose real name is Frank, the "swellest thing about shipyard working is that you get paid. During the five years I caught for the Giants McGraw fined me a total of \$4000. No wonder the clubs can pay high salaries; they take it all back from you in fines. He said he was "fined for everything under the sun" but he hit the ceiling when McGraw fined him fifty dollars for spending a night with his folks and then raised it to \$200 during a game argument the next day. Shanty, 36, pointed out that he is still in his prime although he is still carrying around the 248 pounds he couldn't reduce while with the Giants. Says he'd like to get a minor league club position because, he insists, "I've had enough experience to serve as president, benchmanager, trainer, tickettaker, concessionaire and everything else."

WASHINGTON, (Allied Press) - Mrs. Roosevelt in her column, "My Day", yesterday declared, "If men 18 and 19 are old enough to be trained to fight the country's battles and taken for training for the battlefields, I think we must face the fact that they are old enough to know why we're fighting this war. They are old enough to take part in political life of the country and be full citizens with voting powers."

BORDERTOWN, N. J., (Allied Press) - Although they have never met Army Pvt. George Smith, 23, of Bordertown, and lovely brunette Anna Head, 20, of Osaka, Virginia, will marry when Smith returns from overseas. Smith's mother said Smith's buddy of Osaka encouraged Smith to write Anna who answered. This was 1940 and letters and photographs have been exchanged since. Smith finally wrote popping the question and Anna wrote and accepted. Smith's mother traveled to Virginia to deliver the engagement ring.

LOS ANGELES, (Allied Press) - Sgt. Ezra Stone one of the stars of "This Is the Army," announced that his marriage to Sara Seegar took place in Washington on Oct. 5, last year. Stone is former Broadway star in plays, "What a Life", "Three Men on a Horse", "Brother Rat." Sara, of Kouma, Indiana, is a coplayer with Stone on the radio show, "Henry Aldrich," and also leading player in "Vickie", leading '42 Broadway hit.

RICHMOND, Va., (Allied Press) - State residents face an unprecedented drought. A ten-day suspension of all liquor sales has been called effective February 1, after which rationing of bottled goods will be effective.

HUNTINGTON, W. Va., (Allied Press) - During a tense moment in a western thriller fire broke out on the stage of a theater here but the audience refused to leave and insisted on seeing the outcome. After fire destroyed the screen, the audience wanted to stay and watch the firemen battling the stage blaze. Theater officials said, "We literally had to push them to safety." Damage was estimated at \$29,000.

DETROIT, (Allied Press) - Gromlins and their girlfriends, the Fifinellys, are having a field day here. Examples: Within one day a trolley car wandered three miles off its course. Town bus complete with passengers was lost until one passenger finally recognized the territory and piloted it home. Another bus driver also lost parked his bus while he phoned the dispatcher for bearings. Returning, he found the bus disappeared. It turned up hours later ten miles away at gates of a war plant. The payoff: Motorman stopped a trolley in the middle of the block and calmly stepped to the street, asked gaping garageman the way "home". Garageman gasped, "Don't kid me!" Motorman attempted to convince him that he was serious, but it took a carload of raving passenger to join his plea before the garageman was convinced and gave the necessary directions.

MILWAUKEE, (Allied Press) - James McCarthy awakened at 4 a.m. by sound of running water investigated and found a stranger taking a shower who was equally surprised at the discovery that he was not in his own home. Stranger dressed hurriedly and was leaving the backdoor when a squad car called by Mrs. McCarthy arrived. Judge fined Bather Edward Jahowski, 42, on charges of drunken disorderly conduct.

BOSTON, (Allied Press) - Mrs. Alice Morse and daughter, Betty, of Malden, are the first mother-daughter Western Union messenger team in the nation. On an average they walk 15-25 miles a day. Say they could harmonize if singing telegrams were still permitted.

NEW YORK, (Allied Press) - British Broadcasting Company requested a transcription of Duke Ellington's Carnegie Hall concert Saturday night be broadcast throughout the British Empire so great was English demand to hear Ellington's new 45-minute composition, "Black Brown Beige."

BERTH AMBOY, (Allied Press) - City Commission adopted an ordinance establishing a 9:30 p.m. curfew to prevent loitering of boys and girls under 16. Police are authorized to question youngsters unaccompanied by oldsters, if seen in public places or automobiles. First offenders will be escorted homeward; second offenders will be taken to police court and their parents made subject to court action.

FAIRVIEW, Oklahoma, (Allied Press) - When stormy weather cut church attendance drastically, Rev. C. L. Moser advertised in the lost and found column, "Notice: Herd Sheep Strayed and only 23 came for feed this morning." Shortly thereafter telephone began ringing. Each time Reverend said hello got the same reply: - "Baaaaaa.".

## IV

DALLAS, Texas, (Allied Press) - Policeman J. Roland Smith delivered his ninth baby in eight years on the force. He is a bachelor. "After the fourth or fifth time," he said, "The novelty wears off."

HARTFORD, Conn., (Allied Press) - Saturday is still bathday despite the war and fuel shortages. Mayor Thomas J. Spellacy complied with Gov. Raymond Baldwin's request that all municipal buildings not used for war emergency purposes be closed on Saturdays and Sundays to conserve fuel, but he announced that the public bath houses would remain open on Saturdays and close Sundays and Mondays instead.

OKLAHOMA AIRBASE, (Allied Press) - When Pvt. Sam Crouch approached his squadron adjutant about a dependency allotment for his wife, the adjutant asked him if he had a marriage license. Crouch said, "No, Sir. Termites ate it!" After the adjutant recovered Crouch explained that the license and other valuables were stored and when his wife went to locate them, she found only tiny heaps of powder.

PHILADELPHIA, (Allied Press) - Paul Tishan, 42, of Scarsdale, N. Y., turned over entire kennel of 20 champion German shepherd dogs to U.S. Coast Guard for war training. Tishan said he had refused offers of \$1500-2000 for many of the dogs which represent the country's leading stock including Champion Nox of Rutledge, U. S. grand winner.

ALBANY, N. Y., (Allied Press) - A rationing problem not specifically covered by OPA was uncovered in a police court trial here. Mrs. Jennette Thymian, 28, entered Nicholas Demetry's butcher shop, but "he wouldn't sell me any meat unless I came into the backroom and kissed him." She told police she emphatically refused and he finally sold her meat but insisted on writing his telephone number on the package. Arriving home, she grabbed the phone and called police. Demetry pleaded not guilty and was freed under \$250 bail pending trial.

CAIRO, (Allied Press) - Gen. Montgomery, commander of 8th Army, in personal message read to all his men on Jan. 12 on eve of attack on Rommel's Bucrat line said, "Leading units of the 8th army are now only about 200 miles from Tripoli. Enemy is between us and that port hoping to hold us off. 8th Army is going to Tripoli. Tripoli is the only town in the hands of the enemy overseas still remaining in their possession. Therefore we will take it from them. They will then have no overseas empire. Enemy will try to stop us but if each one of you whether frontline soldier or officer or man whose duty is performed in another sphere puts his whole heart and soul into this next offensive - nothing can stop us. Nothing has stopped us since the Battle of Egypt began Oct. 23, 1942, and nothing will stop us now. Some must stay back to begin with but we will all be in eventually. On to Tripoli! Our families and friends in home countries will be thrilled when they hear we have captured that place."

CAIRO, (Allied Press) - Axis troops are pulling out of Tripoli to the west as fast as they can. Allied aircraft were over Tripoli all today observing enemy movements. Castel Benito on coast was captured by noon yesterday and our troops are well beyond this point. Operating from south of Tripoli sections of the 8th Army are operating in the Castel Benito area 14 miles south of the city. British planes over Tripoli could see huge columns of smoke rising up from demolitions being hurriedly carried out by Axis troops.

WASHINGTON, (Allied Press) - Ersatz coffee will soon reach American homes. OPM announced that ceiling prices for coffee substitutes had been set and simultaneously informed housewives that the mixtures containing coffee would require surrender of a ration coupon just as pure coffee.

MIAMI, (Allied Press) - AFL President William Green wired Vice-President Wallace that the unions will fight to the limit of "our strength to preserve the right to strike which is just as fundamental as freedom of speech, freedom of press." He said some people in U. S. are trying to place labor under government control just as Hitler controls unions in Germany. He also asserted that the AFL would oppose all congressional attempts to repeal the 40-hour week, outlaw union shop agreements and subject unions to Federal jurisdiction.

Regraded Unclassified

"LATEST COVERAGE ON WORLD FIGHTING FRONTS"

UNDATED

SOVIET FORCES ARE CONTINUING THEIR SWEEPING ADVANCES ALL ALONG THE RUSSIAN FRONT, BUT THEY ARE STRIKING THEIR HARDEST BLOWS AGAINST THE GERMANS IN THE LOWER DON AREA AND IN THE CAUCASUS.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED TONIGHT THAT THE NAZI RAILWAY STRONGHOLD OF GORGIEVSK IN THE CAUCASUS HAD BEEN CAPTURED. A COMMUNIQUE ALSO ANNOUNCED THE CAPTURE OF MINERALNIE VODI.

IN THE WESTERN CAUCASUS, RUSSIAN THE RUSSIANS ARE CONTINUING TO LIBERATE SCORES OF INHABITED LOCALITIES; IN THE COURSE OF THESE PREPARATIONS, MOSCOW SAID THE GERMANS ARE SUFFERING HEAVY LOSSES IN MEN AND MATERIAL.

THE GERMANS, HOWEVER, ARE ATTACKING HEAVILY ON THE FRONT WEST OF MOSCOW, IN THE VELIKYE LUKI REGION. THE RUSSIANS SAID THE GERMANS ARE MAKING DESPERATE EFFORTS TO RETAKE THE CITY WHICH THEY LOST TO THE RUSSIANS SOME WEEKS AGO. HOWEVER, ALL THE GERMAN COUNTER-ATTACKS SO FAR HAVE BEEN REPELLED BY THE SOVIET TROOPS.

GERMAN SNEAK RAIDERS, DARTING OUT OF CLOUD BANKS, MADE SEVERAL HIT-RUN ATTACKS ON ENGLAND TODAY.

ONE GERMAN PLANE, BELIEVED TO BE A DORNIER TWO HUNDRED SEVENTEEN, MACHINEGUNNED THE STREETS IN AN EAST COAST TOWN.

BUT ANTI-AIRCRAFT BATTERIES WENT INTO ACTION, AND RIDDLED THE GAS TANKS OF THE PLANE. THE STREETS WERE SPRAYED WITH SMALL PIECES OF FALLING METAL FROM THE TANKS AND ALSO WITH GASOLINE.

A FEW MOMENTS LATER, THE DORNIER WAS SEEN TO WOBBLE VIOLENTLY AND FLASH INTO THE SEA.

ONE MAN AND FOUR WOMEN WERE KILLED AND TWELVE OTHERS INJURED WHEN A JUNKERS EIGHTY EIGHT DROPPED BOMBS IN A RESIDENTIAL SECTION OF ANOTHER TOWN IN EAST ANGLIA.

IN NORTH AFRICA, AIR WARFARE CONTINUED TO BE THE KEY FACTOR IN THE TWIN BATTLES NOW RAGING FOR TUNISIA AND TRIBOLITANIA.

THE LATEST REPORTS FROM NORTH AFRICAN HEADQUARTERS DISCLOSED THAT A GERMAN HEADQUARTERS AT KAIRWAN HAD BEEN DESTROYED BY AN AMERICAN FLIER IN A WARSPITE FIGHTER. THE FLIER, MAJOR PHILIP COCHRAN, OF ERIE, PA., PLACED HIS BOMBS SQUARELY ON THE HEADQUARTERS BUILDING, LEAVING IT A MASS OF JUNK

(PLEASE TURN TO PAGE 12)

(UNDATED, CONT.)

BRITISH EASTERN HEADQUARTERS REPORTED THAT ALLIED BOMBERS HAD RAIDED AXIS INSTALLATIONS ALONG THE TUNISIAN AND TRIPOLITANIAN COAST.

BRAZZAVILLE RADIO ANNOUNCED THAT THE FREE FRENCH CAMPAIGN IN THE FEZZAN SECTOR OF LIBYA WAS PROCEEDING FAVORABLY. THE ANNOUNCER QUOTED A COMMUNIQUE FROM GENERAL LECLERAS AUTHORITY FOR THE STATEMENT.

GROUND ACTIVITY OF THE FIGHTING ZONES WAS AT A VIRTUAL STANDSTILL, AS HEAVY RAINS MADE THE TERRAIN VIRTUALLY USELESS FOR ANY LARGE SCALE GROUND OPERATIONS.

NEW GAINS BY AMERICAN GROUND TROOPS AGAINST JAPANESE POSITIONS ON THE GUADALCANAL DISCLOSED TODAY IN A NAVY WAR BULLETIN WERE DISCLOSED.

ARMY AND MARINE TROOPS ADVANCED INTO AN UNIDENTIFIED AREA AFTER ARTILLERY BARRAGES, COUPLED WITH BOMBING AND STRAFING ATTACKS BY CANNON-FIRING AIRCOBRAS AND DEADLY DIVE BOMBERS, MADE THE ENEMY POSITIONS UNTENABLE. THE GROUND TROOPS ADVANCED DURING SUNDAY, ISLAND TIME, HAMPERED BY ONLY WEAK JAPANESE RESISTANCE.

LONDON:

THE BERLIN RADIO REPORTED TODAY THAT SIX HUNDRED SIXTY SEVEN PERSONS DESCRIBED AS COMMUNISTS HAD BEEN PLACED ON TRIAL IN BUDAPEST AND OTHER PARTS OF HUNGARY TODAY ON CHARGES OF PLOTTING A REVOLUTION BY VIOLENCE AND ORGANIZING GROUPS OF THE ILLEGAL COMMUNIST PARTY.

WASHINGTON:

THE NAVY DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCED THE SINKING TODAY OF A MEDIUM-SIZED UNITED STATES MERCHANT VESSEL OFF THE NORTH COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA IN MID-DECEMBER. THE VESSEL WAS TORPEDOED BY AN AXIS SUBMARINE. SURVIVORS HAVE BEEN LANDED AT NORFOLK AND MIAMI.

WASHINGTON:

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT EXTENDED LEND-LEASE TODAY TO LIBERIA AFRICAN WEST COAST REPUBLIC WHERE AMERICAN TROOPS HAVE ESTABLISHED AIR BASES IN RECENT MONTHS. THE PRESIDENT ADDRESSED A LETTER TO LEND-LEASE ADMINISTRATOR STETTINUS IN WHICH HE DECLARED THAT THE DEFENCE OF LIBERIA IS VITAL TO THE DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES. STETTINUS WAS DIRECTED TO ARRANGE IMMEDIATELY FOR LEND-LEASE AID TO LIBERIA.

26<sup>th</sup> Jan.

Dear Captain Mc Cowan,

I am enclosing a letter from H. Kaptain from Lord Curzon's Resident Cabinet Minister in West Africa. I understand that he has arrived here on instructions from the Prime Minister as the President expressed a desire to see him.

If you are unable to send a reply by Lieut. Thompson I suggest that you send a signal stating that such & such a time would be convenient.

So sorry we missed the occasion but  
we all understand.  
Sincerely  
E. Hawley

MOST SECRET

ANFA CONFERENCE -- FRENCH QUESTION

- January 13th.      Arrival of Air Commodore F. at Anfa.
- January 14th.      Arrival of Admiral Q.
- January 15th.      Joint decision to send invitations to  
                         Giraud and de Gaulle.

Regraded Unclassified

COMMUNICATIONS WITH GENERAL GIRAUD AND GENERAL DE GAULLE

January 16th. Air Commodore F's invitation to de Gaulle despatched. Foreign Secretary replied that he was seeing de Gaulle the following day (January 17th). General Eisenhower, on return to Algiers, conveyed similar invitation from Admiral Q. to General Giraud. General Giraud's reply, accepting, received late the same night.

January 17th. General Giraud arrived at Anfa Camp at noon. Foreign Secretary reported interview with de Gaulle that morning. De Gaulle asked for time to reflect, and returned at 5 p.m. with his reply to Air Commodore F's message. De Gaulle was unwilling to accept Air Commodore F's invitation, since he wished to meet General Giraud alone without the Allies at hand. At the 5 p.m. interview with the Foreign Secretary, de Gaulle mentioned that he was telegraphing again to General Giraud to repeat his proposal for an immediate meeting.

January 18th. Air Commodore F's second message despatched, warning de Gaulle of serious consequences to Fighting French movement of refusal if persisted in.

January 19th. An answer from de Gaulle to Air Commodore F's second message was awaited all day.

General Giraud continued at Anfa Camp.

January 20th. Message from Foreign Secretary stating that de Gaulle had found pretext for not seeing him. Air Commodore F's second message had therefore been conveyed to him in writing on January 19th.

Foreign Secretary also reported that de Gaulle had asked that we should deliver to General Giraud the message of which he had spoken during his interview with Mr. Eden on January 17th. He feared this message might not yet have reached General Giraud. Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Murphy the same afternoon delivered the message to General Giraud, who had not yet received it. General Giraud was asked not to send any reply for the present.

Just before midnight a message received from the Foreign Secretary saying that de Gaulle was leaving that night, (January 20th) weather permitting.

January 21st. De Gaulle's flight postponed, owing to weather. General Giraud still at Anfa Camp.

January 22nd. De Gaulle left England at 0200 hours and reached Anfa Camp at lunch time.

*A draft  
(early)*

SUGGESTED STATEMENT BY GENERAL GIRAUD AND GENERAL DeGAULLE

General Giraud and General DeGaulle have been in friendly conference in North Africa for three days and have come to a complete understanding, which, without going into details which will be worked out progressively, represents a unity of purpose and objective which augurs well for the future course of the common effort of the war.

They have agreed that there is one simple, common purpose in which all Frenchmen everywhere can unite - the liberation of France. This means that every German soldier will be eliminated from the soil of France and the nation returned to the people of France.

This is essentially a military objective. In Africa it is possible for French officers to organize a thoroughly trained, fully equipped striking force, to be used against the joint enemy. Its strength could reasonably reach 250,000. Its equipment would of necessity come principally from the United States and the United Kingdom.

Always keeping the one great purpose in mind - the liberation of France - General Giraud and General DeGaulle, seeking the simplest form of organization, propose to organize a committee for the liberation of France, consisting of themselves and a third member, representing the civil administration of French North Africa, French Morocco, French West Africa, French Equatorial Africa and Djibouti.

The governors of all French territories or protectorates in Africa would carry out their administrative duties as formerly, subject only to final decisions of the Committee for the Liberation of France.

In this provisional set-up covering the whole of Africa, there is no inclusion at this time of other territories and other problems such as the French Fleet in Alexandria, the French fleet and islands in the West Indies, or in other parts of the world. It is hoped that this new organization, controlling as it will by far the greater part of French territories, both in area and population, will play an effective military part in the liberation of the mother country.

This committee of three offers leadership to all Frenchmen who are able to participate with it, but, pending the establishment of a government chosen by the French people themselves, in no sense sets itself up as the government, or the provisional government, or the prospective government of France.

The agreement has been entered into with full cordiality and mutual high purpose. It is an agreement made by Frenchmen, with Frenchmen.

It has the full and sympathetic support of the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

SUGGESTED INSERT

The National Committee, with headquarters in London, will continue until further arrangements are made to exercise its present supervision over territories now under their control in parts of the world other than Africa.

The so-called French Imperial Council set-up in Algeria will be disbanded.

*Notes for my conf. - Dictated by my Jan. 22*

NOTES FOR F.D.R.

Soon after the successful landing operations in North Africa on November 8th, the President and the Prime Minister quickly agreed that the time had come for another review of the world war situation, and the practical discussion of steps to be taken by the United Nations for the prosecution of the war. This involved a meeting of the British-American combined staffs and if possible, another personal meeting. Such a meeting involved total geographical considerations and the President discussed with Mr. Stalin the possibilities of his attendance at a joint meeting somewhere in Africa. It became clear that while Mr. Stalin greatly desired to attend such a meeting, he was of necessity precluded from leaving Russia because he was conducting the new Russian offensive which even at that time had begun its eminently successful operation against the Germans, along the whole long line of the Russian-German front, from the Baltic to the Caucasus.

*definitely intended to come*

*in chief of the Russian army*

*Expansion of operations for the quality of his leadership.*

The Russian war leader was advised that the meeting between the President and the Prime Minister would nevertheless be held, and that he would be kept fully informed of the progress of planning for the year 1943. It is of course expected that as the operations of the year develop, the four major United Nations' military powers will continue their excellent cooperation in, and coordination of the world wide strategy which day by day is closing the net around the Axis powers.

*with Russia as a with China in the far east vs. Japan*

As a result of preliminary conversations, the President and the Prime Minister met at an undisclosed point in North Africa about ten days ago, their Army, Navy and Air staffs having already begun studies of the world situation.

These studies, unprecedented in history in their completeness and

in their total global aspect, have resulted in unanimous agreements marked by a spirit of complete understanding and cordiality, and have now been brought to a conclusion. *Stayed in same hotel with adjoining rooms etc*

The combined staffs have been actuated in this by ~~a spirit~~ <sup>the</sup> of pooling all of the resources of the United Nations and by the determination to maintain the initiative against the Axis powers in every part of the world.

War plans have been agreed on to strike the enemy during the whole of 1943. These plans cover:

- (a) United operations conducted in their areas of hostilities.
- (b) All possible material aid to the Russian offensive against Germany, which is so greatly cutting down the manpower of Germany and her satellites Roumania, Italy and Hungary now opposing Russia on the eastern front, together with the continued destruction of German munitions and material of all kinds.
- (c) All possible aid will be given to the heroic struggle of China now in its 6th year, with the resolve to end for all time Japanese domination of the Far East.

The President and the Prime Minister, after a complete survey of the world war situation, are more than ever determined that peace can come to the world only by a total elimination of German and Japanese war power. This involves the simple formula of placing the objective of this war in terms of an unconditional surrender by Germany, Italy and Japan. Unconditional surrender by them means a reasonable assurance of world peace, for generations. Unconditional surrender means not the destruction of the German populace, nor of the Italian or Japanese populace, but does mean the destruction of a philosophy in Germany, Italy and Japan which is based on the conquest and subjugation of other peoples.

The President and the Prime Minister are confident that this is equally the purpose of Russia, of China, and of all other members of the United Nations.

The meeting of the President and the Prime Minister with the combined staffs has come to a complete and successful meeting of the minds in regard to all military operations, and the war against the Axis powers will proceed according to schedule with every indication of a continuation of successes for the United Nations during 1943.

In view of the fact that the conference was held in North Africa and in view of the world wide desire that France be liberated from the Nazi yoke, the President and the Prime Minister, on arrival, took steps to bring Frenchmen in every part of the world outside of occupied France, into a unity, with one simple objective - the raising of French Army, Navy and Air forces to march with the United Nations to the liberation of France.

They therefore invited General Giraud and General DeGaulle to meet in North Africa, in order that they might discuss ways and means toward this simple objective, and if they desired to consult with the President and the Prime Minister toward the common end. General Giraud, the High Commissioner of French North Africa and French West Africa, arrived at the place of meeting within two days.

General Giraud, as High Commissioner, represents the supreme French command in Algiers, Tunis, the French Protectorate of the Sultantate of Morocco, and West Africa, which includes Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Dahomey and French Guinea. These territories include by far the greater part of the French overseas territory, both in area and in population. In the category of population, these territories include not only the greater majority of the native population, but also the greater majority of the French population which lives outside of France proper.

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*L. Hubert*

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719-1  
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*Notes for press conference*  
*Statement JWR*

1. Eddie Baerdy - Canadian B.C
2. W. Smith
3. Equipment

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

*Casablanca*

While in North Africa, I have visited and inspected a number of American Army ground and air units, and in addition have talked with a number of commanders of Naval areas.

A few days ago I visited and inspected several American divisions which had taken part in the landing operations on the night of November 7-8. I found them in excellent health, high spirits and high efficiency - eager to fight again. And they will.

I had the opportunity of visiting localities where the actual landing operations, followed by severe land fighting, had taken place. I went to a cemetery containing the graves of American soldiers and the graves of French soldiers killed in the first few days before the fighting ceased.

May I say here, that the French garrisons, obeying orders to resist any landing, fought with extreme bravery and with heavy losses, but the moment peace was reestablished, the French Army and Navy and the French civil authorities have given whole hearted assistance to the American forces in carrying out the common objective of peace in these areas, of the establishment of French armies to do battle in the common cause, and to improve the conditions of living in a civil population which had been subjected to grave hardships during the past two years by the demands upon them for food and other supplies by a Nazi machine which thought of itself and itself alone.

I have also had the privilege of meeting and cooperating with the Sultan of Morocco, who, as the sovereign of Morocco, is rightly interested in the welfare of his people. It is gratifying to know that at no time has he given aid or comfort to the Axis.

The American forces in North Africa maintain at the highest point their morale and fighting qualities. They seek further victories. They are ready to go. I am proud of them.

Casablanca,  
24 January, 1943.

Lt. General Dwight D. Eisenhower,  
Commander-in-Chief,  
Allied Forces in North Africa,  
AFHQ,  
APO 512.

My dear General Eisenhower:

It is my desire that the following letter to the American Armed Forces under your command in North Africa be published in a General Order, to be read to each command at the earliest practicable moment:

■ Casablanca,  
24 January, 1943.

**OFFICERS AND MEN OF  
THE AMERICAN ARMED FORCES IN NORTH AFRICA:**

My brief visit to North Africa has given me an increased assurance and a deeper feeling of pride in the leaders and the men of the American Armed Forces. The officers and men who landed with the initial assault, those who are now carrying on at the front in Tunisia, and those who are training, readying themselves for future combat, are deserving of the highest commendation. I could not help but note your alertness, your smartness and the pride you take in yourself and your splendid equipment.

I return to the United States with a renewed confidence that the American soldier, equipped with the best equipment the world can produce, led by men who have proven themselves in battle, and all imbued with the will to win, shall be victorious.

Officers and men of the Armed Forces in North  
Africa - I commend you.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,  
Commander-in-Chief. "

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,  
Commander-in-Chief.

Casablanca,

January 23, 1943

Major G. L. Burgess  
Major E. K. Arnold  
1st Off. L. L. Anderson  
2nd Off. R. W. Collins  
1st Off. L. Anderson  
**Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower**  
**Commander-in-Chief**  
**Allied Forces in North Africa**  
**Allied Force Headquarters**  
**A. P. O. #512**  
**U. S. Army.**

My dear General,

The officers and enlisted men listed in the attached enclosure are deserving of especial mention and commendation for the splendid manner in which they performed the varied and arduous tasks during the Anfa Conference.

I desire that the superior manner in which they performed these tasks be made a matter of official record.

Very sincerely yours,

**FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT**  
**Commander-in-Chief**

**Enc. - List**

1st Lt. E. K. Arnold  
Capt. W. A. Robison  
1st Lt. S. E. Rayland  
2nd Lt. Gunn  
1st Lt. A. S. Schreiber  
2nd Lt. Mangine  
1st Lt. [unclear]  
1st Lt. [unclear]  
1st Lt. [unclear]  
1st Lt. [unclear]  
1st Lt. [unclear]

1st Lt. [unclear]  
1st Lt. [unclear]  
1st Lt. [unclear]  
1st Lt. [unclear]  
1st Lt. [unclear]  
1st Lt. [unclear]  
1st Lt. [unclear]  
1st Lt. [unclear]  
1st Lt. [unclear]  
1st Lt. [unclear]  
1st Lt. [unclear]  
1st Lt. [unclear]

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Major C. L. Burgess		Ass't Sec. Off.
Major H. H. Arnoldson		Ass't Sec. Off.
1st Off. L. L. Anderson	(WAAC)	Stenographer
1st Off. R. M. Briggs	(WAAC)	Stenographer
1st Off. A. Drezmal	(WAAC)	Stenographer
1st Off. M. A. Pinette	(WAAC)	Stenographer
1st Off. M. E. Rogers	(WAAC)	Stenographer
T/4 R. J. Hutchings		Stenographer

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY

T/4 D. G. Beach	Stenographer
-----------------	--------------

1ST ARMORED CORPS

Lt. Col. P. D. Harkins	Executive Officer
Lt. Col. H. E. Hopping	Transportation Officer
Major S. F. Alexander	Attending Physician
Major V. E. McDaniel	Engineer Officer
Capt. R. N. Jenson	Charge of housing
1st Lt. G. Murnane	Asst. housing
1st Lt. W. F. Ort	Asst. Att. Physician
1st Lt. R. Williams	Villa Officer (2,9,11)
1st Lt. W. Bannister	Villa Officer (15,16,17,18)
1st Lt. S. Graham	Q uartermaster Supply Off.
1st Lt. R. Baldwin	Desk Officer
2nd Lt. J. O'Keefe	Mess Officer
2nd Lt. D. P. Frame	Desk Officer
2nd Lt. J. Senseny	Desk Officer
2nd Lt. D. Martin	Courier Officer
2nd Lt. C. Langston	Courier Officer
2nd Lt. J. E. Whelden	Courier Officer
2nd Lt. R. Herman	Transportation Off.
2nd Lt. R. Ryan	Villa Officer (4,5,6,14)
2nd Lt. E. Grine	Villa Officer (8,10,13,7)
2nd Lt. F. K. Smale	A ss't Sec. Off-Mimeograph.
Capt. F. A. Robison	O.C. of Communications
1st Lt. C. E. Ragland	Msg. Cen. Officer
2nd Lt. Dunn	Msg. Cen. Officer
2nd Lt. G. S. Schreiber	Msg. Cen. Officer
2nd Lt. Longine	Photographic Officer
Lt. Albright	Duty Officer, Wire Comm.
Lt. Christensen	D.O. Wire Comm.
Lt. Sanderson	D.O. Wire Comm.
T/5 Andrew Yuzwa	Mimeograph Operator
Pfc. Lewis Ruple	Mimeograph Operator

3RD BN., 30TH INFANTRY

Lt. Col. C. E. Johnson  
Capt. J. W. Hosford  
Capt. P. E. Doherty  
Capt. E. G. Paar  
Capt. R. L. Davies

Major F. M. Izenour  
Capt. G. D. Husser  
Capt. C. Swanberg, Jr.  
Capt. E. F. Egleston  
1st Lt. F. W. Shaw Jr.

Casablanca,

January 23, 1943

Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower  
Commander-in-Chief  
Allied Forces in North Africa  
Allied Force Headquarters  
A. P. O. #512  
U. S. Army.

My dear General,

The officers and men of the 3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry in the past two weeks have been an outstanding example of the American soldier. Their smartness, their appearance, their discipline and the manner of performance of their duty has left nothing to be desired.

It is my desire that the contents of this letter be made known to all men of the battalion at the earliest practicable moment.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT  
Commander-in-Chief

PART TWO From the President of the United States and the  
Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President of the United States

1. We have been in conference with our Military Advisers for the past ten days, and we have decided the operations which are to be undertaken by American and British forces in the first nine months of 1943. We think that you would wish to know our intentions at once. We believe these operations, together with your powerful offensive, may well bring Germany to her knees in 1943. Every effort must be made to accomplish this purpose.

2. We are in no doubt that our correct strategy is to concentrate on the defeat of Germany, with a view to achieving early and decisive victory in the European theatre. At the same time, we must maintain sufficient pressure on Japan to retain the initiative in the Pacific and Far East, sustain China, and prevent the Japanese from extending their aggression to other theatres such as your Maritime Provinces.

3. A constant consideration has been the necessity of diverting strong German land and air forces from the Russian front and of sending to Russia the maximum flow of supplies. We shall spare no exertion to send you material assistance by every available route.

4. Our immediate intention is to clear the Axis out of North Africa and set up the naval and air installations to open-

- (1) An effective passage through the Mediterranean for military traffic, and
- (2) An intensive bombardment of important Axis targets in Southern Europe.

5. We have made the decision to launch large scale amphibious operations in the Mediterranean at the earliest possible moment. The preparation for these operations is now under way and will involve a considerable concentration of forces, particularly landing craft and shipping in Egyptian and North African ports. This concentration will certainly be known to our enemies, but they will not know where or when, or in what strength, we propose to strike. They will, therefore, be compelled to reinforce with both land and air forces the South of France, Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily, the heel of Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, Crete and the Dodecanese.

6. We shall concentrate in the United Kingdom the maximum American land and air forces that shipping will permit. These, combined with the British forces in the United Kingdom, will prepare themselves to re-enter the Continent of Europe as soon as possible.

7. In Europe we shall increase the Allied Bomber offensive from the U.K. against Germany at a rapid rate and, by midsummer, it should be more than double its present strength. Our experiences to date have shown that the day bombing attacks result in destruction and damage to large numbers of German Fighter Aircraft. We believe that an increased tempo and weight of daylight and night attacks will lead to

greatly increased material and morale damage in Germany and rapidly deplete German fighter strength in Germany and occupied Western Europe. As you are aware, we are already containing more than half the German Air Force in Western Europe and the Mediterranean. We have no doubt that our greatly intensified bombing offensive, together with the other operation which we are undertaking, will compel further withdrawals of German air and other forces from the Russian Front.

8. In the Pacific it is our intention to eject the Japanese from Rabaul within the next few months and thereafter to exploit in the general direction of Japan. We also intend to increase the scale of our operations in Burma in order to reopen our channel of supply to China. We intend to increase our air force in China at once. We shall not, however, allow our operations against Japan to jeopardize our capacity to take advantage of every opportunity that may present itself for the decisive defeat of Germany in 1943.

the line which has been... distance of nearly 1,000 miles...

The President, while in North Africa, has visited and inspected a number of American Army ground and air units and in addition has talked with a number of commanders of Naval areas. He said today:

"The American forces in North Africa and on the long approaches thereto, are in splendid shape, and I am convinced that their morale and fighting qualities and eagerness for victory are of the highest order. They are in every way ready to go, not only in connection with the present task, but to carry out further tasks and bring victory as soon as it may be possible.

"I am proud of them and I am proud of the efficiency all along the line which has made them such an effective force operating at a distance of nearly 4,000 miles from their home base."

U. S. SECRET  
BRITISH MOST SECRET

COPY NO. 8

C.C.S. 171/1/D

23 January 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

OPERATION HUSKY

DIRECTIVE TO COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,  
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE IN NORTH AFRICA

(Approved by Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 66th Meeting)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved that an attack against Sicily will be launched in 1943, with the target date as the period of the favourable July moon (Code designation HUSKY).

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have further agreed that the following command set-up shall be established for the operation:

1. You are to be the Supreme Commander with General Alexander as Deputy Commander-in-Chief, charged with the detailed planning and preparation and with the execution of the actual operation when launched.
2. Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham is to be the Naval Commander and Air Chief Marshal Tedder the Air Commander.

You will submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff your recommendations for the Officers to be appointed Western and Eastern Task Force Commanders.

In consultation with General Alexander you will set up at once a special operational and administrative staff, with its own Chief of Staff, for planning and preparing the operation, including cover plans.

The provision of the necessary forces and their training in time for the assault on the target date given above have been the subject of exhaustive study by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and their Staffs. A Memorandum setting out the various considerations and the outline plan for the operation which formed the basis of this study, is attached for your information. (C.C.S. 161/1). Plan A (vide para. 5 of this paper) was accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the provision of the British Ground Forces. The details of the additional forces which will be made

U. S. SECRET  
BRITISH MOST SECRET

available to you for the operation will be communicated separately by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff.

A copy of the Minutes of the 66th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff held at Casablanca on January 22, 1943, which led to the above decisions, is attached for your information.

You are to report to them not later than the 1st March, whether any insurmountable difficulty as to resources and training will cause the date of the assault to be delayed beyond the favourable July moon. In the event of there being such a delay you will confirm that the assault date will not be later than the favourable August moon.

The code designation \_\_\_\_\_ will apply to all general preparations for HUSKY in the Mediterranean Theater, including training, cover plans and preliminary air operations. Specific operations will be given special code designations.

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

Report to the President and Prime Minister

Memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

In a previous memorandum (C.C.S. 155/1) the Combined Chiefs of Staff presented their proposals for the Conduct of the War in 1943. These proposals were in broad outline and we have subsequently examined them and reached certain conclusions on points of detail. We have also studied a number of matters closely related to these proposals. The present memorandum contains a summary of what has been accomplished.

1. SECURITY OF SEA COMMUNICATIONS

A close examination of the minimum escort requirements to maintain the sea communications of the United Nations has been completed (C.C.S. 160). In the course of this examination we have laid down certain scales of ocean-going escort vessels as the minimum acceptable. Our broad conclusion is that the minimum acceptable requirements of escort craft will not be met until about August or September 1943. We ought not to count on the destruction of <sup>U boats</sup> ~~submarines~~ at a rate in excess of the production rate before the end of the year. If it is desired to provide escorts for offensive operations, the acceptance of increased losses must be balanced against the importance of the operations in question. We have adopted certain resolutions on measures necessary to intensify the anti U-boat war.

(C.C.S. 65 Meeting, Item 1)

2. ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA IN RELATION TO OTHER COMMITMENTS

We have examined the extent of the shipments to Russia required to fulfill United States and British obligations throughout 1943 with a view to estimating the effect of these

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BRITISH MOST SECRET

on other commitments. Our conclusion is that, provided a shipping loss rate of not more than 2.4% per month can be relied on, it will be possible to meet full commitments by the end of the calendar year 1943, and we have approved a programme of shipments on this basis subject to the proviso that supplies to Russia shall not be continued at prohibitive cost to the United Nations effort.

An essential point is that an agreed loss rate for 1943 shall be established so that all British and American calculations can be made on the same basis. We have accordingly directed the Combined Military Transportation Committee to make an agreed estimate.

We are agreed that in the preparation of the next Protocol with Russia (should this be necessary) to cover the period after the 1st July, 1943, a clause should be inserted to the effect that the commitments included in the Protocol may be reduced if the shipping losses or the necessities of other operations render their fulfilment prohibitive. (C.C.S. 63rd Meeting, Item 1, and C.C.S. 162).

3. OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

(a) OPERATIONS FOR THE CAPTURE OF SICILY.

We have carefully examined possible operations in the Mediterranean theatre and we have recorded the following conclusions:- (C.C.S. 66th Meeting, Item 2, and C.C.S. 161/1).

*June? ~~July~~*

(i) To attack Sicily in 1943 with the favourable ~~July~~ moon as the target date.

(ii) To instruct General Eisenhower to report not later than the 1st March firstly whether any insurmountable difficulty as to resources and training will cause the date of the assault to be delayed beyond the favourable July moon, and, secondly, in that event to confirm that the date will not be later than the favourable August moon.

(iii) That the following should be the Command set-up for the operation:-

A. General Eisenhower to be in Supreme Command with General Alexander as Deputy Commander-in-Chief, ~~responsible for~~ *charged with* the detailed planning and preparation and for the execution of the actual operation when launched.

B. Admiral Cunningham to be Naval Commander, and Air Chief Marshal Tedder the Air Commander.

C. Recommendations for the officers to be appointed Western and Eastern Task Force Commanders to be submitted in due course by General Eisenhower.

(iv) That General Eisenhower should be instructed to set up forthwith, after consultation with General Alexander, a special operational and administrative staff, with its own Chief of Staff,

for planning and preparing the operation.

The necessary directive to General Eisenhower conveying the above decisions has been drafted.

(b) COVER PLANS.

We intend to instruct the appropriate agencies in Washington and London and the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force in North Africa to draw up a comprehensive cover plan for the Mediterranean. The possibility of carrying out feints or minor operations in the Eastern Mediterranean will be examined.

(c) COMMAND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE.

We have agreed the following Command arrangements in the Mediterranean:- (C.C.S. 63rd Meeting, Item 4 and C.C.S. 163).

(i) SEA.

For operation HUSKY the Naval Commander Force X will assume the title of Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. The present Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, will be designated Commander-in-Chief, Levent. The boundary between the two Commands will be determined later. The Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean will, however, be responsible for naval matters which affect the Mediterranean as a whole.

(ii) LAND

At a moment to be determined after the

U. S. SECRET  
BRITISH MOST SECRET

British 8th Army has crossed the Tunisian border, General Alexander will become Deputy Commander-in-Chief to General Eisenhower, the 8th Army at the same time being transferred to General Eisenhower's command. Subject to the concurrence of General Eisenhower, General Alexander's primary task will be to command the Allied forces on the Tunisian front with a small Headquarters of his own provided from the Middle East and after the conclusion of these operations to take charge of Operation HUSKY. The boundary between the North African and Middle East Commands will be the Tunisian-Tripolitania frontier.

(iii) AIR.

We have agreed that Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder shall be appointed Air Commander-in-Chief of the whole Mediterranean theatre with his Headquarters at Algiers. Under him will be the Air Officer Commanding in Chief, North-West Africa (General Spaatz), and the Air Officer Commanding in Chief, Middle East (Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas). We have defined the relationship and mutual responsibilities of the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and the Commander in Chief Allied Expeditionary Forces in North-West Africa, and we have laid down

certain principles for the organisation of the Mediterranean Air Command subject to any minor changes which the Air Commander-in-Chief may find necessary after his appointment.

(d) THE BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM NORTH AFRICA.

We have laid down the following as the objects of the bomber offensive from North Africa in order of time (C.C.S. 159/1):-

- (i) The furtherance of operations for the eviction of all Axis Forces from Africa.
- (ii) When (i) has been achieved, infliction of the heaviest possible losses on the Axis Air and Naval forces in preparation for HUSKY, including bombing required by cover plans.
- (iii) The direct furtherance of Operation HUSKY.
- (iv) The destruction of the oil refineries at Ploesti.

So far as is possible without prejudice to the achievement of objects (i) (ii) and (iii) above, bombing objectives will be chosen with a view to weakening the Italian will to continue the war.

4. OPERATIONS IN AND FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM.

(a) THE OPERATION OF AIR FORCES FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM.

We have agreed that the United States Heavy Bombardment Units in the United Kingdom shall operate under the strategical direction of the British Chief of the Air Staff. Under this general direction the

United States Commanding General will decide upon the technique and method to be employed. (C.C.S. 65th meeting, Item 2).

We have agreed upon a directive (C.C.S. 166/1/D) to be issued to the British Commander-in-Chief Bomber Command and to the Commanding General United States Air Forces in the United Kingdom.

(b) BOLERO  
(C.C.S. 172 and C.C.S. 68th Meeting, Item 1)

A study has been made of the shipping capabilities for BOLERO build-up in 1943.

With the data available at the conference and making a number of assumptions which are set out in full in C.C.S. 172, Appendix III, we calculate that the U.S. forces as shown in the following table will be available for continental operations in the U.K. on the dates shown. The figures given in the last column include the build-up of the air contingent to 172,000.

	<u>Division</u>	<u>Total Numbers Equipped</u>
By 15 Aug.	4	384,000
15 Sept.	7	509,000
15 Oct.	9	634,000
15 Nov.	12	759,000
31 Dec.	15	938,000

This is based on (1) the figures of 50,000 troops per division with supporting troops (2) 45 days allowance between sailing date and availability date.

As the movement proceeds the overall number of men per division will decrease and by the end of the year it may be down to 40,000, in which case the number of divisions available on the 31st December may be 19 instead of 15. The number of divisions earlier in the year is unlikely to be increased.

(c) AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN 1943 FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM. (C.C.S. 167 and 169 and C.C.S. 68th Meeting Item 2.)

We have examined the problem of amphibious operations from the United Kingdom in 1943. There are three types of operation for which plans and preparations must now be made:-

- (i) raids with the primary object of provoking air battles and causing enemy losses.
- (ii) operations with the object of seizing and holding a bridgehead and, if the state of German morale and resources permit, of <sup>vigorously</sup> exploiting successes.
- (iii) a return to the continent to take advantage of German disintegration.

Plans and preparations for (i) above will proceed as at present. An attack on the Channel Islands is an example of the type of operation which we have in mind.

We propose to prepare for an operation against the Cotentin Peninsula with resources which will be available, the target date being set at August 1st, 1943. This operation comes under type (ii) above.

We have agreed to establish forthwith a Combined Staff under a British Chief of Staff until such time as a Supreme Commander is appointed. A directive to govern the planning is in course of preparation. We intend to include in this directive provision for a

return to the continent under (iii) above with the forces which will be available for the purpose in the United Kingdom month by month. ~~The directive will also make provision for the planning of an invasion of the continent in force in 1944.~~

5. PACIFIC AND FAR EAST THEATRE.

(a) OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC THEATRE. (C.C.S. 168 and C.C.S. 67th Meeting Item 1)

The following is an outline of the operations which it is intended to carry out in the Pacific in conformity with the provisions of our previous report (C.C.S. 155/1):-

- (i) Operations to make the Aleutians as secure as may be.
  - (ii) An advance from Midway towards Truk-Guam as practicable and particularly in conjunction with the operations now in hand for the capture of Rabaul.
  - (iii) An advance along the line Samoa/Jaluit.
  - (iv) An advance on the Malay Barrier (as Timor) on a limited scale to counter enemy capabilities and divert his forces.
  - (v) It is not intended to advance from the Rabaul area towards the Truk-Guam line unless and until forces are in hand to enable the advance to be carried through and followed up.
- (b) RE-CONQUEST OF BURMA.

We have approved the 15th November, 1943, as the provisional date for the ANAKIM assault. It will be necessary to decide in July 1943 whether to undertake or to postpone the operation. (C.C.S. 65th Meeting, Item 4).

We have prepared a provisional schedule of the forces required for the operation and have investigated the possibility of their provision. The land and air forces can be provided. The provision of naval forces, assault shipping, landing craft and shipping cannot be guaranteed so far in advance and must depend upon the situation existing in the late summer of 1943. (C.C.S. 164).

6. THE AXIS OIL POSITION.

We have had laid before us certain information from British sources on the Axis oil position. (C.C.S. 158). It is believed that additional information available in Washington may modify the conclusions which have been drawn by the British. We have accordingly directed the Combined Intelligence Committee to submit as early as possible an agreed assessment of the Axis oil situation based on the latest information available from both British and United States sources. In the meanwhile, we have taken note that the Axis oil situation is so restricted that it is decidedly advantageous that bombing attacks on the sources of Axis oil, namely, the Rumanian oil fields and oil traffic via the Danube, and the synthetic and producer gas plants in

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON


ST draft  
Casablanca

January 22, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President.  
SUBJECT : Draft Telegram, M. Stalin.

1. Attached hereto is a draft telegram to Premier Stalin which has been prepared by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and which is submitted for your approval.

2. The British Chiefs of Staff have submitted a copy to the Prime Minister.

  
Chief of Staff

*top file*

January 22, 1943.

Mr. Hopkins:  
Dear Harry:

Giraud had a long talk with Catroux this morning after which he told me that he had found Catroux' attitude helpful and understanding. In essence Giraud told Catroux for the information of DeGaulle that what Giraud proposed is that Giraud remain Commander in Chief of all French armed forces as a member and titular head of a French War Committee. The Committee would include DeGaulle as a High Commissioner or Commission who would have the direction of the affairs of the territories which he brings into the combination. The Committee would include a third person, possibly General George, as High Commissioner or Commissioner having supervision of North and West Africa. Catroux would be the Committee's Director of Foreign Affairs, and General Valin - who is also with DeGaulle, would be in charge of Propaganda. Other DeGaulle people would be included one way or another in the setup. Giraud, DeGaulle and George would make their headquarters at Algiers. The military character of the organization would be emphasized - its primary purpose waging the war against the Axis - stressing political calm now during the military operation, and the fact that the French people must be left the decision of the eventual form of French Government.

Under the War Committee would be the Directory or Committee of Governors of the several territories. Under that eventually a consultative body of representative civilians from those territories to be called for example the Federal Council.

Giraud says that he looks at this matter as a matter of plain common sense - there cannot be two bosses in this area if we are to get on with the war. On the other hand he wants to play ball with DeGaulle and to respect his sensibilities. When DeGaulle assumes to talk for France and of conditions in France, Giraud points out that he has lived there much more recently than DeGaulle where Giraud was in touch with the underground organizations. He feels that possibly DeGaulle may confuse his idea of his own popularity with the French people and the latter's hatred of the Germans.

General George is still in France and will probably be smuggled out.

Giraud is lunching with DeGaulle and will have a long tete-a-tete after lunch.

Bob

C.C.S. 165/2

22nd January 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

DRAFT TELEGRAM from the President of the United States  
and the Prime Minister of Great Britain to Premier Stalin

Prepared by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

1. We have been in conference with our Military Advisers for the past ten days, and we have decided the operations which are to be undertaken by American and British forces in 1943. We think that you would wish to know our intentions at once.

2. We are in no doubt that our correct strategy is to concentrate on the defeat of Germany, with a view to achieving early and decisive victory in the European Theatre. At the same time, we must maintain sufficient pressure on Japan to retain the initiative in the Pacific and Far East, sustain China, and prevent the Japanese from extending their aggression to other theatres such as your Maritime Provinces.

3. A constant consideration has been the necessity of diverting strong German land and air forces from the Russian front and of sending to Russia the maximum flow of supplies, consistent with equally urgent requirements in other theatres. We shall spare no exertion to send you material assistance by every available route, but it would be no more in your interest than ours to do so at a cost which would cripple our capacity to relieve pressure on you by continuing an intensified offensive effort on our part.

4. Our immediate intention is to clear the Axis out of North Africa and set up the naval and air installations to open:-

- (1) An effective passage through the Mediterranean for military traffic, and
- (2) An intensive bombardment of important Axis installations in Southern Europe.

5. We have made the decision to launch large scale amphibious operations in the Mediterranean at the earliest possible moment. The preparation for these operations is now under way and will involve a considerable concentration

of forces, particularly landing craft and shipping in Egyptian and North African ports. This concentration will certainly be known to our enemies, but they will not know where or when, or in what strength, we propose to strike. They will, therefore, be compelled to reinforce with both land and air forces the South of France, Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily, the heel of Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, Crete, and the Dodecanese.

6. These operations may result in the collapse of Italy. The defection of other German satellite states would probably follow. Germany would then be faced with the choice of shortening her eastern line by a major withdrawal on your front, or of accepting a shortage of some fifty divisions and 2,000 aircraft in her global requirements.

7. In Europe we shall increase the Allied Bomber offensive from the U.K. against Germany at a rapid rate and, by midsummer, it should be more than double its present strength. Our experiences to date have shown that the day bombing attacks result in destruction and damage to large numbers of German Fighter Aircraft. We believe that an increased tempo and weight of daylight and night attacks will lead to greatly increased material and morale damage in Germany and rapidly deplete German fighter strength in Germany and occupied Western Europe. As you are aware, we are already containing more than half the German Air Force in Western Europe and the Mediterranean. We have no doubt that our greatly intensified bombing offensive, together with the other operations which we are undertaking, will compel further withdrawals of German air and other forces from the Russian front.

8. We shall also concentrate in the United Kingdom the maximum American land and air forces that shipping will permit. These, combined with the British forces in the United Kingdom, will be held in constant readiness to re-enter the Continent of Europe as soon as this operation offers reasonable prospect of success.

9. In the Pacific it is our intention to eject the Japanese from Raboul within the next few months and thereafter to exploit in the general direction of Japan. We also intend to increase the scale of our operations in Burma in order to reopen our channel of supply to China. We shall not, however, allow our operations against Japan to jeopardize our capacity to take advantage of any favorable opportunity that may present itself for the decisive defeat of Germany in 1943.

SECRET

*Davis*  
CASABLANCA  
January 20, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

I find myself reluctant to accept the status of Sledgehammer in 1943. Apparently everyone agrees that an attack in 1943, either at Brest or Cherbourg, would be desirable, and the limiting factors seem to be landing craft and shipping. Is there not some way to find the shipping prior to July 1st? It further seems to me that in view of the fact that our present landing craft production program is now at its very peak, it would be possible to continue that for several months more, at the highest possible rate, without causing the damage to the rest of the program that occurred last year. Would it not be better to have the tanks give way to the landing craft, if that is the point of conflict?

I have a general feeling that we are placing the operation across the Channel in 1943 as the last one to be accomplished, and this would only be done if the estimated requirements of all our other theaters of operations are met.

I believe that we even should consider substantial readjustments in our Russian shipments, if by doing so we could actually cross the Channel in 1943. As a matter of fact, would this not be more important to Russia than the loss of supplies which they would otherwise get?

A

INCOMING MESSAGE.

UNPARAPHRASED VERSION OF A MOST SECRET CYRILIC TELEGRAM.

MOST SECRET.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

From: ADMIRALTY. 1559A/20th January, 1943.  
To: BULOLO 232. T.O.R. 1342/21.

N.C.O.T.P.

TELESCOPE NO. 173. (NOCCOP).

Following is Part 2 of my 1930A/20th January, 1943.

SUNSET.

(c) RUSSIA.

- (a) Northernmost Sector. Land contact with Leningrad Garrison probably restored. No justification for report of rail communication yet re-established.
- (b) Recent reports show Germans still hold salient Demyansk area approached by corridor of which exact location unknown. Frequent local Russian attack on corridor recently.
- (c) Upper Don Sector. 19th January. Russians claim Valuiki and encircled German garrison Ostrogoonhsk. No reason to doubt but no confirmation.

T.O.O. 1559A/20.

Distribution.

Grps. 137.

Brig. Jacob (6).

FGC/GOJ.

2 Day's maps

MOST SECRET

### S. RUSSIA AND CAUCASUS

SCALE 1:4,000,000 OR 63 MILES TO 1 INCH  
MILES 50 25 0 50 100 150

**LEGEND**  
German Forces **BLUE**  
German Allied Forces **GREEN**



*See meeting*

*From W.S.C.*

INCOMING MESSAGE:

UNPARAPHRASED VERSION OF A MOST SECRET CYPHER TELEGRAM.

MOST SECRET

IMPORTANT

From: ADMIRALTY. 1847./18th January, 1943.

To: BULOLO 150 T.O.R. 2248./18.

N.C.O.T.P.

TELESCOPE No.103.

Jacob from Hollis. ✓

Following are more important subjects discussed by Vice Chiefs today. There was no meeting on Saturday or Sunday.

(ii) Meeting with General Devers.

Lieutenant General Devers Chief of United States Armoured Forces, gave most interesting "Off the record" account of conditions with Eighth and First Armies. He was most enthusiastic over the way supply and maintenance problems were tackled in Egypt where a strong impetus came from rear. In Tunisia on the other hand the impetus from rear was lacking and pull came from units at the front.

(iii) Devers reported morale seemed excellent in First Army who were worried only by incessant enemy air attacks and apparent absence of our fighters and by relatively inferior quality of our tanks.

(iv) Devers commented adversely on operation of Port of Algiers compared with Oran and Casablanca. V.C.N.S. attributed this to greater degree of French participation at Algiers.

(v) Devers also commented adversely on TORCH Road traffic discipline, both British and American, and on American air discipline throughout North Africa. He seemed to have passed on these criticisms to Eisenhower.

(vi) Convoy to Malta.

Vice Chiefs have telegraphed to Middle East stressing importance of stocking up Malta by early March to level that will ensure safe maintenance up to mid October. On our reckoning this will necessitate three Convoys including one now arranged for early February.

/Middle East...

*Type  
should  
for. 15  
Show  
Principles*

Middle East have been asked to forward details of effects on 8th Army operations of above proposals in order that Chiefs of Staffs may balance up requirements of Malta on one hand and interference with operations of 8th Army on other hand, before issuing definite orders.

(vii) Provision of a Third H.Q. Ship.

Ministry of War Transport after a false start, reluctantly agreed to provide a vessel for conversion into a third H.Q. ship. The vessel selected is named "HILLARY", speed 14 knots of Booth Line. She is due in U.K. end of February and should be ready by end of April. She is not ideal but Rear Admiral Daniel has agreed to accept her.

(viii) Grove's daily telegrams are mostly interesting and useful. They are promptly repeated Coleridge with appropriate extracts to J.P.S. here.

T.O.O. 1847/18.

Grps. 488.

HTW/JFB/EGP.

Distribution:

Brig. Jacob. (20).

C.C.S. 155/1

January 19, 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN 1943

Memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed to submit the following recommendations for the conduct of the war in 1943.

1. SECURITY

The defeat of the U-boat must remain a first charge on the resources of the United Nations.

2. ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA.

The Soviet forces must be sustained by the greatest volume of supplies that can be transported to Russia without prohibitive cost in shipping.

3. OPERATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATRE

Operations in the European Theatre will be conducted with the object of defeating Germany in 1943 with the maximum forces that can be brought to bear upon her by the United Nations.

4. The main lines of offensive action will be: -

In the Mediterranean

(a) The occupation of Sicily with the object of: -

(1) Making the Mediterranean line of communications more secure.

(ii) Diverting German pressure from the Russian front.

(iii) Intensifying the pressure on Italy.

(b) To create a situation in which Turkey can be enlisted as an active ally.

In the U.K.

(c) The heaviest possible bomber offensive against the German war effort.

U.S. SECRET

BRITISH MOST SECRET

- (d) Such limited offensive operations as may be practicable with the amphibious forces available.
- (e) The assembly of the strongest possible force (subject to (a) and (b) above and paragraph 6 below) in constant readiness to re-enter the continent as soon as German resistance is weakened to the required extent.

5. In order to ensure that these operations and preparations are not prejudiced by the necessity to divert forces to retrieve an adverse situation elsewhere, adequate forces shall be allocated to the Pacific and Far Eastern Theatres.

6. OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST.

(a) Operations in these theatres shall continue with the forces allocated, with the object of maintaining pressure on Japan, retaining the initiative and attaining a position of readiness for the full scale offensive against Japan by the United Nations as soon as Germany is defeated.

(b) These operations must be kept within such limits as will not, in the opinion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, jeopardize the capacity of the United Nations to take advantage of any favourable opportunity that may present itself for the decisive defeat of Germany in 1943.

(c) Subject to the above reservation, plans and preparations shall be made for: -

- (i) The re-capture of Burma (ANAKIM) beginning in 1943.
- (ii) Operations, after the capture of Rabaul, against the Marshalls and Carolines if time and resources allow without prejudice to ANAKIM.

ANFA CAMP  
19th January 1943

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COPY NO. 1

*Final  
Quorum  
by #4*

ANFA 2ND MEETING

REVISED

MINUTES OF MEETING

Held at Anfa Camp on

Monday, 18th January, 1943 at 1700

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

THE PRESIDENT  
GENERAL G. C. MARSHALL  
ADMIRAL E. J. KING  
LT. GEN. H. H. ARNOLD  
MR. HARRY HOPKINS

BRITISH

THE RT. HON. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL  
(Prime Minister and Minister  
of Defense)  
ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET  
SIR DUDLEY POUND  
FIELD MARSHAL SIR JOHN DILL  
GENERAL SIR ALAN F. BROOKE  
AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR C. PORTAL  
VICE ADMIRAL  
THE LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN  
LT. GEN. SIR HASTINGS L. ISMAY

SECRETARIAT

BRIG. GENERAL J. R. DEANE  
BRIGADIER E. I. C. JACOB

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The PRESIDENT and the PRIME MINISTER asked the Chiefs of Staff for a report of progress regarding the current conferences.

SIR ALAN BROOKE stated that after seven days of argument he felt that definite progress had been made. A document is now being prepared setting forth the general strategic policy for 1943. This will be gone over in detail at the C.C.S. meeting on the morning of January 19th.

SIR ALAN BROOKE summarized the document as follows:-

1. A statement that the measures to be taken to combat the submarine menace are a first charge on the resources of the United Nations and provide security for all of our operations.

2. A statement that we shall concentrate on the defeat of Germany first which will be followed by the defeat of Japan.

3. Our efforts in defeating Germany will be concerned first with efforts to force them to withdraw ground and air forces from the Russian front. This will be accomplished by operations from North Africa by which Southern Europe, the Dodecanese Islands, Greece, Crete, Sardinia, and Sicily will all be threatened, thus forcing Germany to deploy her forces to meet each threat. The actual operation decided upon is the capture of Sicily.

At the same time, we shall go on with preparing forces and assembling landing craft in England for a thrust across the Channel in the event that the German strength in France decreases, either through withdrawal of her troops or because of an internal collapse.

4. Operations in the Pacific are to be continued to include the capture of Rabaul and Eastern New Guinea while plans are to be prepared to extend the operations to the Marshall Islands and the capture of Truk if the situation permits.

5. Plans and preparations to undertake Operation ANAKIM late in 1943 are to be instituted at once with the understanding that the United States will assist to make up deficiencies in landing craft and naval vessels needed for this operation. The operation is to be planned for December of 1943 with the view to capturing Burma and open the Burma road prior to the monsoon season of 1944.

6. The maximum combined air offensive will be conducted against Germany from the United Kingdom.

By this and every other available means, attempts will be made to undermine Germany's morale.

7. Every effort will be made, political and otherwise, to induce Turkey to enter the war in order that we may establish air bases there for operations against Roumania.

8. Operation RAVENOUS will be undertaken for the purpose of establishing bridgeheads over the Chindwin River, and also to prepare roads and airfields in northern Burma which will facilitate the mounting of Operation ANAKIM toward the end of the year. In this connection, Operation CANNIBAL is now being undertaken with a view to securing air bases in the Akyab area.

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that Chiang Kai Shek wishes to postpone his part of Operation RAVENOUS until there is more naval support in the Bay of Bengal. He added that this was strategically sound as the Chinese operation would be more effective if coordinated as a part of ANAKIM. He said RAVENOUS requires no Naval support.

GENERAL MARSHALL then explained that while that part of the Chinese operation which was to consist of an advance from Yunnan could be advantageously postponed, the advance from Ramgarh could well be initiated as part of operation RAVENOUS in order to provide security for the construction of a road southwards from Ledo. However, this will have to have the approval of the Generalissimo.

The PRIME MINISTER then stated that he wished it made clear that if and when Hitler breaks down, all of the British resources and effort will be turned toward the defeat of Japan. He stated that not only are British interests involved, but her honor is engaged. If it were thought well for the effect on the people of the United States of America, the British Government would enter into a treaty or convention with the U.S. Government to this effect.

The PRESIDENT stated that a formal agreement regarding British efforts against Japan was entirely unnecessary. He said, however, that efforts should be made to obtain an engagement from Russia to concentrate on the defeat of Japan after Germany had been eliminated from the war. He thought that Russia would probably want to come in with the United Nations in that event, but he would like to have an expression from them as to whether they will come in and how.

MR. CHURCHILL then discussed operation SLEDGEHAMMER. He thought it should be given a "sharper point" and that plans

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should be made to undertake it, including the appointment of a Commander and the fixing of a target date. He had not been in favour of such an operation in 1942 but he felt that it was our duty to engage the enemy on as wide a front and as continuously as possible, and as the only way of stopping an operation with the full force of the British Metropolitan air forces and the U.S. air forces in Great Britain, is to do a SLEDGEHAMMER, he thought we should do everything we could to make the operation possible this summer.

The PRESIDENT agreed with the Prime Minister and further suggested that we join together to build up forces in the United Kingdom. He said that it would be desirable to prepare a schedule of the build-up of forces by month in order that we would know what the potential effort might be at any time, and plans should be made for utilizing this potential at any time that there are signs of Germany's deterioration.

The PRIME MINISTER then discussed possible operations from the Mediterranean against the Dodecanese. He considered that these might be developed either as feints in order to conceal the location of the main effort against Sicily, or perhaps as a real attack. He had received a message from the three Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East informing him that plans to this effect were under way. He desired that the final document prepared by the Chiefs of Staff covering the strategy for 1943 should include some mention of the Dodecanese.

The PRIME MINISTER said that he felt that General Chennault's air force in China should be reinforced. He stated that General Wavell concurred in this view.

The PRESIDENT stated that the effects of help to China would be largely political. A small effort to send aid would have a tremendously favorable effect on Chinese morale. The Generalissimo has been disappointed with regard to the Burma operations. He has considerable difficulty in maintaining the loyalty of some of the Chinese provinces. Anything that we can do to help China and to hurt Japan will have a heartening effect on him.

The PRESIDENT stated that reinforcing our air power in China would also be a severe blow to Japan. He said that the Japanese people panic easily. This was especially true at the time of their earthquake. Mr. Grew, the United States Ambassador, in reporting this incident, stated that it was necessary for the Japanese broadcast to adopt every means possible to quiet the people.

The PRESIDENT considered that we should send from 200 to 250 planes to China. This should include heavy bombers which, because of the difficulties of supply, could be based in India. They could be used to operate in raids over Japan proper by refueling in China on their way to and from such missions.

He thought that the United Nations should commit themselves

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to this line of action and that whoever of the Chiefs of Staff was next to see the Generalissimo, should inform him to this effect.

The PRESIDENT then discussed operations in the Mediterranean. He said we had been extremely fortunate in Operation TORCH. He was worried, however, about news concerning the operations against Sicily reaching Germany. To prevent this, he thought that we should give the operations in the Mediterranean some such name as "UNDERBELLY" and continually think of them as being aimed at any one of a number of objectives, knowing secretly all the while, that they were to be toward Sicily.

ADMIRAL KING stated that deception could be well achieved by the use of cover plans. He said that the document that is now in preparation and will be discussed on January 19th goes a long way toward establishing a policy of how we are to win the war. It has taken some days for the Chiefs of Staff to express themselves but in principle they are all agreed. He expressed the opinion that the document being prepared would be approved after a short discussion and with minor amendments. He said that he personally would like to have had it expanded to present a complete concept for concluding the war but that he was well pleased with it as it is.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that when the United States Chiefs of Staff came to the conference, they preferred to undertake operation ROUNDUP in 1943. The decision, however, has been made to undertake operation HUSKY because we will have in North Africa a large number of troops available and because it will effect an economy of tonnage which is the major consideration. It is estimated that possession of the north coast of Africa and Sicily will release approximately 225 vessels which will facilitate operations in Burma, the Middle East, and the Pacific. He felt that the capture of Sicily would do much to improve the air coverage for our shipping in the Mediterranean. This will add considerably to the safety of the passage. He said that Admiral Cunningham and other naval officers had indicated that the capture of Sicily would not be of great benefit in the protection of our convoys, Admiral Cunningham having stated that the possession of Sicily would only make us 5% more effective in the protection of convoys.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL thought there had been a misunderstanding of Admiral Cunningham's views. He feels that without Sicily we will lose 15 ships out of 100, or be 85% effective. We will lose only 10 ships out of 100, 90% effective, with Sicily in our possession. The number of the ships lost is therefore 50% greater with Sicily in possession of the Axis.

GENERAL MARSHALL said the second consideration which brought about the decision to operate against Sicily was the possibility of eliminating Italy from the war and thus necessitating Germany's taking over the present commitments of the Italians.

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GENERAL MARSHALL emphasized that ROUNDUP would be a difficult if not impossible operation to undertake once we have committed ourselves to Operation HUSKY. He said that the United Kingdom maintains a small spearhead of amphibious forces consisting of about 20,000 troops which are available at all times for an operation across the Channel. This force could be augmented by follow-up troops carried in small craft which might be available in England. Unless there is a complete crack in German morale, operations across the Channel will have to be extremely limited. It will be fully as difficult to assemble landing craft following Operation HUSKY and send them to England as it will be to assemble them after the capture of Rabaul and send them to Burma. Probably three months will be required to accomplish this in either case.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that sudden signs of deterioration of the Axis forces might take two forms; first, a collapse in the interior with the troops initially holding fast; and, second, by the withdrawal of troops from France. In the latter case, we should make every effort to cross the Channel and in doing so, utilize any means that are available. He said the greatest difficulty in setting up strength for ROUNDUP in addition to Operation HUSKY is the lack of escort vessels and landing craft.

GENERAL MARSHALL then discussed increasing the air force in China. The United States now has an agreement to increase the Chinese air force to the extent to which it can be supplied. The increase will be much more than the force is now. It is contemplated sending a group of heavy bombers which may be used to shuttle back and forth from China to India. There will be 25 to 30 additional medium bombers with the appropriate aircraft to furnish them fighter protection. He emphasized that while we are committed to the buildup of the Chinese air forces, it is tremendously expensive operation. The air transport planes which must be utilized in their supply could be utilized with great effect elsewhere.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that in the agreements reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, effective measures had been adopted to improve the situation in the Pacific. He said he hoped these were sufficient to insure that we would not again be threatened by a series of crises, since sufficient forces would be made available to insure our maintaining pressure on Japan.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that as summer approaches, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should meet again to make the necessary readjustments in the decisions made now.

He then discussed the use of United States bombers in England. He thought that they should be under the operational direction of the British, who should prescribe the targets and the timing of attacks. Control of operational procedure and technique should remain under the United States Commanders. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will attempt to prescribe general

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priorities of bombing objectives.

GENERAL MARSHALL said we should coordinate and improve our methods in combating the submarine menace and that this also would be a subject of discussion during the conferences.

Another vital question before the Combined Chiefs of Staff is how to maintain the Russian forces at their maximum effort both by forcing a withdrawal of German pressure on their front and also by insuring the flow of munitions to them. It is questionable to what extent the United Nations can take the losses of tonnage incidental to escorting the northern convoys. It may be possible to decrease the intervals between convoys or add to the strength of their escorts. However, it is entirely within the power of Germany to administer such losses as to make it necessary to discontinue this route to Russia.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he does not believe it necessary to take excessive punishment in running these convoys simply to keep Mr. Stalin placated. In any event, he feels that it would be necessary to inform Mr. Stalin that the convoys would have to be discontinued during Operation HUSKY.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that the agreements tentatively arrived at would be very helpful from the air point of view. They will facilitate the allocation of aircraft and the development of procedure and technique.

The PRIME MINISTER said that since we have surveyed the whole field of strategy, it will now be necessary for the Chiefs of Staff to go into ways and means by which the adopted strategy can be accomplished. They must determine where risks should be incurred and where the reduction of forces is necessary. This may take several days. It will involve the broad distribution of our resources. He agreed with General Marshall that another meeting should be held before summer and expressed his pleasure to the President of the United States, and to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, for arranging to attend this conference.

The PRESIDENT said that he particularly appreciated having Sir John Dill at the conferences since he would be the individual who would carry on the liaison between the Chiefs of Staff in London and the Chiefs of Staff in Washington between whom he constituted an indispensable link.

SIR DUDLEY POUND then said that we must go into ways and means of implementing our agreed decisions. Two problems involved are the security of the Atlantic convoys and the extent to which it will be necessary to decrease such security when Operation HUSKY is undertaken. He said that increased pressure against the submarine menace must be maintained by adequate coverage of our convoys and by striking at places where submarines are manufactured and assembled. If this is done, the situation may be

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considerably improved by the time operation HUSKY is undertaken. He agreed with General Marshall that it will be necessary during operation HUSKY to discontinue the northern convoys.

The PRIME MINISTER said that this would be an added reason for increasing the tonnage sent to Russia prior to operation HUSKY.

SIR DUDLEY POUND replied that this could be done provided the United States would help in the escort problem.

The PRESIDENT then discussed the possibility of assembling a large number of river and lake craft available in the United States and sending them quietly to Europe in order to transport troops across the Channel in case Germany cracks.

LORD MOUNTBATTEN stated that five Great Lakes steamers had already been sent.

The PRESIDENT told Admiral King to survey the situation and see what could be done in this respect.

SIR JOHN DILL expressed his satisfaction over the progress of the present conferences.

The PRIME MINISTER then discussed the situation in Turkey. He said that the British had some right to expect Turkey to enter the war when the Balkans were invaded, but in view of our own weakness to help Turkey they did not press it. Turkey will be in a weak position at the peace table following the war if she has not participated in it. It was possible to give them a guarantee for existing territory, and for their rights over passage through the Dardanelles. The United Nations should be prepared to provide Turkey with anti-aircraft, flak, tanks and other mechanized vehicles and also be prepared to send some of this equipment manned with units, since Turkish troops do not handle machinery particularly well. He feels that Turkey might be influenced to enter the war by the successes of Russian troops on the north and those of the United States - United Kingdom troops on the south. At present they are angry with the Bulgarians and it would not be surprising if they did enter the war.

The PRIME MINISTER said that since most of the troops which would be involved in reinforcing Turkey would be British, he asked that the British be allowed to play the Turkish hand, just as the United States is now handling the situation with reference to China. The British would keep the United States advised at all times as to the progress being made.

The PRESIDENT concurred in this view and also said that if ROUNDUP should be undertaken, he felt that it should be under British command.

The PRIME MINISTER said that he thought the question of command in ROUNDUP operation might be determined later, but he agreed that it would be advisable to designate a British commander.

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at this time who could undertake the planning of the operation. In his view, the command of operations should as a general rule be held by an officer of the nation which furnishes the majority of the forces.

He said that in perhaps five weeks six divisions of the 8th Army would enter Tunisia, and it was understood that they would, of course, come under command of General Eisenhower. He thought, however, it would be advisable for General Alexander to be designated as the Deputy Commander of the Allied Forces.

The PRESIDENT and GENERAL MARSHALL both expressed agreement, and the latter said he thought it would be particularly desirable since there would be two British armies involved in the Tunisian front.

ADMIRAL KING suggested the possibility of unifying command prior to the 8th Army's entry into Tunisia, feeling that there were many matters common to both the Allied Expeditionary Forces and the 8th Army which should be coordinated. After discussion it was agreed, that date of appointment should be left for future decision.

GENERAL MARSHALL informed the Prime Minister and the Chiefs of Staff of the great contribution that Admiral Cunningham had made to the success of Operation TORCH. He wished to express the appreciation of the United States Chiefs of Staff not only for the skill that Admiral Cunningham had displayed, but also for his spirit of helpfulness and for his cooperation.

The PRIME MINISTER thanked General Marshall and directed that General Marshall's comments be included in the minutes in order that he could present them to the Cabinet.

After being informed that the agreements arrived at at the conference would be included in a paper, the PRIME MINISTER suggested that one should be drawn up for presentation to Premier Stalin. He felt that the Soviet is entitled to know what we intend to do, but that it should be made clear that the paper expressed our intentions and did not constitute promises.

The PRESIDENT brought up the subject of press releases concerning the current conferences. He said that a photograph should be made of the participants in the conference and be given out with a release date which might be set as the day that he and the Prime Minister departed.

The PRIME MINISTER suggested that at the same time we re-lease a statement to the effect that the United Nations are resolved to pursue the war to the bitter end, neither party relaxing in its efforts until the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan have been achieved. He said that before issuing such a statement, he would like to consult with his colleagues in London.

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FIELD MARSHAL DILL then asked the President if there were any information concerning General De Gaulle.

The PRESIDENT replied that he had arranged to have General Giraud come here for a conference, but that so far the Prime Minister had been unable to effect such arrangements with General De Gaulle.

The PRIME MINISTER said that General De Gaulle had refused, saying that if the President wished to see him, he would no doubt invite him to come to Washington. De Gaulle had said that he would not meet Giraud in an atmosphere dominated by the High Command of the United Nations. The Prime Minister said that he had sent an invitation to De Gaulle to come, and the invitation had been sent in the name of the President and himself. He indicated to General De Gaulle that if he refused the invitation, it would be necessary for him and the President to consider whether or not he was a leader who merited their support.

The PRESIDENT stated that General Giraud had informed him that there were sufficient French officers and noncommissioned officers in North Africa to enable the French to raise an army of 250,000 men. He thought General Giraud should be instructed to raise such an army, and that we should make every effort to provide him with equipment. He said that General Giraud was desirous of being relieved of some of his civilian responsibilities.

The PRIME MINISTER said that he thought the political representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom should be at all times represented in whatever controlling machinery is set up, and that even General Eisenhower should present his demands to the French Government through civilian representatives, except in those cases where he wished to exercise his prerogatives as a military commander of an occupied country.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the French have a considerable number of French 75 mm guns on hand together with ammunition. They were to receive the tanks from the British 6th Armored Division when this unit received its Sherman Tanks from the United States. He said that there were also some antiaircraft weapons available which can be given to the French. GENERAL MARSHALL stated that he thought it necessary to give the French the best equipment obtainable, and that he proposed to do so from United States resources subject to shipping limitations. His idea was that if we are to equip the French, we must make good units of them.

The PRESIDENT thought it would be desirable to utilize some French units in operation HUSKY even if only as a reserve.

The PRIME MINISTER then expressed the hope that the United States would bring to North Africa the remaining three divisions which are scheduled to come here.

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GENERAL MARSHALL replied that there had been no change in schedule yet, but that after the complete details for operation HUSKY had been worked out, a determination could be made as to what divisions should be brought or what other changes might be made.

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COPY NO. 1

C.C.S. 60th Meeting

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

MINUTES OF MEETING

Held at Anfa Camp

MONDAY, January 18, 1943, at 1030

PRESENT

General G.C. Marshall, U.S.A.	General Sir Alan F. Brooke
Admiral E.J. King, U.S.N.	Adm. of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound
Lt. General H.H. Arnold, U.S.A.	Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles F.A. Portal

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT

Lt. General B.B. Somervell, U.S.A.	Field Marshal Sir John Dill	
Rear Adm. C.M. Cooke, Jr., U.S.N.	Adm. Sir Andrew B. Cunningham (for the last item)	
Brig. General A.C. Wedemeyer, U.S.A.		
Brig. General J.E. Hull, U.S.A.	Vice Adm. the Lord Louis Mountbatten	
Colonel J.E. Smart, U.S.A.	Lt. General Sir Hastings L. Ismay	
Commander R.E. Libby, U.S.N.	Major General J.N. Kennedy	
	Air Vice Marshal J.C. Slessor	
	Captain C.E. Lambe, R.N. )	
	Brigadier G.M. Stewart ) For	
	Air Commodore W. Elliott ) part	
	Brigadier M.W.M. Macleod ) of	
	Lieut. Colonel W.A. Howkins ) the	
	Brigadier E.I.C. Jacob ) meet-	
		ing.
		Brigadier E.I.C. Jacob + For
		the second
		part of the
		meeting.

(The meeting adjourned from 1300 to 1500)

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1. OPERATIONS IN BURMA  
(C.C.S. 154)

At the request of GENERAL MARSHALL, ADMIRAL COOKE discussed the landing craft situation in regard to Operation ANAKIM. He said the United States planners had estimated the number of landing craft of types built by the United States which would be required for Operation ANAKIM would be available in November 1943. These requirements can be made available from United States production and they will be in addition to allocations of landing craft already made. There has been uncertainty as to what the production of landing craft would be because of the necessity of revising the whole production program in the United States.

SIR ALAN BROOKE asked if this number of landing craft would be available over and above those needed in all other operations under consideration, including "Round-Up."

ADMIRAL COOKE replied that the landing craft which would be made available for ANAKIM would be from United States production that will be too late for other operations in 1943 which are being considered.

LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN stated that the British will be unable to man additional landing craft beyond those for which they are asking.

SIR ALAN BROOKE then described the proposed Operation ANAKIM. The operation must start by the middle of December in order to clear up the communications to the north after the capture of Rangoon. To protect the flank it would be necessary to occupy Moulmein and the airports on the west coast of Thailand. It will be necessary to protect the east flank to prevent the Japanese from coming in from Thailand by routes that are capable of sustaining a maximum of five divisions, in order to insure that once in Burma, our forces remain there. Thereafter, it will also be necessary to maintain adequate air and naval cover to keep open the lines of communication to Rangoon.

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that naval forces must be built up for the operation. As far as air power is concerned, 18 squadrons will be available and can be provided. The landing craft is the most ticklish question. Landing craft training establishments have now been provided for two brigade groups in the Mediterranean and one in India. There is also a mobile overseas reserve but it will take three months to move this after it completes operations either in the Mediterranean or operations from the United Kingdom. He believed that the necessary shipping could be made available but that the two main bottlenecks were naval coverage and landing craft.

ADMIRAL KING stated that we can count on shipping some landing craft from the Southwest Pacific to Burma together with

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operating crews. These could probably be made available in Burma in November. While the operation was at least ten months off, he did not see why necessary naval coverage could not be assembled, either by having the United States relieve the British from naval missions elsewhere so that they could furnish the Burma coverage, or by supplying the deficiency from the United States naval units to participate in the Burma operation. He stated that he was willing to commit himself to assisting the British in these operations.

ADMIRAL KING stated that our use of landing craft in the Pacific would be in the Rabaul operations primarily. Operations beyond Rabaul would not require landing craft of the types needed for Rabaul. The Rabaul operations would be completed long before ANAKIM would be mounted. He added that even though we had gone beyond Rabaul in the Pacific, the operations could be curtailed or lessened in order to insure the success of ANAKIM in view of its importance.

LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN said that the possibility of securing help from the Pacific altered the whole situation as far as the British were concerned and that with the assistance of the United States, he thought that the necessary landing craft could be assembled.

GENERAL MARSHALL then asked SIR ALAN BROOKE to discuss the relation between Operation RAVENOUS and Operation ANAKIM.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that Operation CANNIBAL now being undertaken was for the purpose of securing the airport in Akyab. This is necessary in order to furnish air support for future operations. He described Akyab as a locality in no man's land lightly garrisoned by both sides.

He described Operation RAVENOUS as one to improve the line of communications preparatory to Operation ANAKIM, in order to drive in from the North at the same time as the offensive from the South. A British corps is to secure bridge heads over the Chindwin River and improve the road between Imphal and Kalewa, to connect it with the River Chindwin for use as a supply line to the South. The Ramgarh force was to advance on Myitkyna from Ledo which will also enable us to build a road between these two points. This road will be of value in supplying our forces in Operation ANAKIM and also will be used as a connecting road to join with the main Burma road into China.

SIR ALAN BROOKE gave a resume of the present conditions of roads in Burma which indicated that all are badly in need of improvement. He said that all of the component operations of RAVENOUS are independent of each other. The operation of the British 2nd Corps from Imphal is thus independent of the action taken by the Chinese Ramgarh and Yunnan forces. The improvement

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of the road from Ledo was only possible to the extent of the advance made by the Ramgarh force.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that ANAKIM is now definitely on the books, is being planned, and should be put to the front. With the assistance from the United States Navy in providing landing craft, the operation would be feasible.

LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN then discussed again the question of landing craft with particular reference to paragraph 9 (d) of C.C.S. 154. In reply to a question from GENERAL MARSHALL he stated that the assault force in England would remain there as a permanent spear head in case of a crack in German morale. The overseas assault force contains sufficient landing craft to undertake the operation in Burma by October 1st provided that they had not been used in operations elsewhere. If they had been so used, their use in Burma would be delayed for a period of three months following the termination of the operation in which they had been engaged. He added, however, that with the assistance promised by Admiral King from the south Pacific, he felt that sufficient landing craft could be assembled to mount ANAKIM.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out that the amphibious operations in ANAKIM would have to be supported by aircraft based on carriers.

ADMIRAL KING said the main point was that we should plan to do ANAKIM in 1943.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Agreed that all plans and necessary preparations should be made for the purpose of mounting ANAKIM in 1943.
- (b) Agreed that the actual mounting of Operation ANAKIM would be determined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the summer of 1943 (preferably not later than July) in the light of the situation then existing.
- (c) Took note that if ANAKIM is mounted in 1943, the United States will assist in making up deficiencies in the necessary landing craft and naval forces by diversion from the Pacific Theatre, and in merchant shipping, if necessary.

2. THE SITUATION TO BE CREATED IN THE EASTERN THEATRE  
(THE PACIFIC AND BURMA) IN 1943  
(C.C.S. 153 and 153/1)

SIR ALAN BROOKE stated that the British Chiefs of Staff took exception to paragraph 1 of C.C.S. 153 in that it did not provide

that Germany must be defeated before undertaking the defeat of the Japanese.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that in his opinion, the British Chiefs of Staff wished to be certain that we keep the enemy engaged in the Mediterranean and that at the same time maintain a sufficient force in the United Kingdom to take advantage of a crack in the German strength either from the withdrawal of their forces in France or because of lowered morale. He inferred that the British Chiefs of Staff would prefer to maintain such a force in the United Kingdom dormant and awaiting an opportunity rather than have it utilized in a sustained attack elsewhere. The United States Chiefs of Staff know that they can use these forces offensively in the Pacific Theatre. He felt that the question resolved itself into whether we would maintain a large force in the United Kingdom awaiting an opportunity or keep the force engaged in an active offensive in the Pacific.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the number of troops used in the Pacific would not have much effect on the build up of forces in the United Kingdom. The conflict arises chiefly in the use of landing craft and shipping. He said that to a large measure the shipping used in the Pacific is already committed and, therefore, could not be made available for a build-up of forces in the United Kingdom and the necessity of maintaining them. These forces are at the end of a long line of communications and the question arises as to whether we should let them remain there precariously or do something to improve their situation.

SIR ALAN BROOKE stated that we have reached a stage in the war where we must review the correctness of our basic strategic concept which calls for the defeat of Germany first. He was convinced that we cannot defeat Germany and Japan simultaneously. The British Chiefs of Staff have arrived at the conclusion that it will be better to concentrate on Germany. Because of the distances involved, the British Chiefs of Staff believe that the defeat of Japan first is impossible and that if we attempt to do so, we shall lose the war.

He said that having decided that it is necessary to defeat Germany first, the immediate question is whether to attempt to do so by an invasion of Northern France or to exploit our successes in North Africa. The British Chiefs of Staff consider that an all-out Mediterranean effort is best but that it must be "all-out".

He said the British Chiefs of Staff appreciate the position in the Pacific and that they will do everything they can to meet it but that they feel we must give first consideration to the defeat of Germany. This can be done by finishing Tunisia and then operating in the Mediterranean so as to draw the maximum number of German ground and air forces from the Russian front. In undertaking operations in the Mediterranean, assistance from the United States is necessary. He felt that if we do not main-

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tain constant pressure on Germany, they will be given an opportunity to recover and thus prolong the war.

GENERAL MARSHALL said the United States Chiefs of Staff do not propose doing nothing in the Mediterranean or in France; they have no idea that we should not concentrate first on defeating Germany. The question that is to be decided is how this can best be accomplished. On the other hand, it is the view of the United States Chiefs of Staff that the war should be ended as quickly as possible, which cannot be accomplished if we neglect the Pacific theatre entirely and leave the Japanese to consolidate their gains and unnecessarily strengthen their position.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he advocated an attack on the continent but that he was opposed to immobilizing a large force in the United Kingdom, awaiting an uncertain prospect, when they might be better engaged in offensive operations which are possible.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that it was apparently agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to give Russia every possible assistance and to endeavor to bring Turkey into the war. His primary concern with the operations in the Pacific was to insure that our positions would be so strengthened as to provide us with the means for necessary operations rather than to continue conducting them on a "shoe string". He felt that this would ultimately reduce the necessity for tonnage in the Pacific and this was his chief reason for advocating operations in Burma.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff certainly did not want to keep forces tied up in Europe doing nothing. During the build-up period, however, the first forces to arrive from America could not be used actively against the enemy; a certain minimum concentration had to be effected before they could be employed. His point was that we should direct our resources to the defeat of Germany first. He agreed as to the desirability of ANAKIM since it appeared that for this operation we could use forces available in the theatre without detracting from the earliest possible defeat of Germany. This conception was focused in paragraph 2(c) of the British Joint Planning Staffs' paper (C.C.S. 153/1) in which it was stated that we agreed in principle with the U.S. strategy in the Pacific "provided always that its application does not prejudice the earliest possible defeat of Germany".

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that this expression might be read as meaning that anything which was done in the Pacific interfered with the earliest possible defeat of Germany and that the Pacific theatre should therefore remain totally inactive.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that this was certainly not the understanding of the British Chiefs of Staff who had always accepted that pressure should be maintained on Japan. They had, perhaps, misunderstood the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and thought that

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the point at issue was whether the main effort should be in the Pacific or in the United Kingdom. The British view was that for getting at Germany in the immediate future, the Mediterranean offered better prospects than Northern France. For this purpose they were advocating Mediterranean operations with amphibious forces while concentrating, so far as the United Kingdom was concerned, on building up a large heavy bomber force, which was the only form of force that could operate continuously against Germany.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he was most anxious not to become committed to interminable operations in the Mediterranean. He wished Northern France to be the scene of the main effort against Germany - that had always been his conception.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that it was impossible to say exactly where we should stop in the Mediterranean since we hoped to knock Italy out altogether. This action would give the greatest support to Russia and might open the door to an invasion of France.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that extended operations in the Mediterranean as well as the concentration of forces in England for the invasion of Northern France might well prevent us from undertaking operations in Burma; he was not at all in favour of this. Moreover, American forces at present in the South-West Pacific were desperately short at present of their immediate requirements.

ADMIRAL KING said that we had on many occasions been close to a disaster in the Pacific. The real point at issue was to determine the balance between the effort to be put against Germany and against Japan, but we must have enough in the Pacific to maintain the initiative against the Japanese. The U. S. intentions were not to plan for anything beyond gaining positions in readiness for the final offensive against Japan. He felt very strongly, however, that the details of such operations must be left to the U. S. Chiefs of Staff, who were strategically responsible for the Pacific theatre. He did not feel this was a question for a decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff had not been consulted before the British undertook operations in Madagascar and French Somaliland - nor did they expect to be; but the same considerations applied to the details of operations in the Pacific.

In his view there would be plenty of forces in the theatre for all necessary operations in the Mediterranean and it was now determined that such operations should be undertaken. The operations contemplated in the Pacific, however, would have no effect on what could be done in the Mediterranean or from the United Kingdom.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the British Chiefs of Staff would be satisfied if they could be assured of this point. Their fear was that the result of extended operations in the Pacific might be an insufficient concentration in the United Kingdom to take advantage of a crack in Germany.

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GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the whole concept of defeating Germany first had been jeopardised by the lack of resources in the Pacific. Heavy bombers set up to go to the United Kingdom had had to be diverted to the South Pacific to avoid disaster there. Fortunately disaster had been avoided, but if it had occurred, there would have been a huge diversion of U. S. effort to the Pacific theatre. The U. S. had nearly been compelled to pull out of TORCH and the decision to spare the necessary naval forces from the Pacific had been a most courageous one on the part of Admiral King. A hand-to-mouth policy of this nature was most uneconomical. He was anxious to get a secure position in the Pacific so that we knew where we were. The re-conquest of Burma would be an enormous contribution to this and would effect ultimately a great economy of forces.

Discussion then turned on the operations proposed to secure the Pacific theatre, which were set out in C.C.S. 153.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that in the British view it would be sufficient to stop at Rabaul and ANAKIM and that to go on to Truk would take up too much force. There would inevitably be large shipping losses in the course of such operations, which would be a continuous drain on our resources.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the proposed operations would be carried out one after the other. After Rabaul had been captured, the same forces might be employed to go on to the Marshalls. Rabaul might be taken by May and ANAKIM could not start before November. During the intervening months, surely the troops in the theatre should not be allowed to remain idle but should be employed to keep up pressure on the Japanese and maintain the initiative. Only by this means could we offset the advantage which the Japanese had in their possession of interior lines. Operations into the Marshalls could be stopped at any point desired and were not an unlimited commitment which had to be seen through to the end. It might well be that Truk would, after all, be found impossible to capture this year.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that there seemed general agreement as to the need for the capture of Rabaul and the desirability of ANAKIM. Could it not be agreed that operations should be continued as far as Truk if it were possible with the forces available at that time? There should be no question of sacrificing ANAKIM for Truk.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said he would not like to be committed to ANAKIM, even with forces released after the capture of Rabaul, without first reviewing whether some other operation more profitable to the war as a whole might not be desirable. For example, to take an extreme case, suppose after the capture of Rabaul a good opportunity arose, owing to a crack in Germany, of breaking into France. Should we refuse to take advantage of it because we were already committed to ANAKIM?

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GENERAL MARSHALL felt that if such a situation arose we should certainly seize the opportunity. He agreed that a further meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff might be necessary in the summer to decide these questions.

SIR ALAN BROOKE proposed that at the present time we should limit our outlook in the Pacific to Rabaul, which should certainly be undertaken, and to preparations for ANAKIM, the decision to launch this being taken later. Similarly any decision on Truk should be deferred.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the effect of this would be strictly to limit commitments in the Pacific, although the British Chiefs of Staff apparently contemplated an unlimited commitment in the European theatre.

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed that a decision on ANAKIM and Truk could be left until later. He pointed out that C.C.S. 153 merely proposed a series of operations which might be carried out in 1943 with the means available.

ADMIRAL KING said that on logistic grounds alone it would be impossible to bring forces from the Pacific theatre to the European theatre. ANAKIM was not therefore an alternative to operations in the European theatre.

GENERAL SOMERVELL supported this view. He pointed out that, once Rabaul had been seized, ships would be required to maintain the garrison there and these could be employed to exploit success by minor operations against other islands.

As regards landing craft, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff had committed themselves to supply a large proportion of the craft needed for ANAKIM. Operations against the Pacific Islands required combat loaders and not the tank landing ships and tank landing craft which were needed elsewhere.

ADMIRAL COOKE said that a very large proportion of the U. S. shipping in the Pacific was needed for the maintenance of the Fleet, which was operating 7,000 miles from its home bases. This requirement would continue whether or not operations against Truk were undertaken. U. S. production of L.S.Ts would shortly amount to about fifteen per month. These could not be ready in time for Mediterranean operations in the summer, but would be available for ANAKIM. As regards land forces, the figure of 250,000 put down in C.C.S. 153 included 150,000 men now in movement or set up to move, and another two divisions which he understood were already earmarked for operations in Burma this year from India. This left a total of only some 50,000 men additional for the whole Pacific theatre.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL re-iterated that it would be unwise to accept a definite commitment for ANAKIM now since a favourable situation might arise in Europe during the year which would make opera-

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tions in the European theatre more profitable than anything in the Pacific.

ADMIRAL KING said that forces set out in C.C.S. 153 constituted the minimum necessary to maintain pressure on the Japanese. Although the forces in the Pacific were primarily for defensive purposes, many of them could be used simultaneously for minor offensives, such as air bombardment of Japanese bases. Favourable opportunities might then be seized for exploitation.

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that paragraph 11 (c) of C.C.S. 153 could be revised to read "seizure and occupation of Gilbert Islands, Marshall Islands, Caroline Islands up to and including Truk with the resources available in the theatre".

(The meeting adjourned at this point)

On the resumption of their meeting the Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a draft note setting out tentative agreements which appeared to have been reached in the preceding discussion.

After some further discussion

THE COMMITTEE:

- (1) Invited General Ismay and General Hull to re-draft this note to include further points which had been raised.
- (2) Instructed the Secretaries to circulate this draft for discussion at the next meeting.

3. ESCORT VESSELS.

SIR DUDLEY POUND emphasised the need for the Combined Chiefs of Staff having before them a proper survey of the escort vessel position before taking any final decision on operations during the coming year. He recapitulated the British needs for additional escorts in the Atlantic and pointed out that considerable U.S. assistance would be required not only in the Atlantic but also for HUSKY if that operation were undertaken. When escorts were withdrawn for an operation such as TORCH or HUSKY, they were absent from their normal duties for about four months. It took at least one month to collect them beforehand from the various convoys on which they were working, and a similar period to re-distribute them after the operation. Experience in TORCH had shown that it was not possible to release them from the operation itself under about two months.

ADMIRAL KING said that with the U. S. and U. K. construction coming out during the next six months, the position should be easier by July, when HUSKY was to be launched. He thought it should be possible to find additional escorts for the Atlantic

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as well as those required for HUSKY. If the use of combat loaders for HUSKY could be cut to the minimum, escort requirements would be correspondingly reduced.

SIR DUDLEY POUND said that new construction in the U. K. was comparatively small during the first half of 1943 and would do little more than make good recent heavy losses.

ADMIRAL COOKE said that the examination of the escort position by the British Joint Planning Staff was progressing well but it appeared that the total number of U. S. and British escort vessels would not be sufficient to provide any surplus after providing for normal convoy work. Any operations undertaken would therefore involve accepting increased losses in normal convoys. The Combined Chiefs of Staff would have to decide what losses would be acceptable.

The discussion then turned on the relation of P.Q. convoys to Mediterranean operations.

SIR DUDLEY POUND said that one problem was whether a 30 ship convoy every forty days would be considered sufficient for Russia, or whether we should be pressed, as we had been in the past, to increase Russian deliveries. The worst three months were from February to the middle of May when daylight hours were increasing and the channel was restricted by ice. Later in the year the ice retreated and although the days were longer, the passage of convoys became less dangerous.

GENERAL MARSHALL felt that we should not again risk the same heavy losses which had been sustained on the Russian convoys in 1942. Such losses were likely to cripple our whole offensive effort against the enemy. He suggested that Combined Chiefs of Staff should include a reference to this effect in the note which was being drafted. One alleviating factor was the improvement in the Persian Gulf route which would offset reductions on Murmansk route.

SIR DUDLEY POUND said that the Prime Minister had made it clear to M. Stalin that we might have to call off P.Q. convoys if the scale of German attack became too heavy. If warning was given of our intention to stop the convoys, there was likely to be heavy pressure to increase deliveries during the early part of the year, when, as he had previously explained, conditions were most difficult. This meant either increasing the size of the convoys or reducing the cycle. The dangers which we were likely to face this year were much greater than last year.

#### 4. POTENTIALITIES OF POLISH FORCES.

SIR ALAN BROOKE, in answer to a question by GENERAL MARSHALL, said that the Polish forces consisted (i) of a "secret" army inside Poland and (ii) of regular Polish troops outside the country. As regards the first, there was a definite organisation of

determined men, with leaders, though they were almost entirely unarmed. Their intelligence service had been good, but recently many of their agents had been caught by the Germans and less information about German forces was now coming out from Poland. General Sikorski claimed that by the use of this organisation he could do great damage on the Polish railways to interrupt German communications at a critical moment. There could be no doubt that this secret army would play a valuable part in the final rising against Germany, particularly if combined with similar action in adjacent Balkan countries. There was always a danger of a premature rising, however.

The Polish forces outside Poland consisted of an armoured division and a parachute brigade with certain other units in the United Kingdom; and 2 divisions and 2 brigade groups in the Middle East. General Sikorski's conception was to get some of these troops into Poland to supplement the secret army. The difficulty was the method of transport, on which General Sikorski was rather vague. He envisaged the use of air transport and parachutes but there were obvious limitations in this.

GENERAL MARSHALL enquired whether any steps had been taken to meet a request of General Sikorski for the bombing of an area in Poland from which the Germans were clearing out all Polish inhabitants under circumstances of great brutality.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said the Poles had been informed that this operation was impracticable but steps would be taken to publicize the presence of Polish air forces in the raids on Berlin which might be considered partly as a reprisal on behalf of Poland.

#### 5. RAIDS ON BERLIN.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL gave details of the recent raids on Berlin, and estimated that, making all allowance for the comparative sizes of London and Berlin and the time interval, the two raids on Berlin on successive nights had hit Berlin about twice as hard as London had been hit in the two heaviest raids of April and May 1941. The aggregate losses in the two Berlin raids amounted to 6%, the figure expected being 10%. The effect of the raids would be largely morale though there were important electrical works in the area attacked. They would be a great encouragement to the Russians as well as the Poles.

(Sir Andrew Cunningham entered the meeting at this point)

#### 6. NAVAL SITUATION IN THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM said that the Germans might threaten our shipping passing through the Straits of Gibraltar by U-boats, and by aircraft and coast defence guns from Southern Spain. He considered the risk from U-boats was comparatively small. The Germans had never been able to maintain many U-boats in the Straits

where currents made their operation difficult. The danger from aircraft would be no less than to coastal convoys along the East coast of England. Provided we had fighters established in the airfields of Spanish Morocco, we should be able to deal with this threat. Coast defence guns constituted the greatest danger, but only experience would show how bad this would be. The guns were supposed to have Radar range-finding apparatus but we had means of jamming this which would probably be effective. The guns would have to be neutralised by counter-battery from the southern shore and by air bombardment.

He thought that ships with a speed of 11 knots upwards would get through the Straits without heavy losses even with the Germans in Southern Spain provided we held Spanish Morocco. Even without it, we should be able to get some convoys through by night. The Planning Staffs at Algiers had been examining the problem and their preliminary conclusions were that if we seized Majorca we should be able to prevent the Germans building up a large air strength in Southern Spain.

SIR DUDLEY POUND said that in spite of the German coast defence guns on the French shore of the Straits of Dover we had not lost a ship from them. The range, however, was some 38,000 yards, whereas the distance across the Straits of Gibraltar was only about half that.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that a plan had been prepared for seizing Southern Spain with a force of about six divisions. It would not be possible, however, to do this at the same time as HUSKY. It must be remembered that even if the Spaniards offered no resistance at all it would take some time for the Germans to become fully established in Southern Spain.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM, referring to the possibility of capturing Sicily, said that he did not anticipate very heavy shipping losses in the operation but the actual assault of the beaches would be a very expensive operation. He did not consider that the possession of the Island would very greatly add to the security of the sea route through the Mediterranean. If we were in Sicily he would estimate this route as being 90% or more secure, without Sicily it would be about 85% secure, once we held the whole of the North African coast.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out that from the air point of view the possession of Sicily would make a very considerable difference. If the Germans were not in the Island it would be difficult for them to operate against our shipping at all; they would have to use bases in Sardinia and the mainland of Italy, which were a considerable distance from the Narrows.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM then described the Naval situation in the Tunisia area. The Germans had made heavy attacks on Bone on 3 successive days damaging 4 merchant ships and a cruiser, but the

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defences were now much improved and our cruisers were still operating from the port. We had at first sunk about one ship a day, but the Germans were getting far too many ships into Tunisia now. We should be able to inflict much greater damage on them as soon as we had fully organised our arrangements. Steps were now being taken to block the channel between the Italian minefields with our own mines.

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
Office of the Commander-in-Chief

17 January, 1943.

Dear Mr. President:

My recent visit to your Headquarters was, for me, an uplifting experience and one that I know will be reflected in increased efficiency in my own operations. I cannot tell you how much I appreciated the kind words you had to say about our efforts in the past, and you may be confident that everyone here will continue to devote his full energies to success in the great crusade, the progress of which you are directing.

Please accept my sincerest wishes for your continued good health and my complete confidence that you will lead us to a great victory in the shortest possible time.

Respectfully,

*Dwight D. Eisenhower*

The Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt,  
President of the United States.

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*The President*

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COPY NO. 1

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MINUTES OF CONFERENCE

Held at Anfa Camp January 16, 1943, at 5 P.M.

PRESENT

THE PRESIDENT

GENERAL MARSHALL

ADMIRAL KING

LT. GENERAL ARNOLD

LT. GENERAL SOMERVELL

REAR ADMIRAL COOKE

BRIGADIER GENERAL WEDMEYER

MR. HARRY HOPKINS

MR. AVERILL HARRIMAN

BRIGADIER GENERAL DEANE

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ADMIRAL KING informed the President that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been attempting to obtain the British Chiefs of Staff's concept as to how the war should be won. He said that the British have definite ideas as to what the next operation should be but do not seem to have an overall plan for the conduct of the war.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that the planners are making a study of what is required in the Pacific in order to maintain constant pressure on the Japanese and keep the initiative in that theatre. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have been particularly concerned with the strategic concept for 1943. They have had discussions on the Burma operations and also whether an immediate operation should be planned for the Mediterranean or for the Continent or both. He stated that the planners had been instructed to estimate the earliest possible date that an operation against Sicily could be mounted in order that the Chiefs of Staff could determine what residue of force would be available for operations on the Continent and if such operations would be advisable this year.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that the most critical factors in the coming operations are the availability of landing craft, the time necessary for amphibious training, and the availability of escort vessels.

He stated that there will be excess troops available in North Africa when the Axis powers have been expelled from North Africa and that this is one of the chief reasons why Operation HUSKY appears to be attractive.

The British have estimated that the operations against Sicily cannot be mounted prior to August but feel that there is a possibility of moving this date up to some time in July.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the question being determined is whether we can undertake an operation against the continent together with Operation HUSKY or separately and at a later date. The British maintain a spearhead in the United Kingdom for an operation against the continent in the event of a crack in German morale. This includes enough landing craft to move four brigade groups and, additionally, the British are putting motors in approximately 1,000 barges which they will use, together with other small craft to bring in troops following the spearhead.

The PRESIDENT asked how many troops were in England at this time, to which GENERAL MARSHALL replied that there was one trained division and about 140,000 to 150,000 men. He said that by next summer we can have six to nine divisions in the United Kingdom, and the British will have thirteen.

GENERAL MARSHALL quoted Sir Charles Portal as saying a crack in Axis morale may come at any time because of the explosive elements existing in the populations of the occupied countries. Sir Charles Portal feels that if such an explosion comes, it will start in the interior of Germany but will finally reach the front line troops who will desire to return to their families. In this case, an occupation of the continent would be comparatively simple.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that training for amphibious operations is the most critical factor which we have to face. The training must be of much higher quality than that given for TORCH. He quoted General Eisenhower as saying that he believed that there must be an invasion on the continent but that it would require a minimum of 12 divisions, which is double previous estimates. General Eisenhower also feels that there is a need for more training. Other limiting factors to any proposed operation are the necessities of combating the submarine menace and for the delivery of supplies to Russia.

An operation against Sardinia can be accomplished about six weeks earlier than one against Sicily, but the results will have little effect in improving the shipping situation through the Mediterranean. The only positive result to be received from the capture of Sardinia would be the ability to bomb Italy and perhaps the southern coast of France.

GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out that there would be much better air coverage for Operation HUSKY than could be given to Operation BRIMSTONE. The PRESIDENT asked where the Germans had the best defence.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that their defence in Sicily was better than that in Sardinia and that by summer it might be expected that the Germans would have 6 to 8 divisions there. General Marshall said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were all agreed on the necessity of placing adequate troops in rear of Turkey to be prepared to reinforce her for a resistance to Axis invasion.

The PRESIDENT remarked that Turkey's entry into the war was a diplomatic question, to which GENERAL MARSHALL replied that he felt that the concentration should be made regardless of whether Turkey came into the war or not.

ADMIRAL KING said that in our endeavors to obtain a definite strategic concept from the British Chiefs of Staff it had become apparent that they intended using the geographic and manpower position of Russia to the maximum. This necessitates making every effort to maintain the flow of supplies to Russia and also to divert German air and ground troops from the Russian front. He added that the British make no mention of where or when a second front on the continent should be established. The PRESIDENT said that we now have a protocol with the Russians which involves a certain delivery of munitions to them and that this shall probably be continued on the same scale when the present protocol expires.

ADMIRAL KING stated that British convoys by the northern route are set up for 30 ships every 42 days. With an additional 12 destroyers this could be improved to a rate of 30 ships each 27 days. He stated that he did not believe we should base our plans too largely on a contemplated German crack-up. It now appeared that a real ROUND-UP operations is not feasible before April, 1944 because of British lack of enthusiasm.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that British would undertake an operation SLEDGEHAMMER if they saw signs of a break in German morale. This would be followed by a makeshift ROUND-UP operation. He said the British feel that they cannot gather the

means for a real thrust against the continent in 1943, and that Admiral Pound states that no operation should be undertaken after August. It is apparent that British cooperation cannot be obtained unless there are indications of the Germans weakening.

ADMIRAL KING stated that if the operations on the Mediterranean and on the Russian front caused the Germans to withdraw their forces from France, the British would be willing to seize this opportunity to invade the continent.

GENERAL MARSHALL informed the President that the British were not interested in occupying Italy, inasmuch as this would add to our burdens without commensurate returns.

The PRESIDENT expressed his agreement with this view.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that in his opinion we may be able to obtain a decision from the Combined Chiefs of Staff concerning the operations in the Pacific by January 17th and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had come to the conclusion that Operation HUSKY should be undertaken, but they had not yet informed the British to this effect.

The PRESIDENT stated that from the political point of view he thought it would be extremely wise to send more airplanes to China. He felt that they could be used to great advantage there and if periodic bombing raids over Japan could be undertaken they would have a tremendous morale effect on the Chinese people. GENERAL ARNOLD stated that he agreed with this view but wished to see for himself whether or not an increased air force in China could be supplied.

The PRESIDENT then stated that he thought it was desirable to set up additional transport planes to insure a supply of a larger air force in China.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that transport planes now allocated to China are sufficient and that we must be extremely careful about making additional allocations. He pointed out that, in addition to China, we would receive demands for transport planes from Russia. We would need a considerable number for the Operation HUSKY and also for General MacArthur's forces in the Pacific.

The PRESIDENT suggested the possibility of preparing two or three plans and making all preparations to carry them out, but leaving the decision as to the objective until a later date.

ADMIRAL COOKE pointed out that if planes were made for Operation HUSKY the objective could readily be changed to either the Dodecanese, Crete or Sardinia.

The PRESIDENT said he would like to have some flexibility to the plans in case it became apparent that Turkey might enter the war. In that case we could then adopt the objective which would fit in best with this development.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated he did not feel that the Operation HUSKY would interfere with Turkey's entering into the war, but rather that a success in Sicily might be an added inducement to her to join with us. Regraded Unclassified

The PRESIDENT then directed the discussion to Russia. He said that he had received information that the Russians did not desire any of our personnel and also indicated that they would not welcome General Bradley's mission to make a survey of the available air facilities in Siberia.

He asked General Somervell about the supply situation to Russia.

GENERAL SOMERVELL replied that the Persian port is capable of handling 15 ships per month. The road and rail facilities are capable of handling about 10,000 tons per day which are sufficient to handle the freight from 40 ships per month, and efforts are now being made to expand the port facilities to make this possible. He then went on to describe to the President several overland routes to Russia, all of which are limited by the availability of truck transportation.

The PRESIDENT asked what might happen if Turkey remained neutral but permitted our transporting munitions and bombs through her territory.

GENERAL SOMERVELL replied that certain routes could be made available by this means, but if they were used it would be necessary to establish a truck assembly plant in that area. He added that he thought this should be done, and that all available routes into Russia should be used.

The PRESIDENT asked General Somervell if truck bodies could be manufactured in the Near East, to which GENERAL SOMERVELL replied that lumber would have to be obtained from India.

MR. HARRIMAN stated that until a truck assembly plant could be constructed, the one now at Cairo could be used.

ADMIRAL KING stated that the last convoy to Murmansk arrived without loss of any of its 16 cargo ships, but that one destroyer had been sunk and another damaged. He stated that we could help Russia more if they would help us to do so.

The PRESIDENT asked if we were getting as much information from Southern Europe as are the British. GENERAL MARSHALL replied that he would have this investigated. (A message was sent to G-2, Allied Force Headquarters, asking for a report as to the amount of intelligence received out of Southern Europe by U.S. Intelligence Agencies and how our efforts in this regard compared with those of the British.)

GENERAL MARSHALL then informed the President that the British had agreed to transfer their Valentine tanks from the 6th Armored Division to the French as soon as the British had received our Sherman tanks. He also stated he thought it necessary to equip the best French divisions rapidly.

GENERAL MARSHALL then informed the President regarding a decision which had been made by General Eisenhower concerning the Tunisian operations. A drive towards Sfax which had been planned for January 24th has been called off. This was necessary because the British First Army on the north could not attack until March 15th and General Alexander could not attack Rommel's forces on the south until February 15th. It was decided that the attack against Sfax might be premature

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and expose them to an attack from the north by German Tunisian forces and from the south by Rommel. Instead, General Eisenhower is to hold his First Armored Division in the vicinity of Tebessa prepared to assist either Alexander's forces in the south or the First British Army in the north, and the attack against Sfax will be made by infantry units at a later date, to be coordinated by General Eisenhower and General Alexander.

The PRESIDENT then asked General Somervell about the general supply situation. GENERAL SOMERVELL replied that the greatest shortages in North Africa were in road machinery and motor transportation. Both of these are now being sent to North Africa. The machinery is needed to improve the railroads and also for the construction and improvement of airfields. Efforts are also being made to bring in needed locomotives

The PRESIDENT then asked about the civilian supply situation. GENERAL SOMERVELL replied that it was being handled satisfactorily, except that valuable cargo space was being utilized by some of the civilian agencies in the United States in sending unnecessary and ridiculous items.

The PRESIDENT then informed the Chiefs of Staff that Admiral Robert in Martinique had received a message from Laval to sink his ships immediately upon receiving evidence that the United States intended action against Martinique. Laval required Robert to give him an answer at once. Robert informed Laval within four hours that he would comply with his orders. This definitely eliminates the possibility of our obtaining the use of French shipping now in Martinique.

ADMIRAL COOKE then informed the President that the British were becoming conscious of the fact that the United States was engaged in a war in the Pacific and described his discussions with the British Staff Planners who recognized the necessity for adequate means being provided to handle the Pacific situation. He stated, however, that he did not feel that the British Chiefs of Staff were as yet convinced of this necessity. The Chiefs of Staff feel that we should maintain the status quo and simply hold, whereas the planners recognize that a constant pressure must be kept on the Japanese and that every effort must be made to keep China in the war. The Planners admit the possibility of the Chinese dropping out of the war.

The PRESIDENT then discussed the proposed operations in Burma. GENERAL MARSHALL informed him that just as he felt that we had convinced the British that Operation RAVENOUS should be undertaken, the Generalissimo had declined to participate. The reason given by the Generalissimo is that the British refuse to place a naval force in the Bay of Bengal to interrupt the Japanese line of communications. The Generalissimo feels that a definite commitment to this effect had been made by the Prime Minister in a talk last year before the Pacific Council. GENERAL MARSHALL said that the Prime Minister probably had the ANAKIA operation in mind.

ADMIRAL COOKE stated that the British have no intention of undertaking an operation to recapture Burma in the present dry season.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the Chinese, particularly General Hsiung, had been loud in their complaints of failures to assist them, and now that we offer them assistance, they refuse our help.

ANFA 1st Meeting

MINUTES OF MEETING

HELD AT ANFA CAMP  
on FRIDAY, 15th January 1943 at 1730

PRESENT

United States

British

The President	The Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill (Prime Minister and Minister of Defence)
General G. C. Marshall	
Admiral E. J. King	Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound
Lt. General H. H. Arnold	
Mr. Harry Hopkins ✓	Field Marshal Sir John Dill
Lt. Colonel Elliot Roosevelt	General Sir Alan F. Brooke
Lt. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., USN	Air Chief Marshal Sir C. Portal
	General the Hon. Sir Harold Alexander
	Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder
	Vice-Admiral The Lord Louis Mountbatten
	Lt. General Sir Hastings L. Ismay

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GENERAL EISENHOWER then gave details of how it was proposed to conduct the forthcoming operation and of the forces to be employed. It was intended to use the American First Armoured Division (less one light battalion), a regimental combat team and additional units of artillery, and also to use the airfields in the Gafsa and Tebessa areas for supporting aircraft. The Germans had disposed their armour northeast of Pont du Fahs, and it would be necessary to guard against a counter stroke towards the rear of the forces attacking Sfax. It was hoped to put supplies into Sfax by sea from the eastward to ease the maintenance problem. It was hoped that this operation would be of real assistance to the 8th Army because the Germans were sending supplies by rail to Sfax whence they were sending small coasting vessels to Rommel. The Sfax force would be separated by 75 miles of rough country from the British 1st Army, in which there were two critical points: Pont du Fahs and Foudouk, which were held by the French. Apart from one regiment in Algiers, and part of a division in Oran, there was virtually nothing between the troops in the front line and Morocco. Troops in the latter place were too far away to move up over the long and difficult line of communications. The 1st Army had 7 to 10 days' supplies of all kinds, and so if an opening were offered by the Germans they could launch an attack. In the whole theatre of war there were now about 320,000 troops.

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GENERAL ALEXANDER then gave an account of the operations of the 8th Army. He said that the El Alamein position was about 40 miles long and was occupied by the German 15th Panzer, 21st Panzer, 90th Light and 164th Infantry Divisions which were at full strength in men and equipment, and by 10 Italian Divisions. The position had no open flank so the problem was one of punching a hole through which the armour could be launched. The attack went in under a very heavy barrage of 500 guns on the 24th October. Infantry advanced through deep minefields for 4,000 to 6,000 yards. For the next ten days there was severe fighting designed to eat up the enemy's reserves and prepare the way for the final breakthrough. On the 4th November, the front was broken and the opportunity came for the fine American Sherman tanks to pour through. In two weeks Tobruk was reached and by the end of a month the army was at Agheila. They had the satisfaction of advancing twice as fast as Rommel had been able to move during our retreat. The Germans had not enough transport to go round and so they had made certain that what there was was used for the German units. Our casualties in twelve days were 16,000; the enemy's must have totalled between 60,000 and 70,000 and Rommel must have lost nearly 5,000 vehicles. None of this would have been possible had it not been for the air superiority gained by the Air Forces who had throughout done magnificent work.

For the further advance beyond Agheila everything depended upon the use of Benghazi. The harbour was left by the Germans in a terrible mess. However by dint of fine work on the part of the Navy, a flow of 3,000 tons per day was reached. A severe gale which again breached the mole and sank several ships interrupted the flow, but it was now back again to 2,000 tons per day. Sirte was useless but there was a small place near Agheila where 400 tons per day had been unloaded.

The plan of the operations which had now begun was an attack by the 7th Armoured Division, the New Zealand Division and the 51st Highland Division who were carrying with them 10 days' supplies and 500 miles of petrol. It was hoped to reach Tripoli by January 26th.

The enemy's fighting value was hard to assess but he was believed to have at his disposal the following forces:-

15th Panzer Division with 30 tanks ) 50 additional  
21st Panzer Division with about 27 tanks) tanks were be-  
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90th Light Division ) both weak in strength  
164th Division ) and short of artillery.

About 9 Italian Divisions.

The total strength might be assessed at 50,000 Germans and 30,000 Italians, though only about 20,000 of the former were strictly fighting troops. The enemy's organisation was much broken up and he was very short of artillery. Furthermore, his army had retreated 1,000 miles, which must have had its effect on morale. Our superiority rested in tanks and guns, of which we had ample. General LeClerc's advance through Fezzan had been a fine piece of work but would not exercise an influence on the present battle.

If we got to Tripoli according to plan the 8th Army would be quite immobilised until the port was open. This would take probably seven or ten days, though in the worst case it might take three months. It was hoped to work up to 3,000 tons a day and if this was achieved it would be possible to attack the Mareth Line towards the middle of March with 2 Armoured and 4 Infantry Divisions. We were getting photographs of the Mareth Line, which was certainly a prepared position, though lacking in depth. It should be realised that the distances involved were very great. From Buerat to Tripoli was 248 miles and from Tripoli to Gabes was 220 miles. It would, of course, be possible, if the enemy's resistance proved weak, to advance to the Mareth Line with very light forces somewhat earlier.

Discussion then turned upon the co-ordination of the operations of the 8th Army and of those of General Eisenhower's command. GENERAL EISENHOWER enquired what Rommel's position would be if the 8th Army captured Tripoli and if he captured Sfax. Could the 8th Army keep Rommel engaged so that the forces at Sfax could neglect its right flank and turn all its attention towards the North?

GENERAL ALEXANDER said that Rommel was living very much from hand to mouth for supplies and if he lost all his

ports he would certainly be trapped; nevertheless, it would be necessary to give very careful study to the Sfax operation. It should be realised that if a force advanced on Sfax Rommel would react like lightning and his plan would be the best possible. Great care would be necessary to ensure that undue risks were not taken.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that a great deal depended upon the timing of the Sfax operation. It might be unfortunate if the force arrived at Sfax just at the time that the 8th Army had reached Tripoli and were immobilised for lack of supplies.

It was generally agreed that the co-ordination of the action of the two armies was a matter of the highest importance and the present opportunity should be utilised to the full.

Discussion then turned on the strength required to hold the North African shore when it had been completely cleared of the enemy. GENERAL ALEXANDER said that he had calculated that two divisions with a mobile reserve would be sufficient for Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. GENERAL EISENHOWER said that he considered four divisions should be held to watch Spanish Morocco and that one infantry and one armoured division would certainly be necessary in Algeria and Tunisia. There were at present six U.S. divisions in French North Africa and three more were set up in the original plan to come. If these were shipped there would be three U.S. divisions over and above defensive requirements. He thought it would be unwise to hand over the defence of Tunisia too early to the French. The PRIME MINISTER agreed. He said that it appeared that there would be some thirteen divisions in the whole North African theatre available for future operations.

In reply to an enquiry SIR ARTHUR TEDDER said that he was of the opinion that convoys could be passed through the Mediterranean when airfields had been established and when the Tunisian tip had been cleared. SIR DUDLEY POUND agreed. He reckoned that if thirty ships could be passed through every ten days the whole of the Cape traffic could be done away with and 225 ships would thus be released for other uses. It was hard to estimate the relative losses which might be incurred, but though the percentage of loss might be slightly higher through the Mediterranean the total would be less as fewer ships would be involved. The Mediterranean route would be more expensive in escorts, but there would be a saving in the time of voyages.

The PRIME MINISTER said that the opening of the Mediterranean would have its effect on the attitude of Turkey;

moreover, the British 10th Army, consisting of six divisions, which had been established in Persia with the object of meeting the threat through the Caucasus, was now available to encourage and support the Turks.

In discussion it was suggested that it might be worth while calculating what specialised units would be required to round out the Turkish Army. SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that up to the present the Turks had been supplied with technical material and arms, but although their Army consisted of first-rate material, as infantry, they tended to misuse technical equipment and allow it to deteriorate. He did not think their army would ever be fit to operate offensively outside Turkey. It might, however, serve to hold Turkey as a base from which our forces could operate.

SIR ARTHUR TEDDER said that the Turks had a small air force to which we gave a limited number of aircraft; it would never be fit to fight. Our plan was to operate initially some twenty-five fighter and night bomber squadrons from airfields in Turkey which had been prepared and stocked. Further airfields would be required if we were to operate offensively and plans were all drawn up for their preparation. It was intended to move antiaircraft defences in with the squadrons.

SIR ARTHUR TEDDER then gave an account of the part played by the Air Force in the recent victories in the Middle East. He emphasised that their task began during the British retreat from Gazala. Since that time the enemy air force had been beaten down and great efforts had been made to stop Rommel's supplies. The action of an air force in operations of this kind was difficult to explain concisely, extending as it did over great areas and diverse tasks. The Middle East Air Forces had first struck at Rommel's supplies and then at the supplies to Tunisia; for the latter purpose Malta had been reinforced to the utmost and aircraft had been transferred to Tunisia. The co-ordination of the Air Forces of the Middle East, Malta and Tunisia was a complicated problem and he was very glad to have the present opportunity of meeting General Eisenhower and discussing it.

GENERAL EISENHOWER explained the difficulties under which the Air Forces in Tunisia were operating in support of the Army. There were only two airfields available for fighters and even these were 100 miles from the front line. The Germans, on the other hand, had two all-weather airfields in Tunis. In the early stages U.S. units from the Western Zone had been moved up and placed under British command; Air Marshal Welch had disposed them in the Tebessa area. For the operation now contemplated the British fighter force would operate from Souk El Arba under Lawson

and the U.S. fighters would operate in the South under General Crane. His own conception of the layout on this front was that the British Army Commander should control it all since there was no sound arrangement by which the front could be divided. The French, however, had refused to serve under British Command. This had meant that he had had to establish a Command Post from which to direct operations. He hoped to overcome this kind of difficulty in the near future.

The PRIME MINISTER enquired whether there was any danger of the Germans striking through General Anderson's left flank rather in the manner adopted by the 8th Army at El Alamein. GENERAL EISENHOWER said that the 1st Army had such superiority over the enemy in artillery that he did not think there was much fear of this. Though the enemy's specialist and tank units were good, his infantry had not seemed to be up to the same standard.

In conclusion it was emphasized that events had reached a crucial stage in the North African Theatre and that the events of the next two or three weeks would be of vital importance. The present was the time at which to consider what action should be taken when the North African shore had finally been cleared.

Anfa Camp.

U. S. SECRET  
BRITISH MOST SECRET

COPY NO. 1

ANFA 1st Meeting

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Mr. Harry Hopkins  
Lt. Colonel Elliot Roosevelt  
Lt. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., USN

British

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(Prime Minister and Minister  
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Admiral of the Fleet  
Sir Dudley Pound  
Field Marshal Sir John Dill  
General Sir Alan F. Brooke  
Air Chief Marshal Sir C. Portal  
General the Hon. Sir Harold  
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SIR ARTHUR TEDDER then gave an account of the part played by the Air Force in the recent victories in the Middle East. He emphasised that their task began during the British retreat from Gazala. Since that time the enemy air force had been beaten down and great efforts had been made to stop Rommel's supplies. The action of an air force in operations of this kind was difficult to explain concisely, extending as it did over great areas and diverse tasks. The Middle East Air Forces had first struck at Rommel's supplies and then at the supplies to Tunisia; for the latter purpose Malta had been reinforced to the utmost and aircraft had been transferred to Tunisia. The co-ordination of the Air Forces of the Middle East, Malta and Tunisia was a complicated problem and he was very glad to have the present opportunity of meeting General Eisenhower and discussing it.

GENERAL EISENHOWER explained the difficulties under which the Air Forces in Tunisia were operating in support of the Army. There were only two airfields available for fighters and even these were 100 miles from the front line. The Germans, on the other hand, had two all-weather airfields in Tunis. In the early stages U.S. units from the Western Zone had been moved up and placed under British command; Air Marshal Welch had disposed them in the Tebessa area. For the operation now contemplated the British fighter force would operate from Souk El Arba under Lawson

and the U.S. fighters would operate in the South under General Crane. His own conception of the layout on this front was that the British Army Commander should control it all since there was no sound arrangement by which the front could be divided. The French, however, had refused to serve under British Command. This had meant that he had had to establish a Command Post from which to direct operations. He hoped to overcome this kind of difficulty in the near future.

The PRIME MINISTER enquired whether there was any danger of the Germans striking through General Anderson's left flank rather in the manner adopted by the 8th Army at El Alamein. GENERAL EISENHOWER said that the 1st Army had such superiority over the enemy in artillery that he did not think there was much fear of this. Though the enemy's specialist and tank units were good, his infantry had not seemed to be up to the same standard.

In conclusion it was emphasized that events had reached a crucial stage in the North African Theatre and that the events of the next two or three weeks would be of vital importance. The present was the time at which to consider what action should be taken when the North African shore had finally been cleared.

Anfa Camp.

A-1  
Capt. Miska

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COPY NO. 1

CORRECTED COPY

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MINUTES OF CONFERENCE

Held at Anfa Camp January 15, 1943, at 10 A.M.

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PRESENT

- THE PRESIDENT
- GENERAL MARSHALL
- ADMIRAL KING
- LT. GENERAL ARNOLD
- MR. HARRY HOPKINS
- MR. AVERILL HARRIMAN
- BRIGADIER GENERAL DEANE

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1. VISIT OF GENERAL NOGUES AND THE SULTAN OF MOROCCO WITH THE PRESIDENT

THE PRESIDENT asked as to the advisability of his seeing GENERAL NOGUES and possibly the SULTAN OF MOROCCO. General Marshall and Admiral King both stated they felt that General Eisenhower was in a better position to advise the President on this subject and he would no doubt do so when he arrived at Anfa Camp. Admiral King, however, questioned whether or not General Nogues merited the honor of visiting the President of the United States.

2. THE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that it had at first been thought the President would stay here for about four or five days; then leave by motor for Rabat and Lyauty where he would visit three divisions and interview certain selected officers and men; then proceed by air to Oran, observe the troops there and also visit a hospital. From Oran, it was planned that he should go to Marrakech, change planes at the airfield there and then return to the United States. He stated that in view of the fact that the conference would probably last about ten days, these plans would of necessity have to undergo some change. He said that it is not desirable for the President to visit Marrakech and he should refuse any invitation of the Prime Minister to do so.

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that Marrakech is inland, that its airfield is entirely open. No one knows how many Axis agents may be included in the civilian populations. He also said that it would be unwise to have the President of the United States in a city that contained about one and one half French divisions which have recently been hostile to us and only one regiment of American troops.

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that if the Prime Minister desired to visit Marrakech, he might do so with Mr. Hopkins and this would furnish good cover for the real location of the President.

It was decided that the President would remain here and that if there was any indication that his presence here had become known, he would immediately start on the inspection tour which had been previously planned to start at the conclusion of his stay in Africa, except that when he returned to the Marrakech airport, he would change planes and leave the Marrakech airport as though returning to the United States. Actually he would return to the Anfa Camp in time to be here to finish up such business as might be necessary in connection with the conference.

In discussing the protection available at Anfa Camp, General ARNOLD brought out the fact that there was a French squadron equipped with our P-40 airplanes and at the request of the President, he explained something of our program for equipping French air units.

3. THE BRITISH STRATEGIC CONCEPT

GENERAL MARSHALL gave the President a brief summary of the British Chiefs of Staff concept regarding the prospects in the European theatre. They believe that we should first expand the bombing effort against the Axis and that operations in the Mediterranean offer the best chance of compelling Germany to disperse her air resources. He explained that the British are now in favor of an attack against Sicily rather than Sardinia and that this change of attitude was probably inspired by the Prime Minister.

At the same time, the United Nations should try to bring Turkey in on our side. Continued aid should be given to the Russians. A balance will have to be struck between these various commitments because they are mutually conflicting.

They also feel that we must be in a position to take advantage of any weakness developing in Germany by being prepared for operations across the English Channel.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that both Lord Mountbatten and General Clark agreed that there must be a long period of training before any attempt is made to land against determined resistance. General Clark had pointed out many of the mishaps that occurred in the landing in North Africa which would have been fatal had the resistance been more determined. General Clark was also apprehensive about our ability to maintain a surprise because of the necessity of locating landing craft along the northern coast of Africa prior to initiating operations. General Marshall stated that General Clark felt that while this presented some difficulties, they could be overcome.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that the British are extremely fearful of any direct action against the continent until a decided crack in the German efficiency and morale has become apparent. The British point out that the rail net in Europe would permit the movement of seven divisions a day from east to west which would enable them to reinforce their defenses of the northern coast of France rapidly. On the other hand, they can only move one division from north to south each day in order to reinforce their defense of southern Europe.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that General Clark had expressed the opinion that operations in the Mediterranean could be mounted more efficiently from North Africa. His reasons are that the lines of communication would be shorter there, that the troops in North Africa have had experience in landing operations, and that there will be an excess number of troops available for the operation once the Axis has been forced out of Tunisia, and finally that training will be more effective if undertaken in close contact with the enemy.

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GENERAL MARSHALL stated that while the British wish to build up a strong force in the United Kingdom for possible operations against Germany in case a weakness develops, it must be understood that any operation in the Mediterranean will definitely retard Bolero.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the line of communication is the bottle neck in any operations in the Mediterranean.

MR. HOPKINS asked if the British Chiefs of Staff felt that the lines of communication are sufficient. General Marshall said that the two critical factors in the decision as to whether the operation is to be in the north or the south were: (1) the safety of the line of communications and (2) the fact that there will be an excess of veteran soldiers available in North Africa to mount an operation.

In discussing Turkey, GENERAL MARSHALL said that the British Eighth Army would be prepared to send a considerable force there or near there. The aim of the United Nations should be to have Turkey resist Axis aggression and at the same time permit and protect our use of their airfields.

The PRESIDENT said that the question of bringing Turkey into the war is one for the diplomats to settle. In conducting negotiations, he stated that he and the Prime Minister should be given information as to how much military support the United Nations should be prepared to offer Turkey in order to accomplish what is desired. He stated that he did not want to be in the position of over-promising anything to the Turkish government. (The Joint Staff Planners have been directed to investigate how much aid it would be necessary for us to furnish Turkey in order to enable them to provide effective resistance to an Axis invasion.)

It was agreed that regardless of whether Turkey came into the war on the side of the United Nations, we should assemble sufficient force to the east of the Turkish boundary to enable the United Nations to reinforce Turkey as soon as she did become involved in the war. This can probably be accomplished by using part of the British Eighth Army.

4. ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

GENERAL MARSHALL then pointed out that both the American and the British Chiefs of Staff agreed that effective measures must be taken against the Axis submarines. He said that Admiral King had pointed out that the most effective targets would be at the places where the submarines are assembled. He agreed with the statement, which he attributed to Sir Charles Portal, that we must keep hammering on one link in the chain, whether it be the factories which manufacture component parts, the sub-

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marine assembly yards, submarine bases, or submarines along the sea lanes.

5. OPERATION RAVENOUS

GENERAL MARSHALL informed the President of the British attitude concerning the operation RAVENOUS.

ADMIRAL KING stated that he had the impression that the British were coming around to the idea that it would be profitable gamble.

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that there were hazards, particularly from Japanese action against the southern flank, but that if the operation was successful it would secure favorable results far out of proportion to the risks involved. The most important benefit to be hoped for would be a decrease in the Japanese pressure in the southern Pacific by forcing the Japanese to divert their attention to the Burma theatre and even in the event of failure it would almost certainly result in a junction of the Chinese forces now in Burma with those from Yunnan and if a retirement became necessary, a trained Chinese army would withdraw into China.

GENERAL MARSHALL then spoke of the Generalissimo's refusal to mount the operation. One reason given by the Generalissimo is the failure to secure British cooperation in assembling naval forces in the Bay of Bengal which he felt was a definite British commitment.

It was agreed that an effort should be made to obtain firm British support for the operation before requesting the President to discuss the matter further with the Generalissimo.

THE PRESIDENT added that for psychological reasons he thought it would be advisable to double General Chenault's force in China and also to bomb Japan proper. General Arnold replied that he agreed that it would be wise to increase General Chenault's force and expressed great confidence in his ability to effectively operate against the Japanese. He stated, however, that the difficulty of supplying gasoline, spare parts, and other maintenance necessities prevented doing this at this time. He indicated that this was one of the most urgent reasons for opening the Burma road.

MR. HOPKINS asked General Marshall what he thought the prospects of success in Operation RAVENOUS were.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that he thought they were better than fifty-fifty. He said the British presented all sorts of difficulties which must be overcome but that he personally did not feel any of them were insurmountable. The tactical operations involved would not be of long duration but it would be necessary to build an improved road rapidly before the rainy season set in. He felt that our engineers could do this but the British were inclined to doubt it. The British also feared the effects of Malaria but General Marshall pointed out that their malaria preventative methods did not approach the effectiveness of ours.

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ADMIRAL KING stated that he thought it was most essential to undertake Operation RAVENOUS, particularly for its effect on the Japanese in the South Pacific. He stated that they are operating on interior lines and it was difficult to understand why they did not make some serious thrusts at Midway or other points on our line of communications.

6. COMMAND SITUATION IN EUROPE

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that he had learned that the Prime Minister was concerned over the effectiveness of our bombing operations in Europe. The utilization of our bombing force is tied up with the question of command. At the present time General Eisenhower controls the Air Force, both in North Africa and in England. We are cooperating with the British in selecting the bombing objectives but we are not subject to their orders. General Marshall said that he felt the time had come when we should establish a separate United Kingdom theatre. He stated that he had sent General Andrews to Cairo to give him some experience in an active theatre of operations and that he now proposed to put him in command of the American troops in the United Kingdom.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that so far as operational direction of bombing, i.e. time and mission, our bombers in England should be subject to British command. So far as technique, etc. they should not be permitted to dictate our procedure.

7. OPERATIONS IN TUNISIA

GENERAL MARSHALL indicated that there may be a change in the British command in the operations in Tunisia. He said that Admiral Cunningham agreed that the command had not been well handled. Instances occurred in which trained United States combat teams loaned to the British were broken up, thus reducing their effectiveness. There had also been instances of the misuse of British parachute troops. This situation is now being corrected.

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ANFA CAMP

January 15, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL ARNOLD:

1. The President would like to know the number and types of planes, and whether properly equipped, used by ourselves and the British for the purpose of searching out and keeping down the submarines. He wants to know the approximate number in all theatres including the Atlantic Coast, the Pacific Coast, the Caribbean, the South Atlantic, England, etc.

2. The President realizes that many of these ships are operationally under the Admiralty or the British Coastal Command, but he wants you to get all that information correlated for him.

HARRY HOPKINS

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**ANFA CAMP**

**January 15, 1943**

**MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL KING:**

1. The President wants to know the number of new destroyers, corvettes and other escort vessels, listed by types and by months, which will become available in 1943. He wants a similar list that will become available from the British and the total of both.

**HARRY HOPKINS**

**SECRET**

SECRET

ANFA CAMP

January 15, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL KING:

1. The President wants to know, in round numbers, the number of vessels used for escort purposes in the various general theatres such as the Pacific, the North Atlantic, the Russian and Mediterranean convoys. He would like to have this information both from the British and ourselves and the total figures.

HARRY HOPKINS

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