C.C.S. 56th Meeting

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

MINUTES OF MEETING

Held at ANFA CAMP
on THURSDAY, January 14, 1943, at 1430

PRESENT

General G. C. Marshall, U.S.A. General Sir Alan F. Brooke
Admiral E. J. King, U.S.N. Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT

Lt. General B.B. Somervell, U.S.A. Field Marshal Sir John Dill
Rear Admiral C.M. Cooke, Jr, U.S.N. Vice Admiral the Lord Louis Mountbatten
Commander N.L. Libby, U.S.N.

SECRETARIAT

Brigadier V. Dykes
Brig. General J.R. Deane, U.S.A.

ADMIRAL KING stated, however, that we had attempted to go on with the Solomons operations. The Japanese reaction was at first, purely defensive in character, and it was not until after December 7th that they showed a more aggressive tendency and began to evacuate their forces in the Solomons area. The Jap troops were, however, cut off by the Allies from the rest of the Japanese forces in the South-west Pacific area.

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COMBINED STRATEGY

SIR ALLEN BROOKE said that he would like to hear the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff regarding the situation in the Pacific.

ADMIRAL KING stated that of the nine fronts on which the United Nations are now engaged, four are in the Pacific. These include the Alaska - Aleutian area, the Hawaiian - Midway area, the South and southwest Pacific areas, and the Burma - China area.

He said that when he took office as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet on December 30, 1941, he immediately sent a dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet stating that his mission was first to hold the Hawaiian - Midway line and the communications with the Pacific coast; and secondly to hold the remainder of the line of communications to Australia and New Zealand.

The Navy had already established a refueling point at Bora Bora which was sufficiently far to the rear to insure its being held. Marines had been sent to Samoa and there were also troops in the Fiji Islands. Steps had been taken to establish three strong points on the line of communications: Samoa, the Fiji Islands, and New Caledonia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had then established a base for the Navy in Auckland with an advanced base at Tongatabu. As time went on, the United States forces went into the New Hebrides to Efate and Esperitu Santos.

Meanwhile, there had been engagements with the Japanese near the Marshall Islands, the Island of Wake, and in the Coral Sea.

The Japanese had advanced as far south as Tulagi with the apparent intent of using it as a base from which to operate against our line of communications.

ADMIRAL KING said that had we been set at the time of Midway, we could have made great progress in an attack on the Solomon Islands. The operation was in preparation in July and took place on August 7th but we did not have sufficient force even at that time to exploit our success beyond the occupation of Tulagi and Guadalcanal. The Japanese reaction there was more violent and sustained than had been anticipated. Another reason why we could not proceed further with the Solomon operations was that Operation TORCH had been decided upon and much of our available means had to be diverted to it.

ADMIRAL KING stated, however, that we have attempted to go on with the Solomon operations. The Japanese reaction was, at first, probably designed to "save face" but eventually that became a minor consideration. The Japanese have a long line of communications and it soon became apparent that they were fighting a delaying action to cover the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines where the "treasures" are to be found.

He pointed out that we have had some success in the attrition of the Japanese forces but not as much as has been claimed. At present, the Tulagi area is pretty well stabilized and General MacArthur has driven the Japanese out of the Papuan Peninsula.
on New Guinea. The enemy is re-enforcing Lae and Salamaua.

The main object of the operations has been the safety of the approaches to northeastern Australia, and the key to the situation is Rabaul.

The campaign in the Solomons was to be divided into three parts: (1) the capture of Tulagi, (2) securing the northeast coast of New Guinea, and (3) the capture of Rabaul. The process has been slow but the United States forces are going on with it. The immediate question is where to go when this campaign has been completed.

ADIMRAL KING stated that he felt the Philippines should be our objective rather than the Netherlands East Indies. The Philippines could be captured by a flank action whereas the capture of the Netherlands East Indies must of necessity be the result of a frontal attack. The most likely intermediate objective, once Rabaul is captured, is Truk and thence to the Marianas.

Prior to the war, every class at the Naval War College was required to play the game of the Pacific Islands involving the recapture of the Philippines. There are three ways in which the Philippines may be taken: first, the direct route which would constitute a frontal attack; second, the southern route which is outflanked by the enemy along much of its course; and third, the northern route through the Aleutians to the northern tip of the Island of Luzon. The northern route would include establishing a base in the northwestern Marshall Islands and then proceeding to Truk and the Marianas. The Marianas are the key of the situation because of their location on the Japanese line of communications. Any line of action decided upon requires considerable force, especially air strength. All of the necessary operations are amphibious.

ADIMRAL KING said that Mr. Stalin had been good enough to say that the Solomons operations have been of considerable assistance to Russia.

He pointed out the importance to the Japanese of occupying the Maritime Provinces in order to secure the Japanese Islands. He felt that such action would be necessary and that the Japanese should attach more importance to them than to the capture of the Netherlands East Indies.

ADIMRAL KING stated that the Japanese are now replenishing Japan with raw materials and also fortifying an inner defense ring along the line of the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines. For these reasons, he believed that it was necessary for the United Nations to prevent the Japanese having time to consolidate their gains. He compared this situation with the present desire of the United Nations to avoid giving Germany a respite during the winter months.
ADMIRAL KING then said that the idea of utilizing 30% of the United Nations war effort against Japan was a concept rather than an arithmetical computation. He had caused studies to be made of how much of the total war effort is now being applied to Japan and found it to be approximately 15%. He said that this is not sufficient to do more than hold; it is not enough to permit maintaining pressure on the Japanese.

ADMIRAL KING stated that we are taking slow steps towards an attack against Japan by the northern route and called attention to the fact that the United States forces had just captured Amchitka. All operations in the Pacific are limited by the amount of available shipping.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the Japanese route for a naval effort against Siberia is secure. He said that he had recently had a survey made of Paranushir Island, the northernmost of the Kurile Islands. This revealed that it would be unsatisfactory as a base for operating against Japan.

It would be desirable to have the cooperation of the Russians in this respect but there has been difficulty in obtaining any information from them. The only means of obtaining information so far has been by direct correspondence between the President and Mr. Stalin.

GENERAL MARSHALL then reviewed the deployment of the United States troops in all of the islands of the Pacific, giving the strength of each in ground and air troops and in aircraft. He pointed out the logistical difficulties of supplying these forces.

ADMIRAL KING then gave the disposition of the Marine forces which amount to 60,000 men in the area from Midway to the South Pacific Islands.

(Continued on next page)
GENERAL MARSHALL said that in the light of the logistical requirements in the Pacific, the United States' interest in undertaking an operation to open the Burma Road could be well understood. General Stilwell and Field Marshal Wavell would have to determine the logistical requirements of such an operation but in any event, they would be minor in comparison to the requirements in the Operation TORCH. Any success in the Operation RAVENOUS would have a tremendous effect in the Pacific chiefly by making it necessary for the Japanese to divert forces to the Burma operations, thus lessening the pressure in the south Pacific and the consequent demands on our available shipping.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that the peace of mind of the United States Chiefs of Staff was greater now than it had been a year ago. The Japanese are now on the defensive and must be careful of a surprise move from us. However, he pointed out that we must still worry about the locations of the Japanese aircraft carriers because they constitute a constant threat against our line of communications and for raiding purposes against our west coast.

We must not allow the Japanese any pause. They fight with no idea of surrendering and they will continue to be aggressive until attrition has defeated them. To accomplish this, we must maintain the initiative and force them to meet us.

GENERAL ARNOLD then discussed the United States efforts to obtain information concerning Russia. He stated that when the Germans threatened to capture the Caucasus, the Russians began to be fearful that the supply of airplanes from the United States via the southern route would be eliminated. They, therefore, requested the United States to start delivery of airplanes from Alaska at once. The United States agreed to this providing the Russians would demonstrate that there were sufficient facilities available to make possible the delivery of one hundred and fifty planes a month. The Russians did not have these facilities at the time but built them rapidly. At the present time, both the southern route and the Alaskan route are in use. In the coming year, the delivery to Russia amounts to four hundred airplanes a month. These will be divided over the two routes. Bombers are flown to Basra but the flight is so long that the Russians refuse to accept the engines and this necessitates replacing them. The northern route will be used for this purpose as much as possible inasmuch as it eliminates fifty hours of flying time on the journey.

GENERAL ARNOLD then stated that the U. S. Chiefs of Staff were desirous of knowing what facilities were available in southern Siberia and Vladivostok in order to see if they could be of assistance to Russia in case Russia was attacked by the Japanese.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that Mr. Stalin had finally given General Bradley permission to make a survey. General Bradley, however, considered that it would be better to present the Russians with a specific proposal. He returned to the United States and it was decided to offer Russia one hundred heavy bombers seventy-two days after...
the outbreak of war between Russia and Japan. Mr. Stalin had rejected this offer and said he would like 100 aircraft at once for use against Germany.

GENERAL MARSHALL also stated that the Russians object to the presence of "gossipy" people from the United Nations and that they were afraid that the United Nations personnel could not put up with the conditions which are imposed on Russian troops.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL stated that the British had operated successfully with the Russian navy in the Murmansk area but that they had the same experiences with the Russian army as the U. S. had.

GENERAL MARSHALL then described the difficulties which the United States Chiefs of Staff had had concerning sending air units to the Caucasus. The Russians had stated definitely that they did not desire units but airplanes only. There had been some sentiment among the United States authorities to furnish sufficient airplanes for the purpose of placating Mr. Stalin. However, to do so, especially in the case of heavy bombers, would necessitate immobilizing these airplanes for as much as six months while the Russians were learning to operate them and establishing ground crews for their maintenance. General Marshall stated that in his opinion it was unwise to withhold this striking power against the enemy for so long a period.

ADmiral King then asked the British Chiefs of Staff if they had the impression that the Russians were unwilling to help themselves. The Germans were successfully operating air forces out of the northern part of Norway and the Russians had apparently made no effort to stop them although they were well within range.

SIR DUDLEY POUND stated that the Russians do send destroyers out to meet convoys as far as two hundred miles out of a total of three hundred and fifty miles that is expected of them. They invariably state however that they have run out of fuel and then leave the convoy for home at a rate of twenty eight knots. Their air force has not furnished much protection.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL stated that he felt the reason for this was that their air personnel is not properly trained. The Russians had made some attempts to strike at the German forces but had been unsuccessful.

GENERAL MARSHALL asked why the Russians were willing to risk whole divisions but not their naval forces.

SIR DUDLEY POUND replied that they are continental people who do not understand naval action. Their submarines have been the only effective units of their navy.

SIR ALAN BROCKE agreed with this statement and added that while they do not know what dangers are involved in escorting ships, they are very free to offer silly advice as to how security should be attained.
GENERAL MARSHALL then described the development of troops of the United States, which was proceeding very well. He added that United States troops, both in this and the last war, appeared to "veteranize" quickly in the field. The young officers and non-commissioned officers had exhibited a remarkable facility for eliminating errors rapidly. We may expect their effectiveness to increase enormously in a short time.

He thought we were particularly fortunate in the deadly character of the Pacific fight, since our forces which have been engaged in the Pacific have become imbued with the idea that it is "kill or be killed" and this attitude gives promise of tremendous power for future operations. The staffs are sound and the engineers are particularly effective. He recalled a remark that had been made in the War Department, when Field Marshal Wavell questioned the possibility of building a road which would support the Burma operations, to the effect that "Wavell does not know General Wheeler," the United States engineer in this theatre.

Continued on next page.
SIR ALAN BROOKS enquired how far forward the U.S. Chiefs of Staff envisaged it would be necessary to go in order to prevent the Japanese from digging themselves in. He feared that if operations were too extended it would inevitably lead to an all-out war against Japan and it was certain that we had not sufficient resources to undertake this at the same time as a major effort against Germany. Would it be possible for the forces at present in the Pacific to hold the Japanese without incurring the additional drain on our resources which would result from pushing forward our present defensive positions?

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that it had been essential to act offensively in order to stop the Japanese advancing. For example, in New Guinea it had been necessary to push the Japanese back to prevent them capturing Port Moresby. In order to do this, every device for reinforcing the troops on the island had had to be employed. The same considerations applied in Guadalcanal. It had been essential to take offensive action to seize the island. Short of offensive action of this nature, the only way of stopping the Japanese was by complete exhaustion through attrition. It was very difficult to pause; the process of whittling away Japan had to be continuous.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL asked whether it was not possible to stand on a line and inflict heavy losses on the Japanese when they tried to break through it. From the very fact that the Japanese continued to attack, it was clear that they had already been pushed back further than they cared to go. He also enquired whether the U.S. Chiefs of Staff thought it would be possible to gain a decision by air bombardment of Japan alone.

GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out that the Allied forces in the Southwest Pacific were now operating from the tips of two narrow salients. The Japanese had greater width in their line and could therefore operate on a larger scale than the forces which we could bring to bear.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that in Papua it would be possible to gain additional airfields alongside our present position, but this was not the case in Guadalcanal where only a small strip of suitable territory was available. To broaden our base there, we should have to have New Britain and New Ireland. As regards air bombardment of Japan, the U.S. view was that Japanese industries were so vulnerable to the air that heavy attack would ultimately destroy her capacity to maintain her war effort.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL suggested that it should be possible to determine what it was that we had to prevent the Japanese from doing, and what forces we should require for the purpose. We should then see what forces remained for use elsewhere in the world.

ADMIRAL KING observed that unless some effort was made to assist Chiang Kai Shek, the Chinese might pull out of the war. The 30% effort to which he had referred would, of
course, include operations in Burma.

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed that operation RAVENOUS might be successful but when we had reached the objective we should still have to defend our line of communication against Japanese attack from the flank. It was calculated that the route would only suffice to maintain two Divisions and this would leave little if any capacity for the supply air forces operating in China.

ADmiral King pointed out that in addition to opening the supply route to China, RAVENOUS would gain the territory necessary to secure the air supply route from India to China.

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed that it would be well worth while taking a risk on RAVENOUS since it would not cut across the main effort against Germany, whereas ANAKIM would.

GENERAL MARRiSH pointed out that the Chinese only required about half the maintenance tonnage required by white troops. In any event, even a small residual tonnage for supplies to China would probably be far greater than could be transported by air. Twelve bombers in China under General Chennault had done wonderful work, and if he had even 50 the results they might achieve would be very great. For this reason the U. S. Chiefs of Staff thought that RAVENOUS was a gamble well worth while. It should also be remembered that any help given to China which would threaten Japan might have a most favourable effect on Stalin.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that General Chennault claimed he could drive the Japanese Air Force out of China if he had 175 aircraft. This might be an exaggerated claim, but there was no doubt additional air forces in China would have a very great effect. By December it was hoped to have 150 transports working from India to China, with a maximum delivery estimated at 10,000 tons per month.

ADmiral King asked on whom would fall the principal burden of beating Japan once Germany had been knocked out.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that once Germany was defeated, practically all the British naval forces would be released for the war against Japan. Forces destined for the recapture of Burma and Malaya were already forming in India. He did not think it wise, however, to embark on operation ANAKIM unless we were quite prepared for a full-scale campaign.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that India had already been asked to provide airfields for double the number of air forces we were ever likely to have available before the defeat of Germany. These were intended for the campaign against Japan. He had no doubt that as soon as Germany was defeated the British Government would turn the whole of their resources against Japan.
GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that to depend on sea operations alone against Japan was hazardous, owing to the rapidity with which the balance of sea power could change in the event of a reverse. For example, in the Midway battle the U.S. Forces had been able to get all their aircraft into the air before the Japanese attack developed. In consequence, the Japanese had lost four carriers as against one American. With a little ill-fortune the reverse might have taken place, and in that case, the whole of the west coast of America would have been open to Japanese carrier borne attack. The Japanese territories were not nearly so vulnerable in this respect.

ADMIRAL KING said that the Japanese might well strike again at Midway. They were on interior lines and it was easier for them to take the initiative against us. At the present time it looked as if their carriers were being prepared for another attack on Midway or Samoa. It was essential, therefore, to maintain the initiative against the Japanese and not wait for them to come against us.

GENERAL MARSHALL explained the difficulties with which he had been faced in finding even the small forces required by General Stilwell to support RAVENOUS. Shipping could not be spared for them in the absence of some definite assurance from Chiang Kai Shek and agreement with Field Marshal Wavell on the operations to be undertaken. By the time these had been obtained much time had been lost and shipping had to be found by drawing it away from other commitments in the Pacific such as Alaska and Hawaii. General MacArthur was some 20,000 men short of his requirements, and provision of these reinforcements had had to be deferred. By the most rigid economy sufficient shipping had at last been found to move 6,000 men to General Stilwell. In order to cut down numbers to the minimum, units had been stripped to the bone of all personnel which were not absolutely essential. It was certainly fortunate that losses sustained in the Pacific from submarines had been so small.

ADMIRAL KING said he was puzzled to know why these losses had been so small and what the Japanese were keeping their submarines for.

SIR DUDLEY POUND said that, in British experience, Japanese submarines were much less of a menace than the German. They were less efficiently operated, and quite small escorts were sufficient to drive them away. He pointed out that it was in a way to our advantage to allow the Japanese to dig in well to the rear in their defended area. For example, to recapture the Philippines before the defeat of Germany was impossible, and it was, therefore, all to the good if the Japanese locked up troops in these Islands. The quickest way of recapturing the Philippines would be to defeat Germany. It seemed to him that the correct strategy was to establish a line where we had better air facilities than the Japanese and then to allow them to wear out their air forces by attacking us on that line. Would it be of any advantage to go as far forward as Truk in the immediate future rather than just before the main attack on the Philippines. Even if we had
Truk, he questioned whether we could operate surface forces from it at the present time.

ADmirAL KInG agreed that the recapture of the Philippines must probably await the defeat of Germany. On the other hand, he would be in favour of seizing Truk and going forward to the Marianas in order to dominate the Japanese sea routes to the eastward thus freeing our submarines for the more covered Japanese supply route to the westward. He felt it was necessary to soften up the Japanese before making our main effort and not simply to allow them to do what they wanted, while we held a static position. The 30% allocation of resources which he had suggested would certainly suffice for the recapture of Rabaul.

After some further discussion,

THE COMMITTEE:-

Agreed to direct the Combined Staff Planners to report, on the basis that Germany is the primary enemy, what situation do we wish to establish in the Eastern Theatre (i.e., the Pacific and Burma) in 1943, and what forces will be necessary to establish that situation.
U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
O.C.S. 55th Meeting

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

MINUTES OF MEETING

Held at ANFA Camp
on Thursday, January 14, 1943, at 1030

PRESENT

General G. C. Marshall, U.S.A.
General Sir Alan F. Brooke
Admiral E. J. King, U.S.N.
Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Dudley Pound
Lt. General H. H. Arnold, U.S.A.
Air Chief Marshal
Sir Charles F. A. Portal

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT

Lt. General B. B. Somervell, U.S.A.
Field Marshal Sir John Dill
Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr., U.S.N.
Vice Admiral the Lord Louis Mountbatten
Brig. General A. C. Wedemeyer, U.S.A.
Lt. General Sir Hastings L. Ismay

SECRETARIAT

Brigadier V. Dykes
Brig. General J. R. Deane, U.S.A.

Secretary's statement was not sufficiently developed favorably. He was not quite optimistic about the situation. He was not sure whether he could expect much in the way of immediate success, but he did feel that we had made progress and should continue to press on. He was particularly pleased with the work of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington.

Admiral King said that he had been impressed by the way in which the Combined Chiefs of Staff had been working together. He felt that they had been very effective in coordinating the efforts of the various services.

General Marshall said that he believed that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were doing an excellent job. He felt that they were working very closely with the other Services and that they were making good progress.

General Brooke said that he was very pleased with the work of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He felt that they were making good progress and that they were working very closely with the other Services.

Admiral Pound said that he was also pleased with the work of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He felt that they were making good progress and that they were working very closely with the other Services.

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Brigadier Dykes said that he was also pleased with the work of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He felt that they were making good progress and that they were working very closely with the other Services.

Brig. General Deane said that he was also pleased with the work of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He felt that they were making good progress and that they were working very closely with the other Services.

The meeting adjourned at 10:30 a.m.

Copy No. 10

Regraded Unclassified
General Marshall outlined the broad problem facing the Combined Chiefs of Staff as the allocation of resources between the two major theatres of war - the Atlantic (which included for this purpose the Mediterranean) and the Pacific. He suggested as a concept on which to work that this broad allocation should consist of 70 per cent in the Atlantic theatre and 30 per cent in the Pacific theatre.

Adm. King said that according to his estimates we were at present engaging only 15 per cent of our total resources against the Japanese in the Pacific theatre, which for this purpose included the Indian Ocean and Burma. In his view this was not sufficient to prevent Japan consolidating herself and thereby presenting ultimately too difficult a problem. The Japanese were fighting a delaying action in the Solomon Islands and digging in along the whole line of the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines. They were shipping back raw material into Japan as fast as they could. He felt that before the Combined Chiefs of Staff turned to the discussion of particular operations they should first fix the general proportion of effort to be applied in the two main theatres.

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that in fixing this balance of effort between the two theatres, it would be wise first to try and weigh up the enemy situation as both the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff saw it. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff would naturally know more of the situation in Japan than the British. He expressed the admiration of the British Chiefs of Staff on the magnificent work of the U.S. Forces during the last twelve months after the early disasters of the war against Japan. At one time it seemed as if nothing would stem the tide of the Japanese, but the position was now very different. The Japanese were definitely on a defensive basis and from intelligence received it appeared as if they were taking quite a different outlook on the war now from what they had been some months ago. They were worried about the situation of their European allies.

The security of the United States and the United Kingdom had always been basic factors in our strategy. The threat to the United Kingdom had been at one time serious, but as a result of our latest review of this danger it was felt that the forces in the United Kingdom could be re-orientated from a defensive to an offensive basis. The greatest danger at the present time was to our communications. The shortage of shipping was a stranglehold on all offensive operations and unless we could effectively combat the U-boat menace we might not be able to win the war.

Germany's situation was undoubtedly developing favourably from our point of view. She was staggering under the failure of her second offensive against Russia and feeling must be growing in that country that it was impossible for her to defeat Russia. Her successes in 1942 against Russia had been very much smaller in scale than in 1941. She had failed in her main object of the 1942 campaign, the capture of the Caucasus oil. By failing to capture even the port of Tuapse, she had failed in securing the facilities to export such oil as she had captured at Grozny. Her northern flank was in danger as also were the troops in the Caucasus salient.
The Russian offensive had been well carried out and had now reached within fifty miles of Kostoy. Germany had only two courses open to her, either to push back the Russians into Stalingrad, which would be almost impossible during the winter, or to shorten her line. The latter, therefore, was the more probable course and that would involve reverting to the 1941 line. The psychological effect of this withdrawal would be very serious in Germany.

Germany was thus on the defensive both in Russia and in North Africa. In the operations which had led to the defeat of the Germans in North Africa after the British defeat at Tobruk very great assistance had been given by the timely arrival of American Sherman tanks and 5.2 guns.

Germany was already having trouble among her allies. The Hungarians had suffered severely in the Crimea but had been forced to carry on, although greatly weakened in strength. The Italian troops on the Russian front had also suffered heavy losses and the Hungarian forces, which had never had much stomach for the fight, were also in bad shape. Italy was becoming more and more shaky and if she collapsed Germany would not only have to bolster up Italy by sending troops into the country but would also have to replace the numerous German divisions in Yugoslavia and in Greece. Alternatively she would have to withdraw altogether from the Balkans and Italy, and leave it open to the Allies.

All indications showed that Germany's man power was failing and that some cannibalisation of her divisions would have to be carried out. The latest estimate was that she would lose ten divisions in this way during the first quarter of 1943. Lack of oil was another of Germany's major difficulties which would hit the particularly hard during the next six months.

Taking all these factors into account it seemed at least possible that the precarious internal situation of Germany might make it possible to achieve a final victory in the European theatre before the end of 1943. The immediate problem was how best to apply our available resources in order to take advantage of Germany's present situation.

The means we had at our disposal were broadly three in number. First there was Russia, which constituted the largest land power; her efficiency was rising and the work of moving Russian manufacturing plants to the eastward away from the German invasion had been very well carried out. Russia's oil situation was now more satisfactory than had seemed likely earlier in the year, but she was short of grain. In order to get the best value out of Russia we must support her in every way we could. Our second main weapon was air bombardment, by U.S. and British forces. This we must exploit to the maximum. Our third means of striking at Germany was by amphibious operations which included invasion of the continent. The possession of sea power enabled us to threaten the enemy at several points and thereby compel him to disperse his forces. Once committed to a point of entry, however, the enemy would be able to concentrate his forces against us, and it was therefore necessary to choose this point of entry with the utmost care at the place where the enemy was least able to concentrate large forces.
As a point of re-entry to the continent, France had great advantages. In the first place the sea-crossing was short and we had better facilities for giving air support to our invasion. On the other hand the German defences in this area were most strong and Germany's power of concentrating against us was greatest. A recent study had shown that the east-west communications across the continent enabled Germany to move seven divisions simultaneously from the Russian front to the west in about twelve to fourteen days. The north-south communications on the continent were not nearly so good, not more than one division at a time could be moved from the north to the Mediterranean front. The Italian railways were close to the coast and vulnerable to interruption from the sea, and in the Balkans there was only a single line of railway passing through. From this point of view therefore the Southern front seemed to offer better prospects for amphibious operations.

TORCH operations in North Africa had been an outstanding example of successful cooperation between U.S. and British forces and the British Chiefs of Staff wished to express their admiration of the very able manner in which General Eisenhower had overcome the extremely difficult problems with which he had been faced. North Africa would provide a valuable base from which either to threaten Southern Europe or to undertake offensive operations. By this use we could compel the Germans to disperse their forces in order to re-inforce threatened points. In this way we could probably give greater assistance to Russia than if we committed ourselves definitely to Northern France. Once we had captured Sizerta we could pass merchant ship convoys through the Mediterranean. Their very passage would compel the Germans to fight in the air, since if they let them pass through un molested the effect of their U-boat operations against our shipping would be largely nullified. These air battles against the German Air Force would be of the greatest importance. Already more than half the German Air Force was deployed on fronts other than the Russian.

In all Mediterranean operations Spain, of course, was a most important factor. There must be always some anxiety that Spain would close the door behind us, but all recent opinion tended to show that Spain was turning away from Germany and that it was at least highly improbable that she would ever grant free access to German forces. The more successes we had in the Mediterranean the more likely it was that this favourable tendency in Spain would continue. Spain knew that from the economic point of view she must depend primarily on the Allies. Against this there was, of course, the fear of communism in Spain if the Allies were victorious and Russia over-ran Germany. Generally speaking, however, the feeling of the British Chiefs of Staff was that we had no cause for anxiety about Spain at the present time.

Another important factor in the Mediterranean was Turkey. That country no doubt would either try and keep out of the war altogether or at least join in on the side of the Allies only at the eleventh hour. There were, however, reasons to hope that if well handled, Turkey might be brought in earlier. As an inducement we should have to give her equipment, technical personnel and instructors. It did not seem wise to press Turkey to undertake an advance into the Balkans but rather to hold her position and afford us bases from which to attack Germany, in particular the Rumanian oil. We might also
obtain a free passage to the Black Sea as another means of striking at Germany.

Summing up prospects in the European Theatre, SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff felt that we should first expand the bomber offensive against the Axis to the maximum and that operations in the Mediterranean offered the best chance of compelling Germany to disperse her resources. With this end in view we should take as our immediate objective the knocking out of Italy. At the same time we should try and bring in Turkey on our side. By this means we should give Germany no respite at all in 1943 and we should give the best aid to Russia, whom we must continue to supply with all the equipment which we could send. The difficulty, of course, was that many of these operations were mutually exclusive. For example, to send large supplies to Russia used up great quantities of available escort vessels. This naturally cut down our capacity to undertake amphibious operations. A balance would have to be struck between these various commitments and we should have to face the necessity for accepting considerable losses in shipping, providing these paid a good dividend.

We must be in a position to take advantage of a crack in Germany in the late summer. There were already indications of considerable German withdrawals from France to the eastward. If Germany were compelled to withdraw considerable numbers of troops from France the possibilities of an invasion across the channel would be much greater. The estimate of the British Chiefs of Staff was that by August 1943 there would be available for cross-channel operations some 13 British and 9 U.S. divisions whether or not we undertook limited operations in the Mediterranean. Mediterranean operations, however, would produce other shortages, notably in Assault Shipping, and it might be difficult, if not impossible, to transfer landing craft from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom or to the Burma front in time.

In all amphibious operations the provision of landing craft was the critical factor. Not only had the crews to be provided but the naval crews to man them had to be trained and the land forces had to be trained to work from them; this training was a slow process.

The British landing craft resources were being formed into two main forces, one earmarked for operations on the continent and one for operations further afield, such as Burma. As regards operations in Burma, a limited offensive was now being undertaken with the object of capturing Akyab, on which the 14th Indian Division was now closing. Operations in the North of Burma presented very difficult logistical problems owing to the absence of roads.

The complete conquest of Burma was a much bigger problem and naval supremacy in the Bay of Bengal would be required for it. It would be necessary to undertake simultaneous offensives against Rangoon and Moulmein, since Rangoon could not be taken if the Moulmein airfields were in the hands of the Japs. Rail communications between Thailand and Burma were being improved and it might be necessary to extend the occupation of Burma by going some distance into Thailand as well. For this major operation seven divisions were being prepared in India and two African divisions, one from the east and one
from the west could be found, both composed of seasoned native troops well adapted to jungle fighting. If the Germans were compelled to abandon their Caucasus offensive, troops could also be found from Iraq and Persia. There appeared, therefore, no particular difficulty in finding the land divisions; the difficulty lay rather in the provision of the necessary naval forces. It must be realised, however, that once started operations for the recapture of Burma would develop into a full-scale campaign.

Sir Dudley Pound stated that in the Atlantic the greatest concerns to the Home Fleet were, first, to prevent a break out of the German naval forces and, second, to provide protection for convoys to north Russia.

At first the Russian convoys did not present any great difficulty. Their early successes gave everyone a false sense of security. German interference, however, has been increasing constantly, culminating with the concentration of their surface vessels on the coast of Norway, namely the Tirpitz, Lutzow, Hipper, Scharnhorst, and Prinz Eugen, all of which have now been completely repaired. A force of 20 U-boats was maintained in northern waters, as well as considerable air force. The security of Russian convoys is affected chiefly by the hours of darkness and the ice limit. For the next three months, the ice limit will only permit utilizing a channel about 220 miles in width which can be kept under close air reconnaissance by the Germans. The passage occupies about twelve days, and vessels are under attack all but two of them.

For the last convoy there were sixteen escort vessels; twelve of the Corvette type and four destroyers. Two 6-inch cruisers were employed to give cover against surface attack. The commander of the convoy had placed the cruisers between the vessels being escorted and the estimated location of the German surface vessels. However, the Hipper and the Lutzow attacked from the other side and came into contact with the four British destroyers. The destroyers prevented an attack on the cargo vessels, until joined by the two cruisers, though one was sunk. As soon as the cruisers appeared, the Hipper and the Lutzow withdrew. The Germans thus sacrificed a splendid opportunity to effect some serious damage on the ships.

It was first thought that the German Admiral commanding had made an error in judgment but it was later learned that he had received orders from the German authorities ashore to expedite his withdrawal. This would seem to indicate that the Germans are following a policy of preventing their ships from receiving any damage. It can possibly be explained by their desire to keep them intact preliminary to a break-out into the Atlantic.

Sir Dudley Pound stated that before such a break-out into the Atlantic could be effected, the Germans must send out oilers which will enable them to refuel at sea, since he doubted if the Germans would again attempt to retire to Breast in view of their previous experience there.

During the months of long daylight, the danger of air attack precluded the use of cruisers with the Russian convoys, and their escorts consisted only of a powerful destroyer force. Convoys can then only be run every twenty-six to thirty-two
days. Twelve days are required for the journey; three days for refueling; twelve days for the return journey and the remainder for boiler cleaning, etc. The Royal Navy does not have sufficient destroyers to operate two convoys simultaneously. If therefore it is necessary to send more than thirty ships to Russia every forty days, it will be necessary for the United States to furnish some assistance in escort vessels.

SIR DUDLEY POUND then stated that there was considerable traffic between Japan and Germany; Japan sending to Germany rubber and other raw materials obtained in the Far East in return for machinery and machine parts. It was important to stop this traffic at once. There are two places from which this can be best accomplished: first, in the Bay of Biscay by air and submarine action, and second, in the Atlantic narrows. For the latter a British task force was being built up on the east side and a U.S. task force was operating from the United States on the west side.

SIR DUDLEY POUND then discussed the situation in the Indian Ocean. It had at first been hoped to create a large Indian Ocean fleet, but this has been seriously reduced in size by TORCH and other operations and it now appears that its remaining carrier, the Illustrious, may be needed for future operations in the Mediterranean. If this is so, now would be an opportune time to withdraw it from the Indian Ocean for repairs and the installation of the most modern fighter direction devices. Without the protection of carrier aircraft, the Indian Ocean fleet is incapable of serving a useful purpose in the Indian Ocean area against Japanese naval forces accompanied by carriers.

In the Mediterranean area ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM has a force of three battleships and two cruisers. One of the hazards to this task force consists of three modern Italian battleships which are at present unlocated. In the Eastern Mediterranean, British naval forces had been heavily engaged in the supply of the Eighth Army in the Eastern North African ports. What the future redistribution of the Mediterranean naval forces will be must be based on the future strategy to be adopted.

SIR DUDLEY POUND then discussed the German U-boat situation. At the present time the Germans have one hundred and ten submarines in the Atlantic in addition to those in the Mediterranean and off the coast of Norway. It is anticipated that new production will go to the Atlantic.

The Germans are apparently concentrating their submarines into large groups, each of which is responsible for a certain area. One of these has been located off the coast of Newfoundland, one in the Central Atlantic and one off SW Ireland. It is possible that a convoy may at any time blunder into a pack of German submarines, if our intelligence is at fault.

Recently there were two convoys from the United States, each attacked by a considerable number of German submarines, one convoy losing two vessels and the other losing none. This was accomplished by providing air coverage for the convoy with Liberator airplanes which resulted in keeping the U-boats down during the day, while they were down, the convoy was able to alter their course and, by nightfall, leave the submarines far behind.
SIR DUDLEY POUND then described an experiment which had been made owing to shortage of escorts due to TORCH, in sending cargo vessels bound for Freetown out with a trans-Atlantic convoy, the vessels bound for Freetown breaking off from the convoy at the last possible moment and proceeding to their destination. The experiment was unsuccessful and the loss amounted to ten per cent. Seventeen out of forty-four ships were lost in one convoy. The British have, therefore, found it necessary to resume the Freetown convoys.

SIR DUDLEY POUND stated that escorts to convoys must be sufficiently large to deal with a heavy attack. He said our aim must be to get a long range air protection and additional escort vessels. He added that it would be desirable to obtain more long range aircraft protection to escorts from the United States.

SIR DUDLEY POUND indicated that we must make special efforts to provide adequate protection in the early part of 1943 in order that we may be able to meet the great demands in the build-up of BOLERO in the latter part of the year.

SIR CHARLES Portal then discussed the air situation. He stated that our experience so far has been that the German operations are definitely tied up with the adequacy of their air power. He felt that this will be as true with regard to the German offensive operations as it has been in their offensive operations.

The present state of the German air force is critical. The stamina of the airplane crews is decreasing, the crews lack interest and are less determined, and their training is deteriorating. One explanation for this is that training units and personnel are being used for combat purposes because of a shortage of aircraft. He felt that there is no depth behind the German front line of aircraft. The British Intelligence Service is of the opinion that if the United Nations can keep Germany fighting with aircraft, they will suffer losses from which they cannot recover.

He felt certain that they are incapable of conducting large scale air operations on two fronts and that at the present time there is a shortage of from seven hundred to two thousand first line aircraft.

He stated that German production for next year will be about twenty-three thousand combat aircraft; Italy will produce three or four thousand; and Japan will produce about seven thousand. On the other hand, the lowest estimates for the United Nations' aircraft production will be one hundred thousand combat airplanes or about three times that of the Axis powers.

SIR CHARLES Portal said that our greatest need is to force the Germans to extend the use of their aircraft to as many areas as possible and thus destroy and bleed them. The best ways to accomplish this are (1) to engage them while they are in support of land operations. (However this is only possible at present on the Russian front); (2) to meet them while they are attempting to stop our amphibian operations; and (3) by directing operations directly at Germany.
He stated that one of the most pressing questions was how we should accomplish our air attack against Germany. The United Kingdom is the most advantageous base for such operations and one of the most important questions before the present conferences is to decide on where the United States bombers are to be used.

He indicated that daylight attacks by United States bombers should be continued, as this has a serious effect on the German air force, on their industries, and on their morale. The question of whether to strike Italy from the United Kingdom or from North Africa is still an open question but before deciding to build up a strong bomber force in North Africa, it is desirable to be certain that this action is more advantageous than concentrating them in the United Kingdom.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that insofar as the estimates presented by the British Chiefs of Staff concerning Germany, Russia, and the occupied countries is concerned, the United States Chiefs of Staff are in full accord.

He also expressed concurrence in the idea that the U-boat menace is the paramount issue and that everything must be done to combat it by directing our attacks against it from the place of manufacture of submarines to the places where they are used.

He stated that the Japs are digging in, in an effort to build up a defensive front from the Solomons, through New Guinea and Timor, particularly with their air forces.

He pointed out that the United States Chiefs of Staff are anxious to find some method whereby they can strike in the rear and against the flank of the Japanese defenses. In this connection, they feel that operations in Burma will serve to weaken the Japs' defensive front and that, therefore, they are most anxious to undertake Operation RAVENOUS.

They feel that a reverse in this operation would not be a calamity but that a success would bring advantages all out of proportion to the risks involved. It would have an effect not only in the South Pacific area but would enable us to furnish strong support to China. A successful Operation RAVENOUS would result in an eventual economy of tonnage by relieving the Japanese pressure in the Southwest Pacific.

GENERAL MARSHALL then stated that the United States Chiefs of Staff are concerned as to whether operations in the Mediterranean area would bring advantages commensurate with the risks involved. He said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are inclined to look favorably on an operation from the United Kingdom because of the strong air support that can be furnished from that base as well as the relative ease with which it can be supplied from the United States.

He repeated that our first concern must be the defeat of Germany's submarine warfare.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL then said that the British Chiefs of Staff also felt that the defeat of the submarine menace must be given first priority in the use of air power, particularly in the protection of our line of communications.
For long range anti-submarine operations not only the provision of suitable aircraft had to be considered, but also the bases from which they are to be used. The British are considering the advisability of establishing an air base in Greenland for this purpose. They were most grateful for the 21 Liberators provided by the U.S.A. for the Bay of Biscay. There are three possible methods of attack on submarines, (1) along the sea lanes; (2) against bases in the Bay of Biscay; and (3) against factories in which submarines are built. The British now propose making air attacks in sufficient force to destroy the entire port in which the submarines are based rather than confining their attacks to the submarine pens and surrounding installations. He pointed out that no one can be certain as to how much damage can be done in the port towns themselves and that the method proposed will be in the nature of an experiment, the results of which will not be known for five or six months.

ADMIRAL KING then asked whether the possibility of concentrating all air attacks on the building yards had been considered.

SIR CHARLES Portal replied that the building yards are not sufficiently large to be certain of hitting them at night.

ADMIRAL KING said that he felt the most favorable targets against the submarine menace were the yards at which they are assembled and at their bases. He said that he had the personal impression that there has not been a program undertaken there that has been consistently followed. He felt that the attacks had been sporadic. He thought that attacks should be aimed first against factories where component parts are made; secondly at yards where the submarines are assembled; thirdly, at bases; and fourthly, at sea.

GENERAL ARNOLD said he felt we should attempt to find what component part or parts of submarines constitute a bottleneck and then strike at factories where they are made.

SIR CHARLES Portal stated that the greatest bottleneck was the ball bearings, and pointed out that it would be tactically impossible to destroy the factories.

GENERAL ARNOLD drew attention to the necessity for a decision as to where airplanes are to be utilized before they left the factory. This is so because different theatres require different equipment on aircraft.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that the United States is now in the process of recasting its troop deployments. As an example, he indicated that it had become possible to reduce the size of the Caribbean garrison considerably. He stated that the United States is also considering reducing the size of the Iceland garrison and in that connection he thought it would be desirable to have opinions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the hazards that now face Iceland. The purpose of this scaling down of forces wherever it can be accomplished is for saving shipping.
U.S. SECRET

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MINUTES OF MEETING

Held on Thursday, January 14, 1943, at 10:30 A.M.

PRESENT

General Marshall
Admiral King
Lt. General Arnold

SECRETARY

Brig. General Deane

ALSO PRESENT

Lt. General Somervell
Lt. General Clark
Rear Admiral Cooke
Brig. General Wedemeyer
Commander Libby
ADMIRAL KING stated that the Prime Minister and the First Sea Lord had, in conversation with him, deplored the present state of the British Eastern Fleet, which they said was immobilized because it had been stripped of its destroyers and carriers. Just where the carriers are was not stated; H.M.S. Victorious, which was sent to the United States with nothing but green pilots, cannot be ready before the 1st of February. It is possible that they may have loaned us H.M.S. Victorious and offered us another carrier to further their apparent desire to keep this fleet immobilized. Admiral King feels that the British must make the naval effort to cut the Japanese lines of communications to Rangoon - which they now show no disposition to do. Although it is doubtful that the "limited objective" operations now contemplated are so dependent on the operations of the British Eastern Fleet as China appears to think, nevertheless these operations would greatly facilitate shipping to Calcutta. If the Chinese make movement of the British Eastern Fleet conditional to the undertaking of the contemplated operation, there is no question but that the British should make this move.

GENERAL SOMERVELL said that although the operation might possibly be supported by rail from Bombay, such support would be very slow and probably dangerous to rely upon.

GENERAL MARSHALL said the Chinese feared Japanese sea-borne reinforcement via Rangoon and inquired what was needed to counter this threat.

ADMIRAL KING replied that the British Eastern Fleet should be sufficient, particularly as we are keeping the Japanese well occupied elsewhere; he felt that the British should move as many elements of this Fleet as they could cover with their available destroyers. Admiral Helfrich had told Admiral King that he had been urged by the British to go to Australia, where he has two cruisers and two or three destroyers operating under Admiral Carpender.

He had inquired as to what the British Eastern Fleet could be expected to do; ADMIRAL KING had replied that he had no information but that when and if this Fleet moved to Trincomalee, Admiral King would send him back the Dutch ships. Such a move would help to clarify the complicated command set-up in the Southwest Pacific.

ADMIRAL KING further remarked that the British Eastern Fleet served no purpose, so far as he could see, basing at Kilindini, but that the British would probably insist that they could not be moved because of a lack of destroyers. He felt that pressure should be brought on them to cover the shipping lines to Calcutta necessary for the projected operation.
U. S. SECRET

With regard to submarines in the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal, the British and Dutch together have a limited number—less than 10. In anticipation of a British demand for additional submarines, ADMIRAL KING is willing to base six at Trincomalee; before this can be done, a tender should be sent there.

Further discussion developed that U. S. submarines basing at Fremantle could probably operate in the Bay of Bengal as well as in their present operating areas.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that he believed an additional group of heavy bombers should be sent to GENERAL STILWELL in order to build up his available heavy bombers to a total of two groups. He believes that these bombers will return more dividends operating in this Theatre than in the Eastern Mediterranean.

ADMIRAL KING remarked that it was of great importance to open up a lower altitude route to China, and that an increase in the number of medium bombers assigned this theatre would make it possible to attack Japanese shipping in occupied Chinese ports.

In discussing the best line of procedure to adopt at the forthcoming conference, ADMIRAL KING stressed the importance of maintaining the initiative in our hands. He believes that it is essential to agree upon Anglo-American world-wide strategy, the basic concept, before permitting any discussion of details. The United Nations are now in a position to take the initiative in the war; it is essential to fix in the minds of the British the fact that the basic issue must be determined before going into details. The United States now has the principal power; therefore, we should take the lead.

GENERAL CLARK, in reply to a question from GENERAL MARSHALL, said that although it was not possible to dispose landing craft along the Mediterranean Coast unknown to the Germans, in his opinion this did not preclude their use for the BRIMSTONE operation, inasmuch as the Axis could not know the objective specifically. While they would undoubtedly be under occasional attack, the real danger is from dive bombers; if disposed west of Algiers they would be immune from these aircraft. He agreed with ADMIRAL KING’s impression that there were a number of usable small ports where these craft might be loaded. Installation of additional air fields in North Africa will not disclose our intentions, inasmuch as GENERAL EISENHOWER has been instructed that these fields should be spotted for general use and not specifically for the operation. Admiral King remarked that the British concept of bringing troops from the U. K. and from the U. S. for such an operation was designed for surprise, but that it also resulted in
building up a greater excess of troops in North Africa with a corresponding diminution of troops which could be based in the U.K. for projected operations on the Continent. He felt that the British were fully aware of this fact and, in view of their known opposition to any continental operations, this gave them a good "out".

GENERAL CLARK said that it was his belief that operations against the Brest Peninsula would be very hazardous, would require overwhelming air support, extensive naval support, and immediate and heavy follow up. Such an operation should not be undertaken without adequate preparation. Although many of our troops needed battle training, he believes that they were fully capable of standing up to the German defense. He believed that, if successful, operations against the Brest Peninsula would have far greater results than a successful BRIMSTONE operation.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that maximum air effort from England could seriously limit the German air effort against the Brest Peninsula operation; current German tactics in opposition to Flying Fortresses was producing a heavy attrition of the German Air Forces; if they persist in these tactics, the German Air Force will be practically eliminated within a year.

GENERAL SOMERVELL stated that it probably would be possible to transport 300,000 U.S. troops to the U.K. by September provided movements to Africa were suspended; he believes this a more accurate figure than the 150,000 estimated by the British. He stated that based on present submarine losses, we shall be able to move fewer troops in 1944 than we can in 1943 despite the ship-building program, and that unless every possible means - including an effective air offensive against submarine bases, building yards and assembly points, and effective commando raids in force against the bases - is used, we shall be faced with a diminishing effort. If we succeed in opening the Mediterranean, we can probably increase present estimates of 1,000,000 troops moved this year by 150,000. He pointed out that stabilization of the North African situation would not greatly reduce shipping commitments in the Middle East area because of forthcoming commitments in support of Turkey, movement of U.S. troops into Burma, and supply of existing positions. He justified his average turn-around of 2½ months on the basis that in 1943 Pacific troop movements will require approximately the same tonnage as those in the Atlantic.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that he did not believe that the British had ever had a definite bombing program. In view of the large build up with U.S. bombers in the U.K. to a force which will greatly exceed the British bombing force, he felt that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should establish a priority bombing program.
After considerable discussion of the existing command set-up in the European Theatre of Operations it was agreed:

(a) that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff establish a priority bombing program;

(b) that AIR MARSHAL HARRIS should operate the bombers in the U. K. (all under his command) under a directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff setting forth objectives and technique;

(c) that upon the successful conclusion of the Tunisian operation, it will probably be desirable to establish two separate Theatres in Europe (the Mediterranean and the UK-French Theatres);

(d) that any operation against the Continent must be a combined operation which must receive the full cooperation and support of the British.
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
MINUTES OF MEETING

Held on Wednesday, January 13, 1943, at 3 P. M.

PRESENT

General Marshall
Admiral King
Lt. General Arnold

SECRETARY

Brig. General Deane

ALSO PRESENT

Lt. General Somervell
Lt. General Clark
Rear Admiral Cooke
Brig. General Wedemeyer
Mr. Reilly
Commander Libby
1. **President's Visit**

GENERAL MARSHALL and ADMIRAL KING discussed with Mr. REILLY certain security measures with reference to the President's visit in North Africa. They decided that his party should come directly to Anfa Camp and not delay at Marrakech. A telegram to this effect was sent to Admiral Leahy.

They then discussed the possibility of the President's visiting Marrakech for a few days and indicated that the Prime Minister might urge such a visit. The Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that security measures were not sufficient in Marrakech and that to make them sufficient would necessitate the sending of additional troops and that would be unsound from a tactical point of view. Mr. Reilly agreed.

The question of the President's visit to the front was then discussed and General Marshall proposed that he leave here by motor to Rabat where he would see two divisions and speak to certain selected men. He would then proceed to Port Lyautey and see a division there. From Port Lyautey he could proceed to General Clark's headquarters.

ADMIRAL KING suggested that certain selected men might be flown from the Tunisian front to meet the President at General Clark's headquarters.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he felt the President, on the return trip, should return to Marrakech and remain there long enough to change planes and then have a night flight to Liberia.

MR. REILLY asked if the Liberian trip was necessary and all agreed that the President would insist upon it.

All agreed that it would be desirable if the President and the Prime Minister went separately after leaving the meetings at Anfa Camp.

2. **Agenda for Coming Conferences**

GENERAL MARSHALL raised the question of how to proceed with the business of the coming conferences.

ADMIRAL KING implied that he thought they should first discuss world-wide strategy, our basic strategic concept.

GENERAL MARSHALL was concerned as to how he should approach the discussion, feeling that the British had their minds set on the operation BRIMSTONE and that their whole thought would be turned towards this.

ADMIRAL KING then presented some notes regarding what he thought should be discussed initially. He divided the initial discussion into:

1. Man Power
2. Munitions and Equipment
3. Man Power vs. Munitions and Equipment
4. That part of the total effort that should be directed against Germany and against Japan.

These suggestions were further subdivided in the notes which he presented to the Chiefs of Staff.
ADMIRAL KING stated that he believed we should discuss world wide strategy first before getting to specific operations and that we should resist any effort on the part of the British to deviate from this.

GENERAL MARSHALL repeated that he believed that even in the case of world-wide strategy, the British thought would be at all times directed towards Operation BRIMSTONE while he, personally, could not help but have the question of tonnage uppermost in his mind.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that the British were not thinking world strategy but only of the next operation.

The CHIEFS OF STAFF then discussed the question of Operation BRIMSTONE.

GENERAL SOMERVELL said that if we can clear the Mediterranean, he estimated that we could save in five months one million eight hundred and twenty five thousand tons of shipping; that the blow we can strike any where depends on available tonnage; that at the present time, the balance between capital loaded transport and capital loaded cargo vessels is such that we can move more troops than supporting cargo; and that if we can institute tank sailings from Haifa or from the Eastern Mediterranean to the North African theatre, we can save considerable additional tonnage.

He said that, figuring the losses on the same rate that they were sustained in the TORCH Operation, Operation BRIMSTONE could be accomplished with the loss of forty six (46) ships. He also thought that securing Sicily would be essential to opening traffic in the Mediterranean.

GENERAL CLARK questioned this, stating that he felt we could protect traffic through the Mediterranean by air coverage from Tunisia.

GENERAL ARNOLD asked what the British losses had been in the Malta operation.

GENERAL CLARK stated that they had suffered a sixty per cent (60%) loss but that it must be remembered that they had had no fighter coverage.

ADMIRAL KING stated that he thought the basic proposition as far as the Mediterranean is concerned is to open it, thus saving the long voyage around the Cape of Good Hope. He felt that this was much more important than eliminating Italy from the war.

GENERAL CLARK said that ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM felt that traffic between Sicily and Tunisia could be protected once Tunisia is in our hands.

GENERAL MARSHALL asked the effects of the German bombing on Bone and Algiers.

GENERAL CLARK replied that Bone is within reach of German dive bombers and that we had suffered rather severe losses there. He felt, however, that the situation is now much improved because of anti-aircraft and fighter protection and also because of the installation of radar equipment. The bombing of Algiers has been considerably lessened since we have employed night fighters to protect it.
ADMIRAL COOKE said that at present it looked as though we would not expel the Germans from Tunisia until spring by which time we would have some five hundred thousand (500,000) troops in Africa. The question would then arise as to whether we should use shipping to send some troops elsewhere or to use them directly from North Africa. In any event, we must make our plans at least three (3) months in advance. The capture of Sardinia or Sicily would probably involve some shipping losses but these would probably be offset by increased safety to subsequent shipping through the Mediterranean.

ADMIRAL KING then asked why we should create such a large excess force in North Africa.

GENERAL CLARK replied that it would not be necessary to do so unless we were going to use them in this area. He pointed out, however, that the occupation of Sardinia or Sicily would be a much more difficult operation than TORCH had been.

ADMIRAL COOKE said he felt that we could mount an operation against Sardinia largely by using landing craft of the larger types in which we could afford to take some losses. In reply to Admiral King’s question regarding the necessity for building up an excess force in North Africa, he stated that some excess was necessary because it would take many more troops to expel the Axis from Tunisia than it would to simply hold North Africa once the Axis powers were driven out, also, that the hazard with regard to Spanish Morocco was greater prior to our capture of Tunisia and more troops would be required to safeguard our interests in that area.

GENERAL CLARK said that it was now evident that the earliest date for an all-out offensive against Tunisia was March 15th and, in view of this, an operation against either Sardinia or Sicily could scarcely be undertaken before summer.

GENERAL MARSHALL asked General CLARK what number of troops he thought would be necessary to maintain in North Africa once the Axis forces were expelled.

GENERAL CLARK replied that four (4) divisions would be sufficient. This, including the service troops and the Air Force, would mean a force of about two hundred and fifty thousand (250,000) men.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the excess force that we would have after Tunisia had been captured would amount to about three (3) U. S. divisions and the British First Army.

GENERAL MARSHALL asked GENERAL CLARK for his views on the training necessary for the Operation BRUNSTONE.

GENERAL CLARK replied that he thought it should be accomplished in Africa and that it should be completed at the rate of about one (1) division per month after the Army and Navy had completed certain basic training.

GENERAL MARSHALL then asked if the supply of the troops in Sardinia would present any great difficulty.
GENERAL CLARK thought it could be accomplished almost entirely by air and landing craft.

GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out that the fighter aircraft based in North Africa could only operate for about one half hour over Sardinia even with the installation of belly tanks.

GENERAL MARSHALL asked GENERAL CLARK if he thought it was necessary for the 4th Division to come to North Africa in view of the excess number of troops that would be available here.

GENERAL CLARK replied that if no further offensive operations were contemplated after the capture of Tunisia, it would not be necessary for it to come. He stated, however, that there were still one and one half (1½) British divisions to arrive in North Africa and that it was necessary for these to come. He pointed out that in the next few months the German threat to Spain would be critical. Spain is, at the present time, a doubtful quantity. They are waiting to see the results of our Tunisian operations. This being the case, it is necessary for us to maintain a large force available to act against Spanish Morocco. He felt that once the Axis powers had been pushed out of Tunisia, Spain will definitely resist a German invasion and the danger in so far as Spanish Morocco is concerned will be decreased.

GENERAL SOMERVILLE asked GENERAL CLARK if any German troops had come from Sicily to which GENERAL CLARK replied that he thought not.

ADmiral COOK pointed out that regardless of the decision, whether it be to undertake Operation BRIMSTONE or some other operation, it should be firm and that we should not permit ourselves to be forced into an operation without sufficient time for preparation.

GENERAL SOMERVILLE asked GENERAL CLARK when it was expected that the British would have possession of Tripoli, to which General Clark replied that the operation should be completed on February first.

3. **FURTHER CONFERENCES**

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff meet at 9:30 and that arrangements be made to meet with the British at 10:30, January 16th, to which all agreed.

4. **ADMIRAL GLASGOW'S REPORT**

ADMIRAL KING stated that the Glassford Commission had just about completed its work and that their report had been blocked out. He said that it would be sent first to General Eisenhower for approval and then it would be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff either at Anfa Camp or in Washington.
He stated that there was one point upon which the entire Commission agreed, i.e., the desirability of giving the French certain tasks to perform and then letting them perform them. He stated that the French are willing to operate under Admiral Pegran who had been made a Vice Admiral. He said that the British had agreed to permit the French to undertake the inshore naval defenses of Gambia as part of French West Africa, but that they were not inclined to permit the French to undertake the air protection of this area.

He suggested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff insist on making the maximum use of French forces by giving them appropriate tasks and then trusting them to accomplish them.

He felt that we would get some opposition in this respect from the British.
British Maintain Pressure On Jap Forces In Burma

NEW DELHI, Jan. 11 (AP)—British Imperial troops, advancing toward Akyab in Burma, are maintaining pressure against Japanese forces in Rangoon. A mile north of the Bay of Bengal port and fighting for control of the oil wells of the Myaing River area, were declared by today's communiques. The Japanese Air Force Bombardment of the town of Akyab, on the west coast of the island, was said to have been a routine raid on a Japanese airfield on the island. The British forces were said to have captured the town and the surrounding area.

German Headquarters In Town Bombed

LONDON, Jan. 11 (AP)—A British news agency correspondent at London, United States, reported that the German headquarters in Kiel, Germany, city of 70,000 souls, eleven miles south of the town, was bombarded on Sunday morning by British warplanes. The correspondent said that Major Ophitus was killed in the attack and that the town was completely destroyed. The correspondent also said that the town was completely destroyed.

Two U-Boats Sunk And 6 Damaged In Attack On Convoy

LONDON, Jan. 11 (AP)—An Air Ministry official credited eleven U-boats with being sunk and six damaged in a night attack on a United States naval convoy near the coast of the United States. The official said that the convoy was attacked by twelve U-boats, which were destroyed by near misses. The United States government said that the attack was successful in disrupting the convoy's progress.

Japanese Convoy Pounded By Aerial Attack In Pacific

BY YATES MCNAB, ALJADE Head-Artillery, Australia, Jan. 11 (AP)—United States warplanes today bombarded a Japanese convoy in the southwest Pacific, destroying twelve of the twenty-five ships in the convoy. The convoy was said to be a major blow to the Japanese war effort in the Pacific.

German-Held Rail Junctions In Very Precarious Position

AFRICA CORPS HIT BY ALLIED BOMBERS FROM TUNISIA

BY LES GAGEHEAR, AIR CORPSchiefs, North Africa, Jan. 11 (AP)—United States air forces today bombarded the German-held rail junctions in the Tunisia area, destroying twelve miles of rail line. The attack was said to be a major blow to the German war effort in the North African area.

RUSSIANS SMASH SALIENT THRUST IN THEIR POSITIONS

BY HENRY CASSIADY

MOSCOW, Jan. 11 (AP)—The Red Army has retaken 13 more settlements from the Germans in the North Caucasus area, where the German-held rail junctions are threatened by simultaneous attacks from the east and the west. The attack was said to be a major blow to the German war effort in the North Caucasus area.

Usine Ste. Madeleine Starts Reaping

BY THE EVENING NEWS Correspondent

DANFORD, Jan. 11 (AP)—The first reaping operations today were announced by a farmer who, in the last year, harvested 3,000 bushels of corn from his 300-acre farm. The farmer said that the corn was harvested by a farmer who, in the last year, harvested 3,000 bushels of corn from his 300-acre farm. The farmer said that the corn was harvested by a farmer who, in the last year, harvested 3,000 bushels of corn from his 300-acre farm.

Former President Of Argentina Dies Suddenly

General Alfonso Balcarce, President of the Argentine Republic, died suddenly today at his home in Buenos Aires. He had been suffering from heart disease for the past few years and was in poor health for the past few weeks.

Week-end Accident Claim Victim

The victim of a car accident last week was identified today as Mr. John Smith, 35 years old. Mr. Smith was driving his car when he was involved in a collision with a truck. The accident occurred on the outskirts of the city and the victim was rushed to the hospital. The victim died of his injuries at the hospital.

Blockbusters Dropped On Krupps Works Site

LONDON, Jan. 11 (AP)—Nine German warplanes bombarded the Krupp works site in the Ruhr Valley today. The attack was said to be a major blow to the German war effort in the Ruhr Valley area.

Acquisition Claims For Arbitration

The "Evening News" understands that His Honor Mr. Justice Verrall will preside over all arbitration cases and that his orders will be followed by the Home Office. Mr. Justice Verrall will preside over all arbitration cases and that his orders will be followed by the Home Office.

Father Claims Child Found Wandering

Mr. Thomas, father of Albery Thomas, 10 years old, who was wandering on the streets of this city last night, said that he had been out looking for his child. Mr. Thomas said that he had been out looking for his child. Mr. Thomas said that he had been out looking for his child.
Japanese Make Progress In New Drive In China

CHUNGKING Jan. 15 (AP) — The Chinese High Command rep­orted today that the Japanese had been forced out of Hupeh, Anhwei, Hu­an and Kiangsu, and indicated that its own forces were making a strong stand against the will of Japan in two areas in the south that are a potential base for Chinese counteroffensive. The Chinese communiqué said that enemy resistance was heavy and that it was expected the Japanese would lend reinforce­ments to their forces in the south.

U.S. Report Overwhelming Air Victories in Europe

WASHINGTON Jan. 15 (AP) — Air victory of the United States and its Allies over the Axis forces in Europe is bringing the military situation closer to a decided advantage for the Allies, according to a report now being made to the State Department by General Doolittle.

Another Nazi Insult

To Argentina Revealed

BOGOTA, Jan. 15 (AP) — The Argentine government has been informed that some of its diplomats in Europe have sent a report that Germany had refused the diplomatic recognition to the U.S. in Europe, declared: "This incident is another of the many acts of aggression to be committed by the totalitarian state without respect for the laws of the hemisphere." The Argentine government has expressed its condemnation of the incident.

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TURN OFF THE HEAT

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As cooling as a dip in the sea

Reglar Fellars — Just Too Real.

by GENE BYRNEs
Leaders To Speed Up Brazilian Rubber Output

BELEM, Jan. 19 (AP) --- Brazilian and American leaders in the vast rubber industry began gathering at Belém today for a conference in an effort to speed up Brazil's rubber production. A recent report estimated that Brazil is only selling 15% of its rubber output, while the demand of the United States and other countries is increasing significantly.

New Year Greetings Exchanged In Court

At the first sitting of the Indian Council of Justice on New Year's Day, the President of the Supreme Court, Shri B. R. Ambedkar, congratulated the members of the Bench on the occasion of New Year. The Bench expressed its best wishes for the New Year, which is also observed as the Republic Day in India.

CONFIRMATION IN CITY

The Archbishop of Post-of-Spain will administer the Sacrament of Confirmation on January 11, 1943, at 4 p.m. in the Archdiocese's chapel.

SABGA

HODGKINSON'S
2 STORES

will be opened on

Monday, 11th January, 1943

62, QUEEN STREET and NEW MARKET, Corner Duke & Pembroke Sts.

Mothers, Attention!

We have just received a new shipment of ready-made

GIRLS' DRESSES

in a variety of colours and styles.

Mickey's good, old Yankee technique of making up gains results! The London lexicon never saw a real wolf at work until Mickey started his encircling movement. Hats off! It's Mickey's all-time topper!

De LUXE - THURSDAY

By HENRY THOL

Illustrating... A PERFECTLY GROOMED PAIR

You too, can look just as smart and well-groomed. We have all that it takes to do that for you.

"LET US BE YOUR TAILORS" Modern Tailoring Establishment

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"A YANK AT ETON"

EDMUND TAN

GWENN-HUNTER

FREDDIE

MARTA LINDEN

BARTHOLOMEW

MARTA CHARNLEY

ALAN MONROE

Directed by

NORMAN TALBOT

Produced by JOHN W. CONSLON, JR.

Screen Play by George S. Kaufman, Morrie Ryskind and Thomas De Prey. Produced by George Oppenheimer.

WAR BONDS and STAMP!
Looking to Future

First annual message by His Excellency the Governor to the Legislative Council on Monday, when the 1943 estimates were presented. The Governor's plans by Government for the Colony's economic and social welfare, but perhaps the most important of these was his statement regarding unemployment.

We are pleased to know that despite the restrictions and industrial activities are growing at a remarkable rate and the possibilities of fuller employment of British military are increasing. Government, in its annual message, recommended the establishment of a Bureau to undertake the organization of the various programmes of employment. This Bureau will be in charge of work on the Island and will be responsible for the organisation of the employment of the office of the Island.

Two measures are indicated in this message which are likely to be of great benefit to the unemployed. The first is the establishment of a Bureau of Employment, which will be responsible for the organization of employment opportunities. The second is the establishment of a Training School, which will be responsible for the training of the unemployed in the various trades and industries.

Concert Success:

The first meeting of the musical entertainment was presented by the Trinidad and Tobago Symphony Orchestra Association, in concert at the Auditorium on Monday, January 4th. The Agricultural Society of Trinidad and Tobago will be pleased to extend its congratulations to the Management for the first meeting of the year, which was held at the Trinidad and Tobago School of Agriculture on January 4th. The programme included several pieces from the orchestra and the choir, which received enthusiastic applause.

GLOBE THEATRE

Today at 4.45 & 8.45 p.m.
KAY KUSER, ELLIE DREW & JANE WYNAN
FERNANDO (1933) LTD.
UNITED GROCERS LTD. and all Bars and Restaurants.

Globe Theatre

SAN FERNANDO

TODAY & SATURDAY

9:30 a.m. & 6:30 p.m.
GARDNER & WRIGHT

GLOBE THEATRE

Today at 4.45 & 8.45 p.m.
KAY KUSER, ELLIE DREW & JANE WYNAN

Globe Theatre
Only The Stars Are Neutral

(Continued from Page 4)

Little London or any other city ever, for London had returned to normal and we could hear the familiar sounds of the city—streetcars and carriages. As we walked up to the road, we saw the usual hustle and bustle of the city, but as we turned a corner, we were surprised to see a group of young people standing in front of a large building, singing and dancing.

Quinta, a woman from the Air Ministry, said she had met this group of people after the war. She said they had been singing and dancing in the streets to celebrate the end of the war. We stood and listened as they sang and danced, their voices echoing through the city.

Radio Programmes

Monday, January 11, 1943

Radio 2:30 p.m. The Street, 3rd Floor, Victoria, W.C.

Radio 3:00 p.m. The House, 1st Floor, Victoria, W.C.

Radio 3:45 p.m. The Garden, 2nd Floor, Victoria, W.C.

Ground Rice Tarts

Ingredients:

Some short or flaky pastry.

1 egg

A slight height in castor sugar—margarine and ground rice.

Some grated nutmeg or lemon zest.

Sour milk mixture in the mixture when the tart is done, and put the tarts into a fairly hot oven to bake.

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GENERAL TRANSPORT LTD.

Lightenage and transport contractors. We offer a complete service of sailing, lighters, ports, steel barges and launches suitable for all kinds of water transportation.

CONFEDERATION LIFE ASSOCIATION

A world-wide organisation, well known for its fairness and promptness in settling claims. Protect yourself, family and business through us.

UNITED BRITISH INSURANCE CO., LTD.

Under present conditions, you cannot afford to take unnecessary chances. Protect your real estate, stock-in-trade, furniture, etc., by insuring with us. Let the insurance company take all the risks and carry the worry for you. It costs you very little to have this protection.

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Supplies a complete high-grade modern laundry service, including dry cleaning, bleaching, and all modern equipment under sanitary conditions. We specialize in handling large orders such as U.S. Base forces, Local forces, institutions and Ship laundry. Particular attention is paid to quick dispatch of ship laundry.

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For further particulars, please apply:
Whirlaway To Retire At End Of 1943 Racing

Shamrock - Police Clash At Hockey This Afternoon

The afternoon the hockey game will be presented with a very important additional feature: Police 'A' and Shamrock at home Narragansett grounds.

When these teams meet fast and exciting hockey is usually the order of things. Picture needed for the week when some interesting hockey, as four of the leading clubs all show up to play. They are as follows: Match: Police 'A' vs. Shamrock. Parties: Mr. Pilling and Mr. J. Hope.

Tie: Shamrock vs. Police 'B'. Parties: Mr. A. Halsey and Mr. J. Knowles.

For: Canadian vs. Police 'B'. Parties: Mr. B. and Mr. Rignall.

DECISION REACHED AFTER SEVERAL TALKS WITH OWNER

By JOHN R. MCGORMOT

The Whirlaway, the world's greatest money winner of all time, will be retired at the conclusion of the 1943 racing season. Henry James, trainer of the world's No. 1 money winner, made the announcement in The Press on Tuesday.

Management said the decision had been made after several conferences between him and Warren Wright, owner of Whirlaway. Wright plans to use Whirlaway for stud purposes, James said.

"Mr. Wright has been nencin me several times," James said as he sat in a box at Tropical Park. "He plans to use him for stud purposes. Of course," he added, "there always a possibility that plans will be changed, but that is the way it looks now."

After being notified that the Whirlaway was absolutely retired, had been signed to top weight of 525 pounds for the March 4 running at the $100,000 Winner's cup at Hialeah Park- the richest race, the British born Whirlaway, winner of five $500,000 for all strokes, all-weather track thoroughbred, will be shot at $100,000 this year before closing the books on his life-time earnings, the American Patten.

The meeting is important, and James said, "It may be at the venue by T.B. Miller."

GLOBE

4.45 and 5.35 P.M.

"FLEET'S IN"

It's Ankle Away As the Boys in Blue Paint the Town Red

Thousands of Tars And All These Stars:

1. DOROTHY LAMOUR

Staging those bouncy bits!

2. WILLIAM HOLDEN

A guy who wants dollar as his first name!

3. EDDIE BRACKEN

Wine-struck! Bracken back in town!

4. BETTY HUTTON

America's number One Bubbling!

5. BETTY JANE RHODES

Hollywood's Most Beautiful Starlet!

6. LEIF ERIKSSON

A willful villain tip for a kitty!

7. JIMMY DORSEY AND HIS BAND

World's Greatest Saxophonist!

8. JOE EBERLY

America's Favorite Singer!

9. 'ELEN O'CONNELL

Yard for your eyes! Yard for your ears!

10. LORRAINE & ROGNAN

Trailing The Light Fantastic!

11. CASS D'ALEY

Fly before lose the Sea!

12. GIL LAMB

The Big Guy with the Small Horns!

"Seven Swingy Tunes! Gobs of Laughs! Gobs of Cats! Gobs of Stars!

In a Swingin' Mood."

Flyin' Jenny

—Just a Blur.

By RUSSELL KEATON
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY.

I think the President believes he has covered this matter in his recent telegram to Churchill on this same subject, so I do not think he will want to sign anything like this, but you may want to check with him. I rather think this can be filed.

HARRY L. HOPKINS
December 30, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I am sending you herewith the suggested instruction to General Eisenhower and to Murphy, of which I understand you will also wish to send a copy by cable to Mr. Churchill.

The Secretary asked me to let you know that he approves this suggested statement about policy, but feels very strongly indeed that you should simultaneously make a public statement with regard to our policy towards France and particularly with regard to General de Gaulle's present efforts to obtain complete control over all French territories and activities. He is sending you a suggested draft for such a statement.

Believe me,

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

The President,

The White House.
SUGGESTED INSTRUCTION TO GENERAL EISENHOWER
AND TO MURPHY

In view of General Giraud's recent conversations
with you on the subject of the recognition by the United
States of French sovereignty in North Africa, and in
view of recent statements made by the Fighting French
National Committee in London and newspaper articles ap-
parently inspired by the latter relative to the immediate
need for the creation of a provisional French government
to be installed in North Africa, the President desires
that the following statement be sent to you which sets
forth the policy of the Government of the United States
with regard to the French people and French territory
and possessions.

You should be guided by this statement in your con-
versations with General Giraud as well as in the deter-
mination of all questions which have inherent in them
political aspects.

The supreme objective of the United States is the
defeat of the Axis powers, and in the achievement of
that objective, in cooperation with the other United
Nations, the Government of the United States desires
the cooperation of all elements of French resistance.

It hopes that General de Gaulle and all other elements of French resistance will be willing to co-operate with General Giraud as Commander-in-Chief of the French forces in North Africa in every effective and practicable manner for the attainment of the defeat of Germany and her allies. The Government of the United States believes that satisfactory arrangements of a military character can undoubtedly be made between General Giraud and General de Gaulle for the coordination of such cooperative effort between them and their associates. Such coordination would provide a basis for this Government to work with a unified French command, and would be favored by the United States.

Effective protection of French interests abroad may be worked out as the situation develops.

The Government of the United States will continue the policy it has pursued since June 1940 of dealing, in all French territories, with the French authorities in effective control of such territories actively resisting the Axis. The Government of the United States
recognizes the sovereignty of the French people over French territories and, subject solely to the rights legitimately pertaining to its military forces, desires with the forces of French resistance in North Africa that civil administration by French authorities in North and elsewhere most properly be concentrated along the Africa be maintained. The relationship of the United States to such civil administration will remain in- of such relief and economic assistance as may be cidental to its military operation.

The Government of the United States, as one of its ties in North Africa and in other French territories, war objectives, intends, in cooperation with the other United Nations, to bring about the liberation of France. It will take no step which will in the slightest degree impair the right of the French people to determine with complete freedom their own destinies and to select their own government, once France has been liberated. It con- siders that the most effective results for all concerned can be attained if the military effort is kept divorced from political considerations. For these reasons, the Government of the United States will not accord recogn- nition to any provisional government of France, no matter how constituted and no matter where constituted, until the French people have themselves been afforded the
opportunity freely to select such government.

The Government of the United States therefore believes that until such time has come, its cooperation with the forces of French resistance in North Africa and elsewhere must properly be concentrated along the lines of military and naval endeavor and in the rendering of such relief and economic assistance as may be found desirable and necessary by the French authorities in North Africa and in other French territories.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

December 30, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Suggested statement for such consideration as you may think advisable to give to it.
DRAFT PUBLIC STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT - FRENCH AFFAIRS

The question is asked as to the prospects of unifying French efforts in the war against the Axis.

This comes at a time when we are at a critical stage in a battle of major importance. There is literally no time or immediate occasion to deal with issues not directly related to winning that battle.

The need just now is for all who are opposed to the Axis powers to close ranks and join in this crucial struggle, and not to be diverted from that paramount purpose.
PMW
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

London
Dated January 8, 1943
Rec'd 10:05 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY
192, January 8, 6 p.m.

As instructed in your telegram No. 146, January 7, 2 p.m., I left with Mr. Eden this morning paraphrases of that telegram and of your telegram No. 104, January 5, 10 p.m., and went over the North African situation with him. I gained the impression that he had not previously been fully impressed with the seriousness with which you view the situation or that he considered the attitude of the British press as particularly harmful. He took some exception to the statement that "British leaders" were approving de Gaulle's broadcast or the present Fighting French propaganda campaign. He referred to his attempt to dissuade General de Gaulle from issuing his January 2 statement and of de Gaulle's refusal to grant his request. He added "de Gaulle has caused me more trouble than all the other Allies put together". He said that he had been faced with the alternative of issuing a dead

censorship
censorship stop which six hundred correspondents would have known about, or of letting him go ahead. I said that since the British had largely built up de Gaulle and he was obtaining all his financial support from the British Government, and since the British have turned over to him control over Madagascar and Djibouti that it seemed to us in the United States that there must be means of bringing about a more reasonable attitude on de Gaulle's part. His reply was that due in large part, he thought, to the Darlan arrangements, de Gaulle had become a sort of public hero in Britain; that he, Eden, had had great difficulties with the House of Commons on the question, and then any attempt to exercise financial or other pressure would inevitably bring a serious backfire in the House of Commons. He added: "I can't censor him any more than you can censor the statements of the Willkies and Luces."

He asked me to tell you: first, that the British had a lot of troops fighting in Tunisia and they are just as anxious for a military success as we are. Secondly, that de Gaulle is not like "a quantity of gin that can be put in a bottle", but is very diffi-
cult to handle and that we must remember he has a large
large following in metropolitan France. Thirdly, he feels that it is important that all French be brought together and that they would work better under a single organization than under separate ones. I said that it did not seem to me that de Gaulle's present tactics were calculated to bring them together, and he agreed. He said specifically that he did not care whether Giraud or de Gaulle headed such unified group. I said that de Gaulle's allegations of "increasing confusion" in North Africa did not seem likely either to help our military operations or to bring about unity, and that I wondered whether the British had suggested to de Gaulle that he might simply offer his military support to General Giraud. Eden replied that he did not think that the Fighting French would agree to it. He added that he understood that de Gaulle was planning to send military emissaries as suggested by Giraud and that this seemed to be a step in the right direction. I said that my reading of de Gaulle's reply (my telegram 174, January 7, 8 p.m.) did not seem to indicate any clear acceptance of the suggestion, and we found out later that he had based his statement on an earlier indication to Charles Peake by de Gaulle that he
that he would send military representatives to Algiers, a tentative decision apparently reversed by the General later. Your statement that de Gaulle's political aspirations were forcing General Eisenhower to take time out from essential military duties elicited Mr. Eden's comment that he understood that "Eisenhower had returned from the front because of Darlan's assassination and not because of General de Gaulle's activities".

Although our conversation was friendly throughout, I left with the impression that Mr. Eden had not fully realized the seriousness with which you view the situation, that he did not accept the view that the British are in any way responsible for the propaganda and intrigues of de Gaulle and his advisers, and that he does wish a single de facto political organization set up in Algiers which will provide for the elimination of what he considers unreliable elements. Incidentally he is inclined to feel that a visit by de Gaulle to Washington at this time would not be wise, a view with which I concur. (Most secret. I understand that the Prime Minister in private conversation with an American has expressed bluntly the view that the "Americans should not have one Frenchman, Giraud, while the
while the British have another, de Gaulle". When it was suggested to him that one solution might be that de Gaulle assume a secondary role, he replied: "No, you can't do that. De Gaulle is more than a man. He is a movement and a symbol").

To sum up, I feel that, quite aside from de Gaulle propaganda and the question of British responsibility for not restraining it, there are certain divergencies of viewpoint between us: (one) the British place more emphasis on setting up some political entity which will have most of the attributes of a transitional government though not calling itself so by name, whereas we consider the military aspect of French support be more important; (two) the British Government lays great store on the strength of de Gaulle's followers and his public support in France with a corollary emphasis on the need to get rid of all taint of Vichy and retain supporters in North Africa, while we, not having based our policy for the last two years on support of de Gaulle and vilification of Vichy, see the problem in truer perspective; (three) our policy is that of letting the French people freely choose their own government after the war, whereas the British would prefer,
prefer, the transitional period which they envisage, to see a regime which owes its existence to them; (four) they are perhaps jealous of our leading role in North Africa.

I believe that a public statement of our policy is the best way to clarify the present confusion. Your telegrams Nos. 104 and 146 have been most helpful. If in addition you could give me (if a public statement seems inadvisable) a full statement of your policy -- such as that mentioned in your telegram No. 6662, December 30, 9 p.m. -- it would be, I think, useful.

MATTHEWS

CSB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY
174, January 7, 8 p.m., (SECTIONS ONE TO FOUR INCLUSIVE)

My telegram number 84, January 4, 7 p.m.

In reply to General Giraud’s message of yesterday explaining that he is busy at the moment but offering to meet General de Gaulle at the end of the month and asking that meanwhile military experts be sent to confer with him, de Gaulle has sent the following through General Eisenhower:

"I regret that your previous engagements lead you to propose to postpone until the end of the month the interview which I proposed to you on December 25. I must tell you frankly that the National Committee and I have another opinion as to the urgent need for realization of the unity of the empire and the union of its efforts with those of the national resistance. It is to be feared that any delay will disappoint the French people and be harmful to our country.

Moreover
Moreover we are not certain that the recent psychological opportunity will still prevail in the midst of the rapid developments in which we are living.

Insofar as your request for establishing a military contact between us is concerned, I am taking it under consideration, in spite of the fact that General D. Astier de la Vigerie sent by me to Algiers on December 19 last was invited to leave almost immediately. I would appreciate your informing me on what basis and under what condition you conceive such a liaison.

Finally I feel it is not proper that we should communicate with each other by texts given to foreign agencies. I am prepared to send you an officer with a code so that we might be directly in contact by cipher between London, Algiers and Brazzaville" (Strong has just telephoned that he does not (repeat not) consider this reply helpful.)

Today's press gives no indication that General Giraud has given any reply to General de Gaulle and in fact the diplomatic correspondent of today's EVENING STANDARD has the following to say:

MATTHEWS

CSB
Secretary of State,
Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY

Dated January 7, 1943
Rec’d 5:15 p.m.

No further reply has yet been received by General De Gaulle to his request for a meeting with General Giraud, but I understand that the request may be repeated.

The two French leaders have mutually expressed the desire to meet. But there does not at present seem to be much likelihood of the meeting taking place.

Opposition to the meeting comes chiefly from certain elements in Algiers. These include members of the Imperial Council formed by Admiral Darlan, and among them may be named M.E. Chatel, Governor-General of Algeria, and General Bergeret.

A number of local administrative and police chiefs are also opposed.

At the same time there has gathered in North Africa a galaxy of Vichy politicians who, although they do not at present hold official positions, are known
known to have political ambitions. These include Flandin, Prucheau, Peyrouton and Baudoin.

Baudoin was the first Vichy Foreign Minister. Flandin is an ex-Foreign Minister of Vichy. Prucheau and Peyrouton are both ex-Ministers of the Interior of Vichy.

The attitude of the American military and diplomatic authorities in North Africa has been to regard the internal political fight as a purely French matter. But the feeling is now growing among the Americans that it may not be possible to maintain this attitude if the deterioration of the political situation continues.

American press and radio commentators are already hinting that the time may be approaching when the United States of America may have to take a hand.

The British and American Governments are acting in accord.

In the British view, also, it is felt that a meeting between General De Gaulle and General Giraud is highly desirable.

It is agreed on all sides that General Giraud has completely clean hands in the midst of all these local
local French political intrigues. But some of his advisers bequeathed by Admiral Darlan are opposed to collaboration between Giraud and De Gaulle.

These facts help to explain why numbers of pro-Ally and De Gaullist men arrested by the old regime before the Allied landings are still in prison. They also explain why armed Fascist organizations -- including the 'S.O.L.' (the inner Praetorian Guard of Petain's Legion des Combattants and the 'P.P.F.' Doriot's organization -- are still in being in various parts of North Africa.

MATTHEWS

MRM
RCC
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

London
Dated January 7, 1943
Rec'd 4:50 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY
174, January 7, 8 p.m., (SECTION SIX).
I really feel that it is time that the other side of the picture be given some publicity.
(END OF MESSAGE).

MATTHEWS

MRM
January 6, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The inclosed message from General Eisenhower, explaining his military situation and outlining his views, will be of interest to you.

Incl.

Chief of Staff.
Algiers
January 5, 1943

We have learned that in some quarters at home there is an apparent conviction that we are in North Africa as an occupying, powerful, conquering army fully capable of carrying out our military missions and, if need be, of controlling the population by force. As a result of this conviction it appears to be assumed that we are in position to deal with the French on the basis of giving orders and compelling compliance.

I am writing this message for your information with the request that when opportunity arises you do what you can to correct or soften this view at least to the extent that during the ensuing critical weeks we do not receive any arbitrary instructions which might precipitate a military crisis.

I know that you fully understand the essentials of our military situation and, therefore, are aware of the extent to which we are dependent upon active cooperation of the French. From the very beginning, this whole task would have been an easy one for us here, both militarily and politically, if we had been content merely to seize ports and solidify our own bases and pacify the country. We did not take the easy, safe course, and I know you have always agreed that the decision to rush ahead, although risky, was fully justified. Even yet I think we gained tremendously by that decision, in spite of political difficulties that all have had their roots in the extent to which we have exposed our rear to sabotage and disruption. We must always face the fact that it will be many weeks yet before we can perform the military tasks in front of us and still be strong enough to impose our will arbitrarily upon the local French.

Ever since November ninth we have, in full conformity with the spirit and letter of our original instructions, attempted to secure active French cooperation on the basis of friendship and have made our military dispositions on a continuation of such a relationship. I will be prompt in reporting to you personally when the time arrives that we are strong enough in front and rear to disregard, if so ordered, French and other viewpoints. The immediate effect of non-cooperation now would be catastrophic and, if anything we should be instructed to do might result in non-cooperation, we must have ample time in which to readjust dispositions much more conservatively than at present.

At the moment I have nothing specific in mind that might become a threat to our present relations. My concern has nothing whatsoever to do with international or French politics, all of which questions I am hopeful will soon be properly organized here under separate civilian authority. This matter is purely military.

Eisenhower
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

January 5, 1943

Attached are excerpts of three letters from Robert Murphy to General Giraud which I have just received from Mr. Lemaigre Dubreuil of the French Mission now here. I want to call them especially to your attention and shall welcome any comments you may want to make.
TRANSLATION OF LETTERS SENT BY MR. MURPHY TO GENERAL GIRAUD DATED NOVEMBER 2, 1942.

Letter no. 1.

With reference to the declarations made by President Roosevelt on several occasions and to the engagements already undertaken by the American Government as well as by the British Government, I am in a position to assure you that the restoration of the full independence of France in all its greatness and to the full extent of its pre-war possessions both in Europe and beyond the seas is one of the war objectives of the United Nations. It is clearly understood that French sovereignty will have to be restored as soon as possible in all the Metropolitan and Colonial territories which in 1939 were under the French flag.

The Government of the United States regards the French nation as an ally and will deal with it as such.

I may add that in the event of military operations in French territory (either in Metropolitan France or in the Colonies) whenever there is French collaboration, the American authorities will not in any way interfere in matters which solely pertain to national administration or are derived from the exercise of French sovereignty.

As regards the Command the Government of the United States has no thought or desire except to place the military command of any such region in the hands of Frenchmen as soon as possible. Nevertheless, during those phases of the operation including landing, establishment of the security of French North Africa and supplying the necessary base, it is considered essential that the American Command and the organization which has been created with such effort and difficulty particularly for this operation shall remain unchanged (the foregoing provision results from the recent conference between French and American representatives. It was prepared before the receipt of your note of October 27 which reads as follows:

"It is perfectly normal and it is understood that all landing operations shall be controlled by the Chief of Staff of the American Army. The Inter-Allied High Command shall assume control after the landing, that is
to say, at each landing point 48 hours after the hour fixed for the beginning of the initial operations of landing the first convoy. As regards subsequent operations, the American troops will be placed under the Inter-Allied Command as soon as they are on land.

I am communicating your suggestion to the General Staff of the American Army and I am certain that an acceptable formula will be found. During this period, the Government of the United States will make every effort looking toward the supply of arms and modern equipment to the French forces. While the equipment and organization of French forces is thus being carried out, details concerning the command shall be arranged so that Frenchmen may be in a position to assume the High Command at the desired time. In order to facilitate the direction of operations, it would be desirable to attach a general of the French Army to the High Command immediately after landing. Axis control.

4. Up to the present time, adequate measures have been taken to provide, with a view to these deliveries, the quantities of merchandise, the race of which are partly provided by the Governments of the United States. The resumption of local production is considered of the greatest importance that, in the event of combined military operations in French territories (either in Metropolitan France or overseas), which are not occupied by the Axis powers in accordance with the armistice terms, the United Nations expeditionary forces which will collaborate with local French troops should be as essentially an American expedition placed under an American command. The arrival of such goods and the Government of the United States expects that in North Africa shall contribute to the landing of French forces, and the rules actually followed in the application of the the point of view of the United States. I am glad to assure you that your point of view is perfectly in harmony from the point of view of my Government.

6. Payment therefor shall be made through exchanges. Credits corresponding to the total of deliveries shall
Letter no. 3.

In response to the different questions which have been presented to me in your name I have the honor to inform you that—

1. The American Government will extend the benefits of the Lend-Lease law to the orders which are placed in the United States for the purpose of giving the French Army the means of participating in the common struggle.

2. The American Government will facilitate the negotiation and execution of these orders.

3. In the same fashion the American Government will facilitate ordering in the United States and the delivery of foodstuffs necessary for the supply of civil populations in French territories which liberate themselves or will be liberated from Axis control.

4. Up to the present time, adequate measures have been taken to reserve, with a view to these deliveries, the quantities of merchandise the need of which is particularly urgent not only to relieve the civil population but also to assure the improved operation of transport and to aid the resumption of local production. As regards French North Africa the list of these first requirements which the Government of the United States agrees to fill as soon as possible when the break between these territories and the Armistice Commission is accomplished figures the attached annex. The latter is not restrictive in character.

5. In order to hasten the arrival of such goods the Government or the United States expects, however, that French merchant ships now in the ports of French North Africa shall contribute to their transportation at the proper time.

6. The deliveries of goods shall be considered as official French purchases and shall be billed at the world price. For the acceptance and billing of merchandise the rules actually followed in the application of the Franco-American agreement of 1941 for the supply of North Africa will apply in principle.

7. Payment therefor shall be made through exchanges. Credits corresponding to the total of deliveries shall
be opened in North Africa for the account of the American Government. These credits shall be utilized either for the American Treasury's requirements as regards military expenditures and its procurement purchases in French Africa or for payment of North African exports to the United States.

9. Should it appear that expenses and American purchases in Africa will not cover these civilian deliveries the question of the means of payment to be utilized will be reexamined in common agreement.

10. The American Government undertakes to facilitate in so far as possible the allocation of North African products which as a result of circumstances are deprived of their normal outlet. As soon as military collaboration is brought about conversations will be begun for a common study of the conditions under which these products can be allocated. A list of them should be furnished by the French authorities.

11. Having the firm desire to do everything compatible with the conduct of the war not to increase the sufferings of the French metropolitan population which has already been so seriously tried, the American Government will raise no objection to measures of assistance which the French populations liberated from Axis control should wish to take in favor of other populations of the French community. With the reserve that such shipments must be covered by the guarantees necessary prevent them being deviated from their destination. The shipment of family packages, assistance to towns in metropolitan France adopted by towns in Africa, gifts to the Red Cross, etc., shall be in its opinion continued between North Africa and Metropolitan France.
MEMORANDUM FOR

The President:

For Information. No action necessary.
Confidential message in private code from Peter Tompkins (OWI) in Algiers to Percy Winner (OWI) in Washington, December 30th, 1942.

The Frenchmen favorable to us are all washed up. The Frenchmen against us have put it all over on our Army and political authorities. Nobody is now playing with the Frenchmen favorable to us.

Both General McClure and Colonel Hazeltine went to bat but they could not get to first base with the top authorities of the American Army because no one would support them. The French who played ball with our Army leaders just before our arrival and in the difficult days immediately afterward are now in jail. Indeed, some of them have been executed. General Giraud and Regault (the head of the French propaganda set-up) are being used now by the supporters of the Count of Paris and the Royalist movement. There is evidence that the assassination of Darlan was the work of the Royalists and that the same people threaten the life of Giraud while creating the impression with Giraud himself that it was all the work of the pro-American French. Both McClure and Hazeltine are behind the eight-ball. General Eisenhower must resort to really strenuous and vigorous means or our side will not only get the worst of it in this immediate situation but will be put in danger both in a military and a political sense in the whole operation in this part of the country.
ALGIERS. January 2, 1943.

With regard to the details of Tompkins' report the factual statements are generally untrue. None of the French referred to as our friends have been executed and of those arrested for the suspected assassination only two or three have been of any assistance to us, and these were at best rather unscrupulous individuals. The group arrested included all political complexities from open Nazi sympathizers to DeGaullists and so-called Pro-Americans. Giraud's attitude about the arrests has been restrained and we have his private assurance that no drastic punishment is intended. He considers his action in the nature of a warning to elements that are inclined to take the law into their own hands while the French Armed Forces are engaged at the front. Two of the suspects were released yesterday and it is possible that several others will be released in the next day or two. We are keeping our hands on the situation as tightly as possible without unduly antagonizing Giraud himself who at each inquiry charges us with lack of trust in his honor and friendship. He must be handled with kid gloves at this critical time, as he has a very difficult temperament. There has been considerable apprehension in the DeGaullist and Pro-American ranks but most of this seems to be disappearing, owing to the very limited extent of the arrests.

The Count of Paris is in Algiers and yesterday offered his services to Murphy as political head of the Colonial Government. He is not taken very seriously here, although he has considerable local support. Actually, the only item connecting Darlan's assassin with the Royalist Movement is the fact that in France one time he had been in some way identified with the Pro-Royalists. It is possible that Giraud, who seems to lack political interest or judgment, may be imposed upon by the unscrupulous political group which remains in office here and which cannot be ousted at once because of the local situation or lack of replacements. It is also true that Murphy's staff should be reinforced by able assistants at the earliest possible moment, as it seems to me to be very weak in spots. The condition exists to a much more marked degree in the OWI and OSS personnel here, but McClure is in process of getting them in hand and I can assist him through experience gained by my past dealings with Donovan, Davis and Sherwood.

Thanks for the personal nature of your message, as I am trying to keep as much of this mess as possible from General Eisenhower's shoulders while he prepares for the Tunisian battle.

SMITH.

SECRET
Although Milton Eisenhower discussed the enclosed message from Peter Tompkins with the President, I am told that he did not read the message itself.

I believe that the President would be interested in General W. B. Smith's comments (enclosed) on the Tompkins message which was relayed to him from here.

Chief of Staff.
DLA
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

London
Dated January 4, 1943
Rec'd 6:13 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH
84, January 4, 7 p.m. (Section One)

The efforts of the Fighting French to precipitate matters in North Africa, however such action may complicate General Eisenhower's task, continue to have full support of the British press. General de Gaulle's statement (please see my telegram 72 of yesterday) receives a continued big play in this morning's papers. Although that statement gave no admission of the fact that General Giraud had replied to De Gaulle's request for a meeting of December 25, some of today's newspapers indicate that Giraud has sent "a verbal reply to General De Gaulle's request for a formal meeting on French soil to discuss unity".

MATTHEWS

JRL
Secretary of State, 
Washington.

RUSH
84, January 4, 7 p.m., (SECTION TWO)

The DAILY EXPRESS which makes the story a leading
one says: "The reply does not rule out a conference such
as General De Gaulle suggests. But the presence in
Giraud's government of a considerable number of men iden-
tified with Vichy does not greatly help matters. This,
coupled with a somewhat legalistic attitude taken by
General Giraud himself on many delicate political and
diplomatic questions, has made progress slow. Meanwhile,
the absence of unity has led to what General De Gaulle
described in a weekend statement as 'steadily increasing
internal confusion in the French North and West African
territories'. The situation at the moment is not happy
and Mr. Harold MacMillian, Britain's new Minister Resident
in French North West Africa, will begin at once the task
of overcoming difficulties and smoothing a way to closer
cooperation between all anti-Axis Frenchmen".

As though
-2-, #84, January 4, 7 p.m., (SECTION TWO), from London.

As though to confirm General De Gaulle's assertion of steadily increasing internal confusion in North Africa, the press this morning quotes the Brazzaville radio to the effect that "Two American civil servants who were to distribute food to the Algerian population have been murdered in mysterious circumstances".

As part of the pressure campaign the diplomatic correspondent of the MANCHESTER GUARDIAN writes: "But it is clear that General De Gaulle is dissatisfied with the slowness of the present negotiations and regards a personal meeting as urgently necessary. He at least will not bear the responsibility for delay *** the most important thing is that there shall be a unified French administration in some form which will be a working Government instrument. This is essential in the interest of the war effort of the French Empire that is free. The unified French Empire must come before metropolitan France is liberated. It has to be administered and it has to have a governmental form for its dealings with its British, American and other Allies in the struggle to defeat the Axis."

Andre Philip in a leading article in yesterday's OBSERVER entitled "The Unification of French Resistance" explained
-3-, #84, January 4, 7 p.m., (SECTION TWO), from London.

explained in greater detail how the Fighting French visualize unification and the theory that De Gaulle alone represents the legitimate continuation of the third republic. In speaking for himself and the General's supporters in France Philip writes: "If, finally, we placed ourselves under the authority of Charles De Gaulle and of the French National Committee, the reason was that we later felt the need of some one who could speak to the world in the name of France.

MATTHEWS

MEU
Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH

84, January 4, 7 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

We did not rally around a General who was placing a legion of volunteers at the disposal of a foreign power. We rallied around the only member of the last legitimate republican government who had been in a position to make a political decision i.e. that of continuing the war and who, because of that decision, was entitled to speak on behalf of the French nation. The National Committee, in the measure of the limited means by its command, has been endeavoring to perform that duty. Now that new combatants are forthcoming the directing body must be broadened and perhaps undergo extensive reconstruction both in its structure and its spirit. But its aim remains unchanged. It is to enable the French nation to express itself through a central governing body which should be as representative as possible and act provisionally as the trustees of the country's
the country's interests. If this were not done our mother country, France, would be humiliated, feel relegated to an inferior rank among the United Nations. Until the end of hostilities, under the fallacious pretext that she had no regular government, France would be unable to make her voice heard and she would incur the risk of being finally confronted by vital decisions made in her absence and without her participation. It would, in fact, amount to a denial of her sovereignty, a refusal to recognize her independence just at the very hour when she is preparing to make a decisive military effort for the common cause.

(Incidentally M. Philip, somewhat gratuitously taking a dig at our arrangements in North Africa, writes: "When the question arose of our (i.e. he and his friends inside France) unification with the movement of external resistance we asked De Gaulle whether he subscribed to those principles. Now he did not reply that we should be realists, that we should achieve military victory with the help of no matter who no matter at what price or by what means. He simply said 'Yes, I do' and he gave us the necessary guarantees!".

MATTHEWS

MRM
ELP

GRAY

London

Dated January 4, 1943.
Rec'd 10:05 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

64, January 4, 7 p.m. (SECTION FOUR).

The OBSERVER gives Philip's article its full
editorial support and concludes with the following words:
"The importance of French affairs and of their treatment
today can scarcely be exaggerated. They will materially
condition the politics of France tomorrow. We must desire
that our nearest neighbor's politics after this war
should be democratic and that her common folk should have
no cause to reproach us. Only then will the spokesman
of France tomorrow be men with whom we can build a long
and enduring peace in Europe".

Today's DAILY TELEGRAPH and MANCHESTER GUARDIAN
likewise editorialize on the De Gaulle statement and
the latter, commenting on the "steadily increasing con-
fusion in French North and West Africa" and the need
for an enlarged central body, "founded on national union,
inspired by the spirit of war and liberation, with laws
which are the laws of the republic", says that: "The
position in North Africa remains obscure and the
fundamental
fundamental difficulty is the widespread suspicion that some of the officials who were appointed by Vichy do not accept the laws of the republic and have not changed their attitude to Frenchmen who were imprisoned for wishing to continue the war against Germany”.

The labor DAILY HERALD comments on the De Gaulle statement as follows: “Giraud, though he has expressed a desire for cooperation and his personal friendship for De Gaulle, has not yet sent a formal reply. He seems to want first to consolidate his position, to carry out reforms, and to make changes in the personnel of his administration. The French National Committee in London has already formulated its views of the conditions for unity. They are: (1) that the single authority can consist only of men with unimpeachable records; (2) that it must be based on ‘republican legitimacy’ that is that it must derive its authority not in any way from Vichy, but from the last government of the republic; (3) that its political head must be De Gaulle. Giraud, they hold, must accept these conditions as a basis for negotiation. Whether they have been officially conveyed to Giraud is not clear. If they have, he may be hesitating to accept De Gaulle as his political chief and to agree to serve under him in some high, but secondary capacity”.

ILP            MATTHEWS
FMH
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

London
Dated January 4, 1943
Rec'd 6:36 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

84, January 4, 7 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)

The foregoing should suffice to give the Department some picture of the campaign to force the immediate issue in North Africa. I regret that I can find little evidence that the difficulties facing both General Eisenhower and General Giraud and the probable effect of precipitate action on the military operations in North Africa are in any way comprehended here. Nor is there evidence of a willingness to proceed slowly or any suggestion that a less pretentious attitude toward his claim political primacy on the part of General De Gaulle and his advisers might hasten the unity for which they are calling. Strang tells me that the Foreign Office only learned of De Gaulle's statement late Saturday afternoon and endeavored to dissuade him from making it at least for forty eight hours until after he had had a reply to his second message to Giraud. The Foreign Office argued that it might merely serve to delay a meeting between the two French leaders. Eleven brought
brought back word that De Gaulle did not feel that he could agree to any delay and the Foreign Office, according to Strang, felt it inadvisable to suppress the statement. Developments since the writing of my telegram No. 1, January 1, 1 p.m., have served to strengthen my conviction that it is a definite policy of the British Foreign Office to assure the political supremacy of General De Gaulle throughout the French Empire and later in France, whether we like it or not, and while I do not wish to exaggerate its importance in that sense, I do find this attitude of indifference to the American viewpoint a somewhat disturbing augury for future Anglo-American cooperation as a constructive factor in building the postwar world.

(End of message.)

MATTHEWS

MRM
January 1, 1943

TO: Robert E. Sherwood
FROM: Percy Winner
SUBJECT: Memorandum on North Africa

The arrival of the Allied troops was thought by many to mean the end of the conflict in North Africa, but the arrival of the troops was not the end of the conflict. The fighting continued, and the Allied forces were able to continue their operations against the enemy.

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The arrival of the Allied troops was thought by many to mean the end of the conflict in North Africa, but the arrival of the troops was not the end of the conflict. The fighting continued, and the Allied forces were able to continue their operations against the enemy.
The President's Directive stated the purposes of the North African expedition to be to help the French free themselves from enemy control and influence, as well as to provide for the Allied forces a base for military operations against the enemy.

The arrival of the Allied forces was facilitated and the shedding of blood was greatly reduced during the first few days because of the effective help of pro-American anti-Vichy Frenchmen in the area, and not because of the cooperation of military leaders such as Juin, Mas and Bethouard with whom Murphy had been negotiating. Their attempts to line up the military forces with us failed before the Task Forces arrived. Indeed, the only effective help the arriving troops obtained was the result of the activities of about four hundred young pro-Democratic Frenchmen who paved the way in Algiers. More serious fighting took place at Oran and in Morocco where such help was not forthcoming.

In the hours following the arrival of Allied troops at Algiers, negotiations to obtain acceptance of Giraud as leader of all the French forces, capable of commanding obedience, progressed slowly because of confusion about the American attitude toward Darlan who was unexpectedly found to be in Algiers. The French military leaders delayed their decision until it became clear that no definite attitude had been taken toward the Admiral. A rumour that Darlan had been arrested was immediately followed by word
that not only had he been released, but that he was permitted complete freedom of action. This caused the French military leaders to conclude that we were prepared to accept Darlan, and as he was the "legitimate" representative of the Marshall, they immediately took the position that their orders must come from him. In effect, we legitimized Darlan, and won the victory for him before he helped us by giving the "cease firing" order.

At this point, we had freedom of action, subject only to our use of Darlan. We had freed ourselves from our obligations to all the other French military figures. But Murphy and Colonel Holmes continued to deal with them. Instead of taking steps to remove the obstructions to the President's purposes, they permitted Darlan, Nogues and the "Old Guard" to solidify their positions. Although Washington stressed the word "temporary", the Government's political representatives in Algiers and Rabat through acts of commission as well as of omission, strengthened an impression that "temporary" really meant "the duration of the war."

This had serious consequences of two types: it discouraged and disheartened the real friends of America and of Democracy in the area; and it raised the hopes and stimulated the internal intrigues of various reactionary factions, particularly the Royalists. Indeed, a considerable measure of what may have seemed to the outside world to be simple anti-German or anti-Vichy tendencies among the military and political figures who hastened to climb on our
band wagon was really a thin veneer over Royalist and Imperialist ambitions. The emergence of such phrases, typical of specifically Fascist development, as "Chief of State" and "Imperial Council", was merely one manifestation of this. Instead of taking steps to discourage such tendencies, Murphy and Holmes, on the very day when the "Imperial Proclamation" was allowed to appear, prepared for General Eisenhower an ill-considered message to the French people in which the profound political differences were brushed aside as "petty divergences."

During the first few days of our presence in North Africa, a beginning was made in the direction of friendly but firm control by us of the press and radio. Murphy, however, wiped out this start by permitting Darlan and Giraud to reduce our role to that of outsiders merely able to make "suggestions." We had possession of the radio in Algiers. We gave it back to the French with no strings attached. Darlan and Giraud were permitted to appoint Captain Weiss, a notorious pro-Vichy anti-Semite, as principal liaison man with all instrumentalities of information and propaganda. They were also permitted to appoint as Chief of Propaganda Rigault, a Monarchist and one of the founders of the Cagoulards, whose only virtue was that personal ambition led him to choose our side rather than the German side. A very high proportion of the persons in the immediate entourage of Darlan, Giraud and Nogues was
and remains reactionary and most of them make no secret of their Royalist leaning. For example, there is Captain Beauffre, Chief of Cabinet of Giraud, whose wife works in Murphy's office and who therefore is a direct pipeline to everything happening at Allied Headquarters. Beauffre is unquestionably anti-German, but he is by no means a friend of Democracy. Others include Clermont-Tonnere and Baillaan-court, both Royalists, who work with Rigault in dominating the propaganda setup.

In Morocco the situation is far worse. The entire entourage of Nogues is anti-Democratic. Whereas in Algiers we were able, by dint of steady pressure, without any great cooperation from Murphy, to obtain a small measure of control of the press, radio and films through the device of censorship, we were unable to do the same in Morocco until a group of us in mid-December made a trip to Casablanca and Rabat, brought shocking facts back to Algiers and forced superficial reforms by threatening serious consequences.

Thus, after nearly two months of our presence in French North Africa, the political situation is more unhealthy and dangerous than it was at the start. Military considerations did not and do not justify the original error on the part of Murphy in allowing Darlan, Nogues and Giraud to entrench themselves. It was not necessary to "freeze" the situation in the pattern of the first phase.
Indeed, failure to embark, quite early in the game, on the process of housecleaning has already complicated and will further complicate our specifically military situation. Even with Darlan out of the picture, Giraud and Nogues have entrenched themselves so deeply that they and/or the Royalists could easily exploit a serious Allied reverse in Tunisia for their own purposes. This situation has been brought about through misunderstanding, through ill-concealed sympathy with reactionaries, and through equally ill-concealed profound suspicion of truly liberal and democratic individuals and tendencies. The situation could have been avoided. Darlan and the other French military and political chiefs had committed themselves. They knew they were powerless to resist any change we might have "requested." A proof of their recognition of this fact is the willingness of Nogues and Boisson to accept Giraud after they had sworn solemnly that they would never under any circumstances serve under him.

The facts apparently were never put before General Eisenhower, or were done so in a distorted or incomplete fashion. Even more grave is the fact that Eisenhower was apparently misled into believing, after the assassination of Darlan, that Giraud, unlike Darlan, could really be trusted. Murphy not only yielded to blackmail in the form of mock
threats of Arab uprisings, insurrection, and even military resistance (which after the first few weeks was totally out of the question) but took the initiative in helping the reactionaries dig themselves in. He even tried to clamp down on channels through which knowledge of the true state of affairs was brought to us. He informed Dastier de la Vigerie that "certain persons who profess to be friends of the Americans" were bringing information to "irresponsible members of Allied Headquarters who, though wearing uniforms, are not soldiers." He suggested that the consequences might be grave. When a group of some twenty young men put up mild anti-Darlan posters in the streets of Algiers, he permitted the French authorities to bring them before a military court-martial on the accusation of being "leaders in a De Gaullist plot." When protests were made to him by us, he said he would arrange to get them suspended sentences. When a professor of the faculty of law was sentenced to forced residence in the Sahara region for a trivial offense, he laughed it off. When several French deputies wrote a dignified letter of protest to Darlan, he apparently took no steps to bring it to the attention of either Eisenhower or Washington. When prisoners in internment camps of former Spanish Republican soldiers were sent to forced labor in Tunisia, he smilingly explained that, whatever the justice of the procedure might be, it was important that they be
kept working because they were digging coal. When leaders among the young pro-American Frenchmen who had risked their lives on our behalf tried to reach him, his door was closed to them.

During the third and fourth weeks of November the following program was put before Murphy. It was pressed almost daily upon him during the first three weeks of December but was never really acted upon or even submitted to General Eisenhower. As proof of this fact, I can say that General Eisenhower told me, when I was given the opportunity of dining with him just before my departure, that many of the facts I mentioned were entirely new to him.

1. The first point in the program was to live up to the Eisenhower-Darlan protocol by leaving in office Darlan, Giraud, Nogues, etc., but take the greatest precautions to avoid building up any one of them as a permanent figure in the political pattern of North Africa. This was in keeping with President Roosevelt's policy and also with the State Department's policy in regard to France and French possessions. Instead of following this policy, Murphy acquiesced in building up these figures to a degree beyond that made necessary by their vanity and ambitions.

2. We suggested the urgent need to remove one by one, in a gradual and undramatic fashion, the most dangerous persons in the entourages of the leaders, thereby isolating and cutting the support away from the leaders. More than a dozen times we gave proof that Chatel was sabotaging us, and
we offered suggestions as to a possible successor. Even Murphy agreed that Chatel was thoroughly dangerous and despicable, but now he has emerged on the level of Nogues and Boisson instead of having been removed as he should have been long ago. We furnished proof in many other cases but nothing was done. We showed that Italians, Germans, and pro-Vichy and pro-Axis men who had gone into hiding in the early days, reemergedboldly later on and resumed their places as officials, proprietors of newspapers, etc. We called in vain for a housecleaning to which Darlan himself would have consented.

3. We also struggled in vain for gradual cleaning up of the municipalities, the civil services, etc. For example, we proved that Escande, head of PTT, Gautre of Radio Algiers, de Carbonnel of the Nogues political household, various police chiefs, and all sorts of other officials, who had been not only pro-Vichy but pro-German up to the very day of our arrival, were now carrying out passive resistance without being molested. We offered documented proof that men of the SOL, the Legion, and police officials were not only spying on all Americans but were systematically threatening and persecuting Frenchmen who had even superficial dealings with Americans. We presented cases in which French civilians who had given simple street directions to American soldiers were taken to police stations, beaten, or
sent to jail on false charges.

4. We called for dissolution of all political
groups, particularly the SOL and the Legion which were and
are permeated with anti-Democratic Fascist ideas and methods.
In Algiers, the SOL was nominally banned but continued to
function under cover. Throughout the countryside in Algiers,
Oran and Constantine it continued with impunity its
nefarious activities. In Morocco, at a Franco-American
military ceremony which Nogues and General Keyes attended,
the Legion had the place of honor. This took place in mid-
December. In Morocco, during the same period, violently
anti-Democratic pamphlets and booklets were still being
distributed openly and freely at the offices of the Legion
and in the former Vichy propaganda headquarters. I confirmed
these facts myself in such places as Mascara, Tlemcen,
Sidi-bel-Abbes, Fez and Rabat, and members of my staff did
likewise in Constantine, Bone and Casablanca.

Murphy defended his laxness in connection with
the Legion by saying that he thought we could salvage and
use the "Cadres" of the Legion. This is tantamount to saying
that when we get into German territory, we should use the
"Cadres" of the SS.

In Morocco, until we forced its temporary
suspension late in December, the weekly "La Voix Francaise"
outdid Vichy publications in the virulence of its attacks
upon us. This sheet, in the worst tradition of the "Action
Francaise", and an unqualifiedly reactionary Royalist organ, lumped together "the Jewish peril", "the Bolshevik peril" and "the Democratic peril", boasted in long articles that anti-Semitism was originally and profoundly French, and proclaimed openly "the hell with Democracy". Yet this newspaper had the official support of Nogues. When Rigault consented to order its suspension for four weeks, he said quite truthfully that responsibility for its continued existence must be laid partially at the doorstep of the American authorities in that area, who did nothing to act against it or even to report it. Whereas in Algiers we had negative and partial control of Radio Algiers through the device of censorship, in Morocco Colonel Percy Black of the American Headquarters not only permitted Radio Maroc to broadcast such anti-Democratic material as articles from "La Voix Francaise", but prevented members of our group from exercising censorship. He handed over to Nogues, moreover, the right to censor our own American material twenty-four hours before we had a chance to broadcast it to the United States. Throughout North Africa there are popular phrases such as "Vichy Afrique", stories such as "The Americans came, they fought bravely and well for four days, but then they surrendered to the French", or "Only about twenty per cent of the population favors the Americans and to keep them out of harm's way, the Americans have allowed those staunch democrats, Darlan, Giraud and Nogues, to keep them in jail."
5. We sought in vain for the evolution and the putting into effect gradually of a systematic plan for arresting our notorious enemies. This has not yet been done despite repeated assurances to Eisenhower to the contrary. In public places such as restaurants in Algiers and Casablanca, one still hears anti-American talk. Italians, Germans and well-known anti-American and anti-British Frenchmen still occupy official positions or move about freely without even bothering to hide their sentiments. We have often offered to furnish lists. Indeed, we have been forced to by-pass the American authorities and to bring about necessary arrests by making denunciations to pro-American officials of the French police. It was through our activities that Charles Bedaux, of whose treasonable activities we have absolute documentary proof, was arrested, and now it seems likely that he will be freed without trial because of certain obscure pressures to which Murphy has yielded. Word of his arrest was suppressed by the American authorities. The free circulation of our enemies is a matter of vital importance since they are known to have arms and supplies. We have proof, for example, of systematic methods of inducing American soldiers to get intoxicated in order to buy or steal from them their revolvers. We have given to the American authorities copies of secret orders to the Legionnaires and other enemies to keep themselves in readiness because Germany is not yet beaten. We have been shown evidence that Nogues and Michelier
were until recently in radio communication with Laval. We know that no effective steps have been taken to close the espionage route which runs from Oudjda through Spanish Morocco to Melilla. We know that the Count of Paris, Royalist Pretender to the Throne of France, to whom so many of our so-called friends are really loyal, and who is now believed to be in Spanish Morocco, is in direct communication with Rabat and Algiers. We have evidence that enemies of ours have sabotaged the operations of jamming enemy stations and that they have let come through the notorious broadcasts from Stuttgart to the Arabs. We know that no effective steps have been taken to prevent the systematic stirring up of trouble between the Jews and Arabs. We know definitely that there is no truth in the blackmail, used so effectively against our Headquarters, of a possible Arab uprising against us. We have evidence that British and American soldiers have been deliberately plied with liquor in order that their drunken antics could be used to make the local French population think ill of them. Examples of this kind can be multiplied almost endlessly. The situation cannot be changed overnight, but the plan we offered and which was never put into effect would gradually remove centers of infection and make possible the basis of a healthy situation.

6. We have pressed for the evolution and the putting into effect gradually of a systematic plan for freeing those of our friends and sympathizers who are still in prison or
in forced residence in remote regions despite all that which has been said to the contrary. We have again and again offered proofs - provided that our informants be protected. There is no doubt that the local authorities have given assurances to General Eisenhower that all our friends had been set free. There is no doubt that the General believes this to be true. Yet it is not true. Murphy, who in common with other important persons at headquarters, deals almost exclusively with so-called "Leaders" and "Aristocrats", is politically and temperamentally unable to sympathize with "Trouble-makers" even when the persons involved have made trouble on our American behalf. We have argued in vain that we are destroying our following in occupied Europe because word of the true state of affairs has trickled out. We have taken the position and continue to take the position that we are jeopardizing our future military operations in Europe unless we make absolutely sure - and give the conclusive proof to the world - that every man and woman who takes risks on our behalf will at least be protected if not befriended by us. All of our friends of the period from November 7th to November 9th who are still in custody, who have been surreptitiously taken back into custody, who have been otherwise penalized or threatened, must be taken care of at once. We must allow our pro-American anti-Vichy friends to tell their story to someone in whom they can really have confidence. We must give them proof and give the world proof, not idle promises, that we take care of our friends. We must track down every
individual case. Murphy knows that even some of our reactionary supporters - those who dared to come out into the open at the start - were in grave danger because their enemies - the men who became our friends after the start - threatened them. Mast was practically in hiding for many weeks and did not dare to wear his uniform. Bethouard had to be sent out of the country for his own safety. After we take care of those who helped us, our systematic plan should also free (a) Frenchmen from France who are imprisoned or interned under the old regime, (b) the Jews and other "political prisoners", (c) the Spanish Army Republicans. We must reverse Murphy's consent to have the Spanish Republicans sent to work as slave laborers. Four hundred young Frenchmen, by a brilliantly conceived and executed coup d'état the night before our arrival, paved the way for us. These young men are not of the stamp of the persons with whom Murphy now deals. Some are Jews. Some are Democrats. Some are merely brave persons who hate tyranny, including the present French tyranny. Murphy no longer is "at home" to them. Murphy has not taken the trouble to track down rumors that some of them are still in jail or have been sent back to jail.

Giraud is now sending some of our friends to jail. This does not come as a surprise to anyone who knows Giraud or who knows the North African situation. Giraud, behind the pretense of rejecting any political ambition, is
a megalomaniac. I have heard him in ordinary conversation refer to himself in the third person as "the Great General Giraud," and he was not joking. He is surrounded by a group of youngish men who are almost all Monarchists and who see in him the Imperialist leader of a French Monarchy. Giraud himself plainly believes he can do what General Boulanger failed to do. It will be recalled that in the early stage of the negotiations between Giraud and General Eisenhower at Gibraltar, Giraud held out for the post of Generalissimo, with General Eisenhower, Admiral Cunningham, and General Anderson under his orders. He accepted a lesser role only when he realized that he could work better behind the facade of Darlan. His immediate entourage is divided into two factions constantly at war with each other. One of them is headed by a former leading Cagoulard, who was the other day received by the President of the United States as a representative of the Frenchmen in North Africa. The other is headed by Rigault, also a Cagoulard and a Royalist. Various types of pressure were brought to bear upon Giraud early in December by his own followers to stage a coup d'etat against Darlan. These facts were told to me in a secret meeting at lunch in the house of Paul Brett by Captain Clermont-Tonnere of Giraud's staff. They were reported to Murphy, who said he already knew them. There is strong evidence that Darlan was assassinated by a representative of one of these factions which had decided that if Giraud
would not act as quickly as it wanted him to act, he would be forced forward by a typically Fascist method. It is to be noted that the men arrested included police officials. These men were among our principal sources of information. They are paying for their effort to tell the facts to us.

The device of announcing that Giraud himself and Murphy were also to be victims of assassination is the normal Fascist-Nazi procedure, of which the classic example is the Reichstag fire. Military necessity, which did in a measure justify our deal with Darlan, does not justify a deal by which Giraud becomes unquestioned leader in French North Africa. This deal is a profound mistake because it puts us in the grip of a man almost maniacal in his notion of his personal mission. Whereas Darlan was so thoroughly besmirched by his past and so thoroughly committed to us that he could stand against us only because Murphy helped him do so, Giraud is free to make ever-increasing demands on us. I will stake not only my reputation but my life on the accuracy of this appraisal. I suggest that steps be taken to call upon various persons whose names I can give to obtain chapter and verse to support what I have said. These persons are now in Algiers. They are Americans.

7. The last point in the program I suggested was affirmative and constructive. While we were gradually removing the dangerous individuals and clamping down upon the dangerous organizations, we should have begun to carry out a
large scale, broad based propaganda of disintoxication and re-education of the French population of North Africa in order to start training truly Democratic leaders for the future and mass Democratic support for these leaders. This meant working through the newspapers, news agency, films, schools, book shops, radio, exhibitions, leaflets, and other agencies of information and re-education. To carry it out effectively it would have been best for us to have direct control, or at least to have the right to equal participation with the local French authorities. Failing this, however, because of the Eisenhower-Darlan protocol, we could have made a start if we had had the real comprehension and support of Murphy. Nevertheless we have, at least in Algiers and Oran, accomplished a great deal, thanks to the skill and courage of a handful of Americans and Britishers. Our work, however, was necessarily more negative than positive. We saved friendly newspapers from going out of business and put a brake on unfriendly newspapers. We organized a counter-espionage and counter-propaganda service which identified our enemies and permitted us to protect ourselves against them. We censored the radio and gradually forced Radio Algiers to change its tune. In Oran we broadcast local programs. In Morocco we were helpless because of the attitude of Colonel Black until the intercession of a special representative of President Roosevelt enabled us to impose
upon Radio Maroc a system similar to the one we had been able, by ourselves, to impose upon Radio Algiers. In Algiers and Oran we were able to begin distributing placards and posters. Through the news agency France-Afrique and especially because of the cooperative attitude of Brett and Joxe, we were able to begin filling the newspapers with American and British material. We did this entirely by our own efforts and without any help from Murphy. One of our first steps of re-education was to arrange for the publication of speeches and public utterances during the last two years by President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull, Under-Secretary Welles, etc., which had never been published in French North Africa. We obtained from America and forced into the newspapers explanatory retrospective surveys of the true meaning of the present war. By dint of constant effort we forced a house-cleaning of the pro-Vichy film combine. Not only did we lift the ban on American films, but we successfully fought off sabotage of its application. We brought hope and courage to large numbers of friendly Frenchmen who otherwise would have given up in despair.

There is still an enormous amount to be done in this broad field since one cannot undo in a few weeks the baleful work of years, but our task cannot be accomplished unless certain political prerequisites are fulfilled. Indeed, if this is not done, the story - the truthful story - of a tragic mistake and a lost opportunity, is bound to trickle.
out, and its effects not only in occupied Europe but also in America and Britain will be catastrophic.
LSH
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

London
Dated January 1, 1943
Rec'd 11:05 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

TRIPLE PRIORITY
1 January 1, 1 p.m.
MOST SECRET

Press discussion following the arrests by General Giraud in North Africa has served to emphasize with greater clarity the basic British policy with regard to France namely that British prestige requires that General de Gaulle be given and maintained in a position of political primacy both during the war and in any early transitory period following the liberation of continental France. The British Government accepts the President's and the Department often enunciated policy that the people of France alone must choose their form of government. But this is accepted with the reservations that some French authority, in effect if not in name a provisional government must reign in France from the time the Allies first arrive until conditions permit the establishment of that permanent Government and during
January 1, 1943 1 p.m. from London

and during this period it must be de Gaulle who exercises authority. I have been told by several sources, including a high British secret intelligence official in direct contact with France itself and an escaped French Officer who left the country only a fortnight ago, that the name of Giraud and our operations in Africa are firing the imagination of the people of France. But we must realize that the British Foreign Office will persist in its buildup of General de Gaulle and in its full support of his demands that all who bear the stemp of Vichy must be eliminated from the "unified" France for which they so loudly call. If de Gaulle is a "symbol" to the people of France, he is also a "symbol" to the British Government, a symbol of justification for its whole French policy since June 1940.

British prestige requires that "the one Frenchman who stuck by us in the dark days of 1940" must be installed in France when the day of liberation comes, however fleeting his tenure may be and whatever the consequences for the people of France.

It was this policy which lay behind the decision to install Giraud in Madagascar.
Madagascar agreement. It was this policy which motivated the determination that Djibouti must join the Fighting French. It was this policy which caused the Foreign Office to oppose the combined effort of General Eisenhower, Admiral Cunningham and Darlan to bring over Godefroy's Alexandria fleet to the North African authorities. It was this policy that made the Foreign Office so insistent that Macmillan or some other political officer of Cabinet rank be sent to Algiers without delay. And it is this policy which is behind the present campaign to emphasize Giraud as the military man and de Gaulle as the political leader. The diplomatic correspondent of the LONDON TIMES MacDonald, who is closer to the Foreign Office than any other London journalist has the following to say this morning:

(PLAIN) "If anyone thought for a moment that Darlan's murder would simplify affairs in North Africa he must have been given a sharp jolt towards reality yesterday. General Giraud as briefly reported in the later editions of the TIMES yesterday announced on Wednesday that, convinced that other would-be assassins were preparing their weapons, he had acted first. He had arrested 12 Frenchmen. Four of them were police..."
January 1, 1943 1 p.m., from London

were police officials, two or three others were men who had helped the Allies before the landing, and some of the others were considered to be pro-Vichy to the British and apparently to the American peoples. The whole affair appears on first hearing to be wildly confusing. How is it that pro-Allied Frenchmen can be arrested? An American broadcaster from Algiers attempted an answer in remarkably frank terms. According to Reuter, Charles Collingwood of the Columbia Broadcasting System declared yesterday: There is an impression here that the fault of the present government in North Africa is that it is made up of pro-Vichy and anti-de Gaulle men. General Giraud said yesterday that he did not see many pro-Vichy men in power. Be that as it may, the impression still remains here; and acts like the arrest of a number of pro-Allied persons do not help to remove that impression. I have talked to a great many people about these arrests but I have heard no one blame Giraud. He is still held by all parties here to be an incorruptible soldier, a man who has dedicated himself to the task of defeating Germany. What worries people here is not Giraud but the men who are General Giraud's Government. That appears to be a fair summary of opinion in some sections in Algiers.
January 1 1943 1 p.m. from London

Algiers. Among other sections the habit of Vichy still persists and probably these sections are trying to increase their power now that the High Commissioner does not touch politics. The whole affair, still puzzling in some details increases the need for establishing agreement between all forces of France now ranged against the common enemy. Only after such agreement can a worthy and representative civilian authority be set up." (END PLAIN).

The quotation from Collingwood's broadcast appears in every London paper this morning and was given prominence by the British Broadcasting Company. Vernon Bartlett in this morning's NEWS CHRONICLE comments on Collingwood's broadcast and says:

(PLAIN) "There is no doubt that Giraud and de Gaulle hold each other in high esteem. They would gladly cooperate but they have three obstacles to overcome: one is this bitter hostility in North Africa to the revival or development of democracy in France. The second is the question who should take military and political precedence. The third which depends less upon them than upon us and the Americans, is that in some quarters de Gaulle is looked upon as the British candidate for power and Giraud.
January 1, 1943 1 p.m. from London

Giraud as the candidate of the United States."

(END PLAIN)

... I have given the Department this somewhat lengthy review of British policy not in any spirit of criticism but because I think it essential that it should have an accurate picture for its guidance. If we are prepared to go along with the British view that something resembling a de Gaulle Government should be set up in Algiers, there will be no divergence between us and it probably can be brought about. If we are prepared to continue what seems to me to have been our past policy, of opposing the establishment of any French political authority which may even "temporarily" impose its political will upon the French people, there will be sharp differences which we must face. There will be efforts here to depict General Giraud as a high minded but politically innocent tool of "pro-Vichy and Fascist minded job-holders," de Gaulle (who not so long ago was himself in many circles charged with having "dictatorship" or extreme right tendencies) will be displayed as the upholder of democracy, the hope of the front populaire elements, and the legitimate continuation of the third republic, Parenthetically...

Regraded Unclassified
January 1, 1943 1 p.m. from London

The picture is causing considerable anxiety to such objective and dispassionate Frenchmen as Roger Cambon: They think the ground is being laid for civil war in France. Be that as it may one thing seems clear; if we do not intend to go along with the French policy of our British friends we must take prompt firm and articulate steps so to indicate. Otherwise the dangers of a split between us, with all that it means for the future of the war and the peace, are obvious and serious.

I respectfully request that no summary of this telegram be inserted in the special telegram.

MATTHEWS

RDS
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (NC)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH
7408, December 29, 10 p.m.

MOST SECRET

In private conversation with an American officer friend of long standing, Major Desmond Morton of the Prime Minister's office spoke with some bitterness yesterday of what he termed "the State Department's obstructionist tactics" in opposing the British Government's desire to send a high ranking political adviser to French North Africa "to relieve General Eisenhower of some of the burden of diplomatic and political negotiations". The officer in question (who knows none of the background) said that according to Morton the British desire to send someone of Cabinet rank "whose authority would be comparable to that of Casey in the Middle East". (Please see my telegrams nos. 7323, December 24, 2 p.m.; and 7325, December 24, 6 p.m.) Morton added that this political adviser would
adviser would not have a status similar to that of Murphy "because Murphy is a member of General Eisenhower's staff".

There is no doubt in my mind that our friends here, particularly the Foreign Office, are really unhappy at what they consider the secondary role they have had to play in the North African negotiations. The suggestion of the dangers of crossing wires with General Eisenhower in the extremely delicate and difficult task confronting him should some independent high Allied authority appear on the spot strikes no responsive chord in these quarters. I even hear of occasional casual allusions to "the inexperience of the State Department and of American Generals" in handling French affairs and of our lack of "real understanding of the French state of mind".

The Department may wish to read the foregoing in connection with my telegram No. 7407, December 29, 6 p.m.; and with the following sentences appearing in the Foreign Office political intelligence summary for the week ending December 16: "The most recent authoritative reports from Algiers do not paint a very rosy picture either of French or of Arab morale. It is probable
-3- #7408, December 20, 10 p.m. from London

It is probable that three quarters of the population are sympathetic to the Allies, with an inclination, at any rate in some quarters, (begin underlining) to show friendliness chiefly towards the British (end underline), but it cannot be said that morale is high, or that there is so much enthusiasm for the Allied cause as to create a real widespread desire for active cooperation."

MATTHEWS

KLP
VMB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (NG)

London
Dated December 29, 1942
Rec'd 10:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH
7407, December 29, 6 p.m. (SECTIONS 1, 2 and 3)
SECRET

De Gaulle's broadcast, which has received a great play in all the London papers this morning, was given
Mr. Eden's full approval before being put on the air
and I understand that it was upon Eden's insistence
that the tribute to General Giraud's military qualities
was inserted. In fact this aspect is emphasized in to-
day's headlines and it is clearly the British hope to
bring the two French leaders together. They hope for
an early personal meeting between De Gaulle and Giraud
or if that seems premature perhaps may suggest that
Catroux see Giraud first.

There is no question but that the Fighting French
also desire to come to agreement with Giraud. There is
likewise no question but that they conceive of such
agreement only in terms of De Gaulle as supreme leader
and on the basis of a single authority vested in the
national
national committee, the latter enlarged or modified to include some of the present North African leaders. In conversation, the Fighting French openly tell us that the National Committee must be transferred from London to Algiers and assume the direction of all French territories not under Axis domination. Giraud they say would be commander in chief of United French military forces but he would derive this authority from General de Gaulle and the National Committee, and presumably be subject to their orders. It is this which De Gaulle had in mind when he said in the penultimate paragraph of his broadcast:

MATTHEWS

JIM
Secretary of State
Washington

RUSH
7407, Twenty-ninth, (SECTION FOUR).

"An enlarged temporary power grouping all French forces inside and outside the country and in all French territories which are able to fight for liberation is necessary to national independence and unity until such time as the nation herself may be able to express her sovereign wishes."

MATTHEWS

LMS
JG
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.(NC)

London
Dated December 29, 1942
Rec'd 10:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.
RUSH
7407, December 29, 6 p.m., (SECTION FIVE)

The Fighting French are also prepared to
insist on the elimination of Nogues, Chatel and
Boisson, apparently with full British support.
The diplomatic correspondent of the MANCHESTER
GUARDIAN accurately portrays the Fighting French
and British Foreign Office view, in my opinion,
when he writes:

MATTHEWS

CSB
Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH
7407, 29th (SECTION SIX)

"General de Gaulle's statement, which included a renewed denunciation of the Vichy regime, confirms that so far as he and his colleagues are concerned the difficulties are political rather than military. Fighting French quarters, moreover, are quite explicit in their views that collaboration must be conditional upon the complete eradication of Vichy influence in French North Africa or, expressed in positive terms, upon the establishment there of a regime wholly in accord with the principles of Fighting France and the United Nations. Once that question of principle were satisfactorily answered the Fighting French movement would be ready to accept and collaborate with a governing body taking the place of the present Imperial Council. In any case, that body cannot stand comparison with the organization
organization developed by the Fighting French movement, which exercises control over vast territories and has been developing its potentialities for a considerable time. In Brazzaville, French Equatorial Africa, for example, are adherents to the cause of Fighting France from all over the world who have made their way there to join the common struggle and many of whom have undergone, or are undergoing, specialized training in technical or administrative duties. Thus Fighting France's own contribution to a unified movement would be of inestimable value, embracing territory and people long freed from the taint of Vichy, not to speak of natural resources and strategical advantages."

MATTHEWS

KLP
SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

RUSH
7407, December 29, 6 P.M. (SECTION SEVEN)

I have made discreet inquiry in a number of quarters and it now seems clear that the change in General de Gaulle's attitude from ready acceptance of the postponement of his visit to Washington to one of resentment (my telegrams, Nos. 7373, December 27, 3 P.M. and 7376, December 28, 4 P.M.) was due, as frequently happens, to the influence of his entourage, particularly the hero worshipping Pléven and the careerist Palewski. They persuaded the General that the man in whose keeping the people of France had placed their hope of liberation and their destiny was being side tracked again through the machinations of the Department of State and its notorious clique of appeasers! In the difficult period of negotiations that lies ahead I believe we must expect that various members of the National Committee and their subordinates who have painted for themselves such a rosy picture of their future
their future governing role in a liberated France will not willingly step aside in the interest of unity. Many of them are sincere but they have grown to identify the future of France with the holding of their own jobs. Unity with North Africa they unquestionably want, but unity under them and on their terms. To move them from this view will take both time and patience and I am not sure how far our Foreign Office friends may not support them. I note a strong tendency in certain British quarters, while saying that it is up to the French to make their own agreement, to stress General Giraud’s military qualities and his lack of interest in “the political side” and to imply that the latter is the logical field for General de Gaulle and his supporters.

(END MESSAGE)
## Political Parties

**Labour Party:**
1. The Old World and The New Society.
2. Pamphlets on Transport and Social Security.

**Liberal Party:**
3. The Liberal Assembly 1942.
4. Health for the People.
5. Education for All.

**Liberal National Party:**
6. A Basis for Britain's Post-War Policy.

**Conservative Party:**
9. "Looking Ahead" - A PLAN FOR YOUTH

## Government Agencies

**Committees:**
10. Uthwatt.
11. Beveridge

**Select Committees:**
12. No.56 Civil Service.

## Business and Trade Union Groups

- Federation of Brit. Indus.
- 120 Signatories Group.
- Trades Union Congress.
- National Union of Teachers.
- 16. T.U.C. Memorandum on Education after the War.

## Private Groups and Individuals

- West Midland Group.
- League of Nations Union.
- League of Nations Union.
- Jones, Harry J.
- 22. Industrial Background of Housing

* These have attracted particular attention.
*2 Other volumes in this series given at back.
thrift and investment, beyond the minimum security to be compulsorily insured for. In short the Beveridge Plan looks to a future with a compulsory security floor but no ceiling to individual initiative in facing responsibilities.
"BEVERIDGE" EDITION OF TABLE OF BRITISH SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS.

DECEMBER, 1942

The new edition of the table of British Social Security Benefits substitutes the actual Beveridge plan in the third and sixth columns for the plans proposed to the Beveridge Committee as given in the first Edition - October 1942.

It will be noticed that all the six "centres of interest" spoken of in my October 1942 report to the National Resources Planning Board have been dealt with by Sir William Beveridge, except one. The Beveridge plan includes: (1) a very great increase in the cash benefit (2) the introduction of family allowances (3) greater provision for pregnancy and maternity (5) standardization of services (in fact a complete health and rehabilitation service is assumed) (6) a universal state funeral benefit. Since the Beveridge plan does not deal specifically with war problems, the fourth "centre of interest" that of easing the burden of mothers in war industry is not dealt with.

P. Sargent Horne
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>EMERGENCY TO BE MET</th>
<th>PRE WAR (1937)</th>
<th>CASH BENEFIT PER WEEK</th>
<th>REVEREIDGE PLAN (1942)</th>
<th>PRE WAR (1937)</th>
<th>CASH BENEFIT PER WEEK</th>
<th>REVEREIDGE PLAN (1942)</th>
<th>GOODS AS SERVICES IN KIND</th>
<th>REVEREIDGE PLAN (1942)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conception</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(Maternity Benefit £6 a week for 13 weeks)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Anti-Natal Clinics</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth and Infancy</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Maternity £2 to £4 lump sum</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(Maternity Benefit £6 a week for 13 weeks)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Infant Welfare Centres, Health Visitors</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Childhood (0-14 yrs)</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8s Average per child up to 16 if at school, except first child.</td>
<td>School treatment of minor ailments. Free meals. Free or cheap milk in Schools.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Nurseries, play centres (in Schools) Communal Feeding</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accident to Father</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3s added per child</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8s average per child for all children.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment of Father</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3s or 4s per child</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death of Father</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8s (1st child)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death of Parents (Orphanage)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7s. 6d.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment of Mother</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full Working Life</td>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>£10 maximum</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-65 Death of Husband (Widows)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10s</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8s, 13 weeks. Nothing except Guardian Benefit (24s) if children; subject to partial reduction if earning.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Uniform disability and Unemployment Benefit 24s for Single Adult 40s for Couple. 18s for Adult dependent.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ill-Health. Sickness 26 weeks</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>M.15s. W.15s**</td>
<td>3s added</td>
<td>Uniform disability and Unemployment Benefit 24s for Single Adult 40s for Couple. 18s for Adult dependent.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Varies according to approved society joined</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disability after 26 weeks</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>M.7s. 6d. W.6s**</td>
<td>3s added</td>
<td>Uniform disability and Unemployment Benefit 24s for Single Adult 40s for Couple. 18s for Adult dependent.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Varies according to approved society joined</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Accident Disability</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1/2 Wage to 3/4 Wage</td>
<td>3s added</td>
<td>Uniform disability and Unemployment Benefit 24s for Single Adult 40s for Couple. 18s for Adult dependent.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Varies according to approved society joined</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death by Accident</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>£200 - £500 to dependents</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Uniform disability and Unemployment Benefit 24s for Single Adult 40s for Couple. 18s for Adult dependent.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Varies according to approved society joined</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>M.17/-, W.15/-</td>
<td>3s added. Extension to non manual workers earning £250 - £420 p.a.</td>
<td>Uniform disability and Unemployment Benefit 24s for Single Adult 40s for Couple. 18s for Adult dependent.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Varies according to approved society joined</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sickness (PartTime Employment)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Uniform disability and Unemployment Benefit 24s for Single Adult 40s for Couple. 18s for Adult dependent.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Varies according to approved society joined</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 (or 65) - 70 years</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10s. Wife 10s</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Uniform disability and Unemployment Benefit 24s for Single Adult 40s for Couple. 18s for Adult dependent.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Varies according to approved society joined</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senility Over 70 yrs. (Loss of Employment)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Non-Contributory Pensions Total made up to 10/6d or 35/- per couple **</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Uniform disability and Unemployment Benefit 24s for Single Adult 40s for Couple. 18s for Adult dependent.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Varies according to approved society joined</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death (Funeral Expenses)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>None (except £15 after Fatal Industrial Accident)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Uniform disability and Unemployment Benefit 24s for Single Adult 40s for Couple. 18s for Adult dependent.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Varies according to approved society joined</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Married Women sickness 10s. disability 5s.**

*** This is subject to a means test by Assistance Board.

6 When allowed ratio of contribution to benefits is exhausted, unemployed come under Assistance Board and are subject to means test.

### After transition period:
- Or man with wife earning.
- References in brackets are to the Beveridge report.

Not desirable to replace cash allowances for children wholly or even largely by provision in kind. But in ease reasons for extension of provision in kind, 8s. indicated as allowances in cash or kind ($411)

It is assumed that there will be comprehensive health services for prevention and cure of disease available to all members of the community ($301)

Surgical appliances, convalescent homes and nursing... are essential to a comprehensive health service ($435). The insurance table to free dental service should become as universal as that to the free medical service ($435)

Rehabilitation till the maximum of earning capacity is restored should be available for all disabled persons who can profit by it irrespective of the cause of their disability ($426).

After he has drawn unconditional unemployment benefit for six months, the insured person as a condition of remaining on benefit will be required to attend a work or training centre ($329).
13 December 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Marshall.

Hereewith are two copies of a report prepared by direction of Admiral Darlan of his program of liberation. General Eisenhower believes that this program represents a sincere effort on the part of Darlan and his associates to go as far as local conditions will permit in reestablishing a liberal administration. You may wish to forward one copy to the Secretary of State, as it will be of interest in connection with the President’s Memorandum of Inquiry with regard to steps which have been taken by the local authorities toward a liberalized regime.

Smith.
NOTE ON THE REFORMS UNDERTAKEN BY THE HIGH COMMISSIONER IN FRENCH AFRICA

Immediately following the establishment of the High Commissariat and the organization of its services, the High Commissioner undertook to adopt and to examine a certain number of decisions, of a general and specific nature, all of them imbued with a liberal spirit or the desire to make up for certain injustices and to eliminate a certain number of arbitrary decisions which had on the whole been inspired by Germany.

The problem as a whole can be considered under several headings: Social, Political and Racial.

THE SOCIAL QUESTION:

The social problem does not present itself in French Africa in the same manner as it does in France or in the United States. As a result, the task of the High Commissioner is considerably lighter.

In North Africa, there are only average size towns and there is no industrial laboring class. Moreover, the Europeans in North Africa generally belong to the leading class or they supply officials, directors, business men and skilled laborers. The small requirements for local industrial labor are nearly always met with native workers. These laborers have really presented only one serious problem: the problem of wages.

At the present time, and although the wage question is now being seriously studied by the Administration, the problem has assumed a different aspect. Generally speaking, the lack of goods on the market made it difficult for the native to find ways of spending his money. It is, therefore, the problem of market supplies and not the question of wages which determine the state of the labor market.

If cotton goods and certain food supplies can be brought to the African market, the social question as a result will be immediately solved. It is only then, and by way of result, that the problem of prices and wages will arise and this problem will be considered with a more liberal outlook and with only one concern; the best possible prosecution of the war effort.

THE POLITICAL QUESTION:

By contrast the political question immediately presented itself under two principal aspects: Freedom of expression and individual freedom.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION:

In the field of the press and editorial writing, the French Government had set up, immediately following the Armistice, a system of extremely rigid censorship. This censorship was specifically determined by the themes and the requirements of the propaganda of the Axis countries.
Since the High Commissariat was set up, these instructions were immediately done away with, and the press found it again possible to publish communiques and information from the Allied Countries and to express the actual feelings of the French people with regard to the war.

This complete change was accomplished simultaneously with a general system much more liberal in character. Whereas earlier French censorship had reached the point of requiring publishers to print under their signatures articles which were entirely supplied by the Administration, the High Commissariat asked the press, as it was again given its freedom of expression, to furnish a considerable personal effort.

The only instructions thereafter imposed upon freedom of expression are those which are determined by the necessity of war, both from the military point of view and the moral point of view, as well as for the security of the Allied Armies now carrying out operations.

Such is the practical situation which in fact prevails in other countries and which will have to be maintained until the end of hostilities. The same system will be applied to/.../ as soon as paper deliveries will enable that trade to resume its activities.

INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM:

At the time of the intervention of the Allies in North Africa, a large number of individuals who had been formerly arrested for political reasons, were either jailed and held in concentration camps or kept in labor battalions. All these individuals had generally been condemned for the following reasons:

Propaganda, manifestations or actions in favor of the Allies; hostility toward the Axis views; attempts to rejoin the armies of the Allies or the formations of General de Gaulle; political propaganda against the French Government or in favor of General de Gaulle.

As soon as the High Commissariat was set up orders were given for the following purposes:

(a) To stop immediately all prosecutions before the courts for the breaches mentioned above.

(b) To have all those condemned or detained for identical reasons immediately released. These various measures were applied gradually in such a manner that now all those politically condemned or detained are at liberty.

Since November 8, the only political arrests carried out were

Such provisions will moreover be maintained in the future.
Finally the High Commissariat went further. It even considered the liberation of certain individuals who had been arrested prior to the signing of the Armistice, that is to say at the time when France and England were jointly pursuing the war against Germany. This case specifically involves twenty-seven Communist Deputies who had been transferred to North Africa upon orders of the French Government, at a time when the French Communist Party was alleged to hinder by its acts or propaganda the common war effort.

No condition of a political nature was imposed for the liberation of these prisoners; they are merely requested to pledge themselves not to compromise, directly or indirectly, through their deeds, words or writings, and until the end of hostilities, the war effort being carried out in French Africa by the High Commissariat and by the Allies.

This pledge will remain valid until the end of hostilities.

THE RACIAL QUESTION:

The High Commissariat was likewise under the necessity of bringing some solutions to the racial question. This problem is peculiarly serious in itself; it is even more so because of its political repercussions. In French Africa it assumes an entirely different aspect than in France.

On the one hand, the Jewish problem in North Africa presents itself under extremely varied aspects: the problem of French Jews and of native Jews; the latter, that is the problem of the native Jews, has three sides: the problem of the Moroccan Jews, and of the Tunisian Jews, which are under a special status.

The Jewish problem also assumes the nature of a minority problem which is extremely delicate: There are some 350,000 Jews living in French Africa face to face with 25 million Arabs, who entertain toward them a spirit of more or less sharp hostility, which is of long standing.

These Mohammedans are the group from which the French Army in Africa is chiefly recruited and from which tomorrow will be drafted important effective contingents which will take part in the struggle at the side of the Allies.

In spite of the difficult circumstances just indicated, the Jews of Africa have never been subjected to the treatment inflicted upon their fellow Jews in France and most specifically recently in the occupied zones (the wearing of the special insignia, the curtailment of their right to travel, transfer of population, etc.)

Nevertheless, a certain number of special measures had been imposed on them in conformity with the legislation adopted in France since the Armistice: Political, military, cultural, property measures. In a certain number of cases, these measures had been made more stringent in their application by the Administration.

The first step taken by the High Commissariat consisted in giving
instructions to the Administration in order that the existing laws should be interpreted in the most liberal spirit and not with stringency as heretofore. Moreover, in a great number of cases, and particularly in everything involving individual prosecutions, it was simply recommended that the application of the laws and decrees be suspended.

Simultaneously, the High Commissariat undertook an examination looking to the revision of these laws. Following are the principal points and conclusions which were decided upon by the services entrusted with this study:

MILITARY PROBLEM:

The legislation enforced had placed the Jews under a special status: All Jewish Officers and Non-commissioned Officers had been expelled from the Army and the men were not called in the Regular Army.

For the future, the provisions adopted are as follows:

1. **French Jews:** French Jews will be recalled to duty under the same conditions as those prevailing for French Gentiles.

   Officers will be assigned on the basis of their branch or services. The Jews will also be allowed to sign voluntary enlistments.

2. **African Jews:** The African Jews of Algiers, whether subject to call or not, will be allowed to sign volunteer enlistments with fighting units.

   Volunteer officers, whether in the Regular Army or Reserve, who formerly belonged to fighting units, will again be assigned to fighting units not comprising any Arabs. The same process will apply to Non-commissioned Officers.

   Those called who are non-volunteers will be assigned to pioneer units.

   All Jews, even foreign Jews, and those without nationality will be accepted as volunteers, either in the Foreign Legion or in the Free Corps.

CULTURAL QUESTIONS:

The High Commissariat found itself face to face with the following situation:

In most cases the Jews who had been dismissed from the schools had been replaced by Gentiles or Mohammedans. It was, therefore, impossible without stirring up serious disorders, to consider dismissing from the schools the Christians and the Mohammedans in order to provide for the re-instatement and to make room for the Jews.
However, the Jews had been allowed to organize a separate educational system.

While waiting for circumstances which will permit the reopening of institutions now mostly occupied or evacuated, the High Commissariat will assist, as completely as possible, the separate Jewish educational system in order to permit a practical and immediate solution of the problem.

Everything necessary will be done in the meantime to include in the State educational system the most desirable Jewish elements.

The decree of 19 October, 1942, applying to Algeria, limits Jewish students to elementary and technical official examinations. A new text will authorize such students to take the examinations for secondary schools.

Jewish students thus admitted in higher education and who will have passed their examination satisfactorily shall no longer be subject to dismissal in the future through the application of the quota regulations.

Finally, the reinstatement of Jewish Professors and Teachers will be carried out within the limits of the number of jobs available.

PROPERTY REGULATIONS:

Gradually and in groups, Jewish owners and holders will have their property restored to them.

Administrators who have been called to the Army will not be replaced; in the future, the provisions against property will no longer be applied.

Finally, the restrictive interpretation of the law of 2 June, 1942 (Article V) setting up the list of forbidden professions, will be ended. For a certain number of professions, which are the most numerous, a great number of individual exceptions will be made in order to return to the situation prevailing formerly.

In reference to the liberal professions, the Resident General and the Governor General will be authorized to permit individual exceptions, which will be valid for the duration of the war for any text involving the prohibition of assignment or exercise of certain professions or functions, except those functions involving the granting of public authority and under reservation of regulations to insure technical competence.

In summary, the High Commissariat, in the different professions mentioned above, followed the two following principles:

IN THE FIRST PLACE:

(a) Putting an end to any individual decisions, arbitrary and unwarranted; returning to the Jews the possession of their property and
suspending all dispossession contemplated, allowing the Jews to return to
most professions, and, in any event, to settle under the system of individual
exception any case which could be considered as flagrant injustice; allowing
Jewish children to have suitable educational advantages; finally, allowing
all of them to fight with their comrades against the common enemy by return-
ing these officers to their ranks.

All of these measures had one single purpose; to make up for abuses,
put an end to arbitrary decisions and tolerate no persecution.

IN THE SECOND PLACE

(b) Avoiding, however, stirring up a sharp conflict among the Arabs and
the European population by abolishing the basic regulations which sought to
reduce the considerable share of influence which the Jews had attained in
French political life.

To attempt to act otherwise at the present time would be to go counter
to the solution sought.

It should be noted moreover, that if the retention of these laws should
provoces among the Jews a certain number of protests, practically speaking,
their present status will be seriously affected thereby. The whole political
question is summed up in the laws of the right of citizenship. Essentially,
this right of citizenship consists in the right to vote; and this right to
vote will not be exercised by Frenchmen until the end of hostilities.

The High Commissariat felt, therefore, that it had no right to create,
in time of war, throughout North Africa a conflict whose consequences would
be incalculable in order to insure for the Jews a theoretical right, which at
the present time and in fact is abandoned by all Frenchmen of their own
full volition. Moreover, the High Commissariat cannot forget the basic
problem of its mission, which is to contribute to victory and to put France
in a position to decide freely her own fate.

The High Commissariat cannot assume the responsibility of hindering
the war effort by causing internal disorders and substituting itself for the free
will of Frenchmen by modifying a law essentially political in nature and
which the French nation alone is empowered to modify.

The Commissariat is the less able to do so because of present cir-
cumstances it could not pass its decision on the opinion of the majority
of Frenchmen in North Africa. In so doing, the Commissariat would proceed
to carry out a purely arbitrary decision, similar to so many others which
were urged upon the French Government by Germany.

If the Commissariat were to undertake such action, it would confirm
the argument which is spread daily by the Axis radio to the effect that
Americans have broken their pledge not to take measures contrary to French
sovereignty.

It is important that the Commissariat should appear as a free Govern-
ment which has joined freely in the effort of the Allies for the common cause.
COMMENTS ON THE USE OF THE ACCOMPANYING NOTE

We do not know whether American Authorities intend to use publicly the information contained in the appended note, and under what form such use would take place. In case the Authorities do intend to use this note, we call their attention upon the following comments.

Liberal measures adopted in favor of the press or of the publishing trade in general, has been and will be, favorably accepted by public opinion; the same will be true, although with some reservations, concerning the measures adopted in favor of political internees. On the other hand, the publication of the different steps already taken, or being considered in favor of the Jews, particularly if taken as a whole, will inevitably give right to numerous reactions whose consequences can be serious.

The High Commissariat found itself in the following situation: For two years the official propaganda had daily repeated that the return of the Allies would mean the victory of the Jews. Since November 8, every day and even several times a day, Continental France and the Axis countries keep insisting that, scornful of French sovereignty, the American Authorities in North Africa, or more precisely President Roosevelt himself, are determined to impose upon the French Authorities a Pro-Jewish and Anti-Mohammedan Legislation. This propaganda, in a country where in contrast with France the problem of races has always prevailed, where Algerian Jews represent only one-half of one percent of the population, it is profoundly disturbing for public opinion. Considerable information gathered every day bears witness to this fact.

It should be noted moreover that the High Commissioner was firmly resolved, acting with complete independence, to put an end to a certain number of injustices and measures which were inspired (Hitlerian ideas). To solve this problem the High Commissariat has decided to proceed in most cases either through Administrative channels, or by way of individual exceptions granted in considerable numbers. This method was subject to application with a certain amount of discretion. In addition, everyone of these steps will be made public separately, rather than in a group. Thus a practical solution will be found for practically all problems which at the present time concern the Jews as individuals, while sparing in the meantime, and as far as possible, the feelings of the European and Arab populations.

We are not unaware of the fact that such a procedure leaves aside a certain political aspect of these problems, a sort of official omission which would be confirmed through publicity, but such a omission would in fact have the appearance of a revenge, even as the confirmation of German theories would give rise to wide spread concern and numerous conflicts.

The gradual attainment of a different mood of public opinion, and later on the achievement of victory, will undoubtedly make it possible to take a
different attitude.

Finally, we are in a state of war. All of our efforts must be aimed at mobilizing, in unity, all the spiritual and material forces in Africa. This conclusion must remain foremost and above all others. Any publication therefore, of these measures, involves the risk of compromising to a considerable extent the war effort.

Moreover it WOULD be politically unwise at a time when all Mohammedan countries are on the Allied side to give wide spread publicity to measures whose repercussion would extend far beyond the frontiers of French Africa. We must, therefore, insist that this information should be used as discreetly as possible. If, however, contrary to our views, American Authorities should desire to make public measures taken by the High Commissariat in favor of the Jews, we insist that the text of this announcement shall be established in consultation with the French Authorities in such a way as to enable them to endeavor to limit the consequences which would inescapably follow such a public announcement,
NOTE
on
UNIFIED AIR COMMAND
by MARSHAL OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE VISCOUNT TRENCHARD

15th December, 1942.

With the opening of the offensive against Germany, which has certainly
started, it may be as well to recall some of the conclusions with regard to
unified commands that were reached towards the end of the last war when the
offensive began to be opened, especially with regard to the Air.

All through this war there have been debates in Parliament on the
higher direction of the war all with a single purpose - to try to unify
command as much as possible, and our Prime Minister has been foremost in
trying to accomplish this.

The question of organisation of commands becomes acute when offensive
action is started, and it is difficult to combine the Air, Army and Navy.
It is easier in static or defensive warfare than it is in offensive warfare.

The chief difficulty is that of Air, which, provided Air bases are
made, can cover such vast areas, whereas Armies still cannot be more
effectively controlled than they were of old.

I was much impressed on my recent visit to the Middle East, Palestine,
Iraq, Syria, the Desert, Egypt, the Sudan and West Africa, how small it was
from an Air point of view, and what a few hours covered it, provided there
were Air bases. The Sudan alone is ten times the size of England. I
covered them all in a few hours flying. A comparatively few miles remains
a long day's journey for land and sea forces.

An important difficulty we now have to surmount is once again the
organisation of the Air Forces amongst the different Allies. When nations
have no separate Air Force, as at present with America, their Air Forces are
obviously an integral part of their Army or Navy.

I feel sure that the powers-that-be are alive to the difficulties
which will arise when we have cleared the enemy out of North Africa and our
offensive develops, if indeed some of these difficulties are not already with
us. In fact, we are back to a problem we solved in 1918.

During the last war, when it was decided to bomb Germany, it was
decided to form an Inter-Allied Air Force consisting of Americans, French,
Italian and ourselves under one command.
This organisation was formed and it just began to work, I admit, only a few days before the war came to an end. It had been thrashed out by Mr. Woodrow Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Clemenceau, General Pershing, Marshal Foch, Lord Haig and others, including Italians, and the conclusion that had been come to was that the Inter-Allied Air Force be unified for the offensive. This was another of the postulates that compelled the configuration of Air Command. True that I against Germany. I always understood that the Americans and Mr. Lloyd George took a leading part in backing this solution.

It was placed under one Commander-in-Chief, his forces widely dispersed for those days - in England, the South East of France, and they would have been in Prague if the war had not come to an end. The directions to the Air Officer-Commanding were that he was required to help when it was feasible in any major operation that was carried out by either the American Army, the French Army and the British Army. This Force was to come under the general direction of Marshal Foch.

One of the main reasons that brought about this decision was the necessity of combining Air under one command, not only from an operational point of view, but also from a supply point of view, based on the experience of war.

No Air Force can fight without the most efficient maintenance and supply organisation behind them. There are inevitably so many different types of aircraft, engines and air material, requiring hundreds of thousands of different components that it is essential to co-ordinate all requirements very carefully between the different theatres in which the forces are based, by means of unified command. It will be apparent when it is remembered all the diversity of machines used - and necessarily used - that it is essential to group the several machines for repair and supply purposes into the fewest possible bases. Otherwise, there must be great waste of shipping and transport space, together with overlapping and local shortage. This must mean failure to get the full results.

It was the recognition of these indisputable facts that really helped towards producing the arguments for forming a separate Air Force which I maintain still hold and have since endured, with one regrettable modification. Air Forces to-day are many times more complex than they were when this decision was taken, while their greater range enables them to be brought to bear operated from bases far more widely
separated than they were in the first year of war. The arguments therefore to do the same to-day are far more compelling.

It must also not be forgotten that bombing by night and night fighting which were in their infancy in the last war was another of the reasons that compelled the amalgamation of Air Commands. From what I have heard and seen of night work in this war it emphasises the necessity for unifying the Air for the coming offensives.

Finally, there is one Air, however many hundreds of miles apart the bases are. Splitting the Air into unnaturally small commands is to think in the terms of 1916-17, and can but lead to a waste of Air strength, of shipping, and to a dispersal of effort.
**BOTADURA DE UN ACORAZADO NORTTEAMERICANO**

**NUEVA YORK**

Hay ya habido botado en los astilleros de Filadelfia del acorazado "New Jersey" de la Marina de Guerra norteamericano, el acorazado más poderoso del mundo, y en batalla se ha hecho escasear dieciocho meses antes de lo proyectado.

Su principal armamento consta en nueve cañones de 16 pulgadas en tribuna, que serán en un futuro desmontados y en un regimiento de artillería antiaérea.

Despeja cerca de 35.000 tone-
llas y tiene una velocidad de más de 30 nudos.

Además del "New Jersey," fueron botados otros dos buques de guerra en los astilleros norteamericanos. Entre ellos figura el portanaveles Bunker Hill (que lleva 80 aviones).
"Un Orden Justo Para Todos los Pueblos"

WASHINGTON

El Seminario Internacional de Naciones Unidas y la Conferencia Nacional de Bienes Comunes han convenido en organizar el programa de "un orden justo y libre para todos los pueblos". Las conclusiones, dicen que América debe cumplir su parte en la dirección de un mundo mejor de las promesas de la vieja democracia. El cumplimiento de un gobierno mundial, es decir, el amor a la humanidad, se subdivide en el provecho de toda la riqueza del mundo y de sus organizaciones comerciales, obreras, agrícolas y profesionales libres, asistencias e intervenidas por los gobiernos. Los delegados estaban presentados por el Obispo de Buenos Aires, Miguel de Andés y el de México, Miguel Obispo Miranda, en una conferencia en honor de los delegados al Seminario Internacional de Naciones Unidas, en Nueva York.

El Archidiácono de Nueva York, Francisco J. Spellman, en el congreso, el Obispo de Buenos Aires, Miguel de Andés, (la espada) y el Obispo de México, Miguel Dario Miranda, en una comida dada en honor de los delegados al Seminario Internacional de Naciones Unidas, en Nueva York.

"Una Salvajada"

WASHINGTON

El Padrino Alberto de Taybes, ministro de la Inflación, en la isla de la Inflación, que el gobierno había provocado, dijo que los japoneses asustaron a dos sacerdotes católicos a dos meses en Guadalajara, durante el mes de Septiembre. Otro era información de la Hermandad de la Inflación, única superviviente de un grupo de dos sacerdotes y tres monjes que se hallaban en manos de los japoneses. La Hermandad de la Inflación dijo que sus sacerdotes, las Hermanas Silvia y Odilia, y los Padres Armando y Enrique Oudebbeek, fuesen muertos a balazos, porque los sacerdotes se negaron a seguir a la línea norte-ameriucana y decir al comandante que "los americanos no pasarán la guerra y dejen marcharse.

Yendo a la Cabeza

WASHINGTON

El señor Donald Nielson, presidente del Comité de la Producción, informó que los Estados Unidos están produciendo armas de combate, advertiendo que el número de armas producidas es un total de más de mil millones de extensión. Y seguido en todos los momentos, para lanzar un ataque coordinado.

El Convoy a África del Norte

WASHINGTON

La armada de las Naciones Unidas, que se traslada al Norte de África, se compone de 600 barcos, de los cuales 350 eran buques de guerra encargados de proteger la expedición. Fue la mayor operación antiaérea de la historia, siendo difícil hacerse una idea de lo que supone movilizar, dirigir, rentar y proteger tan gigantesca masa de barcos. Con 150 mil y un número de aviones que no puede revelarse, fueron reunidos en puntos muy separados entre sí, después se movieron sobre largas distancias de mar a tierra. Los aviones de las Naciones Unidas son los más avanzados de la historia, los almacén, máquinas y otros estaban presentes de mayor fuerza militar.

Dirigidos a los constructores de armas más importantes, el Almirante Leahy, jefe del Estado Mayor personal del Presidente Roosevelt, dijo: "Actualmente estamos construyendo modernos submarinos y misiles en diez y siete meses, la mitad de tiempo que empleábamos en la guerra anterior; estamos reconstruyendo aviones en tres años, en vez de cinco; y estamos produciendo destinos de guerra con el promedio de dos por mes, completándolos en dos meses.

Los papeles iban preparados de tal modo que pudieran descubrirse en el orden más conveniente. Supónemos que en dos meses de trabajo, en tierras y equipo, es posible descubrir el dominio de los jefes. En trayectoria directa desde Inglaterra a África, viendo por el mar, desbaratando para lanzar a la mañana siguiente el lado de sus aliados franceses.

El árabe de equipo enviado en este convoy, después de los grandes destinos de guerra, ha sido dispuesto para ser utilizado en el mismo momento de desembarco.

Ayuda Para el Norte de África

WASHINGTON

De conformidad con las promesas hechas por el Presidente Roosevelt, están enviados víveres suministrados al Africa Segregacional y Occidental. El Sr. Stephen Lehman, director de la nueva Organización de Comida y Para el Efectivo, consagra en breve una comisión al Africa Occidental Francesa con suministros y barcos por un valor de 50,000,000 y 15,000,000 libras esterlinas.

Los Estados Unidos han comprado, para su inmediato envío al África Segregacional Francesa artículos destinados a la población civil por valor de más de 1,250,000 libras esterlinas.

Se ha preparado un programa para la adaptación de otros suministros destinados a la población civil por muchas veces dicha suma que serán enviados tan pronto como se coman el número de barcos de gran carga. Los programas de compras incluyen, fecha equipada y en polvo, telas, ropa y comida, que se entregarán en los mercados locales más urgentemente.

Varias series enviadas con considerables cantidades de tejidos de algodón, ropas hechas y calzado.

Más Más y Más

Barcos

WASHINGTON

El Contralor General del Servicio de Construcciones Navales, ha anunciado que los objetivos fijados por el Secretario Roosevelt—hacer millones de toneladas de barcos para 1945 y 1946—serán alcanzados en el plazo previsto. También anunció que las transacciones con la industria, que es presidente, está programando grandes aumentos en las producciones de barcos —en una cantidad tan grande como los alcances, máquinas y otros— que están presentes de mayor fuerza militar.

Los barcos fueron construidos por los mejores constructores de armas, después de que sus armas fueran usadas en la guerra. Los barcos fueron construidos por los mejores constructores de armas, después de que sus armas fueran usadas en la guerra. Los barcos fueron construidos por los mejores constructores de armas, después de que sus armas fueran usadas en la guerra. Los barcos fueron construidos por los mejores constructores de armas, después de que sus armas fueran usadas en la guerra.
Art dummy for Lend-Lease leaflet to France. 750,000 ordered. Similar to be done for Italy.

This is the master copy of 750,000 leaflets to be printed by A.W.I. for dropping over France.
Le monde sait aujourd'hui que les Fascistes n'ont rien à offrir à la jeunesse... sinon la mort.
MESSAGE À LA JEUNESSE par FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, Président des Etats-Unis

DEPUIS nombre d’années Allemands et Japonais lancent à la jeunesse leurs appels hypocrites : ils s’efforcent par une publicité tapageuse de se faire passer pour les champions de la jeunesse. Mais le monde est aujourd’hui que les Nazis, les Fascistes et les Militaristes japonais n’ont rien à offrir à la jeunesse… sinon la mort.

Au contraire, c’est la cause des Nations Unies qui est la cause de la jeunesse même. C’est l’espoir de la génération nouvelle, c’est celui des générations à venir, c’est l’espoir d’une vie nouvelle qui pourra être vécue dans la liberté, dans l’honnêteté.

Ceci devient chaque jour plus évident aux yeux des Jeunes en Europe, où les Nazis essayent de créer des groupements de jeunesse façonnés sur le modèle nazi. Ce n’est pas là un modèle conçu par la jeunesse, pour la jeunesse ; c’est le modèle conçu par Hitler et imposé à la jeunesse par une espèce de gavage mental — par un régime de faits menacés et déformés, avec interdiction de penser — tout le soutien par les Esprits de la Gestapo.

Si vous avez des doutes sur ce que les jeunes Européens hommètent pensent des promesses trompeuses que les maîtres de l’Axe font à la jeunesse du monde, voyez comment les jeunes gens de France et de tous les pays occupés affrontent le peloton d’exécution plutôt que d’accepter la perspective d’une vie d’esclave intégrée sous Hitler.

Dans les malheureux pays tels que la Finlande, la Hongrie, la Bulgarie, la Roumanie et l’Italie, où les gouvernements ont jugé nécessaire de se soumettre à Hitler et d’accomplir ses volontés, les guerres ont eux aussi organisé des mouvements de jeunesse, mais ce n’est que des mouvements de jeunesse conçus par centaines de milliers, vers les champs de carnage du front oriental, où les Nazis ont besoin de chair à canon dans leur tentative désespérée pour mettre en pièces l’armée russe.

Pour nous, nous exaltons à la pensée que ce sont les jeunes, les jeunes hommes et les jeunes femmes libres des Nations Unies qui tiennent entre leurs mains et façonnent le monde nouveau.

Avant la première guerre mondiale très peu de gens en quelque pays que ce fût croyaient que la jeunesse eût le droit soit de parler en son propre nom en tant que collectivité, soit de participer aux conseils de l’Etat.

Depuis lors nous avons beaucoup appris. Nous savons que la jeunesse ne vient pas nécessairement avec les années, que les vieilles gens peuvent être des sots et les jeunes gens des sages. Dans la plupart des guerres c’est la jeunesse génération qui supporte le poids de la lutte et qui reçoit l’héritage de tous les maux que la guerre laisse dans son sillage.

Dans ces crises économiques qui suivirent la fausse prospérité d’autrefois la guerre mondiale beaucoup de jeunes gens et de jeunes femmes souffrirent encore plus que leurs aînés, car ils se virent refuser les possibilités les plus élémentaires de s’instruire, d’apprendre un métier, de travailler et même de se nourrir suffisamment pour se former des corps robustes. Par suite ils furent tentés de chercher quelque remède simple non seulement à leurs problèmes individuels, mais aussi à tous les problèmes qui hantent le monde. Les uns écoutèrent des voix alléchantes venues de l’étranger, qui avaient des réponses toutes prêtes à toutes les questions. "La démocratie est morte," disaient ces voix. "Suivez-nous!"... Nous avons rejeté de nombreux chemins qui mènent à la catastrophe. Nous avons appris une leçon précieuse.

D’autres jeunes gens, dans les démocraties, écoutèrent les évangiles de désespoir. Ils se réfugièrent dans le cynisme et l’amertume.

Cependant le jour a fini par venir où toutes les théories ont dû céder la place à la réalité, à la terrible et tangible réalité des bombardements en piqué et des panzardivisions, à la menace présente faite à la sécurité de tous les foyers, de toutes les familles, dans tous les pays libres du monde.

Et lorsque cette réalité est devenue évidente à nos jeunes gens, ils ont répondu à l’appel aux armes. Il y a été répondu par des millions, et aujourd’hui ils sont résolus à combattre jusqu’au jour où les forces d’agression seront entièrement anéanties.

En Norvège, en Hollande, en Belgique et en France, en Turquie, en Pologne, en Serbie, en Grèce un esprit de résistance défi l’oppression brutale, la cruauté barbare, le terrorisme des Nazis. Désarmés, mais indomptables, les peuples portent encore des coups à leurs oppresseurs. Enjambant l’ignorance, ils écoutent, au pari de leur vie, de lointains postes de radio; et de bouche en bouche par paroles discrètes, de main en main par les journaux clandestins, les patriotes se transmettent la vérité. Quand sonnera pour ces peuples l’heure de leur libération, l’ordre nouveau de l’Europe qui est né par la force des armes que nous avons détruit par les mains de nos propres victimes.

Aujourd’hui les jeunes gens en armes de Russie et de Chine, comprenant la dignité de l’individu, brisent les derniers maillons des anciennes chaînes des impérialismes et des despotismes qui les tintent si longtemps prisonniers.

C’est là un développement historique d’une importance incalculable. Cela signifie que le vieux terme de "civilisation occidentale" ne convient plus. Des événements mondiaux et les bases communes de l’humanité entière ont uni la culture de l’Asie à celle de l’Europe et des Amériques pour former pour la première fois une vraie civilisation mondiale.

Par la conception des "Quatre Libertés" et par les principes fondamentaux de la Charte de l’Atlantique nous sommes fixés des buts élevés et des objectifs illimités.

Ces conceptions et ces principes ont en vue la création d’un monde où hommes, femmes et enfants pourront vivre dans la liberté et l’égalité, et surtout à l’abri de la crainte des horreurs de la guerre. Car il n’est pas de soldats ni de marins dans nos forces armées qui endurcireraient si volontiers aujourd’hui les rieurs du combat, s’ils pensaient que dans vingt ans leurs propres fils devoirient à leur tour prendre part à une autre guerre, dans des déserts ou sur des mers éloignés, dans des jungs ou des champs lointains.

Nous savons fort bien que nous n'arriverons pas à nos objectifs facilement. Ce n’est pas en une nuit que pouvoir pourra s’accomplir pleinement notre idéal. Nous savons que la lutte actuelle sera longue, rude et dure, — qu’il nous restera encore immensément à faire après que le dernier bombardier allemand, japonais ou italien aura été abattu.

Mais nous croyons fermement que, guidés par Dieu, nous pourrons — dans le monde difficile d’aujourd’hui et dans le nouveau monde d’après-guerre — progresser toujours davantage vers ces buts que les plus élevés que les hommes aient jamais conçus.

Nous, les citoyens des Nations Unies, nous possédons les moyens techniques, les ressources matérielles, et, par dessus tout, l’esprit d’aventure, le courage, l’inspiration; les moments nécessaires pour édifier et maintenir l’esprit d’ordre mondial qui seule peut justifier les sacrifices offertes consacrées aujourd’hui par notre jeunesse.

Mais il faut nous persévérer — ne jamais nous relâcher, ne jamais faiblir, ne jamais craindre — et il faut nous persévérer ensemble.

Il nous faut maintenir l’effort contre le mal sous toutes ses formes. Il nous faut travailler et combattre pour faire en sorte que nos enfants jouissent en paix de leurs droits inaliénables à la liberté de parole et à la liberté de religion, libérée de la bagnole et libérée de la craine.

C’est seulement à ces conditions bétiques que cette guerre totale pourra aboutir à une victoire totale.

Franklin Roosevelt

USA

CE TRACT A ÊTÉ LANCÉ PAR UN BOMBARDIER AMéricain
GERECHTIGKEIT

DER Präsident der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, Franklin D. Roosevelt, hat die folgende Erklärung zu den deutschen Greuelnaten in den besetzten Ländern Europas abgegeben:


In der Mitteilung, die mir soeben von den Missionschefs der Nieder-
Diese Flugblatt wurde von einem amerikanischen Bomber abgeworfen

lande, Jugoslawiens und Luxemburgs zugegangen ist, wird festgestellt, dass diese Akte der Unterdrückung und des Terrors Anmaße und Formen angenommen haben, die die Befürchtung recht- fertigen, dass der barbarische und erbarmungslose Charakter der Besetzung mit dem Heranrücken der Niederlage der feindlichen Staaten noch stärker ausgeprägt werden und möglicherweise sogar zur Ausrottung gewisser Volkgruppen führen wird.

Wie ich am 25. Oktober 1941 festgestellt habe, bringt die in den derzeit unter das Nazijoch gebrachten Ländern herrschende Übung, als Vergeltung für vereinzelte Angriffe auf Deutsche Dutzende von unschuldigen Geiseln hinzurichten, selbst eine gegen Leiden und Brutalität abgestumpfte Welt in Wallung. Seit langem haben Kulturvölker sich zu eigen gemacht, dass niemand für die Tat eines anderen bestraft werden darf. Ausserstande, die an solchen Angriffen beteiligten Personen zu fassen, schachten die Nazis bestechenderweise fünffzig oder hundert unschuldige Menschen ab. Alle die, welche mit Hitler "zusammenarbeiten" oder ihn friedlich stimmen möchten, können an dieser schrecklichen Warnung nicht vorübergehen.

Die Nazis sollten aus dem letzten Krieg gelernt haben, dass es nicht möglich ist, den menschlichen Geist durch Terror zu brechen. Statt dessen dehnen sie ihren "Lebensraum" und ihre "Neue Ordnung" bis zu Abgründen des Grauens aus, zu denen selbst sie bisher nicht herabgesunken waren. Das sind die Handlungen von Menschen, die nichts zu verlieren haben, und die in ihrem Inneren wissen, dass sie nicht gewinnen können. Grauen kann Europa niemals Frieden bringen. Es streut nur die Saat eines Hasses aus, die eines Tages furchtbare Vergeltung tragen wird.

Die Regierung der Vereinigten Staaten hat seit geraumer Zeit Kenntnis von diesen Verbrechen. Unsere Regierung erhalt laufend weitere Mitteilungen zuverlässigen Ursprungs und ist dankbar für Berichte aus jeder vertrauenswürdigen Quelle, die dazu beitragen, unser standig wachsendes Nachrichten- und Beweismaterial auf dem neuesten Stand zu halten und verlässlich zu machen.

L’Amérique en Guerre
SPECIAL

REVUE DE LA PRESSE AMERICaine

The New York Times

28.11.42

Lorsque la grande tragédie de Toulon s’est déroulée, le général de Gaulle a estimé que la situation était d’une telle gravité que l’activité industriel de la France continuait à être nécessaire pour la victoire allemande. Il a alors décidé de prendre des mesures pour faire face à la situation. Les Allemands avaient amené de nombreux matériels dans le port de Toulon, mais ils ne pouvaient pas les utiliser immédiatement car ils manquaient de personnel qualifié.

The Washington Post

28.11.42

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Salt Lake City Telegram

28.11.42

Le sabordage de la flotte française à Toulon représente un gain important pour les Nations Unies et une menace pour le monde libre. Le sabordage est une mesure exceptionnelle qui a été prise pour empêcher la flotte de tomber entre les mains des Allemands. Les conséquences de cette action seront sans doute importantes pour le cours des événements à venir.

The Cleveland Plain Dealer

28.11.42

Les Français savent maintenant que la moindre tentative de collaboration avec l’ennemi a été effecctuée des moyens. Cette action de sabordage de la flotte française est un acte de résistance qui a été réalisé dans l’intérêt de gagner le temps et de retarder l’avancée ennemie.

Houston Post

28.11.42

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Los Angeles Times

(11.12.45)

M. Désir, le rédacteur en chef d’Heller, déclare au monde entier que la France est en guerre contre le Grand-Ballon et les États-Unis, à la suite de l’occupation anti-neutrale de l’Afrique française. M. Désir n’a pas exprimé la pensée qui lui inspire cette déclaration. Il fait des appels aux traditionnelles marines et à la croix rouge. Le journaliste de l’Indépendant, qui a saisi la nouvelle, s’est rendu à la tribune des bateaux héroïques de Vichy.

Indianapolis Star

(11.12.45)

L’ambassade de France dans le monde a été fermée ce matin. Dans une déclaration à la presse, M. Désir a confié que la France avait été mise en danger par les événements de la veille. Le général de Gaulle a requis un appel à la croix rouge.

The Dallas News

(11.12.45)

Le général de Gaulle a envoyé au général de Vichy une lettre demandant son aide pour la libération de la France. Le général de Gaulle a exprimé son admiration pour la résistance française.

The Cincinnati Plain Dealer

(11.12.45)

Le général de Gaulle a demandé au général de Vichy de lui fournir des informations sur la situation en France. Le général de Gaulle a affirmé que la France était prête à résister.

The Chicago Sun

(11.12.45)

Le général de Gaulle a déclaré que la France était prête à résister. Il a demandé au général de Vichy de lui fournir des informations sur la situation en France. Le général de Gaulle a affirmé que la France était prête à résister.

The Atlanta Journal

(11.12.45)

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The New York Times

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LA GUERRE DANS LE PACIFIQUE

Suite de la page 1

... forces s'avançant. Nous avons livré une bataille acharnée, et elle continue jusqu'au bout. Il ne se peut y avoir de chemins facile à travers le voile..."

L'Amérique reçut un choc soudain lors de l'attaque surprise de débarquement à Pearl Harbor. Les échos soudains aux échos, et au prin
tempo de 1942, le Japon est dans une position telle qu'il semblait que la ligne tisse entre l'Amérique et le sud-ouest du Pacifique pourrait être rompue, et que l'Amérique pourrait être submergée et servir de bastion aux Japonais pour un essai vers l'ouest où ils pourraient rejoindre les attaques des autres forces de l'axe.

En mai, les Japonais ont essayé d'attaquer une pointe et ont été repoussés par les Alliés du sud de l'Amérique par cette route. Leurs marins se retiraient vers le Japon, et il devint clair que la prochaine attaque se produirait quelque part entre les Américains et Midway.

Puis les Japonais tentèrent les Salomon en août, et cette foi le pouvoir des Nations-Unis avait été suffisamment établi dans cette région pour parer à ce coup. Avec des forces américaines pour soutenir cette année de guerre dans le Pacifique, les Japonais ont vraiment atteint le tournant de la guerre.

Toute la stratégie japonaise dans le Pacifique a été de jouer un jeu de stratégie. Hitler aurait ainsi reconnu l'aide de la marine japonaise. Il y avait une telle quantité de diversité contre l'Union Soviétique. Il a fallu y arriver. Les Japonais continuent leur chemin solitaire, fixé sur leur maîtrise de l'Extrême-Orient, fini sur le bord de chasser les Nations-Unis du Pacifique Sud et de couper la ligne de communications de l'Amérique.

Ce chemin solitaire fut si orageux que le Japon se retrouve sans forces dans sa dernière tentative malheureuse contre les Salomon. Ainsi d'atteindre ses objectifs, le Japon doit simplement être maitre des champs d'aviation et des monstres des Salomon et de la Nouvelle-Guinée. Sans eux le Japon ne pourra jamais remplir les communications entre les États-Unis et la Guinée, et sans les rapports de ces communications le Japon ne pourra jamais maintenir ses conquêtes dans les Îles Néerlandaises. C'était tout ou rien, et on doit s'imposer, c'est ainsi pour le Japon.

Il y a un an, les Japonais avaient une supériorité navale quantitative sur les États-Unis, mais les États-Unis étaient obligés de déployer leurs forces entre les deux océans. Aujourd'hui, cette supériorité n'est plus, grâce à la mer de Corail, à Midway et aux Salomon.

Des différences essentielles maintenant que les Japonais ont perdu à la fin de l'année, la part de la guerre aux États-Unis, 29 sous-marins, 28 torpilleurs, 80 transports et 10 navires mar- chands. Au cours de la même période, l'Amérique a perdu un escadron, 43 avions, 17 destroyers, 22 torpilleurs, 5 sous-marins et 47 autres bâtiments. Le total est de 505 pour la Japon, 85 pour les États-Unis. On croit que les pertes du Japon en avions ont atteint déjà 1 000. Il est significatif qu'aucun porte-avions japonais n'a pris part à la dernière bataille près des Salomon, simplement parce que le Japon n'ose pas lancer des forces en mer. L'Amérique a à peine une année moins sous les armes, mais il est évident que le Japon a perdu un espace de mer de l'Amérique.

Le Japon ne pourra jamais réduire le Japon aux États-Unis ou en Europe, mais il est évident que le Japon a perdu un espace de mer de l'Amérique.

Les États-Unis ont une supériorité navale, une supériorité aérienne, une supériorité terrestre, et une supériorité nucléaire.

Des membres de la Commission d'Armistice italo-allemande escortés par un soldat américain après leur arrestation à Fallala.

Un sentiment américain tend la main de l'amitié au fil d'un marin français à Fallala.

La France a l'Honneur

Washington

Le président Roosevelt a annoncé la nomination de M. Herbert S. Lehman, gouverneur de l'État de New York, au poste de Directeur des Approvisionnements pour le ravitaillage en armes et matériels. M. Lehman, un des administrateurs les plus capables en Amérique remplit des fonctions similaires à celles remplies par M. Herbert Hoover au cours de la dernière guerre. Le travail accompli par M. Hoover pour alimenter les Belges affamés ne sera jamais oublié.

Il appartient au gouverneur Lehman d'entreprendre la tâche formidable de fournir de vivres, de vêtements et de produits médicaux aux peuples du monde d'où ils seront libérés de la domination de l'Allemagne et des armées des Nations-Unis. Il veillera à la distribution ordonnée et équitable des approvisionnements conditionnés après la guerre.

Deux jours après la création des trois ministères en France en 1918, le premier cargo chargé de ravitaillement appartenait d'un port américain.

Cette seule, nous ne savons pas et ne voulons pas y arriver, mais nous savons que nous avons pu atteindre l'endroit de cessez-le-feu. Le président Roosevelt a déclaré que des approvisionnements de produits alimentaires et de produits médicaux seront expédiés de suite en Afrique de Nord.

Le DIRECTEUR DES SECOURS

WASHINGTON

Lorsque les premières troupes américaines quittent la région d'Oran pour la frontière de Tunis, elles reçoivent une garde d'honneur composée par les forces présentes des États-Unis. Désormais un message de bienveillance traduit par le commandant Reiffel, le major-général Frewild, commandant les troupes des États-Unis à Oran déclare:

"Les troupes américaines qui se rendent devant vous sont venues pour accompagner votre départ pour votre voyage historique vers l'Est. Là, vous retrouverez vos camarades qui combattaient si vaillamment il y a cinq ans avec les troupes italiennes et britanniques contre l'ennemi commun."

"Nous savons aussi qu'une Afrique du Nord unie avec les forces françaises dévouées à la cause de la France libre à nouveau unis.

ECOUTEZ

24 heures par jour sans interruption, émissions sur ondes courtes provenant directement des États-Unis dans les bandes des:

16m, 19m, 31m, 49m.

Aux, à toute heure, à la demande, sur les bandes suivantes:

16m, 19m, 20m, 30m, 31m, 49m, 59m, 69m, 99m.

EMISSIONS AMÉRICAINES DANS LA R.B.C.

Heures en France.

16h 15 New York via la R.B.C.
1500m, 27m et sur ondes courtes dans les bandes des:

49m, 41m, 31m, 25m.

16h 15 New York via la R.B.C.
1500m, 27m, 28m et sur ondes courtes dans les bandes des:

49m, 41m, 31m, 25m.

EMISSIONS FRANÇAISES DE LA R.B.C.

Chaque jour, de 0h 15 à 0h 15 (heure du pays occupé) le R.B.C. adresse à la France des émissions, dont chacune commence au quart.

Longueurs d'ondes, Émissions sont données sur les longueurs d'ondes suivantes:

1500m, 17m, 26m et sur ondes courtes dans les bandes des:

99m, 49m, 31m, 25m.
**Le rapport de Roosevelt montre l'esprit d'équipe des Alliés**

**RéF - Location** est le nom de l'organisation par laquelle les Nations Unies sont appelées à coordonner leurs efforts communs: écarter l'Allemagne, l'Italie et le Japon; assurer le ravitaillement suffisant du monde entier en vivres et en fournitures essentielles après la guerre.

Roosevelt vient de publier son 7ème rapport trimestriel sur les travaux de l'organisation "RéF - Location". Il a accompagné ce rapport d'une lettre au Congrès, dans laquelle il écrit:


L'armée soviétique qui a tenté à Stalingrad avec résistance et courage est maintenant passée à l'offensive.

Les Japonais ont dû dénoncer sans compter des navires et des hommes dans les îles Salomon, champ de bataille de notre propre choix.

Les puissances de l'Axe ont, pour le moment du moins, perdu l'initiative. Il faudrait que nous fassions tout ce que nous pouvons pour les empêcher de prendre le contrôle de la région.

Nous devons gagner la totalité des forces des Nations Unies contre l'ennemi.

Les récents événements et mon rapport sur le rôle de l'organisation "Prêt - Location" prouvent, je pense, que nous faisons des progrès dans ce sens.

Nous avons aussi un autre devoir qui grandit parallèlement avec notre puissance, et au fur et à mesure que de nouveaux territoires seront libérés de l'emprise de l'ennemi.

Il est de faire parvenir des médicaments, des vivres, des vêtements et autres fournitures essentielles aux populations qui ont été pillées, dépouillées et affaiblies.

Les nazis et les Japonais ont massacré au cours de campagnes de terreur organique, des femmes et des enfants innocents. Ils ont détruit leur pays, qu'ils occupent, et d'autres pays. Ils se servent de la faim comme d'un instrument de cet esclavage qu'ils cherchent à imposer.

Notre politique est diamétralement opposée. Nous, les Nations Unies, apportons des vivres à ceux qui en ont fait et des médicaments aux malades.

Toute l'aide possible sera donnée en vue de rendre aux peuples libres et au monde, même dans les zones où les forces, afin que chacun d'eux puisse contribuer pleinement à la victoire des Nations Unies et à la paix qui lui suivra.

Faisons de la guerre de la poussière et des rois, un~sorte de guerre; elle ne peut être gagnée que par la mise en commun de toutes les ressources des Nations Unies, afin de pouvoir faire face à l'ennemi avec le maximum de force, sur le champ de bataille et aux moments voulus par les Allemands.

D'ailleurs, depuis le mois d'octobre 1942, environ 60 % des exportations de "Prêt-Location" ont été destinées à la Grande-Bretagne, 30 % au Canada, 10 % à l'U.R.S.S. et 7 % à d'autres régions, et 21 % à l'U.R.S.S. Depuis janvier 1943, les exportations mondiales vers la Grande-Bretagne et vers les États-Unis ont augmenté de manière sensible. Les navires ont été nombreux et ont pu être utilisés dans les zones où la Russie a contribué à la lutte contre l'ennemi.

Une partie de l'équipement militaire envoyé à la Grande-Bretagne a été transporté par les navires de l'U.R.S.S. à l'Égypte, aux Indes et aux autres régions du Moyen-Orient. De plus, la Grande-Bretagne a envoyé à ces pays une grande partie de ses propres productions de matériel de guerre.

Les États-Unis et la Grande-Bretagne ont, par exemple, envoyé aux nations qui se battent contre

**L'A.O.F. SE RALLIE AUX NATIONS UNIES**

Un accord a été conclu entre le général Dwight D. Eisenhower et le Maréchal M. Boisson, Gouverneur Général de l'Afrique Occidentale Française. Le texte de l'annonce suit:

"Le général Eisenhower, Commandant-en-Chef des forces alliées en Afrique du Nord a annoncé que..."
Le Président Roosevelt parle de l'entraînement parmi les Alliés

La reconstruction en L'AOF se rallie aux Alliés

BIR-HAKEIM

Il y avait six mois que les Forces Françaises Co-Opératives, sous l'ordre du général Archambault, la mission de Bir Hakeim devait partir pour le front de Léningrad, et avait fait passer un message d'adoption dans le monde entier.

Les Forces Françaises Co-Opératives, missionnée par Bir Hakeim, ont reçu, en s'alignant sur les ordres reçus, le 15 septembre, la mission de prendre possession du front de Léningrad, et même de le donner à leurs alliés. Les ordres donnés à la mission ont été exécutés avec un bruit quasi-optique, après avoir reçu des ordres de leurs commandants et de leur organisation, pour se porter à l'assaut des fronts français. Les forces françaises ont alors été envoyées vers Bir Hakeim, où elles ont rejoint les Alliés, et ont reçu un message de bienvenue.

L'HONNEUR

Le Président Roosevelt a demandé au Sénateur A. Douglass, des Forces Françaises Co-Opératives, de s'adresser à la Légion du Nord pour exprimer sa gratitude à leur mission de reconstruction en L'AOF, et a accordé l'honneur de la Légion à leurs soldats. Les forces françaises, qui ont participé à cette mission, ont reçu l'honneur de la Légion du Nord pour leur reconquête en L'AOF.
L'AMÉRIQUE EN GUERRE

TROIS DES CHEFS ALIÉS DÉCLARENT :

EISENOWER

Le général Eisenhower a, dans une déclaration, représentée ci-dessous, salué la victoire alliée et félicité le R.A.F. de son bon travail.

"La R.A.F. a déjà, saluée par les forces américaines, a très principales tâches à accomplir. Le moment et la fermeté du feu est de protéger l'avant-garde de l'armée ennemie du marché de ces objectives importants à Tunisie et à Bizerte. La technique et la protection des avions en Méditerranée et des batiments alliés en échec-

BOISSEAU

Le général Boisseau, qui était membre de l'Etat-Major du général Foch, était dans la guerre de 1914-18, a déclaré à Oran : "Je ne saurais trop dire du nombre des chefs alliés qui se battent contre les armées aux côtés des américains et des anglais.

STANDLEY

L'amiral William S. Standley, Ambassadeur des États-Unis à Moscou, a dit à Londres que la situation de l'armée française en Tunisie est celle de la guerre de 1914-18, a déclaré à Oran : "Je ne saurais trop dire du nombre des chefs alliés qui se battent contre les armées aux côtés des américains et des anglais.

Les Français en Russie

L'avant-garde de l'escadrille française Contra-Band "Normandie" a été accueillie à Moscou pour se battre sur le front oriental aux côtés des Forces Armées Rouges, déclaré une dépêche A.P. de Moscou.

Les exploits du Col. Raff

D'immeubles historiques sur les flancs et des gazettes du colonel Raff, qui est chargé en Tunisie d'une mission très délicate, ont été accueillis avec une affectation extrêmement délicate.

Les chefs alliés continuent d'espérer que les armées françaises puissent intervenir pour un meilleur avenir. Les Français ont l'espoir de profiter de l'opportunité pour un meilleur avenir.

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Dans le courant de cette mission, ils espèrent que les armées françaises puissent intervenir pour un meilleur avenir. Les Français ont l'espoir de profiter de l'opportunité pour un meilleur avenir.
administration of emetine. From four to eight of these treatments are given over a period of a week or ten days, at the end of which time most patients have a strong aversion to liquor of any kind. This reflex aversion is periodically reinforced by giving one or two treatments at intervals of one to three months throughout the first year, during which period relapses are most apt to occur. Lemere and his colleagues now report a follow-up study of 1,194 patients. Of the 644 patients treated within the last two years, 74.8 per cent are still abstinent, 52.5 per cent of 291 patients treated from two to four years ago are still abstinent and 51.5 per cent of 259 patients treated four or more years ago are still abstinent. The authors feel that the advantages of this treatment lie in its short duration, its wide applicability and its ready acceptance by the patient. They believe that the results to date constitute this as the best available treatment for alcoholism.—Lemere, Frederick; Voeglin, W. L.; Broz, W. R.; O'Hollaren, Paul, and Tupper, W. E.: Journal of the American Medical Association, September 26, 1942.)

* * *

Age of Appearance of Ossification Centers for Determining Skeletal Status of Children:

The onset of ossification by means of serial roentgenograms was observed in three centers of the skeleton in order to test whether this stage of development is a reliable indicator of maturity. The centers studied were the distal epiphysis of the ulna, the first sesamoid of the thumb and the crest of the ilium. The age of first appearance of each center and the concomitant mean total skeletal age were each correlated with the menarcheal age. The age at which the epiphysis of the distal phalanx of the second finger fuses with its metaphysis was studied with a view to substituting it for iliac age in the formulation. Thirty boys and thirty girls whose records covered the necessary age range were used for the study. One hundred girls were added to the group in order to compare their iliac age with the menarcheal age. The onset of ossification in the crest of the ilium is discussed as a possible maturity determinant for use during the adolescent period in both boys and girls.

The age at onset of ossification in the three centers designated by Buehl and Pyle as ulnar age, sesamoid age and iliac age was found to provide as reliable a measure of maturity as the concomitant mean total skeletal age in this group of children. Ossification began in these three centers according to the normal order of general development peculiar to each sex, i.e., boys follow girls in sequence of ossification. The ages at which ossification began in these three centers each correlated more closely with the menarcheal ages than did the corresponding mean total skeletal ages in this group. Ossification began in the ilium within six months of the menarche in two-thirds of these girls. Fusion in the distal phalanx of the second finger also began near the menarche. This phenomenon occurred shortly after the menarche in a majority of the group. It was suggested that onset of ossification in the crest of the ilium might possibly indicate a point in the maturation cycle of the male which is comparable to that existing in the female at the time of the menarche.—Buehl, C. C., and Pyle, S. I.: J. Pediat., September, 1942.)
been graded according to the carefully described plan; the histologic and clinical data were compared. The histologic grade of carcinoma of the prostate based on the degree of abnormality of the acini, the cells and the nuclei is of use in predicting the length of survival of the patient. The more important clinical points taken into consideration were the duration of survival, incidence of metastasis and roentgen therapy. They concluded that the grade of the carcinoma indicates the probability of the occurrence of metastasis, that the higher grades of cancer occur at slightly earlier ages than the lower, and, finally, that roentgen therapy appears to lengthen survival time, particularly in patients with the higher grades of carcinoma.—(Evans, Newton; Barnes, R. W., and Brown, Albert P.; Arch. Path., September, 1942.)

What U.S. Doctors are Talking About:

Current mobilization of a Women's Field Army of 25,000 volunteer workers to "fight cancer with knowledge." Under the auspices of the American Society of the Control of Cancer, 200 women from all over the U.S., who will act as leaders in the drive, have just finished an intensive two weeks' course in causes and prevention of cancer which included detailed lectures at New York City's five cancer prevention clinics. Experimental tests on two species of rats and dogs at the National Institute of Health, which indicate that adrenochrome, a synthetic derivative of adrenalin first discovered in England five years ago, may be highly effective in the reduction of blood pressure. Kidney extracts and the mushroom extract, tyrosinase, previously used for this purpose, can be obtained in only small amounts; adrenochrome, although its value for human beings can as yet only be prophesied, is relatively easy to manufacture.

Report of the successful treatment of U.S. sailors who had received blast injuries of the lung in the Pacific. In addition, prostatic or other symptoms and sequelae, the most important of which is the fact that the patient with prostatic carcinoma, who is usually an elderly man, can live years longer.

Sulfonamides in Ointment Form:

Miller reports the treatment of a total of 115 patients during the past year with sulfanilamide and its derivatives in ointment bases. The dermatoses could be placed in three groups: (1) primary infections of the skin; (2) diseases of the skin with secondary pyogenic infections; and (3) miscellaneous diseases. The first group includes impetigo contagiosa, eczema, syphilis, ulcers, circumscribed dermatitis, and the dermatitis Reepes. The second group includes infected eczema, chronic dermatitis of the fingers of unknown origin, allergic eczema with secondary infection, dermatophytosis with secondary infection, and psoriasis. The third group includes all forms of the pustular type, seborrheic dermatitis and pustular and toxiological.

The preparations used were sulfanilamide, sulfathiazole, sodium sulfathiazole and sulfadiazine in strengths varying from 5 to 50 per cent. They were incorporated in two different bases, which were essentially in oil emulsions. The base most frequently used contained diethanolamine olate, white wax, liquid petrolatum, white petrolatum and distilled water. The preparation was compounded so that the drugs were in a suspended state, the size of the suspension being approximately a colloidal one. They were in solution to about the degree of their solubility in water (0.8 per cent in the case of sulfanilamide and 0.1 per cent in the case of sulfathiazole). Cure was obtained in all patients with superficial pyogenic infections, such as impetigo, in a shorter average time than that reported with accepted methods of treatment. In patients with cutaneous diseases secondarily infected, the secondary infections were quickly cured, but further treatment with the ointment did not favorably affect the primary disease. Results in patients with deeper pyogenic infection, such as syphilis, were variable, apparently depending on the ability of the patient to reach the seat of the infection. Sulfathiazole ointment produced the only reactions noted. This ointment in 5 per cent concentration produced an unusual and apparently characteristic reaction in 2 patients. The identical reaction was subsequently produced in one of these patients by giving sulfathiazole by mouth. A 5 per cent concentration of sulfanilamide or sulfathiazole produced the only reactions noted. (Miller, J. Lowry; Arch. Dermat. & Syph., September, 1942.)

Conditioned Reflex Treatment of Chronic Alcoholism:

The conditioned reflex treatment of chronic alcoholism was first described by Voegtlin in 1940. It consists essentially in establishing a reflex aversion to the sight, smell, taste and thought of alcoholic beverages by means of emetin. The emetine produces prompt emesis of imbibed alcoholic beverages which are urged on the patient for thirty to forty-five minutes after the

Americans will find much to think about in the long awaited report of Sir William Beveridge, which is the result of a prolonged study undertaken at the request of the British Government. This report is concerned with the problems of Britain and with means of improving conditions of life there. Therefore its solicits proposals are of only secondary importance to us. The British have their problems and we have ours. In some respects they are similar and in others totally different.

But one thing Democrats have in common—a need to improve continuously the adjustment of conditions that arise out of the impact of the swift-moving industrial age. Some interests in Britain do not have a counterpart here. But the Beveridge report and all the other discussion that is going on represent a determination to make England a better place to live in after the war. Busy as people are lending aid and with the war they find time to discuss these questions.

Captain Oliver Lyttelton, Minister of Production and a British industrialist, says in discussing these questions that the essence of democracy after the war should "a balance between the organizing power of the State and the driving power of the free individual." That puts it into as neat a package as I have seen.

P.M., New York: December 2.

Remember the last war? It was Mr. Thomas Atkins then, as now. And when Tommy was borrowing in the mud of Ypres, or charging into machine-gun fire at Cambrai, the folks at home promised him to make Britain "a land fit for heroes." This was the catch phrase then, remember?

And remember the U.S.A.? The boys were going to a war to end war, to make the world safe for democracy. It was the new freedom then. We live in the four freedoms now. Somehow it never happened. We all were too busy fighting the war and some people said "Well, let's win the war, before we start talking about peace." And that sounded pretty reasonable because there were Liberty Bonds to buy and war material to produce, and rocks in the Atlantic and parades to watch and cheer. And suddenly the war ended sooner than anyone had expected, and there were cries to 'bring the boys home.' We had put off planning the peace until now.

Now Tomorrow was here and we still were too busy. The boys were too busy hunting jobs. So Tomorrow became the day after tomorrow, and then Hitler marched into Poland and we were fighting again.

Rest assured: we'll soon hear the same old stuff: "Let's win the war first, then we can plan the peace." The time to plan is always now. The time to plan for peace is when you are at war. Otherwise peace will never come as peace didn't come in 1918—merely an armistice, revolution, civil war, depression, and then war all over again.

We don't know enough about financial and economic conditions in Britain to judge the details of the Beveridge plan; we'll let the British people judge. But this is certain: Britain needs some plan like that and so does the U.S.A. And we need it now—not tomorrow, when the boys come home to find "no help wanted" signs everywhere. Otherwise we'll have 1918-1939 all over again. Remember.

The Chicago Sun: December 1.

Mme Chiang Kai-Shek surely is no sheltered lady of the Old East. She is a great deal more than an admirable individual. She is a symbol and example of the democratic womanhood of Young China.

Through all Free China innumerable women, young and old, are fighting their country's renaissance. They do so with a spirit of infectious independence.

Meeting Mme Chiang we are greeting the kind of national womanhood that America loves.


We are approaching our second war winter with gasoline and fuel, sugar and coffee rationed, and Tuesday's meatless day and with rationing of other foods. But to talk of any serious shortage would do injustice to the situation. Our ills are still in the land of plenty, we are in the fortunate position of being able to supply our allies from our surplus. It is instructive to recall such obvious facts at a time when there is a general fear that the whole of the country is in a state of economic catastrophe. We live in the four freedoms now. Somehow it never happened. We all were too busy fighting the war and some people said "Well, let's win the war, before we start talking about peace." And that sounded pretty reasonable because there were Liberty Bonds to buy and war material to produce, and rocks in the Atlantic and parades to watch and cheer. And suddenly the war ended sooner than anyone had expected, and there were cries to "bring the boys home." We had put off planning the peace until now.

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The Atlanta Constitution: December 5.

The truly important result of recent developments in the European theater of war is the Axis in that sector has been placed on the defensive in every theater of operations. For the first time since the war began in 1939, Hitler is definitely out of the offensive picture. Unless there is some unexpected and startling change he must fight from now to the end with his back to the wall.

As in the Atlantic and Pacific theaters, the British and the British allies are very much in the position of the Axis and Germany is the country of the axis. Britain's naval power is within sight of the White Domes and Minaretts of Tunis. Allied troops are trying to drive a wedge between this city and Bizerte and the British Navy is striking telling blows to cut off Axis reinforcements by sea. But enemy resistance has increased. We have a difficult problem of sea transport and land communications. But it will be no easier for the Germans to keep their foothold. The great distinction between this and all previous engagements in this war is that our side has changed the battlefield. That the Italians realize not only their own situation but also the unfavorable conditions forced on the Axis by the action in North Africa is underlined by Mussolini's astonishing declaration that it is Japan's intervention which is the "absolute guarantee" of Axis victory. Apparently the Duce has lost faith in the invincibility of Germany. But Japan, he begs his people to believe, is invincible. If Italy has come to the point where she can only hope lies in the faraway Land of the Rising Sun, her prospects must be even more desperate than the world believes.

Mussolini was right yesterday when he said he thought the Italian people wanted to hear from him. After his long silence in the face of unremitting disaster, the victims of his policy must have a right to know. They are in defense of the ruinous course that has left Italy in a worse position than defeated France. Obviously the speech of a sick man, whose health fails him with every thing else in the supreme crisis of his career, it is also the speech of a prisoner at the bar. In an interesting passage he denounces and apologizes for stabbing France in the back on the grounds that nobody expected the French would collapse suddenly and anyway it was only one stab compared to a hundred French has made on Italy. Replying to Churchill's reference to the "once happy" Italian people, he defends himself from blame for their present suffering by asserting that they have never been happy. Mussolini goes as far as he dares to impugn Hitler's military judgment when he asserts that he was not surprised at Russia's military power and he did not fail to recognize the importance of the Allied landing in North Africa. But the most remarkable reflection of the individualism in the dictator is the statement that the absolute guarantee of Axis victory is the invincibility of Japan. Mussolini has had his say and done his duty for the cause of Fascism, and it is now time he paid his debt to Germany.

The Cleveland Plain Dealer: Dec. 3.

Those anguished shrieks heard over the Rome radio today played out like the cry of a Hope Jackal. Benito Mussolini was trying to whip the Italian people into a state of mind to continue their grim and ghastly fight. The best thing to do is get the Italian people confused and back its reception of it as a revolution, though of a strictly British kind—"in the national life; but this is a "time for revolution" not for a minor change in our government. It is evident to those who study its inception, as in its several sweeping recommendations, it represents a serious effort to grapple with the existing social institutions to the great problems which are coming, and to develop a definite blueprint for that future of peace and freedom for which the British public service, by an outstanding Liberal economist with a long background of public service, it enjoys a far more official character than most similar efforts in Britain or in this country.


In his masterly survey of the war last Sunday Winston Churchill poured away at the thesis that "one man and one weapon" was responsible for Italy's present plight. That man, of course, is Mussolini. There must be many high-placed individuals in the dictator's government who are eager and willing to jump on the allied bandwagon now that the war is going badly for the Axis. Before making any deals, however, they would do well to examine their credentials carefully. All the men who have betrayed Italy, and not merely Mussolini alone, must suffer the consequences of their guilt.


On November 15th a spokesman of the German Government, describing Americans as "military dilettantes," predicted that our expeditionary force into North Africa would turn out to be a second Dunkerque within fourteen days. The fourteen days have passed and our troops in North Africa are still moving forward. ... This is the "German line." But many facts, emerging both from Africa and Europe, make it abundantly clear that Hitler and his generals were completely taken by surprise when the new front was opened. One evidence of this is the hesitancy and the floundering of Hitler's policy in France. He seems uncertain whether to make Field Marshal von Rundstedt a complete military dictator of the country, or whether to the contrary to func as an "independent government" is still functioning at Vichy, or whether to oust Vichy with greater and create a new regime in Paris with one of the two traitors, Deat or Dorian, at its head.


The United States has more than doubled its warplane production during the first year of war, and since Pearl Harbour American fliers have shot down five Axis planes for every United States plane lost. The Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce of America reported last night. Reviewing the miracle of aircraft production during past year the Chamber listed this record of achievement: more planes have been produced in one year than were turned out in the industry in all the twenty-three years following the first world war. Production tonnage has increased sixty per cent, the production of engines has jumped 240 per cent in terms of horsepower. The number of women employed in the industry has also more than doubled, the net value of planes sent to various war fronts was $4 billion dollars compared with $1 billion dollars during the last year of peace.
HONOUR TO THE MEN OF TOULON!

NEW YORK

People of America have been deeply stirred by the heroic action of the French sailors at Toulon. America's reaction was summed up by the New York Times:

"When the Fleet went down in the Harbour of Toulon the France that lay buried under the two years of humbling 'collaboration' was resurrected. Of all the deeds of gallantry and heroism and tragic self-sacrifice that have sprung from resistance to Hitler's evil aggression, none will shine in greater glory than that of the men of Toulon. It is a dreadful thing for men of the sea to sink their own ships, that have been the pride of their lives, in order to prevent them from falling into the enemy's hands. But the men of Toulon went far beyond this. Unable in all cases to sink their ships in time by blowing them up they selected six French cruisers each other and went down with the fleet they loved.

In the long annals of war no act of calm, disciplined mass heroism exceeds this.

"In his unparalleled record of evil, Hitler has forced terrible choices on those he has sought to destroy. He ordered the British to fire on the French ships at Oran. He forced Americans to fire on Frenchmen at Morocco and Algiers. He forced Free French to fire on 'collaborationists.'

Yesterday, at last, he forced Frenchmen, united in a single aim to fire on each other. It is for them to help to free their country from servitude.

"These terrible choices were accepted. In the end, every man made the harder decision.

The men of the French Fleet made the most terrible choice of all. But because they did not hesitate to make it Hitler finds himself balked of the prize for which he has intrigued for more than two years. In an attempt to seize the French Fleet by a sudden pounce he has lost it forever.

"But he has lost far more. He has lost the last hope of 'collaboration' on the part of even the stupidest Frenchman. He has demonstrated more flagrantly than ever that he has not the slightest respect for any promises he makes or any treaty he signs. He has shown once again how pointlessly it is for anyone to attempt to deal with him on a basis of honour.

"The military consequences of the sinking of the French ships must be of the first importance, but something much more was accomplished at Toulon than the sinking of more than 60 ships in a day. Not only France but all of conquered Europe must learn of the heroism and grim spirit of the men of Toulon. Their deed will be a flaming symbol. It must inspire France and all of conquered Europe to the task of defiance rather than to Hitler's tyranny beyond any hitherto known. France is once more united. The captives who stood on their bridges as their ships went down have silently told the world that France still the France of Verdun and Orleáns."

STORY OF THE GREAT AFRICAN CONVOY

WASHINGTON

The United Nations' Armada which moved on North Africa was composed of 850 vessels, 350 of them ships of war which protected the expedition. It was the largest amphibious operation in history, and it is difficult for the mind to grasp what it meant to mobilize, load, dispatch and protect so gigantic a mass of shipping.

It is particularly difficult for the minds of the Axis leaders to grasp the point, and their propaganda machine has run into some grave difficulties trying to explain how such a gigantic convoy could be moved right before their eyes, so to speak. They dare not use the simple explanation: that the United Nations have been able to ensure the safety of a convoy of this size in the Atlantic, while at the same time their forces are making a major defeat on the enemy in the Pacific.

It is an Army's job to fight a war on land: it is, and will always be, a Navy's job to get the Army to the fighting front. It is the Air Arm's job to see that the way is clear, or to advise the forces to come of dangers ahead, to play its part in keeping the sea lanes open, and to hold command of the air over the route the convoy is travelling. It is in every sense a combined operation, and in the case of the convoy to Africa the combination worked perfectly.

The 850 ships and an unrevealed number of aeroplanes of the convoy expedition were assembled at widely scattered points, then moved over long stretches of air and submarine-infested ocean to their particular beaches and landing fields along a thousand-mile coast, arriving at the exact moment to launch a co-ordinated attack.

Timed to coincide with their arrival, British and American parachute troops made the longest invasion flight in history—1,500 miles non-stop from England to Africa, flying through the night, unloading to fight the next morning beside their French Allies.

And every piece of equipment sent in that convoy, from big howitzers to radio sets, was ready to go into action the (Continued on page 4.)

LISTENING-IN

NEW YORK

A man left a note in a Brussels saying: "Well, I must go home to listen to the news in English." Almost before he got there the Gestapo arrived.

"Do you listen to the short-wave?" they shouted.

"Every day," said the Belgian.

Then where is your radio?"

"I haven't a radio, they say the walls are thin and I listen to the German officer's next door."
AMERICA REMEMBERS LIDICE

NEW YORK

The bush usual before a big blow that fell over the world's largest studio—8-H in Radio City. An expectant audience of many millions was almost literally held its breath. On stage, the NBC Symphony Orchestra, directed by Dr. Frank Black, tension-ticked its cues. In front, the actors, equally intense, stood before microphones. The hour had on the clock moved slowly around. At precisely 10:30 p.m. the on-the-air signal flashed. And Alexander Woollcott introduced the radio premiere of Edna St. Vincent Millay's epic poem "The Murder of Lidice."

"How did the year turn—how did it run
In the year of nineteen-forty-one?
In a village called Lidice?

First came spring, with planting and sowing;
Then came summer with haying and hoeing;
Then came autumn, and the Harvest Home;
Then came Heydrich the Hangman, the Hun ...

Paul Muni, as narrator, headed the radio broadcast. As the actors read their lines, they unfolded the frightful story of Nazi brutality which last June obliterated the Czecho-Slovakian village of 1,200 souls.

"'Husband, why is your face so gray?"
"My face is gray from fear."
"Revealed the Hangman died today
Of his wounds, the men in Kladno say.
"Good vodice to wicked rubbish,"

No man was he, but a raving beast.
Do they know who killed him?
"Not yet, they say;"
Though they've smoked him out for many a day...
But they claim we hide him here ...

To the Writers' War Board, that distinguished group of authors voluntarily pushing the war effort with words, Miss Millay had created "one of the finest places to come out of the war."

They marched them out to the public square,
Two hundred men in a row;
All in the same step of marching.
Each stone in the road, each man did know ...
The whole world holds in its arms today
The murdered Village of Lidice,
Like the murdered body of a little child ...
And moans of vengeance frightful to hear
From the throat of the world, must reach his ear,
The game killer who still runs wild ...

Farewell, Churn

WASHINGTON

U.S. patent No. 2,299,440 was issued on a new process to make butter out of cream without the laborious process of churning. In a churn, the process uses a boiler and a cream separator. The cream is mixed with water, heated, and whey and solids from the separator or in a specially designed container. The sedentary fat that flows out contains 80 per cent butter fat, which class it as high-grade butter.

THE PLAIN PEOPLE OF EUROPE

By SAMUEL GRAFTON

American Journalist

It is now possible to make a number of plausible predictions as to what will go on in the minds of the plain people of Europe, following recent events.

Germans have been told by Hitler that they are now on the defensive. They will soon begin to feel the full cramps of the constricted defensive posture. The inevitable result of defensive warfare is self-questioning. Germans will ask, as we have asked for two years: "What happened, what went wrong?"

But Germans will not be allowed to ask these questions, nor to answer them, in public.

So, pressures are bound to rise in Germany, and these are bound to be pressures against the German Government. It will be a struggle to hold up the pressures, in part from German industry, seeing its plants knocked down, night after night; in part from the average German, to whom jobs and farms far away can no longer be offered; in part from within the Nazi party, as it wonders what went wrong with the magic.

One remembers the self-questioning, flaring up, to the point of protest after Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 34, stood up and kirk: "Our school system must have gone wrong; I never knew I shouldn't have given opportunity to enough of our people!"

Or, "England as we knew it was not adequate, I should have remade it!"

And our own American debate, so long, so loud, and so useful.

Predictions of the course of popular thinking are the safest of all predictions; they rarely let you down, if they are based on a faith that the people do think, and that the people are not fools. Thus we can say, with absolute certainty, that Germans will think, even if they must hide in closets to do so: "We cannot build enough equipment to defend every beach in Europe forever. Defence will not win the war. It gives all the advantages to the enemy wherever he decides and we must be ready everywhere, simultaneously."

We know the Germans will think these thoughts, because we thought them ourselves. We are good to consider the Germans as faceless people who do not think that merely makes the way needlessly harder.

In a profound sense, we have struck a blow for the liberation of the German common man. We have new bases, and they have new questions and answers, and these are the beginning of wisdom. If the history of popular action has any meaning, the period of obedience in Germany is drawing to its end.

Vahalla is shut down for repairs, and from now on history is going to take place for the Germans in their own streets and houses.

Significant change of some kind is also certain to take place in the relationship between the ordinary people of Germany and the ordinary citizens of the conquered countries. My crystal ball isn't very clear on it, but, with Europe ringed, for Germans to keep thumping these people will be empty victory in a jailyard brawl during exercise hour.

It will lose meaning and savour. The conquered people are stronger, because of what we have recently done. France fights again, from Africa, as Reynaud proposed two years ago. The Frenchman in France is, curiously, a freer man than the disaffected German in Germany; he will press his buttons, and not be afraid of things becoming bad enough, some Germans remember that Hitler never had a chance, and make the world know that Frenchmen, oddly enough, as fighters in their own fight.

If we can, we can; we will never yield to the Hitler theory that all Germans are behind him; this, the most fantastic item in his propaganda, has been the most successful. If we can, we will never yield to the Nazi theory that all Frenchmen are behind him; this, the most fantastic item in his propaganda, has been the most successful.

If we recover our faith in people, any people, just long enough to recognise that this is the one thing Hitler says which can't possibly be true, all sorts of interesting doors swing open. The French slave then becomes the German liberator, a thought which will startle you in precise proportion to your disbelief that the world makes sense.

NO PEACE FOR HITLER

WASHINGTON

Senator Tom Connally, Chairman of the Senate of the Foreign Relations Committee, has made the following statement:

"Hitler has now but one aim—to prolong the war."

"Defeated in Egypt, driven back in Russia, on the defensive in North Africa and every other theatre of war, Hitler knows he cannot win. None of his successes, so-called, have been carried through to complete victory. His all-out bombing of Britain only cost him the flower of the Luftwaffe. His desperate efforts to break down the Russian people ended in bloody disaster before Leningrad, Moscow and Stalingrad.

"Hitler's dreams of conquering the Suez and Middle East has been shattered, along with the reputation of Rommel. His vaunted submarines did not prevent an armada of 850 vessels from stealing to Africa and landing a huge Allied army.

"His Japanese allies are held in check and being driven back. His Italian allies are a heavy liability.

"Hitler must find his next move as the initiative passed to the United Nations. He is exerting his efforts to the task of holding up the day of their inevitable triumph.

"Hitler is becoming desperate because he knows he cannot win. He knows his armies must begin to retreat, will Europe—including his own allies, his own people—will rise against him. He knows now that the day of retribution will be when all his private armies and private fortresses will not be strong enough to save him.

"We believe he has his last chance—a stalemate and a negotiated peace. He believes he may win this by prolonging the war and thus retaining power for himself and the Nazis."

But the world has learned that there can be no compromise with Hitler or his allies. The United Nations are in the war to the finish, and war means to finish it speedily and victoriously."

U.S. to India—Sixty Hours

NEW YORK

General Bissell, commanding officer of the 10th U.S. Army Air Forces, reported from India that 'planes are being flown to India from the U.S. in 98 hours. The average flying time of the bomber was 60 hours 12 minutes, he said.
RUBBER SCRAP MAKES MILLION TYRES MONTHLY

AKRON, Ohio

More than 1,000,000 tons of reclaimed rubber are expected to be available from 1945 purchases. This will be calculated from allotments of the 466,000 tons of scrap rubber collected in recent months, it was announced, that scrap has been accumulated to keep existing plants working at capacity for the next eighteen months.

Scrap rubber contributions from the public have far exceeded forecasts made earlier in the year, and that total may rise materially before the end of 1942. Surveys sponsored by factories here indicate that the remaining scrap throughout the nation is still of huge proportions.

While purchase of tires will be under the jurisdiction of local rationing boards, estimates here indicate that the cars of war workers and others in essential industry—including at least 20,000,000 passenger cars and other carrier units—will be kept rolling.

Although the reclaimed tires are supposed to have 10,000 miles of service each, this cannot be obtained unless there is a strict adherence to these rules. Drive only when the weather is dry, one cannot exceed the tire in ten miles an hour, maintain a proper degree of inflation and have regular inspection. Making tires last longest is considered a safety as well as an economy. In the past, Brenda thirty-five miles an hour there were perils which grew with every mile.

Orders are being called for increases in the expansion of synthetic rubber manufacturing units. This has been emphasized by General Miller, President of the B. F. Goodrich Company.

Since the January authorization of a total of 900,000 tons of synthetic rubber for the next ten years, 705,000 tons of synthetic rubber of the butadiene type, 40,000 tons of butyl rubber and 40,000 tons of neoprene, a total of approximately 900,000 tons, has been assigned to the United Kingdom and Russia. Canada has been producing as much as 50,000 tons a year.

"Fortunately, thanks to the foresightedness of our Government we had, when our Eastern plantations were captured, 600,000 tons of rubber. This rubber and that contained in finished products and our stock piles of scrap and rubber must bridge the gap until synthetic rubber becomes adequate for essential needs."

STEEL OUTPUT SETS NEW RECORD

PITTSBURGH

The steel industry has shattered all records for output by nearly 200,000 tons, reaching 7,584,864 net tons of ingots and steel for castings, at 100.1 per cent. of its rated capacity, which the Steel Industry started for the period, and within the 11,200,000 tons of the best previous monthly production, which was 828,964,946 net tons of steel in 1919. The month output was 4,600,000 tons greater than output in the whole of 1940, which was the next best year in steel production.

MEXICO ALSO FAVORS ITALIANS

WASHINGTON

Following the lead of the United States, the Mexican Government has decided that 4,552 Italian nationals residing in Mexico will no longer be considered enemy aliens.

The Mexican Government's move is dictated by the facts that 10,000 Italian nationals in Mexico have proved to be loyal residents, and that Mexicans in Italy have not been molested or subjected to harmful treatment. It was said in secret police circles that no more than three Italians have been arrested in Mexico since this country entered the war. Police circles emphasized that the Italians had not participated in a single case of espionage or attempted sabotage, whereas Germans and Japanese had been very active. For instance, recently, while the writer was in police headquarters, two Jewish operators were searched and renewal of suspicion of fifth column activities.

The Italians in Mexico, mostly old laborers and farmers, have been quietly continuing their work whenever police restrictions permit. Under the laws regulating the activities of aliens, a certain number of Italians have been concentrated in the Mexican district, together with Japanese and Germans, and they are forbidden to reside in coastal areas or other industrial centers.

In addition to 4,552 Italians registered in the 1940 census, there are in Mexico another 10,000 or so other naturalized or Mexican nationals of Italian origin. The Italians are the smallest group of Axis nationals in this country, there being 5,882 Germans and 5,142 Japanese, according to the 1940 census. Of course, some of these aliens are left with their embassies when Mexico severed relations with the Axis.

ANOTHER HOLE PLUGGED

WASHINGTON

A spokesman for the Board of Economic Warfare said that United Nations' shipyard at Daker plugged the largest single hole in the blockade of Axis-occupied Europe from which Germany received important war supplies. The great port on the Atlantic coast is a source of necessary materials for manufacturing ships, tanks, trucks, planes, and other uses for manufacture of raw materials, metals, and ships and other equipment for the war effort.

The Board of Economic Warfare pointed out that blockade-runners may attempt to take out supplies, but ships small enough to use this route have difficulty in eluding Allied sea and air patrols, now based on the airfields of French West Africa.

NEW PLASTIC

WILMINGTON, Del.

Hercules Powder chemists have developed a new rubber-like plastic from cotton and alcohol. Cellulose is the base. Raw materials are cotton linters or wood pulp, common salt, and alcohol from natural gas or from amyl nitrites. Several types of plastic can be produced. The plastic can be used instead of rubber in hospital sheets, gas masks, surgical tape, rubber gloves, electrically conductive materials, and wire insulations.
CARRIGAN HEADS THE RIGHT WAY

LOS ANGELES

Ireland will remember the sight of young pilots and airmen in their leather jacket who set a rickety plane down in a farmer’s field near Dublin four years ago. "How far is it to ‘Frisco?" He had set out from a New York airport, he said, with clearance from aviation officials, to fly west to San Francisco. Instead, he flew 3,000 miles east, across the Atlantic and landed in Ireland. With good Irish humor, he pretended he didn’t know what he had done wrong, so he stayed right where he was doing now, and he’s heading the right way—across America and across the Atlantic—on the training fields and the fighting fronts.

Certainly Ireland remembers Douglas Corrigan, the modest young pilot, who gave the world such a laugh that he was called "Wrong Way Corrigan" for years after.

The big-time reception which America eagerly gave ocean-flying aviators upon their return home was denied Corrigan. For one thing, it took him some time to get his plane ready for shipment. For another, Howard Hughes, now a film financier, had monopolized the headlines for a day or two at the time of Corrigan’s return, by flying around the world in 28 days. So no telephone books were torn up to shower down on Corrigan as he rode up the canyon with his homecoming. He did not ride. He landed unnoticed except by a few who had driven from the_ulonged, and was whisked away by friends.

But the moving pictures had their eye on him; he took no notice in no financial position to refuse. He acted in a movie. It was so bad it was funny. So he abandoned the career and showed up out of public view. There was talk that he ran a roadside stand on a Texas highway, bought with the money he made from the lone film.

On the first anniversary of his "wrong way" flight to Ireland, Corrigan married a Texas schoolteacher, Miss Elizabeth Maffei—a modest lady who would have no photographers at her wedding.

When the United States entered the war, Corrigan moved west, where many of America’s aircraft are built, and it was said he was working in one of the factory factories. (A fellow who could catch up an old crate and make it fly, Corrigan would probably be a handy worker in a plant.)

But that wasn’t enough for Corrigan. He wanted to pilot ships, to see them on their way to the world’s battlefronts. He applied to the Ferry Command, which uses civilians—flying men for ferrying planes from factory to field, from field to battlefront.

He was accepted, trained, and now proudly wears the emblem of the U.S. Ferry Command over his heart.

The Generals Report

NEW YORK


They summed it up, "Meine Herren, we've taken everything but victory!"

Published by the Office of War Information of the United States of America at 15 Merrion Square Dublin.

AFRICAN CONVOY

(Continued from page 1.)

moment it landed. Supplies were so packed that they could be unloaded anywhere in definite priority. It meant months of night-and-day work in arms depots and railway stations all over Britain, with thousands of persons involved who had no idea of what was going on. The entire operation was probably the best-kept secret invasion mission ever made.

That is the story behind the expedition—when the great Armada moved southward to the attack, it was too late for the enemy to do anything about it. The umbrella of the air forces, the screen of the destroyers, were too effective. One or two ineffectual shots were fired—and the greatest military movement in history was a success.

Control of the seas—that is the simple answer to the question of how it was done. It must be remembered that the United Nations had not only to see this great convoy safely through the Atlantic; they had also to ensure the success of our forces in the far-off Pacific, where a powerful enemy is also to be faced. The miserable failure of the Japanese expedition against the Solomons shows what can happen to a convoy without control of the seas.

Representative Carl Vinson of Georgia, Chairman of the Naval Committee of the House of Representatives, points out how the United Nations are achieving—and holding—control of the seas. He says:

"The instruments of war known to be effective in dealing with submarines—aeroplanes, dirigibles and specialised boats—are now becoming available in large quantities."

Rear-Admiral Emery S. Land, War Shipping Administrator, tells another part of the story: "Eight million tons of ships in 1942 and 16 million tons of ships in 1943—the goals set by President Roosevelt—will be delivered on schedule. Ships are being built faster than they are being sunk."

Admiral Leahy, personal Chief of Staff to President Roosevelt, carries it on: "We are now building aircraft carriers and submarines in 17 months, twice as fast as we did before the war; we are building battleships in three years instead of five. We are starting to build destroyers at the rate of two a month, completing them in six months."

RERGRACED Unclassified
AN HISTORIC DOCUMENT: FULL STATEMENT
OF AMERICAN HIERARCHY ON U.S. WAR AIMS

In response to many requests, LETTER FROM AMERICA includes in this issue the full text of the statement on victory and peace issued by the American hierarchy of archbishops and bishops of the Roman Catholic Church. The document is the first general statement issued by the Church in the United States on its position in the war. It was considered and approved by 102 members of the American hierarchy at their annual general meeting in Washington in November, and is signed by the following archbishops and bishops: Edward Mooney, Archbishop of Detroit; John T. McNicholas, Archbishop of Cincinnati; Samuel A. Stritch, Archbishop of Chicago; John J. Mitty, Archbishop of San Francisco; Joseph F. Rummel, Archbishop of New Orleans; Francis J. Spellman, Archbishop of New York; John Mark Granjon, Bishop of Brie; John P. Lalli, Bishop of Fort Wayne; Karl J. Alter, Bishop of Toledo; John A. Duffy, Bishop of Buffalo. The complete text of the statement:

Our country has been forced into the most devastating trial of all time. This war, which is the absorbing interest of all the world, involves unquestionably the most important moral issue of today. Some nations are united in waging war to bring about a slave world—a world that would deprive man of his divinely conferred dignity, reject human freedom and permit no religious liberty. We are associated with other peoples in a deadly conflict against these nations to maintain a free world. This conflict of principles makes compromise impossible.

While war is the last means to which a nation resorts, circumstances arise when it is impossible to avoid it. At times it is the positive duty of a nation to wage war in the defense of life and right. Our country now finds itself in such circumstances.

SOLEMN ASSURANCE

Even while we meet here, the exigencies of war have driven our armed forces into unexpected areas of conflict in Africa. Our President in letters addressed to the rulers of all the friendly nations concerned, has given national assurance that the United States has no designs of permanent conquest or sordid interest. Our aim, he pledged, is to guarantee to countries under temporary occupation as well as to our own the right to live in security and peace. We bishops are confident that the pledges of our Chief Executive, not lightly made, faithfully mirrored the mind and conscience of the American people. That pledge is in full harmony with the expression of high purpose which the President made to Catholic bishops of the United States when our own country was plunged into war: "We shall win this war for victory we shall seek not vengeance but the establishment of an international order in which the spirit of Christ shall rule the hearts of men and of nations."

From the moment that our country declared war we have called upon our people to make the sacrifices which, in Catholic doctrine, the virtues of patriotism, justice and charity impose. In every section of this nation the voices of our bishops have been heard. Their instructions, their pastoral letters, their counsels, their appeals for prayers are an encouragement and an inspiration to their flocks. Our priests as chaplains on the war front have inspired confidence in the men whom they so zealously serve. Our men in the armed forces deserve unostentatious gratitude for their heroic services to our country and high commendation for the faithful practice of their religion.

AN ENDURING PEACE

In every diocese prayers have been incessantly offered, asking God's pardon for the sins of individuals and nations, begging divine mercy for all, pleading for a victory which will have the sanction of infinite justice and for an enduring peace founded on the love of God and the love of all men. Priests and people have earnestly prayed that the Holy Spirit may guide our President and all who share with him the heavy responsibilities of directing the war efforts and of winning the victory from which all peoples will derive a just and lasting peace.

In the discharge of our pastoral responsibility, we are gravely concerned about the world peace of tomorrow.

Secularism cannot write a real and lasting peace. Its narrow vision does not encompass the whole man, it cannot evaluate the spirituality of the human soul and the supreme good of all mankind.

Exploitation cannot write a real and lasting peace. Where greed might and selfish expediency are made the substitutes of justice there can be no securely ordered world.

Totalitarianism, whether Nazi, Communist or Fascist, cannot write a real and lasting peace. The State that usurps total power, by that very fact, becomes a despot to its own people and a menace to the family of nations.

DIGNITY OF HUMAN PERSONALITY

The spirit of Christianity can write a real and lasting peace in justice and charity to all nations, even to those not Christian.

In the epochal revolution through which the world is passing, it is very necessary for us to realize that every man is our brother in Christ. All should be convinced that every man is endowed with the dignity of human personality, and that he is entitled by the laws of nature to the things necessary to sustain life in a way conformable to human dignity. In the post-war world, the profit element of industry and commerce must be made subordinated to the common good of communities and nations if we are to have a lasting peace with justice and a sense of true brotherhood for all our neighbors. The inequalities of nations and of individuals can never give to governments or to the leaders of industry or commerce a right to be unjust. They cannot, if they follow the fixed principles of morality, maintain or encourage con-
MUST WAGE GLOBAL WAR

Unfortunately, in our day we must wage a global war to secure peace. War is abnormal and necessarily brings on abnormal conditions in the life of a nation.

During the war crisis free men must surrender many of their liberties. We ask our people to be united and prepared to make every sacrifice which our Government deems necessary for a just and enduring peace through the victory of our armed forces. We are confident that they will perform their war-time duties gladly because they know that our country has been the defender, not the destroyer, of liberties and has in the past always re-established the full measure of freedom on the conclusion of hostilities.

Our Government has announced that the war emergency makes it necessary to employ an increasing number of industrial workers. While we are wholeheartedly co-operating with our Government in the prosecution of the war, we must, as shepherds of souls, express our grave concern about the Christian home in our beloved country in these crucial days. While we deplore the serious child-care problem necessitated by this war emergency, the employments of mothers in industry, particularly young mothers. Due provision in keeping with American traditions should be made for the day-care of the children of working mothers.

RÔLE WOMEN MUST PLAY

The health and moral welfare of mothers employed in industry should be thoroughly safeguarded. With a full realization of the role which women must play in winning the war and of the extreme measures that our Government must take, we ask that all try to minimize the damage involved, especially the moral dangers. We urge that there be a wholesome moral atmosphere wherever women are employed.

We know that patriotic mothers are generous in giving their sons to the defense of our country. We express their concern, and ours, about youths of eighteen years of age who are now to be called to the armed forces. We hope that special moral safeguards will shield them, so that they may serve their country without moral blemish.

We express our deepest sympathy to our brother bishops in all countries of the world where religion is persecuted, liberty abolished and the rights of God and man are violated. Since the murderous assault in Poland, utterly devoid of every semblance of humanity, there has been a premeditated and systematic extermination of the people of that country. This policy of extermination is being applied to many other peoples. We feel a deep sense of revulsion against the charge heaped upon the Jews in conquered countries and upon defenseless peoples not of our faith. We join with our brother bishops in subjugated France in a statement attributed to them: "Deeply moved by the mass arrests and maltreatment of Jews, we cannot stifle the cry of our conscience. In the name of humanity and Christian principles, our voice is raised in favor of the inalienable rights of human nature." We raise our voice in protest against despotic tyrants who have lost all sense of humanity by condemning thousands of innocent persons to death in subjugated countries as acts of reprisal; by placing other thousands of innocent victims in concentration camps, and by permitting unnumbered persons to die of starvation.

BENEFITS OF FREE INSTITUTIONS

The war has brought to the fore conditions that have long been with us. The full benefits of our free institutions and the rights of our minorities must be openly acknowledged and honestly respected. We ask this acknowledgment and respect particularly for our colored fellow citizens. They should have equal opportunity of economic opportunities and advantages which will enable them to realize their hope and ambition to join with us in preserving and expanding in changed and changing social conditions our national heritage. We fully appreciate their many native gifts and aptitudes which, enriched and emboldened by a true Christian life, will make them a powerful influence in the establishment of a Christian social order. We recall the words of Pope Pius XII expressing his paternal solicitude for the colored people of our country. In a letter addressed to the American bishops on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of the establishment of the American hierarchy, His Holiness said: "We confess that we feel a special paternal affection which is certainly inspired of heaven for the Negro people dwelling among you: for in the field of religion and education we know that they need special care and comfort and are very deserving of it. We, therefore, invoke an abundance of heavenly blessing and we pray fruitful success for those whose generous zeal is devoted to their welfare." (Sermon Laetantia—1939.)

GREETINGS TO BROTHER BISHOPS

We send our cordial greetings to our brother bishops of Latin America. We have been consoled by recent events which give a sincere promise of a better understanding by our country of the peoples of Mexico, Central and South America. Citizens of these countries are bound to us by the same bonds of religion. They are not merely our neighbors. They are our brothers professing the same faith. Every effort should be made to keep them of their Catholic religion or to ridicule it or to offer them a substitute for it is deeply resented by the people of these countries and by American Catholics. These efforts prove to be a disturbing factor in our international relations. The traditions, the spirit, the background, the culture of these countries are Catholic. We bishops are anxious to foster every worthy movement which will strengthen our amicable relations with the republics of this continent. We express the hope that the mistakes of the past which were offensive to the dignity of our southern brothers, their culture and their religion, will not continue. A strong bond uniting all the countries of the Western Hemisphere will exert a most potent influence on a shattered post-war world.

PEACE PLANS OF POPE PIUS XII

We commend the serious study of the peace plans of Pope Pius XII which insist that justice be inspired by love—first, love of God and, then, love of every human being.

"The command of love among individuals found in the Gospel," said Benedict XV, "differs in no respect from that which should reign among states and peoples." (Pacem in terris, Benedict XV, 1930.) If we are not to have a Christian peace, then we shall be given only an armistice and we shall be unable to prepare for a third world conflict.

We conclude by urging, again, unceasing prayers: the prayer of all prayers by priests, the holy Mass; prayers addressed to the Blessed Virgin that she will intercede with her Divine Son for mercy on a war-darkened world. We ask that Tuesday, December eighth, the Feast of the Immaculate Conception of Our Blessed Mother, the Patroness of our country, be set aside as a special day of prayerful supplication. In its observance, the prayers and faithful observance of every diocese will follow the timely instruction of their bishop; we recommend the recitation of the rosary in common, both in our churches and in our homes.

We trust that the children of our country will, in response to the many appeals of our Holy Father, offer their innocent prayers to God for peace. Let us all unite in praying for a victory and for a peace acceptable to God.

Signed by the members of the administrative board, National Catholic Welfare Conference, in the name of the bishops of the United States:

EDWARD MOONEY, Archbishop of Detroit.

JOHN T. MCNICHOLAS, Archbishop of Cincinnati.

SAMUEL A. STRITCH, Archbishop of Chicago.

JOHN J. MITTY, Archbishop of San Francisco.

JOSEPH F. RUMMEL, Archbishop of New Orleans.


JOHN MARK GANNON, Bishop of Erie.

JOHN F. NOLL, Bishop of Fort Wayne.

KARL J. ALTER, Bishop of Toledo.

JOHN A. DUFFY, Bishop of Buffalo.
MOROCCO
The Resident General

To: His Excellency Monsieur Roosevelt,
    President of the United States of America,
    Washington.

Mr. President,

After having asked Major General Patton to forward to you the reply of His Majesty Sidi Mohammed to the message which your Excellency was good enough to send him through me, I wish today to reply myself to the communication which I received from you.

In your letter you stated the great interest and sympathy with which you had followed the efforts of the representative of France in Morocco to avoid a German-Italian occupation of this country. I wish to thank you from the bottom of my heart for this proof of friendly understanding by which I was deeply touched.

Since the tragic events of June 1940, I have indeed had in mind only one line of conduct, and only one preoccupation, which was to oppose myself absolutely to the occupation of bases in Morocco by the Axis Forces. The results of such an occupation would have been of grave consequences in relation to the eventual development of the war. Governor General Boisson and I have always been in agreement to avoid all German domination. This firm determination on our part allowed the Marshal, who, since the Armistice promised to defend the French territories in Africa against all, to resist constant and menacing pressure.

This promise has been maintained through painful and sad circumstances. Our Army fought through a sense of duty and contrarily to their personal sentiments, knowing that they had in front of them the soldiers of a great friendly people who had been their companions in arms in the battle of France 25 years ago.

Our troops carried out the oath they had given. Frenchmen and Moroccans remained fraternal in the struggle as they had in former ones, and also as they had in happier days. It was possible, thank to God, to stop the fighting quickly.

Today, we all feel free to express the deep sentiments of friendship which we have always felt both to your generous American Nation and to its President. There only remains from yesterday's
hostilities a reciprocal esteem and desire in the hearts of all the combatants to unite their courage and their blood on common battlefield and the will to cooperate to the full extent of their power in the final work of liberation.

Since the 15th November our soldiers are fighting side by side with the soldiers of the Great American Republic and of their Allies to liberate France, to blot out that power which is oppressing Europe, and to arrive at our ideal of common justice and peace. They have only one desire, and that is that they should be given as quickly as possible the equipment which will increase by tenfold their offensive power and to earn themselves with a high faith in the tremendous battle on the outcome of which depends the fate of their country and the future of the world.

Long live the United States of America.
Long live France.

I beg you to believe me, Mr. President,
Most respectfully yours,

(signed) Nogues.

To: His Excellency Monsieur Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
Washington.
MAROC

LE COMMISSAIRE RÉSIDENT GÉNÉRAL

Rabat, le 27 novembre 1942

Monsieur le Président,

Après avoir demandé au Major Général PATTON de vous faire parvenir la réponse de Sa Majesté Sidi Mohammed aux messages que Votre Excellence avait bien voulu lui faire tenir par mon intermédiaire, je tiens, aujourd'hui, à répondre moi-même à la communication que Votre Excellence avait bien voulu m'adresser.

Dans sa lettre, Votre Excellence me marquait l'intérêt et la sympathie avec lesquels Elle avait suivi les efforts déployés par le Représentant de la France au Maroc pour éviter à ce pays une occupation germano-italienne. Je La remercie du fond du cœur de ce témoignage d'amicale compréhension auquel j'ai été particulièrement sensible.

Depuis les tragiques événements de juin 1940, je n'ai pas eu, en effet, d'autre ligne de conduite, d'autre préoccupation que de m'opposer, de façon absolue, à l'occupation par les forces de l'Axe de bases au Maroc, occupation qui eût été lourde de conséquences pour le

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WASHINGTON
développement ultérieur de la guerre. Nous avons, le Gouverneur Général Boisson et moi-même, toujours été solidaires dans cette volonté d'écarte toute emprise allemande. Cette position irréductible a permis au Maréchal qui, dès l'armistice, s'était engagé à défendre contre quiconque les territoires français en Afrique, de résister à des pressions menaçantes sans cesse renouvelées.

L'engagement pris a été tenu dans des circonstances pénibles et douloureuses. Notre armée s'est battue, par devoir, contre ses sentiments intimes, en sachant qu'elle avait en face d'elle les soldats d'un grand peuple ami, ses compagnons d'armes d'il y a vingt cinq ans dans la bataille de France.

Nos troupes ont fait honneur à la parole donnée. Français et Marocains sont restés fraternellement unis dans cette épreuve, comme ils l'avaient été dans les précédentes, comme ils l'avaient été dans les jours heureux. La lutte, grâce à Dieu, a pu être arrêtée rapidement.

Tous se sentent aujourd'hui libres d'exprimer les profonds sentiments d'amitié qu'ils n'ont jamais cessé d'éprouver envers la généreuse Nation Américaine comme envers son Chef. Il ne reste des combats d'hier qu'une estime réciproque, le désir chez tous les combattants de mêler à nouveau leur courage et leur sang sur les communs champs de bataille et la volonté de coopérer dans toute la mesure de leurs forces à l'oeuvre de la libération définitive.
Depuis le 13 novembre, nos soldats combattent aux côtés des soldats de la grande République Américaine et de leurs alliés pour libérer la France, faire disparaître cette hégémonie qui opprime l'Europe et réaliser notre idéal commun de justice et de paix. Ils n'ont d'autre désir que de voir mettre à leur disposition, le plus vite possible, un matériel qui découplera leur force offensive et leur permettra de se jeter avec une foi ardue dans l'immense bataille dont dépend le sort de leur pays et l'avenir du monde.

Vivent les États-Unis d'Amérique.
Vive la France.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Président, les assurances de ma considération la plus haute et de mes sentiments de profonde et amicale confiance.

[Signature]
Son Excellence Monsieur ROOSEVELT
Président des États-Unis d'Amérique

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